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


**U.S. Army Research Institute  
for the Behavioral and Social Sciences**

**Research Report 1610**

# **The Mobilization of Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) Infantrymen During Operation Desert Storm**

**Pamela M. Terry, Kenneth L. Evans,  
Frederick H. Heller, and Seward Smith**  
U.S. Army Research Institute



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**March 1992**

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13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) This report describes the Infantry Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) soldier during mobilization for Operation Desert Storm. Since mobilization is a historically rare event, the leadership of Fort Benning asked the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences Fort Benning Field Unit to capture information that can be used to improve future mobilization(s) and mobilization planning. The statistically descriptive profile contained in this report is based on a survey of 2,641 Infantry IRR soldiers, direct observation, and supplementary performance data. Information is provided on soldier performance, backgrounds, attitudes, concerns, and responses to the various events that occurred early in the mobilization process.				
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**Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel  
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## FOREWORD

In January 1991 a partial mobilization of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) occurred in conjunction with Operation Desert Storm. Fort Benning was the major processing and training site for the Infantry IRR during this mobilization. Because the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences Fort Benning Field Unit conducts research on connective training and training technology with particular emphasis on Infantry concerns, the Commanding General of Fort Benning enlisted the support of ARI-Benning on 23 January 1991 to collect and archive information about this historic mobilization of Infantry reserves. This report presents a descriptive overview of the Infantry IRR soldier early in the mobilization process--performance, concerns, attitudes, and responses to the mobilization process. Results of this research were provided to Fort Benning's senior leadership in June and August 1991.



EDGAR M. JOHNSON  
Technical Director

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This report is the result of much dedication among the leadership of Fort Benning, Georgia, and teamwork among its agencies. Without dedication and teamwork, the work leading to this report could not have been accomplished in the short time allotted. We gratefully acknowledge Colonel John D. Fuller, Chief of Staff, Fort Benning, for his excellent guidance in this effort, and Colonel Joe Trez, Commander, U.S. Army Infantry Training Center, for his excellent ideas and input and also for his support. We thank Lieutenant Colonel Ben Taylor, Deputy Commanding Officer, U.S. Army Infantry Training Center, whose superb coordination made data collection possible. We also thank Lieutenant Colonel J. Matthews, Adjutant General, for facilitating our access to records during a very hectic time, and the following U.S. Army Infantry School directors for their cooperation in this effort: Colonel G. Seibert, Director of Evaluation and Standardization; Colonel Wayne Crawford, Director of Training and Doctrine; Colonel L. K. White, Director of Combined Arms and Tactics; and Colonel Richard St. John, Commander, 29th Infantry Regiment.

Much credit is also due those individuals within the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI), who assisted and supported this effort outside their normal assignments. Our appreciation goes to Margaret Salter, who collected and analyzed the IRR performance data on Bradley gunnery, and to Richard Kern, who oversaw the reduction of data for us at ARI Headquarters. We also thank W. O. Redmond, who arranged for very fast turnaround on survey printing, and Lisa Kelly, Carol Bryan, Carol Ried, and Martha Elizondo of the ARI-Benning Resources Management Team, who willingly worked whatever days or hours they were needed.

# THE MOBILIZATION OF INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE (IRR) INFANTRYMEN DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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### Requirement:

On 23 January 1991, the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) Fort Benning Field Unit received a request for services from the Command Group, Fort Benning, which asked for assistance in capturing and archiving valuable information from the mobilization of Infantry Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) during Operation Desert Storm for use in future mobilization planning. IRR soldiers are Reserve Component soldiers who are not assigned to units. They typically have previous Active Component or Selected Reserve service and a remaining military obligation. Areas of interest and concern regarding the mobilization of these soldiers included skill retention levels; recall, processing, and training procedures; and soldier attitude and background information.

### Procedure:

In conjunction with the Infantry Training Center (ITC) at Fort Benning, the ARI-Fort Benning Field Unit collected survey data on 15 companies of Infantry RT-12, IRR soldiers being mobilized through Fort Benning. RT-12 soldiers are IRR members who have been out of active service for 12 months or less. Supplementary performance data were provided by the ITC, and background data on approximately one-fourth of the survey sample of 2,641 were obtained from military personnel records.

### Findings:

If given a choice of units, three of four (76%) of the IRR soldiers wanted to be reassigned to their former active duty units. This percentage was slightly higher (80%) among soldiers who had been members of Cohesion, Operational Readiness Training (COHORT) units.

Available performance data showed quite high rates of qualifying scores following planned training. IRR companies compared favorably to contemporary One Station Unit Training (OSUT) companies on weapons qualification tasks.

Army Physical Fitness Test scores from two companies showed 51 percent of one company and 66 percent of the other able to pass the entire test without pretraining. Pass rates for push-ups and sit-ups were somewhat better than those for the 2-mile run.

About 60 percent of IRR soldiers reported negative feelings about being called up, and many anticipated problems at home as a result of their absence. These problems included family stress, financial strain, and setbacks in ongoing or scheduled educational programs.

About half felt that information contained in their orders was not fully adequate, especially in the areas of uniforms, equipment, and transportation requirements. Too little time to report and lack of information about where, when, with whom, and for how long they would be assigned were also sources of soldier frustration.

About 56 percent reported problems during their in-processing, including long lines and waits and some problems with records and screening.

Many had difficulty as previously trained soldiers in accepting the constraints of a training environment. The Infantry Center made every effort to counter the perception of a return to Infantry One Station Unit Training (OSUT); but the controlled environment, coupled with the presence of drill sergeants in "Smoky Bear" hats, was significantly different from that found in the IRR soldiers' former units.

Three-fourths of the soldiers thought that it was likely that they would be assigned to the combat theater zone and almost half felt that they would be ready to go.

Infantry IRR soldiers had been away from active duty for an average of 6 months after having completed an average of about 3 years' service. About half were in college and three-fourths were holding civilian jobs when called up.

#### Utilization of Findings:

The information found in this report was provided to Fort Benning's senior leadership in June and August 1991. The findings and recommendations are pertinent to improved planning for future mobilizations and the development of enhanced reserve manpower policies. They include the following:

- Consideration should be given to designing mobilization to facilitate soldiers' return to their former units.



- The possible advantages of early soldier assignments to units and training at units rather than at training stations should be considered.
- Orders should contain more complete and detailed information.
- Where possible, more time should be allowed between notice and reporting date to allow soldiers to get their personal affairs in order.
- More efficient in-processing should be developed. This might include staggered reporting dates and additional early screening.
- Consideration should be given to how family and financial stresses could be ameliorated.

THE MOBILIZATION OF INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE (IRR) INFANTRYMEN DURING  
OPERATION DESERT STORM

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# THE MOBILIZATION OF INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE (IRR) INFANTRYMEN DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM

## Background

RT-12 personnel are members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) who have been out of active service for 12 months or less. IRR members are Reserve Component members not assigned to units. Most IRR members are trained individuals who previously served in the Active Component or Selected Reserve. They usually have a remaining military service obligation and are subject to mobilization (Reserve Forces Policy Board, 1991).

A partial mobilization of RT-12 personnel from the IRR occurred in conjunction with Operation Desert Storm in January, 1991. Reserve mobilization is a rare event for the United States Army. The command group at Fort Benning recognized the importance of collecting and archiving thorough information about this historic mobilization of Infantry reserves in order to be prepared better next time. They also had a more immediate, pressing goal. The RT-12 call-up was expected to be only the first of necessary mobilizations and the Fort Benning leadership wanted to use early findings to improve handling of any later Desert Storm mobilization (which fortunately was not required).

On 23 January 1991, the ARI-Fort Benning Field Unit (ARI) received a request for technical services to assist in this effort from the Chief of Staff, Fort Benning. The guidance provided described areas of interest. These included levels of skill retention; analysis of IRR training and recall procedures and administrative processing for recommended improvements; determination of attitudes and attitude changes; and development of demographic data.

Plans were discussed and coordinated with the U. S. Army Infantry Training Center (ITC) and with the U.S. Army Infantry School, Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD), Directorate of Combined Arms and Tactics (CATD), and the 29th Infantry Regiment. With the ITC as prime sponsor, ARI collected survey data on fifteen RT-12 training companies. Approximately one-fourth of the surveyed individuals were sub-sampled and supplementary data sought from documents in Military Personnel Record Jackets (MPRJ). Performance data were collected, and one RT-12 training company was followed throughout its entire processing and training to provide an enhanced set of performance data and to provide interpretation for findings from the larger sample. The primary purpose of this report is to present descriptive results from the survey and performance data that were collected as part of this effort.

On 5 February 1991, the Director of Military Personnel Management tasked the Army Research Institute to examine skill decay among IRR soldiers involved in the Operation Desert Storm call-up (Wisher, Sabol, Sukenik & Kern, 1991). In response, ARI set up an ARI IRR Training Task Force. Their research effort should not be confused with the one conducted for Fort Benning. It was more broadly based, drawing performance and survey data from seven mobilization stations and using background information from existing Army data bases. Survey data also were collected from 3051

individuals across Career Management Fields (CMF). (Of these, 806 were Infantry, many of whom had also responded to the Fort Benning survey.) Their investigation focused on skill decay issues and performance data (Wisher et al., 1991) as well as attitudes, concerns, and motivation of IRR soldiers in a variety of CMFs (Steinberg, 1991). The current study conducted at Fort Benning was an in-depth look at Infantry IRR soldiers. It involved a longer IRR survey, a survey of trainers, direct observation, and performance data from OSUT companies for purposes of comparison.

## **Overview**

The purpose of this report is to present a description of the Infantry IRR soldier and the experiences he encountered during mobilization from his perspective. Since its purpose is not to examine the effectiveness of mobilization plans, no systematic inquiry has been done to establish the Army's reasons for mobilization plans, specific actions, or particular decisions. Where these findings would suggest modifications in future mobilization procedures, it should be noted that they illuminate only the reactions of soldiers to various policy and procedural decisions.

This report consists of survey responses and performance data which address the following questions. What are some relevant military and civilian characteristics of Infantry IRR soldiers? Why had they chosen to leave the Army? How well-trained did they believe themselves to have remained since departure? How well-trained did their performance prove them to have remained? How physically fit would their performance indicate that they were? What were they doing in civilian life? What was their response to mobilization? What did they experience during mobilization? What were their attitudes toward being recalled, the possibility of facing combat, and their current situations? What would have been their preferred assignments? And what concerns were uppermost in their minds when they chose to comment in their own words?

Throughout this report, the number of the survey question from which the information came (if applicable) will be given along with the number ( $n$ ) of soldiers responding to that question in brackets [ ]. For exact question wording, readers may refer to the surveys, found at Appendixes A and B. Appendix A is a revised survey which was given to 1066 soldiers during the latter part of research. It contains questions which were added or modified from the original survey (Appendix B) to better reflect command interest or better phrase questions based upon original survey comments. The original survey was administered to 1575 soldiers for a total sample of 2641. Since all soldiers did not respond to each question, missing data will cause  $n$ 's to vary.

## **Who Were the Infantry IRR?**

### ***Biographical/Civilian Information***

Reported ages of IRR soldiers (derived from birth year) ranged from 19 to 51 (1940-1972). Both the median and most frequently reported (24.4%) age was 23 (1968) [Question 4,  $n=835$ ].

Over half (51.0%) had some college, a college degree, or better. Another 46.1 percent held a high-school diploma or GED equivalent, and only 2.9 percent held less education than a high school diploma (Table 1).

Table 1  
*Highest Level of Civilian Education*

Responses - Question 8	Percentages
Less than high school	2.9
High school/GED	46.1
Some college	45.8
College degree or more	5.2

*Note.*  $n=2603$

Only 33.5 percent of Infantry IRR soldiers were married [Question 6,  $n=2619$ ]. This percentage is quite close to the 31 percent found by Wisher et al. (1991) for Infantry. However, these researchers also found 39 percent of IRR soldiers to be married when frequencies were combined across CMF's.

About half (52.0%) of the soldiers reported supporting only themselves. Another substantial percentage (40.9%) supported themselves in addition to other dependents, but the remaining 7.1 percent reported having no one (including themselves) financially dependent upon them [Question 7 A,  $n=2494$ ].

Soldiers were asked how long they had been assigned to the IRR. The most frequent response was 6 months (reported by 20.3% of soldiers). Most of those responding (90.2%) had been in the IRR for 15 months or less and the median time reported was 7 months [Calculated from Question 20,  $n=2459$ ].

Over one-fourth (30.2%) of the soldiers reported that they had not realized when they enlisted that their contract would be for a longer time than their required active service [Question n22,  $n=1030$ ].

They reported having left Active Duty or Selected Reserve Service for a variety of reasons (Table 2). Those reasons most frequently marked by IRR soldiers on the survey were that they intended to pursue an education (31.4%) or that they did not like military life (31.0%).

Table 2  
*Reasons for Departure from Active Service*

Responses - Question n23	Percentages
To pursue education	31.4
Did not like military	31.0
Personal/family reasons	16.4
Involuntary separation	3.7
Medical problems	2.4
Other reasons	15.1

*Note.*  $n=861$

Soldiers were asked how they felt about the Army since these feelings could have affected their responses to the mobilization. The distribution of feelings about the Army found among the IRR soldiers is shown in Table 3. It should be noted that the variety expressed underscores the fact that Infantry IRR members are an attitudinally diverse group of people who could be expected to react in different ways to similar circumstances.

Table 3  
*Feelings about the Army after Leaving Active Duty*

Responses - Question n26	Percentages
Liked very much	3.3
Liked	16.4
Neither liked nor disliked	25.0
Disliked	16.2
Disliked very much	30.6
Never on Active Duty	8.6

*Note.*  $n=1038$

### ***Military Information***

The Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) breakdown for the sample is shown in Table 4. Almost all soldiers (99.4%) soldiers held 11-series MOSs.



Table 4  
Current Primary Military Occupational Specialty (PMOS)

Responses - Question 13 A	Percentages
11 B	59.5
11 C	12.5
11 H	12.0
11 M	15.4
Other	.7

Note.  $n=2569$

As shown in Table 5, most Infantry IRR soldiers reported that they were Skill Level 1 (73.1%) and held the rank of Corporal/Specialist 4 (CPL/SP4) (55.9%). Percentages for rank closely parallel (within about 4 percentage points) those reported both by Steinberg (1991) and Wisher et al. (1991) for IRR RT-12s across many MOSs.

Table 5  
Rank and Skill Level

Rank	Percent	Skill Level	Percent
PV1/PV2	10.3	SL 1	73.1
PFC	19.3	SL 2	22.5
CPL/SP4	55.9	SL 3	2.7
SGT	13.8	SL 4	1.7
SSG/SSG	.7		

Note. Question 3, rank,  
 $n=2605$

Note. Question 13 B, skill  
level,  $n=1719$

Most (88.6%) of the Infantry IRR soldiers reported having completed some Active Duty Service. About half (52.2%) of these reported 36 months or less of Active Duty. Another 40.8 % reported over 36 but no more than 48 months of Active Duty; and reports of the remaining 7 percent ranged from 49 to 228 months. This yielded an average reported length of Active Duty of 36.2 months. When reported lengths of Active Duty and Selected Reserve service were combined, the average reported length of service was 41.5 months [Questions 19 A-D,  $n=2586$ ].

Almost a third (32.4%) of the sample reported having trained at the National Training Center (NTC) and 13.5 percent reported having been part of the Opposing Force (OPFOR) there. Fewer soldiers (13.2%) reported having trained at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) [Question 38,  $n=2576$ ]. Only 4.5 percent had been part of the JRTC OPFOR [Question 39,  $n=2550$ ].

IRR soldiers were also asked how many months ago they last qualified with a service rifle. The largest number (21.1%) reported last qualifying 12 months prior to the survey. The median time since qualification was also 12 months [Calculated from Question 40,  $n=2165$ ]. (Wisher et al. (1991) reported decay in weapons qualification skills to become evident after about 10 months.) Most IRR soldiers reported having qualified with an M16A2 (74.0%) or an M16A1 (22.4%) [Question 40 C,  $n=2550$ ]. Most (97.3%) also qualified using an outdoor target (25.3% paper; 72.0% pop-up) [Question 40 D,  $n=2557$ ] and with an Active Army unit (87.8%) [Question 40 E,  $n=2600$ ].

Of those responding to the revised survey, 83.9 percent indicated that they had also qualified with other weapon systems [Question n41 A,  $n=875$ ]. The percentages of those having qualified with various systems are shown in Table 6.

Table 6  
*Reported Qualifications with Weapon Systems*

Responses - Question n41 B	Percentages
M203	27.7
TOW	16.5
Dragon	9.9
M60	21.7
SAW	19.8
Bradley	4.6
One other system	9.4
Two (+) other systems	2.2

*Note.*  $n=875$

#### **How Well Did They Perform? How Well-trained Had They Remained?**

Only 7.6 percent of those who were asked (revised survey) had received any military training since their last day of Active Duty [Question n36 A,  $n=1039$ ]. However, as shown in performance measures, they appear to have retained at least their basic skills quite well. Cadre reports from the company selected for tracking indicated that 100 percent of Infantry IRR soldiers present for training were able to achieve qualifying or "GO" scores by the end of training in Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC), Individual Tactical Training (ITT), Battle Drills, M60 machinegun and M203 grenade launcher. It is unclear how many of these involved only one or several trials.

First attempt qualifications on Military Operations in Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) training are given in Table 7. All but one of those remaining qualified by the fourth trial.

Table 7  
First-time "GO's" in MOUT Training

Tasks	Percentages
Throw grappling hook	93.0 (171) <sup>a</sup>
Throw hand grenade	90.1 (172)
Climb	81.2 (170)
Roll	88.4 (164)

<sup>a</sup>n's in parentheses. Data were available for three platoons of IRR soldiers.

Additional scores from this company showed that 75.5 percent of soldiers qualified on their first attempt with the M16A2 rifle and that 89.1 percent qualified on their first attempt with the Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW), 10-meter firing. SAW 10-meter firing scores were also available for the entire group of IRR companies. These were compared statistically to those of an Infantry OSUT (One Station Unit Training) company. Results showed IRR company average performance to be reliably superior to that of the OSUT company ( $t(1637) = 15.45, p < .0001$ ). The mean firing score for the IRR company was 26.06 and for the OSUT company was 21.63.

First-round "GO" rates on the Bradley Gunnery Skills Test (BGST) for IRR soldiers undergoing 11 M training are shown in Table 8. All others passed on the second trial except for one third-round failure.

Table 8  
First-round "GO" rates for BGST Skills

BGST Skills	Percentages
Clear/remove/(dis)assemble /install 25 mm gun	92.0 (212) <sup>a</sup>
Load feeder 25 mm	98.6 (209)
Misfire procedures 25 mm	97.6 (209)
Unload/clear feeder	98.1 (209)
Install coax machinegun	99.0 (209)
Load/fire/immediate action coax	94.3 (209)
Clear/unload coax	99.5 (209)
Remove coax	100.0 (209)
(Dis)assemble coax	100.0 (213)
Fire immediate action TOW	99.1 (209)
Boresight turret weapons	99.5 (212)

Note. Total  $n = 213$ . Numbers attempting each task in parentheses.

Mortar qualification scores for two IRR companies yielded averages of 95.10 and 97.75. These compare favorably with mortar scores from Infantry OSUT companies who received training during

February 1991. Those company averages were 93.35, 93.47 and 99.55. Percentages among IRR soldiers achieving each qualification rating on the mortar are shown in Table 9.

Table 9  
*IRR Soldier Mortar Qualification Ratings*

Qualification Ratings -	Percentages
Expert	84.9
First Class	12.4
Second Class	2.8

*Note.*  $n=218$

Average TOW (Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided) missile gunnery scores for two Infantry IRR training companies also compared favorably to those for Infantry OSUT companies. Average scores for the IRR companies were 739 and 755 for ITV-mounted (Improved TOW vehicle) TOW gunnery as compared to OSUT company average scores of 700 and 636. IRR-soldier average scores for HMMWV-mounted (High-mobility, Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle) TOW gunnery were 726 and 738 as compared to 713 and 685 for OSUT companies. TOW qualification ratings for both IRR companies combined are shown in Table 10. No statistical comparisons have been done between IRR and OSUT companies for either TOW or mortar scores because only company averages rather than raw scores were obtained for OSUT companies.

Table 10  
*TOW Qualification Ratings*

Qualification Ratings	Percentages Qualifying	
	ITV-mounted <sup>a</sup>	HMMWV-mounted <sup>b</sup>
Expert	26.0	20.9
First Class	43.5	35.4
Second Class	27.3	40.5
Unqualified	3.2	3.2

<sup>a</sup> $n=308$  <sup>b</sup> $n=311$

In addition to performance measurement, IRR soldiers were also asked how much training they felt they would need to assume an Active Duty assignment and for a combat situation (Table 11). (These surveys were administered prior to the occurrence of training for most respondents.) In response to this, 65.5 percent stated that they did believe that they needed more training before assuming an Active Duty assignment. Only 34.5 percent reported feeling ready for assignment without training. There are no comparable data for the ARI IRR Training Task Force survey

because those surveys were administered later in the call-up than the Infantry IRR surveys. However, Wisher et al. (1991) reported that 49 percent of their sample indicated feeling ready for their Army jobs *following* retraining.

When Infantry IRR soldiers were asked about their felt need for training for a combat situation, 79.2 percent indicated that they would need more training (Table 11). They were then asked to select from a checklist areas where they believed they needed training (Table 12).

Table 11  
*Self-reported Levels of Training Needed for Active Duty and Combat*

Responses - Questions 43 & 44	Percentages	
	For Active Duty <sup>a</sup>	For Combat <sup>b</sup>
None, I'm ready now	34.5	20.8
I need a little more of some training	45.5	47.5
I need a lot more of some training	20.0	31.6

<sup>a</sup>n = 2566. <sup>b</sup>n = 2558

Specific tasks where training was most often cited as being needed were land navigation (45.9%) and MOUT (41.2%). NBC (39.1%) and communications (35.3%) were also frequently indicated as training needs. (Training on some of these topics was later provided. Because these surveys were administered prior to the occurrence of most training, responses should not be interpreted in relation to any training that was received.) Further information and discussion of skill decay and IRR soldier performance issues may be found in Wisher et al. (1991).

Table 12  
*Skills for which Soldiers Believed They Needed Training*

Responses - Question n45 A-J	Percentages
NBC	39.1
First Aid	30.5
Maintenance	11.4
Weapons	22.2
Land Navigation	45.9
ITT	19.4
Communications	35.3
MOUT	41.2
Other (MOS-specific)	6.3
Other (common)	5.1

Note. n = 1066

### How Physically Fit Were They?

The Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) was administered to IRR soldiers after their arrival at Fort Benning. This was a diagnostic test which involved no pre-training. Not all soldiers were able to complete all parts of the test. Scores from the test have been examined for two companies, with results as shown in Table 13. Percentages shown in Table 13 reflect the percentages of those attempting each part of the test who passed.

Table 13  
*Percentages Passing the APFT*

APFT Tasks	Percentages	
	Company 1	Company 2
Push-ups	81.4 (226)	89.4 (142)
Sit-ups	75.2 (226)	90.1 (141)
2-mile run	63.6 (220)	71.5 (137)
All parts	51.4 (218)	66.2 (136)

*Note.* *n*'s in parentheses.

As can be seen from Table 13, higher percentages were able to qualify on the push-up and sit-up components than on the 2-mile run. When soldiers were asked on the survey how confident they were that they could pass the APFT, only 57.7 percent expressed confidence in being able to do so (Table 14). This percentage is lower than the percentages actually passing the test shown in Table 13 except for overall performance in Company 1. However, those soldiers who had physical profiles or who failed to complete a section of the APFT were excluded from the performance data, but were not screened from the survey. Had they been screened, confidence rates might have been correspondingly raised.

Table 14  
*Confidence of Passing the APFT*

Responses - Question 34	Percentages
Very confident	31.9
Confident	25.8
Not very confident	25.3
Not at all confident	17.0

*Note.* *n* = 2376

IRR soldiers were also asked whether they believed that they were in good physical condition (Table 15) and whether they believed that they were in tough enough physical condition for combat. About half (51.6%) of them believed that they were in fairly good physical condition and another 10.7 percent believed that they were in very good condition. However, only 41.6 percent believed that they were in tough enough physical condition for combat. Twenty percent (20%) were undecided and 38.4 percent indicated that they were not [Question 35,  $n=2606$ ].

Table 15  
*Responses to "Do you think you are in good physical condition?"*

Responses - Question 32	Percentages
Yes, very good	10.7
Yes, fairly good	51.6
No	27.2
Undecided (not sure)	10.6

*Note.*  $n=2597$

### What Were They Doing in Civilian Life?

Most (77.8%) Infantry IRR soldiers reported having left a civilian job due to the recall [Question 24 A,  $n=2600$ ]. Over half (54.2%) also reported being formally enrolled in school (49.3 percent college; 4.9 percent other schools) at the time of recall [Question 9,  $n=2583$ ]. This differs somewhat from returns of the mixed Career Management Field (CMF) group sampled by the ARI IRR Training Task Force. Those results showed 89 percent having left civilian jobs and 33 percent in college (Steinberg, 1991).

Fewer than half (39.7%) were exercising more than once a week. Another 14.9 percent reported weekly exercise, but 45.3 percent indicated that they exercised less than once a week [Question 31 A,  $n=2582$ ]. Types of exercise selected included weight lifting (38.1%), team sports (25.2%), running (24.7%) and swimming (14.4%). Other sports were listed by 14.7 percent of soldiers [Question 31 C-G,  $n=2641$ ].

Over half (55.6%) of those asked (original survey, Appendix B) reported that they engaged in sport shooting. The most often-indicated shooting sport was hunting (44.1%) [Question 28 (parts 1 and 2),  $n=1575$ ]; and about half of those men who participated in sport shooting (48.8%) indicated that they did so more than once per month [Question 28 (part 4),  $n=864$ ].

### What Was Their Initial Response to Mobilization?

At the very bottom line, it must be said that their country called and they came. Some expressed a high degree of patriotism and some a sense of duty. Some said they feared punishment

for failure to come and some thought no action would be taken against those who did not. When asked on the survey to express their personal feelings about being recalled, their responses ran the gamut. Percentages at each level of positivity/negativity are shown in Table 16.

Results found here closely parallel those found by the ARI IRR Training Task Force who reported 18 percent of IRR soldiers indicating positive attitudes, 21 percent indicating neutral attitudes, and 61 percent indicating negative attitudes. Steinberg (1991) analyzed the relationships of other factors to attitudinal positivity and found it to be related primarily to other attitudinal and motivational factors and not to demographic variables.

Table 16  
*Feelings at First Notice about Being Recalled*

Responses - Question 54	Percentages
Very Positive	6.2
Positive	11.2
Neutral	22.7
Negative	14.3
Very Negative	45.6

*Note.*  $n = 2596$

Almost sixty percent (59.9%) of the Infantry IRR soldiers reported that their initial response to being recalled was negative. Responses to related questions are discussed here as they may provide keys to unhappiness on the part of many respondents about being recalled. First of all, many did not like the idea of being subject to recall. (This question was asked specifically only in the newer, revised version of the survey administered to later companies.) When asked how they felt about being subject to recall, soldiers responded as shown in Table 17.

Table 17  
*Feelings about Being Subject to Recall under IRR Status*

Responses - Question n27	Percentages
Very Positive	2.9
Positive	7.8
Neutral	26.6
Negative	17.9
Very Negative	44.9

*Note.*  $n = 1043$



Comments provided by soldiers in the "general comment" section also provided some insights into the initial negativity toward recall. Because the soldiers chose what to write in this section and were not responding to any particular question, it could be assumed that these comments reflect the concerns of greatest importance to them. Of the 2641 respondents in the sample, 1752 (66.3%) chose to provide comments. These comments were grouped according to theme and used as background information to facilitate interpretation of responses to other questions.

Among the comments, 272 (10.3% of respondents) had themes or statements about detrimental effects the recall would have upon some aspect of civilian life and/or about family concerns. A dislike for Army life was expressed in 98 comments (3.7% of respondents). These men had left the Army behind them and made progress in building new lives and assuming new identities as civilians. In this process some appear to have emphasized the negative aspects of Army life and the positive aspects of civilian life. It cannot be determined from the current data whether negativity toward the Army may have increased as part of a process of reducing mental conflict or dissonance after making a life-changing decision such as the choice of a civilian rather than a military career; or whether these men had left the Army because they did not like it and held negative opinions in the first place.

Many soldiers indicated by their comments that the recall was perceived as an unwanted intrusion and possibly as a threat to the new lives they had worked hard to establish. It would slow down and/or undercut some of the progress made in moving on with their lives. These comments included expressed fears about loss of progress in school, career, business and/or relationships. The extent to which comments focused on these areas revealed that the men were experiencing much of early mobilization from the civilian perspective. They had not returned to the attitudes and habits of the soldier mind set and identity that they had recently left behind.

A second prominent factor from the comments was that a number of these men seemed to have been genuinely shocked by the fact that they were recalled. A number of comments (104, 3.9% of respondents) raised the issue of why the IRR was called before National Guard and other Selected Reserve units. There appears to have been a belief among at least some of the IRR members that they were truly an "army of last resort" and that they would never be called until every available Active and Selected Reserve unit was deployed.

Along with this appeared to be a belief that an IRR call-up was not entirely fair. About 96 comments (3.6% of respondents) used words or themes having to do with having "done my time." Not only did several comments point out that the IRR member receives no pay and benefits like members of the Selected Reserve, but several expressed the feeling that civilians who had no military experience should be tapped by the military for service before those who had already done a tour of duty.

IRR soldiers also reported anticipating some problems at home attributable to their absence. Responses to specific questions revealed anticipated problems in those areas shown in Table 18. Many soldiers wrote comments which addressed their particular concerns in these areas.

Table 18  
*Reported Problem Areas at Home*

Responses - Question 11 A-F	Percentages
Financial	36.4
Family stress	70.8
Employment	18.0
Business	12.2
Education	29.4
Other	10.1

*Note.*  $n=2641$

Most comments relating to financial concerns noted the loss of salary which would be caused by the call-up. Many of these specifically mentioned that they would be in a financial bind with regard to current bills and payments. Just over half (51.4%) of the soldiers expected a loss of income during the recall as opposed to those who expected to break even (30.0%) or to gain income (18.7%) [Question 25 A,  $n=2461$ ]. (Wisher et al. (1991) reported that 60 percent of their respondents expected to lose income.)

Comments regarding problems with employment most often concerned loss of job opportunities which were not secured by permanent status or tenure. A number of people seemed to have been in the process of applying for jobs or in the training or trial phase of a job. Several were concerned over losing upcoming promotions and some were concerned simply about further delay and increased age in getting established in the business world.

The self-employed and those with self or family-owned businesses expressed a number of concerns. These related to losses of clients or customers, lack of adequate help to manage the business or to perform the work involved, and loss of business opportunities.

Concerns over education almost all centered around delay of schooling. These included concerns over age at graduation, being unable to schedule appropriate courses again for another year, and simple displeasure at having wasted half a semester or quarter's effort and being unable to complete the work. Again, age appeared to be a factor. Many seemed to be keenly aware that postponing college until after a military tour had caused them to get a later start than their contemporaries. Age was a serious problem for a few who faced the possibility of going over the age limits for admittance to flight, medical, or other special schools.

The area of concern most frequently reported was that of family stress (70.8%). Many comments directly addressed only the anxieties of parents, spouses and other family members for the soldier's welfare and safe return. A number of other comments, however, reflected soldiers' concerns about their families' ability to cope in their absence. Their concerns included pregnant wives, ill family members, and various needs and dependencies which were not being met. It might be noted in this regard, that IRR families are not networked into military support systems provided for active service families. Thus, some problems from the sudden absence of a supporting

household member should be expected, and many IRR soldiers did anticipate some difficulty for the family in their absence (Table 19).

Table 19  
*Anticipated Difficulty of Spouse and/or Family Management  
in the Soldier's Absence*

Responses - Question 12	Percentages
Fairly easy	18.5
Somewhat difficult	36.0
Very difficult	31.3
Don't Know	14.3

*Note.*  $n = 2528$

Other problem-areas anticipated at home often related to those who were in a period of transition. These included newlyweds, those with newborns, those who were moving and/or buying houses, those planning weddings, the newly engaged, and those getting divorces. It is possible that these types of problems as well as those related to newly-established careers and business and delays in education may be more frequent among RT-12 than among other IRR members. Having been away from Active Duty for one year or less would imply that one is at a transitional phase of life.

### **What Did They Experience During the Recall?**

#### ***Orders***

Specific questions regarding recall orders were asked on the revised survey only. Responses to these showed that most orders had come to the correct address (70.3%) [Question n28 A,  $n = 1057$ ]. (Presumably, the other orders had been forwarded to the soldiers either by the Post Office or by friends or relatives living at the address where the orders originally arrived.) Most orders (82.2%) accurately showed the soldier's name, rank and other information according to soldier reports [Question n28 B,  $n = 1051$ ]. (Note: It should be remembered that this survey was administered to IRR members already on site, who had somehow received their orders. These percentages do not account for soldiers who possibly never received orders because of incorrect addresses and hence never reported to Fort Benning.)

The average of the number of days IRR soldiers indicated that they had between receiving their orders and their reporting date was 6.78 [Question n28 D,  $n = 1036$ ]. In the general comment section, 120 soldiers (4.5% of respondents) indicated that their reporting time was definitely too short to get their personal affairs in order before leaving.

Only about half (49%) of respondents had found the orders to be adequate, containing sufficient

information on needed topics [Question n28 C,  $n=1048$ ]. Topic areas where soldiers found information in orders to be inadequate or insufficient to eliminate confusion were as shown in Table 20. These topic areas were provided as a checklist on the revised survey only. Areas were developed from comments given by soldiers on the original survey.

Table 20  
*Topics where Information on Orders was Inadequate*

Response Checklist - Question n29 A-H	Percentages Indicating Inadequacy
Uniform/civilian attire	45.5
Equipment	26.9
Transportation requirements	25.4
Family support requirements	19.4
Family support availability	17.4
Reporting location	13.5
Reporting time	12.9

*Note.*  $n=1066$

From Table 20, it is clear that the most frequent source of confusion (45.5%) was what clothing should be brought. Orders apparently indicated that uniforms should be brought and then new ones were issued, causing some soldiers to have two sets to carry and maintain. Others prepared for the wrong type of weather and some failed to bring items that they felt would have been useful.

A number of soldiers reported in comment sections that they had difficulty getting travel agents and/or airline ticket agents to accept the travel warrant or voucher. It was apparently very unusual in appearance which caused a hesitation on the part of agents to accept its validity. A number of soldiers also commented that the travel voucher was not honored for the bus ride from Atlanta to Fort Benning and that they were forced to pay for this out of pocket. (However, only 11.8 percent of respondents reported trouble in getting transportation [Question 56 A,  $n=2618$ ].)

Written comments illuminate somewhat the results regarding reporting time and location. Some were concerned that only a specific day and installation were given for reporting; but no time, address, building number, or office symbol was provided. There was also no point of contact for reporting emergencies which might have precluded one from being there on the designated day.

Over half (55.6%) reported having attempted to clarify information by calling the telephone number on the orders [Question n30 A,  $n=1040$ ]. Of those who did call, responses were mixed regarding the usefulness of the information received (Table 21). Less than half indicated the information to be useful at all (38.9%).

Table 21  
*Rated Usefulness of Calling the Telephone Number on Orders*

Responses - Question n30 B	Percentages
Quite useful	16.6
A little useful	22.3
A little useless	13.7
Quite useless	41.3
Not sure	6.2

*Note.*  $n=615$

A number of soldiers (19.0%) also reported having called other locations for information. Comments showed these locations to have ranged from local recruiting offices to soldiers' old units, and nearest Army installations [Question n30 C,  $n=1021$ ].

Many soldiers used the opportunity to comment about orders to share what was apparently a major concern, that of what was ultimately to happen to them. Many suggested that orders should have been explicit about what, where, when, why, and for how long the Army would need them. Similarly, 150 of the general comments (5.7% of respondents) contained statements to the effect that more information about this was needed and reflected frustration that no one during either in-processing or training seemed to be able to reduce this uncertainty.

### *In-processing*

Nearly half (45.1%) of soldiers rated the quality and efficiency of in-processing as about the same as that previously experienced with the Army. Another 44.5 percent found it to be somewhat worse (Table 22). (Since mobilization under the current set of plans has never occurred before, there was no ready basis for comparison. Comparison to soldiers' previous Army experiences may be a bit unfair, since these probably occurred under well-established and frequently-practiced routines such as those of in-processing as part of Basic Training.)

Table 22  
*Quality and Efficiency of In-processing as Compared to Other Army Experience*

Responses - Question 58	Percentages
Much better	2.4
Better	8.0
About the same	45.1
Worse	26.8
Much worse	17.7

*Note.*  $n=2589$

About fifty-six percent (55.9%) of the soldiers reported that they had problems during their in-processing phase. On the revised survey, they were specifically queried about possible problem areas and responded as shown in Table 23. They could respond to each area separately and some indicated problems in more than one.

Table 23  
*Areas in which Reported In-processing Problems  
were Experienced*

Responses - Question n57 B 1-12	Percentages
Finance	17.4
CIIP	7.5
ID	6.8
Medical	24.3
Dental	15.8
Optometry	8.5
Immunization	7.5
Family care	10.4
Education	6.5
SJA (Legal)	7.3
AG	5.9
Other	9.2

*Note.*  $n = 1066$

As can be seen, the most frequent problem area was medical (24.3%). Most written complaints regarding medical screening on the Infantry IRR survey appeared to relate to failure to screen for or to find some pre-existing medical problem which might have resulted in either treatment or discharge. Steinberg (1991) addressed medical screening at some length. She found that most complaints about medical in-processing fell into one of four categories: perceived lack of concern; inadequate screening; refusal to acknowledge the existence of a medical problem; or refusal to consider a medical problem as sufficient reason for being excused from Active Duty.

Finally, soldiers were asked specifically whether problems related to long lines and waits, records, or other difficulties. Responses are shown in Table 24. Percentages for original and revised questionnaires are presented separately. This is because the questions were worded slightly differently. Also, all original surveys were administered earlier in the process than revised ones, and soldiers answering the two versions may have had different in-processing experiences. Those responding to the original survey were not asked where they were initially ordered to report. However, since these surveys were administered early, most respondents had probably come directly

to Fort Benning. Most respondents to the revised survey had either originally reported to Fort Benning (29.7%); or had reported to Fort Drum (37.1%) or Fort Ord (32.8%) first [Question n56 B,  $n = 1054$ ].

Observable differences in percentages between the two surveys occurred. Long lines and waits were less often seen as a problem by those responding to the revised survey. This may have occurred because the crowds became smaller and/or the in-processing became more efficient as time passed. While one might also conjecture that spreading work across two locations may have facilitated in-processing; this appears not to have been true. The most frequent comment for this group appeared to be that too much was done redundantly at the reporting installation and then again at Fort Benning.

Table 24  
*Types of In-processing Problems*

Responses - Questions 57 B-D/ & n57 C 1-3	Percentages	
	Old Survey <sup>a</sup>	Revised Survey <sup>b</sup>
Long lines/waits	67.3	36.6
Errors in records	23.8	-
Wrong/misplaced records	-	26.5
Receiving equipment	15.1	-
Other	17.4	14.2

<sup>a</sup> $n = 2641$ . <sup>b</sup> $n = 1066$ .

For a more extensive analysis of comments regarding complaints about in-processing, the reader is referred to Steinberg (1991). The analysis of comments in that report mirror our findings. Additional information may also be found in that report regarding complaints about training and the training environment.

### *Training*

More than half (61.9%) of those soldiers who were asked (on the revised survey) felt that they had experienced problems in their training unit [Question n61 A,  $n = 1066$ ]. A checklist of possible problem areas was provided based upon comments from the earlier survey. Percentages of men checking each of these areas as a problem for them are as shown in Table 25.

Table 25  
*Training Environment Factors and  
 Percentages Indicating these to Be Problems*

Responses - Question n61 B-G	Percentages
Interaction with drill sergeants/cadre	31.4
Curfew	38.8
Lack of free time	57.2
Training	27.2
Freedom to smoke	11.7
Other	13.6

*Note.*  $n = 1066$

The largest reported problem here was lack of free time (57.2%). Curfew (38.8%), as shown in the table above, contributed to lack of free time by eliminating freedom during late night hours. A number of written comments also related to this factor. These included lack of sleep, long hours, long waits for various in-processing activities, and questions as to whether some training activities were necessary.

Most comments regarding problems in interacting with drill sergeants from the general comment section (179, 6.8% of respondents) indicated that drill sergeants were retaining the directive roles and behaviors normally used with basic trainees while IRR soldiers were not basic trainees. Fort Benning commanders were aware that this mismatch of role and associated behavior was problematic and were taking steps to ameliorate it. This had apparently met with some success, as reflected by a number of comments that the drill sergeants were treating the men fairly and "like soldiers."

Closer analysis of overall comments, however, suggests that there may be a deeper problem than one requiring simply a change in drill sergeant behavior. The drill sergeant represents basic training and all the enforcement of discipline that goes with it. As one soldier expressed it, the mere presence of drill sergeants was annoying. Apparently, the very idea that they were needed was insulting, as were restrictions on behavior and other facets of the basic training environment. A number of the IRR soldiers seemed to find the fact that they were in an Initial Entry Training environment insulting and to have had difficulty understanding why they were there. Did this mean that they were no longer believed to be proficient in basic skills? Were they being considered "2nd class" soldiers? Some seemed to feel that being out for a few months had cost them all the status they had previously earned.

This situation was probably exacerbated by the very fact of Operation Desert Storm. A number of these men wanted to go to Saudi Arabia and many believed that they eventually would (see Table 26). They must have faced the possibility that they might not return. Given this, they expected to be treated with honor and dignity. (Many may have witnessed the ceremony surrounding the departure of many active units on television or elsewhere.) Hence, they found being subjected to



a restrictive environment to be especially unjust. As one soldier put it, "I don't need to be treated like a kid before I die."

The solution most frequently offered by soldiers (65 general comments, 2.5% of respondents) was to be sent directly to the receiving unit for training. They argued that those things being taught at Fort Benning could be handled by the unit and that more advanced and/or collective training could also be accomplished. It is likely that earlier assignment to units would have had a positive effect on attitudes. It would have both reduced some uncertainty about the future and provided quicker resolution of the temporary "identity crisis" discussed below.

### What Were Their Attitudes toward Combat?

Three-quarters (73%) of the men answering this question felt that it was somewhat to very likely that they would be assigned to a combat zone (Table 26). One's willingness to become involved in combat often relates to the perceived justice of the cause and the level of necessity. Comments revealed that some did perceive a great opportunity to do a worthwhile service for their country. Others stated philosophical disagreement with the ongoing action in Southwest Asia and/or with war in general. In the general comment section, 115 (4.4% of respondents) stated a definite desire to go to Saudi Arabia, 39 (1.5% of respondents) stated specifically that they wanted *not to go* to combat, and 44 (1.7% of respondents) stated objections to the war.

Table 26  
*Self-estimated Likelihood of Assignment to a Combat Zone*

Responses - Question 51	Percentages
Very likely	41.7
Somewhat likely	31.3
Possible	13.8
Very unlikely	2.9
Do not know	10.2

*Note.*  $n=2615$

When asked directly about their feelings regarding assignment to combat, IRR soldiers' responses varied across the entire scale. The three largest frequency groups were: those who "did not mind" (26.5%); those who were "uncertain" (21.3%); and those who "strongly did not want to go" (24.5%).

Table 27  
*Feelings about Being Assigned to a Combat Zone*

Responses - Question 52	Percentages
Strongly want to go	14.1
Do not mind going	26.5
Uncertain	21.3
Do not want to go	13.6
Strongly do not want to go	24.5

*Note.*  $n=25$

Whatever their personal feelings about combat, about half (49.8%) of the IRR soldiers indicated that they felt they were ready to go. Another one-fourth (25.0%) were not sure and the remaining fourth (25.2%) did not feel ready (Table 28).

Table 28  
*Self-estimated Readiness for Combat*

Responses - Question 53	Percentages
I am sure I am ready	21.3
I think I am ready	28.5
I am not sure	25.0
I do not think I am ready	9.6
I am sure I am not ready	15.6

*Note.*  $n=2604$

### What Were Their Preferred Assignments?

When soldiers were asked directly whether they preferred to be reassigned with members of their old units, they overwhelmingly (76.1%) indicated that they did [Question 47 C,  $n=2531$ ]. When those soldiers in the sample who had previously belonged to COHORT units (21.8%) were compared to non-COHORT soldiers, the trend was shown to be slightly stronger for the COHORT soldiers. (About eighty percent (80.3%) of them desired old-unit reassignment as compared to 74.7 percent of non-COHORT soldiers.)

It is very significant, but is not surprising that soldiers wished to return to units that they had known. The opportunity to do this would have provided them with the reassurance of familiarity in a situation fraught with uncertainty. It would have facilitated the re-establishment of their

identities as soldiers. And, as some implied in their comments, if confronted with combat, they would rather go with those with whom they had trained and in whom they had gained trust.

In additional questioning, soldiers were asked to choose among a number of assignment preferences. Preferences for the former unit remained strong (23.9%). However, if given the opportunity, almost half (48.6%) of IRR soldiers would have preferred to be assigned near home, reflecting the strength of family and civilian concerns. About one in 12 wanted to go to the Middle East and the remainder selected miscellaneous other preferences or none (Table 29).

Table 29  
*Most Preferred Assignments*

Responses - Question n63	Percentages
Continental U.S./home	48.6
Continental U. S./Elsewhere	3.6
My old unit	23.9
Middle East	8.6
Pacific/Asia	1.8
Europe	3.2
All other	8.8
No preference	1.6

*Note.*  $n = 946$

#### **What Were Their Attitudes at the Time of Survey Administration?**

Overall, 39 percent of IRR soldiers rated what they had encountered during the recall to be about the same as what they had expected. About one of five (19.6%) found it to be better and the rest (41.4%) found it to be worse (Table 30). Further information would be required to determine what other personal and/or situational factors relate to these attitudes.

Table 30  
*Ratings of Recall Experience as Compared to Expectations*

Responses - Question 59	Percentages
Much better	3.0
Better	16.6
About the same	39.0
Worse	25.4
Much worse	16.0

*Note.*  $n = 2598$

Soldiers were also asked how they felt at that moment about being recalled. Responses, shown in Table 31, tended to parallel those for Question 54 which asked how soldiers felt about the recall when they first received their notices. (Percentages from that question are shown in parentheses for comparison.) Because these questions occurred on the same survey which was given at a single point in time, this would be expected. However, responses to Question 54 (regarding first notice) indicated that the initial source of negativity was the call-up itself. Hence, negativity felt at the time of the survey should not be interpreted to be a response to what happened to the soldiers after they reported. In fact, attitudes at the time of survey appear to be somewhat more positive if one examines the comparable percentages. (There are almost ten percent fewer "very negative" attitudes for Question 60; and there are higher percentages in the more moderate categories of "negative," "neutral," and "positive.")

Table 31  
*Current Feelings about Being Recalled*

Responses - Question 60	Percentages	
Very Positive	6.5	( 6.2) <sup>b</sup>
Positive	13.2	(11.2)
Neutral	26.4	(22.7)
Negative	17.1	(14.3)
Very Negative	36.8	(45.6)

*Note.*  $n=2584$ . <sup>b</sup>Percentages from Question 54 showing the same response at first notice are in parentheses.

### **General Comments and the Uncertainty Factor**

It is particularly striking that so many of the IRR soldiers (1752, 66.3 percent of those surveyed) chose to write in the general comment space. It is much more typical in survey administration to have far fewer respondents choose to do so. Thus, the very frequency of comments in this group may be an indicator that the opinions were strongly held. Steinberg (1991) reported that over half of her survey sample also commented despite the fact that space available for comments on the survey form was quite small.

A list of themes or topics most frequently found among the general comments is included in Table 32. While comments have been grouped into categories as shown, this is something of an arbitrary as well as a subjective process. This type of data is much more subject to interpretation than are frequencies of responses to checklist items. However, such data can be very useful for gaining insight into understanding the attitudes and behaviors of IRR soldiers. Many of the themes have already been discussed in conjunction with answers to other survey questions. The remainder, shown in Table 32, will be discussed below.

Table 32  
*Frequencies of General Comments by Theme*

Theme of Comment	Frequency	Percentages	
		Comments	Sample
Effects on family/civilian life	272	15.5	10.3
Treated like a trainee	179	10.2	6.8
Information to reduce uncertainty	150	8.6	5.7
Problems with in-processing	149	8.5	5.6
Comments about training	138	7.9	5.2
Notice was too short	120	6.8	4.5
Want to go to Saudi Arabia	115	6.6	4.4
Call Selected Reserve first	104	5.9	3.9
Comments about drill sergeants	102	5.8	3.9
Dislike of the Army	98	5.6	3.7
"Did my time"	96	5.5	3.6
Concerns over assignment	91	5.2	3.4
Better method of call-up	75	4.3	2.8
Request reassignment to old unit	69	3.9	2.6
Want to go to a unit for training	65	3.7	2.5
Mention of physical problems	61	3.5	2.3
Objections to war	44	2.5	1.7
Do not want to go to combat	39	2.2	1.5
"The Army doesn't need us."	34	1.9	1.3
Leave to go home after training	32	1.8	1.2

*Note.* A total of 1752 soldiers chose to comment. Percentages of both total comments and total survey sample ( $n=2641$ ) are shown.

Comment themes in Table 32 are listed in the order of the frequency in which they occurred. However, some topics probably would have been mentioned more often in the general comment section except that there was opportunity to comment on them elsewhere in the survey. Given this, frequency of comments shown here should be taken as a very imperfect indicator of the order of magnitude of the concerns.

The area most frequently mentioned had to do with civilian and family life. Family concerns are certainly understandable. However, the emphasis on these and other civilian life factors such as work and school highlights the fact that the men had not yet made the transition into thinking as soldiers.

They had been required to leave behind their civilian lives on short notice. However, they were no longer members of their old units. Neither were they Army basic trainees. The IRR is an administrative grouping with no identity or interaction as a unit. So how should the IRR soldier

have reacted? He could have seen through the eyes of a civilian deprived of his home and family, of a patriot eager to fight for his country, of a soldier deprived of his unit, of a college sophomore waxing philosophical about war, or of a citizen called against his wishes in an era when there is no draft. Elements of all these viewpoints were found in the responses given.

These men were temporarily caught in what might be termed a circumstantially-produced "identity crisis." Typically, people determine how to react to events and situations from the vantage point of their role or identity in life. For the IRR soldier at this point in time, that would have been difficult. This would have contributed to the stress and confusion of the situation. It should have faded as adjustment back to Army life occurred. Unit assignment, where the soldier could find a situation with some permanence where he could begin to rely upon his identity, habits and attitudes as a soldier, would have facilitated this process. However, the soldiers were not identifying with the circumstances being provided by the Army. This is indicated by the second most frequently mentioned concern, that of being treated "like a trainee"

The third most frequently mentioned topic was the desire for information to reduce uncertainty. As discussed before, the information desired included all aspects of why the soldiers were there and what would happen to them in the future to include where they would be, for how long, and with whom. This is very understandable in that uncertainty in itself is anxiety-producing. There was also an element of danger in that these soldiers knew that the mobilization had occurred in connection with Operation Desert Storm. What they did not know was whether they were to participate directly in that operation or not. This provided a backdrop for serious introspection in an attempt to cope with the situation.

Given this, the effect of any lack of information was to leave the soldier to deal with all of his imaginary "worst case" scenarios as well as trying to avoid getting his hopes up falsely for better outcomes. Since he was in no position to make a decision, certainty of information would have been the only basis upon which he could resolve his conflicts and dilemmas. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that uncertainty was a major source of frustration. Again, this problem would have resolved itself as events began to unfold. This is not to imply that there were no attempts to provide information. Our experience during observation was that strong efforts were being made locally to provide accurate and up-to-date information.

Comments about training were mixed. They included both positive and negative comments and a number of suggestions. A number of factors may have had an effect on this. The desire to go to a unit may have prompted soldiers to over-value unit training over that available at the training-station. Pride may have caused some to feel that they had remained better trained than they really were. The possibility of combat may have heightened the desire for more training. Since all these factors would operate differently, they would produce mixed results.

Suggestions for a better method of call-up was a theme which included primarily comments about screening. The general theme was that screening which would have picked up medical problems, possible hardships, and disciplinary problems, should have been done earlier in the process and closer to the soldier's home. Such screening would have saved taxpayer money and soldier inconvenience.

"The Army doesn't need us." was a theme that seemed to relate both to other available groups, e.g., Selected Reserve, and to combat, i.e, if they were not needed to go and fight immediately they

were not needed. There did seem to be some striving to see good purpose in having had one's life rather rudely interrupted. Some example comments might illustrate this theme most clearly.

"I was glad to be recalled in such a case like this with a war going on. If there was another reason for calling me back, I would hate the idea. I would be proud to go fight beside the men and women in the Middle East, and for the American people."

"I don't mind being recalled if I'm going to be used for something important. For example, I don't want to stay stateside and pull guard duty."

"If my life is going to be put on hold, it should be for a now situation, not just in case another unit is needed."

Another theme, expressions of the desire for leave to go home after training appeared to be most related to the quickness of the initial departure without desired opportunity to say "good-byes" and get one's personal affairs in order. They also appeared to be related to some concern that they might go into combat before returning home or that they might not return at all.

Comments regarding problems with in-processing, concerns over assignment, and request for assignment to old units mirror the results discussed earlier regarding direct questions in those areas. Comments regarding physical problems were generally similar to those discussed under medical screening.

Additional, less frequently mentioned concerns from comments included those expressing the desire to somehow be rewarded for the inconvenience of the recall. This included suggestions that the soldiers receive benefits such as a bonus or additional Montgomery G. I. Bill money for college; the desire to be first to go home when it was over; and the desire to know what would happen to those who had not responded to the call-up. (Presumably the latter would assure those who did report that they had at least avoided punishment.) The essence of this theme appeared to be to find ways to justify the life interruption. In that sense, they relate to the "Army doesn't need us" theme discussed above. Both are related to the desire to see purpose in a rather traumatic event and to have it have a positive outcome.

### Summary

Overall, it appears that the typical Infantry IRR soldier had left Active Duty about 6 months prior to recall at the age of 23 with a rank of Corporal/Specialist 4. He had completed about 3 years of service. He had remained fairly well-trained and reasonably physically fit. Although he did not like having his job, schooling and family life interrupted, he returned as called. From the soldier's perspective, he would have preferred longer notice, more informative orders, more efficient in-processing and assignment directly to a unit (preferably his old unit). He felt a little insulted that he was in an Initial Entry Training environment and was not sure why he was there. He thought it very likely that he would go to combat and was not sure whether he was ready. He was concerned about his family. He was frustrated by lack of free time and he was very frustrated by lack of information. He was eager to know what his new assignment would be and would have been happy to be stationed near home. He thought he needed more training, but that he could get it at a unit. In general, he was not very happy with his temporary situation and wanted to get on with his life.

## REFERENCES

- Reserve Forces Policy Board. (1991). *Reserve component programs Fiscal Year 1990: The annual report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Steinberg, A. G. (1991). *Individual ready reserve (IRR) call-up: Attitudes, motivation, and concerns* (ARI Research Report 1594). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. (AD A239 362)
- Wisher, R. A., Sabol, M. A., Sukenik, H. K., & Kern, R. P. (1991). *Individual ready reserve (IRR) call-up: Skill decay* (ARI Research Report 1595). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. (AD A239 371)



## APPENDIX A: REVISED SURVEY

1. NAME: \_\_\_\_\_  
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MI

2. SSN: \_\_\_\_ - \_\_\_\_ - \_\_\_\_

TRAINING CO.: \_\_\_\_\_

ROSTER NO.: \_\_\_\_\_

### INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE SURVEY

Your responses to this survey will become part of a body of data that will permit Fort Benning to study and report on its part of the operation of recalling, processing, and training Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) soldiers. Studying this operation will assist the Army in improving procedures in the future. A large recall of IRR such as this one is not a frequent occurrence. Consequently, there are few opportunities for lessons to be learned. Yours and others responses to this survey will be important sources of information about IRR soldiers in terms of background, attitudes, needs, and confidence. Your responses will provide one of the few views of IRR recall procedures we are likely to have. These are very important pieces of the total picture. Fort Benning's Commanding General and the Army Research Institute greatly appreciate your full and careful completion of this questionnaire.

### PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

Public Law 93-573, called the Privacy Act of 1974, requires that you be informed of the purpose and uses to be made of the information collected.

The Department of the Army may collect the information requested in this questionnaire under the authority of 10 United States Code 137. Providing information in this questionnaire is voluntary. Failure to respond to any particular questions will not result in any penalty.

The information collected in this questionnaire will be used solely for research purposes. Social Security Numbers and names are requested only for tracking and control purposes.

Your response will be held in strict confidence. No one outside the research team will have access to individual data.

*This personnel data collection form was developed for the U.S. Army Infantry Center by the U.S. Army Research Institute Fort Benning Field Unit pursuant to its research mission, as prescribed in AR 10-7. When identifiers are requested they are to be used for administrative and statistical control purposes only. Full confidentiality will be maintained in the processing of these data.*

To answer each question, please CIRCLE THE NUMBER OF THE CORRECT RESPONSE and/or FILL IN THE BLANK.

3A. Rank:

1. PV1/PV2
2. PFC
3. SP4/CPL
4. SGT
5. SSG
6. SFC
7. 1SG/MSG
8. SGM/CSM
9. Other \_\_\_\_\_

4. Year of Birth: \_\_\_\_\_

5. Residence at time of recall:

City: (5A) \_\_\_\_\_

State: (5B) \_\_\_\_\_

6. Marital Status:

1. married
2. single
3. divorced

7A. How many people depend upon you for financial support?

1. no one (I receive support.)
2. self only
3. self & others

How many total? (7B) \_\_\_\_\_

8. Civilian education (highest grade/diploma/degree attained).

1. never finished high school
2. high school/GED
3. some college
4. college degree
5. graduate work

9. When you received your recall notice were you attending:

1. college
2. trade or vocational school
3. graduate school
4. other \_\_\_\_\_
5. no, was not in school

10. If you were in school when recalled, were you using Montgomery Bill (GI Bill) benefits?

1. yes
2. no

11. Do you expect any problems at home because of your absence? (Circle all that apply.)

(11A) financial

(11B) family stress

(11C) employment

(11D) business/property

(11E) education

(11F) other

Please describe: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

12. Overall, how easy or difficult do you expect it to be for your spouse and/or others at home to manage in your absence?

1. fairly easy

2. somewhat difficult

3. very difficult

4. don't know

13A. Current Primary MOS and Skill Level.

1. 11B (Light)

2. 11B (Mech)

3. 11C

4. 11H

5. 11M

6. Other \_\_\_\_\_

(13B) 1. Skill Level 1

2. Skill Level 2

3. Skill Level 3

4. Skill Level 4

14. List any Secondary MOS \_\_\_\_\_

15. List any prior MOS \_\_\_\_\_

16. List any ASI (additional skill identifier) \_\_\_\_\_

17. Last Active Duty assignment, if any:

(17A) none

(17B) Unit \_\_\_\_\_

(17C) Duty position \_\_\_\_\_

(17D) Location \_\_\_\_\_

(17E) ETS date \_\_\_\_\_

18. Last Reserve Component assignment, if any (other than IRR):

(18A) none

(18B) Unit \_\_\_\_\_

(18C) Duty position \_\_\_\_\_

(18D) Location \_\_\_\_\_

(18E) ETS date \_\_\_\_\_

19. How many total years/months U.S. Army experience do you have?

active duty? (19A) \_\_\_\_\_ years (19B) \_\_\_\_\_ months  
reserve units? (19C) \_\_\_\_\_ years (19D) \_\_\_\_\_ months

n19E. Do you have experience in the U.S. Armed Services other than Army?

1. no
2. yes, Air Force
3. yes, Marines
4. yes, Navy
5. yes, Coast Guard

If yes, how many total years/months non-Army military experience do you have?

active duty? (19F) \_\_\_\_\_ years (19G) \_\_\_\_\_ months  
reserve units? (19H) \_\_\_\_\_ years (19I) \_\_\_\_\_ months

20. How long have you been assigned to the IRR?

(20A) \_\_\_\_\_ years (20B) \_\_\_\_\_ months

21. Before you received your recall notice how long was your remaining service obligation in the IRR?

(21A) \_\_\_\_\_ years (21B) \_\_\_\_\_ months

n22. Did you realize when you first enlisted that your contract was for a longer time (usually a total of 8 years) than your required Active Service?

1. yes
2. no

n23. Why did you leave the Active Army (or other service) or active participation in a Reserve or National Guard unit? Please mark only the reason that best describes your circumstance. If none applies, please mark "Other."

1. Involuntarily Chaptered out of active/reserve duty, medical problem.
2. Involuntarily Chaptered out of active/reserve duty, non-medical.
3. Chose to leave active/reserve duty to pursue education.
4. Chose to leave active/reserve duty for personal/family reasons.
5. Chose to leave active/reserve duty because I did not like it.
6. Left my Reserve/National Guard unit because I moved to another location.
7. Other, please explain. \_\_\_\_\_

24A. Did your recall cause you to leave a civilian job?

1. no
2. yes, Job Title (24B) \_\_\_\_\_

25A. Will you have a loss of income during your recall compared with your civilian job pay?

1. yes, I will lose about (25B) \$ \_\_\_\_\_ per month
2. no, about the same
3. no, I will be gaining income

n26. After you left Active Duty, how did you feel about the Army?

1. liked it very much
2. liked it
3. neither liked it nor disliked it
4. disliked it
5. disliked it very much
6. not applicable, never was on active duty

n27. How do you feel about being subject to recall under IRR status?

1. very positive
2. positive
3. neutral
4. negative
5. very negative

n28A. When you first received your orders from ARPERCEN, did they come to your correct current address?

1. yes
2. no

n28B. Were the orders accurate?

1. yes
2. no

If not, what were the errors? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

n28C. Were the orders adequate, containing all the information you needed?

1. yes
2. no

If not, what additional information was needed? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

n28D. How many days were there between the day you received your orders and your report date? \_\_\_\_\_ days

n29. After receiving your orders, was there any confusion concerning what was expected of you about the following: (Circle all that apply.)

- 29A. no, there was no confusion
- 29B. yes, reporting time
- 29C. yes, reporting location
- 29D. yes, transportation requirements
- 29E. yes, family support requirements
- 29F. yes, family support availability
- 29G. yes, uniform/civilian attire
- 29H. yes, equipment
- 29I. yes, information in response to questions

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

n30A. Did you call the telephone number on your orders for further information?

- 1. yes
- 2. no

n30B. If you did call, how useful was the information you received?

- 1. quite useful
- 2. a little useful
- 3. a little useless
- 4. quite useless
- 5. not sure

n30C. Did you have any other telephone contact regarding your orders?

- 1. yes
- 2. no

With what agency? \_\_\_\_\_

Topic/comments: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

31A. How often do you exercise?

- 1. daily
- 2. several times a week
- 3. once a week
- 4. less than once a week

31B. Before you were recalled, how long was your typical exercise session?

\_\_\_\_\_ minutes long.

If you exercise regularly, what type(s) of activities do you choose?  
(Circle all that apply.)

- 31C. running
- 31D. swimming
- 31E. weights
- 31F. team sports
- 31G. other \_\_\_\_\_

32. Do you think you are in good physical condition?

- 1. yes, very good
- 2. yes, fairly good
- 3. no
- 4. undecided (not sure)

n33A. When did you last pass the APFT (before your recall)?  
(date) \_\_\_\_\_ month \_\_\_\_\_ year

n33B. Have you taken a PT test since you arrived at Fort Benning?

- 1. yes
- 2. no

n33C. If yes, what was your score? \_\_\_\_\_

34. If no, how confident are you that you could pass the APFT today?

- 1. very confident
- 2. confident
- 3. not very confident
- 4. not at all confident

35. Do you think that you are in tough enough physical condition for going into combat?

- 1. yes
- 2. no
- 3. undecided (not sure)

n36A. Have you had any military training since your last day of Active Duty?

- 1. yes
- 2. no

If yes, how long ago was this training?

(n36B) \_\_\_\_\_ months (n36C) \_\_\_\_\_ years

37. If yes, this training was with what type of unit?

- 1. Active Army (or other Active Service)
- 2. Reserve or National Guard

Please give course title, topic(s) covered or type of exercise. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

38. Have you ever trained with a unit at the National Training Center (NTC) or the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)?

1. yes, NTC
2. yes, JRTC
3. yes, both
4. no

If yes, please list/describe your duty position(s) during these exercises.

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

39. Have you ever been part of the opposing force (OPFOR) at NTC or JRTC?

1. yes, NTC
2. yes, JRTC
3. yes, both
4. no

40. How long ago did you last qualify with a service rifle?

(40A) \_\_\_\_\_ years (40B) \_\_\_\_\_ months

40C. With what rifle did you last qualify?

1. M14
2. M16A1
3. M16A2
4. other, what? \_\_\_\_\_

40D. On what type of range did you qualify?

1. indoor
2. outdoor range with paper targets
3. outdoor range with pop-up targets
4. other, type? \_\_\_\_\_

40E. With what type of unit did you qualify?

1. Active Army
2. Reserve Component

40F. What was your last rifle qualification rating?

1. expert
2. sharpshooter
3. marksman
4. unqualified
5. unknown



n41A. Have you qualified with other military weapons/weapon systems?

1. yes
2. no

n41B. If yes, with which weapons/weapon systems and when? (Mark all that apply.)

1a _____	M203	1b _____	year	1c _____	month
2a _____	TOW	2b _____	year	2c _____	month
3a _____	Dragon	3b _____	year	3c _____	month
4a _____	M60	4b _____	year	4c _____	month
5a _____	SAW	5b _____	year	5c _____	month
6a _____	Bradley	6b _____	year	6c _____	month
7a Other _____		7b _____	year	7c _____	month
8a Other _____		8b _____	year	8c _____	month

42. During this recall, will you keep your same MOS (or are you being reclassified)?

1. yes, keeping my same MOS
2. no, being reclassified
3. don't know

43. How much training do you feel you need to assume your active duty assignment?

1. none, I'm ready now
2. I need a little more of some training
3. I need a lot more of some training

44. How much training do you feel you would need if you were called to a combat situation?

1. none, I'm ready now
2. I need a little more of some training
3. I need a lot more of some training

n45. Please mark/list any specific tasks or skills for which you think you need training to be proficient.  
(Mark all that apply.)

- 45A. NBC
- 45B. First Aid
- 45C. Maintenance
- 45D. Weapons training
- 45E. Land Navigation
- 45F. ITT - Individual Tactical Training
- 45G. Communications
- 45H. MOUT - Military Operations on Urban Terrain
- 45I. Other MOS-specific \_\_\_\_\_
- 45J. Other Common Skill \_\_\_\_\_

46. How good a land navigator do you think you are?

1. very good
2. good
3. fair
4. poor
5. very poor

47A. Were you a member of a COHORT (Cohesion, Operational Readiness Training) unit while on active duty?

1. yes
2. no

If yes, please state unit: (n47A1) \_\_\_\_\_  
location: (n47A2) \_\_\_\_\_

47B. Do you know of other soldiers from your old unit who are also recalled?

1. yes
2. no

47C. Would you prefer to be reassigned with members of your old unit?

1. yes
2. no

47D. Have you attempted to be reassigned with members of your old unit?

1. yes
2. no

48. Since you have been at Fort Benning, have you seen soldiers you know from other units?

1. yes
2. no

49. How long do you expect to be on active duty as a result of this mobilization?

\_\_\_\_\_ months

50. Is there any factor in your personal situation which you think might cause you to be sent home early?

1. yes
2. no

If so, what \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

51. How likely do you think it is that you could be assigned to a combat zone at some time during this tour of duty?

1. very likely
2. somewhat likely
3. possible, but not likely
4. very unlikely
5. don't know

52. How would you feel about being assigned to a combat zone?

1. I strongly want to go
2. I do not mind going
3. I am uncertain
4. I do not want to go
5. I strongly do not want to go

53. If you were to go into a combat situation, would you feel ready?

1. yes, I am sure I am ready
2. yes, I think I am ready
3. I am not sure
4. no, I do not think I am ready
5. no, I am sure I am not ready

54. How did you feel about being recalled when you first received your notice?

1. very positive
2. positive
3. neutral
4. negative
5. very negative

55. How did you get to the Columbus/Fort Benning area?

1. plane
2. bus
3. train
4. POV
5. other \_\_\_\_\_

56A. Did you have any trouble getting transportation here?

1. yes
2. no

If yes, what was the trouble? \_\_\_\_\_

n56B. To what mobilization station were you originally ordered to report?

1. Fort Benning
2. Fort Drum
3. Fort Ord
4. Fort Polk
5. Other, where? \_\_\_\_\_

n57A. Have you experienced any problems in-processing?

1. yes
2. no

n57B. If yes, in what area? (Circle all that apply.)

- |                  |                     |
|------------------|---------------------|
| (57B1) Finance   | (57B7) Immunization |
| (57B2) CIIP      | (57B8) Family Care  |
| (57B3) ID        | (57B9) Education    |
| (57B4) Medical   | (57B10) SJA (legal) |
| (57B5) Dental    | (57B11) AG          |
| (57B6) Optometry | (57B12) Other _____ |

557C. If yes, what were the problems? (Circle all that apply.)

(57C1) long lines/waits

(57C2) wrong/misplaced records

(57C3) other, what? \_\_\_\_\_

58. How would you rate the overall quality and efficiency of the processing you have experienced here compared with your other Army experience?

1. much better

2. better

3. about the same

4. worse

5. much worse

59. Overall, has what you have encountered so far during this recall been better or worse than you expected?

1. much better

2. better

3. about the same

4. worse

5. much worse

60. How do you feel right now about being recalled?

1. very positive

2. positive

3. neutral

4. negative

5. very negative

n61A. Have you experienced any problems in your training unit?

1. yes

2. no

If yes, circle all that apply.

(n61B) Interaction with Drill Sergeants/Cadre

(n61C) Curfew

(n61D) Lack of free time

(n61E) Training

(n61F) Freedom to smoke

(n61G) Other, what? \_\_\_\_\_

n62. How many days has it been since you arrived at Fort Benning for this IRR mobilization? \_\_\_\_\_

**n63.** If you had a choice of assignment, where would you most prefer to be assigned? (Mark only one answer.)

1. no preference
2. my old unit \_\_\_\_\_
3. CONUS - near my home
4. CONUS - elsewhere
5. Europe
6. Pacific/Asia
7. Middle East (Combat Zone)
8. Other, where?

ANY COMMENTS YOU WOULD LIKE TO ADD

This image shows a single sheet of white paper with horizontal ruling lines. The lines are evenly spaced and run across the width of the page. There are no margins, text, or other markings on the paper.

## APPENDIX B: ORIGINAL SURVEY

### INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE SURVEY

Your responses to this survey will become part of a body of data that will permit Fort Benning to study and report on its part of the operation of recalling, processing, and training Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) soldiers. Studying this operation will assist the Army in improving procedures in the future. A large recall of IRR such as this one is not a frequent occurrence. Consequently, there are few opportunities for lessons to be learned. Yours and others responses to this survey will be important sources of information about IRR soldiers in terms of background, attitudes, needs, and confidence. Your responses will provide one of the few views of IRR recall procedures we are likely to have. These are very important pieces of the total picture. Fort Benning's Commanding General and the Army Research Institute greatly appreciate your full and careful completion of this questionnaire.

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**The Department of the Army may collect the information requested in this questionnaire under the authority of 10 United States Code 137. Providing information in this questionnaire is voluntary. Failure to respond to any particular questions will not result in any penalty.**

**The information collected in this questionnaire will be used solely for research purposes. Social Security Numbers and names are requested only for tracking and control purposes.**

**Your responses will be held in strict confidence. No one outside the research team will have access to individual data.**

*This personnel data collection form was developed for the U.S. Army Infantry Center by the U.S. Army Research Institute Fort Benning Field Unit pursuant to its research mission, as prescribed in AR 10-7. When identifiers are requested they are to be used for administrative and statistical control purposes only. Full confidentiality will be maintained in the processing of these data.*

To answer each question, please CIRCLE THE NUMBER OF THE CORRECT RESPONSE and/or FILL IN THE BLANK.

1. Name (Last, First, M. I.) \_\_\_\_\_
2. Rank \_\_\_\_\_ 3. SSN \_\_\_\_\_ - \_\_\_\_\_ - \_\_\_\_\_
4. Date of Birth: (month, day, year): \_\_\_\_\_
5. Current Residence (City, State): \_\_\_\_\_
6. Marital Status:
  1. married
  2. single
  3. divorced
7. How many people depend upon you for financial support?
  1. no one (I receive support.)
  2. self only
  3. self & others How many total? \_\_\_\_\_
8. Civilian education (highest grade/diploma/degree attained).
  1. never finished high school
  2. high school/GED
  3. some college
  4. college degree
  5. graduate work
9. When you received your recall notice were you attending:
  1. college
  2. trade or vocational school
  3. graduate school
  4. other \_\_\_\_\_
  5. no, was not in school
10. If yes, were you using Montgomery Bill (GI Bill) benefits?
  1. yes
  2. no
11. Do you expect any problems at home because of your absence?  
(Circle all that apply.)

1. financial	4. business/property
2. family stress	5. education
3. employment	6. other

Please describe: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

12. Overall, how easy or difficult do you expect it to be for your spouse and/or others at home to manage in your absence?

1. fairly easy
2. somewhat difficult
3. very difficult
4. don't know

13. Current Primary MOS and Skill Level.

- |                |                  |
|----------------|------------------|
| 1. 11B (Light) | 1. Skill Level 1 |
| 2. 11B (Mech)  | 2. Skill Level 2 |
| 3. 11C         | 3. Skill Level 3 |
| 4. 11H         | 4. Skill Level 4 |
| 5. 11M         |                  |
| 6. Other _____ |                  |

14. List any Secondary MOS \_\_\_\_\_

15. List any prior MOS \_\_\_\_\_

16. List any ASI (additional skill identifier) \_\_\_\_\_

17. Last Active Duty assignment, if any:

- |                        |                   |
|------------------------|-------------------|
| 1. none                |                   |
| 2. Unit _____          | 3. Location _____ |
| 4. Duty position _____ | 5. ETS Date _____ |

18. Last Reserve Component assignment, if any:

- |                        |                   |
|------------------------|-------------------|
| 1. none                |                   |
| 2. Unit _____          | 3. Location _____ |
| 4. Duty position _____ | 5. ETS Date _____ |

19. How many total years/months U.S. Army experience do you have?

active duty?	_____ years	_____ months
reserve units?	_____ years	_____ months

20. How long have you been assigned to the IRR?

\_\_\_\_\_ years \_\_\_\_\_ months

21. Before you received your recall notice how long was your remaining service obligation in the IRR?

\_\_\_\_\_ years \_\_\_\_\_ months



22. Did you choose the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) rather than other duty options to fulfill your contract; or were you involuntarily assigned to IRR by the Army?

1. Voluntarily chose IRR rather than active/other duty.
2. Involuntarily assigned to IRR from active/other duty.

23. What was the reason for your choice of or your involuntary assignment to IRR? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

24. Did your recall cause you to leave a civilian job?

1. no
2. yes, Job Title \_\_\_\_\_

25. Will you have a loss of income during your recall compared with your civilian job pay?

1. yes, about \$ \_\_\_\_\_ per month
2. no, about the same
3. no, I will be gaining income

26. Is your civilian job related in any way to the military?

1. yes, DA or DOD Civilian
2. yes, defense contractor
3. yes, other What? \_\_\_\_\_
4. no

27. Have you gained or sharpened any skills on your civilian job that would be useful in a military situation?

1. yes
2. no

If yes, please list/describe. \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

28. Do you do any sport shooting?

1. yes
2. no

If so, in what context? (Circle all that apply.)

1. hunting
2. skeet shooting
3. pistol range
4. other What? \_\_\_\_\_

With what type(s) of weapon? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

How often?

1. more than once a month
2. about once a month
3. less than once a month

29. Do you have any hobbies, sports or avocations which might relate to military skills? (For example, vehicle maintenance, backpacking, orienteering.)

1. no
2. yes These are \_\_\_\_\_

31. How often do you exercise?

1. daily
2. several times a week
3. once a week
4. less than once a week

If you exercise regularly, what type(s) of activities do you choose?  
(Circle all that apply.)

1. running
2. swimming
3. weights
4. team sports
5. other \_\_\_\_\_

32. Do you think you are in good physical condition?

1. yes, very good
2. yes, fairly good
3. no
4. undecided (not sure)

33. When did you last pass the APFT?

\_\_\_\_\_ year \_\_\_\_\_ month

34. How confident are you that you could pass the APFT today?

1. very confident
2. confident
3. not very confident
4. not at all confident

35. Do you think that you are in tough enough physical condition for going into combat?

1. yes
2. no
3. undecided (not sure)

36. How long ago was your last Army training?

\_\_\_\_\_ months \_\_\_\_\_ years

37. This training was with what type of unit?

1. Active Army
2. Reserve or National Guard

Please give course title, topic(s) covered or type of exercise. \_\_\_\_\_

38. Have you ever trained with a unit at the National Training Center (NTC) or the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)?

1. yes, NTC
2. yes, JRTC
3. yes, both
4. no

If yes, please list/describe your duty position(s) during these exercises.

39. Have you ever been part of the opposing force (OPFOR) at NTC or JRTC?

1. yes, NTC
2. yes, JRTC
3. yes, both
4. no

40. How long ago did you last qualify with a service rifle?

\_\_\_\_\_ years \_\_\_\_\_ months

With what rifle did you last qualify?

1. M14
2. M16A1
3. M16A2
4. other, What? \_\_\_\_\_

On what type of range did you qualify?

1. indoor
2. outdoor range with paper targets
3. outdoor range with pop-up targets
4. Other Type? \_\_\_\_\_

With what type of unit did you qualify?

1. Active Army
2. Reserve Component

What was your last rifle qualification rating?

1. expert
2. sharpshooter
3. marksman
4. unqualified
5. unknown

41. When did you last qualify with another military weapon/weapon system?

\_\_\_\_\_ year \_\_\_\_\_ month

Which weapon/weapon system? \_\_\_\_\_

42. During this recall, will you keep your same MOS?

1. yes
2. no
3. don't know

43. How much training do you feel you need to assume your active duty assignment?

1. none, I'm ready now
2. I need a little more of some training
3. I need a lot more of some training

44. How much training do you feel you would need if you were called to a combat situation?

1. none, I'm ready now
2. I need a little more of some training
3. I need a lot more of some training

45. Please list any specific tasks or skills for which you think you need refresher training to be proficient again?

MOS-specific: \_\_\_\_\_

Basic combat: \_\_\_\_\_

46. How good a land navigator do you think you are?

1. very good
2. good
3. fair
4. poor
5. very poor

47. Were you a member of a COHORT (Cohesion, Operational Readiness Training) unit while on active duty?

1. yes
2. no

Do you know of other soldiers from your old unit who are also recalled?

1. yes
2. no

Would you prefer to be reassigned with members of your old unit?

1. yes
2. no

Have you been or will you be reassigned with members of your old unit?

1. yes
2. no
3. don't know yet

48. Since you have been at Fort Benning, have you seen soldiers you know from other units?

1. yes
2. no

49. How long do you expect to be on active duty as a result of this mobilization? \_\_\_\_\_ months

50. Is there any factor in your personal situation which you think might cause you to be sent home early?

1. yes
2. no

If so, what \_\_\_\_\_

51. How likely do you think it is that you could be assigned to a combat zone at some time during this tour of duty?

1. very likely
2. somewhat likely
3. possible, but not likely
4. very unlikely
5. don't know

52. How would you feel about being assigned to a combat zone?

1. I strongly want to go
2. I do not mind going
3. I am uncertain
4. I do not want to go
5. I strongly do not want to go

53. If you were to go into a combat situation, would you feel ready?

1. yes, I am sure I am ready
2. yes, I think I am ready
3. I am not sure
4. no, I do not think I am ready
5. no, I am sure I am not ready

54. How did you feel about being recalled when you first received your notice?

1. very positive
2. positive
3. neutral
4. negative
5. very negative

55. How did you get to the Columbus/Fort Benning area?

1. plane
2. bus
3. train
4. POV
5. other \_\_\_\_\_

56. Did you have any trouble getting transportation here?

1. yes
2. no

If yes, what was the trouble? \_\_\_\_\_

57. Have you experienced any problems in-processing at Fort Benning?

1. yes
2. no

If yes, what were these? (Circle all that apply.)

1. long lines/waits
2. errors in records
3. receiving equipment
4. other What? \_\_\_\_\_

58. How would you rate the overall quality and efficiency of the processing you have experienced here compared with your other Army experience?

1. much better
2. better
3. about the same
4. worse
5. much worse

59. Overall, has what you have encountered so far during this recall been better or worse than you expected?

1. much better
2. better
3. about the same
4. worse
5. much worse

60. How do you feel right now about being recalled?

1. very positive
2. positive
3. neutral
4. negative
5. very negative

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