


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EFFECTIVE DESIGN OF STRATEGIC CONTROL  
SYSTEMS FOR AIR FORCE INFORMATION  
MANAGEMENT: A PROGRAM EVALUATION

THESIS

B. Bruce Cowser, Captain, USAF

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EFFECTIVE DESIGN OF STRATEGIC CONTROL SYSTEMS

FOR AIR FORCE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT:

A PROGRAM EVALUATION

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty

of the School of Systems and Logistics

of the Air Force Institute of Technology

Air University

In Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Science in Information Resource Management

B. Bruce Cowser, B.S., M.S.

Captain, USAF

December 1991

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## *Preface*

This was an exciting study. Exciting because strategic management is an exciting subject. Exciting because I was able to get to know some truly strategic thinkers, both inside and outside of my career field, who have an exciting vision of the future. Exciting because the study revealed some of the tremendous, exciting opportunities that lie ahead, if we, as a community, will take advantage of them. Exciting because the study seems already to have had a positive impact on strategic management in IM, even before it was completed. It is both exciting and fulfilling to be a part of such a worthwhile project.

By the end of the study, it became quite clear that the most urgent need in the IM community is to develop and disseminate a clear strategic direction, a vision for the future of Information Management. It's quite possible, and even necessary, to view the present turbulence and uncertainty as a strategic opportunity to enhance the usefulness and importance of IM to the Air Force. As technology develops, the need for information *handlers* is fading, while the need for information *resource managers* is rapidly growing. Someone will eventually fill that need for the Air Force, and if we want it badly enough, we, Information Managers, can be that someone. The prospects are thrilling; the opportunities endless. I'm excited to be a part of this community at this pivotal point in history.

I sincerely appreciate the tremendous support and contributions of the many people who helped make this study possible. My thanks to those who took the time to participate in the interviews, contributing excellent data for the study. Everyone I contacted seemed willing and eager to help. A special thanks to Marian Bowser, Strategic Planner Extrordinaire, for her terrific support and guidance along the way. Thanks, too, to Jonna Hamrick for all the transcribing and typing support.

During the study, I had the unique opportunity to spend some time with Dick Balogh, Director of Strategic Plans and Programs for Lockheed Engineering and Science Co. He is a brilliant strategic manager. His interviews and advice offered keen insight into the strategic management process, and are cited several times in the study. Portions of his interviews are included in Appendix B-5.

To Majors Wayne Stone and Bob McCauley, my sincere gratitude for advising this project. I felt that their unique contributions offered an effective balance to the study: Major Stone offered vision and direction, Major McCauley, vision and grounding. I needed that balance.

Finally, I could never adequately thank Terry, my wife and best friend, for her unfailing support and direct contributions to the project. All I can offer is my deep love and gratitude.

Bruce Cowser

*Table of Contents*

	Page
Preface . . . . .	ii
List of Figures . . . . .	vi
List of Tables . . . . .	vii
Abstract . . . . .	viii
I. Introduction . . . . .	1
Problem Overview . . . . .	1
Historical Background . . . . .	2
Strategic Management in Air Force IM . . . . .	4
General Issue . . . . .	5
Specific Problem . . . . .	6
Investigative Questions . . . . .	6
Steps of the Research . . . . .	7
Scope of the Research . . . . .	8
II. Review of the Literature . . . . .	10
Introduction . . . . .	10
The Strategic Importance of Information . . . . .	10
Strategic Controls Defined . . . . .	12
The Effectiveness of Strategic Controls . . . . .	17
Strategic Control Models . . . . .	19
Essential Elements of Strategic Control . . . . .	25
III. Research Methodology . . . . .	31
Chapter Overview . . . . .	31
Methodology . . . . .	32
Sample . . . . .	36
Qualitative Research . . . . .	37
Survey Instrument . . . . .	38
Analysis Methodology . . . . .	41
Limitations . . . . .	45
IV. Data Analyses and Findings . . . . .	48
Data Collection and Limitations . . . . .	49
Data Analysis . . . . .	51
Research Findings . . . . .	60
Additional Findings . . . . .	80
V. Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . .	93
Chapter Overview . . . . .	93
Conclusions . . . . .	93
Recommendations . . . . .	102
Appendix A: Survey Questions . . . . .	116

	Page
Appendix B: Interviews . . . . .	120
B-1. . . . .	121
B-2. . . . .	154
B-3. . . . .	189
B-4. . . . .	237
B-5. . . . .	276
Bibliography . . . . .	289
Vita . . . . .	293



*List of Figures*

Figure	Page
1. Strategic Management Framework. . . . .	14
2. Linkages Within and Between Organizational Planning and Control Systems Across the Spectrum of Management Decisions. . . . .	15
3. Relative Importance of Different Categories of Control at Different Levels of Organizational Hierarchy . . . . .	16
4. Feed-Forward Strategic Control Model. . . . .	25
5. Maturation of Research and Research Method. . . . .	34
6. Dendrogram Example. . . . .	44
7. Setting Standards . . . . .	63
8. Premise Control . . . . .	66
9. Measuring Internal Conditions . . . . .	69
10. External Conditions . . . . .	71
11. Information Subsystem . . . . .	75
12. Corrective Actions. . . . .	77
13. Incentives. . . . .	79
14. Focus/Vision. . . . .	83
15. Nature of Plans . . . . .	85
16. Process . . . . .	87
17. Integration . . . . .	89
18. Strategic Issues. . . . .	90

*List of Tables*

Table	Page
1. Strategic Control Systems Matrix . . . . .	52-54
2. External Surveillance Matrix . . . . .	55-56
3. Significant Strategic Management Issues Matrix . . . . .	57-58

*Abstract*

Strategic planning and implementation and strategic controls offer organizations powerful and essential tools for proactive management. In Information Management (IM), they hold the key to successfully navigating the current turbulent environment. This study was conducted in order to evaluate strategic controls in Air Force Information Management, and to recommend ways to improve them. A model for strategic controls was developed from the literature to serve as a standard for evaluating current programs. Interviews were conducted at three major commands to gather data on the current state of strategic controls. A qualitative analysis methodology was selected, and recommendations include the following points: All organizational levels should be setting strategic objectives and establishing measurement standards based on factors that affect strategic outcomes. Planners should analyze and record the premises upon which strategic objectives are based, and review them periodically--especially before taking corrective action--to ensure the premises are still valid. IM should create a clear strategic vision which focuses on defining the organization's intended relationship with every stakeholder. Every management initiative should be thoroughly integrated with the strategy and aligned with the vision.

EFFECTIVE DESIGN OF STRATEGIC CONTROL SYSTEMS  
FOR AIR FORCE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT:  
A PROGRAM EVALUATION

*I. Introduction*

*Problem Overview*

The strategic management concept for maximizing an organization's effectiveness appears to be increasing in use and importance in a wide variety of business organizations (Thompson, 1991). Effective strategic planning, implementation, and control can clarify the organization's mission and goals, unify the collective effort, avoid costly mistakes, and better serve the customers' needs. Strategy can be considered the "major force that provides a comprehensive and integrative blueprint for the organization as a whole" (Hax and Majluf, 1991:2). Like many other governmental and non-profit organizations, the Air Force has adopted concepts of strategic management from the business community in an effort to improve its effectiveness. Unfortunately, strategic management is still a relatively new and poorly understood discipline in many Air Force organizations. As in most organizations, initial efforts in the Air Force have not always met with full success (King, 1987:134; Bowser, 1991).

More specifically, in Air Force Information Management, efforts have been made to establish strategic management programs at the Air Staff and major commands (MAJCOMs), but the full potential of this discipline (strategic management) may not yet be realized.

To better understand the strategic direction of Information Management in the Air Force, it may be helpful to first describe some of the background and recent significant changes in the organization.

### *Historical Background*

Colonel Bill Nations, a former Director of Air Force Information Management, described the history of Air Force Information Management in a recent interview (see Appendix B-1-1 for an edited transcript of that interview). In it, he traced the evolution of the administrative function as it became more and more automated, and developed into a function better described as information management (Nations, 1991).

In 1980, the Paperwork Reduction Act required government agencies to "shift emphasis from managing information technology resources to managing the information itself" (Bowser, 1991b). In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Act reorganized the Air Force, taking Administration (DA), along with several other Air Force agencies, out from under Headquarters Air Force (Air Staff) and placing it under the Secretary of the Air Force (Secretariat), in an effort to

provide "more visible civilian control" (Nations, 1991). (NOTE: in this volume, the terms "the Air Staff," "the Secretariat," and "the Directorate" will be used synonymously.) In the process of this move, DA's name was changed to "Information Management and Administration," to describe the increasing emphasis on managing information. A year later, "and Administration" was dropped from the title, in an effort to further break out of the administrator mold, and to upgrade the image of administrators (Nations, 1991).

Information Management first adopted the tools of strategic planning in 1984. Since that time, program support has waned (Bowser, 1991b). In 1984, the Plans and Resources Division at HQ USAF IM was led by a colonel (O-6), and had a staff of 15 people, three assigned to developing strategic management programs. That division is now a branch with nine people, led by a lieutenant colonel (O-5), with only one person over strategic management programs. Other recent priorities have further diverted resources away from strategic management programs (Bowser, 1991b). As a consequence, planning programs and directives, and even strategic plans in some instances, have not been updated in several years. Efforts to revitalize these strategic programs, however, have recently been initiated.

Air Force Information Management is presently in a state of tremendous flux, with rapidly evolving responsibilities. The pace of technological development in the field, as well as congressional, DoD, and Air Force mandated

changes, including the requirement to develop and manage information as a vital resource, have imposed great new challenges on the organization (Nations, 1991; Thorstad, 1991; Bowser, 1991b; AF IRM Strategic Overview, 1991; OMB Bulletin No. 91-10, 1991; SAF Order No. 560.1, 1988). As the environment becomes increasingly turbulent, planners are recognizing the growing need to enhance strategic management programs (Bowser, 1991b).

### *Strategic Management in Air Force IM*

Air Force Regulation 4-8 (1988) and Air Force Pamphlet 4-12 (1989) outline the Information Management strategic planning program. Responsibilities for establishing organizational objectives and strategies rest with the IM Strategic Planning Team, consisting of planners from major commands and the secretariat, and the IM Executive Committee, consisting of "senior designated Air Force IM personnel, who meet twice annually to address specific issues affecting Air Force IM" (AFR 4-8, 1988). The Strategic Planning Team is tasked with developing the proposed strategic plan, while the executive committee reviews the document and makes required changes. The Air Force Director of Information Management has approval authority for this document, which is called Volume I of the strategic plan.

Volumes II and III are developed and monitored at the MAJCOM level, and should contain MAJCOM-specific action

plans for achieving strategic objectives. Generally, the Plans and Programs branches are responsible for initiating the development of these documents, taking inputs from each of the other branches and base level activities. MAJCOM Directors of Information Management have approval authority for these documents (AFR 4-8, 1988).

### *General Issue*

The general concern of this research is the Air Force Information Management (IM) strategic management process. Initial investigation into this topic revealed some problems with the process. The Air Force Information Management Special Assistant for Strategic Planning (SAF/AADA) requested research assistance in trying to resolve some of these problems.

One of the problems identified by IM strategic planners was the absence of any formal control mechanisms in the plans to provide feedback on progress toward the strategic goals. A current regulation (AFR 4-8, 1988)) calls for Air Force MAJCOMs to establish strategic plans, but provides little substantive guidance for measuring their progress. This issue can be classified as a problem of strategic feedback and control, essential to effective strategic planning (Pearce and Robinson, 1985:360-361). The effectiveness of thorough planning can be diminished without the means and authority to evaluate and control the implementation process.



### *Specific Problem*

Feedback and control mechanisms, which are used to ensure effective implementation of strategic plans, may be inadequate or lacking in the Air Force IM strategic management process. This research will formulate ways to evaluate feedback and control systems, if and where they exist, and will make recommendations on incorporating such systems into the Air Force IM strategic management process.

### *Investigative Questions*

The objectives of this study will be to answer the following questions:

1. What are the essential components of effective strategic control systems?

This question drives the search for an effective model to be used in the study as a benchmark for comparison. Once the essential components of effective control systems have been established, these can be used as a standard for evaluating existing Air Force programs. This question will be addressed in the review of topical literature.

2. Does Air Force IM incorporate the necessary components of strategic control systems in its strategic management process?

This question addresses two issues requiring measurement and analysis: first, actual IM policies and procedures must be ascertained, and second, these policies and procedures must be evaluated in some way against the standard described in

question 1. The methodologies for measuring and evaluating this data will be thoroughly described in Chapter III of this paper.

3. What changes should be made in the IM strategic management program to ensure effective feedback and controls are available and used?

This question will be addressed as a natural follow-on to the analysis described in question 2. Where actual policies and procedures differ from the theoretical standard, these differences will be highlighted and carefully examined. Where appropriate, these differences will serve as the basis for recommended changes.

#### *Steps of the Research*

The specific steps taken during this research effort are outlined as follows:

1. Conduct a review of the literature in order to determine the current state of development of strategic feedback and control systems.
2. Select or construct a model of the necessary components of effective feedback and control systems based on the best theoretical models available.
3. Design the research methodology.
4. Select specific organizations to be reviewed.
5. Design survey instrument and analysis method.
6. Gather data.
  - Assemble documentation.

- Interview planners.

7. Evaluate IM programs against the theoretical model developed in step 2, above, based on the analysis methodology developed in step 5, above.

8. Develop recommendations for adapting necessary control components to the IM program, based on the preceding evaluations.

### *Scope of the Research*

This research will be limited to an evaluation of programs within Air Force Information Management departments at the Air Staff and MAJCOM levels. Three operational MAJCOMs (SAC, MAC, and TAC) will serve as a nonrandom sample, selected because they are the largest Air Force commands in the continental United States, and because logistical and time constraints prohibit the evaluation of every MAJCOM.

The research is directed at strategic controls. Strategic planning and implementation are not a primary focus of the study. Neither are tactical and operational controls a primary focus.

### *Summary*

This chapter has outlined the basic issues that are evaluated in this research effort. Background information and the general problem with strategic controls in Air Force Information Management were explained, and specific research questions were developed.

The flow of the following chapters is guided by these research questions. Chapter II presents a review of the literature on strategic controls and develops a model of essential components of strategic controls, as required by the first investigative question. Chapter III offers the methodology by which the second investigative question, "Does Air Force IM incorporate the necessary components of strategic control systems...", can be evaluated. Chapter IV describes the findings generated by that methodology. Finally, Chapter V offers conclusions to the second investigative question, and recommendations in fulfillment of the third, "What changes should be made in the IM strategic management program to ensure effective feedback and controls are available and used?"

## II. Review of the Literature

### *Introduction*

This review of the literature will begin with a discussion of the growing need for strategic planning for, and management of, information and information technologies, followed by definitions, and an overview of strategic control. To answer the first investigative question of this research effort, various strategic control models from the literature are presented, compared, and evaluated in order to determine the essential components of effective strategic control systems. The development of such a model is critical to the success of this program evaluation, thus it is essential that the model be built on mature, authoritative theory.

### *The Strategic Importance of Information*

There is a great deal of untapped productivity in today's information technology. Many organizations, including the Air Force, have not yet realized all of the powerful opportunities strategic information systems can offer. Certainly part of the problem is a general lack of understanding of the tremendous and growing strategic capabilities of today's information technology (Strassmann, 1991). The newly reorganized career field of *administrators* has not yet had the time or the resources to learn the complex and potentially powerful business of *information management*

(Nations, 1991). According to N. Dean Meyer, President of N. Dean Meyer and Associates, organizational leaders have "got to break loose from the administrative mindset, and build a new image of IS [information systems] as a strategic resource" (Meyer, 1989:37).

Peter Drucker (1988) predicts that the typical large business twenty years from now will be what he calls "an information-based organization," with a relatively flat organizational structure. Information technologies will replace much of the current middle management structure, which functions primarily as an information processing body. These technological tools will provide most or all of the information that leaders and specialists will need to perform their work. Especially now, during this period of tremendous restructuring and down-sizing, the Air Force could greatly benefit from better understanding and promoting the effective management of one of its key resources, information.

Current directives (SAF Order No. 560.1, 1988; OMB Bulletin No. 91-10, 1991) give Air Force Information Management joint responsibility with Air Force Acquisition for planning for and managing information resources. These responsibilities include the development and annual updating of the information management portion of the Air Force five-year plan (SAF Order No. 560.1, 1988). However, "what are being called Information Management Plans at the major command and installation levels are of little value in

guiding long-term automation decisions" (GAO/IMTEC-90-58, cited by Strassmann, 1991).

Still, the strategic management effort currently underway in Air Force Information Management provides a potentially powerful vehicle for developing the long-range shift of focus necessary to convert Air Force administrators into information resource managers. To help with the development of strategic management within Air Force IM, with the immediate goal of developing a model for strategic controls, this evaluation will now examine the topic of strategic management and control in the literature.

#### *Strategic Controls Defined*

Before delving into the elements of strategic control, it is essential to come to a common understanding of the meaning of strategy, strategic management, and strategic controls, and how controls relate to strategic management in general.

*Strategy.* Through an analysis of current literature, Hax and Majluf (1991) describe the various dimensions to the concept of strategy:

1. Strategy is a coherent, unifying, and integrative pattern of decisions;
2. Strategy determines and reveals the organizational purpose in terms of long-term objectives, action programs, and resource allocation priorities;
3. Strategy selects the [operating environment] the organization is in or is to be in;

4. Strategy attempts to achieve a long-term [organizational viability], by responding properly to the opportunities and threats in the...environment, and the strengths and weaknesses of the organization;

5. Strategy engages all hierarchical levels of the firm (corporate, business, functional; and

6. Strategy defines the nature of the [relationship with] and contributions it intends to make to its stakeholders. (Hax and Majluf, 1991:6)

Strategy differs from tactics primarily in scope.

While strategy is concerned with long-range objectives for the organization as a whole, tactics are more short-term and deal with the specific means for achieving them. Tactics generally concern only a part of the organization. Strategy and tactics are in turn different from operational objectives and management, which deal with the lowest, functional level in the organization. Operational objectives become very specific and are generally more near-term still. "Although they cannot be separated in principle, they often are in practice" (Ackoff, 1974:29).

*Strategic Management.* Strategic management is succinctly defined in one source as "a continuous, iterative process aimed at keeping an organization as a whole appropriately matched to its environment" (Certo and Peter, 1990:5). It encompasses the functions of strategy described above, as well as the processes described in Figure 1, below, to include strategy implementation and strategic control.






Figure 1. Strategic Management Framework (Certo and Peter, 1990:20)

*Strategic Control.* The traditional view of strategic control places it as the last step in the strategic management process, with feedback loops "controlling" the various elements of strategic management (see Figure 1).

The literature contains a variety of definitions of "strategic control." One author defines it as "the process which allows senior management to determine whether a business unit is performing satisfactorily, and which provides motivation for business unit management to see that it continues to do so" (Goold and Quinn, 1990:43).

"Strategic control, the process of evaluating strategy, is practiced both after strategy is formulated and after it is

implemented" (Higgins, 1986:221, *italics added*). From another point of view: "a control and evaluation system bridges the gap between strategy development and strategy execution" (Pearce and Robinson, 1985:362). And finally: "one of the key tasks in strategy implementation is strategic control: monitoring strategic performance and taking corrective action. Strategic control attempts to ensure that performance conforms to plans." (Digman, 1986:315). Indeed, Lorange, et al. (1986) portray strategic




Figure 2. Linkages Within and Between Organizational Planning and Control Systems Across the Spectrum of Management Decisions (Lorange et al., 1986)

planning and strategic control as two sides of the same coin. Although described in a variety of ways, the meaning of strategic control is essentially the same: the use of controls applied to strategic aspects of an organization's plans.

Strategic controls, although distinct from, are closely tied to tactical and operational controls. Figure 2 (above) illustrates the linkage between planning and controls at the various hierarchical levels of an organization.




Figure 3. Relative Importance of Different Categories of Control at Different Levels of Organizational Hierarchy (Lorange et al., 1986:125)

All three types of planning and control (strategic, tactical, and operational) will be conducted at all of the

hierarchical levels of an organization. However, strategic management increases in scope and significance at higher levels of the organization. Figure 3 depicts the hierarchical levels of a firm and the relative importance of the three categories of controls at those levels.

### *The Effectiveness of Strategic Controls*

Several major studies have demonstrated the positive effects of strategic management in general on profit and other financial criteria in the corporate world (Pearce and Robinson, 1985; Ansoff, 1987). Other researchers have lamented the lack of specific research on strategic control:

Considerable further empirically based research is needed to explore how companies address these problems, and whether, in what form, and under what circumstances strategic controls can be of real value. (Goold and Quinn, 1990:54)

Despite the lack of empirical evidence, there are still overriding intuitive reasons for practicing strategic control. Three important reasons offered by Goold and Quinn and supported by several others can be summarized as follows:

1. The fundamental requirement for "any large organization to coordinate the efforts of all those who work within it" (1990:44). This coordination effort includes agreement on strategies and objectives at all levels of the organizational hierarchy. The objectives should be precise and measurable:

A strategy that cannot be evaluated in terms of whether or not it is being achieved is simply not a viable or even useful strategy. (Roush, 1980:6)

2. Strategic controls can motivate subordinate managers to work towards strategic goals through rewards and punishments built into the control process (Goold and Quinn, 1990:44, Gray, 1986:96).

3. Controls signal the need for senior level intervention when plans fail (Goold and Quinn, 1990:44), when significant deviations from the plans occur, or when changes to basic premises or to the organization's environment are indicated (Schreyögg and Steinmann, 1987:96-97).

Despite the valuable functions provided by strategic controls, several studies have pointed to their lack of use in the private sector. A study conducted by Horovitz (1979) concluded that:

Analysis of current practices has shown that long range and in some cases strategic planning exist. However when one looks at chief executive control, empirical evidence suggests that there is no control system to match such planning. (Horovitz, 1979:5)

Goold and Quinn (1990) found only 11 percent of British companies responding to their survey "would claim to employ a strategic control system" (1990:47). Some also argue,

that most strategic change proceeds step-by-step or incrementally, and that grand designs with precise and carefully integrated plans seldom work. The best that can be achieved is to introduce some sense of direction, some logic into the incremental steps. (Goold and Quinn, 1990:47)

At the very least, Goold and Quinn stress, strategic control is not a discipline that should be rushed into blindly.

These cautions notwithstanding, principal authors in the field endorse the use of controls in strategic management when applied properly (Ansoff, 1987; Ackoff, 1983; Hayes, 1985; Lorange, 1982).

### *Strategic Control Models*

According to Digman (1986), the basic elements of any control system consist of the following: setting predetermined standards, measuring actual performance, comparing planned versus actual performance, and taking corrective action. These elements could, therefore, constitute the minimum components of strategic control systems; however, strategic control theory has evolved well beyond these basic elements.

Ackoff (1983) lays a broad theoretical foundation for strategic controls in his article "Beyond Prediction and Preparation." His model lays the theoretical groundwork on which many later writers have built. In this piece, he makes the case that "The more accurately we can predict, the less effectively we can prepare; and the more effectively we can prepare, the less we need to predict" (1983:60).

He effectively "proves" this counter-intuitive premise deductively. These conclusions are derived by extending the logic to extreme conditions of perfect prediction or perfect preparation. He describes three such conditions: the static universe, the mechanical universe, and omnipotence. In a static universe, perfect prediction would be possible, but

preparation would be both impossible and unnecessary. In a Newtonian mechanical universe where everything operates with perfect regularity defined by the causal laws of nature, we would be able to predict (or "postdict") perfectly, but not to prepare because "everything that happens is the effect of a cause, and a cause is sufficient for (hence determines) its effects. Therefore, *choice* is not possible in such a universe, and without choice there can be no preparation" (1983:60) Finally, if man were omnipotent, he could create (prepare for) any future he wanted, and hence would have no need for prediction.

All of this hypothetical discussion leads up to Ackoff's point that there is possibly a better paradigm than prediction and preparation. Just as we devote a lot of energy trying to predict and prepare for the weather, there is a better alternative: we build buildings inside which we control the weather, and thus remove the need to predict and prepare for it. From this basis, Ackoff builds the case that,

the ideal sought by problem-solvers and planners should not be perfect prediction and preparation, but *continuous increases of control and responsiveness* to what is uncontrolled. Such increases are matters of *learning* and *adaptation*. Therefore, I believe our efforts are better directed at the improvement of learning, adaptation, and responsiveness than prediction and preparation. (1983:64)

Ackoff lists another reason for holding this belief: "Many of the problems we 'solve' do not stay solved because the problems themselves change" (1983:64). He cites

Toffler's (*Future Shock*) argument that change will occur at an increasing rate, and as these changes become more and more difficult to predict, the "expected life" of solutions as well as the problems they were intended to solve will "decrease at an accelerating rate, and even become negative" (1983:64), meaning they can become obsolete before they are even implemented.

Upon this theoretical foundation of learning and adaptation over prediction and preparation, Ackoff (1983) builds a fairly complex model for strategic management which includes the following five essential functions:

1. Identification and formulation of problems (threats and opportunities)
2. Decision-making--determining what to do about them
3. Implementation--doing it
4. Control--(a) determining the extent to which implementation is carried out as intended, assumptions on which decisions are based remain valid, and results conform to expectations, and (b) where a significant deviation occurs, modifying the system so as to reduce the likelihood of a repetition
5. Acquisition or generation and distribution of the information required to carry out the four preceding functions (65)

Ackoff (1983) develops the control function itself in much greater depth, which includes the following elements:

1. An explicit record created for each strategic decision made. This record should contain the "expectations, assumptions and information used in making the



decision, and the process by which the decision was reached." The list of assumptions should be as complete as possible to assist maximum learning. The record should then be placed in an "inactive" file or memory.

2. The expected effects of the decisions should be recorded along with the expected timing of the effects. This record is to be kept where it can be monitored.

3. An information subsystem should be established which will store the decision records, monitor the effects, and signal significant deviations. When deviations occur, the cause of the deviation should be evaluated, and "appropriate changes (prescriptions) should be made in either the information subsystem, decision making, or the controlled system or its environment."

Many of the features of Ackoff's control model are used and expanded upon by other authors, and will also be used in the model to be developed later in this chapter.

Hurst (1982) offers other important elements of strategic control. Included in his discussion are the following points:

- Strategic control requires input (data) from sources both internal and external to the organization, with a greater emphasis on external (environmental) information.

- Strategic control information is oriented to the future.

- Strategic controls are concerned with measuring and monitoring the correctness of the premises or assumptions on which strategic decisions are based.

- Strategic control standards are based on environmental (external) factors.

- Strategic control models are much more intuitive and less formal than managerial or operational controls.

Elsewhere, Lorange (1982) also argues (as does Ackoff, 1983) for the questioning of the basic assumptions and premises underlying strategic decisions whenever significant differences occur between planned and actual outcomes. Some authors refer to this process of first returning to and questioning the original premises as "'double-loop learning,' which is equivalent to a thermostat questioning its orders" (Goold and Quinn, 1990:46).

Another important model based on the premises established by Lorange and Ackoff was developed by Schreyögg and Steinmann. They argue that traditional feedback loops for signaling deviations from the plan do not offer true strategic controls and are inadequate for two reasons: "(a) Feedback control is post-action control, and (b) standards are taken for granted" (Schreyögg and Steinmann, 1987:92). In other words, by the time feedback reports that implementation has deviated from the plan, essential and unrecoverable time and resources have been wasted, and traditional feedback does not return to question the continued validity of standards and original premises, which

may have been wrong or have changed since their inception. They build a strategic control framework based on current systems theory, contending that:

strategic control should be viewed as a counterbalancing activity to strategic planning and the question of whether or not the strategic plans are still valid should be asked continuously. This compensates for the inherent risk in the selectivity of planning....Thus, strategic control is no longer merely adjunct to the planning function, simply comparing whether performance is in accordance with plans; rather, it is an autonomous management function with its own rationale....This reconceptualization implies that strategic control begins working at the same time the planning begins. It can no longer be conceived as "the last step" in the strategic management process. Instead of a hierarchy of steps, planning and control are now seen as countervailing processes which are simultaneously performed. (Schreyögg and Steinmann, 1987:94)

Their model contains three overarching control devices: premise control and strategic surveillance (or environmental surveillance), which commence with the onset of strategy formulation and continue throughout the process, and implementation control which begins with strategy implementation and remains in continuous effect throughout the process (see Figure 4, below).

Figure 4 offers a graphical depiction of what might be termed "feed-forward" loops, where environmental threats, premises, and the implementation processes are continuously monitored and evaluated, not just at milestones, deviation points, or at the beginning or end of a planning cycle. Thus essential control information is not an after-the-fact




Figure 4. Feed-Forward Strategic Control Model (Schreyögg and Steinmann, 1987)

summary of completed deeds, so that timely adjustments can be made before resources are further expended.

#### *Essential Elements of Strategic Control*

The main purpose for this review of the literature is to develop a model, based on mature, authoritative theory, to serve as a gauge or standard for evaluating strategic controls in Information Management. From the various models described above, a somewhat clearer picture emerges of what elements might be considered essential to effective strategic controls. Still, unified agreement on the processes of strategic control does not exist in the literature (Gould and Quinn, 1990).

There are, however, several authors (notably Ackoff, Ansoff, Lorange, and others) whose views are widely regarded as credible and authoritative. Elements of strategic control proposed by these authors, then, should generally be considered valid, especially when they are also employed by others in this same group. Beyond this, a certain amount of judgement will have to be applied in deciding which components should be included in the proposed model, based on the soundness of their logic and conformity to established theory.

Proceeding on this basis, then, and building on the logic of the experts, an eclectic model for effective strategic control systems, to be used as the standard for evaluating strategic controls in Information Management, can be constructed. A model for strategic controls should include the following essential elements:

1. Setting standards. Lorange (1982) asserts that strategic control standards should be based primarily on external factors (such as customer needs; what a competitor is doing; where the technology is heading). Ackoff and others discuss establishing what are, in effect, "milestones," that are not goals in and of themselves, but markers pointing out expected effects, which are passed along the way toward strategic goals (Ackoff, 1983:68, Goold and Quinn, 1990:45). These standards provide the baseline for determining the direction of progress or for signalling the need for intervention.

2. Premise control. Experts agree that the basic assumptions underlying all strategic decisions should be recorded and frequently or continuously checked against reality (Ackoff, 1983:67, Lorange, 1982:116, Goold and Quinn, 1990:46, Schreyögg and Steinmann, 1987:96). Ackoff (1983) concedes the difficulty in listing *all* assumptions, but recommends nevertheless, that as many as possible should be recorded, especially those which are unique to that particular decision. This is one issue on which there appears to be almost complete agreement in the literature.

3. Measuring actual conditions. Some mechanism must be established for sensing and measuring actual conditions, both internal (performance measurement) and external (environmental scanning or strategic surveillance) (Digman, 1986:319; Schreyögg and Steinmann, 1987:97-98). This surveillance can include a continuous evaluation of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT), and should pay close attention to considerations which might affect decision premises (Ackoff, 1983:68).

4. An information subsystem. Ackoff suggests an information subsystem (not necessarily automated) should be established to monitor performance, compare that performance to the standard, and signal any significant deviations (Ackoff, 1983:66). In Schreyögg and Steinmann's feed-forward control model, the information subsystem signals opportunities, threats, changes in premises, and implementation deviations as they are perceived or even

anticipated, so as to avoid inappropriate expenditure of additional resources (1987). Information subsystems tend to be less formal and less centralized in strategic management. "The information flow which is to be monitored is irregular and discontinuous. The data to be interpreted are often highly ambiguous" (Schreyögg and Steinmann, 1987:99).

5. Taking corrective action. Another area of almost unanimous agreement among the authors is the notion that corrective action generally should *not* mean "punish the guilty" (Peters, 1987; Lorange et al., 1986; Ansoff, 1988). That type of approach only discourages risk-taking. Goold and Quinn suggest the review process should be "non-adversarial" in nature, so that the organizational effort can focus on how to improve in the future, "rather than finding fault with the past" (1990:54). Instead, taking corrective action could mean changing the strategy (the goals and objectives), changing the environment (such as adding a new technology), changing the information subsystem, changing the controlled system, or any combination of the above (Ackoff, 1983:66).

6. Incentives. Many of the authors stressed the importance of incorporating incentives into the control process (Goold and Quinn, 1990:45-46,49; Peters, 1987:332-342; Gray, 1986:95). "If strategy is important, then the reward system should be linked, to some extent, to the implementation of the strategy" (Goold and Quinn, 1990:46). This step makes sense. However, in the Air Force, providing

rewards and incentives may require some creativity, since monetary rewards are usually not possible. In some cases, alleviating some of the potential fear of failure as described in number 5, above, can at least remove some of the disincentives to work toward strategic goals.

These six elements constitute an eclectic model of Essential Components of Strategic Control Systems. The model will be used throughout this study and will serve as the standard for evaluating Information Management strategic control programs in this study.

### *Summary*

This chapter reviewed the literature on strategic controls and their function in the strategic management process. Besides defining terms and evaluating recent articles on the topic, a major goal for the literature review was to respond to the first investigative question, and develop a strategic control model to serve as a basis for evaluating controls in Information Management.

A great many opinions exist about strategic controls, but all are not in agreement. It was generally possible, however, to achieve a consensus on major issues, and an eclectic model describing the essential components of strategic controls was developed. Effective strategic controls, it was determined, should include the following elements:



1. Setting standards (milestones)
2. Premise control (double-loop learning)
3. Measuring actual conditions (surveillance)
4. Information subsystem
5. Taking corrective action when needed
6. Incentives tied to the strategic plan

This model serves as a basis for developing the research methodology in Chapter III, and in fact, for the development of the rest of this thesis. Strategic control systems at the chosen sites are compared to this model and are evaluated on how closely they conform to the model, in compliance with the second investigative question. Finally, recommendations on how Air Force IM can improve its strategic control systems, in response to the third investigative question, are determined by this same model of Essential Components of Strategic Control Systems.

### *III. Research Methodology*

#### *Chapter Overview*

With the building of the "essential elements of strategic control" model described in the previous chapter, the first investigative question of this study, "What are the essential components of effective strategic control systems?" is answered. In order to answer the second investigative question, "Does Air Force IM incorporate the necessary components of strategic control in its strategic management process?," it will be necessary to evaluate actual IM strategic management programs. A scientific procedure, or research design, must be selected from among the myriad approaches detailed in the literature on research methodologies, that will effectively evaluate the IM programs. The desired result of applying this methodology is a clear identification of the strengths and weaknesses of IM strategic control when compared to the model of essential components of strategic controls. A direct byproduct of the analysis of these results, then, should be the recommendations for improving the controls in IM's strategic management program, as required by the third investigative question, "What changes should be made in the IM strategic management program to ensure effective controls are available and used?"

## *Methodology*

The nature of the problem under investigation readily narrows the field of potential research methodologies. The questions under investigation are not concerned with causation (what caused this situation to happen), nor with users' satisfaction with or opinions about strategic programs. A causal analysis or some sort of opinion survey can effectively be ruled out. The investigation instead centers on evaluating a particular Air Force program, to see if it conforms with expert opinion on the subject.

This research, therefore, should logically be conducted as a program evaluation (Isaac, 1985:2), by reviewing existing strategic programs within the field of Information Management. Some of the information required to conduct the evaluation can be gathered from existing documentation (program regulations, strategic plans, etc.). However, all of the necessary information on how strategic management is actually conducted in Information Management is not available or extractible from the documentation. Some other method is required to obtain this information.

Again, a logical method of getting information on actual practices, or on how something is done, is to get that information from those who are directly involved with the process. A written survey of the principals involved might provide that information, but could also reflect what they think the program should be rather than what it is. It was also felt the information provided in this manner could

be somewhat shallow and mechanical. The most effective way to obtain rich detail and in-depth explanations according to Emory (1985) is through personal interviewing: "it far exceeds the information secured from telephone or mail surveys" (1985:160). Emory also states the quality of information obtained and potential for control of the interviewing conditions is far superior in the personal interview than in any other survey method. And lastly, "interviewers can make adjustments to the language of the interview because they can observe the problems and effects that the interview is having on the respondent" (1985:161).

The evaluation of interview data generally requires qualitative rather than quantitative analysis. Extended responses as are received in interviews do not neatly lend themselves to statistical or mathematical evaluation, nor are statistical results the desired goal. Qualitative analysis is more susceptible to the introduction of bias, but if carefully done, can provide far greater depth of analysis.

The logic of using a qualitative research approach in this instance is further corroborated by Schendel and Cool (1981). Their investigation indicates that as research in a particular discipline matures, the nature of the research can become more sophisticated, and more scientific. Figure 5 depicts the maturation stages of research in a particular discipline, showing the least mature stage in cell one, and

developing counterclockwise to cell two, then three, and cell four depicting the most mature stage of research.




Figure 5. Maturation of Research and Research Method (adapted from Schendel and Cool, 1988:28)

Their study further indicates that research in the field of strategic management is rather immature, with most of the work lying in cell two. This information tends to confirm the notion that an empirical, descriptive study using subjective analysis is normal and appropriate in investigating strategic management issues.

Although the advantages of conducting personal interviews are great, there are certainly disadvantages as well; one being the very high costs involved (Miles and Huberman, 1984:15; Emory, 1985:161). Due to severe limitations on

time and resources, it would be impossible to interview all, or even a representative sample, of the IM strategic planners at every Major Command. Therefore, the decision was made deliberately to limit the program reviews to the three largest MAJCOMs (within the continental United States) and to the Air Staff. These sample selections are purposive (Emory, 1985:280) rather than random. Headquarters IM at the Air Staff is responsible for the strategic planning regulations and guidance that go out to all MAJCOMs. SAC, MAC, and TAC are the largest commands with the largest IM staffs. They are also the main operational Air Force commands with the most resources available to them. It is likely, therefore, that they would have the greatest potential for having the most active strategic management programs, a supposition that was confirmed by the Air Force Special Assistant for Strategic Planning. Also, their (relative) similarity in size and mission could help make comparisons more direct and unaffected.

The MAJCOM level managers interviewed included the Director for Information Management (who directs the strategic planning effort at the MAJCOM directorate), and such individuals in the Plans and Programs office who are directly involved with strategic planning. Since the population of strategic planners at each MAJCOM is relatively small (between three and five people in the sample MAJCOMs), all individuals involved were interviewed, if they were available. At the Air Staff level, the Director and Deputy

Director of Information Management, the Chief, Information Management Policy Division, the Chief, Architecture and Integration Branch, the Chief, Plans and Resources Branch, the chief, Data Management Standards Branch, and the Special Assistant for Strategic Planning were interviewed for background information.

### *Sample*

The number of commands surveyed for this research is deliberately small so that the survey can focus on depth of information over breadth; qualitative data over quantitative. "The demands of conducting good qualitative research are not small. Collecting data is a labor-intensive operation, traditionally lasting for months..."(Miles and Huberman, 1984:15). The sample size within the three major commands, is at or near one hundred percent of the population to be sampled. It does not follow, however, that the data gathered will necessarily be generalizable to the greater population of all Information Managers. The nature of qualitative data analysis is almost always such, that sampled data cannot be guaranteed to be generalizable with any finite degree of certainty (Miles and Huberman, 1985:15-16). What can be said, however, is that the data should fairly represent conditions in MAC, SAC, and TAC, assuming bias is not introduced to any significant degree, and that the instrument is fair and accurate.

### *Qualitative Research*

The survey questions are open-ended and not highly structured to allow for a free flow of information (see Emory, 1985:199-223). This places "the emphasis on *construct* and *contextual validity*, where qualitative studies can be especially strong" (Miles and Huberman, 1984:43). Construct validity refers to the validity of the measurement tool (Emory, 1985:97). Contextual validity deals with the context of the comment or behavior: "most qualitative researchers believe that a person's behavior has to be understood in context, and that context cannot be ignored or 'held constant'" (Miles and Huberman, 1984:91).

In this research, the purpose for the interviews is to develop a representation of the attitudes and aptitudes of strategic planners, as well as a depiction of actual practices of strategic managers; hence the need for greater emphasis on construct and contextual validity (Emory, 1985)

The questions are based on the parameters established in the "Essential Components" model developed in Chapter II. They include questions designed to indirectly evaluate the respondent's understanding of and conformity with Schreyögg and Steinmann's three major strategic control elements: (1) strategic surveillance, (2) premise control, and (3) implementation control (1987) and will be tailored to the position and understanding of the individual being interviewed. In qualitative analysis, the exact wording of interview questions should remain flexible:



Unlike the typical quantitative investigation, the qualitative research worker sometimes must move back and forth between data sources and ongoing data analysis *during the period of data collection*. Initial questions are progressively narrowed or, on occasion, shifted entirely as the nature of the living context becomes apparent through preliminary analysis. (Locke, 1980:91)

### *Survey Instrument*

Each of the survey questions is designed to elicit pertinent information about one or more components of the strategic control model developed in Chapter II. Questions from the instrument (Appendix A) are presented below, under the elements of the strategic control model with which they are primarily correlated (most questions were expected to elicit information on several controls). Questions are numbered as they appear in the survey instrument; some will appear more than once, and the numbers will not all appear in order. They are presented in this fashion to demonstrate how they correspond to elements of the control model, and retain the numbers from the survey instrument to facilitate cross-referencing.

#### A. Setting Standards

1. -How do you formulate your strategic plan?
  - Who is involved?
  - Describe the process you go through.
2. -Walk me through the strategic planning cycle.
  - What is the first thing you do?
  - Next, etc.?

## B. Premise Control

(Questions 1 and 2, above, were also directed at premise control)

3. -What do you base your plans/planning on?  
-How do you decide what to include in the plan?  
(Try to discover if premises are dealt with.)
11. -How do you deal with such a problem? Walk me through the procedures.  
-How do you identify the cause(s) of that problem?  
-Describe the steps you would take.  
-How do you keep track of these 'premises'?

## C. Measuring Actual Conditions

4. -What external forces (outside IM) impact on the strategic plan?
5. -Who, outside your organization, helps with the strategic plan?  
-Who asks questions? (Within the headquarters.)
6. -If you needed a strategic resource or extra horsepower in order to accomplish a strategic plan, to whom would you turn--who would be your champion?
7. -Often within organizations the goals of one division may conflict with those of another. Which organization in this headquarters is the biggest threat to yours? (Most conflict?)
9. -By what methods do you coordinate between commands?  
-Why do you coordinate?
10. -How do you know if something goes wrong with the implementation process?  
-Who would notify/alert to the problem?  
-How would they know?
12. -What is the key indicator to the health of your strategic plan to you?  
-Are there others?  
-Who would tell you if it is sick?  
-Why do you think they would tell you?
14. -How/when do you identify deviations (from the acceptable method--see Question 13)?

#### D. Information Subsystems

8. -How does Air Force level IM find out about your progress?
  - What indications do you give them?  
(Try to determine if the indicators are meaningful)
10. -How do you know if something goes wrong with the implementation process?
  - Who would notify/alert to the problem?
    - How would they know?
11. -How do you deal with such a problem? Walk me through the procedures.
  - How do you identify the cause(s) of that problem?
  - Describe the steps you would take.
12. -What is the key indicator to the health of your strategic plan to you?
  - Are there others?
  - Who would tell you if it is sick?
  - Why do you think they would tell you?
13. -What happens when someone deviates from the method/process/tactic which is the accepted method for achieving a goal?
  - What questions might you ask?
  - Describe an example of when this may have happened?
    - (If none, why not?)
14. -How/when do you identify deviations?
15. -What happens if you don't meet a goal?
  - What steps would you take? Next, etc.?
17. -What would keep you from accomplishing elements of the strategic plan?
18. -How do you get feedback on unit (operational) level initiatives?
19. -How do people not in the strategic planning group get information on the strategic plan?

#### E. Taking Corrective Action

15. -What happens if you don't meet a goal?
  - What steps would you take? Next, etc.?

16. -What would cause you to change a goal?  
-Why?
17. -What would keep you from accomplishing elements of the strategic plan?
18. -How do you get feedback on unit (operational) level initiatives?

#### F. Incentives

20. -How do you make the strategic plan meaningful to the worker at the operational level?
21. -How are successes identified/handled?  
-What happens when you meet a goal?  
-What happens when you meet a goal early?
22. -Describe some successes you've had.  
-How did it affect people?  
-How did they know?  
-What evidence was given?  
-To which people?  
-In what form?

The interviews were taped, and careful notes were also taken to assure correct data was obtained, and to avoid premature interpretation of the comments (thus biasing the data). These tapes were transcribed and edited (to remove identifying information and extraneous comments) and are included in Appendix B.

#### *Analysis Methodology*

Once the data was collected, it was methodically analyzed in order to fully answer the second and third investigative questions. This analysis followed methodologies described by Miles and Huberman for "drawing and verifying conclusions" in qualitative research (Miles and Huberman, 1984:215). These methods include the building of "matrix

displays," the notation of patterns and themes in the data, finding meaning and "plausibility" in the patterns, and by further analyzing these intuitive impressions by "clustering" like data using a content-analytic "dendrogram" display (see Figure 6) (Miles and Huberman, 1984:216-228).

Under this methodology, the data is first transferred to a matrix format, with rows representing interviewees (grouped by location) and columns representing the six elements of the control model. Even though the dendrogram (described below) further organizes and categorizes the data, the process of building the matrix also offers a great deal of insight and analysis by itself. Other formats for matrix design are also possible, but the layout described above is perhaps the simplest (and therefore easiest to work) while serving its function of helping to organize the data.

There are no fixed cannons for constructing a matrix. Rather, matrix construction is a creative--yet systematic--task that furthers your understanding of the substance and meaning of your data base, even before you begin entering your information. Thus the issue is not whether one is building a "correct" matrix, but whether it is a *functional* one that will give you reasonable answers to the questions you are asking--or suggest promising new ways to lay out the data to get answers. (Miles and Huberman, 1984:211)

The transfer of information to the matrix is accomplished by closely examining the transcripts and notes from each interview, and extracting short quotes or summaries, or paraphrasing the respondent's answers, which describe attitudes, practices, or competencies under each of the catego-

ries (Miles and Huberman, 1984:212-213). This matrix then serves both as a "stand alone" source of analysis, and as a building block or stepping stone for other procedures, like clustering information in a dendrogram (shown below).

Clustering is a natural human tendency: "in daily life, we are constantly sorting things into classes, categories, bins..." (Miles and Huberman, 1984:218). Clustering is used in an effort to better understand a situation or phenomenon "by grouping, then conceptualizing objects that have similar patterns or characteristics" (Miles and Huberman, 1984:219). One particularly effective form of clustering is the "dendrogram" technique (1984:219-220), which groups the clusters in a horizontal tree-like structure, with similar elements clustered together in nearby branches. The product of this effort is a focused diagram showing areas of common attitudes or comments with their varying degrees of similarity and differences clearly demonstrated by the structure of the branches in the diagram. Figure 6 provides an example of a dendrogram structure.

Not only are the two tools (matrix and dendrogram) described above helpful in demonstrating useful information in answer to the original investigative questions, but the processes themselves also provide exceptionally effective analysis. The mere act of iteratively reviewing the data, each time in a somewhat different context--looking for different types of data or different correlations--yields tremendous insight into the overall conditions under




Figure 6. Dendrogram Example

investigation (Miles and Huberman, 1984:213,219). Where appropriate and necessary, documentation (i.e. regulations, formal strategic plans, etc.) will be referenced to provide any missing information that might be needed for a particular conclusion. This effort, which deals primarily with data manipulation, will be described fully in Chapter IV.

Finally, in Chapter V, each element of the strategic control model will again be evaluated against the clusters of the dendrogram to determine if or how well these elements are incorporated into the strategic management process. Pertinent conclusions will be drawn and explained, supplemented by other, perhaps broader, observations from the researcher.

With this research design and methodology in mind, a final look should be given to actual and potential limitations to this particular approach.

#### *Limitations*

A significant limitation with this evaluation was the inability to collect data from every Air Force major command, due to the great distances involved. Travel funds and the time necessary to conduct the field program evaluations was very limited. This constraint is another reason the sample population had to be limited to the three operational MAJCOMs.

Another, and perhaps more important, limitation was the inherent difficulty involved with qualitative data collec-



tion and analysis. Potential pitfalls described in the literature include the introduction of researcher bias, weak internal and external validity, and difficulty managing the project (Miles and Huberman, 1984:43). Special care and attention is given to these issues in an effort to avoid invalidating the research.

Bias can be introduced in several obvious ways such as asking leading questions, analytical bias, etc. (Miles and Huberman, 1984:230). It can also appear in several ways that may not be so obvious to the researcher, such as the effect the researcher has on the site, and vice-versa (also known as "being coopted") (Miles and Huberman, 1984:232-233). The possibility for bias cannot be eliminated in qualitative research, thus great care and discipline must be exercised in developing questions, recording answers, and analyzing the data (Miles and Huberman, 1984:231).

Program evaluation is not intended to be generalizable, but should be quite specific in application (Isaac, 1985:3). It is intended to focus on specific decisions, thus external validity is really not an issue in this instance. Instead, credibility is the goal (Isaac, 1985:3).

Likewise, program evaluation seeks to achieve isomorphism (defined as the fit between the expected and the obtained) rather than internal validity (Isaac, 1985:3). Internal validity generally applies to an experimental relationship (Emory, 1985:115), and thus does not relate well to program evaluation. Care must be exercised.

however, to ensure that the goals of the evaluation are achieved; that the identified problem is addressed and solved.

Manageability of the project can be enhanced by increasing the structure (Miles and Huberman, 1984:43) and limiting the scope, both of which were attempted in this methodology. Again, care must be exercised to stay within the bounds established by the methodology.

### *Chapter Summary*

This chapter establishes the structure for the remainder of the research effort. It lays out a methodology for a qualitative program analysis for answering the second and third investigative questions. It prescribes the use of depth interviews for gathering data, and establishes the survey instrument to be used in the interviews. It also establishes the use of matrices and content-analytic dendrogram displays for the analysis of the data. Finally, it lays out known limitations (both real and potential) to the chosen methodology.

The following chapter describes the application of this methodology in gathering and analyzing the data, and presents the findings of that analysis in response to the second investigative question from Chapter I.

#### *IV. Data Analyses and Findings*

##### *Chapter Overview*

The purpose of this research effort, established in Chapter 1, was to evaluate the strategic controls used in Air Force Information Management and to make recommendations for improving those controls. In order to evaluate existing methods and make any authoritative recommendations, a standard needed to be developed against which current practices could be compared. Chapter II developed this standard based on the authoritative writings of the experts, answering the first investigative question from Chapter I. The methodology for gathering and analyzing data, developed in Chapter III, is designed to determine answers to the second and third investigative questions: "Does Air Force IM incorporate the necessary components of strategic control in its strategic management process?" and "What changes should be made in the IM strategic planning program to ensure effective feedback and controls are available and used?" Specific procedures are outlined in that chapter which prescribe the flow of data collection and analysis.

Chapter IV describes the execution of those procedures, discussing the data collection process, the data analysis processes, and the findings that resulted from those processes. These findings are intended to provide an initial answer to the second investigative question, referenced above.

### *Data Collection and Limitations*

Initial telephone contacts were made at each of the sites to be visited (the Pentagon; TAC, MAC, and SAC Headquarters), and appointments were set with each of the strategic planners. Despite efforts to arrange the site visits during periods where all of the principal planners would be available, last-minute temporary duty assignments and changes of schedules prevented some of the interviews from occurring. At two command headquarters, interviews with the Command IMs had to be curtailed due to last minute conflicts. Still, even these interviews were quite effective despite being abbreviated, as quality information on "big picture" issues was obtained.

Other minor problems resulted from inexperience using a micro-tape recorder. Some of the first background interviews at the Pentagon were not recorded properly, and in several other interviews, ambient noise in the interview room interfered with the reproduction of some of the data. Nevertheless, the data quality was quite high, and handwritten notes taken during the interviews filled in any gaps.

Despite these and other minor problems with the process, meaningful data were collected. Ten interviews were conducted using the questionnaire developed in Chapter III, and five others were conducted for general or background information, using separate questions developed for individual circumstances. For example, Col Nations, the former

Air Force Director of Information Management, was interviewed to obtain information on the rationale and historical background for the decision to convert the career field from Administration to Information Management. Questions intended for him alone obviously needed to be developed independently. Similarly, the survey questionnaire was inappropriate and not used in a few other instances, but, as will be seen later in this chapter, some of the information obtained in these separate interviews had direct bearing on the issues being studied, and is included in the analysis.

In most cases the interviewer felt constrained by the time allotted for the interviews. The questionnaire was designed to take about an hour, but some interviews required more time than that. In many cases one hour was all that could be scheduled. In other cases, interviewees were quite willing to spend extra time in the interview, and these cases tended to produce the richest, most complete data.

The interviewer also noticed a "learning curve" in his own abilities to redirect and refocus on questions that may have been glossed over or misunderstood by the person being interviewed. Thus, data collected later in the process tended to be more complete and better focused on the model than earlier data.

## *Data Analysis*

This section treats the development of both of the analytical tools to be used in analyzing the data: the matrix structure and the dendrogram cluster display. It also develops the patterns and themes that emerge from the data, and seeks to develop meaning and plausibility from those patterns.

*Matrix Development.* Matrix development is intended to be an iterative, flexible process that is adaptive to the needs and desires of the user (Miles and Huberman, 1984:211-213). Indeed, early in the development process themes and patterns began to emerge that were outside of the original charter (i.e. beyond the narrowly defined strategic control concerns), having to do with broader strategic management issues. Due to the significance of this emerging information, it was deemed appropriate to develop an additional matrix which would incorporate these significant issues.

In addition, it became clear after starting the analysis, that information on external measurement was not detailed enough for meaningful analysis. Another, more focused matrix was therefore developed to examine external measurement in greater detail, placing each separate question which related to external measurement in its own column (Table 2). This method provided information that was significantly more clear and analyzable. Consequently three separate matrix instruments were developed: one focused on

TABLE 1  
STRATEGIC CONTROL SYSTEMS MATRIX

Site/ Interviewee	SETTING STANDARDS External Factors Milestones	PREMISE CONTROL	MEASURE CONDITIONS Performance Measurement Environmental Control	INFO SUBSYSTEM Monitor Signal Deviations	CORRECTIVE ACTION	INCENTIVES
PENTAGON 1	Strategic Data Model - Only requiring standard data elements - Have many stove- piped systems	"Question everything"	It's a constant review "check it, chart it, change it"	Can't share too much information	You build quality in - you don't inspect it in	Major AF approach is negative: kick it in the butt. Need positive reinforcement when something is done right
SITE 1 1	Hard to focus on customer. Base level is autonomous. Milestones would slip to keep on track.	Big picture, direction issues. Deviations not problem.	"You know" when something is wrong	Problems are identified at update time. Share ideas between commands	Idea is to accomp- lish vision not follow plan lock- step. Deviations not problem - maybe should have been that way from the start	Awards -No special things done for meeting goals
2		Where do we want to be?	Measure results milestones	Telephone between commands	Be innovative. Look for new or better, that's how we grow	Parties for successes, time off, recognition
3	Standards are primarily tactical/ operational. POM driven.			Does not have a PC terminal		Recognition is important

TABLE 1 (CONT'D)  
STRATEGIC CONTROL SYSTEMS MATRIX

Site/ Interviewee	SETTING STANDARDS External factors Milestones	PREMISE CONTROL	MEASURE CONDITIONS Performance Measurement Environmental control	INFO SUBSYSTEM Monitor Signal Deviations	CORRECTIVE ACTION	INCENTIVES
SITE 2 1	Look at reality	"Think about them". Don't write down assumptions	"You know"	Crossflow from MAJCOMs. Yearly review. May get a copy when printed.	Don't worry about "acceptable method"	Quality exchange; letter to MG CC; certificate; prevent negative feedback
2	Value added (look for). Technology drives standard.	Don't have tracking system	Technology. Learn from other MAJCOMs	Rely on customer feedback. Process improvement teams - "pinpoint clogs".	Nothing wrong with deviation - find out why. Adaptable, flexible.	Strategic plans are considered an additional duty; pride of ownership; praise
3	Value added (seek). Keep boss happy.	Based on what MAJCOM IM wants. Keep them in mind.	Intuitive	Informal network. MAJCOMs are best source of information. OPH would tell me immediately.	Encourage deviation	Appreciation; awards; performance reports; didn't get fired!
4	TOM, CIP value added hold feet to fire	Not much premise questioning		Capture significant events		Ownership; compliments; recognition spread word briefed Mr. McCormick; team award - free lunch



TABLE 1 (CONT'D)  
STRATEGIC CONTROL SYSTEMS MATRIX

Site/ Interviewee	SETTING STANDARDS External Factors Milestones	PREMISE CONTROL	MEASURE CONDITIONS Performance Measurement Environmental Control	INFO SUBSYSTEM Monitor Signal Deviations	CORRECTIVE ACTION	INCENTIVES
SITE 1	Brainstorm Milestones CINC: 20 #1 priorities	Revalidate old plan every year; take notes - keep track of assump- tions until mile- stones are met		Quarterly review process; other MAJCOMs - get ideas, help them	-Time to regroup - "Dream Goals" - extend/scrub - "Critical Goals" - have to meet	Published, advertized; newsletter, feel effects; kudo from front office; time off
2	Based on regula- tions; goals set out by SAF/AAI	Decide whether to accept AAI plan; no formal way of tracking own assumptions; based on assump- tions from AAI	IM picks up on same things	Informal contacts (phone) with other MAJCOMs; know from updates, milestones Mail out plan - AAI, commands, upits	Depends: over- sight, redirect, change milestones; why occurred; what actions taken; what considered; plan	Could reflect on OPR; awards well publicized; not sure we do except as it causes grief
3	Need to integrate customer; budget, computer support; milestones, quarterly reports	Not flexible enough; no formal process; reasses assumptions	Functional areas responsible -Quarterly rpt -Asking questions -Mandering around -Results (quarterly rpt) -Ask why, process evaluation -Control reports -Base visits -IM update -Crossfeed -Encourage cross- feed from field	-Milestones -Division chiefs -Know I'm concerned -Plan is distri- buted to everybody -Quarterly reports should be automated -Destiny: call, mail -Send out all ideas -Get ideas	Decide what caused - off track; problem analysis; intuition/mile- stones; ask why; sometimes it's better - why was it better?	-IM awards program -Team awards (need)

TABLE 2  
EXTERNAL SURVEILLANCE MATRIX

INTERVIEWEE	EXTERNAL IMPACT	WHO HELPS/ASKS	CHALLENGE/STRATEGIC RESOURCE	ORGANIZATIONAL THREAT/CORRELICT	COORDINATION BETWEEN CMD:
SITE 1 1	Budget, turnover, hiring freezes; Congress; Air Staff	Nobody - that's one of the problems - it's a very internal product	Sometimes IM - he had a lot of alligators	Had "vibes" between DCSS DP biggest roadblock	Distribute copy of plan; steal good ideas- give away good ideas. Occasional planning meeting at Pentagon
2	Manning cuts; base closure; organizational realignment; world-wide events: Desert Storm/Shield	Don't know (too new)	Would like to say it would be the Air Staff	DP - they see us going a different direction	Telephone - I like to know what everyone else is doing
3	Funds-POM process; customer needs; hard to plan when you don't have control of the purse strings		Boss - Chief of Staff Hard of Air Staff to hit all of us		
SITE 2 1	Command section; XP-resources; SC-architecture; Personnel, contracting; AC-execution, programs; Congress, Air Staff; Customer	Contracting and supply at base level; At MAJCOM - XP, AC, DP	XP - make or break XO - operators	DP-threat, sore wounds from orderly room Business-controlling	Phone, E-mail functional coordination; Look for commonalities; Information crossflow
2	Technology is biggest one - Don't know today what's going to be out on the market tomorrow; Finances (Congress)	Bases help SAF plays a big role HQs customers	Other MAJCOM IMs, they're dealing with the same problems; XP can give you hints, but not tuned to your needs; I turn to other MAJCOM IMs - more so even than SAF	DP and SC Our whole mission is so undefined - we've been absorbed here and absorbed there Missions overlap	Good rapport; A lot of telephone coordination; Informal letters; Crossfeed package, copies of MAJCOM, newsletters to learn from each other
3	XP-rules on structure, manning; SC; Air Staff - not too good, tail is wagging dog	Nobody	Depends on what is needed	Some from DP	Informal network systems - E-mail best source of information (Air Staff is not in tune with users)
4	Customers Your people Your boss Other MAJCOMS		Depends on subject Your own people Your boss, his boss Your functional peers Mainly customers		

TABLE 2 (CONT'D)  
EXTERNAL SURVEILLANCE MATRIX

INTERVIEWEE	EXTERNAL IMPACT	WHO HELPS/ASKS	CHAMPION/STRATEGIC RESOURCE	ORGANIZATIONAL THREAT/CONFLICT	COORDINATION BETWEEN CMDS:
SITE 3 1	CINC - has his 20 #1 priorities SAF/AAI goals MA/COMs input Industry SC - gatekeeper/costs	Nobody - more or less on our own I'm sure IM is sending plan out to somebody - not sure who	CINC CMD IM - biggest issue is money. When it comes to cutting up the pie, he's the one with the knife	Potentially everybody	A lot of informal stuff over the phone To see what others are doing A lot of us are doing similar things We try to work together
2	DMRD - DOD level SC - IM merger Desert Storm/Shield	Really not anyone who helps	The boss principally. Then from him to the Chief of Staff	Might say SC	Depends on project. Phone - informal contact. Don't want to go out on a limb
3	Budget, finance; computer support; breakdown organizational barriers and do matrix management; vendors have bearing	Chief of Staff, Vice, more than the CINC	CINC - if the CINC's behind it, it'll pretty much happen	Manpower - organizational restructuring. Not really a threat. I see it as a positive thing. XPM	Destiny - haven't had for awhile; try to share what I'm doing with my colleagues; send out strategic plan; reciprocal; IM update; blow our horn; call TAC, MAC, Space Command

TABLE 3  
SIGNIFICANT STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT ISSUES MATRIX

SITE/ PERSON	FOCUS VISION (Strategic Intent)	STRATEGIC ISSUES	INTEGRATION	NATURE OF OBJECTIVES/ PLANS	PROCESS
AIR STAFF 1	Will marry with SC	Training, use initiative to learn IRM; getting into POM process			
2	Role is to set broad goals and objectives	CIM - indirect interface	Coordination can be extremely complex; SAI/AAI can help integration	Turbulent times: hard to do any planning	
3			Stovepipe systems; don't have integrated approach - parochial		Should start with good staffing level - only guided by highest levels
4	Have to have a vision - even at base level	-Integration -Flexibility - survive -Pay now or pay later -Need to pay for quality up front	-Interoperability -Integration -Eliminate redundancy -Reduce costs -Increase efficiency		Total quality
5					The more you need the plans, the harder it is to plan

TABLE 3 (CONT'D)  
SIGNIFICANT STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT ISSUES MATRIX

SITE/ PERSON	FOCUS VISION (Strategic Intent)	STRATEGIC ISSUES	INTEGRATION	NATURE OF OBJECTIVES/ PLANS	PROCESS	
FIELD 1		UP tries to absorb and take over everything; SC doesn't have act together	No great, unified plan	Primarily practical	Not real active program; became paperwork nightmare; cosmetics to important; ran hot and cold	
2	"Waiting for Air Staff" - like to see firmer stand from Air Staff	"Is total quality a strategic plan by another name?" "How do we answer the troops?"--long range?		Base level: equipment replacement		
3	"What does destiny do?"	Career progression is difficult; don't always have funds; don't have experience dealing with such large purchases	Has to mesh with rest of Air Force; each MAJCOM has different areas of emphasis - hard to mesh	Do not understand plans - write so layman can understand	Pick one of two that are do-able. Needs to be simplified	
4	We're at the tail end of the dog; I'll always have enlisted 70s - officers? Exec support -> DP MSI -> SC	Quality movement related to strategy		We get too narrow in our strategic plan; needs to be conceptual and operational too	Get good ideas from bottom up	
5		Adapt to change Be value added			Roll down to lowest level instead of up; calendar issue; file it	
6		IM, as it exists, has no future - people would rather do it themselves			Has been "suspense thing"; strategic plans are considered an additional duty	
7	Tail is wagging dog; if we don't meet our main goals, we will cease to exist	Adapt to change be value added	TQM, CIP, strategic plan	We'll get back to true strategic planning when force stabilizes	Intuitive	
8	Base hybrid AFSC oversees all info mut/systems mgt issues; reports to base Mj/CC - more technical education	Less and less solid position; from AAI; shakey interim guidance; broaden focus; train IRMs versus information				
9	Some goals are dreams	Integrate customers				
10	No destiny since nations left; MAJCOM IMS want to get together on own; Need longer term focus	Integrate customers	Command objectives did not always fit into SAF's objectives; not a clear connection between various planning efforts	Will be greater emphasis on deliberate planning; destiny does much more strategic planning	Don't have people dedicated to doing process; not a living, useful document (process) at Air Force level	
11	--"We're short-term" -Automated -IRM -Get customer what he wants when he needs it		Total team effort; need to integrate customer	Short term	Review process should be automated; if I see results, I don't worry about process	

the more narrow model of strategic control systems as developed in the preceding chapters, the second on external measurement, and the third on other significant strategic management issues that emerged from the qualitative data. These matrices are presented as Tables 1, 2, and 3 on the preceding pages. Although many themes and patterns emerged from this initial exercise, the discussion of these results will be postponed to the "Findings" portion of this chapter.

*Dendrogram Development.* The organization of data in the preceding matrices proved quite helpful in the task of further ordering those data in the dendrogram. Individual elements (comments) listed in the matrix were grouped with similar elements from the same column. The elements within each group, or cluster, were further sorted, so that elements that were most alike were adjacent to each other. Then the clusters themselves were sorted in the same manner, so that clusters that were similar, or that fell into the same, broader category, were also contiguous. Branches were drawn, so that the loops (connecting lines) between items that were most similar were shortest, and longest where elements were most dissimilar. The broader categories were labeled, and these were then similarly joined under the broadest categories from the matrix column headings.

As in the matrix development process, the very process of developing the dendrograms proved to be of as much (or perhaps more) analytical value as the product, or the tool itself. These dendrograms are displayed as Figures 7-18.

and are placed in the Findings section, where they are discussed.

### *Research Findings*

This portion of the research effort was focused on answering the second investigative question, "Does Air Force IM incorporate the necessary components of strategic control in its strategic management process?," based on the model developed as a result of the first investigative question, "What are the essential components of effective strategic control systems?" That model, developed in Chapter II, provided six elements, or components, that should be found in effective control systems. These elements will be examined individually with respect to the patterns and indications developed from the data that was collected. Finally, other significant patterns, observations, and findings related to overall strategic management issues which surfaced from the research, will be discussed under the heading Additional Findings.

*Setting Standards.* Controls cannot occur in a vacuum. There must be some pre-set standard established against which results can be compared. On the strategic level, these standards should largely be externally focused: on the direction of technological development, on customer needs, on economic or political expectations, etc, but not to the exclusion of internal performance (Peters, 1987; Balogh, 1991).

The first three groups of questions in the survey were intended to elicit information about establishing standards. After analyzing the data, it became clear that the amount of direct information on standards that resulted from these questions was less than expected. Comments included in the matrix and dendrogram mostly are indirect references to standards, or complaints about the lack of standards (usually referring to systems or data standards for integration purposes). Despite the less-than-expected response on the subject from the interviews, the current strategic plans from each of the MAJCOMs and the strategic plans and regulations from the Pentagon offer a complete picture. The issue of setting standards at the strategic level is not directly addressed in Air Force IM.

Strategic level objectives and strategies are published by Air Force IM in Volume I of the Strategic Plan (1990); Volume II (containing specific action plans and milestones that are in effect standards) is published at the Air Force and Major Command levels. Milestones are described at the action-plan level in AFR 4-8, and there, only in an attachment to the basic regulation. (In fact, controls in general are only mentioned in passing in the basic regulation.) Milestones indeed are found in the Air Force and MAJCOM action-plans, which are tactical and operational in nature, and these are appropriately internally (as opposed to externally) focused.



Plans that are strategic in nature, which appear only to come from the Air Force level, are only related to standards in terms of potential lower-level objectives. None of the strategic level plans are tied to externally focused, or even internally focused, standards. This situation could be due, at least in part, to current organizational realities; certain organizational conditions exist that might be part of the reason (or at least the rationale) for not setting standards at the strategic level. These organizational conditions will be further examined and discussed in the next chapter under Conclusions. The issue of setting standards at the strategic level also requires further attention and will be readdressed in the next chapter as well.

Significant themes that did surface from the analysis fall primarily into two main categories: (1) expectations that Air Force level IM (SAF/AAI) should be announcing standards, and (2) what appears to be a fragmentary awareness of potential external standards (see Figure 7). The first category is closely tied to the organizational structure issue just discussed, and, as will be seen, is a theme that surfaces repeatedly in the data (see, for example, Appendix B-2-2; B-3-2, 3, and 4; and B-4-2). The second category may require further explanation. Comments like "It's hard to focus on the customer," "We need to integrate the customer into the process," and "Technology is the biggest external factor" indicate an awareness, by many of the planners, of the importance of some external factors.




Figure 7. Setting Standards

including primary stakeholders (see Figure 7). However, direct connections of these external factors to standards were not generally evident. In other words, some respondents seemed to understand the important impact external factors have in strategic planning and control, but very few vocalized any connection between external factors and standards.

A third (smaller) cluster also developed that should be included: the insertion of "Total Quality," "Continuous Improvement," and "Value Added" management concepts as standards by which to evaluate any undertaking (see, for example, Appendix B-3-1 and B-4-1). Although some may consider these to be mere "buzz words" from popular management theories that seem to be in vogue, they at least indicate a serious effort by some to focus standards (externally) on customer needs.

*Premise Control.* Premises consist of the expectations, assumptions, and information used in making a decision (Ackoff, 1983). In strategic management, expectations of the effects and timing of strategic plans and the assumptions upon which these are based often will change. In addition, information used in making planning decisions can later be updated, changed, or proven initially wrong. It is therefore essential to be aware of and to monitor these premises in order to understand possible causes of deviations from the plan (Ackoff, 1983:66-67). Thus premises have to be recorded and monitored to have real

strategic control, for without knowing the causes of a deviation, a manager cannot know where or how to make adjustments. Colonel Edward Pardini, Director of Air Force Information Management, may have summed-up the situation saying, "Strategic Planning is based on assumptions that always change" (Pardini, 1990)

Question group #3 in the survey deals directly with the issue of premise control. In addition, the interviewer continued to probe in the interviews until it was established how the respondent dealt with premises. Clear indications emerged that premises are not tracked formally at any of the major commands visited.

Although some of the comments that appear on the Premise Control dendrogram (Figure 8) fall under the heading of Active Premise Control, the reader should realize these comments mostly indicated what the respondents thought they should be doing with regard to premise control, not necessarily what they were actually doing. Responses can be categorized into two clusters: positive comments and negative comments about the employment of premise control in strategic management. As mentioned, the positive comments generally reflected what respondents thought they should be doing ("we should reassess our assumptions"). Negative comments can be further grouped into weak, inactive, and reactive clusters. "Weak" comments referred to planners at least "thinking" about premises ("I keep them in mind"). "Inactive" comments directly indicated that no formal




Figure 8. Premise Control

processes existed for tracking premises ("we have no formal way of tracking assumptions"). "Reactive" comments indicated little or no independent assessment of any assumptions--these respondents appeared to rely solely on direction from higher authority ("our plans are based on what the IM wants").

Again, guiding directives and planning documents confirm the assessment that premises are not formally recorded and monitored, except at the Air Staff level. Volume I of the Strategic Plan (1990) does contain a list of assumptions. None of the assumptions on the list, however, is related in any discernable way to elements of the strategic plan.

*Measuring Actual Conditions.* In order to know whether the organization is progressing toward established objectives (performance measurement), as well as to know about conditions outside of the organization (environmental scanning), sensing mechanisms must be in place for measuring these conditions (Digman, 1986:319-320). These mechanisms can be either formal or informal, but tend to be somewhat informal in strategic management (Lorange, 1982:117).

In the survey, question groups 4 through 9 were designed to garner information about conditions external to the organization while question groups 10 through 12 deal with measuring internal conditions. Internal measurement will be examined first.

*Internal Conditions.* Not surprisingly, responses to questions about progress assessment generally fell into two groups: procedures and processes that tend to be more formalized and institutionalized, and those that tend to be more intuitive (see Figure 9). Responses from all three commands contained evidence of both intuitive and formal approaches to internal performance measurement (see also Table 1). It was clear, however, that some commands had stronger (more institutionalized, more active) formal programs than others. This was evidenced not only by direct remarks from the respondents ("it's a constant review"), but also by the obvious use of the plans (plans were current, pencil changes, "dogeared" pages), and perhaps more importantly, by evidence that strategic issues were frequently discussed in those commands. This evidence generally took the form of "harmony" in the responses; the clear impression that everyone in that headquarters was "reading from the same sheet of music." Individuals used the same expressions and "buzzwords," and appeared intimately familiar and in step with the vision of the command IM.

Planners in commands with stronger formal programs, however, also used many intuitive approaches to performance assessment. The most frequent response in all three commands to the question "How do you know if something goes wrong with the implementation process" was, simply, "you know."





Figure 9. Measuring Internal Conditions



*External Conditions.* To help with the analysis of this issue of environmental scanning and strategic surveillance, a separate, more detailed matrix was developed which features as columns, five of the specific survey questions dealing with external conditions (Table 2). A separate dendrogram also was developed from this matrix, featuring the various directions and levels of focus the responses provided (Figure 10). The main theme that developed from the data deals with an apparent strong awareness, on the part of many of the respondents, of the need to allow the customer's issues and needs to be a primary driver in the strategic management process ("Requirements must be customer driven"; "We need to involve the customer in the planning--in the coordination loop"). This awareness of customer importance, however, was generally combined with frustration over the absence of effective mechanisms for identifying and evaluating customer issues. There were several comments to the effect that customers are not yet involved in the process, and mechanisms do not exist for identifying and evaluating customer needs.

Other clusters that became evident broke out into issues that fall outside the government (geo-political, technology, and market issues), and those that fall within various levels of government (Congress, DoD, Air Force level, command level), but outside the organization of Information Management. Outside of the government, lessons



\*Discussed by 8 of 10 respondents at MAJCOM level

Figure 10. External Conditions

learned from supporting Desert Shield/Desert Storm seemed to have a major impact on all three commands. And, interestingly, technology was mentioned by only one respondent at the MAJCOM level as being an external condition having an impact on strategic management (she felt it has the greatest impact).

Congressional budgets, Defense Management Report Decisions (DMRDs), hiring freezes, and base closures are all congressional and DoD level issues that have strong impacts on SAF and command level Information Management. The primary Air Force level issue mentioned in the interviews is the widely held opinion that Information Managers have not been very involved in the POM (Program Operating Memorandum) process in the past, but now have an urgent need to learn about and become an integral part of the process (the POM process establishes priorities and funding for major, long-range Air Force expenditures). At the command level, a primary concern of information managers is the restructuring and realignment thrust that is occurring in most commands. A close look at these and other external strategic issues can offer invaluable analysis for establishing externally focused standards, as discussed earlier.

The matrix/dendrogram analysis reveals effective, albeit informal, awareness by many respondents of external influences that have a strategic impact. Although individual planners, or even commands, did not describe a comprehensive model for environmental scanning and analysis.

taken collectively. the respondents' answers provide the basis for a fairly comprehensive list which could be used for evaluating stakeholders (sometimes called constituents). and stakeholder issues.

The notion of stakeholders has gained importance as an element of strategic concern in the past few years. *Stakeholders* is a term designating everybody who directly or indirectly receives the benefits or sustains the costs derived from the action of the [organization]. (Hax and Majluf, 1991:5)

Although significant stakeholders are not necessarily all external to the organization, stakeholder analysis can be an important part of strategic surveillance and environmental analysis. Valuable strategic analysis results from evaluating each of an organization's stakeholders, and from formally planning, and announcing, the nature of the desired relationship with that stakeholder (Balogh, 1991). A list of IM's significant stakeholders, extracted and summarized from the interview data, could be a valuable tool to help begin this evaluation process. Such a list is presented below.

*Primary Constituents/Stakeholders*

Customers	"Your people"
Congress/DoD	"Sister" DCSs (XP, SC, DP, AC, etc.)
The Air Staff	Like industries
"Your boss" (CS)	Vendors
"His boss" (CINC)	

This list is not necessarily exhaustive, but it can at least provide a good foundation for building a complete list of stakeholders.

*Information Subsystem.* The distinctions between an organization's mechanisms for measuring conditions and its information subsystem are sometimes more conceptual than practical. In theory at least, the process of measuring conditions is a prerequisite for monitoring those conditions, comparing them to the standard, and signaling significant deviations, which are the processes of the information subsystem. In practice, however, the processes are obviously very heavily intertwined.

An assortment of questions on the survey instrument were expected to, and in fact did, elicit information on the organizations' strategic information subsystems. After analysis, several clusters developed, with indications of information subsystems ranging from strong to weak.

The three commands surveyed had a variety of approaches to this process; some approaches appeared to be more effective than others in various aspects of the process. One command has an internal version of their strategic management program, portions of which are reviewed in weekly staff meetings. Another has a very strong quarterly reporting requirement which generates periodic reviews of performance standards and signals important developments. That command IM seemed genuinely disappointed that his quarterly review process was not yet entirely automated!

In other instances, individuals indicated their strategic plans were reviewed and problems were identified




Figure 11. Information Subsystem

only during the yearly update. One individual, when asked what was the next step in the process after the planning document was prepared, answered quite matter-of-factly, "File it!," implying that it would not be reviewed again until the next planning cycle. One command has not yet done a yearly update, pending receipt of updated directives from the Air Staff. The wide disparity in information subsystems, both within and between commands, is captured in the dendrogram depicted in Figure 11.

*Taking Corrective Action.* When deviations are signaled by the information subsystem, another decision must be made whether or not to take corrective action, and if so, what form it should take. Fortunately, most of the respondents seemed to share the opinion of the experts that corrective action generally should not mean "punish the guilty." One respondent's comment that "you build quality in--you don't inspect it in" indicates an attitude that if something is wrong, then there is probably something wrong with the process (Figure 12).

In fact, most of the planners interviewed did not see deviations as a signal that something was necessarily wrong, but simply as a point to intervene and determine why the deviation occurred. Comments like "deviations are not a problem--maybe it should've been that way from the start," and "sometimes it's better--we should find out why it was better" were typical. The responses in general demonstrated a healthy, flexible attitude about how corrective actions




Figure 12. Corrective Actions



should be approached. "The idea is to achieve the goal, not follow the plan lockstep," and "be innovative--look for new or better--that's how we grow." were also comments that seemed to reflect "mainstream" thinking.

The comments "clustered" around two main themes or subcategories: staying flexible and adaptable, and dealing with deviations. The second group could be seen as further breaking down into comments that indicate deviations are positive and even valuable ("I encourage deviation,"), and those that indicate deviations are neutral--neither positive or negative ("time to regroup," "find out why"). Only one comment even suggested that "punish the guilty" may be in order ("could reflect on their OPR").

*Incentives.* The final element of the model developed in Chapter II deals with incorporating incentives into the control process. Human nature is such that people generally will work harder toward a particular goal the greater the incentive to do so (Gwartney and Stroup, 1990:8-10). The last three questions on the survey instrument focused directly on the issue of incentives and how they might be tied to the strategic control process.

Responses to those questions fell generally into two categories (Figure 13). Some respondents felt that incentives for accomplishing a planned course of action were primarily negative ("You don't get fired!" and "the major Air Force approach is negative--a kick in the butt when we do something bad"). Other comments can be grouped as




Figure 13. Incentives

promoting positive incentives. These comments range from suggestions for appropriate forms of recognition to building up a sense of having a personal stake in the success of the plan.

Although most of the respondents could detail potential methods for providing positive incentives, actual practices of relating positive incentives to strategic planning, and to the accomplishment of those plans, were not as evident. In one command there appeared to be little incentive of any kind even to plan, let alone to implement the plan. Additionally, in other commands, several respondents expressed the feeling that the only incentive they had to prepare plans and to implement them was to avoid negative consequences.

*Summary of Findings.* This section has described the findings of the research effort in support of the initial investigative questions. These results will be further examined in the next chapter under Conclusions.

The following section will examine additional findings and observations that surfaced during the course of the investigation. These additional findings were not the direct objective of the research, rather, they surfaced as a result of the broad, qualitative nature of the study.

#### *Additional Findings*

The previous section examined findings in the analysis that addressed the investigative questions of this research

effort. But in addition to the evidence supporting those research findings, the data from the interviews also provided useful information on several broader strategic issues. Whereas the original findings deal directly with the components of strategic control, these additional findings deal with issues of strategic management in general, and are only indirectly related to strategic controls. In the hope of furthering the development of strategic management in the functional area of Information Management, some of those additional findings will be included in this section.

It should also be mentioned here that this section holds much greater potential for the introduction of researcher bias than the previous structured analysis. Indeed, issues are selected for discussion in this section because they are deemed important by the author. This information is nevertheless included because it may prove useful to IM strategic planners, but the reader should be cautioned that the material may (and probably does) incorporate the author's biases.

Although the information described in this section is processed through the matrix and dendrogram formats, significant analysis does not always result from the process. In some cases, the value of the data comes simply from its compilation and presentation as a list: order and clustering is of minimal importance in these cases. Other

cases, where meaningful themes and clusters did develop will be presented first.

*Focus/Vision.* Comments were made frequently during the interviews relating to strategic vision. Figure 14 demonstrates how the comments fell into three distinct clusters. The first group deals with perceptions about perspective in the actual strategic process. These comments were further divided into references about the time-focus of IM's planning effort ("We're short-term," "we need a longer-term focus") and IM's overall relative strategic position ("We're at the tail end of the dog"). As will be discussed in the following chapter, these perceptions can play an important role in managers' attitudes about strategic management.

The second cluster concerns the issue of having a central, unified vision, or providing strategic direction. These comments consist primarily of perceptions that Destiny (an executive committee consisting of the Air Force and field level IM directors) and/or the Air Staff (meaning the IM directorate) should take greater initiative in offering strategic direction ("What does Destiny do?"; "I'd like to see a firmer stand from the Air Staff").

The third theme deals with individual conjecture about the future course the Information Management career field should or might take. Fears that the career field would cease to exist were not uncommon, but many seemed to feel the career field could still provide a valuable contribution




Figure 14. Focus/Vision.

to the Air Force, especially if it adapts and transforms to fill the growing void in information resources management.

*Nature of Objectives/Plans.* Several important comments were made during the course of the interviews that deal with the nature of IM's plans. Figure 15 lays out some of those comments in a format that offers some insight into how these plans might be improved. Three clusters were formed from the data, which were labeled Consistency, Composition, and Focus of the Plans. Comments under the subheading Consistency revealed a widespread perception that planning is too difficult to do when conditions are turbulent, and that planning would get back to normal "when the force stabilizes." Under Composition, comments point out that IM "strategic" plans are primarily practical in nature, and suggest that they should also be more conceptual. Finally, under Focus of the Plans, respondents suggest that the plans are too narrow in scope and should be more strategic in nature.

Closely associated with comments about the nature of IM's plans were comments about the planning process. That information was deemed different enough, however, to merit separate analysis, as follows.

*Process.* Three main themes developed from this analysis, classified as Roles, Tactics, and Program Activity. The cluster under roles addressed an important issue of the initiation of strategic planning and strategic ideas. Opinions were expressed that the best ideas are




Figure 15. Nature of Plans



often generated at lower levels of the organizational hierarchy and filter up. More than one individual expressed the opinion that in fact, ideas had difficulty rising up through the system.

The grouping of comments labeled Tactics offered a variety of practical suggestions for planners. One command IM commented "if I see results, I don't care about process." This remark might indicate that planners could be more innovative in their processes without causing any harm. Another individual suggested the planning process be started by picking one or two objectives that are "doable," and starting out with some initial successes. Others suggested the planning and review processes should be simplified, and that they could (should) be automated.

The last cluster, entitled Program Activity, pointed out some problems with the strategic planning process that were mentioned in all three commands and at the Air Staff. Most of these comments indicate widespread inconsistency in support for and activity of the strategic planning program. The remarks that appear in the dendrogram (Figure 16. See also Table 3) represent only a sampling of the many similar comments heard during the interviews. Typical remarks were "the program ran hot and cold;" "strat plans are considered an additional duty;" "it became a paperwork nightmare--the cosmetics were too important." Observations such as these indicate a need for steady, consistent, but flexible




Figure 16. Process

(meaning process is not of supreme importance) support from top level Information Managers.

A final observation from one astute planner effectively sums-up this and the previous section: "The more you need the plan, the harder it is to plan!"

*Integration.* Integration is another strategic issue with broad significance, especially in the field of information management. Figure 17 offers an examination of a variety of comments on the subject of integration. Many of these comments can be summarized in the remark by one senior manager, "if we had strategic planning at the SAF [Secretary of the Air Force] level, we wouldn't have PC III, SIMS, CAMS, WIMS, etc." On the other hand, interviews at the Pentagon demonstrated systems and data integration is now a top priority, required by congressional and DoD decisions.

In addition to the several points on systems integration, other points were brought up on the need to integrate the planning efforts themselves. Several planners suggested the budget and POM (Program Operating Memorandum) processes needed to be integrated into the strategic planning effort. Also, some organizations appear to be duplicating planning efforts, developing one set of plans to conform with Air Staff directives, another set focused on intra-command strategies, and using a third system for internal management. Certainly strategic management itself is an area that can benefit from integrative efforts.




Figure 17. Integration




Figure 18. Strategic Issues

*Strategic Issues.* Another dendrogram was created to classify various additional strategic issues that surfaced during the interviews, which were not already covered under other headings (Figure 18). This dendrogram was not necessarily intended to provide any meaningful analysis of these issues, but only to serve as a reference or a list of issues that should be dealt with on a strategic level. Strategic bodies, such as Destiny, might benefit from creating an expanded list of strategic issues, and working the highest priorities.

#### *Chapter Summary*

This chapter began by examining the data collection and analysis processes used in this study to evaluate the second investigative question, "Does Air Force IM incorporate the necessary components of strategic control in its strategic management process?" Next it presented the findings of the analysis by individually discussing each component of strategic control with respect to Air Force IM's incorporation of that component. In addition, other findings were presented which may provide further insight into, or perhaps a foundation for further examination of, important strategic issues.

Chapter V will examine the conclusions to be drawn from the findings presented in Chapter IV, will offer recommendations in fulfillment of the final research question, "What changes should be made in the IM strategic

management program to ensure effective feedback and controls are available and used?," and conclude with some final observations on the overall process.

## *V. Conclusions and Recommendations*

### *Chapter Overview*

Chapter IV laid out the findings of the research. Chapter V will offer specific conclusions from the findings and offer recommendations for improving the strategic control processes in Information Management. The conclusions will offer a final answer to the second investigative question, "Does Air Force IM incorporate the necessary components of strategic control in its strategic management process?" The recommendations answer the third investigative question, "What changes should be made in the IM strategic management program to ensure effective strategic controls are available and used?"

### *Conclusions*

This section will answer the second investigative question, "Does Air Force IM incorporate the necessary components of strategic control systems in its strategic management process?" The conclusions of this research effort are based on the separate findings described in detail in Chapter IV. Each of the findings is related to a particular element of the strategic control model, which was developed in Chapter II. Conclusions are examined in this section as they relate to, and in order of, the several findings that were presented previously. Conclusions relating directly to the strategic control model will be



listed first, followed by the broader conclusions that relate to general strategic management issues.

*Setting Standards.* As indicated in the previous chapter, data relating directly to the issue of setting standards was rather sparse. The author's initial response to this somewhat surprising result was to reexamine the questions that were intended to elicit this information, to determine if they were too broad or vague to produce the desired information. Indeed, they are vague in terms of how or whether or not standards are set. Furthermore, more direct probing by the interviewer might have elicited further information on the subject.

The matter is effectively resolved, however, by a careful examination of the various strategic planning documents, as discussed in Chapter IV. Command-level action plans generally have effective, internally-focused standards, but strategic plans, which should generally focus externally, are not delimited by standards of any kind.

Dendrogram analysis of the interviews with MAJCOM planners supports this conclusion. Even though some recognize the importance of external factors on the strategic management process, planners do not tend to connect plans with external issues, and standards (which might offer some sort of performance measurement) are not directly linked to strategic-level plans.

Data indicates organizational conditions may in part be responsible for a lack of measurable standards at the

strategic level. In Air Force IM, operational level (base level) information managers do not report directly to MAJCOM information managers, who, in turn, do not report to Air Force level. Although guidance from higher levels can be directive in nature, very little enforcement is possible. Indeed, efforts are made at the Air Force level to decentralize much of the strategic effort (Zimmerman, 1991). This approach makes it very difficult to set strategic standards at the highest level with any real expectation that they will be met at lower levels. This effort demonstrates a possible lack of understanding of strategic management, and the critical need for top-down vision and strategy (Lorange et al., 1986; Balogh, 1991).

Proponents of strategic planning discuss the importance of the CEO (Chief Executive Officer) in corporate strategic management for establishing a unified vision and communicating corporate direction (Lorange et al., 1986; Certo and Peter, 1990), but a comparable (CEO-like) authority does not exist in the current IM organization. On the other hand, MAJCOM levels may have a little more direct authority. However, even they tend only to set operational and tactical-level objectives, and not strategic objectives (see SAF, SAC, MAC, and TAC Strategic Plans, Vol. II). The net result is that standards are not linked directly to strategic-level objectives, making strategic performance measurement rather indirect and contrived.

*Premise Control.* Chapter IV established the assertion that premises are only tracked at Air Force IM, and even there, no appreciable links exist between the assumptions listed and individual objectives. In the MAJCOMs, premises are not recorded. Premise control, in its purest sense, is impossible without recording premises. This is because premise control involves reviewing the premises, not just evaluating them at the outset of the planning process. In a very loose sense, however, premise control does occur in some instances, such as when one manager suggested a deviation might prompt him to question if the new direction was better--"maybe it should have been that way from the start." This attitude certainly captures part of the "spirit" of the premise control concept, or the idea that plans should not be followed blindly when conditions change. To be done effectively, however, premises for individual objectives and strategies must be recorded, and that is not happening in IM.

*Measuring Actual Conditions.* The analysis indicates that some surveillance mechanisms are in place for measuring actual conditions, both internal and external to the organization. Some commands make a stronger effort and do a better job at measuring than do others. In response to the second investigative question, Air Force IM does incorporate, to some extent, this element of strategic control. Milestones and performance are effectively monitored. In general, planners were at least aware of some of their

threats and opportunities. There appeared to be broad comprehension of environmental impacts, although efforts to control them were minimal.

Where shortfalls exist in measuring, they are primarily in the area of institutionalizing strategic surveillance--making it a part of the culture (this is not the same as formalizing, or making surveillance a structured, rigid process). Some suggestions for change will be offered in the Recommendations section.

*Information Subsystems.* Effective strategic information subsystems, whose purpose is to monitor performance, compare performance to the standard, and signal significant deviations, existed in at least two of the commands. The system in the third command was either inactive, or did not exist in a viable form, as strategic management appeared to be on hold. In this regard, the vitality of a command's information subsystem seems strongly "personality" dependent, driven by the director. Whether or not the monitoring, comparing and signaling functions were being performed appeared to depend, more than anything else, on the determination and persistence of the command IM. It appeared that without continued insistence on feedback, this function would always take a lower priority than "the inbox," or daily routines and brushfires. Iacocca's (1991) philosophy of "management by nagging" appears to be necessary in order for information subsystem functions to continue effectively.

*Taking Corrective Action.* Corrective actions, when they are determined to be necessary, are generally performed effectively in the various commands, in accordance with expert opinion (i.e. they focus on the process, are not adversarial, etc.). The problem with this control element arises from earlier conclusions that premises are not effectively tracked and evaluated, and environmental influences are generally not controlled. Without effective premise control, corrective actions risk reinforcing improper plans; and even though planners are aware of external opportunities and threats, many seem to have a fatalistic attitude that little can be done about them. These aspects of corrective actions will require attention.

*Incentives.* Although a variety of potential forms of recognition were described by the respondents, direct incentives to work towards strategic objectives were not highly evident. Disincentives for failure were mentioned much more commonly.

The need to develop "ownership" among those who contribute to the completion of the strategic plan (these contributors should include everyone in the organization), was evident in some responses. Although difficult to quantify, and probably impossible to demonstrate scientifically from the data, it seemed that the commands whose respondents frequently discussed the importance of "ownership" and "pride of ownership," also had a higher enthusiasm and sense of purpose about the strategic management process.

Across the board, it appeared that a better job could be done of linking the reward system directly to the implementation of strategy (both to the process and the product), of encouraging risk-taking by reducing negative incentives, and of empowering personnel by removing barriers to strategic progress.

*Focus/Vision.* Concerns by many planners that their planning efforts "need a longer-term focus" appear to be well founded. Other findings, introduced under the heading Nature of Objectives/Plans, indicate the scope of the plans are too narrow, and should be more "strategic" in nature. In fact, one of the difficulties with this study was that in Information Management, no distinctions are made between the various levels of planning. Strategic planning, as defined in Chapter I, does not really take place at the MAJCOM or lower levels. Planning at those levels is all tactical and operational in nature. In addition, these tactical and operational plans are all lumped together, with no visible effort to distinguish between them, under the umbrella heading "strategic planning." This situation exists at all three MAJCOMs and at the Pentagon. The author observed no guidance or directive that suggested a distinction should be made between the different levels of planning.

Without a clear understanding of the separate, rather distinct (although thoroughly integrated) nature of strategic, tactical, and operational level planning, it is unrealistic to assume the distinctions between strategic,

tactical, and operational level controls can be understood. This research was directed at strategic controls, as they apply to strategic planning and management efforts, and must not be confused with tactical and operational controls. Without a clear understanding of the differences, the results of this research could easily be misapplied.

Another issue affecting strategic performance is the widely observed feeling that IM is at "the tail end of the dog," and rather powerless in determining its own destiny. This attitude indicates a greater sense of empowerment may be needed for managers to feel capable of affecting their future, which, after all, is what strategic management is (or should be) all about.

A third finding under this heading is the prevalent opinion that a need exists for a clear, central, unified vision. One conclusion that can be drawn from this finding is that a central vision for IM does not exist, or that it is not being communicated to those who need to understand the vision (which should include everyone in the organization). This is a vitally important issue, impacting on every facet of strategic management.

*Nature of Objectives/Plans.* During background interviews at the Pentagon, the most frequent comment heard was how planning is too difficult when conditions are very turbulent. There seemed to be a great deal of frustration among staff members there, that DMRDs (Defense Management Report Decisions) had been the focus of all of their

attention, and that they had not been able to deal with strategic planning or other important issues for the field. These pervasive notions indicate widespread misconceptions at the Directorate, both about the benefits of, and the requirements for, strategic management. One conclusion that can be drawn from these attitudes is that it may be helpful to think about strategic management in a different way. For one thing, these DMRDs are, in fact, important strategic issues that directly affect the field. Also, Lorange (1986) and others (Drucker, 1985; Hayes, 1985; Cowser, 1987) describe a significantly different approach to strategic management during turbulent times than during times of greater certainty. In very turbulent times, a guiding vision, offering general direction and orientation can be more effective than a detailed plan. It provides a stable decision planning framework to the manager whose underlying assumptions would otherwise be constantly shifting. By providing general guidelines and refusing to be overly specific, the senior strategist empowers subordinates by allowing maximum flexibility and latitude. The senior manager's attention can then be focused on working strategic issues, as his or her personal resources are not tied up in the details of subordinates' functions. This endeavor is often difficult, since most senior manager's "comfort zones" are in the tactical arena, after spending the majority of their careers there. Becoming truly "strategically oriented" requires a conscious effort to break free from



tactical perspectives and habits, and to obtain, and then proclaim, a strategic vision (Lorange et al., 1986).

This vision can be incorporated into a carefully crafted mission statement which should be highly publicized down to every level:

But a mission statement covers much more than just a definition of the [environment] the [organization] operates in, who its customers are, and what it will provide them. It defines exactly *how* it will operate..., *how* it will serve the customer, *how* it will create, produce, and distribute its product. It also includes desired attitudes about the [organization's structure], culture, people, service, etc. (Cowser, 1987:21)

This type of mission statement, offering a clear vision and communicated effectively to every echelon, can provide an effective compass for navigating turbulent times.

### *Recommendations*

This section offers answers to the third investigative question: "What changes should be made in the IM strategic management program to ensure effective feedback and controls are available and used?." The recommendations in this section, then, are the ultimate results of this research effort. These recommendations are based on the findings from Chapter IV, and on the conclusions from this chapter. and so will be presented in the same format and sequence.

*Setting Standards.* All organizational levels, at least to some extent, should set objectives that are strategic in nature. These objectives should be formulated in such a way that progress towards the objectives can be measured. The

bases for those measurements can be labeled "standards." Strategic objectives, by their nature, focus on broad, long-term, integrative, over-arching issues, that tend to be more affected by external developments than by internal ones. But whether the determinants of strategic objectives are internal or external, standards should be prescribed so that progress can be measured.

Strategic standards should be established for all strategic objectives. All organizational levels should be setting strategic objectives, aligned with the organizational vision, just as they will all have supporting objectives of a tactical and operational nature. Of course, the Air Force IM Directorate and MAJCOM levels will have more objectives of a strategic nature than base levels, just as base levels will have more objectives of an operational nature than the IM Directorate.

The organizational issue involving not having a CEO in Information Management is a little more difficult to address. For obvious reasons, recommending a reorganization of the IM structure is beyond the charter of this research. However, an organizational realignment is not likely even necessary. With the support of the Destiny team (a senior level committee of Air Force and MAJCOM IM directors), The Air Force Director of Information Management could assume the role of the CEO in this strategic function, and declare the organizational vision and strategic objectives and standards. Alternatively, Destiny itself could assume the

role of the CEO (there is no substantive requirement for the CEO role to be assumed by a single individual). Even though compliance would, to some extent, be voluntary, at least the vision and standards would be in place. Since a majority of managers in the surveyed MAJCOMs voluntarily expressed their desires to be given such a vision and standards, and assuming members of the Destiny group offer their support to the effort, a general alignment with the vision can reasonably be expected to occur.

*Premise Control.* Strategic planners (meaning planners at all levels who are contemplating strategic objectives and issues) should make greater efforts to, or adopt the procedure of, analyzing the premises upon which every strategic objective is based, and recording those premises. Premises, again, consist of all of the expectations, assumptions, and information used in making a decision (in this case, deciding on a strategic objective)(Ackoff, 1983). The strategic analysis that results from this evaluation of premises could, itself, be quite beneficial. However, an even more important reason exists for expending this effort. That reason is to offer a control mechanism on the premises themselves. In the rapidly changing worlds of the military and of information resources management, the premises we hold to be true today are not necessarily going to remain true tomorrow. When plans veer off of their original course, it is essential to determine whether or not that deviation is a result of newer, better information, or if

the original premises are still valid. This evaluation must occur before attempting to redirect progress.

Even more importantly, premises should be periodically reviewed (Schreyögg and Steinmann (1987) would suggest continuously reviewed), even if progress remains on track. These reviews can prevent further resources from being spent pursuing plans that are no longer needed, due to changes in conditions.

*Measuring Actual Conditions.* Procedures are currently in place for measuring internal performance. Other strategic internal measurements should be considered which might relate to evaluating organizational strengths and weaknesses, and organizational standing with internal stakeholders. The measurement of external conditions could be made more methodical, even down to the lowest unit levels. These external measurements could relate to evaluating organizational standing with respect to all stakeholders, organizational opportunities and threats, and other external factors that affect strategic concerns, such as technological and geo-political trends and directions. These measurements can take a variety of forms, from interviewing or surveying customers, to subscribing to and scanning government or technical trade journals. Whether they are formal or informal, they should be purposeful. Peters (1987) recommends becoming "obsessed with listening" to the customers, and even creating a "CIS"--a customer

information system, which includes both formal and informal processes for measuring and reporting on customer issues.

Above all, measure only what is important (Peters, 1987:483-493). Getting bogged down in minutia is not the goal of measuring. Measurements should focus the strategic vision, not detract from it.

*Information Subsystems.* There are a variety of good ideas for monitoring and evaluating performance and signalling significant deviations in use in the various commands. Some of these ideas, such as the very strong quarterly report system at one command and the frequent reviews at weekly staff meetings at another, could be combined into a very effective strategic information subsystem. The commands and the Secretariat should crossfeed information on methods for evaluating strategic performance, and develop a strategic information subsystem prototype for Information Management, which could be adaptable to suit a variety of organizational levels and management styles.

Perhaps most importantly, those in charge of various organizations must be persistent and insistent on receiving feedback (both formal and informal) in order for the information subsystem to be effective. Otherwise, inertia will govern the process, programs will not be reviewed, and those who need to know about progress will not be informed (Iacocca, 1991).

*Taking Corrective Action.* Corrective action should only be taken after evaluating premises and determining that they are still valid. Actual corrections to the implementation process are highly situational, and should be tailored to individual circumstances. In dealing with persons responsible for programs that require correction, organizations should continue current practices of avoiding the adversarial review process (Goold and Quinn, 1990), and continue to encourage risk-taking by their members (Peters, 1987).

Additionally, greater efforts should be made in addressing environmental threats and opportunities, both in the planning and the controlling functions. Continuous environmental surveillance should identify changing opportunities and threats and permit corrections to the established course (this again ties back to premise control).

*Incentives.* Individuals (and increasingly, teams) are being rewarded for achieving successes, and frequently these successes relate directly to accomplishing elements of a strategic plan. What too frequently is missing is advertising the linkage between the strategic plan and the success. Everyone in the organization should be made aware that successes and rewards are linked directly to the strategic management process. Announcing that an individual's or team's award is due to accomplishing a project from the strategic plan not only heightens the

importance of the award, but also publicizes the fact that strategic plans are important to senior management and that their accomplishment brings valued rewards.

The planners at two commands frequently expressed support for the concept of building "ownership," or a feeling of being part of the decision process so that the plan "belongs" to parties who will be responsible for their implementation. Other organizations could benefit from adopting this thrust for creating ownership, and expanding it to include the concept of empowerment, by offering a clear vision, by helping to remove barriers of unneeded tradition and encumbering regulations and policies, and by using strategic controls as a means of intervening rather than directing or punishing (Balogh, 1991).

*Focus/Vision.* Strategic planning, by definition, must have a longer-term focus than tactical and operational planning. It should create a unified, integrated focus for all organizational decisions. It should focus on the organization's relationships with its stakeholders (Hax and Majluf, 1991). Strategic planning in Information Management should include a much greater strategic focus. Current initiatives, such as the ongoing Air Force Information Resources Management (IRM) Study, research efforts (such as this one), and a scheduled strategic planning conference, signal desires within Information Management to improve the effectiveness of its strategic management process. The

following are further suggestions for improving the focus of strategic management efforts.

Distinctions between strategic, tactical, and operational levels of planning and management should be made in Information Management planning guides and regulations. Once distinguished, the various levels of plans should be thoroughly integrated to provide a unified, coherent direction for the organization. Strategic controls, under this model, would be applied as points of intervention in, or as a countervailing process to, the implementation of plans that are strategic in nature.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly under this section, is the need to generate a clear, focused vision for Information Management. This vision statement, which could be included in an expanded mission statement, would outline IM's specific charters, define the operating environments, define the organization's customers and the products supplied to those customers (Hax and Majluf, 1991; Peters, 1987). It also would define how those products should be supplied to the customer (strategies and corporate philosophy), and similarly define the organization's desired relationships with all of its stakeholders. Finally, it would outline broad, bold objectives which offer a clear view of where the organization expects to be in the future. (Hax and Majluf, 1991) This vision must receive widest dissemination and discussion at every level. ensuring that



every stakeholder (not just every employee) understands the vision (Peters, 1987).

A well crafted mission statement, which offers clear vision, will provide valuable and enduring benefits. Vision aligns action (Balogh, 1991). When the vision is understood and accepted, it serves a powerful control function, bringing operational goals and actions into alignment with the vision. It empowers people by removing ambiguity and frustration. And it offers an effective alternative to high-overhead, detailed strategic planning during turbulent periods of change. (Peters, 1987)

*Process.* Recommendations for the planning process include encouraging strategic ideas from lower levels, encouraging flexibility and innovation in the process, and offering consistent, high-level support for the planning effort.

Research indicates that strategic planning is most effective in organizations where there is broad commitment to and belief in the strategic management process. Indeed, some argue, as did one command IM, that the process itself holds most, if not all, of the value of strategic management (Peters, 1987; Appendix B-2-1). The logic here is that it is the analysis that goes into the planning, and more importantly, the decisions that are made, which guide the strategic progress of the organization, not the recorded summary of those decisions. Hence the recommendation that a cultural commitment to the process should be fostered.

*Integration.* Information Management has recently launched initiatives to standardize and integrate systems and data requirements. This effort is strategically essential. Perhaps the time is also appropriate to begin to integrate all strategic management initiatives as well. Certainly the budget and POM (Program Operating Memorandum) processes should be integrated into the strategic management effort. Additionally, a variety of strategic-type management initiatives (like Total Quality, Continuous Improvement, Value Added) are being pursued parallel to the strategic management process, that could be effectively integrated. And finally, a strategic control system, effectively integrated into the strategic management effort, would help improve the entire process.

#### *Summary*

This research was undertaken in an effort to evaluate strategic controls in Information Management, and to determine if and how they should be improved. This specific problem was broken down into three questions that needed to be addressed by the research, namely, (1) What are the essential components of effective strategic control systems? (2) Does Air Force IM incorporate the necessary components of strategic control in its strategic management process?, and (3) What changes should be made in the IM strategic management program to ensure effective controls are available and used?

Specifically, in Chapter II, six elements or components were determined to be necessary in order to achieve effective strategic controls. These six elements constitute an eclectic model for strategic controls, and consist of: (1) establishing standards by which to measure progress, (2) controlling the original premises upon which strategic objectives are based, (3) measuring actual conditions, both internal and external to the organization, (4) building and maintaining an information subsystem, which would monitor performance, compare actual performance to the standard, and signal significant deviations, (5) taking corrective action when appropriate, and (6) providing effective incentives to implement strategic plans. This model provides a response to the first investigative question, and a foundation upon which to base the research for the second and third investigative questions.

A research methodology was then established in Chapter III, using the model for strategic controls as a standard. Programs in three major commands were evaluated against the standard, in order to answer the second and third investigative questions.

In the three commands examined; Strategic Air Command, Tactical Air Command, and Military Airlift Command; Information Managers generally used effective procedures in three of the six elements. Processes for measuring actual conditions, for information subsystems, and for taking corrective actions were performed with some degree of

effectiveness. Setting standards, controlling premises, and tying incentives directly to strategic programs were generally not performed effectively. Overall, improvements can be made in institutionalizing strategic controls and in educating planners and managers in their use.

These results are not surprising. Strategic planning, as a formalized discipline, began seven years ago in Information Management, but has been deemphasized in recent years (Bowser, 1991). Planners at all levels are producing strategic plans in fairly close compliance with current guidance. To a great extent, that guidance offers no information on using strategic controls. As strategic controls generally have not been addressed or taught to planners, what could be considered surprising is the fact that some of the elements of strategic control are performed satisfactorily.

During the course of this investigation, other findings surfaced that deal less directly with strategic controls, but that are important to the strategic management process in general. That information was included in this report, in an effort to improve the understanding of strategic management in Air Force IM.

Finally, recommendations were given in this chapter for improving strategic controls and the strategic management processes in general, answering the third and final investigative question. Recommendations in this section include the following significant points:

All organizational levels should be setting goals and objectives that are strategic in nature, establishing measurement standards based on factors that affect strategic outcomes (e.g. customer satisfaction, technological development, larger Air Force or DoD directions, etc.).

Analyze the premises upon which every strategic objective is based, record those premises, and review them periodically and before taking corrective action.

Establish or retain formal and informal procedures for measuring actual conditions, both internal and external to the organization.

Senior managers should be persistent and insistent on receiving continuous feedback on progress on and deviations from strategic objectives.

Corrective action should be delayed until premises have been reexamined to determine if the objective is still valid. When corrective actions are required, avoid the adversarial review process and the tendency to "punish the guilty," in order to preserve entrepreneurial risk-taking.

Managers should make greater efforts to link positive incentives directly to the strategic management process. Build ownership for strategic programs, and then empower people to accomplish them.

Build a clear strategic vision which focuses on defining the organization's intended relationship with every stakeholder.

And lastly, thoroughly integrate every management initiative in the organization with the strategic management program, aligning them all with the strategic vision.

Strategic planning and implementation and strategic controls, which can be seen as two sides of the same strategic management coin, offer organizations powerful and essential tools for proactive management. In Information Management, they hold the key to successfully navigating the turbulence that will doubtless characterize the 1990s and beyond.

## Appendix A: Survey Questions

Questions are designed to be non-leading, non-directive--in order to minimize influence & bias. Feel free to ask for clarification, explanations, etc.

Questions are broad; let respondents discuss their procedures. Want to learn how strategic planning works in their organization--how it is actually done.

Answers and comments are non-attributional: no name or even MAJCOM will be linked to any specific answer.

### The Planning Process

1. -How do you formulate your strategic plan?
  - Who is involved?
  - What is each person responsible for?
  - How does the process start?
  - Describe the process you go through.

(These questions are designed to elicit information about elements 1 and 2 of the model)

2. -Walk me through the strategic planning cycle.
  - What is the first thing you do?
  - Next, etc.?

(Elements 1, 2, and 3)

### Premise Control

3. -What do you base your plans/planning on?
  - How do you decide what to include in the plan?  
(Try to discover if premises are dealt with.)
  - How do you keep track of these 'premises'?

(1 and 2; possibly 3)

### Environmental Control

4. -What external forces (outside IM) impact on the strategic plan?

(3)

5. -Who, outside your organization, helps with the strategic plan?

-Who asks questions? (Within the headquarters.)

(3)

6. -If you needed a strategic resource or extra horsepower in order to accomplish a strategic plan, to whom would you turn--who would be your champion?

(3)

7. -Often within organizations the goals of one division may conflict with those of another. Which organization in this headquarters is the biggest threat to yours? (Most conflict?)

(3)

8. -How does Air Force level IM find out about your progress?

-What indications do you give them?

(Try to determine if the indicators are meaningful)

(3, 4)

9. -By what methods do you coordinate between commands?

-Why do you coordinate?

(3)

#### Feedback and Implementation Control

10. -How do you know if something goes wrong with the implementation process?

-Who would notify/alert to the problem?

-How would they know?

(3, 4)

11. -How do you deal with such a problem? Walk me through the procedures.

-How do you identify the cause(s) of that problem?

-Describe the steps you would take.

(2, 3, 4, 5)

12. -What is the key indicator to the health of your strategic plan to you?

-Are there others?

-Who would tell you if it is sick?

-Why do you think they would tell you?

(3, 5, 6)



13. -What happens when someone deviates from the method/  
process/tactic which is the accepted method for achiev-  
ing a goal?  
-What questions might you ask?  
-Describe an example of when this may have happened?  
-(If none, why not?)

(4, 5)

14. -How/when do you identify deviations?

(4)

15. -What happens if you don't meet a goal?  
-What steps would you take? Next, etc.?

(2, 4, 5)

16. -What would cause you to change a goal?

-Why?

(5)

17. -What would keep you from accomplishing elements of the  
strategic plan?

(5)

18. -How do you get feedback on unit (operational) level  
initiatives?

(4, 5)

19. -How do people not in the strategic planning group get  
information on the strategic plan?

(4)

#### Incentives

20. -How do you make the strategic plan meaningful to the  
worker at the operational level?

(6)

21. -How are successes identified/handled?

-What happens when you meet a goal?

-What happens when you meet a goal early?

(4, 5, 6)

22. -Describe some successes you've had.

-How did it affect people?

-How did they know?

-What evidence was given?

-To which people?

-In what form?

(4, 6)

## Appendix B: *Interviews*

The interviews are divided into five sections:

Section B-1 contains interviews conducted at the Pentagon.

Sections B-2 through B-4 contains the interviews from the three MAJCOMS. (These are not named to provide anonymity for the participants.)

Section B-5 contains excerpts of an interview with Mr. Dick Balogh, Director, Strategic Plans and Programs, Lockheed Engineering and Sciences Company.

COLONEL NATIONS (The Pentagon, 10-11 June 1991)

(Discussing the change from Administration to Information Management)

Q. First of all, where did the concept originate?

I would suggest that the concept originated with the paperwork reduction act. There are a couple of paperwork reduction acts. The original law and then the paperwork reduction reauthorization act. And I suppose you already went through those and read the terms information resources management, information management, those kinds of words. I will give you my view on it because I've been a MAJCOM DA for two different MAJCOMs--Strategic Air Command and USAFE I happened to be in USAFE when the name changed. I came here directly after that. Col Norm Leeseey, incidently is back in the building now, he's in the MWR business now. He was one of those officers who was half 73 and half 70. But Norm Leeseey was the Air Force DA and Col Fred Hallsworth was the Deputy DA at that time. With the 1987 Air Force reorganization, which was prompted by Congress, saying there was a requirement for more visible civilian control if you will. The several activities moved over from the traditional Air Staff to become parts of the Secretary of the Air Force staff. You've heard the term the Secretariat. Those included the IG, the AQ community, all the acquisition processes. Much of the financial management, FM and as it turned out and the name changed physically with the move. it changed from DA to IM with the move. It would have been May-June 87, when DA moved over to come under the operational control of the Secretariat, the Secretary of the Air Force staff, specifically to the office of the administrative assistant, Mr. Bob McCormick, who, I don't know if you've had a chance talk to him or not, but he's got a lot of knowledge. And some of his philosophy went into the name change. Specifically, when would we do it and would it be information management or would it be information resources management or would it be, and it was information management and administration. Kind of as though there was one piston going 'information management' and one piston going 'administration.' During my tenure as the Air Force Director of Information Management, we knocked off the "and administration" portion of it. So we turned out to be the IM. I would hesitate to tell that that's the last chapter in that book. Ten years from now we may be something else. But the basic reasons that we changed that had to do with the electronic age. And you recognize in talking to me, you're gonna be talking to an old guy. I've been around for a year or two and I'll go back in history with you some, if you don't mind. There has always been ar.

adjutant, adjutant general in the Army. And if you want to, you can get kind of a case study from how the Army is changed from the AG to the IS and IM and they are still in the process as is the name. But there is always an adjutant, there was always a front office person, an exec, and hanging off the tentacles of that exec would be the couriers, messages centers, and the bicycle riding people, the guys who read the message and got in the jeep and ran and carried it to somebody or who cut the orders or who put the daily bulletin out, who ran the print shops, who published regs and published directives and put dates on correspondence and basically handled the offices. Across the years there has been more control then less control then more control, etc. Concerning all those people who do the adjutant type duties, the administrators or 1991 policy information managers. But in any organization to include IBM to Sears Roebuck, there are people who do information management things, who handle information, who manage information. Now you notice I have not said technology yet. And I will not say technology for quite awhile. But there is a cadré, and I think we're the 6th largest career find in the Air Force--the 70 community, 318 community, half of us civilians. Generally speaking, office worker type civilians and people who handle and manage information. If you recall back when Colonel Jim Delaney was the Air Force DA, he had a little cute phrase that got a lot of attention--"office workers with flight line attitudes," administrators, adjutants, information managers, people who worked in offices. It has been across the years those people who handle paperwork. And I've used the term Bureaucrat with a capital B, the paper pushers. Hopefully, today's smart paper pushers, but paper pushers nevertheless, people who handle paper. And will discuss a little later people who handle screens, who move information electronically. O.K., if you'll stipulate to the requirement for people to do adjutant type duties, then let's go on. Those people needed some training and obviously as you would know, administrators traditionally have not received very much formal training, technical school training. Most of their training has been on the job, tailored to the specific job they hold. There are more sub-specialties within the larger 70 community to include the civilian side of that administration information management community than there are in any other career fields. You will find stenographers, you'll find secretaries, you'll find message center people, now I use message center people not the technicians in the message center but the people who prepare messages and ensure their accuracy, they go into the system, and you'll find special orders clerks, and you'll find chief clerks in orderly rooms and you'll find print shop operators who are either heavy duty or copier managers or that sort. You'll find administrators working in the

salvage yard, making sure all the records are right and the records in fact are in course with directives. And you get the traditional types of duties, duties in support of a commander somewhere. I don't know of any administrator, any information manager who does not work for a commander. Now some of those commanders may be senior staff people, but they are in fact responsible for the leadership of something--money, airplanes, fuel whatever. But all that leans toward what is the mission of that unit. And obviously you can't train everybody going through Keesler to handle all of the mish mash of units we have in the Air Force. So the determination has been made, and I agree with the determination, that you will teach the basics, basic filing, basic publications, can you type, can you operate a wordprocessor. Hopefully today, hopefully we've been able to keep the computers in the enlisted tech school and introduced them in the officer tech school. But are you familiar with what you are going to be seeing when you walk into that office so you can earn your pay the first month, basically. Then when you get to the office, when you get to the field, whether it's Hahn or Wright-Patterson or whatever and learn like the devil what your specific duties are. And what the specific regiments are. Understanding of course there are over-arching directives in the Air Force on how you need to file documents. How you need to publish regulations, manuals, directives. How you need to construct special orders. Things that have to be there or the individual can't perform the service. So basically, we're an OJT oriented, low grade versus high grade characterized community. The only reason we have higher grade people is for policy purposes and strategic thinking and strategic planning purposes. The vast majority of our people in the field are TSgt and below and probably GS-7 and below, and major and below. Few lieutenant colonels sprinkled here and there, not a great number. So we are a task oriented career field. O.k., I hope that sets the stage for you as to who we are and perhaps a little bit of where we came from.

O.k. let's step on into the late 70s, early 80s. Wordprocessors became the thing of the day, de rigueur, of the office. Electric typewriters were the predecessors then electronic typewriters and we still have thousands of electronic typewriters around that had a little bit of memory, they had a little bit of a spell checker, and an automatic eraser. But the wordprocessor came in. And that did a couple of three things. Number one, it speeded up the process after the individual learned, and number two it enhanced the image if you will, the symbolism of the office worker. Because traditionally the office worker has been kind of looked down on. Sometimes for good reason, if the office worker tended to be too bureaucratic to follow the mission, work the mission. In other words, if the officer worker thought that he/she was a kingdom unto themselves.

than they could distract the mission. If they were too busy reading regulations and not busy enough hacking the boss' concerns, then they became bureaucratic little b's, a damn thing. So the wordprocessor came in and suddenly an individual, say over 2 or 3, 4 years, the secretary or the 2-stripe or the lieutenant was able to manipulate a machine and could store things and could move things around within that machine. Not connected to anything yet. But enhanced the thought process around the base. Hey that administrator sitting in the front office must be reasonably smart because he knows how to work a wordprocessor. In the early days of the wordprocessor, we worked through pools. We had wordprocessing centers, WPCs. And wordprocessing centers is where you get all the controllers' secretaries perhaps or all the DO secretaries and maybe a 2-striper or two and put them together and everybody brings their keyboard there. That was an ideal that worked for awhile but god was it tough on the mission. Because the poor ole flight line maintenance officer would have to scribble out whatever he wanted drafted out and would have to walk down to the flightline somewhere or an air-conditioned office and then leave it. It would queue up with everyone else's material and basically... Wordprocessing, off the track, but I'm going to tell you a little bit about wordprocessing centers. Basically they perform a very good function. They increased the quality of the output, what they turned out was high quality. But god they didn't support the people and as soon as we could, we decentralized wordprocessing centers. Got those people back as near the airplane, or as near the fuel pit, or as near the controller, or as near to the CBPO as we could. With that enhancement, with the wordprocessor, comes basically along this time comes the time that the AD community (data automation) and the communications community hard-wired, hard-lined com people started talking about putting themselves together. And they did this in 83 or 84. I was out at SAC as a matter of fact. And SAC was the lead command on sticking AD and DC, as it was known then, (director of communications) together. As we, as the Air Force was looking at communications and electronics going together, I was given practically a free hand by General Benny Davis to see if DA should go in with that community.. I thought it should. Now the Air Force hierarchy at that time didn't think we should. Matter of fact we aren't yet, so I guess the Air Force hierarchy prevailed. But anyway, I thought that there was good opportunity for the administrators of the world particularly at the base DA level, not in the office mind you, but at the base DA level and the MAJCOM DA level and the Air Force planning and programming looking down the road, that we should be rubbing shoulders with, if not sleeping with the information systems community. Because I could see at that point and we didn't know what a LAN was but we knew that there was something to be gained by having one machine talk to another machine. We

know as far back as the early days when I guess supply was the first outfit to actually automate up the channel. Automating, putting the punch cards into the electronic system and pumping them all basically through the wire. And we had discovered that works. It's reliable. Whatever you put in at this end comes out on that end exactly the same. If it was in card column 47 then it will be in card column 47 when it comes out. There was a vision, if you will, not too smart a vision, but a vision nevertheless, that hey if we could get all of the administrators on this base so that they could talk to each other at least at the unit level, we could really get smart. In other words, if the orderly room clerk could type the APR or the award recommendation and pump it over to the CBPO, wouldn't that be smooth. And ultimately have the ultimate checker say well yea that looks good and pump it out onto a form and file it away instead of running it through bits for a week and a half. So that was the concept. Quite honestly, as I examine this and for want of name you may use then Brig Gen John Stahl, who was the communicator and Brig Gen Jim Couch, who was the data automater at SAC and Col Bill Nations. We had our millions work the test if you will for information systems. Now up here on the Air Staff was a brigadier general then Maj Gen Jerry Crather, you've probably heard of Jerry Crather. He's the guy who developed, and his people developed, the plan on a back of an envelope with a requirement to brief quickly the concept, although there have been several studies, there have been years of studies going on. And you might have history of that. I was going to say the SIMLOG study, but that's not right. But anyway there were several studies going on concerning communications and electronics going together. And finally the Chief of Staff basically and the way Gen Crather briefed us on it was the Chief of Staff says "Jerry, you got any ideas?" Gen Crather says "Yea, I've got a couple." He says "Well come back in Monday morning or Tuesday morning and tell me what they are." So very quickly we went back figured out how information systems and Comm can go together. Anyway, and we were the lead command to test it and see what we could do and how it would look in the MAJCOM. Combat plan, actual mission unit, mission command. Some aspects of administration at that point would have worked very, very well. Obviously we had D A Xs systems. Some of us were playing around with strategic planning. Some of us were playing around with electronic publishing. Various commands were doing various things based on the initiatives of the command DAs. And we had a couple of things working at SAC. We were practically complete on our electronic publishing system, as an example. We had bought thousands of wordprocessors, central buys. Buys where we would trade in one body and get two word processors, that kind of thing. The sticking points, the reason DA, the DA did not become a part of the information systems at that point, had to do with the more traditional.



and if you will, the more heavy weight of our needs. Records management just didn't match with anything that communications, electronics communities were trying to do. Publishing really didn't. Now it might today with electronic publishing being practically pulled full berth. Repro, no way, no way in the world. The print shops just didn't look right when you put them on a chart with the IS and DC communities melting themselves together. Incidentally there was a hell of a lot the IS and DC communities who, the AD and DC communities that didn't look right either, but we went ahead and did it. But we opted out. Gen Davis said yea, that looks like it's not going to work right now, but don't forget it, go back and look at it some more. I guess we're still looking at it today. It still keeps going. But it was the more traditional things. The PDOs as we still know them today. Data electronic publishing being able to go with a live directive. The warehouse parts of PDO. The heavy duty print plants. The records managers without electronic recordskeeping. The publishing side of the house. And all the manual processes are what kept us from becoming a part of the information systems community in 1983, 84. So we have continued, and incidently along came a LAN or two. A model base had a LAN-- practically--jury rigged, but a LAN nevertheless. And the term administration came to define less and less well what those office workers were doing. Paperwork reduction act mentioned information management and information resources management. Two things, two completely different things, incidentally. But the term information management became more descriptive as we electrified ourselves more. Then the term administration or adjutant office worker, desk clerk. I hate the term clerk. But any of those terms that had served us in good stead over the years. So in 1987 with the advent of the Air Force reorganization, and our subsumption by the Secretariat staff, we included information management in our title. Information Management and Administration. I got to the Air Staff in 1987. I was never the Air Force DA when I got there with this Air Force IM and A. So we continued to look at it, and what does the term administration say to the wing commander. And I asked wing commanders, base commanders. You know when someone say admiristration, what do you think. And more and more I got one of those. ooh (grimace). How does information management sound. Well that sounds a little bit more sophisticated if you would. That sounds like it might be what were managing, information. So we bought information management, the term. We had been managing information since the message went to Garcia, but we evolved into that and deleted the term "and administration" from our title. And that occurred in probably late 88 early 89. And it occurred simply by sending a document to the manpower people and say hey would you please take "and administration" off our title. And they complied. And stamped it and sent it back, said 'yea.

verily.' No big decision, we got Mr. McCormick to concur. And we told the Assistant Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Gen Carl Smith at that time, and he says "no sweat, whatever." So basically it was a decision, you could call it an E-ring decision for want of anything else. But with full concurrence of the MAJCOM Das at that time. We discussed it in one of our destiny conferences, should we do. We said yea, yea it's a good idea. And we banged it around for about a couple of hours, what the pros and cons were. There are still some people in the Air Force and people have been administrators for years and years who still call themselves administrators, and I don't complain about that. I still talk about administration of the entire office layout. So if you look in your Funk and Wagnel there would be a definition for administration. In the next issue, hopefully there will be on for information management. Hopefully. But various parts of the government still are saying information management in the same voice they say information resources management. When you say information resources management, in ole Bill Nations' view, you're talking about the technology that goes with it. When you talk about information management, you're talking about what that office manager does--managing information. The information manager, in my view, should not care whether he has an IBM box or Apple box. As long as he has been smart enough to tell the technologist, but the technologists of the world are the people who are literally the on-line communicators and, more a late comer, but the on-line data automated data processing people--ADP people. Now, we as the office managers of the world should be one of the most eloquent proponents and one of the most eloquent requirers of what the technology looks like. In other words, how much should you be able to put through that pipe. It what formats. We should be the ones who are just flat-ass insisting on GOSIP and POSI and things, so we can talk from one unit to the other. One of my standing jokes with my old friends in the communications and electronics side of the house is that you guys don't know what goes on in the office, you're graded piping stuff to the wall, you're graded originally in running comm centers, and incidently I wanted to question in a few years that comm centers as we, the message processing units should probably belong to the IM community. You're going to be practically no technician, no technology duties going on in the message center. And with SARA and SARA LITE, it's becoming more and more obvious that we're, I think we'll do away with the huge requirements of the base message center. But anyway, the information managers of the 90s should be smart enough, number one to be well grounded to know what the office requirements are, what do I need in this office, what do I need to support my boss and his mission. And the question doesn't have to be too much more complicated than that. What do I need to be able to support my boss and his mission. And then they should be

eloquent enough and smart enough and technology based enough to communicate that to whomever in the technology side of the house, the AFCCs of the world, if AFCC continues as an organization. And in my view, the information manager is that individual who determines what information is required, when it's required, what format it is required in, and when they need it. Basically if he can keep his boss satisfied in the flow of information, and that's in a bunch of different formats, a lot of it still paper of course, probably 80-85 percent of it still paper. Some of it probably will continue to be over the telephone. If you look at the classic front office worker, basically goes through a little equation of what is her boss' schedule, he's got a staff meeting at 7:30, he's got a dental appointment at 8:00, and then she can tell somebody to call in at 9:15. That's information passing. In other words, that's telling how to manage information. How much does the boss know about his box, and information managers incidently should be the leading proponents of computer literacy. If you got a wing commander or base commander or squadron commander, TAC fighter squadron or maintenance squadron commander who doesn't understand the computer, basically, then it's the information manager's responsibility, in my view, to sweet talk that guy into learning or that girl into learning, so they can understand because it speeds up the information manager's job, the office worker's job if you will, if the boss is comfortable with receiving his messages over the system. Instead of having to get into the system and run them through the printer, package them up, bring them in, leave them in the IN box, and catch the boss to have time to read his messages. If the boss has got a nickel's worth of smarts and a nickel's worth of incentive to do so, the boss can read his own screen. It certainly does make the job much more efficient. So the outside person can start figuring out what they are going to need next year, or 10 years down the road. O.k., does that give you any kind of feel for information management?

END COL NATIONS

B-1-2

COL ZIMMERMAN

I wanted to find out what the role that you see the Air Force information management takes vis-a-vis the MAJCOMs industry in the planning effort.

I guess our primary role in the strategic planning in general is really to set broad goals, objectives and setting where Air Force as a whole is going to go.

\*\*\*\*REMAINDER OF INTERVIEW DID NOT RECORD\*\*\*\*

MS. BOWSER

Information resources management as a total concept includes all of the resources to create, store, retrieve, manipulate, disseminate, all the way to the disposition of the information. And when we talk resources that's the people, the equipment, etc. Now then, under the paperwork reduction act of 1979, and updated in 1989, I guess the latest update. Every agency is required to have a senior IRM official. In the Air Force that person is SAF AQ who is the chief of acquisition and he delegates that work to SAF AQC who the comm computer directorate for him. That directorate is headed by a Mr. Moslin, who is an SES-6. He is an equivalent to a three-star. The same as Mr. McCormick, who is SAF AA, who is the head of one of the directorates of information management and that's us. The computer world and both of those have been under SAF, under the Secretariat. Over under the Air Staff side, you have all the comm and computer. And that includes all of the C-4 stuff as well as your general purpose. When I talk about C-4, that's your Command, Control, Communications, and Computers. And you can add the C-4I which includes the imbedded intel world. Under SAF AA the director of information management also has the office of data administration which Air Force reg 429 talks about the total program, that's your data standards, data elements, owning the central repository corporate data dictionary, if you will. That then includes embedded computers. Because one of the big reasons for data standards or so that at a joint level the Army, Air Force, Navy, all the services can talk together in a Desert Storm arena, which they can't do right now. Data standards also implies standards in the communications links, standards in the operating systems, and a lot of things. But data management as a subject.

Is CIM [Corporate Information Management] dictating many of those standards at this point?

CIM is dictating that there will be standards. Standards then are being set up functionally--logistics, financial, surgeon, all of those things have to comply with a corporate data dictionary, if you will. And there will be standards that go across them. As an example, personnel data, those kinds of things. Perhaps we should say then acquisition buys equipment and logistics delivers it, so you have to have the same part numbers, the same designators for equipment that would also identify the kind of fuel or the kind of ammunition that goes in it. So this data standard that then travel horizontally instead of only vertically, functionally. So that's a different kind of world. The CIM

world is managed by the acquisition world in the Air Force. When you get down to computer-aided logistics system, the point of contact for that is in this organization, but the command or the lead organization is Defense Logistics. And if you follow that down the chain, you would get AFLC--Log Command. The organization structure in the Air Force is incongruent at this point. It's very difficult to coordinate response to say DoD. We just went through this exercise to create the input for the annual IRM report to DoD, who ultimately goes into OMB, Office of Management Budget who reports to Congress. And the success of how we're doing with our programs will influence what Congress gives us in the future. The Army has a centrally managed IMR organization that is responsible to the Secretary and responsive to the Chief as regards weapons systems and those kinds of things. They set the technical standards for all computer systems for the information management. And how that's employed in the weapons world, they act as tech advisors to those people. In Navy they are trying to get to that. They still, back to this annual report, this year they had difficulty as we did in compiling their annual report because the person who was the project officer lived in the computer world. And to quote him the records management, information management is not my bag. But this year we had to report. So, the single organization for IRM as a total concept, my perception is being driven through Congress by OMB. And we will get to that.

In the Air Force, we will get to that?

I believe we will have to. And of course you do have the Goldwater-Nichols Act that said the Secretariat is responsible for everything except the warfighting mission. The Secretariat will provide the Chief the resources to perform that warfighting mission. Which the Chief has identified to the Secretariat. Under that, that's why acquisition is now under the Secretariat. That's why information management as a function is under the Secretariat. The Goldwater-Nichols folks didn't solve the problem of communications and computers because they were looking at it only from a command control aspect. And they would look at it from the general purpose and they didn't realize that as we got to these relational data bases that it would be difficult to separate the two, at least from the technical policy point of view. Because if you are in the war arena and you're ordering fuel for your people that are over there, the data must match or you're all of a sudden gonna get the wrong millimeter ammo and other kinds of things. You will have the wrong people there to operate the equipment. Because you don't have the right, because the personnel systems has got to match the logistics system now so that you can send the right, if you start thinking about this it gets to be a mind-boggling thing. O.k., so I've

done a data dump on you on information resources management. But back to my strategic planning it must be tied to the technology though, otherwise there is no requirement for the policy to be fixed. And that's what our strategic plan addresses at this level. Have I confused you now?

No, not at all. O.K., as far as the Army system, the one that you described there, do they manage information resources and what we call IM under the same umbrella?

Everything they have except they have records management, they have forms and pubs and data management. They do not have admin comm as we know it. They still the adjutant function and that has remained. Under the adjutant, the adjutant function is separate from the IRM function.

And that's like the exec.

The exec and mail distribution, orders and those kinds of things. Records management, data management, pubs and forms are under the IRM. Desktop publishing, that's purely in the IRM. The reduction of hard copy and distribution of pubs and forms as we know them is a logistics function. It's operation, it's production and they do their initial distribution directly to the customer. Their reduced PDO function is in a corner of their supply store. You walk to one counter, you get your pencils and staples, you walk over to the other one and you get your pubs and forms. They have local reproduction on a lot of that, where they give you a copy of the reg and if it's not a 67 series or something, you walk over to the high-speed copier and copy it and go on about your business. You do that work, you the customer, you work in civil engineering or somewhere.

That makes a lot of sense to me.

It makes too much sense. And we are going to have to address those issues in our world.

When are we going to address those?

Well this heretic thinks we are going to do it within this fiscal year, perhaps with implementation in 92 or 93.

Really.

I think it's going to happen, it's going to happen over night.

Do you think you're a heretic. Do you feel like you're a lone voice?

No, there's a few people who understand it. More people, like yourself, they see what's happening.

But I have no horsepower.

I don't either. I'm a project officer. I may be a GM-13 but I have no authority. I work for a branch chief, I'm buried three levels from the director. So to get to Mr. McCormick or Mr. Moslin, I can't. I have no input. And when, and of course being a strategist and being a person who thinks, well if this is going to happen then, a strategic planner thinks in a ripple effect. And I know out in the year 2000 a lot of the world will change. A lot of them will be changed by 95. And I would like to influence what that looks like.

Wouldn't that be nice if we would affect the change and not be reactive.

I would like to contribute to it. I'd like to design that future. And when you read my perspectives, I quote Russel Ackoff, who, and I guess studying his work is what really made strategic planning and strategic management and strategic thinking, take with me. That was my inoculation process if you will. And it has to do with that we have the capability to control what our future will look like. But only if we plan for it and take initiative now, instead of reacting out there. He used the term that there are four kinds of planners. Inactive, does nothing, wonders what happened. You have the reactive, responds to whatever, it moves back to status quo as quickly as possible. Then you have the proactive, and they are the ones who predict and plan to meet. And then you have the interactive, who says, takes the predictive and moves it a step further and says this is what is going to happen if I don't do something to make it become this. And that means that horizontally and vertically people are planning together. And that's the way you achieve this synergistic affect of interactive planning. That says that you redesign the future. You don't only meet it successfully, but that you actually create it. I was fortunate enough to have, in my undergrad, which by the way I finished in 85 so it's fairly recent, in technology and management, and I've probably already told you this before, but we had a comprehensive, 12-hour course that was called Managing Change. And this was one of seven textbooks that we had. And this is where it took with me. 1983 I guess. That I got real lucky and stumbled into this. So this is what we're basically talking about here. It talks about the environmental, whatever.

Here's one of the quotes I have. Continuous planning is necessary if the system is to learn and adapt effectively. I used that in one of my inner quotes, there. But anyway.



this was just a wonderful book and I keep it on my shelf. And I'm very selective of what I do put up here.

I'll have to see if I can find a copy of that. It's called what?

Redesigning the Future. And it's a systems approach to societal problems. He was using one of, and I'm sure you're familiar with the Mantua community in Pittsburgh. And it was this ghetto community that the city kept pouring money into. And finally they said why don't we ask them what they want down there instead of going down there and telling them what we are going to do. And that's where the black man who took back the streets, he's from that community. But it had to do with, o.k. if you could do something, what do you guys want to do down here. They told them. They saved a lot of money instead of pouring it down a rat hole, they let the people become empowered to change their community. And it was really phenomenal. And this book is a study of that. It talks to that in that. So that's sort of what my whole basic philosophy about planning is. Is that you design, don't predict what's going to happen. You say o.k., we've got 10 years. The same thing happened with John Kennedy when he went to the moon. He said we're going to the moon. Now how are we going to do that? Everybody started jumping up and down. But we did that. And that's what ...

He didn't know how.

He didn't know either. He knew he was going. He said that is the target. That's the vision, of going to the moon. He didn't know what the spaceship was going to look like. He didn't know what the suits would look like.

We didn't have the technology then.

Yea, but you had to create it. That's sort of the, and it took interactive planning by the scientific community, those aerospace people and everybody. And they said, well if you're going to go and it's going to get this hot when you go through re-entry, then you've got to have this kind of protection for the people or they will come back french fries. That's when you start the brainstorming that says, o.k. how do we want that to happen. And that's what your plan must become then. If you don't do it that way, there is no reason to plan. So anyways, I get a little bit evangelical about this. This is what I do. This is the way I look at the world.

I agree. And this is the way I look at the world too. I get frustrated a little bit when I see that we aren't. I talked to Col Zimmerman just a few minutes ago. And he said that if strategic planning were working right, I would be.

meaning himself, would be involved in the process. He says, but quite frankly, we haven't done anything for about a year and a half because things are just too turbulent.

And that's when you need a plan. And so the things that I work on, the DMRD process, we work on that. I work on special projects. Like, you know if DP comes in here and asks us something, we get to work on that. One of the things that we've done in the last year, I don't know if you're familiar with the program management directives, that create a program, called a PMD.

No I'm not.

O.k., that's who the acquisition usually has to with system development, whether it's a B-2 or if it's a START, Strategic Arms Reduction thing. And they're developing a STARS program which is a reporting and tracking of this. You know, the no notice inspections. So now we've got a system that will, it'll be a reporting and tracking and carrying data among us and all of the people, countries, and services for us, you know, Army, Navy, and the Air Force, plus their counter parts in other nations. We have to share this kind of information. So when SPACECOM was developing an implementation plan. They went over to the information management folks and said we need your help. The information management people said oh my gosh, what are we going to do now, help Air Force. Air Force says, huh. Because we had no idea. We now coordinate on this program management document. So the thing I've been highly concerned about is o.k., they say yes you need information management requirements, you need data management requirements, well that program office when it gets up and running, it's gonna come back to IM and it's gonna say o.k., now how do we do information management, data management. How do we implement your policy. We develop policy and we implement it. We've got some level of policy in place but we don't have, how are we going to implement this thing.

I'm not sure we understand the technology enough to develop the policy.

We don't have to. We do not have to.

But we don't understand the capabilities.

We don't have to. Trust me. Honestly, we don't have to. That's the technology solution. We have to define our requirements. What are our statutory requirements. We know how to manage the stuff in this cabinet. The requirements aren't any different. We need to know how to find it, what's the file label and stuff. We need to know what it's life is. We need to know who has access to it. We need to

tell these people that. We need to know when, if you have automated a 2095, we need to know who and when put the data in. See you've got to have some \_\_\_ out here, that' technical solution. We just need to tell the community, you need to who updates it, who has the right to update it, and when they did, and those kinds of things. That's our requirement, we need to tell them that. But if they come to ask us that, we're not gonna tell them that. We're gonna say you have to do \_\_\_ and privacy act requirements. And they're gonna say what the hell is that. And we're gonna say well... So that's what I'm saying. We define the requirements. We set the policy which is in essence the requirements. And then we tell them we need an audit trail of this, and this, and this in that system. O.k., we've got a program management document that sets up a program office. And they have a systems development life cycle, SDLC. O.k. And they deliver management documents along there. Back to we need a section in those documents that address information management. Somewhere out here, they are gonna get into a functional test demonstration. In that test plan there's got to be a net. What's the audit trail of who updates this. Where is that, that we can find it. What's the access to it, what's the life cycle of this information. And you show us Mr. Contractor, how is this gonna work. And we say yep that looks good. No you can't live that way. Because too many people can get access to it. Then you get involved in it. And that's how you implement your policies. And your policies are the requirements for managing information.

Now, on the statutory requirements that we used as our basis, are they broad or are they very specific?

They're very specific to a large degree. O.k., you have different agencies then that will come out with their statutory requirements based on public law. NAWRA has theirs. Creation access, firma has some in it, privacy act, foya, and those kinds of things. We have to translate that into what a systems development document ought to include. And we do that for this, we finally during the MIFF program got to the optional, annual review of filed things.

Optional and annual. You mean you don't have to review it every year.

If you didn't have any trouble with this office, all of them have to be reviewed within X numbers of years, and I forget. I want to say three years or maybe five years.

How recent is that?

I don't know, it's a couple of years old. The point is, if you, why do you have to keep going back to the same office

every year that always checks out right if you still have certain things in effect, file plan is still in effect. Sometimes you haven't turned over the file custodian and other kinds of things. Then what is the element of risk if you don't go and spend the manhours to do that. So you have to start managing the exceptions. Your problem child, you could probably go see every six months. But the ones that always run properly, leave them alone, don't bother them. So, the point is, that we do that.

And the statutes allow for that.

Sure, if 'thou shalt have a good program.' But to follow this, how then do you practice that kind of oversight of the inspection of the files in the system. I'll bet you the records management people that sit in this same big room couldn't tell you. They couldn't tell you if it was even a requirement.

Why not? They don't get involved enough?

Because they haven't thought about it that far.

They haven't set the policy yet?

You know how we used to have these checklists that the inspectors used when they went out. They don't have any checklists for the inspectors to go and inspect. An electronic system from the information management point of view. They go out there and inspect whether or not you spent the right kind of money, whether or not the system is up and running, whether or not it's up where you have the operating main time that it's suppose to be available. They check on those kinds of things. But as regards to information in the box, they haven't a clue. And this is not being pessimistic. This is the realities. And these are the kinds of things that we ought to be planning to have happen. And that's what our strategic plan should have been looking like.

Do you know what this is? Big Ben. This is my example of user friendly. And I use this in one of my classes. And we were defining user friendly. And I told them that users need change. And most expensive is not always the best. And I go back to when I was a young woman. I had worked for a company that had lots of money, so it was a new company, so when you had been there 5 years, you got to get a gold watch instead of waiting till you retire. So I had a 14K gold Omega watch. And this was back before quartz and you had to wind it, but it was beautiful and I could tell time by it. Later on I was given a watch that had some diamonds around it, but it had quartz. But as time moved on I couldn't read the dial without my reading glasses. This one

has quartz and I can read it and it didn't cost nearly as much as either one of the others. But it's user friendly. Why do we here at the Air Staff when we make the policies not have any of the IRM graduates? Where should those people be?

I agree, they should be at the MAJCOMs and at the Air Force level.

See I believe I will take you up on discussing the MAJCOMs. How about sending them in these big systems offices that are being developed. One of my war stories was the maintenance system, computer-assisted maintenance system, CAMS. If they came to us and said give us an IRM graduate from the program office, and they said o.k. if you'll give us one of your slots at AFIT to train another one, you know. And I say 'what on earth is wrong?' Let them go--let them have a slot--then we wouldn't have any trouble getting these slots. Find the very best you have and send them. And it happened to be Capt Mackleford, ended up going and doing that. But in the initial discussion, it was tooth and nail, to do that. We didn't have any to spare. She was more important to stay in at a MAJCOM level.

MAJOR THORSTAD

Mr. Nguyen is the head honcho for the entire Air Force Data Management Standards program. I've got the fancy title, but that's only to look good on paper. When I came in here, what's my title. Data Management Officer. I'm here in a supporting actor role. So I handle a lot of the issues relating to Data Dictionary, prime words, class words, those kinds of things.

Things that we want to standardize across the Air Force?

That's right. I guess I'm probably the self-appointed Total Quality guy too.

In data base management?

Well, in data management. This is not so much the, this is not a tech shop. This is really a management than a policy part of it. So when you say data base administration, you're talking more the technical side, more the SC side of the house. So you've got management function over there. I don't know, like maybe a poor comparison is you've got your base IM guys then you've got your staff support guys. You know, where they really get down and put the rubber to the roler. We've got really big information engineering efforts under way. Frank Davis is our expert in that area. Right now that's what we're pushing hard for and trying to get money to fund, information engineering, information modeling project. And the whole idea is you can't manage a resource if you don't know what you have.

What information are we trying to model?

Well, initially I think they are trying to do is to work the acquisition side of the house. To try to figure out what exactly it is we have out there. What data we have in different systems, who owns it, what the overlaps are, where the redundancies are. But initially, if we get the money, we're going to have to do a strategic data model for the Air Force. And that all filters down. It's kind of like a pyramid effect. All the way down to the operational level. Of course by the time it gets down to the operational level, most of the work will be done. But I'm convinced, having never been exposed to it before I got here, that, what a neat thing to do information engineering. Because once you identify where all your data redundancies are, of course if you believe that the data or the functional building blocks of all information, if you identify where those redundancies are, and if you can eliminate those redundancies, you know

then you make things a lot more efficient, you save a lot of money. When we talk standardization, we've had a few folks who have said that I don't need you guys sitting up there telling me I have to use this or have to do that. And we have to caution them and no, no, no. We're not telling you that you have to use a certain application. What we're telling you is when those developers out there put that application together that they have to use standard data elements. That's basically going to be transparent to you, the end user. Because they can write an algorithm to have that represented on the screen any which way you like. When we get down to that fundamental building block that you're going to share with others, that's what's going to be standardized. And of course I'm sure you're aware right now that we have so many systems that are stovepiped. So many similar pieces of data are represented so many different ways. It's just hard for one system to talk to another. A good example, Mr. Nguyen wrote up a background paper on real time operational problem over on Desert Storm. We had the TAC, I guess it's their airlift scheduling system and the MAC airlift scheduling system. Which apparently they have been trying to work for some time so that they could share their data, had been unsuccessful. And this was really causing them a problem over there in the desert. It was taking, I guess, about 12 hours of manual labor to put an air tasking quarter together. So the MAC guys sent a small contention over there. And apparently they had done some information flow analysis. And they took that and, well the bottom line was they were able to take what took 12 hours to do manually and turned it in to something that could be done in an hour. So that's, really I think that speaks more, not so much for data standardization but for ease of information engineering to find out where your problems are. I think a lot of people are, even when they do get an understanding of what we're trying to push here, I think a lot of people are scared. One of the by-products, it seems obvious to us anyway, is that when you start identifying the overlaps, that's essentially the fat. We should be able to cut that fat out. Manpower folks love it. We've got a couple of captains over in manpower that are really, they're really interested and I think that's great. Because it's like any business, you ought to be looking to see where you can cut the fat out and streamline your organization. And I think people are going to put up a lot of resistance because people will say whoa, when we find out where these redundancies are we may end up cutting bodies, we may be getting less money for something. But actually that's what it's all about, we all ought to be working toward that.

We've got to sell integratability too. That's a tremendous advantage that everybody is going to see.

I think, well I sense that there is probably some, a lot of fences built up there. I own this deal. This is mine. I'm not going to share with you. We've pumped billions of dollars into developing this site. And that's not the way it ought to be. You have to look beyond your nose and you have to look at the corporate picture. If we're going to treat information as a corporate asset, that's the only way you can do it. You're working the, what is the focus of your ...

My thesis is specifically on strategic control. I'm up here at the Air Staff today to talk to strategic planners to get an overview picture of our strategic management effort. It appears that you are the strategic planner for data administration.

Probably in the sense that I like that kind of thing and I've done the planning before. You know at the base level. I really, I can appreciate the importance of it. Because I've been able to make it work, I've seen it work. It's absolutely critical and maybe a little, and when you start dealing with things that are not so predictable it makes it a little tough. But I think that's where you have to have a vision and you have to be able to say, you know that's where you have to step off the curb. Say well o.k., based on what we know today and what we can predict, this is where we think we ought to be 10 years from now, or this is what we should be working toward. And I think in order to do strategic planning we have to have a vision. I have a little plaque, of course I ran out of room here when I moved into this place, but I had a little slogan there that says on goals, if you haven't set yours, something to the effect that do you know where you're going, if you haven't set yours, you're already there, type of thing. I've always pointed that out to my supervisors worked for me that you have to look ahead. You have to be planning constantly. I think that's real difficult to do in this place because so much is driven by the budget, and you have too many people I think here who are more interested in seeing what they can accomplish on their watch than maybe what they can get underway.

Talk to me for a minute about your vision for data administration. What is this going to do for us? Where are we going to be 10 years, 5 years down the road? And in terms of resources, what do you predict that it's going to save us?

Well, I'm no so sure any of us can be real concrete in terms of what it's going to save us. That's one of the first questions that executives ask is "what's the bottom line, what's it going to save us?" And I think before we can tell



them what it's going to save them, we have to be able to identify where all the redundancies are.

I didn't ask the question very well. What I mean is why are we doing this? What can we anticipate to get out of this.

Well we hope to improve upon system interoperability, integration, eliminate data redundancies, and obviously if you can do that you increase efficiency, and you can reduce costs.

Is there an effort to try to move towards total integration?

What we will do is, how we're gonna get from here to there is, we're reviewing all the management documents. And the PMDs. Management has been successfully getting those folks to walk them through us so we can take a look at them. And from our perspective what we're doing is we're taking a look at these new proposed systems to see if there is opportunities for data sharing, and to make sure that we alert these people that there is a program and that there are standards established and that when they develop these systems that they need to make sure that they incorporate those standards. That's on new systems. Now on existing systems we tell them that when they have a major re-work that they're going to be responsible then for bringing those systems up to speed. What they're going to end up doing, it's going to cost us money up front for these people to take all these existing systems and go in and establish aliases with the existing elements and establish aliases to the standard data elements. But once they do that, then we start working toward greater interoperability. And over the long haul, and that's why we say 10 years since it's not going to happen over night. But over the long haul, we'll get there. But of course that all depends upon whether folks jump on board and can share that vision with us. If they are only looking at the end of their nose, it won't happen that way.

What is your role, vis a vis this vision people need to catch, to see beyond their nose..

I kind of see myself as the local salesman.

Local, here?

I'm the in-house salesman. I think when Mr. Nguyen selected me for the job and he tells me he interviewed or he looked at I think he said 11 different people. I think he selected me because of my experience in the field. So I can bring the end-user perspective to what we're doing. You know, I've learned a lot about Total Quality out of 3M and I've tried to bring that into the IM shop at Hanscom because I

really believe that like anything else that requirements are customer driven. We're here to do what the customer wants. It shouldn't be the other way around. I've been out in the field too many times when as I say we've been slammed dunked by the higher headquarters telling us that someone has decided up here that this is what's good for us. That's wrong. You run your business based on what your customers need, what your customers want. And I think that's the kind of perspective that I bring into all this. It's really a learning experience for me because I have no background in data processing, though in this particular field the emphasis is more on the management ability, I think than it is being a tech which Mr. Nguyen brings the best of both worlds with him. He's got a really extensive background in data processing and he's a heck of a manager too. He's a people-oriented type of guy. Which is one of the qualities too that some articles I've read says it's necessary for really doing a good job as a data administrator. Because if you can't communicate with your customers, you're not going to be able to find out what their requirements are, their needs are. So that kind of ...

Even if you customers wear the same color suit, you've still got to treat them like customers.

That's right. And I don't know. I think we're, I see one of my big jobs as trying to establish some kind of credibility. We have, you know, Frank over here and Mr. Nguyen in the back, very credible individuals. The problem is that perception you see. The Air Staff tells you to do this, and they promise you this, and you never see them. And so, I guess I'm kind of a buffer. The boss wants to send something out, he wants to push this out, you say hey wait a minute I don't think the timing is right boss because we don't want to promise something and not be able to deliver. That's credible, we make a mistake when we do that. So I kind of see myself as a cushion. I also do executive support types of things.

Tell me what your planning cycle is like. How do you plan for this job?

Well, that's a hard one to answer. We just finished drafting up a data management plan, a master data management plan. Which doesn't really go out more than I think it extends out maybe 6 years. And that's probably not realistic. Because as we try to put that thing together as time drags along, we find ourselves adjusting. What we would like to see is completion dates because we recognize that out in the field you know, they have budget problems, they have to be able to plan and to forecast. How do we plan up here, probably I would say that I plan based on my past experiences. What works, what's realistic. I learned from some good people, write a plan that is realistic, write

a plan that you can stick to that will work. Of course you've got to write something that's flexible too. that you can adjust.

One of the words I've been hearing an awful lot in the last two days is turbulent. And its something too, that I've run across a lot in the literature, in business, business being in very turbulent times. As soon as I started hearing it here, I realized we are in very turbulent times in the Air Force. You mentioned the DMRDs--sometimes it is a scramble to keep up with those. What does DMRD stand for, by the way?

I think it is Defense Management Review Decision.

Decision, o.k.

I think I hear document, but I believe it was a decision that was passed down.

Nobody really knows what it means.

The bottom line to all of us that are impacted by this is essentially cutting bodies and that's the bottom line. But I don't see anything bad in that.

We were talking about DMRDs and turbulence. I was going to ask you about, what you said about remaining flexible. That seems to be one of the most important aspects in the literature about dealing with turbulent times, keeping the plan flexible. How do you do that?

I think it just gets back to, now if you're flexible, you're a survivor. And that's only because you're able to adapt to the situation. And you have to be able to recognize that when the times are turbulent, the money is not there. That's when Total Quality comes in. You start looking at your processes. You involve your customers. And lots of times your customers really have ideas on better ways to do things. So I guess our approach is, in fact we sent our plan out for comment to our customers to see what they thought in case we had missed something. I made the distinction between going out for coordination and going out for comment. Because I'm not looking for their approval on the plan. The plan, it's our plan, it's an Air Force level plan. But I want their comments because obviously if you write a plan your customer can live with, probably going to be more successful at achieving all those milestones along the way. I think it's a big part of the planning. Keep those customers in the loop, keep the folks in the loop that are going to get the job done for you. I don't know, I guess it's a constant review, it's a constant assessment. Like there's a phrase they coin back at Hanscom, "check it.

chart it, change it." That's the TQ approach to doing things.

Let me focus in just a little bit on that. Some have feared the constant review would entail a tremendous manpower tie-in requirement. How do you see, what does constant review mean to you?

Disagree. Manager or leader, whatever they call them, has got to be aware of what's going on. Now, what you do is, and this is something that I've participated in at 3M, what they call performance review at the time. I don't know what they call it now. It's been 4 years. Performance review, or excuse me performance management. The ideal was, was that really a positive reinforcement program. And you know the military is not really good on positive reinforcement. We make our money and make reinforcement at the time you're doing something bad we kick you in the butt. And the idea is if we kick you in the butt enough times, you'll change your behavior. That's the wrong approach. The right approach is, when you see someone, something's done right, that's when you reinforce that action. And that's kind of what 3M was embarking on, computer performance management program. But they still check things, they still charted things, and then they would change. They were like heavily upon employee feedback, employee participation. And I really think it works. I think it works. It's got to be an uphill battle. Because that is not our culture. That's not the military culture. And what we're asking people to do is really to accept a cultural change. And that's tough for all the folks who have been around for a long time.

You say it works. Is it worth it?

I think it is worth it. It's not a short-term fix, it's a long-term fix. But, you know, to be cliché I use the Fram man commercial--you can pay me now or you can pay me later. And really I think also that's what Total Quality says. If you have to pay a little more for quality in a product or something that has value added, do it, pay it. And again, that's a cultural thing we.... Because we're used to saying, well budget is cut, well I can't by that. I've got to go with the cheapest bidder here. So it's a cultural problem that we're gonna have problems with. But I think at the same time with the cuts, as people start getting into Total Quality everything will kind of come together. It won't happen over night. And that's again why it is essential to plan.

Tell me how you deal with cultural problems.

Oh I think just, you know people want to know what's in it for me. I think that's at the base of the cultural

problems. And once you, if you're able to convince somebody or demonstrate what's in it for them. I think that's 90 percent of the battle. That's how you fight that. You share information. I don't. I say, maybe I say it too much, but I don't think you can share too much information. We thrive on information, we love it.

It's our business.

And you may not be the middle manager, you maybe down there in the trenches, but my guess is that most people, given an opportunity, would love to go in and just feel as though they are a part of that decision making team. And when you do that, you come back to involving your customers and involving your employees. The suppliers are customers too. And I think when you do that, that's what really is going to make the world go round a little bit. To me that sounds really philosophical, but I think it works. I believe it works.

I believe in it too.

We need more IM grads out there to push this kind of thing. In fact I had a lieutenant who worked for me in my plant shop back at Hanscom who I really pushed hard. He's got his application in the AFIT school.

They pump them out as fast as they can. But it's not fast enough.

This is the AFIT way, the IRM school is the brass ring right now. When I went through EWU, that was the brass ring, you know.

MAJOR WILLIAMS

Let's start with the printing business. That is a truly strategic chain.

Are you familiar with the DMRD process, Defense Management Report Decision?

I've had people tell me that it meant Report Decision or Document. Nobody knew what the "D" stood for.

O.k., what happens is someone comes up for the proposal for DMRD. It's the Defense Management Report Decision. And each one of them has a number (DMRD 998, Consolidation of DOD printing). So somebody came up with the proposal and they floated it, and it goes forward and there is a DMRD office here. And that office will take that proposal and will get it to the functional folks and also the comptroller, analysts. And basically you have 72 hours to respond to the proposal. And so you give your best shot, whether you think it is a good idea, or a bad idea, or savings that the analysts says will take place are bogus or they're good, or there will be more savings. So then it goes up to OSD and they decide yea or nay. And in the case of the DMR, we're talking about the services disagreed with the analyst's computations and the whole concept that it would save money. As did the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I, which also has a part to play in this. Everybody said they didn't concern with the alternatives. There were two alternatives in the DMRD. And services came up with different alternatives. Well none of them were bought and it was forced upon us. And of course you've got to understand that when they sock you with the DMR, a lot of people get the defensive mode--this can't be done, this is dumb. And so basically as I understand the DMR process, Secretary Chaney has said that, he told Congress that he is going to save them 30-39 billion dollars through this process, consolidation.

\$39 billion?

Billion, right. And in the scheme of things, this DOD, DMRD to consolidate printing is really small potatoes as far as number of billets concerned and of the money because there are others that are greater bucks. The DMRD business is serious. And what they do is once it is approved, they take the money out up front and force the savings upon you. So what they've done is they've said we will consolidate all printing under the Navy publishing and printing service

(NPPS) as the single manager. So the Navy, the SECNAV will be the single manager or executive agent. Those terms aren't necessarily the same. They get a little bit confusing. But they will be under the SECNAV. And with NPPS as, over at the Navy yard is their headquarters and they are already an industrially funded operation. And so it's the single manager to use the industrially funded concept. Are you familiar with DEBOF, the other DMRD, where you would pay for your services on the base?

Yes.

It's similar to that. It's a step ahead of that. And understand that Congress has some real problems with the DEBOF DMRD, and rumor has it that that may not live though parts of it are suppose to be admitted in October also. We've had several meetings with the Navy. We've had a meeting with the MAJCOM IMPs. And what we're doing is we're trying to implement this monster and Doc Crook, who is the Director of Administration and Management for OSD is in charge of this DOD printing oversight group of which all the services sit on. And he said o.k. we need to implement this DMRD, we need for you to do some site surveys and a study and give me a report in 90 days on how you're going to do this, what this things is going to look like, what your proposals are. So the services got together and they sent representatives to practically all the sites and site surveys are done and we're writing the final report here. And what we are proposing is that the, the NAVY doesn't want the military billets. They took 952 billets from the Air Force, up front, 622 civilian and 330 military. But the Navy or NPPS's savings under industrial funded is that it's an all civilian operation. And so they can do production type work and plan for it much more efficiently and so they can keep their costs under control. When they have military people in the organization, you know they go to the Academy and leadership school and they have appointments and all this other stuff, so it kind of screws with their way of doing business. Now the way we read the DMR is that it says consolidate all DOD printing. I mean those of us in the Air Force and the Army says o.k. Navy, if you're going to be the single manager, you take it all, military billets, civilian billets, so forth, let's make a new organization. Apparently the Navy has a lot of clout. They're interpreting it how they see it. So we've gone back and forth, back and forth. And what it looks like is they will come on line with Doc Crook's oversight group. We're asking the oversight group to give us a decision by around the 21st of June. Saying what, we want to give the military billets back to the services and we want to allow certain exceptions like there are people in the Air Force that wanted to keep silk screen. There's only about 14 billets involved there and those are in AFLC. We need to keep military billets for

mobility and overseas requirements. Let's see, what are some of the other exemptions. It looks like we are going to keep the few reserve billets that we have at Air Force reserve bases. But there are a number of exemptions that are coming on-line. Now the whole problem is that now the question is will this oversight group and will Doc Crook go forward to the Deputy Secretary of Defense Atwood and say our support bringing those billets back to the services. See Army has a bigger problem because they accidentally identified all their National Guard billets. So they gave up the Governor's billets. And if the DMR is forced upon us or for example, forced upon them, they would end up having to suck up those billets within house, you know come up with that difference. It's all very complicated. What they did when the President's budget went forward in January, they did an initial tasking of the commands with 952 billets and the reductions for the commands did not match what we the functional folks say we wanted it to look like. For example, all of Air University should go under the organization, we'll keep USAFE, military, or as it is, military with a few civilians under Air Force control. Most of TAC, SAC, and MAC would stay under Air Force control. Then what will happen is over the next year we will restudy these and see where we stand and to see if there is more that can be consolidated. The Navy says, and then the way it will work, the bottom line in the way it will work is that the customer will pay for the printed product based upon a price schedule that NPPS develops. And that price schedule is based upon their costs and then they will the next year adjust our costs based upon their costs last year, up or down. They charge a surcharge of I think it's about 4.5% for their work to cover their overhead. And they're claiming it's going to cost us less money overall. The way we come up with the cost figures, you know figures can be manipulated and mean what various people want them to mean. So there's a lot of controversy about how we come up with the costs. But the thing, as you probably know, in the Air Force, the way it works is you have a, the base IM has got his repro shop and he's got his cost of supplies and maybe has a small contract downtown that GPO has arranged for him, and then he sends stuff to GPO. But we never account for our salaries for the military and civilians, it's paid out of a different pot. So when we're looking at our budget, and try to pull it all together with how much we are spending on printing the Navy is saying, services you don't know how much you are spending on printing. Their costs, their price includes all their costs and they say it will save money in the long run. And they expect to, the way it's going to work is that if all the exemptions are granted, say for example you have a facility that has a mixture of military and civilian in it, it goes to the Navy printing and publishing service that will, we will transition those military people out. Of course the size of



some military career fields are going to drop quite a bit. It's going to take us a while to transition those out. PCS, retirement, retraining. And what we have to do in the mean time is just re-evaluate our real need for 703s. Do we need them for wartime, is technology with copiers and so forth overtaking that, do we need printing presses and whatever. So we've got a lot of work to do. Lessons learned as a result of Desert Storm.

You were over there weren't you.

No, I didn't go over there. Desert Storm may or may not be a good proving ground. One of the disadvantages is that, in trying to figure out what you really need is that people were able to go to large cities and buy copiers. I mean some fancy stuff. If they showed up without it, they just went down and bought it. You go out in the middle of the jungle some place or a different situation and you're not going to have the luxury, right. So we have to weigh all that and see how it looks in the long run. Also one of the problems in determining what we need in the 703 world is that with the threat changing, things changing in Europe, things changing world-wide in looking at the type of force we are going to have more of an expeditionary type force apparently. Our requirements will change as to what we, how we deploy, how many people we take with us and so forth. So all that, we don't know what the new wartime scenarios are going to be. The XO folks are working on it right now. I expect a call any day for a meeting to go talk about what our scenarios are going to be so we can build our, build the warplans and source of the ETCs. It's \_\_\_\_\_. The important thing to remember about the DMR is that when the DMR issue came up nobody wanted to listen to the fact that the Navy does not have military printership, ship port printers. They have nothing to do with it, except they get technical oversight. They'll go out to a ship and help troubleshoot or find out what type of equipment they need or whatever. That's why they feel they shouldn't take on military billets. It never was in their frame of reference. So that is our position with the, and with the Army also. That is currently configured, they don't have military billets in their organization and their ship ports, we're gonna call ours equipment to ship port. And take it from there and see if OSD buys it. If they don't buy it they say well it's in the President's budget, you lose 952 billets and the Army loses whatever it lost, and we'll have trouble sucking it up. And we're not the only ones who have problems with the DMR. I understand the civil engineers have a worse problem than us, their numbers are bigger and there's a DMR that effects them. Because on top of the DMR which take the billets away, you have all these other headquarters streamlining manpower reduction actions going on. It's hard to get a handle on where you stand at any one

particular time. So when we went out and validated the numbers, what I did with the MAJCOMs is I said o.k. this is what I say that you have in \_\_\_ 5X, come back to me in writing by position numbers and tell me which ones that you need to keep for whatever particular reason and which ones may have been identified in the out years reductions and so forth. Because I'm getting ready to build, it's called a disconnect package with all of those. I guess you can call it exciting.

It sounds exciting to me.

It's mindboggling how this things goes on and on. We've had difficulty pressing forward with the PAD to the MAJCOMs because we won't have a lot of these issues resolved until the third week of June. And if it's the \_\_\_ of the first of October even if we've got out PAD out on the 21st of June the MAJCOMs don't have time to write a P-plan really.

What does PAD stand for?

Program Action Document. It's like a P-plan. And the PAD is, Carol Lunsford will collect all the inputs. Col Jacobson is the project officer, he's feeding all this stuff into her and then she'll put it together and she'll get it coordinated up the chain to Mr. McCormick and then we'll distribute it. The thing about the PAD is that it's fairly generic. The P-plan is where it gets more specific. So we had a lot of questions from the field, a lot of frustrations, things change. Services have gone back and forth as to what they want to keep, what they want to give up and so forth. The Army in the original answer to the preliminary report was we'll transfer this, we won't transfer this. And I didn't know it was a cafeteria plan. With the DMR it is unless OSD buys off on it. So the report is being written in a manner where hopefully the decision makers can just check off and say yea we support this, we don't support that. Since the Navy has a lot of clout, since the military billets and so forth since they are supporting us, we seem to feel it could come forward. Some mechanics may get a little scary trying to get those billets back which represent dollars which are advertised savings to Congress and already in the President's budget. And how I got into this I don't know. In went over in January to the meeting with Marian and Col Pardini, we have the MAJCOMs' IMPs. And coming back from the meeting Col Pardini says I want you to be the buy in the building working the publishing office, and of course they are over at Boeing. He says you've got the contacts in the building. You've been a base IM, you've been a MAJCOM before. I need you to help troubleshoot and whatever. It's just gotten to be a full-time job. It's a good thing I've had Brian, the intern, to help crunch numbers. This is what I told PE.

Programs and Evaluation. I said 952 billets, I can only come up, when we re-spread these \_\_\_ taskings that are all wrong to the commands. I can only come up with 799 of which I have 64 disconnects. So you need to subtract that from 799. So what we'll do is we'll try to re-spread 799 and carry that balance of, or re-spread 799 less this and carry the balance of the disconnect. And I'm kind of worried about it in the out years. And then there are complications with the intel billets. These are the exemptions that we're asking for. As you might know, as headquarters level for example, at TAC they only had 10 people on the headquarters staff officially. They rest of them were in the \_\_\_ training squadron. And they're getting that straight, but there are a couple of billets that they need for headquarters type support. Get those aligned, get those out of the \_\_\_ 11 5X. We're going to try and keep, where Navy takes over everything, we're going to try and keep on average 1 billet as a liaison between the base and NPPS. Need a military/civilian to be copy manager and liaison because we'll keep office copiers for right now under us. This is the population that we're drawing from to try and come up with the 952 saying this is what we need to keep. I'm getting ready to redo this list. And then we come down by command and price it out. See like this is changed, this will be 15. NPPS doesn't want it, so I have to redo that one. ATC, just about everything in ATC is going. We'll keep this people for copier management liaison. We had to break it down by days. Now what Kim Cain is trying to do is she's trying to go base by base and price out, o.k. if you lose your printing operation, what's that going to do to your \_\_\_ 1105. You're graded your base IM and your \_\_\_ support. Where are you going?

Kirtland, maybe.

O.k. they have two commands there, whose the \_\_\_ command?

MAC.

They had 9 civilians. So it's all going to go to NPPS. And they're going to keep 1 for copier management liaison. That is if we get our 330 military billets back. Otherwise, we'll have to go back to the drawing board and lose all civilians. When you lose 8 or 9 people out of your base IM job, it could have an impact on the standards. That's why base IM are captain billets. We have some majors and lieutenant colonels but not really that many. At places like Langley and whatever we have majors. So she's doing a study there to see what the impact would be. For example, if you earn 3 people, in fact 1105, maybe a major or tech sergeant, maybe a buck sergeant or secretary or whatever and they can earn 2. Maybe earn a major, probably it would be a captain and a staff sergeant is what you would end up with.

To take that extra billet or that billet we would lose because you have less to manage, we need to look at moving it some place else, let the command use that to fund something else. We crunch numbers until we are blue in the face. When people start asking me questions, I have to stop and think which set of numbers we are talking about. But I've learned a lot. How OSD works, how Congress works or doesn't work. How the SAF works. Of course, yea politics of it all. See of folks have never worked at this level before or even at MAJCOM level. They haven't a full appreciate for how not necessarily politics but personalities can come into play. You know if you have somebody who knows what they want and they are real strong about it, they can make it happen. Where the weaker person can't. No matter whether the idea is great or not.

## COMMAND #1--COMMAND IM

...now that's the real problem. The problem is, it's very easy to criticize, it's very easy to say what's wrong, and ... but I'm not always sure that we really have the idea of where we should be going ... that gets everybody down that same path together. But we've got to have something so that ... where there's a plan ... so when funds, when I request for ideas, or how we should be organized or anything like that, at least it's not a completely knee-jerk reaction that is given that we can say, this is the way we've been talking. This is what we would do. You've got to have that dialogue going. And that's what planning does I think - causes you to think through different things.

Some say that it's the most important thing even if you can't achieve it, if it makes you sit down and think about where you want to go.

Yeah, you ask any planner, and they'll say the plan is nothing; the planning is the important thing and it's the reiteration of going through it and thinking ... it's a ... if each year, your plan just says we're going to buy a copier, and this year ... well, we didn't get it this year. So we'll kick that down to the next year ... we're going to buy a copier. I don't think that helps us. We've got to say: do we need the copier? We got by without it this year. Should our plan include the copier next year? Can we get by without it? is there another way? Is there some other technology that's coming along. Then that should be incorporated in the plan. Not just tying it strictly to the money and that type of thing. Is there a better way to be organized. As I said, the strategic plan needs to be a conceptual piece, but it also needs to be a piece, and then maybe that's what we try with the different volumes: to come down a little bit closer so the people down at the base can say: o.k., this is what I need to do. Say reluctantly we don't always have the funds to execute and all the bases don't always have the funds. The Air Staff, the MAJCOM, can say we want to go this way, but if there's no funds ... I was in fact, talking at a base one time with a young captain ... I was saying: here's all the things, and where I see us going, and how, in the future, we can do this type of thing and she basically stood up and said: well, that's fine sir, but I don't have the money, and I'm not going to get the money to buy any of these things so it's great to hear it, but it's kind of pie-in-the-sky, and never going to get down to my level.

That was one of the things that Marian asked me to look into was how we can combine our strategic planning with the POM process, so that funds are looked at 5 years out while we're doing the strategic planning.

Yeah, that's what this whole thing ... if you look at the Air Force ... I worked in plans or programs in PACAF, it wasn't IM plans and programs it was plans and programs. So we were planning weapons systems and all that and working the POM. I was also in charge of the long-range planning. Well, the long-range planning kind of told you where you were going in your POM, and those things, and they all meshed together. And that's what our strategic plan should be doing is meshing together. And a lot of that is within the POM ... is where you're going. And if you don't get the money and you don't put it out there 5 years and give some rationale, then you're probably not going to get it unless there's just a windfall of money that falls down. A lot of the programs I think we tend to look at nowadays are big, expensive programs. It's not buying a typewriter any longer. It's buying a system. Somehow, those systems cost money. Much more money than maybe we every dealt with in the IM community. Before, we'd just buy a typewriter or something. We'd upgrade from the manual to the electric typewriter. Of course, now we're buying systems so we really have to get into the POM process and the planning process because hopefully the POM is a result of a planning process: says this is where we want to go and this is what we want to do. But, at present, we just have to develop ourselves and our thoughts on how we can and get used to this. The Air Force had it: planning and the PPB (Planning, Programming and Budgeting System) for a long time, and people learned to work in that. We need to learn to work in it. I don't have an answer. It's purely going to be that we have to see where we're going and we have to look long-range. Part of our problem is we are customer-oriented. We are not a "driver" in many cases, so we may say well, we want to go this way, but our customers have gone another direction. We've got to shift and go that direction too. Because we're customer-oriented to them. We can't say, no. We're doing it this way and you've got to come along with us. Particularly if we're not out in front of them. If we're out in front of them in our long-range planning in ways, then maybe we can influence them to come our way because we've already got this other system set up and it's going to be a better way than yours. That's what I would hope that we could do.

Other offices, LGX, DOX and all of these offices have had the X, the planners, in there for quite some time, we haven't as much.

Oh, is that right? Is that newer for IM?

To me, yeah. I think it is. That's fairly new. We may have had some and there again, I'm kind of an outsider coming into this a little bit. It's fairly recent compared to what the others have had. Now maybe they've had at the Air Staff. I'm not sure. You'd have to check that, though. So, don't quote me on that. But, it's really developed in the others. The planning. I'm not sure we've had the real planning all the time. At least not down at the lower levels. And that what it's got to bubble up from. And see.

I may have some feelings or thoughts. And I keep trying to say: well, this a base commander. How much, or how did I listen to my MSI or my DA at that time? You know, I can remember things where ... in fact one instance ... where my DA came in and we had some money, I forget how much ... \$50,000 or something extra that we had to spend, or that was available to spend, well my DA said well let's get a local area network for the base. And another person said, well, we can also renovate this building. Well, I ended up renovating that building because I could see definitely the results. There were people working in the building and the like. The land leased initially, it was a small, relatively small base. So I wasn't sure that we needed a local area network to connect all these people because you could probably get around to the places without wasting too much time.

I'd like to be a base IM somewhere and try to sell that to a base commander or wing commander.

What? A LAN? Yeah. Well, and that's the thing. You've got to be a seller and you've got to show and tell him exactly what are his benefits. I'm not always sure we're able to articulate benefits as well as we should, could. The wing commanders are going to be more and more interested in saving money. If you could show him how what you're doing is going to save him money, and I don't just mean save him paper money, money that's cost savings on paper; if you can actually show him the cost savings, if you can say, well, by doing it this way, one of your people is not fully occupied, it takes two people to do it, how it only takes one but you're going to keep that one person there for doing something else, you haven't saved anything. You've still got 2 people there but if you can eliminate that one, then he doesn't have to pay that bill. Or those type things. I see it as not just cost savings. A lot of things we can do, and they're good, but well, sometimes they're paper cost savings or cost avoidance, or something. We need to rally be able to say this is what I'm saving you. Here's the money and here's the money back.

Sometimes they're not measurable cost savings or they're quality savings or effectiveness you can't really measure but they're still ways to sell it and to demonstrate.

That's just like the electric typewriter. When it came in versus the manual typewriter, or something like that. Sometime, the secretaries wouldn't even want, you know, liked the old manual one. The new one they touched and it typed before they were ready to type. It's a matter of printing. I think that's a point of course, too. We need to be ... training is very important ... that we train our people. Sometimes the functional IMs are so small we're relatively small, that doing a lot of different, diverse things, you really call upon people to know a broad, broad amount of information which is sometimes hard to condense down maybe into a strategic plan ...

... Because it is such a generalist AFSC. And I think that's a credit to the IMs too, because people call on them to do anything. They know they'll usually get a person that's going to do the job and do it well. They're not afraid of the challenges of the unknown. If it's not quite in their area, they'll go ahead and accept it. They're people used to doing that. Strategic planning ... hopefully we're going to look a little bit more in quality this time on ours and seeing where we're going and try to look at those type things, a little bit bigger picture than in so-and-so year we're going to buy a copier. That's good and we've got to have that plan and that's part of it, but I think what we really need is a plan of where do we see ... what do we ... we've looked at it and when the opportunity's there we're ready to jump one way or the other as opposed to saying - let's go back and get our stuff together and then we'll make the decision because then it's too late. I think we got into a lot of things in my opinion, at least things in IM, now that the budget is coming down and here we are saying - hey, we've got these great ideas. I think we kind of you know, it was a passing thing. The budget was up here, we were down here planning. The budget started coming down and our ideas were coming up and now we've got a lot of ideas, the budget's down here. We're going to have to hopefully keep those ideas until we get the budget to come back up and meet us again. Hopefully, we won't do another budget coming up - and our ideas; because of the frustration of chopping us up. Of things that we start then quit. And don't do anything.

If you get into looking at the future of IM too. That's part of the thing. What is the future.

What is the future? Tell me about your vision.



I think we're a proud AFSC and a good AFSC. It's interesting until you really get into the functional side of it. As I've said, I've been a 70 basically, in it. I got into it through being the chief of the administration training branch, that's where I first got into it - training our basics down at Amarillo on program learning. And then from there I went to a protocol and aide's job, which was still a 70 job, but is not aligned with the function (branches). You're basically doing other stuff. You're dealing with the operators and those type things because you're dealing for your boss, your general, and the like so ... Actual hands-on information management.

Yeah, more so than ... yeah and so you're a 70 but you're not ... you're doing the 70 things but you're also doing some other things that are more ... and it's inherent in that you've got to pilot everybody else that's coming in and becoming 70s and aides or exec officers too.

So that gives you a different slant on things. My slant is. I think I've always been proud to be a 70, and got as far as I have and the like, but coming back into it and looking at it - in different areas - I think it's a hard one to manage because you do have people come into it and leave. Some are regs, some are pilots, some are navigators, some are all sorts of different AFSCs - come into it and leave. There are those that stay in it. That's where I start getting frustrated on where to tell, how do you ... what kind of a career pattern. But, it's a good field, and I think if you're good, if you're a good officer, you're going to go well, to me. It seems like when I go out and visit the bases, there's always this question: Are we going to merge with so-and-so; are we going to merge with this and that person. And I keep telling them: no, we're not going to merge with this or that person or function. At least not that I know of and there's no real movement other than MAC and SAC (now have at their MAJCOMs) are merging IM and SC. So I say, no, I don't see. I think there'll always need to be a generalist AFSC out there. But taking that aside and saying - o.k. if you said you had to merge or you had to do something, there could no longer be an IM function, or a functional IM (that's important too in this 70), then I think and I talk 2 different levels, officer and enlisted, I think there'll always need to be more/so the enlisted 70 - will always be there. They've got a lot of technical skills. Jobs corps relies upon but not necessarily are deeply into, maybe. So you'll always have the enlisted 70 out there doing the different things.. Your officers - it's a little bit different. They come in as managers/leaders and they rely upon the technical people - knowledge of the enlisted. As I see it, I would divide. If I said you had to get rid of an IM or something, I would probably divide the 70 career field into that 70s, the executive support.

and all of those ... and of course squadron section ... I would probably say I would divide those into - and I had to put them somewhere and right now and using the present structure - where would I put them? I'd say, o.k., put them under the 73 (personnel) personnel because their jobs are more aligned to that. They deal with records, and yeah, they deal with administrative-type things, but they do deal the other way. I would take, though, the functional information managers MSIs and put them under SC because I think that's where information management should go, that side of it. So kind of split it, at least officer-wise. Enlisted, I have a little bit more trouble splitting it because they are so generalist and there I'm not sure how'd I'd put them. You know, because a lot of things they do they're managing information which I feel is what a lot of SC does, if you want to be out in front planning for it, then you want to be in the SC community. Whereas, the DP community is planing, and they've got their PC3 and all and that's planning. But you're more of taking it in and pushing it out and using it and the like, and that's where I would say, the 70 could go and use whatever is out there and do his job.

The distinction I guess is between information handling and information management

Exactly, exactly. And if you're going to manage it, you have to be out in the future. If you're going to handle it, its present-day, and you take what there is. And that's ... what maybe I see the enlisted do is handling a lot, although you need somebody there helping him to figure out how to manage it, so that they handle it well. That's why I would put some people in SC. They'll be able to manage and look at the future. I don't know whether this ... you know ... how this will ever happen. I'm interested in how ... MAC and SAC's experiment goes, because I see real problems and real difficulties when you say o.k. we merge at the MAJCOM, now we're going to merge down at the ... merge at the base level?

MAC is doing that right now. They're merging at the base level.

Good. They're merging them how, though? With SC? See, but I'm saying, I think it's going to be interesting on how they do it. And again, what portion of SC? SC is composed of basically communicators and computer people. If you get MAC's specific thing, I would say the IMers would be merging with the computer people, not with the communicators, although we do let the communicators do the communication equipment and let the computer ... the IMers do the information gathering movement which also occurs occasionally. I think ... it's going to be interesting to

try and see can a 70, can an MSI person - I'm back to the old ... trying to figure out a career pattern - and that person that's an MSI as he is known at the present time - can he go on up to be a communications squadron commander?

Move up in the SC community?

Yeah.

That's a good question.

See, that's why I started having a little bit of a problem there - saying how do I ... when he's out there, where's he going to move? With time .... Well, I'm just getting the story from one side, on the IM side, but they're working hard to try to keep from being absorbed by SC in a distinction ... But also, they're trying to develop career movements between the two. In fact, Col Anderson is bringing in a 49 to be his deputy.

Yeah. I heard that. I don't know whether I absolutely agree. I think it's a good idea. I think he's really maybe trying to merge and get that going. You kind of got both ways to the 70s, well now, there's one less 70 position. I guess part of that I come to say well is SC taking a 70 over in their office to work.

Something he tried to do but I think he hasn't succeeded yet.

Yeah ... I think it's good, but it'll help him as he merges and that's part of it. But I just wonder ... how well that MSI is going to merge. But I think if I was doing it that's the way I would probably go although I think there's still a role for them being separate to an extent. part of why I say ... the merger allows greater coordination. Well, if we are good at coordination ... then maybe we would not need to be talking this way quite so much. Because I sometimes said, well, o.k. if you got the SC and I'm here and they're doing something, the SC said here's this and the IM said ... I can't do it that way, the SC has a reason not to do it because one of his office says ... I have problems with it. And he's going to overrule it or whatever, but at least he's got to deal with it. Whereas now, SC can possibly go on their merry way and never talk to the IM.

I noticed driving around your base that SC, or comm/computers was way over on the other side of the headquarters and you're quite a distance away. I'm sure that doesn't help with your coordination efforts.

No it doesn't. That's what I'm saying ... I think there's those problems that the merger would maybe help, but I still

think you're not going to see it dissolve. It'll still be that. The IM portion, and maybe that, whoever's the leader of the group leader will have to deal with it maybe because he'd probably be apt to say well hey I want my ... when I present a position to my commander I want it to be SC position so we'd coordinate with everybody in SC. That would be that IM portion would get to say something and at least raise it. Whereas, the other may as I said he might be able to put the position forward without ever really looking at the IM side of it and then after the position is reached then ... IM comes in and it's too late ... so the IM ... picks it up and makes it work. And I think that's a lot of times what IMs do anyway. We're ... there. And in someways maybe their own (old) administrator was not a bad title. Depending on how you want to look at us. Whether you want to look at us as information managers, that's one thing. That's why I think we have to shift the gears to become the information managers. We're going to manage information. Now, what does that entail? We've been administrators and all that's in my mind ... what that entails is your given a program and you administer it. You administer how you're going to do these things ... almost two different things. Now if people say well, we changed your name to information managers but we still want you to be administrators, then maybe that wasn't quite correct. If we were wanting to become more information managers, then we have to shift out of it, and somebody else has to administer the program. It tends to be, as I say, what we're trying to do. Hey, we want this done, so whether exec or admin or something, you set up the program so the boss gets the information ... there's where you see the cross over to information management, but you're really administering a program. You're not ... leading the program. You're administering. Somebody else has already said, this is where we're going. Now you make it work.

My opinion is that we haven't yet done a very good job of selling the skill of information management.

I would agree with you.

Most of this I didn't understand a year ago before I started this program. I didn't have a clue what information management really was all about. I knew some of the buzz words. I knew what Col Pardini would say in some of his letters: we need to get more involved in the technology. I thought, well, I know how to use a word processor and even a spreadsheet program so I'm pretty good, I guess. But that's not really what it means at all.

Well, I think the next generation is going to be in with the IRM graduates, staying in and heading that way. I think we'll see more of that. But, as I said, it's not only a

mindset we have to have that mindset within IM, but then we have to convince everybody else that we have a value to the staff as not just administering programs. We're going to be out ahead and planning for new programs and coming up with new ways of doing things ... I think part of that is ... where you see the intermesh between SC and IM, is getting out and talking to the different OPRs, well what ... information do you need? How can I move it better for you? And guess SC is into that a lot. ... let's see what kind of hardware I can develop for you.

And they understand the hardware - SC ...

That's where we compliment them ... we

They don't necessarily understand the management requirements.

That's where synergy really comes in, I think. That's sort of where I see it. I don't know how soon, or anything like that ... it'd be interesting to see how SAC and TAC get into it because in some ways, why, originally or initially they're doing ... taking IM and saying o.k. IM you're now under SC ... but you're not intermingled with them. You're off here as a separate entity. I'm not sure that that gains us too much other than this coordination thing that I was talking about. Maybe we need a little bit more of that.

You've got a good opportunity to use your [IRM grads] to spread the word, spread the mindset, the attitude of information management. It's an attitude.

It's an attitude. And you get yourself known, and maybe you don't even get yourself known in information management. Maybe you get yourself known some other way even for doing something, but then when you want to draw it back in and say I am ... here's my other job as an information manager, you gain, it's not the respect, but gain the ear, because they've seen as you've done other things, they know, hey, he really puts together a good program. Now he wants to talk about information management - they'll listen to that, before, they might say ... information management ... who's that and I'm not going to listen too closely. That's the important ... it goes back to doing the job that you presently have the best you can ... getting that ear and to do other things, to gain that recognition, to be able to say this is where we should go ... sometimes some IMers are so busy they don't have much more time than just to react to things. You can see that in a lot of the cuts and streamlining that is coming forward. It's hard to articulate, so a commander, when he cuts, he's probably going to cut an administrator person out there in the field because he says, well, I can get by with that. I can't get

by without my functional person. But he'll find that he can't get by without his administrative person, too ... I've ... come to the conclusion that it's all negative and I wish it was positive, that I could come up with positive way of saying it, but I tell the BITS people ... you've got an important job. People don't always pat you on the back ... but your job is so important that you miss one delivery and everybody on the phone calling: "where is it?" Now some of these other jobs, if they miss something ... nobody gets that excited ... well, we'll catch it next time. Whereas if you miss a BITS or do something wrong everybody jumps on it. It's ... a reverse and it's a negative way of saying this is how important the job that you're doing is, because they cannot live without you. What if none of the 70s, secretaries, admin, everybody else didn't come to work, they're not going to get to move very far. A lot things won't get done. So you're important, but it's one of those that ... it's pat on the back ... a lot of times say anybody can do it. Well not anybody can do it.

Have you got any good ideas in that area? One of the really important strategic issues is providing incentives for accomplishing our goals. In the literature, they talk a lot about (most of the literature is about business) they talk about monetary rewards, raises, promotions and we can't do those kinds of things, readily. Just good APRs and OPRs. We can't give them a raise, we can't give them a bonus at the end of the year for doing a good job. What are some of the ideas that you've had in providing incentives and rewards?

Well, in that case, you've got your NCO of the quarter, recognizing people, and that. Anything you can do to recognize them. Administrative awards are good. You've got to make sure with those people that supervisors get in and recommend. I think there are a lot of awards that people can be put in for. It's up to the supervisors to really put them in and keep them motivated ... there's probably more things that we can do, in some ways, to try and keep the people motivated or do some awards. That sometimes is part of the problem too. A lot of your administrative staffs are so small - who gets the award? I probably don't have real good answers for you on that.

How many people do you have here under you?

Well, there's about 80 some - that's including the publishing ... the printing and publishing which you know will go under the Navy come 1 October, so then we would come down to more like 40 people.

I just heard about it recently.

Yeah, so that's going to make a big change in changing that with the printers going over. Here, as we get into looking at total quality ... it's going to be interesting getting the people more involved with the work, and it's quality work. Maybe some of the theories are theories that have been around in management for a long time, but at least they're raised again in a different setting and we can get our people to take advantage of them. Not all of the good ideas come from the top. Most of them come from the bottom, so you get your young people involved in that, trying to work for promotions ...

Dealing with the strategic planning effort, when you really need extra horse-power, when you need some extra help. They talk about having a champion, somebody who knows your cause and has the horsepower to get you the resources that you need - who would you turn to?

Well, my boss is the chief of staff, so I would turn to him.

Anybody inside the IM community?

Well, as I said in the beginning, it's an interesting thing the way we're set up. I think we're set up very loosely. Each MAJCOM doesn't always mirror the other one; if they did it would be different. I think it's kind of a conglomeration. We kind of bounce ideas off of several different theaters, MAC, SAC, and TAC are the biggest ones, and similar in that we have operations. Of course, PACAF and USAFE are also very similar. Of course, they're just overseas; hard to get ahold of in discussions that way.

It's kind of hard. I would say it's hard then for the Air Staff who should be the ones we look to. It's hard for them to hit all of us ... they do it one way and MAC says, no. I'm not going to do it that way or HQ says no and, you know, it's loose. I think a lot of us look to the headquarters to give us that guidance. We need it in some areas. Some areas, we may not want it. Some things that they cut across MAJCOM levels, then the Air Staff needs to pick them up because we can't really pick them up down here to do some of them. As I say, that's the frustrating thing about the 70. You've got ... They go different ways. They're kind of tied together but they're still very diverse. You're only usually talking about one deep in each of those areas. You can look and say gee, yeah, they've got transportation, supply, munitions ... are different areas but at the same time they're pretty well got a fairly large staff to handle some of those where who's ... what's your postal division? Well, you see him walking down the hall.

It's one person.

Exactly, in some cases. Even more so, they have the whole ... the postal, the orders, the messages and all that wrapped into one, at times. It's frustrating to try and track down a 70 exactly, particularly in functional management ... I feel each MAJCOM is ... an island unto its own the way it's going. What you need is a strategic plan to try and tie them all together a little bit. There are certain things that we do that need to be tied together.

Oh yeah, if you look at the basics. You look at functional address codes. You look at AIG's, formats for letters. Those are there, and that's where we need the real guidance - this is the way it's going to be for the Air Force. But there are certain things ... you can't come down and tell [the command] you will not do contingency planning and I don't think the chief of staff of the Air Force comes down to Gen Lowe and says you'll not do contingency planning or just because he didn't say, we're doing contingency planning, so you ... plans, or somebody else need to do the same. There's a little bit different emphasis. It makes it hard to gain some of ... Sometimes, it's ... easy for us to say to the Air Force why don't you just tell us what to do, what you want to do. That's good, but sometimes it's hard for them to tell us because they can't get by with it either. One, well HQ will say - no we can't do it, or it doesn't fly completely across the way.

That's why I feel at times, that if we'd been with SC we might have controlled that earlier. Hindsight's a hundred percent. Or whether we'd picked up the computers and said - NDA we'll be the computer groups - and gotten in because we are kind of stodgy and bureaucratic and might have said o.k. - no you can't buy any computer unless it's on this format ... or could talk to another one so we wouldn't have had all these things going off in different directions ... we may have been so anxious to get the computers in to people that we would've gone off on different areas.

No. Well nobody had that strategic plan of seeing what do we do. That's it. We didn't have a good plan that way ... that's ... the plan you would like to see in headquarters, saying o.k., this is the way it's going to be. It's hard to executive when you come down ... the most important thing we do is fly so that's where the money should go. The rest kind of catches up and it's hard to plan when you don't have real control of the purse strings. His whole thought was that you don't need plans. All you need is programmers because they give you an amount of money and the programmers figure out where you're going to use the money. I think that maybe is a little short-sighted because you have to have that plan to sort of know where you were going, but his idea was - you can't follow a plan because you're going to have a limited amount of money, so you're going to program



it. So all you really need is programmers. Congress ... says we got x billion dollars, so what do you want to buy with it; where are you going. The plans are not that important - but the plans are important because it does help the programmers. If you stop planning, then the programmers may not have an idea where to go, then they would be buying this plane and that plane, and just sort of what kind of came up at the time. But with the planners ... you've ... got it maybe controlled under that this is what we need and integrates the different aircraft.

And I think in some ways that's still a plan, giving you the direction of this is where we want to go .. but as I said ... it's hard to march down there sometimes without the money. And that's what I've been getting at . Is this guy that was a programmer, he said hey, it's the money that determines all this so let's just do it this way. He's partially right, but you really need to have that plan to ... or that direction on where in the world will we get it. We need to be far-sighted enough that we don't make quick decisions or directions. Yeah, we're going this way. Then the next AI somebody comes in and says no, we're going this other way. You get yourself going opposite ... you need to have a broad enough plan ... to allow interpretations. That's what you need in that plan, broad enough that we don't say - here's where we're going and we're going to buy the one particular ... all Z248 - no flexibility ... We have to stay the course.

What I'd like to do is a kind of test even if we only get through the first few sections of this. I'd like to test my questionnaire on you a little bit. And also get some information about your planning processes. I've tried to design these questions to be non-leading so I don't influence your answer, and they are rather broad so you can answer however you want. What I'm looking for is how planning is done in your organization. I'll just add one more caveat that there aren't going to be any names or organizations attached to any of the comments so feel free to express yourself.

The first group of questions have to do with the planning process itself. They are very broad. I'd like to first ask you how you formulate your strategic plans.

The last couple of years, the planning process has not been real active. But when I first got there, what we were doing, we would have an occasional meeting with all the divisions. And try to get them to think about the direction that they wanted to go in. \_\_\_\_\_ was our planner even back then. Then in September of 89, I think it was, all these reductions started hitting. The strategic planning process took a backseat because you're constantly staffing short fuse, streamlining, restructuring, and so and so forth. We would do the plan once a year, update the plan. Quite frankly it became a paperwork exercise, in my opinion. However, I would say that although it was a paperwork exercise, it was useful to make people sit down and think things through. So when it was time to revise or update the plan, people would find out that oh no I have made much progress on this. So to maybe make a little progress in that area is that they could put something down on paper that they had made a little progress. In a sense, that's good. The planning process within [the command] at the MAJCOM level ran hot and cold depending upon what was happening. We got a new IM, decisions were hard to come by. Some people are more comfortable with making decisions than others. We just struggled along the best we could. We did not always get the front office support we felt we that we needed for whatever reason. And some people talk about disbanding the planning process but I think we will always need something, I don't care what it is called, TQM or whatever. Well we at X felt we were the only ones pushing the plan, I guess. Though a lot of good things did happen. We brought in 50S and other things that happened that people were able to incorporate into their plan. It kind of helped. Electronic publishing that they brought into the command, I think the Accounting and Finance center has got it and some other commands have it. Col \_\_\_\_\_ and his

folks here are working on 902S which is the follow on, son of 50S. It's how Air Force publications are done now. There's a 50S over at Bolling.

Who else was involved?

\_\_\_\_\_ and actually all of us in the X shop took part in trying to make sure that we always had some action plans in there from each branch or each area of responsibility in the X shop. And the division chiefs and their assistant division chiefs participated in it.

You said that it some times ran hot and cold. The IM was occasionally involved.

I think what would have been useful is if we could have gotten at some point, well let's put it like this, before Col \_\_\_\_\_ left what he wanted to do and I think if he hadn't of left we would have done this, is once a month at the weekly staff meeting \_\_\_\_\_ would brief the status of action items in the plan. And by having the spotlight there people would be a little bit more proactive in their own plan, if they were put on the hotseat so to speak. It's just human nature. You've got so many things happening and the planning takes a backseat. Although people don't realize they are planning all the time, everyday, they are doing some sort of planning. It's just a matter of getting it down on a piece of paper.

Talk to me about how the process is started when you do planning. How is it initiated?

Well it happened different ways sometimes. The IM or division chief would agree that something should be put in the plan, write something up in this area. A two or three word type, we need to get something in the plan about this. So the appropriate people would be tasked to come up with something. We didn't have too many meetings, an occasional meeting where we brought everybody in and discussed the thing as a whole. One of the problems I see is we were in such a flux as to the change from DA to IM and then immediately after that or in concert with that all the restructuring and whatever. People wanted direction from on high as to where are we going, what are we planning for, give us the specifics. But there were no specifics. And even now with the restructuring if some MAJCOM IM function is aligning with SC and so forth, we have no unified great plan, this is the way IM is going. I don't know how far along we will get in that direction of trying to come up with a great master plan. I think the first plan or the plan that we had from the Air Force level worked good in that we had a lot of things that had to be fixed. Some real practical things--UTC management. Now we've got some of

those things fixed. And we need to plan for the tough things. In this period of flux it's hard for people to figure it out and some folks who are just afraid to step out and say well, no one told me which direction to go so we're gonna go in this direction. We did that in a couple of areas. We just struck out when we saw a need and put an item in the plan.

The IMX would initiate that.

But I have to say that the strategic plan was not a daily goal.

It was tough in that you know I had to promote strategic planning. Try to make sure that the X folks were the best at it. And try to bring along the rest of the organization. As the MAJCOM IMX, well I guess like trying to be the commander, you've got to go full steam ahead although it may be difficult at times. I fully believe in a planning process. Now maybe the methodology we are using right now is not the right one. But I venture to say that any planning process or methodology we use we're gonna have trouble with it because people are people, sometimes you have to make them sit down and talk, think, and it's uncomfortable for them. And beat them on the head sometimes, in a nice way. It's really nice when you can take that action item that timeline and complete it. Put it in the back of the binder and when it's time to write up an organizational award you pull this out and you can see a result. I think that's the problem a lot of people have with the planning process, it's not something that they feel applies to them real immediately. They don't see the immediate results. I always, the philosophy that you needed some things in the plan that you could do near term, show immediate results, some things midterm and some things longterm.

That's a good point and I'm going to come to that again. I'm going to come to the issues of rewards and incentives for planning.

Let me say one more thing about the plan. I think that it became a paperwork nightmare for awhile for us and some of our base IMs because they run into the misunderstanding when you reviewed your plan, you had to do everything over again. It makes it all nice and pretty, but you don't have to do it all over again. You build on what you have. I think that's one of the problems people have. They spend too much time with the cosmetics of it all and the paperwork part of it all, and lose sight... Again, when I did a staff assistance visit, if I saw a plan that was in a book and it had handwritten notes, or whatever and it showed some sort of progress and that when they got a chance they would make up a new one. It's a live plan. But most people do it, put it

up on a shelf, they update it later. That has some value, like I said. I don't think most people had the, some people don't have the initiative, but I think most people don't have the know how to use any kind of planning on a daily basis to get them to where they want to go, for whatever reason. That's why people sell books like the One Minute Manager. So go ahead, next. You'll find me full of opinions.

I want your opinions. That's what this is all about. The next question is a slightly different area. What do you base your plans on? In other words, how do you decide what to include in your plans?

One thing of course is you look at, the alligators are eating you up right now and some times you might need an automated system to help you get better in something. You might need to establish in your program to meet a new requirement, you may need to evaluate the need to do away with some things because you don't have enough time. I always try to look at immediately, what are things we're trying to do and then as much as possible with what's going on, and you get a better feel for this at the MAJCOM level, then at the base level. What are the big picture issues that are taking us in a certain direction. Like right now we have, well one good example, the Air Force DP community is going through an evaluation of their vertical organizational structure. Did Marian tell you about this at all? Col Greenwood from MPC briefed us on this the other day. All the MAJCOMs' vices and DPs have been briefed on this. DP and also the Chief of Staff echoed it. That you have to look at the business you are doing today, what can we get rid of, what should you transfer more logically to another function, at all levels. What should you consolidate at a higher level, centralize, what you should decentralize. So the DP community looked at, they came up with about 200 tasks that they do. From base level, MPC, MAJCOM and so forth, and look for duplication of effort. The Chief of Staff is promoting flattened organizations. Why should like, and what this is it's just a concept right now. What should go in our structure, what should come out of it. Should functional IM be a part of the mission support squadron. Should the other 70s, execs, whatever be a part of this. Generals to AFSC, the \_\_\_\_, you know DP structure. DP for example, and I think they use this example is PRP program. Why should personnel be the monitor of the PRP program. It goes into the personnel system. It goes to the commander. It goes to the hospital and certification back and forth. But PC3, it can be between the unit commander and the hospital, take personnel out of it. That would be a product or an action that they could do away with, theoretically. And looking at those types of things. Weight program, surgeon hasn't had in past years a

good record with managing the weight program, they said. But that's something they had to look at. PC3's abilities there or capabilities may be possible to get something going between the commander and the hospital, and take personnel out as the middle man. Because there are middleman in a lot of things. And PC3, regionalization of the personnel system, it's like the accounting and finance system, and so forth, is leading us to the technology that we can do that. Did you read yesterday's Air Force Times yet? I've got to read everything I can get my hands on. McPeak talked about just doing away with the air division and enhance the role of the group. You might have heard about the composite wing, the group commander for maintenance.

Who owns everything on base.

Right. The group commander for operations and whatever. Make those guys really commanders under the wing commander. Therefore, you wouldn't need that level, Air Division. Of course we'd have fewer wings. Seymour Johnson is now going to be the fourth wing, not the fourth tactical fighter wing because it's got tankers and fighters in it.

Let me get to the crux of this. That is, how do you keep track of these premises, these assumptions that you base your plans on?

Within the command, and some might disagree with you, but as the division chief what I did was, we had to do a quarterly activity report to the IM. Of course people hated that. But it made you sit down and write out what you did during the quarter. It was great for APRs, OPRs, decorations. Research when an issue came, I know we did something on this before and instead of searching through your files you go to your activity report and find out when it happened, who was the OPR, what the gist of it was, because it was summary snibbits. I use that a lot. In the read file I would see the other divisions' activity reports, so I kind of know what's going on. The problem is that at base level, base IM, now he's got all the sections working for him and he knows what's going on basically in all those areas, then when you get up to the MAJCOM, you become the Chief of Admin Comm. You basically see the admin comm world out there, you're worried about all your bases. You don't really see what's happening over in publishing, in records management. Well in the X shop we have the advantage that we see a little of what's happening everywhere. Realizing that I was one of the few that probably had, Sheryl and I probably had the biggest picture of anybody besides the boss, besides the IM of what was going on. A lot of times we would, when it was time to rework the plan, we would have to remind people, well what about this you were working, what about that you were working on, and just staying on top of the issues and

being involved. Because we were involved in every major issue going on. Now I'm not saying that we were, we came up with the ideas. But sometimes it was like a brainstorming session. You know, you'd say one thing about one big thing you were there working on and somebody else would say well you know within my little shop I've got this problem that I need a solution to or we need to figure out if we need to give the bases some guidance or build this program or whatever. You can't say this, you don't keep a list, it's just a combination of things, experience.

You didn't keep a written record of basic premises that your plans were based on. In other words, the assumptions that ...

In the plan itself you would have a paragraph or some paragraphs that would say where this came from. In the plan itself you would track it that way and you would have where it came from then you would have discussion sessions, you would change and update, then you have your timeline. That's how we kept track of what got into the plan. Now things that got tossed out of the plan, I can't really speak to that.

Some things that weren't accepted. That you decided not to plan on, that wasn't tracked?

Not formally. Informally though, you'd through it in a folder and come back to it next time.

I don't know of any process that calls for that. So that's an interesting point that you bring out, that might be something worth tracking. Let me move on, I don't want to run out of time here. These next questions deal with the, what your environment, environmental control. What external forces impact on your strategic plan? There's several of these questions, if you want to be concise.

I think one of the big ones was if you wanted to do something it cost money. You had to have a budget. It's always one you had to work with. Say the question again.

What external forces, by external I mean what outside of IM.

It's tough to get the money sometimes to do what you want to do. The regular management thing that would happen, you know, people coming and going, hiring and firing, turnover, hiring freezes that would shorten people. So planning gets to be, you know when you don't have your shops fully staffed and all you can do is answer the phones. And hiring freezes, you have no control over them. They've hit us several times and the organization as a whole.

Where there other organizations or even people above the IM?

We never got the Chief of Staff involved, we never showed him our strategic plan. And I think we would have had something that would have been, if we had reached that stage that we could have brought the higher level in, I think that would have helped. Other organizations on the base like what's happening in the DP world. Like informing the mission support squadrons and so forth, that impacts. Congress and the Air Staff, higher headquarters support and constraints that they put on you.

If one thing could hurt the strategic plan, what would that be?

A lack of managing. You've got to have the support, you've got to have the commitment, management commitment at all levels, it starts from the top. It's tough to drive it, but you have to drive it. It won't work unless you drive it. It doesn't happen spontaneously. Probably everybody says that. This one deals again with those that impact. Outside, who else outside your organization helps with the strategic plan? Who asks questions?

I really can't think of anybody outside the organization and that's probably one of the problems. It's a very internal type product. It was internal to IM. We had a tough time getting the divisions to think about things, programs, projects that will help, that they could focus on the bases, that would help the bases is their job. Because why would we be there, why was the headquarters there. The headquarters was there for the bases not for ourselves. Too much was internally directed. That was a constant battle.

If you needed a strategic resource or extra horsepower in order to accomplish a strategic plan, to whom would you turn? To give an idea of a champion.

When I turn to the IM and could get his attention, I always got his support. He had a lot of alligators

Who could he turn to?

Well there was a lot of animosity between the. I don't want to say animosity. There was not good vibes between the IM and some of the other DCSs that goes way back I think before the last two IMs. Personalities played a role. Col Dzur tells me at SAC he gets total support from the command section on anything he does. He says it's really great that the tactical fighter guys have a different mentality for whatever reason about support than perhaps SAC guys do. It's kind of strange to say that but these people grow up in those commands and they have that mind set. He would turn



to other IMs then he would turn to the AAI and to the destiny group. That's the only one he could turn to. On occasion, with one particular Chief of Staff, he got great support.

Speaking of this animosity between the DCSs, what organization posed the biggest threat?

During my tenure, the DP community was the biggest. I don't like to use the term threat, but they would roadblock the things that you wanted to do. They had a mind set about. I can honestly say this in good faith. There were some people within the DP community there who were intent upon absorbing and taking over all they could. And there were others who had a more balanced approach. I can think of one or two in particular that when we would go to the meetings, they would just real hard over whether it made sense or not on some of the things that they were proposing. Sometimes they got overridden. More frequently than I suspected they got, more frequently than I would have thought, they got overridden. Because people at the higher level could see through that. The rest of the folks, contracting and budget, accounting and finance those folks, if we had our documentation together to try to get what we needed, they were there to support us every way possible. As far as automated issues, SC tried to help on a lot of occasions, but they just didn't have their stuff together, for whatever reason.

How does Air Force level IM find out about your progress? Do you give them any indications?

When the plan is published, a copy comes up so they can take a look at it and see what you're doing. That's the way it's suppose to work. We give a copy to all the bases. I think some things were discussed that destiny, one of the colonels. The formal system sends a copy up.

A copy of the plan, but what about the progress?

In our particular plan, we carried a history of the thing if someone cared to read it.

By what methods do you coordinate between the commands?

Basically distributing a copy of the plan, stealing good ideas, giving away good ideas, piggybacking on each other. You really get an appreciation for the different directions the commands are going and different priorities they set by looking at the plans. That was basically it. And then of course an occasional planning meeting that the folks up here would host.

So you feel like there was good communication between the commands?

I felt there was adequate but it could have been a lot better. The synergism of us working together more could have paid great dividends. But we were doing our plans on different cycles and so and so forth, driven by local requirements, different emphasis.

Feedback and implementation control. How do you know if something goes wrong with the implementation process?

Some people don't find out about it until they sit down to update their plan. It wasn't practical, it didn't make sense.

Basically at base level it is perceived more as an equipment replacement. In other words in 1993, we want to replace our 9900 unit printing plant. All of a sudden 1993 rolls around and you don't get the money for it. So it gets slipped to 1994, 95. It really boiled down to until the things actually broke or some natural disaster occurred like a flood which ruined the piece of equipment, that was about the only time we got the money to replace things. When I was at the Pentagon about 2 months ago, I talked with Mary Bowser about that. It seems almost like an exercise in futility because it doesn't seem to come to \_\_\_ what we are putting in the strategic plan and so that's very frustrating. I could be putting, devoting my time to more productive initiatives in IM. And we talked back and forth and I've kind of formulated a different approach to what the book says on strategic planning. I kind of compare it more towards, the DP community has what they call strategy for the next generation. I don't know if you've ever seen a copy of that. This is more in the direction I would like to see us take in our strategic planning. Basically issues, not so much equipment and replacing things, but where do we want to be at the IM community in 1995 or 1996. In determining where we want to be then back track and figure out who we are going to get there. It may be in implementing these systems. It may be in implementing the war plan. It may have nothing to do with equipment whatsoever. I think if we take a more proactive flow in that sense a strategic plan could have much more meaning than these flow charts with arrows that end up being reaccomplished anyway because we couldn't do it because we didn't get the money. So that's basically how I perceive it. Even human resources were faced with many problems now with all the cuts, what's happening to the 703 career field. Especially the officers, they are going to be cutting back on the number of officers and the enlisted too. I'm concerned too about their future. Those are things I think we should be focusing on as leaders in IM, to where we want to be going. That's how I view strategic planning.

Who is involved in strategic planning?

Simply within the IM? All the divisions. We just sent our success letter out to the divisions saying we are requesting your input for the IM strategic plan, we'll get them in by the 15th of July. We send that to the division chiefs. Now how far down they disseminate that is their own decision. It's not Sheryl and I sitting in a room and coming up with a plan. It's that we get everybody's input and then we will

sit down with the inputs and see first of all what types of inputs we got, are they really what we're looking for, the kind of inputs we need. Because I don't want an equipment list from everybody as to what they want replaced. I want them to put some serious thought into it. IMP is going to be a division that really needs to be looking at that because they are hardest hit by the CMR 988 998, the printing. So they really need to look at their side of it and where are they going.

You're not losing printing here are you?

Yes we are. 4500 printing requirements are going to the Navy.

I heard that TAC, SAC, and MAC were going to be exempted.

No.

You talked about looking at a broader vision, where we're going to be in 5 years. Who would get involved in that kind of thing?

Mr. \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, myself, the deputy, Col \_\_\_\_\_. It's ultimately Col \_\_\_\_\_'s product. We would be the corps. But again we will be going out to Col \_\_\_\_\_, the IMP, and Chief \_\_\_\_\_, IMA, be getting more data to put this together. Especially I really shouldn't be deciding. I'm a facilitator more than I am a decision maker in this case. Getting the ideas from Chief Thornton and who is our IMA, he is faced with the upcoming decentralization of the postal budget and that's a difficult subject. This first came about maybe 2 or 3 years ago when we started hearing about that. Someone should have started the planning 2 or 3 years ago for this. Not only 8 months ago. Because now it is a big scramble. Again those are the types of things I'm talking about. Now he would get involved in it. I don't have as much technical knowledge in his field as he does so I rely on him for that, that technical data. He may not put it in the wording that we need to put it in. That's how it is going to be very interactive in that respect. I think the crux of it is going to be Sheryl, myself, the deputy, and the IM. But we are going to be working very close with the division chiefs.

How does the process start, how does the cycle start?

What initiates it? Well, I don't know. I can't speak for years gone by. What initiated this time was we haven't had one in over 2 years. And I got here and I went up to the Pentagon and talked to Marian about that. The problem is [the command] IM has been waiting for the Pentagon to put out theirs. And that hasn't happened. And when I got here.

it was well Air Staff hasn't put theirs out yet so it's almost a waste of time for us to do ours if they are going in one direction and we set off on a different direction. We need to make sure we are going in the same direction. And then I talked to Marian at the Air Staff and I asked her specifically when she thought they would get theirs out. And she said it probably won't be until the end of this year. I came back and I talked to Col \_\_\_\_\_ and he said we still need to get one out. I personally agree with him that we, there are initiatives that we can take that really have nothing to do with MAC, SAC, or the Air Staff. We can set our own course. Now if and when theirs comes down at the end of the year, if there is a significant difference, we can back track and change what we need to change. These are kind of like a loose leaf thing where you bought a page and put in a new one. If we're going one direction with systems and they come down with another direction, well we pull that page out and re-evaluate it. It's really an on-going process, it shouldn't be just a once a year, o.k. lets pull out the book. I view it as a constant, each one, particularly of my area within IMX, my systems person Capt \_\_\_\_\_, he used to be involved with strategic planning constantly in addition to the mechanics of setting up a local area network. He needs to be thinking futuristic type things and where we are going with this so all of a sudden if we have to take a different, take a right turn instead of a left turn, we take that page out of the book and put the new one in and go. It's not that cut and dry and as easy as I make it sound. But I think you know what I'm referring to. What I'm saying is I don't feel I need the Air Staff product to get going on my own. Because there are definite things that we want to do in here that I really, I think the Air Staff is going to support us in doing them. There's not going to be that much disparity. Personal opinion.

Now can we describe the process itself. What is the process you go through or you will be going through.

That's going to be very difficult for me because I'm, this is so different from the way they've done it before. That I can't really tell. I can tell you what I hope will happen but I may have to pull back and do it a little bit differently. It's kind of run as do type of thing. I know and fortunately I have Col \_\_\_\_\_ backing on the way I'm going about this. He agrees with me on the concept of strategic planning. So I'm pretty sure I'm going to have his backing on the mechanics and how we will go about doing that. I know one mechanic has already started when we put the defense letter out. And we will get inputs. I'm gonna kind of play it by ear once I get the inputs and see what they look like at that time and then we'll go from there.

Basically the process starts from the bottom up. The second set of questions are shifting just a little bit, maybe even backing up a little bit. The next question is, what do you base your plans on? In other words how do you decide what to include in the plan and what not to include?

I haven't been through that portion of it yet, so I really can't tell you. Let me think a minute. That's going to be very difficult to answer at this point. I'll have to see what kinds of inputs I get. Again I haven't been through that process at this level. I would have to say that I don't know at this point. Now I'm envisioning some types of replies I might get from IMA. We might get let's replace the telefax machines. To me that's not really a strategy we want to put in. If it's a topic or a direction that we feel, and again that's Col \_\_\_\_\_, and then deciding that's the direction we want to take, I would say then he'll decide that we'll go ahead and put that in the plan, that's a good direction, that's where we want to go. Exactly what we use to make that decision, I can't tell you at this time, because I haven't been through that at MAJCOM level yet.

The next set of questions deal with the environment we are in, which tends to be a little bit turbulent as you know. What are the external forces outside of the IM, not just IMX but all of IM, that impact on the strategic plan?

Manning cuts, personnel cuts, base closure. I understand there's an initiative somewhere within the DP community to go to a generalized AFSC. We don't know that that is going to take place. Concurrently another initiative was in MAC to merge SC and IM. We have fended that off here. The proposal came up, it was not meet with a favorable response. \_\_\_\_\_ got [the command] to evaluate it. That doesn't mean that that's not going to happen at some time. Gen \_\_\_\_\_ could say, yea I think that's a good idea and the next thing we know we're wearing an SC ball cap instead of IM. That's something, there's always those possibilities lurking out there that kind of makes the future unknown for us. I think the biggest thing is probably the manning cuts. Doing less with less. So we have to be careful what we're planning 5 years from now. Because we may not have the people to do it. I think that's more important than the equipment. At this point we need people, not knowing where we are going to be. The constants of rollbacks, that type of thing. I think that's the biggest external factor. Then of course world wide events. You never know from one second to the next what's going to happen. Desert Storm/Desert Shield is a good example. We've learned a lot from that. That may be included in our strategic plan as far as training for the future.

If one thing could hurt the strategic plan, what would that be?

Merging with anybody. Not being IM anymore. And I say that a \_\_\_ would certainly change it. We couldn't really call it an IM strategic plan anymore, we'd be merging with the FE strategic plan if they had one.

Who outside your organization, IM, helps with the strategic plan?

I really don't know at this point. Again we haven't got to that point. I would say in the old days. I like to call them the old days, because I hope they are behind us. I would say budget. I'm not saying we can't include any money concerns in our strategic plan. I'm just saying I don't think it should be limited to that type of thing. And probably AC as to where we think we are going with the money. And just like personnel, it's not looking very positive in the future. It would be difficult for me to say where we are going to be 3, 4 years from now. They could give us their educated guess, but I think that's something we are going to have to plan for because we're not going to have as much money to do what we want to. Now do we coordinate our strategic plan with him. I don't think we do that. I don't think we send it around to him or DP. AC and DP, perhaps XP, XP tends to be for futuristic. They deal with the base closures. I could see us talking to them. trying to, if the \_\_\_ comes up as we're writing it. I'd say those are the big 3: XP, DP, and AC.

I've got another question related to that too. If you needed a strategic resource or extra horsepower to get things done, to accomplish your strategic plan, to whom would you turn, who would be your champion?

I would say who I would like it would be. I would like to say it would be the Air Staff. That's Col Harding, he gives us that extra horsepower, our number one person. Then again, he's limited to what he can do. Let's say the IM needed some extra horsepower, he could certainly turn to his boss, the Chief of Staff. He may know of some other ways to go about that. I would personally I would like to see the strategic planning, I would really like to see more direction from the Air Staff on issues, or a firmer standing on certain issues. I can't really think of anyone else. It would probably be staff AAI and our Chief of Staff. Of course General \_\_\_\_\_, but I'm thinking we would have to go through Col \_\_\_\_\_ boss first, the Chief of Staff. He himself is a very powerful individual as far as getting things done. Particularly since he is a personnel person. He has greater insight into the issues I've brought up.

Who is your Chief of Staff?

Brig Gen \_\_\_\_\_. He's a personnel officer. He's leaving next month and he's being replaced by the DP. AIRPLANE INTERFERENCE. They seem reluctant to get involved. I say hey it would help us out if you would take a firm stand up there and work with the SC as Air Staff and come up with, do we think this is a good idea, do we not think it is a good idea. Because now we have two MAJCOMs going off in one direction. One MAJCOM has given up their IMXI in contracting \_\_\_ training command. Air Training Command did that. They gave up their Jim Mooreson position.

What is that division?

Systems. The SC. So what they are basically doing is growing their IRM graduates and giving them to ISC which doesn't, in my opinion, seem right. I think we ought to keep those IRMs in the IM community. The rest of the Air Force right now is kind of sitting back and watching what MAC and SAC are going to learn from this. This is where I see this now. I would like to see a firmer stand. That would help us with strategic planning, if we had an idea where they were headed. They may have some ideas that are not releasable yet. I kind of got that impression when I was up there. I talked to the \_\_\_ party themselves. Said well we just don't want you to think we aren't doing anything without the MAJCOM level. They have things they have to coordinate through Mr. McCormick. He may be at a different end of the spectrum than they are so they have to tactfully coordinate through him and get it back and hopefully send something out to the IM.

Here's another tough one for you. Often within an organization, the goals of one division may conflict with those of another. Which organization in this headquarters poses the biggest threat to you, the most conflict? Outside, the other DCMs.

DP, for the reasons I've already mentioned. They see us going a different direction. I think with them, we feel screwed at this point.

How does the Air Force level IM find out about your progress towards your strategic plan? I understand you send them copies of the plan. How do they find out how you progress?

I have not been through that portion of it yet. I don't know. Other than calling Marian and asking her guidance on things, she might find out that way. But right now I haven't been through the process yet.

By what methods do you coordinate between commands?



The telephone. We will call the other ones and ask for specific information. For example, we have a copy of MAC's plan to merge, XP and IM and see how they are working that. I talked to Maj Washington, Air Training Command, frequently. I used to be in SAC, so I call SAC frequently. Usually it's tough to tell \_\_\_\_\_. And I need back data. I like to know what everyone else is doing. I guess that is just part of my personality. I feel it never hurts to know what the other guy is doing in another command. A \_\_\_\_\_ for making decisions. In fact we used MAC and SAC heavily when we were proposing our position on the IM merger. The issue came up. We heard they were doing it. Called out to them and talked at great lengths on the phone about the pros and cons and then they sent us the information. We take that, look at the pros and cons and then come up with our decision. Quite often we in the lead on things and the others are following behind. In this particular issue, the FMBI merging, they were directed to do that before we were. We weren't directed do it.

I understand it came from in both cases came from the commander of the command.

Our SC didn't want anything to do with it. The folks I coordinated with at SC they were adamant against it as we were. XP was the ones who proposed that whole idea. And I'm not trying to off the subject too much. XP was the ones who came up with it. They had been to an XP conference and heard other XPs say that they and their IM were gonna merge. They came back and proposed it. The reason they proposed this is we have similar computer functions. We said good grief just because we have computers and they have computers doesn't mean they should merge. So does AC, MA, DP, LG, LD, they all have computers. Are we saying everyone should merge with SC just because we have computers. That's like, everyone goes to lunch, does that mean we should all merge. It was ridiculous, the thought process that went into proposing it. I keep my ear to the ground \_\_\_\_\_ to hear what's going on. AIRPLANE INTERFERENCE.

The new area of questions, these are on feedback and implementation. How do you know when something goes wrong with the implementation process?

Implementation of the plan? This may be a theory. I may not be able to answer again, I haven't implemented one yet. I can back drop to base level and SAC but certainly not at the \_\_\_\_\_ level.

How do you deal with such a problem when the problem surfaces?

If it would not be implementable? I can't speak from experience. I can only suspect what I would do to re-

evaluate it. we can't go in that direction. look at alternatives. At this point that's all I can say we would do. Again it would depend on the issue.

What is the key indicator to the health of your strategic plan?

I would say results. But then you'd almost have to be in a 4-5 \_\_\_ cycle to see those results. Results number one. Milestones. If you're not able to meet the first milestone, that's one indicator right there. Let's use the postage decentralization. And I'm guessing. There is no plan this right now. Let's say the first milestone would be to determine how much postage the base uses in a year. That should be easy to come up with. What you cannot always expect is a postal increase. The next thing might be working with the AC to determine how the money is going to be derived. Is it going to come from each organization. Budget into the IM budget. How that's going to work. Is it going to be more industrial funding or centrally funded. If you can't get past that milestone or if that milestone was expected to be done in January and all of a sudden it's September and they still can't decide. I think that's a \_\_\_ indicator that's something wrong either with the planning or there's other serious problems in there. Sometimes I think we expect too much from ourselves too soon. And often the information we need, we're depending on other organizations who couldn't care less about our strategic plan. Or these things are not as important to them and getting the information from them in a timely manner is not always feasible. I suspect those are practical things that would indicate that the plan is not complete.

Who would tell you if it was sick?

Probably the bases. They would be screaming. Depending again on which particular topic. Certainly with postal decentralization with bases would be screaming. Because we don't, in ourselves up here in IM, we don't have a postal budget. If it's an issue with let's say contingency planning. We might not know that until we go to war and our after action reports would reveal we had a lack in training deficiency or planning deficiency in equipment to take, that type of thing. I guess our end customers, be it the bases or be it the TDY folks.

Why do you think they would tell you?

Because they need our support. That's what we're here for, to support our customers. Some of them may not. I'm sure there are those out there who have \_\_\_ \_\_\_. I think with strategic plan and working the way it should and is not written to be put on a shelf for a year until you take it

down again. If it's designed the way I think it should be those things are going to come back. If the people up here are attuned to the fact that oh that's something out of the strategic plan. Sometimes we just work issues and forget about the paper part of it, that we need to document that. I think our customers would because we deal with them, we have a pretty good relationship with our bases. We go out on \_\_\_ visits now. We couldn't do that \_\_\_\_\_. When we're out at the bases, we're asking questions. Trying to get feedback from our bases. I talk with two or three bases everyday. And normally if there is something at least within IMX that's not going right, they don't hesitate to let us know. From a wartime standpoint, they are required to get us an after action report. Then if they are having any problems we certainly put them in here.

What happens when someone deviates from the method or process or tactic which is the accepted method of achieving the goal?

I can't think of an example here. I did that frequently at the base IM and SAC. In fact I'm notorious at SAC headquarters. In deviating from the accepted way, I'm for that. Unless you are doing something illegal or that is going to have a serious, adverse impact on the organization. I think it's great that people are innovative enough to think of other ways to do things. Because the accepted way, the technical way may not be appropriate for a certain situation. Or some contingency may come up that that's impossible and you just have to scramble and make things happen. The book says the mail is suppose to be delivered once a day at a base. There are times when that can absolutely not happen. One truck catches on fire and the other one is in the shop already. That happened to me at Barksdale. So all of a sudden you've got to deviate for about a week. We had other ways of getting the mail to people, to use. We came up with other ways of doing it, fax. \_\_\_\_\_ we were doing it. Or sometimes transportation did not have another truck to give us. You just have to deal with the situation and be innovative and constantly be look for newer, better, more efficient ways of doing business. So I don't really get excited about people doing things other than, unless the reg is you must absolutely do it this way or you will be court martialed. I don't know of any reg that clearly says it that way. I think that's how we grow. Somebody looks at something and says I think we can do it this way. Let them go for it. Even if they don't succeed with it. We've learned something from it and that's something else we can put in our book, o.k. base X tried it this way and this is why it didn't work.

What would happen if you don't meet an objective? What steps would you take?

The first thing I would do is and hopefully I would know that I was not to meet the goal before the goal. I guess I find that one hard to answer. Because if I knew ahead of time that I was not going to meet a certain target date. We would be examining the reasons why and establishing a new target date. I have a hard time believing we would not make a target date. Because if you're sitting on top of it, there's something wrong. And I tell the bases there's nothing wrong with erasing that arrow, moving it if, it shouldn't be because you haven't done anything for awhile on it. It should be, review it and see if it's still a realistic goal or a realistic target date. If it's not, re-establish it and figure out what do we need to be doing to meet that. I'm speaking more at this point at the base level. There are things, times you can't do what you want to do, be it buy a piece of equipment if we can't have the money. Re-evaluate, maybe there's a less expensive one, maybe there's a different way we are going to have to go about doing business without that piece of equipment. There's no question they have to meet the goal in decentralizing mail. That will be met. Now some bases may be ahead of the game but there will be confusion if they don't meet it, if they don't have everything ready. It's going to happen whether they are ready or not.

What would cause you to change your goal and why?

Perhaps if the direction we were going changed. Higher headquarters or the Air Staff. For example, right now we are suppose to be \_\_\_ our printing plant to the Navy, 1 October. They come down and say by the way someone has \_\_\_ that and we're not going to do it. And there was a probability of that happening. So I would say if the direction changes that you have no control over. Change the goal if the direction has been changed by another headquarters. Perhaps as we are going along in our milestones we realize our customers, and I'm just talking in a brainstorming session, we realize this would have a negative impact on our customers. We would have to change the way we were going, maybe not change the goal, but change the way we were going about the goal. That hasn't come yet. So I can't really speak from experience, I'm just brainstorming. I would think that perhaps something would come up and we'd say hey that's not the direction we want to go. And we'd change it for whatever reason. Change of goals would result from perhaps another command doing it. Desert Storm has given us a lot of lesson learned. We're starting to think now that we don't need a deployment copier. For a long time the command was having to get Sammon to come up with a deployment copier. We got over there and most of the IMs got there copiers over there, they either didn't work or the \_\_\_ was wrong so they bought them in country. Which brings up the question why do you need a

deployment copier if you can buy them in theater. Little things like that. I think after action reports, feedback from the field.

How do you get feedback from units or operational \_\_\_\_\_?

For example, after the war we had after action reports. We get feedback when we go out on \_\_\_\_\_ and actually \_\_\_\_\_. We see how the program actually ... And then there's always the annual \_\_\_\_\_. Telephone conversations with the IMs.

How do people not in the strategic planning group feed information on the strategic plan?

That's a good question. I can't answer that. I would say that it's responsibility of those who receive the hard copy of it to inform their subordinates. That comes down to individual office goals. To make sure everyone understands the important part they play in the overall picture. Some supervisors are good at that, some aren't. Some just file it away and that's about it. Again I haven't seen a product here yet, so I can't really say how that's going to happen. I can say how I would hope it would happen. I think that would be the way we would do it. Then we would send it out and that would be a topic at the Air Staff, their meetings, staff meetings. Because if they have their own milestones, the who people are actually doing this should be actively involved. If people can see how well they are progressing, I think they do better than if they don't know there is a plan. Jim has done a very good job of planning our \_\_\_\_\_ network. He will even make little diagrams that he's pulled out of magazines where they are talking about their strategic planning process. He'll say this is where we are. It's just clarifies it when you can see that o.k. we have made progress.

How do you make the strategic plan meaningful to the worker at the operational level?

First of all, let them know there is one. If it's clearly marked as to what the milestones are. I'm not above having graphs. I don't like them on the walls, but I think if you're in a staff meeting and it's a topic in the staff meeting, you could say here's where we are at. I think people, as far as the incentive, some people have an intrinsic interest in that type of thing. They can see where they are going. They take the initiative to get there. If they don't know there is a goal they aren't going to have the initiative to do things. Not so much as this level but at base level IG inspection time get people out of initiative to get to a goal. I saw that clearly, this is where we want to be at what time. Let me tell you, the day

before the IG got there we were finishing out last little project. For them the reward was the excellent or outstanding rating. Which leads to comments in APRs, OPRs then leads to recognition via the information management awards program. Not that they are accomplishing these tasks because they want an award out of it. I think it's pursuing that sense of pride in the office that people get on the band wagon and go for it. I haven't had too much problem with my people. It took awhile at Barksdale. My first group, people were weeded out and we got a good group going. They knew where they were going and they could feel they were getting somewhere. I think that's important. That's why milestones are important. They have to feel that they are getting somewhere, not just spinning there wheels. That instills alot of initiative.

How are successes identified in meeting your strategic plan?

Again, we aren't there yet, so I can't answer that at a MAJCOM level.

Have you had any successes with prior plans?

I didn't really see the first SAC strategic plan until. I'm not sure I ever saw the SAC strategic plan while I was at base IM. We kind of came up with our own base IM strategic plan. I never saw one from MAJCOM.

When you have successes, how does that effect the people?

They were very happy. It was one less thing they had to worry about. It's kind of a relief when you accomplish something, that's one less thing on your desk that you have to look at everyday. It could be in the form of, we put together a really nice looking mission board at Barksdale and everyone had a part in designing it. When that thing went up on the wall, everyone took a lot of pride in it. We also did what we call our wall of folks. Everybody on base came by to look at it. I had no idea it would have the impact that it did on folks. I had 8x10s of every one of our workers in IM on this wall. We had a little contest for \_\_\_\_\_ put wooden letters about the pictures.

We had these nicely lined up \_\_\_\_\_.  
Everyone just loved it. I had an NCO who had an office across from that. He said there are people who come in just to look at that wall and they go out again. It snuck up on by folks and took them by surprise. They started taking so much pride in the unit. It didn't matter if it was \_\_\_ or they got there big schedule down to where they got the whole base delivered before noon then they could go to lunch. They were just so excited. The pride they took in themselves was a result of meeting these plans. One of our goals was to get our orders processing down to a certain time, get our

mail delivery down to a certain time. When I first got there they couldn't even get the base mail to the post office by the time the post office closed. We have to look at that process and get it down. When I left, they were down, both trucks were back before noon. All the \_\_\_ guys had a chance to go to lunch then they could back in the afternoon and sort the mail and get it ready to go to the post office. Frequently I would go back there in the afternoon after the mail had gone to the post office, they were sitting around playing chess. The people notice it in the amount of time it's taking them to do their jobs. Hopefully a great part of the strategic plan is how do we do our job more efficiently. When they realize they aren't pulling their hair out trying to get their basic job done in 8 hours, their morale goes up and it has a positive impact.

How do you let people know if they've had a success?

We used to have parties. If someone got promoted we would have a party. When we got our excellent on the IG, we had a party afterwards. We had another after we got the best IM in the Air Force. We even got our base commander to give us the afternoon off. We had to stay on base, we couldn't just pack up and go home. What we sat up was a pot luck lunch and we invited the base commander down and the afternoon was filled with games. They had their chess tournament, they had other things planned. They usually wanted a party. We included everyone who had anything to do with it. Usually the base commander was helping us out doing things, we would invite them down and the base squadron commander, of course they had to approve it. That was the way people wanted to be rewarded so we did a lot of that. It had to be a goal that was in the strategic plan, if they simply they, it could be a milestone, it could be the first time they got the mail to the post office on time. We would reward them with time off. Or anytime right before an IG where people are working ungodly hours, especially the printing plant, where everyone in the world wanted some new pamphlet done before the IG gets here. Those poor folks are just working their rearends off. As soon as we got the excellent we said o.k. have a 3-day pass, that and food. At the end of the year we put them in for information manager of the year and CO of the quarter and airman of the month. We did a lot of that. We had a real good success rate at base level with our folks winning awards. Now at this level, I haven't been through it. Exactly how we are going to go about it, I don't know. We tend to have parties here to and give time off.

## COMMAND #2--COMMAND IM

I believe in the planning aspect--I believe in the long-range and short-range aspects of planning. I believe it is essential that we do it all the time. I think it's more important that we make that plan as well as we can. Adjust it along the way. Then follow it and act on it on what we plan to do. Coming out here in August of 89, I looked at that plan and after 2 or 3 months I found out that I wasn't seeing action from the branch chiefs, the division chiefs that followed those things up. You know, I didn't have that comfort feeling that we're going after those goals. I wasn't comfortable with the strat plan package and the formatting, and the operation that we underwent. Then in April of 90 we got into TQM--[The CINC] got us involved in it. And then at the Destiny meeting that we had at the Pentagon in July of 90, Denny Nevlin, AFSC IM, he and Russ \_\_\_\_\_ gave a pitch on TQM. Anyway I said wow, I've got to think about this. I see some opportunity here. So we gave a little thought and came up with our process we use now, which I call the Continuous Improvement Plan which uses the buzzwords of TQM of continuously improving. But I see it as... it can be a plan too. A living, active plan I thought. Because you could take the ideas that people have, whether they're processes or programs or projects. You can take those and put them into a format, and then you have a working document that is always kept up to date--up to speed--then there are certain aspects of it that are relevant. We have 5 or 6 main parts of that...that plan. One of them is to evaluate where we are in that process or project. We also establish what is our objective. And then we establish our strategies on how we're going to achieve that objective. Then we will measure, do a measurement of did we achieve that objective. The last part of it is the portion toward keeping up with the status of actions taken. That becomes, for me, the corporate memory. No the big driver for this is the opportunity for anyone in the organization to come up with a vision--something we could do, something we ought to do, and that means they have ownership in the organization. So their idea becomes something we should do. So this gives them the mechanism to make something happen, to better the organization, becomes a plan for the organization. And that becomes the subject, and that subject is at the top of the plan. The next important thing is to come up with a team that's going to drive the achievement of this. That team then fulfills those 5 or 6 main points I told you about. And that creates a scenario for the organization, takes the ideas of the people, but puts it together and adds strength from other members of the team and makes it a team effort. As an



example of an individual that suggests we should do something. PCSs. gets promoted, goes to another job, their idea is not lost. It's been picked up by the organization and the team, and it's driven forward because the team has accepted it as value added toward achieving that unit's mission. That's a good healthy process. We need to be doing things that will be value added and focused on that unit's mission. We don't need to do things that wheel-spinning and wasteful and driven by individual self achievements, that result in no value added. We've come up with this process that kind of holds our feet to the fire--that makes us take innocuous comments, and put meat on them and build them--change them, improve them so they become value added. And then we set the true objective of what we want to achieve, and then we set down the specific things think we need to do--the strategies we need to achieve them--and those change as we go along and learn more about the project or the process. Then we have a way to measure ourselves to see how well we're doing at achieving that objective. We capture significant events along the way, so we have a corporate memory. That's a good thing to do if you do have a change of person or something on the team. They can always go back and look and read the CIP, the Continuous Improvement Plan, improve the plan. To see the status of what's been done. It's very simple, it's easy to use, it's user friendly, if I can use those terms. The thing we have not done yet, that's because this thing is kind of in its early stages, is we haven't broken out a categorized them as long or mid or short-range type of plan. That certainly can be our next step as we go into the system. We are trying to foster a vision for the future. To do that we want to capture the thoughts and ideas of our people and make it easy for them to input those ideas into our system. We want then to rally our force to help make that happen. We think that's important. We think that will energize our people into really caring and owning what they're doing. That synergism will then take our organization, quickly where we need it to be to support our wings, our bases, and our major command levels, and be that "value added" and not be just parochially minded. That's what we're doing so far. And the measurement of how successful it is will be down the road. You don't implement something like that overnight. Everybody has to be trained. We're doing that as we go along. We think we'll be productive. We're trying to use some of the TQM philosophy in doing that. But I want a working, hands-on strategic plan that's used daily not that's updated only once every 6 months or once a year then put away on a shelf or in a closet or a cabinet.

In order to accomplish a strategic plan, sometimes you need a little extra horsepower or a champion to get something done. If you needed a champion, who would you go to?

I think it strictly pertains to the subject matter. We might have to go to our own people. We might have to go to your boss, his boss. You might have to go to your peers around your functional arena. It has to do with what the problem is. I think we should after to the person what can champion that and ask them, "sell the idea." And seek their support. If you don't seek their support or they don't give it, then maybe you didn't have the right idea or you didn't have the right justification.

You would feel comfortable going to any of those sources?

I've gone to all of them in the past. All of them. The main thing we need to do--the main people who need to champion our cause are our customers. I've found that's the neat thing about TQM because it causes us to really focus on that. If our customers want what we do, then they're going to champion our cause. We found that to be absolutely value-added.

If something goes wrong with the implementation process, who would notify you that there are problems?

Normally you would expect that a person in the chain of command would respond to you. I think that there's the informal organization that could reach you.

Why do you think they would let you know?

They should have ownership of the project. They should be concerned about achieving the goals and objectives that are set out. So if something were to go wrong, I would think that they would do what I said in the last question that I would do. Go to the right person to champion their cause. Go to the right person to help open the door that was a problem. We should be building a scenario, providing that scenario that the people would feel comfortable coming and seeking that help or that person to champion their cause.

If one of your people came to you and said boss we're having trouble reaching such and such a goal, we're not going to be able to do it because of funding or because of manpower or something like that. What would you ask them?

What I could do. If they had thought about what I could do for them. If they have something in mind, then it's my responsibility to make that happen. If they did not know what to do, then I'd sit there and help them come up with an idea on how to tackle the problem and we'd go from there. That becomes an important job of mine and an important focus--to make that happen.

How do you make strategic planning meaningful at the unit or operational level?

You involve them in the planning of it. You involve them in the development of the plan. You have to build ownership, to be done most efficiently and effectively they have to believe in ownership.

How do you convey that ownership to people?

Get them involved in the planning of it, in the developing of it. You get them personally involved in the planning and developing of it. You include them in the process of ideas. You go out and communicate with them. You come up with the idea then you go sell it to them. Get them involved in the planning and that involves them in ownership. If they feel ownership they will help drive, they'll be a driver along with you to achieve that. If you don't develop them, they don't have it, it becomes much more difficult to achieve your goal.

How do you identify success?

By looking in people's eyes and seeing the twinkle in their eye when they think they've done a good job on a process or project they've worked on.

How do you handle successes when you find them?

I like to personally compliment the people, the team that worked on it. I'd like to make sure they're recognized. I'd like to spread the word in the Quality Exchange that we send out to all the base IMs. We take success stories they submit to us and we give them credit and we share their good ideas. We find that's appreciated and that's effective. We do things like that, sometimes. We give awards. We like to do a lot of personal telling people good job things.

What if someone achieved a goal early?

I think I would do similar things. It might heighten the level of enthusiasm about this success. Complimenting their success story.

Could you describe a success that you've had.

I think a success story is one we had in the PDC. When we had bad morale and we had a leader that recognized, that came in good the scenario, recognized the leadership. We knew a little bit about the TQM process but didn't know formally about it, but had good leadership examples. He set down a goal to improve, came up with a plan, got the people involved in that plan. Took actions to follow the plan, to

communicate, to hold people accountable, to measure success, to enrich their jobs and a lot of good things flowed out of that. People enjoyed their jobs more. They did get rewards for what they did. They were submitted for Airman of the Quarter and NCO of the Quarter and things like that. They did get awards for doing right things right. They did really neat things that was successes in that area. Based on some leadership and planning efforts. That's the success that I can recall.

How did others learn about that success outside of that group?

We took that scenario and I asked the people themselves. We wrote up a talking paper and we passed that around to people. We had an opportunity for those few people from the office to brief Mr. McCormick when he was here visiting the CINC in September 1990. Also the CINC walked in and sat down and listened to the briefing and complimented us, good program, excellent briefing. We talked to other people about it. We aired our learning experience with them, with other people, both written and oral.

What things are done to reward people?

We found out that's not an easy subject. We started a process improvement team to look at awards, and awards for teams. We found its a bit tough to address that subject--to find out what really turns people on. They even mentioned free lunch by the boss, and I've done that. We had some suggest, "Hey give me a parking place close up to the building," or something like that. A pat on the back, personal recognition. We get a lot of feedback like that. There's really not one area where people say hey this really turns me on. I guess you could categorize it though as personal, individual, pat on the back from the bosses, is what really is the motivator, the measure of a good complement.

What is your vision for the future? Where do you see IM five years from now?

5 years from now I think there will be a Chief of Information Division at our wings and bases that will be an administrative systems hybrid type of individual who will be over seeing all aspects of information systems management at a base. I think that person will report directly to the senior officer on the base. That organization will handle all aspects of the information management, resource management, systems management. I think it will become very effective and efficient and value added. Not as fragmented

as it is today. I think there will be a hybrid 7049 type individual that would say to me. I think he'll be more technically educated. I think there will be a career pattern available.

How are we going to get more technically educated?

Like I told the commandant down at your school, I'm a big proponent of the school, the IM school, AFIT. I would think, I totally support the program and think we should invest more into it. That's one aspect. We need to identify people with information systems degrees as they come through the front door of the Air Force and get those into our area, IM/SC area. I think the capability and potential that Lt Collin Bonds gives us as an example of the value added of recruiting people like that.

When I am faced with something that I think is an appropriate topic for some long-term planning concept, behind it I try to get input from a variety of sources, and I guess I weigh that input based on who's giving it to me and what I think are their prejudices or their slant on division or view of things. In other words, I try to stay open-minded about whatever the subject is, get a couple of inputs at least or a variety, as much as I can basically within reason, and then filter through that based on what I know about who gave me those inputs, or where they came from. I try to put my own filter onto it about money, people, politics, 702s being merged into orderly rooms, rooms having 732s, the orderly room 702s being merged into personnel, that thing, you know. The subject came up. I said - sounds crazy, but obviously the politics were it was going to happen no matter how stupid it was. Getting input from DP sources, getting input from IM sources, talking to people in orderly rooms, to find out what their view of it was, then trying to adjust my approach to managing 702s and orderly rooms to accommodate the obvious political clout that the personnel people had while trying to maintain a sense of 702s are buddies with each other and committed to those people at a worker level, advising them early that this is reality, and the best thing they could do for themselves is to take the 732s COCs, get themselves in touch with the DP people, try to adopt their perspectives on life, or at least to understand their perspectives on life, and go from there. So I guess strategic planning wise, I got inputs from a variety of sources, filtered it through what I believed were their prejudices, and then tried to apply it using my own judgement about what was important.

Depends on the subject, for instance, the orderly room 702s being transferred into the 732 world, primarily was DP and IM because that's the people that were impacted and the people that were taking, so to speak. Having worked in XP for the last 18 months before I came this job, I now find out that I probably failed to tap sources outside of the IM community that were always there. In IM, I don't think we have a very broad picture of the whole scope of what it is that goes on in the Air Force in XP. I found out that there are people who have a perspective on our programs where we don't have a perspective on their stuff. For instance, the programming guys up in XPP know enough about the DMRD 998 to talk competently about the budget impacts of that, but most of our IM people don't know their business enough to talk to them from their perspective. Now, I say - well, there's a thing here I think I've got a broader sense of who to talk to. For instance, color copiers: there's an operations-

related aspect to that. My copier manager never thought to go talk to the XO guys because he didn't realize that those guys got bucks; if they want something to happen, they've got the money to make it happen, and they've got the political savvy to do it. We need to cull out what they offer, what they believe, what they think and want and try to incorporate their desires into our planning so that we can have that political support when we got to lobby for bucks to make something happen. In other words, they want color copiers in every squadron for route planning to make copies of maps. Well, you and I as printers may say that's stupid, but if the XO says we need it and the two-star general supports it, that's what's going to get us support for our printing budget 2 years from now. Not the fact that we saved 4 cents per 1000 on the printing press. We can whittle down the printing price to a bucks per thousand, but if you're not producing and that's how you got your 0 bucks per thousand, nobody's going to support that. If you're producing and it costs 25 or 35, they'll buy the extra 10 dollars per thousand, if you're giving them what they need, what they want to get their mission done. We don't have that perspective here in IM, and so that's where I think my XP experience was really beneficial that I can see from other DCS where there's pools of knowledge, per say, the AC guys, and base operating support issues. That's going to impact on them a lot. We should be cultivating friendships or at least exchanges with the AC community so that we can get grass roots input from their AOs: what's important; what are they working on; how does that impact us. AC, SC, XP, XO, DP, XR to a little bit. In this command, the XR people, the acquisitions people have some interactions when us when we're going to talk about acquiring enormous computer systems to network bases across the world. But of probably haven't really tapped into them very much yet, and maybe we need to be doing it; maybe we need to be looking at how can we develop those exchanges at the action officer level to (something) commit our people, or get our people to pick some (something) and have some support out there when they do take that risk.

In reality, what I have seen in the past is that either at Air Staff level, at SAF/AAI, or at the MAJCOM level. (This is the command IM or DA, at the time when I was a base DA). They decide they want something, they communicate that through their IMX person down to the base IM, and the base IM tries to figure out some things to answer that letter with. Usually, it's the base IM and one or two other people on that person's staff, or you might even get an entire cross-section at the base IM level depending on that particular staff at that IM location. For instance, when I was here at the base at Scott I ... took the only strong IMX MSgt Lohen. We got the taskers for the strategic plan she and I talked about it. Then she ... she, and I and the ret

of the staff talked about it, but that we really developed had come from her and I agreeing that these were the kinds of things we needed to focus on. The inputs we got from the other staff members of IM were not broad enough, were not long-range; they weren't big picture. They wanted to buy new furniture for the records office, you know, that's not strategic planning. The problem I see with that is that the base IMS, when you filter it down the chain of command like that, you lose what it is strategic planning is supposed to be about, because those people at the base level are fighting alligators to stay alive. They don't know and they don't have any way of knowing what's happening up here in first structure, in programming, in big mission changes in the command vision ... the whole quality movement here in the Air Force right now is related to strategic planning. That quality movement here in the command has only been here for the last 2 years, where it's been the primary focus and emphasis. If that's the case, then the quality emphasis has just barely begun to filter down to the base level. Still, they're working at a mission support level not at a long-range planning level.

(First clarifies what questioner wants: how it's supposed to happen or how she's seen it happen). I saw it happen in that Col Nations decided that, he must have gotten a briefing or something somewhere, he bought into it and said we're going to do it. I think that's where it starts, that somebody decides we need something. In particular, in this case, I'm using Col Nations as the SAF/AA, when I ever first heard in the IM circles about strategic planning. There had probably been some similar attempts under another name or something somewhere in the past, but somebody at the top decides we need something and they tell their staff to make it happen. Their staff probably struggles with that and says what does he want and how are we supposed to get that and I don't know and ... so they pass it down to the next lower level and it goes from there, instead of it coming up from the bottom to say where are we going and how are we going to get there and the next higher level taking that task and then trying to develop some framework for it. Then that MAJCOM-level framework getting floated to SAF/AA, and said how can we merge these things together from USAF and from the command or whatever. It starts from the top and goes downward directed as a program to spend instead of coming up from the bottom I think. The other ... I'll give you this as a side note ... I see strategic planning in IM to be fractured or fragmented because, again from the XP perspective, strategic planning is done in a 5 or a 6 years POM ... or \_\_\_\_\_. Strategic planning should be a part of that. You shouldn't have to strategic plan if you've done your Fidnet planning right. The command IM in particular, (and that's the only one I have any experience with). I don't think we've really gotten very far in the 5 year



defense plan or the 6 year defense plan (it's been called different things in the last 2 or 3 years we've had name changes 3 times I think). but basically the long-range financial program that goes to building the president's budget, we've never laid in our programs on to that very well. We haven't communicated it very well, maybe. If you were doing that, your strategic plan skeleton would be there by and large. We're trying this year in IM to do that in the sense that we did submit program initiatives for the fiscal year 92 to 96 time frame. That's called DITMF and Mack McGee and Doug McKinnion and Collin Bonds are working that. They're going to have to brief their to the command staff and that's going to bring up some bells ringing in some other people's communities like the SC community and the XR community and probably even in the operations arena. That's going to hopefully build that network where our people are interacting with the other people on the staff. From that, they're going to get good inputs tot he colonel. The colonel's strategic plan will be to let them do what it is SDs are supposed to do. And the Adds here will be communicating with the base IMs to find out at a real grassroots level what do they need. These guys will be able to say - o.k., they're going to need X number of dollars per location on the average worldwide in order to make this happen and we can build that into the program. But we're not going to turn around tot he base IMs and say - well, you guys give us a program hopefully, we're not going to do that. We'll just have a sense of awareness of what it is they need and then incorporate their needs hopefully into our efforts on the staff. As we give this FIDEP input, if we make all the cuts, we'll be doing strategic planning without having to write a separate piece of paper that says our strategic plan involves X, Y, and Z items and we're going to support it with these milestones in this manner.

I don't think it's much more than a calendar issue for suspenses, myself. It means basically, trying to either brainstorm with a few reliable staff members or taking an input from somebody else. For instance, maybe taking the old product and looking at it to say - did we do any of these things, did anything come true that we had on the strategic plan; are we anywhere closer to achieving any of those goals; are those goals still realistic. Basically, data gathering, brainstorming, looking for ideas or initiatives that we could work on or might have value for us. Then, testing those concepts after that. If it's realistic and I do this with it, is it feasible, is it really going to be valuable? Then trying to fit some kind of a framework for it to happen with.

If there's a task, or then you provide a piece of paper to kill that task, you know, if you've gone through those first three things and you say yes, indeed, here's something we

want to do. Strategically, it's going to take us 5 or 6 years to happen. We need money and we need manpower to make it happen, or we need equipment and people somewhere. So you write it down and say - what is it I want to do and try to specify exactly what the goal is, what are the steps I've got to get through in order to get there. So you're basically setting milestones, how will I know I'm there basically to, again, know when you've achieved it.

Outlet. That's about it. I think that's about as far as it goes in our business. I mean, I think they put it in the file drawer and they pick it up the 15th of January next year. You're going to have a blast at Kirtland. I think that's about all they do with in unfortunately ... some members of the staff, they crossroad the thing after they've assembled ... they take my input, they take Debbie's input, they take whoever else's input, put it all together. They staple it together ... make 172 copies of it and send it to everybody and theoretically, all the base Ims have read it. All the staff members have read it. Theoretically, you are working everyday with those specific goals in mind as you commit resources throughout the day and the year. Does that really happen? I don't know. I think that the structure of suspense actions from the command section, the separate program of budget building out of XP, the separate program of budget execution out of AC, are not always in synchronous action. The command section may be worried about something that has nothing to do with the strategic plan, and you're busy killing the suspenses out of the command section to tell them what it is they want to know about and they're not asking questions that are coming off your strategic plan, well, your strategic plan is taking a back burner to what's on the front burner today. Suspense comes out of the XP to develop initiatives. Do you actually consult the strategic plan before you put those inputs in? I would venture to say most people don't. Maybe it happens in IMX, if IMX is the OPR for the initiative to go to XP, and if that same person is the APR for the initiative, is the OPR for the strategic plan, and if they are not unduly stressed for a suspense date, they might pull out the wand and look and see how much contenance there is between the two. But are these Adds doing that. I doubt it. Are the Adds at the bases doing it. I doubt it. I don't think it's happening in the Air Force. I don't know for a fact, but I'd be surprised if somebody out of SAF/AAI sits down and weighs the POM and the strategic plan next to each other.

When I was a base IM, we basically just took the previous year's input. Up here, I would hopefully do it a little differently.

Up here, I would take last year's input, and then I would go to the POM initiatives we built and see how those interact.

I'd also go to the IMX people and ask them for any programming plans they might have. Programming plans are not as long term as strategic plans, but they should give a flavor for where you're headed. So you should be able to get a little bit of color on your strategic plan based on what your programming plans are looking like. For instance, we're having a forced drawdown, and we have currently got 15 bases that we are the host wing for. Any one in their right mind would have to say we're gonna be down to about 10 in 5 or so 6 years. If we are doing a strategic plan, you're going to want to build it not on a 15-base MAJCOM but something less than that. That would be something you would get out of the IMX plan shop to say - o.k., I can think about things in a smaller scale or scope. Hopefully, I would do that. I would probably also ask in the SC community, because we're going into the merged SC/IM community, what their plans people saw as on the horizon, things that we're going to be needing to do.

I think about them. I think about them kind of like electrical sparks. I mean, I know things here, and I'll be working something else and I'll get ... a flash of memory of oh yeah, that's something that impacts this ... I'm working along (on one project), and I remember the other and I try to marry those up and say - how do I visualize those two things happening together. Do they work in tandem? Do they work counter to each other? How do they relate? I try to draw a mental relationship ... to them.

Well, I haven't. No. Probably should. That might be something ... I don't remember in our strategic plan ever having built any assumptions. I know in ops plans world and in the programming planning world, they write a basic and then there are all these appendixes. In that basic, I know they do talk about assumptions. I don't think our strategic plan ... maybe we have, maybe we haven't done assumptions in the ... at front. If we haven't, that probably a real smart thing to do.

Programming plans.

No. That's in XP.

XPPPP. X times 4 Ps, yeah. The other place that they are done is in XPX, which is ops plans, "O" planning, which is a phrase they use for that kind of planning which is emotional planning, which means you think about it but you never tap down the specifics. Then you get into an operation and you go from an "O" plan to an OP order, and that's where you tap the specifics down. The XPX people sit and think about what if we went to war in southwest Asia? There's a guy and his world is the one plan for how we're going to move all of Europe and all of the CONUS, and call up the reserves and go

out there, and what bases we're going to use sort of generically, he's thinking about it. When on the second of August, Kuwait was invaded and the JCF said we're going to do this, that guy in XPX got with a whole bunch of buys in XO (operations world), here at Scott to say - here's what the plan requires; here's what we thought would work; here's what we expected. And these guys, the operators, were saying - this isn't working, we need to refine that, this is messed up, well, how did you get there? He had a whole bunch of assumptions to begin with. His assumption was the MOS - the Main ... Maximum Operating something or another - how many planes you can move through an airport at a time was X number. In reality, the people in theater, the CENTAF people, weren't operating using it those mocks. And that was screwing the system up big time. It was like having flushed a box of kleenex down the toilet. It weren't working. Once this guy said - well, you got to free up this and these people went to the CENTAF guys and said - stop it. You're screwing it up, and CENTAF finally agreed to it, then the flow got going again. So you had somebody who had thought keep thoughts for a long time - he'd been doing that for 5 years probably. Here were these people trying to make it happen, base level IM guys saying - well, this isn't working. Then you had to put them together and say - well, here's what my assumptions were, and he had in fact put them in writing into his plan in the basic.

Yeah, if we do, I'm not sure what value those assumptions might be, you know, assumptions like we're in a forced drawdown. Everybody can see that right now, but the thing you'd want to write down is we're assuming a 25 percent reduction between now and 1996. We're assuming that IM is going to be continuing to operate as a function on its own even though we're merging SC and IM. That assumption will be interesting to see in 5 years whether it's panned out or not. Assumptions are that you can do more with a computer than you can do manually. That's an assumption that doesn't always pan out either. You go into PDOs and you've got 10 times the workload just to lay the data base. Once you get the data base loaded, yeah now you've got some savings, but if you take the bodies away before the data base is loaded, you're sinking the ship big time, that happened, and you go - yeah, o.k. The same thing with RAMS, you know. Everybody at the base level choked when we had to load 425 records plans. (Somebody) are going - oh, my God! Nobody had thought about that part, at least at base level. How am I going to do that until the things were here and the bases were going what do I do next? How do I do this thing? Then try to ... nobody had put these people up here that were making assumptions and put these people down there that were going to make it happen and say - hey, this is what you've got to do, and this is what you've got to do ... assumptions

hadn't been really well done at the base level until very late in the day.

I would say the command section's support of whatever things we've written. The command section's ignorance about where we want to go, where we think we want to go. If they support us, it's a real easy strategic plan item to implement. If they don't know we want to go that way, they may have a different place in mind for us. Then our strategic plan is in conflict with what the command section's vision is of where we're supposed to have gone. XP, from a programming perspective; long-range budget, acquiring that; manpower, which is also, here in the command, it's part of XP and IM sure other commands it is as well; SC ... may or may not be providing the basic architecture for what it is we're thinking about; personnel, because they have designs on reserving as much of our manpower resources and authorizations as they can for their own purposes. AC is short-term, or two to three year execution programs; contracting because you can't ever make happen what it is you want, and when you do it doesn't happen when you thought it was going to and that throws everything chaos because your other milestones now become worthless or unreliable; Congress, because they put a 76 clauses into things or they require you or prohibit you from doing a thousand different things; the Air Staff, because they are working 9 times out of 10 at opposing purposes; the customer, because if you serve the customer, you don't have time to strategic planning and if you do strategic planning you don't have time to serve the customer; all the other competing DCS who are striving for their programs and their strategic plans, which are 9 times out of 10 not orchestrated to work together. They may not be directly opposed to each other, but they aren't feeding each other in a positive manner. I think that's just about everybody.

At the base level, we got a little bit of support from the contracting people because my IMX person's husband worked in contracting. The supply people were cooperative in helping us to identify things. Now, those were real small-scale type things. Who helps up here? It would make a difference who the AO was that was trying to work it. If they had rapport, you could expect help probably ... like XP, AC, SC, DP, XR if you had the positive relationships already laid. I think that's more of a theoretical what-if rather than an actual ... and I have the first-hand experience to back that one up.

I'd go to XP. They make or break this command. If they were failing me, I would go to the operators, XO, because that's who we're all here to take care of is to make them happen. As a third choice, I might go to SAF/AA.

XP is who I would (some affirmation). You betcha. If they support you, you're the only one who can stand in your own way. If they don't support you, everybody else in the building gets in line in front of you.

Threat to ours? DP (and the most conflict with) I'd say DP.

I think there are still some real sore wounds from the orderly room takeover. There's a move afoot in DP that we've heard of to take the rest of the orderly room people. They've got a general; we don't, at Air Staff level - MPC. They've got mission support squadrons; we don't, or we perceive we don't. In fact, we're doing pretty good numbers-wise, I think in this command, as far as putting 70s into mission support squadrons. 70s may be (something) out in the field, keeping that small view of things instead of trying to learn more about DP. Instead, they're running it as the IM at their mission support squadron. But their perception is that they control assignments, they control your career and they will use that to further their own ends rather than support you achieving what it is you think you need to do. There have been more than one staff summary sheet from them to us that were not coordinated properly or they've communicated out to the field and asked mission support squadron commanders things that impact IM, and they won't backfeed that information to the IM resources here. There's a little bit of etiquette between DCSs, that I think may have not happened here - I guess that's what that boils down to. The political power they wield is real. The DP in this building used to be the CINC's exec, has quite a few years experience execing for 4 stars. Our colonel doesn't carry that power; he doesn't appear to wield it. He gets to go see the two-star Chief of Staff occasionally, but it's pretty rare when he goes in to see the four-star, and I know Col Pollack is in the four-star's office one the drop of a hat. I'd say that's the bulk of it there. Their purposes in life are not to make us stand on our own, but to absorb us.

Probably, they normal call and ask, or send E-mail and ask if they're doing anything. Diane would know more about that maybe. Maybe she's doing a report or something.

It had formerly ... our pubs people have talked to the SAC pubs people. Our PDC people talk to the Air Force PDC. Our repro folks have gone to a MAJCOM workshop up at ... in January about the DMRD, but I don't think there's any formal exchange, other than when they print the printed product distributing it to everybody. Again, I'm not sure that is what I would call coordinating because you send it out; you're in the blind whether they read it or not, or if they agreed with it or not, or if they understand it even.

Well, again, you'd be looking for commonalities in program approaches or in end goals and purposes, and if there was commonality, you would assume that the SAF/AA people would see that and work toward an Air Force-wide program, if appropriate, or at least helping to shepherd the two or three common MAJCOM efforts, for instance MAC, SAC, and TAC may all be going in the same direction generally speaking along with PACAF and USAF. There might be 5 commands headed in one direction. The rest of the commands might not want to go along. The Air University and the ATC guys might be on a different track, but those 5 of us that were all headed together might benefit from knowing that somebody at SAF supported that, or would crossflow information among those 5 organizations. I've seen that the SAF/AA people kind of take a hands-off approach to those things though unless it's an Air Force-wide thing. To some extent, given the priorities, the drawdown in staff, and other things, I guess I could accommodate that if it weren't so snottlily done. I didn't say that. That's kind of become hands-off, you're on your own. And, I do that in some respects to my base level people if one base is working to one thing, and I go - o.k., you're free to do that. You know, you're empowered and all that stuff. If you need any help, let me know and I'll try to think it through ... with you, but ... they do need to have some initiative on their own. But I think the Air Force level and I could both be in the business of cross-flowing whatever else we come across. And I think in this command, we do that. One gal's got a training thing offered (something) the rest of the command. We're not going to go and publish it for her. It's a nice program, but somebody else might have something better, so we'll just let them ask. If they want a copy of it we'll send it to them, and if they say - hey, mine's better, then we'll take the new person's and throw it open to the rest of the community as well.

Uh, that was kind of an uncalled for comment maybe just the first time I dealt with them was in January at the DMRD workshop, ... that was my first duty day, was ... I was up in DC in this job all of 10 minutes ... I'm in DC. They kind of had an agenda, but they wouldn't have had the meeting if it hadn't have been for this command pushing to say we have to have some kind of thing to get together and know what it is Air Force-wide we want. They hadn't thought at a base level at all, I don't think. They were thinking in terms of filling squares to tell the DMRD folks that they had implemented this 998. They weren't thinking about base IMs who've got two or four printers and a million copies a year they're trying to produce and how much they're paying for that or whatever. They were thinking in terms of units and dollars and numbers, and they weren't thinking or looking at anybody who'd been at a base level or hadn't put a face to any of these 703s that were going to be given

away, the authorizations point. They still, until middle of March, hadn't thought about or done any coordinating that I know of about how are we going to cross-train these people, how are we going to let them out of this career field, what career fields would they be good for, should we do an early release program out of the Air Force entirely, should we do this ... you know, there has been none of that ... they were worried about their programs and not looking at how it's affecting these people, or ... the other thing I don't think Air Staff ever did was to say we can make this new initiative work well for the Air Force. For now, some of the commands are working diligently to not play in this at all. The approach here in the command has been it's as good a way to get printing done as any other way. If I can take care of my 703s, get them cross-trained, get them early-outted if that's what they want, or get them into something else, then once I take care of that, there's no reason that the bases can't operate just as effectively by getting their printing from a shop that says MIFS and a (something) on the front side of that E44. Takes a hell of a lot of burden of the base IM. If you've got to pay for it, I don't have to tell you no. Your money tells you whether you're going to get it or not. And if all you care about is four-color printing on somebody's change of command program, have at it buddy, and when you don't have money left to print your flying schedule, don't come crying me the blues, because you already made your choice. That's something that the base IMs would really benefit from. That change in approach to printing. They're not a police enforcement agency, they are the customer liaison between the guy with the bucks and the guy with the skill. The Air Force never looked at it that way ... a couple of vocal commands said I don't want to do this and I don't want to do that ...

In reality? On the 15th of January when you pull up last year's plan, if you haven't gotten the thing done, you probably know. If there's ... if you had a milestone that was a real specific thing like getting a program initiative into the POM and the POM has come and gone, and you didn't make the cut, you know you didn't get your strategic goal achieved.

Right. If it's ... I'm thinking of a program more like at a MAJCOM or subordinate level. For instance, if the initiative is here in the command IM, the BITNET initiative, we've got that. And we're going to be briefing that to the POM in this month of July. By the end of August, it'll go ... well, in July we probably will know whether we make the command cut or not. If we make the command cut, it goes to Air Staff. Air Staff then tells us sometime later whether or not we made that cut. If we make that cut, then the next step in that strategic plan can begin to be firmed up and looked at and ... what do we do next. Some of that is a



simultaneous-type effort. Even if we don't get money out (some acronym), if we don't get it out of Air Staff, there are still some things we can be pursuing. But Mack and Collin and Doug are the ones who would actually know their progress on it. I don't think Diane would tell them, and I don't think Air Staff would tell them, and I don't think the bases would tell them.

Again, it would matter what it is and what the impediment is, but if it's something political, I would look for who does have the power to make it happen and try to make myself ingratiated to them, or have them be ingratiated to me. Then, I'd pull this thing out and say - o.k. now break this log jam loose for me. If it was money, I could do that in XP. If it was manpower, I could do it in XP. If it was some other political thing, I'd have to say ... you know, like if it's the DMRD, Mr. Atwood is the guy that makes that happen. I'm not going to be able to get to him, but I might be able to get to the four-star and present it to him in a way that convinces him that I'm right. Then he might get to Atwood or he might get to McCormick or he might at least get to Pardini and Pardini might ... necessary. If it's something in a subordinate chain-type thing, where like base IMs aren't coming through with something that they need to be doing to help make it happen at each base, then I might go to Col \_\_\_\_\_ and say - we've got a problem in this location and that location. We'd like to float a letter to the mission support squadron commander or maybe even to the group commander or the wing commander, encouraging support or whatever, and hope to stimulate the more positive approach from the base IM that way. If it's something insurmountable, I would quit trying. I would focus on something else to work on.

Probably again, depending on what it is. If it's money ... you know, when they publish the POM and you didn't get in there. If it's manpower, they're going to give you a manpower document that's going to say you failed. If it's politics, that's the hard one to know. You would ask people what they heard, what do they think that means, usually AO to AO. Then (something) can set maybe some kind of a conference or working group-type setting where the SAF/AA guys are there. I guess in the arena of the DMRD, telephone contacts of SAF/AAI people to say where are we on this? how likely are we to make this thing happen? Calling them occasionally to find out, just play dumb, and say - what's new? I haven't heard anything lately. Have you got anything to tell us? And hope to gain understanding that way.

If it's political and it's insurmountable, I'm not going to beat my head against a brick wall. I do that enough for things that I'm ordered to. I'd rather say - o.k. that one

I can't solve today (this is just me now talking). I'm a procrastinator, and some problems solve themselves if I put them back there for awhile and work on something else that's also equally important. When working on this, I can either find a connection and pull that thing back forward to the front, or it kills itself for good ... (gives an example - A76). If I look at the strategic plan more than just when somebody tells me I have to, if I'm using it, if the things that are in it are directly related to the daily things I'm having to achieve. Now, I would say at the base level, that's not as good of an indicator because your daily activity at the base level is really customer service. And while your strategic plan should be supporting customer service, you're not going to refer to it in order to give the service. So at the base level, you might not need to look at it as often, on a daily basis for those types of things. But up here where your daily staff activity should be related to long-range planning, 5 years and out, money, manpower, resources, things like that, if you're using your strategic plan faithfully to get through the day, referring to your strategic plan when other things come up to say - where did we say we wanted to go with this what were the things we assumed, how did this thing alter those things - then I would say that was a real good, good sign. If somebody looks at your strategic plan and goes - this is great. Have we done something with this? What else have we done with this? If the command section sends it back and says - keep me advised on the progress of these things. I like that. If they say that, that's a valuable strategic plan you've got there. Even constructive criticism from them that might say - I like your strategic plan except for this item. I think that's inconsistent with our efforts in such and such area. Please coordinate with so and so to make sure you're not misguided on that - that would be a constructive criticism on the strategic plan where it didn't give a hundred percent endorsement to it, but it turns you on to where you might refine that particular goal by coordinating with somebody else.

You never use it. It doesn't have anything in it that has to do with your daily activities. You only look at it because there's a suspense.

I think your own conscience would, first and foremost. You would know it. I don't know if anybody else would. We've used ... I mean, I know we've sent them out to all the other MAJCOMs and we probably got all theirs. I don't think anybody here would call SAC and say - well, that's really a bad strategic plan.

In my mind, it shouldn't be a big deal. But, the strategic plan is to tell you where you want to go. It's not supposed to tell you exactly how to get there. I can relate this a

lot to the XPX and XO in southwest Asia. The ops plan that was written in 1989 had basic assumptions and a basic goal. that was supposed to be achieved, that was to defeat the enemy in that arena. The operators, when it came to really making it happen, had to innovate a lot of things that either we couldn't have known in advance or we didn't realize the impacts of, so were not perfectly addressed in the planning but were overcome in the execution. The strategic plan should tell you a generic direction to go and some alternatives for how to get there. But if everything you are going to have to do is written down into that strategic plan, it is not a strategic plan it is a checklist. Anybody can follow a checklist if they want to. The deviations, if they result in more chaos than not are bad, but that's not to say that isn't the ... only ... you know, that might be the only way to skin that cat that day. To me, there's a thousand ways to do anything, including answering the phone and tape recording something or whatever. It's got to do with the resources available at the time and the person involved and what works for them. So if to get (something), we go one way instead of the other, and that works for Collin, then that's what Collin needs to do. And the next person comes in behind Collin, sees what his strategic plan says, and if there were notes kept or something, realizes he deviated, that person's got the alternative of either picking up where Collin left off that was a deviation or going back to the base and saying - well, I want to do it the way we wrote it down so I'm going to go and try to alter the course a little and refine it this way. To me, it shouldn't be a crisis to deviate from the plan.

I probably would ask, yeah, why are we doing it that way instead of another. But if the person says this one works for me, I'd probably deal with it as long it's not altering the big things. If it doesn't change the FIDEP, you know, then it's transparent to people outside of IM ... they give you X number of dollars, and whether you spend it to have a study done by IM people, or a study done by a consultant, they don't necessarily care much. You told them you were going to get a study, and you say it will take this much dollars and you used that number of dollars, they're not going to bitch. You come in and you need ten times that amount or even two times that amount that they allocated, they're going to go whoa, whoa, whoa! What are you talking about. Now you're messing with the basic concept of it, and now they're going to ask questions. But once they've given you the money and you've gotten the task achieved, as long as it wasn't done illegally or immorally, it matters not to them as long as the steps continue to be achieved, more or less, along the time frame.

Again, I would say keeping in mind that a strategic plan is a big picture item, if you say BITNET is in place by 96 and 96 comes and there's no BITNET or it doesn't work, you failed. That might be too late in the process to make corrective actions, so there should be some developmental steps in there that you can identify and say - o.k., if I don't make this, this is a hard deadline, if I don't make this cut here, I'm throwing the whole thing out five years. PDOS - implementation of software #5 is not on schedule. Somewhere out there is somebody who knew if he didn't have it half way designed by "X" date, he probably wasn't going to make "Y" date. Base IMs only know it isn't here; it isn't here; it isn't here. If they're waiting for that in order to do their next step, they need to know why it isn't there and when is it going to be, and that new date you give them is somewhat reliable, because you've already given them one date that was unreliable. They don't need to know what the complexities of the problem with AIDA programming are. You would just absolutely blow their minds if you tried to teach it to them. It's a programming problem and that's probably all they need to know (goes on about programming details).

Depends on the goal. If it was a good goal in the first place, assuming the strategic plan was good, then you have let down you and the rest of the IM people that were cheering for that one to be achieved. If it was bogus square-filling, I got to put something in so I guess I'll put this in no matter how worthless it is, then it's probably a good thing you failed.

On a good one? I'd look how else could I skin that one? Who else could I go to? Should I resubmit it? Should I rework it? Is there still value to it? Yeah. If it's in the other category, no.

Primarily, changes in technology, politics, or money. In a political atmosphere where growth is o.k., we need strategic goals that say grow, grow, grow. That's great. In an environment where everybody is being cut, it may be better to build strategic planning goals that say I can save by doing this. Some of that I'd be hesitant to put it on paper because the more you save, the more you could cut. If you drew down your forces 30 percent last year and they come in with a new straight-line cut of 10 percent, you've got a 30 - it's compounded by the 10. Whereas the other guy who only drew down 27 percent last year has 27 compounded by 10. So that guy makes out good by failing to achieve what it is he was told to do. There's some gamesmanship there that doing a hundred percent might actually be an injustice you and the community you're in.

Elements of a strategic plan, like milestone steps along the way? If they're a foundation of building blocks-type things. Again, technology or the lack of it. For instance, you might have the capability to do a network including all the cables and everything, but you don't have the software that communicates between them or something. Technologically, you could be short-stopped or ... again, resource-wise, you might need 16 million and you only get 8. You're going to ... you're either going to downsize the scope of your program or you're going to do half of it. Education of the people who are involved. If they don't know ... in other words, you've got turnover chronically and you're trying to do a program that takes two or three years to implement, and every year you've got to start back at ground zero training the buy that's the new staff officer in that particular office. So, personnel turnover as well as education, I guess. It'd be kind of two of them. Other priorities ... were. Something we've recently (fixed).

Mostly the phone. If they tell us they're working on something, o.k. - we listen to what they've got and say o.k. - have you considered this? have you looked at that? And they say yes or no, and if they haven't then we say - well, how about checking that out at your base. Let me know what you need, if anything, from us. But mostly face to face or phone contact. The IM conference I expect in just September. We should have some interesting exchanges there, hopefully.

It's funny because before I was here, there wasn't. (I'm told), a lot of interchange directly. Col \_\_\_\_\_ has implemented quality exchange, which is a little letter that goes out and that has stimulated phone calls to us. Some of the IMs, a couple of them say they'll call and I'll say, you know, I'll get a message and I'll call them back and say - what can I help with? And the guy ways I was just making my weekly phone call to see what's new. That's something that I hadn't heard of. I had never done it when I was an IM here because they usually got idiot treatment on the phone, and I thought - I'm not going to call them, they can call me. I've been in meetings when the acting IM and the CINC said do we know of any problem at McChord or Travis with the returning evacuees out of PI? No - nobody had anything, but I came back here and said - Pete, Tom, do you guys have any problems up there at McChord? Janette, what's happening at Travis? Do you got everything you need? Can we help? They were both flabbergasted that I called, and really appreciative. They both said no, there was nothing I could do for them that week. That's the kind thing that would say you make more money by and large that way than ever sending out a task around the 15th of January to give them status update. That's the way I would really rely on.

Either they don't, or else they get a copy when it's printed maybe.

As a part of writing that strategic plan, if you've got your assumptions in there and you've got your goal well defined, the operational level base IM is going to understand and maybe this is something they really want. If you present it, not in terms of I'm going to give you PDOS and I'm going to take away from you these X, Y, and Z things, but if you can demonstrate to them that by getting PDOS you're going to be developing your network and you're going to have not only PDOS on the network but these multiple other things, and that these are the building blocks for the long-term networking capabilities throughout your whole community, or whatever. You've got to have somebody that can communicate that in the plan as well as, probably, in a face-to-face presentation. When PDOS was presented to base IMs in the command, I don't think anybody stood up there with any credibility in base IMs minds to say - this is really going to be helpful. You're going to have these problems but here's what resources we can put against those problems, and here's what you gain in the long-run for your communities. They were talking software and programming things and equipment purchases, yeah, yeah, it was out of there, way out of there. And nobody said - and you're going to have this kind of problem to implement it that you need to be thinking about today and you need to be preparing your community for this kind of a backlog for 6 months to up load the data; and you're going to have this kind of a learning curve of one or two years, and you're going to have a problem with turnover of personnel so you might want to think about putting some GIs in there, but put also some civilians in there who are not going to go away - which is hard to do too because they've got so much turnover because their grades are so low. But I don't even think there was ... probably no one telling IMS to send your PDC or PDO people to a course on computer programming, or identifying any possible OPM courses or classes on how to make the software work for you. None of that. But I think that that's the key is to make the base IMs to understand really what it'll do for them, not just in terms of the manpower lost, or the money you're spending to buy them a piece of equipment, but how it interrelates to their whole environment.

Well, when base IMs agree that they are really glad something came along. I think RIMS is ... was better done than PDOS, and I think that comes through in the tone of acceptance and satisfaction with the software and the programs at the base level.

RIMS is records information and management systems. It does file plans; it does (something). Used to be you had to keep

a log of every FOYA request and at the end of the year you made a big report based on all your manually kept logs. This thing, you log it in as you receive it, which you have to do anyway for controlling suspense. It'll tell you when the suspense is due and you can update the status of it. At the end of the year it'll give a report that automatically goes up here ... (traces trail of report). It also does privacy act and it does not do records of reports control system. RAMS is refer graphics automated management systems, so that's the printers (explains advantage of system). PDOS 1 is more of an inventory control for the PDO, and it connects with the PDC. That drives printing of forms to have the shelf stock available to send out. But it's pretty cumbersome.

No, no. That one we're not. The RAMS one is the one we'll be losing. The printing one. They have one out at the Navy called premise and it's printing something or another. It's another management information system software program, and it has more of a accountability for funding connected to it. It gives more base, bottom-line end-of-month. End-of-quarter reports of productivity of that particular plant. In the Navy, everything is profit-motivated under the industrial funding concept and regional guys are kept pretty much on the financial report. And that's what that premise does for them. If it's well-used, then it was a success; if it's something that you can talk to base level people and they say - yes, I needed it; yes, I'm glad we got it; it was tough to get it, but it was worth it in the long-run - then, that a success.

Hopefully, you get some feedback from the people it was built for. Hopefully, you got feedback as you were going, that they were looking forward to it; that they were eager; that they understood it; that they were asking questions about it; that they were trying to get smart about it. But, ultimately at the end, if you meet the goal and you get the feedback from them that they thought it was worth it, then that's it, then that's it.

You probably boggle people's minds. It doesn't happen very often. There'll be a few folks in there that'll say - good on you, you did it early. We're glad to see that. Now, we can get on to something else. There's a possibility you could throw somebody else's timing out by getting something done early, but that's not real likely in my opinion, because if you get something done early, what they're going to do is they're going to put it on the back burner. They're still going to operate on their own timeline. Depending on what it was, you could theoretically throw someone out of synch. So you might want to look for that but not a very dangerous thing to have happen on most times.

I go like yeah, wow man that's great. We'll put it in the quality exchanges. That would be about it. Maybe try to find out how it was they got ... you know, was it because they got lucky, or because they put extra workload against it. Sometimes, things come through easier than you thought they would and you go - yeah, it was done early. Other times, it might be that they put out 12-hour days for 3 months in advance and got it in there 3 months early, or something.

Probably try to find out how or hat made it come through early. How did they do that.

Oh, oh. Well then, you'd try to pat them on the back a little more. I mean, if it's base level, maybe you'd have him send a letter to the base commander, the wing commander, and say - hey, really stroke this person for having achieved, and not only achieving it, but achieving it early. If it were my people, we have things called CIPs - continuous improvement plans - and it's sort of a small scale strategic planning concept. They, in the records area (something) they normally give a little certificate when you complete one of those SIPS, and we present it publically and kind of stroke them for having done it early. And they did it basically, by sheer effort.

In the strategic planning world. Probably not. But there's a base level, I don't think I did strategic planning on the level it should be, so I don't really count anything we did down there as that. The one thing I can look at and say I know I had a big impact on ... when these people did deploy, they had all their equipment, and they had people and they had them trained. And that was because Sgt Kavelli and I, in 1988 and 89, sat around and talked about this strategic plan thing, and it was very nebulous, and we did what we thought was right with it. I don't know if it filled these people's squares here, but she did build a training program that allowed 702s in the other DCSs to know how to go on deployment and have some of the basics already filled. I know they went, and I know they did o.k. There were flaws with how they got it done. They were made to do a lot of details that had nothing to do with 70 work, but basically, when they went as 702s, they were qualified. They had the equipment and they processed without great difficulty so I think that was an achievement there, but, again, it was a base level strategic plan concept, not really MAJCOM. Here, we haven't achieved anything that I can say in 6 months. Now the records people did have a RIMS item as a strategic plan and they did achieve it by the deadline, but they were having to do some fast talking to get people at the base levels to get their inputs in. Some of the people were looking like they were going to miss the suspense and we had to keep talking to them, really encouraging them, and kind



of pushing them. I guess the RIMS implementation would be one ...

Well, if they had failed to achieve it, the colonel would have had us doing a whole lot of explaining.

Yeah, yeah. It was a motivation to not have to deal with negative retribution, if you will. So it prevented a lot of extra work. If we had failed, we would've had to do more work. If by achieving it, we get the bonus of not having to work so much overtime.

I think they were greatly relieved to have that monkey off their back. They knew that it was going to happen, and it was a matter of time, and once the time was completed, it did happen as they knew it would. That's one thing they didn't have to continue to report on. I think they felt good that hey, yes, they did do it, and that it impresses some of the other MAJCOMs. They can say - oh, yeah. We made the deadline.

Yeah. As a matter of fact, Grace Rose sent a letter of congratulations on to them and we put it in the quality exchange. We also put it in the (something) periodical, 4-1 for the command. And when we did that, we stroked our base level counterparts as well. We couldn't have done it without them, of course. It was their inputs we were looking for, counting on.

It's based on the directions from Col \_\_\_\_\_. There's certain things that he wants and certain directions that he has for the organization. Then at my level I have to factor in the limiting kind of things. What resources we're going to have. What we're likely to be getting. Then I also have to work with SC and SCX in doing our plans and how we need to plan so we can fit into their organization and continue to be a value added to their organization. It's really based on those 3 things what Col \_\_\_\_\_ tells me, what resources we're going to have or are likely to have, and then how we're likely to fit into SC. Don't really do planning more than 5 years out. Just because we don't know what things, there's too many things impacting them. The career field and the IM functions are being studied now at Air Staff. There's a letter that came out last week from Pardini and it talked about now we're contracting someone to look at how IM is structured Air Force wide and so there's going to be some changes. I think the 5 years window is about all we can really plan for. From the letter coming out it's obvious that the same ole way that they've been doing business isn't working for them anymore. They recognize that and they're going to change, which is good. We've been wondering when they were going to start feeling the same pressures that we've been feeling. It seems like it's finally hit home up there that they need to change.

Who is involved with planning process?

Me.

How does it start?

Probably with me talking with Col \_\_\_\_\_ to figure out the direction he wants us to go in. Then deciding what we need to do to be able to go along with that direction.

Col \_\_\_\_\_ (IM)

It's very intuitive. You'll be amazed. I guess--I'll give you an example. Last year we knew we were gong to merge with SC. I knew, based on talking to him, that he wanted our organization to be essentially the same size. We had taken a 40 percent cut under the MSR reduction. So he wanted us to be the same size. He wanted us to be, what he called, a full partner with the comm/computer people over there. That was the kind of general direction I was given. Of the projects we had when I talked with the SC people, then find out where they're going and I took on the E-mail. Here's something we could do, that we can put our manpower

up against, a project we could get involved with. That will give us respect in the eyes of SC. Because it's a systems kind of thing. That's how we started doing the E-mail. And at the time, I didn't have Mack, I had Doug. I was going to see what resources I had. I only had Doug. But I knew I was getting Mack. Doug McKinney is the GS-9, the future systems guy. He works with Mack pretty loosely. He's a real smart guy. I didn't have Mack yet but I had Doug. So Doug and I figured out how to put some money up against it and get it started. We did that, the when Mack came of course ... that's his whole job \_\_\_ doing that. That's kind of how that one got started. Then how I do the other things. The same thing with admin/comm. The colonel said that he was worried that their processes were antiquated and would go away or whatever. Mack was already here then. mack went down and talked with them. Did kind of a mini systems analysis. We talked about it. Brought them in and started some projects to get them moving, one of them was the database at AIG. Which they're working on it. It's coming along slow because we've had to put so much against the BITNET. But we see who we got. We didn't have a systems person them. But Sgt Transcom then came in. He had a lot of background on systems so we could put him against it. Now I have a resource that can work it. Then it proceeds from there. That's pretty much how it's been done.

Q.

I work it from, I pick the people who are going to work on it. I work with them a little bit until they can do it on their own. Then I let them go ahead and do it on their own. Of course they come talk to me everyday about it. It's not like we'll see ya Mack, let me know when it's finished. That's pretty much how all of them have gotten started. I work with the people. When I'm satisfied that they know what they're doing, I let them go ahead and keep like a loose tab on them. It's worked real well so far. It's worked for IM NET, for BITNET and the admin/comm thing. It's been good.

Q.

For what Col \_\_\_\_\_ wants. He has a general idea. He has like the general idea where he wants us to be. Then I have to figure out how to implement that. What do we need to do to get us where he wants us to be. That's really my job. Then to find the people who can do that is also my job. I am the human resources person ... and then to get the people started in the right direction. Like the example before. He wanted us to be an equal partner with the comm people in SC and he wanted the organization to be the same size. What he didn't want was for 2 people to go over here and 2 people to go over there. He wanted us to have a purpose and a

value added to the SC organization. But he doesn't say how we go about doing it. That's up to me to figure out. Well what should we do. And that's how those projects got started.

Q.

I have my notebook. He uses his set program which he probably showed you and the continuous improvement plans. We document them in there. Also I have brains of my own to keep track of things. I have my own notebook and my own talking with the people. The CIP is like the formalized part of it. And that gives you the basic what is going on. In terms of giving directions, that's an interaction between me and the people that work for me. That goes on constantly all day long.

Q.

From XP, the manpower reductions. There are certain rules about our structure that were put out by XP. We can't have a division and that's less than 15 people. We can't have certain things like the colonel isn't authorized an executive officer. Things like that. There's some of that from XP. Just general rules on how you can structure your organization. There's also restrictions on manning. We were at 85 percent. I think the headquarters now is allowed to be at 90 percent. But we're not allowed, so to speak, to be over 90 percent manned. If we are, it's possible that we would have to take some people and share them with other directorates. The SC, working with SC, we have to do more and more closely because we're going to be merging with them. So far there haven't been too many problems, or too many disagreements over things. They respect us for what our job is. Mack's has been real helpful in working with their architecture people. The whole organization, the SC side should come under a crunch, our manpower would be under theirs. Our programs would be racked and stacked with theirs--and its possible that some of the things we do wouldn't be able to continue. Air Staff to a certain extent. They haven't been too good about providing guidance. Right now we see it more the dog is wagging the tail. They're reactive, they're not really proactive. Now whether that's going to change, they've had some personnel shake-ups, that may change. The projects we've had going, we've done ourselves. it's not like we're implementing something from up there. If they were to start providing guidance, we would go along with it.

Who helps?

Nobody.

Who asks questions?

Nobody.

Champion?

Well it would depend. If I needed a particular person from another division, I would talk to the division chief. If I needed a person like from SC, I would go talk to them probably. If I needed another IM resource, as I said, I own Sgt Burns and he would be the one. He's our human resources person. What we would do is try to juggle things around so that we could make an empty slot and get another person on board. The officer is almost impossible to do that with. You can kind of maybe get another enlisted person. But to get another officer that would be difficult. Col \_\_\_\_\_ possibly could intervene with that.

Threat?

This headquarters works very well together. It's one of the things I've always liked about this command. I can't say there's anybody that would really threaten. Right now we're getting some not really a backlash, we're getting some talk from DP about the IM/SC merger at base level because of the mission support squadrons. But I think threat is too strong of a word. I think they're raising a little flag and I don't blame them. I would if I were in their shoes also. Sometimes from XP, without manning levels and manpower you might have some things. There isn't anybody really that I could categorize as a threat or someone I have to do daily battle with. That doesn't exist. It's really a pretty cooperative organization.

Q.

They aren't really threats. There's concerns: are we going to have enough resources to do the projects that we've started doing, are we going to be able to keep our manpower, are we going to be able to keep our money. A lot of that will be determined by how the Air Force \_\_\_\_\_ down. It isn't something we can control at HQ. The Air Force itself is drawing down. The support officer field is drawing down there's going to be a bunch of rated officers left over when they close these flying bases. I don't know where they're going to go. Things like that. This is sort of an off-the-record rumor. Last year we had an FMI team come down to look at computer training and the one girl who was there as an augmentee told me she had a friend at MPC who worked in rated officer assignments and told her they were looking to the support fields to find jobs for these rated people. Because they spent so much money to train them that they aren't going to boot them out. Besides which if we have a

war, they have a resource they can send to a 2-month school. If they can do the job as well as you or me, of course they're going to give it to them and they're gonna say good-bye to us. It's going to be interesting. \_\_\_\_\_ things at our level that we can't control. That's why I said earlier planning more than 5 years out. Now once the 5 years are completed, by 1995 the force should be the size it's going to be. Then you could probably do your true strategic planning 10 years out. Because you'll know what you have to deal with and what resources you're gonna have and where they're gonna be. For right now, I honestly think the best thing is to just start your projects, do what you know needs to be done, and just kind of hang on there and see what happens. I believe too that if you're doing a job people need, if you have a project like BITNET and people want that and need it, you're not going to go away. Your function isn't gonna go away. What's going to be cut out is the things people don't feel that they need. Like someone to tell them they can't have a form. That kind of stuff is gonna go. The whole career field needs to shift itself over from that mentality to we are providing you this service. If they do that, they'll be o.k. If they don't, that will be that.

If we visit them when we go up to Washington, which we do a couple of times a year, we talk to ----- we talk to last. NOISE ... We'll talk about the different things that are going on. Then he'll share with us what he knows of other MAJCOMs. Of course we usually call them ourselves and talk to them. But there isn't a formal tasking from them to report to them in any way.

I know somebody at almost every MAJCOM. A lot of times it's somebody I went to school with. Doug \_\_\_\_ I met over the phone one time and he and I got to be good friends. It's an informal network. There is an AIG that was established. I think Col Davis established 2 years ago. He wanted to have kind of a working group of systems people. He invited the MAJCOM IMXs to go up to Washington. They set up this AIG on the CCI called systems. That's used sporadically. Steve \_\_\_\_, I'll get things from him on systems and also from John Cane at ESC. Otherwise not a lot. Bobby Crum used it a bunch when he was down at ----- weekly activity report. There is that channel also but it's not, I'm a pretty good \_\_\_\_ runner but everybody isn't. I talked to Tom \_\_\_\_ on the phone, he's a good friend of ours. I'll ask him, he'll say he hasn't logged on in awhile. It's not being used a lot but it's there. You log onto the DCI. We all have a password. Then ----- Air Staff uses it to distribute different things. There's that, another way of staying in touch. CCI is a way also because the telephone.

Because they are the best source of information on what is going on and what is needed. I think the Air Staff is out of touch with the users and they're not well tuned to what people need at base level. I think the MAJCOMs are much closer to their bases. Also, some of them are real gold mines. Like AFFRES, I kind of hit on them by accident. NOISE ... called them up about it because \_\_\_ had a question. We got to be good friends over the phone. They had their conference in St. Louis that year and I went over and met them. Those people are a gold mine. They got electronic forms programs. They started out on IM NET before we did. They also had CAPS which was a printing/publishing system that we were thinking of getting. Bobby \_\_\_ and I took a trip out there. We visited with them and they're great. They've gone ahead with a bunch of projects. SAC is another one that Lt Col Albany did a bunch of stuff in their publishing. I know our guys have gone up and talked with her. We try to find somebody that's a little bit ahead of us. then we can kind of piggyback. I've did it with Chris \_\_\_ at Systems Command also. He was out here for a conference. They were putting in a desk top 3 network at the time we were thinking of switching ours over. It's just a matter of having friends at the other MAJCOMs and talking with them. Hey what are you doing. Oh yeah, well we're gonna do that too. Then we'll go visit them or they'll come to see us. I've talked to Al at PACAF a few times. They're putting in a 6085s and he had some problems. Yeah we've got that and blah blah. We tell him, you can do this or try that. it works out real well. That is the best source of information, is the other MAJCOMs and AFIT people. Even a couple of weeks ago, Norm Watson came from TAC to talk to us. He and Capt Hurley came to us to talk to us about that we were doing. Then I reference them. Said well I talked to Alvary and I talked to Col Albany at SAC. I talked to Chris. I just tell them the different people. They go for it. He brings something to share with us and I give him some stuff. It works out real well. The AFITNET is great. He talks about Scott Summer all the time. I know he's called her a few times over this computer training because she's right there. NOISE ... about the Defense Messaging ... NOISE ... BITNET a bunch.

They come and tell me immediately. Mack or whoever is working on it. That's why we have these discussions going on all the time. They're very good about that.

If they couldn't buy something they had planned to. Or if they had designed their architecture a certain way but they went over to SC and found it wasn't approved. They would get feedback from some place, external probably, and of course if it was something simple, they would work it themselves. If it wasn't, they would come to me. I would tell them what I thought we should do about it. -----

sometimes I just need to tell them what to do. Sometimes they've taken care of it but it's just to let me know from a progress standpoint that they had a problem with this or that. The desktop 3s, we've had a problem with the quotas and stuff like that. So they've always told me, well there's a problem with the quotas but we think we'll be o.k. because blah blah. And say well let me know. It's just a matter of them telling me what's happening.

We just kind of figure out what needs to be done. Sometimes they have suggestions. Sometimes it's a good suggestion, sometimes not. It's up to me to take care of whatever it is usually. Sometimes things have to be surfaced to Col \_\_\_\_\_, pretty rarely. He usually wants us to take care of it at our level whenever possible.

Usually it's pretty obvious. I can't think of a time when we haven't been able to figure out almost immediately who or what was holding us back or holding us up. It's an intuitive thing.

Usually I would just ask them. Like if they came to me and said we can't do something because ... Then I'd say did you talk to this person first. I start asking them the general, simple things that anybody would do to try and solve it. Have you talked to so and so. Have you tried this or that. Usually they've already tried the simple stuff. If they haven't, oh o.k., they'll go and do that. Then we start working on more indirect things. Have you called ----- You work through from the down, and the simple down to the, all the while I'm thinking who needs to take care of this or what would we need to do. Is it something we need to talk to SC about. Is it something that's gonna require Col \_\_\_\_\_. It's like a question and answer thing.

When everything is happening, I would say. I guess if Col \_\_\_\_\_ seems happy that could be one. If Col \_\_\_\_\_ seems satisfied that everything is moving along in the right direction.

If we weren't getting out of it what he wants us to. If we started BITNET and then found out that SC wanted to take it over from us or somewhere after we started, someone decided it wasn't a good idea. Eventually the indicator would be whether or not the organization survives. And we won't know that for a couple of years, probably.

Col \_\_\_\_\_.

He would be unhappy with the way things were being run and he would tell me.



It depends on what they do. I'm pretty flexible about it. I think people need to be able to figure things out for themselves. In fact, I encourage it. I don't encourage people to come to me, rely on me to figure everything out, because I don't have time to figure everything out for everybody. We have 16 people. Generally I would rather that, and I've even told them that sometimes when they've come to me with something, I'm really busy, I think you can figure that out. And they go back and they'll do that. I like that. I have people good grades who do that, very good grades.

In the course of talking with them. There's not a formal process for it. It's intuitive. When I talk to them and they should like they're not sure, they're lost. I ask a few questions and the answer I'm getting doesn't make any sense. Which doesn't happen very often. Every once in awhile you ask a question and you say what about this and you get like a ----- . So then you have to ask them more questions about it. Then you find that they weren't sure so they didn't do anything. Or maybe they did something but it wasn't right. When we first started this AIG business, I told the people in the admin comm to get with this hired AT&T analyst that we have, that we pay. They were suppose to get together and work on user requirements so that we could have later, how is this going. Come to find out that the AT&T analyst had never talked to these people. These people had gotten themselves a PC and were busy writing themselves a database in DOS. I had a meeting, no, stop doing that. I had a meeting, we all went down, no this is not what we want to happen. What we want is a database on \_\_\_ that the bases can log in and tap in. If you do it in DOS on the PC, you're gonna have to make all these disks, every month you're gonna have to send out these disks. It's going to be a pain. It's going to be more work for you. You need to do it this way. Then they kin of , oh well it would be faster. Yeah it would be faster but we can't, it's bigger than any disk. Yes we'll see your result but we can't ever use it. Once Sgt \_\_\_ moves onward and upward, nobody is gonna be able to keep it up to date. That's not what we want. Oh, o.k. That's an example. How's it coming? Oh great, we have it on our PC. No not great you did it wrong. Stop, stop. Go back again and get them hooked up the way they were suppose to be. Most things are within normal ranges. Once in awhile you get an outlier.

Big picture speaking, if we don't meet the goals of the projects we have, we probably won't exist as an organization. What will happen is the functions will transfer over to. SC is structured with two main DCSs, will transfer over. And the IM DCS, the value added of IM to SC will be very small. There's some changing that has to be done on our part. I think in the long term that would be

the best example. Right now if they didn't get some projects done, our customers would eventually bear the cost. The reason we started BITNET is because we're going to start using people to deliver the paper \_\_\_\_\_. We need to have an automated system so that people can continue to get their information. If we fell short of that goal, there would be no automated system and people would not get their information. It doesn't affect us directly but it would affect our customers.

We always have more projects than we have people. That, I think, has to stay really flexible. It's whatever is needed, whatever people want, whatever you can afford. If there is something else that pops up that the resources could be better used.

resources mainly. The spirit is willing. I don't think there is that part. But having the money and having the people to do. You have to be judicious about it. What can people do. People can be \_\_\_\_\_ a little bit by. You can't have everybody in there til midnight. They'll do it for a month then you won't get anything out of anybody. Also having the money to continue. You have a project that starts, you need to know that funding is going to be there. Support from the boss too, I would say.

I talk to the IMs. Usually by talking with the IMs. We're pretty close contact with them. I've been in my job for 2 years so most of them I've met either at the conference or when they come up or when we went down. I think they feel free to call. We all talk to the IMs, not just me.

They ask.

I don't seem to have a problem with that. They seem to be, yeah that's right, that's what we need to do and go with it. I think I'm pretty reasonable and pretty intuned with things. I think that they recognize that. I think they trust me enough that I'm not thinking up busy work for them to do. I think a lot of it is the function, the relationship that I have with the people that work for me. I don't think they say it behind my back. I think a lot of it has to do with that. I mean I try to be reasonable, figure out what needs to be done, we're very TAC oriented at work. I'm not personal about anything. All the people I would pretty much say knows what needs to be done and they're willing to do it. I don't really have any \_\_\_\_\_. I got rid of one last fall. That's the only person I can think of that was a problem. They're good, honest workers.

Pretty much we report them to Col \_\_\_\_\_. He recognizes people and they like that. I spend a lot in his office telling him what we're working on and how well they're

doing. When we get praise from another directorate or we get some good words from SC about this or that, I always communicate that to him. Sometimes he writes somebody a note or he'll drop by and thank them. I hope over the 2 years they know that I really appreciated how hard they've worked and what they've done. I think he goes out of his way to do that as well. We have an awards program, an IM awards program. I don't use it that much, probably less than I should for the things that people do. But I make sure that it shows in their performance report.

They get more work to do. I hate to say it, but it's absolutely true. Once we finish one thing we move onto something else. We say great, good, glad, now we've got blah blah. That's generally what happens. Once you finish one thing you do something else.

They go on with something else, early. Did Col \_\_\_\_\_ tell you he looks at his people like Xerox machines and some of them are a little faster than others so some of them get more work than others. You're looking at the fastest one. There are so many things going on, that is generally what happens. You're done, good.

----- finish anything, any of the projects that we started. I've been in this job for a year. Some things we have done. When I was in publishing we wanted to put publishing systems out to the bases and give them forms design capability. We did that. We bought them the AT&T, the 386 machines and we bought them the software and we did some training. I would say we did that. The AT&Ts, of course we also wanted to use them for communication. We're working on doing that. He has brought up Charleston and now Lt Barnes is bringing up the other one. Those goals are being met. Barnes is going around installing the X \_\_\_\_ 25 cards and training people. I would say those goals are close to being met.

If you would say our goal was to give everybody a forms design capability. Well we met that. We bought the software, we did the training, and we gave them a machine. But everybody's not using it the way they should. The person who was trained last and someone else came in. So there's always that.

I think they're pretty happy. I think success breeds other success. Internally everybody gets a good feeling from knowing that they did what they set out to accomplish. And then it just makes them more likely to want to do more. Once you start failing at things you start, oh why bother I can't get anything done or I can't get what I need. I think that's the main benefit from having some success is being something ... Last summer when we first started reorganizing the directorate and Col \_\_\_\_\_ said well we're

going to 2 divisions. I figured it all out because the MSR. Then he said he wanted to do it in September rather than to do it in 94, which is the deadline for doing it. I was brand new to my IMX job. I had just moved over from IMP. Then he gave me admin/comm. IMX had been split, so really there was 3 divisions at the time. And it was like well put them all together and make it work. It took a long time and a lot of figuring it all out but I think now it works pretty well. But there's still room for improvement. I pat myself on the back for figuring that all out and getting everybody going and up and moving. But that's not to say that within admin/comm I think ----- should get closer with the IMXO people. So there's still more to do even though I give myself a lot of credit for that. Because I wasn't sure last fall how that was going to work out.

I didn't get fired. I got a job in Hawaii. I was rewarded, we're moving can't you see.

No, no really.

IM as it is today has no future. The organization as it exists and has existed probably since 1947 has no place. So many of the things we do, people can now do for themselves. The fact of the matter is, we've done such a poor job over the last, however many years, that people would rather do it for themselves. People look at us as the people who tell them they can't have a form, that we lose their mail, tell them they can't have a publication, they can't have a newsletter. That is the perception people have of our career field. We can do one of 2 things. We can go away and let people have their software and do it. Or what we really need to do is sort of metamorphsize into other things. What we need to do is say, yes we haven't been able to do this in the past but we now can provide you with an electronic mail system that isn't gonna lose it. We get blamed for everything whether it's our fault or not now. It's kind of a scapegoat if the Air Force in a lot of ways. That's what they need to do. They have almost an opportunity to redeem themselves. We can almost blame paper processes for our failures. ----- no were going to provide you with this now. We're gonna give you electronic publications. We're gonna stand between you and SC and make sure you get a system you can use. There's a real opportunity there but it will depend on the leadership and the motivation of those people in the career field if they pick it up. If they don't, it'll probably be dissected. People like Mack and you and me will end up managing SC functions probably. People in the exec support world will have some kind of personnel AFSC and that will be that. And the \_\_\_ organization all total. I'll be real interested to see how this reorganization thing, what those people think if they decide to take it on or not. When I first came into this job I came in as a -----, Col Ackerman was the deputy

then. When I was moving over to IMX, I told him to get an AFIT person and he goes there's not enough space for all those people coming out of AFIT. That's the old way of thinking. That's how a lot of people think. It's like well, they're no body special, they're not anybody we need. This is the first year that I remember they were fighting over resources from AFIT. That shows you they're coming along, whether they can get there fast enough is ... The first class that graduated, we got here in June, those people didn't have assignments. Nobody had asked for them. We're here because I had called Eric Thomas, he had come and I called him and said hey we're looking for a job. Yea, we've got a job. Well \_\_\_ needs a job too. yea, we've got a job for him too.

That's what I'm working on now. I'm not going by the book because I don't like to go to the book. What I'm putting together right now is all ... NOISE ... by section, by functional area. And I will sit down with each functional area and brainstorm. In a sense we're ahead of that game right now because of all the quality initiatives that have come up. The quality initiatives have addressed the strategic plan already. We're ahead of the game. The plan itself takes ... NOISE ... and comes up with plus any long term dos and don'ts that we're projecting irregardless of finding ... NOISE ... We don't know what kind of money we're going to have at the end of the year so I won't be able to realize, you have to think about what you want to do and try to get through that if it's half way workable and go from there. It might take a little bit longer than what we anticipated. We say we want to do this in 5 years and it may take us 8. That's o.k. as long as we have a good ... NOISE ... That's one of the things we're doing right now it's just taking a lot of quality goals that we set plus maybe a few others and sit down and brainstorm what we've got by functional area, not as an IM but ... NOISE.

As far as I'm concerned, everyone is. I like to work by functional area. I don't like to put out little tasking letters and say your inputs are due. Because normally you get garbage when you do that. I'm planning on making out some little ----- functional area and working with them in general. So when we go into records management, I want all the records management people to be in there. If we spend an hour or 2 or if we wanted to spend an hour and do another hour later on in the week that's fine too. What they think would work good. I leave that part up to them. I think everyone needs to be involved.

Normally within the functional areas you have a little bit of an expert within that functional area on certain things. Because just because you have ----- records management is not just records. You've got -----, So you have a bit of an expert in each area. I think normally you'll find that expert will be more of a leader in their particular area of expertise. You see the leaders come out as you talk about specific topics within that area.

It starts with me. I'm the one who gets the ball rolling as far as seeing -----, I'm seen more as a continual \_\_\_\_\_. It's being done here as a suspense type thing. I think it would be a lot easier if we kept it going on a continual basis because it really isn't something that starts and stops. It's something that keeps on going.

I took all these plans old and new and picking out pieces I like, formats I like. Then I'm taking it from there to the functional areas. Once I have all my information back, I put it together. I'm still debating on how I want to put it together. If you go by your book, you have a choice of ----. Then you have the option of using the little arrows which I hate. So hopefully I won't even have to -----. I don't know yet what kind of file plan I want. I'll tie that into the regulations. While I'm putting mine together, I'm working with the bases. Because they need to base their strategic plan on what we do. So I need to get with them. ----- let them know where we're at. They're going to have things that are totally different from what we are. But there's things they need to know what we're doing so they can base theirs on that. After we get it out, it's a matter of keep it going. See if we can meet these goals and what do we need to meet these goals. We know we're going to have deviations. It's a matter of knowing when to make that deviation. Do you scrap it or do you make that deviation and make a little exchange. Because of money, because of manpower, whatever it may be. It's a matter of let's go to it and watch it, see what we ----- . It's a continual process ----- .

It's sort of a cycle. Because you're gonna keep repeating that every year. You're gonna improve on some things you already have. Some of the goals you set this year, will still be goals next year. But maybe you're gonna change them now because of new technology. When you want to change that goal you set 5 years, it's the same goal, different ... NOISE ... because they no longer are needed. It's sort of a circle that keeps going on around.

You've got to base it on naturally what you're doing, what's your current mission. You've got to base it on financial work. Because you can't be planning on a \$3 million system when you know your budget won't allow for it. If you want something that's going to cost that much, you may have to come up with a different way of doing it where you cut your costs. You do have some financial considerations in there. Personnel, manpower wide. Especially like now, a lot of the things that we projected to happen 5 years ago, they're hard to do because of the manpower consideration. We don't have the manpower. I think some of it is you have to use some ingenuity. Kind of \_\_\_ things out there. You don't know if they're gonna work. That's o.k. because you're projecting something for 5 years. You have to consider the technology.

Try to work them in there the best we can. I don't like to see people not put an idea in. I consider a goal and idea the same. I don't like to discourage people from not putting something down just because of those \_\_\_\_\_. Just for the fact you can always change it. You can always go in

next year and say I still want to do the same thing but now within the past year new technology has come out that's cheaper. We can buy it off the shelf where as before it was something ----- . There's always the possibility that what's very expensive here will be cheap down here.

I encourage people to put the ----- factor due to manpower or due to cost or whatever. That's something that should be looked at. Is there a way now we can do this without all this manpower or do it without the money.

Right now we don't have a tracking system. No plans ----- regulation required \_\_\_\_ filed. There was no way anybody did anything with it. My idea is make a monthly update. This is what happens \_\_\_\_ taskings because that make sit a little like taskings. If you constantly do it under suspense, they're not going to put the ideas to help. I'm sort of thinking like a little progress report, with taskings behind it. Sort of a prompt type thing. This is what we're thinking about and this is how it's going. Let the \_\_\_\_ themselves take responsibility on. I'm sitting here, I don't know what the supervisors are gonna say. Most of the time I find if you come up with a good justification on it -----at least try it.

The biggest one is new technology because if somebody that's in the hardware and software, we get that often. That's the biggest one. You don't know today what's going to be out on the market tomorrow. And then finances. There's probably some other little ones I'm not thinking of right off hand. Those are your two biggies.

Your bases definitely give you some support. You base a lot of things you do on their needs. SAC ----- support the ideas you come up with. A lot of times they may have to defend it also. Your own internal headquarters because a lot of your customers are \_\_\_\_ support customers so you base a lot of things on the things they're requesting.

That almost falls back on the same one again. Your internal headquarters does a lot. Everything you do supports the whole headquarters. We just don't support our own IM.

I normally deal with other \_\_\_\_ MAJCOM IMs. They're normally having the same problems or successes that you are. It's hard to find another \_\_\_\_ really. XP can help you as far as the planning cycle. They can give you hints. But they're not really attuned to the needs you have. My own situation, I rely on other IMs, other MAJCOM IMs. More so than SAC.

DP and SC. Our whole mission is so undefined. The last few years has seen us absorbed here and absorbed there. I've got to say that's mainly coming from DP and SC. There's



been an overlap. Not just in basic understanding of what people do but even in some of the regulations there's been overlaps of what we do and what another section may do. Since no one ever came out and really defined exactly what we do in difference to them.

We send them a copy of our strategic plan. A lot of times if we're doing something we're really proud of, we'll set up a little letter just to say hi ... ----- where we can work. We've had their support. They want to be informed and we've kept them informed. Some of the other areas that are mainly command oriented, we haven't really kept them in the loop.

In the past it was just a little letter here and there or maybe a phone call. Future, I don't know yet.

We've got a pretty good rapport with the other commands. A lot of what is telephone coordination and we're doing this, you guys got anything like it. A lot of letters. Informal type letters not the big fancy things just little informal letters going to the IM. We're working on this. If we can help you in any way let us know. Just about all the IMs have some kind of cross feed package, little monthly newsletters or something they send out and they send them to the other MAJCOMs. They're meant for their own people but they also send copies to the other MAJCOMs. \_\_\_\_\_ MAJCOMs. between most of them there's a good rapport. A lot of them let each other in the loop through little monthly newsletters, quarterly RPs, whatever they may have. It's probably good \_\_\_\_\_, a lot better than the Air Force side.

Mainly because you learn from that. You know what they're doing. In some cases they've accomplished something you've been working on and having a lot of problems and vice versa. It makes for good rapport. You're all working the same business. It's good health, good for that. You have no problem picking up the phone and talking to somebody that you don't know and asking them questions of what you \_\_\_\_\_ with.

You rely a lot on feedback from \_\_\_\_\_ and within your own headquarters. That's where it's important to have some kind of on-going, you need to know how your plan is working. Once you put it out ... ----- on-going update process. Because you're not going to know those things until it does go wrong then it's too late. Right now we rely on customer feedback and \_\_\_\_\_ feedback. That's what we're working on to try and change so that we have an awareness ... ----- . So that we do know is anything being done at all for the things we've programmed and projected for. Is anybody doing anything at all. Right now no. Because it's printed then it's filed. That's about the extend of it. That's just not here. It's

an on-going problem not just in IM or the command. -----  
been done with the tasking involved, get them done, then  
file them to next year.

Right now with the quality initiatives that have been put  
out, we have different survey type forms out. Each  
functional area almost has like a little form that they ask  
for customer feedback on how, not just the service but the  
equipment. If there's equipment involved, how's the  
equipment that you're using. ----- OIS and everything  
there. They're constantly asking the people ... ----- Is  
it something that seems to be easily learned. If they get a  
lot of static on people accepting these programs, it's  
usually because there's something not right with it. In  
most cases it's because it isn't user friendly. So they  
strive in that area to get customer feedback on that.

Depending on what kind of problem they are, what kind of  
feedback. We staff them. See where we can fix it.  
Sometimes it's not something that can be readily fixed.  
We'll go back and explain why we can't do something. Maybe  
it's because we can't get new equipment or we're in some  
type of contract field where we can't get out of it.  
Depending on the reason. If it's something that can be  
fixed real easily, that's what we'll do. And we'll go back  
and tell them it's being fixed and keep those cards and  
letters coming.

Again that's kind of \_\_\_ \_\_\_ with the quality thing. We have  
what we call 15 processes movement teams and when we do get  
into a situation, especially one that's far reaching. If  
it's just an internal one we can fix it, no big deal. But  
if it's a far reaching one, one that deals with a lot of  
people, we'll have a \_\_\_ team. And they'll take the process  
from the beginning to the end as it is now and go through  
each step of the procedures we currently have and try to pin  
point the areas where they're causing \_\_\_ and take it from  
there. If we can fix them, which we normally can, there's  
usually something we can do to better the situation, maybe  
not totally get it exactly where they wanted it, but at  
least it improves on what they have. We've had quite a few  
of them. I guess we've hit on about 30 at least. As far as  
just problems where people have complained about something  
taking too long or it's too much frustration, whatever.

We'll fix it however we can. That goes back to like I said,  
if it's something we can't, we've got our hands tied.  
Sometimes you come into not so much \_\_\_ but public law.  
Certain things are Congressional mandated or much higher  
authority than what we are. All we can do is explain why  
certain processes taken so they at least understand why we  
do some things. It doesn't solve it, we can't fix it but we  
can at least explain why it's done that way. If it's

something we can fix, we'll do that. Sometimes you have your hands tied and there's nothing you can do about it.

I would say use and how many accomplishments you \_\_\_\_\_. Maybe not to the point where you've succeeded in exactly doing what you set out to do but you've done something along the lines. I'll say overall accomplishments.

Yea, because a lot of times one idea can generate a lot of other ideas. If you can do that, that's good. You may have started out with this and it no longer is viable. But out of that one you come up with 2 or 3 others. ----- feed off of one to come up with other initiatives and good ideas.

A lot of it has to do with ... ----- throughout your organization even before you look at ... ----- successes. There's no mission. You have nothing to work for. In a lot of cases you ... ----- day-to-day duties. There was never anything generated to try to come up with a new idea. You did what you were told. If something new came out of it, it's because it came from a higher source. There's nothing you ever projected or ever did. In most cases you'd find the strategic plan too, it had very few things in it. I'd have to have that nothing even is really done.

There's nothing wrong with it. Sometimes you have to deviate because that's the choice you have at the time. I think a good, healthy organization allows that. Sometimes you have to try something to see if it's going to work. If it doesn't, then you know. As long as it doesn't cost you a lot of money. It's o.k. I think that's good.

My first question would be why are we going to do it this way instead o that way. Then I'd ask how is this deviation better than the original plan. Why, how being the biggest things. How are we going to achieve this where we couldn't achieve that.

Probably sponsor it, help him out. That's good. As long as you've got the communication doors open. You've got ... --- --- planning a lot of things where you have pride in ownership sometimes comes along with. I think if people work together and keep their communication lines open, that's no problem. Normally you can pull the other person in with the original idea and they can combine the two. That's probably our biggest thing there. You've got to make sure that all parties are involved that need to be involved. I don't think there's anything wrong with that. Most the time if it's done properly, it will work.

It has to be based on why. Why wasn't the goal met. Because it it's financially, the reason you didn't meet it was because of the fiances you need to do it or the

manpower, the resources, that's where, in the beginning you need to identify the fact that you may have a shortfall because of this. If your goal is not met because of one of those reasons, you keep programming it, you keep trying to do it, eventually you'll get it done. If it's not met because of the function didn't take the time to get it off the ground, that's when you need to address the problem and find out why, that they had a problem doing that. It would depend on why it wasn't met. Because if it's a financial or technological manpower wise ... ----.

That's where I think if you'd had that on-going program, you would catch those things in the beginning. You could catch them before they became a problem. If you do it like we're doing it now, that's what happens all the time. You do have goals that aren't met, you don't even know it until the following year when you do your strategic plan again.

Technology, new technology, loss of manpower, a significant loss. Sometimes you may only lose one person and that might not make such a big difference. But if you lose a big part of your function which has happened, that could change it. Other things too like, with the printing now, all the printing programs are going to the Navy. That's going to throw any goals we may have projected because they are no longer viable. There are a lot of good reasons that you could change them. The big 3 are money, technology, and people.

For me the biggest thing is time. I get involved in a lot of other things. Strategic plans are considered, they're part of your duty, but they're almost considered an additional duty. I'd have to say that's probably one of the biggest problems I have is time to be able to really devote the time that you need to it. You could easily spend a day a week. In most cases I don't have a day a week.

By the regulation, they're suppose to send you a copy of their initiatives. Normally that's it. You almost have to go, I've found I've got a goal with two so far not yet, if I just call them up, telephone contact kind of thing going. I've found that to be the best way so far. Letter campaigns are o.k. ... That's been good. Finding out where they've been going and what's working and what's not. They're in the same position. They have a very small office for the work they have to do. For them strategic plan is the last thing on the list.

They do get a copy of it. Most of them, the only ones they're concerned about are their own initiatives. They do have that within their own files. You'll find sometimes one functional area, maybe really involved in their's compared to the next. Especially if they're really hot onto

something. If they're really interested in something they're doing, they'll give it 100%. Then you also have the guy who just puts in an input. He's required to put in an input because the boss wants to see it. That's about what it is. It's an input. It a lot of times depends on the people within the function. If you can have a good on-going program, I think sometimes, people who start seeing results I think that might help us if we could keep it moving. I've seen some offices where they've done it 3 or 4 years. They're really going good. They get everything accomplished that they wanted to accomplish and they're kin of at a stand still. Whether they're at a loss for ideas or they don't know how to improve it. You might see a couple of lean years there. Or Air Force might take on some kind of initiatives that kind of push you out of the picture. You can't improve on your programs. It's a hands off type of thing. You've left there, you don't have anything to do in that sense.

It's got to be his. Whatever is done has got to be their inputs, the way they want them. I think sometimes when you get into the refinement of it, they go through so many channels by the time it comes back out it's nothing like what they started out with. That tends to throw people off. Not to say that you can't improve on the language or something like that. But I think the basic idea still got to be what it started out to be and not a lot of fanciness. That's why I think pride in ownership is important.

Here we publicize them through monthly periodicals. We do what we call a stockholders letter. It's a letter we send up to the command section. We've done this, this is what we consider good accomplishments. We do that periodically. Maybe once a quarter. Whenever we have a few things we've accomplished that we're proud of, we'll send out a stockholders letter. Certain things we may send out to one specific letter to the other MAJCOMs. We should share accomplishments. Because we get that from some of the other MAJCOMs also. That let's them know what we've done. If they're trying to do the same thing and they're having problems, they can maybe get the information they need to help them out.

We start on the next one.

You celebrate a little bit. The whole purpose is to look and say now we've met this and this is good. How can we make it better. You've got to have a time period in there because you don't know where your bugs are. Sometimes you don't need improvement. You do have that once in awhile where things are good and they don't need to be touched.

Depending on the situation, like at the base level, we like to give them the praise and stuff that we feel helps. We'll send them an attaboy letter type thing that goes to their supervisor so that people above the IM chain, they're all in the MMSQ so we'll make sure we send it to the MMSQ commander. We normally send a letter out to the other units, bragging on them, giving them a pat on the back. If somebody does do something, it's really good, it's what they set out to do, kind of let the other offices know. Sometimes we'll have a little gathering. This team has done this.

Over here they've done a lot on the printing side. They've had some good success. They've had a lot of changes. They've been willing to make the changes in the PDO and the printing where it wasn't what they set out to be. ----- familiar with their technology. These guys, now they're working the IM \_\_\_ and OIS, there's constant change. It's something they've been working for several years. And they've constantly been deviating from it because of with the money and new equipment. They've had some successes. The command section likes what they're doing is a good success. Although it's not going to be finished for several years because it's an on-going process. No matter, they're never going to get done because, it's a constant improvement. They are seeing pats on the back coming down because certain things they're putting in with the \_\_\_ and some of the other things they're working. People like it. Over there next door in the pubs area, they've been experimenting with, they're getting ready to start with electronic pubs. We've had the electronic forms for quite awhile. People like that. I don't know how the pubs are going to go over. That's a different scenario.

Overall it makes them feel good too. Because when we get something down from the command section it's to the IM, not one individual or section. Everyone has kind of shared in it.

Usually through the IM. He would gather everybody together. Say we've got some really good words on this. A lot of times they would save it. They would have an awards ceremony on something that would come up and then after the awards ceremony they'd bring up these other announcements too instead of calling a special meeting because that's kind of difficult.

There are times when it's more individualized like a simple office gathering because the other people didn't know anything about it to begin with. Most the time it's been a group. That's kind of nice.

I don't think we have long to live. I don't see IM being in existence not the way it is now. We're merging with SC come October. You lose your identity. I don't much for IM left. The function you have, the real meat and bones could be dispersed somewhere else if they really want to. I think that's what you're going to see. They're also talking about a general AFSC which they've been talking about for quite awhile. If that happens you have to support AFSC which involves all your support services.

## COMMAND #3--COMMAND IM

Through a planning cycle we start out, and we do have a strategic plan, I think that's the first point that you do, we basically formulate objectives ... we've got too many objectives right now - 16 objectives and that's too many, but we've got them - then, from those objectives is the "how are you going to execute." That's the planning process of which is developed by the divisions, each division, if the objective falls ... in admin/comm ... then those people set up the particular objective in the plan with the milestones; then they track it. They give me a quarterly report (which is still not just exactly like I want it - not as good as I had it at TAC, but it's coming). It comes in on paper right now. It needs to be on the computer. And then from that I see are we on target; are we behind; are we ahead, and such. The sad thing is ... we call it strategic. We're near-term. I think what Marian and what you're really looking for - and we should be out there at 2000, most of our stuff's within a 3 year, and a lot of it's within a year. And it's the crisis of the day - decentralized postal those kinds of things. The awards program has always been one of my big objectives ... that I'm going to win more than any body else and so, that one of the objectives - to win at least 20 percent of the Air Force's information management awards for the command. This command has not been too successful yet; we're improving. We'll milestone that; we'll work it. We're working it right now. And I've got kind of an objective manager ... for each objective - and some of our objectives have more than one subset in the strategic plan. Then that objective manager, he's the most responsible for it. He's ... that's his reason for being here, is to keep that on track and, like on the awards program, to be sure that we get information out now to the people saying it's time to start writing. Of course, we try to foster that before we start writing because you've got to cultivate award winners which you really do. You've got to know almost a year before who your nominee's going to be to be successful. We get the information out, then we suspense - when you've got to have the nominations due here, and so forth - we're managers of that. We do that for all different objectives that we have in the plan. But, it's not totally long-range. Now, we've got all this publishing thing that you and I talk about earlier, that's all in the strategic plan. Our concept is there and how we're doing, and we slip and slide. But we're basically making good progress. Another thing ... some of our strategic planning is forced on us. Gen Chain when he was the CINC, he decided that he wanted to reduce the paper in the command by 20 percent. Thus, that became a goal of mine, an objective.



and became part of the strategic plan and we proceeded on. We've done much better than that - 36 percent, 34 percent - that range, and then I assign a person that monitors that objective, or division ... that's how we go about it ... that's probably its near-sighted as to long-range strategic, and we might should be more long-range strategic ... a lot of people write plans then they stick them in their desk. That's the big reason why that I've run that quarterly report business. When I first got here, a lot of people went on gosh, more paperwork, more work and so forth, but I think now that they're realizing what benefit that a quarterly report is, it causes you to focus on your plan; it causes you to look - where was I last year to where I am this year and where will I be tomorrow. And you've got to do that. It gives you justification for manpower, it gives you justification for facilities, money. It documents a lot of things. It provides me, as a manager, a good track on how the things are working. It's a good way to do business, I think. It's my way of doing business.

Everybody. You know, everybody; not necessarily our customers, and that's one of the things we've got to get more involved in. Everybody on the IM staff. I'm the driver, sad to say, and most of it comes out of here (and some of it comes out of the divisions), but I want total team concept; and now, with the quality emphasis ... we should go out to our customers and say: what should we be providing you; what do you want from us. Then feed that back, and then that should become the elements of our plan - how do we meet those needs or those perceived needs of the customer? So, we don't really get the customer all that involved. We've perceived some things that the customer needs ... but we've never asked the customer whether he wants it or not ... we probably need to integrate the customer maybe more than we have in the past. But it's not just me sitting down here and saying, hey, this is going to be what's in the plan. I try to say we're a team, top to the divisions, again a little bit stove-piped maybe not as matrix as we could. Now, I had to reorganize one thing in the planning process that happens here in this publishing business. I had to start looking at things in more of a process, so I, in fact, used to have a IMR and IMP (publishing and reproduction) two separate stovepipes. That wasn't working all that good. Publishing process includes both. So I just dismantled IMR and made it all IMP, and now reproductive, printing, duplicating, composition, and everything is part of the publishing process and it makes it one process. And it's helped. It's matrix even though I took two stovepipes and made one. We've got to do more of those kind of things. That impedes the planning process, sometimes, if you get too parochial admin com can plan for admin com but they really should have publishing involved when they plan, maybe. Maybe some of the on-sights will

help, off-sights will help that. Those are key things that you've got to be concerned ... well, that's one ... quality again process action teams. We're dealing with the travel process, breaking down the organization not only within IM but outside of IM, getting SC, LGT, AC, those kind of people involved with us. To really look at that process, analyze it, then maybe put together a strategic plan as to how that we're going to get out of paperwork on the travel process. I hope that maybe one of the things that comes out of that is that they do a staff study. The staff study gives recommendations we'll then implement that recommendations that go into the strategic plan with milestones to accomplish the objectives. That's one way to go about it: it's not perfect.

That can start two ways. It's sad to say that in this command, basically it started with me, and it's probably because I was a change agent to the command.

Early on in the process, the ... once that we decide that that's going to be an objective and part of the plan, like I told you earlier, we then ID ... it's usually not necessarily that I would assign it. I would say o.k. admin com, you're in charge. Then Chief Cladick may say, Sgt Crowe. I want you to work the decentralized mail objective in the plan. And you draw it all up, how you're going to go about it. You establish the milestones and everything. And so then that's how he becomes involved. Or, one of the individuals would foster the idea ... then, if it's in his area that he's already working in, we'd let him carry it all the way. This orders thing is, I'm just getting Middleton in so it's really not assigned to anybody that's had that responsibility in the past, but sometimes that's good too. You get ... I've always experienced that sometimes you get people too close to the problem and they can't see the forest for the trees ... and that happens. They've got a paradigm and they can't get away from their paradigm ... so sometimes, if you really want to bring about change, you get guys into it that don't know anything at all about it ... sometimes it works better that way. That's ... how you get them involved; each one's a little bit different. Some of them I assign. We rotate things around. I'm a big believer that you can't ... that I don't like to leave people in an arena too long, and I try to work rotation. Thus, by just making internal moves sometimes I move people that are responsible for an objective and by rotating them around I bring somebody new in. And that's good. Then they don't get stale, bring new ideas to it, new enthusiasm. So not always the same guy that starts out with something may not see it to the end, depending upon how long it takes.

Yeah. And some of it has, too ... it's not all been ... I brought in a lot of ideas just from my experience down at TAC.

Well, we use a strategic plan. A lot of it is dictated from me as to what we want to accomplish via objectives. Others percolate up through the division. We gather as a senior ... I deal primarily with the division chiefs ... tell them that we need to plan in their particular area. From that, hopefully, some of it does percolate up. As I mentioned to you, we'll probably change a little bit with our emphasis on quality and the TQM thing to do off-sights and probably more team-oriented planning so that hopefully the organization percolates ...

Objectives .... there are external factors (uses paperwork reduction mandate of Gen \_\_\_\_\_ to illustrate, also office clean-out objective from an external source).

... Again like if we do an off-site, or what I want to accomplish. Externally, some of those things are driven, like decentralized postal. Certainly then, that becomes an objective, that we're going to accomplish that, and becomes part of the plan. Well, that certainly wasn't necessarily initiated by us. We initiated a lot of the ways that we're going to go about accomplishing it. We went through the test and some of those kind of things and that ... it's a corporate thing. And I've got ideas we want to get accomplished throw those out. Now we've got a basic set of objectives and next planning cycle, we'll say - hey, these ... we may go to an off-sight or we may not and we say ... what have we accomplished that we don't need to focus on anymore, and so forth.

Well, guys will come in and say, tell me - we don't want to do this. And we've had some of the division chiefs do, and some of them we do. The guy that finally made the decision that, yes, indeed, those are going to be the objectives, and yes, indeed, this is going to be the plan ... one of things that's the matter with planning, and even our planning, is that it's probably not flexible enough. It tends to ... scope you in and we probably should be more flexible in the plan ... It's an objective today doesn't mean that we shouldn't have another objective tomorrow. ... dynamic than it is. And it will become more dynamic. The more automated we get, the more dynamic it will get. Because right now the quarterly reports, that comes on a quarterly basis. You got to wait till the end of the quarter so they close out their quarterly report. Then it takes them awhile to put them together to get them to me. Then it takes me ... a period of time to review them because I might be on a trip or bogged down with something. Then the feedback to them is not as timely as it should be. Basically, the plan's not as

dynamic as it could be ... give you a copy of our plan? Have you got a copy of the plan and you got a copy of the objectives and everything? O.k.. good.

Planning process, are you talking about the milestones? Well ... or is this before it even gets committed to a milestone?

... more on experience. That's the thing to do. Like I was probably telling you, it would probably be more scientific to go out and ask the customers, then we might be able to tweak it some. One thing we do which is an efficiency effort is reduce copying. That probably is not really customer-oriented, but the command objective is to reduce copying every year by 5 percent. Well, I've got another objective and part of the plan is that I turn printing faster in the dup center. One of those compliments the other. What I really want to do is get long-run things that shouldn't be done on copying machines over to the dup center and the customer will know when he comes to the dup center, if he needs it right now, I'm going to give it to him. So hopefully, the two compliment each other. Now, the assumptions that I make there, well one assumption is that I want to make, you know, I want to be most efficient. Copying is a heck of a lot more expensive than duplicating, so thus, I'm trying to get things off the copy machines over to duplicating. I'm not denying the customer of anything. I do make the assumption that if the customer says and I need to print information to disseminate it, I'm going to do that. It's just a matter of the vehicle ... want to use ... I know where you're coming from, it's not scientific and it's not really set on set things. Yes, we do get an Air Force plan, and usually it's so late that it's not very good to us. A good example is the change of the printing and publishing from Air Force ... and we don't even have a plan yet. Well, I finally decided, hey, time's passing, so we're developing our own plan, our COMMAND plan. Hopefully, it will be complimentary to the Air Force plan when it ever gets out and we're moving forward in that ... it really should flow. Why your customers should give you input that causes you to set assumptions that you need to do certain ... the CINC lays on certain things: paperwork reduction. Some things that I am a proponent of, that I present to him, and then he says, yes indeed we do want to ... decrease the time it takes to ... in my head. They're scratching their head, not totally me. There's good ideas that come up from the staff ...

... finance, computer support, comm support ... Did I tell you about the little process action team we got going for, to refine the travel process? There's were you look at the environment and you've got to do matrix management. You've got to break down some of those organizational barriers and

deal with LGT, accounting and finance ... computers, so that as you look at the travel process, you're considering everybody, and all the variables of it. You need to do a lot of that. In the publishing objectives, on turning the pubs in 30 days or less, you've got to look at the coordination process, which certainly is environmentally oriented because you're dependent there upon the people you support on the staff to get the pubs out. If they coordinate them on a fairly rapid basis, well, your opportunity to make your objective is much better than if they don't. If it gets in the to-hard-to-do pile, you've just died, as far as accomplishing ... leaves a big environmental barrier. Can you afford to buy the computers? Which computers do you buy? Which software do you buy? as we move out to automate the publishing system, what decisions do I make? Do I buy X-amount of software or do I buy hardware? Where do my dollars lie and that depends upon COMMAND budgeting process. How much money am I going to get to do that with?

... at least, more than CINC. The new vice is probably as active in my business as any vice that I've ever dealt with. The Chief of Staff usually is the outside ingredient that questions what we do ... is the significant ones. In fact, the CINC now has asked for the ... he's trying to prioritize what we're doing. he's asked me what are the most important things that I do that affects the entire command. We're currently in that process, and a lot of it's already there we've just got to get it together, and then I've got to say - hey, which is more important, decentralized postal, conversion to Navy printing and publishing, and so forth. I will then rack what I'm doing for the CINC in a priority order and I have an idea that maybe the CINC will come in and say - look you only need to do down to 7.

It causes us to focus a little bit. It's the external force that causes us ... there are external forces that work on it ... in the case of the project action team for the travel process, from my level just to the other two digits that I need to support from the AC, SC, and the GL to provide me a person, to provide the support for that little process action team is what we're calling it - tiger team ... didn't have to escalate it any higher than that. Everybody was very responsive to ... you give them a little overview of what we're wanting to do and they were more than happy to participate because they think that it's a real possibility ... you rely on them for how good the input is: is the sergeant that AC gave me the best guy to do the job that I want done? I hope that he is. ... if I have problems with it, I'm hoping my captain will be able to say - look, the accounting and finance guy, all he knows about is the budget. We need to know somebody that knows something about vouchers. Then I'll call AC and say - I need a change, and

hopefully they'll ... think I outlined the problem enough that I think I got the right buy ... probably the most vivid case that we've got going at this point in time ...

... manpower, the primary organizational restructure, which if you really want to pose a threat. I'm looking at it not as a threat, but more as a positive thing which is really what has grown into us merging with SC. We were doing an internal working group study as to how we were going to cope with the headquarters reduction. One thing that spun out of that is that maybe in the future, we should study the possibility of merging IM and SC. We briefed to the CINC and he said - well, why study it, let's do it. The decision was made. So now we're going to do it. ... Salt Lake's P guys ... but manpower not only here in the headquarters but even at base level. That's a significant thing, is to get the authorizations that you need to do the job ... through the planning process, have figured out that, hey, in the PDOs, we weren't adequately manned to run PDOs. The manpower standard wasn't right. And the reporting wasn't proper so that what happened is that you didn't get enough people to do the job. We went to the mat, and there, they weren't an adversary, they were helpers. We've managed to reevaluate that standard and have got it back to what we think is an equitable standard ... adversarial or not, but I think you probably know where I'm coming from, and it's probably the XPM, the manpower business, that bothers me as much as anything. I guess I'm like anybody else ... I've got enough ideas, I'd keep them all busy.

Well, quite a bit. I'm a big proponent of destiny. I try to share as much of the information that we're doing with my colleagues ... my strategic plan goes to everybody, and others send to me. It's a reciprocal thing. I send out an IM update ... an RP, which I don't have anymore. I put out a letter whenever I deem that it's appropriate. I pass that to all the major commands. That's just a matter of exchanging information, both internally and externally to the command. If we do something great, we're certainly not ashamed to blow our horn and we do ... in the letter, we pass on information to others. I call down at TAC, MAC, Space Command, Systems Command fairly frequently just to keep pulse on what they're doing, what's going on. We've not had a destiny in a while. I think the destiny are good = that's a form to get the major command IMs together and make decisions, decide what we're going to do and what we're not going to do, maybe some of your external direction of planning. Out of those meetings, you say - well, this is the direction that we as IM as a corporate entity for the Air Force should be pursuing. Not having destinies, then you come up with county option - \_\_\_\_\_ decides for COMMAND we're going to do it this way and he's not hearing from anybody else so he does his own thing. It may not be good.

or it may be good; you never know. Whereas, I think when you share corporately, you probably gain from that.

... had the Desert Storm wrap-up. We're working right now real hard to gather the lessons learned and then take those down to what we think are category lessons learned - you know, that'll fall in so that ... without other commands into the Air Staff. But it would be good to get the corporate leadership together and say - this is what was good and this is what didn't work quite so good and here's what we might need to change, here's what we could do to be better prepared to serve our customers ...

... haven't read that yet.

... I ran the flag of them, said I'm willing to host a meeting down at Barksdale, but I've not gotten any salutes to say that ... may go ahead and just have a Desert Storm wrap-up hosted by the COMMAND. ...

You got the milestone that you're monitoring. That's your checkpoint ... to see that you're on track, on schedule ... also is the mechanism to tell you what's going on. Then the quarterly reports are the things that should key me to that. Now, whether they do or not, normally they do, we stay ... of course, another thing is that informally, if a program objective manager, or whoever's working that particular objective, if they've got problems he should come in and say ... basically asking questions: how are we doing on our automated publishing process? How are ... meeting once a week, which is enough, I think ...

Normally, the division chief ... cases, just asking the right question. I'm a big advocate of "why." I ask the why question a lot. I get replies. So I see the correspondence going on and ... recession, wondering around ... a lot of thing are on track ...

Well that's their refined down to the specific objectives, so they should be tracking. I rely a lot on the division chiefs, and they know I rely on them to run their division ...

... what's caused us to go off track ... wishing process. We went to ventura software, total departure in hardware and software ... the Air Force is bringing a lot of that to this headquarters, bringing in new people, using primarily airman, computers software airman, and it ... isn't working. So what did I have to do ... training was the problem. Col Albany identified ... so we had to contract training ... bothers me. We've got a big training problem in IM, Air Force-wide, not just this command ... is not adequate to train basic information managers in what they need to do.

OJTs not ... automated world and we depend upon the blame vendors manuals basically to train our people ...

Results ... quarterly report, and it's more than just the headquarters. I get it from the field. I've got key ... line on turn around to pubs. Not as exact on paperwork reduction. it's a little bit hard to get a handle on ... fairly quantitative, fairly objective.

Dynamic and flexibility. Don't get too locked in on a pattern necessarily. A deviation can sometimes be good. A deviation that's trying to go around the system or make the system work is not good ... we did the organizational chart here not too long ago and the expediency became ... so they decided they would bypass the deputy and me and go directly to the printing process without us signing off the form. I went down there and it was a disaster: it was a quality disaster. Well, we stopped it and then backtracked it. So sometimes deviating is not good, but a lot of times it's good; and I don't really hold them to a real set process. ... be the first thing. It ... was it better? ... usually give me the answer. That's a key question ... up side down, you know; no telling. The situation probably would determine the type of question you ask. ... standards set for that particular objective. 98 percent turnaround time in the dupe center. If they're better, no question. If they're fairly close, I usually don't worry too much about it. If they drop down like 87 percent, then you get real concerned. ... totally invisible to me, and if I see results, I don't get too concerned about the process. ... retrench ... next time. Two years, we haven't met the awards goal. We're still pressing, which causes us to treat why didn't we meet the goal. Was it because of the way we wrote the thing? Did we not get the right nominations in? did we not do the right things here? Process evaluation. Back one end to the other. Change the people that are managing it. I mentioned to you I put a new project manager on it. ... a good reason why that you say ... or maybe sometimes you've got the goal set too high. The criteria may not be good. Is 20 percent really realistic? In that particular case, you're damn right it is because we've got 23 percent of the resources.

Sure, and say that where we should be. The interesting thing is most of them we exceed. I don't know whether it's hawthorne effect or what, but you know 98 percent turn around time in dup centers, you get there. 20 percent paperwork reduction, however you account it, you get there. So normally you make it. Now, the awards thing may be just a little bit more objective. You win "X" number. So if you meet the goal.. fine if you don't ... doing a lot of other things. The little deal on the wall out here. I don't know whether you noticed that or not. I got all the command



winners out there. First year ever that they've been in the hallway of the command. ... publicize it more, put it in the IM update who won and those kinds of things.

Well, then, that's ... when were readjust. If you don't meet a goal, that's a good indicator as to doing something to decide why you didn't meet a goal, ask the questions and so forth, or reevaluate your goal. In some cases, your goal is too high. If you've exceeded expectations, it may not be too high, but at that point in time, that's as far as the organization can go. So then you maybe need to realign your goals. It's just a good evaluation point, because then you can say - do I have problems that I'm not getting there, or is my goal really beyond expectations, you see. So, it's a readjustment point.

Well, another thing that ... if you continually exceed your goal, then you would say - it's easy to make the 95 percent, let's up it to 98 percent. That would be usually the only way that you would change a goal. then, sometimes, if you did lower a goal, you'd finally conclude that - hey, I've got it set too high. I need to back it off, usually, you're real hesitant to back it off because you've usually said - we need to meet customer needs and satisfaction; you need to be at that point. The 98 percent turnaround - I guess some commands do a 95 percent turnaround time in the dup centers. Personally, I think it should be 100 percent, but then I factor in 2 percent just for machine down time, sick people, and other things that might come up; power outages. So I give them a little bit of slack. I've got in this command 9 dup centers this last quarter, went 100 percent for a whole quarter. So every time a customer that came in and he wanted his work tomorrow, they gave it to him tomorrow. But I'm not going to up the standard to 100 percent, though, because I had a few that didn't make 98 percent.

Budget constraints. You know, not getting the money, which is a realistic problem, like in our objective to automate the publishing system, of which is time phased out over time. But if we don't get the money, or even say we got the money and we don't get the delivery of the desktop threes, thus then, the total plan will not consummate when we have it planned. That does cause the milestones to shift. The backlog in the delivery of the equipment has caused it to slip. We've not had the problem yet, but it's very possible that we will, with the shrinking budget, that I won't have the money to buy the software. Or like I told you yesterday, training is such an important element. One of the ways that I've been doing training is I buy it. If I don't have the money to buy the training and then I don't bring the people up to speed, I'm going to cause me to slip a little bit. Those are some, I guess you'd call money, people, and equipment primary factors there.

Well, we've got just the basic reporting system. Control reports are key indicators, like dup center turnaround, pub turnaround, copying reduction, those kind of things other indicators are work just by the objective monitor or whoever happens to be working. There are systematicals and then there are those that aren't systematic. A lot of them are worked right here in the headquarters. So then it's just by the quarterly status reports and such that I know we're on target. We've got some on the computer. In fact we do have the plan on the computer. It's not working just as good as I'd like to have it work yet. Hopefully, this time on the quarterly review, I'll do it all on the computer, and all the updates will be on the computer. When I go through the plan every quarter, obviously I make a lot of margin notes, and I ask the questions ... why are you not to this milestone, what are we doing about this and so forth. We're going to try and do all that on the computer this time. Then it's reactive to everybody immediately because they're all on the network. If somebody in IMA and I had a question about decentralized postal, they'll get it instantaneously. Some of them we check more often than quarterly, obviously. The decentralized postal, and of course, as it went into effect in this command on the 16th of June, we're watching that one pretty damn close. I was watching the money, and almost on a daily basis either myself or Col Harman were keeping tabs as to exactly where we were and did all the postal entities have their meter and equipment, have they changed out their licenses, what was the status. That's just to tell you that it doesn't always fit just on the quarter. Sometimes we track things a lot closer, depending on the criticality of it, and the priority and so forth ...

... report them, not in any formal reporting system. It's just that we say - let us know if you're doing something. That's one reason I go out on base visits. I find things they haven't reported and I say - why aren't you telling me about this or so forth, or I'll see things that I think are good and I tell them to report them. Then that loops back into our information management update, our little letter that we put out to cross-feed information. I think the most effective part about that is if I could get initiatives from the field, and get the field people to write to that and say - at Grissom AFB, we're doing this with our library, for example, and then Captain Hunt writes. Then it goes out across the command. Then Walker or others at other bases will say - this is Hunt writing instead of Al Cramer, or one of my guys here on the staff. I sometimes think the field says - oh, here comes the headquarters party line again.

Well, we see it, and I encourage it. I've got ideas about the way PDO should be set up. We've got a plan to reorganize this one. We're finally getting there. As to where that you've got your PDO organized to bring the work

all to a little work center - one center in the PDO. An ideal of what you've got would have lectrivers, and you'd have no walks that bring forms and pubs right to that center, then that's your wrapping, and then you're out to dock, right there so that you don't lose a lot of time in motion study ... Part of the plan is to revolutionize the antiquated PDO here with new equipment, putting no walks in, restructuring the whole thing, use half the floor space, put the work center at one point so that they're all ... and then bring the work to them automatically via lectrivers and no walks, put the work center down close to the dock instead of at the opposite end of the building so that it's an efficient operation. You do that by planning. I try not to say - this is the \_\_\_\_\_ model, but I had a little bit of trouble on this one. You talk about how is your plan developed and all - you know, you tell them what you want, but they didn't understand you. So, I had to send 3 people to TAC to see one that looked like what I wanted, then they came back and their light bulb was on. Then we were on track.

Well, the plan's distributed to everybody. It's distributed to all the bases as well as the tenant units ... you ... need to see what is the headquarters doing - what's the objectives of the headquarters. What's the plan of the headquarters - to the bases, because they're an integral of ... accomplish a lot of that. Then, that should be the basis of their planning. If these are the command goals, I'm not saying they've all got to be base goals; most of them are, but then the base usually adds a few of their own. So we distribute it to everybody.

Well, we've got the IM awards program. Now whether that really relates that much to the strategic plan ... probably not. That would be one means ... if an individual like Wyatt up there at Fairchild ... I'd be kind of disappointed if I don't see him nominated for the IM NCO of the Year this next time around. I'm almost sure he will be. He was doing things to make the PDO more efficient, to get the distribution and the pubs turned faster and so forth.. That would kind of fit with the plan. Now, whether he was being driven by the fact that he was wanting to accomplish that objective - to win the IM of the year - may have been. Of course, any troop that really works performance-wise will have the opportunity to compete for Airman of the Quarter, NCO of the Quarter, Base Level IM of the Year, IM of the Quarter, whatever they happen to have. But as far as an individual incentive tied to our planning process, we don't have any. A pat on the back, thanks for a good job. Just to see your unit on the chart. That says - Fairchild is 100 percent on dup center turnaround. They're turning their pubs at 27 days. Those kind of things - is an incentive. It's a Hawthorne Effect to a certain thing and one reason

why you are successful. People at base know that we're looking at it here; thus, they work harder at it. That's probably one of the reasons why that a lot of those things should be put into the management system. The base knows that we're looking at it; they'll do better, I think. Not in all cases. Sometimes ... well, in some cases, they've got their own little spotlight. The wing commander's looking at some of the things they do, and they do better. It's not really tied to the plan. Maybe it should be. Another thing that Duncan just suggested to me, he thinks we need to change the Air Force awards program. Instead of it being an individual program, back to the total quality management thing, that we look at groups and teams. He would nominate, instead of Wylie, he would nominate his PDO team for a productivity gain in the PDO for their renovation and reorganization, new procedures, process that they came up with which is probably right. If we're really going to endorse TQM Air Force-wide, we might just look at that. You've got your organizational awards. But it recognizes only the IM, total IM entity. It doesn't break it down to PAT for example (Process Action Team), or a cell within the organization like PDO, admin com, BITS, whatever ... we're probably going to look at doing planning altogether different, with total quality. I think that we might integrate more team efforts instead of one guy being the objective monitor, have a pat team. We really, I don't know whether I evolved to the ... on the publishing business. I really had to break that down into a process action. The way that evolved in the plan is ... and I aligned 2 divisions and made organizational changes so that we could look at publishing as a total process from start to delivery to the customers and that included printing. With 2 organizational structures in that, it wasn't working good. So part of that when we laid out that particular objective was to combine 2 divisions in this directorate. We may have to do more of that and then look at entities in a total process instead of a stovepipe, I guess would be the other analogy that we used. Now, we're going to have to do a lot more matrix management. Cut across organizational lines like we are on the travel process initiative. We've got to get the AC involved and the SC and the LG and others. A lot of our business is going to get that way. And as we go more automated, it's going to touch out a lot more people. Of course, the IS for the headquarters is touching everybody. It's going to be interesting and it's interesting to change.

Well, the successes are identified just through the management progress. The reporting process. Knowing which bases are 100 percent of dup center turnaround, just to use that as an example. And then we'll use the IM update on say ... in fact is we even write little articles in there about congratulations to McConnell. You finally got your dup center turnaround time up to 98.2; or we're real happy to

recognize Plattsburg, Grissom, Griffiths, Grand Forks that turned all their base pubs in less than 30 days. So Col Almany and her division managing that part of the plant, put that in the IM update. It ... recognizes people. Hopefully, it makes them feel good, and they get the feedback. They get the feedback anyway through the reporting system that AC runs, the management reporting system, which has got the charts in it, the ones that we briefed up to the headquarters, to CINC. We try to provide them feedback as to how they're doing, not really pinpointing any particular person unless somebody pops up with a good initiative. On Duncan, with his PDO things, we're going to highlight that. I'm going to try to get Marcus Hunt over at Grissom, doesn't really fit the plan here yet, but we may well start an initiative on that to get that information resource center ... going. I just stumbled across that and saw that it's a good idea, and maybe get him to write an article about it. And the Grissom could be a good start because, like I was telling you, that's even run by military guys, the base library. So just put it all together. I think I eluded to you earlier right here at Offutt, it's almost disgraceful the number of libraries we've got. We've got 3 major libraries in this headquarters ...

We've had a lot of good successes. Maybe before I got here at TAC was a better example of the awards business. Well, we started out, in a 4 year period, we only won one award. We set up in the plan the goal to get 20 percent ... there was not that much emphasis in this command on awards, on the IM awards. I don't know why. In fact, just one of the thing, they had a shabby old plaque, when I was here as a Lt Col. That was the command outstanding information manager of the year award, a laminated certificate. TAC, I didn't win it at TAC, but one of the things I said - hey, we've put so much emphasis on this program at TAC, that when I leave TAC I want you guys to give me a plaque that looks like the TAC IM award. That's mine, not for winning the award but just for having a lot of pride in that program. Then we came here. I don't have a command one yet, but we don't do that anymore. We give a nice, big professional-looking plaque. People see that around the command for the command winners, thus they would hope to aspire to that. Every time that chief Asher and I go out to a base, and in every speech I give, there's a block in the speech on personal planning, not only organizational planning, but also personal planning, and what you people are doing to set your own personal goals, and you don't just set goals. You don't say - I'm going to be the outstanding IM officer of the year for 1991. You can say that, but, it's not going to get you there. You've got to do what you're talking about; you've got to make a personal plan, you've got to sit down and say - am I going to compete for airman of the quarter? What

am I going to do on my job to improve my performance? Am I going to start going to school? All the different things to win that award. So we push it and I think it does the people a lot of good. We're trying to make it visible. We commented last night, you saw my little deal in the hall here. That gets a lot of traffic. You'd be surprised how much. In fact, some of the guys that finally get here to visit the headquarters - ah Jez, my picture's in the headquarters. We let them know that their pictures is in the headquarters. That was an article in the IM update. It changes. Out on the corners you'll notice that those are action pictures. You got the portrait on the inside, but on the corners, now those change out. Next month we'll put up different winners, but they'll be in their work place, or in some kind of activity on their base. It's an interesting thing, that people walk by and then all of a sudden they see that there's change out there. It's still the same thing, but there's change I think that's good. What else you got?

Yeah, sure. It's an automated vision ... I'm not totally idealistic to think that we'll ever do away with paper. If I had one vision, I see that instead of information moving on paper, and I like to talk to it as we'll be moving information by bits and bytes. I really perceive that the future of information management is going to be to bring the Air Force to automation of information management: filing, the records management part of it all automated, the transfer of information all automated, the management of information which will be the executive information systems and such all in the computers, they'll all be networked. We'll be able to communicate back and forth via computer. I really see a total reduction in printing because there will be a limited need for it. You will print on demand. I see a change in forms ... forms will not be forms, they'll be formats, hopefully, a lot of it will stay on the system. We're working the PAT right now on revolutionizing the travel process with really my objective is to get that automated. Instead of carrying orders, you may carry a plastic card with a magnetic strip on it that does everything you do, or bar code or such. I anticipate that if we do keep things in paper that we manage them a lot more with computers, like in the PDO. We do all inventory control with reading bar codes and such. The vision from me, and you know, PIPS, the old printing information or what did they call it publishing information process or whatever, 12 years ago. We were going to automate the publishing system. It's still not getting there. We, hopefully, are going to get there soon. In this command, that's one of our planning objectives is to automate the publishing system and put pubs on an automated system ... whether it's CD RAM or whether it's going to be live or how we're going to do it. The person that wants to get information about a pub or directive, instead of looking through the master library and

paper copy, will go to the computer. If he doesn't have his own computer, he'll go to a information resource center. He should be able to pull it up on the computer, even if he has to load in a CD or what to get it. ... That's really the vision that I have. I think we'll get there. I've been in the business a long time - 27 years. I've seen a lot of change. It's good change, but it still needs ... and I think it will change faster. I really believe in the next 5 years you'll see more significant change than we probably saw in the 27 previous years. In this command, we're really getting posture now that ... we will start networking, we're bouncing form down the back still - automatic. The publishing thing - if our plan works right, by the end of next year, this command will be in the automatic publishing mode. We're getting there. It takes planning though. It's what you're targeting to...

The first group of questions deal with the planning process itself. How do you formulate the strategic plan?

If you're talking specifically about the published strategic plan, which I, again we discussed this the last time, what particular relevance that has to the overall planning process. To date we have based our strategic plan, at least nominally by the book, by the Air Force regulations and by the Air Force strategic plan, which is put out by SAF AAI. That means that for the purposes of getting a strategic plan on the streets, we accepted the analysis and the goals and objectives set out by AAI and their strategic plan which is now bordering on about 3 years old. We really have not changed that process. But using those goals and objectives, we then have asked our individual division chiefs to take a look at programs in their areas of things they want to project both long range and short range. Although there's not a formal breakout between those two. They're all projected on the same scale. And then to give us their own particular action plans and milestones that sit within goals and objectives as sat out by AAI. Then we consolidate those together into two volumes. To the Volume 2 those are goals and objectives which involve the entire command that is down to base level. And our \_\_\_\_\_ to base level. And then we publish a separate Volume 3 which involves those action plans that we feel only have applicability to the headquarters. We have no particular time limit set on it. We allow them to project their milestones as far out or as limited as they want to. It's really essentially what's spelled out in the book, is the process we follow. The only modification we've made to what is in the regulation is we've found it simply easier to do the milestones forms, the charting by using a different set of symbols than what they use. It's simply a graphic problem.. If we were to take the effort or if someone would have taken the effort to make an electronic form out of that, that we could print out on laser, we could do the same kind of symbols they have there. But we substituted letters and dashes for their arrows and lines.

Whose involved in the planning process?

Principally, I would say all of the, obviously Col \_\_\_\_\_, all of the division chiefs and subordinate branch chiefs underneath them are the key players. Depending upon the particular action plan that you're talking about. I could be down to the individual worker. Those are the key players.



What would each person be responsible for then?

Col \_\_\_\_\_ will set overall direction. By virtue of approval, by reviewing what we have done and saying, yes that's what we want to do, he in essence puts the \_\_\_\_\_ upon the plan and accepts it. Our part in the process is dual. We are facilitators, coordinators, and helping the process along. Doing the physical and administrative work that gets accomplished as well as acting on our own as a corporate division which projects action plans and milestones. Division chiefs would formulate their own action plans and milestones based upon inputs from their division and the subordinate people would provide specifics, technical, and subjective content input to the action plans. And of course there are means of monitoring all of those same characters would provide much of the same role in terms of the specific action officers and workers providing specific input on what had been accomplished and where we were and those particular things, division chiefs speeding those into our process and we feeding that back to Col \_\_\_\_\_, and he's monitoring what is going on.

How does the process start?

I'm not sure exactly how to answer that question. There's a date and a point in time which we first decided we needed a strategic plan. That was when Col \_\_\_\_\_ first arrived. We set the process I described to you in motion. It really goes out I guess from a decision first to have accepted volume 1 of the SAF AAI plan and then for us, INX, as the facilitators of this process to put out a \_\_\_\_\_ to the divisions that explains what we are doing and asks for their inputs. We went through the first year of the plan and decided that we needed to do a fairly complete update and rewrite so we accomplished that back in the first quarter of this year. Essentially did the same process over again. I think we have found so far that the further away we've gotten from any kind of update or reaccomplishment at the Air Force level the more it begins to look like we're going to have to sit back and do our own reanalysis of the situation and perhaps do our own Volume I. That's probably the thing we'll do the next go around. Simply because we find those things I guess probably to be of less and less relevance to us as it goes on. But we can't \_\_\_\_\_ with that process with everything that's going on, it was a more manageable process to get things under way. Even the second time around. We always like to think out in the future when we accomplish all of our wonderful goals and objectives that there will be all kinds of time available and we'll have the opportunity to look up and see a great new world and we'll be able to do it as it comes down to reality you put in the same kind of time boxes and you sometimes take the path of

least resistance. Candidly to this point that's what we have done.

Can you describe the process?

Well, I've sort of advocated the mechanical process in term I guess the real process in terms of coming up with the meat of it is at each division level, taking a look at what projects they have on their table at this point. What things that they have reaccomplished and in conjunction with Col \_\_\_\_\_ there is a bit of interplay. There's not as much interplay perhaps as there should be but there should be between the divisions except as a matter of other people reviewing each other's work and what we've done. They will conceive what particular action plans or things they need to put into effect and then on the basis of that project out what their milestones and timing ought to be. It's really as simple a process as that and then it's a matter of coming back periodically to check where we are on those milestones, make some revisions. We always have the possibility open to people that they can suggest changes to the action plans at any particular update point. I have to tell you that it's not been a real clean process in my view point for how we make changes to the system. Whether or not we pull changes to some republished event or if we try to do a looseleaf type of environment and we haven't figured out in our own minds how best to handle that change and update kind of program. Col \_\_\_\_\_ wants us to be alive and vibrant document and go out to the field. Nevertheless the mechanical process of producing something like that it's not something where you can be in a continual process of updating because it's a simple administrative \_\_\_\_\_ of doing that. If we have people, for example, that are dedicated solely to that function, we could turn out the stuff, sending it out all the time. That's not the case. We don't have the people who can stop and spend all kinds of time putting out updates to this whenever they come along. So it gets to the point where we kind of have to draw a line in the sand and say this is the point in which we will publish updates and put them out.

What do you base your plans, planning on?

So far we have based it on the assumptions of the goals and objectives published by AAI. We are finding those to be of less relevance for us. We're going to have to start looking at things in our own context. As time goes on, we're finding less and less of a solid position out of AAI on a whole range of issues, all of the strategic planning process. My personal opinion, things are very shaky across the board in terms of guidance, whether you're talking about the DMRD on printing or you're talking about the centralization of the postal budget or a whole host of other

things. Guidance from the Air Staff is very shaky or non-existent.

Do you base any of your planning on your own assumptions?

I think those are inherent to a certain degree and some of the specific action plans and milestones. What our real process has been, has been that each of the divisions have projected action plans and milestones on what they think they want to do. Then it's turning back to a process to kind of make it fit. For an administrative neatness, we have to try to tie what you want to do to specific sort of things. The assumptions are certainly there, but perhaps not expressed as well as this deliberate planning process would like you to believe. Which leads me to say we probably have come to the point where we need to do our own fund analysis, make our own assumptions and base our plan on that. What we would really like to do, I think, is get a bunch of the key players off somewhere separate for a couple of days and sit down and go through this swap process on our own and come out with our own statement of assumptions and proceed from there to goals and objectives. We're also hampered to a certain bit because it used to be, until recently about a year, year and a half ago, that the major command IMs had to get together for their destiny meetings. Although those meetings really perhaps didn't solve as many things as people thought they solved, at least they tended to set the tone for the career field across the Air Force. There were some ideas we could get about which directions we ought to go into. Well since Col Pardini has been in place, those have been suspended. They're not even holding that kind of session. In the absence of the deliberate planning process outlined in the regulations, where representatives from each of the major commands would get together and put together this plan. I think the last time that happened was the summer of 86. These destiny meetings did tend to try to fill in any gaps so you could at least have a feel for this is the way the career field is going. We don't really have that kind of process anymore. It's getting to the point where, I think, some of the major commands IMs are talking about getting together on their own in kind of rough sessions. Whether or not Mr. McCormick would approve of any such sessions. Randy \_\_\_ personal opinion.

What forces outside of IM, outside your directorate impact on the strategic plan?

A whole host of them. Actions that are on-going at higher levels that we have no real control over. Key components of that being such things as the DMRD printing at the DOD level. That impacts quite heavily on the plans at our publishing arena particularly have put into place. Changes

the whole world as a matter of fact. I don't know that there's a lot in our published strategic plan right now that has a lot of relevance to what actually has gone on and then decided at that level. Similarly, actions such as the Headquarters Management Review which we all went through and we \_\_\_ down in our organization decided to make some changes. That was something we had to play with. We did not have a great deal of influence. We had our inputs to it but ... ----- . One of the outcomes of that has been a decision to merge SC and IM here at the headquarters. Something that we'll promise to take a look at operations across the board and how we're doing. Initially that really has been working itself out. It's like a moving IM and a box as it currently exists over under the SC. But I see in the future that there have been emphasis to make a whole lot more thorough examination of what each of our organizations is about and trying to achieve some greater efficiencies and synergy. Like holding together different parts of those two organizations. That was way out over a period of years. The Desert Storm/Desert Shield operation had a great deal of impact on our operations. I think for quite some time is going to give us inputs and change some of the ways we do things in the area of deliberate war contingency planning. We'll have to re-think some of the assumptions and some of the comfortable things we have been doing all along in that area. This is the whole slim down of defense type of movement. It's going to impact our operations because we're being swept along with that. For example, one of the things that was a result that I talked about the Headquarters Management Review. One of the predictable things that happened as a result of that Headquarters Management Review was the elimination of around some 750 or more 702 slots at headquarters. And I can see that happening across the command as a staff support kind of thing. The impact of that is that action officers are going to have to shoulder more and more of the burden of doing their own administrative support work at a time, particularly here at the headquarters and to a greater degree in the field, we do not have in place the office automation and communication network kind of things that can pick up that kind of slack where you have a template, formats on the system that can guide people on how to do things. Action officers in the absence of that kind of automated support may be spinning their wheels trying to satisfy administrative requirements that they are not very familiar with and probably have less concern for. But nevertheless those old people are going to be out the door very quickly over the next 3 years. We are running fast trying to catch up here at the headquarters. We've got an effort that's underway to try to build a comprehensive headquarters-wide network. What we don't have is a funding ... ----- grab money from wherever we can for it. It's not at all clear if we'll have it in place to the

degree and specification we need by the time that the ... --  
-----.

Who outside your organization helps the strategic plan?

Outside IM there really is not anyone who helps with the strategic plan itself and the construction of it. Lt Col Everett. Other than in terms of, of course impacts and influences. I've talked about the sources of information ... ----- Right now only the boss. Now I understand that as a part of the implementation of TQM at headquarters that there is perhaps going to be a greater emphasis on deliberate planning across the headquarters and we may be asked to supply out strategic plan up the change of command here as an input to show that we are looking at those kind of issues and doing things. But to date people have not been asked those types of questions.

If you needed a strategic resource or extra horsepower in order to get something done on your strategic plan, who would you turn to?

The boss principally. Then from him to the Chief of Staff.

Often within organizations, the goals of one division conflict with those of another. Which organization in this headquarters do you find to be the greatest threat to yours?

You might say to a certain extent that SC from a standpoint of their being, we are playing in the same sandbox. Information resources management is a broad, or information management in the broad context. Not necessarily as it relates to IM as an entity. Trying to sort out of the dividing lines as to who is responsible for what can be a problem and a threat. Saying that as an absolute threat may be hitting it a little too strongly. It's kind of like an attempt to sort out some issues that should have been sorted out a long time ago. But now because of other external factors headquarters ... ----- sort them out. In the sense that they have to implement policies which are decided at a level which we sometimes view the manpower folks as a threat because they certainly impact our plans. You might be aware of course of the ... ----- try to establish a manpower standard or at least a manpower guide for the plans and programs function at the base level. We had a bunch of our people who were familiar with what goes on get together and attempt to lay out what all the work and the factors that were involved in that particular work center and then went to the manpower folks to \_\_\_\_\_. Several positions increased at a base level. Most of our bases, we have one person that tended to do this whole \_\_\_\_\_ that we described as a plans and programs function. And it seemed

like the manpower system was very resistant and not helpful at all in terms of \_\_\_\_\_. I guess what makes it worse is that they say we base this on concept analysis and our job is not to deny you the manpower you need for the job, but the end result was exactly that. Because things we had \_\_\_\_\_ for the plans and programs function to be doing, was just like common sense, required more than 2 or 3 people at a base level to do. Yet it seemed like there's no way the manpower system \_\_\_\_\_ that extra ... -----.

How does Air Force level IM find out about your progress?

We send them a strategic plan. We do not necessarily send them our updates and to the extent they find out what we're doing is because of projects they are working from their level and they will come and ask us for inputs. It appears to be a de-emphasis on \_\_\_\_\_ at that level. They don't really ask us for input or progress on what we're doing.

What methods do you coordinate between commands?

A lot of it has to do with individual projects that we may be working on. And there are a number of more or less informal contracts. I get calls all the time from people in other commands who want to know what we're doing in terms of the SC and IM merger. And that's simply it, it's calling on the phone to people that you know or your counterparts in the organization will call up and ask a question about a particular sort of thing that's going on or how they feel about that sort of thing. Informal kind of contact to the extent that we're all involved in common activities that's going on like the project like the DMRD on the centralization of the postal budget or things like that. There may be some more formal coordination as positions \_\_\_\_\_ the program. Why do you coordinate?

Well we sure obviously, one that we're not going out on a limb with something that no body else is going to do. At the same time, we want to coordinate to be sure that we get the benefit of thinking that may not have occurred to us. Somebody else may have a better idea for doing something. Or looking at it in a reverse situation, we're facing something which other commands projected they may have to face. They want to see what we're doing in order that they can avoid some of the pitfalls as they go along. None of us are very \_\_\_\_\_.

How do you know if something goes wrong in the implementation process?

Each division essentially tracks their own progress. When we periodically ask for updates or progress reports on the action plans and milestones, that will be sent back into us.

we consolidate and we give that to the boss. If there are particular problems within a specific action plan, that should be highlighted. Then it's really essentially a process between the boss and the individual division that checks up on \_\_\_ the \_\_\_. May ask questions about a particular milestone, what kind of \_\_\_, the explanation was not quite complete, why can't we do this, let's estimate here. Or that kind of thing. That's how we find out about those particular problems. We give the responsibilities for being on top of those to the division chiefs or taking action to correct the situation.

Who would notify you or alert you to a problem?

It would be the division chiefs through the deputy.

How would they know?

Well, I guess I can only answer with respect to the kind of process that I go through with our own division. That is either formally or informally from time to time we will gather and we will talk about our specific projects that there are going on and figure out if there are any kind of difficulties that are going on. It depends very much on the people in the divisions to give me that kind of feedback so we can deal with those situations and make decisions on how to deal with them \_\_\_ at this point.

How do you deal with a problem like that when it comes up?

The first part is what the problem is. If it's an oversight, we haven't paid proper attention to it, we try to re-direct our attention to it and then make sure we can take care of the particular kind of problem that has come up. If it has something to do with forces beyond our control outside the directorate then we will probably accommodate to that, maybe change our milestones a little bit to take into account these factors that came up at that we didn't know anything about. It depends on what the problem is. We deal with those on a case by case, individual basis.

How do you identify the cause of the problem?

Again, it depends on what the particular problem is. I don't know if there's a real formal process, you know. The kind of things we're doing don't lend themselves to nice easy, step-by-step processes. So the problems could be a whole range of kind of things. We have to look at what the particular situation is and they're usually not too difficult to identify. Because something we had depended upon happening, didn't happen at a particular point or someone was suppose to give us an answer about a particular thing and that didn't happen or simply and one of the

biggest problems usually is that we have projected out something to do and the \_\_\_ day-to-day, on-going business got in the way and we weren't able to take care of the \_\_\_\_. In those cases \_\_\_ reassessment of the priority. If we decide it's something we need to push on with, then we reschedule the milestones and try to pay more attention to it.

You're nudging closer and closer to what perhaps is the \_\_\_ of the real problem. We've been talking about the strategic plan as though it were the key management process that guided our actions. I think we discussed this last time. The \_\_\_ as I say at the end office.. There's more \_\_\_ than what drives our activity. A primary example is this. 2 or 3 things that are going on right now. I'm heading up a special project in the headquarters dealing with executive information systems. That's not anywhere in our strategic plan. It's a pretty key activity for the headquarters and I think it's appropriate we should be involved in that sort of thing. But it's not an action plan or milestone in that strategic plan. I don't know if it actually should be because the strategic plan analysis conceived as a directorate IM kind of thing. But on the other hand, maybe it should be. Capt Middleton has been assigned by Col \_\_\_\_\_ under my monitoring to work on a process action team that looks at the travel process. With assignment to come up with a staff study report that will make some recommendations on how we could re-do the travel process to make it more efficient, take out some of the dependence on paper and that sort of thing. That particular assignment is not in the strategic plan anywhere. So there's a whole range of things that guide what we do on a day-to-day basis that are not in the strategic plan, probably won't ever find their way into the strategic plan. The strategic plan is a process that is somewhat cumbersome. It takes you some time to set it aside, set aside some time for it and put together all the things and mechanically, and administratively it takes time to do things. And by the time you get all this kind of process out on the streets, you have the volumes published then something else comes along that didn't make it in to the strategic plan and you've got to work on such a time table that you really don't go back and incorporate it into the strategic plan until such time that it comes around for another major rewrite. The strategic plan that we had produced to a greater or lesser extent through out the directorate is not something that sits on the desk and is opened at each day and this is the first thing we check in the morning to see how we're doing. It's something we publish because Col \_\_\_\_\_ is very interested in publishing these kinds of things. I agree with him that if you don't know how, if you don't have a plan then anywhere you get is, you make progress anyway or lack, you don't have any progress. And if you don't have a plan, you don't know when



you get there. On the other hand, he knows as well as anybody else we'll be failing weekly issuing new kinds of ideas and new kinds of initiatives and projects and ideas and many of those things will never find their way into the strategic plan. Yet they pick up some significant amounts of time \_\_\_\_.

Who would tell you if the plan was sick?

I guess we would know from the inputs we had gotten at our various different updates. We're in an update cycle right now. We do this on a quarterly basis. On the basis of what we had seen if they were significant problems then a lot of different milestones would make the \_\_\_\_ plan \_\_\_\_\_. Certainly if we had gone down a path and were doing something and we got this to the boss and he in turn says you're completely off the mark ... -----... Some combination of those kind of inputs.

What happens when someone deviates from the accepted method or \_\_\_\_ of keeping the goal?

Not much other than \_\_\_\_\_. Identified up to the point of this is what you're been doing, it's not something we think should be done, so we do it \_\_\_\_ into the more appropriate channel thing. We have not had instances where we've had real bad \_\_\_\_ you deliberately or negligently undermine ... .. Mostly people that we have up here are very well qualified \_\_\_\_\_. We're not dealing with things ... -----... It's simply a matter of redirection. If somebody significantly blows it, you have little things that can be reflected in perhaps less favorable OPRs, APRs, performance ratings, or things like that. But I don't know of anything that has happened in that sense that would be specifically related back to ... -----...

What questions might you ask in terms of when there is a deviation from the accepted practices?

If I were looking at those sort of things, I would try to find out why a particular deviation had occurred. What action the person responsible for it had taken. Whether or not they had considered other kinds of resources. What their plans were collectively.

Can you think of an example when this might have happened?

The closest thing I can think of would be when things didn't seem to be moving as quickly on getting out plans for the DL4, the centralization of the postal budget. I think there was some question whether or not we were getting out adequate ... -----... and whether our bases were prepared to take this responsibility over. That was a matter of asking

whether we diligently enough perceived all of the \_\_\_ we should in order to prepare people for it. I think really the response got ... -----... training in AAI and there were some questions they weren't able to answer because they didn't have the answers themselves. It was a matter of we were going to have to make some decisions on our own in order to get us ready for this thing. Readjustments were made and pretty much got back on track. I think.

How or if or when you identify deviations?

Hopefully through the quarterly update process. Once a quarter we go out and ask the divisions to give us an update on where they are with respect to accomplishment of the milestones \_\_\_ specific action plan. And if there are deviations, they would formally should be identified under that process. More realistically perhaps is the fact that if there are hot projects in the forefront of the division chiefs and Col \_\_\_\_\_'s minds, we will probably be asking a lot of questions along those particular items, whatever the hot project happens to be at that time. Continuous deviations will be identified as a part of that process, an act performed on the spot. In terms of the formal planning process, it's a quarterly thing in terms of what sometimes really drives the train is the daily, weekly examination of what's going on and then updates at staff meetings ... -----  
...

What happens if you don't meet a goal?

Most of the goals and objectives that we set out in the strategic plan, if we don't meet those, usually what happens is we'll probably rethink the timelines, extend the process. Or possible sometimes what happens is that things get overcome by events and we decide that maybe that wasn't something really crucial to us anyway and simply remove it from the plan. In between those is problems which, I don't really think they've come up where we've had significant negligence or bad faith on the part of somebody ... -----... In a case like that again it would probably be a matter of resetting the timeline, taking action against a specific individual to try to correct a bad actor kind of problem and then regroup the best you can and reset the goals and objectives. But some combination of all those things have happened. Either resetting the timelines, redirecting an action, maybe taking a different tasks or simply deciding that this thing is simply not working.

What would cause you to change goals?

The combination of factors like I just described.

What would keep you from accomplishing certain elements of your strategic plan?

Lack of funds, manpower. The intrusion of higher priority kinds of activities that were either imposed upon us. That's usually the thing, they're imposed upon us from the outside, something we have to deal with.

How do you get feedback on unit or operational level initiatives?

If we got out and ask for it from time to time. That's related to specific programs or projects. It could be in the plan or it could be the DOD kind of thing that comes down. Col \_\_\_\_\_ will pick up on some of these things that people about the bases to bases he carries on a fairly extensive program of visiting the bases, trying to see all of them within a 3 months period or so. Some of our divisions have fairly constant contact with the base level counterparts. So they get feedback through phone calls and messages. They send out information in letters and messages and get some feedback from them. We do have reports in the various different areas. Particularly in the duplicating area, and coping area. We get manhour accounting through the \_\_\_ system that gives us feedback on at least that aspect of how the bases are using their manpower.

How do people who are not in the strategic planning group feed information on to the command?

We do mail it out to a very expensive list of commands, consumers including AAI, our sister major command and we mail it out to our base units. To date we have not given out much on the updates or the progress reports except within our colonel community here, within the directorate actually. Unless somebody asks us a question about a specific thing, there's not a real formal method ... ----- ... outside of the directorate itself. I think that's partially as a result of the extent of internal focus of the strategic plan as it has been known to date. There aren't with the exception of a couple of items that probably would raise the interest by means of the day-to-day activity kind of thing. That's specific project kind of thing. There's not a lot in the strategic plan right now that people outside ourselves have a real strong interest in. No one is clamoring for information about our strategic plan.

How do you make the strategic plan meaningful to the worker at the operational level?

I'm not sure we do. In fact the discussion we had earlier about how relevant it is to our day-to-day activities. I'm not sure that a lot of our specific workers do find it

relevant except as it impinges on something that everybody is hounded about right now. There are some things in the strategic plan, a lot of the stuff that's in from the publishing division has real relevance to those people because it reflects some major changes that they are doing in terms of how we deal with composition and obviously how we're going to deal with printing activities in the DMRD, and those sort of things. So they're directly involved. That's where by convergence of effort between the strategic plan and by the day-to-day \_\_\_ in-box type of thing they're focused in the same area. They get involved with us that way.

How are successes identified?

At this point we're taking a strong effort in identifying those successes at least in the context of the strategic plan. Obviously people are, who make great accomplishments, are recognized by all of the traditional kinds of means. The performers of the quarter, the manual outstanding information management awards, with performance ratings and things like that. There's not a specific separate program from all those other things that recognize achievement in the strategic plan system. It's folded into the general scheme of awards and incentive program.

What happens when you meet a goal? Or meet a goal early?

I'd probably pass out. At this point nothing particular or special recognition.

Describe some successes you've had.

That gets back to whether or not the strategic plan is a relevant day-to-day kind of thing. There are some things we have projected that have been accomplished. If you put something relatively easy to accomplish then you could point to that as a success. IMP finally accomplished the goal it had set up \_\_\_\_\_ reading room kind of \_\_\_ to support freedom of information act. IMP has succeeded in doing some things in internal reorganization, consolidating a couple of their branches and broadening their editor force. We call ourselves successful simply for selling the strategic planning process in promotion. That's an on-going project which we'd like to make even better. The fact that we didn't even have that process before a couple of years ago, we've called ourselves successful by being able to put this process into motion. We have been successful, I think, at least in implementing in interim AFIT's automation capability within the directorate which we didn't have before. We didn't have a network before. We had our own stand alone type computers. That was something that was in the strategic plan that we've been successful. you

projected automating some of your budget information. I think we can get \_\_\_ completed and using some spreadsheets and database tools to automate parts of that. Most of our successes are I'll grant you are kind of on the short term kind of things. There has been some \_\_\_ on some of the division chiefs that we need to have a longer term focus to the extent we kind of project out beyond what our current reach is so we extend ourselves a little bit more. How about the instructor facilities that was projected.

But that's pretty much a base-level ... -----...

That's still a success. It's a long term project to try and upgrade that destruction facility and find some old incinerator equipment that was difficult to use, dangerous, constantly breaking down and holding the environment to a newer kind of system that will solve many of those kinds of problems.

I think the biggest success that I ... -----... MSgt Rodriguez, a young lady that works ... -----... Along with Col \_\_\_ .... There have been several people that have worked hard to get monies through different sources to automate this directorate. Bring it on-line, better system, better software, better hardware. Everybody has it a lot easier. We've saved money by doing that through the publishing branch. They have what I call a good system.. We've switched that over to bring in line with the Air Staff guidance. We've changed how they're looking at their forms and publications, even using different software/hardware to create forms and publications. In the long run it's going to be a cost effective thing. But the money part of it ---- ... AC community along with people \_\_\_\_\_ different projects, etc.

That's a good point because now that you ask that question to focus in on successes. It's not to say that many of those things would not have been accomplished anyway. But many of those things that we've just ticked off were incorporated into the strategic plan and perhaps by doing that it increased the focus on us towards accomplishments.

How do successes affect people?

An update of how we are perceived and the importance of our contribution to the rest of the Air Force. I think from an organizational standpoint, that almost from the beginning DA and now IM have been in a relatively weaker organizational position because we didn't have anywhere that we had a general officer. It's almost as simple as that. I think the Air Force IM position has been an authorized but unfunded brigadier general position for all these years. The chances are nil that it ever will be funded under the

current configuration. I think from the standpoint of simple organizational placement, that is it's important for our people to get a line into some kind of structure that had a general officer at the head. Certainly we will have IM and SC at command level put together, where the SC position itself is a brigadier general position. I'm hopeful that some time in the future we \_\_\_\_\_ in a position where it would not be unthinkable for somebody coming from an information management position to arise to that particular position. That may seem kind of trivial and self-serving. But I don't think it is trivial because if people perceive that your organization is of lesser importance then the kind of things that you do are not going to be perceived as being very important. When in fact I think information management in it's broadest context is very important. Information resources management whether the old traditional \_\_\_\_\_ realize it or not, it can be as important to the Air Force as supply management, maintenance management or anything else. We really haven't I think done a very good job of managing information, figuring out what the most objective means and methods are or formulating our information handling processes and policies so that we're not all going off in a bunch of different directions with stovepipe kinds of systems. And we're not ... ----- taking advantage of the synergy that occur and you look at the appropriate interfaces of different kinds of information systems. Using database and automation technology to it's greatest extent and all those kinds of things. We just need an organization with more horsepower in order to try and implement those things throughout the Air Force and do a better job.. The other impact I think it will have is that I'm hopeful it will tend to upgrade the quality and the training of the information manager personnel. I think training within the IM career field is high. We are not training our people to do what the Air Force needs us to do for them. That pulls back to the same question. They're not qualified and not trained to do what we ought to be doing. People don't perceive us as being much more than a green-eye shade clerk which has been replaced by the computer. I think it's a perception \_\_\_\_\_. Why do I need a 702 if I can do all this on my computer. Well you don't understand behind that computer there's a whole bunch of support and you need people who are systems managers. You need people who are applications developers, not simply from the programming/technical standpoint but from a point of understanding what the application need is and being able to design an application that will fit that need. You need people from the realm of software and information systems ... ----- everything continues to go right.. As well as the people who decide how you make these automated systems respond to not only information needs but also legal requirements. How do we deal with records management kind of issues. How do we deal with format kinds of issues.

Until we get the people who are training in these kinds of \_\_\_\_, and I think 702s ought to be trained to fulfill some of these different kinds of roles, working together with our more technically qualified brethren in the computer/communications field. Again they aren't going to be stepping up to what the Air Force really needs them to be doing. I'm not sure if I really foresee that happening because a lot of organizational inertia. SC bureaucracy itself is not ideal. There are a lot of things about the SC bureaucracy here that scare me. From a philosophical basis, I think we ought to be together with them. From a reality basis and seeing how they operate, I'm not real anxious because they've got their own peccadillos. I'm hopeful that this kind of merger will elevate our kinds of \_\_\_\_ to an area where we can begin to be effective to implement those kinds of things to support the mission of the Air Force. To the extent we are successful in really doing \_\_\_\_ within that structure, taking advantage of the greater power structure that \_\_\_\_ and to the extent that we're able to bring along the training that's necessary. The other necessary component is ... -----... I think the outcome is very hopeful. To the extent we don't exempt those kinds of issues. We could \_\_\_\_\_ shrivel up and die. Some people say, well if you're not needed then why not shrivel up and die. Because other than people's own concern, you shouldn't just have a function just to have a function because you had it in the past. -----... My point of view is we need our kind of function. We need our kind of input in the Air Force to be effective and handle information and getting the best out of our technology. We need a perspective that goes beyond the \_\_\_\_ chasers. That's what I hope will happen. I'm not yet completely sure of this.

The current process is based on the quarterly review that we as individual branch chiefs put together. We actually \_\_\_\_\_ it out to include the milestones and once that's done we turn them into our division chiefs who either buy off on it or kick it back for more or less information. When it's bought off on it goes up to Col \_\_\_\_\_ in the front office. That's pretty much it. We do a quarterly review to basically update everybody as to where we are in the planning cycle and make adjustments as needed.

Anybody in the office is involved. When I got here there was no one working systems to any great degree. So it was whatever I wanted or \_\_\_\_\_ our division for the future. Based on input from anybody and everybody. Not only in the division but any place somebody wanted to feed me an idea that I thought may or may not work. It's a good form for anybody who has an idea.

Each person may or may not be responsible for anything. A specific OPR is assigned for each portion of the plan and that person is responsible for each of our limited numbers of bodies. Not only overseeing the program but actually working and making sure they get done. Sometimes it's a management function and sometimes it's a real hands-on and doing the work your self. It just depends on what the issue is.

As I understand it, in January of every year it's completely revalidated. You take last year's and look at it and bring it up to date as a quarterly review. Plus we add anything to the plan that, over the past couple of months may come to mind as an issue that we want to look at. Things can be added during the year but the big time is during the first quarter and the January cycle. Other than that, it's just a quarterly review as time goes by.

The first thing that you do, we try to sit down and brainstorm - where we are, where we want to go. Then we go back and look and say have we ever done this, is there something similar going on to it. I've found that in some of the things I looked through last year. That was the case in so many other divisions. So I would sit down with who ever the OPR was in that area and make sure we weren't going to duplicate any effort. If we were, try to work together to get something. If it was a newer issue then we try to decide whether it's feasible, whether it fits the mold for the strategic plan and where it's going to get us in the long run. Once that's decided, then we sit down and try to put together some milestones that will get us there. What



we're going to do throughout the year or 2 years, 3 years whatever, what the life cycle is going to be. Then those are the things we review in the quarterly review to see how we are as far as coming on track is concerned. Once those are set, then we present them up the chain of command to make sure everybody else can live with what we're doing. If they like what they see, it's fine, we'll stick with those items and they don't get really scrutinized for their content for another year. Although making sure you stay on track is what \_\_\_\_.

Anything from an educated guess to past experiences I guess of other people that have been successful. It just depends on what the issue is. In dealing with the systems area, a lot of this is new technology and it's how you feel things are going to be, where you think things are going to go over the next couple of years. In the case of simple desktop computers, when I got here I see everybody's got access to a 248 but everybody does not have one. And yet we had money available to go out and buy things. We developed a plan to put a desktop \_\_\_\_ on everybody's desk in a few year's time. I think we're going to make that. -----... It's knowing that things are out there. Developing a LAN throughout the headquarters has been based on successes of other companies. But it's been a slow process because of everything that's involved with it. That plan is not only driven by successes of others, we're also driven by the CINCs office who initially came out and said I want one by the end of the year. I think that was a little bit much ... -----... seven days then we can't do a LAN in 10 months.

It's what can be feasibly done in a relative period of time that will get you to your end goal.

Pretty much just by taking notes and then going back later on and looking at them one at a time to weed out what's good and what's not and press on with the good ones.

For a short period of time till we develop the milestones because we have to develop a goal. So the assumptions feed the goal per se. We're right in the middle of our review cycle.

#### ENVIRONMENT QUESTIONS

Starting at the top, the CINC has what I think he calls his twin number one priorities. That certainly drives what the rest of us do. We also have to look at what the SAF AAI goals are. Because we have to try and stay current with them. We look at what some of the other MAJCOMs are doing. We get inputs from them. Then we also look at what \_\_\_\_ portions of industry are doing to see what we can get and all that comes together. Then we've got our relationship

with SC. That has a lot to do with what we can get done because they can either keep the gates open or they can be a roadblock. So everything we try to do, we do through them and coordinate with them up front to make sure it can be done. Then of course there's costs. Is the money available.

In the sense of coming in and possibly being a facilitator or something like that to drive, there is nobody. Maybe we can get some help from the front office but by the time it gets down to our level, it's pretty much what we can come up with. Technical support or something like that to see if an idea is feasible, I might go outside to use somebody as a sounding board but as far as the plan development ... -----  
...

I guess we all do. We question the validity of what we're trying to do for one thing. Can we do it. Not only in the technical sense but in a cost sense. Is the money going to be there.

I'm sure Col \_\_\_\_\_ is sending our plans to somebody. But honestly, I don't know who. Unless it's RXP, Plans and Programs folks may keep a handle on what our plans are.

We're still very up and down organization as the chain of command works. In our LAN development effort we've been real lucky. Our champion has been the vice CINC. So when the 3 star says go ahead and do it, all the doors open up for you. It's helped a lot. As far as other issues go, probably Col \_\_\_\_\_ will be the main champion. I guess our biggest issue is money. And anybody can go to Col \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ we need this, we need this to get \_\_\_\_\_ today. When it comes to cutting up the pie, he's the one with the knife.

The biggest threat. Conflict wise I guess it would have to be our publishing division. External to IM I really don't have too much of a problem with any one group. I see a major problem with everybody. As information management grows and we become responsible for electronic information, we're in trouble because we're going to have a user community that's not educated that's really going to hurt us if we don't do things right when we make our transformation. There's going to be conflicts just with everybody in making changes because of resistances. Because of lack of user knowledge. But there's no one person I can focus on that's really been a problem, everybody's been cooperative.

Normally they don't ask the questions. My \_\_\_\_\_ of things down here is they move too slowly up there. We have ideas here that we want to try out and for one reason or another it can't be done or it can't be done today. We find ourselves in a situation where we volunteer to be tested for

something or develop something because they can't get to it. In the long run we end up solving a program for them after it's developed which everyone else \_\_\_\_\_. They don't, at least where I'm concerned come down and ask me too much about what I'm doing. It's always been the opposite. There's been things that I've known they've been involved in that they should be giving us information on that they haven't offered us. So I get on the phone and call them and it's usually oh yeh, we're going to get something out to the field real soon. That's a problem. They close hold information. Too bureaucratic. Informal stuff over the telephone. That seems to work best. If it's anything formal, it goes through the normal 10 \_\_\_\_\_ where it goes up through the DCS and Art \_\_\_\_\_ back in at the DCS level at the other command and back down to who ever is going to work it.

Where a letter goes and gets coordinated by, you know, you sign it, your boss coordinates on it, his boss coordinates on it, the chain of command on out. It comes from the staff summary sheet or command has a little form that where you leave your coordination on the side of your coordination copies.

Primarily just to see what other's are doing because a lot of us are doing similar things. A lot of times we come across programs where I can help make someone else's job a little easier or they can do it for me. So it doesn't hurt where they've worked through a problem that I've now got. So we try to work together. I've found especially with the people that have been through the \_\_\_\_\_ program, we're on the phone with each other a lot.

#### FEEDBACK QUESTIONS

Normally it's because it won't work. For what I'm mainly involved with in a computer business if you put it in and it doesn't work, you know right up front. However the planning end for the buying of the hardware and software is real dependent on the people who are doing a processing, they give you the feedback that something's not right. Sometimes you lose touch and they're slow in getting back to you and you're not sure if ... -----... For the most part it works pretty well. Most people stay in touch with you.

No, primarily it's the people who are the buyers, the contracting, base supply, contracting vendors. They don't understand what we're asking for. The users primarily would get involved when something has been delivered and it's been installed and it doesn't work, they're the first ones to yell. It's not what it's designed for ... -----...

Each one is individual. Primarily if it has to do with the purchasing process where somebody doesn't understand

something. You either give them more information or we qualify what they don't understand or if we fail to provide enough for instance sometimes, we'll go ahead and do that. From the users standpoint, sometimes it's a question of more training. We didn't put enough training into the program. We failed to complete a step or two in what we thought we had done through kind of a mental checklist process, we put things in to see if they were right or not.

Mainly through going back and seeing who handled what and who made what decisions. How they occurred. We will also turn around and look at what could have been done to avoid it so we don't create the same mistake twice.

Slow but steady progress in the positive direction, no negative direction at all. We've had some instances recently where we've had to take a step backwards and two steps forwards sometimes. That's part of growing pains. As long as we're progressing and things are staying on track, that's our indicator.

Not really. We provide indicators up the line in the form of how goes it and things like that for Col \_\_\_\_\_'s staff \_\_\_ everything we're doing. The real program indicators are the points we monitor as far as our milestones are concerned. To make sure we stay on top of things.

It could be just about anybody who was involved that feels something's not working right or won't occur on time because of some previous actions we've done or plan on doing. Anybody who's involved in the process. They have a part in it. In those cases, the people who are involved will benefit from it and certainly want to see it happen and \_\_\_

In most cases it throws the process into some form of disorientation because, most processes are step by step and if you go out of the step, then \_\_\_ might not occur because they wasn't done properly. It takes time to sit down and re-group and find out where everybody is and then you have to re-establish the path again. It's not a nuisance but it certainly is, in some cases, a catastrophe where you've got to re-group and start again.

Primarily what caused you to do it and why. Why did you feel it was a better direction to go than the one that had been agreed upon and planned on. Then what were the expected gains from it. The umbrella picture is how do you feel your actions are going to impact the rest of the process, the big picture. It works both, to give me a shield as far as the thought process of the individual. Maybe something was, they saw something that we didn't. But

at the same time it's also something to make the individual think too as far as consequences of deviating from the plan.

The \_\_\_ \_\_\_ times when for instance we, in the resource management area as far as money is concerned, we'll sit down and we'll plan out who's going to spend what money for what. The out of the ordinary, you get a division chief who has a project and they go directly to Col \_\_\_\_\_ and sell him on it and he comes back and tells us, do it. Suddenly we're caught short with, it was unplanned for and what are you gonna give up and that kind of thing. It really messes things up. That's a common occurrence sometimes around here.

How is when we're made aware of it either by the individual who's doing it, if they're asking up front to be able to do it. Somebody who just happens to pick up on it. For instance if we do something that's got to be coordinated on somewhere else and realize it's a deviation, they're gonna raise a flag. We get indicators we're not getting the results that we had planned. You go back and find out what occurred and find there was deviation no one picked up on and no body called you about it. You found out about it almost at too late a point to do anything. Then you have to go back and re-chart your course from a lot of different directions.

It depends on the goal. Some goals are dreams that would be nice to do. For instance the IM \_\_\_ at MAC is a nice to do thing here. I have a goal, obviously if I can't get the money for the funding it's a goal we're not going to meet on the time we've defined. We have options. We can either extend it and try to continue with the program or scrap it and say it was a nice try and work with what we've got. That's one thing. More critical goals you don't really address what happens if you don't meet it because you've got to. Most of what I do fall into that critical category. At least at this point.

A change in direction from upper management. If they change their plans or strategic plan, we have to change ours. Changes in technology. Some are dependent on people. Who you have and the numbers you have and what you can do with them. Time is a key factor too. Instead of being able to get it done today, you may have to wait till next year to get something done. Conflicts, one goal against another one, make a choice.

Lack of resources. \_\_\_ \_\_\_ people, time, or money.  
Conflicting goals. Failure to stay on top of the process itself, where you make sure you meet your milestones.

It's published and the fact that it exists is advertised quite well, especially through the IM newsletter. Recurrent periodical business. That puts it out in the field to let them know the headquarters has one and if they want to, they certainly can call and talk about it. They certainly feel the effects of what we do. The command has a master strategic plan. It's available to me if I want to go up and look at it. Various levels have access to it through the fact that it's just advertised that it's there.

#### INCENTIVE QUESTIONS

The best thing is trying to show what the end result is going to do for them. That's a big driver. The other one is try and get them involved. That in itself is an incentive instead of going in and saying this is how it's going to be. Going in and asking for their input certainly helps you get there. That's an incentive because it gives them a feeling of possession, that they had something to do with it.

They're identified just from the fact that things go according to plan. You get the benefit you'd helped to derive or sometimes more than what we'd planned on. The process normally is if something works well you reward the individual through some kind of a \_\_\_ from the front office, certificates of achievement, letters of appreciation, that kind of thing. We generally put people in for NCO, Airman of the Year programs. Information Manager of the Year type things. If things have gone really well for the year. We have a lot of those programs. Just little things like time off.

Not too much. We'll put together some kind of closer package to say it's over with, it no longer exists, we've closed it out. We do a lessons learned things so the next time someone wants to do something similar, it's available to pick up and follow it.

Not that I've seen, since I've been here.

The effort to put together requirements document for the headquarters LAN has been a big one. Improving the operational capability of the 3B2 system is a big one. In that we \_\_\_\_\_ here which gives us the ability to talk to anybody around the world who has access to DDN. The awareness of most of the people in IM of the fact that the future is here.

DICK BALOGH,  
Director, Strategic plans and Programs, Lockheed Engineering  
and Sciences Co.

Well, we start off with, we have a mission statement which basically is the vision. Then, as in the game of Poker, we've got the field-of-play rules and in the game called Lockheed, the company I'm in, those field-of-play rules are what's called the strategies, and we've broken the strategies into five, I believe it's five major areas: one is marketing, one is new business acquisition, one is growth, one is key personnel, and contracts is the other one. And to give you an indication of what some strategies are, they're not goals. A goal is a place to go to; you've got to work to go to it. A vision is a place to come from, it's a context, whereas a goal is a series of actions linked together towards some end. If you take a look at goals, goals normally, you rarely ever find someone outlining or declaring a goal that's not achievable. Goals cut short the mark. They're always things that can be achieved. Now, in those instances where you don't achieve your goal, what you substitute in place of the goal is a good reason why not. And the reason becomes as good as achieving the goal. And it really tends to blind you a little bit. It gives us, the way we operate as human beings, a good reason for not doing something that's almost as good as the result. So you set yourself up that way. So, a vision is a place to come from, and it's a context. It's looking into the future, bringing it by declaration, by declaring this to be the vision, bringing it into the present and operating consistent with that vision. The actions tend to align. Getting back to the game where we have the mission or the vision, and then we have the field-of-play rules which are the strategies. We've got strategies like, for example, in terms of recompeting, as I said earlier, our basic market is recompetition. About 95% of what we compete in during the course of the year is recompetition and 5% in new starts. In a recompetition, one of our strategies is to bid only on those contracts where the incumbent is in trouble, or the nature of the work is changed. Now, one thing to notice in recompetitions is we ask ourselves the question - why does an incumbent lose after 15 or 20 years? Why does the customer want to replace him? And it invariably turns out to be a management issue. It's not a technical issue. The customer has the technical smarts. The incumbent personnel, the day-to-day people who do the work, have the technical smarts. So there's a corporate memory and a customer memory that's there regardless of what happens to the management, of contractor management. But why is it, again, that the contractor management falls out of favor with the customer?

It's basically because they're minding the store and working the basic requirements of the job and not supporting the customer in working their issues. The customer issues are those things that are on the table, and you don't know what to do with them necessarily. You know they've got to be worked at some point in time, but you don't know how to start it or when to start it. A good example might be cutting the budget. You know that's going to have a material impact on the way you operate and the way the number of things you can do with contractor support. So the contractor management team that can come in and offer to work that issue for you is a contractor management team that's probably going to stay in place. The contractor management team that is working day-to-day requirements that has to be told what to do every step of the way ultimately is going to be blindsided by a team that can come in and really point to their ability to work the customer's issues.

Now, getting back to strategy for just a moment, as I mentioned before, another strategy that we have relative to competition, actually growth, is that our strategy is to grow through competition rather than acquisition, fairly straight forward. That's not a goal, that's not a vision, it's simply a strategy. Our strategic plan provides openings for our operating units to develop their own plans and it provides the opening for them to act consistent with our plan, the strategic plan, as well as their own long-range, or mid-range, or short-range plans. So the strategic plan provides the opening and the direction. It's like, we're going to go east, but not necessarily tell people that they've got to start off, say in Houston, and drive to Baton Rouge on I-10. That's left to the individual operating plan. Now, why is that important? If you don't give a basic flavor of which direction you're going in you could indeed wind up going east by first going west and ending up in the same place. So we provide a basic direction and an opening for action. A good example is, another strategy is that we're going to bid from an empty wagon. What that really means is this: that traditionally, most organizations tend to look at what their capabilities are (build the infrastructure first) and build the infrastructure, and then they go out in the market and see who needs what they're good at. When you really take a look at that, you begin to notice that that has a built-in limiter on the market size. So what we do is sell from an empty wagon and we take a look at what the customers' needs and wants are, and then we go find out how we can meet those needs or wants. With a large corporation like Lockheed, we're fortunate that we can go many, many places, within the corporation. And if we don't then we'll go out in the market area and we'll get that... (subcontract) ...we'll either subcontract or we'll bring in four or five people. In our business, we capture 95% to 98% of the incumbent



workforce, and it's not unusual on a 2 or 3 thousand person contract, when we win it, to only be required to provide 8 to 15 or 20 key personnel. That's why key personnel are very important because that's really what we're selling. We're selling the new management team, because the day-to-day workers, they were doing a great job. It was the management team that wasn't supporting the customer in resolving their issues. So, in the process of going to where the work is rather than bringing the work into the factory, we'll send out a key management team of whatever, 8 people or 15 people, and we'll replace the incumbent management team, more often than not. As a matter of fact, as a matter of practice, all the senior positions will be filled by Lockheed people, not by the incumbent personnel. Often the incumbent contractor that's been unseated will do whatever it is they do with their key personnel.

An interesting thing ... the way we operate is that our strategy is articulated in probably less than 15 standard-typed pages allowing for artwork and everything. The way we put it together, it's more in briefing chart form where we have the art that we want to display, and then we attempt to make distinctions or bring points out for the reader, that they basically aren't aware of or haven't thought about before. A good example is control versus controls. More often than not when we talk about control, that's an issue of being in charge, being in control. But having controls, or controls with an "s", is about having management controls. So it's an issue of being in control or having controls. And basically, when you take a look at the way we operate, the way we think, generally, and the traditional management philosophies that you read about in the books, it places management systems senior to people. And basically when you do that, you're heavy duty into being in control rather than trusting the people to be able to place controls at the appropriate places. Have the people empowered to take action, and you intervene through your controls at the appropriate times. This is still kind of... we're really taking a hard look at that right now. but there's a real difference between being in control and having controls. When you talked about earlier today, strategic control, I was wondering to myself whether you were talking about strategic controls with an "s".

Yes. From what you've just explained.

Yeah, so there's a powerful distinction there for people that haven't seen it. Having control is an issue of being in charge, having the authority. That's control. Controls deals with the management controls, like for example, the strategic plan is the senior level controls in our organization. That forms the senior document. Then comes the program plan. Internally they have their own set of controls truing to the strategic plan. Other controls that

we have in the company are weekly reports. Most people don't see a weekly report as a form of management control. They see it as control. They see it as drudgery. It's something that they've got to put in. But if they were to look at the weekly report, or the quarterly report, or the quarterly review, staff review, they would really begin to notice that these are nothing more than controls that we set up within the infrastructure to guide the infrastructure and the actions in the infrastructure.

Towards the strategy.

Consistent with, not towards the strategy, but consistent with the strategy. Now, what happens in some organizations is that they set a goal. They are into being in charge or having control, being in control, and what they will do is they will dictate and direct rather than empower, and they will work toward a goal. That's not what we're doing. We have a vision. It's really interesting. A vision aligns action. A goal compares action. It's working towards something, and compares action to the goal. A vision tends to align action, the actions of people. There's a quality difference there. There really is a different mindset, a different bent, a different way of operating. I've got a chart if you're interested. I've got a presentation that I gave to NASA, at Langley, and to our own guys. It's called "Managing Change in Turbulent Times," and if you're interested, I'll send it to you.

Yes, definitely.

It brings out some of the distinctions. You know, people talk about empowering and 90% of the people, maybe even a bigger number than that, that talk about empowering they see it as a leash... just a longer leash. They really don't see that you can empower people when your management controls are in place and operating, not managers in control, but management systems set up as control points, as controls. So it's not an issue of directing any longer, it's an issue of intervening. So we have quarterly program reviews where we have the opportunity to intervene. We have a... thing ... it's about key personnel growth. It's a succession framework, and that's a place where Bob Young and several of his management team get to intervene in the key personnel that's running the company. So that's a checkpoint.

When you say intervene in the key personnel, do you mean intervene in the process?

We can intervene in the process. See, we see it, if you could just look at this as a process of actions, and the management controls are set out to provide a means of intervening in the processes as required, but in the

meantime, let the people be empowered to work the processes. That ain't the way it works traditionally. The managers and supervisors are in the process, controlling, having the authority, etc., Being in charge, being in control, directing. And when they say - yeah, I'm empowering my people to get the job done, all they're really saying is I gave them another six feet of leash. Now they're running out 12 feet, and then I'll jerk them back when they get out 12 feet.

What does empowering really mean? What should it mean?

Empowering is... I like what the Army had to say about it: enabling a person to 'be all that they can be.' But empowering really ...

How do you do that?

Well, the way I do it, intellectually, and the way it makes sense to me is to work, ... see I've got to define something first. When you talk about a powerful person, most people hear it as someone at the top of the organization with a lot of control. I'm going to suggest to you in my jargon that's a person with a lot of force. So I'll distinguished force as someone who has a lot of organizational clout. The truly powerful person is a person that in working with another group of people or an individual can speak to them in a way that they see for themselves what needs to be done. I have yet to meet someone who, in the beginning, didn't want to do a good job. In the beginning. And over time, for whatever rationale they've got in their head, they turn sour. Some do, some don't. But you're truly empowering a person when you don't tell them what it is they need to be doing, but you speak to them in a way that they see the actions that need to be taken within the design of the game within the field of play rules set up by the game, within the way you have designed the controls. See, no one's going to bitch about having to write the weekly report or attend the weekly meeting or quarterly meeting when they see it simply as another way of exercising control points in the process of action. It's the controls, it's much like a cake I guess. You've got the inside of the cake, which is the process, and layered on top of it are the controls. And you intervene using those controls. That's one way of looking at it; that's basically the way we look at it. And people know when they're empowered, and people know where they're being controlled. When people are being controlled and are told they're empowered, they see it as manipulation. A person who comes from a background of control and a foreground of empowerment, in other words, their whole make-up is around being in control, when they talk about empowering someone, it's just so much BS. And they'll give them the leash. When a person truly comes from a background of empowering,

shifts the paradigm and comes from a background of empowering, and a foreground of controls, what you do is you'll empower people to get the job done and you've got the controls, and they know you've got the controls, to intervene when you need to. The controls can be anything dealing with management systems; reports, status reviews, project reviews, a calling to account. It can be positive; it can be negative. Someone who is coming from a background of control and sees someone who is truly empowering people, it looks like abdication. If you were a heavy duty control oriented guy and I am truly into empowering people and working with them in a way they see for themselves how to work the process consistent with the controls and the vision and all that, you'll tell your friends that Balogh's just abdicated; he's given up. He's not in charge; he's lost control. So I've abdicated. That's what it looks like to a control-oriented person. And they can't see it any other way except abdication. They miss the whole phenomenon of empowerment. But they'll pay it lip service like they'll pay the strategic planning and such lip service. They'll say, I'm empowering my people, and that's what I say is just a longer leash. And people know that. You know it's funny. When we get to be managers and supervisors, we have an instantaneous shift in perspective. If you ask a supervisor or manager what one of their important things is they do they'll ultimately get around to saying 'motivating their people.' But ask them who motivated them. And they'll say - well, no one had to motivate me. I motivated myself. Well, then why in the hell can't those 2000 people, some of them at least, motivate themselves? What makes us so arrogant to think that because we're now managers and supervisors, all those people out there, like we were one of those, have to be motivated? Motivation comes from within. You can't motivate me. You can't motivate anyone. You can empower people to think of it themselves.

That means letting them get a vision of how to do it for themselves. And they couldn't have that vision ... It's a contradiction to think you have a vision of how to do something if you don't have the power to do it. In other words, if you tell me to do something and I see how it could be done, but I see I can't do it, because I don't have the power ...

And I'm in control ...

And you're in control ...

By that you mean the power ...

That's a contradiction, and I don't really have that vision. What I have to have is a vision of how I can do it.

Yeah, or ... It's not a vision of how to do something. It's a vision of what you are, in doing something. You see the difference? A vision is not about how to do something. A vision is a concept. it's like ... instead of becoming a leader, you operate as if you currently are the leader. Now, I know we're not the leader, but you operate as if you are. And it's magic, but your actions start to align to those of the leader. All I can say is try it if you don't believe it. It happens that way. It's happened in our company anyway. Someone, and this isn't done by a committee. There's a poem I like, and it goes like this: "Visit the parks in all your cities, you'll find no statues of committees." And what you need is, whoever is heading up a unit or whatever you call your various organizations, whoever's heading that up has got to declare the vision. You know when you were growing up, did you ever go to school with someone that really desperately wanted to be a doctor? There's a woman at work who was reading something I had written reactive to quality, but it was really about vision. And she said, you know, that was me you were talking about. From the day, just about, I could walk and talk, I knew I wanted to be an engineer. Everything I did was engineering related. Every course I took, every activity after school, every school activity other than the academics, everything was engineering. I built model airplanes ... See, she was being the engineer at age 9, 10, and 11 ... she was doing engineer things for that age. And then when she got into high school, she loaded up with all the tough math classes and so on, being the engineer. Then, when she went into college, she got a curriculum about engineering. She had a vision of being an engineer and her actions were aligned with that vision. Now, that a pretty good example to get you to see that and it's a true story. That could be done with an organization. But the vision's got to be declared. You've got to be able to look about and envision what it is you're going to declare yourself as. Then, in the present, declare it, and then the actions align with it. They really do. It's just amazing. Our mission is to be (see I even said "to be"), our mission is 'Be and be recognized as the high technology service industry quality and productivity leader.' Be the leader from a quality and a productivity point of view which is basically performance. Our purpose is to provide engineering and scientific services to specific market segments, like government and industry. We purposely left both the purpose and the mission broad to provide a lot of latitude.

When you say the mission, is that the same as the vision?

That's the vision. Now, in the Air Force or in the military that may be different. You know, there's a good metaphor that might be used ... In a game, there's three things that can occur: you can design the game, you can play in the

game, or you can sit in the stands and talk about the game. And the mission statement and what's in the strategic plan, the vision and whatever, all the other things in the strategic plan, are about the game, the design of the game. The "in the game", the actual playing in the game, those are other plans, such as our program plans, our financial plan, our human resources plan, and so on. Those are plans of action within the game. So you've got: on the game, in the game, about the game. On the game is the design in the game is the play of the game and about the game is the journalizing of it, the sitting in the stands, telling everyone what you'd do if you were in charge, kind of thing. I don't want to make that sound bad because there are a lot of good things that come about after talking about the game. But the strategy, the strategic planning function, and this is left to the most senior several members of the organization, their conversation should be "on the game": the design of the game. Now, the design of our game at our company is purposely, intentionally left very broad so that the people playing in the game, the process, the work process, have a lot of latitude. They're empowered within the field-of-play boundaries that we set up when we design the game. It's kind of (to give you an example), it would kind of be like going out to White Sands National Monument and playing in the white sands there at the monument and you could probably play there all day and never retrace any of your steps and never get outside the boundaries of the white sand. Or, if you're into a heavy duty control oriented environment, you could close it down tight to where you have everyone playing in a kitty litter box. And more often than not people are going to step outside of the kitty litter box and you're going to smack them along side the head. That's not the way we operate. We purposely define the boundaries very broadly so that people could make moves within the game, and not get their hands slapped. And most of the people play within the design of the game. And from time to time, there will be people who get outside the design of the game. They'll go into the organization and design their own game, if you will, that extends beyond the boundaries of the design of the enterprise. When that happens, they pretty quickly begin to see that they can't function outside the boundaries. Because, when you set up the design of the enterprise, what you're really talking about is establishing controls relative to the resources. There's not a thing that Bob, the president of our company, doesn't have some form of control over as it relates to the resources. He has to approve bid & proposal funds at the top level, he is aware and has to approve all personnel actions on a senior salary board, we have delegated certain levels of authority for signature on money, promotions, etc., etc. So in the setting up of the game, he designed the field of play, he designed the boundaries; and the boundaries were made intentionally broad, like playing in the sandbox of White

Sands. NM. Versus, tightening down with F&R statements, policies and procedures, dos and don'ts, where everyone's playing in a cat-box, and stepping out of bounds all the time, and getting their hands slapped for doing it. But when you really look at an enterprise, the controls are really focused toward resources. I can't really think of one that isn't. Your HR (human resources) certainly is, your budget certainly is. It's actually about managing the resources--making them available. And when someone steps outside the design of the field of play, outside the design of the boundaries of the game, there are no resources. I'm sure if you take a look, not conceptually, but as a matter of practice, that's what happens.

See, here's something interesting. We as human beings tend to think form and operate from models of the way the world ought to work, and we tend to miss the way it really works. We tend to look: this is the way it's really working. We've got this model up here, like we've got econometric models, and models of the weather, and so on, and this is our concept of how it works, but this is how it really works. And some people see that difference, and recognize it as a difference, but a lot of people don't. This is the way it ought to work--I've got this model--it ought to work this way. We write books about how strategic planning ought to be done, and when it isn't done that way, we suffer. It produces an angle--the angle of suffering--the difference between the way it is and the way it ought to be. If you get away from the organization, and you get it down to a particular individual, that individual thinks "this is the way the world ought to work, this is the way life ought to be." But this is the way it is--and there's a big angle there--look at it. And the way it is and the way it ought to be don't match, and people suffer. They're depressed, they're downtrodden, they don't know what to do, etc. When people can see that the way it is is the way it is, then people don't suffer.

So, we're prone to do that because of the way we're created. It has to do with neural-linguistic programming. We have three different things that we do as human beings. One is that we generalize things, one is that we delete things, and one is that we distort things. Like, for example, we'll learn as we are growing up what a chair is, and the next time we see a different form of a chair, we don't have to be retrained that that's what a chair is. We see a chair and we say "That's a chair." We generalize the basic concept of what a chair is, so that we can recognize a lot of chairs. We don't have to be retrained. So the information flowing into us doesn't have to be pumped into us in vast quantities--millions and millions of electrical impulses every time we see a chair--we know that that is a chair.

Now we can also delete. Here, read this.

"I need a kick in the rear end."

Now, read it again. (Points to individual words)

"I need a kick in the the rear end."

See, the second thing we do is to delete. We generalize information, we delete information, and we distort information. And all these three patterns, as humans, tend to shape the electrochemical model we have of the real world. I will perceive things differently than the way you perceive things. And then I may not generalize in the same way as you generalize, or delete in the same way you delete, or distort in the same way you distort. So that we all come out as unique human beings. That nonetheless shapes a model that we have, and we think from, we act from, that model. And in the course of growing up and dying, we have all kinds of models, one of which is a model of how you ought to manage. Another is how you ought to strategically plan. Another is how we ought to fight nuclear wars. We've got models for everything--we think from models. And what that does, it's a phenomenal thing, it blinds us to the action that really goes on, because we're thinking from the model. For example, what is QUALITY? What is quality? See, the first thing you do is think for the model of it and a definition. What if I were to tell you that quality is nothing more than an assessment made by an interested party? It is my assessment of your work. It's an assessment that may be made by any interested party. Often we call that interested party in our model the customer. And we make all kinds of really big deals out of this, and we've got a model called TQM, and most of the military doesn't know what the hell to do with TQM because they're looking at it from a model. And the question that our chairman of the board asked, which is a very valid question, is, "what the heck is the difference between TQM, and quality, and just downright good management?"

Nothing.

You could say that, but if you could distinguish the difference, and say more than just 'nothing,' and that's where we're working on this control and empowerment, and management systems versus people, and in quality, what you gotta do is, management systems and control systems deal with managing the resources, and when you come from, when you shift your paradigm to people, you shift away from managing resources to managing people--empowering people, literally. I think this is where we are going to have a break-through at Lockheed, in looking differently at what quality is versus just good management.



So we shape our models, we generalize, delete and distort, we make assessments about things, and by the time we are set in our ways as adults, we miss the action that goes on--like REALLY what's going on. We'll say things like "management's all screwed up." "What do mean?" "Well, they can't do anything." We talk like that. See, those are assessments--that may or may not have any validity to them. And you say "Who is 'they'?" See, 'they' is a generalization. I may see one supervisor do something out of step, and over time, I say 'they' are all screwed up. I generalize that one action to include everyone. We do it all the time. We, see, there's another generalization. So, there's a whole bunch of funny things going on that you need to be aware of when you stop to take a look at something like this, or when you're studying something like strategic planning. You need to recognize that we all think form models, and often miss what really goes on in practice. And part of your research, I think, is trying to find out what goes on in practice. Really. Not like a concept. What really goes on in practice, as I've heard it today, is that most of your upper level people don't really have a vision that they have created for themselves, most really use goals as a place to go towards, then call it a strategy or a strategic goal, so they're operating with an unclear vision. Goals that are always going to be attainable. Have you seen a goal that was not attainable going into it? We just don't make up goals that aren't attainable. And visions can be pretty risky.

In your levels here, you have the vision, the purpose, and your eight strategic goals, where do your strategies fall?

Well, it isn't really written like a hierarchical structure. We have a half a page on what the vision is, and how it got to be that way; and the purpose on about a quarter of a page (in big type, I might add); the goals are on a separate page each, then we talk about our stakeholders. I mentioned to you earlier that this is really important. In your arena, who has a stake in your performance? Who are they, like really. Who are the stakeholders? Is congress a stakeholder?

Down at the Information Management level, congress would be a minor one, because of all the levels in between.

But, see, we don't characterize them as minor and major and primary and secondary. They either have a stake in our performance or they don't.

Congress would have a stake.

Then what relationship do you want to produce with them? Is that articulated anywhere?

No.

Then how do you know what it is you have to do to produce the relationship? You don't.

Right. It's assumed. It's part of the 'models' that people have. It's assumed that if congress says something, that we've got to jump and immediately do it.

We discovered early on, stumbled, bumbled, or realized intuitively, that in order to 'Be and be recognized as' we had to satisfy at least six stakeholders. One was our current customers, and the image we want to project, we want to take action such that current customers assess us as committed to their success. So if an outsider comes in and says "what about Lockheed, our customers say "Those people, I know for a fact that the things they do, it's clear that they are committed to this mission, and to my personal success." With the other companies in our corporate staff, the image, the relationship that we want to have with them is that we are a valued member of the Lockheed team. So we take those actions that would produce that assessment from the other companies. So don't go around ignoring them and not supporting them--we support them to the hilt, and they, over the last six years have really begun to see us as a valued member of the team. And winning the Malcom Baldrige Quality and Productivity Award has helped the other companies. So they're impressed--"you guys won that." With employees, being an exceptional place to work, that's what we wanted to be to them, so we started to take actions that produce that. They just tend to align.

So if you don't know who your stakeholders are, or worse yet, if you don't know what image or relationship or identity you want to produce with them, how do you know what actions to take? You can study the heck out of a problem and not produce anything that is meaningful. It all starts with the vision. What is the vision of Information Management? See, 'Be and be recognized' are really key words. It may be 'Be and be recognized as the Air Force ...' or 'Be and be recognized as a major....' I don't know enough about what it is you do. If you could say 'be and be recognized as' something, what would it be?

It would be 'Be and be recognized as a major, value-added segment, managing all aspects of Air Force information resources.'

So it might be something like 'Be and be recognized as the Armed Forces leader at managing information resources.' Now do you want to have it as the Armed Forces, or just the Air Force...

Well we are the Air Force information managers--there is no other group in the Air Force that manages information.

Well, do you want that? Do you want to extend beyond the Air Force? I mean, we could have said 'Be and be recognized as the Aerospace...'

Yeah, we could say DoD, we could say government...

What do you want to say? See, this is the kind of conversation that needs to go on with whoever has this responsibility--the senior members--that kind of thing. What is it you want it to be? Do you want to just restrict it to the Air Force? If so, how so? Would it be better to open it up? And then who does have a stake? What about the people? 'Be and be recognized' is the vision. The stakeholders deal with who you are going to 'be' that with...who you 'be' that with. And, if you can tell someone what identity or image you want, then, it automatically starts to produce action. It really does--it automatically starts the action that produces that identity. If you tell me that we've got seven stakeholders, or ten, and we want to take action to produce this assessment from this entity; we want to take actions, whatever they are, to produce this assessment, identity, then that's something I can work on.

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# REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

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