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STUDY REPORT
CAA-SR-91-2

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COUNTER - DRUG: MANDATE FOR THE ARMY

MARCH 1991



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PREPARED BY
STRATEGY AND PLANS DIRECTORATE

US ARMY CONCEPTS ANALYSIS AGENCY
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
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**STUDY REPORT
CAA-SR-91-2**

COUNTER-DRUG: MANDATE FOR THE ARMY

March 1991

Prepared by

**STRATEGY AND PLANS DIRECTORATE
LTC C. Harry Golding, Study Director**

**US Army Concepts Analysis Agency
8120 Woodmont Avenue
Bethesda, Maryland 20814-2797**



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

CSCA-SPC (5-5d)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

US ARMY CONCEPTS ANALYSIS AGENCY
8120 WOODMONT AVENUE
BETHESDA, MARYLAND 20814-2797



05 AUG 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans,
ATTN: DAMO-SS, Washington, DC 20310-0544

SUBJECT: Counter-drug: Mandate for the Army (CMA) Study

1. Reference memorandum, DAMO-SSP, 25 September 1990, subject: "Counter-narcotics: Mandate for the Army" Study Directive.
2. Referenced memorandum requested that the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA) identify policy options, analyze these options, and report findings and observations to provide for the short-, and mid-, and long-term direction of Army support to the national drug control strategy.
3. This final report documents the results of our analyses and incorporates your comments on the draft report which were received in June 1991. Included is an executive summary which provides an overview of the entire study. Questions and/or inquiries should be directed to the Assistant Director, Strategy & Plans Directorate, U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency, 8120 Woodmont Avenue, Bethesda, MD 20814-2797, DSN 295-1532.
4. Between the time this study was completed and its final publication, the principal findings of the study were incorporated in a message released by the Chief of Staff of the Army on 26 June 1991. This message (261720ZJUN91, Encl), "prescribes broad guidance for the future direction of Army support to the National Drug Control Strategy." This demonstrates how we have moved expeditiously from theory to practice in providing direct analytic support to the needs of the senior Army leadership.
5. I would like to express my appreciation to all the staff elements and agencies which have contributed to the study.

Encl

E. B. Vandiver III
E. B. VANDIVER III
Director

STATEMENT A PER TELECON
LTC HARRY GOLDING ARMY CONCEPTS
ANALYSIS AGENCY
BETHESDA, MD 20814-2797
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OPERATIONS
SUPPORT DIRECTORATE

ROUTINE

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UNCLAS

SUBJECT: ARMY SUPPORT TO NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

1. THIS MESSAGE PRESCRIBES BROAD GUIDANCE FOR THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF ARMY SUPPORT TO THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY.

2. ON 18 SEP 89, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ISSUED GUIDANCE WHICH ESTABLISHED A STRATEGY FOR ATTACKING THE FLOW OF DRUGS AT EVERY PHASE--AT THE SOURCE, IN TRANSIT, AND IN THE U.S. THIS GUIDANCE ASSIGNED DETECTING AND COUNTERING PRODUCTION, TRAFFICKING, AND USE OF ILLEGAL DRUGS AS "A HIGH PRIORITY NATIONAL SECURITY MISSION OF THE ARMED FORCES."

3. TO IMPLEMENT THIS GUIDANCE, THE ARMY STAFF DEVELOPED THE ARMY COUNTERNARCOTICS PLAN, WHICH SECRETARY STONE AND GENERAL VUONO SIGNED ON 17 APR 90. THE INTENT AND ROLE ARTICULATED IN THIS PLAN ARE VALID TODAY AND WILL REMAIN SO FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. THE ARMY WILL PROVIDE SUPPORT, FROM THE FULL SPECTRUM OF ITS CAPABILITIES, TO A WIDE RANGE OF DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (DLEAS), U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, AND COOPERATING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. WE WILL EXECUTE THE COUNTER-DRUG MISSION WITH THE SAME DEDICATION, SKILL, AND PROFESSIONALISM THAT WE APPLY TO ALL OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY MISSIONS.

4. FUNDAMENTAL ROLES AND MISSIONS FOR THE ARMY, ESTABLISHED IN TITLE 10, U.S. CODE, WILL NOT CHANGE. THE ARMY IS NOT, NOR WILL IT BECOME, A LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (LEA). ARMY ACTIVITIES WILL COMPLY WITH THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT, THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT, THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT, AND OTHER LAWS. INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES WILL BE CONDUCTED UNDER THE OPERATIONAL COMMAND OF COMBATANT COMMANDERS. ASA(IL&E) WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE OVERSIGHT OF THE ARMY COUNTER-DRUG PROGRAM.

5. CONSISTENT WITH THIS INTENT, AND THE GUIDANCE OUTLINED IN THE ARMY PLAN (TAP) FY 94-09, I AM DIRECTING THE MAJOR COMMANDS TO INCORPORATE THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE IN PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING FOR COUNTER-DRUG SUPPORT:

- IDENTIFY TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES THAT FURNISH SUPPORT REQUIRED BY COMBATANT COMMANDERS AND DLEAS, AND SIMULTANEOUSLY ENHANCE ARMY READINESS BY IMPROVING PROFICIENCY IN TASKS THAT ARE READILY TRANSFERABLE TO OTHER MISSIONS (E.G., RECONNAISSANCE, INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD (IPB), AND COMBAT ENGINEER SUPPORT TO INCLUDE MOBILITY AND COUNTERMOBILITY).

- THROUGH RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION (RD&A) SUPPORT TO DOD AND NON-DOD AGENCIES, DEFINE REQUIREMENTS FOR PROTOTYPE TECHNOLOGIES (E.G., SENSORS AND NON-LETHAL TECHNOLOGIES) WHICH WILL ASSIST DOD AND NON-DOD AGENCIES TO PERFORM THEIR COUNTER-DRUG ROLES (E.G., DETECTION AND MONITORING) AND STRENGTHEN THE ARMY TECHNOLOGY BASE IN THE PROCESS.

- PUBLICIZE TO INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL AUDIENCES THE ARMY'S SUCCESS IN SOLVING ITS DRUG PROBLEMS. THE INTENT IS TO STIMULATE AND REINFORCE NATION-WIDE DEMAND REDUCTION EFFORTS, AS DESCRIBED IN THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY. (WE NEED TO EMPHASIZE THE FACT THAT WE OFFER A DRUG-FREE LIFE STYLE).

- PROMOTE UNDERSTANDING OF THE DOD AND THE ARMY ROLE IN THE

ACTION ~~DA MO~~
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OPERATIONS
SUPPORT DIRECTORATE

NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY THROUGHOUT THE ARMY (BOTH WITHIN THE TRAINING BASE AND THE FIELD).

- INCORPORATE THE COUNTER-DRUG SUPPORT MISSION IN EXISTING PLANNING SYSTEMS (E.G., PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING, AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (PPBES) AND CONCEPTS BASED REQUIREMENTS SYSTEM (CBRS)), AND IMPROVE ARMY PROCEDURES FOR DEFINING COUNTER-DRUG SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS THROUGH THE NEWLY ESTABLISHED ARMY COUNTER-DRUG PROPONENT OFFICE (ACDPO) AND THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (RD&A) PROPONENT OFFICE (SARD-ZCN).

- CONTINUE TO PROVIDE TIMELY AND RESPONSIVE ARMY SUPPORT TO ALL FACETS OF THE NATIONAL PROGRAM TO INCLUDE: FORCES PROVIDED TO UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDERS FOR OPERATIONAL SUPPORT, RESOURCES PROVIDED TO DEAS AND HOST NATIONS IN A NON-OPERATIONAL CAPACITY, PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO PERFORM LIAISON AND TO MAN DOD AND NON-DOD BILLETTS, AND INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT AND PLANNING ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO VARIOUS USG AGENCIES, LEAS, AND HOST NATIONS.

6. SINCE PUBLISHING THE ARMY COUNTERNARCOTICS PLAN, NUMEROUS DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS, DOD POLICY DECISIONS, INTERNAL STUDIES AND AUDITS, AND REFINEMENTS TO NATIONAL POLICY HAVE OCCURRED. FOR THIS REASON, I HAVE DIRECTED THAT THE ARMY COUNTERNARCOTICS PLAN BE UPDATED AS ARMY REGULATION (AR) 500-XX, SUPPORT TO THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY. ADDITIONALLY, TO IMPLEMENT GUIDANCE FROM THE DOD OFFICE OF DRUG ENFORCEMENT POLICY AND SUPPORT (DRUG COORDINATOR), THE TERM USED TO DESCRIBE ARMY SUPPORT TO NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL EFFORTS WILL BE "COUNTER-DRUG" NOT "COUNTERNARCOTIC OR "ANTI-DRUG." THIS IS BECAUSE "NARCOTIC" IS TOO LIMITING OF A TERM. COCAINE, THE PRIORITY OF THE NATIONAL EFFORT, IS A "DRUG" - NOT A "NARCOTIC."

7. TO DEVELOP BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF ISSUES CONFRONTING THE ARMY IN THE COUNTER-DRUG ARENA, AND TO BUILD CONSENSUS FOR AR 500-XX, A SECOND ARMY COUNTER-DRUG SYMPOSIUM IS PLANNED FOR 16-17 OCT 91 AT THE WESTPARK HOTEL IN ROSSLYN, VA. GUIDANCE FOR THIS EVENT WILL BE FORTHCOMING.

8. THE DRAFT NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY, FY 94-99, STATES THAT, "MILITARY SUPPORT TO THE NATIONAL COUNTER-DRUG EFFORT, FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, WILL REQUIRE THE SUSTAINED DEPLOYMENT OF APPROPRIATELY TRAINED AND EQUIPPED MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, AND IMPROVED COOPERATION BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THE DEAS." THIS MESSAGE REAFFIRMS THE ACTIONS WE HAVE TAKEN TO DATE AND IS INTENDED TO PREPARE THE ARMY FOR CONTINUED SUPPORT TO THIS CRITICAL MISSION.

BT

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COUNTER-DRUG: MANDATE FOR THE ARMY

STUDY
SUMMARY
CAA-SR-91-2

THE REASONS FOR CONDUCTING this study were to provide the Army leadership with options, and an objective assessment of those options, that contribute to the development of Army policy and strategy in support of the national counter-drug effort, and to meet the challenge posed by the Secretary of Defense "to find better ways to support the President's National Drug Control Strategy."

THE STUDY SPONSOR was Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS), ATTN: DAMO-SS, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-0424.

THE STUDY OBJECTIVE was to identify policy options, analyze these options, and provide observations for determining the short-, mid-, and long-term direction of Army support to the national counter-drug effort. Also, this comprehensive review will provide a basis for responding to new missions assigned to the Army by statutory or policy directives.

THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY was to develop and analyze policy options encompassed by the seven national priority areas articulated in the President's strategy.

THE MAIN ASSUMPTIONS for this study were:

- (1) The threat posed by narco-traffickers will increase rather than decrease in years to come.
- (2) Congress will demand increased Department of Defense (DOD) support to the national counter-drug effort, and DOD will demand increased Army support.
- (3) Congress will not significantly increase the Army budget to support the national counter-drug effort.
- (4) There will be no near-term change in the statutes prohibiting direct DOD participation in search, seizure, and arrest in the US.
- (5) For the foreseeable future, the importation of illicit drugs across US borders will remain a national security issue affecting the security, health, and well-being of the American people.

THE BASIC APPROACH followed in the study was to:

- (1) Review national, DOD, Joint Staff, and Department of the Army counter-drug policies and programs to ensure an understanding of the policymaking environment and the "top-down" guidance assigned to the Army.

(2) Develop a discrete list of policy options. Two world scenarios were considered regarding policy and law restricting military involvement in counter-drug operations. Priority of effort went to the first scenario.

(a) World One: Current Army roles and missions remain unchanged.

(b) World Two: Relaxation of *Posse Comitatus* restrictions allows direct military involvement in the areas of search, seizure, and arrest.

(3) Develop an analytic framework addressing the impact the policy options would have on contribution to the national drug control strategy, financial cost, readiness and training, the domestic and international political environments, current Army doctrine, and current Army force structures and organization. The framework was used to survey a diverse audience of knowledgeable working group members, and in interviews with key senior level individuals. The survey and interview responses were analyzed. Finally, the options were arrayed into three tiers ("Implement Now," "Consider for Implementation," and "Avoid"). Findings were provided to the study sponsor.

THE PRINCIPAL FINDINGS are:

(1) To "Implement Now" 5 of the 16 options. These include ensuring the US Military Academy (USMA) and all colleges offering Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs are in the Network of Colleges and Universities Committed to the Elimination of Drug and Alcohol Abuse on their campuses, expanding liaison with drug law enforcement agencies (DLEAs) and host nation forces, expanding information sharing capabilities, expanding training on Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) and data correlation, and exposing civilian leaders to the Army drug program and its successes.

(2) That the Army provides operational and nonoperational support within limitations set by Congress and law. The Army is actively involved in supporting supply reduction actions. Army external support for demand reduction efforts, the primary focus of the President's national strategy, deserves greater emphasis. Differences in interpretations of the legal issues exist, especially the *Posse Comitatus* act and the prohibition of accessing intelligence data on civilian personnel. It is not well known which Army organizations have the lead for different counter-drug functions. The consensus is that the Army should not become another police force. The World Two scenario is a possible but unlikely reality. Because it is unlikely, the groups disagreed whether contingency planning should be done for it.

THE STUDY EFFORT was directed by LTC C. Harry Golding, Strategy and Plans Directorate, US Army Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA).

COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS may be sent to the Director, US Army Concepts Analysis Agency, ATTN: CSCA-SPC, 8120 Woodmont Avenue, Bethesda, MD 20814-2797.

Tear-out copies of this synopsis are at back cover.

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CHAPTER 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1-1. PROBLEM. As stated in the Army Counternarcotics Plan, "Illicit drugs are a significant threat to U.S. national security and to the values and institutions we cherish." The focus of this study is to assist senior Army decisionmakers to learn more about what the Army can do in support of the national counter-drug strategy. Analysis of selected options will assess in which areas the Army can make the greatest positive contribution to reduce drug supply and demand. The objectives of this study are to develop a discrete list of policy options for Army involvement in each of two scenarios, develop an analytic framework, analyze each of the options, and report findings and observations to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS), ATTN: DAMO-SS.

1-2. BACKGROUND

a. Narcotics trafficking and use pose a threat to national security, economic well-being, and the national social order. Drug traffickers have developed highly sophisticated smuggling operations that include their own transportation, communications, finance, legal, intelligence, and defense capabilities. They are organized and strong enough to challenge the stability of some lesser developed nations in the Andean Ridge region. As democratic institutions and social order within these countries deteriorate, US national security is threatened.

b. The three principal drugs of abuse are marijuana, cocaine, and heroin. All of the cocaine and heroin enter the US from abroad, as does most of the marijuana. Marijuana and cocaine originate in large part within Latin America and are routed to the US through Central America and Mexico. All the world's coca, from which cocaine is produced, is grown in the Andean region. Heroin originates from the Golden Triangle area of Southeast Asia (Burma and Thailand), the Golden Crescent area of Southwest Asia (Afghanistan and Pakistan), and Mexico. US domestic production of marijuana and synthetic drugs is increasing and contributes to the threat.

c. Countering the flow of drugs into the United States is a formidable task. Numerous federal, state, and local agencies must coordinate their operations. They must defend thousands of miles of land and sea borders as well as inland areas. They are at a disadvantage with respect to money and the formidability of the task given the geography of the problem. The traffickers transport from a few ounces to several tons via numerous transport media through both high density and remote points of entry.

d. One other form of the threat must be targeted--the user. Without high demand by users, there would not be the high volume and profits of the suppliers. Given no demand reduction, the consequent supply reduction efforts will likely result in higher prices and more crime activity to fund the drug habit.

e. *Posse Comitatus*. The *Posse Comitatus* Act of 1878 prohibited the military from engaging in civilian law enforcement activities in the US, its

territories, and dependencies. As such, the military is not allowed to conduct searches, seizures, and apprehensions of nonmilitary personnel. Since the early 1980s, pressures to limit drug trafficking have led to amendments and exceptions that have allowed the armed forces to perform logistics, training, and surveillance functions in the drug war. These functions are in support of civilian drug law enforcement agencies (DLEA).

f. National Strategy Development. The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) was established when Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. On 5 Sep 89, President Bush issued the National Drug Control Strategy developed by the ONDCP.

g. Increased Priority Assigned. The National Defense Authorization Act of 1989 gave the Department of Defense (DOD) a Presidential and Congressional mandate to act as the single lead agency for detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the US, to integrate all federal DLEA into an effective command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) network, and to expand the use of the National Guard under State status to support drug interdiction. On 18 Sep 89, Secretary of Defense Cheney declared "the detection and countering of the production, trafficking and use of illegal drugs is a high priority national security mission of the Department of Defense." All commanders in chief (CINCs) were directed to prepare plans to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the US. Five key CINCs (CINCLANT, CINCFOR, CINCNORAD, CINCPAC, and CINCOS) were assigned special emphasis. Mr. Cheney also "asked DOD civilian and military leaders to immediately find ways to better support the President's national drug strategy."

h. Army Response. The Army Counternarcotics Plan, signed on 17 April 1990 by Secretary of the Army Stone and Army Chief of Staff General Vuono, addresses the requirements assigned to the Army because of this increased priority. The Plan provides broad guidance to major Army commands (MACOMs) and Department of the Army Staffs (ARSTAF and Secretariat) for use in developing courses of action and responding to requirements. The Army currently provides a wide range of counter-drug supply reduction support to civilian DLEAs and the CINCs.

i. Response to ASB. The Army Science Board (ASB) Summer Study of 1990, "Use of Army Systems and Technologies in Counter-narcotics Efforts," offers numerous findings and recommendations for Army scientific involvement in counter-drug activities. Objective analysis of its key recommendations is required to support the development of the Army's response to the ASB.

1-3. SCOPE. This study explores Army counter-drug policy options for fulfilling the requirements placed on the Army by current law and policy. It also meets the aforementioned challenge posed by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to find better ways to support the President's national drug control strategy. Policy options were developed in each of the seven national priority areas outlined in the 1989 National Drug Control Strategy ("Red Book"). Each of the seven priorities are briefly described below.

a. Criminal Justice. Efforts in this area are directed toward strengthening the national criminal justice system through reform and

expansion. The strategy addresses vigorous enforcement of drug laws, support to law enforcement agencies and the courts, incarceration capacities and alternative sentencing (flexible punishments), increased coordination among DLEAs, and increasing public confidence and support.

b. Drug Treatment. Help must be provided to those in need in order to reduce overall drug use. Efforts are aimed at getting more people into the treatment programs and improving treatment capacities, effectiveness, and efficiencies.

c. Education, Community Action, and the Workplace. This area focuses on prevention. The goals are to prevent nonusers from starting and users to stop by increasing moral awareness in concert with active anti-drug involvement in the communities, schools, and work sites.

d. International Initiatives. The great majority of illegal drugs are imported into the US. This priority area recognizes the need to cooperate with and convince foreign governments to attack and disrupt the drug supply at its origins and in transit to the US. Broad, cooperative international efforts are necessary.

e. Interdiction Efforts. Because most illegal drugs are imported, it is essential to focus efforts at intercepting those shipments at US points of entry. Air, land, and sea interdiction strategies have proven successful, but still need to be improved and responsive to changes in trafficker smuggling tactics.

f. Research Agenda. National needs include a larger and more flexible information base, technology to aid law enforcement, more medical research, and improved evaluation and dissemination systems. Support for research will benefit meeting these needs.

g. Intelligence Agenda. Collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence is imperative. Intelligence priorities address automated information systems, establishing an interagency working group, and intelligence sharing capabilities.

1-4. LIMITATIONS. The nature of the options being studied limited the use of traditional quantitative cost-benefit analysis. The analytic framework relied heavily on expert judgment. The developed options and their evaluations are limited by the collective knowledge and experience of the participating groups. The effectiveness of this approach was also dependent on the ability of the working group to judge political impacts. Not all possible Army counter-drug policy options could be studied. This was a first step. The number of options was purposely limited. The summary results gave an indication of what type policy options were felt to be more implementable by the study group. Survey comments tended to focus on specific components of the option; whereas the matrix responses were directed at the options as a whole.

1-5. TIMEFRAME. This study examined options to be implemented in the short- (fiscal years (FY) 91-93), mid- (FY 94-99), and long-term (FY 99 and beyond) direction of Army support to the national counter-drug effort. Emphasis was on the current time.

1-6. ASSUMPTIONS

- a. The threat posed by narco-traffickers will increase rather than decrease in years to come. The threat will expand to other theaters and intensify in both Europe and Japan as personal disposable income increases.
- b. Congress will demand increased DOD support to the national counter-drug effort.
- c. DOD will demand increased Army support to the DOD counter-drug effort. More stringent allocation of Army resources will be required.
- d. Congress will not significantly increase the Army budget to support the national counter-drug effort.
- e. There will be no near-term change in the statutes prohibiting direct DOD participation in search, seizure, and arrest in the US.
- f. For the foreseeable future, the importation of illicit drugs across US borders will remain a national security issue affecting the security, health, and well-being of the American people.

1-7. METHODOLOGY

- a. A small study group assessed national and Army counter-drug policies. Two alternative world scenarios regarding policies and laws that restrict military involvement in counter-drug operations were developed and considered.

(1) World One: *Status quo*.

- (2) World Two: *Posse Comitatus* restrictions are relaxed, allowing for a more direct involvement of the military in the areas of search, seizure, and arrest.

b. The study group brainstormed possible counter-drug roles for the Army in each of the seven national priority areas. This was done to demonstrate Army compliance with the national drug control strategy. Not all possible roles, or options, could be evaluated. Two options were selected for each of the national priority areas. Four options were selected in the education, community action, and the workplace priority because it is a broad area. In all, 16 discrete policy options were developed for further analysis. Each option contains component elements. The components are individual tasks or short statements to help amplify the specifics of the option. The options and components are given in paragraphs 2-2 through 2-21 in Chapter 2. Priority of effort was given to the World One scenario in which roles and missions are unchanged.

c. Surveys were sent to study and working group members. (See Appendix A for the group compositions. The small study group performed as a management cell by developing the options and analytic framework. The working group was those individuals selected to respond to the survey. Study group personnel are also members of the working group.) Survey participants were asked to rank the magnitude of impact that successful implementation of each option

would have upon each of the following seven impact areas: contribution to the national drug control strategy, financial cost, readiness and training, domestic political environment, international political environment, doctrine, and force structure and organization. The results are consolidated and shown in two impact matrices, Appendices E and F. Survey participants were then asked to make a determination as to whether each option should be implemented now, considered for implementation at a later time or avoided. Appendix G is an implementation matrix showing those results. Along with these rankings, participants were asked to return any comments they had concerning the options or components. Interviews were held with senior working group members following return and collation of responses. Discussions with key senior level personnel focused on the survey preliminary results, not the specific details of the survey.

d. Each option was placed into one of three categories/tiers: Implement Now, Consider, and Avoid. To be rated Implement Now or Avoid, at least half of the survey respondents had to rate the option in that category. Special considerations were taken into account, such as significant comments from the working group written responses or comments from the senior working group interviews. If an option was not clearly Implement Now or Avoid, it was rated Consider. Five options were rated Implement Now and 11 were Consider. Observations and analysis are provided in Chapter 2 of this document.

e. Chapter 3 is a rank ordering of the options. The first five options are rated Implement Now. The remaining 11 are rated Consider. The primary criterion for ordering the options was the percentage of survey responses in each category from the implementation matrix. A simple formula, the percent for "Implement Now" minus the percent for "Avoid," was used to develop an initial rank order. Again, special considerations were taken into account before arriving at the final rank order.

1-8. FINDINGS

a. US Army Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA) performed analysis of the policy options based on 27 survey responses and 11 interviews. The key finding was that five options were rated Implement Now. These five options include:

(1) Ensuring the United States Military Academy (USMA) and all colleges and universities offering Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) programs are in the Network of Colleges and Universities Committed to the Elimination of Drug and Alcohol Abuse on their campuses.

(2) Expanding liaison with DLEAs and host nation forces.

(3) Expanding information sharing capabilities.

(4) Expanding training on intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and data correlation.

(5) Exposing civilian leaders to the Army drug program and its successes.

b. The Army is actively involved in counter-drug operations by providing operational and nonoperational support within limitations set by Congress and law. The Army is a support agency to the civilian DLEAs. The Army is proceeding with caution.

c. The Army is contributing more to support non-Army supply reduction efforts than demand reduction measures.

d. Differences in interpretations and understanding of the legal issues exist, especially the *Posse Comitatus* Act and the prohibition of accessing intelligence data on civilian personnel (Executive Order 12333).

e. It is not well known which Army organizations have the lead for different counter-drug functions.

f. It is commonly agreed the Army should not become a police force. The World Two scenario was generally considered as unlikely. There is disagreement whether contingency planning should be done for the possibility of World Two conditions.

1-9. REPORT FORMAT. Chapter 2 presents the observations resulting from the survey responses and interviews. The 16 World One and 4 World Two options are discussed. Also included are five other issues deemed important which are not part of the options. Chapter 3 lists the 16 World One options in rank order based on the study results. Appendix A lists the study contributors by group. Appendix B is a copy of the study directive commissioning this study. Appendix C is the references used during the course of the study. Appendix D is a consolidated list of the 16 options. Appendices E and F are World One and World Two results of the survey participants ranking the impact of successful implementation of the options upon the seven impact areas. Appendix G shows the percentage of responses by the survey participants for the three implementation choices. It also shows the final tier ranking for each option. Appendix H contains sponsor comments to this report. Appendix I is the report distribution.

CHAPTER 2

SURVEY RESULTS

Section I. WORLD ONE

2-1. OPTIONS. This chapter presents a short discussion of the components, ratings, and observations for each individual option considered in this study. Section I addresses the 16 options in the World One scenario. Section II addresses four options in the World Two scenario. The four World Two options are the same as in World One, but the component actions are different. Only the International Initiatives and Interdiction Efforts option, two of each, are addressed in World Two. Actions in the other five national priority areas were not considered to be significantly different in Worlds One and Two, and were therefore not addressed again. Section III presents other observations that emerged during the course of the study.

2-2. CRIMINAL JUSTICE, OPTION 1. Offer the DLEAs the use of five regional facilities for prison overflow and/or alternative sentencing that correspond in location with the five high intensity drug trafficking areas established in the 1990 National Drug Control Strategy ("Blue Book").

a. Discussion. The National Drug Control Strategy states that "the criminal justice system remains the most powerful tool for making individuals accountable for their actions." Additionally, it highlights the lack of correctional facility space and manpower as key problems in the national counter-drug effort. The Army can play an active role in helping to solve these problems and augment the national effort. Assuming there is space in our correctional system to handle a greater population of offenders, the Army can offer to DLEAs the use of its facilities in an effort to help fill the void highlighted in the "Blue Book." The Army is already present in the high intensity drug trafficking regions, and it is those regions that will require the greatest support.

b. Components

(1) The five high intensity drug trafficking regions are New York City, Miami, Houston, Los Angeles, and the Southwest Border.

(2) The offer must be specific in detail (exactly how many and of what type offender at any time) and tailored to the specific capabilities of the regional facility chosen to support this course of action.

(3) The offer should be temporary in nature and serve as a "bridge loan" until new civilian facilities are established to handle the needs of the criminal justice system.

(4) Facilities designated for closure may be offered and "saved" from the chopping block.

(5) This offer must be positioned clearly as one to support the criminal justice effort.

(6) Provide engineer personnel and equipment to assist in the construction of new correctional facilities.

(7) Respond to requests for incarceration facilities by establishing temporary prisoner of war (POW)-style camps.

(8) Expand logistical and transportation support in the criminal justice area.

c. Ratings

(1) **Implementation.** IMPLEMENT NOW CONSIDER AVOID SUMMARY RATING
33% 50% 17% Consider

(2) **Impact.** From -3 (high negative) to 0 (neutral) to 3 (high positive). See page E-1 for a description of how these ratings were derived.

National Priority	Financial Costs	Readiness Training	Domestic Political	International Political	Doctrine	Force Structure
2	-2	0	1	0	0	0

d. **Comments.** Legal issues outweigh the Samaritan gesture of offering military facilities to DLEAs for prison overflow. The Base Realignment and Closure Act and similar documents need to be reviewed for legal ways to transfer Army-occupied facilities directly to DLEAs for correctional facility use. Any use of military facilities must be done without using military personnel because of prohibitions of the *Posse Comitatus* Act. Engineer personnel and equipment cannot be used to construct or convert facilities if the work would be in competition with civilian firms. Conversion of existing facilities presents the question of who would pay the associated costs of conversion. Establishing POW-style camps has strong negative connotations and would suggest the illegal use of military personnel to serve as guards and assist in the enforcement of domestic law. It is noted that six states have established facilities similar to boot camps where convicted drug offenders may be sent. Because the Army is downsizing, the Army would find it difficult to expand logistical and transportation support in the criminal justice area. Although the amount of Army prison space available to transfer is unknown, it is probably not sufficient to make a difference to the in-prison time for the prospective civilian inmates. On a positive note, the transfer of facilities and additional space could have a psychological impact on the criminal mind by implying that the likelihood of serving time is greater because there is additional prison space. However, given the legal issues and conversion problems, this is not a high payoff item.

2-3. **CRIMINAL JUSTICE, OPTION 2.** Establish a Mobile Training Team (MTT) to advise and assist DLEAs on development and implementation of "alternative sentencing" methods.

a. **Discussion.** The Army disciplinary system can serve as a role model of a flexible punishment system. Given the array of options available to a commander, from simple restriction to a correctional confinement facility (CCF) to federal incarceration, the Army system gives commanders the ability to make the punishment fit the crime. Elements of the Army system are highlighted in the National Drug Control Strategy which states that

"military-style boot camps, with their rigorous regimes and austere conditions, bring a sense of order and discipline to the lives of youthful, nonviolent first-time offenders." By providing advice and assistance to the DLEAs in the development and implementation of "alternative sentencing" methods, the Army would serve as a role model and ensure that, should it be required to provide this service at some later date, a system compatible to the one already in place is initiated. The components below help amplify the specifics of this option.

b. Components

(1) The MTT should be three to five personnel and, at a minimum, include representatives from the Military Police and Judge Advocate General (JAG, judges, and lawyers) Corps.

(2) The MTT should conduct briefings at DLEA headquarters, both field and administrative, as well as on-site tours of facilities and programs.

(3) The MTT should be available for follow-up assistance as requested and serve as a liaison team to the DLEAs as they implement their programs.

(4) Offer the use of military lawyers and judges in selected areas to try civilian drug cases in order to decrease the backlog of drug-related cases in state and federal court systems.

(5) Offer the use of military facilities (judicial and otherwise) to state and federal officials for drug-related judicial uses.

(6) Expand logistical and transportation support in the criminal justice area.

c. Ratings

(1) Implementation.	<u>IMPLEMENT NOW</u>	<u>CONSIDER</u>	<u>AVOID</u>	<u>SUMMARY RATING</u>
	9%	56%	35%	Consider

(2) Impact. From -3 (high negative) to 0 (neutral) to 3 (high positive)

National Priority	Financial Costs	Readiness Training	Domestic Political	International Political	Doctrine	Force Structure
1	-1	0	0	0	0	0

d. Comments. The intent of this option was to exhibit the Army disciplinary system as a role model to civilian agencies and offer the assistance of military lawyers, judges, and facilities in prosecuting the backlog of civilian cases. It met with general disapproval. The positive benefits of using Army JAG personnel for assistance to civilian authorities was seen as being outweighed by the disadvantage of them not being available to the Army and adversely affecting their ability to provide needed legal services to the Army. This is in spite of the Army already having provided four judge advocates to the Department of Justice as Special Assistant US Attorneys for prosecution of federal cases. A similar authority to act as state prosecutors must be further researched. The use of Army judges to try federal cases

would require a Presidential appointment with the advice and consent of the Senate. State judges are generally appointed or elected, and military officers cannot hold an appointed or elected office or position. It would seem the use of military judges to try federal and state cases is not legally possible. Also needing further research is the issue of using National Guard judges and judge advocates in state cases. Federal sentencing guidelines mandate certain sentences, so attempting to transfer military options to the federal system does not appear to be feasible. The options a commander has under nonjudicial punishment do not transfer well into the civilian sector because the military system normally deals with first-time offenders, and the civilian court system already has more options than the military system. The Army does have expertise in the area of minimum security correctional retraining. The Corrections Brigade at Fort Riley would be an excellent role model for alternative sentencing.

2-4. DRUG TREATMENT, OPTION 3. Task the Recruiting Command to incorporate drug awareness and prevention programs in its normal duty functions.

a. Discussion. The Recruiting Command is physically present in numerous communities throughout the US and comes in contact with many individuals from all strata of society. It is in an ideal position to help in the "War on Drugs." With little or no additional support, recruiters can be spokespersons for drug awareness, education, and prevention. The following component items amplify this option.

b. Components

(1) Recruiting Command can be augmented with Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program (ADAPCP) professionals who could assist in tying the military ADAPCP drug prevention programs into the local community.

(2) Recruiters need to be briefed on the Army drug treatment system and be provided with a drug awareness, education, and prevention pitch.

(3) Recruiters must be charged with the additional responsibility of "spreading the gospel" throughout their areas of responsibility.

(4) Recruiters should present themselves to the school counselors in their areas as a liaison link to the Army drug treatment program.

(5) Recruiting Command can offer to expand the Army recruiting apparatus to include recruiting for the US Border Patrol.

c. Ratings

(1) **Implementation.** IMPLEMENT NOW CONSIDER AVOID SUMMARY RATING
52% 9% 39% Consider

(2) **Impact.** From -3 (high negative) to 0 (neutral) to 3 (high positive)

National Priority	Financial Costs	Readiness Training	Domestic Political	International Political	Doctrine	Force Structure
1	-1	0	1	0	0	0

d. Comments. Despite the 52 percent "Implement Now" response, the bimodal nature of all responses necessitated caution, hence a "Consider" rating. Although there was a majority in favor of the option, there was a strong contingent clearly against it. There was general disapproval of augmenting the Recruiting Command with ADAPCP personnel and tasks. Such an action would take these counselors from other needed activities. Recruiters could easily include antidrug discussions in their normal duties, thus contributing to national demand reduction efforts. They were seen as being able to educate youth during their recruiting pitches, but they should not be asked to do more than that. This could be implemented easily at minimal cost. This low key approach does not need to be limited to recruiters. Any facet of the military dealing with the public could be tied in with antidrug messages, such as the Army Band, Golden Knight demonstrations, Army sports competitions, the Old Guard, etc. Recruiting for the Border Patrol or any other government agency was rejected as too confusing and presenting both legal and policy issues. It would be an improper expenditure of DOD funds.

2-5. DRUG TREATMENT, OPTION 4. Expose civilian leaders to the Army drug prevention and treatment program and its successes.

a. Discussion. The Army has a lot to be proud of, and its efforts and success in the drug treatment arena are worthy of emulation by the civilian sector. Although our system of identification, treatment, and punishment is not directly transferable to the civilian community, much of it is. Much of the current literature that reflects disappointment with Army counter-drug efforts reflect a failure on the Army's part to "sell themselves" to the public. This option is one way to correct misperceptions.

b. Components

(1) The target audience is local government leaders, key Congressional leaders and committees, school officials, and leaders in the civilian business community.

(2) An MTT should be developed and consist of three to five members to include representatives from the JAG, ADAPCP, and the local installation where the briefings are given.

(3) The MTT should provide civilians with a way to tap into local military programs for training, advice, and assistance.

(4) The MTT should relate to the military communities how to provide appropriate training services and facilities to requesting Federal, State, and local agencies on establishment and operation of rehabilitation-oriented training camps for first offense drug abusers.

(5) Extend ADAPCP programs to civilian communities to train and assist the civilian counterpart efforts.

(6) Project medical department activity (MEDDAC) expertise off post into geographic areas of responsibilities to train and assist civilian counterparts.

c. Ratings

(1) Implementation. IMPLEMENT NOW CONSIDER AVOID SUMMARY RATING
 48% 43% 9% Implement Now

(2) Impact. From -3 (high negative) to 0 (neutral) to 3 (high positive)

National Priority	Financial Costs	Readiness Training	Domestic Political	International Political	Doctrine	Force Structure
<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>

d. Comments. This option was rated "Implement Now" because of the very high combined "Implement Now" and "Consider" responses. It did not achieve the 50 percent "Implement Now" level, but the very low 9 percent "Avoid" score was considered significant in that very few respondents were definitely against this option. The few comments received on this option were generally admonishments not to promise too much. The option does have modest, positive possibilities, which would create a positive image. Negatively, it may be more than the Army could deliver, making it a limited effort with limited resources. Concern was expressed over whether the Army needs to sell its successes to anyone. Our environment is unique, and it was expressed that the same measures would not work in the public sector. Also, the Army should consider carefully any commitment to work with civilian community rehabilitation-oriented agencies because these efforts could impact on local readiness.

2-6. EDUCATION, COMMUNITY ACTION, AND WORKPLACE, OPTION 5. Ensure the USMA and all colleges and universities offering ROTC programs are in the Network of Colleges and Universities Committed to the Elimination of Drug and Alcohol Abuse on their campuses.

a. Discussion. The Department of Education has established a Network of Colleges and Universities Committed to the Elimination of Drug and Alcohol Abuse on their campuses. As of March 1991, over 1,300 colleges and universities have joined the network. The United States Military Academy at West Point is an American institution that by its very nature epitomizes the values and attitudes of a drug-free society and should be a member of this network. Additionally, the Army should aggressively work to have all ROTC colleges join the network. Joining is a simple process. To join the Network, a college or university must endorse the Standards of the Network and submit a letter from the president of that institution indicating their commitment to implement the Standards on their campus. This letter of endorsement should be sent to Network Coordinator, US Department of Education, Washington, DC 20208-5644. The USMA far exceeds the Standards, and their joining is a leadership move that visibly demonstrates that the Army recognizes this effort as important. POC at the Department of Education, Office of Educational Research and Improvement, is Dr. Vonnie Veltri, (202) 219-2265.

b. Components

(1) The Department of Education has good ideas on other programs that our military colleges and academies could implement.

(2) Work with local schools, colleges, and universities in the development of firm drug prevention and control programs and policies (a condition for the receipt of federal funds).

(3) Project a proactive attitude regarding involvement in the "War on Drugs" and approach the counter-drug mission in an intelligent, aggressive, and imaginative way to convey the Army's supporting role.

c. Ratings

(1) Implementation.	<u>IMPLEMENT NOW</u>	<u>CONSIDER</u>	<u>AVOID</u>	<u>SUMMARY RATING</u>
	61%	30%	9%	Implement Now

(2) Impact. From -3 (high negative) to 0 (neutral) to 3 (high positive)

National Priority	Financial Costs	Readiness Training	Domestic Political	International Political	Doctrine	Force Structure
1	0	0	1	0	0	0

d. Comments. Few comments were received on this option. That could indicate it met with general acceptance, especially since it is noncontroversial. It is doable at no cost, worth pursuing, and most effective if done in a low key manner. There is practically no negative side to this option if done without undue aggressiveness. Yet, it would not be realistic to believe every school would join the network.

2-7. EDUCATION, COMMUNITY ACTION, AND WORKPLACE, OPTION 6. Task the Army Staff to develop a composite briefing team to advise MACOMs on Army capabilities and limitations in support of the counter-drug effort.

a. Discussion. MACOM commanders are able to shape and influence the counter-drug support that DLEAs and host nations request, but they need to fully understand the Army's capabilities and limitations when in a counter-drug role/mission. As the Army develops greater expertise from working with the DLEAs and host countries, planners will understand more fully how to incorporate Army assets into their *modus operandi*. This knowledge must continually be sent out to the field so that the requests received from non-DOD agencies are actually supportable.

b. Components

(1) Briefing teams should include representatives from Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT), DCSOPS, and Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) and be composed of both military and civilian personnel.

(2) Briefing teams should emphasize two-way communications with the MACOMs and serve as a liaison between the ARSTAF and the MACOMs.

(3) Use of the briefing teams could be expanded to include key Congressional leaders, DLEAs, installations, and host country leadership.

(4) Establish a drug-specific network to disseminate lessons learned and successes, i.e., a drug newsletter or magazine.

(5) Publish Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army counter-drug memoranda in Army periodicals to send a clear message to the field on the Army position regarding counter-drug involvement and importance.

(6) Develop a comprehensive public affairs/public relations campaign highlighting current Army involvement, commitment to the counter-drug effort, and Army strategy to support the President's counter-drug program. The target audience is key political leaders.

(7) Include counter-drug as a key agenda item in all Commanders' Conferences.

(8) Task CINCs/MACOMs to ensure counter-drug mission tasks are included in unit Mission Essential Task Lists (METL) where appropriate.

(9) Incorporate a block of instruction on counter-drug operations and contingency considerations in military schooling systems.

c. Ratings

(1) Implementation. IMPLEMENT NOW CONSIDER AVOID SUMMARY RATING
30% 61% 9% Consider

(2) Impact. From -3 (high negative) to 0 (neutral) to 3 (high positive)

National Priority	Financial Costs	Readiness Training	Domestic Political	International Political	Doctrine	Force Structure
1	-1	0	1	0	0	0

d. Comments. No consensus exists over whether Army counter-drug capabilities and limitations are adequately known within the Army. Army respondents tended to believe they are not well known. DLEA personnel believe they know enough about Army capabilities, but seem to rely on their Army liaison for this knowledge. This indicates that more needs to be done in this area. Existing ARSTAF and MACOM communications channels are sufficient. The Center for Army Lessons Learned should be used to disseminate counter-drug information rather than a drug-specific network. Likewise, a drug newsletter would duplicate current publications. A public affairs strategy can and should be developed, with appropriate operations security (OPSEC) constraints. Key political leaders as a target audience was seen as inappropriate. Mission Essential Tasks Lists should be built by the units as dictated by missions. The doctrine should be developed by TRADOC.

2-8. EDUCATION, COMMUNITY ACTION, AND WORKPLACE, OPTION 7. Direct the Installation Commanders to become actively involved in local drug reduction programs.

a. Discussion. Once again, this option highlights the role model aspect of assisting in demand reduction efforts. Army leaders and soldiers are inextricably woven into the communities where they live, both military and civilian. The Army needs to highlight the importance of its ties to the civilian community. Additionally, efforts such as these may help change stereotypes of the military as condoning heavy drinking and rabble rousing that frequently are associated with drug use.

b. Components

(1) Where communities have no programs, commanders can become catalysts for action such as boy/girl scout support, summer youth programs, after school activities (recreation, tutoring, employment, etc.), mentor programs, Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps activities, etc.

(2) Invite local business and community leaders to observe all aspects of the Army drug education, identification, treatment, and punishment system at work.

(3) Highlight the fact that we have an active system of education, detection, treatment, and punishment. Avoid painting a picture of nirvana; we have been successful to some extent, but we still have problems.

(4) Care must be taken when explaining the disciplinary aspects of our program so as not to give the impression that unsolved problems are thrown back into the civilian communities.

(5) Use the Community of Excellence architecture to advertise what works and learn what has worked as an intracommunity sharing media.

(6) Identify underutilized military facilities and/or facilities designated for closure that may be suitable for possible use as treatment sites, including treatment campuses.

(7) Offer assistance to local school systems and municipal drug treatment programs.

(8) Provide professional training and assistance to the local communities (MEDDAC and ADAPCP).

(9) Provide assets and expertise to schools and local organizations for Health and Welfare style inspections.

(10) Strongly encourage, and even reward, active involvement from leadership at all levels in post and community-wide drug prevention efforts.

c. Ratings

(1) Implementation.	<u>IMPLEMENT NOW</u>	<u>CONSIDER</u>	<u>AVOID</u>	<u>SUMMARY RATING</u>
	48%	26%	26%	Consider

(2) **Impact.** From -3 (high negative) to 0 (neutral) to 3 (high positive)

<u>National</u> <u>Priority</u>	<u>Financial</u> <u>Costs</u>	<u>Readiness</u> <u>Training</u>	<u>Domestic</u> <u>Political</u>	<u>International</u> <u>Political</u>	<u>Doctrine</u>	<u>Force</u> <u>Structure</u>
1	-1	0	2	0	0	0

d. **Comments.** Nearly half of the respondents favored implementing this option despite most of the comments being negative or warning in nature. Installation commanders are already involved in several of these activities and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) already has an award for installation involvement in community drug abuse programs. An excellent military-civilian community rapport exists in many locations. Installation commanders need to take the pulse of their local communities and determine their magnitude of involvement without directives from higher authority. Additional assistance is limited. Health and welfare inspection assistance was rejected as being bad publicity. Other negative comments were that it would be a gamble having the Army too involved or proactive in US society, which could damage the Army image, and that commanders have better things to do with their time. Points well made were that the Army rehabilitation expertise is with alcohol, not drugs, and the greatest areas of civilian needs, the larger inner cities, are where the Army is not well represented. It was also suggested that the Army, if it undertakes these actions, coordinate them through the ONDCP Office of Demand Reduction.

2-9. EDUCATION, COMMUNITY ACTION, AND WORKPLACE, OPTION 8. Aggressively implement Executive Order 12564, the civilian urinalysis program.

a. **Discussion.** Executive Order 12564 is intended to result in a drug-free federal workforce. Aggressive implementation of EO 12564 by all MACOMs will ensure that military members and the civilian work force that support them are jointly moving toward the same goal.

b. Components

(1) Devise and implement one urinalysis program applicable for all DOD employees--military and civilian. Considering the proven effectiveness of the military system, this One System should be modeled after the current military program.

(2) Implement the same testing, identification, referral, treatment, and punishment provisions on an equitable basis for all military and civilian DOD employees.

(3) Encourage the public support of DOD civilians for the One System approach.

(4) Impose punishment measures the same for both military and civilian, i.e., reprimand, grade reduction, forfeiture of pay, and elimination.

(5) Offer a one-time self-referral amnesty period for DOD civilians prior to implementation of the One System.

c. Ratings

(1) Implementation. IMPLEMENT NOW CONSIDER AVOID SUMMARY RATING
43% 43% 14% Consider

(2) Impact. From -3 (high negative) to 0 (neutral) to 3 (high positive)

National Priority	Financial Costs	Readiness Training	Domestic Political	International Political	Doctrine	Force Structure
2	-1	0	2	0	0	0

d. Comments. To undertake implementing a uniform urinalysis program for all DOD military and civilian personnel would be a monumental legal task requiring a change in law and a major battle with the civil liberties community. Civilians have constitutional rights not applicable to the military and are not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). While perhaps a noble measure to demonstrate service unity and an example to other government and private agencies, attempts to implement one system for all appears to be too large a task for the Army to promote at this time. Comments centered on the patriotic and legal aspects of having a uniform DOD urinalysis program. Favorable comments included that the Army and its civilians are one team and should have one standard. Such a program would show non-DOD civilians that the entire military establishment is committed to the control of drug abuse within its ranks. Unfortunately, these comments were not supported by other than a desired sense of unity. The two high impact ratings reflect this attitude. Executive Order 12564 leaves to agency heads the determination of which employees are tested based on the agency mission and critical employee duties. Only approximately 10,000 of 360,000 employees are subject to random urinalysis at this time. As for punishment, soldiers are subject to criminal prosecution, whereas civilians face administrative actions, up to removal from federal service. The Fourth Amendment, prohibiting illegal searches, comes into play here. Requiring an employee or soldier to produce a urine sample to be analyzed for evidence of illegal drug use constitutes a search. To be a valid search, it must meet the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. This means the Government must demonstrate a compelling need which overrides an individual's privacy interests. The great majority of civilian positions in the Army (350,000 of 360,000) does not entail duties that would overcome an employee's expectation of privacy. The readiness requirement of the military to protect national security interests makes random urinalysis necessary for them. No such critical state of alert requirement exists for all civilians of the DOD or any other government agency because they are not on call to go to war.

2-10. INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES, OPTION 9. In support of the CINCs and in cooperation with host nation governments, conduct extensive anti-narcotic public affairs and psychological operations (PSYOPS) campaigns directed toward the country's business establishments, civic leaders, and general populace.

a. Discussion. Supply reduction measures cannot rely only on host nation government, police, and military organizations. As in the United States, if a long-term struggle is to be successful, it must have the willing support of the people. In order to gain the active support of the people, they must be

informed of the issues and dangers. Army public affairs and PSYOPS specialists can be made available to assist host nation organizations in shaping national awareness, education, and action programs. These efforts will help shore up host nation law enforcement agencies (LEA) and military capabilities so that the nation can provide for its sovereignty and the rule of their law within their own borders and airspace.

b. Components

(1) Have CINCs, in cooperation with TRADOC and Special Warfare Center, identify the total requirements in their areas of responsibility and assign additional public affairs and PSYOPS personnel as appropriate.

(2) Activate/create additional public affairs/PSYOPS/civil affairs units for expanded missions and/or MTTs in the Third World.

(3) Ensure these personnel are well trained in language and culture for the region/country to which they will be assigned.

(4) Aim campaigns primarily against the drugs, and secondarily against the drug people. Cite religious and moral arguments against drugs.

(5) Include alternatives to the drug wages earned by the lower-level drug workers, such as farmers and drug transporters.

(6) Encourage the populace, business, religious, education, and municipal leaders to get involved and take action against the drug economy, negative effects of the drugs, and the drug culture.

(7) Aim PSYOPS efforts at delegitimation sentiment in countries which do not now possess a significant narcotics trafficking industry.

(8) Assist other countries in the development of counter-drug public affairs and PSYOPS strategies. Continue to support host country civilian and military antidrug roles.

(9) Recognize the Army support role in these efforts as equivalent to Low Intensity Conflict under peacetime rules of engagement.

(10) Conduct these international activities under the operational command of the CINCs and coordinate with Country Teams.

c. Ratings

(1) Implementation.	<u>IMPLEMENT NOW</u>	<u>CONSIDER</u>	<u>AVOID</u>	<u>SUMMARY RATING</u>
	27%	31%	42%	Consider

(2) Impact. From -3 (high negative) to 0 (neutral) to 3 (high positive)

National Priority	Financial Costs	Readiness Training	Domestic Political	International Political	Doctrine	Force Structure
2	-2	-1	0	1	0	-1

d. Comments. Public affairs and particularly PSYOPS measures were not held in high esteem by the majority of respondents. This option should be deleted in its present form because the Army is not the lead agency for these actions, and many are already being implemented. Military personnel are already considered to be well trained, host countries are being assisted, and the programs are conducted with the full support of the US Country Teams and the CINC. The Army provides assets such as qualified personnel when tasked, but it is not an Army lead issue to determine where, when, or how to employ them. DOD has a similar role. However, this is a very important area and the Army should be supportive. Because of its high importance, this option was rated "Consider" rather than "Avoid." The interagency process must be used, led by the State Department and coordinated with the specific country involved. The campaign themes should be developed by the agencies in country. Campaigns should include nation assistance initiatives to develop and strengthen the host nation infrastructure, such as those involving engineer, medical, dental, and communications assets. The US military should keep a low profile. Cultural biases in South American countries against a strong military leadership carry over to the US forces. Also, since the US military is not viewed as a creditable conveyer of information, the programs implemented would receive a better reception coming from other US government agencies.

2-11. INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES, OPTION 10. Expand military-to-military liaison in support of our international roles and objectives.

a. Discussion. Actions here closely parallel the recommended actions for community involvement. The difference is that here the community is the international military community with whom we work side by side. Understanding that our role is not to usurp the host country's sovereignty and to convince them to actively pursue the war against drugs in their own country, this liaison mission helps explain the actions of the US and highlights that we operate in a purely support role at the request of the host nation.

b. Components

(1) As a matter of policy, stress international cooperation in drug interdiction, eradication, and intelligence activities.

(2) Designate the senior US military liaison person in country to be a general officer to demonstrate how much importance we attach to the position.

(3) Encourage continuing and expanded joint military training exercises and operations.

(4) Develop a counter-drug curriculum for the School of the Americas, counter-drug exercises at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) integrating civilian and host nation DLEAs with active and reserve forces, and restart the Military Assistance Training Advisor (MATA) course at Fort Bragg.

(5) Provide positive examples of CONUS military-DLEA cooperation efforts to encourage similar efforts in host nations.

(6) Continue to offer training to host nation forces, at reduced or no charge, and at either US or host country sites. Develop a CONUS-based training course for source country security forces (El Salvador model).

(7) Implement exchange programs where US and host nation officer and enlisted soldiers are temporarily assigned to the other country's units (this would not apply to US soldiers in host nation units actively engaging in narco-combat operations).

(8) Arrange for the establishment of Theater Logistical Support Offices to coordinate offers to support and requests for support from host nation military and civilian DLEAs.

(9) Continue to provide and develop more effective command and control techniques in host countries.

(10) Continue to provide and develop more effective operational planning assistance, transportation support, tactical intelligence support, information sharing, logistics assistance, equipment loans, and temporary use of military facilities for training and basing for US and host country forces.

(11) With host nation cooperation, clarify what is "extraterritorial" (3-, 12-, or 200-mile limit) in terms of DOD policy for interdiction.

(12) Assist host countries in the eradication of crops, interdiction of illegal drugs and precursor chemicals, and development of the counter-drug infrastructure with the goal of host nation self sufficiency.

c. Ratings

(1) Implementation.	<u>IMPLEMENT NOW</u>	<u>CONSIDER</u>	<u>AVOID</u>	<u>SUMMARY RATING</u>
	32%	56%	12%	Consider

(2) Impact. From -3 (high negative) to 0 (neutral) to 3 (high positive)

National Priority	Financial Costs	Readiness Training	Domestic Political	International Political	Doctrine	Force Structure
2	-2	1	0	2	0	-1

d. Comments. The US military must not overemphasize direct military-to-military liaison in its counter-drug efforts outside the US, its territories, and dependencies. Most counter-drug coordination will be done with other US government agencies and host nation police forces, not with the local military. We must be aware of the host nation military role in the country counter-drug effort. Designating the senior US military liaison in each country to be a general officer is not realistic with current force reductions. Training offered at reduced or no charge is not allowed by the Foreign Assistance Act and Arms Export Control Act unless emergency authorities exist. There is little chance of that occurring at this time. The same laws apply to transportation support, logistics assistance, equipment loans, and similar actions. Theater logistical support structures already exist, as do interdiction, eradication, and infrastructure development

programs assisting the host countries. Successful efforts in these countries will require political support, financial pressure, CINC and Country Team coordination, and a thorough understanding of the political, economic, and cultural underpinnings of the South American drug trade. Mistakes will only give guerrilla insurgency and narco-terrorist organizations more legitimacy with the impoverished local populations. Clarifying extraterritoriality is a responsibility of the State Department.

2-12. INTERDICTION EFFORTS, OPTION 11. Support DLEA operations along the Southwest border with deployments of company-size tactical units on a rotational basis.

a. Discussion. An aggressive role in counter-drug support translates into people on the ground. The Southwest border operations in support of Joint Task Force (JTF) 6 are the Army's most visible role in the interdiction effort. Given the previous sentiment among the DLEA community that the military was not fully behind the counter-drug mission, direct application of force on a larger scale than the *status quo* is an overt signal of commitment. A tactical unit is required in order that training be "substantially equivalent" to other mission training. This mission should be a coordinated Army-DLEA operation and should be carried out as described in the components below.

b. Components

(1) Companies rotate through for a 90-day period.

(2) Companies are augmented with sensor and night vision devices, ground surveillance radars, vehicles, communications equipment, and aviation support.

(3) The company undergoes certification by the Ranger Training Brigade at its home station prior to assuming the support mission.

(4) Operations will be conducted in support of the Border Patrol. The company will not conduct unilateral operations.

(5) The dedicated mission is to observe and report possible drug-related activities to the Border Patrol, improve communications, provide transportation to arresting officers, and raise the risk to drug traffickers through effective deterrence.

(6) The company would be a force multiplier and the aviation support and communications aspects are critical so as not to overwhelm the capabilities of the DLEAs to respond.

(7) The rotation will be continuous throughout the year.

(8) Continue to press for inclusion of "land" in the DOD's role as the Federal Government's single lead agency for detection and monitoring of "aerial and maritime" transit of illegal drugs into the US.

(9) Continue and expand training, reconnaissance, and logistics planning with the local DLEAs.

c. Ratings

(1) Implementation. IMPLEMENT NOW CONSIDER AVOID SUMMARY RATING
39% 22% 39% Consider

(2) Impact. From -3 (high negative) to 0 (neutral) to 3 (high positive)

National Priority	Financial Costs	Readiness Training	Domestic Political	International Political	Doctrine	Force Structure
2	-1	2	2	1	0	0

d. Comments. Rotating units near the Southwest border has appeal and benefit. A real mission for the units means high morale and "substantially equivalent" realistic training. It also satisfies the Congressional directive to conduct training exercises in known drug interdiction areas. The deployments must emphasize the training mission and not provoke the Mexican sensitivities to militarizing the border and to sovereignty issues. Unduly arousing these sensitivities could harm our continuing efforts to coordinate more expansive counter-drug activities with their participation. The more routine the deployments appear, the better. However, it makes sense for the military to participate in interdiction. Even so, increased military efforts probably would not be much more effective than current efforts. The border cannot be sealed economically. The Joint Staff had proposed an expansion of the DOD role, to include being the single lead agency for detection and monitoring of land as well as aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the US. Congress has since decided not to approve that mission extension. The comments above do not address the specific components, other than number 8 and the option itself. In general, the comments exhibit a positive inclination toward the option, and are supported by the impact ratings. Only financial costs are rated negative, and then only a low negative. Conversely, an equal percentage of respondents voted to avoid this option as to implement it now. An even lesser percentage favored its consideration, less than one-quarter of the respondents. The distinctly bimodal distribution resulted in a low rank order of number 13 out of 16.

2-13. INTERDICTION EFFORTS, OPTION 12. Expand liaison with DLEAs and host nation forces.

a. Discussion. Keeping in mind that the Army is in a support role, it is only through effective liaison with the DLEAs and host nations whom we support that we become a team player. The Army must play by their rules and make clear our capabilities and limitations so that we do not over/underwhelm them with support. The issue of effective liaison was a weak link with the DLEA community. The Army was perceived as not fully committed to the counter-drug mission because we either did not man counter-drug positions with competitive personnel or we failed to man positions at all. It is through effective liaison that we are able to shape and influence our role in the counter-drug effort. Moreover, it is the people we provide to the key positions that give us our best public relations. There are many steps we can take to ensure effective liaison.

b. Components

- (1) Increase the number of liaison positions in support of DLEAs and host nations.
- (2) Task DCSPER to immediately fill all designated Army counter-drug positions with competitive personnel.
- (3) Petition Congress to exclude all Army counter-drug personnel from end strength ceilings.
- (4) Assign counter-drug additional skill identifiers (ASI).
- (5) Rotate key personnel through key counter-drug positions to establish a solid base of knowledge and spread the knowledge base throughout the Army.
- (6) Develop a priority placement program with the ONDCP and DLEAs to facilitate transition from active duty status to civilian employment.
- (7) Poll the DLEAs for their opinions regarding Army personnel support to date and have them provide recommendations for improvement.
- (8) Have liaison officers serve as "member of squad" for a 2- to 4-week period with the DLEA with whom they will work so they gain an appreciation for the DLEA methods of operation and their needs.
- (9) Train liaison personnel on the Army counter-drug missions, role, capabilities, and limitations prior to their arrival on station. Additionally, train them in diplomacy, the proactive nature of their positions, and that the Army is primarily a support agency.
- (10) Stabilize liaison positions for at least 2 years in an effort to ensure continuity and unity of effort.
- (11) Provide canine support to DLEAs upon request subject to availability.
- (12) Develop a counter-drug Training Center on a CONUS installation to train service personnel and host country security forces assigned to counter-drug missions.

c. Ratings

(1) Implementation. IMPLEMENT NOW CONSIDER AVOID SUMMARY RATING
52% 26% 22% Implement Now

(2) Impact. From -3 (high negative) to 0 (neutral) to 3 (high positive)

National Priority	Financial Costs	Readiness Training	Domestic Political	International Political	Doctrine	Force Structure
1	-1	0	1	1	0	0

d. Comments. This option met with a high level of approval. The Joint Staff has liaison officers at all the major agencies and cooperation is very good at that level. An overall impression is that military-DLEA tensions have been less than expected. Filling counter-drug positions with competitive and retainable personnel was an early issue. While some of these concerns still exist, they have lessened. Two to three year stability of these personnel was frequently expressed as desirable. There is a general feeling that the liaison personnel have done and will continue to do a good job as long as there is a spirit of cooperation, sensitivity to the needs of the DLEAs, and a common sense approach. More progress will be made by being proactive, meeting with DLEA personnel, and seeing the drug problem from their point of view. Newer issues to pursue are to support the petition to Congress to exclude all Army counter-drug personnel from end strength ceilings and to facilitate a direct transition from the Army to DLEAs of qualified personnel departing active Army service. Tracking counter-drug personnel with use of an Additional Skill Identifier will not work. Possible solutions are to create a Functional Area for these personnel or a counter-drug management cell at PERSCOM. We also need to create the perception within the Army that an assignment to a DLEA is career enhancing. Another suggestion was to perform a front end analysis of the positions with DLEAs. This would include a more complete description by the DLEA of the position requirements for the people they want assigned to them.

2-14. RESEARCH AGENDA, OPTION 13. Develop and offer to the counter-drug community a counter-drug research, development, and acquisition (RD&A) program using Army laboratories and centers in support of the counter-drug mission.

a. Discussion. In August the Army Science Board completed a thorough study of the use of Army technologies in support of counter-drug efforts. Their study determined that much more can be done and many good recommendations in the area of research support to counter-drug were made. Many current and evolving technologies presents capabilities that can be used for both traditional military applications and the many aspects of the counter-drug effort. Considering the high level emphasis and support to fight the war against drugs, the Army is compelled to take advantage of any and all affordable technological advances.

b. Components

(1) In the counter-drug community, offer to be the executive agent for all drug-related research and development.

(2) Appoint an Army representative to the Drug Control Research and Development Committee to enhance cooperation, visibility, input, and output.

(3) Provide input to the comprehensive information base about "what works" in controlling drug use through drug enforcement, prevention, and treatment based on the Army model.

(4) Take the lead in night vision device and early warning systems utilization, training, and development. Tie this into the comprehensive information base suggested above.

(5) Task the Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) to support research efforts in aircraft traveler and container monitoring and tracking (space tracking), border surveillance (airborne moving target indicator (MTI) radars), and urban surveillance (physical and electronic surveillance).

(6) Task Engineering Topographical Lab to support growing field surveillance and eradication (space surveillance).

(7) Task medical labs to support Department of Agriculture in growing field surveillance and eradication (bio/chemical).

(8) Task the Chemical RD&E Center (CRDEC) to support Department of Agriculture in growing field surveillance and eradication (eradication).

(9) Follow up on several of the recommendations made by the Army Science Board Summer Study on how to use Army systems against drugs.

(10) Advertise widely among DLEA technical representatives and sponsor a comprehensive R&D symposium to publicize what the Army R&D labs and centers are working on, their counter-drug applications, and how the DLEAs can take advantage of those research efforts and products. This would include DLEA input on what they need and how the Army labs and centers can help them.

c. Ratings

(1) Implementation.	<u>IMPLEMENT NOW</u>	<u>CONSIDER</u>	<u>AVOID</u>	<u>SUMMARY RATING</u>
	42%	37%	21%	Consider

(2) Impact. From -3 (high negative) to 0 (neutral) to 3 (high positive)

National	Financial	Readiness	Domestic	International		Force
<u>Priority</u>	<u>Costs</u>	<u>Training</u>	<u>Political</u>	<u>Political</u>	<u>Doctrine</u>	<u>Structure</u>
1	-1	0	1	0	0	0

d. Comments. The offer to be the executive agent for all drug-related research and development was rejected. It is probably too big for the Army, maybe even for DOD. The research agenda for the Army is currently full. The primary mission of that research is to support traditional Army needs. The Army must see to those needs first. Interoperability committees exist and are working, such as the ONDCP Science and Technology Committee. The Army should use these existing agencies as much as possible and resist creating new ones. We need not add Army membership to committees with representatives already designated to act on our behalf, such as the Drug Control Research and Development Committee. Make the existing system work and meet organizational requirements with the existing structure. Army labs are supporting the counter-drug R&D effort. The Army is already the lead in night vision devices and early warning systems utilization, training, and development. A DCSOPS report on the Army Science Board Summer Study recommendations on the "Use of Army Systems and Technologies in Counter-narcotics Efforts" is due to be released soon. The one R&D product with the highest potential payoff is a device that can detect drugs inside containers.

2-15. RESEARCH AGENDA, OPTION 14. Develop a simple process to allow DLEAs to submit their requirements and obtain expedited support from Army laboratories and centers.

a. Discussion. Whereas the previous option was focused on scientific research and development, this option is concerned with the procedural process of getting requirements identified and the products out to the users in an expeditious manner. Drug fighters need advanced technological equipment as soon as possible. DLEAs are being overwhelmed by the volume of opposition and must have responsive support. Even though the counter-drug effort is long-term, 20 or more years, the DLEAs can afford to wait neither for research to drag on nor for the bureaucratic morass of delays between request and delivery.

b. Components

(1) Establish technical liaison and exchange programs with the DLEAs.

(2) Establish a direct line from DLEA technical liaison personnel to a single Army R&D agency (PEO/PM for counter-drug) to expedite research requests and information.

(3) Work with the DLEAs to articulate the needs of the research and development process to expeditiously support counter-drug efforts (e.g., sensors and collectors on long legs aircraft, etc.).

(4) Provide responsive support to DLEAs by considering their requests as the number one Army R&D priority and receive the appropriate funding support.

c. Ratings

(1) **Implementation.** IMPLEMENT NOW CONSIDER AVOID SUMMARY RATING
46% 37% 17% Consider

(2) **Impact.** From -3 (high negative) to 0 (neutral) to 3 (high positive)

National Priority	Financial Costs	Readiness Training	Domestic Political	International Political	Doctrine	Force Structure
2	-1	0	0	0	0	-1

d. Comments. There was considerable opposition to treating DLEA requests as the number one priority. The Army R&D effort should remain unchanged, that is, to develop weapons systems and to support combat, combat support, and combat service support units. After these priorities, remaining available efforts can be directed against the drug effort. The Army R&D facilities do not exist for the DLEAs and should not subordinate their primary efforts to the DLEAs. The DLEAs would like their projects to have a higher priority, but understand that will happen only if the research has a DOD and DLEA dual applicability. The other component actions in this option received no comments.

2-16. INTELLIGENCE AGENDA, OPTION 15. Expand training on intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and data correlation.

a. Discussion. When asked what he had learned about what is needed to effectively interdict the flow of drugs, Vice Admiral Irwin, US Coast Guard, Commander of JTF 4, replied, "Our convictions are more and more fortified that intelligence is the key. You either have to have outstanding intelligence in order to properly detect, interdict, and apprehend these people, or you have to have almost a continuous surveillance, a barrier of some kind; otherwise they will find ways to operate when you are not operating." Intelligence preparation of the battlefield can be effectively adapted to the counter-drug effort with only minor modifications. The IPB process lends itself very well to the counter-drug mission--intelligence is a key to preparing for battle, it is a systematic approach to analyzing the enemy and terrain, it incorporates enemy doctrine, and it supports the decisionmaking process of commanders.

b. Components

(1) Establish at the Army Intelligence Agency an all-source counter-drug intelligence element for support to Army units.

(2) Establish an Army intelligence briefing team to advise Army MACOMs and civilian DLEAs about Army intelligence personnel, equipment, operational doctrine, and training assets as well as to assess field needs.

(3) Determine optimal task organizations to respond to counter-drug demands.

(4) Keep intelligence at a low classification so it may be used by DLEAs.

(5) Coordinate with the DLEAs to resolve the disparity between Army intelligence efforts aimed at destroying critical nodes (Decide - Detect - Deliver) and the DLEA aim of criminal prosecution (Detect - Decide - Deliver).

(6) Expand training opportunities for civilian DLEAs on IPB and data correlation. Tailor existing courses to meet their particular needs.

(7) To foster a greater understanding of intelligence capabilities and procedures, send competitive Army personnel to DLEA intelligence training courses to learn how they operate, compare that to Army methods, and determine ways to satisfy all participants in the counter-drug effort. This training exchange program applies equally to host nations.

c. Ratings

(1) Implementation.	<u>IMPLEMENT NOW</u>	<u>CONSIDER</u>	<u>AVOID</u>	<u>SUMMARY RATING</u>
	63%	8%	29%	Implement Now

(2) Impact. From -3 (high negative) to 0 (neutral) to 3 (high positive)

<u>National</u> <u>Priority</u>	<u>Financial</u> <u>Costs</u>	<u>Readiness</u> <u>Training</u>	<u>Domestic</u> <u>Political</u>	<u>International</u> <u>Political</u>	<u>Doctrine</u>	<u>Force</u> <u>Structure</u>
2	-1	-1	0	0	0	-1

d. Comments. Most of the structure for implementing these measures is already in place. We should make use of those agencies and continue to improve. For instance, the DIA Counternarcotics Research Center, formed in November 1989, is doing what the Army Intelligence Agency was proposed to do. Let DIA continue. The Army can receive what it needs from DIA. CINCFOR is now determining optimal task organizations to respond to counter-drug action requests. The task organization is situationally dependent and driven by mission and terrain. Intelligence is kept at the lowest level possible even now. Training opportunities exist for both DOD and DLEA personnel, such as by the National Interagency Counternarcotics Institute in California, the Ranger Training Brigade, and the DIA Defense Intelligence College Counternarcotics Intelligence Course. Since most of the activities already exist, we should focus on expanding them.

2-17. INTELLIGENCE AGENDA, OPTION 16. Expand information sharing capabilities by continued efforts to establish an integrated C3I network.

a. Discussion. Each of the separate agencies involved in the counter-drug effort has its own information and intelligence gathering elements and procedures, as well as its own ways of acting on data. In a much more efficient world, all intelligence collected by all these agencies would come into a central location for processing, analysis, and immediate dissemination to any agency requiring its use in real time. Such a system is the goal of this option. All applicable agencies would be hooked into the system, feed it with their intelligence gathering products, and have all the intelligence from all the agencies at their immediate disposal for use.

b. Components

(1) Design a single, interoperable intelligence architecture for use by all agencies.

(2) In coordination with the DLEAs, agree upon a common methodology for tactical intelligence operations to be applied by all agencies at all echelons. This methodology must support ground-to-ground, ground-to-air, air-to-ground, and air-to-air operations (ground includes sea-based surface assets).

(3) Continue to provide and develop more effective intelligence support for host countries.

(4) Ensure the C3I design facilitates rapid, responsive, and reliable data transfer.

(5) Appoint an Army representative to the interagency working group chaired by the Office of National Drug Control Policy that is used to develop plans for an intelligence center to unite US drug-related analytical capabilities and improve intelligence capabilities.

(6) Establish an Army communications briefing team to advise Army MACOMs and civilian DLEAs about Army communications personnel, equipment, operational doctrine, and training assets as well as to assess field needs.

c. Ratings

(1) Implementation. IMPLEMENT NOW CONSIDER AVOID SUMMARY RATING
63% 12% 25% Implement Now

(2) Impact. From -3 (high negative) to 0 (neutral) to 3 (high positive)

National Priority	Financial Costs	Readiness Training	Domestic Political	International Political	Doctrine	Force Structure
3	-2	0	0	0	0	-1

d. Comments. Under OSD C3I, a considerable amount has been done. Intelligence efforts are receiving much support and this option was highly endorsed by the respondents. A number of interconnectable networks is preferred over a single interoperable intelligence architecture--a reasonable and cost effective choice. Existing networks and facilities provide varying capabilities. The Anti-Drug Network (ADNET) provides interconnectivity between members of the counter-drug community on collateral operational issues. DIA established the EMERALD computer linkage analysis prototype and is attempting movement analysis. The El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) provides a comprehensive and accurate tactical intelligence picture of drug movement. The Army does not need to appoint a representative to the interagency working group chaired by the ONDCP, because the OSD C3I is the DOD point of contact for these efforts. Unfortunately, the DLEAs are supposed to pick up the funding responsibility for these efforts after 1991 when the OSD funds run out. There is a plan for that, but it does not appear many DLEAs are following it.

Section II. WORLD TWO

2-18. WORLD TWO INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES, OPTION 1. In support of the CINCs and in cooperation with host nation governments, conduct extensive antinarcotic public affairs and PSYOPS campaigns directed toward the country's business establishments, civic leaders, and general populace.

a. Discussion. Supply reduction measures cannot rely only on host nation government, police, and military organizations. As in the United States, if a long-term struggle is to be successful, it must have the willing support of the people. In order to gain the active support of the people, they must be informed of the issues and dangers. Army public affairs and PSYOPS specialists can be made available and assist host nation organizations in shaping national awareness, education, and action programs. These efforts will help shore up host nation LEA and military capabilities so that the nation can provide for its sovereignty and the rule of their law within their own borders and airspace.

b. Components

(1) Publicly expose the actions and involvement of known but unproved drug kingpins and key players, especially politicians, police, and military leaders.

(2) Actively promote internecine gang wars by instigating animosity between drug groups and their personnel at all levels.

(3) Encourage the defection of narcotics traffickers and revolutionaries with promises of immunity and relocation in exchange for significant information.

(4) Leak disinformation to known narcotic informants about real and manufactured antidrug operations and personnel.

(5) Set up and operate a clandestine radio station to barrage the populace with information on the evils of the drug culture and how the hidden drug economy hurts them to foster hatred toward the extravagance and cruelty of the drug lords.

c. Impact. From -3 (high negative) to 0 (neutral) to 3 (high positive), NC is No Consensus. There are no implementation figures because the survey respondents were not tasked to complete an implementation preference for the World Two options.

National Priority	Financial Costs	Readiness Training	Domestic Political	International Political	Doctrine	Force Structure
NC	-2	0	-1	-3	0	NC

d. Comments. The kindest things said about the component actions are that they support our national objectives and that the actions already being developed could be greatly expanded in the World Two scenario. However, none of the component actions listed are Army lead activities. All actions, inside or outside the US borders, would be the responsibility of other US government agencies. These actions, if undertaken without the consent of host nations, would most likely violate those host nation laws. These actions also have the potential of escalating into violence that might not be limited to the drug gangs. Even in a World Two environment, operation of a clandestine radio network is contrary to the provisions of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.

2-19. WORLD TWO INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES, OPTION 2. Expand military-to-military liaison in support of our international roles and objectives.

a. Discussion. Actions here closely parallel the recommended actions for community involvement. The difference is that here the community is the international military community with whom we work side by side. Understanding that our role is not to usurp the host country's sovereignty and to convince them to actively pursue the war against drugs in their own country, this liaison mission helps explain the actions of the US and highlights that we operate in a purely support role at the request of the host nation.

b. Components

- (1) Authorize US military to conduct counter-drug operations independent of host nation military or civilian forces.
- (2) Authorize US military to apprehend suspected drug traffickers in host nation countries, with use of force if necessary.
- (3) Allow US military to detain apprehended suspected drug traffickers while awaiting host nation extradition approval.
- (4) Temporarily assign US language qualified interrogators to host nation units actively participating in antidrug operations.
- (5) Use attack helicopters to destroy remote drug processing sites, storage sites, landing strips, and known trafficker haunts.
- (6) Conduct overt search and destroy missions with host nation forces against known trafficker personnel and/or sites.

c. Impact. From -3 (high negative) to 0 (neutral) to 3 (high positive), NC is No Consensus.

<u>National</u>	<u>Financial</u>	<u>Readiness</u>	<u>Domestic</u>	<u>International</u>		<u>Force</u>
<u>Priority</u>	<u>Costs</u>	<u>Training</u>	<u>Political</u>	<u>Political</u>	<u>Doctrine</u>	<u>Structure</u>
NC	-3	-1	-3	-3	0	0

d. Comments. Without the explicit consent of the foreign nation involved, US military unilateral or independent actions would violate host nation sovereignties. There are no international agreements allowing the military forces of one nation to be used against the citizens of another host nation. Such consent should not be expected. Even if the host nation government authorized outside military actions, and certainly if the outside military actions were taken unilaterally, violent nationalistic reactions should be expected.

2-20. WORLD TWO INTERDICTION EFFORTS, OPTION 3. Support DLEA operations along the Southwest border with deployments of company-size tactical units on a rotational basis.

a. Discussion. An aggressive role in counter-drug support translates into people on the ground. The Southwest border operations in support of JTF 6 are the Army's most visible role in the interdiction effort. Given the previous sentiment among the DLEA community that the military was not fully behind the counter-drug mission, direct application of force on a larger scale than the *status quo* is an overt signal of commitment. A tactical unit is required in order that training be "substantially equivalent" to other mission training. This mission should be a coordinated Army-DLEA operation and should be carried out as described in the components below.

b. Components

- (1) Authorize military hot pursuit of suspected traffickers from US to Mexican territory.

(2) Use attack helicopters to respond to suspected air and land traffickers who fail to heed identification zone entry points, identification requirements, speed and altitude criteria, or orders to stop for search.

(3) Authorize military raids into Mexican territory against suspected crop growing areas, contraband transfer points, and traffickers.

(4) Use Special Forces to covertly "tag" drug shipments to obtain intelligence about trafficker means, routes, and assets.

(5) Employ Special Forces and/or Criminal Investigation Division personnel as undercover agents to infiltrate drug networks at both the "mule" and "management" levels.

c. **Impact.** From -3 (high negative) to 0 (neutral) to 3 (high positive).

<u>National</u> <u>Priority</u>	<u>Financial</u> <u>Costs</u>	<u>Readiness</u> <u>Training</u>	<u>Domestic</u> <u>Political</u>	<u>International</u> <u>Political</u>	<u>Doctrine</u>	<u>Force</u> <u>Structure</u>
3	-2	-1	-3	-3	-1	-1

d. **Comments.** Military hot pursuit of suspected drug traffickers into Mexico, and the possible use of force by the military, violates international law unless an international agreement exists with Mexico. The State Department has responsibility for negotiating such agreements. Mexico would certainly require reciprocal rights with the possibility of the use of force on our soil. The units we position along the border, in World Two, would not have to have "substantially equivalent" training as their reason for being there. Even so, rotating units would require a substantial amount of training, transportation, and costs. Since they would have a clearly counter-drug mission, doctrine for that purpose would need to be developed. Actions of tagging drug shipments and going undercover to infiltrate trafficker networks are not Army lead functions. These actions belong to other agencies.

2-21. WORLD TWO INTERDICTION EFFORTS, OPTION 4. Expand liaison with DLEAs and host nation forces.

a. **Discussion.** Keeping in mind that the Army is in a support role, it is only through effective liaison with the DLEAs and host nations whom we support that we become a team player. The Army must play by their rules and make clear our capabilities and limitations so that we do not over/underwhelm them with support. The issue of effective liaison was a weak link with the DLEA community. The Army was perceived as not fully committed to the counter-drug mission because we either did not man counter-drug positions with competitive personnel or we failed to man positions at all. It is through effective liaison that we are able to shape and influence our role in the counter-drug effort. Moreover, it is the people we provide to the key counter-drug positions that give us our best public relations. There are many steps we can take to ensure effective liaison.

b. Components

(1) Give the CINCs much greater authority to plan and execute overt and covert antidrug operations.

(2) Authorize US military hot pursuit of suspected traffickers across host nation borders.

(3) Use all available CINC military personnel and equipment to effect air, land, and sea interdiction of narcotics personnel, drugs, and precursor chemicals.

(4) Use Special Forces to covertly "tag" drug shipments (the drugs and/or transport assets) to obtain intelligence about trafficker means, routes, personnel, and assets.

(5) Use Special Forces and/or Criminal Investigation Division personnel as undercover agents to infiltrate drug networks, at both the "mule" and "management" levels.

(6) Authorize US military to apprehend suspected drug traffickers.

(7) Authorize US military to conduct counter-drug operations independent of host nation military/DLEA units.

(8) Use US personnel and equipment to perform inspections of outbound cargo shipments from host nation ports and terminals.

c. **Impact.** From -3 (high negative) to 0 (neutral) to 3 (high positive), NC is No Consensus.

National Priority	Financial Costs	Readiness Training	Domestic Political	International Political	Doctrine	Force Structure
NC	-2	NC	-3	-3	0	0

d. **Comments.** The same comments as in the previous option apply here. The legal issues and lead agency responsibilities are unchanged. The added component of performing inspections of outbound cargo would be extremely manpower intensive if attempted with a large degree of thoroughness.

Section III. OTHER OBSERVATIONS

2-22. **ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS.** Other observations that emerged during the course of the study are given below.

a. Demand Versus Supply Reduction

(1) The National Drug Control Strategy has two mutually supporting approaches to the drug problem. These are demand reduction and supply reduction. The first point to be made here is that while the national war on drugs will be won by demand reduction, the Army is making support to supply reduction the major thrust of its effort.

(2) Many sources support the claim that only a successful attack on demand can win the drug war. The National Drug Control Strategy (January 1990, page 2) makes it clear: "But the heart of our drug problem is use, and the heart of our drug policy must be reducing that use. A drug strategy--if

it is really a *strategy*--reflects the fact that effective policies to reduce demand and supply are inseparable." In Reflections on National Strategy, the Military, and the "Drug War," 14 August 1989, M. D. Munger wrote, "In the long term only by reducing the demand for drugs can the U.S. Government hope to win the drug war." On 6 September 1990, during a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, Senator Arlen Specter (R, PA) stated, "We need to do more on the demand side. This is the essence of the solution to the problem."

(3) The Army is better suited to the supply reduction role. It is what the Army can do best given its large organization, equipment assets, and combat training. Interdiction support is the most easily perceived use of the military, and that is the major mission assigned to them (aerial and maritime detection and monitoring).

(4) The second point is that the Army does not need to concentrate solely on supply reduction. This study points out specific ways that the Army can attack demand.

b. Army Involvement. The military is a support agency in the national counter-drug effort, providing operational and nonoperational support to drug law enforcement agencies. The Army is actively involved in supporting supply reduction measures. Demand reduction efforts outside of the Army are less well supported and deserve more attention. Demand reduction efforts inside the Army were highly praised.

c. Legal Issues. Differences in legal interpretations of issues abound. It is a cost of doing business in the counter-drug arena. Of particular concern is Executive Order 12333, which restricts military intelligence gathering efforts directed toward civilian personnel. Better education is needed on this Order and the laws on intelligence collection. The limits of authority are not as restrictive as generally thought and the Army needs to take full advantage of the law.

d. Organizational Responsibilities. It is not well known which Army organizations have the lead for different counter-drug functions, such as propensity, oversight, and research and development. No single source contains this information. Although not universally stated, the comment was made a few times that there is no *one* in charge of Army counter-drug actions.

e. World Two. The comments about World Two center on two main themes. First, almost everyone agrees changing the Army role to become a police force is not the constitutional intent nor desire of what the Army should be. Second, disagreement exists whether combat readiness planning and contingency planning should be done for the possibility of World Two conditions.

CHAPTER 3

RANK ORDER

Based on the study results, the options should be considered for implementation in the following order. This rank ordering applies only to the World One courses of action.

TIER 1: IMPLEMENT NOW

1. Ensure that the USMA and all colleges and universities offering ROTC programs are in the Network of Colleges and Universities Committed to the Elimination of Drug and Alcohol Abuse on their campuses. (Education, Community Action, and the Workplace, Option 5)

2. Expand liaison with DLEAs and host nation forces. (Interdiction Efforts, Option 12)

3. Expand information sharing capabilities by continued efforts to establish an integrated C3I network. (Intelligence Agenda, Option 16)

4. Expand training on IPB and data correlation. (Intelligence Agenda, Option 15)

5. Expose civilian leaders to the Army drug prevention and treatment program and its successes. (Drug Treatment, Option 4)

TIER 2: CONSIDER

6. Task the Recruiting Command to incorporate drug awareness and prevention programs in its normal duty functions. (Drug Treatment, Option 3)

7. Develop and offer to the counter-drug community a counter-drug research, development, and acquisition program using Army laboratories and centers in support of the counter-drug mission. (Research Agenda, Option 13)

8. Direct the installation commanders to become actively involved in local drug reduction programs. (Education, Community Action, and the Workplace, Option 7)

9. Task the Army Staff to develop a composite briefing team to advise MACOMs on Army capabilities and limitations in support of the counter-drug effort. (Education, Community Action, and the Workplace, Option 6)

10. Expand military-to-military liaison in support of our international roles and objectives. (International Initiatives, Option 10)

11. Offer the DLEAs the use of five regional facilities for prison overflow and/or alternative sentencing that correspond in location with the five high intensity drug trafficking areas established in the 1990 National Drug Control Strategy ("Blue Book"). (Criminal Justice, Option 1)

12. Establish an MTT to advise and assist DLEAs on development and implementation of "alternative sentencing" methods. (Criminal Justice, Option 2)

13. Support DLEA operations along the Southwest border with deployments of company-size tactical units on a rotational basis. (Interdiction Efforts, Option 11)

14. Develop a simple process to allow DLEAs to submit their requirements and obtain expedited support from Army laboratories and centers. (Research Agenda, Option 14)

15. Aggressively implement Executive Order 12564, the civilian urinalysis program. (Education, Community Action, and the Workplace, Option 8)

16. In support of the CINCs and in cooperation with host nation governments, conduct extensive antinarcotic public affairs and PSYOPS campaigns directed toward the country's business establishments, civic leaders, and general populace. (International Initiatives, Option 9)

APPENDIX A

STUDY CONTRIBUTORS

A-1. STUDY TEAM

a. Study Group

LTC James Coar, DCSOPS, Army Anti-Drug Task Force
 LTC Harry Golding, Concepts Analysis Agency, Conflict Analysis Center
 (Study Director)
 MAJ(P) Richard Corson, Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict
 MAJ Mark Rocke, DCSOPS, Strategy Plans and Policy Directorate,
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 CPT Alex Perwich, US Military Academy, Department of Social Sciences
 Mr. Dean Munger, US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute

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 MAJ Kenley/CPT T. B. Lyles, J-3 Counternarcotics Operations Division
 MAJ Joseph R. Nunez, US Military Academy, Department of Social Sciences
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 CPT R. D. Hooker, Jr., US Military Academy, Department of Social
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 CPT Rick Waddell, US Military Academy, Department of Social Sciences
 CPT James J. Zanolli, Army Artificial Intelligence Center, CSOS-AI
 Mr. David Jones, Political Advisor, Director of the Army Staff

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Mr. George Heim, Senior Policy Analyst, Office of National Drug Control Policy
Dr Peter Reuter, Senior Analyst, RAND Corporation
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d. Other Contributors

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A-2. PRODUCT REVIEW BOARD

Mr. Ronald J. Iekel, Chairman
Ms. Harriet C. Lewis
MAJ Andrew G. Loerch

APPENDIX B

STUDY DIRECTIVE



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DAMO-SSP

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS AND PLANS
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0400



25 SEP 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMY CONCEPTS ANALYSIS AGENCY (CAA)
8120 Woodmont Avenue, Bethesda, MD 20814-2797

SUBJECT: "Counternarcotics: Mandate for the Army" Study
Directive

1. Purpose. To establish procedures and assign responsibilities to ensure this study is properly planned, realistic in scope and methodology, and expeditiously executed.

2. Objective: To identify policy options, analyze these options, and provide recommendations for the short- and long-term direction of Army support to the national counternarcotics effort. Additionally, this study will also provide a basis for responding to initiatives assigned to the Army by either statutory or policy directives.

3. Scope: This study will explore policy options for fulfilling the requirements placed on the Army by current law and policy, and meet the challenge posed by the Secretary of Defense "to find better ways to support the President's National Drug Control Strategy." Consideration of possible options will be driven by the seven National Priorities articulated in the President's strategy.

4. Study Sponsor: HQDA, ODCSOPS, ATTN: DAMO-SSP (CPT Rocke), Pentagon, Room 3E519, Washington, D.C. 20310-0424.

5. Study Agency: CAA Conflict Analysis Center, ATTN: CSCA-SPC (LTC Golding), will conduct this study and be assisted by DAMO-SSP, DAMO-ODD, USMA Department of Social Sciences, the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (CLIC), Strategic Studies Institute of the Army War College (Dean Munger), and other ARSTAF agencies.

6. Background:

a. Increased Priority Assigned: On 18 September 1989, SECDEF declared that "detection and countering of illegal drugs is a high priority national security mission of DoD. DoD will attack the flow of drugs on three fronts: at the source, in transit, and in the U.S." DoD is charged to act as single lead agency in the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs, and with integrating all federal Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (DLEAs) into an effective C3I network. All CINCs were directed to prepare plans to reduce the flow of

DAMO-SSP

SUBJECT: "Counternarcotics: Mandate for the Army" Study
Directive

illegal drugs into the U.S. Five key CINCs (CINCLANT, CINCFOR, CINCNORAD, CINCPAC, and CINCSO) were assigned special emphasis. The role of Reserve Component forces was enhanced. Mr. Cheney also tasked all "DoD military and civilian leaders to find better ways to support the President's National Drug Control Strategy."

b. Army Response: The Army Counternarcotics Plan, signed 17 April 1990, identifies the requirements assigned to the Army because of this increased priority. The Plan provides broad guidance to Major Commands (MACOMs) and Department of the Army Staffs (ARSTAF and Secretariat) for use in responding to these requirements. The Army is now providing a wide range of counternarcotics support to civilian DLEAs and the CINCs. Observable trends suggest that Congress, the public, and DoD will expect greater Army support to the national effort.

c. Lack of Objective Analysis:

(1) Efforts to describe a future role for the Army in counternarcotics have been undertaken by the Army Staff and several Field Operating Agencies. None of these efforts, however, has been supported by objective analysis.

(2) The Army Science Board (ASB) recently conducted a study entitled, "The Use of Army Systems and Technologies in the National War on Drugs." This study offers numerous findings and recommendations for Army involvement in counternarcotics. Objective analysis is required to support the Army's response to the ASB (due in March or April).

7. Tasking.

a. CAA will develop a discrete set of policy options for Army involvement in each of the two categories below. Priority of effort will be to the first category in which roles and missions are unchanged. Options will be developed for each of the seven National Priorities in the National Drug Control Strategy.

(1) Roles and Missions are Unchanged: These options will focus on developing initiatives for Army involvement assuming that national policy and strategy remains constant, and the current status remains in effect, i.e., Posse Comitatus. These options will assume that U.S. armed forces continue to support civilian DLEAs in CONUS and provide indirect support to host nation forces OCONUS.

(2) Roles and Missions are Changed: These options

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assume that relaxation of certain statutory and policy occurs. U.S. armed forces support both DLEAs (at home and abroad) and host nation forces in a more direct way. The extent of changes in policy or legislation will be based on "a worst case" view of policy (DoD Regulation 5525.1) and legislation (D'Amato Bill, Senate Resolution 240 etc,) now being considered for significant changes.

b. CAA will develop an analytic framework to analyze each of the options with respect to explicit and implicit benefits. The nature of the options to be considered precludes the use of traditional quantitative "cost-benefit" analysis. The analytic framework will rely heavily on politico-military criteria, which are "soft" in nature. The end product of the analysis will result in a tiering of objectives into a top tier ("Do these first"), middle tier ("Possible options for consideration"), and bottom tier ("Avoid").

c. CAA will prepare a Report of Key Findings and Recommendations.

8. Methodology: Options will be developed and grouped with the seven National Priorities identified in the National Drug Control Strategy. Several options will be developed for each Priority. From these options, a distinct set will be developed for analysis. The analysis will begin with an estimate of the contribution the option will make to attaining the objectives of the National Drug Control Strategy. The costs of each option will also be evaluated. This process will result in a comparison of each of the options. The next step will be to develop a rank ordering of the options using the tiering approach described above. This product will be presented to DAMO-SSP as input for the development of their policy recommendations.

9. Assumptions.

a. The threat posed by narco-traffickers will increase rather than decrease in years to come. The threat will expand to other theaters and intensify in both Europe and Japan as personal disposable income increases.

b. Congress will demand increased DoD support to the national counternarcotics effort, necessitating greater Army support.

c. DoD will demand increased Army support to the DoD counternarcotics effort. More stringent allocation of Army resources will be required.

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d. Congress will not significantly increase the Army budget to support the national counternarcotics effort.

e. There will be no near-term change in the statutes prohibiting direct DoD participation in search, seizure, or arrest in the U.S.

f. For the foreseeable future, the importation of illegal drugs across U.S. borders will remain a grave national security issue affecting the security, health, and well-being of the American people.

10. Responsibilities.

a. DAMO-SS:

(1) Provide CAA liaison with DoD, CINCs, Joint and Service Staffs as required. Provide materials required in literature search. Arrange for interviews with subject matter experts (SMEs).

(2) Arrange for TDY of USMA officers to participate in key study events. Per agreement with USMA, ODCSOPS will provide fund cite for travel and per diem. USMA officer will arrange for lodging independently. Other participating agencies will bear their own TDY costs.

(3) Assume the lead for development of policy recommendations. Recommendations will be included in the final study report. Recommendations will be provided for the short-term (FY 91-93) and for consideration during the balance of the mid-term (FY 94-99).

(4) Has approval authority over the final report and will coordinate recommendations with ARSTAF.

b. CAA:

(1) Conduct study per this directive.

(2) Prepare final report and participate in the policy recommendation process with DAMO-SSP.

(3) Adhere to milestones established in paragraph 11.

c. Assisting Agencies:

(1) Identify SMEs for Expert Interviews.

DAMO-SSP


SUBJECT: "Counternarcotics: Mandate for the Army" Study
Directive

(2) Provide expertise in functional areas.

11. Milestones.

- | | |
|---|-----------|
| a. Develop Options and Analytic Framework | 14 Aug 90 |
| b. Complete Analysis of Options | 10 Oct 90 |
| c. Complete Report of Key Findings
and Recommendations | 14 Nov 90 |

12. Method of Control. In-Process Reviews (IPRs) will be periodically scheduled, generally to coincide with milestones listed above. These IPRs (generally conducted by LTC Golding) will provide Chief, DAMO-SSP; Chief, CSCA-SPC; and Deputy Director, DAMO-SS the opportunity to offer mid-course corrections.



THOMAS W. MONTGOMERY
Brigadier General, GS
Deputy Director of Strategy,
Plans, and Policy

CPT Rocke/LTC Golding

APPENDIX C

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APPENDIX D

OPTIONS LIST

D-1. PURPOSE. This appendix was designed to list concisely and compactly the seven national priority subject areas and the options developed for each area. All of the 16 World One options are on these two pages. The options are listed here without their component elements. Refer to the appropriate paragraphs in Chapter 2 (2-2 through 2-17) for the component elements.

D-2. WORLD TWO OPTIONS. The four World Two options are not included. As stated in paragraph 2-1, the wording of the World Two options is identical to the World One options in the same national priority areas. The component elements in World Two options are significantly different than for World One. Again, refer to the appropriate Chapter 2 paragraphs (2-18 through 2-21).

D-3. CRIMINAL JUSTICE

OPTION 1: Offer the DLEAs the use of five regional facilities for prison overflow and/or alternative sentencing that correspond in location with the five high intensity drug trafficking areas established in the 1990 National Drug Control Strategy ("Blue Book").

OPTION 2: Establish an MTT to advise and assist DLEAs on development and implementation of "alternative sentencing" methods.

D-4. DRUG TREATMENT

OPTION 3: Task the Recruiting Command to incorporate drug awareness and prevention programs in its normal duty functions.

OPTION 4: Expose civilian leaders to the Army drug prevention and treatment program and its successes.

D-5. EDUCATION, COMMUNITY ACTION, AND THE WORKPLACE

OPTION 5: Ensure that the USMA and all colleges and universities offering ROTC programs are in the Network of Colleges and Universities Committed to the Elimination of Drug and Alcohol Abuse on their campuses.

OPTION 6: Task the Army Staff to develop a composite briefing team to advise MACOMs on Army capabilities and limitations in support of the counter-drug effort.

OPTION 7: Direct the installation commanders to become actively involved in local drug reduction programs.

OPTION 8: Aggressively implement Executive Order 12564, the civilian urinalysis program.

D-6. INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES

OPTION 9: In support of the CINCs and in cooperation with host nation governments, conduct extensive antinarcotic public affairs and PSYOPS

campaigns directed toward the country's business establishments, civic leaders, and general populace.

OPTION 10: Expand military-to-military liaison in support of our international roles and objectives.

D-7. INTERDICTION EFFORTS

OPTION 11: Support DLEA operations along the Southwest border with deployments of company-size tactical units on a rotational basis.

OPTION 12: Expand liaison with DLEAs and host nation forces.

D-8. RESEARCH AGENDA

OPTION 13: Develop and offer to the counter-drug community a counter-drug research, development, and acquisition program using Army laboratories and centers in support of the counter-drug mission.

OPTION 14: Develop a simple process to allow DLEAs to submit their requirements and obtain expedited support from Army laboratories and centers.

D-9. INTELLIGENCE AGENDA

OPTION 15: Expand training on IPB and data correlation.

OPTION 16: Expand information sharing capabilities by continued efforts to establish an integrated C3I network.

APPENDIX E

IMPACT MATRIX - WORLD ONE

E-1. **THE MATRIX.** The matrix below reflects the general consensus responses of the survey participants when asked to rate the impact that successful implementation of each option would have upon each of the seven impact categories. This matrix addresses only ratings in the World One scenario where current Army roles and missions remain unchanged.

E-2. **RESPONDENT VALUES** Into each block of the matrix, survey respondents put a number from -3 to 3 representing the impact implementation of that option would have upon that impact category. The numbers 3, 2, and 1 represent, respectively, a high, medium, or low *positive* impact. Zero means neutral or no impact. A low negative impact is -1, medium is -2, and a highly *negative* impact is -3.

E-3. **MATRIX VALUES.** A distribution of the responses for each block in the matrix was constructed (16 x 7 = 112 of them) showing the number of responses for each of the possible ratings, -3 through 3. The value shown on the impact matrix, page E-2, represents the mode of those responses (the most frequent response). Not all distributions exhibited a clear mode. In such cases, the entire distribution was considered before selecting the best representative value. Sometimes this was not possible, such as with flat or widely separated bimodal distributions. In these cases, the NC (no consensus) notation was used.

Table E-1. Impact Matrix--World One

IMPACT CATEGORY NATIONAL PRIORITY	CONTRIBUTION TO NATIONAL PRIORITY	FINANCIAL COSTS	READINESS AND TRAINING	POLITICAL IMPACT		CURRENT ROLES & MISSION	
				DOMESTIC	INTERNATIONAL	DOCTRINE	FORCE STRUCTURE AND ORG
CRIMINAL JUSTICE	OPT 1	-2	0	1	0	0	0
	OPT 2	-1	0	0	0	0	0
DRUG TREATMENT	OPT 3	-1	0	1	0	0	0
	OPT 4	0	0	1	0	0	0
EDUCATION, COMMUNITY ACTION AND, WORKPLACE	OPT 5	0	0	1	0	0	0
	OPT 6	-1	0	1	0	0	0
INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES	OPT 7	-1	0	2	0	0	0
	OPT 8	-1	0	2	0	0	0
INTERDICTION EFFORTS	OPT 9	-2	-1	0	1	0	-1
	OPT 10	-2	1	0	2	0	-1
RESEARCH AGENDA	OPT 11	-1	2	2	1	0	0
	OPT 12	-1	0	1	1	0	0
INTELLIGENCE AGENDA	OPT 13	-1	0	1	0	0	0
	OPT 14	-1	0	0	0	0	-1
	OPT 15	-1	-1	0	0	0	-1
	OPT 16	-2	0	0	0	0	-1

Rating of NC means no consensus
 Rating of 3 means high positive impact
 Rating of 2 means medium positive impact
 Rating of 1 means low positive impact
 Rating of 0 means neutral or no impact
 Rating of -1 means low negative impact
 Rating of -2 means medium negative impact
 Rating of -3 means high negative impact

APPENDIX F
IMPACT MATRIX - WORLD TWO

The matrix below is identical to the one in Appendix E except that this one addresses ratings in the World Two scenario. In World Two, *Posse Comitatus* restrictions are relaxed, allowing for a more direct involvement of the military in the areas of search, seizure, and arrest. Only the International Initiatives and Interdiction Efforts options are addressed because the other five priority area options were not considered to be materially different in the two World scenarios. The same rating and representative value criteria were used as with the impact matrix in Appendix E.

Table F-1. Impact Matrix--World Two

IMPACT CATEGORY		CONTRIBUTION TO NATIONAL PRIORITY	FINANCIAL COSTS	READINESS AND TRAINING	POLITICAL IMPACT		CURRENT ROLES & MISSION	
					DOMESTIC	INTERNATIONAL	DOCTRINE	FORCE STRUCTURE AND ORG
NATIONAL PRIORITY	CRIMINAL JUSTICE							
	DRUG							
	TREATMENT							
	EDUCATION, COMMUNITY ACTION AND, WORKPLACE							
INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES	OPT 1	NC	-2	0	-1	-3	0	NC
	OPT 2	NC	-3	-1	-3	-3	0	0
	OPT 3	3	-2	-1	-3	-3	-1	-1
	OPT 4	NC	-2	NC	-3	-3	0	0
RESEARCH AGENDA								
INTELLIGENCE AGENDA								

Rating of NC means no consensus
 Rating of 3 means high positive impact
 Rating of 2 means medium positive impact
 Rating of 1 means low positive impact
 Rating of 0 means neutral or no impact
 Rating of -1 means low negative impact
 Rating of -2 means medium negative impact
 Rating of -3 means high negative impact

APPENDIX G

IMPLEMENTATION MATRIX

G-1. THE MATRIX. This matrix shows the percent of survey participant responses when they were asked when each option should be implemented. Percent of responses was used rather than the raw number of responses because not all participants rated every option. There was a low of 23 and a high of 26 responses for the options. The tier ratings were Implement Now, Consider, and Avoid. To be rated Implement Now or Avoid, at least half of the survey respondents had to rate the option in that category. Special considerations were taken into account, such as significant comments from the working group written responses or comments from the senior working group interviews. If an option was not clearly Implement Now or Avoid, it was rated Consider.

G-2. EXCEPTIONAL CASES. Two exceptional cases were Options 3 and 4. The special considerations caveat was used with both of these.

a. Option 3 received 52 percent of the Implement Now responses. However, the response distribution is distinctly bimodal. The relatively strong 39 percent Avoid responses and very weak 9 percent Consider responses do not support the bare majority Implement Now responses. Given these factors, an overall rating of Implement Now could not be granted, and it was downgraded to Consider. The specific components receiving disfavor were to augment the Recruiting Command with ADAPCP professionals and to include recruiting for the Border Patrol.

b. Option 4 received only 48 percent of the Implement Now responses but was rated as Implement Now. Deciding factors were the very weak 9 percent Avoid responses, the near-majority 48 percent Implement Now responses, and the strong combined Implement Now-Consider responses, i.e., very few respondents were against this option. The greatest selling points are that it would create a positive image for the Army and enhance community relations.

Table G-1. Implementation Matrix

ACTION PRIORITY		IMPLEMENT NOW (PERCENT)	CONSIDER (PERCENT)	AVOID (PERCENT)	TIER
CRIMINAL JUSTICE	OPT 1	33	50	17	Consider
	OPT 2	9	56	35	Consider
DRUG TREATMENT	OPT 3	52	9	39	Consider
	OPT 4	48	43	9	Implement Now
EDUCATION, COMMUNITY ACTION, AND THE WORKPLACE	OPT 5	61	30	9	Implement Now
	OPT 6	30	61	9	Consider
	OPT 7	48	26	26	Consider
	OPT 8	43	43	14	Consider
INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES	OPT 9	27	31	42	Consider
	OPT 10	32	56	12	Consider
INTERDICTION EFFORTS	OPT 11	39	22	39	Consider
	OPT 12	52	26	22	Implement Now
RESEARCH AGENDA	OPT 13	42	37	21	Consider
	OPT 14	46	37	17	Consider
INTELLIGENCE AGENDA	OPT 15	63	8	29	Implement Now
	OPT 16	63	12	25	Implement Now

APPENDIX X

SPONSOR'S COMMENTS



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DAMO-SSP

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS AND PLANS
WASHINGTON, DC

28 JUN 1991



MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMY CONCEPTS ANALYSIS AGENCY
(ATTN: CSCA-SPC (LTC GOLDING))

SUBJECT: Critique of "Counter-drug: Mandate for the Army"

1. Purpose: To forward final sponsor comments.

2. Discussion:

a. The objective of this study was to provide observations and recommendations to support the development of Army counter-drug policy. The study achieved this objective.

b. The principal findings of the study were incorporated in the message released by the Chief of Staff on 26 June 1991 which "prescribes broad guidance for the future direction of Army support to the National Drug Control Strategy, (261720ZJUN91, Encl 1)." This demonstrates how we moved immediately "from theory to practice." Your considerable effort and comprehensive analysis directly supported the needs of the senior Army leadership.

c. Please include this message in the final report as an enclosure to the Director's cover letter. This will be mutually beneficial to both CAA and HQDA. It will demonstrate how CAA's firmly grounded analysis was used in formulating Army policy and, at the same time, ensure the widest possible distribution of the message.

d. To express our collective appreciation to both the study participants (Encl 2), the retired flag officers (Encl 3), and other experts we solicited input from (Encl 3), all should be added to the distribution list.

3. Thank you for the tremendous effort you have put forth. I believe the study will prove to be a valuable resource to the many people who are, and will become, involved in Army support to the national counter-drug effort.

MARK D. ROCKE
Major, GS
Strategic Plans
and Policy Division

3 Encls

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GLOSSARY

1. ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND SHORT TERMS

ADAPCP	Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program
ADNET	Anti-Drug Network
AECA	Arms Export Control Act
ARSTAF	Army Staff
ASB	Army Science Board
ASI	additional skill identifier
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
AWC	US Army War College
BP	US Border Patrol
CA	civil affairs
CAA	US Army Concepts Analysis Agency
CCF	Correctional Confinement Facility
CECOM	US Army Communications-Electronics Command
CID	Criminal Investigation Division
CINC	commander in chief
CINCFOR	Commander in Chief, Forces Command
CINCLANT	Commander in Chief, Atlantic
CINCNORAD	Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific
CINCSO	Commander in Chief, Southern Command
CLIC	Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict
CN	counternarcotics
CNOD	Counternarcotics Operations Division
COA	course of action

CONUS	continental United States
CRDEC	US Army Chemical RD&E Center
CT	Country Team
C ³ I	command, control, communications, and intelligence
DA	Department of the Army
DCSINT	Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
DCSLOG	Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
DCSOPS	Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
DCSPER	Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DLEA	drug law enforcement agency
DOD	Department of Defense
EO	Executive Order
EPIC	El Paso Intelligence Center
FAA	Foreign Assistance Act
FY	fiscal year
HQDA	Headquarters, Department of the Army
IAA	Inter-American Affairs
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IPR	in-process review
JAG	Judge Advocate General
JRTC	Joint Readiness Training Center
JTF	joint task force
LEA	law enforcement agency
MACOM	major Army command
MATA	Military Assistance Training Advisor

MEDDAC	medical department activity
METL	mission essential task list
MTI	moving target indicator
MTT	Mobile Training Team
NC	No Consensus
OCONUS	outside continental United States
ODCSOPS	Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
ONDCP	Office of National Drug Control Policy
OPSEC	operations security
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PA	public affairs, Pennsylvania
PEO/PM	Project Executive Office/Project Manager
PERSCOM	US Army Total Personnel Command
POC	point of contact
POW	prisoner of war
PSYOPS	psychological operations
R	Republican
R&D	research and development
RD&A	research, development, and acquisition
RD&E	research, development, and engineering
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
RTB	Ranger Training Brigade
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SME	subject matter expert
SOUTHCOM	Southern Command (CINCSO)
SO/LIC	special operations/low intensity conflict
SSI	US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute

SWB	Southwest border
SWC	US Army JFK Special Warfare Center
TLSO	Theater Logistic Support Office
TRADOC	US Army Training and Doctrine Command
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
US	United States
USAC&GSC	US Army Command and General Staff College
USARSO	US Army Southern Command
USCG	US Coast Guard
USMA	US Military Academy

2. DEFINITIONS

component

individual elements of the courses of action

demand reduction

efforts aimed at reducing drug usage by users

EMERALD

a computer linkage analysis prototype established by DIA

Executive Order 12333

the prohibition against the military from collecting and processing intelligence data on civilians

Executive Order 12564

the Federal civilian urinalysis program

Posse Comitatus

the prohibition against using the military to enforce civilian law in the US, its territories, and dependencies

status quo

no change to the current situation

supply reduction

efforts aimed at reducing the availability of drugs



COUNTER-DRUG: MANDATE FOR THE ARMY

STUDY
SUMMARY
CAA-SR-91-2

THE REASONS FOR CONDUCTING this study were to provide the Army leadership with options, and an objective assessment of those options, that contribute to the development of Army policy and strategy in support of the national counter-drug effort, and to meet the challenge posed by the Secretary of Defense "to find better ways to support the President's National Drug Control Strategy."

THE STUDY SPONSOR was Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS), ATTN: DAMO-SS, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-0424.

THE STUDY OBJECTIVE was to identify policy options, analyze these options, and provide observations for determining the short-, mid-, and long-term direction of Army support to the national counter-drug effort. Also, this comprehensive review will provide a basis for responding to new missions assigned to the Army by statutory or policy directives.

THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY was to develop and analyze policy options encompassed by the seven national priority areas articulated in the President's strategy.

THE MAIN ASSUMPTIONS for this study were:

- (1) The threat posed by narco-traffickers will increase rather than decrease in years to come.
- (2) Congress will demand increased Department of Defense (DOD) support to the national counter-drug effort, and DOD will demand increased Army support.
- (3) Congress will not significantly increase the Army budget to support the national counter-drug effort.
- (4) There will be no near-term change in the statutes prohibiting direct DOD participation in search, seizure, and arrest in the US.
- (5) For the foreseeable future, the importation of illicit drugs across US borders will remain a national security issue affecting the security, health, and well-being of the American people.

THE BASIC APPROACH followed in the study was to:

- (1) Review national, DOD, Joint Staff, and Department of the Army counter-drug policies and programs to ensure an understanding of the policymaking environment and the "top-down" guidance assigned to the Army.

(2) Develop a discrete list of policy options. Two world scenarios were considered regarding policy and law restricting military involvement in counter-drug operations. Priority of effort went to the first scenario.

(a) World One: Current Army roles and missions remain unchanged.

(b) World Two: Relaxation of *Posse Comitatus* restrictions allows direct military involvement in the areas of search, seizure, and arrest.

(3) Develop an analytic framework addressing the impact the policy options would have on contribution to the national drug control strategy, financial cost, readiness and training, the domestic and international political environments, current Army doctrine, and current Army force structures and organization. The framework was used to survey a diverse audience of knowledgeable working group members, and in interviews with key senior level individuals. The survey and interview responses were analyzed. Finally, the options were arrayed into three tiers ("Implement Now," "Consider for Implementation," and "Avoid"). Findings were provided to the study sponsor.

THE PRINCIPAL FINDINGS are:

(1) To "Implement Now" 5 of the 16 options. These include ensuring the US Military Academy (USMA) and all colleges offering Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs are in the Network of Colleges and Universities Committed to the Elimination of Drug and Alcohol Abuse on their campuses, expanding liaison with drug law enforcement agencies (DLEAs) and host nation forces, expanding information sharing capabilities, expanding training on Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) and data correlation, and exposing civilian leaders to the Army drug program and its successes.

(2) That the Army provides operational and nonoperational support within limitations set by Congress and law. The Army is actively involved in supporting supply reduction actions. Army external support for demand reduction efforts, the primary focus of the President's national strategy, deserves greater emphasis. Differences in interpretations of the legal issues exist, especially the *Posse Comitatus* Act and the prohibition of accessing intelligence data on civilian personnel. It is not well known which Army organizations have the lead for different counter-drug functions. The consensus is that the Army should not become another police force. The World Two scenario is a possible but unlikely reality. Because it is unlikely, the groups disagreed whether contingency planning should be done for it.

THE STUDY EFFORT was directed by LTC C. Harry Golding, Strategy and Plans Directorate, US Army Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA).

COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS may be sent to the Director, US Army Concepts Analysis Agency, ATTN: CSCA-SPC, 8120 Woodmont Avenue, Bethesda, MD 20814-2797.



COUNTER-DRUG: MANDATE FOR THE ARMY

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THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY was to develop and analyze policy options encompassed by the seven national priority areas articulated in the President's strategy.

THE MAIN ASSUMPTIONS for this study were:

- (1) The threat posed by narco-traffickers will increase rather than decrease in years to come.
- (2) Congress will demand increased Department of Defense (DOD) support to the national counter-drug effort, and DOD will demand increased Army support.
- (3) Congress will not significantly increase the Army budget to support the national counter-drug effort.
- (4) There will be no near-term change in the statutes prohibiting direct DOD participation in search, seizure, and arrest in the US.
- (5) For the foreseeable future, the importation of illicit drugs across US borders will remain a national security issue affecting the security, health, and well-being of the American people.

THE BASIC APPROACH followed in the study was to:

- (1) Review national, DOD, Joint Staff, and Department of the Army counter-drug policies and programs to ensure an understanding of the policymaking environment and the "top-down" guidance assigned to the Army.

(2) Develop a discrete list of policy options. Two world scenarios were considered regarding policy and law restricting military involvement in counter-drug operations. Priority of effort went to the first scenario.

(a) World One: Current Army roles and missions remain unchanged.

(b) World Two: Relaxation of *Posse Comitatus* restrictions allows direct military involvement in the areas of search, seizure, and arrest.

(3) Develop an analytic framework addressing the impact the policy options would have on contribution to the national drug control strategy, financial cost, readiness and training, the domestic and international political environments, current Army doctrine, and current Army force structures and organization. The framework was used to survey a diverse audience of knowledgeable working group members, and in interviews with key senior level individuals. The survey and interview responses were analyzed. Finally, the options were arrayed into three tiers ("Implement Now," "Consider for Implementation," and "Avoid"). Findings were provided to the study sponsor.


THE PRINCIPAL FINDINGS are:

(1) To "Implement Now" 5 of the 16 options. These include ensuring the US Military Academy (USMA) and all colleges offering Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs are in the Network of Colleges and Universities Committed to the Elimination of Drug and Alcohol Abuse on their campuses, expanding liaison with drug law enforcement agencies (DLEAs) and host nation forces, expanding information sharing capabilities, expanding training on Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) and data correlation, and exposing civilian leaders to the Army drug program and its successes.

(2) That the Army provides operational and nonoperational support within limitations set by Congress and law. The Army is actively involved in supporting supply reduction actions. Army external support for demand reduction efforts, the primary focus of the President's national strategy, deserves greater emphasis. Differences in interpretations of the legal issues exist, especially the *Posse Comitatus* Act and the prohibition of accessing intelligence data on civilian personnel. It is not well known which Army organizations have the lead for different counter-drug functions. The consensus is that the Army should not become another police force. The World Two scenario is a possible but unlikely reality. Because it is unlikely, the groups disagreed whether contingency planning should be done for it.

THE STUDY EFFORT was directed by LTC C. Harry Golding, Strategy and Plans Directorate, US Army Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA).

COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS may be sent to the Director, US Army Concepts Analysis Agency, ATTN: CSCA-SPC, 8120 Woodmont Avenue, Bethesda, MD 20814-2797.

	COUNTER-DRUG: MANDATE FOR THE ARMY	STUDY SUMMARY CAA-SR-91-2
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THE REASONS FOR CONDUCTING this study were to provide the Army leadership with options, and an objective assessment of those options, that contribute to the development of Army policy and strategy in support of the national counter-drug effort, and to meet the challenge posed by the Secretary of Defense "to find better ways to support the President's National Drug Control Strategy."

THE STUDY SPONSOR was Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS), ATTN: DAMO-SS, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-0424.

THE STUDY OBJECTIVE was to identify policy options, analyze these options, and provide observations for determining the short-, mid-, and long-term direction of Army support to the national counter-drug effort. Also, this comprehensive review will provide a basis for responding to new missions assigned to the Army by statutory or policy directives.

THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY was to develop and analyze policy options encompassed by the seven national priority areas articulated in the President's strategy.

THE MAIN ASSUMPTIONS for this study were:

- (1) The threat posed by narco-traffickers will increase rather than decrease in years to come.
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