


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BORROWED MILITARY MANPOWER: WHAT ALTERNATIVE
IN A SMALLER ARMY OF THE FUTURE?

BY

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United States Army

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
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Borrowed Military Manpower: What Alternative in a Smaller Army of the Future?

An Individual Study Project

By

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ABSTRACT

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The collapse of the Warsaw Pact, improved U.S. Soviet relations, and a changing security environment present new challenges to the Army as it examines how best to restructure its forces in the face of major force reductions. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 calls on the Army to reduce its active strength to 520,000 over the next 5 years. How well the Army manages its restructuring will determine whether it can maintain combat effectiveness during this transitional period as well as into the future.

One of the by products of past force structure operations has been increases of Borrowed Military Manpower and Troop Diversions. With increased emphasis on readiness, BMM and Troop Diversion must remain under control during this period of transition. Learning from past lessons should provide insight into how best to resolve the issue.

BORROWED MILITARY MANPOWER: WHAT ALTERNATIVE IN A SMALLER ARMY OF THE
FUTURE?

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The events of 1989 and early 1990 in the Soviet Union and Central Europe have brought new challenges to the Army as it examines how best to restructure itself in the face of proposed force reductions. With the general recognition of a reduced Soviet threat to Western Europe and continuing budgetary pressures, the Army made plans in mid 1990 to reduce its forces to 580,000 by 1997, the lowest level since 1948. However, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 subsequently called on the Army to reduce its active end strength even lower to 520,000 by fiscal year 1995, a reduction of over 200,000 personnel over the next 5 years. This mandated end strength would require the Army to eliminate at least six divisions and the related support from the Army's force structure.(1)

As the Army restructures its forces, it must decide on the extent to which its units should be fully resourced. It is instructive to examine what happened under AOE. AOE planners, recognizing the operational problems that the "hollow Army" has caused, sought to eliminate unresourced units and to design combat forces that could be staffed at 100 percent of their wartime requirements. Army leadership ultimately

accepted a goal of authorizing combat units to be staffed at 100 percent and support units at an average of 90 percent and accepted the fact that some units would remain unresourced. Today, a higher proportion of combat forces is authorized at 100 percent, and the number of Army units remaining unresourced has been significantly reduced. This improvement was achieved through a deliberate effort on the part of AOE's designers to match force requirements more closely to authorized levels of personnel. The problem of hollowness, however, appears to be returning. Unresourced personnel requirements increased between fiscal years 1988 and 1990. The present Army Chief of Staff has warned against a return to the "hollow Army." Several reasons have been advanced to support this view:

- . A certain amount of Army structure needs to be highly ready and capable of responding immediately to certain contingencies.
- . Realistic peacetime training is difficult when units are seriously understaffed.
- . Understaffing creates morale problems and leads to the diversion of personnel from their primary missions to other tasks for which inadequate numbers of personnel have been assigned.(2)

This paper will focus on the historical prospective of Borrowed Military Manpower to better determine what actions if any need to be taken in a smaller Army of the future. The observations and recommendations will be generated from past lessons learned.

Numerous studies conducted on the topic from the early 1970's to present by the Department of the Army, Comptroller General, General Accounting Office, Army Inspector General and the Army Audit Agency

were analyzed. Personal observations from a division and MACOM staff officer perspective are also included.

The era we are about to enter in reducing the size of the Army can benefit from past lessons learned.

Definitions

One problem which has been constant since 1970 is the lack of understanding of the definition of associated terms and the intent of related Regulations. Before proceeding, an overview of each related Regulation and definitions of the associated terms are provided.

The objectives, principles, policies, and procedures for manpower management in the Army are provided in AR 570-4. The primary responsibility for managing soldiers within their mission and functional areas, including special duty assignments, rests with the major Army commands, but the actual selection of soldiers for special duty assignments is made at company level. When selecting soldiers for borrowed or diverted assignments, commanders should consider readiness objectives of their combat units including training needs, deployability of combat units, and integrity of smaller unit components, such as platoons and squads. Units or individuals that, in a peacetime environment, can receive practical training and experience only through borrowed and diverted assignments should be given priority for these assignments. (3)

Policy and guidance for using soldiers outside their military occupational specialties are provided in AR 600-200. Special duty assignments are limited to 90 days, after which the soldiers are to be

returned to their assigned positions for at least 120 days. Using activities can request an extension to keep borrowed soldiers beyond the 90 day limit. Major commands may extend the 90 day limit up to one year when it is required to accomplish total mission; however, the major commands are responsible for establishing a system to monitor special duty assignments in excess of 90 days. Bonus recipients may be used for special duty if:

1. The assignment is in the same occupational specialty as the bonus awarded.

2. The specialty for the assignment is within the bonus recipient's normal career progression pattern.

3. The occupational specialty in which the bonus recipient will be used has been designated by DA as comparable. Soldiers that possess critical occupational specialties and soldiers that are first-term enlistees should not be selected for special duty. To the extent possible, the selection of noncommissioned officers should be avoided. (4)

Special Duty (SD):

The performance of duty with an organization other than the unit to which assigned, while continuing to be administered and accounted for by the unit of assignment. SD includes Borrowed Military Manpower and Troop Diversions. (5)

Borrowed Military Manpower (BMM):

The use of military manpower from an MTOE unit to perform duties within a TDA activity where a MACOM approved manpower requirement

exists, but for which no manpower space has been authorized. Additionally, borrowed military manpower may be employed in those cases where manpower spaces have been authorized, but the positions are vacant. 16.

Troop Diversion:

The use of soldiers to perform recurring duties that do not meet the definition of Borrowed Military Manpower with an organization or unit other than that to which they are assigned while continuing to be administered and accounted for by the unit of assignment. (7)

ENDNOTES

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2. Ibid., p. 47.
3. U.S. Army Audit Agency, Advisory Report on Borrowed Military Manpower and Troop Diversion Report, Jun. 1984, p. 5.
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7. Ibid., p. 59.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND

During the period 1974 to 1980 Army civilian end strength was reduced by an estimated 50,000 without a concurrent reduction in missions or functions. As a result, Army commanders were forced to borrow or divert soldiers from their assigned positions to perform critical support functions that had been the responsibility of civilians. By the end of 1980, some 14,000 to 16,000 soldiers were reported as borrowed or diverted on a daily basis. In FY 81, the Chief of Staff of the Army expressed concern to Congress about decreased near-term readiness caused by the number of soldiers borrowed and diverted from tactical units. Congress responded by increasing the Army's civilian end strength and earmarking 16,800 civilian spaces for returning borrowed and diverted soldiers to their units. Department of the Army assured Congress the spaces would be used for the intended purpose and that audit trails would document use of the spaces and return of replaced soldiers to their units. In March 1982, the General Accounting Office (GAO) made a limited review of the use of civilian spaces provided the U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army. This review showed that some civilian spaces were not used appropriately and that sufficient documentation was not available to identify specific near-term readiness improvements. Based on the review results, Congress reduced the 16,800

civilian spaces by 2,500 spaces.(1)

Faulty Audit Trails and Inaccurate Reporting

Results of the limited review by GAO prompted the DCSPER of the Army to visit selected CONUS installations to determine the magnitude of the problem. The Inspector General and the Army Audit Agency (AAA) were subsequently asked to look into the issue. A full audit was conducted by the U.S. Army Audit Agency. This audit ran from December 1982 to October 1983 and covered portions of the following MACOMS: USAREUR, TRADOC, FORSCOM and Health Services Command. An overview of the audits and observations follows.

DA policy and guidance for managing borrowed and diverted soldiers were adequate. Major command guidance was consistent with DA guidance except for the U.S. Army Europe's definition of diverted soldiers. This inconsistency confused communities in Europe and affected the accuracy of data reported to DA.(2) The practices and procedures for selecting and returning borrowed and diverted soldiers and for ensuring they were returned for training were not fully effective; however, soldiers were properly used in the positions for which they were selected. Contrary to guidance, bonus recipients and soldiers with critically short occupational specialties were selected for special duty assignments not related to their occupational specialties. Selected soldiers were often kept longer on these assignments than the prescribed time frames, and borrowed and diverted soldiers frequently were not returned to their parent units for scheduled training.(3)

The reports on borrowed and diverted soldiers provided to DA were often inaccurate and did not provide a sound basis for determining civilian personnel requirements. Inaccuracies occurred because personnel preparing the input for the reports misinterpreted the definitions of borrowed and diverted soldiers and the guidance for preparing the reports. Troop diversions were not routinely reported, and reported data did not provide sufficient information to determine the total extent of diversions.(4)

Distribution of the civilian end-strength increase did not always meet congressional intent, and priorities for returning borrowed and diverted soldiers to ensure the greatest improvements in near-term readiness were usually not established. The inaccuracy of data reported to DA affected the distribution of civilian spaces. Borrowed soldiers were required to be returned before diverted soldiers, but were not; nor were key personnel such as noncommissioned officers and soldiers with critical skills given priority when soldiers were returned to their units.

Some civilian spaces received to reduce reported borrowed and diverted soldiers were not used appropriately, and in some cases audit trails were not established to support the use of the spaces and the resulting readiness improvements. About 17 percent of the 2,494 civilian spaces reviewed were not used appropriately because,

1. Soldiers were not returned to their unit when civilian spaces were used.

2. Spaces were used to return surplus soldiers to table of distribution and allowances activities.

3. Spaces were used to offset prior personnel reductions.

Another 20 percent of the civilian spaces reviewed did not have adequate audit trails. Reports to DA overstated the number of soldiers actually returned to their units but usually did not specify the readiness improvements from returning the soldiers.(5)

The results of this audit prompted heightened interest in audit trails and accurate reporting. Headquarters, Department of the Army, subsequently implemented centralized management controls on the 14,300 civilian spaces. Quarterly reports from MACOMS were required on the level of BMM as well as limitations on how the civilian spaces could be used.

BMM Reporting Requirements Terminated

By 1985 BMM was perceived to be at an acceptable level (3,206 Army wide). Commanders began asking for flexibility in the management of the 14,300 spaces and relief from reporting requirements. Headquarters, Department of the Army, responded in March 1985 by decentralizing management of these spaces to the major commanders. Reporting requirements were terminated during first quarter fiscal year 1986.(6) Monitorship of the BMM portion of the program was accomplished through the Unit Status Report.

III Corps and Fort Hood Indicate BMM on the Rise

In July 1987, the Commander, III Corps and Fort Hood, indicated

that diversion of troops from units was adversely affecting the training of his TOE units. Neither the data in the Unit Status Report nor the BMM data maintained by Forces Command indicated a problem at III Corps or Fort Hood. Chief of Staff, Army, directed the DCSPER to look into the matter. The DCSPER decided to conduct a limited, on-site review of Fort Hood (III Corps) and Fort Lewis (I Corps).

The limited study determined that the majority of formal special duty (Borrowed Military Manpower and Troop Diversion) approved by both installations were supportive of MOS skills and training, with the exception of those working in the Morale, Welfare and Recreational (MWR) area. While this special duty was supportive of MOS training, it was acknowledged to have had adverse impacts on unit cohesion and common skills training. Procedures were in place to keep the disruption as low as possible by returning soldiers for prime time training. Procedures were in place to monitor the assignment of soldiers to ensure personnel utilization policies were followed.

Some discrepancies were noted. The utilization policy needed to be consolidated into a more readable format for use by those not in the personnel management field. There was a lack of understanding of reporting procedures for special duty contained in AR 220-1, Unit Status Report. When Special Duty presents a problem, it should be reflected by units reporting a "C" (SD is having a major impact on the unit's ability to conduct training), or "D" (SD prohibits training tempo necessary to maintain a satisfactory training status) condition in Block 54, Special Duty, of the Unit Status Report.

Different staff elements at each of the two sites (I Corps and Ft. Lewis, III Corps and Ft. Hood) approved borrowed military manpower, troop diversion, over-strength and tasking requests. While the majority of individual requests were staffed, no one staff element had, at either installation, captured a complete picture on a routine basis of the total impact of special duty, over-strength, and tasking. (7) Both, however, were exploring the feasibility of developing a methodology for capturing the amount of time soldiers expended in completion of taskings.

The management of the over-strength accounts at both I Corps, Fort Lewis, and III Corps, Fort Hood, caused concern. Soldiers in this category were permanently assigned to "positions" for which there were no manpower requirements. An example of this was the Law Enforcement Command at Fort Lewis which requested three positions to support the privately owned vehicle registration function. Since vehicle registration is not currently required by Headquarters, DA, Forces Command does not recognize requirements nor provide authorizations for this function. (8) As long as local commanders require functions which are not supported by higher headquarters, situations like this will continue. Both commands experienced the increased need for BMM as civilian authorizations decreased.

The majority of personnel questioned on the need to reinstitutionalize HQDA reporting procedures that would capture the number of special duty soldiers, both borrowed military manpower and troop diversion, were not supportive of changing the current procedures unless something positive was done with the data collected. These individuals

indicated that they did not want to place additional administrative requirements on units to report special duty data unless HQDA uses the data for subsequent resource decision making, such as justifying increased manpower in budget requests.(9)

Another concern expressed on the reporting theme was definitional. There is currently a lack of consistency on what is being reported. III Corps and Fort Hood have developed their own unique definitions and categories. Some of the internal troop diversions at III Corps and Fort Hood (1,681) did not meet the current definition of troop diversion. In order for an Army-wide reporting system to be effective, standard definitions would have to be enforced in order to ensure consistency.

Force structure changes resulting from Army of Excellence initiatives were perceived as a major contributing cause of the increased use of special duty. The revised organizational structure does not provide all the manpower required to accomplish the day-to-day work requirements, as well as allow time for unit training. In the military police area, officials stated that force structure initiatives had reduced unit size to the point where unit level training could not be accomplished when day-to-day military police operations were being conducted. The consistent use of "shadow clerks," drivers, supply clerks, etc., indicates, as one former battalion commander stated, that commanders are placing their manpower where they get "pinged" the most. The planned reduction of MOS O3C (Recreation Specialist) without offsetting civilian replacements is another example of a force structure change that will only further increase the special duty problem.(10)

It appears from the current data, as well as available historical

data, that an undefined level of troop diversion will exist regardless of the resource of force structure level. The Army's management philosophy of allowing the commander to use the resources assigned in the manner he determines best to accomplish the assigned mission contributes to this diversion. Each commander has his or her own agenda and/or special interests. We have to accept these conditions as a part of doing business while trying to dampen the impact on unit cohesion and training.

Congressional Interest Renewed in Civilian Substitution

On September 8, 1987, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Defense, House Committee on Appropriations, asked GAO to review the services' practices for converting military positions to civilian positions, including a comparison of budgeted and actual conversions; to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of these conversions; and to evaluate whether the services should be using civilian substitutions to a greater degree. DOD and service policies support converting military positions to civilian positions when the military are not required. DOD Directives 1100.4 and 1400.5, and Army Regulation 570-4, state that civilian personnel are to be employed unless military are required for reasons of law or for other matters such as combat readiness, training, and security. The Army regulation furthers states that the use of military should be held to a minimum. Army regulations provide detailed guidance to assist service officials in determining what positions must be military. In addition, service headquarters offices usually provide crite-

ria for selecting the military positions to be converted. Criteria used in the past have included making civilian those functions that (1) are currently performed by both military, and civil service employees and (2) historically are military but are not required to be military based on guidance contained in Army regulations governing manpower management.(11)

Civilian substitutions are not a separate budget line item but are funded primarily as part of the O&M lump-sum appropriation. Because there were no other tracking mechanisms, the Army did not know the amount of funds received for substitutions but believed that all funds requested were received.(12)

Civilian substitutions were not monitored, nor did the military commands routinely retain records to document civilian substitutions made. In addition, the commands did not report this information to their headquarters. Consequently, it is generally not possible to compare planned versus actual substitutions. Even though the command indicated that some civilianization did take place, they were unable to provide an audit trail. Although the justification for the O&M budget included funds requested for substitutions, headquarters officials believed that recording and maintaining substitution information is unnecessary because funds are not specifically designated for substitutions in the annual O&M appropriation.

Records were not maintained to show the disposition of military positions freed by civilian substitutions. As a result, no determination could be made about the number of military positions moved to higher priority missions to enhance readiness.

When substitutions are made, the new civilian positions are entered into manpower authorization records for each unit and the military positions are deleted. The freed military positions then become part of a pool of military authorizations that are available to meet unfilled needs. These positions are managed at the services' headquarters level. Because freed military authorizations resulting from substitutions are merged with other authorizations that are managed by headquarters staff and are not separately identified, it is not possible to determine where the replaced military positions are reallocated and, consequently, whether the positions are used for higher priority missions. (13)

Because civilian substitution may take on increased importance in the future, the Army should improve its management oversight and assess progress made toward achieving civilian substitution objectives. Although more military positions could be made civilian, the success of these substitutions depends on the Army's ability to obtain funding for the additional civilian positions required and to implement the necessary internal control procedures to ensure that the substitutions accomplish their objectives.

Good News?

A reduction of the Army's FY-88 and FY-89 funding levels impacted a reduction of approximately 12,000 civilian spaces. The DCSPER of the Army was concerned that commanders were diverting soldiers to offset these reductions. The Army Audit Agency was requested to review the

issue.

An audit of Special Assignments was performed from July to October 1989. Work was accomplished at the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, DA; 7th Infantry Division (Light) and Fort Ord; 6th Infantry Division (Light) and Fort Richardson; U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery Center and Fort Bliss; and Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe and 7th Army. The observations and conclusions of the Audit follow. (14)

The July 1989 DA Units Status Report indicated special duty assignments did not have a significant impact on the Army. This report disclosed that less than one percent of all reporting units reported trouble meeting unit readiness due to the effect of special duty assignments. Most of the units reporting problems due to special duty assignments were located in Europe. The U.S. Army Europe Inspector General completed a command-wide review of special duty assignments. He concluded that special duty assignments did not have an adverse impact upon units' ability to accomplish their wartime missions. The three sites the Audit Agency visited in the United States and those in Europe reported one percent and two percent, respectively, of assigned personnel tasked to special duty assignments. A medical company (air ambulance) in Europe which reported that special duty assignments had an adverse impact on their readiness was visited; their concerns about special duty assignments were valid. The medical company essentially has the same peacetime and wartime missions. However, because they are a tenant activity on an installation, they were being tasked with many menial chores. Two similar medical companies in Europe are not tasked

with special duty assignments because of their missions. Responsible U.S. Army Europe personnel were aware of the unit's problem with special duty assignments and were evaluating the situation.

The commands visited during the audit were managing the special duty assignments in an effective manner. Review boards had been established that either approved or disapproved requests for personnel to perform special duty assignments. The audit did disclose that most commands were placing personnel in special duty assignments in excess of 90 days. This was because most responsible command personnel felt that it took a soldier more than 90 days to learn the duties of the area to which the soldier was assigned. For example, in Alaska soldiers who operated fishing vessels at the recreational sites had to be certified by the U.S. Coast Guard prior to assuming their duties. In addition, at Fort Ord the command has assigned specific responsibilities which were to be accomplished by the subordinate units on a cyclic basis. This ensured that units would not have to accomplish the tasks when they were training. Also, the various commands had instituted some procedures for assigning soldiers which they felt were effective. At Fort Bliss they were using soldiers who were soon to retire and were not using soldiers just out of advanced individual training, or who were bonus recipients. (15)

Controls over monitoring special duty assignments were found to be satisfactory. Review boards or specific review procedures had been established for evaluating special duty positions at all sites visited. At the three United States sites, the commanding generals approved the special duty positions. In Europe, the Deputy Corps Commander approved

the positions. At Ford Ord and Fort Richardson, where historical data was available, the numbers of special duty assignment positions were decreasing. For example, at Ford Ord approved positions were reduced 67 percent over a five-year period. There were 210 approved positions in the fourth quarter of FY 84, and 70 approved positions in the fourth quarter of FY 89.⁽¹⁶⁾ Commanders were aware of the monetary constraints which were reducing some civilian positions, and they anticipated an increased demand for soldiers to perform special duty assignments in the future.

ENDNOTES

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2. U.S. Army Audit Agency, Audit of Borrowed Military Manpower and Troop Diversion, Dec. 1983, p. 3.
3. Ibid.
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6. Fowler, Calvin M., Special Duty Review Borrowed Military Manpower and Troop Diversion I Corps and Ft. Lewis 14-17 Sept. 1987 and III Corps and Ft. Hood 21-24 Sept. 1987, p. 1.
7. Ibid., p. 52.
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11. U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Manpower, Lack of Management Oversight over Civilian Substitutions, p. 8.
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14. Anderson, W.P., Audit of Special Duty Assignments Audit Report, p. 1.
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CHAPTER III

FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGES IMPACT BMM

Borrowed Military Manpower and Troop diversion are outgrowths of a larger, more serious problem of Force Structure inadequacy. In the past this inadequacy prompted the Army to do more with less. Doing more with less ultimately means some organizations must accept more risk. Because of the Army's desire to maintain as many combat flags as possible, Combat Support and Combat Service Support units assumed the increased risk in force structure. This risk translates to less robust organizations. A review of past force structure changes provides us with some lessons we need to consider for future reductions and the subsequent impact on BMM and Troop Diversion.

In the late 1970's the Army adopted new force designs termed "Army 86" as the means of increasing the combat power of its divisions. By 1983, it became clear the new structure required too many people and too much equipment to be affordable. Hundreds of units were totally without people or equipment, and many others were seriously understaffed and underequipped. The Army had become "hollow." (1)

In the summer of 1983, the Chief of Staff of the Army directed a task force to redesign Army Forces. The resulting force structure, "Army of Excellence," became the organizational blueprint of the future. (2)

The basic problem the task force faced was how to draw down Army 86 (the Army's previous force structure) requirements of 1.17 million personnel spaces to a 998,700 level. Reducing the Army's personnel requirements so drastically was made more difficult when the Chief of Staff asked the task force to examine whether it could add more combat forces yet stay within the 998,700 personnel ceiling. To accomplish this task various means were considered, which included:

- . Eliminating excess structure in divisions, separate brigades, and armored cavalry regiments by consolidating functions at higher levels, eliminating duplication, and accepting more risk;
- . Converting the air assault division and airborne division to designs based on the new light division design but with unique capabilities added;
- . Implementing Logistics Unit Productivity Systems (LUPS) initiatives, which were designed to increase the productivity of logistics units through labor-saving equipment and functional reorganizations;
- . Substituting civilians and contractors for some military personnel and enlisting additional host nation support to fill some personnel requirements;
- . Converting some aviation units to new designs;
- . Introducing new communications equipment requiring fewer operators;
- . Implementing a new Combat Field Feeding System that would require fewer cooks;
- . Eliminating some military police, transportation, field artillery, and other units altogether.(3)

Most of the above recommendations were approved by the Chief of

Staff of the Army. Although the required spaces saved through these economizing measures were sufficient to cover the additional force structure for combat forces, they were insufficient to totally eliminate hollowness in the Army's force structure. In addition to the remaining hollowness, planners assumed risk by designing the rest of the force to accommodate the number of spaces they had remaining. In some instances professional judgement was used in lieu of manpower standards. This resulted in risk being taken without delineating the magnitude these risks would have on the force. The failure by Army planners to adequately document their decisions has compounded the difficulty in reconstructing the circumstances which led to the establishment of these risks.(4) As a result it is difficult to accurately depict the degree of risk embedded in our current force structure. For the local commander this risk translates to available resources to accomplish a particular task. When that commander recognizes he or she has a given amount of work to accomplish with a given amount of manpower and the two do not equal, he faces two choices: Reduce the amount of work to meet the size of his force, or borrow the manpower to accomplish the task. Multiplying this mentality across the Army has the potential of creating major problems.

Had all the labor and space-saving devices been implemented as designed, manpower problems associated with the AOE force structure would have been greatly diminished. Not only were these labor and space saving devices not fully implemented, the structure they were to replace was correspondingly eliminated. Although the results of AOE impacted all organizations, the capability of combat support and combat

service support organizations to perform their wartime missions was only a fraction of the impact created on their ability to accomplish their peacetime missions. Because peacetime functions are more labor intensive, force structure short falls are more apparent. This is especially true in TDA organizations at the installation level. The TOE Army, especially the combat service support side, offset the shortfall caused by AOE through troop diversion. Battalion PAC's and S4 shops are principle users of these diversions.

ENDNOTES

1. U.S. General Accounting Office, Army Force Structure, Lessons to Apply in Structuring Tomorrow's Army, p. 2.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 17.

4. Ibid., p. 28

CHAPTER IV

BMM, THE INSTALLATION AND THE FUTURE

Even though AOE force structure caused manpower problems in TOE organizations, structure in TDA organizations was correspondingly affected. The issue in TDA organizations is compounded by how the structure is manned. To save military spaces civilianization has been used as the answer. The Army's historical poor performance in managing the civilianization process is typical of the problems associated with this process, i.e., spaces identified for civilianization often become the first target for cuts when budget reductions are faced. The above circumstances set the stage for use of BMM. Even though TDA headquarters will be targeted in the coming draw down for reductions, installations will invariably take a significant portion of cuts. This will compound an already austere staffing situation.

Installations are a vital part of the total Army. They have a peacetime and wartime focus. In their wartime focus of assisting in mobilization, they are augmented by designated organizations and fillers. In peace, however, additional manpower resources are derived from tenant organizations through BMM or troop diversions. The larger the reduction in these organizations the greater the need for BMM and/or troop diversion will become.(1)

Historically, the following staff elements on an installation have

required the greatest need for BMM: Director of Personnel and Community Activities, Director of Logistics, and the Provost Marshall Command. Although a number of other organizations need BMM and Troop Diversion, the above three have required the preponderance.(2) The unique aspect of this situation is that the same activities are short-structured in TOE organizations.

One program under the DPCA which requires support is the Morale, Welfare and Recreational Program (MWR). I single it out because over time this program has gone from a military run program to one that is operated almost totally by civilians.

MWR programs provide a variety of community, soldier and family support activities and services. These services enhance community life, and soldier and unit readiness, promote and maintain mental and physical fitness, and provide a working and living environment that will attract and retain quality people.(3)

The mix of MWR activities on an Army installation is based on the needs of the personnel who work and reside there. The determination of what is offered will be based on needs assessments of the individuals and the particular community served.(4)

Manning MWR activities will be accomplished principally with civilian personnel. If used, military personnel may be placed on temporary assignment to MWR activities to include detail and temporary duty for a period not to exceed 90 days unless used in a seasonal operation which requires a period of training (e.g., safety patrols and instructors at recreational areas or facilities). Assignments of this nature will not exceed 150 days.(5) Commanders are and will continue to be very sensi-

tive about reducing any capability in this area because of the direct relationship it has on quality of life.

What Does the Future Hold?

The Army's draw down will essentially occur in two stages. They include the period during the draw down and the period after the draw down is complete. Manning the force during the first stage will be difficult. The turmoil caused by mandatory and involuntary separations will create imbalances throughout the Army. Current personnel management practices will not be able to compensate for all these imbalances. BMM and Troop Diversions will be used to fill the holes created.

Commanders at all levels will need information regarding their manning situation since this period will present the biggest challenge to readiness. Currently, only the monthly readiness report provides a means for monitoring BMM, and this only occurs when the commander perceives the issue has a major impact on training. There is no report to Department of the Army level which monitors Troop Diversions. Although most installations have management programs to handle BMM, these programs are nonstandard. To keep commanders and managers informed, standardized reporting and management of BMM from installation up through MACOMS to DA is essential. The reporting process can be enhanced by requiring all BMM and Troop Diversion data to be a part of the monthly readiness report. All Army directives which deal with special duty and its two subsets, BMM and Troop Diversion, need to use standard definitions. This standardization will enhance local management programs by

ensuring everyone is using the same terminology.

Once the force has reached its designed floor, a different set of issues must be dealt with. The speed with which we have moved toward reducing to a smaller force may not allowed us time to reshape the force structure as we reduce it. The force structure problem which exists today will be present in the smaller force unless action is taken to offset them. From a manpower perspective TOE force structure issues need to be worked back through the Planning Programing Budgeting and Execution process (PPBES), specifically the DCSOPS manpower side of the process. The problem is that any fixes contemplated will require corresponding trade offs. The dilemma is that there are few if any organizations which can afford to provide the necessary trade offs. The number of military manpower spaces available in this smaller force has been provided by Congress. The number of civilian spaces will be driven by money availability. Indications that 58,000 civilians will be affected by the draw down will adversely impact organizations already operating in an austere environment. Even though BMM and Troop Diversion are and will continue to be accepted practices, the degree to which it is used and its size will increasingly become points of concern.

We must seek alternative solutions to both our structure and manpower problems. We need to begin by looking at how we do business, with emphasis on eliminating or streamlining redundant and unnecessary functions and procedures. This review will need to start from the top and work its way down the chain. As redundant functions, procedures and processes are eliminated, we must correspondingly institute controls

which ensure all new functions and procedures meet the test of "is it essential?" and "do we have the resources to support it?" Contracting of functions must continue to be considered as an option and instituted when it is cost effective. Looking for technology to provide labor-saving assistance is a must. We must use current ideas and investment programs to enhance this initiative.

Documenting all new legitimate personnel requirements through the use of manpower standards must be routinely accomplished and then pursued when funding becomes available.

Commanders will always be allowed to use the resources provided as they see fit to accomplish their assigned mission. As such, emphasis must be placed in the schooling process to teach them how best to utilize these precious resources.

ENDNOTES

1. U.S. Department of the Army, Army Regulation 5-3, p. 3.
2. Fowler, Calvin M., Special Duty Review, Borrowed Military Manpower and Troop Diversion, I Corps and Ft. Lewis, 14-17 Sept. 1987 and III Corps and Ft. Hood, 21-24 Sept. 1987, p. 12 & p. 29.
3. U.S. Department of the Army, Army Regulation 215-1, p. 7.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p. 32.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

The management of borrowed soldiers during the period 1974-1980 was not fully effective. Problem areas included implementing the policy for selecting and returning borrowed soldiers, distributing increased civilian end-strength, audit trailing the civilians hired and soldiers returned to their unit, and the reporting process to cover the entire action. This action and the inquiry in 1987 by Congress about civilian substitution provides insight that Congress is willing to support the Army strength problem with civilian substitutes if we demonstrate we can manage the program. Civilian substitution provides the Army with an opportunity to increase the number of military positions freed for higher priority missions. Once the Army's draw down, which will include civilian personnel, is complete, the ability to impact military end strength will again present itself through the use of civilianization programs. The opportunity to use this tool will be tempered by our ability to obtain funding and implement necessary control procedures.

Recent audits have reflected a marked improvement in managing Borrowed Military Manpower at the unit level. It is apparent that SD, BMM, and TD will be with us for the foreseeable future. Therefore, it is

incumbent upon us to keep them to a minimum. We will be able to do that if everyone understands the program and associated terminology.

The Army's experience in implementing AOE has yielded important lessons that should be applied as it proceeds with its restructuring plans. As with AOE, realistically projecting the resources that will likely be available for a new force structure is a critical step in building an "affordable" future Army. With the changed security environment, Army planners will need to re-evaluate some of the decisions made under AOE, especially regarding the extent to which the Army can safely accept partially resourcing its force structure in peacetime. The projected increased warning time of a European conflict should enable the Army to consider options of a smaller yet more robust force. The higher the risk taken with this force, the greater the likelihood BMM and Troop Diversion's use will increase. This ultimately leads to a less ready force.

Recommendations

Revise the Unit Status Report so that all BMM and Troop Diversions are reported regardless of the number. The Department of the Army needs to establish a standard which indicates what is acceptable and what is not. This information will provide those who monitor this process the ability to determine when a problem is developing.

Consolidate personnel utilization guidance in both personnel and manpower management directives for ease of use by all commanders and managers.

Ensure the definition of special duty and its two subsets--Borrowed Military Manpower and Troop Diversions--are standardized in the numerous directives in which they appear. The chain of command must pass this information down to the company level.

Develop a manageable system for monitoring the use of civilian substitutions. Until we can demonstrate that we can monitor and manage this action, Congress may be resistant in providing funded spaces.

Aggressively pursue the contracting program. The priority for this program must be those TDA functions in the garrison which will be likely targets for cuts.

Review all functions in TDA organizations for simplification and/or elimination. This action must start at Headquarters, DA. As functions are simplified and eliminated at that level, the positive impact at

lower level will multiply. Institute controls to ensure new functions are necessary and are resourced.

Fully document the basis for major changes in the Army's force designs as it proceeds to restructure the force. Most critical is ensuring that any risks associated with such changes are clearly identified.

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