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**The Search for an Operational
Warfighting Doctrine:
What Are NATO's Options After CFE?**

**A Monograph
by
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Armor**



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
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
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ABSTRACT

THE SEARCH FOR AN OPERATIONAL WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE: WHAT ARE NATO'S OPTIONS AFTER CFE? by MAJ William H. Parry, III, USA. 54 pages

The ground force doctrine of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) reflects the times in which it was written. It is tactically-oriented and attrition-focused. Since its adoption in 1984, the body of military thought has grown substantially. Success on the modern battlefield will demand that commanders synchronize the effects of tactical engagements to achieve operational/strategic goals in a theater of operations/war. The commander must grasp the art, in addition to the science of warfare. He does this through the design of major operations and campaigns. Just as important, his subordinates need a warfighting doctrine that reflects these principles.

If NATO succeeds in reaching an agreement in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations, it can reap significant benefits. Achieving numerical parity and perhaps gaining operational depth in which to maneuver may finally correct a 40-year strategic shortcoming. However, CFE will also reduce the numbers of ground forces available in NATO's critical Central Region. Already stretched thin, an even lower force-space ratio will force NATO to seriously examine its current military strategy and doctrine.

The Commander in Chief, AFCEM has a vision of operational level warfighting to achieve strategic objectives in his theater. He has enunciated this in his operational warfighting concept. This concept can serve as the foundation upon which NATO can build an operational, and thus more effective military doctrine.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Doctrine: Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (1)

Military doctrine...provides the structure of military operations...It provides an officially sanctioned framework for common understanding, dialogue, training, learning and most importantly, action. Doctrine...is eminently practical. (2)

Doctrine reflects the times in which it is written. (3)

Since being founded in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has maintained a high degree of strategic constancy. It has been thrust willingly or otherwise, into an evolving standoff between two military superpowers, each with the capability of ushering in the prophetic Armageddon. Remarkably, NATO has persevered despite significant odds against it.

The alliance has had to contend with a situation of conventional ground force numerical inferiority relative to its principal nemesis - the Soviet Union, leader of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). In 1967, France's withdrawal from the integrated military structure of NATO led to the loss of the majority of its available strategic/operational depth. Driven principally by political reasons, it occupies a shallow, linear defense along its eastern frontier.

NATO has been able to accommodate change in order to survive as an effective political and military alliance.

However, it is a large, bureaucratic organization and changes to its military strategy have occurred slowly and incrementally, even when the situation seemed to demand otherwise.

Today, the apparent need for dramatic changes confronts NATO in the form of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations. This unprecedented arms control initiative, began in March 1989, aimed at providing a more stable environment from the Atlantic to the Urals with lower force levels. If an agreement that fulfills NATO objectives can be concluded, it offers profound opportunities for NATO to correct the strategic military imbalance which has confronted it for over forty years. At the same time however, conventional force reductions of the scope being considered will demand that NATO closely examine both its military strategy and doctrine. The state of current military thought in NATO's critical Central Region indicates the foundation is in place for an orderly evolution. It only remains to be seen if NATO is capable of overcoming its slow-moving bureaucratic tendencies in order to adequately prepare itself for the military challenges that lie ahead.

The "way ahead" is filled with uncertainty. As the dramatic events of the past year would indicate, the depth and breadth of potential changes within NATO and WTO could likely surpass any expectation currently anticipated. However, for analysis purposes, the following assumptions have been made. First, NATO territory will remain

essentially the same as it exists today. If the Germanies do unite, the area formerly comprising the DDR will take the character of a neutral zone; NATO forces will not be forward deployed there in peacetime. Second, the United States will continue to have national security objectives (associated with a strategy of containment) in Europe; those objectives can best be fulfilled by a continuing, but diminished US presence in NATO. In addition to providing near-term stability as NATO attempts to manage the changes thrust upon it in an orderly fashion (German unification, withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, etc.) NATO will continue to rely on the extended deterrence guaranteed by US strategic nuclear weapons.

Third, the US ground force presence in NATO will amount to one forward deployed reinforced corps commensurate with national security interests. The six division sets of FOMCUS currently located in NATO's Central Region (for M+18 forces) will likely be reduced and/or withdrawn; however, to what extent is unknown. (4) Fourth, fiscal realities, and a greatly reduced force-space ratio will force an eventual dichotomy of ground force capabilities and missions. Tactical units assigned to NATO will be tailored for either holding terrain or will be highly mobile and have significant firepower. Fifth, NATO's military objectives will remain defensive/deterrent in nature. However, lowered force levels as a result of CFE will require that military planners seriously examine the feasibility of current General Defense Plan

deployments/dispositions. Sixth, despite its stated intentions, the Soviet Union will retain sufficient near-term military capability to pose a credible security threat to NATO's interests.

Finally, in order to keep the scope of this paper manageable, the focus will be directed towards Allied Command Europe's Central Region (AFCENT). In addition to being an air/land theater of operations where the bulk of US ground forces would be committed in the event of war, it is the only theater where the potential exists for the Soviets to obtain a rapid military/political decision by choosing to go to war with NATO. It is likely that in the event of hostilities, the fate of NATO would depend largely on the events that unfolded in AFCENT.

This paper will seek to determine the possible impacts of the CFE reductions on the military policy, strategy, and doctrine of NATO. This will be accomplished by first defining the components of military doctrine followed by examining models that attempt to clarify the linkages between policy, strategy and doctrine. This data will be analyzed using criteria proposed by Barry Posen in his book, The Sources of Military Doctrine, with the aim of providing a theoretical basis for the most appropriate military doctrine to guide warfighting in a post-CFE NATO environment. The possible implications of accepting or rejecting the doctrine will be examined from an historical perspective by examining military doctrines of selected 20th century nations. Finally, conclusions and

recommendations will be offered for the reader's consideration.

II. BACKGROUND

One of the most serious doctrinal deficiencies confronting NATO is that the alliance does not enjoy a commonality of strategic, operational and tactical thinking. (5) Richard Simpkin captured the essence of this dilemma by noting that "the most [the army group commanders on the NATO center] can hope to do is coordinate and support the various national corps battles, each fought in the way the national army concerned prefers." (6) To be effective in wartime, military doctrine must clearly and concisely convey the essence of an operational warfighting concept that serves as the overarching architecture for a series of tactical battles. In an alliance like NATO, that concept should reflect a joint and combined focus. Figure 1 depicts how doctrine and military strategy are ideally linked. However, within NATO, the process associated with developing General Defense Plans (GDP) appears to have inordinately more influence on warfighting than doctrine.

This section will address in general terms, NATO's go to war (GDP) planning process, the current trends in military thought in NATO, the objectives and importance of the CFE negotiations, and the impact of CFE on NATO military strategy. The intent of this section is to describe the environment currently facing military planners. A secondary objective is to lay the foundations for a postulation that the environment is not conducive to

the doctrine development process.

Military doctrine is the principal mechanism that links the realities of modern war with an accepted body of military theory. However, the way NATO intends to fight in the event deterrence fails reflects less of an emphasis on military concepts and doctrine than in a series of top-driven General Defense Plans. SACEUR, as the senior warfighting commander in NATO, translates strategic military guidance found in MC 14/3 (Military Committee Document 14/3: Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area) into a strategic/operational vision for three regional commanders (AFNORTH, AFCENT, and AFSOUTH). (7) His GDP conveys how forward defense and flexible response are implemented to achieve NATO's strategic objectives. However, this family of GDP plans technically governs only the aspects of alliance mobilization and deployment in the event of hostilities, as opposed to being true defensive plans. These plans are generally reviewed annually, but modifications must be approved by the individual nations before being implemented. The single greatest fallacy of these GDP plans is that unlike a campaign plan, they do "not provide the concept of operations and sustainment throughout the conflict to termination." (8) As a result, both the process as well as the product obstruct any notion of a clear linkage between the realities of modern war in Europe, NATO's theoretical military concepts, and military doctrine.

NATO has eschewed the recommendation that it needs to develop finite campaign plans that delineate in stages how it first intends to defeat an attack, and subsequently restore the ante-bellum status quo from a position of numerical inferiority. There is strong resistance, both on the grounds of tradition (detailed plans imply an unhealthy state of rigidity) and principle (campaign plans connote offensives for ulterior motives). Yet, waging modern warfare without a clearly articulated plan that focuses on protecting the interests, if not the survival of the West, defies logic. NATO clearly and collectively lacks the numbers of conventional forces to achieve its strategic objectives with a "win the first battle by attrition" mindset. Adhering to a strategy of exhaustion, gradually wearing down the opponent in a sequential series of firepower-oriented conventional engagements is a viable option only for the side that enjoys overwhelming numerical strength. NATO undoubtedly had positive intentions to begin alleviating the conventional force imbalance in May 1977 when its members agreed to a five-year plan to boost defense spending by at least three percent in real growth terms. However few "consistently attained this modest goal." (9) As it was unlikely that more conventional forces would become available, some nations, including the United States, began to refocus their national doctrines towards fighting outnumbered and winning.

In the late 1970's, the US Army began to search for plausible alternatives to its attrition-oriented "Active

Defense" doctrine. Prompted in part by the criticisms of a group of vocal defense reformers (most notably Bill Lind, Edward Luttwak, Steven Canby, et.al.) the US Army embarked on a series of initiatives to correct the inadequacies of the 1976 version of FM 100-5, Operations. The Army's concept, later to become its official doctrine was known as AirLand Battle; and it had a strikingly different focus. The Army acknowledged that victory was not congruent with attempts to attrite the numerically superior Soviets from static defensive positions. Perhaps more importantly, the doctrine resurrected a body of thought on the operational level of war within the US Army, dormant since World War II.

The operational level of war links military strategy with tactics. It is the level at which commanders synchronize tactical effects by sequencing major operations and campaigns within a theater or area of operations. The operational level requires the commander to grasp the essence of the art rather than merely the science of warfare. He designates operational objectives that are needed to accomplish the strategic objectives established by the theater of war commander. Finally, through the design of a campaign plan, he sequences tactical events to achieve the operational objectives, initiates actions, and applies resources to bring about and sustain these events.

(10) Despite the fact that this process would enhance joint and combined warfighting in NATO, the alliance has been reluctant to embrace the notion of operational

warfighting.

In 1984, while profound doctrinal changes were affecting US military thought, NATO continued to recognize only two levels of war - the strategic and tactical. The alliance was forced to contend with differing views, not only from its 15 different member nations, but the parochialism of the service bureaucracies as well. As Banks and Mendel astutely point out, alliance doctrine for the operational level of war has been slow to develop due to a more limited regional (versus global for the US) focus, and constrained budgets. They further state that with regard to campaign planning, NATO has had difficulty in striking a balance between its charter to maintain a defensive deterrence and the notion that campaign plans have historically implied offensive action in pursuit of territorial gain. (11) Rather than risk fragmenting the alliance over this one issue, the NATO Military Committee compromised by settling for three separate, service oriented tactical doctrines. (12) While a CFE agreement may ultimately enhance NATO security, fewer forces and an inappropriate doctrine will make the AFCEM commander's mission of contributing to the achievement of SACEUR's strategic ends more difficult.

The CFE negotiations are the product of the coupling of constrained defense budgets with a genuine willingness to relieve East-West tensions. CFE realistically offers NATO the chance to rectify its habitual shortcoming in conventional ground force parity. However, parity does not

provide the quantitative superiority that a conventional, attrition-based doctrine demands. This has created a paradoxical dilemma for NATO given that the state of parity will be at a level somewhere between ten and fifty percent below NATO's current force ceilings. While the reduction of tension is cause for optimism, the probability of success demands that given less resources, NATO must seriously re-examine how it intends to fight in the 1990's and beyond, in light of the limitations imposed by a CFE agreement.

The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks are an outgrowth of a larger architecture of negotiations between 35 nations (Europe, US and Canada) known as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). CSCE began in July 1973, with the principal initiatives centering on developing confidence building measures between the East and West regarding the exchange of information about military activities, economic cooperation, humanitarian issues, and freedom of information. (13)

The CFE talks are more limited, both in scope as well as the number of participants. Officially opened in March 1989 in Vienna, the talks involve 23 nations; 16 are members of NATO, while the remaining seven are members of the WTO.

It must be stressed however, that negotiations within CFE are unlike any previous East-West arms control process. In CFE each nation has an independent voice in the negotiations. This is significant because as a 1989

study pointed out, the European nations have little experience in implementing arms control agreements. (14) The political and economic urgency for CFE in Europe may override the intended military implications. There is a High Level Task Force in place to coordinate NATO policy on CFE, but how powerful it is remains to be seen. However, in practical terms, there will be no official alliance to alliance agreement (unless the current forum changes). As a result, NATO should reasonably be expected to undertake an alliance-wide examination of its collective interests, strategy and doctrine once an agreement is reached.

The NATO nations have collectively established three general objectives that reflect their mutual interests for the CFE negotiations:

- 1) establishment of a secure and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels in Europe [from the Atlantic to the Urals];
- 2) elimination of disparities (between East and West) that are prejudicial to stability and security;
- 3) elimination of the capability for launching a surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action. (15)

Will there realistically be a need for NATO after CFE, and if so, will NATO have a military role? While the outlook for a state of more peaceful competition is promising, NATO must clearly understand that for the near to mid term, the Soviet Union will retain formidable military forces. As a result, it will continue to warrant

the distinction accorded a military superpower. Worse yet, there may be an even greater risk that as Soviet influence diminishes in Eastern Europe, any number of seemingly small, localized crises (such as the nationalistic fervor sweeping the Baltic States) or political upheaval in Russia itself could escalate quickly into war. As the European Security Study Group has noted, NATO should continue to function both as a political as well as a military entity "as a guarantee against unforeseeable contingencies and as an agent of stability." (16)

It is logical to conclude that a CFE agreement will impact significantly on NATO strategy. Therefore, a brief examination of NATO's strategic military ends, means, and ways is in order.

The military objectives NATO established in 1949 would appear to still be feasible: deter aggression; and should deterrence fail, take appropriate military action to defeat the aggressor; restore NATO territorial integrity; and terminate hostilities on terms favorable to NATO. It is highly improbable that NATO would adopt more ambitious, offensive aims. Additionally, as long as the possibility of nuclear warfare remains a fact of East-West relations, the only option is to deter conflict so that the use of weapons of mass destruction remains clearly a last and well thought out resort.

It is with regards to the means available that CFE will likely have the most significant impact. Recent proposals indicate that final reductions may ultimately approach

fifty percent of current NATO force ceilings for each alliance. Despite the rhetoric surrounding "peace dividends," the Soviets have acknowledged that in order to inject a degree of stability into an otherwise floundering economic and political system, they are likely to take up to eight years to draw down their forces to that level. It is only logical therefore, to conclude that until a verifiable state of actual parity exists, the Soviet Union will remain the only nation capable of threatening the security interests of NATO with military force. As a result, NATO will continue to require the following military means:

- 1) an increasingly strong and coherent European pillar;
- 2) a sizeable US ground force presence in Europe;
- 3) a US reinforcement capability, including air and naval forces;
- 4) an alliance tactical nuclear capability;
- 5) US strategic (extended) deterrence (17)

It appears that NATO's most pressing military challenge is to formulate a joint and combined warfare doctrine. It must be based on sound defense concepts but with sufficient flexibility to accommodate changes not only in its own means, but in the threat as well.

Strategic military concepts are the ways that means are applied to achieve the stated objectives. As noted earlier, forward defense and flexible response are NATO's current strategic military concepts. Briefly, forward

defense has come to be interpreted as positioning strong defenses as far east along the frontier with the Warsaw Pact as possible. Although not explicitly prescribed as such, the numbers of forces available in the Central Region have tended to make the defenses thin and linear in nature. NATO's decision to forego operational reserves in lieu of stronger forward defenses, and the lack of depth required in order to maneuver those reserves, tend to make this concept suspect. But, as the former CINCENT Franz-Joseph Schulze has noted, forward defense is "a prerequisite to any German contribution to the common defense." (18) Flexible response is a concept that envisions three possible levels of response to aggression. These are direct defense, deliberate escalation, and general nuclear response.

Are these two concepts still feasible with fewer forces? And will a unified Germany nullify the option for the use of tactical nuclear weapons? The current SACEUR, General John R. Galvin has stated that the ambiguity of CFE makes the process of accurate strategic assessment difficult. He acknowledges that a "forward defense has never been a classical military strategy," especially with the appreciable frontage currently defended by an AFCENT corps at pre-CFE levels. Galvin has not ruled out that the scope of reductions being contemplated may ultimately drive NATO to rethink the appropriateness of forward defense.

(19) The European Security Study Group concluded that cuts in excess of the ten percent initially proposed will

"require a more mobile and flexible defense in depth with a forward security echelon at the border." (20) In summary, the evidence would seem to indicate that there is a high probability that NATO will have to re-examine the viability of its current strategy, or at a minimum its two strategic concepts. While there is no formal strategic military doctrine that specifies how these are or will be executed, the question becomes whether or not the strategic objectives can realistically be accomplished with far fewer forces. As will be seen, this has a significant impact on lower-level planning in NATO as well.

III. THEORY, PRACTICE AND MILITARY DOCTRINE

...when change is slow and not manifest, routines are apt to go on as before, until the sudden and catastrophic discovery of inferiority in war itself. (21)

I am tempted indeed to declare dogmatically that whatever doctrine the Armed Forces are working on now, they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it does not matter that they have got it wrong. What does matter is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives. (22)

Success on the battlefield is the proven test of the effectiveness of a military doctrine. The dilemma that confronts NATO is that having enjoyed a period of peace for more than forty years, meaningful and applicable observations regarding the reality of war are scarce. It is therefore difficult, as Michael Howard succinctly noted

to not only develop the correct doctrine, but to be able to assess that it is correct. It appears the process of doctrine development is just as important as the product. A theoretical model that depicts the process is at Figure 2.

Modern history is replete with examples of nations that in peacetime have correctly perceived the challenges and requirements imposed by a hypothetical military reality. These nations subsequently succeeded in developing and resourcing an effective military doctrine during peacetime. Just as numerous, if not more so, are the examples of nations that have been fully prepared to fight the last war, only to find their warfighting doctrine was totally inadequate for the war in which they were currently engaged.

It has been previously stated that modern nations need a cogent military doctrine that conveys their warfighting concept to achieve strategic objectives. What is less clear is whether doctrine is a hard and fast set of written, prescriptive rules, or more of a pervasive thought process that guides the practitioners of the art of warfare. Certainly contributing to the confusion is the fact that there is lack of a precise, single definition of what military doctrine is. To further amplify this point, Figure 3 details 16 different perceptions or definitions of this commonly-used term.

From the different definitions, two general trends of thought emerge. The first is that doctrine is prescriptive

and authoritative; normally written, and based on a set of mutually-agreed ideas, principles or concepts detailing how military forces are structured and employed to achieve stated objectives; it becomes the basis for all service school instruction. The second line of thought is that military doctrine is more of a mental discipline, a way of thinking that is broadly based on the application of a body of theoretical knowledge including principles of war. This is then universally shared by the corporate body of the practitioners of warfare. An evaluation of the product would seem to indicate that NATO prescribes to the first definition.

Regardless of form, a sound and practical doctrine should help reduce friction, promote standard language and practices, and create a basis from which requirements for force development and missions are derived. The importance of this function for NATO cannot be over-emphasized in a post-CFE environment.

Referring to the theoretical model in Figure 2, it is clear that rarely will there be consensus on what constitutes military reality. If the army, navy, and air forces of 16 different nations view that reality differently, the number of possible permutations is staggering. Those differing national perspectives have hampered Alliance unanimity on developing joint and combined doctrine. As a result, NATO currently has three, tactically-oriented, service-specific doctrines. (23) For purposes of this study, only NATO's doctrine for land force

operations will be discussed in depth.

One of the key problems in developing an effective military doctrine for NATO is that until now, the "cart has been put in front of the horse." Force design is independent from and therefore not necessarily linked with a common doctrine. Force design is considered a national responsibility and prerogative that is generated in large part by the means available to each nation to spend on defense. Smaller, less prosperous nations start the process at a tremendous disadvantage. Therefore, a key perception of reality for any NATO planner is that the organization, equipment, and states of training and readiness between the nine national corps committed to AFCEM are quite different. This can serve to compound the inherent problems associated with interoperability in a coalition.

The nature of the integrated command structure of NATO has also inhibited the development of a common, operational doctrine. During peacetime, forces operate under the purview of their respective nation. It is only upon the declaration of hostilities that the formation of Army Groups under NATO commanders occurs. As is the case with the United States, different nations bring a unique national perspective to war with them. Despite commonalities that do exist, each nation has different national and/or global interests and responsibilities that they believe supersede those of the alliance. This in turn, has led to unique national military doctrines,

tailored specifically towards satisfying those requirements.

To provide a measure of commonality and increase interoperability between diverse tactical units, NATO developed Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-35(A): NATO Land Force Tactical Doctrine, with the stated intent of providing a "common understanding of the principles of land combat." (24) In practical terms, the doctrine is not based on a coherent warfighting concept. Additionally, it does not go much beyond an esoteric discussion of the numerous factors that comprise armed conflict - timeless verities as they are. In application it is only loosely binding. By ratifying the implementing Standardization Agreement (STANAG 2868), the nations have only committed to use the doctrine as stated, and its terminology in dealing with NATO agencies and member nations. ATP-35(A) is a fitting testimony to Paul Herbert's claim that doctrine reflects the times in which it is written. (25) Times are about to change for NATO with CFE; subsequently, a new doctrine is needed in response to that change.

The most serious deficiency of ATP-35(A) is that it lacks the foundation provided by an overarching warfighting concept. As the model in Figure 2 indicates, an effective military doctrine is derived from a sequence of actions ranging from the theoretical perception of reality through concept design and culminates in publication of the doctrine that links theory with practice. NATO needs only to look at the US Army's experience in developing its

AirLand Battle doctrine for some valuable and applicable lessons.

Between 1976 and 1982, the US Army's search for the most appropriate doctrine centered around debates about the pros and cons of the theories of attrition versus maneuver warfare. NATO's defensive strategy and doctrine (and the US Army's role within that framework) were consistently cited by the "reformers" as clear examples of the futility of attrition. In 1982, the US Army abandoned its attrition focus and adopted a doctrinal concept that was linked more along the lines of the principles of war of offensive and maneuver. If it can be logically deduced that this change in doctrinal focus was the best solution for the United States, can it also be concluded that NATO should adopt a more offensive, maneuver-oriented doctrine? To answer that question, it is necessary to briefly compare the theories of attrition and maneuver and determine how they operate within the offense/defense dynamic.

Modern combat is made up principally of two dynamic elements - firepower and maneuver. While the argument may be purely academic, one of these two elements may tend to be more pronounced in doctrine and thus connote a maneuver or an attrition focus.

In what the reformers have labeled as attrition warfare, overwhelming firepower is used to attrite, or reduce enemy numbers, usually from static positions. The primary purpose of maneuver in this concept is simply to facilitate bringing firepower to bear on the opponent.

Bill Lind characterizes this form of combat as a "mutually casualty-inflicting and absorbing contest where the goal is a favorable exchange ratio." (26) He contends that at the opposite pole resides maneuver warfare. The aim of this construct is to use

both firepower and movement in a maneuver context...You are moving to create a series of unexpected and dangerous situations for the enemy. The main role of firepower is to help you maneuver...[and] is used most often to suppress the enemy while you move around or through him. (27)

While Lind oriented his criticism specifically towards what he perceived as the firepower/attrition focus of the US Army as demonstrated in its 1976 version of FM 100-5, other reformers (most notably Edward Luttwak and Steven Canby) have been quick to assert that NATO collectively suffers from the same "attrition myopia." Luttwak contends that NATO strategy merely reflects the US predilection for attrition, holding "on to the belief in her own material superiority." (28) Canby further states that

NATO's military deficiency derives from this discrepancy in military thought: its conceptualization of modern war in the European theater is more akin to that of Douhet (a firepower approach to war) than Guderian (a maneuver approach...Ground forces are thus to hold and in the process attrit enemy ground forces. (29)

In response to the reformer's criticisms of US Army doctrine, (then) Colonel Huba Wass de Czege contends they have created "two uniformly unreal, but academically

convenient polar cases. The real world lies between. Often conditions dictate which end of the spectrum is most appropriate for success." (30) While he did not explicitly state what he meant by conditions, it is quite probable that this refers to the dynamic relationship between offense and defense. While the natural inclination appears to be to unequivocally equate attrition with defense and maneuver with offense, this would be similar to comparing apples and oranges.

A useful matrix that justifiably separates these four theoretical concepts, but permits the examination of the interrelationships between them is depicted in Figure 4. It indicates that both in a theoretical as well as a practical sense, a defensive concept does not automatically imply that the defending force must restrict itself to pursuing strictly a firepower/attrition focus (Quadrant 2). Clearly, within a defensive framework, such as that which NATO has established for both political and military purposes, maneuver is possible, feasible, and desirable (i.e. Quadrant 3). Concurrently, Wass de Czege's contention that reality lies between attrition and maneuver theory implies that NATO could easily structure its warfighting doctrine around a concept that links tactical engagements from both Quadrants 2 and 3. In essence, the realities that confront NATO as a defensive alliance can be linked effectively with theory in a dynamic and proportional mix of both maneuver and firepower/attrition. Whichever element is predominant will depend on the

existing situation. NATO's challenge is to develop a doctrine that is flexible enough to accommodate both, rather than sacrifice one at the expense of the other.

IV. THE PREREQUISITES FOR AN EFFECTIVE DOCTRINE

The NATO Military Agency for Standardization (MAS) is ultimately responsible to the development of NATO doctrine. The MAS oversees the efforts of three separate and distinct Service Boards (Army, Navy and Air Force.) Current NATO doctrine, as delineated in the previously mentioned Allied Tactical Publications is the product of this corporate approach to warfighting. It can be argued that despite its inefficiency this process is necessary to maintain alliance cohesion. However, there are indications that there is a recognized need for change, both in the doctrinal product as well as the doctrinal process. In November 1989, the MAS Army Board identified that "an agreed NATO joint warfare doctrine is an essential prerequisite for the effective conduct of NATO joint operations, particularly at the operational level of war."

(31)

While the deficiency has been noted, a framework to guide the development of an operational, combined warfighting doctrine does not appear to exist. The US Army's AirLand Battle doctrine clearly addresses the operational level of war; however, the wholesale adoption of one nation's doctrine by the alliance is clearly not likely to occur, nor is it necessarily desirable.

Effective doctrine must build upon the analysis of clearly defined ends and available means. It is significant that both of these have remained fairly constant in NATO's forty year history. While NATO has demonstrated a capacity to change its strategic military concepts, it has done so at a very slow pace. (32) It might be optimistic to believe that NATO is capable of collectively setting aside national preconceptions in order to develop truly combined doctrine in a rapid fashion. However, the process described below represents one way to initiate the process that leads to a feasible, suitable and acceptable doctrine that meets the alliance's needs.

In his book, The Sources of Military Doctrine, Barry R. Posen proposes three aspects that must be considered when developing a doctrine. Each will be briefly discussed below. These will then in turn be applied to the situation in NATO - both current and projected with CFE - to determine what, if any changes should be made to NATO's current military doctrine.

Posen's first aspect, or criterion is the doctrine's character, which he describes as follows:

Offensive doctrines aim to disarm an adversary - to destroy his armed forces. Defensive doctrines aim to deny an adversary the objective that he seeks. Deterrent doctrines aim to punish an aggressor - to raise his costs without reference to reducing one's own.
(33)

Posen asserts that in accordance with balance of power theory, the character of a nation's military doctrine

affects the quality of international political life. This is due in large part to the reaction that a given doctrine will evoke from other nations. He contends offensive doctrines increase the probability of wars and that arms races escalate in response to offensive military doctrines. On the other hand, defensive doctrines ideally threaten no other power, but they also tend to define specific force structures that allow only cautious or limited counter-action on the part of the defender. Deterrent doctrines limit the possibilities of misperception and overreaction. Nations with deterrent doctrines will often go to great pains to ensure they do not present the appearance of possessing an offensive, disarming capability. Nations with this form of doctrine are usually committed politically to protecting their sovereignty, even at the price of suffering if necessary. (34)

Posen's second criterion is centered around the degree to which military doctrine reflects political-military integration. In essence, the very purpose of the military is to guarantee the continued survival of the nation itself. Therefore in peacetime, the doctrine that guides the military forces should provide an adequate degree of security at an affordable economic, political and human cost. In an integrated doctrine, the military means are tailored to the political ends of the state. (35) If integration is deficient, the nation could be inadvertently led into war and ultimately suffer defeat as a result.

The third criterion, and perhaps the one with the

greatest relevance is the degree of innovation a doctrine possesses. Posen argues that innovation, and its converse stagnation, are the key dependent determinants of political-military integration. Should war come, the measure of innovation (i.e. how quickly the doctrine can be modified to fit the conditions) governs the probability of victory or defeat. (36) This aspect is precisely what Michael Howard sees as the sine qua non of the problem - the ability to get the doctrine right when the moment comes. The linkage between war and politics is a very dynamic one and thus changes in the threat, ends, means, technology, etc. may in turn drive changes in doctrine. The capacity to do so quickly and with positive results is the military planner's, not the politician's responsibility. However, Posen cautions against changing a doctrine at the wrong time, such as in the face of eminent war. (37) Major change is disrupting and disorienting to an organization, especially large, bureaucratic ones like NATO.

The ability to arrive at an effective doctrine depends to a large part on a rigorous analysis of suitable warfighting concepts and their associated requirements before implementation. Using Posen's criteria, Figure 5 reflects this process. This model will be used to examine the current and CFE environments in NATO to determine if existing military doctrine is indeed sufficient.

NATO's ends, as embodied in its political and military objectives, serve a principal role in defining the character of its military doctrine. As stated earlier, it is unlikely

that NATO's ends will change radically in a post-CFE environment. As the NATO treaty binds its signatory nations to provide only for mutual self-defense, NATO will retain objectives with a defensive/deterrent nature. NATO doctrine must reflect this constraint in order to achieve a high degree of political-military integration. The character of a defensive/deterrent doctrine seems appropriate in the post-CFE environment. It is probable that if the Soviet leadership successfully manages the enormous changes facing them, eventually their doctrine may reflect a defensive character. However, as long as the possibility exists that conflict might escalate up to the use of nuclear weapons, war deterrence must remain the overriding political objective of the Alliance.

There are numerous assessments of the proper means required to deter war in NATO. Reformers such as Canby have asserted that with some modifications, NATO's conventional forces can serve as an adequate deterrent in and of themselves. (38) However, the current SACEUR believes that the current dictates of a "defense that deploys troops far forward...will still need the backing of nuclear weapons to ensure we [NATO] can maintain our cohesion." (39) While others, such as MG F.W. von Mellenthin hold a middle approach and assert that "with moderate increases in numbers, NATO can affect a quantum increase in conventional support (and credibility) for tactical nuclear deterrence presently lacking in Europe." (40) The synthesis of these views deems that NATO requires a mixture of strong

conventional forces, coupled with tactical nuclear weapons. NATO will most likely be required to assume some risk in the area of conventional forces if for no other reason, the numbers available are going to decline.

The reduction in numbers coupled with the extensive frontage of the Central Region will stretch defenses even thinner. If 50 percent reductions are mandated by CFE, and if the current "layer cake" dispositions are retained, divisions will be hypothetically tasked to hold almost 100 kilometers of front; that may be asking to do too much with too few forces. This is a critical reality that must be made clear to the political decision makers of NATO. Political realities associated with defending forward must be balanced with the military fact that reduced conventional force levels may render the current concept infeasible.

Finally, innovation may be the most serious deficiency of the existing NATO doctrine. ATP-35(A) is exceedingly vague and nebulous. However, it is to be expected that there will be great reluctance to adopt a more specific doctrine in light of the ambiguity that CFE places on accurately assessing the future NATO environment. Regardless, ATP-35(A) is inadequate to guide current or future warfighting in Europe. It lacks a definable underlying concept to serve as a suitable framework for an emerging doctrine. Likewise, if there is a discernible focus, it is tactical, with a firepower/attrition orientation that seeks to defeat a numerically superior enemy from somewhat static defensive positions. Innovation

also demands a high degree of built-in flexibility. As doctrine is integrally linked with force design, materiel development and training, a flexible doctrine can provide a wider range of options to the operational level commander.

Given the environment that NATO is likely to face with a CFE agreement, the alliance requires a candidate warfighting concept that capitalizes on the flexible employment of available forces. The concept must be adaptable not only to changing battlefield conditions (i.e. designed with a flexible mix of firepower and maneuver) but changing geo-political conditions as well.

CFE represents a crucial crossroads for NATO. If the alliance inadvertently elects to reduce current force levels for economic or ideological reasons without regard to the objectives that must be accomplished, the results could prove disastrous. If it is to remain a viable political and military entity, NATO must confront the realities of a post-CFE Europe with a clearly defined and rational thought process. This entails ensuring that the character of its doctrine reflects alliance objectives, the degree of political-military integration is maximized, and finally that the concept be flexible so as to accommodate innovative changes when required.

V. HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS IN 20TH CENTURY

WARFIGHTING DOCTRINES

Instead of a simple choice between trench warfare and blitzkrieg, each army was faced with a variety of possible

changes...between the two extremes. In many cases, the choice was determined by social, economic and political factors more than by the tactical concepts of senior officers. (41)

In an attempt to determine if the models presented so far (Figures 1, 2, 4 and 5) can be used to structure effective parameters for military doctrine, the warfighting doctrines of three selected 20th century combatants will be examined. The intent of this section is to determine what, if any conditions, theories, constraints, etc. led a nation to adopt a specific doctrine over another. In addition, it is important to understand why a particular doctrine succeeded or failed. To maintain consistency, the technique of comparing ends, ways and means will be adhered to. Additionally, to provide diversity, both offensive and defensive doctrines will be examined to determine if a real or perceived orientation towards maneuver or firepower/attrition warfare existed. The national doctrines and the time periods examined are: Germany - Blitzkrieg, 1940; France - Maginot Line, 1940; Soviet Union - Barbarossa, 1941 and Kursk, 1943.

House perceptively notes there are multiple causes for the varied doctrines of World War II. He contends that no nation or "major army entered World War II with the same doctrine and weapons that it had used twenty years before." (42) However, it was not a situation of clear dichotomy - blitzkrieg or trenches. There were several common factors that collectively combined to temper respective doctrines.

In the aftermath of remembering the bloody struggle in World War I, there was almost universally, a general repugnance about war and having to fight such a total one again. This is reflected by the fact that in June 1928, 66 nations signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact in Paris, outlawing war. Defense budgets were exceedingly constrained and the Great Depression that spread worldwide relegated spending for such a distasteful activity to even lower priorities. As technology and the research for new weapons matured, political considerations tended to shape equipment and doctrine more than military requirements. One only has to recall Stalin's purges of his officer corps in 1937-8, or the influence of the French Parliament on the building of the Maginot defensive line, lack of response to Germany's remilitarization of the Rhineland, etc. (43)

The Treaty of Versailles may have placed Germany in the best position to develop the most functional warfighting doctrine despite its clear intentions to do otherwise. Severely restricted both in size as well as equipment, the Germans were essentially compelled to develop somewhat radical concepts (i.e. devoid of World War I parallels) and equipment to execute them. With a 50-year plus tradition of the Kesselschlacht (cauldron battle), the German propensity for a doctrine with an offensive character based around a concept of envelopment and maneuver to the flanks was well established.

German doctrine represented essentially an evolution of World War I tactics. However in relative terms, it was

highly innovative. It blended motorization/mechanization with a combined arms approach resulting in the first modern maneuver warfare concept. While it has been previously stated, it bears repeating here, to lend perspective if for no other reason. Blitzkrieg was not altogether a novel concept. It did not rely on a technological breakthrough, new tactics or equipment. It demanded a high degree of synchronization and coordination to make it work, and the German Army proved capable of this task. A final interesting point about German doctrine was that in the Battle of France (where blitzkrieg was used against the Western allies for the first time,) the Germans were outnumbered theater-wide, 3 million to 2.5 million. (44) In effect, the key was not overall strength, but rather massing that strength to achieve an overwhelming advantage at the point of decision.

One of those Western allies was France. Based upon its World War I success with fortifications against the Germans at Verdun, France opted to construct the Maginot Line, an intricate defense system that stretched from Sedan to the Swiss border. While its ultimate effectiveness can be questioned, the concept reflected a high degree of political-military integration. The line protected the Alsace-Lorraine region that had been won from Germany in World War I, but it also forced the Germans to attack through neutral Belgium in order to get into France. Politically, violation of Belgian neutrality would bring the British in to the Allied cause. Militarily, the

Maginot Line would buy time for France to mobilize its large citizen army and serve as a pivot for their maneuver into Belgium, hypothetically into the German's flank. Therefore, it was not a true reflection of static, linear warfare that some critics have made it out to be. (45)

The Maginot Line clearly gave French doctrine a defensive character. House contends that "more than any other participant in the First World War, France retained the positional warfare concept in its postwar regulations." (46) Horne also asserts the defensive mindset and the lack of a grasp of the maneuver warfare concept was the root cause for France's decision to not pursue an adequate tank program despite clear indicators that her principal enemy, Germany was doing so. Rather, she chose to keep her obsolete World War I armor, a decision that would have serious consequences. According to Horne, "it would be hard to find any single military factor contributing more directly to the defeat of 1940 [than the lack of suitable tanks and an effective mechanized doctrine]." (47)

In essence, France's military doctrine was militarily stagnant as opposed to being innovative on the outbreak of World War II. Significant capital had been invested in the Maginot Line at the expense of mobile warfare concepts and equipment. As a result, France was incapable of incorporating change at a time when it was needed most.

The Soviets likewise got their taste of the German blitzkrieg in Operation Barbarossa almost a year later in June 1941. Apparently seeing the success the Germans had

enjoyed against the West, Stalin attempted to reverse the catharsis he had created with his purges by initiating reforms in equipment, structure, and deployment. The 1939-40 Russo-Finnish War had clearly demonstrated the inability of Soviet commanders to adequately coordinate large units for an attack. Yet Stalin ambitiously ordered the formation of mechanized corps (2 tank and 1 motorized rifle division) to be used as an exploitation force in line with Tukhachevskiy's deep battle concept. (48) As a clear historical precedent for Posen's caution about changing doctrine in the face of eminent war, "the Germans caught the Red Army in transition and ripped it apart." (49)

In Operation Barbarossa, the overwhelming force of the German attack prevented the Soviets from ever seizing the initiative. The officers that were familiar with Tukhachevskiy's mechanized concepts were dead. Soviet commanders and staffs lacked both the skills to orchestrate combined arms in battle as well as the specialized units themselves. Fortunately, they were able to make use of the one resource the Western allies did not have - operational depth. In doing so they were able to gain some valuable time, albeit at the expense of significant loss of territory.

As House notes,

the remainder of 1941 was a desperate struggle for the Red Army, a struggle in which its traditional doctrines of deep battle and large mechanized units were inappropriate because of the German advantage in equipment and initiative. (50)

Yet the Soviet military was learning by its mistakes and quickly went about correcting them. While they had suffered enormous casualties, numbers were not a problem for the Soviets - they were for the Germans. However, leader casualties and the inexperience of Soviet armored crewmen continued to result in disproportionate losses compared to the better trained Germans.

After their offensive fell short of its original objectives, the Germans resorted to a tenuous defensive line in the Soviet Union. Forced to fight on multiple fronts, they found their lack of numbers stretched these thin defenses to the breaking point. Against this backdrop, Stalin instituted a series of significant military innovations. The Soviet political system virtually gave him carte blanche to accomplish the needed changes that in retrospect, reversed the course of the war. Due to the earlier problems Soviet commanders had coordinating different branches in combined arms operations, Stalin directed that artillery, engineers, and other specialized forces be consolidated for mass effects at higher echelons. Likewise to ensure they had adequate force ratios to break the German defenses, Stavka Circular 3 directed the formation of "shock groups" which were concentrated on narrow frontages to be the breakthrough force and armored "mobile groups" to pass through and complete the encirclement. (51) The Germans simply lacked the resources to plug the holes created by these "new"

Soviet formations and tactics. The Soviet successes in the final phases of the Great Patriotic War are well documented elsewhere. What is important is that despite their initial setbacks, beginning at Kursk in 1943, the Soviets proved capable of implementing the needed changes that resulted in victory. Interestingly, rather than develop a complete new doctrine, Stalin merely adapted Tukhachevskiy's 1936 deep battle concept to the conditions at hand.

Are there any relevant conclusions that NATO can draw from the doctrinal lessons of the past? I believe there are. Chief among them is that military doctrine reflects the influences of a significant number of often disparate factors. These include economics and the ensuing impact on defense spending in times of fiscal constraint. Political considerations play a great role today just as they did in the 1930's in France. Finally, it should be clear that there are different requirements that dictate whether an offensive doctrine is better than a defensive one. Equally, a maneuver doctrine that lacks sufficient resources can be made irrelevant by an opponent with superior strength fighting with an unsophisticated strategy of exhaustion. An over-reliance on static, positional warfare can inculcate a sense of complacency to the detriment of maintaining a highly mobile, capable reserve. Linear defenses in the past have proven to bear a high cost in terms of casualties as well as lost territory. NATO clearly does not enjoy the luxury of numbers or depth today and the problem may only intensify in a post-CFE

environment.

VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

NATO cannot approach the future with indifference. Despite a high degree of ambiguity imposed by the still-evolving CFE negotiations, it is rapidly becoming obvious that the degree of change will be dramatic and unprecedented. While the post-CFE NATO environment cannot be completely (or necessarily accurately) predicted in advance, some resolute actions can be undertaken now.

As stated previously, NATO's political and military objectives will remain deterrent/defensive in nature. Therefore, a revised warfighting doctrine must reflect this character in order to achieve the desired degree of political-military integration. Force reductions will also dictate that candid exchanges occur between the political decisionmakers and NATO's military leaders. The new realities present an ideal situation in which to develop innovative techniques for NATO to achieve its strategic ends. However, any changes to alliance strategy or doctrine must be suitable, feasible and acceptable.

NATO's greatest challenge is to structure its warfighting doctrine around a flexible concept that will readily facilitate innovation when it is needed. There is cause for optimism that the alliance is capable of the task at hand. Nowhere is this currently more evident than in AFCEM. Recognizing the current deficiencies, CINCEM has correctly perceived the requirement to think and fight at

the operational level of war. He cautions against the tendency to narrowly adhere to GDF perspectives and fixate on pre-planned sequences of operations. He recognizes the saliency of the principles of war for planning, but insists that initiative, flexibility and concentration of effort are vital. Without the initiative, NATO's chances of success are limited.

CINCENT'S warfighting concept of operations is enunciated in his "Operational Principles for the Employment of Land and Air Forces in the Defense of the Central Region." In it, he envisions a series of sequentially-linked land and air battles oriented on achieving the regional objectives, in line with NATO strategy. He has clearly defined the end states of each battle and delineates responsibilities for tactical commanders. This concept appears to have precisely the elements required for an effective NATO military doctrine. It links tactical actions by the national corps with NATO strategy. It stresses the importance of operating, or being fully prepared to operate in a combined environment. It is clearly in line with NATO's political objectives and is inherently flexible enough so as to accommodate changes dictated by the changing environment of a post-CFE NATO.

A specific recommendation would be to carefully examine the employment of a mix of forces with somewhat diverse capabilities that is likely to be a result of CFE. By necessity, some forces will be better suited for holding terrain, while others will be highly agile with significant

firepower. Jomini's concept of decisive points is clearly applicable in this case. It is reasonably clear where the economic, political, and military decisive points are located in NATO. These locations should be correspondingly designated as decisive, and military commanders should structure their defenses accordingly to hold them. This can easily be accomplished within an overall defensive scheme that retains a primary orientation on the enemy force and provides the opportunity for operational maneuver. Agile, self-protecting forces can be concentrated as an operational reserve with the capability of moving quickly to establish a relative positional advantage from which to destroy the enemy, disrupt his cohesion, etc. As this concept demonstrates, the theoretical aspects of offense/defense as well as attrition/maneuver can be executed simultaneously or sequentially within an overall defensive strategy.

CFE offers both enormous promise as well as challenges for NATO. These challenges require military planners to develop an effective warfighting doctrine that is integrated with the political objectives of the alliance and innovative enough to evolve in consonance with, rather than isolated from the environments that defines the requirements. In sum, while the doctrine development process requires a quantum leap forward from what exists today, the foundation required to develop a more effective military doctrine for NATO is in place. The alliance's overriding objective in the near-term is to begin taking those steps now.




FIGURE 1: A MODEL FOR STRATEGY, POLICY AND DOCTRINE

Source: AMSP Course Material, Lesson 1-32




FIGURE 2: A MODEL FOR DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

Source: AMSP Course Material, Lesson 1-32

FIGURE 3

PERCEPTIONS/DEFINITIONS OF DOCTRINE

1. Condensed expression of an army's approach to fighting campaigns, major operations, battles and engagements. (FM100-5)
2. An approved set of guidelines for the conduct of war. (Bill Lind)
3. A way of thinking that is shared throughout the officer corps. (Bill Lind)
4. An authoritative rule, a precept, giving the approved way to do a job; officially recognized and taught; tells how to do something best; based upon an objective generalization from experience. (Dr. I.B. Holley)
5. The implicit orientation with which a military culture collectively responds to the unfolding circumstances of war. (Watts and Hale)
6. What is being taught, i.e. rules or procedures drawn by competent authority...precepts, guides to action and suggested methods for solving problems or attaining desired results. (Dr. I.B. Holley)
7. A mental discipline, which consists first in a common way of objectively approaching the subject; second in a common way of handling it by adapting without reserve the means to the goal aimed at, to the object. (Foch)
8. Doctrine is taught to practice...the conception and practical application is not a science of war nor of some limited dogma...but of a certain number of principles, the application of which must logically vary according to circumstances while always tending towards the same goal, and that an objective goal...a common manner of seeing, thinking, acting...a discipline of the mind common to you all. (Foch)
9. A governing idea to which every situation may be referred and from which there may be derived a sound course of action...the object of which is to furnish a basis for prompt and harmonious conduct by the subordinate commanders of a large military force...without the necessity for referring each decision to superior authority before action is taken...to provide a foundation for mutual understanding. (Knox, 1915)
10. Beliefs or teachings which have been reasoned from principles...general guides to the application of mutually accepted principles. (Knox, 1915)
11. A teaching...based on principles - a basic truth applicable to all cases...a method is a procedure...it does not apply to all cases. (Johnston - Field Service Regulations (FSR) of the Future)
12. FSR should be applicable to war of any sort and to units of all kinds...dealing in fundamentals which will never change (Johnston, FSR of the Future)
13. The practical application of theoretical knowledge by real world armies that have unique force structures, operational missions and weapons holdings. (Jim Schneider)
14. The way things are done by most of the commanders most of the time. (Gen. Wm. DePuy)

FIGURE 3 (CONT.)

15. Doctrine is a tested, approved and accepted concept...concepts address needs not systems or pieces of material. Doctrine is what is written, approved by an appropriate authority and published concerning the conduct of military affairs...generally prescribes how an army fights tactically; how the tactics and weapons systems are integrated; how command, control and CDS are provided, how forces are mobilized, trained, deployed and employed. (Gen. Donn Starry)

16. Within grand strategy doctrine sets priorities among various military forces and prescribes how those forces should be structured and employed to achieve the ends in view...the subcomponent of grand strategy that deals explicitly with military means; a set of prescriptions...specifying how military forces should be structured and employed to respond to recognized threats and opportunities...includes the preferred mode of a group of services, a single service or a subservice for fighting wars...reflecting the judgment of professional military officers...about what is and is not militarily possible and necessary...based on appraisals of military technology, geography, threat capabilities and the skills of one's own military organization. (Barry R. Posen)





FIGURE 4: RELATIONSHIP OF ATTACK/DEFENSE WITH MANEUVER/ATTRITION

Source: Theoretical Paper No. 3, p.37



- CHARACTER: OFFENSIVE, DEFENSIVE , DETERRENT - APPROPRIATE?
- DEGREE OF POL-MIL INTEGRATION
- CAPACITY FOR INNOVATION

FIGURE 5: MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MILITARY DOCTRINE

ENDNOTES

1. NATO Military Agency for Standardization (MAS), Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-35(A): NATO Land Force Tactical Doctrine. Brussels, Belgium: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, March 1984, Glossary 7.
2. James J. Schneider, Theoretical Paper No. 3: The Theory of Operational Art. Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, School of Advanced Military Studies, March 1988, pp. 44-5.
3. Paul H. Herbert, Leavenworth Paper Number 16: Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DeFuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations. Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, Combat Studies Institute, June 1988, p.5.
4. Recent briefings given to the School of Advanced Military Studies by members of both the Army Staff and Army Secretariat indicate that there is growing pressure, mostly within Congressional circles, to withdraw the POMCUS to CONUS, principally for modernization of CONUS and Reserve forces.
5. Chris Bellamy, The Future of Land Warfare. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1987, p. 124.
6. Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift. McLean, VA: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1985, p. 384.
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11. Banks and Mendel Report, p. 38.
12. ATP-8 for Naval Forces
ATP-33(A) for Air Forces
ATP-35(A) for Land Forces
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Handbook. Brussels, Belgium: NATO Information Service, April 1986, p.25.

14. Thomas Marshall et.al., "European Perspectives on CFE." McLean, VA: The Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), 11 Dec 89 (from a briefing presented at CAC, 11 Dec 89.)

15. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), "CFE Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe." Washington, DC: ACDA Office of Public Affairs, undated, p.1.

16. Paul Bracken et.al.: The European Security Study Group, "Towards a Cooperative Security Regime in Europe." A study conducted under the auspices of the Cornell University Peace Studies Program. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, July 1989, p.12. (As General Wallace H. Nutting (USA, Ret) was a member of the study group, in military circles the study is often referred to as the "Nutting Study." Therefore, it will hereinafter be referred to as the Nutting Study.

17. Ibid.

18. Banks and Mendel Report, p.37.

19. General John R. Galvin, "NATO's Enduring Mission," NATO's Sixteen Nations, October 1989, p.14.

20. Nutting Study, p.13.

21. Edward N. Luttwak, "The American Style of Warfare and the Military Balance," Survival. XXI, No.2 (Mar/Apr 79), p.57.

22. Sir Michael Howard, "Military Science in an Age of Peace," RUSI Quarterly. 119:1 (Mar 74) p.7.

23. There are currently three Allied Tactical Publications that constitute NATO doctrine. They are:

ATP-8: Doctrine for Amphibious Operations; ATP-36, 37,39 deal with the more detailed aspects of amphibious operations.

ATP-33(A): NATO Tactical Air Doctrine; ATP-27 deals with offensive air support, ATP-40 with the Combat Zone Airspace Control and ATP-42 with counter air operations.

ATP-35(A): NATO Land Force Tactical Doctrine.

24. ATP-35(A), p. XXIII.

25. Herbert, p. 5.

26. William S. Lind, "The Case for Maneuver Doctrine," The Defense Reform Debate, ed. Asa A. Clark et al., Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984, p.65.

27. William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985, p.19.
28. Luttwak, p.57.
29. Steven L. Canby, "NATO Defense: The Problem is Not More Money," American Security Policy and Policy Making, ed. Harhavy and Kolodziej, Lexington, KY: Lexington Books, 1988, p. 89.
30. Huba Wass de Czege, "Army Doctrinal Reform," The Defense Reform Debate, p. 103.
31. The NATO Military Agency for Standardization (MAS), Army Board, Enclosure II ("Proposal for the Development of NATO Joint Warfare Doctrine,") to MAS (Army) Document 458-27/50: Validation of a Standardization Proposal. (NU) Brussels, Belgium: NATO (MAS), 10 Nov 89, p. II-1.
32. For example, NATO's concept of Flexible Response, modeled after the US strategy adopted in 1951, was not approved by NATO Ministers until 1967 - a span of 6 years. Even then, it can be argued that NATO Flexible Response is a significant departure from the US version. See J.W. Kipp's monograph: Conventional Force Modernization and the Asymmetries of Military Doctrine: Historical Reflections on Airland Battle and the Operational Maneuver Group. Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACAC, SASO, 20 Sep 86, pp. 15-3.
33. Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984, p.14.
34. Posen, pp. 16-24.
35. Posen, pp. 24-5.
36. Posen, pp. 29-30.
37. Posen, p. 30.
38. Canby, p. 93.
39. Galvin, p. 14.
40. F.W. von Mellenthin, NATO Under Attack. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1984, p.8.
41. Jonathan M. House, Research Survey No. 2: Towards Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th Century Tactics, Doctrine and Organization. Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, CSI, Aug 84, p.43.
42. Ibid.
43. House provides an excellent and far more detailed

commentary on this subject on pages 43-5; Alistair Horne in To Lose a Battle likewise details the general conditions of France's political-military interface during the interwar years in Chapters 1 and 2.

44. T.N. Dupuy, Numbers, Predictions and War. Fairfax, VA: HERO Books, 1985, p.15. Von Mellenthin in NATO Under Attack lists the numbers as 3.5 million for the Allies and 2.8 million for the Germans. In any case, the Germans were outnumbered.

45. House, p. 58.

46. House, p. 60.

47. Alistair Horne, To Lose a Battle. New York, NY: Penguin Books, p. 66.

48. House, p. 96.

49. House, p. 96.

50. House, p. 100.

51. House, p. 102.

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