




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THE POST COLD WAR NATIONAL SECURITY ROLE OF JAPAN

BY

COLONEL NAOTO HAYASHI
Japan Ground Self-Defense Force

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THE POST COLD WAR NATIONAL SECURITY ROLE OF JAPAN

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Colonel Naoto Hayashi
Japan Ground Self-Defense Force

Colonel Donald W. Boose, Jr.
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

ABSTRACT

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After the Cold War, we have entered a new era which is uncertain, difficult, and unstable. During the Cold War, world peace and the system of free trade have depended on the economy and military efforts of the United States. Today, however, the relative strength of the United States has declined and that of Japan and Western Germany has risen. It is no longer possible for the United States to support the international world order alone. In this difficult time, the most important objective is to contribute to prosperity, stability, and security around the world. Japan must perform a role equal to its position as the world's second largest economic power, but its efforts to do so up to now, have met obstacles not only in Japan but also in East Asia. Japan has done much to maintain the stable world without using military forces. However, it is now time to identify Japan's appropriate role in the political, economic, and military realms. This paper examines the most appropriate and practicable roles for Japan as an advanced country and recommends Japan provide military forces to peace keeping units on the same basis as other countries within specifically defined limits, expand its non-military aid, and maintain an adequate self defense capability.



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INTRODUCTION

In the past few years, major changes in international relations have been taking place. A spectacular political transformation which no one had predicted began to unveil itself in Europe. Communism fell in Poland in September 1989, the Government was reformed in Hungary in October 1989, a "Velvet Revolution" took place in Czechoslovakia in November 1989, the Berlin Wall fell in November 1989, the regime was overthrown in Rumania, and German reunification was completed on 3 October 1990. This series of changes in Europe was triggered by the change of foreign and domestic policies of the Soviet Union caused by its serious economic stagnation.¹ In the military sphere, a decrease in military tension has been witnessed between the East and West in Europe.² In addition, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) have been making progress.³ Now the Cold War is finished and a new era is beginning.

During the Cold War, the world was a "tight bipolar system" with the United States and the Soviet Union exercising control over their two "spheres of influence."⁴ Because the competition was cast in military terms, military power and maintenance of large military forces at a high degree of readiness was seen to be essential. Budgets on both sides were geared to military needs with damaging economic consequences.⁵ At the same time, however, through the threat of nuclear confrontation, this

East-West framework also deterred an outbreak of war, and in this sense, the framework functioned as an international order with the ability to maintain peace, although it was an unstable one.⁶ In this Cold War environment Japan became the world's second largest economic power in terms of GNP owing to the economic and military support of the United States. This bipolar world is now changing. War in the Persian Gulf began on 16 January 1991, involving a large number of countries. Wars of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) are likely to occur in the future as a result of the reduced influence of the two major powers. In this uncertain, difficult, and unstable time, the most important objective is to contribute to prosperity, stability, and security around the world. For that very reason Japan should perform a role equal to its position as the world's second largest economic country.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the most appropriate and practicable role for Japan as an advanced country.

THE WORLD STANDS ON THIN ICE

Since the end of World War II, the basic international political framework has been shaped by East-West relations focused on two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The tension between the Western democracies and Eastern communist countries was liable at any time to escalate the Cold War into a hot war.⁷ During the Cold War, international political relations were such that it was easy to understand which country was an enemy and which one was friendly. This

East-West framework succeeded in maintaining peace as a result of holding the certain balance of power.

Today, East-West relations are shifting from confrontation to full-fledged talks and cooperation. The ongoing changes have been set off as a direct consequence of a deadlock of socialist countries in the East.⁸ At the same time, this major shift was induced by the success of the Western democracies and changes in the posture of the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev.⁹ The Soviet Union is also struggling to sustain massive military expenditures and faces a crisis in its economy. If the Soviet Union fails to rebuild its economic system, it will lose its superpower status and become isolated from development and progress. The "Perestroika" of President Gorbachev is intended to rebuild "a strong Soviet Union" by finding a breakthrough in this impasse.¹⁰ In this restructuring of its domestic political and economic system, the Soviet Union cannot maintain an expansionist policy using military forces.¹¹ The withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 tells us that the Soviet Union cannot afford to support military action and is seeking a more stable relationship with other countries. This "New Thinking" allowed the people of Eastern Europe to realize their long-suppressed desires for political democratization and economic liberalization.¹² The Soviet Union became active in seeking a policy of dialogue and cooperation with the United States and other Western nations.¹³

In the United States, the Bush administration welcomed these changes

in the Soviet Union.¹⁴ As the result, there is now hope that agreement will be reached in the area of arms control and reduction including START and CFE.¹⁵ Some observers have called this new phase in East-West relations, "the end of the Cold War." It is true that the basic postwar international political framework has collapsed and one era has ended. However, the world has entered into a transition period with uncertainty and instability.¹⁶

There is uncertainty about "Perestroika" and the crisis in the Soviet Union caused by its economy and political system. It is hard to believe that the Soviet Union can successfully resurrect its economy under the same communist society which led to the current disaster even though the Soviet Union attempt to install a "planned market-economy." In addition, no signs have appeared that the Soviet Union is solving the increasingly serious ethnic problems that have broken out in various parts of the country.¹⁷ In fact, the Soviet Union has attempted to suppress the government of Lithuania using military forces. In short, President Gorbachev faces vast difficulties in his efforts to rebuild "a strong Soviet Union."¹⁸ It is impossible to know whether he will succeed or not.

Eastern Europe has many of the same problems. Those countries are still hungry, wonder why their new, just-born systems do not work like those of Western Europe, and face instability. To add to the problem, they lost the financial aid from the Soviet Union. Viewed from another

point, the changes in East-West relations show a decline in the two superpowers' so-called "peace management capabilities".¹⁹ For the Soviet Union, the more it is forced to concentrate on domestic reform, the less ability it will have to engage in outside matters.²⁰ On the other hand, the United States has its own "twin deficits" of the budget and trade. This means the United States is also unable to establish the international order on its own.²¹ When the two superpowers lost their overwhelming influence in the world, some conflicts became more likely to occur in such conflict areas as the Middle East, South Asia, and parts of Africa, where both superpowers scrambled for influence during the Cold War. The War in the Gulf is one such instance.

In short, with the decline in the peace management capabilities of the two superpowers, the international situation will become increasingly unstable unless the world can develop a new international order or system for the maintenance of peace.²² British former Prime Minister Thatcher well expressed the danger of the present fluidity of East-West relations with the phrase, "The ice is most dangerous when it begins to melt".

HOW TO MAINTAIN PROSPERITY, STABILITY, AND SECURITY AROUND THE WORLD

The confrontation between democracy and communism is changing now. The Soviet Union is not able to support any other country, because of rebuilding its economy. The United States also wants to reshape its military not only to meet the shift of international relations but also

to deal with its own economic issues. At the same time, in the economic sphere, many sea-changes are making for an uncertain and unstable world.

The first sea-change: The relative strength of the United States has been weakened by the rising of Japan and West German and, more recently, of newly industrialized countries such as Korea, and it is no longer possible for the United States to support the Free World alone.²³

Now the world GNP has reached approximately 20 trillion dollars. The United States and the European Community each have a GNP of roughly five trillion dollars, and Japan's is about three trillion dollars. Japan's economy has expanded into high technology industrial sectors and international finance.²⁴

The second sea-change: There is a widening economic gap in the developing world. Some developing countries succeed in maintaining higher growth rates and export performance, but some countries still increase their debt. The reason for this is that world economic conditions in the early 1980s (high interest rates, deep recession, plummeting commodity prices) were beyond the control of developing economies.²⁵ While some newly industrializing countries have made the transition to rich-country status, other developing countries are still scrambling to escape a decade of stagnation and an increasingly marginal status in the world.²⁶

The third sea-change: International markets and international corporations are changing the world. International corporations'

strategy has further blurred the boundaries between nation states. Brain drains and labor outflows are increasing as international economy undergoes the integration of international corporations. These movements can cause serious damage to national governments, particularly in the developing countries.²⁷ This is because a liberalized economy requires less control by the national state's government and has a tendency to overwhelm the economies of developing countries. The economic situation and survivability of developed and developing countries are not at the same level. Advanced countries have enough ability to meet the international market system and their international corporations' activities are beyond the control of national governments, while developing countries need some government protection for their infant industries to survive as members of the free trade system.²⁸ If the open markets system and integration of international corporations expands throughout the world in an uncontrolled disorderly fashion, the gap between the countries will increasingly widen and some developing countries will be destabilized. On the other hand, the decline in the confrontation between communist and Western ideologies and the escalation of economic competition encourage the revival of nationalism which was restrained during the Cold War.

Thus, the Post Cold War environment is one of big changes and introduces an uncertain, complex, and unstable era. In this era, a key

question for Japan and the West, specifically the United States, is how to maintain prosperity, stability, and security around the world.

The first and most important task is to deter war and conflict; therefore, maintenance of the military balance of power not only globally but also in various regions of the world and maintenance of a stable economic situation through the development of sound free trade are essential. The second task is to win the war or conflict if deterrence fails or to settle the conflict and prevent its expansion; therefore, the preservation of enough military strength and possession of enough economic power to support the war are required. The third task is to rebuild a stable environment after the war or conflict; therefore, every supporting means to rebuild the stricken area is important. This includes economic support, technical support, and other aids.

Those tasks are the same as at present, but the question is, who will have the responsibility in the future. From now, Japan has to participate in those tasks widely as an advanced country, otherwise it is obvious that Japan will fall short of the other allied countries and be isolated at the end, thus dropping Japan out from the present situation.

What is the appropriate Japanese role in those tasks? To carry out the first task, Japan must maintain the same effort as at present and expand its share as the relative strength of the United States has been weakened. That means Japan must support the United States' functions. In addition, improvement of the relationship between the United States

and Japan will contribute to sound world economic prosperity and stability.

In the second task, Japan has supported only the economic side. Japan has not supported military action directly without the security of the Japanese themselves being directly threatened. But now, it cannot avoid supporting military action or taking some part. Such an action is a big issue not only for Japan but also for other countries as well. However, Japan should take some action to the best of its ability. In the War in the Gulf, for example, the countries which have participated in military action did so to secure their interests. Each country takes military action to secure its own interest, even though they know they will lose their soldiers in the process. Nothing can take the place of human life. Japan can no longer be excused from participating in some military action and thereby risking Japanese lives as well.

Regarding the third task, Japan should continue the same function as it does at present.

WHAT IS THE CURRENT POLICY OF JAPANESE NATIONAL SECURITY ?

Japanese National Security Policy is based on the diplomatic and other efforts to create environments of minimizing possibilities of threat or aggression by maintaining a peaceful international community, promoting appropriate defense buildup and holding the security arrangements with the United States to prevent aggression and repel aggression if Japan should be invaded.²⁹

DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER EFFORTS

Diplomatic and other efforts are extremely important as a means of ensuring national security to create the stable and peaceful world which makes not only the environment of minimizing the possibilities of aggression but also an environment which aids Japan's prosperity and development.³⁰

Japan has been making efforts to ensure a stable and peaceful world through economic and social activities. Japan takes the position that various reformations having taken place in East European nations since 1989 centering on Poland and Hungary are contributing to the stabilization of not only the Europe area but also overall East and West relations and the Asia Pacific region.³¹ Therefore, in January 1990 the government of Japan decided to implement measures for aid to Poland and Hungary in order to help their economic reconstruction and development.³² Moreover, Japan has extended cooperation for developing countries located in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America to influence the stability and peace of the international community.³³

In the economic realm, Japan began offering economic assistance in 1954 and the scale of this economic cooperation has been expanded year by year.³⁴ Beginning from 1978, the Japanese government has set four medium-range plans for its Official Development Assistance (ODA). The last medium-range plan is to achieve a total of more than 50 billion dollars during the five year period from 1988 to 1992.³⁵ The government

of Japan spent 11 billion dollars for ODA in 1989, the biggest assistance budget in the world (the United States budget of ODA in 1989 was 9.5 billion dollars).³⁶ Government of Japan ODA emphasizes assistance in job training, agriculture and energy development as well as projects for building up the social infrastructure.³⁷

In the realm of technical cooperation, Japan began extending official technical cooperation in 1954 to provide the technology needed for the developing countries' economic and social development.³⁸ The amount of this fund was 0.9 billion dollars for 1987 which was the fourth biggest program for any country in the world and was next to that of West Germany.³⁹ In 1986, 4,500 trainees visited Japan under this program, 7,615 Japanese specialists were sent overseas and 786 members of Japan Overseas Cooperating Volunteers were dispatched to 34 countries.⁴⁰ This assistance includes the supply of materials, development surveys, investments and loans for development projects, assistance in building and operating technical training centers, and cooperation relating to health, sanitation, medical care, family planning, agriculture, forestry and industrial production.⁴¹

In those efforts, Japan has performed the role equal to Japan's position in the international community. As the relative strength of the United States has been weakened, Japan's responsibility will expand to include much which was done by the United States before. At the same

time, it is important to continue the economic progress to support not only a stable and peaceful world but also internal stability.

DEFENSE BUILDUP OF JAPAN

Japan must build up its own defense capability to be able to repel a "limited and small-scale invasion" and continue defensive operations against any form of aggression until the pledged United States military commitment arrives. Based on that idea, Japan has been making efforts on its own initiative for a moderate defense buildup under its "Peace Constitution" in accordance with the fundamental principles of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy and of not becoming a military power which might pose a threat to other countries, while keeping the principle of civilian control, the three non-nuclear principles, and firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. security relationship.⁴²

In October 1976, the National Defense Council and Cabinet set up the "National Defense Program Outline", which prescribes the level of defense capability that should be maintained by Japan in peacetime and provides the guidelines for improving Japan's defense capabilities. Japan's defense capability has thus been steadily improved in accordance with the "National Defense Program Outline" since JFY 1977.⁴³

The "National Defense Program Outline" shows the concrete scale of defense capability Japan should possess and clearly specifies the framework of the scale in terms of the basic units and main equipment of

each of the three Self-Defense Forces.⁴⁴

The Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) is required, "to be capable of swift and effective systematic defense operation in any part of Japan, must deploy its divisions and other units with a balance conforming to Japan's geographical futures."⁴⁵ The GSDF should maintain 180,000 personnel, 12 divisions, one armored division, two combined brigades, one airborne brigade, one helicopter brigade, one artillery brigade, eight anti-aircraft artillery groups and other smaller units.⁴⁶ By 1990, the GSDF possessed about 1,200 tanks including the type-90 tank, 650 armed vehicles, 830 field artillery pieces, 48 attack helicopters and 360 other kind of aircraft as main equipment.⁴⁷

The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), "must possess one fleet escort force as a mobile operating ship unit in order to quickly respond to aggressive action and such situations at sea, therefore, the fleet escort force must be able to maintain at least one escort flotilla on alert at all times."⁴⁸ The MSDF should maintain four escort flotillas for mobile operations, 10 divisions as regional district units, six divisions as submarine units, two flotillas as minesweeping units and 16 squadrons as land-based antisubmarine aircraft units, through possessing about 60 ships including two AEGIS system destroyers, 16 submarines and approximately 220 aircraft as main equipment.⁴⁹

The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), "must possess fighter units to provide the capability of maintaining continuous alert to take immediate

and appropriate steps against violations of Japan's territorial airspace and air incursions."⁷⁰ The ASDF should maintain 13 combat squadrons in consideration of such factors as Japan's geographical features, the fighters' operational range, their endurance, and training for maintaining of pilots' skills.⁷¹ By 1990, the ASDF possessed 132 F-15s, 124 F-4EJs, 13 C-130Hs and eight E-2Cs as main equipment.⁷²

To achieve the scale of defense capability described by the "National Defense Program Outline," in September 1985 the Japanese government formulated a Mid-Term Defense Program to be carried out during the period from FY 1986 through FY 1990.⁷³ The ceiling of the total amount of the defense-related expenditure for the Mid-Term Defense Program was put at about ¥18.4 trillion.⁷⁴

The Defense Expenditure of Japan in 1990, the last year of this program, was ¥4.2 trillion which is 6.3 % of the General Account Expenditure.⁷⁵ Compared to the Defense Expenditure of the largest nations in 1987, Japan's expenditure was 25 billion dollars (¥3.5 trillion) putting it in sixth place after the Soviet Union, the United States (\$288 billion), France (\$35 billion), West German (\$34 billion) and the United Kingdom (\$32 billion).⁷⁶ India's defense expenditure was 10 billion dollars, which was the second largest of Asian countries, while Korea's was six billions.

Considering the above facts, the capability of the Japan Self-Defense Force is neither big nor small. Japan will continue

building up its defense capability with regard to the nation's resources and the prevailing domestic situation. However, this continuing defense effort will come into question in the now changing world, even though the threat situation has not changed in Northeast Asia like it has in Europe.

The Soviet Union continues to modernize its strategic nuclear and much of its conventional forces, even as it reduces the numbers.⁵⁷ In Northeast Asia in particular, we have yet to see the kind of retrenchment that has occurred in Europe.⁵⁸ In fact, the modernization of the Soviet Forces in Asia has improved the qualitative capability of the units stationed there and they continue to represent a significant threat to the nations of the region. For instance, introduction of the new arms like T-72 tanks and multiple rockets is beginning in the Soviet Army in the Far East and the Pacific Fleet, the largest Soviet fleet, is deployed in the Far East region and is being modernized.⁵⁹ Moreover, Japan faces the illegal Soviet forces' occupation of its Northern Territories.⁶⁰

On the other hand, the United States is now determining how to reshape its military. If the United States forces' presence is withdrawn from this area, it will cause a force vacuum and lead to a more unstable situation in this region. Therefore, Japan must support the continued presence of United States forces in this area at the same level as at present using every effort possible, such as increased host nation support and other measures for the smooth stationing of United States forces in Japan. In addition, although Japan's defense capabilities

have increased greatly, expenditure has not yet reached the level of defense capability described in the "National Defense Program Outline."

These elements as mentioned above require additional defense expenditures in spite of the decreasing defense expenditures of other countries. That will raise other issues such as whether the Japan Self-Defense Forces are growing big enough to be a threat to invade other countries and whether expanding defense expenditures may have an adverse effect on the national economy. It will thus be important to get understanding and agreement not only with the neighbor nations but also inside of Japan so that adequate defense improvements can be achieved as well as continued development of a sound national economy in the future.

JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY ARRANGEMENT

On 23 June 1990, the Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty saw its 30th anniversary since its effectuation. It is impossible for Japan to establish its own defense system capable of coping with every conceivable development ranging from all-out warfare involving even the use of nuclear weapons, to aggression in every conceivable form using conventional arms.⁶¹ Therefore, Japan makes it a policy to ensure its own security by not only possessing an appropriate scale of defense capability, but also maintaining security arrangement with the United States.⁶²

The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty provides, in Article 5, for coordinated, joint action by Japan and the United States in the event of, "an armed attack against either party in the territories under the administration of Japan."⁶³ Article 6 of the treaty provides for the U.S. to station its forces in Japan. The presence of United States forces in Japan contributes greatly not only directly to Japan's security, but also to the maintenance of peace and security of the Far East, which benefits both countries.⁶⁴

In addition, Article 2 of the treaty provides not only for the defense aspect but also for the promotion of political and economic cooperative relations.⁶⁵ Thus, the Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty is the basis of, as far as Japan-U.S. relations are concerned, not only simply defense but also friendly and cooperative relations in a wide range of areas of the two countries such as politics, economics and society.

In order to maintain and enhance the credibility of the Japan-U.S. security arrangement, Japan and the United States should seize every opportunity to conduct continued dialogue, and thereby establish a relationship of mutual trust and cooperation. At the same time, the two countries should respectively fulfill their responsibilities commensurate with Japan-U.S. defense cooperation and strive to have their security arrangements function effectively.

To that end, Japan, in addition to consulting with the United States

government officials concerned, is promoting the smooth stationing of the United States Forces in Japan (USFJ) by providing them with the necessary areas and facilities, and is continuing a wide range of Japan-U.S. cooperation, including studies based on "the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation," combined training and joint research and development.⁶⁶

The measures for smooth stationing of United States Forces in Japan has been on going. Japan is obligated to furnish facilities and areas (these refer to buildings, structures, land and the publicly owned surface of the water) without any cost to the United States Forces in Japan.⁶⁷ In addition, the USFJ needs the work force of Japanese employees, and the salary, benefits and allowances of this work force requirement is met with assistance from Japan.⁶⁸

With regard to facilities and areas used by USFJ, the Japanese government has been undertaking, since FY 1979, the reconstruction of old barracks, construction of new family housing, etc. for use by the U.S. forces.⁶⁹ The budget for 1989 to implement these facilities improvement measures totaled about ¥89 billion (about ¥74 billion of future obligatory outlay expenses authorized in addition to this budget), as compared to ¥113 billion for all JSDF facility improvement budget.⁷⁰

In regard to the Japanese work force, the Japanese government hires Japanese nationals (about 22,100 as of March 31, 1990) after determining their wages and working conditions, and furnishes their labor to USFJ.⁷¹

The Japanese government in an effort to reduce the financial burden of USFJ and also to ensure the stable employment of those employees, has shared the welfare and recreation expenses and other costs since FY 1978 and part of their wages since 1979.⁷² The labor costs required for the implementation of those measures have been budgeted for FY 1990 at about ¥67.9 billion.⁷³ This cost is just half of the total cost of local national employees and under a recently signed agreement the Government of Japan will, by 1995, assume the full cost of local national employees plus the cost of utilities used by U.S. forces.

Japan-U.S. defense cooperation has continued to develop. In diplomatic channels, Japanese and U.S. government officials have exchanged views on security issues between the two countries closely and frankly at various levels, including summit meetings between the Japanese prime minister and the U.S. president and annual consultations between the Director General of the Defense Agency and the U.S. Secretary of Defence.⁷⁴ In September 1989 and in March and November 1990, Prime Minister Kaifu visited the U.S. for talks with President George Bush on the relationship between the two countries. In February 1990, U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney visited Japan and met with Prime Minister Kaifu and Defense Agency Director General Juro Matsumoto in the 24th defense chief's consultations since August 1975.⁷⁵ Topics were "influences of the reorganization of the United States Forces" and "burden sharing." At present, the Defense Agency is conducting studies

with USFJ on joint defense planning and other studies on the basis of the "Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation" formulated in 1978 in order to effectively attain the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and related arrangements.⁷⁶ Studies on Joint Defense Planning, Joint Studies on Sea-Lane Defense and Studies on Interoperability are the main studies now.⁷⁷

In training, Japan-U.S. combined training has been developing since 1975.⁷⁸ In 1989, Japan-U.S. combined exercises included one Joint Command Post Exercise, six ground exercises, eight maritime exercises and nine air exercises.⁷⁹ Combined training is effective in enhancing the tactical skills of the respective forces. It is essential that the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Forces should promote closer communications and mutual understanding in tactical areas on a daily basis thereby upgrading interoperability between the two forces. Such combined exercises are indispensable for the smooth conduct of Japan-U.S. coordinated actions in an emergency, and it also contributes to the maintenance and enhancement of the credibility of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and the deterrent effect.⁸⁰

In equipment and technology, Japan-U.S. cooperative relations have been developing and changing. Japan has obtained various forms of cooperation from the United States in defense buildup, as before, mainly based on the Mutual Defense Agreement. Equipment such as the AEGIS system and portable SAMs have been procured under the terms of Foreign

Military Sales (FMS) , while P-3C anti submarine patrol aircraft, F-15 interceptor-fighters and other such equipment have been produced in Japan under license arrangements with the United States.⁸¹ On the other hand, due to the Japanese technical standards in recent years, Japanese technologies have come to contribute to the improvement of the defense capability in the United States and it has become increasingly important to promote exchanges of technology between Japan and the United States in the defense area.⁸² With regard to mutual exchanges of technologies in the defense area, the Japanese government decided to open the way for Japan's transfer of military technologies to the United States in 1983 as an exception to the Three Principles of Arms Export and to the Government's Policy Guideline on Arms Export decided in February 1976.⁸³ Japan-U.S. joint research and development are important from the viewpoint of not only effectively developing equipment through incorporating advanced technologies of the two countries but also progressing defense cooperative relations between Japan and the United States. As regards the Japan-U.S. joint research and development of equipment, the co-development of the next generation support fighter (FS-X) is the first case in point.⁸⁴

This Japan-U.S. Security Treaty has been providing the peace and prosperity not only for Japan but also for the Far East. So far, to enhance the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, many kinds of efforts have been made as mentioned above. But now Japan-U.S.

security arrangements based on retaining close friendly relations between Japan and the United States have met more difficulty. In other words, the expanding trade friction between Japan and the United States caused by the rising of Japan's economy and economic stagnation of the United States is likely to cause a rift in the relationship. The appearance of Japan as a powerful rival/competitor which was no match before and whose rapid economic growth was supported by the United States, is considered by some to be unfair to the United States. Some American observers suggest that Japan's "free ride" must end.

The direct cause which invited this situation is the huge bilateral trade imbalance of 50 billion dollars on an annual basis. This requires an open market in Japan and protectionism and economic nationalism in the United States. It is necessary to open markets in Japan not only to reduce the imbalance of trade between Japan and the United States but also to build up the sound free trade society around the world. But both countries must understand that, while the bilateral trade imbalance can and should be reduced, because of the relative size of the two markets, the nature of the trade system, and other economic factors, a total elimination of the imbalance is impossible. Free trade countries' trade balances need to be viewed from the perspective of total trade not bilateral trade. For instance, while Japan has a trading surplus with the United States and the EC, it has a trading deficit with Canada and the nations of the Middle East.⁸⁵ Lopsided relationships can also be

seen in other than trade transactions. Most of the "invisible trade deficit" is generated by trade with the United States and the members of the EC.⁸⁶ In addition, 60 percent of Japan's imports are accounted for by raw materials (with crude oil accounting for 15 % of the total) and foodstuffs, and the majority of exports are industrial goods. Japan tries to open its market not only to reduce the economic friction with the United States but also for the maintenance of free trade around the world. Certain important preparations must be completed within before Japan opens its markets: laying the foundation for an open economy through structural changes in industry and society, expanding the internal economy and reducing dependence on exports, and promoting science and technology.⁸⁷ At the same time, the United States will be required to restore its economic competitiveness and lead the free trade world as a superpower.

At this time, it is most important to enhance the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. security arrangement through maintenance of close friendly relations between Japan and the United States. For that purpose, the two countries should continue every effort based on a mutual understanding of each country's situation. Both countries should respect each other as good competitors and partners and continue the sound relationship.

THE REARMING OF JAPAN

In World War II, Japan lost nearly 1.2 million soldiers and 0.7 million civilians. The atomic bombs killed about 200,000 in Hiroshima

and 120,000 in Nagasaki.⁸⁸ At that time, the whole country of Japan was essentially destroyed. This experience of being defeated in war was the first such experience of Japan, and the losses were too great. No Japanese who experienced that disaster ever wanted to be at war again, not only at that time but also in the future. The United States demanded the unconditional surrender of Japan and Japan had no other choice but to accept the Potsdam Declaration on August 15, 1945. During Japan's occupation by the Allied Forces following its defeat in 1945, the nation's governmental, economic, social and educational systems underwent a thorough remodeling and its military forces were disbanded.⁸⁹ That means Japan was reborn, and is not the same as it was before.

The new Japan's Constitution was promulgated on November 3 of 1946 and took effect on May 3 the following year under the Occupation authorities led by General Douglas MacArthur. The Constitution, upholding pacifism, sets forth in Article 9 the renunciation of war, non-possession of war potential and denial of the right of belligerency of the state.⁹⁰

At the beginning of the Korean War, in 1950, without changing the Constitution, the National Police Reserve was set up to maintain the peace of Japan because the majority of the occupation forces moved to Korea. At that time, Prime Minister Yoshida explained that the National Police Reserve was set up to maintain the peace only and was not a military force.⁹¹ He emphasized that this was not a rearmament. The

National Police Reserve reorganized as the Peace Preservation Corps in 1952 and was transformed into the Self-Defense Force in 1954.⁹²

The Japan-U.S. security arrangements, originally signed in 1951, were revised in 1960 with a view to making them more reciprocal.⁹³ The process to conclude this arrangement was not an easy one. In Japan, objections were made to this arrangement based on fears that the Japan Self-Defense Force would be strengthened to the point where it would become too big for the maintenance of the peace of Japan only and that such a scale of defense capability would be contrary to the pacifistic constitution. These objections were strong enough to stop the deliberations of the Diet. The Kishi cabinet rammed the bill of acceptance of the Japan-U.S. security arrangement through the Diet, after which the Kishi cabinet was dissolved.⁹⁴

In 1976, the Japanese government established a policy that the defense expenditure should be no more than one percent of GNP.⁹⁵ In 1987, the government of Japan established a new defense budget ceiling guideline based on the total 5 years defense expenditure to complete the JFY 1986-1990 Mid-Term Defense Program.⁹⁶ This new rule was intended to replace the old "one percent" ceiling, but, in fact, the one percent limit seems to be in effect even now.

These facts indicate that Japan has tried to set certain limits for building up its defense capability in order to have a force big enough to defend Japan but not to have the capability to invade neighboring

countries. In addition, any country which had the experience of being occupied by Japan or fighting with Japan before or during World War II, including the United States, cannot accept the idea of Japanese remilitarization in the pattern of the old Imperial Japanese Army and Navy.

The majority of the Japanese people have adhered to the idea that Japan should be able to keep the peace, but not have enough military power to invade other countries. Therefore, the government of Japan has set limits so as not to remilitarize, not to go back to prewar Japanese militarism, not to repeat the past mistakes which lead to the near-destruction of this small country.⁹⁷ The limitations are not only in terms of a ceiling on the cost of building up Japan's defense capability but also on specific military activities. The current policy limitations on military activities cover a wide area, including not sending Self-Defense Forces as members of U.N. peace keeping units, Japan's "three non-nuclear principles" (not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them and not permitting their introduction into Japan), a prohibition against the sale of arms and arms production-related equipment abroad, and a reluctance to even assist military activities including support, transportation, medical care and even the use of airfields and ports.⁹⁸

On the other hand, one of the most immediate tasks facing Japan in the postwar period was economic rehabilitation.⁹⁹ Japan has devoted

itself to catch up with the living standards of the United States and has tried to reach the United States' high level of industrialization and material affluence. These two factors: defense limitations and rapid economic growth, led Japan to the present situation.

Japan has enjoyed peace since 1945 and has made steady economic progress. It is natural that most of the nation of Japan believes that their choice was the sound one. No Japanese wants to change this approach if it is acceptable to other countries. In addition, Japan faces many issues regarding its society and economy.

The first issue is retaining the ability to create new technology to survive economic competition in the new era. From now, the progress of the Japanese economy has been based on Japanese adeptness in combining and applying techniques. Japan learned the new techniques from other advanced countries and imitated and developed the imported technology.¹⁰⁰ The abundance of Japanese labor and its national character helped this approach and Japan soon caught up with the advanced countries.¹⁰¹ This same approach was used by newcomers such as South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan. If Japan stayed in the same position, those newcoming countries would catch up with and overcome the economy of Japan. It is difficult for Japan to research and develop original new technology. It is required that Japan change its system of developing and nurturing talented persons and using money as a investment in research and development.¹⁰² That means Japan needs major changes in its

education system and much government investment. That has not been done so far.

The second issue is agriculture policy reform. During the period of rapid economic growth the advance of secondary and tertiary industries was great but primary industry was getting smaller. In particular, agriculture employed 30.0% of the working population in 1960 but only 8.4% in 1985, by which time agricultural production accounted for just 2% of the net domestic product.¹⁰³ Japan produces all its own rice, which is the staple of the Japanese diet, but over 90% of wheat and soy bean requirements are imported.¹⁰⁴ Also, many agricultural products that have been typical products of Japan are now imported, such as buckwheat, red beans, laver (edible seaweed) and green tea. Japanese self-sufficiency in food crops is at an extremely low level compared with that of other advanced countries.¹⁰⁵ Agriculture policy reform is essential to gain international competitiveness to recover self-sufficiency in food crops. This is now beginning to cause many trade conflicts.

The last issue is the growing number of elderly Japanese, which is an increasingly heavy burden for Japan. The number of elderly Japanese (65 years and older) in the population was 10.3% in 1985 is expected to reach 23.4% in 2020.¹⁰⁶ The population of productive age must care for this elderly population. Ten productive age people supported 1.5 elderly people in 1985, but ten productive age people will have to support four elderly people in 2020.¹⁰⁷ The current expenditure of 5% of GNP for the

elderly is expected to expand in the near future.

Japan's defense expenditure has been steady expanding by about five percent every year over the past decade even though other expenditures of the government have been frozen or reduced since 1982.¹⁰⁸ However, the previously described socio-economic issues will require the other government expenditures to expand and will be an obstacle to increased defense expenditures from now.

In such an environment, Japan must exert its efforts to both contribute to the peace of the world and to continue the prosperity of Japan.

RECOMMENDATION

What is the appropriate Japanese role and what role should it assume now and in the future? Any kind of expanded military role will be difficult in Japan not only on the basis of cost but also because of the obstacle of public opinion. But Japan can not evade playing an appropriate role like those of other countries which is the burden of an advanced free trade country in this era.

As mentioned above, Japan has made many kinds of efforts to provide for the stability and prosperity not only of Japan but also around the world. However, today the relative strength of the United States has been declining, relative to the rise of Japan and the EC, and it is no longer possible for the United States to support the peace of the world without additional help. That situation requires other countries to

share the burden which has been largely borne by the strong United States before. The Persian Gulf War demonstrated this. The United States did not conduct the war alone in light of the high cost of the execution of modern warfare and the potential cost in human life for the keeping of world peace. Many allied countries cooperated with the United States to defeat the Iraqi military and force its withdrawal from Kuwait.

Japan made strenuous efforts to support the allied countries within the limitation of its defense policies, but some objection to the nature and extent of Japan's support has appeared in the world. The United States made sacrifices to keep the world order not just for the interest of the United States. Japan, however, which is the one of the countries depending heavily on oil from the Middle East, never sacrificed anything other than paying money.

There is no more precious treasure than human lives. No country sacrifices its citizens' human lives purely for another country's interest. The United States and another countries who sent their military forces to the Persian Gulf, were securing their interests as independent countries. If they could have secured their countries' interests by only paying money, they would have done the same thing as Japan. However, if Japan were to have done the same type of military action as other allied countries, it would have seemed to many people to be a revival of Japanese militarism. Some definite promise to place a limit on the escalation of Japanese militarization is required,

otherwise, Japan cannot make the same type of efforts as other allied countries and should not do so. Today, Japan cannot make the same type of efforts as other allied countries without the authorization, not only of the Japanese nation based on its democratic system, but also the understanding of other countries, especially those in East Asia. It is most important to know what kind of military action should be taken now and in the future by Japan and what constraints are needed to ensure a limitation on the escalation of militarism at that time.

Japan should take military actions equal to those of other Asian countries, such as support to allied military activities and the dispatch of peace keeping units. This might include logistic support such as transportation, medical treatment units and medical evacuation transport aircraft and vehicles. Concerning the sending of peace keeping units, these should be limited in terms of mission, size of units and equipment under a defined situation, otherwise it will seem too easy for Japan to use military forces anywhere and anytime, inviting images of a resurgence of the old Imperial Military. That kind of image would do Japan no good and would cause much harm in its economic relationships. One appropriate limitation might be to send small units based on specific requests of the United Nations. Such military activities are required of advanced countries and Japan must respond to such requests.

It is time to identify those roles and to be prepared to take the appropriate action. It is for that purpose that Japan must gain the

acceptance, not only of the Japanese public, but also of neighboring countries. Japan must enlighten the nation and have repeated coordination and talks. If necessary the Constitution, laws and internal policies should be changed after thorough discussion.

Concerning possible changes to Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, it is important to understand that this article does not specifically address peace keeping forces, but is interpreted to mean that Japan may possess self-defense but not military forces. Under the present Japanese constitution, the general view is that Japan may send JSDF units as part of some kind of peace keeping force controlled by the U.N. but only if certain changes to existing laws are made. The key issue is that existing Japanese laws do not provide the same kind of death or injury benefits for the members of the JSDF as do those of other countries for their soldiers. Because the JSDF is established specifically and only for the defense of Japan, there is no requirement for such special benefits for members of the JSDF, because in the event of war against Japan, not only the members of the JSDF but also civilians would be killed and injured. However, such benefits and guarantees are necessary if Japanese forces are to serve overseas.

Under existing law, if a member of the JSDF were to be killed in action as a member of a peace keeping unit, the Government of Japan would consider this death to be the same as being killed in a non-combat accident. Under these circumstances, there would be a disinclination for

Japanese commanders to put their troops in the same kind of actions and dangers as other countries' soldiers. Maybe the members of the JSDF will be prepared to carry out the same actions as other countries' soldiers because they know their mission and they are educated and trained as well as other countries' soldiers, but the problem is "who will take care of them?" If the Government of Japan does not support their behavior in the line of duty and provide adequate and appropriate compensation for hazardous duty, Japan not only loses face as an independent country but also fails in its duty to its JSDF members who are risking their lives to secure the national interest. In such a circumstance, in which its members are being treated as second class citizens, it would be impossible for the JSDF to attract future generations of young men and women to serve their country. That is the reason Japan should change the constitution: in order to insure that its forces have the same character as the military forces of other nations. Otherwise, Japan must not send its forces as part of U.N. peace keeping units.

The second important contribution for Japan is to expand other, non-military, roles to reduce the burden of the United States, such as providing developing countries with the technological and economic cooperation and assistance they need for their own development.

The last important role is for Japan to maintain its own defense capability. In other words, Japan should continue its efforts to maintain an adequate scale of defense capability so as not to be

dependent on others for the defense of its own homeland and should maintain and enhance the credibility of the Japan-U.S. security arrangement. In order to achieve an appropriate scale of defense capability, it will be impossible to continue the same previous rate of the expansion of defense expenditure in the future. A proper scale must be considered, taking into account the potential threats and the time period for conducting the war by ourselves until the U.S. deploys its forces. This requires continued modernization of Japan Self-Defense Force units and logistical strength. The number of units and equipment should be proportional to the balance of other functions. Modernization and logistical development should be focused on quality, not quantity. Having the industrial potential for mobilization in wartime is the most important capability.

Regarding the credibility of the Japan-U.S. security arrangement, it is most important that both countries understand each other and build up a close and firm relationship as both good security partners and friendly economic rivals among the free trade countries. It stands to reason that both countries should expand their cooperation in peacetime and promote the smooth stationing of United States forces in Japan. In addition, it is even more important that Japan should open its market and that the United States should rebuild its economic competitive power in order to not only get rid of trade friction but also to lead the free trade countries.

When Japan performs those roles, Japan will walk the road to prosperity and will play its full part as an advanced nation within the free trade system.

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