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IMPROVING OFFICER CAREER AND INTERMEDIATE LEVEL EDUCATION

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Outline


Thesis. Although career and intermediate level schools are adequately educating officers for future command and staff billets within a MAGTF, they are not modern professional educational institutions. The schools, as a whole, exhibit significant weaknesses in the areas of faculty and pedagogy -- cornerstones of a quality professional military education system.

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IMPROVING OFFICER CAREER AND INTERMEDIATE LEVEL EDUCATION

INTRODUCTION

Shortly after General Alfred M. Gray was appointed Commandant of the Marine Corps, he began a program of emphasis on professional military education (PME) which is unparalleled in the Corps' 215 year history. On 1 August 1989, Commandant Gray established the Marine Corps University (MCU). The Marine Corps University serves as the parent command for the Command and Staff College (C&SC), the USMC intermediate level school; the Amphibious Warfare School (AWS), and the Command and Control Systems Course (CCSC), the USMC career level schools. Establishment of the university is representative of Commandant Gray's desire to strengthen the officer education program in the Marine Corps.

As stated in FMFM 1, Warfighting, "Professional military education is designed to develop creative, thinking leaders."(21:49) Career and intermediate level schooling is instrumental in preparing today's officers for critical leadership and staff positions in the future. Formal schools provide for extensive study, reflection, and discussion of a wide range of military and professional topics. As such, formal schooling is integral to the development of officers capable of exercising sound military judgement and leadership on the battlefield. Tactical and operational level success will be significantly

impacted by the quality of education received by our officers at Command and Staff College, Amphibious Warfare School, and Command and Control Systems Course.

Furthermore, the United States Congress views high-quality professional military officer education as an investment in future military leadership for war and peace and emphasizes PME as vital to national security.(2:11) In light of the national importance placed on the educational development of military officers, it is imperative that officers attending resident career and intermediate level schools receive instruction commensurate with PME's stated importance. Presently, they do not.

Although career and intermediate level schools are adequately educating officers for future command and staff billets within a MAGTF, they are not modern professional educational institutions. The schools, as a whole, exhibit significant weaknesses in the areas of faculty and pedagogy -- cornerstones of a quality PME system. Pedagogy is defined as the art, practice, or profession of teaching to include the principles and methods of teaching.

Specific weaknesses of the schools are detailed below:

1. Faculty selection and training is inadequate.
2. Perception of faculty duty needs to be improved.
3. There are too few civilians on faculty.
4. Student to faculty ratios are too high.
5. Schools rely too much on external sources of instruction.

6. Teaching methods are too passive.
7. There is too much emphasis of the Instructional Systems Design process at the career and intermediate levels.
8. Oral examinations are not being aggressively incorporated into the schools' testing methods.
9. Curricula focus is not sharp enough, resulting in redundancy within the curriculum of each school as well as between the schools.

SCOPE OF RESEARCH

In conducting our research, we adopted a three tier approach. We conducted background research through published magazine articles, policy letters, memoranda, and congressional reports addressing PME. Next we conducted interviews and solicited input through questionnaires. A sample questionnaire can be found in Appendix 1.

The interviews were conducted with the three school directors, members of each school's staff, present and past students, Instructional Systems Design personnel, Marine Corps University personnel, former school instructors, and the Commanding General, MCCDC. Questionnaires were sent to present students of each school and to Fleet Marine Force (FMF) units throughout the Marine Corps at the Division, Wing, Force Service Support Group, Marine Expeditionary Brigade, and Marine

Expeditionary Force level. Because the questionnaires were distributed after most of the units deployed in support of Operation Desert Shield, response from FMF units was virtually non-existent. Of over 200 questionnaires sent to operational units, only 2 were returned. Accordingly, our research findings are based almost exclusively on background research as detailed in the bibliography and on responses to interviews conducted and questionnaires distributed aboard MCCDC, Quantico, Virginia.

FACULTY

The single most important factor in quality education is a school's faculty.(2:133) A competent, credible, and dedicated faculty will establish and maintain both the fabric and reputation of educational institutions. No other factor weighs as heavily in determining the quality of the education that students will receive.(2:133)

MILITARY FACULTY

The instructors at Command and Staff College, Amphibious Warfare School, and Command and Control Systems Course are, almost without exception, superior officers. They bring significant operational and staff level experience to their assignment as instructors. Their backgrounds, and consequently their experience levels, are diverse and complementary; however, the faculty

members of the three schools are not professional educators nor have they been trained appropriately as educators. Furthermore, the selection process for instructors is informal, at best, and subject to the whims of the school director, present school faculty, and the individual's monitor.

SELECTION PROCESS

One could argue that the school director and present faculty are in the best position to select officers for duty at their schools, and clearly their input is valuable. This approach to faculty selection, however, results in a prospective instructor being chosen largely on his reputation and performance record. Quite often that performance record and reputation will not reflect the officer's ability to instruct at the professional military officer education level.

Further, the selection process does not always consider the individual's depth of personal study in the art of warfare, strategic policy and decision making, command and control theory etc.. Without a firm foundation in such disciplines, the officer will be ill suited to instruct beyond a basic level in any subject area. The end result is an inefficient faculty selection process.

INSTRUCTOR TRAINING

Assignment of officers to instructor duty who have little, if

any, formal teaching experience and who lack depth of personal study in the area to be instructed results in classes which are shallow in their approach to the subject matter. The classes rely on a script and emphasize basic information. Such scripted classes are often the result of the instructor training which each officer receives through the Training Management Branch.

This training, consisting of two weeks of classroom instruction, teaches the Instructional Systems Design (ISD) process. This process, in its purest state, provides a tool for developing curricula; however, in reality, it is restrictive and intellectually stifling. A more detailed analysis of the ISD process will be covered in the section entitled Pedagogy. Suffice it to say that the training offered by the two week ISD course is inappropriate for the curricula taught at the career and intermediate level schools.

PERCEPTION OF INSTRUCTOR DUTY

A further hindrance to the establishment of a high-quality faculty is the commonly held perception that instructor duty is seen, at best, as neutral to an officer's career. This perception varies slightly from school to school, and there are officers who view instructor duty at any of the career and intermediate level schools as prestigious. Major General Sullivan, Deputy Commanding General, FMFLANT, stated, "Being at Quantico as an instructor is a

real plus... the superstars are at AWS and C&SC."(18) Other comments, however, suggest the opposite feeling. One officer commented, "I would seek a lateral move before I would accept orders as an instructor at any of the schools aboard Quantico."

Fortunately, despite negative comments concerning instructor duty, most interviewees acknowledged that the perception of instructor duty was improving. The improvement was universally attributed to Commandant Gray's emphasis on PME in general and the establishment of the Marine Corps University specifically.

The intent of this paper is not to advocate a careerist attitude in which one should avoid instructor duty solely because that duty is viewed as non-prestigious. However, the need to foster the belief that instructor duty, particularly at the career and intermediate level, is not only prestigious but crucial to the development of the officer corps and consequently significant with respect to our national security cannot be overlooked. The Panel on Military Education of the House of Representatives states, "Faculty duty for military officers must be seen by everyone in the services... as important, desirable, and rewarding."(2:133)

CIVILIAN FACULTY

Civilian faculty, we believe, can be instrumental in the development of high-quality PME institutions. Civilian

instructors add considerable depth to the curriculum and are often invaluable in establishing appropriate pedagogy.(2:139) Further, the mere presence of nationally and internationally renowned professors enhances the academic stature and scholarship of an institution.(2:139)

All three courses of instruction at C&SC, AWS, and CCSC would benefit significantly from incorporating civilian faculty into their programs of instruction. Civilians are often able to provide a broadened perspective on contemporary military and national issues. They also provide continuity and subject matter expertise to the curriculum.(2:139)

Currently the Command and Staff College employs three civilian educators who hold doctorates in their fields. They instruct almost exclusively at the Command and Staff College.

The Marine Corps University, under the MCU Campaign Plan, plans to hire an additional twelve civilians for inclusion in the MCU faculty. Current plans are to have the civilian faculty teach primarily at Command and Staff College. We believe that this is an appropriate number of civilian educators; however, we recommend that the curriculum at the career level schools also be considered when selecting civilian faculty.

STUDENT TO FACULTY RATIO

Although the quality of the faculty at a PME institution

is indisputably the factor of greatest import to the caliber of education imparted to students, the quantity of the faculty with respect to the class size is of significance also. Table 1, shown below, depicts the student to faculty ratios at the three schools.

Table I

STUDENT TO FACULTY RATIOS

<u>School</u>	<u>Students</u>	<u>Faculty</u>	<u>Ratio</u>
Amphibious Warfare School	188	26	7.2:1
Command and Control Systems	52 (92)*	14	6.6:1
Command and Staff College	193	28	6.9:1

* Command and Control Systems Course currently has 52 students. The figure of 92 students was used in computing the ratio because the CCSC faculty have a dual course responsibility that includes instructor duties for both CCSC and the Basic Communication Officers Course (BCOC). On average, the BCOC has 40 students. The two courses run concurrently.

The Congressional Panel on Professional Military Education believes that schools, particularly at the intermediate level, should have a student to faculty ratio of approximately 3 or 4 to 1. (2:144) A low ratio is essential if the faculty is to refine curricula and conduct research. An educational institution which does not allow for immediate revision of curricula in response to world events, technological developments, changes in

doctrine etc. and which does not provide time for the continued research and professional growth of its faculty members is short sighted. Such an institution will be constantly reactive in its approach and will quickly slip into mediocrity.

A school with a faculty which is overcommitted because of class size, administrative commitments, and additional external commitments will become a school which facilitates education rather than a school which educates its students. The faculty becomes forced to adopt a training mentality in which lesson plans and approved solutions substitute for instruction geared toward the development of military judgement and decision making. This approach degrades student to faculty interaction.

EXTERNAL VERSUS INTERNAL SOURCES OF INSTRUCTION

Additionally, if the faculty is too small, a lack of subject matter expertise inevitably results. Consequently, the faculty must find external instructors for critical packages.

Unfortunately, according to those interviewed, instruction from external sources is often inadequate in quality and focus.

At the Command and Control Systems Course, 81% of instruction is given by personnel external to the school.(10) Approximately 20% of instruction at the Amphibious Warfare School comes from external sources.(9) An accurate percentage assessment of external instruction at Command and Staff College could not be

ascertained as such records are not kept. The Head of the Command and Staff College, Lieutenant Colonel Frank Martello, however, stated that the majority of the curriculum is taught by external instructors. (14)

We view these figures, with the exception of AWS's percentage, as a clear indictment of the schools' ability to educate their students through in-house instructors who have the requisite expertise in the fields being taught. This situation, as previously outlined, may also be attributable to the insufficiency of the staff size. In either case, the situation is not conducive to the establishment of a high-caliber PME institution. General Andrew Goodpaster, in his comments to the Congressional Panel on PME, clearly stated, "There is too much reliance on outside lectures at all the schools." He further insisted, "There needs to be a faculty that can teach and do their own lectures." (2:160)

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FACULTY IMPROVEMENT

COMMANDANT'S GUIDANCE

Commandant Gray, in a memorandum to the Commanding General of MCCDC, in July 1989, directed that "consideration be given to the selection, preparation, and subsequent professional evolution of instructors." He further directed that "consideration be given to forming a small permanent faculty of perhaps half a dozen world-

class scholars on the military art and that incoming instructors spend a period of time, perhaps as much as one year, studying under the permanent faculty in preparation for teaching." His stated objective was "to develop instructors who are truly expert in the areas they teach."(1:2)

COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE PLAN FOR FACULTY DEVELOPMENT

In keeping with the Commandant's guidance, the Command and Staff College established a top level school. The primary purpose of the school is to prepare officers for instructor duty at C&SC. Graduates of the top level school are retained as military faculty. The top level school currently has six lieutenant colonels enrolled. Additionally, the Command and Staff College retains two graduating students each year for two years as faculty members. We believe that this program will pay great dividends in developing quality faculty for C&SC; however, it is not far reaching enough for it only addresses faculty concerns at the intermediate level while ignoring career level faculty shortfalls.

MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY PROPOSAL

The proposed Marine Corps University Campaign Plan, dated 21 May 1990, details an alternative system for faculty selection. The proposed faculty structure encompasses establishing "chairs," a Board of Regents, and a two tiered faculty body.

MCU CHAIRS

The establishment of two chairs at MCU is recommended to attract the top academic talent in the country. These chairs are (1) The Chair of Modern Military Theory and (2) The Chair of Warfighting Strategy. The distinguished scholars occupying these chairs would be charged with advising the MCU President, conducting research, and teaching at the university. This structure is similar to the chairs established at the prestigious Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.

We believe that the establishment of such chairs would be invaluable in the development of a first rate PME institution. The chairs could be filled by civilian scholars, retired military officers with distinguished careers, or retired high-level government officials with experience in national security. Not only would the occupants represent a font of wisdom for the students and the faculty, they would attract additional top notch civilian scholars to the university as well.

It should be noted that the intent of the establishment of the chairs is not to merely attract "big name" personnel, but rather to attract quality instructors regardless of the prestige associated with their names.

MCU BOARD OF REGENTS

The Board of Regents being proposed is a body of civilians and military personnel who would approve and appoint nominated faculty members and oversee the schools' curricula, academic standards, admissions policy, and issues of academic freedom. Inherent in the responsibility for approval of faculty is the right to veto the selection of any prospective instructor. (13:7) Members of the Board would be appointed by the Commandant of the Marine Corps and would serve terms ranging from two to six years to ensure continuity at the university despite the change in university presidents and Commandants of the Marine Corps.

Though the establishment of such a board is militarily unorthodox, the benefits gained, in the form of continuity and maintenance of high quality curricula and faculty, far outweigh any reservations concerning the board's unique organizational status within a command. Despite this unique structure, the President of the University would retain all the authority vested in military command.

MCU TWO TIER FACULTY PROPOSAL

The two tier approach to faculty assignment involves developing a body of officers who will gain permanent status as faculty members of the university and individual officers who will normally serve one tour of duty as instructors. These officers

will be known as general faculty and special faculty respectively.

MCU GENERAL FACULTY

The general faculty will comprise civilian and military personnel who hold doctoral degrees. These individuals will essentially be the Marine Corps' equivalent of professional educators. Active duty military personnel who are interested in teaching and who have a genuine aptitude for teaching will be eligible to progress toward general faculty appointment.

To qualify for appointment, an officer will pursue a doctoral degree in a field pertaining to teaching the art of war. Additionally, the officer will complete the Marine Corps University's course in "Teaching the Art of War". This course will consist of approximately 24 credit hours. Throughout this officer's career, he will serve alternating assignments between the Fleet Marine Force, in appropriate staff and command level billets, and the Marine Corps University as an instructor. It is imperative that the officer serving in this capacity remain operationally proficient through assignments to the FMF. (13:9) Maintaining technical and tactical proficiency will lend credibility to his instruction in the art of war.

Clearly, pursuit of doctoral degrees is expensive. The proposed avenue for pursuit of the doctorate for general faculty members is through the Special Education Program (SEP). The SEP

is the current program through which many officers pursue a masters degree. Essentially, an officer would apply for admission into the Special Education Program. If accepted, the officer would then be sent to a graduate school to pursue his doctorate. All educational expenses would be paid by the Marine Corps. The program would be managed by the SEP monitor at Headquarters Marine Corps.

The desire for officers to obtain a doctorate for appointment to the general faculty does not preclude the university from being staffed, on its special faculty, by officers who have masters degrees.

MCU SPECIAL FACULTY

The special faculty will comprise individual officers who serve a single tour of duty as instructors at the university. An officer will be selected, by the MCU Board of Regents in conjunction with the Officer Assignment Monitors, based on operational experience, last assignment, and proven record of performance. Naturally, as with all assignments, officer availability and the needs of the Marine Corps will factor heavily into the selection process as well. Thus, a member of the special faculty will be similar, in many respects, to the instructors currently serving at the career and intermediate level schools. A noted exception, however, will be the requirement to complete the

MCU course "Teaching the Art of War" prior to assuming instructor duties.

The instructor preparatory course, detailed in the MCU plan, will prove crucial to the maintenance of quality instruction and appropriate curricula. The prospective instructor will develop his instructional skills and acquire much greater subject matter expertise. At present, instructors are not provided such an opportunity for extensive research prior to assuming duties on the instructor platform.

CRITIQUE OF THE MCU PROPOSAL AND REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESS

A valid criticism of the plan to establish a general faculty is the dearth of Marine officers who possess a doctoral degree. However, if the Marine Corps University is to realize any of its desires to become a premiere professional military education institution, then it must be visionary and establish long term objectives. The establishment of a general faculty is such an objective.

Initially, the general faculty will be staffed primarily by civilian scholars. Eventually, however, the Marine Corps will have a pool of well qualified educators who are respected scholars and tacticians in their fields of study. Such a pool of talented individuals will not only be a tremendous asset to the school, but will represent a national asset as well. The caliber of Marine

officer that could be produced from such a program of lifelong study, instruction, and practical application in the operating forces of the Marine Corps will positively impact the future of the Marine Corps, the joint arena, and national level strategic planning.

Absolute requirements for success of the envisioned faculty development are that instructors be volunteers, that instructor training, in the form of the "Teaching the Art of War" course, be conducted prior to the officer assuming his duties as an instructor, and that the reputation of instructor duty be enhanced. The plans and recommendations outlined above will ensure that these requirements are met. Each facet of the plan builds upon the other facets, and they complement one another well. With the establishment of the "chairs" and the Board of Regents will come greater stability of curricula and higher quality standards. This will serve to attract better faculty and perpetuate the quest for still higher standards. The end result will be a strong faculty, the bedrock of any PME institution.

Without question, there will be fiscal and manpower issues to address if the plan, as stated above, is to be implemented. The examination of such issues is beyond the scope of this paper; however, we believe that faculty improvement must be pursued despite these obstacles. If the Marine Corps desires to establish a first-rate faculty at the MCU, then the Office of Manpower, Code

MMOA, must examine these issues and balance fiscal and manpower constraints against the benefits to be gained by implementing the proposed faculty improvement programs.

PEDAGOGY

Pedagogy is also an essential determinant of quality in professional military education. As asserted by the Congressional Panel on Professional Military Education, "How an institution teaches its curriculum can be as important as what is taught. If pedagogy is ineffective and the students are not challenged intellectually, then the students, the military, and the country are being short changed."(2:158)

COMMANDANT'S GUIDANCE

In a memorandum to the Commanding General, MCCDC, pertaining to PME, Commandant Gray wrote, "My intent is to teach military judgement rather than knowledge. Knowledge is of course important for developing judgement, but should be taught in the context of teaching military judgement, not as material to be memorized.... The focus of effort should be teaching through doing, through case studies, historical and present day, real and hypothetical, presented in war games, map exercises, sand table exercises, free play, force on force, three day wars and the like." He further

wrote, "The current evaluation process based on lesson plans, ELOs (Enabling Learning Objectives) and TLOs (Terminal Learning Objectives), is inappropriate for education. A new evaluation process must be devised that recognizes the inherent impossibility of "objectively" or quantitatively measuring an art."(1:2)

CURRENT PEDAGOGICAL FOCUS

Commandant Gray's guidance reflects a desire for the education process, particularly at the officer level, to be active -- to promote learning through doing, thinking, reflecting, studying, interacting, and debating. This philosophy also surfaced in every interview we conducted. There is a universally held perception among school administrators, faculty, and students that active teaching, rather than passive instruction, is the best method of instruction for officer students. Brigadier General Davis, President, Marine Corps University, stated, "The best way to learn is through the seminar method involving give and take... through conducting problem solving together (teacher and students)." He continued, "Lectures should be immediately followed by practical application if possible."(5) Despite this commonly held view of the desired method of instruction, the schools at the career and intermediate level fail to adequately employ the active approaches to instruction. The Vice-President of the Marine Corps University, Colonel Wyly, supports our

analysis in characterizing the schools as "unfocused institutions featuring passive learning."(22)

It must be noted, however, that both the Amphibious Warfare School and the Command and Staff College have decreased their reliance on passive instruction. Both schools have increased the time available for student research, professional reading, and reflection concerning topical issues. Further, such study time is often followed by guided seminar discussions which stress student interaction, development of ideas, articulation of opinions, and development of military judgement. Wargaming, tactical exercises without troops (TEWTs), and historical analyses have also been heavily incorporated into their curricula.

The table below delineates the percentage of time devoted to passive education vice active education for the three schools.

Table II

PERCENTAGE OF CURRICULA INSTRUCTED VIA PASSIVE TECHNIQUES

<u>School</u>	<u>Hours Passive</u>	<u>Hours Active</u>	<u>% Passive</u>
AWS	593.5	935.5	38.8%
CCSC	524	276	65.5%
C&SC	485.5	766.75	38.8%

All lecture hours from a school's curriculum were counted as passive instruction. Time devoted to seminars, wargaming, TEWTs,

field exercises, simulations, and any other practical application exercises were included as active instruction. Time devoted to professional study and preparation time (PSPT) and skill progression or occupational field expansion courses were given an arbitrary weight of 50% active and 50% passive.

Only one half of the time devoted to PSPT was credited as active because of the erratic scheduling of PSPT. For example, PSPT is often scheduled at the end of the day such as from 1600-1700 on a Friday. Clearly, such time is not likely to be used for active learning. Conversely, there are times when PSPT is undoubtedly used for professional reading and research. The skill progression and occupational field expansion courses are normally a mix of lecture and practical application exercises and therefore they were rated as 50% active. Data for the computation of the above figures was provided by the Director and Chief Instructor of AWS for the AWS curriculum, the Course Coordinator for the CCSC curriculum, and the Head of Command and Staff College for the C&SC curriculum.

It is difficult to set a desired percentage of time to be devoted to passive education versus active education for each school because of the differences in each school's curriculum and mission as well as the requirement to gear instruction to a different experience level between career and intermediate level schools. As exemplary institutions at the intermediate level,

however, the Congressional Panel of PME offers the Army Command and General Staff College which has a passive education percentage of 10% and the College of Naval Command and Staff which has a passive education percentage of 16%.(2:159) Clearly, in terms of passive education percentages alone, the Marine Corps schools do not compare favorably with these schools.

ACTIVE VERSUS PASSIVE EDUCATION

In the PME setting, the most effective learning occurs in small seminar discussion groups where students participate actively and are accountable both to the faculty and their peers for their participation.(2:161) Such an instructional technique, to be successful, requires that the students exercise self-discipline and diligence in their studies. Also, they must be provided with pertinent study assignments and allotted the time to complete them.

To further enhance the active learning approach, students should be required to synthesize and articulate their thoughts concerning the various subjects being studied through frequent writing assignments and oral presentations. There is no better vehicle to ensure that a student thoroughly understands a subject than to require that he take the time to organize his thoughts for written or oral presentation. This often forces the student to conduct additional research to answer the many questions that

arise as he tries to solidify his thoughts. Lastly, after expending personal effort, rather than sitting passively in a lecture hall and listening to a scripted classroom presentation, the knowledge gained will not easily be lost.

If students retain knowledge better through active methods such as seminar discussion, wargaming, practical application exercises, research, individual study and reading etc., why do our schools predominantly utilize such passive methods of instruction as lectures, slide presentations, and films? We believe that the answer to this question relates to the deficiencies in faculty and the flaws of the schools' use of the Instructional Systems Design approach to instruction.

As stated by the Congressional Panel on PME, a major cause of passive education is the limited qualifications of some school faculties.(2:161) This is undoubtedly a factor in the predominance of passive techniques over active techniques in the career and intermediate level schools.

A small faculty cannot devote the time that is required to achieve a level of competence required to lead discussion group seminars on the wide array of subjects taught at the schools. The instructors do not have enough time to conduct the required reading and research for upcoming blocks of instruction.

This critique should not be viewed as an indictment on the professionalism or dedication of the schools' instructors. It is,

however, an indictment on the lack of appropriate staffing of the faculty and the lack of adequate training and study time offered to the faculty prior to assuming their instructional duties.

The end result is a reliance on passive instruction like the typical fifty minute lecture and slide presentation. Another unfortunate result is the reliance on external instructors who may or may not provide the type and quality of instruction envisioned. Although all schools state that they negotiate with outside agencies and instructors for the instruction required, the schools also state that they are often disappointed in the product delivered.

CRITIQUE OF THE INSTRUCTIONAL SYSTEMS DESIGN PROCESS

The Instructional Systems Design process also encourages passive techniques. Under the ISD process, an instructor is required to formulate a lesson plan with appropriate learning objectives. These lesson plans are easiest to write if they are scripted and limited in scope. That is, the lesson plan prescribes that a given number of objectives will be taught in a prescribed time with the aid of a given number of slides or overhead transparencies. The lesson plan then becomes a script that many instructors follow to the letter without sensitivity to the class' experience level, needs, or desires. Such a system enables a marginally qualified instructor to fulfill his duties as

an instructor adequately. It does not, however, foster student to instructor interaction, debate, decision making, development of military judgement, or problem solving. This form of instruction fails to challenge the students and is in direct contradiction of Commandant Gray's guidance, in the memo previously discussed, and the philosophy embodied in FMFM 1, Warfighting.

We recognize, however, that the ISD process is only a tool to aid in the education process. As such it can be utilized at the career and intermediate education level, if implemented properly. In reality, however, it will never be implemented as intended because it causes the instructor to focus on the process rather than the subject to be taught. It is, however, effective for certain training applications and basic level instruction.

TESTING PHILOSOPHY

The testing philosophy adopted by a school is also an important aspect of its pedagogical philosophy. To varying degrees, each of the three schools incorporates testing into its curriculum. We believe that testing is necessary if a school hopes to develop a truly rigorous academic atmosphere. Additionally, we believe that testing promotes healthy competition.

To be successful, however, tests must focus on a student's ability to think. The tests must be mentally challenging and

require the student to exercise judgement. Tests which require rote memorization of enabling learning objectives have no place at the career and intermediate level of officer education. Specifically, true-false, fill in the blank, and multiple choice examinations are not appropriate.

Career and intermediate level graded requirements should include frequent essay type examinations, writing of papers, and oral presentations. The tests should be a mix of in-class and take-home examinations. Such testing, however, will require a tremendous time investment by the faculty to properly review, critique, and grade the tests. Such tests are also more difficult to grade because they are subjective. There will seldom be only one correct solution for essay or oral examinations.

This form of testing will clearly evaluate a student's depth of knowledge and thought on a given subject. It will also provide a vehicle for innovative thought and ideas. Not only will the student benefit from such testing, but the instructor as well. The faculty will be exposed to a greater breadth of ideas and solutions to contemporary issues -- ideas which would have never surfaced from a multiple choice test.

All three schools now predominantly test their students through essay type examinations; however, oral examinations are not widely used. Oral exams would not only be instrumental in fostering student to instructor interaction but would also improve

an officer's poise and confidence in conducting briefs. Additionally, oral exams could be effectively coupled with written essay exams. An officer, upon completion of his written requirement, would present his solution to the instructor in a briefing.

SCHOOL MISSION AND FOCUS

Prior to establishing a pedagogical focus, a school must be clear and precise in its mission focus. The clearer, sharper, and more distinct the primary mission, the better the school can carry it out.(2:19) Lack of a clear focus will result in a lack of concentration on vital subject matters, a diffusion of effort at the faculty level, and unnecessary redundancy among schools as well as internal to an individual school.(2:21)

Although analysis of each school's curriculum to determine whether each class contributes to the accomplishment of the school's mission and educational objectives is beyond the scope of this paper, we did receive input which described a diffusion of focus as well as redundancy within the curriculum of all three schools. Specific examples include contradictory views concerning the school's mission and focus amongst faculty members, receiving the same basic instruction during two, three, or four separate classes throughout the school year, and receiving classes on

information which was effectively taught at The Basic School.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PEDAGOGICAL IMPROVEMENT

Pedagogical improvements cannot be implemented in a vacuum. Such improvements are tied directly to the issue of faculty improvement. Both must progress simultaneously.

The first area which must be addressed is the schools' missions and curricula focus. A comprehensive analysis must be undertaken to ensure that first, the mission of each school is stated precisely to reflect what the Marine Corps and the Nation require for officer development at both the career and intermediate level. We include national requirements because of the previously stated national level importance associated with military officer development.

Such a task goes well beyond establishing a mission statement that looks good on paper. An in-depth analysis which questions the relevancy of every aspect of the current mission statements is required. This will require vision. The missions and focus established should not be solely based on the philosophies of changing school directors. We recommend that a body such as the Board of Regents, previously discussed, be tasked with the analysis. Naturally, the expertise inherent in each school's faculty and director would play an important role in discussion of mission oriented issues with the Board.

The second task to be undertaken is an analysis of curricula to ensure that redundancy between the schools is eliminated and that the courses being offered are in keeping with the schools' educational objectives. This redundancy is not limited to that found between career and intermediate level schools but includes redundancy internal to an individual school's curriculum as well. The Marine Corps University staff and the Board of Regents would play a pivotal role in this analysis. All new course material or courseware would be subject to review by the Board as would all pre-existing courseware.

Our third recommendation is to eliminate the Instructional Systems Design process at the career and intermediate levels. What is needed is instruction which reflects depth of individual study and operational experience. The courseware design process cannot be so regimented as to become the focus of the instructor's efforts. This recommendation involves inherent dangers. Specifically, if the ISD process is done away with, then there no longer remains a standard by which to measure courseware. We believe that this concern will be alleviated by the development of a professionally educated and qualified faculty as discussed previously. A faculty comprised of individuals who have completed the "Teaching the Art of War" course and who have devoted years to professional study of the subjects to be taught will not require restrictive lectures and slide presentations. Additionally, the

Board of Regents will provide the necessary system of quality control through their review of all courseware.

Further, if the university has enough confidence in an individual to select or hire him as an instructor, then the university should grant the instructor the freedom to tailor his instruction to the needs and experience level of the class. The method of instruction or process followed should not be dictated other than to provide guidance that the instruction promote student interaction and development of judgement and decision making skills.

Fourth, we recommend increased emphasis on active education means. As General Jones, USAF Retired and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated, "Passive education is the least productive for the time spent."(2:158) The schools' curricula must center on seminar discussion, professional reading, writing, wargaming, TEWTs, and sand table exercises.

Crucial to the development of officers with sound military judgement who can lead on the battlefield is the emphasis on student to student and student to instructor interaction, debate of issues, and oral and written articulation of ideas. Accordingly, we recommend that no more than 20% of the intermediate level curriculum be taught using passive techniques and no more than 30% for career level curriculum.

CONCLUSIONS

The required improvements outlined will not be easily or rapidly implemented; however, they will vastly improve the Marine Corps officer education system and the quality of the officer corps. Quality education of the officer corps will pay great dividends to our nation during peace and war. As stated by Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "In today's world it would be a tragedy to neglect the intellectual dimensions of leadership, and we must continue the fight to keep the war colleges not only healthy but constantly improving and intellectually expanding."(2:18)

We must be visionary in our quest for high-quality professional military education and adopt a long term perspective. The Marine Corps University, as planned, is the appropriate vehicle for propelling Marine Corps officer PME to the forefront of officer education within the Armed Services. To do so, the Marine Corps University must immediately adopt a program of pedagogical and faculty improvement.

APPENDIX 1

SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE

**ADEQUACY OF USMC CAREER LEVEL AND INTERMEDIATE LEVEL SCHOOLS
IN DEVELOPING OFFICERS WHO UNDERSTAND AND KNOW HOW TO FIGHT A
MAGTF**

SECTION A

NAME (Optional)

RANK

MOS

CURRENT BILLET/UNIT

WHAT RESIDENT PME SCHOOLS HAVE YOU ATTENDED?

SECTION B

1. What major strengths do you see in the USMC Career level and Intermediate level schools?

2. What deficiencies do you see in the USMC Career level and Intermediate level schools with particular regard to the availability of school seats and the curriculum at the schools?

3. Should any of the Career or Intermediate level schools offer a MAGTF Workshop Course designed for officers to attend while in a TAD status?

4. Do the resident Career level and Intermediate level schools provide their students with instruction leading to a thorough understanding of all four elements of a MAGTF?

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5. Are graduates of USMC Career level and Intermediate level schools capable of effectively articulating the unique capabilities of a MAGTF in a joint arena?

6. Is instruction/emphasis on any particular MAGTF element lacking? If so, which element?

7. Are graduates of USMC resident Career level and Intermediate level schools better prepared for combat, across the spectrum of possible conflict, than their contemporaries who have not attended the same school?

8. Should there be increased emphasis on any one particular area at the schools (EG.: leadership, the ACE as the focus of main effort, joint level operations, wargaming etc.)?

9. Is the passive approach to instruction (lecture) effective? Is a more active approach needed such as study group seminars, practical application exercises, wargames and simulations etc.?

10. Do you or would you consider assignment as an instructor at Amphibious Warfare School, Communication Officers School, or Command and Staff College a prestigious assignment?

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11. Would you rate such an assignment as career enhancing, neutral, or career detrimental?

12. Would you rate the instructors at Amphibious Warfare School, Command and Control Systems Course, and Command and Staff College as exceptionally well qualified to instruct, well qualified, marginally qualified, or not well suited to instruct?

13. Are more instructors/faculty needed or is the student/faculty ratio adequate?

14. Is there a proper representation of Military Occupational Specialties at the instructor level?

SECTION C

Additional Comments/Recommendations:

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