AD-A243 393

AMERICAN PRISONERS OF JAPAN: DID RANK HAVE ITS PRIVILEGE?

DTIC
ELECTE
DEC 13 1991
S C D

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

MICHAEL A. (BUFFONE) ZARATE, MAJ, USA
B.S., Cameron University, Lawton, Oklahoma, 1983

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1991

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

91-17559

91 1210 093

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
	7 June 1991	Master's Thesis Aug 90 - Jun 91

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
American Prisoners of Japan:
Did Rank Have Its Privilege?

5. FUNDING NUMBERS

6. AUTHOR(S)
Major Michael A. Zarate

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
A

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

This thesis examines the story of American POWs held by the Japanese in WWII to see if there were significant differences in treatment based on rank. It examines how the Japanese treated the prisoners according to international law and also distinctions made by the officers themselves simply because of higher rank. The thesis begins by discussing the historical framework for POW rank distinctions by looking at past wars and the development of rank distinctions in international rules. It then covers the American WWII POW experience in the Far East from Bataan and Corregidor to the war's end. Special emphasis is placed on distinctions made in food, housing, pay, medical care, camp administration, work requirements, escape opportunities, transportation, leadership problems, and overall death rates. The study concludes that there were significant differences in treatment based on rank. These differences caused extremely high enlisted death rates during the first year of captivity. The officers fared worse as a group, however, because the Japanese held them in the Philippines until late 1944 because international rules prevented the Japanese from using officers in Japan's labor camps. During shipment to Japan many officers died when the unmarked transport ships were sunk by advancing American forces.

14. SUBJECT TERMS	15. NUMBER OF PAGES
American POW's, WWII, Privileges of Rank, POW's of Japan	241
	16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
Unclassified	Unclassified	Unclassified	UL

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING SF 298

The Report Documentation Page (RDP) is used in announcing and cataloging reports. It is important that this information be consistent with the rest of the report, particularly the cover and title page. Instructions for filling in each block of the form follow. It is important to ***stay within the lines*** to meet ***optical scanning requirements***.

Block 1. Agency Use Only *(Leave blank)*.

Block 2. Report Date. Full publication date including day, month, and year, if available (e.g. 1 Jan 88). Must cite at least the year.

Block 3. Type of Report and Dates Covered. State whether report is interim, final, etc. If applicable, enter inclusive report dates (e.g. 10 Jun 87 - 30 Jun 88).

Block 4. Title and Subtitle. A title is taken from the part of the report that provides the most meaningful and complete information. When a report is prepared in more than one volume, repeat the primary title, add volume number, and include subtitle for the specific volume. On classified documents enter the title classification in parentheses.

Block 5. Funding Numbers. To include contract and grant numbers; may include program element number(s), project number(s), task number(s), and work unit number(s). Use the following labels:

C	Contract	PR	Project
G	Grant	TA	Task
PE	Program Element	WU	Work Unit Accession No.

Block 6. Author(s). Name(s) of person(s) responsible for writing the report, performing the research, or credited with the content of the report. If editor or compiler, this should follow the name(s).

Block 7. Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es). Self-explanatory.

Block 8. Performing Organization Report Number. Enter the unique alphanumeric report number(s) assigned by the organization performing the report.

Block 9. Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Address(es). Self-explanatory.

Block 10. Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Report Number. *(If known)*

Block 11. Supplementary Notes. Enter information not included elsewhere such as: Prepared in cooperation with...; Trans. of...; To be published in.... When a report is revised, include a statement whether the new report supersedes or supplements the older report.

Block 12a. Distribution/Availability Statement. Denotes public availability or limitations. Cite any availability to the public. Enter additional limitations or special markings in all capitals (e.g. NOFORN, REL, ITAR).

- **DOD** - See DoDD 5230.24, "Distribution Statements on Technical Documents."
- **DOE** - See authorities.
- **NASA** - See Handbook NHB 2200.2.
- **NTIS** - Leave blank.

Block 12b. Distribution Code.

- **DOD** - Leave blank.
- **DOE** - Enter DOE distribution categories from the Standard Distribution for Unclassified Scientific and Technical Reports.
- **NASA** - Leave blank.
- **NTIS** - Leave blank.

Block 13. Abstract. Include a brief *(Maximum 200 words)* factual summary of the most significant information contained in the report.

Block 14. Subject Terms. Keywords or phrases identifying major subjects in the report.

Block 15. Number of Pages. Enter the total number of pages.

Block 16. Price Code. Enter appropriate price code *(NTIS only)*.

Blocks 17. - 19. Security Classifications. Self-explanatory. Enter U.S. Security Classification in accordance with U.S. Security Regulations (i.e., UNCLASSIFIED). If form contains classified information, stamp classification on the top and bottom of the page.

Block 20. Limitation of Abstract. This block must be completed to assign a limitation to the abstract. Enter either UL (unlimited) or SAR (same as report). An entry in this block is necessary if the abstract is to be limited. If blank, the abstract is assumed to be unlimited.

Accession For
NTIS GRA&I
DTIC TAB
Unannounced
Justification
By
Distribution/
Availability Codes
Dist | Avail and/or Special
A-1

AMERICAN PRISONERS OF JAPAN: DID RANK HAVE ITS PRIVILEGE?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

MICHAEL A. (BUFFONE) ZARATE, MAJ, USA
B.S., Cameron University, Lawton, Oklahoma, 1983

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1991

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major Michael A. (Buffone) Zarate

Title of Thesis: American Prisoners of Japan:
Did Rank Have its Privilege?

Approved by:

Dr. Jack J. Gifford, Ph.D., Thesis Committee Chairman

Major Gary D. Rhay, M.M.A.S., Member



Ch (Major) Daniel K. Nagle, Th.M., Member

Accepted this 7th day of June, 1991 by:

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D., Director, Graduate Degree Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

AMERICAN PRISONERS OF JAPAN: DID RANK HAVE ITS PRIVILEGE? by Major Michael A. (Buffone) Zarate, USA, 241 pages.

This thesis examines the story of American POWs held by the Japanese in WWII to see if there were significant differences in treatment based on rank. It examines how the Japanese treated the prisoners according to international law and also distinctions made by the officers themselves simply because of higher rank.

The thesis begins by discussing the historical framework for POW rank distinctions by looking at past wars and the development of rank distinctions in international rules. It then covers the American WWII POW experience in the Far East from Bataan and Corregidor to the war's end.

Special emphasis is placed on distinctions made in food, housing, pay, medical care, camp administration, work requirements, escape opportunities, transportation, leadership problems, and overall death rates.

The study concludes that there were significant differences in treatment based on rank. These differences caused extremely high enlisted death rates during the first year of captivity. The officers fared worse as a group, however, because the Japanese held them in the Philippines until late 1944 because international rules prevented the Japanese from using officers in Japan's labor camps. During shipment to Japan many officers died when the unmarked transport ships were sunk by advancing American forces.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I come from a family of warriors. My grandfather, Cosimo Buffone, emigrated from Calabria, Italy in 1910 and settled in Poughkeepsie, New York. A few years later he returned to Europe to fight with the allies in World War I. All of his six sons also enlisted in the U.S. Armed Forces. Vincent joined the U.S. Navy and fought in the Pacific in WWII. He died two years after the war ended in an industrial accident. Dommie joined the Army and fought in Europe. Frank fought in Burma and was a Combat Engineer during the Korean war. George also fought in Korea and later worked recovering downed helicopters in Vietnam. My father, Angelo, spent three tours in Guam during the Vietnam war. This thesis is dedicated to them - the warriors in my family.

Cosimo had another son who fought with the Army Air Corps during WWII in the Far East. His name was Louis Buffone and he was captured by the Japanese on Bataan in April 1942. He survived the infamous Bataan Death March and confinement in POW camps in the Philippines and Japan for over three years. I met Louis in 1982 and we corresponded for two years before he died of leukemia in 1984. We talked very little about his experiences as a POW. I could see a distant pain in his eyes whenever the subject came up, but I sincerely felt he wanted me to know what he had endured.

As I researched the material for this thesis I tried to envision what Louis must have experienced. Through the eyes of others I felt his fear as Japanese soldiers brutally murdered the weak men who could not keep up on the march. I felt his parched throat crying out for water as the hot sun burned down on his head. I drank foul water from a carabao wallow where the bloated bodies of less fortunate men had fallen to their final rest. I saw the endless procession of emaciated bodies being taken to the shallow graves at Camp O'Donnell. I watched Louis spend agonizing hours bent over the rice fields of Cabanatuan. I descended with him into the vile holds of the Hell Ships and later into the chilling blackness of the coal mines of Fukuoka. I stood by his side and smelled the acrid smoke from the atomic bombing of Hiroshima as it passed slowly over his camp. I cried tears of joy with him as American planes dropped barrels of food by parachute into the camp when the war ended. He could not tell his story so I have told it for him.

I would also like to dedicate this work to another man who holds a special place in my heart. He is my father-in-law, William Marion Kirby, Jr. While Louis labored in a prison camp under the Japanese, Marion Kirby was also in a prison camp under the Nazis in Germany. He was shot down late in the war during a night photoreconnaissance mission over Cologne. I have never

met a person with more love for his family and compassion for his fellow man.

Many people assisted in the preparation of this thesis. I would like to thank John Homerin and David Ifflander for their genuine encouragement throughout the year. I would especially like to thank Ed Fallon for his patient, listening ear. I could always count on him for ideas and advice. I would also like to thank Chris Ellis and John Herko for help in making the maps which appear in this thesis.

Special thanks to Colonel (Retired) Johnny Hubbard for taking some of his valuable time to read the final draft and adding his suggestions for improving the final product.

I am indebted to the members of my committee for the long hours they spent reading, editing and prodding me along. I am grateful that they were patient and could see that beneath my hard head lies a soft heart.

Finally I would like to thank my wife, Melinda, for hot coffee, proofreading and patience. But mostly I want to thank her for recognizing when my mind had wandered too deeply into the abyss and for gently jerking me back to reality.

Louis Buffone identified himself to me as the POW seated at the end of the row in the photo above. This photo appears in the official U.S. Military history, The Fall of the Philippines, by Louis Morton.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Philippine Islands
Manila Harbor
Sindangan Bay
Davao Penal Colony



BATAAN DEATH MARCH

(Not to Scale)


Mukaeq
FORMOSA
Karenko
Hotei
Shirakawa
Tamazato
Takao
Heito

POW Camps in Japan

POW Camps Outside Japan



CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

A few short hours after American naval forces were bombed at Pearl Harbor, Japanese planes attacked U.S. airfields and military installations throughout the Philippine Islands. Three days later forces of the Japanese army, Commanded by General Masaharu Homma, began landing at various locations on Luzon. In the next six months Nipponese forces swept through the Pacific islands like an immense, unstoppable tidal wave, leaving thousands of Japanese soldiers in its wake.[1]

In the Philippines, General Douglas MacArthur initiated War Plan Orange-3, a plan that called for a delaying action and withdrawal of U.S. and Filipino forces into the Bataan peninsula until reinforcements arrived from the United States. They never came. General MacArthur, vowing to return, removed his headquarters to Australia and transfered command of the Philippine forces to Major General Jonathan Wainwright on 12 March 1942.[2]

Within four months American resistance on Luzon was crushed. Less than one month later, after intense and merciless bombardment from air, land, and sea, mighty Corregidor fell

and the Stars and Stripes was torn down and replaced by the stark, burning reality of the Rising Sun.

General MacArthur's promised return would not come for thirty months and during that time many thousands of American and Filipino prisoners died. The total number of Americans captured or interned in the Pacific theater of operations during WWII has been estimated at 34,648.[3] The bulk of them were captured at the fall of the Philippines. The military forces captured on the Philippines provide a unique cross-section of American POWs. This is because they included members from all ranks and services arrayed in near-normal proportions of officers to enlisted men.

While American prisoners in the Pacific theater represented only twenty-seven percent of the total number of Americans captured during the war in all theaters, they made up an appalling ninety-two percent of the total who died while in captivity. Stated another way, almost four out of ten American POWs in the Far East did not come home alive. Nine out of ten Americans held by the Germans returned.[4]

Two books written by American POWs in the Far East generated the interest for this thesis. Both books are titled Of Rice and Men. Both cover in great detail the brutal experiences of Americans held prisoner by the Japanese from the Death March of Bataan until Japan's unconditional surrender three and one-half years later. One book was written by an officer and the other by a sergeant. Their perspectives,

although similar in chronology, were quite different in substance.

The research question for this thesis is: Was there a significant comparative difference in the treatment of officers and enlisted persons as prisoners of war in the Pacific Theater of World War II?

The thesis will begin by examining the historical basis for differing treatment of officers and enlisted persons in peace and war and see what rank distinctions existed in past treatment of POWs.

The thesis will then analyze the international rules in existence at the beginning of WWII which established differing treatment standards for officers and enlisted persons and see what changes were made to international POW rules and guidelines following WWII because of differing treatment standards.

A large portion of the thesis will seek to determine how and why American officer and enlisted prisoners may have been treated differently under the Japanese in WWII.

One major area to be examined is the quantity or quality of food provided or obtained for officers and enlisted persons. A related area will be examined to see if there was a difference in POW pay received or personal money retained between officers and enlisted persons and what effect these factors might have had on chances for survival.

The thesis will also try to determine if officers and enlisted persons were punished differently by the Japanese for

infractions of their rules and also see what standards of discipline the Americans established themselves, who administered the discipline, and if it had any impact on survival.

The thesis will examine any differences in opportunities for escape between officers and enlisted persons and see what impact leadership had on attempting escape.

The housing of POWs will be looked at to see if officers and enlisted persons were housed separately and how housing conditions might have affected captivity. Special emphasis will also be placed on the effect of officers having to act as negotiators between the Japanese and the enlisted prisoners.

Other areas to be looked at include any distinctions in medical treatment and availability of medicines for officers over enlisted persons and seeing if differing methods and timing of transporting prisoners had any special impact on the POWs.

The thesis will also look at the differences in work requirements for officers and enlisted persons and see what impact the work environment had on chances for survival.

Another factor that will be examined is the existence of any peculiar leadership problems caused by differing treatment standards which might not have existed otherwise.

The thesis will attempt to analyze any known differences in death rates for officers versus enlisted to see if there was a link between death rates and variations in treatment which cannot be attributed to normal factors such as age, training, religion, marital status and so forth.

The fluid, non-linear nature of warfare predicted in Army Field Manual 100-5 for future battles will almost certainly result in Americans becoming prisoners.

Established and recognized differences have always existed between officers and enlisted persons. Many of these differences may be based on traditions established when it was believed that officers were commissioned from nobility and soldiers from the poor and uneducated masses.[5]

These traditional roles developed into the formal legal requirements of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and various military regulations which outline distinct differences in authority, responsibility and courtesy between officer and enlisted persons. These legal distinctions, though perhaps different from previous codes and unwritten rules, still allow many social, educational and professional class separations to remain even while the gulf between enlisted persons and officers may be narrower than ever before.

It has long been recognized that as rank and responsibility increase, military personnel usually receive increased pay, benefits, authority and prestige. Perquisites and prerogatives are a recognized form of rewarding those who are successfully climbing their organizational ladders - be they civilian or military. The term, "Rank Has its Privileges," is universally recognized by officers and enlisted persons in all services. It generally describes what our military society accepts and <u>expects</u> for its progressing leaders. The fringe

benefits that accompany positions of higher rank and responsibility may serve to signal to all the status attained and deference required of the position now occupied.

Very few would question that an officer needs absolute authority, and should feel responsibility, in order to maintain good order and discipline in demanding combat conditions. Lawful orders must be obeyed quickly to ensure the mission is accomplished properly and with the least amount of friendly casualties. Subordinates of all ranks trust that their leaders are technically and tactically proficient and able to make sound decisions under pressure. To accomplish these objectives, officers are given the same authority in peace that they must have in war. With this authority comes a tremendous responsibility to care for the assets placed in the leader's hands. This not only includes millions of dollars of sophisticated equipment, but also the asset given to the leader by the mothers and fathers of our country - their sons and daughters.

Distinctions in rank, with accompanying benefits, are necessary for good order and discipline in units during peace and war. They are a functional necessity that the organization needs in order to meet its missions. However, these distinctions may not transfer so easily when service members become prisoners of war. When service persons are taken prisoner they are often separated into various groups. These groups are usually organized by rank, citizenship, race, sex, branches of service,

or organizational duties. An example of the latter were the German Stalags for ground forces prisoners and Oflags for Air Corps prisoners. In most cases, unit distinctions break down very quickly and enlisted prisoners do not always find themselves being led by those who commanded them prior to surrender. The authority of the officers in these situations is based on rank alone and not necessarily by a formal assumption of command order or a recognized chain of command. Military members are trained to defer to any higher rank, but unit cohesion and integrity often cause service persons to give lesser regard to officers outside their specific branch of service or skill.

While the conditions of combat are often brutal, and officers make life-and-death decisions for their subordinates, service personnel still have a measure of freedom and are not entirely dependent on their leaders for their well-being and survival. If they feel themselves being taken advantage of or being unlawfully repressed, they can seek assistance from higher commanders to solve their problems. Prisoners of war, on the other hand, have no immediate legal recourse beyond the senior officer in the camp. Distinctions in rank, if used to the advantage of the person most senior, can translate to life for some and death for others on the battlefield or in a prison camp.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine any differences in treatment between enlisted and officer POWs held by the Japanese in WWII and determine if these distinctions had any

major impact on the prisoners. The study will cover not only distinctions required of the Japanese under international law, but also distinctions allowed by the officers themselves by virtue of higher rank. By doing this, it is hoped that this thesis will allow military and civilian leaders a greater insight into how existing rules, codes, and conventions might affect the treatment of future prisoners of war. It is also hoped that this study will illuminate how officer and enlisted prisoners have responded in the past, and will likely respond in the future, to the difficult leadership challenges POWs have to face.

Some assumptions will be necessary in this work. This thesis will focus on all American military persons taken prisoner by the Japanese in the Pacific theater of operations from the attack on Pearl Harbor until the war ended. It is assumed that the prisoners taken at the surrender of the Philippines were already suffering from disease and malnutrition when captured. It is assumed that Americans taken prisoner later in the war were predominantly from the U.S. Army Air Corps and therefore contained a higher percentage of officers. It is also assumed that most prisoners taken after the surrender of the Philippines were in better physical condition at the time of capture than prisoners taken earlier. It is assumed that prisoners captured later in the war fared better than earlier POWs because they avoided the Death March and the disease-infested camps on the Philippines. The duration of their confinement was shorter

and it is possible that those captured later were treated better as the Japanese realized they were losing the war. These assumptions should not alter the nature of how officer and enlisted prisoners were treated throughout the duration of the war - only the results of any differing treatment.

The term, "Prisoner of War," will be used in this thesis to describe all military persons held captive by the Japanese from the attack on Pearl Harbor to the war's end. The actual definition "prisoner of war" is a legal term which is very broad and includes civilians. While many civilians (men and women) suffered alongside military persons, their story will not be covered in this work. The distinction in the mind of the Japanese soldier between an "honorable prisoner of war" and a "detainee" was based on a strict military code which evolved from the historic Code of Bushido. This became a critical issue immediately after the fall of the Philippines and will be covered in this thesis.

There are certain limitations on this study. Officers and enlisted members may have unique perspectives on their conditions as prisoners of war. Senior officers were often separated from enlisted members in different camps. Because of this, their differing treatment standards may not have been readily apparent to them - it will have to be deduced from their writings. Statistical information varies widely due to the confusion over the numbers of prisoners actually captured early in the war and those who died in the defense of the Philippines.

Additionally, the records were kept by prisoners in harsh conditions under trying circumstances. These records may have been produced under duress and in some cases falsified to satisfy Japanese requirements.[6] Because of this, exact statements of fact based on these records are not always possible. Nevertheless, they should establish parameters and trends. Finally, the distinctions in rank between officers and enlisted persons which may have resulted in differing treatment standards for prisoners of war needs to be evaluated against the social background of the period and not by current standards.

This thesis will cover only American military prisoners of war held by the Japanese throughout the Far East during WWII. Some comparative information may be included on how the Japanese treated officers and enlisted prisoners from other countries to determine if treatment standards varied between countries. Unfortunately there is not enough time to study in any detail the effects of harsh treatment by the Japanese on the Filipino POWs who stood by the side of Americans throughout the war and died in numbers far exceeding American deaths in the POW camps.[7]

This thesis will not discuss American POWs held by the Germans or POWs held since WWII. While it is likely that officers were treated differently than enlisted persons as prisoners of war in Germany, Korea and Vietnam, the time allotted for this thesis does not allow for investigation beyond the delimitations stated above. Other researchers are encouraged

to use this study as a basis for further research and either substantiate or refute the conclusions drawn by this thesis.

This study is significant for several reasons. The most recent rules governing the treatment of prisoners of war in our international society are contained in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, dated 12 August 1949, and the internationally recognized Law of Land Warfare, July 1956. Many nations considered as potential threats today were not participants at this convention and may not recognize these accepted "rules" pertaining to warfare. The United States will likely follow these rules in a future conflict and seek to enforce them on other nations regardless of their acceptance or knowledge of them. Other researchers are invited to use the results of this study and examine international rules to see if they need revising.

Military life does not follow the principle of "majority rules." Most people in the military understand and accept that they are bound by the legal orders of their superiors even if they personally disagree with what they are being ordered to do. But should a line be drawn between authority used for functional necessity, and authority used for the benefit and well-being of the one holding the authority?

Leaders and other researchers are encouraged to examine this thesis and use it to explore in greater detail the ethical questions raised. Critical discussion of the controversial

issues explored in this thesis may prevent ethical dilemmas from developing in the future.

NOTES CHAPTER 1

[1] Jonathan M. Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, (Edited by Robert Considine. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1946), 1-20.

[2] Ibid., 2.

[3] Veterans Administration, Study of Former Prisoners of War, (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C.: May 1980; quoting from Charles Stenger, "American POWs in WWI, WWII, Korea, and Vietnam - Statistical Data", Veterans Administration Central Office, Washington, D.C.: June 30, 1979.

[4] Ibid., 10.

[5] Charles R. Kemble, The Image of the Army Officer in America, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1973), 122.

[6] John E. Olson, O'Donnell - Andersonville of the Pacific, (Lake Quivira, Kansas: J. E. Olson, 1985), 198.

[7] Ibid., 3.

CHAPTER 2

SETTING THE STAGE

Historical Review of Rank Distinctions in America

Before examining the distinctions made between officers and enlisted persons as prisoners of war, one should begin with a discussion on the distinctions in rank which existed between them prior to being captured.

The United States Continental Army had its formal beginnings with the American Revolution. It was made up of a small regular force complimented by part-time soldiers of the state militias. The officer corps of this army was a combination of American gentlemen and congressionally commissioned foreign officers.[1]

General George Washington had great difficulty finding proper, qualified leaders to assume high-ranking positions.

> Washington complained repeatedly about the scarcity of gentlemen in his officer corps and argued that, "they ought to have such allowances as will enable them to live like, and support the Characters of Gentlemen; and not be driven by a scanty pittance to...low and dirty acts."[2]

Washington's attitudes toward rank very likely reflected the common thought among officers of the noble European classes.

Washington was praised by Charles W. Eliot, one of the pioneers of Harvard University who said, "Washington was a land owner, magistrate and soldier." Eliot thought that the modern rich man was apt to possess none of these functions. He said, "Washington was a stern disciplinarian and [Washington thought] that army officers should be on a different class from their men, and should never put themselves on equality with their men."[3]

The success of the American Revolution, however, brought about a substantial change in American thinking toward the structure of its military hierarchy. Since one of the stated goals of the revolution was to abolish monarchial rule and establish a classless society, it followed that the military would seek to eliminate rank distinctions based on class.

> The writings of the military men clearly reveal the mixed tensions created within a traditionally hierarchal order that was operating in a theoretically classless society, but one torn in fact by class division. On the other hand, the officer corps showed decidedly progressive attitudes compared to those of other western armies. They harangued Congress for better educational and recreational facilities for their troops and struggled to dispel the idea that their enlisted regulars were worthless and unthinking derelicts.[4]

With the move toward the elimination of an officer corps based on class, there still remained the difficult task of determining those best fit to serve as military officers. While the trend was toward reducing class distinctions, there was,

nevertheless, a desire to retain an elite, professional officer corps.

> Obviously, rank structure is the primary means of identifying the elite among the military. By virtue of being commissioned, an officer is identified both in his official capacity as well as in his social status....The entire rank system has been legitimized by law, by rules and regulations, and by the profession which has accepted it as the primary means for rewarding its members and selecting its leaders.[5]

For many years the bulk of America's military officers were obtained from the military academies. Even though the official policy was to eliminate a socially elite caste of officers, the U.S. Military Academy was often criticized for selecting cadets from only wealthy or influential families. However, facts show otherwise:

> At this time, too [1842] there was a good deal of criticism to the effect that cadets were appointed almost entirely from families that represented wealth or influence. This entirely erroneous notion is prevalent even at the present day. The records from 1842 to 186[illegible] show that only one-eighteenth of the cadets would have been able to receive in civil life more than the commonest education, while still smaller proportion had any likelihood of income otherwise than their pay.[6]

Major Sylvanus Thayer, a graduate of West Point, was appointed superintendant in 1817. His goal was to select the most highly-qualified men from throughout the country and then instill honor, obedience and efficiency into all the cadets. "Major Thayer created the system that caused the speedy

disappearance from our army of the careless, happy-go-lucky, and often inefficient type of officer who served in European armies during the eighteenth century."[7]

Following the American Civil War the Academy continued to graduate officers who were not divided from their soldiers by virtue of class distinction. The one exception to this rule was the organization of regiments in the army based on skin color.

> For a long time military leaders believed that the ability to command was largely a matter of race or family inheritance, so Blacks obviously were not suited to be officers. Charles Young, the third black graduate of West Point, expressed a similar attitude. He wrote in 1912 that the black man was, "by nature more dependent and has less initiative that his Anglo-Saxon comrade." However, he believed that the performance of the black officers in command of the black volunteer regiments in the Spanish-American War and the Philippine Insurrection had shown that Blacks could command other Blacks.[8]

The establishment of black regiments in the U.S. Army was to cast a shadow on the American conception of a classless military organization. Selection for duty in the black regiments was based on class-standing at West Point with the lowest ranks being sent to serve with these regiments. High-ranking officers, including George Custer, refused to command black regiments and instead took lower-ranking positions in white regiments. Doubt existed in the ability of the black men to become competent soldiers and the officers felt it would be impossible to get

"literate enlisted man" to fill positions of company and regimental noncommissioned officers.[9]

With the exception of the black man, officers were generally taught to look upon their enlisted men as capable and teachable.

> It takes more than clothes to wear, and a place to sleep, and three meals and a dollar a day to make him contented. So, in one respect, the relationship of the officer must resemble that of the teacher in a big university....The character of the American soldier is fundamentally sound.[10]

Officers were taught to develop a family attitude within their organizations with the officer being the father and the noncommissioned officers being the elder brothers of the family. The role of the commander was to, "instill in them [the NCOs] the doctrine of loyalty, superiority, and cooperation."[11] This leadership philosophy naturally assumed that the commander also claimed superiority over the noncommissioned officers as part of the leadership structure.

With the absence of a hierarchical caste system for selecting and promoting officers, the officer-enlisted relationship developed in much the same way as senior-subordinate relationships were developing in business. Officers were cautioned that in their ambition for promotion, "there must be no desire to escape a supposed harder lot of the ranks, and no desire for un-earned honor or adulation."[12]

Rank in the American military organization, therefore, had been designed to serve the same purpose as rank in any organization - to meet the functional necessity of dividing those doing the work from those managing it. But rank appears to have caused difficulties in senior-subordinate relationships during and following World War II.

> Even if the behavior of officers had been a model of self-denial and concern for the welfare of the enlisted men, it is reasonable to expect that the leadership would have been a target for aggression. Army life, for most civilian soldiers, was a succession of deprivations and frustrations, and it is not surprising that the blame should have been personalized and focused on those in authority. Why was the criticism of officers even more acute in inactive theaters and in rear areas of active theaters than in the United States? The most plausible hypothesis seems to turn on the concept of scarcity...The charge which enlisted men repeated in theater after theater was that officers used their rank to monopolize...desired objects. This was not expressed merely in indictments of particular officers....It was an indictment of a <u>system</u> - [emphasis original], a system by which a privileged minority acquired, through their authoritarian position, a preponderant share of the scarce objects which were craved by others....The significant point is not that individual officers took advantage of their rank in certain circumstances, but rather that the army's aristocratic tradition...sanctioned and encouraged a system of special privilege.[13]

It is surprising that a nation which so carefully sought to eliminate a caste system in its commissioning process would later be accused of creating a system which sanctioned special privileges for officers in an environment of scarce resources. If the system caused officers to acquire the "scarce resources which others craved," how much more likely was the system to

allow officers to acquire the even scarcer resources of the prisoner of war?

Historical Review of Rank Distinctions for POWs

Distinctions in rank among prisoners of war seems to have begun almost from the moment of capture. In most historical examples, being higher in rank usually meant receiving better treatment. But, there have been cases where being an officer was a definite disadvantage.

> Could prisoners in classical times who were not ransomed have expected any other fate than death? Mutilation was also practiced by the Chinese, for it is recorded that King Wau, a "just king" who reigned in BC China, although he had the commanders of the captured forces put to death, released the rank and file after each had one ear sliced off. For this he was considered "humane."[14]

An important point which may be overlooked in the above passage is the reference to ransom. Ransom implies that certain prisoners obtained freedom by money paid in exchange for their release. Although there is no specific mention in this reference of officers obtaining ransom more easily than enlisted men, it is assumed that the officers had private funds and resources and therefore would have been the ones being ransomed.

If an officer or enlisted man was not killed on the battlefield after being taken prisoner [as in the massacre of French prisoners by the British at Agincourt],[15] the next

distinction usually made based on rank was on the method of transportation from the battlefield to the holding area for prisoners.

An example of differing methods of transportation for prisoners based on rank was the British campaign against the Turks at Kut-el-Amara in 1916 of World War I. The captured British officers marched two miles to a railway station where they were transported by train for 80 miles to Samarra. From there they continued on foot with one donkey to carry the equipment of every two officers and one donkey to ride for every three officers. The officers took turns riding the extra donkey. The enlisted situation was quite different.

> The first column of our rank-and-file prisoners marched from Samarra on May 22nd and reached Mosul on June 3rd...No transport was provided except a few camels and donkeys for the sick, and the escort frequently used these animals, so that the sick men had to walk or die.[16]

Upon reaching the location determined by the captors for quartering the prisoners, a distinction was often made regarding the accommodations for the officers and the men. During the American Revolution, accommodations for officers were expected to be better and, in some cases, the captured officer became upset if he was given less than his due.

> Burgoyne and his generals, von Riedesel and Phillips, were quartered at a notoriously gloomy inn, named the Blue Anchor....In a peevish letter to Washington's chief-of-staff, he wrote, "After being pressed into Cambridge through bad weather, inconvenience and fatigue, without

> any preparation made to receive superior officers, I was lodged in a miserable public house."[17]

One of the most common benefits of the officer was the ability to offer his parole - or his promise to fulfill stated conditions in exchange for his release. In some cases the officer was even allowed to return to his home country as long as he promised not to engage in any more hostilities in the current war.

> The greatest possible trust has always been placed on a officer's honour, so that those who accepted parole need not wait in captivity until an exchange could be arranged...To break parole was an unforgivable sin...An officer who did so would be ostracized, probably cashiered, and even sent back to the enemy's country to be deservedly confined.[18]

Officers on parole in the detaining country followed written rules such as limitations on the distance of travel from their place of lodging, restrictions from trespassing into fields, the hour he must be in his lodgings in the evenings, and the requirement to observe local laws. Officers reported to a government agency to receive pay and allowances which were used to cover expenses and pay for their lodgings. Letters home were also screened by this agency. Often, investigators from warring countries were sent to ensure allowances were fair based on the local cost of living. This was especially important since the governments repaid each other for the living expenses given to officers. In some cases paroled prisoners even had

girlfriends or obtained wives from the country of their incarceration.[19]

French officers held by the British Empire during the Napoleonic wars were paroled to villages in the countryside. The enlisted or "other ranks," were held on prison ships, or "hulks," or else placed in criminal prisons in the towns and cities. If an officer failed to live up to the provisions of his parole, he was punished by a serving a sentence in a prison or on a ship.

> Failure to obey any of these conditions [parole rules] was punishable by a spell on board a hulk or in one of the prisons. The penalty for attempting to escape was particularly bad, for it involved a spell of ten days in the Black Hole.[20]

The Black Hole was a particularly dank and dark cell situated below the lower decks of the prison hulk. It was less than ten feet by ten feet and had breathing holes so small that even a mouse could not fit through. Ten days aboard a ship under these conditions was usually enough to convince an officer to obey the rules of his probation. Enlisted men, however, experienced these conditions routinely.

> A man had to know his place in society and, if he were an "other rank," or a member of the lower deck, [he] lay within the interior of a hulk or else in the only moderately less uncomfortable confines of a prison. Here, too, came the officers who, in one way or another, had defaulted against the terms of their parole. But, in their case, the sentence was finite. Once they had been purged of their sins, they were allowed back into comparative freedom.

> For lesser mortals, who had not received commissions, there was no knowing when the ordeal might end.[21]

The prisoners of the French during the same period enjoyed similar circumstances. Officers were quartered throughout the countryside and, as a result, cities vied for the prisoners since they received benefits from the government along with the opportunity to obtain favors from the officers' personal financial supplies.[22]

Prisoners held captive by Sweden and Russia during the same time period did not fare so well. While each country provided quarters and clothing for the other's officers, they did not provide a subsistence allowance since the Russian government would not agree to refund it. Enlisted soldiers were housed and worked in such pitiful conditions that, "they died in considerable numbers, both in Sweden and in Russia."[23]

The conditions of prisoner of war camps for officers and enlisted men during the American Civil War were similar to conditions overseas.

> Libbey had senior officers among its inhabitants - at one time, there were three generals incarcerated in this former tobacco warehouse....For the enlisted men at Libbey, the conditions were terrible. Like the French rafales in the Napoleonic wars, the men slept spoon-fashion on a damp floor with no blankets.[24]

During the Civil War, as in most other wars, officers were separated from enlisted men and placed in different camps. Internal organization and discipline was then left up to the

prisoners. In at least one instance during the Civil War, the distinction in rank appears to have resulted in a greater than normal death rate among the enlisted soldiers.

> In officers' camps internal discipline was provided and administered by the prisoners themselves....I believe that this acceptance of authority and maintenance of discipline accounted for the better success on the part of officers as compared with enlisted men...in lessening the percentage of illness and death. There were two other prisons in the town...in which enlisted men were confined, possibly a thousand or more. There was no difference in the quarters and no difference in the food between the prisons; but we understood from the Confederate sergeants that the percentage of deaths among the men were much greater than among the officers.[25]

Perhaps the greatest distinction in the treatment of prisoners of war has been the requirement for enlisted prisoners to perform manual labor. This practice has been common among nations because the enlisted soldiers were not usually allowed to offer parole or effect an exchange. Prisoners of war have been put to work in various occupations designed to replace what they were receiving from the detaining nation.[26]

In exchange for work, the enlisted prisoners received food and clothing at no cost. Officers purchased their own food and clothing from their allowance. The rations and clothing provided to the enlisted men, however, usually were less than that given to the soldiers of the detaining nation.

During World War I the practice of officers not being required to work became an issue since many officers did not return to their own countries.

> Most private soldiers held captive in Germany during World War I were employed by industrialists and farmers....Officers were different. Officers did not work....During the latter part of the war, a system of exchange was arranged. German and British officers could buy themselves journeys to neutral Holland in exchange for a promise that they would take no more part in the fighting. Many refused because they did not want to exclude themselves from fighting.[27]

Toward the end of World War I the practice of parole slowed and at the beginning of World War II had even been banned by many nations. Because of this, officers were expected to remain in captivity for the duration of the war. It is under these circumstances that officers had to decide if they wanted to volunteer for work or just sit out the war with little to occupy their time. At the beginning of World War II it was considered morally wrong for an officer to seek work and, therefore, most officers had to, "have recourse to lectures, classes, amateur theatricals and what today are called leisure pursuits, in a frantic endeavour to fill their time."[28]

One of the common longings of prisoners of war, officer and enlisted alike, was the desire to return home. During World War I, when British officers were forced to remain in camps similar to the enlisted men, the desire often became so earnest that many prisoners seriously considered escape. Once again the distinction of rank appears to have favored the officer in effecting the escape.

> I think most of the escapes occurred in officers' camps. Officers were able to get stuff from England that an ordinary ranker couldn't very well get. We thought, "We're well out of it. We're out of it for good."[29]

Many officers obtained packages from home. In this way an officer was able to have essential items such as maps, clothing, extra food, and perhaps even a compass secretly mailed to him to aid in his escape. Using these items, along with a limited opportunity to leave the camps under light guard, many officers escaped.[30]

When World War II began, many officers discovered that they were unable to leave the camps. Since many did not choose to work, their opportunity to escape was drastically reduced.

International Rules for POWs Governing Rank Distinctions

Although it is likely that officers received preferential treatment during wars prior to the eighteenth century, the first written agreement of major note for America was the Treaty of Friendship made in 1785 between Prussia and the United States.

> It forbade confinement in civil convict prisons and the use of fetters, and required that prisoners should have adequate rations on the scale of the captor nation's own troops, and sufficient exercise for good health.[31]
>
> Officers shall be enlarged on the paroles within convenient districts, and have comfortable quarters, and the common men be disposed in cantonements open and extensive enough for air and exercise, and lodged in barracks as roomy and as good as are provided by the party in whose power they are for their own troops.[32]

Even though the United States and Prussia never went to war against each other, this agreement served as a model

for future prisoner of war agreements between nations. Since officers of the period were allowed parole, the Treaty of Friendship was significant primarily to the enlisted soldier who had to wait for exchange in batches or stay in camps until the war ended.[33]

In 1863, President Abraham Lincoln ordered a study conducted and a set of rules drawn up to govern the circumstances of prisoners of war during the Civil War. The study was conducted by Professor Francis Lieber and became known as the Lieber Code. In April of 1863 the code was officially promulgated as General Orders No. 100 and entitled, "Instructions for the Government of Armies in the Field."[34]

Many of the articles of the Lieber Code outlined specific distinctions made on the basis of rank. Most of these articles were later adopted by other countries in their own versions of the Lieber Code and also by the formal Hague and Geneva Conferences which will be discussed later. There were six articles in the Lieber Code which made distinctions based on rank.

> Article 76 - They may be required to work for the benefit of the captor's government, according to their rank and condition.
>
> Article 106 - In exchanging prisoners of war, such numbers of persons of inferior rank may be substituted as an equivalent for one of superior rank as may be agreed upon by cartel, which requires a sanction of the government, or of the commander of the army in the field.
>
> Article 107 - A prisoner of war is not to assume a lower rank than belongs to him, in order to cause a more

advantageous exchange, nor a higher rank, for the purpose of obtaining better treatment.

Article 110 - No exchange of prisoners shall be made except after complete capture, and after an accurate account of them, and a list of the captured officers, has been taken.

Article 126 - Commissioned officers only are allowed to give their parole, and they can give it only with the permission of their superior, as long as a superior in rank is within reach.

Article 127 - No NCO or private can give his parole except through an officer. Individual paroles not given through an officer are not only void, but subject the individuals giving them to the punishment of death as deserters.[35]

While President Lincoln was adopting the Lieber Code for the American army in the field, independent efforts were being taken to protect the sick and wounded on the battlefields. The result was the first Geneva Conference of 1863. While this was not a diplomatic convention, it formed what later became the Red Cross. This conference led to the Geneva Conference of 1864 where twelve countries signed a convention providing, "neutral status for medical personnel and facilities, neutralization of the wounded, and established the Red Cross brassard and flag."[36]

In 1874, at the instigation of the Russian government, an international conference was held in Brussels. The United States did not participate. The purpose of the convention was to develop a, "project for an International Convention on the Laws and Customs of War."[37] None of the provisions of the Brussels Conference were ratified, but many of its articles

incorporated the ideas of the Lieber Code and were included in later documents. Two articles of the Brussels Conference of 1874 discussed rank distinctions.

> Article 25 - Prisoners of war may be employed on certain public works which have no direct connection with the operations in the theater of war and which are not excessive or humiliating to their military rank, if they belong to the army, or to their official social position, if they do not belong to it.
>
> Article 29 - Every prisoner of war is bound to give, if questioned on the subject, his true name and rank, and if he infringes this rule, he is liable to a curtailment of the advantages accorded to the prisoners of war of his class.[38]

Two other articles of the Brussels Conference of 1874 discussed prisoners receiving pay and obtaining parole, but no rank distinctions were made.

At the invitation of Czar Nicholas II of Russia, representatives from twenty-six nations met at the Hague in the Netherlands on 18 May 1899 to, "define the laws of warfare."[39] Twenty-four of those nations, including the United States and Japan, adopted and ratified what was called the Hague Conventions of 1899.

Eight years later, again acting on a Russian proposal, the Netherlands called a second Hague convention. This conference included representatives of forty-four nations who came with the purpose of, "correcting certain deficiencies in the 1899 conventions."[40]

Articles 4 through 20 of both documents discussed prisoners of war, but only four specifically spelled out rank distinctions. Two articles in both conventions discussed pay for working prisoners and parole, but no distinctions were made regarding rank. The 1907 Conference made only slight changes to the 1899 articles. The comparisons are shown below.

Article 6 - 1899 - The state may utilize the labor of prisoners of war according to their rank and aptitude. Their tasks shall not be excessive, and shall have nothing to do with military operations.

Article 6 - 1907 - The state may utilize the labors of prisoners of war according to their rank and aptitude, officers excepted [emphasis author's]. The tasks shall not be excessive and shall have no connection with the operations of the war.

Article 9 - 1899 - Every prisoner of war, if questioned, is bound to declare his true name and rank, and if he disregards this rule, he is liable to a curtailment of the advantages accorded to the prisoners of war of his class.

Article 9 - 1907 - Every prisoner of war is bound to give, if he is questioned on the subject, his true name and rank, and if he infringes this rule, he is liable to have the advantages given to prisoners of his class curtailed.

Article 17 - 1899 - Officers taken prisoner may receive, if necessary, the full pay allowed them in this position by their country's regulation, the amount to be repaid by their government.

Article 17 - 1907 - Officers taken prisoners shall receive the same rate of pay as officers of corresponding rank in the country where they are detained, the amount to be ultimately refunded by their own government.

Article 19 - 1899 - The wills of prisoners of war are received or drawn up on the same condition as for soldiers of the national army. The same rules shall be observed regarding death certificates as well as for the burial of

prisoners of war [with] due regard being paid to their grade and rank.

Article 19 - 1907 - [There was no change in the 1907 version to this article, but it is interesting to note that the language regarding, "due respect to grade and rank," was dropped by later conventions.][41]

In 1929 representatives of forty-six nations met again in Geneva to correct "inherent faults" from the previous conventions. These faults had been discovered during World War I. The major problem with the 1907 convention was a general "impairment clause" which provided that the agreement was binding only if all the belligerents in a given war were parties to the convention.[42]

When World War II began, the Geneva Conventions of 1929 provided a legally binding document that all signatories were committed to observe. But Russia never signed the document and Japan had not ratified it. Japan, however, agreed to observe the 1929 convention reserving the right to make changes.[43]

It is important to note that this was the first conference convened with the main intent to establish conventions specifically dealing with prisoner of war issues. The 1929 convention did not replace previous articles, but only served to expand provisions which had already been established.

The 1929 Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War consisted of ninety-seven articles as compared with seventeen articles of the Hague Convention of 1907. All of the seventeen articles of the Hague Convention were incorporated with the exception of articles 10 through 12 relating to the release on parole. [Parole was never to be mentioned again in formal conventions.]

> The definition of "prisoner of war" was expanded. Reprisals were forbidden, cruelty was forbidden, work cannot be connected to the war effort, provisions reference food, clothing, and hygiene were considerably expanded. New sections were added reference relations of prisoners of war with the exterior and on penal and disciplinary sanctions and procedures for repatriation.[44]

The principle reason for the revision of the 1929 Geneva Convention was non-compliance rather than inadequacies of the provisions.[45] The major change written in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, and signed on 12 August 1949 was that, "the conventions apply to all signatories and non-signatories if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof." These conventions also applied even if a state of war was not recognized.[46]

It is not necessary to depict the exact changes in the prisoner of war articles involving rank distinctions which were changed from 1907 to 1929. It should be apparent that each convention built upon the previous one and a comparison of the changes made in 1949 to the 1929 convention should adequately show this expansion.

> Article 4 - 1929 - Differences of treatment between prisoners are permissible only if such differences are based on the military rank, the state of physical or mental health, the professional abilities, or the sex of those who benefit from them.
>
> Article 16 - 1949 - Taking into consideration the provisions of the present [1949] Convention relating to rank and sex, and subject to any privileged treatment which may be accorded to them by reason of their state of health, age or professional qualifications, all prisoners of war shall be treated alike by the detaining power, without any adverse distinction based on race, nationality, religious

belief or political opinions[47] or any other distinctions founded on similar criteria.

It is very clear from the above articles that some distinctions were still based on rank. No significant change was made to the clause, however, additions were made covering race and so on. It has been left up to the individual countries exactly how they would apply preferential treatment based on rank.

Article 5 - 1929 - Every prisoner of war is required to declare, if he is interrogated on the subject, his true names and rank, or his regimental number. If he infringes this rule, he exposes himself to a restriction of the privileges accorded to prisoners of his category.

Article 17 - 1949 - [The wording of the 1949 article is basically the same, but much more wordy. Later articles, however, spell out exactly what privileges would be relinquished.]

Article 21 - 1929 - At the commencement of hostilities, belligerents shall be required reciprocally to inform each other of the titles and ranks in use in their respective armed forces, with the view of ensuring equality of treatment between the corresponding ranks of officers and persons of equivalent status...Officers and persons of equivalent status shall be treated with due regard to their rank and age.

Article 43 - 1949 - Upon the outbreak of hostilities, the parties to the conflict shall communicate to one another the titles of all the persons mentioned in Article 4 of the present [1949] Convention, in order to ensure equality of treatment between prisoners of equivalent rank.

The major reason for the above change was because of the numerous difficulties which arose during World War II regarding the use of noncommissioned officers as laborers.

Since the original convention only required the reporting of officers, many NCOs were unable to prove their status after their papers proving their rank were either lost or confiscated.[48]

> Article 22 - 1929 - In order to ensure the service of officers' camps [no mention had been made prior to this of putting officers in separate camps] soldier prisoners of war of the same armed forces, and as far as possible speaking the same language, shall be detached for service therein in sufficient numbers, having regard to the rank of the officers and persons of equivalent status.
>
> Officers and persons of equivalent status shall procure their food and clothing from the pay to be paid to them by the Detaining Power. The management of a mess by officers themselves shall be facilitated in every way.
>
> Article 44 - 1949 - Officers and prisoners of equivalent status shall be treated with the regard due to their rank and age.
>
> In order to ensure service in officers' camps, other ranks [enlisted persons] of the same armed forces who, as far as possible, speak the same language, shall be assigned in sufficient numbers, account being taken of the rank of officers and prisoners of equivalent status. Such orderlies shall not be required to perform any other work.

It is important to point out that no previous convention specifically called for the separation of officers into separate camps. Since separate accommodations were generally provided during World War II, no specific clause was inserted in 1949.[49] The most important addition in the 1949 article was the added sentence which stated that the orderlies would not be required to perform any additional work. As will be shown later in this thesis, the absence of this sort of clause in the 1929 convention

resulted in major problems in prisoner of war camps in the Far East during World War II.

> Article 45 - 1949 - Prisoners of war other than officers and prisoners of equivalent status shall be treated with the regard due to their rank and age.
>
> Supervision of the mess by the prisoners themselves shall be facilitated in every way.[50]

This was a new article added to the 1949 Convention not addressed in 1929. It was written to specifically address the problems encountered in World War II with the noncommissioned officers being treated as private soldiers. It also covered distinctions in enlisted grades between services such as the army and navy.

> Articles 23 and 24 - 1929 - [These articles discussed the receipt of pay and were almost identical to the 1907 provisions.]
>
> Article 60 - 1949 - The Detaining Power shall grant all prisoners of war a monthly advance of pay, the amount of which shall be fixed by conversion, into the currency of the said Power, of the following amounts;
>
> Category I: Prisoners ranking below sergeants: eight Swiss francs.
> Category II: Sergeants and other non-commissioned officers or prisoners of equivalent rank: twelve Swiss francs.
> Category III: Warrant officers and commissioned officers below the rank of major or prisoners of equivalent rank: fifty Swiss francs.
> Category IV: Majors, lieutenant-colonels, colonels or prisoners of equivalent rank: sixty Swiss francs.
> Category V: General officers or prisoners of war of equivalent rank: seventy-five Swiss francs.[51]

This article in the 1949 convention reflects a major change in the manner prisoners were paid. It is important to note the use of the term "advance of pay". In many instances in World War II the pay that was forthcoming to officers was kept in a special account unavailable for use by the prisoners. Additionally this article called for the payment of money to all ranks. Previously only officers were paid with the exception of a small amount being given to enlisted prisoners who worked in order for them to be able to buy sundries. Noncommissioned officers who did not volunteer for work, and enlisted prisoners unable to work, were left with no money.

> Article 27 - 1929 - Belligerents may employ as workmen prisoners of war who are physically fit, other than officers and persons of equivalent status, according to their rank and their ability.
>
> Nevertheless, if officers or persons of equivalent status ask for work, this shall be found for them as far as possible.
>
> Noncommissioned officers who are prisoners of war may be compelled to undertake only supervisory work, unless they specifically request remunerative occupation.
>
> Article 49 - 1949 - The Detaining Power may utilize the labour of prisoners of war who are physically fit, taking into account their age, sex, rank and physical aptitude, and with a view particularly to maintaining them in a good state of physical and mental health.
>
> Non-commissioned officers who are prisoners of war shall only be required to do supervisory work. Those not so required may ask for other suitable work which shall, so far as possible, be found for them.
>
> If officers or persons of equivalent status ask for suitable work, it shall be found for them, so far as possible, but they may in no circumstances be compelled to work.[52]

The forcing of officers and noncommissioned officers to perform manual labor during World War II caused the significant change in wording from 1929 to 1949 shown above. Additionally, the 1949 convention specifically stated what was, and what was not acceptable work.

> Article 34 - 1929 - [This article stated that prisoners of war would not be paid for duties involving camp administration, but would be paid for other duties. This article referred to enlisted prisoners only and did not specify any specific amount to be paid.]
>
> Article 62 - 1949 - Prisoners of war shall be paid a fair working rate of pay by the detaining authorities direct. The rate shall be fixed by the said authorities, but shall at no time be less than one-fourth of one Swiss franc for a full working day.[53]

The differences in pay received by officers in World War II in the Far East, and the working pay received by enlisted prisoners, was substantial. Since prisoners supplemented their diets by food purchases on the black market, it becomes readily apparent that the person having more money had an easier time obtaining food. This situation will be described in greater detail in subsequent chapters.

> Article 43 - 1929 - In camps of officers and persons of equivalent status the senior officer prisoner of the highest rank shall be recognized as intermediary between the camp authorities and the officers and similar persons who are prisoners. [Other camps would appoint a representative to speak in their behalf.]
>
> Article 79 - 1949 - [This article is basically unchanged from the 1929 version except that in the 1949 version the enlisted camps would elect their representatives periodically rather than appoint them. The later article also stipulates

that these duties will be the only duties of the representative.

Article 49 - 1929 - No prisoner of war may be deprived of his rank by the detaining power. Prisoners on whom disciplinary punishment is inflicted shall not be deprived of the privileges attaching to their rank. In particular, officers and persons of equivalent status who suffer penalties entailing deprivation of liberty shall not be placed in the same premises as noncommissioned officers or private soldiers undergoing punishment.

Article 89 - 1949 - The disciplinary punishments applicable to prisoners of war are the following:

(1) A fine which shall not exceed 50 per cent of the advances of pay and working pay which the prisoner of war would otherwise receive under the provisions of Articles 60 and 62 during a period of not more than thirty days.

(2) Discontinuance of privileges granted over and above the treatment provided for by the present [1949] Convention.

(3) Fatigue duties not exceeding two hours daily.

(4) Confinement.

The punishment referred to under (3) shall not be applied to officers. In no case shall disciplinary punishments be inhuman, brutal or dangerous to the health of prisoners of war.[54]

Again the major distinction between the 1929 and 1949 versions is the degree of specificity. Normal military rules do not allow for officers to perform fatigue duties. Also, since these duties would be performed by enlisted orderlies, it would be considered an indignity for an officer to work such duties. Confinement for officers would be in his quarters, but if that was not possible, then in premises apart from enlisted prisoners serving punishment.

The 1929 convention has no other articles with specific references to distinctions between officer and enlisted prisoners. The 1949 convention continues beyond Article 89 with additional provisions regarding punishments. Any distinctions regarding rank in these articles has already been made.

The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War dated 12 August 1949, is considered a legally binding document for the nations who have signed it and to non-signing nations who accept its provisions at the outbreak of a conflict. It has been clearly shown in the past that not all of the articles have been strictly applied by belligerent nations during war, and the only recourse offered to the affected prisoners has been the satisfaction of seeing the offenders brought to justice at war's end. The practice of enforcing the standards after the conflict, however, implies that the one being offended will come out the winner. Additionally, and of far greater importance, it does not restore the losses incurred by the prisoners, and families of prisoners, who had to suffer for another nation's unwillingness to adhere to terms it had already accepted.

History shows that distinctions in rank for officers and enlisted persons have existed for centuries. These distinctions have become formalized in military and civilian codes and regulations and have also been made an integral part of evolving conventions governing prisoners of war. Rank

distinctions are considered necessary in order to maintain the good order and discipline essential to running military organizations in peace and war. Unfortunately, an unwillingness to follow written rules by the detaining power, and a reluctance by officers to follow basic moral values, may have caused suffering and death to the enlisted men who had no power to intervene.

Even if rules change or officers assume a greater responsibility of caring for their soldiers, the treatment of American prisoners of war in future conflicts is likely to continue to be considered harsh.

> The United States enjoys an extremely high standard of living and provides better care for its own military forces than do any of our potential adversaries. Since the Geneva Convention only requires that the prisoners of war be accorded treatment equal to that provided the armed forces of the capturing state, that treatment will be deficient in the eyes of the American public.[55]

NOTES CHAPTER 2

[1] Larry H. Addington, The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 13.

[2] Charles Robert Kemble, The Image of the Army Officer in America, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1973), 21-22. Kemble was quoting Washington from "To The President of Congress," in Millis, American Military Thought, pp. 9-10.

[3] Ibid., 138. Kemble was quoting from, Charles W. Eliot, Four American Leaders, (Boston: American Unitarian Association, 1907), 35-53.

[4] Ibid., 122.

[5] Sam C. Sarkesian, The Professional Army Officer in a Changing Society, (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1975), 165.

[6] H. Irving Hancock, Life at West Point, (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, The Knickerbocker Press, 1902), 15.

[7] Ibid., 8-9.

[8] Marvin Fletcher, The Black Soldier and Officer in the United States Army, 1891-1917, (Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1974), 62-63.

[9] Ibid., 60.

[10] Arthur Harrison Miller, Leadership, (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, The Knickerbocker Press, 1920), 60.

[11] Ibid., 91.

[12] Arthur Vollmer, How to Become an Officer U.S. Army, (New York: Hastings House Publishers, 1941), xiii.

[13] Samuel A. Stouffer., et al., The American Soldier, 2 vols. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1949), 1: 367-369; 373.

[14] Patrick Robert Reid, Prisoner of War, (New York: Beaufort Books Publishers, 1984), 17.

[15] Richard Garrett, P.O.W., (London: David & Charles Publishers, Ltd., 1981), 231.

[16] Reid, Prisoner of War, 80-81.

[17] Garrett, P.O.W., 46.

[18] Reid, Prisoner of War, 35.

[19] Garrett, P.O.W., 49-56.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid., 61.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid., 97-98.

[24] Ibid., 88-89.

[25] Reid, Prisoner of War, 117-118. Reid is quoting from George Putnam's book, A Prisoner of War in Virginia.

[26] Ibid., 154.

[27] Garrett, P.O.W., 117-118.

[28] Reid, Prisoner of War, 163.

[29] Garrett, P.O.W., 111-112. Garrett is quoting from a diary of Mr. L. G. B. Eastwood who was a corporal in the English Border Regiment and confined at Giessen, Germany, during the First World War.

[30] Ibid., 124.

[31] Reid, Prisoner of War, 35. This treaty has also been called the Treaty of Amity and Commerce.

[32] Leon Friedman, ed., The Law of Land War; A Documentary History, two vols., (New York: Random House, 1972), 1: 150.

[33] Reid, Prisoner of War, 35.

[34] Friedman, The Law of Land War, 1: 152.

[35] Deitrich Schindler and Jiri Toman., ed., The Laws of Armed Conflicts; A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions and Other Documents, (Geneva: Henry Dunant Institute, 1981), 3, 17, 19.

[36] Office of the Provost Marshall General, A Review of United States Policy on Treatment of Prisoners of War, (Washington, D.C. Prisoner of War Study Group, three vols., 1968), 3: 364.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Schindler, The Laws of Armed Conflicts, 30-31.

[39] Office of the Provost Marshall, A Review of U.S. Policy on Prisoners of War, 3: 364.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Schindler, The Laws of Armed Conflicts, 70-75.

[42] Air University Maxwell AFB, Alabama, The Geneva Convention, Background, General Principles and Applications, (Arctic Desert Tropic Information Center, 24 March 1960), 4.

[43] Office of the Provost Marshall, A Review of U.S. Policy on Prisoners of War, 3: 366.

[44] Air University Maxwell AFB, Alabama, The Geneva Convention, Background, 5.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Office of the Provost Marshall, A Review of U.S. Policy on Prisoners of War, 3: 367.

[47] Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of International Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War, The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary, (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 154-467.

[48] Ibid., 248.

[49] Ibid., 250.

[50] Ibid., 252.

[51] Ibid., 305.

[52] Ibid., 260.

[53] Ibid., 312.

[54] Ibid., 464.

[55] Clarence E. Skoien, Prepared to Be a PW? (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 15 March 1973), 22.

CHAPTER 3

PRISONERS OF THE RISING SUN

The Gathering Storm

Distant thunder and a blackening sky usually alerts a good farmer to gather his livestock, equipment and family under strong shelter. He does this to protect the possessions he feels are too valuable to replace. If he is slow, or if he underestimates the intensity of the storm, he will fall victim to the unrestrained fury of nature.

America watched the storm clouds of war gathering on her horizons for several years prior to the start of World War II. Then, like a frantic farmer caught unprepared in a violent frenzy, she vainly tried to protect her belongings at the last hour.

The bulk of the American forces in the Philippines during the months preceding the bombing of Pearl Harbor were part of the United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE). These forces were placed under the command of General Douglas MacArthur hastily called out of retirement. The U.S Army, combined with the poorly-trained Philippine Army and U.S. Navy and Marine

elements, were battered by the full onslaught of the Japanese military in the early months of the war.[1]

The build-up of American forces in the Philippines naturally included both officers and enlisted men. By 30 November 1941, only one week prior to Japan's invasion, they were divided as follows:

U.S. Units in the Philippine Islands, 30 November 1941[2]

Units on Luzon:

Unit	American Officers	American Enlisted
Hq USAFFE	61	0
Hq and Hq Co Det Phil Dept	249	304
Hq N Luzon Force	38	0
Hq S Luzon Force	10	0
Philippine Division	517	1,807
26th Cavalry	55	0
43d Infantry	15	0
86th FA Regt	22	0
88th FA Regt	34	0
808th MP Co	5	155
192d Tank Bn	36	552
194th Tank Bn	36	374
200th CA AA	77	1,732
Air Corps	669	4,940
Total on Luzon	1,824	9,864

Units on Corregidor and Other Islands:

Unit	American Officers	American Enlisted
Hq Visayan-Mindanao Force	9	0
Harbor Defenses	335	3,318
U.S. Naval Personnel[3]	172	2,126
Total	516	5,444

Units Divided Between Luzon and Corregidor:

Unit	American Officers	American Enlisted
Service Detachments		
Quartermaster Corps	38	487
Medical Dept	187	507

Unit	American Officers	American Enlisted
Ordnance Dept	40	1,010
Corps of Engineers	29	715
Signal Corps	16	488
Chemical Warfare Dept	5	224
Finance Dept	2	21
Other (No unit indicated)	19	0
Total other than on Luzon	336	3,452
Grand Total	2,676	18,760
Philippine Scout Officers	-31	0
Adjusted Total	2,645	18,760

The normal percentage for officers over enlisted in the American army and navy was about ten percent during WWII. The Army Air Corps usually had a higher percentage (around 11.9) since the commissioned pilots formed a larger part of their overall structure. The bulk of the forces on Luzon, were made up of the Air Corps as well as the Philippine Scouts. Both were part of the USAFFE. Since the Philippine Scout units were often led by American officers, the overall percentage of officers over enlisted on Luzon was almost 15.6 percent. The harbor defense forces, naval units, and service detachments all had a normal spread of between nine and ten percent officers. These figures are important in order to effectively analyze the death rates of officers and enlisted men in the various camps.

Distinctions in rank had been a time-honored tradition in the Philippines since America had gained the territory following the Spanish-American War. These distinctions remained as new forces arrived during the build-up prior to the Japanese attack.

> There was a vast difference between the social life of the officer and the enlisted man [in the Philippines]. The officers and a few white American civilians constituted a tightly knit unit of the American upper class who ruled the Philippines in much the same way the British ruled India....The American raj heightened their sense of imperial dignity by living aloof from both the Philippine people and the enlisted class.[4]

Some of the enlisted men serving in the Philippines at the beginning of the war believed that the Army had, "a long-established policy of using the Philippines as a dumping ground for ineffective officers in all branches. Nothing important was going to happen there....We got castoffs from a corps that contained too many incompetents."[5]

This belief may or may not have been widespread among the enlisted soldiers serving in the Philippines. Nevertheless, some soldiers felt that the greatest burden the Americans faced at the beginning of the war was more than just an unpreparedness for conflict.

> When the war alarm sounded in December 1941, the problem was not that the war came before the U.S. Army in the Philippines was ready; it would never have been ready. The Army's severest handicap...was not a scarcity of manpower and materiel, but the officer class's anguish over the loss of a way of life based on overconfidence and a sense of superiority.[6]

The invasion of the Philippines by Japan forced General MacArthur to implement war plans for the defense of the islands. War Plan Orange 3 called for the steady withdrawal of forces into the Bataan peninsula and a strong defense in

the harbor anchored by the fortress on Corregidor Island in Manila Bay. The defenses needed to hold until reinforcements arrived from the states. No reinforcements were forthcoming, partly due to the destruction of a large part of the navy in Hawaii, and a greater priority of scarce assets going to aid allies in Europe. In less than one month General MacArthur placed the soldiers on half rations to conserve the dwindling supply of food for as long as possible.[7]

MacArthur understood that the defense of the Philippines relied on a successful delaying action on Bataan and the retention of the fortress on Corregidor until help came from outside. Because of this, on 24 December 1941, he ordered his quartermaster, Brigadier General Charles Drake, to stockpile enough food in the tunnels of Corregidor to feed 10,000 men for six months. This left the men on Bataan only about, three-thousand tons of canned meat and fish.[8] This amount would allow each of the approximately 70,000 American and Filipino troops each to have less than one-half a pound of food per day for 180 days. Unfortunately the distribution system left a lot to be desired and many soldiers found themselves left to scrounge in order to survive.

Conditions on Bataan soon became desperate. The lack of food and intense combat began to wear the men down as they battled and fell back before the thousands of Japanese troops.

> If we had had something in our bellies, some hope that we could expect from the United States, things might have

> been a little more endurable. But our perpetual hunger, the steaming heat by day and night, the terrible malaria for which we did not have enough quinine, and the moans of the wounded, were terribly hard on the men.[9]

Eventually the men were forced to eat the horses of the 26th Cavalry.[10] When these were gone they ended up eating anything they could find including insects, snakes, lizards, and monkeys.

The officers on the Philippines prior to the invasion of the Japanese received more food than the enlisted men and Filipinos. The daily food issue during peacetime was, "seventy-one ounces for American troops and sixty-four ounces for Filipinos, with the officers receiving slightly larger rations."[11] This quote implies that the officers received slightly more rations than either the American troops or their Filipino counterparts. The Filipino was used to living on a slightly more austere ration than his white American counterpart. Americans are generally not accustomed to eating rice as the predominant staple in their diet. There is no explanation other than rank preference for the officers receiving larger portions.

In at least one instance during the battle to retain Bataan, officers were given more rations than the men in order for them to be able to complete their jobs.

> Then on March 27 they started a training table for the remaining twenty-five pilots. We began eating all the extra food there was around, so we'd be in shape if we got some extra planes in. If they expected us to fly without killing ourselves, they had to give us more food. The new chow was plenty good. I couldn't help feeling sorry for the

men that didn't get it and had to watch us eat. I could hardly look them in the face. Some men were so weak, their food had to be carried to them. It was not unusual for men to keel over waiting in the chow line.[12]

The additional rations issued to the pilots were sent to Bataan from Corregidor by orders of General MacArthur. There was enough extra food for the twenty-five fliers for ten days. These rations were issued less than a month before the surrender of forces on Bataan and had an impact on the pilots' chances for survival during the Death March. "The food worked a miracle almost overnight. Because of it, those favored pilots did much better that the other men during the Death March from Bataan, which was just ahead."[13] There is no other evidence that the command structure endorsed the issue of food based on rank. There is ample evidence, however, to suggest that these pilots played a key role in providing intelligence on Japanese unit movements as well as providing some long range offensive firepower to assist in the defense of Luzon. General MacArthur made a conscious decision to allow favoritism in this instance for the good of the command.

Major General Jonathan Wainwright was called to Corregidor in early March and given command of the renamed United States Forces in the Philippines (USFIP) by General MacArthur who had been ordered by President Roosevelt to Australia. One of the first orders Wainwright issued to his new command was the transfer of some of the stockpiled food on Corregidor to Bataan.

> Beginning with my arrival on the Rock, I began parceling out some of that food to Bataan. But it was little more than a crumb for the 70,000 starving men over there. Yet the shipments cut into Corregidor's stock to a point where I figured - at the start of the battle for the Rock - that our 11,000 defenders would consume it all by June 20, 1942, on less than half rations.[14]

Corregidor fell on 6 May 1942, almost six weeks before the date given for the consumption of the food. Some accounts showed that the starving Bataan defenders had been unaware of the amount of food stored on the Rock. This food ultimately fell into Japanese hands. Rumors of the lost cache reached some of them in their prison camps.

> The Japanese couldn't understand why we were in such a state of starvation at the time of surrender, and yet there were tons of food stored on Corregidor. That's something we would all like to have explained to us....There was no reason for stinted rations, nor was there any reason why the Bataan troops should not have food up to the very last. There were field rations by the thousands, carabao and mule meat, bulk canned food-stuffs, all stored in tunnels.[15]

The officers and men on Bataan who did not receive extra rations from Corregidor were forced to fend for themselves. Most of the Air Corps personnel had been reorganized to fight as infantry since their planes had been destroyed in the initial Japanese attack. Accounts of the struggle to find food on Bataan include many examples of units banding together to care for one another. Unfortunately there were some accounts of officers who used their rank and status to obtain rations for themselves over their men.

> One day our CO [commanding officer] got on the radio and told our tank crews that the mess sergeant had a big pan of baked beans waiting for them when they came back. Everyone on the net heard him and those rear-area officers came flocking in like flies on a turd....Our CO, course, invited the colonel to help himself. Then it was seconds, thirds and fourths. The tanks came in around 4:00 p.m. There were a few beans left in the pan where they had burned onto the side so hard the officers couldn't scrape them loose with their spoon...The crews looked at the pan and just quietly walked away.[16]

When a person is hungry he will likely go to great lengths to satisfy that hunger. This example shows that a few officers did not feel morally bound to ensure their men were fed before them. By today's standard this would be considered unacceptable. Officers take pride in being the last person in the unit to eat. The reaction of the tank crews, however, would suggest that they were used to being taken advantage of by their officers.

The conduct of the officers at the bean pot may have been excused as simply "first come first served," but another account shows that even some of the pilots who received extra rations took advantage of their troops regarding food.

> We knew that our officers were trading cartons of our cigarettes to some of the boat crews for sugar, fruit juices, and jam. None of this, however, was ever seen on our table. Eventually, a discussion came up as to why this was the case. One of the officers finally admitted that they had eaten some of it and the rest was in their tent. He said further that before they would let us have it, they would dump it in the Bay. Paddy Clawson laid his .45 on the table and told the lieutenant to think about that before he did it. The rest of the food was divided with us soon afterwards.[17]

By the night of 8 April 1942, most of the defenders of Bataan were in a starved, defeated condition. Unit integrity had broken down and many men had divided themselves into small groups to try and evade the Japanese troops. Most had not eaten for days. An earthquake, coupled with the massive blasts coming from the ammunition dumps being destroyed, combined to produce an atmosphere of terror and resignation. Some officers simply abandoned their men in the darkness.

> During the night [8 April 1942], a group of officers came through the heavy brush. Fourteen of them. I counted. Some were from my unit. They urged me to go with them to Corregidor. I told them I couldn't abandon, nor could they, the men we were leading. We argued back and forth, and I told them that if I survived the war I'd make sure that each of them was court-martialed. It made no difference, and they left before dawn to find a boat that would take them to Corregidor.[18]

Approximately 2,000 people made it to Corregidor that night. They included American troops, Filipino soldiers and civilians all trying to escape the advancing Japanese soldiers. Many drowned in the bay or were shot by Japanese planes as they tried to swim to the island that was easily visible but agonizingly far away.

The remaining men on Bataan were surrendered to the Japanese by Major General Edward P. King who had replaced General Wainwright in command of the Luzon forces. The surrender was official at 5:00 a.m., 9 April 1942.[19] The American and Filipino forces on Bataan, thinking their long nightmare was almost over,

were about to be swept into the raging hurricane of Japanese vengence called the Bataan Death March.

The Death March

The experience of being captured by the Japanese varied from soldier to soldier. Some were rounded up in small groups by bayonet-wielding Japanese soldiers who shouted at them and slapped them when they did not obey their incoherent jabbering. Others gathered by the thousands around the town of Mariveles on the southern tip of Bataan. The exact number of Americans and Filipinos captured is only a guess.

> Because of the chaos that followed the disintegration of the Luzon Force, it is impossible even today to give a precise number to the men who took part in the march out of Bataan....An educated guess, however, puts 62,000 Filipinos and 10,000 Americans on the march.[20]

The surrendering American forces on Luzon contained many officers from the rank of major general to second lieutenant. There were no distinctions in rank initially. All men, officers and enlisted alike, were treated brutally as the Japanese began moving them north and out of the way of advancing forces bent on crushing the remaining American resistance on Corregidor. The tired, hungry, wounded and sick Americans and Filipinos were gathered into groups of about one thousand each to begin the sixty-mile march to Camp O'Donnell.

And, "...for the first time in history, numbers of American generals were walking toward a prison camp."[21]

Some groups attempted to maintain unit cohesion at the start of the march so that the officers could attempt to intercede on behalf of their men. They learned very quickly, however, that the Japanese had no respect for rank nor age among the Americans.

> Whether by accident or by design we had just been put...across the road from a pile of canned and boxed food. We were famished, but it seemed worse than useless to ask the Japs for anything. An elderly American colonel did, however. He crossed the road and after pointing to the food and to the drooping prisoners, he went through the motions of eating. A squat Jap officer grinned at him and picked up a can of salmon. Then he smashed it against the colonel's head, opening the American's cheek from eye to jawbone. The officer staggered and turned back toward us, wiping the blood off.[22]

The enlisted soldiers in the group must have been astonished to see their leader being treated so harshly by a junior-ranking Japanese officer. The men expected to be roughed up a bit by the Japanese, but most of them knew the provisions of the Geneva Convention forbade this sort of treatment. It must have been disheartening for the enlisted soldiers to see their officers being treated in such a manner. They must have thought that if the Japanese treated American officers so badly, what chance would they have?

In some cases the officers were separated from the enlisted men and placed into groups with, "the colonels together,

majors together, and so on."[23] But usually the officers were just grouped together with the enlisted men to slowly trudge along the dusty road under the merciless sun.

Most of the prisoners on the Death March were searched and personal belongings taken by the Japanese enlisted guards. This often occurred during short breaks where fresh guards were exchanged along the route. Some of the officers were carrying a substantial sum of money which was quickly discovered by the guards. Eventually the officers and men of the Death March would discover that the loss of their personal possessions would have a dramatic impact on their chances for survival.

> While we were sitting there in the sun getting ripe, a Jap interpreter walked through the group. He was a 'Frisco Nip who could talk English like any American. He dumped out one officer's musette bag. It was packed full of money. He gave it a kick and scattered it around. He said, "Where the hell do you think you are going, to a whorehouse?"[24]

The Japanese ruthlessly pushed their prisoners to the north only stopping them to allow advancing trucks to pass on their way south. Thick dust was churned up and choked the men. Occasionally, Japanese soldiers would lean from the trucks and smash a prisoner in the head with a rifle butt if he was too slow in getting out of reach. No water or food was given to the prisoners during the first few days of the march.

> That night when we stopped, most of us had had no water all day....My small group was made up of some senior officers, even a few colonels....Most of these officers did not have canteens, but I spotted an old pail, and since

> I was only a captain, I went over to get it. [The bucket had manure in it, but he was told to ignore it.] There wasn't much water in the pail, but it was something. Lille [Colonel Edmund Lille] told us we could each have only one mouthful before we passed the pail to the next man. In those days an officer's word meant something, so that's just what we did. Each of us took one full gulp. That way there was enough for everyone.[25]

Many soldiers were not lucky enough to find a pail to drink from. During stops the guards would occasionally allow them to drink from the stagnant carabao wallows on the sides of the roads. Often these wallows contained the rotting bodies of animals and men. Before long many prisoners became sickened with dysentery. They had little choice because without water they would have died of thirst.

> On this last day's march, the guards were shouting, clubbing, and having trouble keeping the column moving at a regular pace....Many [prisoners] had dysentery from drinking bad water that hadn't been chlorinated. I saw one man leave the column to defecate and a guard shot him. Some were bayonted.[26]

As the march continued, more and more prisoners began lagging behind either through illness or simply overwhelming fatigue. Every source with information on the Death March told of the brutal treatment by the Japanese during the march. The Japanese did not allow stragglers and those who fell behind were shot or bayoneted. Rank had no privilege for the crew of Japanese soldiers assigned to "clean up" these stragglers.

> Colonel Campbell, head of our Air Warning Service, was bayoneted through the back when he did not walk fast enough

> to suit the Jap private behind him. He was only one of the thousands thus treated for stumbling or not keeping pace with the killing march.[27]

Some of the older soldiers, instead of facing the "hideous ordeal of marching," chose to take matters into their own hands and end the horror themselves. "To many of the men, suicide seemed the only escape....Hardly a bridge was crossed from which someone did not dive headfirst onto the rocks far below."[28]

There was a disagreement in sources regarding age as a factor in surviving as a prisoner of the Japanese. Some felt that those who were older and had families fared better since they had something to live for. Others felt that those who were pining away for someone back home simply gave up waiting. Some blamed the high death rates among the young men on lack of experience and training and that officers were better disciplined in matters of survival. Regardless of the reason, the young enlisted men ultimately died in greater numbers than the older officers as will be shown later.

The only respite for the men along the march came from sympathetic Filipinos at the sides of the road who, at the risk of their own lives, attempted to hand food or water to the weary men. They often put water in cans in the weeds at the sides of the road. Some men were able to jump out of ranks and take a quick gulp while the guards were not looking. More often

than not, however, the cans were kicked over by the guards and the water left to soak quickly into the dust.

The food the men obtained along the march often was simply sugar cane stripped from the fields during a stop to allow trucks to pass. Some men were lucky and caught pieces of candy thrown into their ranks by Filipinos. Still others were able to reach out while passing a Filipino residence and take more substantial food such as chicken, rice, or carabao meat wrapped inside banana leaves. Occasionally, fights broke out over the food.

> At one of those residences, a Filipino tried to hand me a sandwich, a sort of biscuit with carabao meat inside. Just as I reached to take it, an arm came over my shoulder, and a hand snatched the sandwich out of my grasp.[29]

The two men grappled for the meager sandwich in the dirt until the first, an enlisted man, realized the man trying to steal his sandwich was an officer. The enlisted man got up off the ground and left the officer behind as he, "picked the sandwich scraps from the ground among the horse droppings in the street."[30]

Unit cohesion and respect for rank seemed to dwindle as the march continued. The exhausted men simply looked at the ground and placed one foot in front of the other. They knew that if they quit they faced certain death. Soon it was every man for himself and only the help from a close buddy might

ensure survival. Sick and dying men clung to the arms of their friends until both became too weak to continue. At least one enlisted man was spurred on by a higher-ranking officer, but not intentionally on the part of the officer.

> I was real bad. This MP [military police] captain started looking after me. I was getting weary. He said, "Come on, Kermit." I felt I couldn't take another step....As I went through one of the ranks I looked over and saw old Colonel Garfinkel. I really disliked him. I was over in the Philippines one time before, 1935, and had made corporal, and I remembered that Garfinkel had reduced me. When I saw him now I said to myself, "If that gray-haired bastard can make it, so can I," He gave me incentive. So I managed to keep on chugging.[31]

Each group of men eventually made it to the town of San Fernando after a march of five to six days. Most had received very little water and only one or two meals of rice while being held overnight in barbed-wire enclosed pens which were covered by the excretions of thousands who had passed ahead of them. Flies danced in the air and spread disease among the men. At San Fernando the prisoners were again placed in pens to await transportation by rail to Capas where they were forced walk the final few miles to Camp O'Donnell. Men were dying by the thousands at San Fernando. No one seemed to want to take charge and try and alleviate the suffering.

> The live prisoners in the pen [at San Fernando] were emotionally dead, perfect examples of zombies....No officers, commissioned or noncommissioned, assumed command. Though some prisoners continued to give a helping hand to the weak and sick, by and large it was every man for himself.[32]

The men who survived at San Fernando were jammed into small gauge box cars until there was no room between their standing bodies. The air was stifling and the men who died could not even fall to the ground due to being pressed together so tightly.[33] The ride to Capas lasted over three hours, but seemed like an eternity to the men inside the oven-like heat. Those who survived the trains managed to stumble the final distance to Camp O'Donnell. Although several thousand Americans and Filipinos died along the Death March, nothing would compare to the scenes of death that would afflict them at O'Donnell.

Surprisingly, not all of the American prisoners were forced to suffer the Death March. Some were transported to Camp O'Donnell by automobile and truck.

> The transporting of the small group of Luzon Force Headquarters and the approximately 250 men of the 200th Coast Artillery to O'Donnell, plus the short move by motor of the hundred or more American officers from Limay to Balanga on April 11th, seemed to indicate that there was a bone fide intent on the part of the Japanese to utilize trucks to clear the peninsula.[34]

The first group of prisoners to arrive by truck at Camp O'Donnell consisted of 133 officers and enlisted men of the Luzon Force Staff, Tank Group, and Air Corps under the command of Major General King. These men were quartered in the east portion of the camp.[35] Other senior officers, including Brigadier General William E. Brougher, were transported by automobile and truck for much of the distance from Orani to

San Fernando. Upon reaching San Fernando they were, "thrust into the cattle cars with the enlisted men who had just staggered out of Bataan."[36]

Even some junior officers and enlisted men other than those mentioned above were able to ride on trucks for part or all of the distance from Bataan to San Fernando or even Capas. The inconsistency of the Japanese guards became readily apparent as they loaded some sick men aboard trucks while they were bayoneting others along the road.

> A few hours later a Japanese truck convoy...stopped by our shed [while resting along the march at Orani]. They loaded all the sick, the lame, and the lazy onto those trucks and moved us to San Fernando. Incidentally, at the time they loaded us on that truck I'll have to admit to being lazy. I wasn't sick any longer. I went past my group twenty minutes later. They'd been on the road in the sun a couple of hours.[37]

There did not seem to be any organization on the part of the Japanese regarding the use of truck transportation. Mercy or brutality seemed to depend on the attitude of the guards from one area to the next. Some men who were not even sick were loaded aboard trucks and transported all the way to Capas sparing them most of the march and the awful trip on the cattle cars.

> Midmorning one of the days, we boarded some trucks that were coming back from dumping their equipment down at the staging area for Corregidor. They jammed us on tight until we were like vertical logs. As the trucks went forward, we passed some marching American columns. When these men saw Americans on the trucks they tried to hang on to the

> sides and backs of the trucks. We were moving too fast and they fell off. If they didn't get to their feet fast enough, they were caught and beaten by their guards. A few hours later we rolled into Capas, from where we walked an additional few miles to Camp O'Donnell. A week later I realized how lucky I was. Most of the men had walked, not ridden, out of Bataan. These men, when they began to arrive at O'Donnell, were in just terrible condition. It was hard to believe that these were the same men that I had surrendered with.[38]

The exact number of Americans who died on the Death March has been very difficult to determine. The reason for this is because confusion during the latter days of the battle does not permit an exact count on the number of persons who survived to begin the march. Additional confusion is added by not being able to count the exact number of Americans who swam to Corregidor; were patients in the Bataan hospitals; or were placed immediately on work details. The official estimate on the number of Americans alive on 3 April 1942 has been placed at 11,796. The number of patients in the two hospitals has been placed at approximately 1,575. At least 300 Americans definitely made it to Corregidor. This means that there would have been approximately 9,921 left to begin the march. It is known that approximately 9,300 made it to Camp O'Donnell. Therefore approximately 600-650 Americans may have died on the march or managed to escape and died later.[39]

The infamous Bataan Death March was no respecter of person. All men suffered regardless of rank or station in life. It is unknown, but the percentage of deaths by rank was likely proportional based on the numbers beginning the march. There

is little evidence that a higher percentage of officers over enlisted rode in vehicles. The Japanese allowed very few distinctions based on rank during the first few days following surrender. All of the American prisoners, including General King, the commander of all Luzon Forces, were taken to Camp O'Donnell. It was there that the men began to die in large numbers. It was also there that distinctions in rank began to have the greatest impact on survival.

NOTES CHAPTER 3

[1] William E. Brougher, South to Bataan - North to Mukden. The Prison Diary of Brigadier General W. E. Brougher, (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1971), a quote from the editor, D. Clayton James on page xviii; his source was listed as Operations Report of U.S. Army Forces in the Far East and U.S. Forces in the Philippines, pp. 1-14, Modern Military Records Division, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

[2] Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1953), 49.

[3] Duane Shultz, Hero of Bataan. The Story of General Jonathan M. Wainwright, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), 288; These figures represent the numbers of navy personnel captured on Corregidor at the fall of Corregidor according to an official radio dispatch sent by Captain Kenneth M. Hoeffel, commander of all naval forces in the Philippines at the time.

[4] Preston Hubbard, Apocalypse Undone, (Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press, 1990), 30-31.

[5] Donald Knox, Death March - The Survivors of Bataan, (New York and London: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Publishers, 1981), 257-258, quoting from Corporal Kenneth Day.

[6] Hubbard, Apocalyspe Undone, 40.

[7] Jonathan M. Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1946), 48.

[8] John Toland, But Not in Shame, (New York: Random House, 1961), 131.

[9] Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, 53.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Brougher, South to Bataan, 27-28.

[12] Knox, Death March, 91; quoting Second Lieutenant John Posten.

[13] William E. Dyess, The Dyess Story, (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1944), 61-62.

[14] Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, 71-72.

[15] A. B. Feuer, Bilibid Diary - The Secret Notebooks of Commander Thomas Hayes POW, the Philippines, 1942-45, (Hamden, Connecticut: The Shoe String Press, Inc., 1987), 26; Although other sources confirm that tons of food remained on Corregidor at the time of surrender, no accounts mention carabao or mule meat being present or eaten on Corregidor. Additionally, during the latter stages of the Bataan and Corregidor defense, it would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, to transfer tons of food from Corregidor to Bataan due to the intense Japanese air and artillery bombardment. In any case, Wainwright could not have anticipated Corregidor falling as early as it did.

[16] Knox, Death March, 91-92; quoting Sergeant Forrest Knox.

[17] Ibid., 92; quoting Technical Sergeant William "Cowboy" Wright, 17th Pursuit Squadron.

[18] Ibid., 101; quoting from Captain Mark Wohlfield. According to Knox, close to 2,000 soldiers and civilians managed to escape to Corregidor on the night of 8 April 1942. Others managed to slip through or allow Japanese units to bypass them. Some of them became guerrilla fighters during the war. The majority, however, were captured.

[19] Ernest Brumaghim Miller, Bataan Uncensored, (Long Prairie, Minnesota: The Hart Publications, Inc., 1949), 210.

[20] Knox, Death March, 119.

[21] Toland, But Not in Shame, 318-319.

[22] Dyess, The Dyess Story, 77.

[23] Ibid., 80.

[24] Knox, Death March, 135; quoting Sergeant Forrest Knox.

[25] Ibid., 128; quoting Captain Mark Wohlfield.

[26] John S. Coleman Jr., Bataan and Beyond - Memories of an American POW, (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1978), 81.

[27] Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, 94.

[28] Bob Reynolds, Of Rice and Men, (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Dorrance and Company, Inc., 1947), 62.

[29] Hubbard, Apocalypse Undone, 92.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Knox, Death March, 141; quoting Second Lieutenant Kermit Lay.

[32] Hubbard, Apocalypse Undone, 90.

[33] Miller, Bataan Uncensored, 228-229.

[34] John E. Olson, O'Donnell - Andersonville of the Pacific, (Lake Quivira, Kansas: J. E. Olson, 1985), 167.

[35] Ibid., 49.

[36] Brougher, South to Bataan, 41.

[37] Knox, Death March, 147; quoting Captain John Spainhower.

[38] Ibid., 132-133; quoting Captain Mark Wohlfield.

[39] Stanley L. Falk, Bataan: The March of Death, (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1962) 194.

CHAPTER 4

THE EARLY DAYS

Camp O'Donnell

Camp O'Donnell was a partially completed Philippine Army camp in central Luzon abandoned by the Americans and Filipinos as the Japanese advanced down the Bataan peninsula.[1] As each group stumbled wearily into the camp they were welcomed by an ugly, disfigured Japanese camp commander.

> We were counted, then lectured by the Camp C.O., a retired captain....We were P.W. and at his mercy; we are the eternal enemies of Japan. We have no rank, will wear no insignia, we will salute all Japanese regardless of rank.[2]

It was during this speech that most of the prisoners realized for the first time that they were not yet considered official prisoners of war by the Japanese. Their status as mere captives did not change until late August when most major units had surrendered or been captured.[3]

Following the welcome speech the prisoners were subjected to another search by the Japanese guards. Although there were no distinctions made in rank as to who would be searched, some prisoners said the Japanese took the blankets from the enlisted

men and later issued them to the officers.[4] This practice could not have been widespread since those men who suffered the Death March had already had all their personal possessions taken. Many accounts also said that the marchers discarded everything except their canteens in order to survive the march.

Some American command structure existed as early as 11 April 1942 as members of General King's headquarters and about 250 members of the 200th Coastal Artillery Group arrived by truck. American prisoners were separated from the Filipinos in different parts of the camp.

The adjutant of the command group, John E. Olson, made an attempt to keep a daily record of arrivals, departures and deaths at Camp O'Donnell. The departures were prisoners going out on work details. Most of these men came back into camp from time to time and were counted as another arrival.

RECORD OF PERSONNEL AT CAMP O'DONNELL[5]

DATE	ARR	DEP	DIED	TOTAL	COMMENTS
April					
11	383	0	0	383	(DSR is Daily
12	0	0	0	383	Status Report)
13	0	0	0	383	
14	1,500	0	4	1,879	
15	1,500	0	0	3,379	
16	987	0	4	4,362	Train dead.
17	0	0	4	4,355	Several dead.
18	1,188	0	2	5,544	
19	92	0	1	5,635	DSR 5,636
20	0	0	0	5,590	DSR 5,590
21	832	0	3	6,464	DSR 5,465
22	904	246	1	7,121	
23	423	76	0	7,467	
24	1,255	269	0	8,449	
25	120	0	4	8,252	

DATE	ARR	DEP	DIED	TOTAL	COMMENTS
26	396	259	14	8,375	DSR 8,126
27	56	0	9	8,533	DSR 8,589
28	31	0	22	8,587	DSR 8,545
29	12	0	7	8,612	
30	19	10	15	8,602	DSR 8,609
May					
1	98	0	26	8,602	Total deaths 100
2	0	0	13	8,675	DSR 8,674
3	0	0	13	8,661	
4	41	133	15	8,646	
5	103	99	19	8,635	
6	10	966	21	8,518	
7	9	14	22	7,530	
8	71	70	24	7,505	DSR 7,502
9	104	4	22	7,484	
10	4	182	24	7,560	
11	0	217	32	7,376	
12	0	200	25	7,104	
13	10	0	29	6,875	DSR 6,885
14	0	112	23	6,750	
15	50	253	24	6,523	
16	33	187	21	6,348	
17	55	1	31	6,370	DSR 6,371
18	27	1	30	6,366	
19	122	110	43	6,335	
20	37	56	30	6,292	DSR 6,284
21	28	67	33	6,215	
22	25	306	37	5,896	
23	37	87	44	5,802	
24	83	29	40	5,818	
25	40	5	35	5,818	
26	11	11	38	5,780	
27	239	142	47	5,830	
28	104	49	42	5,892	
29	0	0	50	5,793	
30	33	6	49	5,721	
31	5	3	44	5,679	
June					
1	0	1,500	37	4,142	
2	0	850	22	3,270	
3	0	0	64	3,206	
4	9	2,245	28	1,263	

It is obvious that the record above was made under some duress and the figures do not always add up. Nevertheless it shows that an attempt was made to keep track of people and

general trends can be derived from the figures. The Daily Status Report was a required report given to the Japanese commander. It did not always track with the diary record above because the totals on the report had to equal the official count by the Japanese or the adjutant would have been executed. It must have been a monumental effort to ensure the records were correct enough to fool the Japanese. The record of deaths appears to be the only constant figure on the chart.

Following the official welcome and search the newcomers were turned over to a waiting party of Americans who had arrived earlier. At first the men were separated according to unit and then placed into respective barracks. General King addressed some of the first groups to arrive. "His words were simple and to the point. He apologized to all for the circumstances which they found themselves and shouldered the blame for the fact that the surrender had been necessary."[6]

The term "barracks" is used rather loosely above. Some accounts of the arrival at Camp O'Donnell differ from that explained above. Some said that at first, officers and enlisted men simply moved into the area assigned to the Americans and occupied, "the first structures that appeared in their paths."[7] After the first few days, however, the accounts said the Americans began separating themselves according to rank and unit.

> We were divided into groups by rank and assigned to barracks. My barracks, about fifty feet from headquarters,

had an unfloored dirt aisle down the center. On each side of the aisle were double-decked platforms floored with bamboo slats. These were our sleeping quarters. There were no bunks, blankets, or mosquito nets.[8]

Most of the buildings at Camp O'Donnell consisted of bamboo structures covered by a nipa thatched roof. Many of the huts had fallen in and, since it was the beginning of the rainy season, the gaping holes on the top exposed the inhabitants to the monsoon rains. Some officers, however, were billeted in wooden buildings.

It has been impossible to reconstruct an accurate sketch of the layout of the buildings in each sector and sub-sector. Each had a mixture of bamboo barracks and small wooden buildings. The former were used to billet the men and the latter as officers quarters and Group/Sub-Group headquarters.[9]

The availability of wooden buildings for the officers would have had a minor impact on survival since everyone slept on the floor. Yet those in the buildings would have escaped the dampness of the rain and the mud which accumulated under the bamboo structures. As more and more Americans arrived at the camp the conditions of the sleeping quarters became cramped and even the substandard bamboo huts overflowed with sick and dying men.

Initially, there was plenty of room on the bamboo floors or built-in wooden bunks in the barracks for everyone to bed down. By the time I recovered from my bout with dysentery, however, space was becoming scarce as more and more American and Filipino POWs poured in....POWs who were not seriously ill had to find room under the barracks. Because most of the sick men above were suffering from

> dysentery and the accompanying problems of uncontrolable bowels, and because the bamboo poles that formed the floors had air spaces between them, the shelter beneath the barracks became a septic slum.[10]

The conditions for officers were not much better. During the latter stages of the war, the United States Secretary of State sent a telegram to Japanese Prime Minister Tojo complaining of camp conditions and warning of American retribution.

> At Camp O'Donnell many of the men had to live without shelter during 1942. In one case twenty-three officers were assigned to a shack, fourteen by twenty feet in size. Drinking water was extremely scarce, it being necessary to stand in line six to ten hours to get a drink. Officers had no bath for the first thirty-five days in the camp and had but one gallon of water each to have their baths after that delay.[11]

This account obviously had no impact on the conditions of the men at Camp O'Donnell since they had long since moved on. It does show, however, that the officers were relatively cramped and living in filthy conditions. No first hand accounts ever reported the luxury of having a gallon of water in which to bathe. If this was the case for the officers it certainly was not so for the enlisted soldiers. Water was so scarce at Camp O'Donnell that the only accounts of people bathing were those that stood under the eaves of buildings during a rain storm to rinse off. There does seem to have been a major disparity in living conditions between the officers and enlisted. While some officers felt pity for the enlisted men, many found they could do nothing to help.

> It was a depressing sight to see how our troops were living. They were staying in buildings that had fallen down, with the roofs still intact. They would crawl under these roofs to sleep and try to stay out of the rain or even the heavy dews. Some had holes dug in the ground and some would crawl under the floor of old buildings. They had sore throats, bad colds, malaria, and dysentery.[12]

On the 9th of May 1942, about one month after the prisoners began arriving at Camp O'Donnell, the officers of the rank of colonel and above were transferred out of Camp O'Donnell to Tarlac, another camp farther north on Luzon.[13] The removal of General King and the other senior officers left Camp O'Donnell with only lower-ranking field grade officers in charge. This transfer did not seem to have any real impact on the men remaining behind at Camp O'Donnell, but the senior officers who left were spared the depressing sight of endless burials.

The only potable water available in Camp O'Donnell came from a small number of spigots where the water came out only in a trickle. Vast numbers of men waited in line for up to ten hours holding clinking canteens on a stick in order to obtain drinking water. Although there were reports of officers "monopolizing water buckets,"[14] most officers waited their turns.

> Because of the segregation [of officers from enlisted men], I came into contact with officers only when I was standing in the water line. The only source of water for personal use in the American section was one defective, rusty hydrant where a slowly moving line of men stood most of the day. Rank or class distinctions were never observed at the water line. Officers did not attempt to pull rank to gain quicker access to the hydrant and, to the best of my knowledge, waited their turn the same as enlisted men.[15]

The only other source of water at the camp was a nearby creek. Enlisted men on details brought the water back to the camp in barrels to be boiled for use in cooking the daily rice issue. The water was stagnant and some prisoners heard that the hundreds of dying Filipino prisoners were simply being thrown into the creek farther upstream. Many prisoners also believed that the extremely high death rates among the Filipinos was due to their drinking the polluted water. At first the officers assumed that the American enlisted prisoners knew better than to drink the contaminated water.[16] Not all of them, however, heeded the warnings of the officers not to drink from the creek.

> We marched down the hill to a stream covered with green filth - just a carabao watering hole. To my amazement, the Filipino soldiers, contrary to their teaching by American officers, fell face-forward and drank, pushing back the green moss and brush. Our American group pleaded with them not to drink until they were back and could boil the water....I didn't feel too proud of our own group. Three or four did just the same. A man dying of thirst is going to satisfy that desire and ask questions later.[17]

A guard of American officers was eventually placed at the creek to prevent further contamination of the creek from the Filipinos and to prevent the enlisted men from drinking the unboiled water. There were usually ten to twelve officers on the detail serving for four to five hours at a time.[18]

The drinking of foul water is cited in numerous accounts as being the primary cause for most of the initial deaths at Camp O'Donnell and subsequently at Camp Cabanatuan No. 1.

The foul water caused dysentery which debilitated the men and prevented them from obtaining nutrition from their scant diet of rice. Their bodies succumbed to other diseases such as malaria and pellagra and very soon men were dying so quickly the burial detail was unable to keep up.

Some officers, however, found that by volunteering for the water guard duty, they were able to obtain extra food from civilian Filipinos.

> We always carried a raincoat to the detail. This was to hide the food we got from the civilian Filipinos. The infantry officers had the best of this task, as the Filipinos only came to the river at night when the Japanese guards were not able to spot them in the darkness.[19]

Most of the food provided by the Japanese at Camp O'Donnell consisted of rice, boiled to a tasteless mass of white paste in large iron caldrons. The rice was infested with weevils and worms and contained small rocks. Occasionally the prisoners received small amounts of vegetables in a watery soup.

The prisoners knew that they would not be able to survive on the rations issued by the Japanese. Because of this, many prisoners obtained food from outside sources at great personal risk. The bulk of additional food eaten by the prisoners came from either the water detail or from enlisted work details which left the camp and returned. This food, however, was not always shared equally.

> Trouble with officers at O'Donnell was not unusual. The one thing that just really bothered me more than anything else was the absolute lack of control anyone had over them. And they apparently couldn't control themselves. I think they expected to have the same kind of consideration they got in peace-time. I think, too, that they thought they should have some extra privileges that nobody else had. For example, they expected somewhat better rations. The officers had better contacts with the Filipinos and through that they were able to get better food. Once, when I was out on a detail, I got four stalks of bananas. When I returned to camp they didn't go to the hospital. They went to the officers' mess. That's the kind of stuff I'm talking about. There were large numbers of people who objected to this strenuously. They were going to kill the officers responsible....They were going to get the extra food or get rid of the few who were eating it....I think a couple of officers finally established control and the extra food in the officers' mess did stop.[20]

It is very likely that the officers chose not to go on work details during the early days and therefore were unable to obtain additional food except through the water detail. The enlisted men probably felt that if they took the risk of smuggling food back into the camp, they should not have to share it with the officers. The animosity that developed as shown above is understandable when people are starving. The enlisted men probably felt that all the officers had to do was go out and work and get food for themselves. Eventually many officers chose to do just that.

The physical barriers surrounding Camp O'Donnell consisted simply of four strands of barbed wire and intermittent guard towers. Lighting around the camp was poor and the native cogan grass of the prairie on which the camp was situated came to with a few yards of the fence. Additionally, the creek and

cemetery were both outside the perimeter of the camp fence. The combination of these circumstances naturally draws one to the question as to why Americans did not attempt to escape?

> Why did not many prisoners try to escape? First...was the utterly debilitated mental and physical condition of the prisoners....Second, was the command attitude. General King addressed each arriving group and ordered them to obey the instructions of the Japanese [attempting escape was punishable by death]. In justice to General King, there was little else he could do. The admonition did, however, create doubt in the minds of all as to whether attempting to escape would be construed as desertion or direct disobedience of orders if the American was lucky enough to make it back to American control.[21]

The order by General King to obey the Japanese must have come as a tremendous slap in the face for the prisoners. They had fought the Japanese and fallen back for several months and now they were told to cease trying to resist. The morale of the soldiers and airmen must have been shattered and many must have just quit trying to maintain the struggle to survive.

With little to eat and dysentery rampant in the camp, men began to die in ever-increasing numbers. One barracks was set aside as a hospital, but it was little more than a bamboo-floored hut where prisoners were taken to die. The medicine issued by the Japanese was not enough to treat the hundreds of cases of dysentery present in the camp. What little quinine that was provided was distributed to the doctors based on the number of patients for which each was responsible. The doctors decided to give patients, selected by lottery, a, "sufficient

dose to bring about remission, rather than waste the drug by giving each individual a single noneffective dose."[22]

Some evidence suggests that medical corpsmen stole some of the drugs to sell in order to obtain money to buy food for themselves. One doctor was even accused of selling medicine, but the charges were never proven. Other drugs were also obtained from outside sources by men on details to sell to the dying prisoners who had money.[23]

Unfortunately, many prisoners were unable to obtain either enough food or medicine to ensure survival and two weeks after their arrival, they began dying. Initially the numbers were small - about thirteen per day, but as can be readily seen on the previous chart, by 6 May 1942, the daily death toll was more than twenty and it continued to increase until it reached a high of sixty-four in one day on 3 June 1942.[24]

The dead were taken outside of the hospital and placed under the building until the burial detail could catch up. Most of the prisoners were buried together in common graves without respect to rank. One officer, however, received permission to bury his friend in a separate hole.[25] Occasionally, animosity between the enlisted and the officers even spilled over at the cemetery.

> There was a Corporal O'Brien and a Lieutenant O'Brien. For some reason Corporal O'Brien hated the guts of Lieutenant O'Brien. Something happened and the corporal promised the lieutenant that he was going to dig the lieutenant's grave and then piss on him before he covered him up. Two weeks

or so later, Lieutenant O'Brien died and Corporal O'Brien kept his promise. A week later Corporal O'Brien also died.[26]

The camp adjutant reported a total of 1,547 men died and were buried at Camp O'Donnell. The exact percentage of officers to enlisted men at the camp has not been determined, but a rough estimate can be established using the strength figures at the beginning of the war and the status chart shown earlier. The initial percentage of officers to enlisted men on Luzon was approximately 15.6 percent. Since there appeared to be no favoritism for rank during the Death March, deaths on the march should have occurred on a generally equal basis. Therefore, the percentage of officers to enlisted men should have remained fairly constant throughout the arrival phase of prisoners at Camp O'Donnell. The arrival and departure of enlisted men on work details would have had an impact on the total percentage as well as the departure of the senior officers from the camp, but the overall percentage of officers to enlisted in the camp should never have fallen below the original 15.6 percent. It is likely that the percentage of officers was higher due to the work details. The exact number of officers who died, along with a roster of their names, has been set at fifty-nine.[27] A quick calculation shows that officer deaths represented only 3.8 percent of the total deaths in the camp.

There is no explanation for the disparity of deaths between the officers and enlisted. The same reference above shows that forty-three of the fifty-nine deaths were company

grade officers. The camp adjutant went back to his original records and examined the death certificates and came to the conclusion that death was highest among the youngest in the camp. He noted that he recorded the age on at least 279 of the certificates and made the following chart.

Death By Age Groups[28]
Camp O'Donnell
11 April - 5 July, 1942

AGE	AGE	AGE
17-1	26-22	36-2
18-1	27-9	38-2
19-3	28-15	40-2
20-12	29-9	43-1
21-18	30-19	45-4
22-26	31-1	51-1
23-38	32-6	54-1
24-32	33-2	Total 279
25-47	35-5	

It is difficult to determine the impact of death based on age from these figures because 279 is only 18 percent of the total deaths, and there is no way of knowing the ages of the men in the camp to make a comparison. It is likely that the deaths in the camp were proportional to the naturally occurring ages of the men who were prisoners. But one cannot discount the impression of the adjutant. He was there and it was his impression that death hit the young men hardest.

Naturally there is a fair amount of extrapolation in the figures above, but it should be noted that the officers figures are always best case. It is possible that the

percentage of officers at Camp O'Donnell was higher than 15.6 percent due to several factors: enlisted deaths during thefighting on Bataan; the work details; and a lower percentage of officer deaths on the march. It is also possible that the units that could not be identified as being only on Luzon could have lowered the percentage of officers to enlisted. But it would be outrageous to believe that the percentage of officers to enlisted at Camp O'Donnell was anywhere close to the 3.8 percent of the total number that died. Because of this the only conclusion that can be reached by this author is that the officers at Camp O'Donnell escaped the high death rates by a combination of better quarters, better water, better sanitation, and better food. It is also possible that more officers survived because some would argue they were better educated and had more self discipline.

Due to the extremely high death rates, the prisoners were transferred to another camp near the town of Cabanatuan beginning in June 1942. Almost one-fifth of the men who entered Camp O'Donnell did not leave. All the deaths occurred in approximately fifty days from mid-April to early June. Some enlisted men believed that the officers might have been able to make a difference at Camp O'Donnell.

> In general, the performance of Army officers at Camp O'Donnell was poorer than it might have been. For selfish reasons, I desperately wanted to see aggressive leadership from our officers. I felt that had they made a greater effort, morale among the enlisted men would have been much higher....For example, the superior performance of the U.S.

> Navy officers at Bilibid Prison resulted in a much higher quality of life for all the military personnel there.... Looking back, I am forced to admit that the officers probably could not have done anything to alleviate, in any significant way, the terrible situation there. Officers at O'Donnell, like enlisted men, were spiritless, hollow-eyed men dying of dysentery and broken hearts.[29]

The Work Details

With dozens of American men dying daily at Camp O'Donnell from starvation and disease, many chose to depart the camp on a work detail in order to improve their chances of receiving additional food or medicine. Many of the details, however, were only for short periods of time with the prisoners returning to camp after the task was completed. Some details left Camp O'Donnell and stayed away until after O'Donnell had closed.

In the beginning, the details were made up primarily of enlisted men and noncommissioned officers with an officer supposedly along to supervise.

> The prisoners were organized into companies of two-hundred each with an American officer at its head. The officers went along with the men, but were not allowed to supervise the work. If we could have assigned the men to the tasks, sparing the enfeebled soldiers and shifting the heavier work to the stronger ones, we might have been able to save many lives....But we were used chiefly as interpreters and as butts for the jokes, insults, and abuse of the Japs.[30]

Most of the initial work details at Camp O'Donnell were internal and consisted of basic necessities such as wood-gathering, water-carrying, cooking, and digging graves.

The men for these details were selected by the officers and senior noncommissioned officers.[31] Soon the Japanese began demanding men to work outside the camp and the distinction between privates and noncommissioned officers disappeared. Even officers were sometimes forced to work.[32]

> Most of the larger details had one or more officers. In certain instances the American Group Headquarters [at Camp O'Donnell] filled all or the bulk of the detail with officers and men from the same organization in order to retain unit integrity and enhance discipline. While this was desirable for morale and administration, in a few instances it had one major disheartening feature. Where the Japanese in charge of the detail were arbitrary and merciless, the casualties were high.[33]

Occasionally officers were selected as part of a special work detail designed by the Japanese for intelligence and propaganda purposes. These details included officers being forced to explain their communications systems between Bataan and Corregidor, radio propaganda broadcasts in Manila, and even a humorous search for a fictitious tunnel the Japanese thought linked Bataan with Corregidor.[34] These special details for officers only involved a handful of men who had special skills or were simply the right branch and rank for Japanese propaganda needs. Although the officers were not treated with the dignity their rank demanded, they did have an opportunity to return to civilization if even for a brief period of time.

As time dragged on at Camp O'Donnell a few officers decided to volunteer to be part of the work details.

> The detail that departed on the 16th [of May 1942] totaled 187 of whom 21 were officers, but curiously no NCOs. The answer lies in the fact that many of the officers had become so restless with nothing to do they volunteered. In compliance with the Japanese order issued the first day, none wore insignia of rank, so the Japanese did not know a man was an officer unless he declared himself to be. In these circumstances, there was a chance of better conditions than O'Donnell, so there were those that gambled. Some benefited, others did not.[35]

Most of the recruitment for work details at O'Donnell took place at the water line since the majority of the camp population spent their time waiting endlessly to fill their canteens.[36] It was here that many of the officers volunteered for the work details. It was a risky business for an officer to volunteer to work. As mentioned previously, the Hague and Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War in both 1907 and 1929 forbade the detaining nations to compel officers to work. Because of this many officers felt it would be an act of collaboration to volunteer for manual labor.

> When I run out and volunteered to go on a detail, because I was an officer, they called me a collaborator. I figured, well, forget that Philippine Army commission, dump it down the drain. I didn't want to be charged with collaboration, if I ever made it through. I just quit it right there in O'Donnell. I also didn't figure I was collaborating. I was just going to help myself, because I was ready to take one of them sixteen places in the burial hole and I didn't want that.[37]

The most frequently assigned work detail outside the camp during the early weeks of captivity went to the men who were truck drivers. The Japanese had very few motorized vehicles

and were unable to operate the gear systems of the captured American vehicles. The men assigned to these details made contact with the civilian Filipinos and obtained food and medicines. Some used the detail to help their friends, while others, "became black marketeers and sold precious drugs at excessive prices to helpless dying men."[38]

Even though some of the drivers took advantage of the other prisoners, it was through them that the sick men in O'Donnell learned of better conditions on the outside. Because of this, many of the enlisted men volunteered for work. Some of the details were good and the men were able to obtain food they had not seen since before the war started.

> When this detail ended they shipped all the drivers back to O'Donnell, but they took the maintenance people to Manila. After driving a while it [the convoy] stopped and the guards went into a store that sold candies. They came out with lots of stuff and gave us jars of strawberry jam. I'll never forget it - strawberry jam.[39]

Not only did some of the details receive treats such as jam, some received additional food such as meat and sugar. Because of this, deaths on some details were almost nonexistent.[40]

Some of the men remained on work details even after the prisoners were transferred from O'Donnell to Cabanatuan. Their conditions were so good that they did not wish to return to the main body of prisoners. It is possible that some prisoners remained outside the normal prisoner camps until they

were eventually transferred to Japan. It was a risky business because the prisoners never knew when they would be put under a brutal guard or forced to do dangerous work.

> One afternoon a truck load of forty men arrived from Cabanatuan to re-inforce [sic] our detail. I knew two of the men in the group and immediately inquired about conditions in the central camp. I learned that thousands of men had died and were still perishing in alarming numbers. Then I realized that I was better off being away from the main body of prisoners, for help such as I had obtained in the village would have been impossible in a camp of thousands of men.[41]

The odds outside the camps seemed better, but not all the details were good. Some men were forced into road-building or clearing jungles for airfields. Others worked as stevedores on the docks at Manila. Many of these details were even formed during the Death March. One account told of an English-speaking Japanese guard who ordered all members of the Engineers to move off to the side of the road. These men were literally worked to death doing heavy work such as bridge repair and road building.[42]

One of these road-building details was particularly deadly. Three-hundred men were taken into the jungle near the town of Lipa. Their job was to construct a road after clearing the mass of vegetation by hand. They slept on the ground in the rain and had to build ovens out of river stones in order to cook their food. The men quickly came down with dysentery

and pneumonia. Within three weeks it is estimated that only thirty-five men out of the 300 survived.[43]

In almost all cases the officers accompanying these work details went along as supervisors rather than workers. In August 1942 the Japanese began paying officers. During the work details after August, officers were able to purchase food from the Filipinos. Sometimes the enlisted men on the details who had no money would try and strike up a partnership in order to share the food.

> I soon met an officer...who also had been having buddy trouble and was looking for a new partner. After commiserating with each other, we decided to become partners, agreeing to share and share alike....Meanwhile, a group of Filipino civilians came by selling various food items. Since I had no money, I could not take advantage of that attractive mobile market, but my new partner purchased a whole chicken, fried in pieces and wrapped in banana leaves....When I asked for a piece of chicken, I instantly sensed by the expression on the officer's face that he was becoming a reluctant buddy.[44]

Most accounts state that the officers often remained in the base camps of the work details and took care of sick prisoners. They supervised the preparing of meals and attempted to trade with the Filipinos to get more food for the men. Occasionally the Japanese allowed the men to gather American rations found during the details and use these to supplement their rice issue. On the road-building detail near the town of Tayabas, the prisoners kept their supply of food in a small pen which they made from bamboo and banana leaves. Unfortunately

someone was sneaking in during the night and stealing from the common stock.

> Captain Pierce, the officer most respected by the POWs and the one trying valiantly to establish some measure of internal administration, found that someone was slipping into the food pen at night and stealing the canned goods. One night the Captain hid in the pen. About midnight a figure entered the facility and began picking up the canned goods. The culprit was another officer who had been staying in camp during the day, ostensibly to aid with administrative matters. As punishment, Captain Pierce sent the thieving officer out on the road detail.[45]

The work details from Camp O'Donnell, and later Camp Cabanatuan, proved to be a life-saver for some and a death sentence for others. Even the road-building detail at Tayabas mentioned above where the men received American rations resulted in the deaths of many men. Dying prisoners were taken from this detail to the hospital facility at Old Bilibid Prison in Manila. Commander Thomas Hayes, an American naval doctor at the facility, felt the deaths were caused by, "the ineptitude of their own American camp commanders," and that prisoners who volunteered for this detail to escape Camp O'Donnell were, "swapping the devil for a witch."[46]

Nevertheless, men continued to volunteer for the work details even after being transferred to the slightly better conditions at Cabanatuan because the Japanese offered them slightly better rations as an incentive and it was the only opportunity of making outside contacts with the Filipinos.

Once the officers began receiving pay they generally ceased volunteering for work. The enlisted men, however, continued to work even though the additional benefits usually resulted in a net loss.

> The small amount of extra food was more than burned up by hard labor and long hours. At least, though, they had the mental diversion of getting from behind the barbed wire and away from the depressing environment of sick and dying comrades.[47]

By 4 June 1942 all but about 400 of the sickest men had been transferred from Camp O'Donnell to the camps near Cabanatuan City.[48] But the dying was far from over. More men would die during the first six months at Cabanatuan than from the Death March and Camp O'Donnell combined. It was also at Cabanatuan that rank distinctions appeared to have even a greater impact on survival.

NOTES CHAPTER 4

[1] Ernest Brumaghim Miller, Bataan Uncensored, (Long Prairie, Minnesota: The Hart Publications, Inc., 1949), 231.

[2] John E. Olson, O'Donnell - Andersonville of the Pacific, (Lake Quivira, Kansas: J. E. Olson, 1985), 45-47.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., 42-43; quoting Captain Homer J. Colman.

[5] Ibid., 147-148.

[6] Ibid., 45-47.

[7] Ibid., 51.

[8] Marion Lawton, Some Survived, (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill, 1984), 26.

[9] Olson, O'Donnell, 36.

[10] Preston Hubbard, Apocalypse Undone, (Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press, 1990), 96.

[11] Olson, O'Donnell, 165.

[12] John S. Coleman Jr., Bataan and Beyond - Memories of an American POW, (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1978), 86.

[13] Olson, O'Donnell, 61-62.

[14] Ibid., 91-92; Although Olson made a note in the daily journal entry on April 26th 1942 regarding officers monopolizing the water buckets, he was unable to explain who the officers were that were responsible. He said it was not considered likely that this practice was too widespread since anyone who tried to carry any container much larger than a Number 10 tin can on the march would have had it confiscated. He said the possible owners might have been some of the senior officers who had been allowed to bring their complete field equipment, less weapons, into the camp. In any case, General King ordered the practice stopped.

[15] Hubbard, Apocalypse Undone, 95.

[16] Ibid., 101.

[17] Donald Knox, Death March - The Survivors of Bataan, (New York and London: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Publishers, 1981), 165; quoting Sergeant Forrest Knox.

[18] Olson, O'Donnell, 89.

[19] Ibid.; quoting an incompletely identified Captain Anders who served on such a detail.

[20] Knox, Death March, 163-164; quoting Private First Class Jack Brady.

[21] Olson, O'Donnell, 121.

[22] Ibid., 115-118.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Olson, O'Donnell, 147-148.

[25] Ibid., 144.

[26] Knox, Death March, 163-164; quoting Private First Class Jack Brady.

[27] Olson, O'Donnell, 202.

[28] Ibid., 153.

[29] Hubbard, Apocalypse Undone, 95.

[30] William E. Dyess, The Dyess Story, (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1944), 103.

[31] Knox, Death March, 161; quoting Private First Class Jack Brady.

[32] Olson, O'Donnell, 67.

[33] Ibid., 145-146.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid., 64.

[36] Hubbard, Apocalypse Undone, 106.

[37] Knox, Death March, 176; quoting Second Lieutenant Fred Gifford. Many noncommissioned officers accepted commissions as officers in the Philippine Army during the early days of the war. Some officers even transferred in order to obtain a higher rank even though they were paid at their permanent rank in the American army. Officers transferring back to American units reverted back to their former rank. This was probably the case for the noncommissioned officers, but the informal manner Lieutenant Gifford gave to discarding his commission was probably the result of the prison environment.

[38] Lawton, Some Survived, 30.

[39] Knox, Death March, 176; quoting Private First Class Roy Diaz.

[40] Ibid., 191; quoting Sergeant Forrest Knox. Sergeant Knox stated that on one detail they were allowed to take some rice that had been stored under a pile of wood. The rice was full of worms and weevils, but they put it into a bucket and added water and, after swirling it around, the worms and bugs floated out. In this way they were able to obtain more rice than they could eat. Reynolds, Of Rice and Men, 105-108;

Reynolds stated that on his detail meat was served once each day. They received rice and sugar and were able to buy additional food from local Filipinos. Reynolds said that during the four months he was on the detail, not one man had died.

[41] Bob Reynolds, Of Rice and Men, (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Dorrance and Company, Inc., 1947), 87.

[42] Knox, Death March, 142; quoting Private First Class Blair Robinett.

[43] Ibid., 186; quoting Private First Class Cletis Overton.

[44] Hubbard, Apocalypse Undone, 112; Hubbard said the officer rooted around and gave him a chicken wing, but when he asked for more, the officer, "announced the dissolution of the partnership."

[45] Ibid., 115.

[46] A. B. Feuer, Bilibid Diary - The Secret Notebooks of Commander Thomas Hayes POW, the Philippines, 1942-45, (Hamden, Connecticut: The Shoe String Press, Inc., 1987), 16-17.

[47] Lawton, Some Survived, 46.

[48] Olson, O'Donnell, 151-154.

CHAPTER 5

CABANATUAN

The Cabanatuan prison camp was actually three camps located a few miles to the northeast of Cabanatuan City. The camps were made up of prisoners from three groups: the prisoners from Camp O'Donnell; most of those captured when Corregidor was surrendered; and patients left behind in the field hospitals on Bataan.

> Some of the American prisoners arrived in late May [1942]. The sick and wounded who had remained behind on Bataan...arrived first and were placed in Camp No. 3. The men who surrendered on Corregidor began to arrive there shortly afterwards and its rolls eventually reached 6,066 prisoners....Once Camp No. 3 reached this quota, the remaining 1,500 Corregidor prisoners in Bilibid were shipped to Cabanatuan Camp No. 2, where they arrived around May 31 [1942]. There being no water in the camp, they were moved to Camp No. 1.[1]

The prisoners from O'Donnell began arriving at Camp No. 1 on 2 June 1942. The total number transferred from O'Donnell to Cabanatuan No. 1 has been estimated between 4,595 and 5,850.[2] Camp No. 3 consisted of about 3,500 soldiers and 2,500 sailors and marines. The camp was divided into three groups each commanded by a lieutenant colonel. The groups were further subdivided into four companies of 550 men commanded

by a captain. These companies were then divided into three or four sections (each section being one barracks) commanded by a lieutenant.[3]

Most accounts regarding Corregidor stated that there were approximately 11,000 people on the island when it fell. It is not known how many of these were Filipinos or American civilians, but it is apparent that not all of these people went to Cabanatuan. It is possible that some of the Americans were placed on work details or remained at Bilibid. It is also very possible that some of them were taken to camps in the Visayan Islands and then on to Malaybalay on Mindanao. Some accounts of the Davao Penal Colony on Mindanao stated that approximately 1,200 Americans from the Malaybalay camp joined another group of 1,000 who had been shipped from Cabanatuan in October 1942. Since the forces in the Visayan Islands and Mindanao were made up of Philippine Army soldiers led by a few high-ranking American officers, it follows that the 1,200 Americans who were held at Malaybalay might have come from Corregidor.

The prisoners arriving at Camp No. 1 from O'Donnell discovered that even though the Corregidor prisoners beat them there by only a few days, they were considered the "black sheep" among prisoners due to their debilitated conditions.

> When I arrived at Cabanatuan, the prisoners from Corregidor had already arrived and set up their organization. My experience was that they did their damndest at first to keep me out of their organization. When I arrived, there was what you might call a black market operating. People were managing to get things in from outside. There was

no way that I was allowed to get any of that stuff. If you got a detail that left camp, you could generally get something in the way of coconuts or bananas or sugar to bring back with you. These, of course, were choice details. I don't know anyone from Bataan who, at first, got to go on these details. We got the ones inside the camp. We were the most sick too. That kept many from going out of the camp. We paid a price for that.[4]

The price paid by the O'Donnell prisoners was indeed high. Close to 740 died in the month of June 1942 alone with 130 from an outbreak of diptheria. Between the end of June and December 1942 nearly 2,000 more would die in Camp No. 1. The effects of the Death March and the conditions at Camp O'Donnell took a heavy toll on the weakened men. Of an equal number of men in Camp No. 3, only sixty-one died between June and October 1942.[5] To be snubbed by other prisoners who were in a position to help was the unkindest cut of all. That it was allowed to happen at all is almost unforgivable.

The following is a list of the causes of death at Cabanatuan No. 1 between May 1942 and December 1943.[6]

CAUSES OF DEATH AT CABANATUAN NO. 1

	1942							
Reason	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D
Malaria	151	322	95	69	56	25	5	3
Dysentery	293	392	148	127	114	122	48	19
Pellagra					2	10	37	28
Beriberi					6	9	75	62
Diptheria		19	60	23	3	9	1	
Pneumonia				6	2	2	1	2
Diabetes								1
Malnutrition					20	36		

1942 continued

Reason	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D
Inanition		21	1		2	8	23	
Tuberculosis				2			2	
Colitis								
Apoplexy								1
Avitaminosis					14	11		
Scurvy					5	5	4	1
Tonsilitis		3						
Trench Mouth		2						
Nephritis								
Heart disease		3	3	9	4	5	3	1
Spleen					1		1	
Injuries					2			
Pylitis					2			
Cellulitis		1	1	1				
Cerebral Hem			1	1				
Meningitis				1				
Peritonitis				1				
Septicimia			1					
Jaundice			1					
Gangrene								
Suicide		1						
Cancer								
Atrophy of Liver								
Shot		6			3		2	

1943

Reason	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D
Malaria	1											
Dysentery	1	3						1				
Pellagra	17	1										
Beriberi	28	4	4			2						
Diptheria	5	2										
Pneumonia		1										
Diabetes												
Malnutrition												
Inanition												
Tuberculosis	1			1					1	1		
Colitis			1									
Apoplexy												
Avitaminosis												
Scurvy												
Tonsilitis												
Trench Mouth												
Nephritis						1	1					
Heart disease			1									
Spleen												
Injuries												

Reason	1943 continued J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D
Pylitis												
Cellulitis												
Cerebral Hem												
Meningitis							1					
Peritonitis												
Septicimia												
Jaundice												
Gangrene												
Suicide												
Cancer					1					1		
Atrophy of Liver						1						
Shot				1			1				1	

The total number of deaths on the chart above is 2,649. A few more died after this time, but what is significant is that almost all of the deaths occurred by January 1943. Furthermore, the vast majority of the deaths were from dysentery, malaria, pellagra and beriberi - the very same reasons the men died at O'Donnell. Once again the deaths seem to have hit the young enlisted men hardest.

> Of the men who died during July [1942] at Camp 1, 85 percent were under thirty. Ten percent of the enlisted men died, compared to about 4 percent of the officers. Given the fact that nearly all of the men, young and old, officers and enlisted, had their hopes dashed on the Death March and during their stay at Camp O'Donnell and were weakened by disease and malnutrition, some probable causes for the higher death among enlisted men might have been: they were being tested for the first time; they had no wife and children who needed them; they possessed little or no money or other means to get extra food and medicine; and finally, they lacked the resourcefulness and determination that usually comes with maturity and long experience.[7]

In October 1942 two details left the Cabanatuan Camps. Each consisted of approximately one-thousand men. One group

went to Davao in Mindanao and the other to Mukden, Manchuria. Because of the reduction in prisoners, the Japanese closed Camp No. 3 and moved the remaining 3,000 men to Camp No. 1. The total prisoners left in Camp No. 1 was approximately 8,700.[8]

The water situation in the camps was not much better than at Camp O'Donnell, but there are no reports of enlisted men drinking foul water. That is not to say it did not occur because the enlisted were required to bathe in a nearby river. But, regardless of the critical water situation, once again reports show that the officers were not allowed to use their status to gain an advantage.

> Because I didn't have malaria or dysentery, I was put in charge of the water faucet. The faucet didn't trickle like at O'Donnell, it dripped....If an officer tried to pull rank and get ahead in the line, he was told where to go and fast.[9]

There are no reports or photographs of men showering under the eaves of the huts at Cabanatuan. There are also no reports of river water being used for the preparation of the rice, but this practice must have continued considering the thousands of prisoners needing to be fed. Even though the water situation was critical and the enlisted men were required to march as a company to a nearby river to bathe and wash their clothes, some reports show that the officers were able bathe under showers every other day.[10]

The barracks at the Cabanatuan camps consisted of the standard bamboo huts with the nipa thatched roofs as at Camp O'Donnell, but they seemed to be in much better condition. Nevertheless, the bamboo slats in the floors were infested with thousands of lice and bedbugs. Some of the junior officers devised hammocks to escape the biting insects, but they were eventually ordered by the Japanese to take them down. The junior officers suspected the field grade officers of instigating the order.[11] Most of the field grade officers slept on beds with mattresses while the others slept on the bamboo floors with the bugs.

> Lieutenant Colonel Curtis T. Beecher, as American senior officer, though given little authority by the Japanese commandant, attempted to run a tight ship. Some of his methods and actions were not popular with the POWs. His inspections of the troops, sometimes prior to Japanese inspections, and his demands that unsightly articles be concealed, irked the men. The junior officers in particular resented the fact that beds, mattresses, footlockers, and other amenities were provided for Beecher's staff officers and even for some of the headquarters' noncommissioned officers.[12]

Once again the Japanese only provided rice and thin vegetable soup for the prisoners to eat. One prisoner said that there were so many weevils and worms in the rice that it was, "half weevils, worms, and rocks."[13] He counted eighty-two insects in his single cup of rice, but put them back and ate them anyway in order to get some protein.[14]

The only way many prisoners survived was by obtaining additional food from outside the camp. The prisoners from O'Donnell were naturally excluded from purchasing food because all of their possessions had been taken. Many were in such a poor condition that they were physically unable to attend work details outside the camp. Even those who were able to work were forced to remain in the camp by the Corregidor prisoners.

> Many men brought canned food and also money with them when captured. If lucky they were able to keep this; but, of course, there were many who had neither money nor food. If a person did have money, he was sometimes able to buy such commodities as sugar, candy, coconuts, canned fish, corned beef, catsup, mongo beans, peanuts, chicken, eggs, and canned milk....At first these purchases were made when a detail went out to work. One member of the group was allowed to collect from the rest and buy from a roadside store operated by a Filipino. On return to camp the purchases were distributed pro rata to those who had contributed to the fund. Naturally this left out the men who had no money; however, many a buddy took care of his friend.[15]

Very few, if any, enlisted men had money when they arrived at Cabanatuan. A survey of the men in one group of about 2,000 prisoners showed, "sixty-five percent had no money, fifteen-percent had no shoes, and thirty-three percent had no blankets."[16] Many officers, on the contrary, were able to retain some money. At one point the distribution of food for those with money was even based on rank.

> Another source of food opened when the Japanese authorized the Camp No. 1 leadership to purchase food and

> tobacco from Filipino merchants approved by the Japanese. At first the limited quantities led to abuses. Supposedly at the direction of the Japanese, the foodstuffs were made available for purchase according to rank. In one such issue lieutenant colonels got a can of corned beef each, majors received one can of milk for each four men, and a barracks of captains (eighty-four men) had three cans of corned beef and six cans of milk to divide. They usually divided them by drawing lots among those who had money. The enlisted men's barracks got candy and cigarettes.[17]

The shortage of money and food made the creation of a black market a lucrative, if not dangerous, business. Food coming in from the outside work details and from the approved commissary in the camp often showed up in the black market at exorbitant prices. One officer who survived the Death March, but was left with no money, convinced the operator of the market (a civilian who resisted the senior officers orders to stop) to take his personal check in exchange for food. The arrangement lasted for thirty days and the officer regained his health and managed to survive.[18]

The problem of money was resolved for the officers in August 1942 when the Japanese officially recognized the captives as prisoners of war and began paying the officers according to international law. The pay was to be equal to the corresponding rank of an officer in the Japanese military. Under this arrangement a lieutenant colonel should have received 220 pesos ($110) per month, but the Japanese only allowed the field grade officers to keep thirty pesos per month and 20 pesos for company grade officers. The Japanese took another portion of the money for "room and board" and the remainder of the money

was deposited into a "savings" account to be drawn from upon release.[19]

International law under the Geneva Conventions required the detaining power to pay prisoners who performed work. The enlisted men, however, did not begin receiving worker's pay until late 1942 or early 1943. Their pay amounted to between ten and twenty-five centavos per day depending on rank.[20] With 100 centavos in a peso, even if a junior enlisted man worked six hours per day for thirty days in a month, he would earn only three pesos or one-tenth of what a field grade officer received without having to work.

The major source of income for officers in the camp during the first year, however, was not from the Japanese pay.

> The chief source of income...were [sic] an underground mail system from Manila and personal checks, which were written on United States banks and cashed surreptitiously by Filipinos. The rate of exchange on these checks was one peso per dollar [twice the normal peso to dollar rate], which, of course, meant considerable profit for the entrepreneurs if they could get the checks to America. Inter-camp loans were made frequently to those who had no underground connections, the loans to be repaid upon return to the States.[21]

There are no reports of enlisted men being able to write checks or obtain money from outside sources. Undoubtedly those who went on work details were able to obtain food from Filipinos, but it has already been established that many were prevented from working.

It is very obvious that food was available for sale in Camp No. 1 as early as August 1942 and a person with money who could purchase from this commissary had a much greater chance of survival than one without.

Listed below is a list of items available at the camp commissary. Inflation caused the prices to increase over the months and eventually the prices became so high, no one could afford to buy from the store.

Commissary Costs[22]

Items (cost in pesos)	Aug 42	Jan 43	May 43	Aug 43
Corned beef per can	1.10	1.15	1.50	3.50
Mackerel, 16oz can	.65	.75	1.55	1.80
Purico, 1lb pkg	.35	.40	1.00	
Sugar, 1lb pkg	.08	.15	.25	.10
Sardines, 15 oz	.70	.80	1.40	
Evap milk, 14½oz	1.00	1.40	1.50	2.20
Large notebooks	.18	.35	.65	1.80
Tablets	.40	.50	1.00	
Coffee, kilo	2.60	3.15	5.40	6.60
Cigarettes, native	.20	.25	.30	.25
Duck eggs, each	.10	.12	.14	.25
Hen eggs, each	.07	.075	.09	.16
Oriental tea, 5oz	.55	.75	1.00	1.00
Chickens, med	.80	1.00	1.30	2.80
Tooth brushes, oriental	.80	1.00	1.30	2.80
Towels, Turkish bath	.90	1.50	3.15	3.50
Native sausage, kilo	.95	.95	1.55	3.60
Native tennis shoes	5.00			
Razor blades, each	.20	.40	.60	
Cigarette papers (250)	.60	1.00	1.60	1.60
Native toilet soap (3oz)	.35	.55	.75	.20
Chili con carne, 12oz	1.00	1.25	1.60	
Pork and beans	1.00	1.25		

Purchases at the commissary in Camp No. 1 were substantial with a total of 25,457 pesos being spent in the

month of August 1942 alone.[22] The total spent at the commissary from July to December 1942 was 99,586 pesos or close to $50,000. That works out to $10,000 per month or about ten dollars per day for each of the officers in the camp if the standard 15.6 percent is applied. What is more incredible is that these purchases were made while over 2,000 men from Camp O'Donnell were dying from causes that might have been prevented with a little extra food.

At some point in time the senior officers created an indigent fund so the enlisted men could buy from the commissary. It is not known exactly how much was donated or what impact this fund had on the enlisted men.[24] None of the primary source references discussed the creation of an indigent fund while many accounts stated that it was every man for himself regarding food.

As has been mentioned previously, enlisted men who went on work details often were able to obtain extra food from the Filipinos. Most stories told of men being handed candy and rice balls and perhaps an occasional chicken wrapped in leaves. Some accounts described the kinds of food some of the officers were able to obtain while accompanying a work detail.

> I go to Cabanatuan [City] in charge of 24 prisoners with four jap sentries to dig fertilizer from city dump. Work is easy, rather pleasant to see the bustle of Filipino city life. At noon men eat their mess kit of rice; jap sentry takes me to city market to purchase bananas, peanuts, and sugar cane for men. The sentry is a good-hearted soul, and takes me to a cafe. What a treat to sit down to a table with an oilcloth cover, and order ice cream; even if a jap

> sentry is sitting across the table ordering rice noodles. I order the third dish of ice cream and cesond cake; the jap holds his own with three dishes of noodles eaten with chop sticks and finished by licking the bowl. Of course, I clean up all my ice cream and cake crumbs (with fork and spoon)...and consume four glasses of ice water. A treat well worth the 1.55 pesos it cost me. The sentry kindly offered to pay, but it ended in a Dutch treat.[25]

The Japanese instituted a policy at Cabanatuan regarding escape that was to be common throughout the camps in the Philippines and other countries. This policy was to divide the prisoners into ten-man death squads. The idea was that if anyone escaped from the group, the remainder would be shot.[26] Because of this policy, the American commanders in the camp instituted their own guard system to prevent Americans from escaping. In at least one instance it caused a disastrous conflict between an enlisted guard and three officers who were trying to escape.

> Army Lieutenant Colonels Lloyd W. Biggs and Howard E. Breitung, and a Navy Lieutenant, Roydel Gilbert, with all the money, food and medicine they could gather, attempted to escape. As they were crawling down a drainage ditch which they expected to lead them under the camp fence, an American enlisted man on guard challenged them. A struggle and a loud argument ensued. The noise alerted those in a nearby barracks. They tried to quiet the bitter argument between the officers and the guard. But soon the Japanese overheard the still-noisy Americans and came and marched the three officers away to their headquarters. [The officers were beaten and then executed.][27]

Not all the Japanese prison camps carried out the order to execute the remaining squad members when one or more escaped. The threat of mass execution was enough, however, for the

Americans to consider escaping unfeasible. This task was deemed so important that even hospital personnel were required to provide men for the guard detail even though they were overwhelmed with the requirement to care for the sick.[28]

Medical care at Cabanatuan was not much better than that received at Camp O'Donnell. The doctors had immense number of patients and very little medicine. The hospital barracks at Cabanatuan became known as "Zero Ward" because very few men sent there returned alive.[29]

For obvious reasons medicine became as important as food at Cabanatuan, but was not as readily available. On one occasion a work detail was able to purchase some vitamins from local Filipinos. It was reported that the distribution of the vitamins would be made according to rank.

> A few days ago some officers were in Group 2 dispensary. Lt. Quinn heard one ask for vitamins for his feet. Maj. Raulston told me there probably would be some vitamins, but when they came in they would be distributed to the needy according to rank![30]

Once again the lack of medicine led to abuses such as people stealing and selling medicine. Apparently even family bonds were not strong enough to stop this practice. "I seen two brothers in Cabanatuan. One was lying in the barracks dying of malaria and his brother's out selling quinine for cigarettes. Can you believe that? I saw it."[31]

The practice of selling medicine appeared to be confined to the enlisted prisoners, but even some officers were accused of selling medicines to the local Filipinos and prisoners in the camp. One warrant officer was caught and punished for selling sulfathiazole at one peso each to the Filipinos in Cabanatuan City.[32] There were also reports of other officers selling medicines to the prisoners.

> I received a note from Bob Herthneck. He's still at Cabanatuan, but hopes to return to Bilibid in a few days. I also learned that Commander Brookes and Colonel [Lieutenant Colonel] Hamilton are conducting an investigation at the Cabanatuan hospital. They are checking into reports that certain Army officers are selling medicines. The accused Army officers are offering the defense that since there was no medicine available, they had bought the medicines themselves and were only trying to get their money back. I will leave that case to the jury.[33]

Perhaps it was considered a noble thing for an officer to take his own money to buy medicine for the prisoners. At least the officers were trying to improve the lot of the sick men. The ultimate result, however, would likely have been the fostering of more corruption among the men as they tried desperately to obtain money to buy the scarce medicines.

Even though medicine and medical care were at a premium in Cabanatuan, not all patients required drugs to cure their illnesses. One soldier with a chronic case of dengue fever had been lying in pain on his barracks floor for some time. He said a major came along and berated him for not acting like an American soldier. He told the man to get up and clean himself

up and reminded him that there were others much worse off. The soldier said, "I did. I was at lower points than that later, but never again did I feel I wasn't going to go all the way."[34]

Work at the Cabanatuan camps consisted of the routine details in and around the camp as well as the details in support of Japanese war efforts throughout Luzon. The work project that occupied most of the time for the prisoners was a large farm located near the camp. Supposedly the farm was designed to produce additional rations for the prisoners, but rarely did they see the benefits of their labors in their meals. Once again, the officers were used in propaganda activities and were even taken to Bataan for a week for the filming of a Japanese movie depicting the Americans surrendering.[35]

By the spring of 1943 the farm detail called for more healthy enlisted prisoners than the camp had enough to provide. Sick men were occasionally required to report to work anyway. At first, some junior officers volunteered to work in place of the sick enlisted men, but soon the Japanese demanded that all the junior officers work.

> The practice of having well officers volunteer in place of sick enlisted men, while giving the usually non-laboring officers some exercise, shortly fell into abuse. In April, 1943, the japs came out officially and ordered 12 and ½% of the total working figure to be officers. The [American] camp commander's orderly, a husky well-fed sergeant, remained inside to wait upon the colonel [lieutenant colonel]. Other field officers' servants did likewise. Company grade officers - captains and lieutenants - were permitted no orderlies by the High Command. Junior officers went to work and were treated lower than privates by the japs, who

delighted to humiliate them. Even sick officers were forced to report to meet the heavy demand for laborers.[36]

No specific reason was given for the figure of twelve and one-half percent. It is possible that this figure represented the percentage of officers to enlisted men in the camp, but it is difficult to determine the percentages at this time due to the transfer of 2,000 out of the camp and the movement of the men from Camp No. 3 into Camp No. 1 in October 1942.

During the same month, Prime Minister Tojo issued instructions to all prisoner of war camp commanders to reduce the rations of the non-workers (officers) to 420 grams per day which was about 300 grams less than a workers ration. Many officers were able to subsist on the extra rations their pay allowed them to buy, but eighteen months later Tojo issued the order that anyone who did not work would not eat.[37]

In April 1943, many of the company grade officers complained about the work requirement because they felt they were being forced to work against international law. They drew up a petition to their group commander requesting that field grade officers also be required to work and also their enlisted orderlies. The field grade officers managed to hold their orderlies back in camp on the grounds that their camp duties met the requirements of "work" under the Geneva Conventions. The Japanese did not seem to understand or care that normally field grade officers did not receive orderlies and the number

of enlisted orderlies held back far exceeded the number required to perform the manual labors required for the officers. The company grade officers further demanded that no sick personnel, enlisted or officers, be required to work. They gave this petition to the American Group commander who became very angry and threatened the officers with court martial and "black-balling" if they ever tried to seek regular commissions in the army after the war. A Lieutenant Colonel Dennis M. Moore took the side of the junior officers and accompanied the delegation to see the American camp commander. After a lengthy discussion, the camp commander ordered that the enlisted orderlies of the field grade officers work and sick men stay back.[38]

The company grade officers fought the battle primarily for themselves, but the consequences must have affected the enlisted men who did not seem to have a voice in camp administrative matters. The privileges of the enlisted orderlies created some bitter rivalries which lasted for many years after the war ended.

> One man from our town, Carl, he had beriberi so bad he lost all feelings in his legs. Mother Nature's answer - so you didn't have to scream when a fly lit on your toe. He was in bad shape. Could hardly walk to the latrine. But he had to answer a work call and work the farm. Another man in our town, Phil, had been a barber before service. So he was put on special duty in the officers' area as an orderly. Never had to answer any work calls, got extra rations and small tips for service. Now Carl, Carl hates Phil's guts. After thirty-five years he still won't speak to him. It is damn hard to be a philosopher about what

happened when it hurt that bad. No one ever said everything would be fair and equal.[39]

The battle between the junior and senior officers at Cabanatuan does not come out in all the stories of life in the camps. Nevertheless, in one source the indictments against senior officers were so severe that the names were intentionally blacked out of the published copy of the book. This account told of how a senior officer made a speech to the junior officers claiming, "Rank Has Its Privilege." It also told how another officer required the men to put away their ragged clothes, makeshift eating equipment, and buggy bedding, before Japanese inspections because they felt he was afraid to demand their rights as prisoners of war. The account said that this officer was so disliked by his own men that they, "threw rocks at his barracks and shouted derisive remarks to him as they passed."[40]

But not all the accounts of the senior officers at Cabanatuan were harsh. Some stories credited Lieutenant Colonel Beecher with cleaning up the camp and enforcing sanitation standards that ultimately reduced the high death rate. Some stories told of how Beecher devised a system where men could trade a container of dead flies for cigarettes thereby eliminating the problem of flies spreading disease. Still other accounts credited Beecher with developing a walkway system out of stones that got the men out of the mud as they went about their daily duties. Perhaps the greatest credit given to Beecher (even though he was not named in the quote) came when he

interceded on behalf of some of his men who had been caught returning to camp with food after having bribed a Japanese guard to let them out.

> The American officer in charge of the camp had a heated argument with the Japanese camp commander. He drew the Jap's attention to the fact that, in International Law governing prisoners of war, there is no clause sanctioning the execution of prisoners for leaving and attempting to re-enter a prison camp. However, the Jap, not to be outwitted, produced a book of American army regulations and opened it to a chapter authorizing the execution of any soldier caught looting during time of war.[41]

Unfortunately Lieutenant Colonel Beecher was unsuccessful in his attempt and the men were tied to stakes in the scorching sun for two days until they requested to be shot. The Japanese promptly answered their request.

The only time before the "no work-no food" edict from Tojo that the field grade officers worked on the Cabanatuan farm was after Memorial Day in 1943. The reason for this unusual event was because Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto had been shot down by American fighter planes. In addition to the work requirement, the Japanese camp commander ordered that no American was to sing or smile for two days.[42]

By 1944 the Japanese transferred many of the enlisted prisoners to Japan to work in factories and mines. More prisoners were transferred as the American forces continued to advance across the islands of the Pacific. The Japanese did not want American prisoners returning to their forces if

the camps were recaptured. By this time food in the commissary was either unavailable or inflation had pushed the prices beyond reach even for the officers. The Japanese now required all prisoners to work on the farm.

> For those remaining - by now most POWs were aware that the Japanese intended to get them out of the Philippines - life became increasingly difficult. At Cabanatuan the Japanese reduced the POW meal to a small scoop of rice mixed with greens, a portion of thin soup, and some corn. Those who didn't work (all officers and men were required to do so at this time) got only rice and soup.[43]

The high-ranking officers learned that work on the farm was backbreaking and strenuous. The sun was hot and the physical labor drained every ounce of energy from a man. It is unfortunate that the requirement for them to work came so late in their internment. Had they volunteered or been forced to do this work earlier they might have felt compelled to try and alter the conditions in the camp that cost so many lives. On the other hand, if the senior officers had volunteered to work, the Japanese might have perceived this as a sign of weakness by the Americans or as a sign that the Americans were not willing to fight for any of their Geneva Convention rights. It is possible that under these circumstances the death rates might have been even higher.

But history only records the actual events that occurred at Cabanatuan. Life there was so hard that junior officers felt obligated to fight for their perceived rights. Perhaps

they had some effect and the toll of lives was lessened. Two poems which were recovered after the war reflect what may have been a common perception among the prisoners at Cabanatuan.[44]

To The Colonels (Author Unknown)

I wish I were a colonel in a concentration camp.
I'd "confiscate" a blanket to keep out the cold and damp;
I'd let a sentry "twist my arm" and make me take a can
Of beans or meat intended for some poor enlisted man.
I'd gather up the commissaries as they were carried in;
You can bet the others' share would be mighty, mighty thin.
I'd keep the jams and the crackers and eggs and butter too.
My attitude toward the rest would be, "The hell with you."
I'd sit around the headquarters thinking up a lot of crap.
And blame my goofy orders on some misguided jap.
I'd make things so damned miserable, that your teeth would grind and champ.
If I could be a colonel in a concentration camp.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HONESTY (LT Henry G. Lee)

Let others cheat and steal and profiteer,
Let others use high rank for private gain,
Let others find obedience in fear,
Authority that rests on human pain;
Let others violate the very laws
That they've decreed and so exploit the mean,
And sing their own self-flattering applause
Well rationed to prove their hands are clean.

The way is bitter when one walks alone,
The innocent in chains - the criminal free;
When one presumes to question things that be.
I would not change; I value more my own
Smug knowledge of superiority.

NOTES CHAPTER 5

[1] Donald Knox, Death March - The Survivors of Bataan, (New York and London: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Publishers, 1981), 198-199.

[2] Ibid.; John E. Olson O'Donnell - Andersonville of the Pacific, (Lake Quivira, Kansas: J. E. Olson, 1985), shows a total of 4,595 transferred from 1 June 1942 to 4 June 1942. Since daily status reports were made at Camp O'Donnell, these figures are probably much more accurate than Knox's estimations. Knox also estimated the number dying on the Death March at 650 while Olson put it at 950. This would account for some of the discrepancy. Olson's figure of 4,595 along with the 1,500 Corregidor prisoners would have put the population of Camp No. 1 at about 6,095 - almost equal to the "quota" reached at Camp No. 3.

[3] Calvin E. Chunn, ed., Of Rice and Men, (Los Angeles, California: Veterans' Publishing Company, 1946), 129; quoting from the diary of Major Benson Guyton.

[4] Knox, Death March, 213; quoting Private First Class Jack Brady.

[5] Ibid., 198-199.

[6] Chunn, Of Rice and Men, 136-137.

[7] E. Bartlett Kerr, Surrender and Survival, (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1985), 96.

[8] Ibid., 222-223; also Chunn, Of Rice and Men, 18.

[9] Ibid., 202; quoting Corporal Hubert Gater.

[10] Ibid., 129; quoting the diary of Major Benson Guyton.

[11] Chunn, Of Rice and Men, 160-161.

[12] Kerr, Surrender and Survival, 154.

[13] John S. Coleman Jr., Bataan and Beyond - Memories of an American POW, (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1978), 102.

[14] Ibid.; Olson's book O'Donnell - Andersonville of the Pacific, stated that he felt eating of weevils and worms contributed to dysentery in the men. Coleman mentioned having dysentery on a number of occasions, but does not link this with

the eating of the insects. General Wainwright also said it was common practice to eat the insects along with the rice and never mentioned any side effects.

[15] Chunn, Of Rice and Men, 24.

[16] Ibid., 132; quoting from Major Benson Guyton's diary.

[17] Kerr, Surrender and Survival, 98.

[18] Marion Lawton, Some Survived, (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill, 1984) 38-43; Lawton never said if the man cashed the check.

[19] A. B. Feuer, Bilibid Diary - The Secret Notebooks of Commander Thomas Hayes POW, the Philippines, 1942-45, (Hamden, Connecticut: The Shoe String Press, Inc., 1987), 120 (This entry was made in November 1942); also Kerr, Surrender and Survival, p. 108, states officers were paid for the first time in August 1942; Chunn, Of Rice and Men, contradicts himself on p. 29-30 and 163, when he states that pay began in December 1942 in the first entry, yet says that pay was increased in October 1942. No doubt if pay was increased in October 1942, they had to have been receiving pay earlier. The only explanation for the delay in payment of the naval prisoners in Bilibid might have been that the Japanese were reluctant to pay them at all since they were mostly medical personnel and were not considered prisoners of war by the rules they accepted.

[20] Bob Reynolds, Of Rice and Men, (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Dorrance and Company, Inc., 1947), 102, stated the enlisted men received fifteen centavos (seven and one-half cents) per day for working beginning in early October 1942; Chunn, Of Rice and Men, p. 148, stated the medical enlisted men received pay for the first time on January 26th, 1943, with master sergeants receiving 32 pesos per month and technical sergeants receiving 23 [22 and 13 pesos being deposited into an account respectively]; Chunn further stated, p. 156, that the enlisted were to be paid - privates ten centavos per six-hour day, non-coms - 15 and warrants, 25 centavos. He does not state if this is just a normal payday or the first time they had been paid.

[21] Chunn, Of Rice and Men, 29-30; quoting Major Paul R. Cornwall, Coastal Artillery Corps.

[22] Ibid., 30-31; Chunn stated that the actual food issues from the Japanese for those without money was rice and thin vegetable soup which was insufficient to sustain life.

[23] Ibid., 29-30; quoting Major Paul R. Cornwall.

[24] Kerr, Surrender and Survival, 151-152.

[25] Chunn, Of Rice and Men, 134; quoting from Major Benson Guyton's diary. The use of the non-capitalized word "japs" is deliberate on the part of Chunn. He said that he felt the Japanese and Formosans were, "sub-humans and therefore should be common - and contemptible - nouns."

[26] Coleman, Bataan and Beyond, 99.

[27] Kerr, Surrender and Survival, 101; The three officers were tied to a post for two days while Japanese and Filipinos beat them with a heavy stick. Two were then shot and one beheaded just outside the camp boundary. The Filipinos were forced to conduct the beatings.

[28] Chunn, Of Rice and Men, 43; quoting Lieutenant Colonel Eugene C. Jacobs, Medical Corps.

[29] Ernest Brumaghim Miller, Bataan Uncensored, Long Prairie, Minnesota: The Hart Publications, Inc., 1949), 247.

[30] Chunn, Of Rice and Men, 167; The assumption here is that the higher-ranking officers would receive the vitamins first. There is no indication in Chunn's book that any medicine was ever actually distributed by rank.

[31] Knox, Death March, 205; quoting Private Lewis Elliott.

[32] Chunn, Of Rice and Men, 158-159.

[33] Feuer, Bilibid Diary, 123.

[34] Knox, Death March, 206; quoting Staff Sergeant Harold Feiner.

[35] Kerr, Surrender and Survival, 150.

[36] Chunn, Of Rice and Men, 52-53.

[37] Lord Russell of Liverpool, G.B.E., M.C., The Knights of Bushido, (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1958), 149-150.

[38] Ibid.; also 154-155.

[39] Knox, Death March, 222; quoting Sergeant Forrest Knox.

[40] Chunn, Of Rice and Men, 20-21.

[41] Reynolds, Of Rice and Men, 100-101.

[42] Kerr, Surrender and Survival, 151.

[43] Ibid., 197.

[44] Chunn, Of Rice and Men, 208-210; According to Chunn, Lieutenant Henry G. Lee wrote many poems while a prisoner at Cabanatuan. When Lee left in December 1944, he placed the poems in a denim wrapping and buried them under his barracks building telling some close friends who remained behind. LT Lee was killed in the bombing of the Enoura Maru on 9 January 1945 in Takao Harbor, Formosa. His body was cremated on the docks along with several hundred other prisoners who died in the attacks by American dive bombers. The poems were recovered during the Ranger raid on Cabanatuan and many were published in the Saturday Evening Post.

CHAPTER 6

A "BRIEF BRIGHT FLAME"

Davao Penal Colony

Not all the camps in the Philippine Islands were associated with brutality and death. The Davao Penal Colony (also known as DAPECOL) was located in a lush jungle clearing on the southern Philippine island of Mindanao, just ten miles north-west of the Davao Gulf and twenty-five miles north of Davao City. The approximately 2,000 prisoners who made up this camp were divided approximately equally between the soldiers transferred from the Malaybalay camp on Mindanao and those who were sent from Cabanatuan in October 1942.[1]

The emaciated prisoners from Cabanatuan were primarily the healthiest men who survived the Death March and Camp O'Donnell. Both officers and enlisted men were included in the group. During the voyage south from Cabanatuan, the Japanese guards on the ship forced the officers to perform ship KP [kitchen police] in order to humiliate them. Unknown to them, however, their plan backfired.

> After the first day, American officers were ordered to KP duty, to the unconcealed delight of the enlisted men. The "commissioned KP.s" soon discovered that the Jap officers

> had a large store of captured American pork. And though each morsel was a potential case of dysentery, we ate heartily of the generous portions our fellow officers slipped us. The pork was, of course, a forbidden dish. But if the Japs had been half so observant as they seem to think they are, they could readily have spotted all Americans who had been indulging.[2]

There was no comparison between the Mindanao prisoners and the ones from Cabanatuan. Not only was their health better, but they had been able to keep their personal possessions. Enlisted men had barracks bags and officers still had foot lockers. They still had things such as fountain pens, rings, and toilet articles. As one prisoner put it, "Their rights as prisoners had been respected, and they could no more believe us than we them."[3]

It is very difficult to determine the exact composition of the group of prisoners that came from Malaybalay. As was shown earlier, the Visayan-Mindanao Forces were made up primarily of Filipino soldiers under the command of American leaders. There is no evidence to suggest that Filipinos were kept in prisoner of war camps in the southern islands as they had been on Luzon. In any case, most accounts state the Filipino prisoners were released by the Japanese in the summer of 1942 when they granted the Philippines its "independence." Other accounts state that the majority of Filipinos, and some American enlisted men in the Visayan-Mindanao force, refused to surrender and fled to the jungles to fight as guerrillas.[4] With all of these things considered together, it is possible that some of

the American prisoners had been captured on Corregidor and shipped south when the Japanese determined the Cabanatuan camps to be full.

Very little has been written about the barracks at Davao, but it is known that the officers and enlisted men were billeted in separate buildings and internal camp leadership was established. The senior American officer was the camp commander and he appointed the other leaders based on rank.[5]

The Japanese camp commander, described as a fair man, usually looked after the basic needs of the prisoners. It is said that he was appalled at the condition of the men who arrived from Cabanatuan. He did not require the sick men to work initially, but had them rested and fed first.

> To get the walking corpses in working condition, Major Maeda ordered increased rations for the next month and initiated a work program for all men under forty-five years of age who were not hospitalized or medically classified as "sick in quarters." Initially, large numbers of the Cabanatuan contingent were in the latter category; but in succeeding weeks their condition improved, and a larger number of their enlisted men began working under Filipino overseers on the various agricultural activities on the penal colony.[6]

This treatment must have seemed heavenly for the men from Cabanatuan. All they had received from the Japanese up to this time was a steady diet of brutality. Finally they were held by a camp commander who appeared to have some respect for fellow human beings.

All prisoners worked at Davao including the officers. The work was divided into two categories: heavy and light. The heavy work was generally done on the farm and included handling carabao which were used plowing fields for rice paddies. Other heavy details were woodchopping, harrowing and planting, and harvesting. Some men were sent away to sub-camps and worked at road-building, and airfield construction work. These details were particularly brutal and many men died before they could be brought back to camp for recuperation. The light-duty jobs were done within the camp. They were reserved for the sick and the senior-ranking field grade officers. The tasks included rope-making, hat-making, barracks cleaning and latrine details which were designed to eliminate the mosquito larvae and protect the camp from malaria.[7]

> Every man not actually in the hospital was put to work, regardless of age or rank. Chaplains, officers, and enlisted men labored side-by-side, planting rice, harvesting it in murky paddies, building and cleaning Jap latrines, cultivating crops,[8] and building roads, bridges and revetments.

The junior officers and men got up in the morning and ate a standard breakfast of lugao which was a sort of rice cereal or mush. They then went out and boarded railroad flat cars for the five-mile ride to the rice fields. There they lined up for work assignments. There is no evidence of any junior officers complaining about the work arrangements

as they did at Cabanatuan. At first some officers tried to take charge and assign the details at the farm.

> Some stupid officers tried to run the operation, but they had no sense of organization. They would stand out in front and bleat orders, while the men laughed at them and did what they pleased....Never was leadership in such great demand and such short supply.[9]

There is no discussion of a camp commissary or men receiving pay of any kind at Davao. It is almost certain that they did, however, but since most of the men received an adequate diet, they must not have felt a need to discuss discrepancies in food based on pay received. The accounts of life at the penal colony talk continually about hunger, but many of the limited stories mention how the men were able to bribe guards or smuggle food into the camp to supplement their diets. Eventually Red Cross packages made their way into the camp and the men were able to eat well for a time. Even so, the common diseases which the prisoners faced such as malaria and beriberi were also present at Davao. According to firsthand accounts, of the 2,000 men at the camp, there was always close to 400 at some stage of illness or another. Some remained in the sick barracks, while others were placed in the hospital. Those well enough to work were put on light duty. During the eighteen months the camp remained open, however, only sixteen men were reported to have died due to illness.[10]

Since the senior officers at Davao were not required to work in the rice fields, they spent their day at camp doing light duty. It is unknown whether this arrangement was an attempt by the Japanese commander to meet the requirements of the Geneva Conventions or something the senior officers required themselves due to their status. In any event the work was quite different from struggling under the hot sun at the reins of a belligerent carabao.

> An elderly lieutenant colonel named Beard had one of the few [wrist] watches left in the camp, and he was assigned the duty of ringing the bell every hour during the day from morning to evening tenko [roll call]. That was his only duty....Surely he was the highest-paid bell ringer in the world. He lived to collect his pay too.....Ranking close to Beard on the pay scale were thirty lieutenant colonels and majors who were given the job of weaving straw hats. All day long they would sit in bleacher seats alongside the parade ground and chat of this and that, reliving their good old days in the Army. Their production for the first month was one hat. Not one hat each - just one hat.[11]

Even though the policy of the ten-men "death squads" was in force at Davao, twenty men managed to escape. Most of these men were officers who survived the Death March and Camp O'Donnell and were desperate to return home and tell the story of the incredible brutality of the Japanese. Although conditions became harsher for those remaining at Davao after the successful escape, the camp commander did not execute anyone, but he did reduce their rations for a short period of time. Most accounts of the escape show that the men remaining were quite upset that others would jeopardize the safety of those

who had to remain. These accounts show that there was not an organized effort on the part of many prisoners to attempt an escape.

As General MacArthur's forces advanced in the South Pacific, Japanese authorities ordered the Davao Penal Colony to be abandoned between June and September 1944. Close to 1,200 of the prisoners were sent by ship on a twenty-one day voyage back to Old Bilibid Prison in Manila arriving on 26 June 1944. Nine hundred of these men were sent to Cabanatuan on 28 June 1944. The others remained in Bilibid to be sent on to Japan in a few months. The remaining 800 men at Davao worked on details around Davao City until September 1944 when they were placed aboard a Japanese cargo ship called the Shinyo Maru. This ship was sunk by an American submarine off Sindangan Bay on northern Mindanao with all but eighty-one men perishing in the seas.[12] These men were sheltered by Filipino natives and later many of them linked up with resistance fighters until the war ended. Some of them were taken off the island by submarine where they were returned to the United States to tell their story.

Old Bilibid Prison

Old Bilibid Prison covered a city block in the city of Manila near the old walled city of Intramuros. It was not specifically a prisoner of war facility like many other camps in the Philippines, but was used by the Japanese as their primary prison hospital and as a central clearing facility for prisoners throughout the islands as they went from one work detail to another or were prepared for shipment to Japan.[13]

The American staff at the prison was made up primarily of captured naval personnel who had fled to Corregidor from the Canacao Naval Hospital at the Cavite Naval Base. The population of the prison was constantly changing, but at one time there were as many as 2,000 prisoners within the walls.[14]

In May 1942 the first prisoners to occupy Bilibid were from Corregidor so the officers did not have the knowledge of Camp O'Donnell to show them that the accommodations they were about to occupy were luxurious by comparison. When the officers saw their new quarters they complained loudly to the prison commandant.

> When the American prisoners whom the savages gleaned from the rocky recesses of Corregidor reached Old Bilibid in May, 1942, an army colonel wrote a letter to the jap commandant requesting the American officers be interned in quarters befitting officers, rather than the dirty sty afforded them. He suggested some of Manila's hotels and requested that the Americans be permitted to buy their own food from their pay to be received as prisoners of war. Although the request was perhaps too bold, the reply, nevertheless, indicates that a campaign of exterminations

was already contemplated. [They were told they were being permitted to live only through the benevolence of His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor.][15]

The hospital staff and the sick prisoners who were patients in the hospital slept on wooden beds with mattresses. At one point the Japanese even offered steel beds for the senior staff in the hospital, but they refused. Most accounts show, however, that transient prisoners slept on the concrete floors of the numerous cells within the prison.[16]

After living at Camp O'Donnell and Cabanatuan, some prisoners found Bilibid a comfortable place to stay since it got them out of the bug-infested huts, but other prisoners saw it for exactly what it was - a dank, forbidding prison.

> Each day was much the same....Every day the guards dragged an old iron tub, clanging and bumping, along the cement floor. At each cell they ladled out a mere handful of rice. There was not enough food value in the little cup of watery rice we received each day to keep us more than just sleepily alive.[17]

When the prisoners from Corregidor first arrived at Bilibid the army officers assumed control. This arrangement lasted for approximately six months and then the navy took over. According to the diary of a medical staff officer, a level of animosity existed between the army and naval medical personnel during their stay together. The naval group accused the army of foul-ups and crookedness including the selling of medicine to the prisoners and charging for medical services.[18]

The rations provided by the Japanese at Bilibid were almost identical as those in other camps. The Japanese issued wormy rice with tiny rocks left over from floor sweepings along with a thin vegetable soup. The treatment of the prisoners and staff was equally as harsh as at any other camp and once again survival was only assured because many of the prisoners had money and were allowed to purchase food from outside the prison walls.[19]

When the permanent staff prisoners first arrived their money was taken and placed into a special account. By September 1942 the money was refunded to them. One officer had a substantial sum of money and went to the American administration to get their opinion on his idea of loaning some of his money to the other prisoners at a fixed interest rate. At least one officer told him what he thought of his idea.

> Greenman received a refund of over a thousand dollars. He came to me [Commander Thomas Hayes] and asked what I thought of the idea of him lending out some of his money to the boys in the camp, "at a fixed rate of interest - all business like and above board." It didn't take me long to tell him what I thought of his suggestion. The son of a bitch! With his shipmates fighting like hell to eke out an existence, and this bastard wants to lend them money at interest! An American Navy officer with pawnbroker propensities. If that's the crap we commission as an officer and a gentleman, they can have my suit anytime.[20]

The Japanese allowed a small store to operate inside the camp and those with money were allowed to buy from it. It appears as though the inventory was much more meager than

the commissary that was being operated at Cabanatuan. A small profit was allowed to be accumulated to go toward a fund to help those without money.[21]

In November 1942 the Japanese began paying the officers at Bilibid. The enlisted prisoners who were transients received no pay since they were not considered to be working. This meant that the transient prisoners had to survive on the rice and soup issued to them. As in other camps the Japanese withheld all but a little of the money from the officers.

> The Japanese paid us with the "bayonet money" that they have been turning out on a printing press. The paper bills have no serial numbers and represent nothing in the way of government backing. According to international agreement I drew the pay of an officer of corresponding rank in the Japanese Navy - 220 pesos ($110). I was allowed to keep 25 pesos and the rest I had to give back to the Japs to be placed in postal savings - minus 60 pesos that I'm charged for "room and board."[22]

It was at the first payday that Commander Hayes attempted to establish an indigent fund with each officer voluntarily contributing ten percent of his pay to assist the transient and sick enlisted men. It is unknown how many officers were in the camp, but it could not have been many. A total of 258 pesos was collected the first day. Once again the animosity between the army and the navy was felt since Hayes said the "American Wardens" contributed nothing.[23]

The enlisted men on the hospital staff and other sick prisoners in the hospital did not receive the money directly,

but were able to receive food purchased for them from the store. It was felt that the men would likely purchase cigarettes or other things which would not directly improve their health. Some permanent staff prisoners also received money and clothing from friends or relatives held at a local civilian internment camp located at the Santo Tomas University. Army enlisted prisoners who were transients at the prison, however, received little from the fund and almost nothing from Santo Tomas.

> Most of the contact between Santo Tomas and Bilibid involved shipments of food and clothing from the civilians at the university. Those imported goods were not designated for general consumption but were sent to specific persons (mostly officers and petty officers in the Navy) by civilian dependents. Little or no help for Army enlisted men came from Santo Tomas.[24]

Commander Hayes required that most of the money from the indigent fund initially be used to buy firewood for cooking rice and other meals. This was because the Japanese had suspended the practice of issuing firewood to the prisoners after they began being paid. Hayes knew that the firewood was essential so that the prisoners could continue to cook their meals over the many "quan" stoves throughout the camp. Quan was a term used by prisoners to denote the practice of several prisoners combining their food into one community pot to be shared.

Many officers continued to refuse to contribute to the indigent fund. They felt that the enlisted men should not have

any spending power at the store but should be given the food directly. Because of their unwillingness to contribute, Japanese authorities did not allow the hospital personnel to contact local neutral agencies for additional help. Commander Hayes, was infuriated.

> My policy is, and always will be, that I will never sacrifice the welfare of the enlisted man for the officer brass. In fact, it's the duty of the officers to take care of the men. I consider their proposal unbecoming an officer, un-American in principle, and another disgraceful commentary on officer conduct in general.[25]

Since the prisoners at Bilibid did not have the variety of foods available to buy at Cabanatuan, they grew a garden inside the prison. In the beginning they grew mostly camotes which were simple sweet potatoes. They ate the potatoes and put the vines in their soup for extra vitamins. Eventually they grew chrysanthemums for use in the soup because they were thought to have more food value than the sweet potato vines. Another staple in the diet was mongo beans and peanuts. Some men on work details outside the prison got additional food from local Filipinos, but not enough to satisfy all the prisoners inside.

Occasionally the officers of the hospital staff were invited to dine with the Japanese guards. This practice seemed to be common in the camps and the meal was a starving prisoner's dream.

> Late in the afternoon Sartin, Joses, Welch, and I were invited up to the front building to have supper with Nogi [a Japanese doctor assigned to the prison]. The meal wasn't anything to write home about - a tiny piece of meat about the size of a half-dollar, a hard piece of camote and tea that tasted like medicine...After a short while Nogi said, "I have ordered another dinner." Then in came five steaks with potatoes, tomatoes, and a bowl of spaghetti.[26]

Following the dinner the Japanese camp commander gave them a building and books for a medical library. In this instance it appeared as though the Japanese may have been using the higher-ranking officers for unknown purposes. On the other hand, the navy officers in Bilibid seemed to push extremely hard to maintain control of their own operations. It seems as though the Japanese officers in Bilibid respected the American officers who stood up to them and demanded more rights for their men. This may have simply been an aberration in this camp alone due to the personality of the Japanese commandant. One example of high-ranking officers being given special privileges according to rank is when the senior officers no longer had to show up for roll call.

> The Tai-sas [senior officers] no longer have to show up for bango [roll call]. That makes me the senior staff officer present at bango from now on. Sartin [Commander Lee Sartin] was inclined not to take advantage of this Japanese concession to him as commanding officer, but Joses and Duckworth talked him into it. The Japanese go in for rank in a big way. The fact that a person is looked upon as "high up" gives him valuable prestige. We convinced Sartin that he must play the "rank with privilege" game.[27]

Colonel Duckworth was the commander of Hospital No. 1 on Bataan before the American surrender. He refused to go to Tarlac with the other senior officers, but elected to remain with his medical personnel and treat patients. Apparently he had many privileges that the other officers at Bilibid did not. He arrived, "with a personal orderly and valet, along with an administrative assistant and twenty pieces of baggage. He also brought his own bed equipped with mattress and spring."[28]

Colonel Duckworth was not well-respected by Commander Hayes during his stay at Bilibid prison, but after Duckworth was transferred to Camp O'Donnell to care for the remaining prisoners not transferred to Cabanatuan, he showed what one officer could do in the face of a brutal enemy.

> Colonel Duckworth...quickly adopted an attitude of authority toward all Japanese except high ranking officers. He also demanded that his own personnel look and act in a neat and military manner. Thus, a sense of confidence that no other Americans, from General King on down, were able to enjoy prevailed, among the staff at Hospital #1. As he put it to his staff, "I can't begin to control them [the Japanese] unless I can prove to them that I can control you. I must impress the Japanese that I take it for granted the sick and wounded will get what they need." Fortified with this positive attitude and reinforced with a letter from the Japanese general directing that the hospital be respected, Duckworth managed to shelter his people from many of the sufferings of the majority of the prisoners.[29]

It is not known why Colonel Duckworth was not at Camp O'Donnell during the time when hundreds of the men were dying. It is also not known why he arrived at O'Donnell after the bulk of the prisoners had been transferred. According to reports

he stayed at O'Donnell and treated the Filipinos until the camp closed in January 1943. There is no mention of him at Cabanatuan where his services were dearly needed.

Bilibid prison was unique from most of the other prison camps in that the officers held disciplinary boards when enlisted prisoners were accused of wrongdoing. Many of the cases were the result of, "crooked dealings and the handling of money for food."[30] Although the intentions of the board appeared to have been honorable, it seemed to fall into abuse as some prisoners were punished and others were not if they were the favorite of certain officers. Still, the board managed to retain an amount of military control within the camp and prevented a "reversion to pack instinct" that often follows surrender.[31]

Although the American officers attempted to prevent the establishment of "packs" within the camp, there was one example where the men organized themselves into a group based on race.

> All the Mexicans are lining up to join this latest Cabanatuan draft....This sudden decision all revolves around the fact that Garcia is on the draft. Garcia is the leader and has taken care of most of the Mexican group. He's a hustler and a racketeer, but has shared his wealth and gains with the needy. A sort of Mexican Robin Hood in this Sherwood Forest. Even before the war, Garcia was an enterprising fellow, running cabarets, etc. The others look to him for leadership and support. The Mexicans are not without their wrong side and do have their intergang differences. But I would rather deal with them than some of the other factions in the camp.[32]

One wonders why even in a camp where the officers tried to assist the enlisted men and discipline them for their infractions that men would quickly divide themselves into packs according to race or other reasons. Obviously the human will to survive transcended rank and authority, but one would think that in a prison environment the officers would retain some control. Commander Hayes might have offered some insight into the challenging problem of retaining control in a difficult environment as he reflected on his one-year anniversary of the day he was bombed at Cavite.

> We had the hell kicked out of us day after day and week after week. And then the surrender with all its chaos. Officers and men becoming animal derelicts with only the crude law of the jungle as the order of the day - the primal urge to survive. The veneer of civilization, thinly spread to begin with, was wiped clean like chalk from a slate. There was not one leader big enough to meet the issue as a whole. Although here and there through the pandemonium and graveyard of decent human behavior, an occasional self-disciplined courageous personality would emerge. But their numbers were so small that they cast only the feeble light of a tiny candle throughout the black and crumbled world.[33]

The attitude toward escape from Bilibid was almost identical to other camps throughout the Philippines. No one was supposed to escape because it jeopardized the safety and well-being of the other prisoners remaining behind. Officers were expected to issue orders and ensure prisoners did not attempt escape.

> An Army private who had been on a working detail took "French leave" last night....Reprisals have been threatened

> and that can be serious....The escape route was easy. Anybody can escape from this place, but then one's troubles are just beginning....When our present bango system was instituted, I pointed out that since the Japanese had turned the policing over to us, it was our job to make it thorough enough so that the Japs would keep their hands off....I can't understand the reluctance of some officers to issue implicit orders. I'm not asking for favors in this game, but somebody has to run the show - and I mean "run it."[34]

Bilibid prison had many advantages over other prison camps throughout the Philippines. It had a good supply of water, protection from the elements and especially from malaria-carrying mosquitoes, and it was close to the civilian population of Manila and therefore the officers were able to keep up with the war news. There was a constant stream of prisoners coming in and out of the prison so people had fresh news from the outside world even if most of the war news was just rumors being passed from one mouth to another.

Even though the enlisted prisoners often did not experience such benefits as increased rations and beds with mattresses and springs, their stay at the prison meant a respite from the agonizing work details and the bed-bug infested bamboo huts of Cabanatuan. It also gave many of them an opportunity to experience what they had been lacking - military discipline and a sense of organization. For many enlisted prisoners it was the best experience of their time as POWs. "That year spent in the prison hospital provided the most pleasant memories I have of prison life. We had no work to do; thus our time was our own."[35] Most of the prisoners would have agreed that being

able to rest at Bilibid was preferred to the back-breaking labor of a work detail or farm project. Unfortunately the stay at Bilibid was only temporary for most and the thin ray of hope dwindled into the never-ending darkness of prison life.

Bilibid had one notorious reputation that almost all prisoners from the Far East in WWII relate. For most prisoners it was the last place they saw in the Philippines before they boarded a ship bound for Japan or Manchuria. Prisoners in all states of physical deprivation entered and exited Bilibid. The doctors did everything in their power to help them during their short stay. Commander Hayes was able to personally witness a scene on a hot, sunny day in October 1942 that he would have to experience himself two years later.

> Early this afternoon Nogi sent for me. He decided that I should go with him to the port area and examine a prisoner who he had seen....The port area was completely littered and every inch of space was covered with prisoner drafts on their way to Japan. The men were a miserable lot - a horrible mass of human wreckage....After our walk, Nogi treated me to a dinner at a little place off the Luneta. We had soup, bread, sauerkraut, roast pork, ice cream, and tea. I didn't enjoy the meal. The food stuck in my throat. After witnessing the misery and starvation of the men waiting to board ships, how could I eat? Granted I was hungry, and I have been hungry for so long that I don't know when I last felt gastronomically happy. But the best food in the world wouldn't taste good under these circumstances.[36]

Each prisoner looked at the world from his own unique perspective. While some men starved, others watched from a distance and ate ice cream that stuck in their throats - but they ate it. It was all a simple matter of survival. For some,

Bilibid was a paradise. For others it was a prison. For all it was the gateway for an experience far worse than the Death March. It was the stairway into the nightmare of the Death Ships.

Commander Hayes was one of the few prisoners to make a fairly complete account of life at Bilibid Prison. His efforts to maintain order within chaos was unique among the stories from prison life in the Far East. Perhaps through his efforts a few prisoners who passed through Bilibid were able to regain a sense of purpose and survival. Unfortunately, Hayes was on board the Enoura Maru when it was bombed in Takao Harbor, Formosa, by an American dive-bomber on 9 January 1945. His body was cremated on the docks along with the others who died in the disaster. In a manner of speaking he predicted his own death in a journal entry on 12 March 1944.

> I held a long disciplinary mast this afternoon: a series of stupid miscreants who still haven't been yanked out of their "reversion to pack" instincts that followed the surrender. The difficulty in handling many of these problems is that we have American interests to protect and yet satisfy the Japanese and keep them in accord with our actions....To all intents and purposes I died a couple of years ago. I'm thankful for the brief bright flame:
>
> My candle burns at both ends
> It will not last the night.
> But Oh my friends, and Ah my foes,
> It gives a pleasant light.[37]

NOTES CHAPTER 6

[1] Donald Knox, Death March - The Survivors of Bataan, (New York and London: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Publishers, 1981), 248; according to Knox, the group from Mindanao were from Major General William F. Sharp's forces who had been held since 10 May 1942 in a POW camp at Malaybalay. They left for Davao on or about 16 October 1942. They arrived on 22 October 1942 and were joined on 6 November 1942 by the men from Cabanatuan. Louis Morton's official history of the fall of the Philippines shows only a small officer cadre to supervise the Philippine Army units as of 30 November 1942. Later reports showed that over 1,000 Americans came from Malaybalay to join the Cabanatuan group. It is unknown which units these Americans came from, but it is possible that some of the Corregidor group were taken south to Mindanao since the total number of prisoners at Cabanatuan did not reach the total number of prisoners captured on Luzon and Corregidor.

[2] William E. Dyess, The Dyess Story, (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1944), 151.

[3] Sidney Stewart, Give Us This Day, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1957), 88 and 91; Many of Stewart's recollections appear as exaggerations compared to most of the other writings on the Far East POW experience. Additionally, Stewart had an uncanny nack for personally witnessing all of the major atrocities mentioned by other people. It is possible that his book is more a compilation of the experiences of all combined into one story rather than a personal record.

[4] Matthew S. Klimow, Surrender - A Soldier's Legal, Ethical, and Moral Obligations; With Philippine Case Study, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: United States Army Command and General Staff College Master's Thesis, 1989), 118-119.

[5] Knox, Death March, 266; quoting Marion Lawton. Lawton's account of life at the Davao Penal Colony seems to paint a picture of good American supervision and a well-run hospital organization. Other accounts such as The Dyess Story make life at Davao Penal Colony appear much harsher and less organized. Considering the low death rate at Davao, it is much more likely that Lawton's version of the camp is accurate.

[6] E. Bartlett Kerr, Surrender and Survival, (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1985) 119.

[7] Stewart, Give Us This Day, 96. Other reports also stated that the light details allowed sick and recovering prisoners an opportunity to work and assist the senior officers at running the camp.

[8] Dyess, The Dyess Story, 156.

[9] Knox, Death March, 253; quoting Corporal Kenneth Day.

[10] Marion Lawton, Some Survived, (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill, 1984), 75. Other reports stated that a total of 18 died at the Davao Penal Colony. Lawton only reported those who died from disease and malnutrition while others may have included those who died attemting to escape.

[11] Knox, Death March, 262; quoting Corporal Kenneth Day.

[12] Ibid., 292 and 307; Lawton, Some Survived, 104. The American submarine reported to have sunk the Shinyo Maru was the USS Narwhal which regularly operated out of Australia.

[13] Knox, Death March, 180. The prison facility had a central hub with wings radiating from the center like spokes in a wheel. Prisoners were housed within these wings with the hospital taking the wing nearest the Japanese guard house.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Calvin E. Chunn, ed., Of Rice and Men, (Los Angeles, California: Veterans' Publishing Company, 1946), 96.

[16] A. B. Feuer, Bilibid Diary - The Secret Notebooks of Commander Thomas Hayes POW, the Philippines, 1942-45, (Hamden Connecticut: The Shoe String Press, Inc., 1987) 77; Preston Hubbard, Apocalypse Undone, (Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press, 1990), 126-127. During the monsoon season the camp would fill with water causing the men to try and move to higher ground within the camp. In most cases this was impossible and the prisoners were forced to remain in their waterlogged cells.

[17] Stewart, Give Us This Day, 152.

[18] Feuer, Bilibid Diary, 4. Commander Hayes gives no explanation regarding the switching of control of the camp from the navy to the army. The only explanation for this was probably because of the larger number of naval personnel available to handle the medical duties.

[19] Ibid., 100; Hubbard, Apocalypse Undone, 136. The camp commissary in Old Bilibid had far fewer items for purchase than the commissary at Cabanatuan. The main items for purchase included peanuts, mongo beans, sweet potatoes, limes and cigarettes.

[20] Feuer, Bilibid Diary, 96.

[21] Ibid., 7-8.

[22] Ibid., 120.

[23] Ibid., 121-122. The "American Wardens" referred to by Commander Hayes seems to be directed at the American army officers who were sick transients within Old Bilibid. It is possible that these officers did not feel responsible for the sick enlisted men since they were also transients and did not belong to their former units.

[24] Hubbard, Apocalypse Undone, 143.

[25] Feuer, Bilibid Diary, 205; Commander Hayes did a lot to aid the enlisted men at Bilibid including taking in an "invalid youngster" to do his laundry and look after his bunk in exchange for five pesos per month. He said the man was able to buy some extra limes and peanuts with the money. In other camps this was also done as a sort of special enlisted orderly for the officer. The difference at Bilibid was that the men had no other form of work and therefore were not being held back from farm detail work at the expense of other enlisted soldiers. On the other hand, enlisted men at Old Bilibid were unable to work since there were few regular details. Because of this, the enlisted men who passed through the prison were unable to earn money to supplement their diets.

[26] Ibid., 106.

[27] Ibid., 15.

[28] Ibid., 13.

[29] John E. Olson, O'Donnell - Andersonville of the Pacific, (Lake Quivira, Kansas: J. E. Olson, 1985) 73.

[30] Feuer, Bilibid Diary, 59.

[31] Ibid., 180-181. Commander Hayes, while attempting to maintain order through his "masts", may have caused additional trouble in the camp since, by his own admission, he tended to favor some men over others. He also admitted in his diary that he had a differing opinion on when and how punishment should be administered. There is a good example regarding his view of punishment for illegal use of alcohol. While Hayes punished one soldier for becoming drunk within the camp boundaries, he dismissed an incident where three prisoners became drunk and slept with a Japanese guard's wife while doing work in her house. His answer to this incident was simply, "boys will be boys."

[32] Ibid., 189.

[33] Ibid., 125.

[34] Ibid., 98.

[35] Bob Reynolds, Of Rice and Men, (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Dorrance and Company, Inc., 1947), 115.

[36] Feuer, Bilibid Diary, 104.

[37] Ibid., 180-181.

CHAPTER 7

THE DEATH SHIPS

The Japanese began transferring prisoners by ship from their captured territories in the Philippines and other areas almost immediately. The marines and naval personnel on Guam were taken directly to Japan and did not suffer a Death March or camps such as O'Donnell or Cabanatuan.[1] Most of the American embassy personnel throughout the Far East were rounded up and taken to various camps throughout the region.

Not much has been written about the early shipments of American prisoners in 1942 and 1943. While conditions in the holds of the ships were cramped and uncomfortable, the trip did not take as long as those in 1944 because the Japanese still controlled the sea routes to and from the Philippines. Later shipments contended with American submarines and dive-bombers and the men were kept in the filthy holds for over two months in some cases.

Most of the early shipments were made up of enlisted prisoners sent to Japan to work in the factories and mines. A few officers were sent along with the men to supervise and provide camp administration in Japan.

> The japs in the early days transferred only skilled technical men from Cabanatuan to Japan to be slaves of yellow industry. As the American forces drew closer to victory and the liberation of captives was imminent, the nips frantically tried to transport all the remaining Philippine prisoners who could not even stand up alone, whether they were ill or not.[2]

Regardless of the date of shipment, all prisoners had to contend with almost unbelievable conditions aboard the ships. The men were jammed into the cargo holds of the ships until they barely had room to stand without touching other men on all sides. The holds were in total darkness and a small wooden bucket had to suffice for a latrine. Needless to say the bucket was unable to accommodate the needs of all the prisoners and soon the hold became a fetid sewer filled with the uncontrolled excretions of hundreds of sick men. Food and water were lowered into the hold from above only once or twice per day. Many prisoners near the back of the hold were unable to push their way forward to eat. The temperature in the holds was stifling and within a few days men began dying of dehydration and thirst.

Some ships containing prisoners were sunk in the immediate vicinity of the Philippines. The Shinyo Maru, already mentioned, contained the last 800 prisoners from Davao. The Arisan Maru sailed from Manila harbor on 10 October 1944. It held 1,800 prisoners, mostly officers, and was sunk by the USS Snook on 24 October 1944 while crossing the South China Sea about 200 miles south of the Formosa Strait. Only about ten prisoners survived the sinking.[3]

One common factor repeated by many who survived the voyages was the lack of leadership in the holds. This problem seems to have been present in all the ships, but was reported more vividly during the latter trips. In the hellish conditions aboard the Shinyo Maru no one seemed to take charge.

> You might say there were few leaders - mostly the natural kind. There was a Catholic priest, some West Pointers, and a guy who was a self-appointed bouncer. An officer's rank didn't mean anything. We knew we were on our own.[4]

Perhaps the most notorious and most recorded of the Death Ships was the voyage of the Oryoku Maru that sailed from Manila harbor in December 1944. The plight of the Oryoku Maru was similar to all the other Hell Ships the Japanese sent from the Philippines. This particular voyage contained 1,619 prisoners coming from Davao, Bilibid and Cabanatuan. Like the Arisan Maru, this ship was also reported to be carrying mostly officers.

> When the Davao detail arrived back at Cabanatuan, they were first kept in isolation from the other prisoners in Camp No.1....By September 1 Cabanatuan was down to about 4,000 prisoners, most of whom were officers. Two details left Cabanatuan for Bilibid and Japan in early September. The voyage of the Oryoku Maru...carried the last detail of prisoners shipped from Cabanatuan.[5]

The men were loaded aboard the ship into three separate holds. Hold #1 had a floor space of about 4,000 square feet. This hold was large enough for about 250 men to fit semi-

comfortably, but reports said the Japanese did not stop filling it until there were 800 men crammed in so tightly they could not even sit down. Six hundred junior officers and enlisted men were placed into hold #3 and the remaining 200 were placed in the much smaller hold #2. Within minutes the temperature in the holds soared to above 120 degrees. There was no ventilation. "Rank and authority lost their meaning as tempers grew short and men became desperate for space to stand and even for air to breathe."[6]

Within a few hours the situation on the holds became unbearable as men cried out for air. The Japanese guards told the men to be quiet or they would lower the hatch covers and shut out all the air and light. Eventually the ship got under way and the movement brought a little air into the holds.

The only food and water given to the prisoners was a small bucket of water and another bucket of rice lowered into the holds on ropes twice a day. Many of the prisoners away from the hatches were unable to receive anything to eat or drink. Latrine buckets overflowed and men with dysentery, unable to move in the mass of men, simply let their bowels loose where they stood. Before long the floor of the hold was ankle deep in vomit, feces and urine. Soon the men lost all measure of dignity and control.

> A haunting fear began to grip the deranged masses below decks. Several of the prisoners heard (or imagined they heard) people plotting against them. Chief Pharmacist's Mate, Dudley Hensen, stumbled through the dark steaming

aisles to a group of officers. He pleaded with them that the men in his bay were intending to kill him. He was told that it was nonsense and to return to his place. The next morning they found Hensen, his belly slit open.[7]

The Oryoku Maru was only out of Manila harbor a short while when it was attacked by American dive bombers. The ship was hit several times and many prisoners were killed and wounded along with hundreds of Japanese soldiers and civilians who were riding above decks. The men were ordered to strip and to jump from the deck into the ocean and swim to shore. On the way toward the beaches the American plane returned and strafed the swimming men in the water. When they reached the shore they had to take cover behind rocks on the beach because Japanese soldiers fired at them with a machine gun fearing they were trying to escape. Eventually, less than 1,300 survivors were placed inside a tennis court at Olongapo [near present day Subic Bay] where they remained for close to eight days until the Japanese could arrange transportation to another port facility.[8]

Some men had refused the Japanese order to strip and they were the only ones in the tennis court who had some protection from the burning sun. The only food given to the men was two mess kit spoons of uncooked rice per day. The Japanese guards from the ship told the prisoners that they had no control over the Japanese army units on shore and one bag of rice was all they could get. Water was equally scarce and was given to the men by spoonfuls.

> By wedging us back until we could scarcely move they made room in the centre [sic] so that the water could be dispensed. One of the prisoners had a mess kit spoon, and after much debate and cursing it was decided that we would make an encircling ring of the men. As we passed, each man was given five spoonfuls of water. He held his head back so that we would not lose one drop, and then one of the officers dropped in five spoonfuls. The men cried that it wasn't enough, that there was more water than that. It was a thankless job.[9]

Eventually the men were taken by truck and then train to San Fernando in La Union Province. They were placed inside a schoolyard and within minutes they had stripped and eaten all the leaves from the trees and bushes. They even pulled up the flower bulbs from the ground and ate them even though other prisoners had eaten the bulbs earlier and were vomiting on the ground. Some officers were able to enter the building and drank water from a toilet to quench their thirst. The officers spent the night on the courtyard while the enlisted men dug themselves shallow holes on the beach to shelter themselves from a light rain.[10]

The men were then loaded on board the Enoura Maru to continue the trip. The conditions in the holds were once again like an unending nightmare. Flies filled the holds because the ship had recently been used to haul horses and the manure from the horses still covered the floors. It became almost impossible to eat the small amount of rice without also eating some of the flies.

> Often I looked up above and saw the toothy, hunchbacked Wata [the Japanese guard also called Wada in other

> references] glaring with his distorted eyes through his thick-lensed glasses. Standing at the open hatchway, he grinned down at us. When the rice was passed around I saw what he considered funny....A colonel who had once commanded an entire regiment stood, his eyes glazed with hopelessness, clutching his little handful of rice against his naked chest and eating it with filthy fingers. He was trying desperately to keep the flies away from it and to put the grains into his mouth without getting flies in at the same time.[11]

Before long during the voyage the prisoners discovered a cache of raw brown sugar stored in the corner of one of the holds. The men were starving, so naturally they tore into the bags and ate the sugar even though many knew it would cause an uncontrollable attack of dysentery. It was not long before the Japanese guards discovered the stealing and announced that unless the guilty persons gave themselves up there would be no more rice or water issued to the entire group.

> Colonel Beecher [the same lieutenant colonel who commanded at Cabanatuan] realized the seriousness of the situation and asked for two volunteers to take the blame. He promised that, if they survived the Japanese reprisals, he would do everything in his power to make sure that they would not go without food or water during the remainder of the trip to Japan.[12]

Two enlisted soldiers, a Sergeant Arda M. Hanenkrat and a Sergeant Edwin Trapp, volunteered to take responsibility for all who had stolen the sugar. They were taken on deck and badly beaten, but not killed. It is unknown whether these two men survived the ordeal.

When the Enoura Maru reached Formosa it was attacked on 9 January 1945 by American dive bombers while moored in Takao

harbor. This time the death toll was much higher among the prisoners and the Japanese did not even allow medical care or the removal of dead from the shattered holds for three days. Finally on the third day, a Colonel Olsen who had been in charge of the entire group of prisoners at Davao, shouted at the Japanese guards to allow the wounded men treatment and to allow the removal of dead from the hold. The Japanese refused his pleas and the men continued to lie with broken bodies in the rotting stench of men who had already died.

A total of 279 were killed and 343 wounded in the bombing. The next day the Japanese allowed the Americans to pile their dead in cargo nets to be lifted to the docks of the harbor. The dead were either covered with diesel fuel and cremated on the docks or buried nearby in a pit of lime.[13]

On 13 January 1945, the 938 survivors including the wounded were placed aboard the Brazil Maru to continue the trip to Japan. One of the men still alive was Lieutenant Colonel Harold K. Johnson who would later live to become the Army Chief of Staff. The odds of his survival were greatly against him because ninety percent of the wounded died in route and were dumped into the sea.[14]

It was during this final leg of the trip that some officers were reported to have taken advantage of the food and water situation. Lieutenant Colonel Johnson forbade trading with the Japanese, but apparently the civilian gambler who had been in charge of the black market operation at Cabanatuan

continued the practice. Discipline in the holds, even among officers, soon broke down completely.

> The mess officer - an American - issued only enough tea to amount to about six spoons per man per day. But while distributing food and tea he dipped into buckets and drank whole cups. Then he filled his canteen and bottle. Thereafter he treated the staff - about 20 officers - to the elixir. The staff also ate a "workers ration" of rice each meal. This means that they received a full mess kit.[15]

Some prisoners on the trip noted the changes in temperature as the ship entered the freezing weather south of Japan. One prisoner reported being beaten after stealing a piece of ice hanging from a guard rail during an infrequent trip to the top deck. Some prisoners literally licked the frozen condensation from the side of the hull in order to get enough moisture for survival.

When the Brazil Maru finally docked in Moji, Japan, only 425 prisoners of the original 1,619 remained alive. Many of these died within a few weeks after arrival.[16]

Rank appeared to have had no privilege in the Death Ships. Only the men who had learned to hate survived. One man who survived the ordeal of the Oryoku Maru trip summed it up this way:

> I've forced myself at times to think about that experience. It broke me as a soldier....Love never kept anyone alive....But if you hated...I mean hated real hard...[you] lived. Those that started begging for their mothers, then you'd better start digging a hole for them. Once you felt sorry for yourself, you were an absolute gone bastard.[17]

Other prisoners agreed that the saints did not survive the ordeal. Nothing about rank or privilege allowed one man to live and another to die. If it was true that the officers were kept until the end of the war to be transported, then they paid a tremendous price. One officer compared himself and the men who survived the trip as devils as bad as the Japanese themselves.

> Yes, the Japanese were as bad as you say, but we - the 300 living - we were devils too. If we had not been devils, we could not have survived. When you speak of the good and the heroic, don't talk about us. The generous men - the brave men - the unselfish men - are the men we left behind.[18]

The Oryoku Maru was the last of the ships taking prisoners from the Philippines to Japan. Less than 500 American prisoners remained at Cabanatuan. They were later rescued by the 6th Ranger Battalion on 30-31 January 1945.[19]

NOTES CHAPTER 7

[1] Martin Boyle, Yanks Don't Cry, (New York: Published by Bernard Geis Associates; Distributed by Random House, Inc., 1963), 34.

[2] Calvin E. Chunn, ed., Of Rice and Men, (Los Angeles, California: Veterans' Publishing Company, 1946), 111.

[3] Donald Knox, Death March - The Survivors of Bataan, (New York and London: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Publishers, 1981), 344.

[4] Ibid., 296; quoting Private First Class Victor Mapes.

[5] Ibid., 347.

[6] Marion Lawton, Some Survived, (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill, 1984), 155.

[7] A. B. Feuer, Bilibid Diary - The Secret Notebooks of Commander Thomas Hayes POW, the Philippines, 1942-45, (Hamden, Connecticut: The Shoe String Press, Inc., 1987), 220.

[8] Sidney Stewart, Give Us This Day, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1957), 165-168 and 181; Although Stewart appears to have exaggerated in other sections of his book, his account of the voyage of the Oryoku Maru has been confirmed in many other references. Even the hellish references to prisoners slashing the arms and throats of other prisoners in order to drink their blood to quench their thirst has been repeated in various sources.

[9] Ibid., 182-183.

[10] Ibid., 194-195.

[11] Ibid., 202.

[12] Feuer, Bilibid Diary, 232; this is a secondhand account by Feuer to try and explain the conditions of the trip Commander Thomas Hayes was forced to endure.

[13] Chunn, Of Rice and Men, 117-119.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Lawton, Some Survived, 210; Lawton said other sources showed 435 survived the voyage.

[17] Knox, Death March, 345; quoting Sergeant Forrest Knox.

[18] Feuer, Bilibid Diary, 244.

[19] Dr. Michael J. King, "Rangers: Selected Combat Operations in World War II", in Leavenworth Papers, vol No. 11, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 1985), 55.

CHAPTER 8

SUFFERING IS RELATIVE

The Nurses

One group of American military officers were not even treated as members of the armed forces after being captured. These were the nurses who were captured at the fall of Guam and Corregidor. Although they represent an extremely small portion of the total number of Americans captured, their story should be told because they received different treatment from the remainder of the prisoners. In retrospect, however, their preferential treatment was more likely due to their sex rather than their rank or profession.

The first nurses captured in the Far East were members of the U.S. Navy stationed on Guam. They were taken along with the male prisoners to Japan until they were released as part of a diplomatic exchange in the spring of 1942.[1] Their treatment was exemplary compared to the Japanese treatment of women in China and Singapore earlier. Apart from an occasional surprise visit by a guard in their quarters while they were changing clothes, the women were not molested. The Japanese soldiers

who deliberately caught them in a partial state of undress were severely disciplined by their officers.

The nurses on Bataan, however, were not as fortunate as their counterparts from Guam. On the night of 8 April 1942 they were taken from the hospitals on Bataan and loaded onto barges for the short trip to Corregidor. A total of about 150 army nurses made it to Corregidor that night amid the shelling and explosions of the ammunition dumps.

> Their names must always be hallowed when we speak of American heroes. The memory of their coming ashore on Corregidor that early morning of April 9, dirty, dishevele̊, some of them wounded from the hospital bombings - and every last one of them with her chin up in the air - is a memory that can never be erased.[2]

General Wainwright knew of the atrocities inflicted by the Japanese on the city of Nanking, China, a few years earlier and he did not want to subject these women to the same horrors of rape and torture. He contacted MacArthur's headquarters in Australia and arranged for two seaplanes to be dispatched to carry some nurses, civilians, and senior officers away from Corregidor. Fifty men and women were placed on board the sea planes. The group included thirty nurses who were chosen by the Chief Nurse, Captain Maud Davison, along with twenty other officers and civilians.[3]

Both planes took off in the darkness and flew to a lake on Mindanao. One plane's pontoon hit a submerged rock while landing and was unable to depart. The other plane had a

difficult time taking off even after the passengers discarded many of their personal possessions.

> Under the pilot's relenting eye we threw out more and more of our few remaining possessions. But when the plane still did not rise, we would have gladly thrown everything away. We sat still and tense, willing the plane to rise, to take us away, sick with the thought that if we were going to fall into the hands of the Japanese after all why couldn't we have been with the others at Corregidor? And then, just as utter despair clutched us, the motor seemed to make a tremendous effort - and the plane rose slowly but steadily. It was almost an hour before the real cause of the trouble was found - a young American soldier stowed away in the tail of the ship.[4]

The remaining nurses on Mindanao were captured by the Japanese, but it is unknown where they were eventually interned. The stowaway is unnamed, but he is likely the lowest-ranking soldier to have escaped from the Philippines.

An additional twenty-five persons, including nurses, were evacuated aboard a submarine, the USS Spearfish, on 3 May 1942, just three days before the island surrendered. Wainwright also included an ailing colonel who was suffering from ulcers and who he thought would die in captivity.[5] The voyage of the Spearfish inspired the Hollywood movie entitled "Operation Petticoat," which is loosely based on the event.

A total of about one hundred nurses were captured on Corregidor when it fell. Wainwright admitted in his memoir that his decision to surrender the island was largely based on a fear of the nurses being killed by the Japanese who had invaded the island. These nurses were taken to the Santo Tomas

Internment Camp where they were joined by navy nurses from the Canacao Naval Hospital at Cavite. They did not reach Santo Tomas until July and it is likely that they spent the period between May and July at Bilibid treating the wounded from Corregidor.[6]

The conditions in Santo Tomas, though bad by conventional standards, were much better than any camp where male prisoners were being kept. The camp held American families who were living in the Philippines when the Japanese invaded. Food was initially provided by the Japanese and later allowed to be bought by camp personnel from local Filipino merchants. The males were separated from the females at night, but could be together otherwise. The hospital building where the nurses worked was actually the Santa Catalina dormitory across the street from the Santo Tomas University and was located outside the actual internment camp grounds.[7]

Some military personnel with families in Manila discarded their uniforms in the confusion of the Japanese invasion and hid for a time at Santo Tomas. Technically they were classified as deserters from their units. In January 1943 a number of these men were discovered and forced to move to the Cabanatuan camp after a short, but brutal stay at Fort Santiago prison where the Japanese attempted to determine if they were spies.[8]

Even though the nurses did not suffer the deprivations of the male prisoners, they had to work up to twelve-hour days

in the hospital while the civilians in the camp only performed two to three hours of community service daily.[10]

As MacArthur's forces advanced on the Philippines, the city of Manila became a target for American bombers. Many civilians were wounded and the army nurses worked many hours under fire trying to care for the injured. Some of the nurses were wounded themselves in the process.[11]

Despite the normal protective feelings that may have existed at the time, in hindsight, some prisoners did not feel the extraordinary efforts by General Wainwright to evacuate the nurses were necessary.

> On April 8, 1942, as Bataan was falling, the Army nurses stationed there were evacuated to Corregidor despite the desperate need for them on Bataan. At the time, Hospitals No. 1 and No. 2 were filled to the brim with the wounded and soldiers suffered dreadfully from dysentery or malaria, but the welfare of the nurses was given priority over that of the patients. During the Battle of Corregidor, many nurses, including some who had already left Bataan, were evacuated to the States via Australia, using extremely scarce space on military craft (submarines and aircraft) that might have been used for seriously wounded men. When those nurses arrived in the States, they were welcomed as war heroines. When the Japanese took Corregidor, they interned all captured nurses with American civilians in Manila and treated them reasonably well. At least, all survived and were liberated. Certainly their treatment was better than that afforded the male POWs, including the patients at Hospitals No. 1 and No. 2 on Bataan.[12]

The story of the nurses was included to show that at least in once instance the Japanese made a deliberate decision to treat one class of military person differently from another. This was most likely due to their sex rather than occupation

since male physicians and chaplains were sent to the prison camps where they suffered alongside the soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen even though they were considered noncombatants under the Geneva Convention rules.

The Senior Officers

Shortly after the Bataan Death March the colonels and general officers were moved from Camp O'Donnell and other locations to a camp near the town of Tarlac in central Luzon. The conditions of their internment at Tarlac were harsh, but still better than what the lower-ranking prisoners experienced.

> Undoubtedly the prison camps in which he [Brigadier General William E. Brougher] and his high-ranking fellow prisoners were held had better conditions that those of other camps in Asia in World War II....But, as the diary starkly reveals, the treatment which Brougher's group received was generally harsh and trying, and it lasted well over three years.[13]

General Wainwright never saw Camp O'Donnell. Following his surrender of Corregidor, the Japanese held him in a small apartment in Manila. According to his memoir, he and his staff were treated well and fed "a decent Japanese officers' breakfast."[14]

Wainwright remained in Manila until all other forces throughout the Philippines had surrendered. At one point his captors threatened that he would have to witness the execution

of ten American officers every day that the troops held out against the Japanese. This never happened as most of the men under Wainwright eventually surrendered.[15]

General Wainwright and his staff had a small measure of freedom during those early days. There does not seem to be any particular reason for this since the Japanese lumped all the other generals on Luzon together in Camp O'Donnell where they were treated the same as any other prisoner.

> After breakfast we were allowed to go up on the roof of the University Club and walk around for thirty minutes. When we were returned we could read or play cards, if there was no questioning. The club's old library had been virtually untouched by war, but it was hard to concentrate on books. The estate of captivity simply saturates an American's system, driving out almost all other thoughts and coloring such thoughts as do come through with the dismal realization that you are caged.[16]

General Wainwright was unaware of the brutality of the Death March and Camp O'Donnell that occurred as he played cards and read books. This is not unusual since even General Homma was unaware that the intricate plan he had for moving the American prisoners on Bataan broke down under poor management and lack of human concern. As mentioned earlier, the colonels and generals were moved from Camp O'Donnell to Tarlac on 10 May 1942. General Wainwright did not arrive until 9 June 1942.[17] The Japanese authorized enlisted orderlies and mess personnel to accompany the officers. A report submitted to the camp headquarters at O'Donnell showed that eleven generals,

sixty-three colonels, one lieutenant colonel (medical corps) and one major to act as adjutant, departed along with seventy-four noncommissioned officers and twenty-nine enlisted men.[18]

Tarlac was similar to Camp O'Donnell in that it was a partially completed Philippine Army camp. General Wainwright described the conditions of the barracks after his arrival.

> The barracks to which we were assigned had once housed eighty Philippine trainees. But the Japs put a hundred and eighty of us in there. The general officers were each given a cot, with the heads against a wall and the sides so close to one another that we had to climb in over the foot. Officers below the rank of general were assigned to wooden, double-decked bunks on which there were, of course, no springs or mattresses. They gave us no blankets. I had two with me, and I gave one to Beebe....The cots and bunks were on the second floor of the little building. Downstairs was a small mess and two smaller rooms, one of which was turned into a hospital to care for the brutalized men from O'Donnell.[19]

The food at Tarlac was better than what General Brougher recalled receiving at O'Donnell, but was much worse than what General Wainwright ate in Manila. Their diet consisted mainly of rice with, "an ounce or two of either pork or beef thrown in every week or two."[20]

Following breakfast the prisoners were free to walk around the prison camp yard which measured about 200 by 100 yards. The general officers were called in for questioning while others would go inside to read some of the books that had been brought from the University Club library. General

Brougher managed to obtain some vegetable seeds and the guards allowed him to grow a small garden of tomatoes, sweet potatoes and watermelons.[21]

Within a few weeks they persuaded the camp commandant to allow them to buy additional food from the local Filipinos. Most of the general officers had been allowed to keep their personal possessions and money. The area around Tarlac had been hit pretty hard during the war, but they were able to buy small quantities of bananas, canned milk, sugar, mongo beans, and candies. They even stocked some Filipino cigarettes and carabao soap in what they called a small commissary.[22]

Around 11 August 1942 the Japanese told the officers to gather their belongings because they were moving to another camp.

> At about 7 A.M...we were formed in a column of fours, burdened down with more than we had planned to carry on our backs, and marched to the Tarlac railroad station. We were probably a pathetic-looking lot; hardly a Bataan Death March, but certainly a Parade of the Vanquished. Because of the weights on our backs it was impossible to present any military bearing, any vestige of our remaining dignity as officers and men.[23]

After the group arrived at Manila they were marched to the docks to await loading on a ship bound for Formosa. While they were waiting, a Japanese lieutenant who had gotten to know General Wainwright during his stay in Manila, brought him a carton of Lucky Stike cigarettes. This same lieutenant

had purchased a hot plate for Wainwright while he was being held earlier.[24]

General Wainwright and General King were both given a cabin on board the ship, but the others were placed in the holds. Although they were not jammed in like the men who left on the Hell Ships, it was still a very uncomfortable journey. There was no mention of being deprived of adequate food and water during the trip.

> They slept on two long wooden shelves extending six feet out from the walls and arranged one over the other. Each man was granted two and a half feet of space on the shelves, with no bed clothing and the most primitive toilet arrangements.[25]

When the group arrived at Formosa they were taken by train to the Karenko prison camp they were greeted with less than enthusiasm by the Japanese guards. They were lined up in front of the barracks and their personal belongings were searched. The guards opened their baggage and threw clothing and personal belongings onto the ground. They were then forced to strip down to their shorts as the Japanese inspected the clothing they were wearing.[26]

The lower floor of the barracks at Karenko had two big squad rooms and several smaller rooms. The upper floor had six smaller squad rooms. The bunks were made of metal and had thin rice straw mattresses with sacks filled with rice for pillows. In most other camps these pillows would have been

eagerly ripped open and the contents consumed. Once again General Wainwright and General King were given separate rooms while the others slept together in the open bays.[27]

The total number of American army prisoners at Karenko included one lieutenant general, five major generals, thirteen brigadier generals, and 122 colonels. There were also two marine colonels and five navy captains. A total of seventy-three enlisted men also worked as orderlies in the camp.[28] This report differs from the number of enlisted orderlies who left from Camp O'Donnell. It is unknown where the remaining thirty enlisted men went.

By the time they arrived at Karenko the officers began receiving pay. They used their pay to purchase additional food. They also had enough money to buy a herd of about thirty goats.

> The goats were hardly more than kids, and though the temptation was great we could not slaughter them at the time we bought them because there would not have been enough meat to make more than a shred for each man. So we set about the task of rearing them, against the day when they would be large enough to provide for us.[29]

By October 1942 the Japanese began forcing the officers to work by clearing land for a vegetable farm. Although they initially refused because of the Geneva Conventions, the Japanese cut their rations until they were forced to "volunteer" to work in order to be fed.[30] Apparently the amount of available foodstuffs on the local economy was much more limited than what was available to the men at Cabanatuan. The lieutenant colonels

and majors at Cabanatuan managed to avoid compulsory work until 1944. It is also possible that the Japanese guards on Formosa forced the generals to work in order to humiliate them.

The Japanese treated the officers brutally at Karenko. General Wainwright reported that he was bayoneted through the left wrist for accidentally breaking his food bowl. Enlisted prisoners were slugged and beaten as many a three times per day and, "it became a rare sight to find one whose eyes were not blackened, nose mashed, or head and body full of lumps."[31] There is no report of the enlisted men on Formosa ever being paid for their work, but it appears the food ration was sufficient to sustain life even though it may have been very unappetizing. Later reports showed the officers paid the enlisted men for personal orderly duties.

General Wainwright said the quality of food at Karenko was awful with the men eating snails after it rained and rice filled with dozen of white worms with black heads. He said the rice also contained small black weevils which they ate by the thousands, "looking for the tiniest nutrition to give us strength to work in the fields.[32]

General Brougher, on the other hand, spoke of a special New Year's Day meal at Karenko on 1 January 1943 that consisted of two ounces of pork in the soup, rice and one small potato cookie. He also had one half a tomato from his garden and a green onion and cabbage leaf salad with salt for a dressing. He did not mention this type of meal very often so this was

obviously something he planned and saved up for. Tomatoes, cookies, cabbages and pork were almost unheard of in other camps. By early March 1943 the men received about one pound of potatoes per man per day.[33]

The food continued to improve through March 1943 when the men received a supper consisting of a full bowl of beef, potatoes and vegetable stew and some meat and potatoes in the rice for other meals. Additionally, the camp received about thirty tons of Red Cross supplies during the month, but they were not immediately issued to the prisoners.[34] The meals the men received during this period, even without the Red Cross boxes, were to be the peak of their food experience for some time. The only other camps that mentioned Red Cross supplies were the Davao Penal Colony and Old Bilibid prison. In these camps they received very few boxes and had to share them between several men. It appears as though the Japanese sent a great deal of the supplies to accompany the general officers so they would be led to believe the issue of Red Cross supplies was common throughout the region.

The men were moved from Karenko to another camp near the town of Tamazato immediately after the Red Cross supplies arrived. This move occurred on 2 April 1943, and shortly after their arrival the food situation became much worse.

> Food situation getting desperate. Everybody ravenously hungry - no vegetables in soup - no sugar. Red Cross supplies belong to us and in hands of Nipponese - will not let us have them. Will not buy sufficient food for us to

sustain life. Unless something is done soon we will starve to death - and it won't be long.[35]

The food situation at Tamazato was rectified on 14 April 1943 when the Japanese issued the prisoners one individual Red Cross box each. The box contained, one pound of sugar, eight ounces of corned beef, four ounces of cocoa, one pound of salt,...one chocolate bar, a small package of lemon drops, two small packages of sugar, one can of pineapple and plum jam, one small cheese biscuit, tongue and liver paste, steak and rice, margarine, marmalade pudding, bacon, one can of tomatoes, one can of ham paste and gelatin, soap and tea.[36] Most people would look at this menu and think it was sparse, but the senior officers saw it as a feast. Prisoners at other camps would not have believed their luck at obtaining this variety and quantity of food all at one time.

At Tamazato, General Wainwright and seven others were given four small rooms to share two apiece. He complained that the others had to be, "crowded into large squad rooms under conditions about as bad as those at Karenko."[37] General Brougher, on the other hand, did not seem disappointed at all in the sleeping arrangements and food at the new camp.

> Since the General Officers moved from Karenko to this Camp our situation is in many ways much more pleasant. So far we are free from work requirement. Red Cross supplies are being regularly issued. We are allowed a fair degree of independence in interior economy and administration of the Camp....It is a quiet, restful place with delightful climate. We are reasonably well fixed here - "for the duration," if necessary. I can take it.[38]

Life was indeed much better at Tamazato than at previous camps. The officers continued to receive food parcels, had news on the war from Japanese newspapers, and were even able to play bridge. The Japanese gave them so many inoculations that General Brougher believed he had had more shots as a prisoner of war than in his entire former life.[39]

Their stay at Tamazato was short, however, and on 5 June 1943 the Japanese began moving them to other camps on Formosa. The constant moving of the generals was to prevent the American intelligence from being able to locate the exact location of the men for rescue operations. General Wainwright and twenty-seven senior officers and civilian governors were sent north to the coastal city of Muqsak while General Brougher and eighty-eight others were sent to Shirakawa. The lives of General Brougher's group were quite different since the Japanese again required the Shirakawa prisoners to perform manual labor.[40]

General Brougher's group arrived at Shirakawa on 8 June 1943. His initial impression of the camp was good.

> Arrived at new camp by marching about 2:30 PM, issued tea and ate lunch on arrival. Assigned rooms (two generals to each room). Weaver [Brigadier General James R. Weaver] and I are roommates. Looks as if we are going to be much more comfortable here. We even have a chair each in our room, a good table, ample shelf space, and a good reading light.[41]

The officers continued to be paid at Shirakawa, but the bulk of their pay went into the same "postal" savings account

as at other camps. As of 7 August 1943, General Brougher had 3,987.370 yen in his account. The yen was worth about fifty cents at the time so it is readily apparent that General Brougher was considered a rich man by prisoner standards even though he was unable to touch the money. Unfortunately there was very little to buy at the camp. The Japanese did allow the officers to buy pigs to be raised and later butchered, but the only way the prisoners obtained additional food at Shirakawa was to perform heavy pick and shovel work making a trail around the camp. They received worker's rations for doing this.[42]

By September 1943 the trail had been completed and the officers and enlisted men were put to work on the camp farm. The Japanese used human waste for fertilizer and the men were required to work with this soil daily.

> Officer squads No. 1-5 and all enlisted squads worked until 6:30 PM - got in one hour and ½ after supper is usually served - very tired and dirty - no water to bathe in - after handling soil infected with human feces all afternoon.[43]

The work details continued through the winter months and the men did not receive Red Cross parcels even though the prisoners believed the Japanese had them. By June 1944 the officers decided not to "volunteer" for any more work details. By this time all the camps in the Far East were under Prime Minister Tojo's "no work - no food" policy. The Japanese quickly responded by taking away what little privileges the officers had. They also butchered some of the pigs which the

officers had bought and fed them to the enlisted men. This really irritated the officers because they paid the enlisted men for doing work for them.[44]

The punishment of the officers for refusal to work continued through late August 1944. The officers were required to answer to roll calls late at night. Extra food was brought into the camp and given to the enlisted men. Rabbits and pork were added to the enlisted men's soup, but not for the officers. The officers' rice ration was cut to a non-wo[illegible]rs portion of 390 grams per day.[45]

The battle of wills between the Japanese and the American officers only ended when the officers got orders that they were to be moved to another camp - this time by air. This news came to them on 30 September 1944. General Brougher mentioned that he had 8,447.07 yen in his useless savings account at that time.[46]

Conditions at Muqsak for General Wainwright's group during the same time period were much better than what General Brougher's group had to endure.

> Each top officer at Muqsak had his own chair, table and a reasonably comfortable cot in buildings situated on a hill overlooking a pleasant valley. Though the men had adequate living quarters and orderlies to take care of their cooking and washing, they still shared some of the same psychological burdens as other POWs: a sense of isolation from the outside world and a deep yearning for letters from family and friends.[47]

The camp buildings were made of rough pine board and were one-story with eight rooms measuring eight-and-one-half feet by ten. Each room had an easy chair, a bamboo cot, and a small table where the generals could write letters and eat their meals. The Japanese provided them with books to read and even gave them better food than they had received at other camps.

> We received more rice at our first meal than I had seen at one time since my early days of captivity in Manila. What is more, it was accompanied by vegetables.[48]

The officers were told they could spend 100 yen per month from their pay for cigarettes, cigars, tomato ketchup, soy sauce, tea and sugar. They were given fruit to eat and told they didn't have to work unless they wanted to. The enlisted men, however, were given chunkles [a crude Japanese hoe] and told to clear land for a farm. The officers bought some hogs and chickens and planted a garden to pass their time.[49]

The officers slaughtered a hog for Christmas 1943 and the camp commander sent them two turkeys. General Wainwright invited his enlisted orderly to his room for Christmas dinner. He felt sorry for the conditions of the enlisted men at Muqsak. By this time he must have been aware of the conditions the enlisted men faced at Camp O'Donnell.

> If possible, they were worked harder at Muqsak than at Karenko. They were so miserably housed that it made me ashamed of myself to have a little room of my own....The

enlisted men's quarters consisted of a single room with a cement floor. On each side of the room was a long bench extending about seven feet out from the walls. This was their bed place. Each bench slept sixteen men, and the only insulation between them and the rough boards were their blankets.[50]

Undoubtedly not a single orderly would have traded his life with the generals for anything other than complete freedom. They might have been treated like dogs, but at least they were able to eat of the crumbs of their masters while other prisoners in the Far East were starving. Since all of them had spent time at O'Donnell, they knew the alternatives.

General Wainwright's semi-pleasant stay at Muqsak ended around 5 October 1944 when he and his group were taken by train to a small POW camp near the town of Heito on the southern tip of Formosa. A large number of General Brougher's group had departed from there the previous day by plane to Kyushu, Japan. Some lower-ranking officers and enlisted orderlies were sent by boat. During his one night at Heito, General Wainwright saw first hand how the other lower-ranking prisoners were being treated compared to the generals.

As we entered the compound I saw a large group of prisoners, mostly British but with a number of Americans, returning from work in the fields. They were little more than skin and bones, some of their depleted bodies bronzed and some of them horribly burned by the sun. They were the very epitome of human bondage, and standing there watching them drag themselves to their cup of rice moved me to helpless tears....I saw the enslaved men limp back at dark that evening and lie in an irrigation ditch in complete weariness, and my mind was filled with them that night as I tried to find sleep on the hard bench that was my bed. Later that night I felt a tap on my ankle and,

> investigating, saw a bony white hand reaching up from under the foot of my bench. It was wagging a bit of paper. I reached down and took the paper. It was a note from an American officer...He told me there were thirty-four American officers and men in this camp, and that they had pledged themselves to endure any treatment the Japs gave them; they were determined to live.[51]

When General Brougher left the previous day he described his plane trip to Japan as, "most comfortable and delightful." He said there were only ten people aboard the plane which had space for fourteen. They each had a padded seat and room for their luggage. After arrival they went to a small hotel and were treated to, "a delicious dinner of fish, chicken and onion soup, bread, and some other vegetables." Brougher said it was the best meal he had eaten in two years.[52]

This pleasant journey should be constrasted with the horrible story of the Hell Ships that has already been mentioned. The Japanese certainly could use the excuse that there were so few generals that they could afford to transport them by air. But the decent treatment of the generals can never compensate for what the Japanese allowed to happen on the ships. Some men who survived the Hell Ships still believe their experience was so horrendous that the Japanese should never be forgiven.

About ten days after General Brougher's group reached Japan, they arrived at the Manchurian camp of Chengchiantun on 14 October 1944, after a long train journey through Korea. Once again, Brougher's view of their situation was optimistic.

> Had excellent supper of 1 bun and excellent mutton stew - the best we've ever had as prisoners. Ten of us assigned a room [20' by 20']....Each issued 7 heavy blankets - iron beds with straw mattresses - made up our beds and turned in at about 8:30 for much needed sleep. Big Russian stove in room and much ado about keeping a fire going. Looks like we are going to be fairly comfortable.[53]

The officers continued to be fed extremely well for prisoners. On the night of 20 October 1944, they were fed bread, meat stew, potato pie and green salad. According to Brougher, they ate as much as they could possibly eat and then were issued one hundred cigarettes and a small box of caramel candy. They were also being given beans with every meal with second and third helpings for those that wanted them. Brougher said, "This is a situation beyond imagination in Karenko days when we used to serve beans by count."[54]

The good conditions at Chengchiantun continued through March 1945 where General Brougher commented on the luxury of being able to take a good hot bath and weighing 153 pounds, "as much as I've ever weighed in my life!"[55]

The good treatment of General Brougher should be contrasted with the 435 survivors of the Oryoku Maru journey who had recently arrived in Japan on the Brazil Maru. Within thirty days of their arrival, 161 of them died leaving only 264 of the original 1,619 who left Manila in December 1944.[56] One of these survivors was Lieutenant Colonel Harold K. Johnson.

Conditions became worse in May 1945 when the Japanese again demanded the officers to "volunteer" to work. Their bread

ration was cut in half, but no other punishment was mentioned. Brougher and his group was transferred for the last time on 20 May 1945 to Mukden, Manchuria [Hoten Camp], where he stayed until the war ended.[57]

General Wainwright's group arrived at their new camp which he called Sheng Tai Tun, Manchuria, in early October 1944. It is very likely that this was the same camp that General Brougher's group went to, but with the name spelled a little differently. Neither general, however, ever mentioned the presence of the other group of officers.

Regardless if these were the same camps, General Wainwright too, was surprised at the quality and quantity of the meals provided.

> The arrival of our first meal made us realize to our joy, that we had at last moved out of the rice-eating and watery-soup world. The meal contained bread, real white bread, and a thick vegetable cake mixed with maize or millet.[58]

The colonels and orderlies arrived at the camp after a long voyage by ship and train on 14 November 1944. The reports described life at the camp as hard even though the officers were not required to work. They had no books to read and walking around outside was considered extremely rigorous in the, "piercing gales."[59]

General Wainwright and fifteen other senior officers were transferred again on 1 December 1944 to a camp in Sian,

Manchuria. The officers who were left behind were ordered to work and when they refused their rations were cut. Although they received Red Cross packages, the Japanese punched holes in the cans so the men had to consume them immediately. The idea was to keep the men from accumulating enough cans to provide food for an escape attempt.

The enlisted men at Sian were required to work outside in the bitter cold. General Wainwright felt sorry for his orderly and loaned him his wool cap and boots. The Japanese commandant ordered them returned.[60]

Around 3 April 1945, the Japanese required the enlisted men to begin planting a garden at Sian. The ground was still frozen solid down to a depth of nearly eighteen inches. The senior officers were given small plots for vegetables. General Wainwright's orderly planted a garden of string beans, red peppers, melons, and tomatoes for the general. While his orderly labored to break the frozen ground with his Japanese issued wooden chunkle, General Wainwright spent his time trying to reach a goal he had started in Formosa of playing 10,000 games of solitaire. By this time he had reached 7,500. He never said if he made his goal. He remained at Sian until he was liberated by Russian troops in August 1945.[61]

General Wainwright quickly grew tired of waiting for word from the outside about his repatriation so he traveled overland to Mukden with a Russian escort. From there he was flown to participate in the formal surrender ceremonies in the

Philippines and then to meet with General MacArthur in Tokyo where he also participated in the surrender ceremonies of the Japanese aboard the USS Missouri. Following this he returned to the United States where he was given his fourth star and decorated with the Congressional Medal of Honor by President Harry Truman.

It should be obvious from comparing the treatment of the senior officers to those prisoners already mentioned that their treatment was substantially different. Most people in the military would expect that general officers and perhaps some colonels should be treated with the dignity accorded their rank even when being held as POWs. It is likely that the American generals and colonels were treated more harshly than any other senior officers in the history of warfare. But when one compares the treatment of the generals and colonels to the field grade officers in the Philippines, one can easily see a distinction that is much greater than the distance between their ranks. From there the distinctions in treatment based on rank drop drastically until it is almost impossible to make a comparison between what General Wainwright experienced and what the average private soldier endured. It is hoped that the lower-ranking men who defended Bataan and Corregidor were able to share vicariously in the joy General Wainwright felt over receiving the Medal of Honor. God knows they endured the lion's share of the suffering.

NOTES CHAPTER 8

[1] Martin Boyle, Yanks Don't Cry, (New York: Published by Bernard Geis Associates; distributed by Random House, Inc., 1963), 51.

[2] Jonathan M. Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1946), 81.

[3] Ibid., 101-102; Juanita Redmond, I Served on Bataan, (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1943), 149-150.

[4] Redmond, I Served on Bataan, 157-158.

[5] Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, 108.

[6] Frederic H. Stevens, Santo Tomas Internment Camp, (New York: Stratford House, 1946), 86-87.

[7] Carol M. Petillo, ed., The Ordeal of Elizabeth Vaughan - A Wartime Diary of the Philippines, (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1985), 207.

[8] Stevens, Santo Tomas Internment Camp, 43-44.

[9] Ibid., 49-50.

[10] Ibid., 348-349.

[11] Ibid., 381.

[12] Preston Hubbard, Apocalypse Undone, (Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press, 1990), 77.

[13] William E. Brougher, South to Bataan - North to Mukden. The Prison Diary of Brigadier General W. E. Brougher, (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1971), xviii; preface remarks by editor D. Clayton James.

[14] Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, 144-145.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid., 154.

[17] Ibid., 158.

[18] John E. Olson, O'Donnell - Andersonville of the Pacific, (Lake Quivira, Kansas: J. E. Olson, 1985), 62.

[19] Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, 158.

[20] Brougher, South to Bataan, 43; James' quote.

[21] Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, 161.

[22] Ibid., 159.

[23] Ibid., 168.

[24] Ibid., 171.

[25] Ibid., 172-173; After arriving at Takao harbor, Formosa, Generals Wainwright and King and the others were then transferred to the hold of a local steamer for the remaining journey. The hold was infested with bed-bugs and there was little air circulation.

[26] Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, 176.

[27] Ibid., 178.

[28] Brougher, South to Bataan, 48.

[29] Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, 202.

[30] Ibid., 187, and 190-191.

[31] Ibid., 194.

[32] Ibid., 201.

[33] Brougher, South to Bataan, 55 and 61.

[34] Ibid., 62-63.

[35] Ibid., 66.

[36] Ibid., 67.

[37] Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, 208.

[38] Brougher, South to Bataan, 69-70.

[39] Ibid., 71-72.

[40] Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, 213; 226-227.

[41] Brougher, South to Bataan, 77.

[42] Ibid., 86 and 90.

[43] Ibid., 92.

[44] Ibid., 106, 120, 126.

[45] Ibid., 137, 139; Editor D. Clayton James said that by 1944 the average daily rice ration at the Cabanatuan camps was 420 grams of rice, or else rice and barley or corn and barley. He also said the Japanese people, even during the last part of the war, received 1,000 grams. His source was Georgetown Institute of World Polity, Prisoners of War, 35-36.

[46] Ibid., 140.

[47] Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, 171.

[48] Ibid., 215.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid., 221.

[51] Ibid., 234-236.

[52] Brougher, South to Bataan, 142.

[53] Ibid., 146.

[54] Ibid., 147.

[55] Ibid., 160.

[56] Marion Lawton, Some Survived, (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill, 1984), 214.

[57] Ibid., 164-165; 168-169.

[58] Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, 240.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Ibid., 242, 244, 251.

[61] Ibid., 257.

CHAPTER 9

CAMPS OUTSIDE THE PHILIPPINES

Camps in Japan

Officers below the rank of colonel spent a lot of their POW time at the camps already mentioned in the Philippines. Enlisted prisoners, along with a few officers, began arriving in Japan as early as the summer of 1942.

Most of the prisoners arrived by ship at the port of Moji and then were sent by train to the dozens of camps throughout Japan. Some of the weaker prisoners were placed in a local "hospital" before being transported. American fliers shot down during the many raids over Japanese cities were usually kept separated from the other prisoners.

> The Narumi prison camp on the edge of Nagoya was composed of four barracks, a small clinic, a kitchen, and a long headquarters building containing the Commandant's office and a food storage area. Attached to the rear of the headquarters building was a facility that would be used later as an isolation cell for some of the Air Force personnel shot down in the raids on Nagoya.[1]

The majority of camps in Japan were located near industrial complexes and mines and the enlisted men were put to work doing jobs alongside civilian Japanese workers. The work included various forms of mining, steel mills, zinc smelting, stevedore jobs on the docks, munitions and war materiel factories, and jobs in the railroad yards. The officers generally worked around the camp and performed administrative duties for all camp personnel. Medical officers performed their normal duties. Most camps had only a few officers. The bulk of officers in Japan were assigned to the camp near Zentsuji.[2]

The arrangement of barracks for enlisted men varied from camp to camp, but usually consisted of an open-bay barracks with fifty to sixty prisoners in each bay. The men had an assigned space on a bunk bed of about the width of a man's body and they slept on rice-straw mats called tatamis.[3]

In one of the Fukuoka Groups of mining camps near the town of Omine, however, the enlisted men were placed four to a room with the captain receiving a room to himself. The men were immediately put to work in the mines while the officers stayed in camp. At least one officer reported feeling guilty about the arrangement.

> What always played on my mind...was the feeling that here I was drawing officer's pay for supposedly being in command of a group, and I wasn't really doing anything....I won't say I was there to look after them. These guys were pretty good at looking after themselves....There were times when people got in trouble and you felt you ought to help them. Here you had to use some judgment as to when you

would try to help out, because if you picked the wrong time you wound up getting the beating instead.[4]

The men at these Fukuoka Group of camps worked in underground coal mines. They worked all day with picks and shovels to load rail cars which they pushed on tracks to larger rail cars. The officers remained in camp and received a smaller non-workers ration. The enlisted workers received about 720 grams of rice and soy beans per day while the officers received 420. Occasionally the Japanese would give them fish, mesan [a salty, sour, soy bean paste], daikon [a turnip-like radish], whale meat, and vegetables.[5]

In many camps the officers assigned the specific work details that the men were required to perform during the day. This arrangement caused some contention among the enlisted men in the coal mining camp of Niigata.

> The whole time I was there no work was rotated, which would have been the fairest way of doing it. These kitchen people, who had the choicest jobs in the camp, never went out and shoveled coal. The American officers never suggested to the Japanese that the jobs be changed. Of course the officers didn't have to do manual work. If you're ever captured, make sure you're an officer, hear? That way you're a gentleman by act of Congress.[6]

Not all of the camps allowed the officers to remain in camp, however. It seems as though the individual Japanese camp commanders had as much latitude in Japan as they had in the Philippines. At the camp near Yodogawa, the officers were forced to work as laborers. The Japanese physically punished

them and created problems between them and the enlisted men. The officers were humiliated in front of their men and separate quarters were not provided.[7]

This situation was the exception rather than the rule. In most cases the officers had a much better situation than the enlisted men. One officer, a navy lieutenant named Edward Little, at the Fukuoka Camp No. 17, served as the camp mess officer. He was court-martialed following the war on charges that he withheld food from some enlisted men and caused their deaths. He was later acquitted of the charges.[8]

Cigarettes became the trading commodity in the Japanese camps. There were no camp commissaries in Japan so the men had to trade among themselves for additional food. The cigarette was used as the base line for all trading deals. Officers received about twenty cigarettes and a private about three. They were issued about every ten days.[9]

The craving for cigarettes became so bad for some of the enlisted men that they actually traded rations in advance for cigarettes.

> Many men have no change of clothing because of trading clothes for cigarettes. Some men trade two cigarettes to be paid issue day for one cigarette now. They get so deep in debt that it will take three or four months to pay out. Then the men call on officers to settle their disputes.[10]

In some camps the disputes were solved by declaring the men bankrupt and getting a couple of strong enlisted men

to keep the insolvent man from continuing to trade and preventing the men who lost food or cigarettes in the deal from taking out their frustration on the bankrupt prisoner.[11] In other camps the officers did nothing to prevent the trading.

Life in the camps was a constant struggle to try and get around the system established by the Japanese. Men would smuggle stolen food back to camp to eat at night or share with the sick men. Some men even took advantage of the medical system to stay off the work details.

> One of our boys, a corporal, got his finger run over by a coal car, so the Jap doctor amputated it. This old Dillon was a pretty smart boy. He picked at the stump for the next six months and it never did get well. So Dillon came up to me and attached himself to me as an orderly....So talk about a guy living the life of Riley....If there wasn't anything in camp that wasn't tied down, Dillon could get it, particularly with my twenty cigarettes. So Dillon got a straight razor. So this here captain had tea to sip each morning between the lather and the razor.[12]

Many of the enlisted men despised the men who worked for the officers in the camps. They called them "dog-robbers" and accused them of stealing for the officers to obtain special favors such as cigarettes or money.

Officers were paid in Japan, but there was very little to buy at camps other than Zentsuji. Some camps allowed the officers to purchase socks or G-strings to wear. One officer at the Yodogawa Bunshaw camp used his money to secretly buy quinine from the manager of the local steel mill. He then

distributed this medicine to cure lingering malaria among all the prisoners in the camp.[13] Stories such as this one are rare where an officer was reported to have gone out of his way to help his men. It is hoped that more examples of this type of behavior occurred but were just not reported by the men.

This same officer was later taken care of by his men when he was only allowed five sugar lumps from a Red Cross parcel since he was considered a non-worker. They pooled their food and each gave him a portion.

> We received some Red Cross packages in camp...They had cigarettes, chocolate bars, cubes of sugar, and rice pudding in cans. The Japanese thought they would use it to reward the hardest workers, thereby getting more work out of the prisoners. We had a work inspection by some district officers and doctors. They would go along in front of each person and feel the palms of his hands to see if there were any corns or rough places on them. When they felt my hands, they hit the palms of my hands with a wooden paddle as hard as they could....They did not know I was the foreman of a large work crew [and] did office work.[14]

Once the Japanese had enough officers to perform the supervisory camp duties throughout the work camps in Japan, they began transferring officers to a camp near Zentsuji. This camp was considered a "model" camp and a number of Red Cross inspection teams were brought there during the war as an example of other camps in Japan and throughout the Far East. The earliest transfer of officers to this camp were from the Tanagawa and Umeda camps. Other officers came later from other Osaka Group camps. Eventually officers from the Philippines arrived

at Zentsuji bringing the total number of officers from the United States and other countries to over 700.

> Though quality of life dropped off somewhat after the arrival of the Philippine POWs, it was still better than at other camps in Japan. The barracks were cold and the food was minimal, but the work details for officers were usually light and when off duty the officers remained in the barracks compound where they played cards, walked, discussed the war or participated in educational or recreational activities which were rarely possible in other camps in Japan. The state of health at Zentsuji was above average for POW camps.[15]

As officers arrived at Zentsuji from camps throughout Japan they immediately sought out old companions and had mini-reunions. Some had not seen each other since the initial groups left Cabanatuan in 1942. After the back-slapping and handshakes were over the new arrivals were issued five cotton blankets and two rice bowls and then assigned to a barracks with twenty-eight officers to a room.[16]

> Our living quarters consisted of two bays, one on each side of an aisle about ten feet wide. The bays were one-and-one-half feet off the floor. The floors of the bays were board with thin straw mats covering them. In this room of twenty-eight prisoners, each one had a space seven feet long and thirty inches wide in which to sleep. There was a one-foot shelf overhead against the wall that ran the length of the room. This is where we put our personal possessions. I had a Webster's dictionary, a safety razor, a shaving brush, a notebook, a toothbrush, a canteen, a mess kit, a haversack, and a few sheets of toilet paper on my part of the shelf.[17]

Meals at Zentsuji were much better than at most camps in Japan. The officers received one small loaf of bread for

the evening meal instead of rice along with their soup. For lunch they had noodles and beans and a pint of milk. They had to pay for their milk and even though the meal was appetizing, it rarely exceeded 1,400 calories and the men were never quite satisfied.[18]

The camp was unlike the working camps because the prisoners were allowed more freedom and had better facilities. For those who had spent many months in the Philippines, it was like moving from the slums to a Manhattan apartment.

> There were several drinking fountains and a nice wash rack where a person could scrub his clothes and a line to hang them on to dry. They even furnished us soap and a brush to scrub our clothes. There were 743 prisoners in this camp. Prisoners were allowed to play games like bridge and dominoes.[19]

The camp had two projects to keep the prisoners busy. One was raising rabbits for food with the prisoners foraging outside the camp for clover, grass, dandelions and other acceptable food for the rabbits. They left the camp in the mornings and walked far into the fields searching for the right grasses. They often saw young Japanese children on their way to school or Japanese women going to work in the factories. The other project was a vegetable garden to raise additional food for their meals. Both projects were supposed to be for the benefit of the prisoners, but, as usual, the Japanese allowed the prisoners to do the work while they took the proceeds.[20]

When the prisoners were not actually working on one of the projects they were allowed to spend their time discussing the war or playing games. The Japanese also provided various text books and the officers began holding classes and lectures to pass the time.

> The demand to read them [the books] was so great from the prisoners that we decided to set up some classes for the ones who were interested. It was necessary to take some kind of work to keep a person's mind plastic and to keep from worrying. There were some who were losing their minds, going crazy from fear of punishment, starvation, and disease that might take their lives. Since we could not get any medical attention, to take this schooling helped to build our knowledge as well as being good for our health.[21]

In addition to the better food, housing, washing facilities, schooling and easy work details, Zentsuji had one other major advantage - it was not located near an industrial center so it was not a target for American bombers. While other prisoners faced a very real threat to their lives from the fragmentation and fire bombs, the prisoners at Zentsuji only saw the bombers as they passed by far overhead.[22]

On 23 June 1945 the Japanese moved the American officers to a camp without other allied prisoners called Roku Roshi in the central part of Honshu, twenty miles from a large city named Fukui. There were a total of 335 officers and thirty enlisted men in this camp. Both officers and enlisted men worked a total of four hours per day planting sweet potatoes. Once again the

living conditions in the camp were somewhat better than other enlisted camps.

> We arrived in the new camp...at 3:30 on the morning of June 25, 1945. We were cold, tired, and wet to the bone. Our shoes were soaking wet and muddy. The Japs had a warm fire waiting for us, also an excellent ration of rice and wheat with a thin fish soup....The building had a high ceiling and on one side there was an attic-type floor, where one-hundred bunks were. The top of the building was made of clay tiles. The outside of the building was 120 feet by 200 feet. The whole building would accommodate five hundred prisoners. When we measured off the bunk space for each individual, it allowed us twenty-two inches by seven feet long, in which to sleep.[23]

The officers' stay at Roku Roshi was not long since the Japanese surrendered two months later. Most officers were surprised when they received back pay which the Japanese held in the postal savings accounts. According to some reports, a captain in the army had received 220 yen or pesos per month (the same value some lieutenant colonels reported being paid), both being about the same value of fifty cents. The Japanese advanced 60 yen per month and then took back half for rations and quarters. After three and one half years a captain "saved" a total of 1,800 yen or over $900. Unfortunately, after the Japanese surrendered, the yen became virtually worthless.[24]

Camps Outside Japan

Apart from Hoten Camp in Mukden, Manchuria, and the other Manchurian camps where the senior officers were kept, not much has been written about camps outside Japan and the Philippines. Most of these other camps contained British, Dutch and Australian prisoners augmented by a few Americans.

The Rangoon Prison Camp in Burma had 1,200 prisoners of which 150 were Americans. The men worked constructing anti-aircraft installations and air-raid shelters. They also worked on the docks and recapped Japanese truck tires. There is no information regarding any American officers being at this camp.[25]

Approximately twenty-five American prisoners were held at the Bridge House Jail in Shanghai, China, along with about 580 other political prisoners. They were locked behind bars most of the time.[26]

The Ward Road Jail, also located in the city of Shanghai, held about twelve American prisoners including naval and marine personnel. They were not required to work, but did grow vegetable gardens.[27]

The Naval PW Camp was also located in the city of Shanghai. It held the crew of the USS Wake as well as British prisoners from HMS Petrel. The officers did not work at this camp, but the enlisted men did cleaning work and also worked on the grounds of a Japanese shrine.[28]

The Tientsin Camp was located in the city of Tientsin, China, and was a collection of marines captured in China at the beginning of the war. A total of 262 officers and men were held there. The enlisted men did chores around camp and the officers were not forced to work.[29]

The Woosung Camp was located fifteen miles north of Shanghai and contained 700 civilians plus prisoners transferred from the Naval Camp and Tientsin. At this camp the enlisted men were required to level ground for a Japanese parade ground, farm, and to repair roads. The enlisted men also polished enemy shell cases, but this stopped when the American officers protested. The officers did not work except to supervise some enlisted details.[30]

Approximately 700 American prisoners were held at the Kiangwan Camp after being transferred from Woosung. Again the enlisted men were forced to work for the Japanese by building a "recreation mound." The officers refused to work and their rations were cut.[31]

Other camps were located in Fengtai (Peking), China; Siagon, Vietnam; Jinsen (Inchon), Korea; Keijo (Seoul), Korea; Changi, Malaya; Batavia, Java; Padang and Pakanbaroe, Sumatra; and the Nakhon Hospital Camp, Siam (Thailand), in support of the Burma-Thailand Railroad. Each camp contained a number of American prisoners and the treatment of officers and enlisted varied from camp to camp, but in most cases the officers performed supervisory duties only.[32]

The largest of the camps outside of Japan and the Philippines was the Hoten Camp located near Mukden, Manchuria. The first group of prisoners to occupy the camp came from Cabanatuan in the Philippines aboard the Tattori Maru which left Manila harbor on 8 October 1942. A total of 1,962 men, including only thirty-one officers, left Manila. A total of 600 of these men stayed in a hospital in Korea due to their poor condition. Approximately 200 men died the first winter at Mukden from exposure and malnutrition.[33]

The enlisted men were put to work immediately at the local factories. They worked about eight hours per day, six days per week, This was not as hard as the ten hours per day some had worked in the Philippines and much less than many of the prisoners working in Japan. Some of the enlisted men in Japanese camps worked from 2:30 in the morning until 7:00 in the evening.[34]

The living conditions in this camp were similar to other camps previously mentioned. The officers were grouped together in a brick building with each officer receiving a straw mattress, four blankets, a sheet and a straw pillow. After July 1943, the camp also had separate buildings for a mess hall, storeroom, boiler room, general workshop, and a bathhouse where officers bathed daily and enlisted men every other day.[35]

The enlisted men received larger portions of food because the officers continued to refuse to work. The officers

were paid, however, and many of them paid the enlisted men to bring them food from outside the camp.

> One clever soldier devised a false bottom for the large food buckets which were carted from the camp to the factory each morning and returned empty each night. Traffic in small stores such as tobacco and small-packaged food picked up briskly - to the joy and gratitude of our officers who, because they refused to work in the factory, were being punished by the usual starvation method....The officers began buying anything edible or smokable brought to them by the enlisted men....The enlisted men were given more to eat than the officers, so the latter occasionally even bought leftover food....One boy [enlisted soldier] is said to have amassed close to twenty-five-thousand dollars during his stay at Mukden.[36]

Some officers chose to spend their money to buy food from the enlisted men. Others, however, were relatively free to roam about the camp during the day while the men were at work, and resorted to stealing.

> The officers worked for a while in different places in the camp. They got so involved in that, they began to take advantage of the situation for their own greed. They began stealing food whenever they were in the kitchen or the bakery. If they weren't, then their dog robbers [enlisted orderlies] were doing it for them. Now, damn it, you don't take food from a man. So the men went to the Japanese and told them to remove the officers from these jobs. Eventually, the Japanese did.[37]

There appeared to be more animosity between officers and enlisted men at Mukden than at other camps outside the Philippines. One enlisted man attributed some of the problems to the way the officers acted after the surrender on Corregidor.

> The officers and enlisted men fought like cats and dogs [at Mukden]. It started out, as best as I can tell, on Corregidor, when we were captured. They took us all out there on Monkey Point and we sat there on the little old airstrip in the hot sun. There wasn't no water, no food, no nothing. The Japs wanted a work detail, so five of us volunteered. We spent a whole day taking all that food out of the tunnel [Malinta] and loading it onto Japanese boats. While we was doing this, we was eating. When they sent us back to the strip we had stole enough to take with us. The first night all hell broke out. Officers came over to us, "O.K., there's five of your guys. We'll give you ten cans of this food and we'll take the rest." Boy, that guy got hit right in the snoot. We said, "Goddamn, if you want to eat, you do like the rest of us, get out there and work." The last part of our time in Mukden, when we got a lot of officers in there, we had guys who stayed in camp to guard our barracks. Because the officers didn't work, they'd come over to our barracks and steal our stuff....We couldn't prove it was the officers until they caught one guy, a major.[38]

There were not many reports of officers stealing from their men in the camps. In most camps the officers and enlisted men developed a working relationship and each went about his duties and waited for the war to end.

In most of the camps in the Far East the war ended by a formal announcement by the camp commander and the hasty exit of all the Japanese guards as they tried to escape punishment for their atrocities. The enlisted men and officers suddenly realized someone had to take control of their situation once they realized they were in control of their destinies again. Whether it was because they were out of practice or because their leadership was no longer respected by their men, some officers were not up to the task.

> During the waiting period [after the Japanese surrender], an unspoken understanding developed that the Commandant and the guards would no longer have authority over Allied personnel, who would now be under the control of their respective officers. But American officers made little effort to assume control. One lieutenant attempted to exercise authority but failed utterly.[39]

The most vivid event that signaled the end of the war for all the prisoners in the Far East was the dropping of food in two 55 gallon drums welded end-to-end. Word was passed for all POW camps to paint large white POW letters on the tops of their camp buildings so the Air Force planes could find them and drop the food. Dozens of the food-filled containers were dropped on the camps, each suspended by a brightly colored parachute. The men ate and ate until they were sick and then ate some more. One officer knew the war was truly over when several of his men ran over to him and said, "Captain, sir. May we use these parachutes to make an American flag?" The officer told them go ahead and then, as he watched them run away with full bellies and glorious expressions on their faces, he realized that for the first time in over three years someone had referred to him as "sir." The officer thought about calling them back to discuss the matter, but decided against it. He just smiled and accepted for the first time that the war was truly over and things were getting back to normal.[40]

NOTES CHAPTER 9

[1] Preston Hubbard, Apocalypse Undone, (Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press, 1990), 171.

[2] Prisoner of War Study Group, A Review of United States Policy on Treatment of Prisoners of War, (Office of the Provost Marshall General, Washington, D.C.: Three volumes, 1968), V-119 through V-176.

[3] Hubbard, Apocalypse Undone, 174.

[4] Donald Knox, Death March - The Survivors of Bataan, (New York and London: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Publishers, 1981), 365-366; 385; quoting Major Benson Guyton.

[5] Calvin E. Chunn, ed., Of Rice and Men, (Los Angeles, California: Veterans' Publishing Company, 1946), 144; quoting Major Benson Guyton.

[6] Knox, Death March, 421; quoting Private First Class William Wallace.

[7] John S. Coleman Jr., Bataan and Beyond - Memories of an American POW, (College Station, Texas: Texas A & M University Press, 1978), 180-181.

[8] Knox, Death March, 486; quoting Staff Sergeant Harold Feiner.

[9] Ibid., 393; quoting Major Benson Guyton.

[10] Chunn, Of Rice and Men, 146-148; quoting Major Benson Guyton.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Knox, Death March, 402; quoting Major Benson Guyton.

[13] Coleman, Bataan and Beyond, 114.

[14] Ibid., 115-116; The men combined the Red Cross packages and divided them equally between all the men, including Captain Coleman.

[15] E. Bartlett Kerr, Surrender and Survival, (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1985), 178-179.

[16] Coleman, Bataan and Beyond, 128-129.

[17] Ibid., 130.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid., 129.

[20] Ibid., 131; The men got back at the Japanese for forcing them to raise rabbits while not letting them have any of them to eat. Coleman said they gathered and fed the rabbits a certain weed known to make rabbits have constipation. By the next morning all the rabbits were dead and they were free from the project.

[21] Ibid., 135-136.

[22] Ibid., 158.

[23] Ibid., 161-165.

[24] Ibid., 174.

[25] Prisoner of War Study Group, A Review of United States Policy on Treatment of Prisoners of War, V-150.

[26] Ibid., V-151.

[27] Ibid., V-151-152.

[28] Ibid., V-153.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid., V-154.

[31] Ibid., V-155.

[32] Ibid., V-156 through V-168.

[33] Knox, Death March, 367.

[34] William E. Brougher, South to Bataan - North to Mukden. The Prison Diary of Brigadier General W. E. Brougher, (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1971), 175; This information was in a footnote by James. His source was American Prisoners of War Information Bureau, Prisons of War Camps in Areas Other than Japan, 30-34; and Georgetown Institute of World Polity, Prisoner of War, 48.

[35] Brougher, South to Bataan, 168-169; Kerr, Surrender and Survival, 168.

[36] Jonathan M. Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1946), 247-250.

[37] Knox, Death March, 395; quoting private First Class Robert Brown.

[38] Ibid., 394-395; quoting private Lewis Elliott.

[39] Hubbard, Apocalypse Undone, 214.

[40] Knox, Death March, 448; quoting Captain Jerome McDavitt at Omine camp.

CHAPTER 10

THE BLACK KNIGHTS OF BUSHIDO

American military and civilian leaders were surprised by the barbaric treatment their prisoners received at the hands of the Japanese during WWII. The leaders of Japan publicly said they would adhere to the principles of the 1929 Geneva Conventions regarding the treatment of prisoners of war. The official Japanese Army Regulations for Handling Prisoners of War explicitly forbade many of the atrocities that were committed [See Appendix A]. But the Japanese leadership appeared to publicly sanction the appalling treatment meted out to the helpless POWs.

When General King surrendered the Luzon forces to General Homma he was assured that his men would not be mistreated. King never met Homma, but was told by his chief of staff that the Japanese were not "barbarians." Colonel James V. Collier, General King's operations officer, personally met with General Homma. He too was assured that the surrendering Americans would be well-treated. He was told by General Homma that, "Japan treats her prisoners well. You may even see Japan in cherry blossom time and that is a beautiful sight." Americans leaders

had no reason to disbelieve them since the Japanese treated German POWs from World War I quite well.[1]

Brigadier General William E. Brougher was also personally assured by a Japanese general that his men would not be mistreated. The general told him that even though the Japanese soldiers fight very hard, they held no vindictiveness toward their defeated foes and that their Code of Bushido would ensure that POWs would be well-treated.[2]

The Japanese Code of Bushido had evolved from the ancient Japanese Samuri era when warlords ruled provinces throughout the land. Most westerners tended to look upon Bushido as similar to the chivalric period of England's Knights of the Round Table, but the Japanese code was quite different.

> Bushido puts its stress on loyalty and self-sacrifice. It had no tradition of mercy or compassion, and sanctioned, if it did not actually encourage, deceit and cruelty in the performance of duty to a superior.[3]

The brutal treatment of American prisoners throughout their captivity in the Far East suggests that the senior officers of the Japanese Army had no intention on following any "chivalric code," Geneva Convention, or Japanese army regulations. General Homma testified at his trial during the International Military Tribunal of the Far East (IMFTE) that he had not been aware of the atrocities his men committed and that if these atrocities actually occurred, he was "ashamed of himself."[4] General Homma

was to be more than ashamed of himself because at the end of the trial, he was sentenced to hang for his moral responsibility in not preventing the atrocities from occurring.

Some have suggested that the Japanese were harsh with the Americans because they wanted to humiliate the white race in front of the Filipinos as part of their overall strategic quest to make "Asia for the Asiatics." This suggestion might have been valid if the Japanese had not also been brutal to the Filipinos. Thousands of their Asian Filipino brothers died at the hands of the Japanese on the Death March and at Camp O'Donnell. This theory can also be rejected because if the Japanese truly wanted to humiliate the Americans they would have treated the senior officers as harshly as the rest of the men.

The most likely explanation for the harsh treatment of Americans is probably a combination of factors. The first reason is because the Americans were already in an extremely poor state of health at the time of capture. Any amount of mistreatment on the part of the Japanese was sure to cause numerous deaths. Second, the Japanese underestimated the strength of the Luzon force and were unprepared to transport such large numbers to initial holding camps. Third, the individual Japanese soldier was through harsh training an extremely brutal person. Finally, the Japanese leadership failed in its moral and legal obligations to ensure the prisoners were not mistreated.[5]

Two aspects of the Japanese military system deserve a closer look. The first is the Japanese attitude toward surrender and second is the normal day-to-day life of the Japanese soldier. Both factors had an impact on the way the Japanese treated Americans.

The Americans were not prepared initially to face an enemy whose military code considered surrender an act of cowardice. The Japanese soldier was taught that it was more honorable to commit suicide than surrender. Military regulations made it a crime punishable by death for a Japanese soldier to be taken prisoner while he still had the means to resist.

> The youth of Japan had been brought up...to consider that the greatest honor was to die for their Emperor and that it was ignominious to surrender to the enemy....The only honorable conduct for the Japanese soldier is to fight to the death. This concept of manly duty undoubtedly led to the Japanese soldier having a feeling of utter contempt for those who surrendered to the Japanese forces.[6]

The Japanese believed in this concept so strongly that during the Battle of Quinanan Point, General Wainwright was forced to order his men to blow up a group of Japanese soldiers who had taken cover in a cave and refused to surrender.[7] Throughout the island-hopping battles in the Pacific, U.S Marines found that the Japanese would hide in fortified caves and had to be killed literally one at a time in order to take the island.

The Japanese soldier, if captured, would often ask to be killed. When he discovered that American customs did not

permit this, he often tried to became a model prisoner having totally given up his loyalty to home. The soldier felt that his life under the emperor was gone forever and he could never go back home. It was considered the ultimate dishonor to be taken prisoner rather than to die on the battlefield. In fact, Japanese prisoners who were liberated when the Philippines fell were seen being taken back to Japan in chains.[8]

The Japanese could not understand how the American soldiers could surrender so easily. They were astonished that American soldiers actually demanded their names be sent to the United States so that their families would know they were being held as a prisoner.

The Japanese government did not ratify the Geneva Conventions of 1929, but was still bound by the Hague Conventions of 1907 which they had accepted. The Japanese military opposed the ratification of the 1929 version on the grounds that certain articles made it easier for an enemy air force to conduct raids over Japanese cities. The military wanted a death penalty if another country bombed their cities. Some American air crews were actually executed after being captured.[9]

Probably the most surprising aspect of the Japanese treatment of American prisoners of war was that it did not differ drastically from the way they treated their own soldiers.

> A squad in the Jap army was a very complicated organization, as was the whole army, enmeshed in a maze of intricate feudalistic concepts. From the very first day that a youth entered the army, he was taught the absolute

> necessity of respect. True, to be sure, as in every army! But how uniquely, how very uniquely so, in the Jap Imperial Army. First came worship for the Emperor, then respect for the superiors all the way down the line to anybody who had been in service longer, irrespective of rank.[10]

Each Japanese soldier was required to carry the Imperial Rescript Promulgated to the Armed Forces in his breast pocket. They were told it was based on the ancient Code of Bushido. This rescript had an introduction, five articles, and a conclusion. It had to be memorized in order for a private to become a Private First Class. A soldier could be beaten for not knowing the five basic doctrines when asked by a superior.[11]

The Five Imperial Doctrines[12]

> First, the Soldier Makes it his Destiny to Perform Patriotism.
>
> Second, the Soldier Maintains Etiquette.
>
> Third, the Soldier Respects Martial Courage.
>
> Fourth, the Soldier Values Truthfulness.
>
> Fifth, the Soldier Remains Austere.

These articles were recited twice daily facing to the east at each roll call. The entire rescript took fifteen minutes to recite. The Japanese faced east toward the rising sun which they believed was symbolic of the power and divinity of the Emperor.

The main points the Japanese military training system tried to accomplish were the following: it stressed the insistence in uniformity of training; the discouragement of too much competition and of individuality; the encouragement of thrift and simple living; the importance of loyalty and discipline; the teaching that in war-time, self-destruction is better than surrender; and the importance of reticence in regard to matters of military importance.[13]

Discipline was strongly enforced within the Japanese army. Many American prisoners were shocked and unprepared for the vigorous slapping campaign that the Japanese constantly inflicted upon them. Senior American officers found the practice humiliating - especially when the slap was more of a light tap like a person would give to a misbehaving child or dog. But the Americans did not realize that slapping and even fierce beatings was a normal practice in the Japanese army.

> The practice of disciplining by slapping was not unique to squad three, but universal in the Jap armed forces, and no subordinate ever thought of resisting for it would have been insubordination and punishable by death.[14]

Some accounts by American POWs stated the Japanese forced them to line up and face one another and then slap each other back and forth. If the guards perceived that they were pulling punches, they would strike the men from behind and force them to hit harder. Although this practice appeared brutal and

undignified by the Americans, it was a standard procedure in the Japanese military.[15]

> These First-Year-Soldiers of the Emperor's Army took their beatings quietly and answered their superiors meekly. These were men who would have gladly laid down their lives for their Emperor, but who asked nothing for themselves in return. They had the courage to charge a thousand enemy, but not the determination to stand up for a single individual right. For there were no individuals in the Imperial Army - only absolute servants of the Emperor - and no rights except the right to die gloriously for the Emperor.[16]

The description of Japanese sleeping quarters almost mirrors the descriptions given of most of the American enlisted POW quarters. The Japanese soldiers slept on thin straw mats, fifty to sixty to a room, there were no decorations, they had thin blankets and the men ate on their mats. The noncommissioned and commissioned officers had rooms to themselves in the same barracks. Medical care was usually limited to treating battle wounds and soldiers who came in for something less were made to feel as though, "they lacked in will power."[17]

Many excuses brought before the Military Tribunal were rejected as a defense for the brutalities inflicted on the American prisoners. The judges rejected the defense that senior Japanese officers were unable to view the atrocities being committed. The judges also rejected the defense that camp commandants and guards were only acting on orders from superiors.

Many of the harsh conditions the POWs suffered went far beyond even what the Japanese privates endured.

Even though American prisoners probably would have starved on the ration fed to the Japanese soldier, they were always given much less. Medical care was withheld routinely and prisoners were transported in the most hellish conditions imaginable. Japanese soldiers were often transported in the holds of ships, but they were not denied food and water and they were able to come on deck occasionally for fresh air and latrine breaks.

The life of a Japanese soldier was a life of deprivation and hardship, but the life of an American prisoner of war in the Far East was a living nightmare. It is likely that most of the prisoners would have traded their conditions for the lifestyle of even the lowliest Japanese private.

Life in the Japanese army has been described as a, "true reflection of the authoritarian and compulsive society from which it sprang."[18] The Japanese soldier was nothing more than a neighborhood bully allowed to roam the streets unchecked and inflict his will on any defenseless being that crossed his path. Not satisfied when his prey had cried "uncle," he continued to twist the arm until it cracked in its socket and fell uselessly at the victim's side.

Perhaps the best explanation for the conduct of the Japanese military in World War II came directly from the hand of a Japanese soldier. There may never be an excuse for the wanton violence inflicted upon the prisoners in the Far East, but perhaps this quote will help others understand why it might have happened and seek to prevent it from happening again.

When living under some high ideal, man is easily fooled into believing that his capacity is unlimited, and the leaders of the Imperial Army had tried to teach their subordinates that there was no limit to what they could stand. But there is always a limit, and the acts of violence which follow are always remarkable in their abnormality.[19]

NOTES CHAPTER 10

[1] Stanley L. Falk, Bataan: The March of Death, (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1962) 74; Charles Burdick and Ursula Moessner, The German Prisoners-of-War in Japan, 1914-1920, (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, Inc., 1984).

[2] Falk, Bataan: The March of Death, 113.

[3] Ibid., 230.

[4] Ibid., 224.

[5] Ibid., 236-237.

[6] Lord Russell of Liverpool, G.B.E., M.C., The Knights of Bushido, (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1958), 56.

[7] Jonathan M. Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1946), 57.

[8] Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword - Patterns of Japanese Culture, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston: The Riverside Press, 1946), 41; Donald Knox, Death March - The Survivors of Bataan, (New York and London: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Publishers, 1981), 367.

[9] Russell, The Knights of Bushido, 70-76.

[10] Hanama Tasaki, Long the Imperial Way, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1949), 16-17.

[11] Ibid., 13.

[12] Ibid., 29.

[13] Captain M. D. Kennedy, The Military Side of Japanese Life, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1973), 352.

[14] Tasaki, Long the Imperial Way, 33.

[15] Ibid., 196.

[16] Ibid., 38-39.

[17] Ibid., 120-121; 226-227.

[18] Falk, Bataan: The March of Death, 227.

[19] Tasaki, Long the Imperial Way, 69.

CHAPTER 11

CONCLUSION

As stated in the introduction, the purpose of this thesis was to see if there were significant differences in the treatment of officers and enlisted prisoners of war held by the Japanese in WWII. The answer to this question is that there were significant differences. These differences were so significant in the first year of captivity that many more enlisted men died than their proportion of the entire group of prisoners. In the latter stages of the war, however, officer deaths surpassed the enlisted deaths because many officers died while being transported to Japan.

The exact number of American military members who died as prisoners of war has been very difficult to establish. One study placed the total number at 12,935.[1] The following chart shows an analysis of reported prisoner of war deaths from various sources. These reports cover only the major numbers reported from the Death March, various camps, work details and Hell Ships. It is very likely that the numbers are not completely accurate as can easily be seen by the estimates of American deaths on the Death March. Also not included are the deaths that must have occurred on many of the smaller work details nor the deaths

that occurred in the numerous camps throughout Japan. These additional deaths could very easily add up to the deaths not accounted for in the Veterans Administration figures stated above.

FAR EAST WWII POW DEATHS

LOCATION	NUMBER	SOURCE
Death March	950	Olson[2]
Death March	600-700	Knox[3]
Death March	2,330	Toland[4]
Camp O'Donnell	1,547	Olson[5]
Cabanatuan No. 1	2,649	Chunn[6]
Cabanatuan No. 3	61	Knox[7]
Davao Penal Colony	18	Lawton[8]
Palawan	345	Provost Marshall Study[9]
Lipa Road Detail	265	Knox[10]
Tayabas Road Detail	180	Hubbard[11]
Mukden (Hoten) Camp	200	Knox[12]
Burma Railroad	356	Bergamini[13]
Shinyo Maru	719	Knox[14]
Arisan Maru	1,790	Knox (Mostly officers.)[15]
Oryoku Maru	1,194	Knox (Mostly officers.)[16]
Total	9,924 to 11,654	(Depending on Death March figures used.)

Using these figures, coupled with the percentage of officers to enlisted already shown as being present in the Philippines on 30 November 1941, it is possible to make some calculations regarding who fared worse overall - officers or enlisted. The overall percentage of American officers to enlisted in the Philippines can be derived as 2,645 of 21,405 or approximately 12.4 percent. If all other things were equal, officers should have accounted for only 12.4 percent of the

total POW deaths or a number equal to their percentage of the POW population. The term "mostly officers" above can be interpreted, by definition, as anything above 50 percent. If we simply add the known officers who died at Camp O'Donnell (59) with just 51 percent of the known dead from the Arisan and Oryoku Maru ships, we end up with 1,582 of the 12,935 deaths being officers or about 12.2 percent. This is slightly less than the overall percentage of officers to enlisted and represents a "best case" for officer deaths. But the number of officers on the Arisan and Oryoku Maru ships could also, by definition, have been as high as 99 percent. This is unlikely, but will be used here for illustration. Using this higher figure we would end up with a total of 3,013 of the 12,935 deaths being officers or about 23.3 percent. By interpreting "mostly officers" at 99 percent, as in a possible "worst case", it is obvious that many more officers than enlisted as a group would have died as POWs. Even splitting the difference on the ships at 75 percent would put the officer deaths at about 18 percent of the total POW deaths or about 6 percent more than their percentage of the total group of prisoners.

It should be intuitively obvious that officers died at other places than Camp O'Donnell and the two Hell Ships mentioned above. Many would have died on the Death March and on work details. Many did die on the Shinyo Maru and at Palawan. Even if officers continued to die at the same low rate of 3.8 percent of the total deaths at Cabanatuan as they had at Camp

O'Donnell, they would have accounted for over 100 of the total 2,700 deaths at Cabanatuan No. 1. When all these things are taken into consideration, it is obvious (even without exact figures) to see that the officers fared much worse as a group than the enlisted simply because of the tragedies on the Death Ships.

The reasons for POW deaths were often linked to rank distinctions. There is one possible exception. As was shown earlier, no distinctions were made between officers and enlisted men during the Bataan Death March. It was simply a matter of luck if a person was able to ride on a truck to Camp O'Donnell. Age may have been a factor in being able to survive the grueling march, but sources disagree.

Enlisted men died in extremely high numbers at Camp O'Donnell. The predominant causes of death at O'Donnell were from dysentery and malaria. Fresh water was generally unavailable and reports showed that many enlisted men drank stagnant water to stay alive. Enlisted men were crowded into dilapidated bamboo structures where proximity with sick and dying men aided in the spread of disease. Officers had slightly better wooden shelters, but many also slept in the bamboo huts. There were reports of officers using rank to obtain fresh water and food over the enlisted men. Medical care was almost non-existent and no distinctions were made based on rank. Work details from the camp, however, provided enlisted men an opportunity to receive food from local Filipinos. Some officers

volunteered to work and were initially considered collaborators by their peers.

Deaths continued at Cabanatuan with the enlisted men continuing to die in greater numbers than the officers. The officers began receiving pay and a camp commissary was established. Thousands of dollars were spent at this facility while hundreds of men were dying of disease and starvation.

Other camps in the Philippines such as the Davao Penal Colony and Old Bilibid Prison did not experience the same high death rates. Strong American camp administration and a more benevolent Japanese leadership seemed to have an impact on the overall conditions within the camps. These two facilities showed that it was possible to maintain a semblance of order and military discipline within a Japanese prisoner of war camp. It must be remembered, however, that the vast majority of American deaths in the Philippine camps occurred before the Davao Penal Colony was established.

Conditions on board the transport ships were equally bad for officers and enlisted men. No distinctions were made based on rank with the exception that the ships that sailed later in the war contained a higher percentage of officers and took longer to travel from Manila to Japan due to having to evade American forces.

The conditions for the nurses and senior officers were much different than for other prisoners. The senior officers were forced to perform manual labor more frequently than officers

at other camps, but their living environment and food far exceeded that received in other places.

Officer treatment in camps outside the Philippines was generally much better than the treatment of enlisted men. The conditions at Zentsuji appeared to be the best of any Japanese camp including those holding senior officers. Forced manual labor by officers varied from camp to camp, but outside the Philippines it was usually limited to supervisory work.

This thesis was not meant to be an indictment of officers in general, nor an indictment of the officers held by the Japanese. But most sources showed that during the first year of captivity, life or death depended on a person's ability to survive disease and starvation. It is clear that the officers were in a better position to survive. One could argue that officers being paid and also being able to avoid work were simply receiving what they were allowed under the Geneva Conventions. They did not have a <u>legal</u> obligation to share their money with the enlisted men. Since they did not choose to assist the enlisted men with money for food, the officers established an environment that allowed survival to be linked directly to rank.

To be fair to the officers it must be pointed out that in almost all other historical examples of prisoner of war experiences, the officers were separated from the enlisted men and placed in different camps early after capture. For whatever reason, the Japanese chose not to do this so officers below the rank of colonel were lumped together with the enlisted men.

It is unknown how the results of captivity in the Far East during WWII would have been different if all the officers had been separated from the enlisted men. If this had happened, the officers would have been unable to have any impact on the enlisted men at all, positively or negatively. Perhaps the enlisted men would have died in greater numbers without the officers to assist them in camp supervision. The only reason for separating officers from enlisted men which could be found in any sources was for the convenience of interrogation by the detaining power.

What resulted was an unusual situation where officers were kept in the same camps with the enlisted men. With few exceptions, the officers were not required to perform manual labor until very late in the war. The officers generally occupied the best facilities in the camps. The officers had better access to water for bathing. In some camps the officers had access to books, playing cards, and had leisure time to study. The officers were paid regularly in amounts far exceeding what the enlisted men earned through hard labor. With this money the officers bought additional food which undoubtedly had a great impact on their ability to survive. There is no overwhelming evidence that the officers, as a whole, did anything to pool their resources for the benefit of the enlisted men except at Old Bilibid Prison. Even in this example the few officers who contributed did it reluctantly and many eventually withdrew their donations. On the contrary, there is evidence

to suggest that the officers, as a whole, stood back and watched hundreds of men die without making any concerted effort to prevent it.

The Japanese said they accepted, with certain reservations, the Geneva Conventions of 1929. Chapter Three of this thesis outlined the articles in these rules which have evolved over the years and make distinctions based on rank. These rules, if they had been followed, should have provided a level of subsistence for all prisoners that would have ensured their survival. Therefore, the differences for officers and enlisted men should not have had any great impact on survival. These distinctions were only intended to show respect for rank and, in the case of officers, provide pay to allow them to purchase food and clothing which the detaining power is not obligated to provide free of charge for officers.

But the Japanese did <u>not</u> provide a satisfactory level of subsistence in any camp to include the camps for senior officers. Because of this, the matters of work and pay had a tremendous impact on the ability of one person to survive over another. The officers could not have had much of a say on the work requirements except to try and determine who was unfit to work and plead with the Japanese to keep them back. The selection of quarters and opportunities for bathing was simply a matter of rank. This probably had an impact on general health through sanitary conditions, but little else could be done under the circumstances. Not everyone could use fresh

water for bathing or live in the best quarters so these naturally went to the officers.

The Geneva Conventions allowed officers to have enlisted orderlies in their camps to perform the menial tasks considered demeaning for officers such as cooking and cleaning the barracks. The need for this could be debated, but not in the scope of this thesis. Since officers were kept in the same camps with the enlisted men, it was not unreasonable for the officers to task some enlisted men to perform these duties. And since the Geneva Conventions state that these enlisted men should not have to perform any other labor, it was also reasonable to exempt them from other manual labor. But what should happen when other enlisted men in the same camp are being forced to work themselves to death? What are the rules for choosing who works for the officers and therefore has a better chance to live? There are no easy answers to these questions.

It is easy, however, to sit back in a comfortable chair today and condemn the actions or inactions of the officers who were held prisoner by the Japanese. After all, one could argue, it was the officers who bought thousands of dollars worth of food and then divided it between themselves while leaving only candy and cigarettes for the starving men. It was the officers who slept on beds with mattresses while their men lived on bug-infested bamboo floors. It was officers who deliberately stole food from their men while they were at their slave-labor jobs. It was officers who ate lunch or dinner with the Japanese

who were inflicting pain and suffering on all the men. It was an officer whose major concern was with the number of card games he could get played while in a prison camp. It was officers who failed to answer the distress call of an enlisted man on a Death Ship, and who deliberately took extra food and water when other men were so thirsty they drank their own urine or another man's blood. It is hard to imagine a situation where these things would occur, but according to the words of many enlisted men, and even some officers, these things did happen.

But there are other examples where officers stood up to the Japanese on behalf of the men. There are examples where officers used their own money to buy medicine to cure a disease in the camp. There are examples where officers took the clothes from their own backs to give to their men. There are examples where officers paid the enlisted men for their services so they would have money to buy food. Finally, there are examples, though few, where officers contributed to a fund to aid the poor.

It is hard to predict what each individual person would do if faced with a similar set of circumstances. After the Death March, most men probably realized that the only person they could depend on for survival was themselves. When life or death is at stake, moral rules seem to pale in insignificance. Everyone wants to live. No one wants to die.

The hardest question to answer is why did these things happen? The answer to the early deaths of the enlisted men

basically boils down to a moral judgment by the officers who failed to try and use their influence or money to solve the greater problem. They must have felt that their individual resources were inadequate to solve the entire problem. Many probably felt that their personal survival was more important than taking the morally right alternative. It probably was not a conscious decision made because of rank, but rather a personal decision to survive made under demanding circumstances.

Some of the problems the POWs faced in the Far East may have been rectified by the changes made in the Geneva Conventions on 12 August 1949. Today all prisoners receive an advance of pay. Noncommissioned officers are not compelled to work. Prisoners of war who work shall be paid a fair working rate. Other provisions such as minimum standards for food, medical care, housing and transportation which should have prevented the Japanese atrocities remain in force. But, if like Japan, a country chooses to ignore the rules and be brutal toward prisoners of war, the only recourse will be to punish the persons responsible after the fact. This does not help the men and women being held. This is an inherent weakness in the overall system that will never change until governments choose to abide by the rules.

After looking at all the information provided in this thesis and considering how the enlisted men might have benefited by more assistance from the officers, the simple fact remains that it is highly likely that officers died in numbers far

exceeding their proportion of the total prisoners of war. The reason for this is very simple. Although the Japanese balked at the Geneva Convention requirement which prevented compelling officers to work, they basically complied with it during the early years of the war. Because of this, most officers were forced to remain in the Philippines until the Japanese either had the assets available to ship them, or felt compelled to move them to prevent their recapture. It is a matter of sheer bad luck for the officers to have died in the bombings and submarine attacks by advancing American forces. Normal Geneva Convention rules prohibited the transporting of prisoners on unmarked troop ships. It should not have happened, but it did. America could not stand by and allow its enemy to hold our war aims hostage by using prisoners as shields. The war aims remained the same and unmarked Japanese ships were sunk at the cost of many American lives.

There are very few recommendations to be made concerning the problems which have been identified in this thesis. The United States has continued to move toward a classless military structure over the years and most officers are instilled with a strong sense of responsibility toward their men. But officers must understand that they could find themselves thrust into similar circumstances and be forced to make decisions regarding the welfare of their men against other priorities - including personal ones. Perhaps if officers study this thesis and ask themselves some hard questions, they might be able to make some

basic philosophical decisions now instead of later when their minds might not be as clear.

The Geneva Conventions are basically sound. If Japan had chosen to follow the rules, this thesis would have been unnecessary. It is hard to speculate what might have happened differently if officers and enlisted men had been separated, or if they had all received equal pay or the officers had been compelled to work alongside the enlisted men from the beginning. Perhaps more would have lived in the first example and more would have died in the latter. Perhaps all would have had better access to food and all would have been transferred to Japan at the same time preventing the slaughter of officers at the end. But maybe the only result would have been that they all would have died in equal numbers. Is there anything wrong with that? Only if society deems that one person is no more valuable than another person.

In some ways it could be argued that the enlisted men were condemned to death by the rules of the Geneva Convention. But one might also argue that if all had equal money in the camps, then the value of money would have been worthless - there was probably not enough food to go around anyway and other means would have been established to divide the food, probably by rank.

The issue of separating officers into different camps and giving prisoners differing pay based on rank needs to be carefully reviewed after considering the results discussed in

this thesis. Do officers in prison camps <u>really</u> need separate facilities and more money? Would it not be better to maintain some semblance of unit integrity and keep officers and enlisted men together? Does keeping officers in the same camps with enlisted men help or hinder morale and camp administration? Each of these questions could prompt another study such as this thesis.

The overriding theme that comes to the surface when this problem is delved into at depth is that perhaps our international society, with the United States as a leader for world thought, has determined that officers are a little more valuable than the basic rank and file. This thought may be linked to the traditions that were discussed in Chapter Two or may simply be due to the society having invested more money in officers' education and training. It is obviously more difficult to replace officers with soldiers fresh out of basic training. But cannot the same thing be said about a career noncommissioned officer? In some ways a seasoned sergeant is more irreplaceable than a new second lieutenant.

When the international committees sit down to discuss the rules that govern the treatment of POWs they certainly do not discuss the relative value of one class of person over another, be they officer or enlisted. They expect all the prisoners to be treated in a manner that will protect their lives until they can be repatriated. But things do not always work out the way people intend them to. Some countries do not

play by all the rules. Subtle distinctions in wording can have an impact on survival. The results of this thesis are an example of this very premise.

Rank distinctions were determined to be necessary for good order and discipline and to provide the functional necessity of dividing the workers from the managers. But is one human being really more valuable than another in a prisoner of war camp? Should international rules benefit one human being over another simply based on rank? Probably not. But tradition is a very hard thing to break and in future wars officers will probably continue to be treated differently from enlisted men. That is simply the nature of our society. The only thing that might make a difference over the historical examples given in this thesis is the attitudes of the officers themselves. Only they may ultimately determine whether or not rank will have its privilege in future prisoner of war camps.

NOTES CHAPTER 11

[1] Veterans Administration, Study of Former Prisoners of War, (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.: May 1980), 10; quoting from Charles Stenger, "American POWs in WWI, WWII, Korea, and Vietnam - Statistical Data", Veterans Administration Central Office, Washington, D.C.: June 30, 1979; The Combined Arms Research Library at Fort Leavenworth made several attemptes, but was unable to find the reference by Charles Stenger in order to determine the source of his data.

[2] John E. Olson, O'Donnell - Andersonville of the Pacific, (Lake Quivira, Kansas: J. E. Olson, 1985), 151-154.

[3] Donald Knox, Death March - The Survivors of Bataan, (New York and London: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Publishers, 1981), 154-155.

[4] John Toland, But Not in Shame, (New York: Random House, 1961), 329.

[5] Olson, O'Donnell, 151-154.

[6] Calvin E. Chunn, ed., Of Rice and Men, (Los Angeles, California: Veteran's Publishing Company, 1946), 136-137.

[7] Knox, Death March, 198-199.

[8] Marion Lawton, Some Survived, (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill, 1984), 75; this reference states only 16 died at the Davao Penal Colony yet almost all other sources place the number at 18.

[9] Prisoner of War Study Group, A Review of United States Policy on Treatment of Prisoners of War, (Officer of the Provost Marshall General, Washington D.C.: Three volumes, 1968), V-129.

[10] Knox, Death March, 186.

[11] Preston Hubbard, Apocalypse Undone, (Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press, 1990), 126.

[12] Knox, Death March, 367.

[13] David Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1971), 971.

[14] Knox, Death March, 344.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Lawton, Some Survived, 214.

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A

JAPANESE ARMY REGULATIONS

FOR HANDLING PRISONERS OF WAR[1]

These regulations were issued in February, 1904, as Army Instruction No. 22 of that year, and subsequently revised on several occasions. They were the official regulations in force for all units and members of the Japanese Army in World War II.

Regulations for the handling of prisoners of war shall be as follows:

Chapter I
General Rules

Article 1. The term prisoner(s) of war as used in these regulations shall refer to combatants of enemy nationality or to those who by treaty or custom are entitled to treatment as prisoners of war.

Article 2. Prisoners of war shall be treated with a spirit of goodwill and shall never be subjected to cruelties or humiliation.

Article 3. Prisoners of war shall be given suitable treatment in accordance with their position and rank. However, those who fail to reply with sincerity and truth to questions regarding name and rank, and violators of other rules, shall not be included in this.

Article 4. Prisoners of war shall be required to conform to the discipline and regulations of the Imperial Army. Beyond this, their persons shall not be subjected to unwarranted restriction.

Article 5. Insofar as military discipline and moral standards are not affected, prisoners of war shall have freedom of religion and shall be permitted to attend worship in accordance with their respective sects.

Article 6. In case of disobedience it shall be permissible to hold a prisoner of war in confinement or detention or to

subject him to other necessary disciplinary action. In case a prisoner of war attempts to escape, he may be stopped by armed force and if necessary killed or wounded.

Article 7. When a prisoner of war not under oath is captured in attempted escape, he shall be subjected to disciplinary action. When such a prisoner of war, after successful escape, is again made prisoner of war, no punishment shall be inflicted for the previous escape.

Article 8. The methods of disciplining prisoners of war shall, besides following the foregoing articles, be in accordance with the provisions of the army regulations for minor punishments. Criminal acts of prisoners of war shall be tried by army courtmartial.

CHAPTER II
Capture and Transportation to the Rear of Prisoners of War

Article 9. When a person to be treated as a prisoner of war is captured, his personal belongings shall be immediately inspected, and weapons, ammunition and other articles which may be put to military use shall be confiscated. Other belongings shall either be held in deposit or shall be left in his possession as circumstances require.

Article 10. When among the prisoners of war mentioned in the foregoing article, there are officers who should be treated with special honor, an army commander or independent divisional commander may permit them to carry their swords. In such cases the names of the prisoners of war together with the records shall be reported to Imperial General Headquarters, from whence due notice shall be transmitted to the Ministry of War. The weapons which shall be carried shall be held in deposit in the prisoners of war camp.

Article 11. Commanders of armies and of independent divisions shall, upon negotiations with the enemy forces after combat, be permitted to return or exchange captured sick and wounded prisoners of war who swear on oath not to take part in combat during the remainder of the same war. In such cases, names, total number and reasons shall be reported to Imperial General Headquarters from whence the Ministry of War shall be duly notified.

Article 12. Each unit capturing prisoners shall duly interrogate said prisoner, prepare a roster containing the name, age, rank, home address, home unit and place and date of wounding; a prisoner of war diary; and inventories of articles confiscated or held in deposit in accordance with the provisions of Article 9. When as provided for in the next

foregoing article, the return, exchange or release on oath of prisoners of war are effected, the fact shall be noted on the prisoner of war roster.

Article 13. Prisoners of war shall be divided into officers and warrant officers and under and shall be transported under guard to the nearest line of communications command or transport and communications organization. When this is done, the articles held in deposit, prisoner of war roster, prisoner of war diaries and inventories shall be forwarded together with the captured personnel.

Article 14. Army units, lines of communications commands or transport and communications organizations may, upon conference on the handing over of PW's by a naval commanding officer, receive into custody those prisoners of war together with deposited articles, rosters, diaries, and inventories.

Article 15. Commanders of armies or independent divisions shall promptly report to Imperial General Headquarters the number of prisoners of war they desire to send to the rear. Imperial General Headquarters shall inform the Ministry of War thereof.

Article 16. When the Ministry of War is in receipt of the information mentioned in the foregoing Article 15, it shall report to the Imperial General headquarters the post or other location where the reception of prisoners of war will be effected. Imperial General headquarters shall inform the Ministry of War regarding the expected date of arrival at the designated point. The same procedure shall be followed when the Ministry of War has been informed regarding the reception of prisoners taken by the Navy.

Article 17. Lines of communications commands and transport and communications organizations which in accordance with Articles 13 and 14 have accepted prisoners of war shall transport said prisoners of war under guard to the location(s) mentioned in the next foregoing article and shall there transfer said PW's together with deposited articles, PW rosters, PW diaries and inventories to the custody of the officer of the War Ministry charged with reception.

Article 18. When no Imperial General Headquarters is established, "Imperial General Headquarters" in this chapter shall be taken to read "General Staff Headquarters."

CHAPTER III
Accommodation and Control of Prisoners of War

Article 19. (Rescinded)

Article 20. For prisoners of war accommodations, army establishments, temples or other buildings which suffice to prevent escape and are not detrimental to the health and honor of the prisoners shall be utilized.

Article 21. The army commander or garrison area commander under whose jurisdiction comes the administration of prisoner of War camps (hereinafter to be referred to as the High Administrator of PW camps) shall determine "regulations concerning PW camp duties" and shall make a report thereof to the Minister of War and duly inform the Director General of the PW Information Bureau.

Article 22. (Rescinded)

Article 23. (Rescinded)

Article 24. (Rescinded)

Article 25. (Rescinded)

Article 26. Insofar as mail sent and received by prisoners of war is, by international treaty, exempted from postage dues, the High Administrator of PW camps shall confer with the Post Office in the vicinity of the PW accommodations and shall determine a suitable procedure for the handling of postal matters.

Article 27. Rules and regulations concerning control within PW camps shall be determined by the High Administrator.

CHAPTER IV
Miscellaneous Rules

Article 28. Those enemy sick and wounded who, after medical treatment at dressing stations or hospitals, are considered incapable of military service shall, after due promise not to serve in the same war, be returned to their homes. However, those who have important relations with the conduct of the war are not included in this.

Article 29. Articles belonging to the prisoners of war and held in deposit by Imperial Government offices shall be returned to their possession at the time of their release.

Article 30. In case of the death of a prisoner of war, the money and possessions of the deceased shall be sent to the Prisoner of War Information Bureau by the unit, organization hospital or dressing station concerned. When the belongings are of a perishable nature, such shall be sold and the proceeds of the sale shall be forwarded instead.

Article 31. The last will and testament of a deceased prisoner of war shall be handled in the same way as that of Japanese military personnel by the unit, organization, hospital or dressing station concerned, and shall be duly forwarded to the Prisoner of War Information Bureau.

Article 32. (Rescinded)

Article 33. Direct welfare activities for the benefit of prisoners of war by organizations legally established for charitable purposes may be permitted on submittal of a written pledge to the effect that no infractions or violations of the rules and regulations concerning prisoners will be made.

SOURCE

[1] Stanley L. Falk, Batan: The March of Death, (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1962), 241-246.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Government Documents

Air University, Arctic Desert and Tropic Information Center. The Geneva Convention, Background, General Principles and Applications. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: 24 March 1960.

Office of the Provost Marshall General, Washington D.C. Prisoner of War Study Group. A Review of United States Policy on Treatment of Prisoners of War. Three vols., Dec, 1968.

U.S. Department of the Army. Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees and Detained Persons. Field Manual 19-40. Feb. 1976.

U.S. Department of the Army. The Law of Land Warfare. Field Manual 27-10. Jul. 1956.

U.S. Department of the Army. Operations. Field Manual 100-5. May 1986.

Veterans Administration. Study of Former Prisoners of War. U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash. D.C., May 1980.

Books and Articles - Primary Sources

Atienza, Rigoberto J. A Time for War; 105 Days in Bataan. Manilla: Eugenia S. vda. de Atienza, 1985.

Boyle, Martin. Yanks Don't Cry. New York: Random House, 1963.

Brereton, Lewis H. The Brereton Diaries: 3 October 1941-8 May 1945. New York: William and Morrow & Co., 1946.

Brougher, William E. South to Bataan, North to Mukden. Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1971.

Chunn, Calvin E. Of Rice and Men. Los Angeles: Veteran's Publishing Company, 1946.

Chynoweth, Bradford G. Bellamy Park. Hicksville, New York: Exposition Press, 1975.

Coleman, J. S. Bataan and Beyond. College Station, Texas: Texas A & M Press, 1978.

Dyess, William E. The Dyess Story. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1944.

Feuer, A. B., Bilibid Diary. The Secret Notebooks of Commander Thomas Hayes, POW, the Philippines, 1942-45. Hamden Court, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1987.

Fortier, Malcolm V. Life of a POW Under the Japanese. Spokane, Washington: G. W. Hill Printing Company, 1946.

Gloria, Carlo C. All the Way from Bataan to O'Donnell. (S.L.: S.N.), 1978.

Hawkins, Jack. Never Say Die. Philadelphia: Dorrance and Company, 1961.

Hersey, John R. Men on Bataan. New York: A. A. Knopf, 1942.

Hubbard, Preston John. Apocalypse Undone. Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press, 1990.

Hunt, Ray C., and Bernard Norling. Behind Japanese Lines. Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1986.

Ind, Allison. Bataan, The Judgment Seat: The Saga of the Philippine Command of the United States Army Air Force, May 1941 to May 1942. New York: MacMillan, 1944.

Knox, Donald. Death March. The Survivors of Bataan. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981.

Lawton, Marion. Some Survived. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: Algonquin Books, 1984.

Lee, Clark. They Call it Pacific: An Eyewitness Story of Our War Against Japan from Bataan to the Solomons. New York: Viking Press, 1943.

Lory, Hillis. Japan's Military Masters: The Army in Japanese Life. New York: Viking, 1943.

MacArthur, Douglas. Reminiscences. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964.

Mallon'ee, Richard C. The Naked Flagpole: Battle for Bataan. San Rafael, California: Presidio Press, 1980.

McCoy, Melvin H., Steve Mellnik, and Welborn Kelley. Ten Escape from Tojo. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1944.

McGee, John H. Rice and Salt. San Antonio, Texas: Naylor Company, 1962.

Miller, Ernest Brumaghim. Bataan Uncensored. Brainerd, Minnesota: 1949.

Moody, Samuel B. Reprieve from Hell. New York: Pageant Press, 1961.

Olson, John E. O'Donnell, Andersonville of the Pacific. Lake Quivira, Kansas: J. E. Olson, 1985.

Petillo, Carol M., ed. The Ordeal of Elizabeth Vaughan. A Wartime Diary of the Philippines. Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1985.

Redmond, Juanita. I Served on Bataan. Philadelphia-New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1943.

Reynolds, Bob. Of Rice and Men. Philadelphia: Dorrance and Company, Inc., 1947.

Stewart, Sidney. Give Us This Day. New York: W. W. Norton Company, 1957.

Thompson, Paul W., et al. How the Jap Army Fights. Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1942.

Tolischus, Otto D. Through Japanese Eyes. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1945.

Volckmann, Russell W. We Remained. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1954.

Wainwright, Jonathan M. General Wainwright's Story. Edited by Robert Considine. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1946.

Waldron, Ben D. Corregidor, From Paradise to Hell. Freeman, South Dakota: Pine Hill Press, 1988.

Weinstein, A. A. Barbed Wire Surgeon. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948.

Books and Articles - Secondary Sources

Addington, Larry A. The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1984.

Baumer, William H. How to be An Army Officer. New York: Robert M. McBride & Company, 1940.

Beck, John Jacob. MacArthur and Wainwright: Sacrifice of the Philippines. Albuquerque, New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press, 1974.

Benedict, Ruth. The Chrysanthemum and the Sword. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946.

Bergamini, David. Japan's Imperial Conspiracy. New York: William Morrow, 1971.

Burdick, Charles and Ursula Moessner. The German Prisoners of War in Japan, 1914-1920. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, Inc., 1984.

Butow, Robert J. C. Japan's Decision to Surrender. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1954.

Craig, William. The Fall of Japan. New York: Dial Press, 1967.

Devereaux, James P. S. The Story of Wake Island. New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1947.

Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of International Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War. The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950.

Dull, Paul S., and Michael T. Umemura. The Tokyo Trials: A Functional Index to the Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1957.

Eichelberger, Robert L. Our Jungle Road to Tokyo. New York: Viking Press, 1950.

Falk, Stanley Lawrence. Bataan: the March of Death. New York: Norton, 1962.

Feis, Herbert, The Road to Pearl Harbor. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1950.

Fisch, Arnold G. The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1989.

Flanagan, E. M., Jr., Lt. Gen. USA (Ret.). Corregidor. Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1988.

Fletcher, Marvin. The Black Soldier and Officer in the United States Army, 1891-1917. Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1974.

Flikke, Colonel Julia O. Nurses in Action. New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1943.

Friedman, Leon. ed. The Law of Land War; A Documentary History, Two vols., New York: Random House, 1972.

Garrett, Richard. P.O.W.. New Abbot, London: David and Charles, 1981.

Gulick, Sidney, L. Toward Understanding the Japanese. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1935.

Hancock, H. Irving. Life at West Point. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, The Knickerbocker Press, 1902.

Ienaga, Saburo. The Pacific War. New York: Random House, 1978.

International Committee of the Red Cross. Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross on Its Activities During the Second World War. Three vols., Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1948.

Johnston, B. F. Japanese Food Management in World War II. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1953.

Kemble, Charles R. The Image of the Army Officer in America. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1973.

Kennedy, Malcolm Duncan. The Military Side of Japanese Life. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1923.

Kerr, E. Bartlett. Surrender and Survival: the Experiences of American POW's in the Pacific, 1941-1945. New York: W. Morrow, 1985.

King, Dr. Michael J. "Rangers: Selected Combat Operations in World War II," in Leavenworth Papers, vol No. 11, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: United States Army Command and General Staff College, June 1985.

Klimow, Matthew S. Surrender - A Soldier's Legal, Ethical, and Moral Obligations; With Philippine Case Study. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: United States Army Command and General Staff College Masters Thesis, 1989.

McLendon, Larry F. Effectiveness of the Geneva Convention Relative to American POWs (Prisoners of War). Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: May 1973.

Miller, Arthur Harrison. Leadership. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, The Knickerbocker Press, 1920.

Morton, Louis. The Fall of the Philippines. United States Army in World War II. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953.

Moskos, Charles C. The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today's Military. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970.

Pennington, Leon Alfred, Romeyn B. Hough, Jr., H. W. Case, The Psychology of Military Leadership. New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1943.

Piccigallo, Philip R. The Japanese on Trial: Allied War Crimes Operations in the East 1945-1951. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1979.

Reid, Pat. Prisoner of War. New York: Beaufort Books Publishers, 1984.

Reischauer, Edwin O. The United States and Japan. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957.

Russell, Lord, of Liverpool. Knights of Bushido. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1958.

Sarkesian, Sam C. The Professional Army Officer in a Changing Society. Chicago, Illinois: Nelson Hall Publishers, 1975.

Schindler, Deitrich, and Toman, Jiri. ed. The Laws of Armed Conflicts; A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions, and Other Documents. Geneva: Henry Dunant Institute, 1981.

Schultz, Duane. Hero of Bataan: The Story of General Jonathan M. Wainwright. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981.

Sengal, David R., and H. Wallace Sinaiko, ed. Life in the Rank and File. Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1986.

Skoien, Clarence E. Prepared to Be A PW? Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 15 March 1973.

Smith, Robert R. Triumph in the Philippines. U.S. Army in World War II. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963.

Stevens, Frederic Harper. Santo Tomas Internment Camp. New York: Stratford House, Inc., 1946.

Stouffer, Samuel A., et al., The American Soldier. Two vols., Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1949.

Tasaki, Hanama. Long the Imperial Way. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1949.

Toland, John. But Not in Shame. New York: Random House, 1961
____,The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945. New York: Random House, 1970.

Volmer, Arthur. How to Become and Officer, U.S. Army. New York: Hastings House Publishers, 1941.

Wells, William L. The American Prisoner of War. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, March 1972.

Yoshihashi, Takehiko. Conspiracy at Mukden: The Rise of the Japanese Military. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1963.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Combined Arms Research Library
   U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
   Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

2. Defense Technical Information Center
   Cameron Station
   Alexandria, Virginia 22314

3. Dr. Jack J. Gifford
   Combat Studies Institute
   U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
   Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

4. Major Gary D. Rhay
   Combat Studies Institute
   U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
   Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

5. Chaplain (Major) Daniel K. Nagle
   Center for Army Leadership
   U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
   Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

6. Lieutenant Colonel Michael Keohane
   Center for Army Leadership
   U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
   Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

7. Lieutenant Colonel James McLean
   Combat Studies Institute
   U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
   Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900