AIR WAR COLLEGE

RESEARCH REPORT

THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON AIR FORCE

LOGISTICS COMMAND'S OVERSEAS ACTIVITIES

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AIR UNIVERSITY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM

ON

AIR FORCE LOGISTICS COMMAND'S OVERSEAS ACTIVITIES

b y

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A DEFENSE ANALYTICAL STUDY SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM REQUIREMENT

Advisor: Colonel David E. Friestad

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

May 1990

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: The Impact of Terrorism on Air Force Logistics
Command's Overseas Activities.

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The incidence of international terrorism has been
increasing over time. Many of these terrorist attacks have
been directed against U.S. interests, personnel, and
facilities abroad. The threat of future terrorist attacks
has an impact on the work and quality of life of U.S.
government personnel assigned overseas.

To better understand the nature and scope of this
issue, the authors first explore terrorism by defining it,
highlighting its principal causes, describing a sample of
active terrorist groups, and reviewing terrorist tactics and
targets. Next, the authors analyze the effect of the threat
on personnel assigned to the Air Force Contract Maintenance
Center; an organization of U.S. military and civilian
personnel who are primarily assigned overseas. Various
approaches for dealing with the threat of terrorism are then
reviewed. From the analysis and review, it is concluded that
increased awareness and improved training are necessary to
place the threat in perspective and reduce the likelihood of
being a victim of a terrorist attack.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Robert N. Mitchell received his Associate of Arts degree from Oxford College in 1970, a Bachelor of Arts degree in Biology and an Air Force commission from Emory University in 1972. After completing missile launch officer training at Sheppard AFB, Texas and Titan II combat crew training at Vandenberg AFB, California, he was assigned to the 373rd Strategic Missile Squadron at Little Rock, AFB, Arkansas. After upgrading to missile combat crew commander, he served as a commander for the 308th Strategic Missile Wing alternate command post and as an instructor for the wing. From 1979 to 1982, Colonel Mitchell was assigned to the Warner Robins Air Logistics Center, Robins AFB, Georgia, as a contract negotiator and then as Chief, Heavy/Medium Cargo Aircraft Section, Weapon System Division, Directorate of Contracting and Manufacturing. In 1982, he was assigned to Headquarters, Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) as a contracting program manager in the Business Strategy and Operations Division. During this tour, Colonel Mitchell served as executive officer for two deputy chiefs of staff and then to the AFLC Chief of Staff. From 1986 to 1989 he commanded Detachment 36, Air Force Contract Maintenance Center, Brindisi, Italy.

Colonel Mitchell has a Master of Arts degree in
Business Administration and Human Relations and is a graduate
of Squadron Officer's School, Air Command and Staff College,
the National Defense University and a 1990 graduate of the
Air War College.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

As family members awoke during the early morning hours, there was a heavy feeling of anxiety spreading among the household. No longer were plans being made to go shopping among the local national population at the local open air markets, where special bargains were waiting around every corner for just the right purchaser. No longer were plans being made for taking the family to the local beach for a picnic. No longer were the husband and wife planning that special evening at a restaurant in the local village. There were more important decisions to be made by the family. The local air base radio station just announced the base school buses would not be making their school runs because they were "too easy targets for terrorists which may be in the area." The children still had to get to school and the father still had to go to work; however, the morning drive along the beautiful country-side was now filled with suspicion and worry for the safety of family and oneself. Other questions began to surface. Have I been identified as a terrorist target and am I being watched for planning just the right moment for attack? Is it still safe to live isolated in the local community, with no phone service, so far away from the safe confines of the base? So many deep probing,

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unanswerable questions continue to surface from within oneself!

Every Air Force family in the area experienced these kind of feelings because this was the morning of April 16, 1986...just a few hours following the United States raid on Libya. Colonel Qadhafi had just identified your base in southern Italy as a target of retaliation for the attack on his homeland. One primary method of retaliation, as everyone knew, would be some type of terrorist attack against American interests. Such an attack occurred just four months earlier at the Rome international airport where so many innocent people were killed by machine gun fire and bomb blasts. The fear of such a terrorist attack affected the lives of every American man, woman, and child on that particular day and many days thereafter. This uncertainty probably impacted job performance at work, academic performance at school, family quality of life at home, and even recruitment of personnel for the Air Force organizations. These feelings not only were felt by military members, but also the civilian civil servants who make up the majority of the manning at many Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) overseas locations.

In trying to understand this problem, first we will explore the phenomenon of terrorism. In addressing this subject, we will define terrorism, highlight its principal causes, briefly describe a representative sample of international terrorist groups, and review terrorist tactics

and targets. Second, we will analyze the effect of the terroristic threat on a representative group of U.S. military members, civil servants, and their dependents. We chose to survey personnel assigned to the Air Force Contract Maintenance Center (AFCMC). Its operations span the globe and its personnel are exposed to a wide range of high and low, real and perceived terrorist threats. Lastly, based upon our analysis, we will make some recommendations for dealing with the threat.

CHAPTER II

THE TERRORISTIC THREAT

What is Terrorism?

Recently the government of Greece freed a Palestinian
wanted in Italy as a suspect in a 1982 synagogue bombing,
which resulted in the death of a two year old boy and the
wounding of 34 other people. The Greek government determined
this horrible act was not an act of terrorism, because it
fell "within the domain of the struggle to regain the
independence of his homeland."(1:12) In another case, the
Irish Republican Army (IRA) now states the families of
British servicemen are legitimate targets for its guns and
bombs. When examining these instances, one may sense the
loss of an acceptable, universal definition of "terrorism."
With the difficulty of properly defining terrorism, a country
which has experienced a terroristic act may look for an easy
way out instead of recognizing terrorism for what it is.
Trying to ignore terrorism with the idea that it only affects
other people, could have disastrous results...we could be one
of tomorrow's victims.(1:12)

When an individual tries dealing with the concept of
terrorism, specific acts come to mind such as aircraft
sabotage, assassinations, bombings and shootings. More
importantly, the victims of these acts probably had no idea

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or any understanding of the reasons which drove the terrorist in expressing his or her grievances in such a way. Some individuals attempt to describe terrorism as a type of low-intensity, unconventional warfare, while others state that describing terrorism as a type of warfare places the terrorists' acts at a level of accepted international behavior. (2:16) How about the bombings and shootings of innocent civilians and government employees ordered by the drug barons and cartels of Columbia? The news media states that these are terroristic acts against a defenseless public! Does this fall into the parameters of "terrorism?" An attempt will be made to clarify the meaning of such a complex term.

In 1986, the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism officially defined terrorism as "the unlawful use or threat of violence against persons or property to further political or social objectives."(2-16) Another definition is that terrorism is an act committed by an individual or group for political purposes. It is communication through violence. These violent acts cause panic, disorder, destroy social discipline and increase misery and suffering of a community. (3) Such terroristic actions are intended to intimidate or coerce a government, groups, or individuals using physical and psychological harm to modify their behavior toward the terrorists beliefs. Using this definition, the term "terrorism" may be put into

three groups for clarification. They are repressive, defensive, and offensive terrorism. (3)

Repressive terrorism occurs when an element of government supports an organization using the tactic of fear, suppressing public political activity within the country. An example would be Hitler using his secret SS police to control political activity within Germany. Defensive terrorism may be defined as patriots defending their country against a foreign invader. Offensive terrorism, on the other hand, is terrorism targeted against a government or political system with the goal of bringing about a revolution for the purpose of overthrowing an existing government. Therefore, the drug war in Colombia could be classified as criminal acts and not a form of terrorism. Defining terrorism is no simple task because it is dependent upon identifying the proper political target which would justify the lawful use of violence against these targets.

It has been shown that to some people, the terrorist may be the champion of the oppressed, the critic of social ills, or more specifically, a fighter of freedom against a foreign invader. But the line has to be drawn when a "terrorist" deliberately kills small children, a passerby in the street, people attending a worship service or blows up an airplane 30,000 feet above the ground carrying innocent people. (4:54) One has to oppose such violations of human rights. This aids in the development of a more accurate

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definition where unlawful terrorism is defined as "the
deliberate and systematic murder, maiming, and menacing of
the **innocent** to inspire fear for political ends."(4:53)   This
forms the thesis that a sustained campaign of political
violence, whether lawful or not, has a drain and corroding
effect on any society or group of people.(3)   This may be
especially true, whether the terroristic threat is real or
perceived, with the personnel stationed or even planning to
visit the overseas activities of AFLC.

What are the Causes of Terrorism?

When one contemplates the many possible factors which
contribute toward the development of terrorism, a few of the
more prominent ones come to mind.   They are:

    a. The need to be heard is crucial.   Terrorism
        becomes the violent means of expressing
        grievances which have accumulated over a period
        of time.

    b. The combination of anger and helplessness
        results in the desire for retributive violence
        against the individuals or political government
        perceived responsible for the problems.

    c. The victims of continued violence are themselves
        transformed into terrorists to get even with the
        stronger parties or dominating groups.

    d. Terroristic violence becomes internationalized
        when identifiable targets from other countries
        become available.(5:60)

These factors are important when one searches for the reasons
terroristic acts occur, but there is another important factor
which forms the basis of most, if not all, terrorist attacks
--- the desire for media publicity.

When exposed to the world through newspapers and the "magic" of satellite television, the terrorists' power and influence over events increases many fold. Most terrorists tend to be idealistic, even fanatical about their beliefs. They want immediate, simple solutions to their complex social and political problems.(3) Therefore, media publicity gives terrorists instant power for use in carrying out their objective of fear, the need to be heard, and the desire for change or the need to get even.

When one statistically looks at the chances of being involved in a terrorist act, this risk is quite small; however, the resulting anxiety (caused by extensive media coverage) of being involved in future events could be quite high. The media heightens this tension by reporting not just the horrible acts which have just occurred, but also the terrorists' threats of future violence. They describe, in detail, the campaign of terror which will follow if the government does not meet their demands. This spreads anxiety and panic by increasing the ordinary citizen's fear that he may fall victim to a bomb while flying in a plane or eating dinner at a restaurant. It also gives the impression that society is in moral chaos and its laws and moral standards no longer provide any protection against random violence. Therefore, the media can magnify the violence of terrorism so that its impact on public opinion is far greater than the resulting physical harm from the terroristic event.(6:70,71)

It becomes obvious that media attention fulfills the terrorist's desire for power and influence over the public. Following the murder of Italian Premier Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades, economist Thomas Sowell recognized these real motives.

> For several weeks a group of obscure young men became important. They carried out a deed that made headlines around the world. They had a famous man in their power, to abuse or taunt as they pleased and to kill whenever they felt like it. They saw the life of the country around them disrupted as police, workers, and others changed their daily routines in response to the event. The pope, the American president, and the United Nations recognized them with appeals and declarations. In normal times they might never have gotten past the secretaries to see any of these people, much less expect to influence them. With one daring crime, they leapfrogged bureaucracy and protocol and elbowed their way into the headlines and even into history. (7:65)

This hard-hitting example clearly shows that when the desire and determination of gaining political attention is high enough, the use of violence in the form of terrorism and the media attention generated by its use, becomes an acceptable method for desperate people.

What are the Most Threatening Groups?

There are numerous terrorist groups located all over the world of which a large number of them operate on a broad international scope. In order to give one more knowledge of the operation, influence and far-reaching danger of these groups, six of the more prominent organizations will be briefly described as identified by the Pentagon report "Terrorist Group Profiles."

The Abu Nidal Organization (The Revolutionary Council of Fatah) broke away from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1970 and is headed by Abu Nidal. It is sponsored by Libya and is an extremely violent terrorist group. They are committed to the total destruction of Israel and will attack any of Israel's allies. This group has been accused of numerous bloody terrorist attacks in Europe and the Middle East, including the machine gun massacres at the Rome and Vienna airports in December, 1985. This group is a prime suspect in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103, which crashed during December 1988 in Scotland. The total number of people killed aboard this aircraft was 258 along with 22 people killed on the ground by falling debris. (8:1)

The Hezbollah (Islamic Jihad) has an estimated membership of over 3,000 full-time members. Over 500 of these members are directly involved in terrorist activities all over the Middle East. Their main operating headquarters is located in Lebanon and the organization is sponsored by Iran. Its main political objectives are to establish a revolutionary Shi'ite Islamic state in Lebanon modeled after Iran. They are well known for recent kidnappings in the region, truck bombings, shootings and airplane hijackings. (9:31)

An organization which is not located in the Middle East but is an extremely violent group which claimed over 93 lives last year, is the Provisional Irish Republican Army

(IRA). They are located in Northern Ireland and have two main objectives of breaking away from the United Kingdom and establishing a unified Ireland under a socialist government.(9:31) The main surprise with the IRA is their sponsor...Libya! Britain's chief security official, Secretary Douglas Hurd stated, "Qadhafi is without doubt the most dangerous of the Provisional Irish Republican Army supporters....We have proof that he has supplied them with tons of sophisticated weapons and large quantities of Semtex explosive."(10:9) This organization's primary operating methods are bombings and assassinations.

One of the oldest West European terrorist groups is the Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group (ETA). It was formed in 1959 and has approximately 200 active members. ETA, through terrorism against the Government of Spain and Spanish interest, hopes to establish an independent and probably Marxist Basque nation. ETA regularly targets for assassination members of the Spanish Government, military, and security forces, plus moderate Basques. ETA has also bombed numerous government facilities and economic targets, such as tourist resorts. ETA, one of the most violent groups in Europe, is responsible for over 500 deaths since 1968. It has been reported that ETA has ties with the Provisional Irish Republican Army, and ETA members have been trained at Cuban and Middle Eastern terrorist training camps.(11:35-36)

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Terrorism is also rife throughout Latin America. One of the largest and most ruthless terrorist group is the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) (SL) from Peru. Its membership is estimated between 4,000 and 5,000. Formed in 1969, SL began terrorist operations in 1980. Shining Path is a neo-Maoist organization that wants to overthrow the current constitutional government and install a leftist, ethnic Indian state by means of a peasant armed struggle. The SL hopes to eliminate foreign influence by attacking U.S. and other "imperialist" targets. The SL also wants to embarrass the Peruvian Government and cause it to invoke repressive measures. The Shining Path's hallmark is gruesome assassinations. The main targets of SL assassination teams are civilian technicians and local political leaders. Many economic development projects fail to get launched because SL assassinates the technicians and blows up the equipment. In June 1988, two U.S. Agency for International Development civilian subcontractors were killed in an area under SL control. (11:106-111)

Asia is also the home for many terrorist groups. One such group is the New People's Army (NPA) of the Philippines. Membership in the NPA numbers at least 20,000. The NPA was formed in 1969 and is the military wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines. The NPA's efforts are aimed at replacing the current government with a Communist regime. Its activities are designed to erode support for the

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continued U.S. military presence and provoke repressive responses from the Aquino government, thereby alienating large segments of the population. The NPA's terrorist activities usually take the form of assassinations using hit teams called "sparrow" units. Targets for the NPA include local and provincial governmental officials, security personnel, police units, informants, and anti-Communist members of the media. Except for an incident in 1974 where three U.S. Navy personnel were murdered, the NPA did not actively target Americans until October 1987. At that time, two U.S. servicemen, an American retiree and a Filipino bystander were assassinated by this group. This decision to target Americans "...reflects careful calculation of political, strategic, and tactical benefits."(11:114,122-123)

The terrorist groups identified and discussed are just a few of the more prominent organizations located throughout the world. These groups could threaten the lives of AFLC employees travelling through or actually working in these areas. In fact, there are 52 separate terrorist groups detailed in the the Pentagon's report "Terrorist Group Profiles." They operate in all corners of the world, using a wide variety of tactics aimed at various individual and group targets, to further the specific terrorist group's unique goals and objectives.

Terrorist Tactics and Targets

To better understand how terrorists operate and why,
it is necessary to look at terrorist tactics and targets.
Acts of terroristic violence are not necessarily random or
indiscriminate. In fact, more often than not, terrorist
attacks are deliberate and premeditated. Targets are
selected and studied, and operations are meticulously
planned. Tactics are chosen for the expected effect they
will have on innocent victims. Terrorists often want to
create immediate terror by the viciousness of their attack,
instill lasting fear and anxiety in a populace by threatening
similar attacks in the future, and provoke a repressive
response by the current government.

By tactics, we are talking about the types of
terrorist acts. In addition to considerations regarding the
desired effect, the type of tactic employed is also governed
by the resources available to the terrorists. These acts
take many forms such as bombings, armed attacks/
assassinations, hostage-taking (kidnaopings and hijackings),
arson, and sabotage. Without a doubt, the most prevalent
tactic employed by terrorists is bombing. The "shock, trauma
and international publicity" that results from a bomb attack
are key reasons why the explosive device "...remains high in
the tactical arsenal."(12:80) A bomb can knock a plane out
of the sky, blow up a discotheque or restaurant, take out a
powerplant, or kill someone opening their mail. It can be

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INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS 1988

BY TYPE OF EVENT

FIGURE 1

Armed Attack 15.1 %

Bombings 48.2 %

Skyjacking 0.4 %

Kidnaping 3.7 %

Other 3.7 %

Sabotage 0.9 %

Arson 28.0 %

SOURCE: U. S. Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1988*.
Washington: Government Printing Office, March 1989.
(Also the source for Figure's 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, & 7)

used against facilities as well as people. By most accounts,
bombings make up about half of all terrorist events. In 1988
there were 856 international terrorist incidents; of these,
48.2 percent were bombings, 15 percent were armed attacks, 28
percent were arson, 4.1 percent involved hostage-taking, 0.9
percent sabotage, and the remaining 3.7 percent were not
classified (see fig. 1). (13:viii,4)

On the receiving end of these terrorist tactics are
the targets. In discussing terrorist targets an important
distinction must be made. That distinction is between the

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target as an audience and the target as a victim. Although
in context this distinction may be apparent, it is noted here
for clarity. When terrorists perpetrate an act of violence,
it is normally not violence for the sake of violence, but it
is done with a specific purpose in mind. Terrorists use
violence to gain a forum and command an audience. The target
audience may be a group of foreign investors or businessmen,
key government policy makers, or the population at large.
The terrorists, through the use of violence, communicate to
their target audience the group's message of the need for
economic, social, or political change. On the other hand,
the targets as victims are people who are attacked, murdered,
wounded, or taken hostage by the terrorists. Many times
these individuals are specifically targeted because of their
government job, diplomatic post, military position, business
affiliation, religion, or nationality. Other times they
happen to be "innocent" bystanders who were in the wrong
place at the wrong time.

Although some terrorist groups appear to be very
discriminate in their targeting, other groups seem to be
totally unconcerned, and even cavalier about the prospect of
civilian noncombatant casualties. As a result of the 856
international terrorist incidents in 1988, 658 people were
killed and 1,131 were wounded. About 10.7 percent of the
victims were government related, 7.4 percent were diplomatic
personnel, 5.8 percent were military, and 4.7 percent were

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INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS 1988
BY TYPE OF VICTIM

FIGURE 2

Other 71.5 %

Government 10.7 %

Diplomat 7.4 %

Military 5.8 %

Business 4.7 %

business affiliated.   The remaining 71.5 percent were simply described as "other" (see fig. 2).   When looking at the type of facilities damaged or destroyed by international terrorist events in 1988, we find that 31.3 percent were business related, 9.7 percent diplomatic, 7.7 percent government, 2.9 percent military, and the remaining 48.4 percent grouped as "other" (see fig. 3).   Another way to look at international terrorist incidents is by region.   In 1988, the Middle East accounted for approximately 36 percent of the incidents, Asia almost 23 percent, Western Europe just over 17 percent, Latin America just under 17 percent, Africa almost 6 percent, and North America about 1 percent (see fig. 4). (13:viii,4)

INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS 1988
BY TYPE OF FACILITY

FIGURE 3

Business 31.3 %

Other 48.4 %

Diplomat 9.7 %

Government 7.7 %

Military 2.9 %

FIGURE 4

INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN 1988
BY REGION

NUMBER OF EVENTS

	MIDDLE EAST	ASIA	WESTERN EUROPE	LATIN AMERICA	AFRICA
	310	190	150	140	55

FIGURE 5

ANTI-US TERRORIST ATTACKS (BY EVENT) 1988

NUMBER OF EVENTS

It is important to note that of the 856 international terrorist incidents of 1988, those classified as "anti-US" numbered 185. More than 75 percent of these anti-US incidents were bombings, over 11 percent were armed attacks, about 8 percent were arson, 3 percent were some form of kidnapping, and the remaining 3 percent were labeled "other" (see fig. 5). As a result of these attacks, 192 Americans were killed and 40 wounded. Business people were the principal victims of approximately 51 percent of these incidents, diplomatic personnel were victims of 21 percent of the incidents, military personnel were victimized in 11 percent of the incidents, government employees were victims

FIGURE 6

ANTI-US TERRORIST ATTACKS (BY VICTIM) 1988

NUMBER OF EVENTS

FIGURE 7

ANTI-US TERRORIST ATTACKS (BY REGION) 1988

NUMBER OF EVENTS

in 5 percent of the incidents, with "other" US citizens accounting for the remaining 12 percent (see fig. 6). By region, 59 percent of the anti-US attacks occurred in Latin America, 21 percent in Asia, 10 percent in the Middle East, 9 percent in Western Europe, and 1 percent in Africa (see fig. 7).(13:4-5)

CHAPTER III

AIR FORCE LOGISTICS COMMAND (AFLC) AND

THE AIR FORCE CONTRACT MAINTENANCE CENTER (AFCMC)

AFLC Mission

"Combat Strength Through Logistics" is the worldwide
mission of the Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC). It does
this by ensuring readiness and sustainability of USAF weapon
systems. To accomplish its mission, AFLC has just under
100,000 employees, of which almost 90 percent are civilians.
In discharging its responsibilities, AFLC performs the major
logistics functions of Materiel Management, Distribution,
Maintenance, and Contracting and Manufacturing. The command
carries out its mission through five air logistics centers
and several specialized centers. In addition to managing an
inventory of almost 900,000 aircraft parts, over 2 million
items, valued at more than $30 billion, are stored in AFLC
storage space. The command's contracting activities engage
in more than 300,000 contracting actions annually totalling
just under $11 billion. Air Force Logistics Command is also
responsible for depot-level maintenance of the entire Air
Force inventory of aircraft and missiles. With contractor
support, AFLC provides overhaul, modification, and depot
maintenance services on some 1,300 aircraft, 7,300 engines
and 1.3 million exchangeable components every year. (14:3)

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Although the majority of AFLC's workload is accomplished within the United States, a significant portion is performed overseas. To assist in managing this portion of its workload, AFLC has approximately 679 personnel (165 military and 514 civilians) permanently assigned overseas. Some of this overseas workload is done in-house at organic facilities such as the Support Group Europe located at RAF Kemble, United Kingdom and the Support Center Pacific at Kadena Air Base, Japan. The rest of this in-depth depot maintenance, modification and overhaul work is performed at various overseas locations by a variety of foreign contractors. The principal AFLC organization for managing overseas contract maintenance programs is the Air Force Contract Maintenance Center (AFCMC).

AFCMC Mission

The Air Force Contract Maintenance Center (AFCMC) was established in 1969 to perform contract administration services for government contracts within the United States. In 1971 AFCMC accepted overseas responsibilities for specific regions in Europe and the Pacific area; transforming it into an international organization. Personnel of the center currently administer a total of 1,468 contracts valued at approximately 7 billion dollars. (15)

The mission of AFCMC is a broad one. Primarily, the organization supports USAF combat readiness through aggressive contract management of aircraft and engine

maintenance and modification programs. The organization also directly supports the United States government's economic and political commitments overseas. This is accomplished through administration and management of joint production and foreign military sales contracts.(15) In carrying out the administration and management of these complex, high-dollar contracts, the center has established detachments and operating locations throughout the world (see figs. 8 and 9).

The Operation of AFCMC Overseas Detachments

The worldwide organization of AFCMC is represented by a headquarters and contract management staff, 8 detachments and 19 operating locations. The manning composition is approximately 450 personnel (370 civil servants and 80 military).(15) Of the total, approximately 338 are assigned overseas (274 civilians and 64 military). The countries in which these personnel are stationed are; Belgium, Great Britain, Germany, Spain, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Korea, Japan, Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Among these countries is a wide variety of work being performed ranging from A-10, F-4, F-15, F-111, and C-130 Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM) to F-16 aircraft co-production among partner countries, and F100, T56, and J79 aircraft engine repair, overhaul, and manufacture. This type of work requires a lot of monitoring from the AFCMC detachments.

AFCMC-EUROPE &
MIDDLE EAST

DET 33 BRUSSELS

DET 27 CROUGHTON

DET 19 MADRID

DET 16 LINDSEY

DET 30 TANAGRA

DET 34 MURTED

DET 32 TEL AVIV

RIYADH ESG/PM

FIGURE 8

AFCMC - PACIFIC

DET 28 -- KIMHAE
OL ICHON
OL SEOUL
OL CHANGWON
OL YOKOTA
OL SINGAPORE
OL MANILA
OL BANDUNG

KOREA

JAPAN

PHILIPPINES

MALAYSIA

INDONESIA

FIGURE 9

A detachment is divided into several divisions in fulfilling the requirement of contract administration and management. The core divisions are contract administration, production, industrial property, safety, quality assurance and flight operations. The detachment is commanded by a military officer and is supported with an administrative/ management support division. It is the job of these individuals to represent the United States government by monitoring and ensuring everything goes right with the contract made with a foreign organization or company. On average only 22 percent of this type of administrative work can be accomplished in-house. The remaining 78 percent of this workload is performed on an itinerant basis. This requires personnel to travel to the contractor's facilities since no permanent on-site detachment personnel are present.(15) This high amount of travel significantly increases the visibility and susceptibility of U.S. personnel to any terrorist group desiring to target these people or the government they represent.

The Susceptibility of AFCMC Overseas Activities

Early on a Sunday morning in November 1985, the Executive to the Chief of Staff of AFLC received a call from the AFLC Command Post's senior controller. He indicated an extremely high priority message had just been received from Greece and the executive's presence was requested at once. Upon entering the command post the executive read the message

and immediately called the Chief of Staff. As the general entered the command post, communication links were just being established with the AFCMC detachment commander in Greece. The worst fears were confirmed after the brief, initial conversation. A civilian, assigned to the detachment, had just been murdered by terrorists while on a plane at the Athens, Greece airport. The direct and shocking reality of terrorism reverberated throughout the Command.

Another example of how the threat of terrorism made itself felt in the AFCMC community occurred in the aftermath of the April 1986 US air raid on Libya. United States Air Force F-111 aircraft based in the United Kingdom formed a major element of the joint Air Force and Navy strike force. Not only were the F-111 bases at RAF Lakenheath and RAF Upper Heyford considered likely targets for terroristic reprisals, but so was the British Aerospace facility at Bristol, England. At this facility, British Aerospace performs contract depot level maintenance and overhaul on USAF F-111s based in Europe. Contract management is accomplished by permanently assigned personnel of AFCMC Detachment 17. After the raid, these people and their dependents had to acknowledge and live with the fact that they would be a lucrative target for a reprisal terrorist attack. Although no terrorist attack materialized, the anxiety and fear experienced by these people was real.

On yet another occasion, this one in September 1986, the Vice Commander of AFCMC narrowly missed being the incidental victim of a terrorist bomb. En route to a meeting at AFCMC's Korean detachment, he deplaned at Seoul's Kimpo Airport and then transited the international terminal less than one hour after a terrorist bomb had exploded there. It is believed the bombing was the work of North Korean operatives attempting to disrupt the Asian Games and discredit the South Korean government.

These few cases illustrate that no one is immune from the real or perceived effects of terrorism, especially in the high risk areas overseas. Whether one is driving to work, directly involved in the work at the detachment facility, travelling to other job locations, or living in the local community, the terroristic threat could possibly have a definite impact not only on the individual, but on the operation of the overseas facility. How much are overseas personnel, or employees travelling overseas, concerned with the possibility of a terroristic event? Does the threat directly influence the recruitment of personnel to high risk areas? Does the threat impact work performance? Is more training needed to lessen employee and family anxieties? Does the terrorist threat warrant payment of a hazardous duty pay supplement? These questions and others were directed to the AFCMC staff and to personnel stationed at overseas locations. Their thoughts, reactions and ideas were

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expressed through survey questionnaires. These thought provoking responses were analyzed and will be addressed in the following chapter. It is hoped that the results of these various analyses will provide more insight and personal understanding of how AFCMC employees feel concerning the terrorist threat. Also the resulting suggestions and thoughts may help implement some form of action which may help reduce the perceived or actual terrorist threat at these overseas locations.

CHAPTER IV

SURVEYS AND ASSESSMENTS

Two distinct questionnaires (Appendices A and B) were
developed by the authors and administered to AFCMC personnel
for the purpose of measuring their concerns regarding the
threat of terrorism. One questionnaire was written
specifically for the personnel stationed at the AFCMC
overseas locations. The other questionnaire was designed to
elicit comments from the AFCMC headquarters staff regarding
their views of the terrorist threat. Several members of the
staff frequently travel to these overseas locations and may
have developed a different perspective toward the situation,
than the people who are permanently stationed there.

The questions were divided into three major areas.
The first area of interest was directed toward assessing the
degree to which there was a perception of a terroristic
threat. The second area dealt with the impact of the
perceived terrorist threat on the work environment and the
quality of life for the employees and their families. For
instance, one question asked if the risk of terrorism
influenced the employee's decision to accept an assignment to
a particular location. Another question asked if the quality
of the individual's work was affected by the terrorist
threat. The last area of interest tried to identify what

actions, if any, were needed for improving security and
reducing the anxieties and personal concerns expressed by the
workforce regarding terrorism.

Responses from AFCMC Personnel Overseas

Survey responses, totalling 164, were received from
the approximately 338 AFCMC employees stationed overseas.
This level of response allowed us to form a reasonable
appreciation of the deep-rooted concerns and fears these
people, along with their families, experience living and
working in an overseas environment.

Overall, 55 percent of the respondents felt they were
at risk of a terrorist attack. Personnel stationed in
Greece, Germany, Korea, and Belgium felt considerably
more at risk than their counterparts at other locations.
Surprisingly, of the respondents stationed in Saudi Arabia,
only eight percent felt at risk (see fig. 10). More
importantly, it was discovered that more than 75 percent of
the overseas personnel felt they were likely to be a either a
direct target or incidental victim of a terrorist attack.
The countries where this concern was most pronounced were
Belgium, Israel, Greece, Turkey, and Korea. Only twenty-five
percent of the respondents from Saudi Arabia felt this was
a concern (see fig. 11). When asked to comment on the risk
to their families, less than half the responses voiced this
as a specific concern. The exceptions were Belgium and

FIGURE 10

PERCEPTION OF BEING AT RISK OF A

TERRORIST ATTACK

RISK PERCENTAGE

FIGURE 11

CONCERNED ABOUT BEING A TERRORIST TARGET
OR
INCIDENTAL VICTIM OF A TERRORIST ATTACK

PERCENT

Germany where almost all respondents felt their families were at risk (see fig. 12).

When reviewing survey responses to assess the impact of the perceived terroristic threat on work and quality of life issues, the affirmative responses were unexpectedly low in number. Only 18 percent responded the risk of terrorism influenced their decision regarding an overseas assignment (see fig. 13). Overall, only 28 percent indicated the quality of their work was affected as a result of the terrorist threat. Here the exception was Greece, where

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FIGURE 12

PRECEPTION OF TERRORISM RISK TO FAMILIES

PERCENT

```
100 │100
 90 │ █        83
 80 │ █        █
 70 │ █        █
 60 │ █        █
 50 │ █        █
    │ █        █    46   44   44   44
 40 │ █        █    █    █    █    █    41                   42
 30 │ █        █    █    █    █    █    █                    ▓
 20 │ █        █    █    █    █    █    █    20              ▓
 10 │ █        █    █    █    █    █    █    █                ▓
    │ █        █    █    █    █    █    █    █    8           ▓
  0 └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
      B     G     G     T    S    I    K    E    S      OVER-ALL
      E     E     R     U    P    S    O    N    A      AVERAGE
      L     R     E     R    A    R    R    G    U
      G     M     E     K    I    A    E    L    D
      I     A     C     E    N    E    A    A    I
      U     N     E     Y         L         N
      M     Y                               D    A.
```

FIGURE 13

TERRORISM: A FACTOR IN AN ASSIGNMENT DECISION

PERCENT

```
100 │
 90 │
 80 │
 70 │
 60 │ 58
    │ █    50
 50 │ █    █
 40 │ █    █
 30 │ █    █
    │ █    █    22   21
 20 │ █    █    █    █                                  18
    │ █    █    █    █    12   12   11                  ▓
 10 │ █    █    █    █    █    █    █    6               ▓
    │ █    █    █    █    █    █    █    █    0           ▓
  0 └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
      S    B    E    G    T    S    I    K    G      OVER-ALL
      A    E    N    R    U    P    S    O    E      AVERAGE
      U    L    G    E    R    A    R    R    R
      D    G    L    E    K    I    A    E    M
      I    I    A    C    E    N    E    A    A
           U    N    E    Y         L         N
      A.   M    D                             Y
```

FIGURE 14

QUALITY OF WORK IMPACTED BY THE TERRORIST THREAT

PERCENT

100	
90	
80	
70	
60	57
50	
40	
30	33 31 30 28
20	25 25
10	10 8
0	0

G   I   K   E   T   S   B   S   G   OVER-ALL
R   S   O   N   U   P   E   A   E   AVERAGE
E   R   R   G   R   A   L   U   R
E   A   E   L   K   I   G   D   M
C   E   A   A   E   N   I   I   A
E   L   N   Y   U   N
   D   M   A.   Y

fifty-seven percent felt their work was adversely affected
(see fig. 14). When asked if there were places where the
employee or their family would not go due to the threat, only
in Germany, Israel, and Korea did a majority respond in the
affirmative. When the employees were asked to indicate if
there were any countries to which they would not desire an
assignment due to the threat of terrorism, the most
frequently mentioned were Greece, Israel, the Philippines,
Middle Eastern countries, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Korea.

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There were several specific areas of concern which were identified by the workforce where action could be taken or current efforts improved which would help place the terrorist threat in proper perspective, enhance personal security, and reduce anxiety and fear. If, as has been said, "knowledge is power," one can conclude that lack of knowledge is weakness. It follows therefore that training and awareness were key issues with those surveyed. Approximately 42 percent of the people felt they had not received adequate training to deal with the threat. Although a large percentage of the people considered the training they received adequate, more than 50 percent of all respondents indicated they wanted more emphasis placed on addressing the threat. Many of these people wanted terrorist threat training prior to their departure for overseas. On a more positive note, 78 percent of the people were encouraged to vary their routes and times to and from work. Furthermore, a full 82 percent believed their work environment was adequately protected. The results were different when questioned about their living quarters. Approximately 50 percent of these people felt their living quarters were not adequately protected. This concern was most prominent in Greece, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Spain, and Belgium (see fig. 15).

An overwhelming 95 percent of the respondents wanted the risk of terrorism to be frankly and openly discussed when

FIGURE 15

LIVING QUARTERS NOT ADEQUATELY PROTECTED

PERCENT

considering employment overseas. Several people indicated
their work performance would suffer if the issue of terrorism
was not adequately addressed in advance. They felt that
subsequent concerns for the safety of their families would
detract from their ability to perform well on the job. When
asked if the terrorist threat warranted a hazardous duty pay
supplement, only 54 percent overall responded affirmatively.
Topping the list in favor of such a pay supplement were
affirmative responses from Saudi Arabia (92 percent) and
Israel (82 percent) (see fig. 16).

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FIGURE 16

FAVOR HAZARDOUS DUTY PAY AS COMPENSATION FOR TERRORIST THREAT

Of particular interest were the personal comments from the people living overseas which accompanied the completed questionnaires. A sampling of these comments follows:

- Individual was 30 seconds ahead of a fire bomb last year.

- Children are extremely vulnerable targets.

- Would have turned down the assignment if I had known about terrorism.

- Did not consider terrorism a high risk - I was wrong.

- Cautious awareness programs and emphasis on a frequent basis would be extremely prudent.

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- Civilians should live on military installations.

- Should be mandatory to wear civilian clothes.

- Last year AFN (Armed Forces Network) re-broadcast a
  NBC special on terrorism. If I had been in the States
  and heard the program, there is no way anyone could
  have talked me into coming to Germany.

- There is very little information or training provided.
  This is wrong. I was not told of significant
  terrorist events before I accepted this assignment.

- Personnel at the US Embassy, the Office of Defense
  Cooperation and corporate business people are all
  given home security systems. We are not. They also
  have bullet-proof vests when they go to high
  visibility functions. They recognize the threat
  overseas and protect their people.

- Families should go through terrorist briefings
  quarterly.

- The majority of overseas assignments today have a risk
  factor of terrorism. It's becoming a way of life
  overseas and it's something we just have to learn to
  live with and be aware of.

- Obviously, terrorist acts are extremely difficult, if
  not impossible to prevent; however, increased
  awareness should help to reduce the effects. This
  survey is probably on the right track.

Responses from Headquarters AFCMC Staff Personnel

Of the approximately 112 AFCMC personnel not

overseas, 48 are assigned to the headquarters staff at

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. Responses to the

survey were received from 36 members of the staff.

Compared to the personnel permanently stationed

overseas, a higher number of staff personnel (66 percent)

indicated they felt at risk of a terrorist incident when in

an overseas area on temporary duty. Almost 80 percent felt

they were likely to be a direct target or an incidental victim of a terrorist act. Nearly 28 percent indicated this anxiety over the terrorist threat impacts the quality of their work while travelling overseas. A majority indicated that the risk of terrorism would influence their decision of accepting an assignment overseas. From the above, it is clear the actual or perceived threat of terrorism does have its impact across a broad spectrum of issues.

When the staff was asked where they would prefer not to travel due to the threat of terrorism, the responses were: Middle Eastern countries, Greece, Israel, the Philippines, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Spain, and Saudi Arabia.

When asked about terrorist training, over 44 percent of the staff responses indicated they did not feel they had received adequate training. Furthermore, 71 percent of the responses stated more emphasis should be placed on addressing the threat. Yet, when asked if the risk of terrorism should be discussed when considering employment overseas, 60 percent said that it should not be discussed. Also, 60 percent indicated that the threat of terrorism does not warrant a hazardous duty pay supplement.

The staff also provided personal comments which give insight and perspective to their replies. A sampling of these comments follow:

- Scarlett Rogenkamp. (Ms Rogenkamp was an AFCMC employee assigned to the detachment in Greece. In 1985 she was killed by terrorists.)

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- Threat is portrayed by news media as much greater than it actually is.

- Threat will get worse with Americans being targeted more.

- I think the perceived threat is worse than the real threat.

- When an American is singled out as a target, his chances of being killed are much greater than an automobile accident.

CHAPTER V

DEALING WITH THE TERRORIST THREAT

Counterterrorism and Anti-terrorism

As we saw in the responses to the questionnaire, the threat of terrorism does have an impact on the employees of the Air Force Contract Maintenance Center. By extension, it would be fair to say that these feelings are shared by many other US citizens living or working overseas. Given this situation, what can be done to deal with this terroristic threat?

One way of looking at the issue of coming to grips with terrorism is to classify the strategies as either offensive or defensive in nature. Department of Defense Directive 2000.12, "Protection of DOD Personnel and Resources Against Terrorist Acts," dated 16 July 1986, spells out two types of measures for dealing with the threat:

Anti-terrorism. Defensive measures used for reducing individual and property vulnerability to terrorism.

Counterterrorism. Offensive measures taken for preventing, deterring, and responding to terrorism.

In accordance with this directive, it is Department of Defense policy to make permanently assigned and tempoary duty personnel aware of any known or suspected local terrorist threat, security measures for protecting them, and defensive precautions that should be taken to reduce their

vulnerability. Although governments may possess the
resources and capabilities to pursue offensive and defensive
strategies, individuals and most organizational entities are
limited to a defensive, anti-terrorism strategy.

Government Actions

We indicated earlier in the paper that terrorism is
primarily perpetrated by groups that have a political or
economic axe to grind. Therefore, one way for a government
to approach the terrorism problem is taking a conciliatory
approach and redressing the terrorists' concerns. This could
entail a restructuring or sharing of political power, land
reform measures, or the freeing political prisoners, to name
a few. This is often a long-term approach that may not
necessarily or immediately reduce terrorist activity.
Paradoxically, attempts by the government to accommodate the
terrorist demands may be seen as a sign of weakness and, as a
result, spur even more attacks by terrorists trying to
administer the coup de grace.

Another avenue of government response may be to
implement an offensive strategy of preemption, repression,
and reprisal. Operation El Dorado Canyon, the US air raid on
Libya in April 1986, is an example of the implementation of
such a strategy. This type of approach is clearly aimed at
defeating terrorism rather than accommodating terrorist
demands. Although this approach has a certain "gut-level"
appeal, it is not without its drawbacks. Often in

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perpetrating an act, the terrorists deliberately attempt to provoke an over-reaction on the part of governments. It is hoped the over-reaction will cause the populace to lose confidence in their government's ability to maintain control and provide for their security and freedom. Terrorists view a repressive government response as a fortuitous event because such actions sow "...the dragon's teeth that will sprout into future terrorists."(16:132)

The spectrum of government-level responses to terrorism runs from conciliation to repression and includes such actions as: political and economic concessions, direct negotiations with the terrorists, major structural reforms of the government and economy, domestic and international legal remedies, enhanced security measures, diplomatic pressure, reprisals, preemption, retribution campaigns, and military intervention.(16:137) At the government-level, the decision regarding the best way of dealing with terrorists is often subjective. The most effective response may be at either end of the spectrum; or more likely, some mix of the several measures available. The effectiveness of any of these measures will also be enhanced through quality intelligence and a good understanding of the terrorist group. As with any form of conflict, the better you know your enemy, the better your chances of victory.

Individual Actions

In dealing with the terrorist threat, government strategy often emphasizes a mix of counterterrorism and antiterrorism, repression and conciliation. However, for individuals and and their organizations, the most realistic and appropriate approach is an antiterrorism strategy. The key principles of such an approach are awareness and training. Awareness is extremely important because it places the threat in its proper context and perspective. This in turn allows individuals to make informed decisions concerning the threat to themselves and their families. The organization is responsible for keeping the individual apprised of "official" terrorist threat-related information and for training the individual in appropriate self-protection measures commensurate with that threat. Likewise, the individual is responsible for being aware of any other information regarding the threat and for taking prudent steps to minimize the risk.

In those situations or locations where the risk is regarded as low, all that may be needed are the same precautions one would normally take to preclude an assault by a common criminal. Conversely, in those situations where the threat to an individual may be specific, or the general terrorist threat level is considered medium to high, a more active self-protection approach would be warranted.

> One school of thought on how to protect someone
> or something from these adversaries suggests
> surrounding the threatened individuals or facility
> with wide concrete walls, high barbed-wire fences,
> attack dogs, and a moat full of man-eating fish.
> Such barriers are, in the case of individuals,
> hardly realistic. People must have relative freedom
> to continue to lead their lives. (17:96)

What is needed is a proportionate response based on the actual threat. The response must balance the security needs of the individual with their desire for and right to freedom of movement.

In designing such a balanced response, it must be recognized from the outset that it is difficult to deny the determined terrorist the opportunity to strike. However, in studying ways to inhibit terrorist attacks, Colonel David E. Friestad, Ph.D., concluded:

> If specific targets, such as aircraft, are known
> to be vulnerable to terrorist or criminal attack,
> the hardening of the target has a prophylactic
> value. Denying terrorist access defeats the
> amateur and places the potential risk or cost to
> the professional too high. (18:226)

This principle of hardening applies equally well to the individual. By adopting a sound individual security approach, one can "harden" oneself as a target. By making it more difficult for the terrorist to acquire his target, he may desist or shift his efforts to other, more vulnerable targets.

There is nothing magical about the elements of a good individual security program. For the most part, they are based on plain common sense. There are three key elements to

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such a program. The first element is PROFILE. Individuals at risk should strive to maintain a low profile in their appearance and conduct. They should be discreet, and not unnecessarily draw attention to themselves. They should pay particular attention to the clothes they wear and the vehicles they drive or ride in. Unneeded publicity should be avoided. In one incident overseas, an individual was selected by terrorists as a prospective target when his picture appeared in a base paper showing him at an organizational ceremony.

The second element is PREDICTABILITY. "Routines are deadly!"(12:174) By being unpredictable, individuals greatly compound the terrorist's target acquisition problem. Departure and arrival times and travel routes should be varied to the maximum extent feasible. Another aspect of predictability has to do with where you go. It may

> ...be prudent to avoid frequenting pavement cafes
> and other outdoor businesses that are close to
> foreign embassies, consuls, etc. This is because
> of the belief or knowledge of terrorists that the
> staff from such buildings spend some of their
> off-duty hours there. This makes them high-risk
> targets. (19:188)

Little imagination is required to identify several other establishments which could be considered lucrative targets by terrorists and therefore are good places to avoid.

The last element is PLANNING. The time to face the potential of a terrorist attack is before it happens. Homes and work locations should be assessed for major weaknesses or

vulnerabilities and repairs or upgrades initiated. Escape routes should be considered. Police, medical, and other emergency services phone numbers should be readily available. Recall rosters should be current and regularly exercised to ensure people can be rapidly informed of any new or specific terrorist threat information. The importance of planning and preparedness cannot be overstated; "...to wait until the bombs begin to explode and then depend on luck to see you through as you gather your defenses is foolish. Luck smiles on those who are prepared."(17:127)

As individuals go about developing their personalized security programs, consideration must be given to the safety of their families.

> (The) security of the family basically follows the same common sense lines as the strategy for target hardening the individual, except that it is an area where positive attention has to be paid to the stresses potentially imposed upon the wives and children by too frightening a briefing.(12:199)

A useful document for individuals in developing their security programs is Military Airlift Command Pamphlet 208-2, "Combatting Terrorism: Family Protection Workbook," dated 1 January 1986. This pamphlet details several actions that should be taken to significantly reduce the risk. U.S. government personnel and their families travelling or assigned overseas should get a copy and become familiar with its contents.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Oppression and injustice, the main justifications for terrorism, have existed for thousands of years. Why then has international terrorism blossomed in recent years and become such a major concern for people working or travelling in the overseas environment? The reason is modern technology has given the terrorists new physical elements which they wield as the weapons of terrorism. These physical elements are the airplane, the compact hand-held weapon, powerful plastic explosives and immediate electronic broadcasting. When terrorists put these key elements together, they easily capture the world's attention through the catastrophic consequences of viol ing the innocent. Terrorism then becomes a cheap and highly visible way of conducting a form of warfare. Terrorism produces fear and anxiety way out of proportion to its risk, and baffles governments and individuals alike in their efforts to deal with the threat. (5:61)

Through the use of surveys, it was discovered that 55 percent of AFCMC's overseas employees are concerned with the threat of terrorism. The affect on the individual is the same whether the threat is real or perceived. However, an

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individual can reduce their risk if certain precautions are taken. The cornerstone of improved individual security begins with awareness. A current and thorough training program is the best way to increase awareness. Becoming more familiar with the nature of terrorism and the ways of reducing personal risk, could be instrumental in preventing oneself from becoming the victim of a terrorist attack. The knowledge gained from the awareness and training program would serve to reduce personal anxiety, enhance family relationships, and improve the quality of work.

APPENDIX A: OVERSEAS PERSONNEL QUESTIONNAIRE

THE THREAT OF TERRORISM

1. In your current assignment, do you feel that you are at
    risk of a terrorist act?

        Yes ____   No ____

        Comment:

2. How significant to you is this threat of a terrorist act?

        Not significant _____
        Somewhat significant ____
        Very significant ____

        Comment:

3. Are you likely to be the direct target of a terrorist act
    or an incidental victim?

        Direct target ____
        Incidental victim ____
        Both ____
        Neither ____

        Comment:

4. Do you feel your family members are at risk of a
    terrorist incident?

        Yes ____   No ____

        Comment:

5. If your answer to question 4 was "Yes", to what degree
    are your family members at risk?

        High risk ____
        Moderate risk ____
        Low risk ____

        Comment:

6. Did the risk of terrorism influence your decision regarding your assignment?

        Yes ____ No ____

        Comment:

7. Is the quality of your work impacted by the threat of terrorism?

        High impact ____
        Low impact ____
        No impact ____

        Comment:

8. Are there places locally that you will not go due to the threat of terrorism?

        Yes ____ No ____

        Comment:

9. Are there countries to which you would not desire an assignment due to the threat of terrorism?

        Yes ____ No ____

        Comment:

10. If your answer to question 9 was "Yes", list a maximum of three such countries.

        A. _____
        B. _____
        C. _____

        Comment.

11. Have you received adequate training to deal with the terrorist threat?

        Yes ____ No ____

        Comment:

12. Should more emphasis be placed on addressing the threat?

    Yes ____ No ____ If "Yes", how?

    Comment:

13. Is your work environment adequately protected?

    Yes ____ No ____

    Comment:

14. Do you travel to and from work in a privately owned or a
    government vehicle?

    Private vehicle ____ Government vehicle ____

    Comment:

15. Are you allowed/encouraged to vary your routes and times
    of your travel to and from work?

    Yes ____ No ____

    Comment:

16. Do you live in base housing or on the economy?

    Base housing ____ Economy ____ Other _____

    Comment:

17. Are your living quarters adequately protected?

    Yes ____ No ____

    Comment:

18. Should the risk of terrorism be discussed and evaluated
    when considering employment overseas?

    Yes ____ No ____

    Comment:

19. Does the terrorist threat warrant payment of a hazardous
     duty pay supplement?

     Yes _____ No _____   If "Yes", how much? _____

     Comment:

20. Please use the space below to write any other comments
     regarding terrorism and overseas employment.

APPENDIX B: HQ AFCMC STAFF QUESTIONNAIRE

THE THREAT OF TERRORISM

1. When you perform TDY travel overseas, do you feel that
   you are at risk of a terrorist act?

   Yes _____   No _____

   Comment:

2. How significant to you is this threat of a terrorist act?

   Not significant _____
   Somewhat significant _____
   Very significant _____

   Comment:

3. When in an overseas area, are you likely to be the direct
   target of a terrorist act or an incidental victim?

   Direct target _____
   Incidental victim _____
   Both _____
   Neither _____

   Comment:

4. Would the risk of terrorism influence your decision
   on accepting an assignment overseas?

   Yes _____   No _____

   Comment:

5. During TDY travel overseas, is the quality of your work
   impacted by the threat of terrorism?

   High impact _____
   Low impact _____
   No impact _____

   Comment:

6. Are there countries to which you would not desire TDY travel due to the threat of terrorism?

   Yes _____ No _____

   Comment:

7. If your answer to question 6 was "Yes", list a maximum of three such countries.

   A. _____
   B. _____
   C. _____

   Comment:

8. Have you received adequate training to deal with the terrorist threat?

   Yes _____ No _____

   Comment:

9. Should more emphasis be placed on addressing the threat?

   Yes _____ No _____ If "Yes", how?

   Comment:

10. Should the risk of terrorism be discussed and evaluated when considering employment overseas?

   Yes _____ No _____

   Comment:

11. Does the terrorist threat warrant payment of a hazardous duty pay supplement?

   Yes _____ No _____ If "Yes", how much? _____

   Comment:

12. Please use the space below to write any other comments regarding terrorism and overseas employment.

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