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Newport, R.I.

MILITARY POLICE
A Multipurpose Force
for
Today and Tomorrow

By:
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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Operations Department.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ALB: AirLand Battle doctrine
ALO: AirLand Operation doctrine
BCC: Battlefield Circulation Control
CINC: commander and chief (of unified or specified command)
C³I: command, control, communications, and intelligence
CONUS: Continental United States
CS: Combat Support
CSS: Combat Service Support
EPW: enemy prisoner of war
FORSCOM: U.S. Army Forces Command
HHC: Headquarters, Headquarters Company
HHD: Headquarters, Headquarters Detachment
IPB: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
JCS: Joint Chief of Staff
JSTARS: Joint Strategic Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance System
LIC: Low Intensity Conflict
METT-T: mission, enemy, troops, terrain, and time
MOADS: Maneuver Oriented Ammunition Distribution System
MP: Military Police
MSR: main supply route
NBC: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
NCA: National Command Authority
OCNUS: Outside the Continental United States
RISTA: Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition
ROE: rules of engagement
TAA: Total Army Analysis
TCP: traffic control points
TOC: tactical operation center
TOE: table of organization and equipment
USAMPS: United States Army Military Police School

THESIS

The early 1990's started with the victory of the United States and its allies in the Gulf War and the ending of the COLD War era. The last decade of the 20th century will now be one of unprecedented challenge for the Department of Defense as it reorganizes to meet the dramatic transfiguration of the world political scene and the growing imperatives of the economic constraints within the United States. To meet this challenge the United States can no longer afford mission/functional duplications among the services. This has accelerated a drive towards jointness and interoperability throughout the Services. Therefore, I will address the contributions of the United States Army's Military Police combat support units to the United States National Strategic objectives. This will be presented in the context of their utilization in the 80's and early 90's, their role as a CINC's preferred force for peacetime and certain low intensity conflict missions, and finally I will focus on the future base force role of the Military Police in AirLand Operations.

DISCUSSION

Military Police units have been performing a wide variety of combat, combat support, and combat service support operations. As a branch, since 26 September 1941, it is well integrated into conventional battlefield operations. In the late 1980's this branch became orientated towards contingency operations as a result of the United States reemergence as a Super Power increasingly willing to police world affairs. The result was an increase in troop deployments in support of contingency missions throughout the world. The majority of these missions centered around humanitarian assistance and force protection.

Doctrinally the Military Police Corps has oriented itself towards contingency operations, a mission that it is well suited to support. Based on the current National Security Strategy of the United States, August 1991 and the National Military Strategy for the 1990's, the corps orientation is on target for the Force requirements of the 90's. Given the new reality, that the likelihood of a global war

is remote and the shift in focus is now to regional contingencies operations, the units of the future must be multipurpose and joint oriented¹.

Department of Defense Force Packages

The Total Force Policy used during the Cold War era has been replaced with the Base Force concept. Under the Total Force concept the military heavily relied on its three components (the Active, National Guard, and Reserve) to fight and win. To insure national support the majority of the force structure was found in the Reserve and National Guard. This equates to 63% of the MP TOE force structure in the Reserve and National Guard.² The type of MP units found in the Reserve and National Guard are: MP Brigade and Battalion headquarters level units, MP prisoner-of-war units, MP confinement units, MP security companies, MP Division Companies, and MP combat support units. On the active duty side the military police have Brigade and Battalion level Headquarters, MP Combat Support Companies, MP Physical Security Companies and MP Division Companies. As implied by its name the Total Force concept takes all three components of MP units to get the job done in a major operation.

The rules have just changed with the introduction of the Base Force concept. The Base Force is the minimum force required to meet our enduring defense needs and accomplish the national military strategy. It is organized into four conceptual force packages - Strategic, Atlantic, Pacific, and Contingency Forces. Backed up by four supporting capabilities --Transportation, Space, Reconstitution, and Research and Development.³ The Military Police Corps Brigade HHC, Battalion HHDs, and the MP combat support companies will find themselves tailor made for the conceptual Force Packages. The multipurpose role that military police units are capable of contributing is uniquely suited to the new National Military Strategy of the 1990's. In the Atlantic and Pacific base forces the Military Police will continue to be an integral element of the force structure for deployed U.S. Army Corps and Divisions. As in the past they will continue to have the peacetime assistance and force

¹National Military Strategy for the 1990's (Draft), Washington, D.C., 10 Aug 91 8:27 AM

²Major David Perkins of ODCSOPS, HQDA, Washington D.C., by author, 6 February 1992, Newport, R.I. Telephonic Interview

³National Military Strategy for the 1990's (Draft), Washington, D.C., 10 Aug 91 8:27 AM, pg 12

protection missions and at the same time will be required to train and prepare for wartime contingency missions. The FORSCOM military police combat support units are well suited for the Contingency Forces.

The Contingency Forces element of the base force package will use a force selection criteria to identify the right mix of units for the mission. The Military Police Corps Battalion HHDs and MP combat support companies can operate at all levels of the operational continuum and are well suited for many of the missions because of its unique makeup. As a force they are quickly deployable, highly mobile, lethal, well trained (individually and collectively) in a wide variety of missions (e.g. police functions, enemy prisoner of war operations, civic relations, combat related skills, etc.), and have the capability of operating in a large operational area. To fully understand these capabilities the critical equipment densities of an MP combat support company (TOE 19477L, 12/18/91) and an infantry rifle airborne company (TOE 07037L, 12/18/91) have been compare at Figure 1. This might be seen as comparing apples and oranges; however, that is exactly what the leadership must do when considering the right force for the job. Additionally, there are two key aspects to the MP force: first, they are trained in, understand, and routinely use peacetime rules of engagement; second, they project a more politically acceptable force presence. The military police units are many things to many people, but most of all it represents a less threatening signature to the world at large. While it is a lethal force it is capable of avoiding collateral damage and it is not identified as a combat element by many countries.

When comparing military police assets of the other services there is no combat support equivalent. The primary missions of the Air Force Security Police are centered around an air base. As a branch they are divided into two functional areas; law enforcement and base security. In their law enforcement role they perform duties equivalent to a civilian police department. Only in their base security role do they perform limited combat support operations. Their focus has been air base ground defense; the security of special weapons and air frames. As a contingency force they have an air base focus only and doctrinally must be augmented by Army assets to secure a base. They are primarily designed to







Figure 1

operate in an air base environment with the appropriate support elements.¹ The Navy and Marines do not have a dedicated combat support military police equivalent branch. The Marines detail personnel into security duties who are normally infantrymen (e.g. embassy duty, guarding nuclear facilities, etc.). The Navy details both Navy and Marine personnel to perform security duties of their ships and ports. They rely heavily on host nation support agreements, civilian guards and military augmentation to secure their facilities during peacetime. In a combat area the Army is tasked to perform port security operations. Again, the Navy and Marines do not have a dedicated combat support unit assigned to perform combat support police functions and rely on the infantry assets within the Marine Corps.

Force Selection Model

The United States Army Military Police School (USAMPS), under the direction of General Hines, developed a Force Selection Model which looks at the suitability of the force selected to meet the requirements of contingency operations. The key word is suitability, which is defined by USAMPS as the measure of a units capability against a known threat and its political acceptability. In recent years a forces signature has been known to change the type of force selected. An example often cited by the Navy is the political unacceptability of using grey hulled Navy ships off the coast of South America for drug operations. The Coast Guard white hull ships were more politically suitable for the mission without degrading the operations. The importance of political acceptability in both the domestic and international levels is becoming more of a concern to the CINCs, JCS and NCA.

In the Army there are various types of units whose organization, training, mobility, and lethality make them capable of performing many contingency missions based on METT-T (Mission, Enemy, Troops, Terrain, and Time). However, their political acceptability may take them out of the contention as a suitable force to deploy. The term METT-T-P is entering the

¹Robert E. Pike, LTC: Alternative Futures: United States Air Force Security Police in the Twenty-First Century: Air University, United States Air Force Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: 1988

FORCE SELECTION MODEL




FIGURE 2

lexicon with the P indicating the significance of the political element in the force selection process.¹

¹ METT-T-P was extracted from a USAMPS briefing script on Force Selection Model January 1991

As a result we now see forces being tailored from all service components to meet a specific contingency operations. The broad principles for force-tailoring in behalf of military actions falling anywhere on the operational continuum are depicted schematically in the accompanying diagram (FIGURE 2¹). The diagram highlights the mission and appropriate occasions for employment of military police in comparison with those of the traditional combat arms. Unique capabilities of the military police, coupled with their domestic and international acceptability as a security force, frequently make them the most appropriate force for contingencies occurring at the lower end of the operational continuum. Conversely, as the lethality of a situation intensifies and combat operations become more certain, the suitability of military police declines while that of the combat arms rises.²

Historical Review of Military Police Deployments in the 80's & 90's

The United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) has been providing military police support for various contingency missions throughout the world (see Figure 3³). The relevance of this force selection model can be seen by reviewing the recent utilization of military police units. Here are some of the deployments by mission category:

Force Protection Missions

Assistance & Protection

In this area, military police are currently deployed to Cuba in support of the Haitian relief effort (Operation Guantanamo 1991-1992). The military police units were selected over combat arms units because of their training in riot control and their ability to handle civilians with restraint (peacetime ROE application). All reports indicate that the military police have already

¹Charles A. Hines, "Military Police in Contingency Operations: Often the Force of Choice", PARAMETERS, U.S. War College Quarterly, September 1990, pg 13

²Ibid, pg 12 - 13

³USAMPS, Force Selection Model Briefing, Ft. McClellan, AL, Jan 91

HISTORICAL REVIEW OF MILITARY POLICE DEPLOYMENTS IN THE 80s & 90s




Figure 3

proven their worth by maintaining law and order within the Haitian Camp. They have shown that they are adept at handling the Haitians with control and restraint. Additional examples of military police FORSCOM deployments in this category are:

- o 83 (Aug-Nov)-- Seneca Army Depot, New York anti-nuclear demonstration support to the Army Depot when they were transferring nuclear

weapons. The MPs were used to protect facilities from saboteurs, terrorists and demonstrators.

- o 84-91 Joint Task Force Bravo (Honduras). The military police have been performing a force protection mission there since 1984. In March of 1988 the Nicaraguan Sandinista's crossed the Honduran boarder dramatically changing the situation and Operation Golden Pheasant was ordered by the JCS (see Golden Pheasant in low-order combat operation below). Once Operation Golden Pheasant concluded the military police resumed their force protection mission as they continue to do even now.

- o 88-91 Panama Security Enhancement (initial phase) and Promote Liberty are force protection missions that have been performed prior to and after the war in Panama. We continue to have military police units still performing force protection and host-nation support functions in Panama today as part of Operation Promote Liberty.

- o 89 (Sept-Oct)-- Operation Hawkeye (Hurricane Hugo in Virgin Islands)
During relief operations, the number of FORSCOM soldiers--other than MP--fluctuated daily. MP units were among the first elements to arrive on 21 September and remained a significant percentage of the force until the mission was complete on 22 November 1989. At the height of the deployment, soldiers from FORSCOM MP units numbered 952, or 80% of the relief force.¹ This deployment was seen by the inhabitants as an assistance mission rather than a U.S. occupation. This disaster relief effort is an excellent example of an operations that falls in the low end of the operational spectrum.²

- o 89 (Oct) San Fransisco Earthquake-- The Army had military police units helping civil authorities with disaster relief after the earthquake.

¹MAJ English, Point Paper: "FORSCOM MP Participation in Operation HAWKEYE", Georgia, Fort MacPherson, 17 Dec 90

²Daniel C. Watkins, Memorandum For FORSCOM Provost Marshal, "Military Police Force Structure in Contingency Operations", Georgia, Fort MacPherson, 2 Apr 90

Combat Operations

Low-Order

o 88- Operation Golden Pheasant (Honduras) The JCS ordered this operation in response to a provocative move by the Nicaraguan Sandinista's when they crossed the Honduran boarder. An infantry task force was deployed to Honduras as a show of force. The insertion of combat units was enough to get the Sandinista's to back down. This was a clear example of a transitional phase in the force selection model when the force mixture was changed in response to the threat changing.

High-Order

o 83 (Oct)- Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada). The military police were involved in the early phases of the operations and remained for quite some time to assist host-nation law enforcement authorities reestablish themselves.

o 89 (Dec)- Operation Just Cause (Panama)- "FORSCOM MP units contributed 1640 personnel or just slightly greater than 14% of the total force."¹

o 90- 91 Desert Shield/Storm-- The military police comprised approximately 7 - 8% of the total Army force deployed. Thirteen out of the 20 CONUS based military police combat support companies were deployed to Saudi Arabia. Seventh Corps brought their own combat support MP slice with them to Saudia Arabia. The Reserve and National Guard deployed a large contingent of military police forces to conduct law enforcement and enemy prisoner of war operations. The 800th MP Brigade (PW), a reserve unit commanded by BG Joseph F Conlon III, deployed to perform the enemy prisoner of war mission. It was a clear example of the military police performing all aspects of their missions in the high-order of the operation continuum and within the context of the total force concept.

Military Police Force Structure in Contingency Operations

In the "come as you are" scenarios of the future a previous success story stands out as an example of the use of military police in a task force organization.

¹ MAJ English, Point Paper: "FORSCOM MP Participation in OPN Just Cause", Georgia, Fort MacPherson, 13 Dec 90

During Operation Just Cause the military police were able to prove their value in military operations in urban terrain when a battalion was task organized under the 193rd Infantry Brigade. The Task Force was comprised of three infantry battalions and one military police battalion made up of five military police companies. The mission priorities for the battalion were to provide area security to neutralize all Panamanian Defense Force in its assigned area of operation; perform battlefield circulation control to secure the main supply route while gathering intelligence; and operate an EPW holding area. Missions assigned to subordinate companies included seizing objectives, establishing roadblocks, evacuating U.S. personnel, securing critical facilities, escorting convoys, providing airfield security, providing overwatch and security for Rangers, establishing an EPW holding area, and escorting VIPs. Additionally each of the infantry battalions received at least an MP platoon OPCON.¹

The augmentation of the military police battalion gave the combat brigade task force commander the agility and sufficient assets to insure that all four military police battlefield missions (battlefield circulation control, area security, enemy prisoner of war operations, and law and order operations) were accomplished simultaneously. The ability to have sufficient force to do all the MP battlefield missions at once is demanded by the very nature of a high speed modern battlefield. It also insures that no combat forces are diverted to combat support functions. However, the lethality of the military police force also insures that their combat power is only slightly diminished.

In the urban battlefield the civilian dimension must be addressed for it never disappears but only gets blurred during the combat phase. In this case by using the military police in the combat phase it insured that the infrastructure was established to handle the civilian population during the transition from war to host-nation support. This is the phase where the need for law and order is necessary or you run the risk of losing the local populations support. The modern battlefield commander has to plan for war termination and must have the

¹Daniel C. Watkins, Memorandum For FORSCOM Provost Marshal, "Military Police Force Structure in Contingency Operations", Georgia, Fort MacPherson, 2 Apr 90, pg 2

capability to influence events in positive manner. In this case the commander already had a police force in place and functioning.

The success of this contingency brigade shows the applicability of the concept. It reinforces the National Command Authorities current focus on Regional Contingency Operations with forces that are multipurpose, interoperable, agile, and off the shelf. This force exemplified that concept by its success.¹

AirLand Operations

On 25 December 1991 the United Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) Flag was lowered for the last time from the roof of the Kremlin symbolizing the death of the Soviet Union. This single act was the closing of the final chapter to the monolithic threat that the USSR had posed to the West for over 45 years. It has forever changed the face of the earth by leaving only one Super Power in the World--The United States. As a result, the National Command Authority as part of a budget reduction is adjusting the size of the Armed Forces to coincide with the decrease in the threat. This down sizing, which some have now estimated may be as much as 25% for the Army, has given credence to the Army's development of the AirLand Operations; A Concept for the Evolution of the AirLand Battle (ALB) for the Strategic Army of the 1990's and Beyond². The concept relies on the heavy use of emerging battlefield technologies which are aimed at the Commanders ability to see the battlefield. This coupled with the mobility and lethality of our weapons platforms support the drive to make the AirLand Operations concept work.

"The AirLand Operations Concept recognizes change in the strategic environment and threat. It describes how Army forces will be operate as a land component of military forces in future joint, combined, and interagency operations. It introduces operations across the operational continuum, power projection, and decisive advantages as precepts for future military operations. We seek the capability to preempt crises, but if combat power must be used, its application must be swift and decisive--to win with minimal casualties."³

¹Ibid

²TRADOC Pam 525-5, AirLand Operations A Concept for the Evolution of the AirLand Battle for the Strategic Army of the 1990's and beyond, 1 Aug 91

³Ibid, pg 1




Figure 4

CONCEPT

High Intensity Conflict

The AirLand Operations Concept relies on the extended battlefield and is predicated on the destruction of the enemy force as opposed to our retaining land objectives. In the conceptually extended battlefield area there are many sub elements: "(a) The Joint Battle Area is where Army forces fight to the depth of all their weapons systems and where the Army and Air Force capabilities overlap, (b) The Shaping Area must be large enough to locate and develop the enemy situation and establish and initiate the operation plan as well as to provide security, (c) The Close Battle Area is where the commander chooses to conduct decisive operations, (d) Dispersal Areas is where maneuver forces can be held in relative secure staging areas until committed, (e) Staging and Logistics Areas are anticipated and projected when and where needed, (f) Areas are not fixed in their relationship to each other."¹ (see Figure 4)

At the operational level the Army incorporates four stages: (1) Detection and Preparation- This is to detect the enemies incursion into the shaping area, intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and protecting the force; (2) Establishing Conditions For Decisive Operations- This is where the commander uses "all means necessary to set the conditions for the best use of Army capabilities to achieve decisive results. Battlefield conditioning and shaping isolates selected enemy forces in time and space to create favorable conditions for employment of U.S. and allied air and ground maneuver forces."²; (3) Decisive Operations- This stage exploits the efforts that the previous two stages have done to shape the enemy for battle. Once the appropriate condition exists the Commander masses his force for a decisive battle in the area of his choosing; and (4) Force Reconstitution- This stage is where the units are redispersed after battle and reconstitution efforts are conducted as required (sustainment, reorganization and regeneration). Again the relationship between each area is not fixed. The shape of the battle area is more fluid than the linear AirLand Battle. It can be solely linear, nonlinear, or a mix of both depending on the operations. The total duration of future battles is

¹Ibid, pg 15

²Ibid, pg 16

seen as being much shorter than the AirLand Battle with the maneuver battle being from 24 to 48 hours in length.¹

At the Army Corps level the concept calls for maneuver units to be dispersed and to mass at a specific point and time to conduct a decisive battle. Once the battle is complete the units disperse and conduct reconstitution efforts (sustainment, reorganization and regeneration) to prepare for redeployment. The fact that units need to be massed to fight a specific enemy threat identifies the reliance on mobility and emerging detection technologies that will enable the Commander to see the battlefield (Shaping Area) and communicate (C³I) that picture to his field elements. The fast pace of the battle will mandate that all units be capable of being integrated into a task force and joint task force configurations. There will be a greater reliance on different weapons and electronic platforms than the Air Force and Navy have in future conflicts. The overall makeup of this type of battlefield will place a heavy reliance on Combat Support (Intelligence, Military Police, and Signal support) and Combat Service Support (Logistics). Logistics support will be predicated on the need for quicker support to the maneuver elements. The staging and logistics area will also be a volatile area because of the need to be mobile to avoid doing battle with an enemy until the decisive point and time. (see Figure 5²)

Low Intensity Conflict:

The AirLand Operation concept encompasses the Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) element of the operational continuum. It emphasizes the continued support of Civil-Military operations to support civilian authorities. "In foreign areas activities will included: civil affairs and psychological operations, military civic action, foreign disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, foreign internal defense, and counterinsurgency operations."³ All these fall within the Army's four broad categories of LIC articulated in FM 100-20. The key is that the

¹USAMPS White Paper, The Military Police Role in AirLand Operation, 23 August 1991 (not an Official position of USAMPS)

²Ibid

³TRADOC Pam 525-5, AirLand Operations A Concept for the Evolution of the AirLand Battle for the Strategic Army of the 1990's and beyond, 1 Aug 91, pg 6




Figure 5

peacetime engagement includes non-violent measures to promote the U.S. national strategic objectives in lieu of destroying enemy forces. The U.S. involvement in LIC operations will continue into the 90's and the Military Police will continue to be the preferred force as it has been in the past. This will be especially true in the areas of disaster relief, military civil action, force protection, and humanitarian assistance.

The Military Police Battlefield Missions

The Battlefield Circulation Control (BCC) Mission

The BCC mission has always been vital for the MPs to perform. In the ALB doctrine it focused on the forward and lateral movements of combat resources. Under AirLand Operations BCC takes on a whole new meaning that encompasses the movement of combat forces from their dispersal areas through movement corridors to the close battle area and back to dispersal areas. It is not only a critical task for the MPs, but a potential show stopper to the combat commander who is relying on his forces to arrive at the exact time and place for the decisive battle. Speed, agility, and flexibility in the movement of combat forces will be demanded. The MPs will be vital to insure that traffic jams are deconflicted along the movement corridors. The need for "on the spot rerouting" will be critical as unforeseen changes and threats occur which require immediate solutions.

In the staging and logistical areas the MP BCC support will remain the same as in the ALB Doctrine. The dispersal area and close battle area will require more intense MP BCC support. An emerging example of this is the identification of MP support to Ordnance and Quartermaster units in the future. The Ordnance Corps has developed the Maneuver Oriented Ammunition Distribution System (MOADS) to meet the ammunition requirements of the maneuver units of the AirLand Operations battlefield. The MOADS program has been approved and Ordnance units were programmed during the TAA 96 process. The MP doctrine has required dedicated security for conventional ammunition and petroleum/pipeline operating units. As a result, USAMPS determined that MOADS will require additional MP assets. The estimated bill for MOADS is 15 additional combat support MP

companies.¹ This is but one example of the logistics systems being developed to push the Combat Service Support forward to meet the requirements of the combat maneuver forces of the future.

The complexity of the BCC tasks takes on new meaning in the nonlinear operations. It will require new techniques for traffic circulation control; marking routes and route classification. The manning of critical MP traffic control points (TCP) will still be necessary but will be more mission oriented than terrain driven. The distances between units and their platforms will be greater because they will want to reduce their signature to the enemy. As a result, the modern battlefield will cover large distances and will require the use of existing road networks. Future commanders will use agility when selecting and tailoring their combat force. Since the forces are dispersed this will require multiple routes and detailed mobility plans in order to mass them for battle. All of this means that the modern Army will be heavily reliant on the road network not only for logistical support but for combat power mobility.

Straggler Control will become harder in this environment because of the rapid changes in unit position so as to avoid contact with any enemy element. This will result in an increase of lost soldiers and reuniting them with their parent unit will become more difficult. Unit locations will be known by movement managers, however, it is hard to translate that to the exact location on the ground because of units jumping to avoid discovery. In all likelihood straggler collection points will have to be established and the units will have to pick up their lost soldiers or they will have to be shipped forward with their personnel and logistics supplies.

Refugee Control depending on the scenario can be critical because of our dependance on existing traffic routes. Most refugees fleeing the combat area will use existing roads and that could prove to disrupt our combat force's mobility in the joint battle area. This mission will have to be well coordinated with the host nation in order to insure that it does not become a show stopper. This mission will

¹CPT McCrea, Information Paper: "MP Support to Ordnance and Quartermaster", Alabama, Fort McClellan, 17 Apr 91

always remain a function of the MPs, but its importance will fluctuate with the battlefield situation.

Route reconnaissance and surveillance in the non-linear battlefield takes on new meaning with the detection requirements of the modern battlefield. The commanders need to detect and shape the enemy using JSTARS, RISTA and the IPB process which are all focused on shaping the battle area and is dependent on real time data either being confirmed or denied. Putting eyes on a technical report is not often done because of the complex demands on scouts. The MPs operation area, which encompasses the entire shaping area, provides an excellent source of input data for RISTA. They also provide rapid means to verify threats. The MPs need to be seen as collection assets used to confirm or deny the technical collection reports. Verified reports provide a more accurate picture for the combat commander.

While electronic observation and reconnaissance platforms are critical to the commander, they are also critical to the MPs in the performance of force protection and mobility missions. The MPs need to be plugged into a "Common Ground Station via direct communications from the Corps TOC to the MP Brigade headquarters to facilitate the movement and security of assets operating in the close battle area. The efficacy of expanded awareness of threat activity across the close battle area will result in increased warning time for friendly assets to displace and avoid enemy contact. The close battle area terrain manager will be able to make essential decisions regarding security force employment earlier, and, if necessary, draw upon more resources to influence the developing situation."¹

The Military Police BCC mission is an integral part of the four stages of the Army's operational cycle. In Stage I (detection/preparation) MPs are employed to conduct route reconnaissance and surveillance and are feeding the IPB process with battlefield intelligence that they gather. They are also conducting movements in the joint battle area to support the distribution of forces. In Stage II (establishing conditions for decisive operations) MPs provide force protection and

¹USAMPS White Paper, The Military Police Role in AirLand Operation, 23 August 1991 (not an Official position of USAMPS)

movement security for the distribution of logistical supplies (e.g. MOADS, fuel, critical repair parts). In Stage III (decisive operations) the MPs support the deployment of combat forces from the dispersal area through movement corridors to the close battle area and back to the dispersal area. In Stage IV (force reconstitution) MPs support the movement of resources to support the sustainment, reorganization, and regeneration of forces..

The MP Area Security Mission

The Area security mission will remain a key MP battlefield mission. The force protection mission will continue, but the manner in which it is accomplished will change. The MPs will switch from doing static, terrain-oriented defence articulated in the ALB doctrine to one that is better suited to ALO. This being to "detect, warn, and displace." "The MP forces will give threatened units maximum possible warning time to move out of the wake of the enemy advance."¹ The warning time needed will be approximately 20 minutes which should be attainable given the projected MP forces. As you can see this concept highlights not only the MPs need for mobility and communications, but the need for mobility and communication in the CS and CSS forces deployed in the joint battle area. The current force structure does not have the rapid tactical mobility capability for a large number of CS and CSS units.²

In reviewing the basic requirements of the ALB doctrine for the Military Police area security missions you find the following tasks: area reconnaissance and surveillance, security of designated critical assets, security of special ammunition, base force operations, air base ground defense operations, terrorism counteraction, area damage control operations, and NBC detecting and reporting. The area reconnaissance and surveillance, area damage control operations, and NBC detecting and reporting missions are basic tenants of their total mission and are constantly being performed. For example with NBC detecting and reporting the MPs conduct mounted operations with the vehicle mounted NBC detection kits operational.

¹Ibid

²Ibid

These are excellent sources for detecting contaminated areas throughout the Joint Battle Area.

The dynamics of this fluid joint battle area will require force protection to be predicated on the total forces agility, mobility and the reliability of support systems. Displacement of threatened forces will be preferable to engagement. Even on a nonlinear battlefield the MPs will still be used to identify, fix, and destroy level I and II threats¹ under the auspices of their terrorism counteraction and base response force operations missions. Level III threat will require additional assets from the combat commander to defeat the threat (e.g. the Armored Cavalry Regiment). Enemy special operations forces cannot have free target practice on your force in the staging and logistical areas. While the close battle terrain manager is identifying the threat and shaping it for Stage III operations, the MPs will be helping them to verify and shape the threat in the dispersal and logistic areas during phases I and II.

The special ammunition security mission will be replaced by the dedicated support mission to secure Field Artillery units, MOADS, and C3I nodes. This additional forces protection mission will require additional MP units added to the force structure similar to the changes identified for MOADS. The MPs will always have to do some static security, but only those critical to the operations will be accomplished. An example of this would be the security of a major assets such as key bridges linking the dispersal area to the close battle areas on movement corridors.

The hardest nut to crack under area security will be the air base ground defense operations. It has been a mission that no one wants to handle. The MPs do not have enough assets to dedicate units to this mission. It is further complicated by the fact that air bases do not move very quickly once a threat is identified as heading in their direction. An air base will get some support from the MPs but well below that which is demanded by the air base commander. The combat

¹FM 19-1, Military Police Support for the AirLand Battle, Washington: Department of the Army, May 1988

commander will in all likelihood have to divert combat assets to this mission even if the Air Force develops its own base force with Security Police assets.

The missions that the MPs have to perform under the Area Security umbrella are numerous, complex and at times competing. Due to the limited resources the MPs will have to shift their priorities between different missions as the situation and commander dictates. There is no doubt that their role in area security has been complicated by the nonlinear battlefield, but the importance of their contribution to the future battlefield commander has increased not diminished.

The MP Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Mission

After Desert Storm the importance of having EPW capability cannot be understated. In Desert Storm vast numbers of enemy surrendered to troops as they advanced. Similar scenarios will force future planners to replace the capture rate with a surrender rate. Specifically, in Stage II when the commander is establishing conditions for decisive operations, we will probably see more surrenders. This will require planners to calculate MP support and transport requirements based on projected surrender rates. The dramatic numbers of EPW based on surrenders in Desert Storm put a tremendous burden on the transportation system. The MPs do not have sufficient organic transportation to move EPW out of the close battle area. The backhaul concept under ALB where the MPs used rear-moving CSS ground transportation will have to be revamped. In Desert Storm the MPs were given busses by the Saudi Arabian government so they could transport the EPWs to EPW cages.¹

There should be no doubt that the EPW issue can also be a show stopper. Large numbers of EPWs in the hands of the combat force saddles them down and effects their combat operational capability. In Desert Storm large numbers of EPWs began to impede the combat force. As a result the 800th MP Brigade MPs moved far forward to get prisoners and free up combat assets.² Therefore, MPs must be

¹National Prisoner of War Information Center After Action Report for Desert Storm

²Ibid

capable of gathering EPWs closer to the engagement area to free up the Combat forces. "By pushing corps collection points farther forward, division MPs will be less likely to become separated from their maneuver element. Corps collection points will be located adjacent to division engagement areas, in some situations only 5-10 kilometers from divisional units."¹ A secondary issue is the movement of EPWs rapidly to the rear without choking up MSR and movement corridors. This becomes critical in an environment that requires combat forces and logistics to move quickly over long distances and mass at the exact time and space for battle. In cases where there are limited alternate routes the MPs must be capable of containing the EPWs until the engagement is over. This is not something that we have planned on doing nor equipped our force to do.

The most resource-intensive phase of EPW operations will be during Stage IV, Force Reconstitution, when the need to consolidate and transport EPW to the rear will be in full swing. The Corps (Theater) MP assets will have to be reallocated to accomplish this mission. It may mean that another MP mission task suffers until the EPW issue can be stabilized.

The MP Law and Order Mission

This mission is more prevalent in the LIC and peacetime scenarios. A scenario where MPs are the force of choice for counter drug efforts, host nation support, humanitarian relief efforts and force protection. This would encompass ordinary crimes, isolated and sporadic acts of violence, riots, sporadic armed fighting, and mass arrest. It also covers the non-violent arena; training of host nation police forces, humanitarian assistance, and power projection. Recent history shows that the MPs are often the preferred force.

Battlefield Law and Order takes on a different emphasis in the high intensity conflict and fluctuates depending on what stage of the operational cycle you are conducting. The Law and Order mission is more likely to receive the lowest priority in Stage III, Decisive Operations. The initial crime statistics from Desert

¹USAMPS White Paper, The Military Police Role in AirLand Operation, 23 August 1991 (not an Official position of USAMPS)

Storm are low and show that the majority of reportable crime was in the rear areas. This would support the concept that the greater requirement for the Battlefield Law and Order mission will probably be during Stages I, II, and IV. It also emphasizes that the unit commanders will continue to be responsible for taking care of petty crimes at their level in the field.

Force Structure Issues

The United States Army has a force structure planning process called the Total Army Analysis (TAA) program which determines the resource levels of its total force structure (Active Duty, Reserves, National Guard, COMPO 4). The process is presently in the TAA 99 iteration and the Army is shifting its focus from a conflict with the Soviet Union to a Regional Crisis conflict. As a result, there is a shift in MP TOE force structure levels from the 1991 figures of 37% Active, 39% National Guard, and 24% Reserve to the 1995 figures of 42% Active, 40% National Guard, and 18% Reserve.¹

This presents new challenges as the OCONUS force structure is reduced and the demands on FORSCOM are increased to meet power projection requirements of the short notice regional conflicts and other contingencies. The Army's answer to this requirement is the approval in TAA99 of the Enhancing CONUS Contingency Capability (EC³) package. In EC³ the CONUS military police combat support contingency forces (2 MP Brigade HHCs, 6 Battalion HHDs, and 21 Combat Support Companies) are increased. If all programmed actions take place by FY93 the MP combat support companies will increase from 21 to 26 units. This increase is a recognition of the deployment role that military police units have played in the past. However, no force element is safe as the next TAA cycle looks at every unit again.²

¹Major David Perkins of ODCSOPS, HQDA, Washington D.C., by author, 6 February 1992, Newport, R.I. Telephonic Interview

²CPT McCrea, Information Paper: "Force Structure Update", Alabama, Fort McClellan, ATZN-MP-CFS, 26 SEP 91

Military Police Impact on the Principles of War

The principles of war are supported by the military police missions in the AirLand Operations concept. The military objectives of the modern era will primarily be defined by politics. Therefore, as a possible force element the MPs are suitable to support many of the political and military objectives of modern contingency operation. It is clear that the battlefield circulation control (BCC) discussed earlier will have a significant impact on the principles of **offensive, mass, maneuver, and surprise**. In the AirLand Operation scenario the need to seize, retain and exploit the initiative will rest on a commanders ability to maneuver his units to mass at the decisive place and time needed to achieve surprise. The MPs BCC support will be a critical element needed to insure that the forces arrive from the dispersal areas to the close battle area in time to prosecute the war in the engagement area. The military police will allow the commander to apply the principle of **economy of force** by enabling a risk to be taken in the rear areas. The combat forces will be able to focus on the decisive victory while the MPs are employed to defend the logistic and C³I nodes, to defeat level 1 and 2 threats, to delay enemy threats so units can be warned and displaced, and if necessary conduct deception missions as directed. The MP units are integral elements of the Corps and Division level units and are therefore applying the principle of **unity of command**. As a result, the military police need to be tied into the combat commanders goals and concept of the operations so that they can perform their missions and anticipate requirements. Due to the limited number of MP assets on the modern battlefield, the MPs will be required to use economy of force when performing their missions. At various times they will have to shift force to accomplish a given task (e.g. shifting to EPW operations during bulges). Military police performing BCC functions will enable the commander to apply the principle of **simplicity** (e.g. MP traffic management in movement corridors, or in-stride rerouting). Finally, the principle of **security** is supported by the MPs performing the area security and BCC missions. Here they support the commander by protecting the force through observing, detecting, engaging and stopping enemy activities designed to disrupt combat, combat support, and combat service support operations (e.g. anti-terrorism operations on key C³I facilities). In the end the military police missions support the commanders ability to implement the principles of war.

CONCLUSIONS

The Military Police Corps is ready to meet the challenges in the new National Military Strategy for the 90s. The new focus on multipurpose forces capable of responding quickly to regional contingency missions is what the military police have been doing throughout the 80s and early 90s. As a Corps it has proven that it can meet the challenge and become a force multiplier to a CINC. This is significant because the Military Police Corps combat support elements constitute only 3 to 4% of the total Army force structure and their percentage of the U.S. Forces deployed on contingency missions has been considerably higher. Thus, based on past deployment experiences and projected contingency requirements, the military police corps role as an integral part of the force mix selected for future contingency operations is assured.

The Military Police School (USAMPS) is the doctrinal proponent for the military police branch. It has stayed ahead of the cresting waves when developing doctrine and training. One only has to look at the success of the military police operations in the 80s and 90s for examples. The future challenges of the AirLand Operations concept have already started to be addressed by USAMPS. They are looking at new equipment, doctrine, and training requirements to make the force fit into the concept. It took us 10 years to meet the challenge of the AirLand Battle Doctrine and it will take us some time to meet the new doctrine.

USAMPS has also done an excellent job selling the merits of the force. A clear example is General Charles Hines' Force Selection Model which addresses the Contingency Force selection process and shows why military police units are the preferred force in many cases. It is critical that the military police capabilities continue to be discussed and explained to the modern Joint CINCs. The Army component representation on the Joint Staff is the best way for the capability and suitability of the MPs to be institutionalized. Based on the historical utilization of military police deployments I do not see a real problem in this area.

The biggest challenge lies ahead with cuts in the area of force structure. Here, the MPs have to compete with the rest of the Army for their slice of the

force. This issue will not be an easy one to resolve because of the fluidity of the modern battlefield which require more MP assets than ever before. In addition, the base force concept necessitates the ability to quickly deploy MP units in support of contingency operations throughout the globe prior to the National Command Authority activating the Reserves or National Guard. It is going to be critical that the MP community capture this and get the CINCs to articulate, on the record, their MP requirements for contingency operations. The next TAA cycle will be an acid test to see if the MP force structure can be retained to meet the contingency challenges of the future.

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