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THE FUTURE OF THE RESERVE COMPONENT: A COMMON SENSE APPROACH

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This paper suggests the combining of these two and addresses what to do with all of the various elements that are essentially duplications between them. The author realizes the political implications of accomplishing such a move, but remains objective throughout and sees a future wherein pet rocks and individual interests must be set aside in favor of the practical and realistic ends.

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ABSTRACT

The reserves, in one form or another, have been around for a very long time and will be a major player for an equally long time to come. Current thinking, in spite of the recent current events, is that the military must build down to meet anticipated defense budget reductions.

There are a number of studies looking at ways to scale back or reorganize the military and numerous initiatives being considered to reduce defense costs. Most of these, however, are extremely complex and sensitive and will take a great deal of time to produce any results, if an agreement can even be reached.

The Reserve Component, as is the case with most of the military, has over time grown in such a way that there is a vast amount of duplication. The mere fact that the reserves are divided into the US Army Reserve and the National Guard substantiates this verity.

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The requirement for a militia has been with us throughout our history. From the very beginning with the first settlers, there existed an overwhelming concern, and rightfully so, to protect and defend what were at the time extremely fragile and vulnerable interests. It was decided, therefore, to establish among themselves a rather loose structure of volunteers who would respond to any crisis that might jeopardize their settlement.¹ Volunteers in those very early days meant every able bodied man. It was unthinkable to not be a volunteer to help repel any invader. These were hard times and the ability of these settlers to protect and defend themselves was extremely limited. As the nation grew and developed, so did the nature of the militia. In the early 1600s settlers began to form units. One of these early units, if not the first, was a regiment of militia in what is now Massachusetts. Although their purpose had not changed, they were better able to carry out their tasks as units. Forming themselves into units gave them organization, leadership and common purpose.

These pioneers understood the value, if not the outright necessity, of having a viable military force. They also understood the rationale of a militia force as opposed to a standing or full time army.² This was demonstrated by our founding fathers in the wording of the Constitution and later in the Bill of Rights by allowing the states to form and maintain their own militia. After all, these same people had come to the new world to escape the type of leadership dominated by a

powerful military. As we all know, there have been occasions throughout history which required the forming of a standing army to deal with one situation or another. And in some cases these standing armies were rather large. In all cases, however, the standing army was reduced substantially or even eliminated after the conflict was over. Even the standing army of today has seen dramatic reductions after each war or crisis.

Yes, the army of today has been drastically increased for and reduced after each conflict. It is the nature of a democracy to do so. As our great nation has evolved and the threat has changed, we have found it necessary to maintain a reasonable standing army. There are many reasons for doing so; not the least of which is a result of the nature of war itself. In order to maintain a deterrence, or presence around the world which serves as a deterrence, requires a full time military. Should the deterrence fail however, and the military has to react, then it will need to grow as well. This growth would entail both personnel and equipment. And where does the growth come from? The same place it has always come from. The citizens of this great land. Today as always, that is the militia. If things get really bad, a renewal of the draft would then follow. Both the draft and the mobilization process have been put to the test over the years and throughout the wars, and they work. In fact, they work quite well when exercised in a timely manner. Now one could ask, why don't we just maintain a large enough standing army that we don't have to go through this process of mobilization and

draft? And on the surface it would appear to be a valid question. However, closer examination clearly shows that our economy can not afford to keep the numbers of personnel in uniform and the associated amount of equipment we are talking about on a daily basis. This dilemma can only get worse in the future with spiralling costs while at the same time less and less of the budget appropriation available for defense spending. Taxpayers want and are entitled to get the most bang for their buck. We will talk more about budget and who gets what later but this is yet another reason why in our society a militia is so popular and a large standing army is not.

Something needs to be said about this term MILITIA. I have been using it freely and have not bothered to define it or perhaps assumed that everyone understood it - I apologize for that. Webster's defines the word as, a) originally, any military force, b) later, any army composed of citizens rather than professional soldiers, called out in time of emergency.³ Of course, we all know or should know that Webster's obtains definitions based on the most popular usage of a word. This definition then together with history and our own Constitution strongly support, and well document, that today's Army National Guard is the true militia. Besides, the Army Reserve, the only other military element that could legitimately lay claim to the title, didn't come into existence until the early twentieth century with the passage of legislation such as the Dick Act of 1903.⁴ Now there are those, particularly in the US Army Reserve, who will be upset by that

statement, but that's alright, because if that bothers them they will really be rattled by the rest of what I've got to say.

By now most of you are probably asking yourself what it is that I have in mind for the Army Reserve Component. And that is a fair question at this point. But before we can address what should be done, it is equally important that we have a common understanding of what this component really is. For that reason, we need to take a look at what makes up the Total Army of today. For the purpose of this article, I am going to assume that my reader knows nothing about the military, let alone the army. Using that strategy has proven to be the best approach because it insures that no matter who reads this article they will have a better appreciation of what is meant and hopefully agree with it. Since it is the citizenry in a democracy who ultimately decides how and on what our government spends money, I hope that everyone will understand my message and get the word to their legislative representatives so they in turn can make it happen.

The Total Army is made up of two components. Those two components are the Active Component (AC) and the Reserve Component (RC). The RC is further broken down into two sub-components if you will. These two sub-components are the US Army Reserve (USAR) and the Army National Guard (ARNG). The USAR is federally controlled at all times while the ARNG is state controlled during peacetime and during state emergencies but federally controlled during wartime.⁵ That is somewhat of an

oversimplification but none the less true.

The future of the RC depends to a large degree on the size and availability of the defense budget. Congress and the Department of Defense, to include most senior military leaders, recognize that the amount of money available for defense spending in the future will be substantially less. That in turn will force a reduction in the size of the military. The recent Gulf War, some would argue, has diminished or perhaps even eliminated the probability of any reduction in the military. And although the war in the Gulf did a lot to improve the general feeling about the military community as a whole, it will never translate to more or even equal budgetary limits for defense. Even the vast gains made in public and congressional appreciation, understanding and support for the military, as a result at least in part due to the great success of the Gulf War and weapon systems like the Patriot missile and laser guided bomb, will not begin to compare to levels of financial support for defense that we have seen in the past. It will be interesting, for that matter, to see how the general population and more importantly the Congress feels about the military after the euphoria of the war wears off.⁴ Or even more significant, after all the troops are out and some degree of normalcy returns to the area! Other recent developments, such as the newly released base closure list, would support the argument for further reductions.

With these reductions inevitable, the big question then becomes,

how can the military, specifically the Army, continue to perform all of its missions with a whole lot less money? Let's take a moment and look at where the money goes, or to say that another way, who gets what in terms of dollars between the AC, USAR and ARNG. The chart below depicts dollars in billions and corresponding percentages for the last two years.

<u>COMPONENT</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>
Active Army	\$69.2/89.1%	\$67.4/88.6%
Army National Guard	\$5.3/6.8%	\$5.4/7.1%
Army Reserve	\$3.2/4.1%	\$3.3/4.3%

The point to be made here, which should be rather obvious, is that the RC consumes a very small portion of the total authorization. Tie those statistics to the ones below showing force structure allocations and the RC looks even better.

<u>COMPONENT</u>	<u>COMBAT</u>	<u>CS/CSS</u>
Active Army	48%	33%
Army National Guard	44%	27%
Army Reserve	8%	40%

It now becomes clear that the RC is not only desirable and necessary but also extremely cost effective with 52% of the combat and 67% of the combat support/combat service support force structure of the total army but only 10.9% of the total army budget in 1990 and 11.4% in 1991. The ARNG alone has 43% of the Armored battalions, 50% of the Infantry battalions, 52% of both the Field Artillery and Combat Engineer battalions and 57% of the Armored Cavalry regiments of the total Army!

One more chart is necessary to indicate the direction that the military must take to satisfy anticipated fiscal limitations. The numbers shown in this last chart reflect congressional goals for the total army strength by fiscal year (in thousands).

	<u>FY91</u>	<u>FY92</u>	<u>FY93</u>
Active Component	702	660	618
Army National Guard	457	411	366
Army Reserve	319	283	255

if these numbers seem alarming, and they should, consider that Congress desires to reduce the total Army even farther. By the year 1995 current congressional leadership would like to see an active army of 300,000 and a reserve of 250,000! These dramatic type reductions have already forced the Army to seek

congressional relief for fiscal years 91 and 92. If we are to maintain a viable force throughout, this same kind of relief request is almost inevitable for the outyears as well.

The argument then is clearly not whether we should or shouldn't have an RC or even how much of the total Army should be in the RC - that will require decisions to be made by people in much higher pay grades. It will undoubtedly take a great deal of time to begin to see any results from those efforts, knowing how that system works, if any kind of an agreement can ever even be reached. This is not meant to sound pessimistic. It is, however, meant to reflect what this author believes to be close to reality. The question is then what can be done now that will perhaps help by having a positive affect and in turn show these decision makers that the reserves at least recognize the problem and are willing to do their part. The issue is really more money than size. So let's organize to save money.

Before putting the ax to the RC and in order to appreciate what I am about to suggest, it is important to understand the command structure of the reserve component, both in the ARNG and the USAR. Specifically, the various headquarters that exist between the lowest level, that being the individual units, and the highest level for the USAR and the ARNG. Before going any farther, you need to be aware that several of the terms I am about to share with you are interchangeable with each other and with other terms and are often used in such a manner. Being a

reservist myself, I may fall guilty of that practice in this paper - please understand and forgive me in advance.

Starting first with the ARNG we find at the national level the Director, Army National Guard (DARNG) who serves as the interface between the Department of the Army (DA) and the ARNG. As the most senior ARNG agent, the director and his staff works closely with other federal agencies, particularly DA and is responsible for the total ARNG program. It must be pointed out here that there is a higher headquarters within the total National Guard structure called the National Guard Bureau (NGB). The reason for this is that the National Guard is made up of both an Army and an Air National Guard, hence NGB. Although it is not the intent of this paper to address other services, were I too, my remarks would suggest similar actions for them as well. Within every state there is a state headquarters with an Adjutant General (AG) and all his staff. The AG is responsible for ARNG matters to the Governor and to NGB through the DARNG for the overall management of those units within that state. Additionally, most states have a State Area Command (STARC). The STARC is primarily oriented towards those functions that deal with the state missions such as natural disaster, riot control and other state level emergencies. Many states, particularly those with a lot of units and certainly those who have a division, also have what is called a Troop Command. This organization serves as an intermediate command between the units and the state.

Looking at the USAR, we find the Chief, Army Reserve (CAR), also referred to as the Office of the Chief, US Army Reserve (OCAR) which serves basically the same function for the USAR as the DARNG does for the ARNG. Next would be the Army Reserve Commands (ARCOMs) and the General Officer Commands (GOCOMs). Again, these headquarters perform almost identical functions for their USAR units as the AGs do for the ARNG units. Now it doesn't take a management expert to recognize that what we have here is a whole lot of upper level management structure, all with its associated expenses and for the most part duplicated between the USAR and ARNG. If that is not bad enough, there are also six Continental United States Armies (CONUSAs) and Readiness Groups that, although are not part of the RC, are in the business of managing the RC. Add to this the fact that the USAR very recently got approval and has already begun to establish a new three star Reserve Command within Forces Command (FORSCOM) which will be doing - guess what - you got it - managing the USAR! We are told that it will eventually replace at least part of the CONUSAs. So what this means is, we are in the process of forming a new headquarters, and creating all the costs related with that, at a time when the military as well as the rest of the economy should be making every attempt to cut back. When you realize that at best this addition replaces only part of some already existing headquarters it truly smells of waste or gross mismanagement to say the least!

Are we beginning to get the picture? This is a classic case of

empire building. We have all heard the term before. It is not new; nor is it unique to the military. It is, however, equally inappropriate, particularly for the military, at a time in our history when everyone needs to try and reduce expenditures. So let us begin NOW with a program to consolidate where possible, reduce overhead and become fiscally practical by being fiscally responsible. How does the reserve component do that, you ask? The answer is simple. Make the reserve components (the ARNG and the USAR) truly one component. The skeptics will say, it will never work, and furthermore we tried it once before; remembering then Secretary of Defense McNamara's effort to roll the USAR and ARNG together in the 60's and how he failed. Although the latter was true, it does not mean that the former need be. Times are different. This time we must make a change and Congress and the people who elect them know it.

Okay, so let's say we agree to this. Well then what will this new reserve component look like and who and what goes away? Taking the easy part of the question first, the answer again is simple. Since we have already learned that the two present sub-components' respective headquarters perform almost identical functions, all we need do is eliminate the duplication. With the ARNG being dual missioned, it would be practical to build on that base and not reinvent the wheel so to speak. Besides, the ARNG is better known and has abundantly greater visibility. That translates to the elimination of most, if not all, of the USAR commands from ARCOM/GOCOM up through OCAR. More about how that

all falls out later. For those who need more rationale as to why the National Guard, here are but a few reasons. The ARNG has an equipment on hand percentage of 80 while the USAR is at 59. The Army Guard has an 81% facilities on hand while the USAR's is 53%. The Army National Guard has a 12% full time unit manning rate while the USAR is at just over 7%. All of these indicate that the National Guard is better manned, equipped and should be the clear choice to not only lead this consolidation but continue as in the past to be the one MILITIA.

There are three groups who probably would oppose this move. Many members of Congress obviously because they would feel pressure, first of all from their constituency, to do so. It's the old: sure we have to cut and I am in favor of cuts, but not in my district syndrome! Secondly, take a count of how many of our legislators hold a position in that same reserve system -- you might be surprised. The AC would definitely be opposed because, as you will recall, the USAR is federally controlled. A move like this would take away a good portion of the control the AC has over roughly half of the reserve component. Others would argue, and this author believes rightfully and especially so in a democracy, that separation of power is a desirable goal particularly in the military. The last group who would be adamant against such a thing, of course, would be many and especially those senior officers of the USAR who most likely would be out of their military job. Well if you are going to save money, which is after all what this is really all about,

then somebody has to go. Besides, it is not like they would be thrown to the wolves. Most, if not all, are and probably have been for some time qualified a military retirement. It was not too long ago when the military let many personnel go during reduction in force (RIF) actions. And although the majority of these personnel were not as senior in grade, most got little more than a discharge certificate to show for it!

Until recently, there would have been a legitimate argument, the only one I might add, against putting everything in the Guard. I am speaking, of course, about those four or five states who took exception to the training of their guardsmen in Central America. That issue was raised all the way to the Supreme Court. Fortunately, the highest court in our land ruled against those governors and in favor of the rest of the Guard who supports training anywhere in the world. This was a land mark decision which puts this issue to rest for good.^u It is interesting to note that these same governors were fighting for re-election at the time the issue was raised!

I have not done a count of all different headquarters for both the USAR and Guard. I will leave that to the bean counters. But a quick look at an overlay of all of the various headquarters throughout the continent clearly indicates that it would be substantial. So substantial, in fact, that I would deduce by their elimination and associated cost savings there would be no need to cut any troop units what so ever. A goal that would

allow the army, or the reserves at least, to be able to continue performing all of their missions with less money and no strength reductions at the unit level, which is where most the work is actually done in the first place.

To many, I am sure, this sounds too good to be true. And I would be remiss in leading you to believe that it could come to pass without some difficulty. Anytime you attempt such dramatic changes in the military there will be problems along the way. On the other hand, there are a lot of areas that would be vastly improved by the consolidation. In addition to the obvious cost factor of having to maintain almost duplicate headquarters, it is no secret that there has been and always will be rivalry, to say the least, between the USAR and the Guard; each with their own regulations and procedures and both components also have their own peculiar set of acronyms. Where will it end? And of course, both fight hard for their share of that ever shrinking pot of money.

There are some agencies/functions which are part of the existing structure of the USAR that must be addressed as we consolidate. As well as some within the National Guard for that matter. Sort of policing up the battlefield if you will. ARPERCEN which is a relatively new term for the old RCPAC has always been a personnel management function under the control of OCAR and the USAR. By this time you won't find it very surprising when I tell you that there is a GuardPERCEN that does the same thing for the National

Guard as well. These two can and should be combined easily. The name given to this new combined organization is unimportant. The point is it would need to be done; and in doing so there should be a sizable savings of personnel if the reorganization is viewed with efficiency in mind. There may be some requirement to roll a portion of the spaces from ARPERCEN over to NGB to handle the additional work of managing what is currently called the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), the Retired Reserve and the Standby Reserve, but that should be minimal. An even more practical way of dealing with this some 250,000 strong IRR would be to require these personnel to complete whatever is left of their eight year obligation in a unit where they could be kept current on their military skills and eliminate the IRR altogether. Those in the IRR with no obligation left would have a choice of joining a unit in their area or being put into the inactive National Guard. That in turn should reduce the number of roll overs from ARPERCEN. Of course, it goes without saying that, the new USAR command already discussed would no longer need to be created.

USAR units are located generally speaking where there is population to support them as are Guard units. So the USAR units would simply become part of the force structure of the state in which they are located. Obviously there will be some disconnects in this process, but again they can be worked out providing the emphasis is on efficiency and effectiveness and not individual interests. The full time personnel in these USAR units would

remain in place. But the full time USAR personnel, called Active Guard and Reserve (AGRs) in both the Guard and Reserve, could be eliminated in most cases because they are almost always co-located with a Guard AGR. Obviously, where there is only one AGR, be it Guard or Reserve, that position should remain. Further, the current Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) program which is only in the USAR, and somewhat of a boondoggle, should be abolished without question. IMA personnel would be handled the same as the IRR; either join a Guard unit or transfer to the inactive guard.

It is the view of this author that the twenty ARCOMs and probably equal or larger number of GOCOMs can be eliminated as well and their functions assumed by the respective AGs and his staff previously mentioned." For that matter, it is also the opinion of this author that with this consolidation and the reestablishment of good management practices that the CONUSAs and Readiness Groups could also be eliminated. Although neither CONUSAs nor Readiness Groups are part of reserve component force structure, they comprise a considerable amount of spaces collectively which could be used to boost unit force structure where necessary.

Another agency or group of agencies that have not been addressed at all to this point are the USAR Regional Training Sites. As the name implies, these 24 sites are out there to perform training functions for the USAR, but moreover to house and

maintain the equipment that these units train with. Well as luck would have it, the Guard has very similar sites. In fact, the Guard, being linked with each state, has a much more detailed network of these type facilities. So as we have seen before, and as has been suggested for the last five or six pages of this paper, it would make sense to consolidate these duplicate efforts.

Two final groups that need to be addressed are USAR Training Divisions and USAR schools. Both are currently under scrutiny at this point in time. A Pentagon study called Project Quicksilver has already suggested some kind of consolidation and/or elimination of USAR school staffs. What they are wrestling with is what to do with the instructor force that they want to keep. Simple answer, put them in the Guard Academies located in each state. Interestingly enough, over half of the students attending these schools are National Guard personnel anyway. As for the twelve Training Divisions, which are in most cases nothing more than a cadre at best, the only possible conclusion is abolishment.¹⁰ Now we have one militia as it should be.

This consolidation could also serve as the catalyst to accomplish several worthwhile changes needed in the Total Army. Changes that would be beneficial to both components. For example, it would be possible and practical to put some Corps headquarters in the new reserve component we are building. This would allow the AC to concentrate its' efforts toward development of a force

design tailored as a result of events in eastern Europe and post Gulf War. It would be difficult to specify the number of Corps or exact details of this suggestion until our new doctrinal defense strategy is completed and approved. It would, however, be a very cost effective effort. A mission that is ideally suited for the reserves is that of mobilization. After all, it is the reserve force that is mobilized. All the more reason to charge the reserve with the responsibility of mobilizing their forces.

At the NGB level, two task forces to look at RC initiatives and reshaping the army have been formed. Part of their effort will include looking at an array of missions for the reserves. Missions such as ROUND-UP, ROUND-IN, Contingency Force composition, AC/AGR total Force integration, Cadre units, Equipment Maintenance Centers (EMC) in the states - as we are already doing in Europe and many more. They are also looking at better peacetime use of the military such as in drug interdiction, environmental issues and humanitarian assistance to third world countries. These peacetime type missions, and many others like them, can and should be performed by the military, particularly when there is no war going on. It serves to strengthen resolve around the world that this country is committed to doing its' part; and don't think for a moment that these type missions are not appropriate to maintaining a ready force. Nothing could be further from the truth.

It is a great time to be associated with the military and particularly the reserves. So much has changed recently that makes being in the service today very exciting and challenging. The threat has changed dramatically particularly the third world countries. This all means that the military has got to change as well in order to be able to meet these challenges properly, practically and economically. The reserves will play a major roll in this effort. One needs only read any periodical to realize the ever increasing significance of the reserves. An article in a recent issue of the National Guard journal quoted General Makhmut Gareev, the Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff and prominent military theorist as saying, "it is improper to calculate the balance of power between NATO and the Warsaw Pack without including the US National Guard." At its' last annual conference, the ACs' own association, the Association of the United States Army (AUSA), passed 16 resolutions. One of those resolutions passed requested congressional support to the reserves to insure the Total Force Policy works. And, the commander of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), General John Foss, stated in the 24 Dec 90 issue of the Army Times that, "We cannot afford to develop concepts or plans in any of the TRADOC functions that focus only on the active component and try to bring in the Guard and Reserve as an afterthought. The time is appropriate for some creative thinking. As we build down the Army, we can ill afford to have unnecessary duplication of schools, training concepts or force design initiatives within each component of the total force."

It is obvious then that at least the military leadership around the world recognizes the importance of a viable reserve with an active role long into the future. So let's make the changes. Unfortunately, it is not quite that simple. In our society these kind of decisions are made by our legislative body called Congress. Particularly when those decisions involve money. Here is what a few influential people had to say about the reserves. Senator Sam Nunn (D-Georgia) "includes Guard and Reserve reliance in the new military strategy." He also said, "US defense posture should seek greater utilization of the reserves. In this period of increased warning time and fiscal austerity, we must conduct a fundamental reexamination of the use of the reserves in the military. This will be a difficult challenge for the military, but one which must be addressed." Former Secretary of the Army, John D. Marsh, said, "Force reductions could mean Guard and Reserve enhancements." And LTG LaVern E. Weber (retired), Executive Director, National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS), said recently, "The role of the Guard and the Reserve in the new Total Force Policy, as enunciated in March 1990 by President George Bush, seems to be enhancing, not reducing."

The difficulty of deciding if any of this will ever occur rests ultimately with the people. The problem is that the people are not close enough to the issue to understand it and therefore will not do anything about it. The people only get involved when they feel the direct effect. What would the people, the tax payers,

say if they realized they were paying to maintain three separate ground forces, four counting the Marines? What smart business executive would have three separate divisions in his organization all with the same function? Two of the divisions almost identical! He wouldn't have to look at budget charts to recognize the stupidity in that!

Nothing being suggested here is all that new or earth shattering. It is simply a common sense approach to dealing with a rather basic problem. It is also, I believe, a realistic and achievable goal. If we all are willing to face the realities of the situation, remove our emotions and pet rocks, it can be accomplished. As stated, there will be sacrifices along the way, but that is usually true with anything goal worth attaining. This may sound elementary to some or even rather simplistic. If it is so, thank God for that. Just once it would be refreshing to think that there was a simple solution to a problem more serious than most would care to admit. Thank God indeed.

1. Robert L. Goldich, "Historical Continuity in the US Military Reserve System," in Bennie J. Wilson III, ed., The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force (Library of Congress), p. 12.
2. Jonathan M. House, "John McAuley Palmer and the Reserve Components", from The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force, edited by Bennie J. Wilson III, page 29.
3. Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, College Edition, page 933.
4. Robert L. Goldich, Historical Continuity in the US Military Reserve System, from The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force, edited by Bennie J. Wilson III, page 22.

5. Ibid, page 23.

6. Wallace J. Ihies, A Twenty-First Century Army, Parameters, Vol. XXI No. 1, Spring 91, page 62.

7. Jeffrey A. Jacobs, Integrating the Total Army: The Road to Reserve Readiness, Parameters, Vol. XX No. 4, Dec 90, page 81.

8. MG Charles M. Kiefner, President, NGAUS, President's Annual Report to the 1990 General Conference, National Guard Association of the United States, page 1.

9. The Officer, ROA Annual Reserve Forces Review, Feb 91, page 123.

10. Ibid.