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AMERICA'S NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY:
NEW SCENARIOS FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS
RESEARCH

BY

JAMES J. TRITTEN

JUNE 11, 1991

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
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
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ABSTRACT

Provides an analysis of President Bush's new national security strategy first unveiled in Aspen, Colorado on August 2, 1990, and General Colin Powell's "base" force. If implemented, the new strategy and force structure would return a significant amount of U.S. ground and air forces to CONUS where most would be demobilized. In the event of a major crisis, the U.S. would rely on active and reserve forces for a contingency response. The new national security strategy is based upon a revised Soviet threat and new international security environment which allows us to assume two years warning of a major ground war in Europe. During this two year period, the U.S. would reconstitute additional military capability. Outline of new strategy and "base" force structure, transportation requirements, and whether or not the U.S. will retain a unilateral capability for overseas intervention. Discussion of parallel NATO initiatives. Discussion of major issues, including: defining new goals and objectives in both programming and war planning, the effect of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, new requirements for intelligence, requirements for decision-making, investment strategy and industrial conversion, reconstitution, and impact on military operations research and analysis.

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NEW SCENARIOS FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS RESEARCH

by
James J. Tritten¹

President George Bush unveiled a new national security strategy for the United States in his August 2, 1990 speech at the Aspen Institute in Colorado. The national security strategy concepts he unveiled at Aspen would be **revolutionary** and have direct and dramatic impacts on NATO and the rest of the world.

Essentially, the President opened the door to a **total** reexamination of America's role in the world and its overall military capability. The historical parallel is the British reorientation in the first decade of the 20th Century from strategic focus on colonies to Europe. As Clausewitz wrote, war has ". . . its own grammar, but not its own logic." The old political logic of the Cold War has changed - it is now time to change the military grammar.

U.S. defense policy will be based upon four major elements: deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution. Rather than deploy forces at the levels maintained since WWII, under this new national security strategy the United States would maintain a much smaller active and reserve force mix primarily focused on world-wide major contingency operations -- not a Europe-centered global war with the USSR. If forces were required to fight a major war against the Soviet Union, the U.S. assumes that there would be sufficient time to reconstitute them. Specifically, the President has apparently accepted the consensus

of his intelligence community that the Soviet Union would need "at least one to two years or longer to regenerate the capability for a European theater-wide offensive or a global conflict."² The U.S. will, therefore, have two year's warning for a Europe-centered global war with the USSR.

SOURCES OF THE NEW STRATEGY

Rather than having a single or even a few documents that we can refer to understand the new national security strategy and the associated force structure, there are a series of speeches, articles, and reports that must be consulted if one is to get the complete story. To properly understand these documents, one **must** read them in sequence in order to see how the concepts evolved over time. The sequence starts with the President's Aspen speech on August 2. Generally ignored by media due to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on the same day, the concepts outlined in the President's speech were brief and visionary - destined to be full developed by official spokesmen in the following months.

Only limited commentary about the new national security strategy or force structure appeared in the U.S. media until the February DoD testimony to Congress. The U.S. press had been otherwise engaged in major defense-associated reporting of events in the Middle East. On the other hand, the Soviet press has given both subjects wide coverage.

Following this February testimony, the 1991 SECDEF Annual Report to the President and the Congress was issued, although it

is dated January. This report specifically addresses the new national security strategy and provides a force structure that is designed for budgetary and political give and take. For those that had still not yet understood that strategy and force structure were changing, a copy of the President's Aspen speech was provided as an annex. By the end of March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued their 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA).

A number of things stands out, by reviewing the primary source documents. The first is that this appears to be a very top-down re-direction in defense strategy and force structure. From the public record, it appears that there were a handful of individuals that orchestrated the new concepts and that there were only a few authorized spokesmen. The usual indicators of a debate are absent - discussion by other senior military officials does not appear until well **after** the new concepts have been articulated in public.

A second matter that stands out is that the new national security strategy does not have a name. Inside the Washington beltway, the strategy is known as the "new strategy" or the "President's strategy." The strategy has also been referred to, informally, as the "Aspen Strategy," the "reconstitution strategy," and the "strategy for the new world order," but it appears that the Administration will let academia, or the press, select the title that will appear in the history books. For the pur-

poses of this paper, the strategy is uniformly referred to as the "new national security strategy."

By the beginning of May, sufficient details of the President's new strategic concepts were available to make an in-depth assessment of the new national security strategy's impact. It should be acknowledged that the strategy lacks a formal name and that the internal debate and discussion within the Administration has not yet ended. Rather than a "bottom-up" product of endless hours of staff work involving all the major defense and industrial participants, the new national security strategy is very much in the model of recent shifts in military doctrine in the USSR - with perhaps even more debate in the USSR that has yet occurred in the United States.

THE PRESIDENT'S NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The major factor underlying the reexamination of America's role in the world, and basic national security strategy, is the recognition by the Congress and the Administration that the level of resources devoted to defense in the last decade cannot be sustained. American defense spending will apparently be reduced on the order of 25% under the new national security strategy and the "base" force. This reduction is **not** simply the low end of a periodic cycle of fluctuating defense expenditures -- it is a recognition that the total amount of resources devoted to defense need not be as high as long as the current political climate remains with us.

Another fundamental component of the President's new national security strategy is that, assuming a two years warning of a Europe-centered global war with the USSR, the U.S. can generate wholly new forces - to rebuild or "reconstitute" them if necessary. Specifically, current forces deemed unnecessary, will be disbanded, **not** put into the reserves, since the risk is deemed acceptable.

Reconstitution is **not** the same thing as mobilization or regeneration - it is more like what the United Kingdom had planned during the 1930s when it assumed that up to ten years of strategic warning would be available. New defense manufacturing capability and new forces and military would be built; essentially from the ground floor up. Preserving this capability will mean protecting our infrastructure and the defense industrial base, preserving our lead in critical technologies, and stockpiling critical materials. Preserving our alliance structure is another element of our ability to reconstitute a more significant forward-based military presence when, and if, it is ever again required.

The shift in focus from the Soviet threat and a European centered global war is a **major** change in both program and war planning. We will justify why we procure defense programs for reasons other than those routinely used since the end of World War II.

The estimated two-year warning is predicated upon the assumptions that all Soviet ground and air forces will withdraw to the homeland, that a CFE-like parity will exist from the Atlantic to the Urals, that the Soviet Union will remain inwardly focused, and that NATO and its member states intelligence apparatus are functioning.

Another area of emphasis in the new national security strategy is emphasis on technological breakthroughs that will change military art. SECDEF Dick Cheney first addressed this in his February remarks to Congress. Changes in military art occurred during the inter-war years with the development of *blitzkrieg*, carrier-based strike naval air, and amphibious warfare capabilities. The Soviet military has long discussed the "Revolution in Military Affairs" that occurred after World War II and the advent of nuclear weapons and long-range means of deliver. Senior Soviet military officers have been warning of another "revolution" in the near future.³ After the performance of U.S. weapons during Operation DESERT STORM, it appears that their worst fears were justified. The coming revolution will present enormous challenges and opportunities in the area of doctrinal and strategy development.

One of General Colin L. Powell's more frequent themes in his writings and speeches over the past year has been that of enduring realities and emerging defense needs. Under the category of enduring reality, the CJCS lists Soviet military power, vital interests across the Atlantic, in Europe and the Middle East, and

in the Pacific, and the unknown threat - the crisis that no one expected. The new national security strategy and the associated "base" force are designed to meet these needs by providing a less Soviet/European-centered and more flexible military capability which will meet America's security requirements as we enter the next Century.

The cornerstone of American defense strategy will remain deterrence of aggression and coercion against the U.S. and its allies and friends. Deterrence is achieved by convincing a potential adversary that the cost of aggression, at any level, exceeds any possibility of gain. To achieve this goal, the U.S. will continue its modernization of strategic nuclear forces and associated command, control, and communications capabilities.

The U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy will remain committed to fostering nuclear stability, where no nation feels the need to use nuclear weapons in a first-strike. The U.S. remains committed to improving its strategic nuclear defensive capabilities. One new area for strategic nuclear warfare will be to respond flexibly to lower levels of aggression. Strategic defenses can be effective in countering the growing threat of ballistic missiles from nations other than the USSR.

Deterrence is often thought to only involve nuclear weapons, but under the new national security strategy, we should expect to see further investigation of the deterrence of conventional

warfare without the explicit threat to use nuclear weapons. Other major elements of the new national security strategy include forward presence, crisis response and collective security.

There is a risk that the end of the Cold War may bring an increased risk of regional conflicts and a greater degree of unpredictability in the international security environment. Today's crises are extremely dangerous due to the proliferation of advanced weaponry and weapons of mass destruction and the demonstrated willingness of Third World nations to use them. U.S. crisis response forces will provide presence with the ability to reinforce with sufficient forces to prevent a potentially major crisis from escalating or to resolve favorably less demanding conflicts.

For ease of budget discussion, the U.S. often has used an illustrative planning scenario. Any planning for contingency responses by the U.S. should include the ability to react to more than one "canned" predicament or a single scenario. The JCS have now developed a family of likely (and perhaps even unlikely) events for which the U.S. may elect to commit military forces.

The conventional conflict scenarios now used by the JCS are contained in this year's JMNA. They range from peacetime engagement to war escalating from a European crisis with full mobilization. Contingencies include: (1) counter-insurgency; (2) lesser regional contingencies, with two sub-cases (2,000 and 6000 nauti-

cal miles from the U.S.); (3) a major regional contingencies in Korea; and (4) a major regional contingency in Southwest Asia.

The JCS recognize that not all crises will evolve the same. The JMNA outlines four possible types of crises: (1) a slow-building crisis; (2) a fast-rising crisis; (3) imminent conflict; and (4) conflict. The length and intensity of combat, for planning purposes, is assumed to be 450 days for counter-insurgency, 90 days of low-mid intensity for lesser regional contingencies, 120 days of mid-high intensity for major regional contingencies, and >50 days of mid-high intensity for a war escalating from a European crisis.

Responses to these contingencies are contained in a series of measured response options. The types of response could include a flexible minimal force deterrent response, a major deterrent response (Operation DESERT SHIELD), and more worst-case responses where combat is undertaken soon after the insertion of troops or simultaneously. This program of types of contingencies and measured responses appears to be a building-block and force sequencing approach to crisis management.

THE "BASE" FORCE

Although details of the President's new national security strategy are still being debated, active duty and ready reserve forces are likely to decrease significantly. The "bottom line" numbers are likely to be:

- Army: 12 active, 6 ready reserve divisions (currently 18 active & 10 reserve), and 2 "cadre" or reconstitutable reserve divisions
- Air Force: 15 active & 11 reserve TFWs (currently 36)
181 strategic bombers (currently 268)
550 ICBMs
- Navy: 451 ships (currently 545)
150 surface combatants with 0 battleships
12 aircraft carriers + 1 for training (currently 14)
13 carrier air wings
- Marine Corps: 160,000 personnel (currently 196,000) organized in three MEFs with simultaneous lift for the assault echelons of 2½ MEBs

Sometimes termed the "base force," the new force structure advocated by General Powell will be organized into four basic military components: Strategic nuclear offensive and defensive; Atlantic; Pacific; and a Contingency Force; and four supporting capabilities: Transportation, Space, Reconstitution, and R&D. What constitutes those forces will be debated throughout the next year.

The Strategic Force

The Strategic Force would include those offensive forces that survive the START process - perhaps some 4500 to 3000 warheads for each side. In their February Congressional testimony, Secretary Cheney and General Powell stated that they were prepared to halt the construction of *OHIO* class ballistic missile submarines at eighteen, not retrofit all of those submarines with the more advanced *TRIDENT II* (D-5) missiles, and only consider the *PEACEKEEPER* (MX) rail garrison ICBM and small ICBM as R&D programs **without** plans for deployment.

President Bush said in his State of the Union address in January, that SDI would be refocused only on providing protection from limited ballistic missile strikes against the U.S., its forces overseas, and friends and allies. Secretary Cheney outlined a reorientation of SDI to a system of Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) -- indicating that it would be space, ground, and **sea**-based. The initial objective of GPALS would be protection against accidental, unauthorized, and/or limited ballistic missile strikes. The system should only be about half the size of the Phase I plan associated with SDI. It is likely that strategic defenses will at least continue as an R&D program.

The Atlantic Force

The conventional military forces of the U.S. appear to be headed for both reductions and restructuring. The Atlantic Force will include residual forces remaining in Europe, those forward-deployed to Europe, and the continental U.S.-based reinforcing force (including heavy ground forces). The Atlantic Force would contain a significant reserve component. This force would be responsible for Europe, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia in recognition of the fact that in the future, the threat in the Middle East is on a par with that of Europe, thus necessitating the same type of response.

The U.S. military has recommended that it retain in Europe: 2 Army divisions and 3 Air Force TFWs. One CVBG and a MEU-sized

amphibious ready group will remain deployed continuously in the Mediterranean Sea or eastern Atlantic Ocean. There will also be some residual presence in the Middle East.

Atlantic Force forward presence will be backed up by a powerful reinforcement capability. That capability will consist of 4 active, 6 reserve, and 2 cadre reserve Army divisions, 2 active and 11 reserve Air Force TFWs, 5 Navy CVBGs, 2 USMC MEBs, and the USMC reserve component. The Atlantic Force appears to be the backbone of America's future conventional deterrence.

The Pacific Force

The Pacific Force will include a modest and chiefly maritime residual forward-based and forward-deployed force remaining in Korea, Japan and elsewhere in the theater, and reinforcing forces located in the continental U.S. In Korea, the U.S. will initially retain one Army division and 1-2 Air Force TFWs. In Japan, 1-2 Air Force TFWs and one home-based Navy CVBG. A MEU-sized amphibious ready group will operate in the Western Pacific for most of each year.

American Army and Air Force power in the Pacific will be primarily reinforcements; a single light Army division, one Air Force TFW, a Hawaii-based USMC MEB, and in the continental U.S., there would be an additional Marine Corps MEB and 5 Navy CVBGs. Modest reserve components in Alaska and Hawaii would be allocated

to the Pacific Force. In short, the Pacific Force will be an economy of force operation.

If the Cold War was our original justification for the large presence of forces in the Pacific, then if the Cold War is over, it is over in the Pacific as well. If forces and bases are to be permanently retained overseas, it will have to be for other reasons. If the U.S. significantly reduces its forces in Japan, there is a possibility that there will be arguments to increase the size and/or capability of the Japanese Armed Forces. Any such possibility will be watched very carefully by China, the USSR, and other Pacific nations.

The Contingency Force

Perhaps the most dramatic innovation of the recommended force structure is the creation of a Contingency Force based in the continental United States. The Contingency Force, according to the guidelines in the President's Aspen speech, will apparently be shaped by the need to provide an overseas presence and response to regional contingencies. It would appear that the Contingency Force is to be responsible for Latin America and Africa, not Europe, the Middle East, or Southwest Asia. It is not clear, but some recent U.S. military reports allude to the Contingency Force having a role in the "far-flung islands of the world's oceans." It is also possible that the Contingency Force may end up with responsibility for South Asia.

Continental U.S.-based contingency response forces are not a new idea. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the U.S. military experimented with a series of similar schemes that were eventually abandoned under the Kennedy Administration. The Army and Air Force will apparently commit 4 divisions and 7 TFWs to the Contingency Force while the Navy and Marine Corps will provide dual-committed forces from the Atlantic and Pacific. Most of the rapid response sealift and all intertheater airlift and all special forces would belong to the Contingency Force.

The first stage of a Contingency Force in what is termed a "graduated deterrence response," would consist of Army light & airborne divisions, USMC MEBs, Special Operations Forces, and selected Air Force units. This initial component of the Contingency Force would be buttressed as necessary by carrier and amphibious forces. The third tier of the Contingency Force appears to be heavier forces with the capability for long-term sustainability. We have seen this application in Operation DESERT SHIELD. The Contingency Force would "borrow" heavy forces, as needed, from the Atlantic Force. The key to understanding the new crisis response part of the new national security strategy is that it is not keyed to one service or even the active component having a unilateral capability. Crisis response in the future appears to be a joint responsibility with a mix of active and selected reserve units.

Transportation

Mobility programs proposed by the SECDEF include the ability to return to Europe with 4 Army divisions, 30 Air Force tactical fighter squadrons, one Marine Corps MEB, and their associated support within 10 days. Additional forces would be provided within 2-3 months. DoD will continue to build toward prepositioned equipment in Europe for 6 Army divisions and their associated support elements.

For contingencies outside of Europe, the goal is to be able to provide 5 Army divisions, along with associated air and naval forces in about 6 weeks. It would appear that ground units would fly to a future crisis, much as forces assigned to Operation DESERT SHIELD did to Saudi Arabia. Personnel will then either be married up with prepositioned equipment or with equipment that arrives via sea.

Lift will probably include a modest government-owned capability in a caretaker status and civilian air and sea transportation assets engaged in normal peacetime trade. The U.S. was able to generally meet its lift requirements for Operations DESERT SHIELD with a combination of existing assets, those that were taken up from trade, and charters of foreign capability. Similar assumptions will probably be made under the new national security strategy.

Air and sealift for a major NATO war in Europe can be put into the category of forces that could be reconstituted. Reconstitution of lift should include: that provided by allies, charters from foreign non-aligned sources, and the activation of assets placed in storage.

Unilateral Capability?

One of the more interesting questions regarding the Contingency Force and potential intervention by the Atlantic or Pacific Forces is whether or not the planning assumption includes a unilateral capability or is the participation of host nations and allies understood? The JMNA assumes that host nation support and sufficient infrastructure is available for any **major** regional contingency.

"Acting alone" **must** be viewed in terms of what level of warfare is being discussed -- strategic (for example, World War II), operational (campaign sized similar to Operations DESERT SHIELD or DESERT STORM), or tactical, and whether or not such operations are essentially nuclear, maritime, or air/land warfare. The U.S. will probably reserve the right and maintain the capability to take unilateral military actions with nuclear forces and with all types of tactical level warfare, but probably **not** at the strategic or operational levels of air/land warfare.

However, we should assume that the U.S. would **not** be able to **unilaterally** mount an opposed contingency operation or campaign such as DESERT SHIELD with the "base force." One could argue,

furthermore, that the U.S. probably does **not** even have this operational level capability today. Both the SECDEF and the CJCS were careful in their testimony to the Congress in February, to project that the "base" force **could** handle an Operation DESERT SHIELD or DESERT STORM but that it might have taken longer before the forces were prepared to go on the offensive. This answer assumes, however, that such operations are coalition - **not** unilateral-based.

The U.S. long has assumed that a major war (at the strategic level) would only be pursued as a part of alliances, such as NATO - hence there is no real change at this level of warfare. Similarly, the U.S. has always had a unilateral capability at the tactical level of warfare and there is no reason to assume that it will not have this in the future.

NATO INITIATIVES

U.S. forces in Europe, and elsewhere, cannot be changed without considering commitments made to allies and the planned employment of American resources in combined operations under NATO command. While the United States is considering major changes in strategy and forces, so is NATO. The July 1990 NATO London Declaration stated that "NATO will rely more heavily on the ability to build up larger forces if and when they might be needed." The July Declaration stated that the Alliance too was preparing a new "military strategy moving away from 'forward defense'. . .towards a reduced forward presence. . ." The decla-

ration also stated that "NATO will field smaller and restructured active forces" and "will scale back the readiness of active units, reducing training requirements and the number of exercises."

General John R. Galvin, U.S. Army, SACEUR, recently told the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) in December that he envisages a change in his primary combat mission from flexible response and forward defense to crisis response. The centerpiece of this capability would be a standing Rapid Reaction Corps centered about a multinational corps and the existing ACE Mobile Forces. Should these standing forces not be able to support political decision making, then additional forces will be mobilized and regenerated or "reconstituted."⁴

According to the NATO London Declaration and General Galvin's DPC remarks, a new NATO war fighting strategy is being drafted to replace the current strategy of flexible response (MC-14/3). The overall new NATO strategy will be based upon newly calculated national commitment force levels. Unilateral programming actions for future forces being undertaken by individual NATO nations, like the U.S., will obviously affect the warfighting strategy that NATO as a whole will be able to implement as those programmed forces become operational. Current national programming actions may stem from revised national views on war, the threat, or the resources available for defense. This is exactly what has happened in the United States.

The new NATO strategy will be based upon paragraph 20 of the London Declaration. According to General Galvin's remarks at IISS, NATO strategy will have peacetime, crisis, and wartime responses. Peacetime elements will likely include: enumeration of national prerogatives, maintenance of alliance cohesion by integration and multinational forces, intelligence and verification of arms control agreements, and force generation preparation.

The crisis response strategy will likely address: readiness for the Rapid Reaction Corps, the quick reaction of the alliance to emerging crises, communication with adversaries, escalation and deescalation, and the preparation for controlled mobilization and demobilization. The political goal of a future crisis appears to be - control and deescalate. NATO initiatives include more emphasis on mobility and multinationality. Multinational corps with two or three divisions from different countries parallel existing arrangements for multinational maritime forces.

ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION

The issues raised in the President's Aspen speech are numerous, complex, and require discussion. Some of the more important include: how do we define our new goals and objectives for both program and war planning; what is the lasting impact of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM; what are the new requirements for the intelligence community and for decision-making? What are the industrial aspects of the new national security strategy: investment strategy, conversion, and reconstitution?

Finally, there are obvious implications for military operations research and analysis.

Defining Goals & Objectives in Programming & War Planning

Political-military strategic planning generally commences with: (1), a tabulation of the resources likely to be available, or (2), an assessment of the threat, or (3), an examination of the goals and objectives to be attained. The planning process can start with any of these three factors but it generally does start with different ones depending upon the type of planning underway -- war planning for immediate combat operations or program planning for forces to be delivered in the future.

In wartime, planning often starts with a tabulation of the resources available - probably how the military started the process on December 8, 1941 -- after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor put significant portions of the Pacific Fleet on the bottom. Existing plans for war with Japan had to be revised based upon the numbers and types of surviving forces. Initial goals were limited by the resources available.

In wartime, nations may also turn first to an examination of the threat, especially when faced with the need to create major strategic plans insufficiently researched before the war. The USSR likely did this after the Germans invaded on June 22, 1941. Prior to being invaded by Germany, insufficient attention had been paid to fighting the Germans on Soviet soil on the strategic

defensive. The Soviet military was forced to develop plans and execute them in short order based upon a revised threat scenario.

War planning may also **start** with an examination, analysis, and reconsideration of goals and objectives. The U.S. and the Soviet Union each had initial goals and objectives they attempted to achieve in the initial stages of World War II but generally these were limited by the newly revised resources available and the actual threat as demonstrated by enemy capability. Later, however, the allies amassed sufficient forces to operate on the strategic offensive in all theaters and recognized that "unconditional surrender" was a possible goal. War plans could then be drawn up with primary consideration given to goals and objectives rather than resources and the threat. This also underscores that goals and objectives can and often do change during wars.

Much of the literature devoted to defense planning does not, however, concern actual **war** planning, but rather **program** planning, used to explain to legislators and the public why certain types of weapons systems and forces should be purchased and maintained. There is often some overlap between the initial program plans and subsequent program plans - but not always. For example, the *USS MIDWAY* was justified in 1940s programming plans to help defeat Japan. War plans in the 1980s included the *USS MIDWAY* defending Japan. Similarly, program plans after March 1983 included SDI but war plans written that year could not.

Program planning under PPBS, in the United States, officially starts with an examination and identification of the threat. There have always been implicit unofficial discussions of the range of resources available and a general consensus on goals that may have preceded this threat examination. The consensus on goals is what is being discussed in the President's new national security strategy.

Current U.S. and Soviet program planning has been drastically affected by the change in perceptions of the threat facing these two nations. After years of relying on military preparedness to guarantee peace, each side has apparently seen that what it took as reasonable steps for self-defense were perceived by the other side as evidence of aggressive intentions.⁵ The American public, and therefore the U.S. Congress, has revised their world view and made it known that the levels of programming expenditure devoted to the Soviet threat are simply no longer required. It seems that the major driving factor behind the creation of the President's new programming strategy is the need to outline a plan to maintain national defense under a climate of greatly reduced resources.

Program planning should logically start with goals and objectives, but in the past, this has rarely occurred. In general, a fundamental reexamination of goals and objectives has not been necessary given the generally stable state of political military relations between the superpowers. Due to the major changes in the international political climate, we should also

expect to see the U.S. debate whether or not its programming (or even wartime) planning should include a unilateral capabilities or automatically assume standing alliance or ad hoc coalitions and host nations. There is a **tremendous** difference in programming based upon the assumption that is made regarding this question.

Although the U.S. and NATO never had the opportunity to develop war plans for an environment that included forces envisaged under SDI, there is no need to delay immediate revisions of war plans for existing forces. There are significant changes to the international environment, especially the threat, and an urgent need to reduce defense expenditures - hence plans can be changed **now**. This specifically includes our desire and ability to change now the planned employment of strategic nuclear forces.

Do we need to target facilities and forces in nations that clearly are no longer enemies? What political benefit would be gained from targeting areas where restless nationalities are already struggling against the national government in the USSR? Will the Soviet military assume that these areas and Eastern Europe are "safe havens?" Will the USSR create targeting plans for areas in formerly allied nations? Can both sides change their targeting fast enough to respond to rapidly changing political events?

Similarly, in the conventional realm, there is an obvious need to immediately revise existing war plans since NATO now controls both sides of the Fulda Gap. Indeed, General Galvin told the DPC that "it is clear that the old General Defense Plan is useless, and I have already rescinded it." There are obvious components to conventional war planning that should be revisited and need not await programming decisions.

Conventional war planners should also be already changing the focus of their efforts from the "big" war with the USSR to the regional contingencies outlined in the JMNA. War planners have traditionally devoted most of their efforts to planning for the most demanding and least likely scenarios -- they should now devote the bulk of their efforts to the most likely and less demanding. This redirection in efforts will not come easy and may require some different types of expertise. New contingency plans are needed soon so that program planners can have C-in-C inputs to force requirements, i.e. the forces desired for contingencies may not be the same as we procured for the "big" war.

Impact of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

Operation DESERT SHIELD demonstrated that the U.S. can initially muster sufficient assets from the continental U.S. to meet a major contingency where there were no forces in being. The initial deployment of forces in Operation DESERT SHIELD also seemed to demonstrate that such a force does **not** require basing overseas, such as in Europe although additional forces did redeploy from Europe and other overseas locations to the Middle East.

The developed ports, airfields and available petroleum in Saudi Arabia may not be available at future contingency locations -- cautioning us to not necessarily use these operations as a model for the future. It will take analysis of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM to make a definitive statement on the issue -- but we should review the President's new national security strategy and the associated force structure now that these two Operations have run their course.

Once DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM after-action reports are written, analysts will try to answer the question what systems appeared to make a difference in the political and military outcome. Successful use of the PATRIOT anti-missile system is one that has already suggested to many the value of ABM systems for the continental U.S. Systems that did not make a major contribution to Operation DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM will need to be reevaluated for upgrading or cancellation and replacement. Under the new national security strategy to reconstitute capabilities useful in a Europe-centered global war with the USSR, there will be no need to retain systems that do not have a dual use in the Contingency Force.

There appear to be a number of obvious areas for research with regard to lessons learned. Some of the more obvious are whether or not a land campaign was truly required or could our objectives been accomplished with airpower alone? What lessons do the Soviets claim that they have learned from our experience?

Both sides will obviously study the lessons learned, especially of the Air Campaign, and see if adjustments to military art are required. If the lessons are that significant, we can expect to not only see the U.S. consider revisions to the new national security strategy, but also the Soviet Union start their internal military doctrine debate anew.

New Requirements for Intelligence

The changes suggested by the Bush Administration, if accepted by the U.S. Congress, will place an enormous burden on the intelligence community. Although one might argue that logically, concomitant with such fundamental changes intelligence appropriations should increase, it is probable that they will decrease like defense spending.

President Bush's remarks in Aspen are **programming** remarks and do not reflect changes in the **current** defense plans for the U.S. or U.S. forces which would fight today under NATO. The intelligence community will still need to provide all of their traditional services until the new international security environment takes hold. This fact should satisfy critics who will complain that we are overlooking the Soviet threat or that the events that we see in the USSR are simply a ruse or represent an attempt to secure a breathing space prior to a massive rearmament. In short, there is a current intelligence requirement that remains well focused on the existing Soviet threat.

In addition to providing intelligence products vis-a-vis the USSR to support current war planning, the intelligence community must also provide new products to support programming for the future Atlantic Force. For example, we need quick rough answers to approximations of how much the USSR will devote in the future or is devoting to defense, given other needs. Naturally, the intelligence community has been attempting to provide this information all along, but with new information available, we can perhaps refine our assessments. Similarly, we need to identify the new international goals and objectives that serve as the requirements for future Soviet forces. Perhaps the time has come to jointly game with the USSR the deescalation of crises.⁶ If we do this, we will need to "game the game" before hand in order to not give away more than we expect to learn.

The bulk of the U.S. and NATO national intelligence communities are oriented toward understanding and countering the Soviet threat. Although it took many years, the West eventually grew sophisticated at understanding the Soviet perspective on doctrine, strategy, arms control, and the like. Our intelligence agencies and associated policy offices are substantially less competent at analyzing, predicting behavior, and conducting net assessments for the rest of the world. Obviously that situation is already remedying itself vis-a-vis Iraq, but there remain many areas of the world for which this conclusion remains true. The Contingency Force will need strong supporting intelligence capabilities.

We need more in-depth intelligence capabilities for new areas of the world. Deficiencies in this area should be corrected, and quickly. Is the intelligence community prepared to provide players in seminar and war games that can represent the behavior of nations other than our traditional enemies?⁷ We recently felt comfortable enough with our knowledge of the USSR to create artificial intelligence-like models to represent Soviet behavior in expert systems that substituted machine actions for human behavior. Are we ready to do this for non-Soviet actors?

Flexibility in shifting intelligence assets from one set of collection targets to rapidly emerging priority targets is essential to support the contingency response element of the President's new national security strategy. Continued unimpeded access to space underlies support for the use of American military forces and has been identified by General Powell as one of the key supporting capabilities.

As the intelligence community re-/enters new areas, it will have to make some adjustments in the manner that it does business. Formerly, when intelligence analysts differed, the debate could be settled by an assessment of the data. With political and economic intelligence, it is often the methodology rather than the data that settles disputes.

We have to build capabilities to match our stated need for new types of information. Economic and other forms of strategic intelligence, for example, may become relatively more important

than extremely costly technical intelligence systems designed to provide tactical warning.⁸ The net impact of the President's new national security strategy is that the intelligence community may have to undergo a fundamental reexamination of its missions and priorities.

Requirements for Decision-Making

NATO used to talk in terms of a few days warning (the time to detect an invasion) and another few days for decision. Mobilization and return of initial American troops and air forces from the continental U.S. to Europe would take around 10 days. Hence the canonical 14-day scenario arose, with enormous effort devoted to the assessment of theater-strategic operations and campaigns that would be fought by forces that could be brought to bear. We became very adept at calculating theater-wide force ratios for the first thirty or forty-five days of a war in Europe.

The question arises: how long would it take the Soviets to again be in such a position to cause the U.S. to worry about a European crisis that could escalate to warfare and perhaps be over within a month and a half? Similarly, how long does the Soviet military feel that it would need to respond to an unanticipated rebuilding of Western military potential in Europe?

From the JMNA, it appears that in the event of a superpower crisis, the prime programming assumption is that armed conflict

will not occur for at least 24 months. This is not exactly the same thing as assuming that we will have two year's strategic warning and response time; warning might be provided and ignored or warning might not be recognized. For programming purposes, however, U.S. planners should assume that the old theater strategic operation, or a surge operational-strategic level attack across the old inter-German border with the Pyrenees as goal, could not be mounted without the U.S. intelligence community obtaining and understanding indicators two years in advance.

For program planning, we also assume that during this two year period, the U.S. can reconstitute forces for defense of Europe while the Soviets are doing the same for their offensive capability. During that time, we assume that we can re-build forces and materials instead of maintaining them on active duty, in the Ready Reserves, or prepositioned in Europe. U.S. forces reconstituted for a major war in Europe need only be sufficient to deter or defend against a Soviet attack - not launch a theater strategic offensive operation.

Succinctly, the need for the old, massive, short-term (14-day) mobilization has diminished. The threat planning assumption that once drove NATO toward a two-week mobilization requirement has been replaced with a threat, for programming purposes, that now gives the alliance two years to respond.

We need to more fully discuss this two years period. For example, should we assume that we will have two years to recon-

stitute forces from the time that strategic warning is provided and accepted by the intelligence community? If so, which intelligence community - the U.S., NATO, all NATO nations, or some new international command? Perhaps the assumption is two years following the government's accepting that something is wrong that needs to be redressed? Which government or governments and does NATO collectively have to agree to react? Is it two years assuming that we can find something significant and recognize it at the time?

Two years does not mean that the USSR cannot launch an intercontinental nuclear strike against the continental U.S., or an attack at the tactical or perhaps even the operational level in Europe in less time than that. There is probably some period of time associated with still realistic, but lesser, threats from the Soviet Union that is less than two years and more than two weeks. A major regional contingency involving the USSR in Europe should be and is in our program planning contingencies. Indeed, the U.S. **should** include in its family of programming scenarios a major regional contingency involving the USSR in Europe but limited **only** to that theater.

Even accepting the ability of the intelligence community to provide a two years strategic warning, there is controversy over what governments will do when faced with the inconclusive evidence provided initially. General Galvin told a group of former SHAPE officers that two years warning time should be looked at in

the context of the warning provided to and the response made by the United States from September 1939 to December 1941. Post-Stalin Soviet military authors are never reluctant to remind their readers that despite overwhelming intelligence evidence of an impending invasion by Nazi Germany, and despite the recommendations for mobilization from his military staffs, the USSR was not prepared for the invasion that actually did take place in June 1941.

If Western history of non-reactions to rearmament by totalitarian nations and violations of arms control agreements is a guide, we should assume that democracies will: (1), delay decisions to rearm for many good reasons - such as different interpretations of ambiguous intelligence data, the desire to deescalate a crisis, etc., (2), deny that a change in the behavior of a former opponent has taken place or, if it has, is not strategically significant or not precisely a violation of an agreement, and (3), even suppress the intelligence and findings of facts that do not support government policy. Linking the behavior of a nation to a formal agreement, such as arms control, takes the reporting and interpretation of data away from analysts in the intelligence community and makes it the province of lawyers and politicians.

We will need to make a study of the decision-making patterns of nations when faced with decisions similar to one that NATO governments will face when presented with ambiguous evidence which, some might argue, constitutes "proof" that the USSR, or

the Russian Republic in a new USSR confederation, is violating the "understandings" or treaties that codify the new international security environment. NATO reactions will be inhibited by the arms control and confidence building measures that we adopt over the next few years.

War planners, unlike program planners, are not **required** to use "best case" assumptions and are therefore authorized to formulate their plans on less optimistic suppositions. Hence, redirection of programming planners to the "best case" (two years warning) does not necessarily influence war planning for current forces. Nor does it necessarily deny governmental decision-makers access to alternative intelligence assessments based upon current capabilities rather than program assumption intentions.

The military should include in their family of actual war plans, plans based upon the track record of their governments acting courageously in response to provocation. For example, the military is not limited from drafting internal war plans that assume that authorization for the mobility of existing forces and the mobilization of reserves will **not** be granted until the commencement of hostilities (M=C=D).

Decision-making studies to support program and current war planning should span the gamut of possible scenarios. At one end of the spectrum is the "worst case," of NATO reconstituting its forces within the two years predicted, but withholding the au-

thority to mobilize forces out of garrison and respond to tactical warning until an attack by the USSR takes place, is verified, reported to the national and allied command authorities, and an authorization to respond is communicated to the field. In this scenario, we assume that the Soviet military machine was able to come back strong and perhaps even be "invited" into Eastern Europe.

The related "best case" would be if all forces were allowed to report to their NATO-assigned positions, ready for a stillborn Soviet threat generated during two years of economic and political chaos. Perhaps in this situation, NATO might have an option for offensive tactical and even operational-level warfare against the USSR.

At the other end of the spectrum is the other "worst case," of a USSR that takes a full two years to rearm in such a manner that it obtains a significant advantage in its estimation of the correlation of forces and means. The scenario would assume that NATO nations failed to make bold decisions when faced with ambiguous evidence by the intelligence community. The associated "best case" would be a NATO that made the bold decisions and matched the Soviet regeneration with their own. Both sides would then be fully reconstituted and on a wartime command and control footing and deployment.

There are numerous other scenarios that need investigation. Despite the lack of credibility accorded a "bolt-from-the-blue"

ground attack by the USSR during the new international security environment, we should analyze this scenario to develop intelligence indicators we should monitor to ensure against such a possibility.

It is even conceivable that Eastern European nations might ask Soviet, or Russian, troops back into their nations⁹ to counteract what they perceive to be a threat from Germany. That scenario can build upon existing studies. Differences with today's scenarios might include reconstitution at national locations but failure to deploy forces from home garrisons and allow their transfer to NATO. Other possibilities include using portions of the programmed Pacific and Contingency Forces in addition to the Atlantic Force to respond to a European crisis.

War planners will also wrestle with how much time and what type of decisions are necessary during the initial combat actions in a crisis, before forces are either called up from the reserves or reconstituted in full. During this period, presumably both superpowers would act defensively. How long should we assume that this period will last? Should we have one set of assumptions for programming and another for war planning? It is very likely that programming will assume a longer defensive period than do operational war planners.

NATO exercise and simulated military decision-making has traditionally assumed that the alliance political structure would

make decisions, which would then be carried out by near-simultaneous actions taken by all member nations. In a restructured NATO alliance that is more political than military, and exists in a new international security environment, NATO and national military commanders might have to make future plans based upon a likely decision-making process that has member nations making unilateral actions prior to those of the alliance as a whole.

National decisions taking preeminence, in turn, would require Alliance planning for sequential rather than simultaneous military operations. Similarly, planning for allied, or combined forces, military operations may take second place to national planning. Future military planning by NATO may stress combined or joint operations but with forces retained under national command. All of these topics are currently being discussed by the appropriate military commands.

Crisis decision-making should also be reviewed with the lessons of the post World War II era firmly in mind. Not all crises will require decisions at the same pace; some crises are slow to build, others are more fast-paced. Some crises occur with armed conflict imminent while others happen after the outbreak of hostilities. Measured responses need to include the full gamut -- from a minor show of force to a major insertion of all types of troops. Scenarios need to be looked at that include a favorable outcome to a worst-case response. A building-block approach would appear to be an appropriate analogy.

These and other scenarios should be augmented with the most sophisticated techniques available to learn lessons of wars and campaigns yet to be fought. An artificial history could be written of alternative futures so that the military can better advise their political leadership on the most suitable courses of action for decisions they should make today.

Investment Strategy and Conversion

The major implication of the two-year big war warning of a Europe-centered global war with the USSR is that American programming strategy will shift its focus to the threats presented in other areas of the world. Until now, the unstated relationship of the threat to programmed forces was, generally, that U.S. forces would meet the challenge of the most demanding threat, the USSR, and assume that they could also cope with lesser contingencies. That basic assumption was generally not entirely true and now will be essentially reversed: forces will be acquired to meet the challenges of the more likely, less demanding, threats assuming that they are useful against the more unlikely but greater threat posed by a Soviet Union that decides to rearm.

This will be a new planning assumption for America, new for its allies, and somewhat impractical for the near term - or until we see substantial changes in Soviet maritime and nuclear force structure to match what we know are reductions in the ground and air forces. The intelligence community will need to advise Western governments when their strategic nuclear and maritime postures can be relaxed.

Implicit in the reconstitution portion of the new national security strategy is the retention of capability to produce equipment and supplies that have not been maintained. Not all firms will have to convert, nor should they be allowed to convert to the civilian non-defense sector. Government could regulate the decline but it appears prepared to allow the market to determine survivors.

Reconstitution

Reconstitution has three essential sub-components: mobilization, military force reconstitution, and industrial reconstitution. Mobilization will provide the ability to respond to crises with an active duty and reserve force mix. Military force and industrial reconstitution, however, are areas in which the U.S. has not had active interests for some years. Reconstitution must provide, primarily in the European theater - but not only there, additional forces and military hardware for a major war with the assumption that no combat takes place for two years. Reconstitution time goals can be somewhat vague; since what is really required is that we need to convince the Soviet Union, and European nations, that we can reconstitute a credible deterrence/defense faster than the USSR can reconstitute their offense. Reconstitution in Europe is only possible with a continued alliance structure such as NATO.

The new cadre reserve divisions will be able to restore combat ready status in 12-18 months. The individual ready re-

serve or conscription will obviously be a low cost methods of managing the necessary manpower pool required for reconstitution. Additional goals for reconstitution will obviously be provided as staffs wrestle more with the concept - but some initial areas to investigate might include: sealift and intertheater airlift, strategic air and missile defenses, and short-range and naval nuclear weapons.

Some of the military capability that America and her allies need to retain should be contained in existing active duty and ready reserve forces. On-hand equipment and supplies for those ready forces is needed. Some of the equipment and supplies will need to be stockpiled and prepositioned. Maritime prepositioning offers flexibility that has recently been demonstrated in the Middle East. However, not all of the materials for all types of war need to be readily available.

Implicit in the President's new national security strategy is the capability of tooling-up for wartime production within two years for a major war in Europe and less than that for lengthy contingency operations. General Powell stated that this ability to reconstitute was one of the critical underlying supporting capabilities of the new national security strategy. This capability will consist primarily of the knowledge, skills, and tools to respond within the timelines now specified. This concept is **not** new and we should review the history of planning assumptions and industry's ability to respond in the 1930s.

Dr. Fred Ikle, former Undersecretary of Defense (Policy), was a proponent of preprogrammed crisis budgets and industrial responses to bridge the gap between peacetime and wartime.¹⁰ Industrial mobilization, instead of military mobilization or the deployment of troops, might form the basis of an adequate governmental response to ambiguous warning indicators. Ikle proposed a series of industrial alert conditions, similar to those found in the military, which would trigger specific actions. Actions would be less threatening because they would not result in an immediate increase in military capability.

A "graduated deterrence response" could well involve a "graduated industrial response." This response is **not** the same type of response that the government has already ordered in 1987 under the Graduated Mobilization Response (GMR) concept -- that program being used to support national mobilization for crises and war with existing forces and strategies. GMR remains a high priority program to support regional contingency response. There is no reason contracts cannot be let ahead of time for both a response to a major war and for contingencies.

Although we can speak abstractly about having plans and passing budgets ahead of the need to do so, economists must help government ascertain how much money would be required to reconstitute the defense industry. If that money is earmarked for other purposes, then financial planning should include tracking sufficient governmental short-term money that can be quickly

diverted to defense -- if the GMR and reconstitution part of the new national security strategy is to have teeth.

The reconstitution of industrial capability appears to be the single most demanding element of the new national security strategy. The JMNA states that "it would likely be 6 to 24 months before industrial base mobilization or surge production could begin to deliver critical items. . .by the end-FY 1997, it is estimated that it would take 2 to 4 years to restore production capability to 1990 levels for items whose lines have gone 'cold'." Fortunately, the Soviet Union is rated with the same capability. Clearly, the U.S. will have to design programs to monitor the ability to meet reconstitution targets, to test capabilities, to enhance the credibility of our response and to monitor the Soviet ability to do the same.

Reconstitution is fundamentally oriented toward the U.S. contribution to the defense of Europe in the face of a regenerated Soviet conventional threat. The U.S. need **not** reconstitute the 1990-era conventional force it had forward-deployed to Europe. New technologies, especially in air breathing systems, may offer the same or even increased combat potential with fewer ground troops. Nuclear weapons, especially those based at sea, and maritime forces offer the U.S. an ability to fully meet its military commitment under the North Atlantic Treaty without an extensive deployment of any ground or air forces on European soil.

MILITARY OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS

The operations analysis and political science communities will need to cooperate like they never have before.¹¹ Military operations analysis has previously concentrated on investigating issues posed in a political-military environment that was not subject for debate. Those assumptions are no longer valid. The old European-based war scenarios with two weeks warning and mobilization are simply not of very much interest anymore.

The military operations analysis community needs to reorient itself to measurements of regeneration and reconstitution where the timelines are measures in months and years and not days or weeks. Strategic warning, decision making, non-NATO battlefields (ashore and at sea), manpower and personnel planning, resource allocation, test and evaluation, combat models, and gaming and simulation are all areas that will need fundamental readjustment due to the new international security environment.

One technique for viewing alternative futures is that of path gaming. These are political-military games that identify interesting alternative paths to a desired future and examines them simultaneously with different groups of players. Gaming, naturally, is no substitute for solid analysis. Gaming, however, can provide new insight and supplements more traditional methods of dealing with alternative futures.

Governments will become more refined at using means, other than military forces, to influence the behavior of other nations - hence these tools will also need to be studied as a part of our "graduated deterrence response." A recent Soviet forum "Civic Control Over Security," sponsored by the magazine Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn and the School for the Strategy of Socio-Intellectual Enterprise in Rostov-on-Don, highlighted the vulnerability of the USSR to economic sanctions as the USSR becomes tied into the world economy and less self-sufficient.¹² In short, the military operations research community will need to integrate itself into analysis involving other tools of statecraft rather than considering itself a discipline that can exist unto itself.

For example, new research may evaluate how successful economic sanctions have been in the past and as a supplement to Operation DESERT SHIELD. Apparently, sanctions were not as successful as some would have desired since the U.S. and allied coalition nations launched Operation DESERT STORM. What is the appropriate mix of economic sanctions as a precursor to military operations and a follow-on, once the military campaign is completed? Economic tools are even more difficult to use than in the past as multi-national corporations become less responsive to national governments. The intelligence community will have to provide new types of information to decision makers to allow them to assess the capabilities of economic and other sanctions.

In short, military operations research and analysis will become more complicated and require the cooperation of special-

ists in other disciplines. This will mean that the government should devise a strategy to manage all of the studies that will be done as we learn what is required of our transition to the "new world order."

NOTES

(1) The views expressed by the author are his alone and do not necessarily represent the position of the U.S. government, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Navy. This paper is an edited version of a substantially longer Naval Postgraduate School Technical Report, "America Promises to Come Back: A New National Strategy," NPS-NS-91-003A, May 13, 1991, 153 pp. available from DTIC. This report was prepared as a result of research sponsored by the Director of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Long Range Planning in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, the Director, Competitive Strategies, in the Office of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Defense Policy at the National Security Council. Full citations are available in that report.

(2) Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, January 1991, p. 3.

(3) Indeed, this subject is mentioned in their new draft military doctrine. See: "On the Military Doctrine of the USSR (Draft)," Moscow Voyennaya Mysl in Russian, Special Issue, signed to press November 30, 1990 (JPRS-UMT-91-001-L, January 3, 1991, p. 16).

(4) There appears to be a definite difference in the use of the term "reconstitution" by NATO and as envisaged by the President and Secretary Cheney. NATO officials have been talking in terms of mobilization over a longer period of time rather than the creation of wholly new forces. A similar problem exists even in the U.S. The U.S. Army uses the term "reconstitution" to mean both a return of operationally deployed units to pre-hostilities levels of capability as well as to rebuild forces as envisaged by Secretary Cheney.

(5) For examples of possible Soviet misperceptions of the U.S. military buildup of the 1980s, see commentary by ex-KGB Officer Oleg Gordievsky as recently published widely in the West. Oleg Gordievsky, "Pershing Paranoia in the Kremlin," London The Times in English, February 27, 1990, pp. 12-13 (FBIS-SOV-90-052-A, March 16, 1990, pp. 11-15); and an excerpt of the new book KGB: The Inside Story, by Christopher Andrew in cooperation with Gordievsky, was published in the U.S. by Time, Vol. 136, No. 17, October 22, 1990, pp. 72-82 (page 80-82 are of most interest).

(6) Suggested by General-Major Valentin Larionov in "Combat Readiness and Security: Will People Stop Playing at War?" Moscow New Times in English, No. 37, September 12-18, 1989, p. 14; and by General-Major Yuriy Kirshin in "Why is Military Reform Needed?" Moscow New Times in English, No. 12, March 20-26, 1990 (FBIS-SOV-90-066, April 5, 1990, p. 69).

(7) The failure by the U.S. to capture North Vietnamese behavior with "red" team players in late 1960s - early 1970s politico-military war games has been addressed by General Bruce Palmer, Jr.

in his The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam, Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984, p. 29.

(8) This fact has not gone unnoticed by the Soviet Union. See: I. Kulkov, "Is the CIA Changing? U.S. Intelligence in the Era of Glasnost," Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian, January 3, 1991, 1st Ed., p. 3 (FBIS-SOV-91-003, January 4, 1991, pp. 6-7). On the other hand, from published U.S. reports, the DoD is avoiding any entry into economic intelligence. See: William Matthews, "Intelligence Reorganization Focuses on Cuts, Mergers," Navy Times, May 13, 1991, p. 13.

(9) As far-fetched as this sounds, it is interesting to note that exactly this scenario was examined at a forum "Civic Control Over Security" that took place in Rostov-on-Don. The forum was sponsored by the magazine Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn and the School for Strategy of Socio-Intellectual Enterprise. See: Konstantine Ovchinnikov, "'Independent' War Games Described," Moscow New Times in English, No. 39, October 1, 1990, p. 32 (JPRS-UIA-90-017, November 6, 1990, p. 1).

(10) Fred C. Ikle, "Industrial Mobilization Planning: Critical to National Defense," based upon remarks to the Society of Manufacturing Engineers Conference, Detroit, November 9, 1987, printed in Defense 88, January/February 1988, pp. 15-18.

(11) The encouragement for operations research practitioners to delve into the world of strategy, and the perception that they often do not, was addressed in Craig W. Kirkwood's, "Does Operations Research Address Strategy?" Operations Research, Vol. 38, No. 5, September-October 1990, pp. 747-751.

(12) Konstantine Ovchinnikov, "'Independent' War Games Described," Moscow New Times in English, No. 39, October 1990, p. 32 (JPRS-UIA-90-017, November 6, 1990, p. 1).

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