

MISSION ORDERS IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY: IS THE DOCTRINE EFFECTIVE?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

JOHN D. JOHNSON, MAJ, USA
B.A., Virginia Military Institute, 1977

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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

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

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

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

MISSION ORDERS IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY: Is the Doctrine Effective? by Major John D. Johnson, USA, 145 pages.

This study is an analysis of the effectiveness of the U.S. Army's mission order doctrine at the tactical level. The study examines the reasons for decentralized command and control philosophies, the development of mission orders in the German Army, and the evolution of mission order doctrine in the U.S. Army. The study determined the doctrine's effectiveness by administration of a survey to selected middle grade officers. The study explains the development of the survey instrument and analysis of responses.

The survey determined whether the participants had a common understanding of the term "mission," whether they could correctly identify the characteristics of mission orders, and the level of their personal experiences with mission orders. The survey also focused on the state of selected conditions which are necessary for the use of mission orders.

The primary conclusion drawn from the analysis was that the U.S. Army's mission order doctrine is not effective at the tactical level. The analysis of survey data revealed that a workable doctrine exists; however, it was not commonly known nor, by inference, understood by those officers surveyed.

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Second, I owe special thanks to my research committee. I thank my committee chairman, COL William West for his unique insight, personal experiences, and welcomed guidance. Dr. Ernest Lowden freely provided his expert help and guidance in constructing and analyzing the results of my survey. I also want to thank my second reader, MAJ Stan Tuttle for his editorial efforts and objective thoughts.

Lastly, I would like to thank all the officers who took the time to participate in the survey. The results of this thesis would not have been possible without their honest and thoughtful answers.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The 1982 revision of FM 100-5, Operations, emphasized an environment of war that was nonlinear, chaotic, and characterized by uncertainty. This view of future battle stressed the need for a decentralized command and control system.[1] The authors of the doctrine borrowed heavily from German experiences and doctrine to prescribe a command and control system that would meet the challenges of such a chaotic battlefield.

The senior leadership of the Army determined that the command and control solution rested with the German concept of Auftragstaktik and its use of **mission orders**.[2] By this process, they incorporated mission orders into the new doctrine.

Incorporation of a concept in the doctrinal literature does not ensure its acceptance or practice. A U.S. Army Training Board discussion paper released in 1986 and titled "Auftragstaktik in the U.S. Army", concluded that the army was not using mission orders and was not trained to use them.[3]

The conclusions in the Army Training Board's discussion paper point to a significant problem for an approach to warfighting that demands a decentralized command and control philosophy. The first step to a solution must

begin with an analysis of whether the doctrine is effective.

I. Problem Statement

The problem the Army Training Board suggests is: **The US Army does not have an effective doctrine for the formulation and communication of mission orders at the tactical level.** This the basic problem this study will address.

II. Research Questions

The following research questions must be answered to determine if the problem, as stated above, exists:

a. What constitutes an effective doctrine?

b. What are the characteristics of a mission order?

c. Are the characteristics of mission orders included in U.S. Army doctrine?

d. Do U.S. Army officers have a common understanding of the definition of mission?

e. Do US Army officers know the characteristics of mission orders as expressed in U.S. Army doctrine?

f. Do US Army officers think their doctrine is adequate for the formulation and communication of mission orders?

g. Which of the prerequisites (command climate, standard operating procedures, mutual trust among leaders, etc.) contribute to or detract from a unit's use of mission orders?

h. Does the formal officer education system teach the use of mission orders?

i. Do U.S. Army leaders understand and practice the use of mission orders?

III. Assumptions

The study required two assumptions. First, U.S. Army doctrine will continue to require the use of mission orders in support of its warfighting doctrine.

The second assumption is that instruction at the Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC), Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS^3), and the Pre-Command Course (PCC) reflect U.S. Army doctrine. This assumption also holds true for all instructional materials including orders and student texts.

IV. Definition of Terms

A common point of departure is necessary for the analysis of data collected during research. That point of departure is provided by a mutual understanding of key terms. The below listed definitions resulted from the review of literature.

(1) Mission: "The task, together with the purpose, which clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefor. It does not specify how the mission is to be accomplished."[4]

(2) Order: "A communication--written, oral, or by signal-- that conveys instructions from a superior to a

subordinate. In a broad sense, the terms **order** and **command** (emphasis in original) are synonymous. However, an order implies discretion in execution whereas a command does not.[5]

(3) Mission Order: Orders that convey a subordinate's mission. "[It] should clearly state the commander's objective, what he wants done and why he wants it done. [It] should establish limits or controls necessary for coordination. [It] should delineate the available resources and support from outside sources." It should convey the commander's intent and the overall mission of the force.[6]

(4) Doctrine: "...doctrine is the condensed expression of [the] approach to fighting...rooted in time tested principles, yet forward looking...[and] definitive enough to guide operations....Finally, to be useful, doctrine must be uniformly known and understood."[7]

(5) Task: " A clearly defined and measurable activity accomplished by individuals and organizations. Tasks are specific activities which contribute to the accomplishment of encompassing missions or other requirements."[8]

(6) Tactical level: For the purpose of this thesis, the tactical level will be considered division and below.

V. Limitations

The following limitations helped to define the parameters of this study:

(1) The primary source for determining whether current US Army doctrine is effective was a survey of Army officers. I only surveyed officers assigned to Ft. Leavenworth (permanently or temporarily for training), observer/controllers (O/C) from the National Training Center (NTC), and officers serving with the 3rd Armored Division during their Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) seminar.

(2) I considered current command and control doctrine as that which was published and distributed prior to 1 January 1989. The primary manuals were FM 100-5, Operations; FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations; and FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Symbols.

VI. Delimitations

The following delimitations also apply to the study:

(1) The doctrine and history of the German Army will be the only foreign army studied.

(2) The study will only focus on division through battalion levels.

(3) There is a considerable debate ongoing concerning the definition and expression of intent. While the expression of intent is integral to mission orders, resolution of the debate is beyond the scope of this thesis. The issue cannot be ignored entirely and some valuable data did arise concerning intent. I have pointed this out in the thesis, where appropriate.

VII. Importance of the Study

This study provides useful feedback as to the effectiveness of our doctrine and the perceptions of Army officers. Airland Battle doctrine says that decentralized command and control is essential to success in combat. This is in recognition of the chaos and complexity expected in any future conflict. The doctrine accepts this and expresses a command and control doctrine that accommodates this environment instead of resisting the inevitable.

If mission orders are an integral part of our command and control philosophy, then we must have an effective doctrine for their implementation. The purpose of this study was to determine if such a guiding doctrine exists and if it is effective in that it is commonly known and understood.

END NOTES FOR CHAPTER 1

[1] U.S. Army, FM 100-5--Operations (1982): 1-1--1-3.

[2] John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to Airland Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973-1982 (1985): 58-59.

[3] United States Army Training Board, "Discussion Paper 1-86: Auftragstaktik in the U.S. Army" (1986): 6.

[4] U.S. Department of Defense, JCS Pub 1--Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (1987): 236-237.

[5] U.S. Army, FM 101-5-1--Operational Terms and Symbols (1985): 1-53.

[6] FM 100-5: 2-7.

[7] U.S. Army, FM 100-5--Operations (1986): 6.

[8] U.S. Army, FM 25-100--Training the Force (1988): Glossary 7.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

I. Introduction

I conducted a review of literature to assist in refining the scope of the study, to assist in formulating the problem statement, and to determine the nature of the subject. The primary focus of the review was to identify the characteristics, content, and methodology of mission orders. I further sought to determine the existence (or lack thereof) of these characteristics, content, and methodologies in current U.S. Army doctrine. Finally, I sought to determine whether Army officers' level of knowledge, understanding, and acceptance of mission orders was reflected in the literature.

The review revealed U.S. Army command and control doctrine to be inconsistent and contradictory. At the same time, however, it contains the crucial genesis of a command and control philosophy needed to guide the Army in the use of mission orders.

This chapter describes the perceptions of war that resulted in the formulation of decentralized command and control philosophies. It further describes the origins of the mission order tradition in the German Army, the history of mission orders in the U.S. Army, and the current level of

understanding and practice of mission orders as expressed in the literature. The conclusion traces the dominant themes and summarizes the findings of the review of literature.

II. Why Mission Orders?

> And there will be other ways and means which no one can foresee at present, since war is certainly not one of those things which follow a fixed pattern; instead it usually makes its own conditions in which one has to adapt oneself to changing situations.
>
> -King of Sparta to his people, as related by Thucydides.[1]

The quote, above, made at the outset of the Peloponnesian War (circa 430 B.C.) illustrates a fundamental truth about the nature of war. War exists in an environment of confusion, near chaos, and uncertainty. This is so (and will always be so) due to the very nature of man and his opposing wills in conflict. This is also the nature of war recognized in current U.S. Army doctrine.[2]

This chaotic, uncertain aspect of war directly conflicts with man's desire for certainty and control over his environment. In his historical study of command systems, Martin van Creveld concluded that there is a constant struggle between the desire for certainty and the necessity of functioning in spite of uncertainty. This has resulted in the development of two basic philosophies of command and control: centralized and decentralized.[3]

The differences in these two philosophies are directly tied to the essence of command and control. FC 101-

55, Corps and division Command and Control, defines command as "...a process by which the will and intent of the commander is infused among subordinates. This process is directive; its premise is reliable subordinate behavior."

Control is defined as: "...a process by which subordinate behavior inconsistent with the will and intent of the commander is identified and corrected. This process is restrictive; its premise is unreliable subordinate behavior."[4] Unreliable behavior, here, is simply behavior not consistent with the commander's intentions. This could result from a lack of understanding related to problems with doctrine, training, procedure, or terminology. It could also be exacerbated by a lack of familiarity or lack of trust.

The manual goes on to say that both processes are necessary and serve vital functions. As we shall see, however, the difference between centralized and decentralized philosophies is directly related to the dominance of one or the other of these processes.

The root cause for the difference between the two command and control philosophies originates in how each one attempts to deal with the quest for certainty. A centralized style places more emphasis on control than on command and removes responsibility and latitude for making decisions from the lower echelons of command, reserving it for the top echelon. This allows increased certainty at the top about the decision.

The primary advantage to this system is that it requires less time to train subordinates since their training doesn't necessarily have to include situation assessment and decision making skills. The top echelon assesses the situation based on input from below, deduces the required actions, and directs subordinate levels to carry out the decisions.

An additional assumption about the nature of future war is that it will be fast-paced; victory will go to the more agile.[6] Herein lies the disadvantages of a centralized command and control philosophy. Any changes to a plan have to originate from or await approval from the top echelon of command. An additional disadvantage is the amount of detail necessary in orders and the time needed to transmit the instructions[6]. This effects the speed of decisions and, thereby, the speed of actions resulting in a loss of agility.

Decentralized command and control places its emphasis on command and requires lower echelons of command to take responsibility and act when the situation so dictates. This decreases the level of certainty at the top echelon and increases the level of certainty at the lower echelons, where the situation is clearer and more immediate.[7]

The primary advantage of this style of command is its responsiveness to a changing situation. It increases the potential speed of execution because more decisions are made at the point of action. The primary disadvantage is in the

training investment necessary to enable lower level commanders to properly read the situation and then act appropriately.[8]

A centralized command style relies on an almost constant direction from the top and assignment or reassignment of tasks as the battle progresses. A decentralized style of command relies on a more general control--based upon an understanding of the overall intent or purpose to be achieved.[9] An understanding of the overall intent is expected to provide unity of purpose and thereby unity of effort.[10]

This expression of purpose (intent) and dependance on it as the ultimate influence for controlling subordinate initiative is key to the success of a decentralized command style. It is adherence to the spirit of an order and not its letter which is the determinant of subordinate action. This is a theme that poses one of the greatest problems for acceptance of a decentralized style of command". It demands a high level of senior-subordinate mutual trust and understanding.

An understanding of purpose is the element that allows subordinates to exploit the chaotic environment of war. This is by means of what the U.S. Marine Corps has termed an "opportunistic will."[12] This, it is expected in the aggregate, will counter the effects of chaos best and provide superior agility.

The prerequisites needed to practically apply a decentralized command philosophy are: mutual trust among all levels of command, acceptance of responsibility for taking action and making decisions, and uniformity of thinking.[13]

III. Mission Orders According to the Germans

Why study the Germans? First, the Germans are felt by many historians and military experts to have come the closest to perfecting a truly decentralized command and control system. Second, The U.S. Army has taken its doctrinal cues, regarding command and control, from the Germans for most of the 20th Century.

The German influence on U.S. Army doctrine started with the Army's first field service regulations of 1905, continued through the influence of the German's 1933 Truppenfuhrung (Troop Leading) on the 1941 version of FM 100-5, Operations, and ultimately to the German influence on the authors of the 1982 version of the manual.[14]

It is important, therefore, that we understand the roots of our doctrine. We should also look closely to ensure that we have understood and included, or purposely excluded, the fine points that have made the system work for the German Army.

The German Army recognized, through their experiences in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, that fighting elements on the battlefield were becoming more and more dispersed. This dispersion was

necessitated for survival in the face of the continued improvements in the rifle's range and accuracy. This created a problem for the Prussian Army's tradition of centralized control established by Frederick the Great.

An example of Prussian thinking of this time is provided by Sigismund von Schlicting, a corps commander in Prussian Army. He railed against rigidity, writing, "Give me the objective ("Gefechtsziel") and leave me the choice of means to do it (emphasis in original)."[15]

Mission-order tactics, or auftragstaktik as the Germans came to coin it, is a form of decentralized command and control. Its actuating factor is the mission order. In this regard, the mission order must convey the essence of a superior's intent, the subordinate's task, and the purpose for the subordinate's actions. This latter piece of information was the key to allowing subordinate initiative when the situation called for change.[16]

This decentralized command and control philosophy was put to the test in the first world war. The system worked well in the opening stages of the war in France and throughout the war against Russia. However, as the battlefield in France became dominated by trenchlines and artillery, the command style reverted to a more centralized style.

To break the deadlock, the Germans developed new tactics. Infiltration tactics for the offense and, for the defense, defense in depth organized around strongpoints.

These tactics required decentralized execution and drove the German army back to its decentralized style of command.[17]

The German defeat in World War I resulted in intense analysis of wartime lessons. As they looked for solutions to their problems, the Germans were able to look at entirely new systems and methods. Additionally, as opposed to their American, French, or British enemies, they had the advantage of their Russian front experiences. The battles there were much more maneuver oriented and demanded decentralized control.[18]

These studies resulted in the publishing of Truppenfuhrung (Troop Leading--rough equivalent to the U.S. Army's FM 100-5) in 1933. This manual established the command and control philosophy that would prevail at the tactical level in the German Army during World War II.

The following are extracts from the 1933 German doctrine concerning mission orders:

> The mission and the situation form the basis of action.
>
> The general intention is expressed, the end to be achieved is stressed.
>
> The language of orders must be simple and understandable.
>
> An order shall contain all that is necessary for the lower commander to know in order for him to execute independently his task. It should contain no more.
>
> [The order is] adopted to the understanding of the receiver and, according to conditions, to his particularity.
>
> The order must guarantee the desired cooperation of all elements.[19]

The namesake of mission orders was the mission. It was here that the Germans expressed the intent or will of

the commander. It was a combination of understanding the mission and knowing the situation, that allowed for subordinate initiative.

The German army also recognized the training investment required for such a system. According to General Erich von Manstein, the German system presupposed that "... all members of the military hierarchy are imbued with certain tactical or operational axioms."[20]

General Von Mellinthin elaborated on the prerequisites for the German Army's command and control system by saying that the most important characteristic in an officer was character. He defined character as the "...capacity to make independent decisions."[21] Both generals remarked that the desire of the German system was to make decisions at the lowest level possible, including non-commissioned officers and soldiers.[22]

This doctrinal philosophy influences the German Army even today. The 1987 printing of Truppenfuhrung (HDv 100/100) reiterated their command and control philosophy as "mission-oriented." The quote on the following page expressed the philosophy.

> Mission-oriented command and control is the first principle in the Army....It affords the subordinate commander freedom of action in the execution of his mission....The superior commander informs his subordinates of his intentions, designates clear objectives and provides the assets required. He gives orders concerning the details of mission execution only for the purpose of coordinating actions serving the same objective....The subordinate commanders can thus act on their own in accordance with the superior commanders intentions; they can immediately react to developments in the situation and exploit favorable opportunities.[23]

The particulars of German orders are specified in HDv 100/200, Fuhrungssystem des Heeres (Army Command and Control System). The manual defines mission as "...the essence of every order....Therefore, the will of the superior must be expressed unequivocally in the mission." The manual goes on to specify the content of an order to include (among others): intentions of the superior, the unit's own mission, and the mission of subordinate forces.[24]

It is appropriate here to remind ourselves of the reason for this style of command philosophy--so that subordinates can take logical actions in the face of a changed situation and still contribute to overall mission accomplishment. How does this work in practice? Brigadier (ret.) Richard Simpkin in his book Race to the Swift, says that if need be, a subordinate could change his task if the situation indicated that the task would no longer accomplish the intended purpose.[25] In other words the purpose has primacy over the task.

German regulations make it clear that subordinate commanders must be prepared to "...assume the task of

another commander or deviate from his mission in order to act in accordance with the superior commanders intentions." This is not taken lightly and the manual specifies that the commander must accept responsibility for his decisions.[26]

From the above we can conclude that, in the German system, the mission includes not only the task to be accomplished but the purpose (intent) therefor. We can also conclude that an understanding of purpose at every level is essential.

We can conclude that the content of a mission order includes the superior commander's intentions, one's own mission, subordinate forces' missions, any constraints on mission accomplishment, outside resources available, and any coordinating instructions deemed necessary to ensure the cooperation of those forces. Finally, we can conclude that as the situation changes, the superior commander's intention, as expressed in our mission statement, allows us to change the assigned task, if necessary.

IV. Mission Orders in the U.S. Army--Mixed Signals

Some have argued that the history of mission orders dates back to the origins of the military in America.[27] Several of the great Civil War leaders demonstrated something akin to what we now call mission orders[28]; however, its use was inconsistent and level dependant. As stated before, the lineage of our current concept of mission orders is traced back to the German Army.

During the 1920's, the U.S. Army began to closely study the German concept of command and control. With the German publication of Truppenfuhrung in 1933 (and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College's subsequent translation of it in 1936), the U.S. Army revised FM 100-5 and published a 1941 version. The two manuals were strikingly similar.

One of the most valuable sources discovered during the review of literature was Martin van Creveld's Fighting Power. The book is the result of a study done to compare the German and American Armies of World War II. Van Creveld compares all aspects of the two armies including their command doctrine and practices. He outlines a comparison of the German Army's 1933 version of Truppenfuhrung and the 1941 version of FM 100-5 concluding that the U.S. Army's manual was virtually a direct copy of the German manual.[29]

The 1941 version of FM 100-5 stressed the need for individual initiative governed by the overall plan, stressed the need for mutual confidence, stated that "...the first demand in war is decisive action", and stated that "A willingness to accept responsibility is an essential trait of leadership."

The 1941 version of FM 100-5 also included the following guidance for orders:

> An order should not trespass upon the province of a subordinate....It tells the subordinate what to do but not how to do it.
> Any statement of reasons for measures adopted should be limited to what is necessary to obtain intelligent cooperation from subordinates.
> Orders which attempt to regulate action too far in the future result in frequent changes.[30]

While the Army's implementation of the doctrine was inconsistent at best, there were those who fully believed in and practiced the use of mission orders. Notable among these was general George S. Patton. In his "Letter of Instruction Number 1" to his 3rd U.S. Army, he included the following guidance for orders:

> The purpose of the whole as well as the missions of the subunits must be clear so that when communications break down subunit commanders can carry-on in absence of orders to fulfill the objective. Tell them <u>what</u> not <u>how</u> (emphasis in original).[31]

Major General John S. Wood, a commander of the 4th Armored Division under General Patton, frequently corresponded with military author B.H. Liddell Hart. This correspondence included, "Direct oral orders-no details, only missions." in a list of General Wood's leadership principles. A study of the 4th Armored Division after the war conducted by the Armor School credited mission orders as one of the division's keys to success.[32]

General Bruce Clark, a veteran of the World War II 4th Armored Division, elaborated on the content of mission orders: "...what the commander issuing the order wants

accomplished,...limiting or control factors that must be observed for coordinating purposes,...delineate the resources made available,...and support which he can expect or count on from sources outside of his command."[33]

It is clear that some officers in the U.S. Army of World War II understood and, to a certain extent, practiced mission orders. The Armor School study demonstrated that the lessons of mission orders were not entirely lost on the post-war army; however, these lessons were not consistently applied to our doctrine.[34]

In the middle of America's involvement in the Vietnam War, the Army revised FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations. The 1968 version was a point where the doctrine took a tangent and deviated from the path of missions expressed as task and purpose.[35]In this version, the why was included only "...as appropriate." The part of the mission statement that is the essence of mission orders, the why, was made optional. This is significant since the majority of senior officers in the army today grew up under the influence of this doctrine.

The Army rewrote FM 100-5 in 1982 and introduced AirLand Battle doctrine. The doctrine was a maneuver oriented doctrine which contained a decentralized command and control philosophy directing the use of mission orders.

The 1982 version of FM 100-5 specified the content of mission orders as:

> Clearly state the commander's objective, what he wants done and why he wants it done.
> Establish limits or controls necessary for coordination.
> Delineate the available resources and support from outside sources.
> The subordinate commander must fully understand his commander's intent and the overall mission of the force.[36]

In 1984 the Command and General Staff College rewrote FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, to better support AirLand Battle doctrine. Its only mention of mission orders, however, was in its discussion of fragmentary orders (FRAGOs).[37] This left the possible impression that mission orders could only be used once an operations order had been issued. This is clearly not supportive of the spirit of FM 100-5.

An additional problem was included in the 1984 version of FM 101-5. While the manual returned to a definition of mission that supported the use of mission orders (**task and purpose**), the examples in its appendices did not reflect this definition. The 1984 FM 101-5 provided "secure a bridgehead on the Blue River"[38] as an example of a task. The example orders in the appendices, however, used types of operations (attack, defend, etc.) and tasks (secure, retain, defeat, etc.) but did not include the why.

The most recent change in the U.S. Army's doctrine was the 1986 version of FM 100-5. This version was not seen as a dramatic change but a refinement of the 1982 version. This manual adhered to the maneuver concept of AirLand

Battle and specified that mission orders would be used in most cases.

The 1986 version also made some statements important to the understanding of mission orders and their implementation. The manual set the tone early by saying that commanders must build confidence in subordinates and require them to make decisions during fast paced, changing situations "...based on broad guidance and mission orders."[39]

The manual goes on to make the following points:

a. It is essential to decentralize decision authority to the lowest level possible and thereby risk losing precision in execution. However, loss of precision is usually preferable to inaction.[40]

b. Common understanding of doctrine, common educational background, common procedures, and standardized training practices are key prerequisites for the use of mission orders.[41]

c. The commander must express his intent and subordinates must understand the intention of commanders two levels above himself.[42]

d. Subordinates, armed with an understanding of the purpose of the operation, must act decisively and boldly to do what is necessary--even in the absence of orders.[43]

e. "Commanders should restrict the operations of their subordinates as little as necessary." and "Control measures should secure cooperation between forces without

imposing unnecessary restrictions on the freedom of junior leaders."[44]

Unfortunately, in an effort to clarify the content of mission orders, the manual added more confusion instead. The manual said mission orders "...specify <u>what</u> must be done without prescribing <u>how</u> it must be done...." It did not define what "what" was, leaving the possibility open for different interpretations.

From this discussion, we can see that the Army desires a decentralized command and control system that includes the use of mission orders. We can also see that the doctrinal road to the present has not been a straight one and that there is still considerable contradiction in our doctrine.

V. Where Doe the U.S. Army Stand Now?

Since the publication of the 1982 version of FM 100-5 and its revision in 1986, there have been a significant number of studies conducted and articles written about mission oriented command and control. These give us some insight as to the level of acceptance of mission orders and the status of the preconditions that must exist to facilitate their use.

The U.S. Army Training Board published a 1986 Discussion Paper titled "<u>Auftragstaktik</u> in the United States Army." Among the Training Board's findings were that most field grade officers believed that mission orders were a

type of fragmentary order (FRAGO); the level of detail in an order depended on the time available--more time, more detail; and that the National Training Center exacerbated the problem by placing "inordinate" stress on lengthy, detailed orders. The board's conclusions were:

> The school system orients primarily on the creation and use of lengthy detailed orders.
> Field training leans toward the use of lengthy orders.
> Shorter orders in the U.S. Army are driven by time rather than a concept that encourages them.
> Field training reflects what is taught in the schools.[45]

The question of whether mission orders were being taught in the armor and infantry officer advance courses was explored in 1989 by MAJ Robert Tezza. By conducting a content analysis of orders used in advance course instruction, he concluded that while the Infantry School was teaching mission orders, the Armor School was not.

Further, his study discovered several doctrinal voids in primary doctrinal manuals, notably FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Symbols for not being complete or specific enough in its definitions.[46] MAJ William Crain came to this conclusion also in his study of the U.S. Army's doctrine on mission analysis and expression of intent.[47]

MAJ David Cowan, for his 1986 School of Advanced Military Studies monograph, conducted a survey to determine at what level Auftragstaktik could be applied in the U.S. Army. His conclusion was that it could only function down to battalion level due to a lack of experience, lack of school

support below the advance course level, and level of training.[48]

Other studies conducted in a similar vein reached similar conclusions. Part of the reason for these results could lie in the level of mutual trust within the officer corps. A 1985 survey of officers conducted by the Chief of Staff of the Army reported three notable perceptions: operational skills were noted as the weakest area of preparation across all grades, leadership skills were reported as the second weakest ares, and most officers polled felt that half or less of their fellow officers would make good wartime leaders.[49]

The studies listed above reflect poorly on the state of some of the key preconditions necessary for the use of mission orders. Specifically, they indicate a lack of mutual confidence and problems with common knowledge and understanding of doctrine.

VI. Conclusions

The review of literature allowed me to draw several conclusions that are pertinent to this study. First, the essence of mission orders is the mission. The mission consists of a task and its associated purpose; the purpose being an expression of the intended outcome and the "acid test" for subordinate initiative.

The second conclusion is that mission orders contain the intention of the superior commander, one's own mission,

and assigned missions of all subordinate forces. It also contains the minimum amount of control measures to ensure cooperation among subordinate forces. The amount of detail in a mission order is dependent on the amount of confidence a superior has in his subordinates and the coordination necessary to attain cooperation among the subordinates.

The third conclusion is that several preconditions must exist to implement mission orders. Primary among these is mutual trust. This stems from a shared recognition of competence and confidence. Superiors have a responsibility to allow subordinates to act and subordinates must accept the responsibility to act. In the confused environment of battle, this translates into a willingness to risk loss of precision for the gain of greater success through action.

Mutual trust and acceptance of responsibility come from confidence in each other's ability. This confidence results, in part, from a common professional language, a common educational background, common procedures, and a common understanding of doctrine.

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CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

I. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the methodology used to determine whether the U.S. Army's doctrine for mission orders is effective at the tactical level (division and below).

II. Description of the Study

I conducted the study to determine whether the Army's doctrine for mission orders is effective at the tactical level. I developed the following research questions to guide the search for an answer:

a. What constitutes an effective doctrine?

b. What are the characteristics of a mission order?

c. Are the characteristics of mission orders included in U.S. Army doctrine?

d. Do U.S. Army officers have a common understanding of the definition of mission?

e. Do U.S. Army officers know the characteristics of mission orders as expressed in their doctrine?

f. Do U.S. Army officers think their doctrine is adequate for the formulation and communication of mission orders?

g. Do U.S. Army officers practice the use of mission orders?

h. Which of the prerequisites (command climate, standard operating procedures, mutual trust among leaders, etc.) contribute to or detract from a unit's use of mission orders?

i. Does the formal officer education system teach the use of mission orders?

These questions served as the basis of the initial literature search and support the study's problem statement: **The U.S. Army does not have an effective doctrine for the formulation and communication of mission orders at the tactical level.**

I used the review of literature to answer the supporting questions concerning the content of mission orders and whether that content was included in U.S. Army doctrine. I developed the "Mission Order Survey" to determine the answers to those supporting questions concerned with U.S. Army officers' knowledge level, experiences, and opinions.

III. Description of the Survey

This section is a detailed description of the survey, including the purposes behind each question or group of questions and the survey validation process. A copy of the survey is included as Appendix A to this thesis.

Survey questions

The first series of questions determined the demographics of the participants. Blocks 1-9A determined the branch, military rank, component, duty status, echelon of assignment, and previous military educational experience. Questions 1-4 determined the previous command and operations staff experience, additional information on the level of the participant's previous military education, assignment to or training experience at the Combat Training Centers (CTC), and degree of instructor experience, if applicable. A sample demographic question follows:

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1. Duty positions held: (Select more than one, if applicable. If not, leave blank.)
    a. Brigade Commander
    b. Battalion Commander
    c. Brigade S3
    d. Battalion XO/S3
    e. Company Commander

Figure 1

Question 5, "Which of the following is the U.S. Army's current definition of mission?," answered the supporting research question: **Do U.S. Army officers have a common understanding of the definition of mission?**

Definition choices offered were from: a. the 1984 version of FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations; b. the 1968 version of FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations; c. the 1986 version of FM 100-5, Operations; and d. the 1985 version of FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Symbols.

Questions 28 and 29 further determined the degree of common understanding about missions. Specifically, do officers differentiate between tasks (examples given were seize and retain) and types of operations (examples given were attack and defend)?

Questions 6-14 answered the supporting research question: **Do U.S. Army officers know the characteristics of mission orders as expressed in their doctrine?** These questions were designed using language from the 1986 version of FM 100-5 to describe the Army's doctrine. A sample question follows:

For questions 6-14 and using the scale below, which of the following describe the U.S. Army's command and control doctrine?

a. YES
b. NO
c. I DON'T KNOW

11. It requires subordinates to understand the intent of commanders two levels up.

Figure 2.

Questions 15-20 answered the supporting research question: **Do U.S. Army officers practice the use of mission orders?** A sample question follows:

For questions 15-20, use the scale below to indicate the degree to which mission orders were used in your last assignment.

a. Always
b. Usually
c. Now and then
d. Seldom
e. Never

19. If the situation revealed that my assigned mission would not accomplish the stated intention, I was expected to receive permission prior to changing my mission.

Figure 3.

Questions 21-26 answered the supporting research question: **Which of the prerequisites (command climate, standard operating procedures, mutual trust among leaders, etc.) contribute to or detract from a unit's use of mission orders?** The prerequisites were selected from a list compiled through the literature search and interviews. A sample question follows:

For questions 21-26, use the scale below to assess how well the following contributed to your last unit's use/non-use of mission orders.

a. Extremely good
b. Good
c. So-So
d. Poor
e. Extremely poor

21. Command climate.

Figure 4.

Questions 31 and 32 further determined what contributes to or detracts from a unit's use of mission orders. These questions asked the participant's opinion as to the competence of himself and fellow officers to use mission orders in combat.

Question 27 determined the participant's opinion concerning the primary research question: **Does the U.S. Army have an effective doctrine for the formulation and communication of mission orders at the tactical level?**

Questions 33-36 answered the supporting research question: **Does the formal officer education system teach the use of mission orders?** A sample question follows:

For questions 27-36, use the scale below to signify the level to which you agree with the correctness of each of the following statements.

a. Strongly agree
b. Agree
c. Neither agree or disagree
d. Disagree
e. Strongly disagree

35. My CGSC instruction taught the use of mission orders. (Answer only if you attended the course.)

Figure 5.

Validity

I achieved confidence in the survey by checking the survey's content and construct validity. "Validity information indicates the degree to which the test [survey] is capable of achieving certain aims."[1] Content validity "refers to the extent to which the [survey] items reflect the...behavior under study."[2] Construct validity "refers to

the theoretical construct or trait being measured."[3] A representative sample of the population (CGSC students) and experts at the tactical level (CGSC faculty and staff) checked both content and construct validity. I incorporated the results of their feedback into a revised survey which the thesis committee further reviewed for correctness and substance.

Reliability

Reliability concerns the consistency or accuracy of the measurement.[4] I used the Coefficient of Internal Consistency (split-half) technique to determine the reliability of the survey. This technique required only one administration of the survey. I conducted the technique by dividing the items of the survey in two equal parts. Upon completion, I applied the Spearman-Brown formula to the result to estimate the reliability of the complete survey.[5]

IV. Description of the Subjects

The subjects chosen to participate in the survey represented the Army officer corps responsible for the issue and receipt of mission orders at the tactical level. I chose the subject groups because of their experience levels and, with two exceptions, because of their proximity to the study's location.

The exceptions were observer/controllers (O/C) from the National Training Center (NTC) and officers from the 3rd Armored Division. I selected the NTC O/Cs because of their

daily contact with units attempting to implement army doctrine and because the NTC Operations Group agreed to assist in the survey's administration. I selected the officers from the 3rd Armored Division to gain the perspective of current practitioners and because of the division commander's interest in the study.

The characteristics of the participants resulted in the study being limited to the tactical level. For the purpose of this study the tactical level is defined as division and below. I only included those branches that represented combat arms (CBT) (Armor, Infantry, Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery, Corps of Engineer, Aviation, and Special Forces); combat support (CS) (Chemical Corps, Military Intelligence, Military Police, and Signal); and combat service support (CSS) (Finance, Ordinance, Quartermaster, and Transportation Corps).

Non-OPMD (Officer Personnel Management Division) officers were not included in the survey sample due to the nature of their duties. There was also a response option for general officers. Aviation was mistakenly left off of the survey form; however, survey administrators were directed to make verbal corrections.

The following is a listing of those who participated in the survey and their contributions based on perspectives afforded by their present or past duty positions.

1. Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC) students that had completed their basic tactics

instruction. This provided the perspective of officers that had recently completed instruction responsible for conveying the army's command and control doctrine and procedures.

I surveyed all applicable army officers in CGSOC class 89-90 student division 'B' (there were four divisions in this class). This was the largest group surveyed. I selected them because they were readily available and because they represented a good cross section of middle grade (captain-colonel) Army officers.

2. Pre-Command Course (PCC) students provided the perspective of seasoned officers enroute to battalion and brigade commands--the future senior trainers of those organizations.

3. Observer/Controllers (O/Cs) from the National Training Center (NTC) and Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) provided the perspective of those who observe many units, from platoon through division, trying to implement the doctrine on a daily basis.

4. Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS^3) instructors with previous battalion command experience. They provided the perspective of those teaching command and control doctrine while being, themselves, recent practitioners.

5. Tactical Commanders' Development Course (TCDC) instructors. These provided the perspective of those tasked

with teaching the Army's command and control doctrine to command designees attending the Pre-Command Course.

6. Selected officers serving in the 3rd Armored Division. The division commander gave permission to survey his officers during their participation in a BCTP rotation. The officers provided the perspective of a forward deployed division attempting to exercise the U.S. Army's doctrine.

V. Procedures for Collecting Data

The survey consisted of a standard package which I distributed to the participants located on Ft. Leavenworth using established distribution procedures (student boxes for CGSOC students and operations sections for the other activities located on Ft. Leavenworth). The TCDC instructors distributed surveys to the PCC students.

In the case of the NTC participants, I mailed the surveys and administrative instructions to the Plans and Operations section, Operations Group. The Operations Group is the headquarters for the O/Cs at the NTC.

In the case of the 3rd Armored Division (3AD) participants, the surveys were distributed and retrieved by the BCTP trainers during the 3AD rotation in February 1990.

The Mission Order Survey packet included the following documents:

1. Survey (Appendix A)
2. Mark Sense Form (Appendix B)
3. Letter (Appendix C)

I devised a marking system to allow me to distinguish between the different subject groups. I made a small colored mark at the top left-hand corner of each survey. The marking codes were: Blue--CGSOC, Pink--NTC, Yellow--CAS^3, Orange--BCTP, Green--PCC and TCDC instructors, and Black--3d AD.

The letter accompanying the survey requested their return by 15 March. I received a sufficient sample size by 15 March and, therefore, did not distribute follow-up letters to solicit additional responses. I have included a matrix, below, showing distribution numbers and the response rates.

NUMBER AND PERCENTAGES OF OFFICERS RESPONDING TO THE MISSION ORDER SURVEY

Subject Group	BCTP	NTC	CGSC	CAS^3	3AD	PCC	TOTAL
# Distributed	33	50	174	40	50	55	402
# Responding	31	39	104	31	11	55	271
% Responding	94	78	60	78	22	100	67

Figure 6.

VI. Procedures for Analyzing the Data

The Mission Order Survey sampled U.S. Army officers' degree of knowledge about the concept of mission orders, the degree to which mission order characteristics are expressed in Army doctrine, and the degree to which they have experienced the use of mission orders in their normal operations. The participating officers recorded their

responses on a standard CGSC Form 953 (Mark Sense)(Appendix B). A computer program arranged the responses into a data base from which I conducted my analysis.

I conducted my analysis using the Standard Package for Social Sciences, SSPSpc Information Analysis System. I cross referenced the officers' responses with their demographic data and cross referenced selected questions within the survey.

While I used scientific methodology to assist in my analysis, this was not a strictly scientific endeavor. The statistical results are merely used as indicators of officer knowledge and opinions.

Cross Reference of Questions to Demographic Data

I compared the demographic groups (branch groups-combat arms, combat support, and combat service support; military rank; level of military education; Combat Training Center experience; command and operations experience; and instructor experience) with all the survey questions.

These comparisons resulted in the following analytical groupings:

1. The demographics of officers associated with the different definitions of mission (question 5).

2. The demographics of officers who correctly/incorrectly identified the characteristics of mission orders included in U.S. Army doctrine (questions 6-14).

3. The demographics of officers who felt they had/had not experienced the use of mission orders in their last assignment (questions 15-26).

4. The demographics of officers who had similar perceptions about the effect of selected conditions on the use of mission orders in their last unit (questions 21-26).

5. The demographics of officers who felt the army's doctrine for the formulation and communication of mission orders was adequate (question 27).

6. The demographics of officers who differentiated/did not differentiate between "attack/defend" and "Seize/retain" as tasks (questions 28 and 29).

7. The demographics of officers who felt that they and the other leaders in their last unit understood mission orders and their preconditions well enough to use them in combat (questions 31 and 32).

8. The demographics of officers who felt their military education taught/did not teach the use of mission orders (questions 33-36).

Cross Reference of Selected Questions

I cross referenced the accurate responses to questions 6-14 (correct identification of mission order characteristics of mission orders in U.S. Army doctrine) with each of the other groups of questions (15-20, 21-26,27, 28 and 29, 30, 31 and 32, and 33-36). This provided the data on the following page:

1. The number who experienced the use of mission orders during their last assignment (questions 15-20).

2. Officers' perceptions as to the importance of selected conditions and their contribution to the use of mission orders in their last unit (questions 21-26).

3. Officers' perceptions as to the adequacy of U.S. Army doctrine for the formulation and communication of mission orders (question 27).

4. Whether they differentiate between "attack/defend" and "seize/retain as tasks (questions 28 and 29).

5. The degree of confidence they have in themselves and the other leaders in their last unit to use mission orders in combat (questions 31 and 32).

6. The degree to which they believe their military education has taught them the use of mission orders (questions 33-36).

Test for Significance

I conducted the Chi^2 statistical test for significance. Chi^2 allowed me to determine any significant differences in perceptions between the groups. Significance refers to the difference in sample results probably not due to chance. The differences can, therefore, be attributed to another factor.[6]

> Chi^2 is a measure of squared deviations between observed and theoretical numbers in terms of frequencies in categories or cells of a table, determining whether such deviations are due to sampling error or some interdependence or correlation among the frequencies. It involves a comparison of frequencies of two or more responding groups.[7]

END NOTES FOR CHAPTER 3

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CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

This chapter contains my analysis of data gathered through the "Mission Order Survey". I conducted the analysis to determine whether the data confirmed or denied the problem: **The U.S. Army does not have an effective doctrine for the formulation and communication of mission orders at the tactical level.**

The first step in the methodology was to determine the characteristics of mission orders and whether they were included in current (as of 1 January 1989) U.S. Army doctrine. Chapter two, "Review of Literature," discusses these characteristics and includes a review of current doctrine.

The second step of the methodology was to determine whether the doctrine was effective or useful by the FM 100-5 standard of "...uniformly known and understood."[1] This consisted of distribution of the "Mission Order Survey" and analysis of the results. This chapter is the result of my analysis. Appendix D to this thesis portrays the frequency of responses for each question of the survey.

I conducted the analysis to help determine an answer to the supporting research questions:

a. Do U.S. Army officers have a common understanding of the definition of mission?

b. Do US Army officers know the characteristics of mission orders as expressed in U.S. Army doctrine?

c. Do US Army officers think U.S. Army doctrine is adequate for the formulation and communication of mission orders?

d. Do U.S. Army officers practice the use of mission orders?

e. Which of the prerequisites (command climate, standard operating procedures, mutual trust among leaders, etc.) contribute to or detract from a unit's use of mission orders?

f. Does the formal officer education system teach the use of mission orders?

I. Survey Participant's Demographics

The following tables depict the demographics of the survey participants:

TABLE I

BRANCH GROUPS

	CBT	CS	CSS	Total
Number of Participants	207	52	12	271
Percentage of total	76	19	5	100

Table I shows that of the 271 participants in the survey, combat arms made up the majority with 76%. Combat support officers constituted 19% and combat service support 5%.

The number of combat service support officers who participated in the study was not big enough to realistically portray statistical significance. This means that differences in their answers may be due to chance, statistically. This fact notwithstanding, I included their responses in my analysis and drew some general conclusions based on their responses. Additionally, there were two responses that contained miscoded branch designations. These responses were included in the combat service support category.

Branch groups:

1) Combat Arms (CBT)

   Armor
   Aviation
   Air Defense Artillery
   Corps of Engineers
   Field Artillery
   Infantry
   Special Forces

2) Combat Support (CS)

   Chemical Corps
   Military Intelligence
   Military Police
   Signal Corps

3) Combat Service Support (CSS)

   Finance
   Ordinance
   Transportation Corps
   Quartermaster Corps

TABLE II

RANK

	COL	LTC	MAJ	CPT	TOTAL
Number of participants	7	87	127	43	269
Percentage of total	3	32	47	16	99

Missing=2

Table II shows that the largest group of participants in the survey were majors (47%). This is understandable since Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC) participants constituted the majority of the total surveyed and the majority of these students were majors.

Similar to the reasons stated above for CSS officers, statistical significance could not be assessed for differences in the colonels responses because of their

limited number. As before, their responses will be identified and general observations offered.

There were two officers who miscoded their rank responses. They account for the missing percentage in the figures presented above.

TABLE III

MILITARY EDUCATION LEVELS

	WAR COLLEGE	CGSOC	OAC	CAS³
Number of Participants	2	220	269	65
Percentage of total	<1	80	99	24

WAR=War College; CGSOC=Command and General Staff Officers Course; OAC=Officer Advance Course; CAS³= Combined Arms and Services Staff School. Missing=2

Table III shows the military education level of the participants. All of the participants were Officer Advance Course graduates (two responses were missing) and the majority (80%) were either CGSOC graduates or currently attending CGSOC.

There were relatively few graduates of CAS³. This may be because the majority of the participants in the survey were year group 78 and older. CAS³ education was not available for most of these officers and mandatory attendance began with year group 79.

There were two respondents who indicated attendance at the Army War College or its equivalent. Again, their

numbers did not allow for conclusions based on statistical significance.

Question 4 of the survey asked participants to indicate information about their military education. The question further instructed participants to indicate all responses that applied to them, allowing for multiple responses to the question. Due to limitations in the program used to scan the Mark Sense forms, only the first response was recognized by the program.

The numbers shown above, then, were extrapolated from the responses to question 4. My rationale was that CGSOC attendance requires successful attendance at an OAC and War College attendance must be preceded by successful attendance at CGSOC or an equivalent.

Eight respondents indicated they had completed CGSOC by correspondence and an additional participant had attended a CGSOC or equivalent reserve course. Further, since the majority of participants were currently attending the CGSOC resident course, their indication concerns attendance and not completion.

TABLE IV

COMBAT TRAINING CENTER (CTC) EXPERIENCE

	NTC	JRTC	CMTC	BCTP	TNG	NOEX
Number of Participants	24	1	0	45	43	156
Percentage of total	9	.4	0	17	16	58

NTC=National Training Center assignment; JRTC=Joint Readiness Training Center assignment; CMTC=Combat Maneuver Training Center assignment; BCTP=Battle Command Training Center assignment; TNG=Rotational unit training at a CTC; NOEX=No indicated CTC experience. Missing=2

Table IV shows the extent of Combat Training Center experience among participants. The table shows that the majority of respondents (58%) have no experience at all. The high incidence of participants with NTC and BCTP assignment experience results because they were specifically targeted by the survey distribution plan. The lack of participants with JRTC and CMTC assignment experience probably reflects the relatively short existence of those training centers.

The survey requested that participants with CTC training experience provide further information about their duty positions and training dates. Participation at all the CTCs was indicated and in a variety of duty positions from Brigade commander to platoon leader.

The CTC question (3) also asked for more than one answer to be annotated, if applicable. As noted above, the scanning process could not accommodate this. The numbers in table IV do not reflect anyone with assignment experience in more than one CTC or those with CTC assignment experience who also had training experience.

TABLE V

HIGHEST COMMAND OR OPERATIONAL STAFF POSITION HELD

	BDE CMD	BN CMD	BDE S3	BN XO/S3	CO CMD
# of Participants	3	9	17	148	87
% of total	1	3	6	55	33

Total responding=264 Not responding=2 Missing=5

Table V shows the command and operational staff experience of the participants. Question 1, from which I derived this data, was also a victim of the multiple response problem. The results therefore reflect the highest position achieved.

The table shows that a majority of participants have battalion S3 or XO experience (55%). These data reflect the participants targeted (majority of CGSOC majors) by the survey.

The survey also requested information concerning previous or current instructor experience (question 2) among participants. This question, too, fell victim to the scanning problem for reasons mentioned above. However, of the total number of participants, 115 (42%) indicated previous instructor experience (CGSOC, OAC, CAS^3, PCC, ROTC or other).

II. Who Knows the Characteristics of Mission Orders?

The following section addresses the supporting question: Do US Army officers know the characteristics of mission orders as expressed in U.S. Army doctrine? As mentioned above, the 1986 version of FM 100-5 says that doctrine must be commonly known and understood. Knowledge can be assessed by the ability to relate facts. Understanding, however, is concerned with application and judgement. Additionally, understanding cannot be complete without knowledge.

My methodology (survey), did not lend itself well to assessing understanding. It did allow for an assessment of knowledge about the characteristics of mission orders through the responses to questions 6-12 and 14. For my purposes then, the litmus test of "common knowledge and understanding" was determined by the participants' responses to these questions.

I divided the officers into two catagories--COMPLETE and PARTIAL KNOWLEDGE. Those officers whose answers to questions 6-12 and 14 completely agreed with U.S. Army doctrine were deemed to be completely knowledgeable. Officers were considered to be partially knowledgeable if they answered any of these questions incorrectly. Admittedly, this is an all or nothing approach, however, any attempt to weight the value of characteristics or calculate the degrees of knowledge would not be credible.

I must also note that while a solid majority of officers in all branches and all ranks could not correctly identify all of the characteristics, for each individual question, the majority of officers chose the correct answer. This points to a lack of consistent or thorough knowledge of the doctrine. The most commonly misunderstood characteristics are addressed in later tables.

Question 13 concerned the issue of mission orders as FRAGOs (fragmentary orders). It was designed to determine whether the participants placed limitations on the use of mission orders by using them only after an operations order had been issued. This is what is implied in FM 101-5 and is not in the true spirit of mission orders.[2]

While the question remained after the survey validation process, several officers expressed confusion about the nature of the question. It was, therefore, not included as a criteria for the categories described above.

TABLE VI

LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE CONCERNING THE CHARACTERISTICS OF MISSION ORDERS INCLUDED IN U.S. ARMY DOCTRINE BY BRANCH GROUP
NUMBER (PERCENT)

	COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE	PARTIAL KNOWLEDGE	TOTAL
CBT	45 (22)	160 (78)	205
CS	9 (17)	43 (83)	52
CSS	0 (0)	12 (100)	12
COMBINED	54 (20)	215 (80)	269

Missing=2

Table VI shows a comparison between officers' knowledge levels about the characteristics of mission orders included in U.S. Army command and control doctrine and branch groups. This table helps to answer the supporting research question: Do US Army officers know the characteristics of mission orders as expressed in U.S. Army doctrine?

Table VI shows that only 54 (20%) of the participants were able to meet the established criteria. The distribution of knowledge levels within the branch groups is relatively the same. Twenty-two percent (22%) of the combined arms officers and 17% of combat support officers demonstrated complete knowledge. There were no combat service support officers who demonstrated complete knowledge. As stated before, however, their numbers do not allow a statistical validation of their absence.

TABLE VII

LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE CONCERNING THE CHARACTERISTICS OF MISSION ORDERS INCLUDED IN U.S. ARMY DOCTRINE BY RANK
NUMBER (PERCENT)

	COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE	PARTIAL KNOWLEDGE	TOTAL
COL	1 (14)	6 (86)	7
LTC	13 (15)	74 (85)	87
MAJ	31 (24)	96 (76)	127
CPT	9 (20)	34 (80)	43
COMBINED	54 (21)	208 (79)	262

Missing=2

Table VII shows a comparison between officers' knowledge levels about the characteristics of mission orders included in U.S. Army command and control doctrine and rank. This table also helps to answer the supporting research question: Do U.S. Army officers know the characteristics of mission orders as expressed in U.S. Army doctrine?

The table shows that a higher percentage of majors and captains (5-10%) can correctly identify mission order characteristics than colonels and lieutenant colonels. This data may reflect that captains and majors have more recently participated in formal military instruction (OAC, CAS^3, CGSOC). CGSOC students comprised the largest group surveyed and had just completed their tactics instruction.

The analysis of data provided some additional demographic information about the officers in the COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE category. Of the 54 officers in the category, 23 (43%) had current or previous instructor experience. This is

the same percentage of instructor experience as the general population, indicating that instructor duty did not make a difference.

Combat Training Center (CTC) experience did not have an effect on the number of officers represented in the complete knowledge category either. Of the 54 officers in the category, 22 (41%) had CTC experience. The general population had 113 (42%).

From tables VI and VII we see that combat arms majors have the best grasp of mission order characteristics as portrayed in U.S. Army doctrine. We can conclude that students attending CGSOC understand the characteristics better due to their recent study of the doctrine.

TABLE VIII

COMPARISON OF RESPONSES TO: "IT IS PRIMARILY CENTRALIZED IN NATURE AND STRESSES DIRECTION FROM THE COMMANDER." BY BRANCH GROUPS NUMBER (PERCENTAGE)

	NO	YES OR I DON'T KNOW	TOTAL
CBT	132 (64)	75 (36)	207
CS	33 (63)	19 (37)	52
CSS	4 (34)	8 (66)	12
COMBINED	169 (62)	102 (38)	271

Missing=0

Table VIII shows the comparison of answers to question 6: "It is primarily centralized in nature and stresses direction from the commander." by branch groups. While a majority of the officers in combat arms and combat service support branches chose the right answer--NO, 36-37% of the officers felt the command and control system was a centralized system stressing direction from the top. Sixty-six percent (66%) of the combat service support officers felt that the system was centralized in nature.

TABLE IX

COMPARISON OF RESPONSES TO: "IT IS PRIMARILY DECENTRALIZED IN NATURE AND STRESSES INDEPENDENT ACTION BY SUBORDINATES." BY BRANCH GROUPS NUMBER (PERCENTAGE)

	YES	NO OR I DON'T KNOW	TOTAL
CBT	133 (64)	74 (36)	207
CS	31 (60)	21 (40)	52
CSS	5 (42)	7 (58)	12
COMBINED	169 (62)	102 (38)	271

Missing=0

Table IX shows that responses to question 7: "It is primarily decentralized and stresses INDEPENDENT action by subordinates," were answered in virtually the same ratio as question 6. The same general percentages answered incorrectly, with 36% of combat arms, 58% of combat support, and 38% of the total not recognizing the decentralized nature of the doctrine.

The ratio for combat service support reversed itself; however, due to their limited numbers, no statistical significance can be attributed to this change and the shift could be the product of chance. The same can be said for the limited shift among combat support officers.

TABLE X

COMPARISON OF RESPONSES TO: "IT REQUIRES A SUBORDINATE TO CHANGE HIS MISSION AND ACT IF THE SITUATION DICTATES AND COMMUNICATIONS WITH HIS SUPERIOR IS LOST." BY BRANCH GROUPS
NUMBER (PERCENTAGE)

	YES	NO OR I DON'T KNOW	TOTAL
CBT	132 (64)	75 (36)	207
CS	32 (62)	20 (38)	52
CSS	4 (34)	8 (66)	12
COMBINED	168 (62)	103 (38)	271

Missing=0

Table X shows the responses to question 14: "It requires a subordinate to change his mission and act if the situation dictates and communications with his superior is lost." by branch groups. The percentages of officers answering incorrectly are the same as seen above. Thirty-eight percent (38%) of the total do not recognize the responsibility to change their missions when the situation requires it and direction from the commander is unattainable.

The review of literature showed that mission orders were incorporated into U.S. Army doctrine to facilitate subordinate initiative and increase agility in relation to the enemy. Table X shows that 38% of the population surveyed does not understand a key characteristic of that doctrine--responsibility. This characteristic was the one most emphasized in German doctrine and by the World War II practitioners.

The review of literature highlighted a potential problem which may be reflected in the tables presented above. The doctrine's emphasis on synchronization may conflict with its emphasis on initiative. The responses to question 10, "It stresses the need for precision over action." shed some additional light on this problem. Twenty-six percent (26%) of the officers said precision was stressed more than action.

Some of the characteristic questions (6-14) received very high percentages of correct answers. Ninety-one percent (91%) said YES to question 8: "It stresses the need for centralized terminology." Participants recognized the need for standard training with 85% answering YES to question 9: "It stresses the need for standardized training."

The doctrine's emphasis on the need to express and understand intent was also understood by a clear majority of officers. Ninety-one percent (91%) of the participants answered YES to question 11: "It requires subordinates to understand the commanders intent two levels up." Additionally, 83% of the officers said YES to question 12: "It requires the commander to provide his intent in all orders."

The relatively high number of incorrect responses to questions dealing with subordinate action in the absence of orders compared to the very high recognition of the importance of intent highlights a problem. Officers recognized the importance of intent but a high percentage

did not understand its purpose or role in the order--to guide subordinate initiative in the absence of orders. This attests to the importance of the ongoing debate concerning intent.

III. How We Define Mission

TABLE XI

RESPONSES TO: "WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING IS THE U.S. ARMY'S CURRENT DEFINITION OF A MISSION?" BY BRANCH GROUP.
NUMBER (PERCENTAGE)

	CBT	CS	CSS	COMBINED
TASK AND PURPOSE	24 (12)	6 (12)	0 (0)	30 (11)
WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, AND WHY AS APPROPRIATE	34 (17)	5 (10)	3 (25)	42 (16)
WHAT NOT HOW	14 (7)	7 (13)	1 (8)	22 (8)
SPECIFY THE PRIMARY TASK BUT SELDOM SPECIFIES WHY	132 (64)	34 (65)	8 (67)	174 (65)
TOTAL	205	52	12	269

Missing=2

Table XI shows the responses to which definition of mission is current U.S. Army doctrine (question 5) by branch group and answers the supporting research question: Do U.S. Army officers have a common understanding of the definition of mission?

The majority of participants (CBT-64%, CS-65%, and CSS-67%) chose the definition in the 1985 version FM 101-5-1 Operational Terms and Graphics. Of the remaining 33% of the participants who chose other definitions, 42 (16%) chose

a definition of mission from the 1968 version of FM 100-5-1 Staff Organization and Operations. (This definition also appeared in a 1977 Approved Final Draft of this manual which was never fielded.) Of these, 34 (17% of CBT, 13% of the total) were combat arms officers.

The definition these 42 officers chose required inclusion of the why (purpose) of the mission only as appropriate. From the review of literature, we know that expression of purpose is an essential part of a mission order and serves to guide subordinate initiative.

From these data we can conclude that the majority (65%) of officers have a definition of mission that is current and supports the use of mission orders. However, 33% understand other definitions and 16% understand a definition of mission that does not fully support the needs of a doctrine specifying the use of mission orders.

TABLE XII

RESPONSES TO: "WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING IS THE U.S. ARMY'S CURRENT DEFINITION OF A MISSION?" BY KNOWLEDGE LEVELS.
NUMBER (PERCENTAGE)

	COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE	PARTIAL KNOWLEDGE	COMBINED
TASK AND PURPOSE	6 (11)	24 (11)	30 (11)
WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, AND WHY AS APPROPRIATE	4 (8)	38 (18)	42 (16)
WHAT NOT HOW	3 (6)	19 (9)	22 (7)
SPECIFY THE PRIMARY TASK BUT SELDOM SPECIFIES WHY	40 (75)	134 (62)	174 (65)
TOTAL	53	215	268

Miscoded=1 Missing=2

Table XII shows the responses to: "Which of the following is the U.S. Army's current definition of mission?" (question 5) by the levels of participant knowledge about mission orders (Table VI). The data show that officers who demonstrated a higher level of knowledge also define mission more consistently.

Officers with a better knowledge of mission orders are more consistent by 12%. Significantly, a much smaller percentage chose the definition that least supports mission orders--the 1968 definition which includes why only as appropriate. Only 8% of the officers demonstrating COMPLETE knowledge choose the 1968 definition.

IV. The Adequacy of U.S. Army Mission Order Doctrine

TABLE XIII

RESPONSES TO: "THE U.S. ARMY'S DOCTRINE IS ADEQUATE FOR THE FORMULATION AND COMMUNICATION OF MISSION ORDERS." BY KNOWLEDGE LEVELS NUMBER (PERCENTAGE)

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	NEITHER	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	TOT
COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE	8(15)	42(78)	1(2)	2(3)	1(2)	54
PARTIAL KNOWLEDGE	39(18)	133(62)	23(11)	18(8)	3(1)	216
COMBINED	47(17)	175(65)	24(9)	20(7)	4(2)	270

Miscoded=1 Missing=0

Table XIII shows the responses to question 27: "The U.S. Army doctrine is adequate for the formulation and communication of mission orders." by the participant's level of knowledge of mission order characteristics. The greatest difference in percentage of responses is between AGREE and NEITHER AGREE OR DISAGREE.

Officers with COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE of mission order characteristics (as explained earlier) have greater confidence in the doctrine's adequacy with 78%. Officers demonstrating PARTIAL KNOWLEDGE only agreed with the statement with 62%--a difference of 16%.

Only 2% of the COMPLETE group chose NEITHER while 11% of the PARTIAL group made that choice--a difference of 9%. These data indicate that officers who demonstrated only partial knowledge also have less confidence in the

doctrine's adequacy. Officers who demonstrated complete knowledge are not as ambivalent about the doctrine.

TABLE XIV

RESPONSES TO: "THE U.S. ARMY'S DOCTRINE IS ADEQUATE FOR THE FORMULATION AND COMMUNICATION OF MISSION ORDERS." BY RANK
NUMBER (PERCENTAGE)

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	NEITHER	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	TOT
COL		7(100)				7
LTC	16(18)	55(63)	7(8)	9(10)	0(0)	87
MAJ	25(20)	80(63)	11(9)	8(6)	3(2)	127
CPT	6(13)	30(70)	4(9)	2(7)	1(2)	43
COMBINED	47(18)	172(65)	23(8)	19(7)	4(2)	264

Miscoded=6 Missing=1

Table XIV shows the responses to question 27: "The U.S. Army doctrine is adequate for the formulation and communication of mission orders." by the participant's rank. The table shows an almost complete agreement among the different ranks as to the adequacy of the doctrine. Eighty-three percent (83%) of the officers agreed with the statement. The only deviation of note is that captains are not as enthusiastic in their agreement by approximately 5%.

From tables XIII and XIV we can conclude that the officers surveyed believe the doctrine is adequate for the formulation and communication of mission orders.

V. Who Uses Mission Orders?

TABLE XV

RESPONSES TO: "MY SUPERIORS ISSUED MISSION ORDERS TO ME." BY KNOWLEDGE LEVEL NUMBER (PERCENTAGE)

	ALWAYS	USUALLY	NOW & THEN	SELDOM	NEVER	TOTAL
COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE	8(15)	30(55)	8(15)	6(11)	2(4)	54
PARTIAL KNOWLEDGE	43(20)	101(47)	45(21)	17(8)	10(4)	216
COMBINED	51(19)	131(48)	53(20)	23(9)	12(4)	270

Miscoded=1 Missing=0

Table XV shows the responses to: "My superiors issued mission orders to me." (question 15) by the participant's demonstrated level of knowledge. The difference between the two groups' responses is minimal; however, those officers demonstrating complete knowledge respond less vigorously to the use of mission orders by placing more emphasis on USUALLY rather that ALWAYS (5% difference). The table shows that 33% of the participants were issued mission orders only NOW AND THEN or less often.

TABLE XVI

RESPONSES TO: "I ISSUED MISSION ORDERS TO MY SUBORDINATES." BY KNOWLEDGE LEVEL NUMBER (PERCENTAGE)

	ALWAYS	USUALLY	NOW & THEN	SELDOM	NEVER	TOTAL
COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE	8(15)	38(70)	6(11)	0(0)	2(4)	54
PARTIAL KNOWLEDGE	41(19)	119(55)	33(15)	14(7)	9(4)	216
COMBINED	49(18)	157(58)	39(15)	14(5)	11(4)	270

Miscoded=1 Missing=0

Table XVI shows the responses to: "I issued mission orders to my subordinates." (question 16) by the participant's demonstrated level of knowledge. The table shows that 85% of those officers with complete knowledge of mission orders felt they used them when issuing orders to their subordinates (at least USUALLY). Only 74% of the officers with partial knowledge felt they used mission orders at least USUALLY.

These data indicate that officers with less knowledge of mission orders use them less often (responding with ALWAYS or USUALLY 11% less than the other group). The data also shows that these officers are less committed to their use with greater percentages of use only NOW AND THEN, SELDOM, and NEVER (10% less than those with a better understanding).

TABLE XVII

RESPONSES TO: "MISSION ORDERS WERE USED IN MY UNIT TO DIRECT GARRISON OPERATIONS." BY KNOWLEDGE LEVEL NUMBER (PERCENTAGE)

	ALWAYS	USUALLY	NOW & THEN	SELDOM	NEVER	TOTAL
COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE	4(7.5)	26(48)	8(15)	12(22)	4(7.5)	54
PARTIAL KNOWLEDGE	24(11)	77(36)	54(25)	39(18)	21(10)	216
COMBINED	28(11)	103(38)	62(23)	51(19)	25(9)	269

Miscoded=2 Missing=0

Table XVII shows the responses to: "Mission orders were used in my unit to direct garrison operations." (question 17) by the participant's demonstrated level of knowledge. The data shows that officers with a better knowledge of mission orders used them more than those with partial knowledge to direct garrison operations.

Fifty-five and a half percent (55%) of the COMPLETE group selected ALWAYS and USUALLY as opposed to 46% in the other group. The PARTIAL group chose the NOW AND THEN category with the difference in percentages indicating again, that they are less committed to the use of these orders in all aspects of their operations. Fifty-one percent (51%) of the population as a whole indicated they only experienced the use of mission orders in garrison operations NOW AND THEN or less often.

Other Observations

Question 18, "I understood the intent of missions given to me." received high percentages of ALWAYS and USUALLY from both groups (Complete-94% and Partial-89%). This reinforces the earlier observation that knowledge of intent is important; however, the data from Table X, Section II, indicated a disparity in the two groups' ideas of what intent is.

Questions 19 and 20 sought to determine the level of responsibility entrusted to the participants when faced with a need to change. I wrote the questions to have opposite meanings; however, both questions received the majority of responses in the ALWAYS or USUALLY categories. The data indicates that a majority of the participants did not understand the question. The frequencies appear in Appendix D to this thesis; I will not present the data here.

This section shows that while the majority indicated they used mission orders in their last assignment, a significant percentage of the population did not share that experience. Further, the percentage of the total population that believed they issued mission orders to their subordinates is greater than those who believed they received them from their superiors.

VI. Are the Conditions Right for Mission Orders?

TABLE XVIII

RESPONSES TO: "COMMAND CLIMATE."
BY KNOWLEDGE LEVEL
NUMBER (PERCENTAGE)

	EXTR GOOD	GOOD	SO-SO	POOR	EXTR POOR	TOTAL
COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE	14(26)	23(43)	10(19)	5(9)	2(3)	54
PARTIAL KNOWLEDGE	76(35)	101(47)	20(9)	16(8)	3(1)	216
COMBINED	90(33)	124(46)	30(11)	21(8)	5(2)	270

Miscoded=1 Missing=0

Table XVIII shows how well command climate (question 21) supported the use (or non-use) of mission orders in the participant's last unit compared by his demonstrated level of knowledge about the characteristics of mission orders. The data shows that the COMPLETE group did not experience as good a command climate in their last unit as did the PARTIAL.

COMPLETE had 10% less responses in the GOOD or higher categories shifting it to the SO-SO and worse categories. The difference is not statistically significant but it may indicate that officers with better knowledge of mission orders expect more out of the command climate than other officers. The tables in section IV above demonstrated that the COMPLETE group used mission orders more than the other officers. It may follow then, that their expectations

stressed the tolerance of their superiors more and resulted in the shift seen here.

TABLE XIX

RESPONSES TO: "TRUST BETWEEN LEADERS IN THE UNIT." BY KNOWLEDGE LEVEL
NUMBER (PERCENTAGE)

	EXTR GOOD	GOOD	SO-SO	POOR	EXTR POOR	TOTAL
COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE	12(23)	27(50)	12(23)	1(2)	1(2)	53
PARTIAL KNOWLEDGE	57(26)	122(57)	23(11)	11(5)	2(1)	215
COMBINED	69(26)	149(55)	35(13)	12(5)	3(1)	268

Miscoded=2 Missing=1

Table XIX shows how well trust between leaders (question 22) supported the use (or non-use) of mission orders in the participant's last unit compared with his demonstrated level of knowledge about the characteristics of mission orders. As in table XVIII, the data shows a 10% difference in the responses of the COMPLETE and PARTIAL groups.

The COMPLETE group experienced less trust among the leaders in their last unit. As we reasoned before, when you compare this with the results indicated in section V, this is consistent. Mission orders stress the need for mutual trust among leaders. Officers who attempted to use them and expected their use by their superiors would probably be

disappointed with the level of mutual trust--especially if they worked under someone from the other group.

I compared of the responses concerning mutual trust and superior's use of mission orders. Table XV showed that 33% of the participants had superiors that issued them mission orders only NOW AND THEN or less often. Table XIX, on the other hand, showed only 19% believed mutual trust was SO-SO or worse. This seems to indicate that, for some officers, their superiors' non-use of mission orders did not effect the level of mutual trust. More likely, use of mission orders were not seen by these officers as an indicator of trust.

TABLE XX

RESPONSES TO: "COMMON LANGUAGE/ TERMINOLOGY." BY KNOWLEDGE LEVEL NUMBER (PERCENTAGE)

	EXTR GOOD	GOOD	SO-SO	POOR	EXTR POOR	TOTAL
COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE	4(8)	34(64)	10(19)	5(9)	0(0)	53
PARTIAL KNOWLEDGE	51(24)	120(56)	29(13)	15(7)	1(<1)	216
COMBINED	55(20)	154(57)	39(15)	20(7)	1(<1)	269

Miscoded=1 Missing=1

Table XX shows how well the use of common terms (question 24) supported the use (or non-use) of mission orders in the participant's last unit compared with his demonstrated level of knowledge about the characteristics of

mission orders. As has been the case in the analysis of Tables XVIII and XIX, fewer (8% less than the PARTIAL group) of the officers in the COMPLETE category believed the use of common terminology in their last unit was good..

While this again is not statistically significant, it does add to the trend already observed: officers who are knowledgeable about mission orders expect more out of the prerequisites (in this case standard terms) than officers with less knowledge. As seen in the review of literature, the German army places significant emphasis on the understanding and precision of terminology.

The review of literature also demonstrated the apparent problem the U.S. Army has with inconsistent definitions of key terms. Questions 28 and 29 provide insight to the problem. Participants were asked whether two different sets of terms (attack/defend and seize/retain) were tasks. As determined in the review of literature, the only definition for the word "task" exists in FM 25-100, Training the Force.

The responses varied widely for the two questions indicating the difference of opinions about a commonly used term. Only 69% of the participants agreed that attack and defend were tasks, while 71% agreed that seize and retain were tasks. In each case approximately 30% did not know or disagreed.

Survey question 5, definition of mission, was also designed to explore this problem. As we saw in Tables XI and XII, the participants did not agree on a single definition of mission--a term that mission orders are dependent on.

TABLE XXI

RESPONSES TO: "COMMON TRAINING BACKGROUND." BY KNOWLEDGE LEVEL
NUMBER (PERCENTAGE)

	EXTR GOOD	GOOD	SO-SO	POOR	EXTR POOR	TOTAL
COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE	4(8)	25(46)	19(35)	6(11)	0(0)	54
PARTIAL KNOWLEDGE	25(12)	111(51)	60(28)	19(9)	1(<1)	216
COMBINED	29(11)	136(50)	79(29)	25(9)	1(<1)	270

Miscoded=0 Missing=1

Table XXI shows how well a common training background (question 25) supported the use or non-use of mission orders in the participant's last unit compared to his demonstrated level of knowledge about the characteristics of mission orders. The data shows that 38% of the participants felt the level of common training background in their last unit was SO-SO at best.

The data also shows the continuing trend with the COMPLETE group having 9% worse experience with the training background in their last units. Here again, the literature review pointed out the necessity of a common out-look and understanding through training background.

Responses to questions 23 and 26 contained minimal differences in the percentages between groups; however, the data did reinforce what has been examined thusfar. Question 23 asked how well the participant's unit Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) helped or hurt the use of mission orders. Thirty-seven percent (37%) felt that their SOPs were SO-SO or worse.

Question 26 asked how common doctrinal understanding effected their unit. Fourty-six percent (46%) felt that the common understanding of doctrine in their last unit was SO-SO at best.

VII. Are Mission Orders Being Taught?

TABLE XXII

RESPONSES TO: "MY OFFICER ADVANCE COURSE TAUGHT THE USE OF MISSION ORDERS." BY KNOWLEDGE LEVEL NUMBER (PERCENTAGE)

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	NEITHER	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	TOT
COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE	2(12)	11(65)	0(0)	3(17)	1(6)	17
PARTIAL KNOWLEDGE	6(9)	32(46)	10(14)	15(22)	6(9)	69
COMBINED	8(9)	43(50)	10(12)	18(21)	7(8)	86

Miscoded=0 Missing=185

Table XXII shows the participant's perceptions as to whether their officer advance courses taught the use of mission orders (question 33) by knowledge level. Only 31% of the officers responded to this question; however, each catagory (COMPLETE/PARTIAL) was proportionally represented.

The data shows that those officers in the COMPLETE category felt more positive about their advance course instruction. Seventy-seven percent (77%) of these officers responded with either STRONGLY AGREE or AGREE. Of those officers in the PARTIAL group, only 55% felt positively about their advance course instruction.

TABLE XXIII

RESPONSES TO: "MY OFFICER ADVANCE COURSE TAUGHT THE USE OF MISSION ORDERS." BY BRANCH GROUP NUMBER (PERCENTAGE)

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	NEITHER	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	TOTAL
CBT	7(10)	33(49)	9(13)	12(18)	7(10)	68
CS		4(50)		4(50)		8
CSS	1(10)	6(60)	1(10)	2(20)		10
COMBINED	8(9)	43(50)	10(12)	18(21)	7(8)	86

Miscoded=0 Missing=185

Table XXIII shows the participant's perceptions as to whether their officer advance courses taught the use of mission orders (question 33) by branch groups. The table shows that 70% of CSS officers believe their advance courses are doing a good job of teaching mission orders. Only 59% of combat arms officers and 50% of the CS officers think their schools are doing as well.

This data goes a long way toward illustrating the nature of the Army's problem with mission orders. Fifty-nine percent (59%) of the participants believe their respective service schools are doing a good job of teaching mission orders but only 20% of them were able to correctly identify governing characteristics.

If the majority of officers see no problem, then how much attention will this subject get when competing with all the other problems the service schools are wrestling with?

This is particularly troubling when you look at the 70% approval rate for CSS schools and realize that no CSS officers are in the COMPLETE category. This problem is discussed in more detail later.

TABLE XXIV

RESPONSES TO: "MY CGSC INSTRUCTION TAUGHT THE USE OF MISSION ORDERS." BY KNOWLEDGE LEVEL NUMBER (PERCENTAGE)

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	NEITHER	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	TOT
COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE	2(17)	3(25)	0(0)	6(50)	1(8)	12
PARTIAL KNOWLEDGE	19(26)	28(38)	14(19)	10(13)	3(4)	74
COMBINED	21(24)	31(36)	14(16)	16(19)	4(5)	86

Miscoded=0 Missing=185

Table XXIV shows the participant's perceptions as to whether their CGSOC instruction taught the use of mission orders (question 35) by the level of knowledge. Again, only 31% of the officers responded to this question and the responses are not as evenly distributed between the two groups. Only 22% of the COMPLETE officers responded while 34% of the PARTIAL group responded.

The data show that only 60% of all officers believe that CGSOC taught the use of mission orders (either responded STRONGLY AGREE or AGREE). This is approximately the same overall level of confidence expressed for officer advance courses. However, while the COMPLETE group was more

positive about their advance course instruction (Table XXII) they were less positive about their CGSOC instruction by 12%.

Fifty-eight percent (58%) of the officers in the COMPLETE group felt that CGSOC did not teach mission orders (those who answered DISAGREE or STRONGLY DISAGREE). Only 17% of the other group answered negatively.

As we saw before, those with a better knowledge of mission orders probably expected more from their instruction. According to these data, the majority of the COMPLETE group felt CGSOC did not meet their expectations.

In general, a large percentage of officers (40%) did not express confidence in the Army schools' instruction of mission orders. This stands in contrast to the 82% approval rating the participants gave to the adequacy of the doctrine. These data point to the instruction and not the doctrine for problems with mission order knowledge. This is especially illustrative when you look at the COMPLETE group's perceptions of their CGSOC instruction. Only 42% of this group felt that CGSOC taught them mission orders.

We saw before that approximately 30% of the officers said their superiors were not using mission orders in their last assignment. When this is combined with the discussion above, we see that as much as a third (1/3) of the participants were potentially not taught the use of mission orders in their unit nor in their formal instruction.

The data for questions 34 (CAS[3]) and 36 (PCC) was not analyzed due to problems with the data. The frequencies are included in Appendix D to this thesis.

VIII. Perceptions versus Reality

TABLE XXV

RESPONSES TO: "I FEEL I UNDERSTAND MISSION ORDERS AND THEIR PRECONDITIONS SUFFICIENTLY ENOUGH TO USE THEM IN COMBAT." BY KNOWLEDGE LEVEL
NUMBER (PERCENTAGE)

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	NEITHER	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	TOT
COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE	9(17)	27(51)	10(19)	7(13)	0(0)	53
PARTIAL KNOWLEDGE	45(21)	112(52)	28(13)	25(12)	4(3)	214
COMBINED	54(20)	139(52)	38(14)	32(12)	4(2)	267

Miscoded=0 Missing=4

Table XXV shows the responses to "I feel I understand mission orders and their preconditions sufficiently enough to use them in combat." (question 31) by knowledge levels. The responses between the two groups are fairly consistent, with the COMPLETE group responding slightly less positively (5% less responding STRONGLY AGREE or AGREE). This difference is added to the NEITHER AGREE OR DISAGREE response.

Seventy-two percent (72%) of all officers felt they understand mission orders. Twenty-eight percent (28%) are

unsure or feel they do not know. This is the same basic percentage that indicated they did not experience the use of mission orders in their last assignment and did not have confidence in their formal military education.

By identifying the participants' knowledge levels about mission orders and then asking their perceptions of their own understanding, we can compare perception to reality. Table XXVI, on the following page, is a reconfiguration of the data contained in table XXV.

TABLE XXVI

OFFICERS PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF MISSION ORDERS BY ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE LEVELS
NUMBER (PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL)

		REAL	
		COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE	PARTIAL KNOWLEDGE
PERCEIVED	I UNDERSTAND MISSION ORDERS	36 (14%)	157 (59%)
	I DO NOT UNDERSTAND MISSION ORDERS	17 (6%)	57 (21%)

TOTAL=267 MISSING=4

Table XXVI shows the surveyed officers' perceptions about their understanding of mission orders (question 31) by their demonstrated knowledge of mission orders (questions 6-12 and 14). For this table, those officers who responded to question 31 with either STRONGLY AGREE or AGREE perceive themselves as understanding mission orders. Those who answered with any other answer do not have confidence in their understanding of mission orders.

The data shows that 14% of the officers know mission orders and have confidence in their understanding. Six percent (6%) of the officers know mission orders but are not confident of their understanding. Twenty-one percent (21%) of the officers have limited knowledge and recognize their lack of understanding. Finally, 59% of the officers surveyed have a limited knowledge of mission orders but believe they understand them sufficiently to use them in combat.

The last group discussed above presents a considerable problem for improving the Army's doctrine for and use of mission orders. These 59% of current and future leaders can only partially train their subordinates or students. The people who work for these officers will not receive a complete understanding of mission orders and may well misunderstand some of the crucial characteristics.

You will remember from the earlier discussion, that 59% of the officers also felt mission orders were being taught in the schools. These officers may not, therefore, understand the need to revise command and control doctrine as needed or understand the need for further study and debate about the use of mission orders. Because they are in the majority and perceive they understand the problem, it will take additional effort to make them aware of the extent of the problem.

TABLE XXVII

RESPONSES TO: "I FEEL THAT THE LEADERS IN THE LAST UNIT I SERVED IN, UNDERSTOOD MISSION ORDERS AND THEIR PRECONDITIONS SUFFICIENTLY ENOUGH TO USE THEM IN COMBAT." BY KNOWLEDGE LEVEL
NUMBER (PERCENTAGE)

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	NEITHER	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	TOT
COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE	5(10)	20(38)	13(25)	12(23)	2(3)	52
PARTIAL KNOWLEDGE	18(9)	79(38)	40(19)	59(28)	13(6)	209
COMBINED	23(9)	99(38)	53(20)	71(27)	15(6)	261

Miscoded=0 Missing=10

Table XXVII shows the surveyed officers' perceptions about other leaders' understanding of mission orders (question 32) by their own demonstrated knowledge level (questions 6-12 and 14). The data show that officers in the COMPLETE category are more unsure about the level of understanding of others. These officers responded with 8% less DISAGREE and STRONGLY DISAGREE and 7% more NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE than the PARTIAL group.

When we compare the results of Tables XXVI and XXVII we see that 72% of the officers have confidence in their own understanding while only 47% have the same confidence in their fellow leaders. This, again, brings into question the responses seen in Table XIX concerning trust between leaders in the last unit. That table shows that 81% of the officers thought mutual trust was EXTREMELY GOOD or GOOD. The trust they felt existed must not have extended to their mutual ability to use mission orders in combat.

IX. The Test for Significance

I conducted the Chi^2 test for significance for each comparison shown in the preceding tables. There was not any appreciable statistical significance found to exist. This means that only very low statistical significance can be given to the differences between responses. This does not, however, diminish the importance of the observations made herein.

The primary question this study sought to answer was: "Does the U.S. Army have an effective doctrine for the formulation and communication of mission orders?" The litmus test was to hold the officers up against FM 100-5's requirement for doctrine to be "...commonly known and understood." The data presented above addressed to what degree this was true for the officers surveyed.

END NOTES FOR CHAPTER 4

[1] U.S. Army, FM 100-5--Operations (1986): 6.

[2] U.S. Army, FM 101-5--Staff Organization and Operations (1984): 7-2.

CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Summary

The purpose of this study was to determine whether the U.S. Army has an effective doctrine for the formulation and communication of mission orders at the tactical level. The determination could not rest solely on a content analysis of the literature since the mere presence of verbiage would not meet the criteria for effectiveness found within the doctrine itself.

The Army's capstone doctrinal manual, FM 100-5, Operations, states that doctrine must be commonly known and understood for it to be useful. Judgement as to the doctrine's effectiveness, therefore, had to result from a survey of its practitioners.

I determined the characteristics of mission orders and the conditions that must exist for their use through a review of existing literature. I also conducted a series of interviews of subject matter experts having both significant academic and practical experience.

Armed with an understanding of mission orders I set out to determine whether the U.S. Army's version was effective. I developed, distributed, and analyzed results of

the "Mission Order Survey" to determine whether a chosen sample of the officer corps knew and practiced the doctrine.

Importance of the Study

This study indicated that U.S. Army officers lack sufficient knowledge about mission orders--a key concept key of AirLand Battle doctrine. It further showed that a majority of the officers (59%) thought they understood mission orders when they did not. These results are key to any assessment of the level of doctrinal knowledge of Army officers or an assessment of the acceptance of AirLand Battle doctrine.

II. Conclusions

The U.S. Army does not have an effective doctrine for the formulation and communication of mission orders at the tactical level. The results of this study showed that the original problem statement was true. While the doctrinal genesis exists for mission orders, it is not known and, by inference, not understood. By the doctrine's own criteria, then, it is not effective.

A full appreciation can be gained of the conclusion above by reviewing the study's research questions and the supporting conclusions that answer them.

1. Are the characteristics of mission orders included in U.S. Army doctrine? Yes, based on a review of current U.S. Army doctrine and the German doctrine and practices from which it took its lead. FM 100-5 stresses the chaotic

nature of warfare and the resultant need for decentralized command and control. The primary characteristic of a mission order is its expression of the purpose to be achieved.

AirLand Battle doctrine is characterized by four basic tenets--Synchronization, Depth, Initiative, and Agility. A common theme through these tenets is an expression and understanding of purpose. It is the knowledge of purpose that allows initiative to be intelligently exploited. This exploitation results in a force that is more agile than the enemy. Knowledge of purpose also extends the depth of the battlefield in terms of time, as time is expanded when decisions are being made at all levels.

Synchronization, with all its current fascination and study, also depends on a knowledge of purpose. While the quest for synchronization has placed a premium on precision, FM 100-5 says synchronization is, in part, an arrangement of battlefield activities in terms of purpose.' A comment from the survey read, "The term synchronization is being misunderstood....the purpose of opns [sic] (result) is rarely expressed in mission statements so that synchronized opns [sic] are only partially ensured."

The other characteristics, as outlined in chapter two, are contained in the doctrine. They permeate every topic. One shortfall is that the doctrine does not lay-out the characteristics in any one place. A second shortfall, and the most important, is addressed by the following question.

2. Do U.S. Army officers have a common understanding of the definition of mission? No. From analysis of the survey results we saw that a simple majority of officers agreed on a definition of mission that is supportive of mission orders. However, 35% of those surveyed differed with the majority. Sixteen percent (16%) chose a definition of mission that does not support mission orders. A survey comment from an National Training Center (NTC) Observer/Controller is illustrative, "In two years of observing combat operations at the NTC, I have discovered that only about 5% of mission statements are written correctly (task [and] purpose)."

We cannot say precisely how many officers must agree on a definition before it can be said to be commonly understood; but it must surely be more than a simple majority. Especially since the mission is the heart of a mission order.

3. Do U.S. Army officers know the characteristics of mission orders as expressed in their doctrine? Clearly the answer is no. Only 20% of those surveyed were able to correctly identify all of the characteristics presented. Again, I concede that my standards for this finding were strict. For a concept so integral to our concept of warfighting, it is difficult to be otherwise.

This is especially damning when we recall the experience levels of the survey participants. They were middle grade officers, many of whom had recently completed

their CGSOC tactics instruction. Many of the participants were, themselves, responsible for teaching the command and control process.

4. Do U.S. Army officers think their doctrine is adequate for the formulation and communication of mission orders? As we saw in the analysis--yes. The perception is that the doctrine is adequate and this perception is borne out by my review of the doctrine. Can it be improved? Yes--and it should be improved (see recommendations, below).

5. Do U.S. Army officers practice the use of mission orders? The perception of the majority is yes; however, much of this must be discounted since as many as 80% did not demonstrate complete knowledge of the characteristics. Notable here also were the admitted perceptions that, while they themselves used mission orders, their superiors did so to a lesser extent. Additionally, not even a majority indicated they used mission orders for everyday garrison operations.

6. Which of the prerequisites (command climate, standard operating procedures, mutual trust among leaders, etc.) contribute to or detract from a unit's use of mission orders? From the officers' responses, the conditions would seem to be good for the use of mission orders. Preconditions receiving high marks were mutual trust, command climate, and common use of terms.

It must be remembered, however, that there was an important trend displayed by those officers who demonstrated

a more complete knowledge. They consistently marked these questions with less enthusiasm. I hypothesized in chapter four that this may be due to higher expectations of these conditions by these officers, due to their knowledge of mission orders.

Two preconditions stood out as being questionable--common training background and unit Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Both of these are critical. The lack of a common training background brings to question the high marks that mutual trust received. As the Germans stressed, this common background is essential for true confidence and trust.

The lack of confidence in SOPs raises equally important questions. Richard Simpkin, in his book Race to the Swift, writes:

> In sum, SOPs must provide a framework of discipline within which the trained mind can safely roam free. Their purpose is not to restrict human judgement, but to free it for the tasks only it can perform; not to exclude it from the primary control loop, but to sustain it there.[2]

Simpkin goes on to say that SOPs are key to decentralized command. They allow you to operate without detailed orders and help provide the unity of thinking required. The importance of SOPs to the use of mission orders was also addressed by COL William West, Director of the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS^3) and former Commander of Operations Group at the National Training Center (NTC).

Based on his observations of units training at the NTC, COL West expressed the opinion that battalion SOPs should be prepared at division level. This would facilitate division-wide use of common procedures and streamline the interaction of units.[3]

Therefore, the low opinions expressed for common training background and SOPs is significant. These are conditions that must exist at a high level to maximize operations using mission orders. Again, while it is difficult to quantify these things, we must say that, in the aggregate, we are deficient.

7. Does the formal officer education system teach the use of mission orders? Here again, the majority of officers responded favorably. Officer advance courses received a favorable response from 72% of those answering. Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC) trailed with a 60% favorable rating.

Again, notwithstanding the problem of quantifying this, 28-40% of the officers were ambivalent or worse. Many of these officers were fresh out of their tactics instruction at CGSOC. A fellow combined arms officer and CGSOC student's comment was telling: "If you wanted information about five-paragraph-field-orders why didn't you just say so? The stuff about mission orders really threw me off." He saw the problem of mission orders as concerned with format as opposed to content.

Other General Conclusions

The U.S. Army Training Board study that stirred my initial interest, placed a lot of emphasis on the degree of detail seen in training orders. After my research, I found it hard to quantify what was too much detail in an order. Suffice it to say, however, that excess detail is in the eye of the beholder, to a certain extent.

It was clear in both the German doctrine and our own that orders must convey sufficient control measures to achieve cooperation among the participants. There is no published limit. It is popular to show the famous mission that GEN Eisenhower received to invade the continent of Europe and destroy the Germans' ability to resist. It is also popular to show representative copies of German orders from the past or present. These are almost always taken out of context or used to make a point at a level totally out of proportion to the level being emphasized.

Orders at the very highest levels (theater, army, etc.) are broad, by necessity, if for no other reasons than the relatively self-contained nature of organizations and types of missions at those levels. Orders taken from an ongoing operation seldom take into account the information already known or the length of common service among commanders.

This is not to argue that the level of detail in current training orders is acceptable. From my study and personal observations we have too much of the wrong kind of

detail. However, the emphasis on length or detail detracts from the more important aspects of the order. I fear the emphasis is on form and not content. A primary example of this is expression of purpose, or lack thereof.

There was also concern about the level of detail observed in training unit orders at the NTC. The environment of the NTC focuses on results. If a unit is unable to coordinate its actions through use of commonly known procedures, they must compensate with instructions in their orders. If common coordinating measures are not understood, they must be spelled out to assure cooperation.

LTC Hensel, the German exchange tactics instructor at CGSC, said that many American officers he has talked to have a misconception about the type of freedom German officers have when operating. He said the popular conception is that each unit establishes the procedures it feels are appropriate. This is not so.

The procedures are laid out in detail for everyone and expected to be followed. This provides the freedom to concentrate your attention at a higher level.[4] Thus, he echoed the sentiments expressed in the Simpkin quote, above.

Another general conclusion concerns what COL Carl Ernst, Director of the Battle Command Training Program, calls the moral responsibility to act.[5] This is also a theme frequently repeated by German practitioners. It is the obligation to act. It is not an option.

The responses to question 14 of the survey were particularly disappointing. Question 14 dealt with responsibility as a characteristic of mission orders. The participant was asked if the doctrine expects him to change his mission and act if the situation had changed and communication with his superior was lost. Thirty-eight percent (38%) did not know or felt that our doctrine did not expect this.

This is fundamental to AirLand Battle doctrine and the reason for mission orders. All the platitudes about audacity, boldness, mutual trust, and confidence must be questioned if this fundamental is not known or understood.

LTC Hensel said that German training exercises frequently feature giving a subordinate a task that, by design, will not achieve the stated purpose. These training exercises force the leaders to grapple with the limits on their initiative (self imposed or external). Our own FM 100-5 directs us to do likewise by forcing our subordinates to exercise their initiative during training.[4]

The last general conclusion deals with the perception versus reality table from chapter four. It revealed that 59% of the officers participating in the survey believed they understood mission orders well enough to use them in combat but could not demonstrate the knowledge level to support it.

This means that a very influential part of the officer corps will not consider this a problem. By their responses, they understand mission orders, the doctrine is

adequate, and the schools are doing a good job. Why should it deserve any of their attention when their plate is too full already?

In the main, these officers are the most successful middle grade officers in the Army. This is true either by virtue of their selection for advanced schooling, command, or appointment to positions of important trust--instructing others. These will be the officers who teach the next generation. We must make them aware of the problem and educate them in the use of mission orders.

III. Implications

There were two major implications that resulted from this study:

1. The survey participants' lack of knowledge concerning mission orders may imply a more general lack of doctrinal knowledge. Since the use of mission orders depends on a common knowledge and understanding of doctrine, this is, potentially, a fatal flaw. This failing has been addressed in Combat Training Center lessons learned and deserves additional investigation. (See recommendations, below.)

2. For the most part, the survey participants had either recently completed instruction concerning the Army's command and control philosophy or are responsible to teach it themselves. This implies that their level of knowledge

may have been greater than the general population of officers. The results of the "Mission Order Survey" may not accurately reflect the officer corps' knowledge level. The general population may be worse.

IV. Recommendations

The following recommendations resulted from this study:

1. Those responsible for the development of the U.S. Army's doctrine need to reassess the importance of a decentralized command and control philosophy to the success of AirLand Battle doctrine. If it is an integral part, as I have argued here, then it must be more clearly addressed in future versions of doctrinal manuals.

Two supporting doctrinal manuals deserve special attention. FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, is the Army's source for command and control doctrine (after FM 100-5) and for procedure. As pointed out in the review of literature, it only mentions mission orders once and in an off-hand way. This manual is where specifics must be expressed. Other than a good basis for understanding what are a mission's component parts, it is not much help. The examples of orders in appendices are poor in that they do not illustrate the earlier verbiage on mission. (These example orders are also lengthy, possibly compounding the problem with detail.)

The second manual, FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Symbols, is not precise or complete enough to support mission orders. The key term "task" is not defined at all. Terms that describe tasks (seize, clear, fix, etc.) are only loosely defined. The definitions are often so similar they appear to be interchangeable. Everyday terms like "destroy" and "defeat" are not defined at all. My tactics instructor was forced to publish a list of key terms and their definitions for our use in the classroom. If, as he liked to say, "Words are weapons!" we have defective ammunition.

To illustrate the importance of precise terminology to the German system, LTC Hensel described two German terms for tasks. Erreichen--to reach and nehmen--to take. Each has a unique definition describing the result to be obtained, conveying information about the potential enemy situation and, thereby, guidance for your own level of security.

2. This study has provided an indication of a potential Army-wide problem. Therefore, the methodology presented in this thesis should be repeated for the following subject groups: non-commissioned officers, combat service support officers, and the United States Marine Corps.

The participants in the "Mission Order Survey" were all officers. It did not, therefore, include a sizable and important sector of Army leaders--non-commissioned officers. To be thoroughly effective, mission orders must be known and

understood at all levels. Future researchers should make an assessment of the Army's non-commissioned officers' knowledge of mission orders. Further, the Non-commissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) should be evaluated for its ability to teach mission orders.

Combat Service Support (CSS) officers demonstrated a problem with knowledge about mission orders. However, the percentage of CSS officers that participated in the "Mission Order Survey" was not representative of CSS officers in the Army. Additionally, their numbers did not allow me to determine the statistical significance of their responses. Future researchers should replicate this study focusing on CSS officers to accurately determine the knowledge level of those officers. Such a study would allow a more detailed indication of which branches do not know or understand mission orders.

In accordance with the above recommendation, each branch school should replicate this study on a larger scale focusing on leaders in that branch. This would provide a more accurate picture of the level of mission order knowledge within the branch and a more detailed picture of where weak links exist (specific school instruction, specific ranks, types of units, etc.).

With the publishing of Marine Corps Fleet Marine Field Manual 1, the Marine Corps also adopted the use of a decentralized command and control doctrine and mission

orders. The Marines should replicate this study to determine the level of mission order knowledge among their leaders.

This study indicated that the U.S. Army's decentralized command and control philosophy is not adequately taught in Army schools or reinforced in unit training. Since it is an integral part of how the Army intends to fight, it must be emphasized and integrated into all aspects of training. Particular emphasis is needed in the areas of training philosophy and management, tactics, and leadership.

This education must begin with precommissioning training. Since the survey demonstrated a lack of knowledge at all grades, all Army schools must reinforce the knowledge of the Army's command and control system and mission orders.

4. The survey results showed that 38% of the officers did not know they were responsible to change their mission in accordance with the situation. This reflects a lack of understanding of intent (even though the survey participants recognized the importance of intent).

Training exercises, both in the Army school system and in units, must require subordinates to analyze the situation and make independent decisions based on their understanding of the mission and the situation. The nature of these training exercises should be similar to those mentioned earlier from my interview with LTC Hensel.

5. This thesis focused on the German Army's practice of mission orders. Their history of mission order use has

not extended into the technologically advanced age of combat; it has only been used in training. Future researchers should determine what effect technological advances have had on the use of mission orders in combat. A study of the Israeli Army's experience with mission orders might reveal modern limitations or concerns that may need to be reflected in our Army's techniques and procedures.

6. Finally, the greatest obstacle to improving the Army's knowledge of mission orders is the 59% who do not know the doctrine, but think they do. The Army must not take the existing doctrine and the level of its comprehension for granted. Those responsible for educating the Army in the use of mission orders (educators and commanders) should administer diagnostic tests that more accurately measure knowledge and understanding. These tests should serve as the basis for renewed emphasis in units, branch school instruction, and the Combat Training Centers. An acknowledgement of the problem is the first step toward its solution.

END NOTES FOR CHAPTER 5

[1] U.S. Army, FM 100-5--Operations, (1986): 17.

[2] Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare, (1985): 239

[3] William A. West, COL, USA, from an interview conducted by the author, 13 March 1990.

[4] Klaus Hensel, LTC, Bundeswehr, from an interview conducted by the author, 17 January 1990.

[5] Carl Ernst, COL, USA, from an interview conducted by the author, 5 March 1990.

[6] FM 100-5: 7 and LTC Hensel interview.

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APPENDIX A

MISSION ORDERS SURVEY

Command and General Staff College
Master of Military Arts and Science Program

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

Telephone: AV 552-3320
Commercial: (913) 684-3320

POC: MAJ John D. Johnson
Dr. Ernest G. Lowden

January 1990

INSTRUCTIONS

1. **Use the enclosed mark sense form** (CGSC Form 953, 1 Apr. 86) to indicate your responses.

2. **Use only a number 2 pencil** and completely fill-in each oval that contains the letter you select as an answer. If you change an answer, be sure to erase your initial response completely.

3. **Select only one response** unless otherwise instructed. Be sure to answer all questions.

4. **All information will be kept confidential**. Results will be presented only in summary form. The last four digits of your social security number will be used only to distinguish between participants for the purpose of computer assisted scoring. (Please note and read the Privacy Act Statement on the mark sense form.)

(GO TO NEXT PAGE)

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Block 1 (serial number): Write the last four digits of your social security number in the vertical row of empty boxes in block #1. Fill in the corresponding ovals to the right of each block.

Block 2 (Branch): In the empty boxes provided write the appropriate two-letter abbreviation for your basic branch using the top box for the first letter and the bottom row for the second letter.

Branches and their two-letter abbreviations

Air Defense Artillery - AD	Military Police - MP
Armor - AR	Ordnance - OD
Chemical - CM	Quartermaster - QM
Corps of Engineers - EN	Signal - SC
Field Artillery - FA	Special Forces - SF
Infantry - IN	Transportation Corps - TC
Military Intelligence - MI	General Officer - NO

Block 3 (Rank): Fill in the oval below your rank.

Block 4 and 5 (Component and Duty Status): Leave blank.

Block 6 (Echelon of Assignment): Mark the highest level of staff or command assignment to date.

Block 7A,B,and C (CAS^3 Data): Fill in the ovals that correspond to the appropriate answers.

Block 8A and B (CGSOC Data): Fill in the ovals that correspond to the appropriate answers. Answer **YES** if you attended CGSC (resident or non-resident), Completed CGSC by correspondence, or attended any CGSC equivalent.

Block 9A and B (PCC Data): Fill in the ovals that correspond to the appropriate answers.

(GO TO NEXT PAGE)

SURVEY

********PLEASE MARK THE MOST APPROPRIATE RESPONSE(S)*******

1. Duty positions held: (Select more than one, if applicable. If not, leave blank.)
   a. Brigade Commander
   b. Battalion Commander
   c. Brigade S3
   d. Battalion XO and/or S3
   e. Company Commander

2. Instructor Duty: (Select more than one, if applicable. If not applicable, leave blank.)
   a. Command and General Staff College
   b. Officers Advance Course
   c. Combined Arms and Services Staff School
   d. Pre-Command Course
   e. ROTC or Service Academy

   List others here_____.

3. Duty at the Combat Training Centers: (Select more than one, if applicable. If not applicable, leave blank.)
   a. Assignment to the National Training Center (NTC)
   b. Assignment to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)
   c. Assignment to the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC)
   d. Assignment to the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP)
   e. Player during a training rotation.

      Which CTC?_____ Year/Month?_____

      Duty Position during the rotation?_____

4. Schools attended:
   (Select each that has been attended. If not applicable, leave blank.)
   a. Army War College or equivalent
   b. Command and General Staff College or equivalent (resident)
   c. Command and General Staff College (Correspondence)
   d. Command and General Staff College (Reserve School)
   e. Officer Advance Course

(GO TO NEXT PAGE)

THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS PERTAIN TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF AND EXPERIENCE WITH MISSION ORDERS AND THE ARMY'S COMMAND AND CONTROL DOCTRINE

****

5. Which of the following is the U.S. Army's current definition of a **mission**? (Select one answer.)

a. Missions specify the task(s) to be accomplished by the command and the purpose to be achieved.

b. Missions specify Who, What, When, Where, and Why as appropriate.

c. Missions specify what must be done without prescribing how it must be done.

d. Missions specify the primary task assigned; it usually contains the elements of Who, What, When, Where, and the reason therefor, but seldom specifies how.

For questions 6-14 and using the scale below, which of the following describe the U.S. Army's command and control doctrine?

****

a. YES
b. NO
c. I DON'T KNOW

6. It is primarily centralized in nature and stresses direction from the commander.

7. It is primarily decentralized in nature and stresses independent action by subordinates.

8. It stresses the need for standardized terminology.

9. It stresses the need for standardized training.

10. It stresses the need for precision over action.

11. It requires subordinates to understand the intent of commanders two levels up.

12. It requires the commander to provide his intent in all orders.

13. It allows for the issue of mission orders as a type of fragmentary order (FRAGO) after an operations order has been issued.

14. It requires a subordinate to change his mission and act if the situation dictates and communications with his superior is lost.

****
For questions 15-20, use the scale below to indicate the degree to which mission orders were used in your last assignment.
****

a. Always
b. Usually
c. Now and then
d. Seldom
e. Never

15. My superiors issued mission orders to me.

16. I issued mission orders to my subordinates.

17. Mission orders were used in my unit to direct garrison operations.

18. I understood the intent of missions given to me.

19. If the situation revealed that my assigned mission would not accomplish the stated intention, I was expected to receive permission prior to changing my mission.

20. If the situation revealed that my assigned mission would not accomplish the stated intention, I was expected to make necessary changes whether approval could be gained or not.

****
For questions 21-26, use the scale below to assess how well the following contributed to your last unit's use/non-use of mission orders.
****

a. Extremely good
b. Good
c. So-So
d. Poor
e. Extremely poor

21. Command climate.

22. Trust between leaders in the unit.

23. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).

24. Common language/terminology.

25. Common training background.

26. Common understanding of doctrine.

****

For questions 27-36, use the scale below to signify the level to which you agree with the correctness of each of the following statements.

****

a. Strongly agree
b. Agree
c. Neither agree nor disagree
d. Disagree
e. Strongly disagree

27. The U.S. Army's doctrine is adequate for the formulation and communication of mission orders.

28. "Attack" and "defend" are examples of tactical tasks.

29. "Seize" and "retain" are examples of tactical tasks.

30. Mission orders must include the mission of the issuing unit, subordinate units, and the next higher command.

31. I feel I understand mission orders and their preconditions sufficiently enough to use them in combat.

32. I feel that the leaders in the last unit I served in, understood mission orders and their preconditions enough to use them in combat.

33. My officer advance course taught the use of mission orders. (Answer only if you attended the course.)

34. My CAS³ instruction taught the use of mission orders. (Answer only if you attended the course.)

35. My CGSC instruction taught the use of mission orders. (Answer only if you attended the course.)

36. My PCC instruction taught the use of mission orders. (Answer only if you attended the course.)

PLEASE INCLUDE ANY ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON THE REVERSE OF THE LAST PAGE OF THE SURVEY.

YOU HAVE COMPLETED THE MISSION ORDER SURVEY
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION!!!

Please return all survey materials (questionnaire and mark sense form) in accordance with the instructions in the cover letter. **Please do not fold the CGSC Form 953 (Mark Sense Form).**

APPENDIX B

HQ, U.S. ARMY
COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

SURVEY RESPONSE FORM



1. SERIAL NUMBER
GRADUATE

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: Title 5, 10 US Code, Section 3012

PURPOSE: To obtain attitudes and opinions from persons responding to CGSC external evaluation surveys.

ROUTINE USE: The portion of the SSN provided will be used to compare data between selected respondent interview / survey answers. Demographic information provided will be used to categorize attitudinal responses which are solicited to ascertain respondent attitudes about the effectiveness of CGSC instruction and doctrinal products.

DISCLOSURE AND EFFECT: Participation in this survey is strictly VOLUNTARY. Respondents are encouraged to provide complete and accurate information, but are not required to answer any questions considered objectionable. Identifying data included in the questionnaire will be used only for statistical purposes. Answers will be held in strict confidence with no personal attribution. If all requested data is not provided, individual responses may not be used.

2. BRANCH

3. RANK

FLAG	COL	LTC	MAJ	CPT	INCO	CIV

4. COMPONENT

RA	USAR	ARNG	CIV

5. ACTIVE DUTY?

YES	NO

6. ECHELON OF ASSIGNMENT

JCS		CORPS		MACOM	
JOINT		DIV		CONUSA	
COMBINED		BDE		STARC	
HQDA		REGT		MUSARC	
SCHOOL/TR		BN		INSTLL	

7. CAS3 DATA

7A. DID YOU ATTEND?

YES	NO

7B. CLASS NUMBER

7C. GRADUATION DATE

8. CGSOC DATA

8A. DID YOU ATTEND?

YES	NO

8B. GRADUATION YEAR

9. PCC DATA

9A. DID YOU ATTEND?

YES	NO

9B. GRADUATION DATE

CGSC FORM 953 (1 Apr 86)

SURVEY RESPONSES

1	A	B	C	D	E	41	A	B	C	D	E
2	A	B	C	D	E	42	A	B	C	D	E
3	A	B	C	D	E	43	A	B	C	D	E
4	A	B	C	D	E	44	A	B	C	D	E
5	A	B	C	D	E	45	A	B	C	D	E
6	A	B	C	D	E	46	A	B	C	D	E
7	A	B	C	D	E	47	A	B	C	D	E
8	A	B	C	D	E	48	A	B	C	D	E
9	A	B	C	D	E	49	A	B	C	D	E
10	A	B	C	D	E	50	A	B	C	D	E
11	A	B	C	D	E	51	A	B	C	D	E
12	A	B	C	D	E	52	A	B	C	D	E
13	A	B	C	D	E	53	A	B	C	D	E
14	A	B	C	D	E	54	A	B	C	D	E
15	A	B	C	D	E	55	A	B	C	D	E
16	A	B	C	D	E	56	A	B	C	D	E
17	A	B	C	D	E	57	A	B	C	D	E
18	A	B	C	D	E	58	A	B	C	D	E
19	A	B	C	D	E	59	A	B	C	D	E
20	A	B	C	D	E	60	A	B	C	D	E
21	A	B	C	D	E	61	A	B	C	D	E
22	A	B	C	D	E	62	A	B	C	D	E
23	A	B	C	D	E	63	A	B	C	D	E
24	A	B	C	D	E	64	A	B	C	D	E
25	A	B	C	D	E	65	A	B	C	D	E
26	A	B	C	D	E	66	A	B	C	D	E
27	A	B	C	D	E	67	A	B	C	D	E
28	A	B	C	D	E	68	A	B	C	D	E
29	A	B	C	D	E	69	A	B	C	D	E
30	A	B	C	D	E	70	A	B	C	D	E
31	A	B	C	D	E	71	A	B	C	D	E
32	A	B	C	D	E	72	A	B	C	D	E
33	A	B	C	D	E	73	A	B	C	D	E
34	A	B	C	D	E	74	A	B	C	D	E
35	A	B	C	D	E	75	A	B	C	D	E
36	A	B	C	D	E	76	A	B	C	D	E
37	A	B	C	D	E	77	A	B	C	D	E
38	A	B	C	D	E	78	A	B	C	D	E
39	A	B	C	D	E	79	A	B	C	D	E
40	A	B	C	D	E	80	A	B	C	D	E

APPENDIX C

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U S ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH KANSAS 66027 6900

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

January 23, 1990

Combined Arms and Services Staff School

Dear Fellow Officer:

Attached is a student-developed survey for use in the Command and General Staff College Masters of Military Arts and Science (MMAS) Program. The purpose of the survey is to determine the perceptions of successful officers about the use of mission orders in the United States Army. The data will allow comparison of your responses with other officers to help determine the level of understanding about mission orders in our army. Analysis of the data will also help determine the adequacy of the doctrine for mission orders.

This is an opportunity for you to express your opinions concerning a concept key to our command and control doctrine. The data obtained from this survey will not be attributed to you personally. All data reported as a result of this survey will be presented in summary form. Your input is vital to the success of this survey and will assist in the revision of our command and control doctrine.

Please complete the survey and return all materials to the survey administrator.

Thank you for your support.

Sincerely,

William A. West
Colonel, Armor
Director

Attachments:
Mission Order Survey
CGSC Form 953 (Mark Sense)

APPENDIX D

APPENDIX D

FREQUENCY SUMMARY FOR MISSION ORDER SURVEY

(#=Frequency of response; %=percent of 271)

1. Duty positions held:		
a. Brigade Commander	3	1%
b. Battalion Commander	9	3%
c. Brigade S3	17	6%
d. Battalion XO and/or S3	148	55%
e. Company Commander	87	32%
	MISSING=5	
2. Instructor Duty:		
a. Command and General Staff College	6	2%
b. Officers Advance Course	38	14%
c. Combined Arms and Services Staff School	12	4%
d. Pre-Command Course	1	<1%
e. ROTC or Service Academy	58	21%
	MISSING=29	
3. Duty at the Combat Training Centers:		
a. Assignment to the National Training Center (NTC)	24	9%
b. Assignment to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)	1	<1%
c. Assignment to the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC)		
d. Assignment to the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP)	45	17%
e. Player during a training rotation.	43	16%
	MISSING=2	
4. Schools attended:		
a. Army War College or equivalent	2	1%
b. Command and General Staff College or equivalent (resident)	218	80%
c. Command and General Staff College (Correspondence)	8	3%
d. Command and General Staff College (Reserve School)	1	<1%
e. Officer Advance Course	39	14%

5. Which of the following is the U.S. Army's current definition of a **mission**? (Select one answer.)

a. Missions specify the task(s) to be accomplished by the command and the purpose to be achieved.

30 11%

b. Missions specify Who, What, When, Where, and Why as appropriate.

42 16%

c. Missions specify what must be done without prescribing how it must be done.

22 8%

d. Missions specify the primary task assigned; it usually contains the elements of Who, What, When, Where, and the reason therefor, but seldom specifies how.

174 64%

MISCODE=1 MISSING=2

For questions 6-14 and using the scale below, which of the following describe the U.S. Army's command and control doctrine?

6. It is primarily centralized in nature and stresses direction from the commander.
YES=33 11% NO=169 62% I DON'T KNOW=2 1% MISSING=1

7. It is primarily decentralized in nature and stresses independent action by subordinates.
YES=169 62% NO=96 35% I DON'T KNOW=4 2% MISSING=2

8. It stresses the need for standardized terminology.
YES=249 92% NO=20 7% I DON'T KNOW=1 <1% MISSING=2

9. It stresses the need for standardized training.
YES=232 86% NO=31 11% I DON'T KNOW=7 3% MISSING=1

10. It stresses the need for precision over action.
YES=35 13% NO=201 74% I DON'T KNOW=33 12% MISSING=2

11. It requires subordinates to understand the intent of commanders two levels up.
YES=248 92% NO=20 7% I DON'T KNOW=2 1% MISSING=2

12. It requires the commander to provide his intent in all orders.
YES=224 42% NO=42 16% I DON'T KNOW=4 2% MISSING=1

13. It allows for the issue of mission orders as a type of fragmentary order (FRAGO) after an operations order has been issued.
YES=253 93% NO=10 4% I DON'T KNOW=7 3% MISSING=1

14. It requires a subordinate to change his mission and act if the situation dictates and communications with his superior is lost.
YES=168 62% NO=86 32% I DON'T KNOW=15 6% MISSING=2

For questions 15-20, use the scale below to indicate the degree to which mission orders were used in your last assignment.

15. My superiors issued mission orders to me.
ALWAYS=51 19% USUALLY=131 48% NOW AND THEN=53 20%
SELDOM=23 9% NEVER=12 4% MISSING=1

16. I issued mission orders to my subordinates.
ALWAYS=49 18% USUALLY=157 58% NOW AND THEN=39 14%
SELDOM=14 5% NEVER=11 4% MISSING=1

17. Mission orders were used in my unit to direct garrison operations.
ALWAYS=28 10% USUALLY=103 38% NOW AND THEN=62 23%
SELDOM=51 19% NEVER=25 9% MISSING=2

18. I understood the intent of missions given to me.
ALWAYS=77 28% USUALLY=169 62% NOW AND THEN=19 7%
SELDOM=2 1% NEVER=3 1% MISSING=1

19. If the situation revealed that my assigned mission would not accomplish the stated intention, I was expected to receive permission prior to changing my mission.
ALWAYS=47 17% USUALLY=101 37% NOW AND THEN=57 21%
SELDOM=46 17% NEVER=19 7% MISSING=1

20. If the situation revealed that my assigned mission would not accomplish the stated intention, I was expected to make necessary changes whether approval could be gained or not.
ALWAYS=68 25% USUALLY=109 40% NOW AND THEN=44 16%
SELDOM=36 13% NEVER=13 5% MISSING=1

For questions 21-26, use the scale below to assess how well the following contributed to your last unit's use/non-use of mission orders.

21. Command climate.

EXT GOOD=90 33%	GOOD=124 46%	SO-SO=30 11%
POOR=21 8%	EXT POOR=5 2%	MISSING=1

22. Trust between leaders in the unit.

EXT GOOD=69 26%	GOOD=149 55%	SO-SO=35 13%
POOR=12 4%	EXT POOR=3 1%	MISSING=3

23. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).

EXT GOOD=32 125	GOOD=136 50%	SO-SO=80 30%
POOR=19 7%	EXT POOR=2 1%	MISSING=2

24. Common language/terminology.

EXT GOOD=55 20%	GOOD=154 57%	SO-SO=39 14%
POOR=20 7%	EXT POOR=1 <1%	MISSING=2

25. Common training background.

EXT GOOD=29 11%	GOOD=136 50%	SO-SO=79 29%
POOR=25 9%	EXT POOR=1 <1%	MISSING=1

26. Common understanding of doctrine.

EXT GOOD=28 10%	GOOD=125 46%	SO-SO=82 30%
POOR=31 11%	EXT POOR=4 2%	MISSING=1

For questions 27-36, use the scale below to signify the level to which you agree with the correctness of each of the following statements.

27. The U.S. Army's doctrine is adequate for the formulation and communication of mission orders.
STR AGREE=47 17% AGREE=175 65% NEITHER=24 9%
DISAGREE=20 7% STR DISAGREE=4 2% MISSING=1

28. "Attack" and "defend" are examples of tactical tasks.
STR AGREE=63 23% AGREE=127 47% NEITHER=15 6%
DISAGREE=52 19% STR DISAGREE=11 4% MISSING=3

29. "Seize" and "retain" are examples of tactical tasks.
STR AGREE=56 21% AGREE=139 51% NEITHER=26 10%
DISAGREE=42 16% STR DISAGREE=4 2% MISSING=4

30. Mission orders must include the mission of the issuing unit, subordinate units, and the next higher command.
STR AGREE=92 33% AGREE=156 58% NEITHER=14 5%
DISAGREE=8 3% STR DISAGREE=0 0 MISSING=1

31. I feel I understand mission orders and their preconditions sufficiently enough to use them in combat.
STR AGREE=54 20% AGREE=139 51% NEITHER=38 14%
DISAGREE=32 12% STR DISAGREE=4 2% MISSING=4

32. I feel that the leaders in the last unit I served in, understood mission orders and their preconditions enough to use them in combat.
STR AGREE=23 9% AGREE=99 37% NEITHER=53 20%
DISAGREE=71 26% STR DISAGREE=15 6% MISSING=10

33. My officer advance course taught the use of mission orders. (Answer only if you attended the course.)
STR AGREE=8 3% AGREE=43 16% NEITHER=10 4%
DISAGREE=18 7% STR DISAGREE=7 3% MISSING=185

34. My CAS^3 instruction taught the use of mission orders. (Answer only if you attended the course.)
STR AGREE=41 15% AGREE=112 41% NEITHER=20 7%
DISAGREE=30 11% STR DISAGREE=6 2% MISSING=62

35. My CGSC instruction taught the use of mission orders. (Answer only if you attended the course.)
STR AGREE=21 8% AGREE=31 11% NEITHER=14 5%
DISAGREE=16 6% STR DISAGREE=4 2% MISSING=185

36. My PCC instruction taught the use of mission orders. (Answer only if you attended the course.)
MISSING=271 NO DATA

APPENDIX E

MEMORANDUM FOR: COL West, Director, CAS3 9 March 1990
SUBJECT: Mission Order Interview
FROM: MAJ JD Johnson

1. I request permission to conduct an oral interview with you. The purpose is to gather your opinions concerning the use of mission orders in the U.S. Army and will be incorporated into my Masters of Military Art and Science (MMAS) thesis. I am attempting to determine whether the U.S. Army has an effective doctrine for the formulation and communication of mission orders.

2. The interview will require approximately one hour to complete. If you agree, I will schedule the interview with your secretary.

3. I plan to record the interview.

4. The following are the questions I plan to use to guide the interview:

a. Is the use of mission orders integral to the execution of AirLand Battle doctrine?

b. Is the reason for mission orders to allow the exercise of subordinate initiative when unforeseen opportunities arise? If not, what is the primary reason? If so, what is the essential information that must be communicated in the order?

c. Does the U.S. Army have an effective doctrine for the formulation and communication of mission orders? If not, what is missing?

d. Is the U.S. Army doctrine for the formulation and communication of mission statements adequate?

e. Is current U.S. Army doctrine concerning intent adequate?

f. Is there any conflict between the army's desire for synchronization and the desire for initiative?

g. Are mission orders understood by NTC rotational units? Do they effectively formulate and communicate mission orders? If not, what are the reasons for their failure? What about communication of intent?

h. Did you experience the use of mission orders in combat?

The tactical situation on the following page is provided to allow a discussion about the exercise of initiative.



a. X Brigade is a supporting effort for the division. The division main effort is to the east of X Brigade's area of operations.

b. 2d Battalion is the brigade main effort and is responsible for securing Objective 2 to prevent any enemy interference with the division main attack from the west. Speed in seizing Objective 2 is of the essence.

c. 1st Battalion is the brigade supporting effort and is responsible for securing Objective 1 and preventing enemy counterattacks from the west from interfering with the 2d Battalion.

d. There is no brigade reserve.

e. You are the commander of the 1st Battalion. After crossing the Line of Departure/Line of Contact (LD/LC) you lost all communications capability with the brigade commander. The brigade commander is moving with the 2d Battalion. What are your actions when: (The situations stand alone and are not cumulative.)

1. Upon arrival at Objective 1, you determine that you cannot block enemy counterattacks to the east from that position?

2. Upon arrival at Objective 1, the enemy tank company is already in Objective 1 and moving east?

3. Upon arrival at Objective 1, you determine that the enemy tank company is already through Objective 1, in contact with 2d Battalion, and effectively blocking 2d Battalion's movement north?

John D. Johnson
MAJ INF
CGSC, Section 11C

APPENDIX F

APPENDIX F

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1. Combined Arms Research Library
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   Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

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3. Colonel William A. West
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4. Dr. Ernest G. Lowden, Ed.D.
   Office of Evaluation and Standardization
   USACGSOC
   Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

5. Major Stan Tuttle
   U.S. Army CGSOC, TCDC
   Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027