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**Blinding the Enemy:
Soviet Tactical Reconnaissance
in the Rear Area**

**A Monograph
by
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Infantry**



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ABSTRACT

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This monograph examines Soviet tactical reconnaissance doctrine, organizations, and capability. The Soviet capability is analyzed using their own criteria for the conduct of tactical reconnaissance operations: purposefulness, aggressiveness, continuity, timeliness, and reliability. Soviet and Warsaw Pact Army documents (in translation) are used extensively.

A recent Combined Arms Center study concluded that the U.S. Army's counterreconnaissance doctrine, force structure, and training are deficient. Beginning with this assertion, the monograph briefly explores the historical and current relationship between effective tactical reconnaissance and success on the battlefield. Then a detailed analysis of the Soviet reconnaissance capability determines that, despite difficulties in executing their doctrine, the Soviets possess a significant capability for "seeing" through the depth of the modern battlefield.

The monograph stresses the correlation between the Soviet reconnaissance effort and their doctrine of developing operations into the tactical and operational depth of the battlefield. Consequently, Soviet reconnaissance patrols will operate in American rear areas. The monograph concludes with the suggestion that the U.S. Army should place greater emphasis on counterreconnaissance in its own rear areas -- in effect, blinding the enemy.


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
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I. Introduction

The whole art of war consists of getting at what lies on the other side of the hill, or in other words, in deciding what we do not know from what we do. (1)
The Duke of Wellington

Reconnaissance is a critical combat function. The commander who can best see what lies "on the other side of the hill" begins the battle with a distinct advantage over his enemy. And as the above quotation suggests, reconnaissance is only the beginning of a process that leads to victory on the battlefield. What is acquired by reconnaissance must be understood as intelligence. The commander's judgment discriminates and evaluates information provided by his reconnaissance resources. The information about the enemy and the terrain becomes the product of intelligence, and the commander acts on this intelligence to maneuver his forces for advantage over the enemy.

The advantages of good reconnaissance and good intelligence include surprising the enemy and bringing strength against weakness -- achieving mass through maneuver. Effective reconnaissance also secures our forces from the enemy's attempts to surprise us. Effective reconnaissance allows us to economize our forces and focus our resources against the chosen objective. In both the offense and the defense, reconnaissance is the first step in seizing the initiative

in battle.

Lieutenant General E.S. Leland, USA, a former Commander at the National Training Center, explained:

There is typically a battle which precedes the battle -- a confrontation of opposing reconnaissance units -- and the winner of that preliminary battle is most often the victor in the main event. (2)

In recent years the Army has been studying this reconnaissance-counterreconnaissance battle. We have come to realize how the conditions of modern combat on the AirLand battlefield require more effective reconnaissance-counterreconnaissance than ever before. Our appreciation of the importance of winning this reconnaissance-counterreconnaissance battle in modern combat is shared by the Soviets.

The conditions of modern combat, characterized by great maneuverability and by rapid and drastic situation changes, have further enhanced the role and importance of reconnaissance. Moreover, a modern confrontation of adversaries roughly equal in quantity and quality of weapons constitutes a struggle primarily to attain superiority in battlefield reconnaissance, since victory will be gained by the side that can first locate and hence destroy the most important enemy objectives. In other words, in order to defeat it is necessary not only to have the weapons needed for his destruction, but also to know exactly where he is, what he is doing, what is the nature of his fieldworks, and what he intends to do. (3)

Both the Americans and the Soviets expect the battlefield of the future to be fast-moving, non-linear, confusing, and very dangerous. There will be a positive relationship between the effectiveness of reconnaissance and intelligence and the success of combat operations. Clausewitz reminded us, however, that all relationships in war are approximate: "No other human activity is so continuously and universally bound up with chance." (4) The commander needs the best reconnaissance possible because, ultimately, "The quality of information determines the degree of real tactical risk." (5) Effective reconnaissance leads to prudent risks on the battlefield.

The focus of this monograph is a detailed analysis of Soviet tactical reconnaissance. I begin with the assertion that the current American counterreconnaissance capability at the division-level of tactical operations needs to be improved. I then examine the historical background of modern battlefield reconnaissance. I analyze the current Soviet tactical reconnaissance capability by using their own criteria of purposefulness, aggressiveness, continuity, timeliness, and reliability. This analysis determines the extent of the Soviet capability and, when linked to an understanding of their doctrine of developing military operations into the depth of the battlefield,

suggests a U.S. doctrinal deficiency for rear area operations. I will conclude my monograph with a brief discussion of this deficiency and offer suggestions for improving our counterreconnaissance in the division rear area. Effective counterreconnaissance will deny the enemy the information he needs to see on our "side of the hill." Counterreconnaissance will force the enemy to gamble on the battlefield and improve our chances of winning.

A Rand Corporation study in 1987 determined that the U.S. Army's doctrine and training in counterreconnaissance was flawed. The Rand study, based on experience at the National Training Center, concluded that, regardless of the OPFOR's "home court" advantage, an important factor in the OPFOR's success was its effective reconnaissance effort. The statistics offered striking proof of the correlation between effective reconnaissance and battlefield success. In a sample population of thirty-three OPFOR regimental attacks the reconnaissance effort was evaluated as good twenty-eight times. Twenty-six of those times the OPFOR won. The OPFOR reconnaissance was evaluated as poor five times, and the OPFOR lost each time. (6)

A former S-3 of the NTC's OPFOR regiment agreed that good reconnaissance was the key to the OPFOR's success. (7) Ground reconnaissance by vehicle and

foot, in conjunction with radio and radar reconnaissance, usually revealed the deployment of the defending or attacking U.S. forces. In the reconnaissance-counterreconnaissance battle, the U.S. scout platoons were either too thin on the ground or too busy with other missions to prevent the OPFOR's successful reconnaissance by infiltration. U.S. infantry often failed to patrol beyond the immediate vicinity of their battle positions. U.S. battalions rarely patrolled their rear areas or attempted deception measures against the OPFOR. (8) Clearly, the performance of U.S. battalions at the National Training Center demonstrated a deficiency in U.S. Army doctrine and training to defeat the Soviet reconnaissance effort.

But does a counterreconnaissance deficiency at the battalion or brigade level translate to a problem at the division level? Yes, I am convinced that it does. Effective Soviet reconnaissance in our main battle area allows him to bring overwhelming combat power to bear at any point of his choosing. Because the Soviets intend to penetrate into the depths of our defense quickly, any successful infiltration through the main battle area threatens reserve forces and rear area facilities with enemy long-range fires and combat forces. Soviet tactics require their reconnaissance forces to find the routes that will turn a fight on

the FEBA into an offensive through the depths of our defense.

To succeed...attacking sub-units [companies, battalions, regiments] must maneuver fire and resources. Every breach and vulnerable spot in the enemy's battle formation must be exploited to breakthrough to the flanks and rear of enemy strong-points, advance swiftly into the depth, and make a surprise strike. (9)

The U.S. battalion or brigade that loses the reconnaissance-counterreconnaissance fight jeopardizes the division's defense.

The U.S. Army has realized there is a need to improve its counterreconnaissance doctrine and training. Based on NTC experience, as well as reports from the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), the Commanding General of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) tasked the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth to begin a special study in August of 1988 on the subject of Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Counterreconnaissance. The second phase of this study, focusing on division level operations, was completed in October of 1989. A key finding was that counterreconnaissance planning (defined as "all measures taken to prevent hostile observation of a force, area, or place") is not being done at the division level. (10) The study also noted other deficiencies in our counter-reconnaissance training, force structure, and equipment.

The Combined Arms Center study confirms the assertion that there is a need to improve how we will fight to defeat Soviet tactical reconnaissance. The study recommends improvements. My monograph analyzes the threat's capability for tactical reconnaissance in order to determine the extent of the problem. My monograph will argue, however, that the CAC study fails (as does our current doctrine) to address adequately the counterreconnaissance challenge in the U.S. division's rear area. Our counterreconnaissance program focuses on winning in the close battle. We expect to fight the Soviet reconnaissance forces using our combat and combat support soldiers in the main battle area. We must understand, however, that the counterreconnaissance fight continues throughout the depth of our defense and involves every soldier in the division. The Soviet reconnaissance effort does not stop at the forward edge of the battle area.

II. Historical Background

The entire experience of the [Great Patriotic] war, both of some failed operations at its beginning and of successfully conducted ones in its subsequent periods, showed convincingly that success in battle depends first and foremost on how carefully the enemy has been reconnoitered and how accurately and reliably fire has been delivered on the major objectives and targets of his defenses. (11)

Marshal of the Soviet Union
S.L. Sokolov

Clausewitz believed that the defender, by using the terrain of the battlefield wisely, enjoyed a significant tactical advantage over the attacker.

...the defender is better placed to spring surprises by the strength and direction of his own attacks.... Ever since the right method of defense was adopted, reconnaissance has gone out of fashion -- or rather, it has become impossible. Some reconnaissance is still carried out now and again, but as a rule nothing much comes of it. (12)

The futility of reconnaissance against the "right method of defense" was exemplified by the battle of Waterloo. Time and again the French columns stumbled into Allied strength. Wellington, a master at choosing defensible terrain, frustrated Napoleon's attempts to break his lines. The Emperor never clearly saw what lay on the Allied "side of the hill." The nature of battle changed, however, in the years after Napoleon, Wellington, and Clausewitz. The greater lethality of rifles and artillery demanded greater dispersion on the battlefield. The larger armies and their better logistics capabilities expanded military operations in breadth and depth in the theater of operations. This evolution in tactics challenged Clausewitz's assertion that tactical reconnaissance was "impossible."

The Prussian Army in 1870 discovered that the non-linear battlefield of their day allowed for effective tactical and operational reconnaissance.

...the timidity of the French cavalry patrols contrasted unfavorably with the boldness of the Germans. German Uhlans, light cavalry, crossed the frontier...not full squadrons such as the French used, compelled by their size to keep to the main roads, but small groups of one officer and two or three men, cutting telegraph lines, raiding railways, and laying the foundations of that moral superiority which the German cavalry was never thereafter to lose. (13)

These small patrols, some covering almost ninety miles in a single day, provided the Prussian commanders accurate reports of the French dispositions. Consequently, the Prussian corps moved to meet the French on terms of their own choosing. The Prussians marched confident of their own security until reaching the battlefield. Effective reconnaissance-counterreconnaissance at this grand tactical level allowed the Prussians to conduct an almost administrative march into France. Their corps marched faster and with less fatigue than if they had been required to march prepared for an unexpected encounter with their enemy. (14)

Even on the battlefield reconnaissance was possible by small cavalry patrols. "I could relate many cases," recalled one Prussian commander, "in which single horsemen have watched the enemy from the shortest distances without attracting his attention; the hotter the fight the easier was this to do." (15)

Audacious patrol leaders used the confusion of the battlefield to infiltrate French positions. The Prussians concluded that smaller was better for tactical reconnaissance: "a simple officer's patrol reconnoitres better and sees more than an entire squadron." (16)

The Prussians also differentiated between security and reconnaissance duties: "sicherheitsdienst" and "aufklarungsdienst" respectively. Security duties protected the main body of the forces on the march. Reconnaissance duties acquired information for the commanders and their staffs. The effects of these two duties were complementary. The small reconnaissance patrols probed and penetrated the enemy dispositions. These patrols reported the information that helped commanders direct their forces onto the flanks and rear of the enemy formations. An advancing cavalry screen prevented the enemy's reconnaissance forces (which were too large to move stealthily) from finding the main body. The Prussian officer's patrol of a few men, unobserved among the French forces, was really the vanguard of the Prussian division or corps that arrived on the battlefield within hours or days -- and often on the flank and rear of the French positions. "I am at first only puny and small," wrote the Prussian officer regarding reconnaissance, "but my wings grow as I fly." (17)

The Prussian experience in 1870-1871 proved that reconnaissance was both possible and essential on the post-Napoleonic battlefield. And many of the tactical lessons of the Franco-Prussian war, such as the reliance on small patrols and the distinction between reconnaissance and security duties, are apparent in current Soviet doctrine.

The Soviet Army's current manual on tactical reconnaissance emphasizes the importance of good reconnaissance to successful combat operations. Recalling the Soviet Army's Russian military heritage, Tactical Reconnaissance reminds the reader that outstanding Russian generals, like the legendary Marshal Suvarov, have always attached exceptional importance to reconnaissance in the defeat of the enemy:

For example, in 1778, before the start of the celebrated encounter with the Turks at Rimnicu -- where a Russian army of 25,000 destroyed a Turkish army of 100,000 -- the great Russian general, A.V. Suvarov, carried out reconnaissance with a few officers and Cossacks. In a grove on the bank of the Rymna river, he chose a branched, fairly tall oak tree, climbed up into it and began to observe the enemy with a telescope... and immediately drew up a plan for the impending engagement. He decided to bring up his forces covertly and attack the enemy. At daybreak... Suvarov crossed the Rymna River, led his troops into the attack, and, in a fierce encounter that lasted 12 hours, completely routed the 100,000-man Turkish army.... (18)

While it is unlikely that modern Soviet generals will climb into trees with telescopes, personal reconnaissance of the battlefield is still considered important. The Russian Army's traditional excellence in tactical reconnaissance carries forward today in the Soviet Army's determination to excel in the reconnaissance-counterreconnaissance battle.

The Soviet military theorist, V.K. Triandafillov, believed that an army commander must provide himself with sufficient ground and air reconnaissance to gather information throughout the depths of the enemy's dispositions. Reconnaissance requirements extended beyond the line of contact with the enemy: "The command element...must direct its main attention to the enemy rear area to detect in a timely manner areas of supply of new enemy forces." (19) Indeed, the 1927 Soviet cavalry field manual envisioned reconnaissance patrols moving as far as 100 kilometers in advance of the main body. (20)

The advent of mechanization in twentieth-century warfare actually increased the requirements for timely and accurate reconnaissance. The German general, Heinz Guderian, in his Armored Forces (1937) echoed the observations and conclusions of his Prussian ancestors.

Reconnaissance calls for highly mobile, flexible, and easily handled units that possess a wide radius of

action and good means of communication. Reconnaissance forces must observe and report to a maximum, without being observed themselves. Therefore, the smaller the reconnaissance element and the more readily it lends itself to concealment, the easier the accomplishment of its mission will be. (21)

The German Army in WWII fielded reconnaissance units that were able to move fast and report fast. Indeed, the success of the Blitzkrieg depended on the tank, the airplane, and the radio-equipped reconnaissance and command and control units that Guderian pioneered. (22)

Even as the Soviet Army was struggling to transform itself into the modern mechanized force envisioned by Triandafillov and Tukhachevskiy it suffered a disastrous defeat at the hands of the German Army. A strategic-operational intelligence failure, coupled with abysmal tactical reconnaissance, nearly destroyed the Soviet Army in the opening battles of the Russian campaign -- Operation Barbarossa. The resilience of the Red Army allowed the Soviet commanders the time to rebuild and relearn. And as Marshal Sokolov's quotation at the beginning of this chapter states, the importance of reconnaissance in battle was a fundamental lesson.

The Soviet Army learned how to win the reconnaissance-counterreconnaissance battle by the summer of 1943. The Germans launched their attack at Kursk with

either incomplete or inaccurate information. Soviet tactical reconnaissance corroborated operational intelligence of the German preparations. Soviet counterreconnaissance, coupled with a successful deception plan, denied the Germans the intelligence they needed to devise a prudent plan. Consequently, the German attack at Kursk was a gamble at poor odds that failed. (23)

The experience of the Great Patriotic War taught the Soviets the connection between reconnaissance, intelligence, and success in battle. Their current doctrine cites reconnaissance as "the most important [my emphasis] type of combat support." (24)

...one of the main conditions for success is constant and aggressive reconnaissance of the enemy... forces that remain unaware of enemy positions, forces, and intentions... lose the initiative, and, as a result, suffer defeat. (25)

If we expect to defeat the enemy we must first defeat their reconnaissance effort. The first step to winning this reconnaissance-counterreconnaissance battle is understanding the Soviet Army's tactical reconnaissance doctrine, organizations, and tactics.

III. Soviet Tactical Reconnaissance

The Soviets have a special term that incorporates the correlation between reconnaissance and intelligence: razvedka. The Soviets understand razvedka as both the process of acquiring information through reconnaissance and the product of intelligence for military operations. Razvedka is a requirement at the lowest tactical level through to the highest strategic level. At all levels, razvedka efforts must work together towards a common goal. The Soviet Military Encyclopedia defines razvedka as:

The obtaining, collection, and study of data about military-political conditions in individual countries and in probable or actual enemy coalition nations; their armed forces and military-economic potential; the compositions, dispositions, condition, nature of actions, and intentions of groups of forces; and also the theater of operations. (26)

The definition shows a sophisticated integration of political, economic, geographic, and military considerations. For the purpose of my monograph, however, we will focus on tactical razvedka -- the activity at levels below army-size -- "responsible for obtaining and analyzing information about the enemy before and during battle." (27) Specifically, I will analyze the Soviet's ground reconnaissance capability at the tactical level of operations -- division and below.

Ground reconnaissance is, "the principal type of

reconnaissance of the Ground Forces and is divided in turn into troop, radio-electronic, radar, artillery, engineer, radiological, and chemical warfare reconnaissance." (28) Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions contain specialized organizations to conduct the different types of ground reconnaissance. The reconnaissance information reported by these different organizations is collected and processed centrally by the division's Chief of Reconnaissance who is also the Chief of Intelligence. Unlike the G2 in the U.S. Army, the Chief of Reconnaissance exercises direct operational control of all reconnaissance units within his division. (29) The Chief of Reconnaissance at regiment and division is not subordinate to the operations officer.

Troop reconnaissance includes the activities of specialized units: the divisional reconnaissance battalion, the regimental reconnaissance companies, and the reconnaissance sub-units of artillery, engineer, and chemical units. Troop reconnaissance also includes the special reconnaissance missions (observations, raids, ambushes, reconnaissances in force) conducted by tank and motorized rifle units. (30)

The Soviets make the same distinction between reconnaissance duties and security duties that the Prussians did. Reconnaissance duties are performed by

specialized units moving well in advance of the main body in conformity to reconnaissance-intelligence objectives. Security duties are performed by the advanced guard elements detached from a parent tank or motorized rifle formation that move in conformity with the main body. While advanced guard elements will fight to protect the main body,

Combat [by reconnaissance units] will be avoided -- the aim will be to infiltrate enemy positions and determine the depth deployment of the enemy. The only time when enemy positions will be attacked is when nuclear delivery means are identified. (31)

Patrols from the divisional and regimental reconnaissance units will attempt to infiltrate in groups of 2 to 6 vehicles moving along covered routes into the tactical depth of our defenses. (32)

Each Soviet tank and motorized rifle regiment has a reconnaissance company that will operate 25 kilometers forward of its parent formation. This company includes approximately 5 officers and 50 men organized into a company headquarters, a BMP platoon of 3 vehicles, a BRDM platoon of 4 vehicles, and a motorcycle section of 3 vehicles. The primary radio is the vehicle mounted R-123 VHF transceiver that has a range of 55 kilometers. The company also has a man-portable battlefield surveillance radar comparable to our AN/PFS-5. (33)

Each Soviet tank and motorized rifle division has a reconnaissance battalion that will operate 50 kilometers forward. This battalion has a total strength of approximately 350 men organized into a headquarters company; two BMP companies of 7 BMPs, 3 tanks, and 2 chemical scout cars each; one BRDM company of 13 scout cars; and one radio/radar reconnaissance company capable of radio and radar intercept and direction finding to a depth of 60 kilometers. (34) Recent studies of the reconnaissance battalion also assign a long-range reconnaissance company of 6 officers and 27 men to the battalion. This company is probably airborne qualified and would operate along the lines of the U.S. Army's long-range surveillance detachments and out to a depth of 100 kilometers. (35)

The artillery regiment's target acquisition battery includes a sound ranging platoon, a reconnaissance platoon for selecting displacement locations, and surveillance radar sections that use electronic line-of-sight counterbattery radars and direction finding radars. The divisional Chief of Rocket Troops and Artillery (CRTA) will coordinate closely with the Chief of Reconnaissance both to pass on reports from artillery observers and to use reconnaissance resources to detect high value targets for indirect fires. (36)

The engineer battalion includes an engineer reconnaissance platoon of 6 vehicles. Patrols from this platoon will travel well in advance of the main body in order to scout routes to and around natural or man-made obstacles. The Soviet emphasis on speed, especially regarding river crossing operations, requires competent engineer reconnaissance hours before any anticipated crossing. (37)

The chemical defense battalion includes a chemical reconnaissance platoon of 9 BRDM vehicles. These vehicles will supplement the divisional reconnaissance battalion's radiological and chemical detection capability. Both the engineer and chemical reconnaissance platoons will be task organized with divisional patrols to reconnoiter selected objectives or routes.

The advent of new technology poses challenges to Soviet tactical reconnaissance. Recent articles in Warsaw Pact military periodicals ponder the problems of locating and jamming burst transmitter and frequency hopping radios. The enemy realizes that our investment in high technology communications equipment must be matched with a corresponding investment in their radio-electronic warfare capability. (38) The Soviets currently have the capability to conduct radar reconnaissance over an area 60 kilometers deep by 50 kilometers across. They believe that the integration of their

radio-electronic and radar reconnaissance (both within the resources of a divisional reconnaissance battalion) allows them to template the locations of U.S. forces based upon the types of radios and radar emitters used in our organizations. (39) The Soviets hope to use this information for maneuvering their forces and massing their fires. An important caveat, however, is the enemy's attitude that radio-electronic and radar reconnaissance only supplement information from other reconnaissance sources. (40) The Soviets prefer to confirm or deny SIGINT or ELINT information by ground-troop reconnaissance. "The Soviets," says Richard Simpkin, "very sensibly like to have a man on the spot." (41)

The Soviets have also begun fielding remotely piloted vehicles and remote electronic sensors -- perhaps as a result of their experience in Afghanistan where the terrain and the enemy made troop reconnaissance difficult and dangerous. (42) Such electronic devices will enhance the division's capability.

Owing to the employment of more sophisticated optical instruments, infrared technology, television, and other technical reconnaissance equipment, the capabilities of observation have been considerably expanded -- especially at night and in other unfavorable conditions: the very times the enemy will usually carry out regroupings or his resources and strengthen occupied positions. (43)

As already mentioned, ground-troop reconnaissance also includes reconnaissance missions performed by non-specialized tank or motorized rifle units. The divisional Chief of Reconnaissance can request from the division's Chief of Staff the tasking authority to assign missions for platoons, companies or even battalions. Reinforced platoons and companies may form "independent reconnaissance patrols" to scout "the enemy and terrain on the march, in anticipation of a meeting engagement...in the course of an offensive...or on the defensive." (44) Platoons, companies, and battalions may be tasked to conduct a "reconnaissance in force" in order "to determine the enemy's grouping, ... to learn the details of his system of engineer preparation of the ground and of his fire plan, and to determine the true shape of his FEBA...." (45) The Soviets realize that reconnaissance in force substitutes brute strength for stealth, but they also realize that the tactical situation may make this kind of reconnaissance either preferable or unavoidable. An MRB may be better suited (or more expendable) than a reconnaissance unit to discover the strength of a prepared defense. Several western military analysts believe that one company of every tank and motorized rifle battalion in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany is routinely required to conduct troop reconnaissance training. (46) If

this is true, the Soviets will have a great many units to perform independent reconnaissance patrol missions, albeit not to the standard of the specialized units. The Soviet division's Chief of Reconnaissance will be controlling literally dozens of patrols simultaneously, and these patrols will range from the small detachment of the long-range reconnaissance company observing the MSR 100 kilometers deep, to the engineer patrol performing a hydrographic survey at a possible river crossing site 50 kilometers deep, to the reinforced battalion conducting a reconnaissance in force on the FEBA.

I have limited my survey of the Soviet ground reconnaissance to the tactical level: the division-level and below. In a Soviet offensive, however, reconnaissance assets from Army and Front will be allocated to the main effort. A defending U.S. division may find itself contending with a greater redundancy of radio-electronic and radar reconnaissance assets as well as a greater density of ground-troop reconnaissance units. The Army's SPETSNAZ company, for example, will operate its 15 teams at depths of 50 to 200 kilometers. The Soviet razvedka effort at the operational level will complement the tactical level; the engagements won at the tactical level will contribute to success at the operational level.

Soviet military doctrine calls for the development of an "engagement in depth," that is, "the simultaneous and massive employment of weaponry throughout the depth of the enemy's tactical zone of defense." (47) The defender will define the dimensions of his tactical defense by the terrain, the forces and time available, and the political-military object at risk. In a conventional war scenario, the Soviets expect the defending NATO forces to have less than 96 hours to occupy and prepare their defensive positions. Consequently, NATO's hasty or partially prepared defense will, to some extent, define the Soviet objective depths. A Soviet regiment's immediate objective will be the rear of the NATO brigade, and its subsequent objective will be the destruction of the NATO reserve brigade. A Soviet division's immediate objective will be the destruction of the NATO reserve brigade, and its subsequent objective will be the rear of the NATO division. The Soviets expect to be able to effect a penetration into the tactical depth of the defending NATO division, into the NATO division's rear area, within 24 hours of combat. (48) The Soviet's regimental and divisional reconnaissance must provide the information to achieve the required destruction of the NATO reserve brigade and the penetration into the NATO division's rear area. Divisional reconnaissance resources, pri

marily HUMINT from troop reconnaissance, will observe objectives in the depths of the defense for battalion-sized forward detachments and air assaults. (49) Divisional long-range reconnaissance elements, in cooperation with Army-level SPETSNAZ, will provide the detailed and timely information required by the regimental-sized forward detachments, the air assault battalion and brigade from Army and Front respectively, and the division and larger-sized "operational maneuver groups" -- the OMG. (50)

Reconnaissance is also crucial in the timing and the targeting of 2nd echelon formations. The 2nd echelon is supposed to maintain the momentum of the attack, exploit success, and penetrate into the depth of the defense. The 2nd echelon is the decisive echelon of the Soviet attack. Exercise "ZAPAD-81" demonstrated the value of reconnaissance at even the shallowest tactical depth:

A situation had developed where the "southern" forces, having lost their first defensive position, had hastily begun to move up their reserves to counterattack and reinforce their defenses in depth. This was discovered in time by "northern" force reconnaissance...the commander of the "northern" battalion decided to commit his second echelon...the attacking subunits succeeded in disrupting the defender's concept and in maintaining the momentum of advance. The "southern" forces did not have time to deploy for a counterattack

and were unable to put up stout resistance. The "northern" forces successfully breached the defense. (51)

All Soviet reconnaissance-intelligence is complementary. The report from a regimental patrol will affect the division's fire support plan; the report from a divisional patrol will affect the commitment of an Army OMG. The Soviet patrol, like the Prussian patrol, is "at first only puny and small." But its power to affect the battle is out of all proportion to its size.

The Soviet's razvedka (reconnaissance-intelligence) effort must succeed in order to develop the offensive battle with the depth and tempo required by their doctrine. The razvedka effort must generate a cumulative effect. The Soviet commander must see through the depth of the enemy's dispositions. His reconnaissance effort must be purposeful and aggressive. His reconnaissance information must be continuous, timely, and reliable. The Soviet's razvedka program is ambitious, but is their capability credible? I will now analyze their tactical reconnaissance capability against their own criteria.

Purposefulness is "the strict subordination of all reconnaissance measures to...supporting the preparation and successful waging of combat...and in concentrating the reconnaissance efforts on the main axis and on the discovery of the most important objectives." (52) As

already mentioned, the Soviet Army has a chief of reconnaissance at every level from regiment upwards. This Chief of Reconnaissance is also the Chief of Intelligence demonstrating the Soviet concept of razvedka as a reconnaissance process and intelligence product. Although the Chief of Reconnaissance has operational control of the reconnaissance forces in his zone of operations, he may not have selected the forces' objectives because each higher headquarters reserves the right to assign missions in accordance with its own razvedka plan. (53) Strictly speaking, this subordination of effort should produce an efficient and integrated result. However, as these higher headquarters become further removed from the immediate battlefield their razvedka plan may become inflexible and incorrect. Razvedka objectives may change in the course of the battle.

At the tactical level of operations the Chief of Reconnaissance is coequal with the operations officer. Therefore, the organic reconnaissance units are not subordinate to the operations officer. The reconnaissance-intelligence officer and the operations officer must cooperate to conduct operations. The Chief of Staff must resolve all disputes between these primary staff officers. The staff dynamics and personalities involved may interfere with effective cooperation of effort.

Soviet reconnaissance forces are used strictly for reconnaissance missions. They will not be employed in the traffic control and other distracting duties that NATO scouts often perform. Soviet reconnaissance forces are structured for speed and stealth, not for fighting a covering force-type battle. Compare the number of tanks in a Soviet and U.S. reconnaissance battalion. The Soviet battalion has 6 tanks; the U.S. ACR squadron has 41 tanks. The new U.S. divisional cavalry squadron has no tanks. The criticism that this TO&E makes the squadron incapable of fighting for reconnaissance information demonstrates the different American attitude towards reconnaissance. Soviet reconnaissance forces have one purpose: reconnaissance. Their tanks will provide protection for their patrols. They will avoid combat except when presented the opportunity to attack nuclear delivery assets.

The Soviets expect that there will be more reconnaissance missions than there are reconnaissance units. Therefore, tank and motorized rifle platoons and companies may be assigned reconnaissance missions. While these units will lack the expertise of the specialized units the net effect will be a significantly increased density of patrols throughout the depth of the battlefield. The expertise shortcoming can be minimized by assigning the tank and motorized rifle platoons as

OPCON to the specialized units, e.g. giving the engineer reconnaissance officer a motorized rifle platoon to help secure his own specialists while moving to and acting on the objective. A problem might occur, however, when the Chief of Reconnaissance asks for the authority to task these non-specialized units. Will the operations officer or the affected sub-unit commander willingly give up a significant portion of his maneuver forces? Will the Chief of Staff or the commander be able to balance the requirements for reconnaissance and maneuver? I suspect a compromise solution may prove a poor solution in combat.

Tactical Reconnaissance cites a successful example of purposefulness in WWII. The 1st Belorussian Front's zone in the Vistula-Oder operation was 230 kilometers wide. They concentrated 90% of their artillery reconnaissance resources in the selected breakthrough sectors totaling only 34 kilometers! (54) Given the requirement for subordination and concentration of reconnaissance resources in support of the main effort, and given a Soviet commander willing to take risks, might not the reconnaissance units from the 2nd echelon regiments and divisions be taken from their parent formations and sent deep immediately? This would increase the number of well-trained patrols infiltrating the U.S. dispositions early in the battle and would

probably confuse U.S. intelligence analysts. I think such a non-traditional approach would be productive and purposeful.

Aggressiveness in reconnaissance "is achieved by the skillful exploitation of its various resources, and by the extensive manifestation of initiative, quick-wittedness, resourcefulness, decisiveness, and daring.... Reconnaissance can accomplish its mission only if it...overcomes the enemy's opposition." (55) Aggressiveness may be demonstrated by the radio-electronic technician as well as the SPETSNAZ soldier. In either case, however, "a high level of training among the personnel of reconnaissance subunits" is as desirable as it is difficult to attain -- especially in the conscripted Soviet Army. (56) Aggressiveness also implies risk-taking. Soviet reconnaissance units will suffer casualties in the process of accomplishing their mission. Indeed, the same aggressiveness that sends the patrol deeper may lose that patrol to an unexpected encounter with the enemy consequently jeopardizing the mission. Soviet doctrine requires these patrols to move fast and far. The Soviets will try to minimize their risks by advancing in small groups on numerous routes (6 to 8 patrols over 3 to 4 axis for divisional reconnaissance). Christopher Donnelly believes that the Soviets will commit their reconnais-

sance forces at the same time, and not in advance, of their 1st echelon formations, thus preserving surprise and protecting their reconnaissance units in the confusion of the initial engagements. (57) Regardless of how successful the Soviet reconnaissance infiltration may be, the purposefulness and aggressiveness that places a patrol on or near a crucial objective may also violate the reconnaissance security that "consists in keeping strictly secret...the concentration of its main efforts." (58) If the Soviet reconnaissance effort is detected, then they risk losing the object of their aggressiveness. One analyst, for example, speculates that the Soviet's dread of FASCAM-type munitions will make their patrols behave with extreme caution during route reconnaissances. (59) The notions of aggressiveness and security are mutually exclusive without exceptional resourcefulness on the part of the soldiers and staffs involved.

Continuity requires reconnaissance "to the entire depth of the enemy's position and throughout the engagement, combining the efforts of all reconnaissance resources...in terms of time and objectives." (60) The redundancy of reconnaissance systems, the integration of their information, and the centralized control of all reconnaissance-intelligence efforts is supposed to achieve a continuous intelligence picture of the

battlefield. Time and space considerations, however, work against continuity of reconnaissance. Units can move faster than information can be processed. The Soviet desire to confirm reconnaissance information with a patrol "on the spot" necessarily involves delay, even against a relatively immobile target. A moving target will be very difficult to track continuously. The collection and coordination of information from the various ground reconnaissance sources (troop, engineer, chemical, artillery, ADA, etc.) will be time consuming. The physical dimensions of the troop reconnaissance mission argues against continuous information.

Tactical Calculations, published in Moscow in 1982, offers a troop reconnaissance planning equation. (61) In order to determine the probability of a patrol detecting a target within a specified area, the planner multiplies the patrol's observation range by its movement rate and divides the product by the area to be searched. For example: assume the Soviets infiltrate 8 motorized patrols into a U.S. division's rear area; the rear area is 20 kilometers by 40 kilometers; the Soviet patrols can always observe 3 kilometers while they are moving at an average of 5 kilometers an hour; and that each Soviet patrol searches a separate 10km by 10km area. Then: $\frac{3\text{km} \times 5\text{km/hr}}{100 \text{ sq km}} = 15\%$ probability of target detection for each hour of search.

Therefore, it will take this patrol 6 hours to achieve a 90% probability of detecting its target. This is obviously a crude calculation that makes no attempt to account for the fog and friction of battle. Yet this planning norm clearly demonstrates how difficult continuous reconnaissance will be even in ideal conditions. The maneuver-oriented, non-linear battlefield of the future will preclude continuous reconnaissance.

Timeliness means that "the necessary reconnaissance information must be known to the commander by a set time, so that he will be able to foresee the nature of the actions the enemy is about to undertake." (62) Timely intelligence, then, requires prompt communication and correct interpretation. The Soviet's dependence on "systematic monitoring...at fixed deadlines" of communicated reconnaissance reports makes them vulnerable to jamming and direction finding. (63) The very tempo of their operations may prevent information being received, processed, and used in a timely manner, that is, in sufficient time for the commander to take advantage of the latest intelligence. The absence of scout helicopters in the reconnaissance battalion is a serious deficiency.

The processing of information into the intelligence product "consists in studying, recording, and

analyzing it, then consolidating it and formulating conclusions." (64) The Chief of Reconnaissance and his small staff may well be overwhelmed by the number of incoming reconnaissance reports generated during an attack. The judgment to select the critical bit of information from among so many reports remains a rare quality. As Soviet General Gredasov remarked, the key to success in reconnaissance is "not only the availability of [the] means, but also the ability of the commanders of all levels to use them with the maximum effectiveness." (65)

Reliability "is achieved by careful study, comparison, and cross-checking...and, where necessary, by conducting a final reconnaissance in order to discover in time any steps taken by the enemy to mislead and conceal." (66) The Soviets assign a numerical grade to reconnaissance information as a method of classifying its reliability. These grades are:

- 1 = confirmed (by other sources or elements)
- 2 = completely reliable
- 3 = possibly reliable
- 4 = reliability doubtful
- 5 = reliability improbable
- 6 = reliability impossible to establish (67)

The most reliable information has been confirmed by multiple reconnaissance assets, including HUMINT. The Soviets, reflecting their own predilection for deception, hesitate to trust information acquired from a single source. Reliability requires well trained

troops, highly capable and redundant reconnaissance technology, and analysts who can make a reasoned guess. A strictly formulaic approach to evaluating information from the battlefield is bound to fail -- the human element cannot be calculated.

I think that this analysis of the Soviet tactical reconnaissance capability demonstrates that the enemy will have problems acquiring information and producing intelligence in a purposeful, aggressive, continuous, timely, and reliable way. Despite the difficulties, however, the Soviet commander still possesses a significant and dangerous reconnaissance potential. The recent Combined Arms Center study acknowledged:

....His intelligence gathering efforts employ a well integrated and redundant system whose strength is derived from numbers of systems, deliberately programmed duplication of reconnaissance means, centralized control, and close integration with the combat arms. (68)

We cannot ignore the Soviet reconnaissance threat, especially in our rear area. My concluding chapter offers some suggestions to improve both our doctrine and our training for fighting the Soviet reconnaissance patrols we must expect in our divisional rear areas.

IV. Conclusion

...Absolutely critical to our ability to conduct close and deep operations...we must look at the rear battle through the enemy's eyes and perspective and, with an appreciation of his capabilities, determine the greatest threat to our rear areas. (69)

General Crosbie Saint, USA

The Army's experiences at the National Training Center, as well as observations from the Battle Command Training Program, have convinced the leadership of the Army that we must improve our counterreconnaissance capability. Our doctrine and training will soon address this perceived deficiency (see appendix A). Yet our Army's focus for counterreconnaissance is in the main battle area -- killing the Soviet scouts forward in our defense. The proposed Combined Arms Center counterreconnaissance responsibility matrix emphasizes counterreconnaissance being fought by the division's combat arms maneuver units (see appendix B). (70) Soviet reconnaissance patrols, however, will infiltrate into the depth of a defending American division. The experience of history (on the battlefields of the Franco-Prussian war and the NTC) has proven that the Soviets will succeed. Some number of their patrols will penetrate into the division's rear area. Unless we aggressively seek out and neutralize these patrols we concede the initiative, and quite probably the

victory, to the enemy.

Our doctrine does recognize the importance of rear area operations to:

...protect and sustain command and control and combat service support... to protect the commander's freedom of action by preventing disruption of command and control, fire support, logistical support, and movement of reserves. (71)

And our doctrine realizes that enemy reconnaissance patrols, classified as level II rear area threats, will be in the division's rear area. (72) Yet our doctrine also contains a dangerous passivity towards rear area security operations.

When possible, the defending commander should contain and avoid enemy forces in his rear area rather than attacking them with forces needed in the MBA. Unless such enemy units pose an immediate threat [my emphasis] he should defer attacking them until after the battle is stabilized or won. (73)

The latest Division Operations manual explains initiative in rear operations in this way:

Initiative -- The division aggressively denies the enemy landing areas [my emphasis] to restrict access to critical bases and to ensure continuous logistic support. (74)

I believe that our doctrine reflects our attitude that rear area security operations are only important when countering level III threats -- fighting enemy combat

formations of battalion size or larger. We will defend against level I and II threats; we will attack to defeat level III threats. Our defensive attitude against enemy reconnaissance patrols is wrong. We cannot wait for the Soviet patrol to attack us because it will not. We will be attacked, however, by the battalion, regiment, or division that follows that patrol. We must conduct counterreconnaissance in our rear area too.

Current doctrine states that the division's tactical combat force (TCF) will be committed when a level III rear area threat appears. The TCF will only coordinate with the rear battle commander (usually the ADC-S) before its commitment. (75) I suggest that the TCF begin work for the division rear battle commander immediately upon its arrival in the area of operations. A portion of the TCF (one or two companies) can conduct counterreconnaissance patrols while the remainder prepares to counter level III threats. Light infantry forces can conduct patrols and ambushes. Even a squad-sized ambush may be able to destroy a Soviet motorized reconnaissance patrol.

Our Army does not do a good job on rear area IPB. (76) The Soviets know our IPB techniques and will attempt to use our terrain analysis against us. (77) They will plan their infiltration routes to use

"slow-go" or "no-go" terrain. They expect to move faster on "poor" routes because they will not have to fight for their advance. We must improve our rear area IPB to identify these likely infiltration routes and reconnaissance objectives. We should consider using remote sensors in our own rear areas. We should consider allocating IEW assets (radio DF) to detect enemy observers in our rear. Finally, we must remember that counterreconnaissance includes "all measures to prevent hostile observation of a force, area, or place." Counterreconnaissance includes deception, camouflage, and OPSEC.

Divisions rarely plan for fire support in their rear areas. (78) Commanders do not like to keep artillery in reserve. While we do not require artillery to defeat Soviet reconnaissance patrols, we may need artillery to defeat air assaults and forward detachments. I suggest that the artillery battalion normally DS to the reserve brigade be placed in direct support of the rear battle and be positioned with batteries able to range likely landing zones (LZs). Immediately available fires can destroy an enemy air assault in progress. The USAF AC 130 cannot survive against a sophisticated air defense. We can use this aircraft, flying safely over our own rear area, to identify and destroy Soviet patrols. (79)

Air defense artillery assets must be placed to cover likely LZs. These soldiers must expect to encounter Soviet patrols scouting the same LZs.

Engineers must also be alert to the Soviet reconnaissance threat. They must provide their own local security against Soviet patrols even as they work within the brigade and division rear areas.

Military Police are the "linchpin" of rear battle, but their requirements exceed their resources. (80) The rear battle commander must prioritize their missions. MP area security patrols should include the threat routes and observation points identified by the rear area IPB.

Combat service support soldiers must be trained to identify and report Soviet reconnaissance activity. Base defense must include local patrolling (e.g. ambushes 1-2 km beyond the perimeter). We should consider assigning rear area counterreconnaissance missions to combat units reorganizing or reconstituting in our rear area. The G-2, G-4, and DISCOM Commander must coordinate their activities in the rear area.

Divisions must staff Rear Area Operations Centers (RAOC) to be capable of managing all the battlefield operating systems. The RAOC staff must participate in exercises regularly. Divisions usually expect the DISCOM Commander to control the fight against level I

and II rear area threats while the ADC-S assumes command of the fight against level III threats. This command and control arrangement usually leads to confusion at a critical moment in the rear battle. (S1) The ADC-S must fight the division's rear battle. One commander should synchronize the rear area security effort throughout the course of the battle.

This monograph has analyzed the Soviet tactical reconnaissance capability and its crucial role in their tactics. Soviet reconnaissance patrols will operate in our rear area. We must understand that an aggressive counterreconnaissance effort in our rear area will slow the tempo of the enemy's operations and affect his maneuver and fires into the depth of the battlefield. The U.S. Army is improving its counterreconnaissance doctrine and training. This monograph has offered suggestions how we can better defeat the Soviet tactical reconnaissance effort by focusing more of our efforts to the counterreconnaissance fight in the U.S. division's rear area.

ENDNOTES

1. Quoted in Robert Patterson, "Reconnaissance and Surveillance on the European Battlefield," NATO's Sixteen Nations (July 1986), p. 62.
2. Martin Goldsmith, Applying the National Training Center Experience: Tactical Reconnaissance, p. 2.
3. R.G. Simonyan and S.V. Grishin, Tactical Reconnaissance, p. 4.
4. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, p. 85.
5. Richard Simpkin, Red Armour, p. 173.
6. Goldsmith, p. 9.
7. David Ozolek, "Reconnaissance Planning," Infantry (March-April 1986), p. 27.
8. David Ozolek, "Counterreconnaissance," Infantry (September-October 1986), pp. 34-37.
9. V.G. Reznichenko, Tactics, p. 100.
10. Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Counter-reconnaissance (R/S/CR) Special Study Group, Phase II Report (SECRET), pp. I-1, I-2, and I-7. All references to this report will draw on the unclassified portions.
11. Quoted in Michael Dueweke, "Soviet Reconnaissance: An Overview," How They Fight (April-June 1988), p. 15.
12. Clausewitz, p. 361.
13. Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War, p. 73.
14. Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Letters on Cavalry, pp. 41-43.
15. Hohenlohe, p. 77.
16. Hohenlohe, p. 168.
17. Hohenlohe, p. 23.
18. Simonyan, pp. 33-34.
19. V.K. Triandafilov, Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies, p. 129.

20. Triandafillov, p. 125.
21. Heinz Guderian, Armored Forces, p. 238.
22. Robert Patterson, "Reconnaissance and Surveillance on the European Battlefield," NATO's Sixteen Nations (July 1986), p. 63.
23. F. Gredasov, "Reconnaissance in Modern Battle," Soviet Military Review (June 1984), p. 14.
24. Reznichenko, p. 52.
25. Reznichenko, p. 132.
26. David Glantz, The Fundamentals of Soviet Razvedka (Intelligence-Reconnaissance), p. 4.
27. Glantz, Razvedka, p. 6.
28. Simonyan, p. 11.
29. Simpkin, Red Armour, p. 74.
30. Simonyan, pp. 11 and 33.
31. James Smith, "Eyes Everywhere? Soviet Reconnaissance Methods or Razvedka," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review (January 1989), p. 36.
32. Christopher Donnelly, "Soviet Reconnaissance, Part II," RUSI Research Centre Bulletin (March 1976), p. 73.
33. FM 100-2-3: The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization, and Equipment, pp. 4-15 and 5-192.
34. FM 100-2-3, pp. 4-67 to 4-69 and Smith's "Eyes Everywhere," p. 37.
35. David Isby, Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army, p. 373.
36. FM 100-2-3, p. 4-55 and George Norris' "The Bear Facts: Someone is Watching," Field Artillery Journal (January-February 1985), pp. 36-38.
37. Simpkin, Red Armour, p. 100.
38. Zbigniew Groszek, "Radio-Electronic Reconnaissance," Przegląd Wojsk Lotniczych (June 1988), pp. 13-19.

39. Andrzej Malik, "Analysis of the Radio-Electronic (Radar) Situation," Przeglad Wojsk Ladowych (April 1988), pp. 43-46.
40. Malik, p. 46.
41. Simpkin, Red Armour, p. 172. See also Glantz's Razvedka, pp. 7-8.
42. Isby, p. 373.
43. Simonyan, p. 35.
44. Simonyan, p. 96.
45. Simonyan, p. 87.
46. Simpkin, Red Armour, p. 74. Also conversations with LTC Grau of the Soviet Army Studies Office -- LTC Grau stated his conviction that future Soviet force structure changes will give each tank and motorized rifle battalion its own reconnaissance platoon.
47. Reznichenko, p. 7.
48. Lester Grau, Changing Soviet Objective Depths, pp. 24 and 34.
49. Simpkin, Red Armour, pp. 114-115.
50. David Glantz, The Soviet Conduct of War, p. 36. See also Simpkin's Red Armour, pp. 160 and 173.
51. Reznichenko, p. 102.
52. Simonyan, p. 6.
53. Glantz, Razvedka, p. 26.
54. Simonyan, p. 6.
55. Simonyan, p. 7.
56. Gredasov, p. 15.
57. Donnelly, "Soviet Reconnaissance," p. 68.
58. Simonyan, p. 7.
59. Simpkin, Red Armour, p. 154.
60. Simonyan, p. 7.

61. A. Bayner, Tactical Calculations, pp. 111 and 5.35.
62. Simonyan, p. 7.
63. Simonyan, pp. 114-115.
64. Simonyan, p. 115.
65. Gredasov, p. 15.
66. Simonyan, p. 8.
67. Simonyan, p. 122.
68. Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Counterreconnaissance Special Study, p. I-2.
69. Crosbie Saint and Walter Yates, "Attack Helicopter Operations in the AirLand Battle: Rear Operations." Military Review (October 1988), pp. 5.
70. Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Counterreconnaissance Special Study, p. II-4A.
71. FM 100-5, p. 138.
72. FM 71-100, p. 1-14.
73. FM 100-5, p. 150.
74. FM 71-100, p. 1-12.
75. FM 71-100, pp. 1-8 to 1-9.
76. BCTP Common Sins, chapter on intelligence, pp. 9 and 11.
77. Grau, p.31.
78. BCTP Common Sins, chapter on fire support, p. 30.
79. John House, "Fire Support Tactics for Rear Operations," Field Artillery Journal (March-April 1987), p. 24.
80. Robert Baker, "Linchpin of the Rear Battle," Military Police Journal (Fall 1985), p. 10.
81. BCTP Common Sins, chapter on command and control, pp. 18-19.

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
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**RECONNAISSANCE, SURVEILLANCE
AND COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE
PHASE II ASSESSMENT**

**SECTION III
PHASE II ACTION PLAN**



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R/S/CR PHASE II

ACTION PLAN

DOCTRINE

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Task</u>	<u>Action Agencies</u>	<u>Target Date</u>	<u>POC/AV #</u>
IPB not used in decision support synchronization	1. Integrate synchronization matrix into FM 101-5, FM 71-100-1, and FM 71-100.	CGSC	2QFY90	LTC Tichner 552-2112 LTC Burkett 552-2112
Counterrecon planning	1. Expand discussion of counterrecon in Div/Staff publications (FM 71-100). 2. Include R/S/CR responsibilities matrix in FM 101-5.	CGSC	2QFY94	LTC Burkett 552-2112 LTC Tichner 552-2112
Div Cav capability to conduct recon/security mission	1. Emphasize TTP to reflect normal attachment of additional maneuver units for guard mission. 2. Revise TTP (for LID) to reflect attachment of recon platoons to Bde based on METT-I.	AR	1QFY90	MAJ Harju 464-7034 MAJ Branch 835-1700 MAJ Harju 464-7034
Capability to collect and process threat info in rear area	Revise rear area TTP to fill info void (FM 101-5, FM 71-100-1, FM 100-15).	CGSC	3QFY90	LTC Tichner LTC Burkett 552-2112

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R/S/CR PHASE II

ACTION PLAN

DOCTRINE (continued)

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Task</u>	<u>Action Agencies</u>	<u>Target Date</u>	<u>POC/AV #</u>
Capability to detect minefields	1. Establish responsibility and development of TIP for templating enemy minefields. (FM 71-100-1) 2. Establish organic Armor in stride breaching capability responsibility.	CGSC EN AR	20FY90 20FY90	LTC Burkett 552-2112 MAJ Harju 464-7034 CPT Burris 581-2376
Recon elements in stay-behind role	1. Emphasize that recon elements do not conduct stay-behind operations in publications (FM 17-95, FM 17-98). 2. Provide analysis of considerations for stay-behind operation.	ARMS	20FY90	MAJ Harju 464-7034
Denial of enemy detection through visual acquisition	Revise current camouflage and deception manual (FM 5-20) to emphasize proper procedures.	EN	20FY90	CPT Burris 581-2376
Plan and conduct deception operations	Expand the battlefield deception operations section of FM 90-2.	CGSC	20FY90	MAJ Kaye 552-2112
PIR too general	Publish PIR example for incorporation in FM 71-100-1.	CGSC	20FY90	LTC Burkett 552-2112

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R/S/CR PHASE II

ACTION PLAN

DOCTRINE (concluded)

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Task</u>	<u>Action Agencies</u>	<u>Target Date</u>	<u>POC/AV #</u>
LRSU in MOUT environment	LRSUs operate in urban areas by exception only. Reemphasize in FM 7-93.	INF	2QFY90	MAJ Branch 835-1700
LRSU conduct recon mission	Revise FM 7-93 to emphasize risks involved when/if LRSU conduct recon mission.	INF	1QFY90	MAJ Branch 835-1700
Identify TTP for G2/G3	1. Review results of CATA SME team results. 2. Provide to field for publication in divisional FMs.	CATA CGSC	2QFY90	Dr. L. Seglie 552-2132 LTC Tichner 552-2112
LRSU continuous operations	Change mission duration of LRSU from 6-8 to 10-14 days in FM 7-93 and FM 7-93-1.	INF CGSC	2QFY90	MAJ Branch 835-1700 MAJ J. Adams 552-2112

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R/S/CR PHASE IIACTION PLANTRAINING

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Task</u>	<u>Action Agencies</u>	<u>Target Date</u>	<u>POC/ AV #</u>
IPB Development	1. Revise AMTP to reflect Cdr/Staff involvement in IPB. 2. Standardize IPB teaching process to support Cdr/staff involvement.	CATA	1QFY90	Dr. L. Seglie 552-2132
IPB not used in decision support synchronization	Publish lessons learned that focus on synchronization matrix.	CGSC	1QFY90	MAJ Campbell 552-4492
Counterrecon planning	Make counterrecon planning a point of interest in BCTP.	CATA CGSC	1QFY90	Dr. L. Seglie 552-2132 LTC S. Adams 552-4492
Integration of operational/strategic assets in Division Ops	Continue to educate leaders in PCC, CGSC, CAS3 on means to request and obtain essential information.	CGSC	1QFY90	LTC Tisdale (CAS3) 552-5611 LTC S. Adams (PCC) 552-4492 LTC Griffith (CGSC) 552-4492
Plan and conduct deception operations	Modify corps and division AMTP to include deception operations. Include in BCTP evaluations.	CATA	2QFY90	Dr. L. Seglie 552-2132

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R/S/CR PHASE II

ACTION PLAN

TRAINING (continued)

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Task</u>	<u>Action Agencies</u>	<u>Target Date</u>	<u>POC/AV #</u>
PIR too general	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Review/modify POI for OAC, CAS3, CGSC, and PCC2. Emphasize during warfighting exercises (BCIP).3. Modify AMTP.	CGSC All Schools	2QFY90	LTC Tisdale (CAS3) 552-4492 LTC S. Adams (OAC/PCC) 552-4492 MAJ Campbell (CGSC) 552-4492 Dr. L. Seglie 552-2132
Identify TTP for G2/63	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Assemble SME team to visit BCIP.2. Evaluate, compile and publish results.	CATA	FY91	LTC Oberlin 552-3839
Capability to collect and process threat information in rear area	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Revise POI in Basic NCO and Officer courses and PCC to include total collection efforts for rear area.2. Include collection/processing task in rear area operations center AMTP.	AR, IN, IEW, ARTY, AD, MP CATA	3QFY90	LTC S. Adams 552-4492 Dr. L. Seglie 552-2132
Capability to employ signal security	Assess existing OPSEC SIGSEC, COMSEC training programs.	SIGCEN	3QFY90	CPT Pekkula 780-6643

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R/S/CR PHASE II

ACTION PLAN

TRAINING (concluded)

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Task</u>	<u>Action Agencies</u>	<u>Target Date</u>	<u>POC/AV #</u>
Capability to identify targets during periods of limited visibility	Integrate obscurant training as a normal condition.	CML, IN, IEW, ARTY, ADA, MP, CATA	2QFY90	Dr. L. Seglie 552-2132 LTC S. Adams 552-4492
Denial of enemy detection through visual acquisition	Require planning or actual employment of smoke/obscurants during AMTP.	CATA	2QFY90	Dr. L. Seglie 552-2132

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R/S/CR PHASE II

ACTION PLAN

ORGANIZATION

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Task</u>	<u>Action Agencies</u>	<u>Target Date</u>	<u>POC/AV #</u>
Capability of Div Cav to conduct recon/security mission	1. Retain current Hvy Div force structure. Emphasize attachment of forces in TTP.	ARM CGSC	2QFY91	MAJ Harju 464-7034 LTC S. Adams 552-4492 TBD
	2. Conduct Heavy Division restructure study/review.	CACDA	TBD	
	3. Add 2d ground troop to LID as resources become available.	CACDA	TBD	CPT Brandl 552-4882
	4. Maintain existing Bde organization (no organic scouts).	N/A	N/A	
	5. Analyze implications of LID Recon Sqd reorganization (4 to 3 platoons).	ARM	2QFY90	MAJ Harju 464-7034
Enough LRSU detachments	1. Maintain 6 LRSU teams in Hvy Div.	N/A	N/A	
	2. Conduct analysis to determine need to increase from 4 to 6 teams in LID.	INF CACDA	2QFY90	MAJ Branch 835-1700 Mr. Oakley 552-4882

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R/S/CR PHASE II

ACTION PLAN

LEADER DEVELOPMENT

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Task</u>	<u>Action Agencies</u>	<u>Target Date</u>	<u>POC/ AV #</u>
IPB not used in decision support synchronization	Integrate synchronization matrix into POIs for PCC, CAS3, and OAC.	CGSC AR IN FA IEW ADA AVN	20FY90	LTC Tisdale (CAS3) 552-5611 LTC S. Adams (PCC/OAC) 552-4492
IPB development	Standardize POIs of PCC, CGSC, CAS3, and OAC to reflect Cdr/Staff involvement in IPB.	CGSC AR IN FA IEW ADA AVN	School Year 91	LTC Tisdale (CAS3) 552-5611 LTC S. Adams (PCC/OAC) 552-4492 MAJ Campbell (CGSC) 552-4492
Counterrecon planning	Emphasize counterrecon planning into PCC, CGSC, CAS3, and OAC.	CGSC AR IN FA IEW ADA AVN	10FY90	LTC Tisdale (CAS3) 552-5611 LTC S. Adams (PCC/OAC) 552-4492 MAJ Campbell (CGSC) 552-4492
Integration of operational/strategic assets in Division Ops	Continue to educate leaders in PCC, CGSC, CAS3 on means to request and obtain essential information.	CGSC	10FY90	LTC Tisdale (CAS3) 552-5611 LTC S. Adams (PCC/OAC) 552-4492 MAJ Campbell (CGSC) 552-4492

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R/S/CR PHASE II

ACTION PLAN

LEADER DEVELOPMENT (concluded)

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Task</u>	<u>Action Agencies</u>	<u>Target Date</u>	<u>POC/ AV #</u>
Plan and conduct deceptive operations	Emphasize planning for deceptive operations into PCC.	CGSC	1QFY90	LTC S. Adams 552-4492

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R/S/CR PHASE II

ACTION PLAN

MATERIEL

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Task</u>	<u>Action Agencies</u>	<u>Target Date</u>	<u>POC/AV #</u>
Integration of operational/strategic assets in Division Ops	Continue development of the following programs: LCC ASAS, GSM, UAV, JSTARS and IPDS.	IEW	IAW 92-96 POM/FLRRDAP	COL Vaughn 821-2971/2532 Mr. W. Stramm 821-3325
Capability to collect threat information	1. Accelerate development and fielding of the following programs: UAV, ASAS, AFATDS, GBCS, OH-58D, NLOS.	IEW FA AVN	IAW 92-96 POM/FLRRDAP	Mr. W. Stramm 821-3325 CW3 E. Price 978-5144 Mr. R. Penepauler 639-5960/5607 CPT T. Peters 780-6643
Capability to locate targets beyond line of sight	2. Increase quantity and accelerate fielding of STAND/OPTICS and communications for DIV CAV, LRSU and Bn Scouts. Continue development of UAV, OH-58D and NLOS.	AR INF	FY90	MAJ Cheny 494-5565 MAJ Harju 494-7034 CPT Snukus 835-1700
		IEW	IAW 92-96 POM/FLRRDAP	COL Vaughn 821-2971 CPT T. Peters 780-6643

R/S/CR PHASE IIACTION PLANMATERIEL (continued)

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Task</u>	<u>Action Agencies</u>	<u>Target Date</u>	<u>POC/AV #</u>
Capability to detect and breach minefields	Continue development and fielding of CHV, STAMIDS, MCHSS and BCS.	ENGR	IAW 92-96 POM/FLRRDAP	MAJ Stevenson 581-1376 Mr. Cojro 581-3261 SSG Zelko 581-1376
Capability to process information in a timely manner	Continue development of ASAS.	TPIO-ATCCS	IAW 92-96 POM/FLRRDAP	Mr. F. Glover 552-4786
Communication beyond line of sight	1. Conduct scrub of IHFR requirements. 2. Examine fielding of TACSAT to LRSU 3. Identify requirements for QEAM.	SIGCEN	1QFY90	CPT Pekkula 780-6643
Div Cav capability to conduct recon/security mission	Increase/modify STANO/OPTICS requirements for Squadron (pending results of Scout CEP).	SIGCEN IN	1QFY90	MAJ Branch 835-1700
		SIGCEN AR, IN	1QFY90	MAJ Cheny 464-5565 CPT Snukis 835-1700
		AR IN CACDA	1QFY90	CPT Cheny 464-5565 MAJ Branch 835-1700

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R/S/CR PHASE II

ACTION PLAN

MATERIEL (continued)

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Task</u>	<u>Action Agencies</u>	<u>Target Date</u>	<u>POC/ AV #</u>
Capability to transmit enemy info - Allied interoperability	Continue to develop and field JTIDS, FAADS-C2I, and ADDS.	ADA IEW	IAW 92-96 POM/FLRRDAP	CW3 E. Price 978-5144/5012 Mr. Higgins 780-7174
Exploit LRSU/SOF capability to collect threat info	1. Develop multiple sensor concept/requirement. 2. Continue development of equipment (clothing, rations, etc.) for LRSU/SOF use.	IEW INF SOF	FY90 IAW 92-96 POM/FLRRDAP	CPT Holgate 821-5003 MSG Wimmer 239-4122
Aerial and ground target acquisition and handover to attack system	1. Continue OH-58D fielding - change priority of fielding to recon units. 2. Develop AFATDS, ASAS, and TENCAP with direct downlink to Division for ELINT system.	AV IEW FA	FY90 IAW 92-96 POM/FLRRDAP	CPT T. Peters 558-4704/3920 Mr. R. Penepauler 639-5960 Mr. W. Stramm 821-3325
Capability to identify nuclear warheads	Move the TACNET program from DARPA to an Army proponent.	IEW	FY91	CPT Holgate 821-5003
Capability to receive and transmit NBC hazard information	1. Field the lightweight digital fax. 2. Develop and field the MCS-ANBACIS to provide automated warning capability.	SIGCEN CHEM	IAW 92-96 POM/FLRRDAP	CPT Pekkula 780-6643 CPT Shafer 865-3986

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R/S/CR PHASE II

ACTION PLAN

MATERIEL (continued)

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Task</u>	<u>Action Agencies</u>	<u>Target Date</u>	<u>POC/ AV #</u>
Capability to detect NBC contamination	Continue the development and fielding of NBC detection devices (NBCRS, XM21, AN/VDR-2, CAM, AN/PDP-75).	CHEM	IAW 92-96 POM/FLRRDAP	Mr. Champion Mr. Nelson Mr. Pearce 865-5569
Identify air targets beyond visual range	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Develop and procure FAAD PDB I and II.2. Develop mask target sensor for NLOS.3. Develop non-cooperative target recognition and identification (NCTR) for all ADA systems.4. Develop and field ACIS.	ADA	IAW 92-96 POM/FLRRDAP	CW3 E. Price 978-5144/5012
Transfer IMINT on deep targets	Continue development and fielding of the following programs: ASAS, UAV, GSM, JSTARS and IPDS.	IEW CACDA	IAW 92-96 POM/FLRRDAP	Mr. Southard 552-2096 COL Vaughn 821-2971 Mr. W. Stramm 821-3325
Capability to collect and process threat information in rear area	Continue development and fielding of ASAS.	IEW	IAW 92-96 POM/FLRRDAP	Mr. W. Stramm 821-3325

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R/S/CR PHASE II

ACTION PLAN

MATERIEL (continued)

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Task</u>	<u>Action Agencies</u>	<u>Target Date</u>	<u>POC/ AV #</u>
Limited capability to provide smoke	Develop advanced smoke to defeat threat EO systems. Delivery Systems must include ground, mortar and artillery.	CHEM	IAW 92-96 POM/FLRRDAP	Mr. Sussman 584-2390/3016
Capability to employ signal security (CP signature reduction)	Develop and field SICPS. Field planned communications system to include JTIIDS, EPLRS, EPDS.	SIGCEN	IAW 92-96 POM/FLRRDAP	Mr. Higgins CPT Hunter 780-7174
Capability to identify target during periods of limited visibility	1. Increase thermal, radar, binocular and multi-sensor assets for the recon force. (Based on Scout CEP) 2. Develop and field ACIS.	AR IN	FY90	MAJ Cheny MAJ Harju 494-7034/5565
Capability to insert/extract SOF/LRSU by air	3. Develop a passive sensor requirement for cavalry unit use. Develop and procure MH-47 and MH-60K.	CACDA IEW AVN SOF	IAW 92-96 POM/FLRRDAP FY90 IAW 92-96 POM/FLRRDAP	Mr. Southard 552-2096 CPT Holgate 821-5003 CPT T. Peters 780-6643

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R/S/CR PHASE II

ACTION PLAN

MATERIEL (continued)

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Task</u>	<u>Action Agencies</u>	<u>Target Date</u>	<u>POC/AV #</u>
Provide target damage assessment beyond line of sight	Develop and field UAV (close) (short). GSM and JSTARS.	IEW	IAW 92-96 POM/FLRRDAP	COL Vaughn 821-2971
Collect weather/meteorological information	1. Develop and field IMETS, NBCRS and UAV. 2. Look to availability of NDI satellite downlink.	IEW CHEM IEW	IAW 92-96 FY90	Mr. Champion 865-3986/5569 MAJ Spear 821-2249
Denial of enemy detection through visual acquisition	1. Develop easier-to-use camouflage systems that will provide thermal protection. 2. Continue development of low observable technology for fighting vehicles.	EN	FY91	CPT Burris 581-2376
Plan and conduct deception operations	1. Continue fielding multispectral vehicle decoys. 2. Continue development of radar/communication simulators. 3. Develop and incorporate an automated staff support aid in MCS to facilitate C2 and synchronization.	IEW	IAW 92-96 POM/FLRRDAP	CPT Holgate 821-5003

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R/S/CR PHASE II

ACTION PLAN

MATERIEL (concluded)

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Task</u>	<u>Action Agencies</u>	<u>Target Date</u>	<u>POC/ AV #</u>
Distribution of OH-58D assets	Pursue fielding of OH58D with priority to recon elements.	AVN CACDA	FY90	CPT. T. Peters 780-6643 CPT Hunter 780-7174 Mr. Southard 552-2096
LRSU in deep battle targeting role	Justify and procure IHFR and Plasterworks for LRSU.	INF	IAM 92-96 POM/FLRRDAP	MAJ Branch 835-1700

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R/S/CR RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

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ASSETS

RECON

SURV

CR

BN

(AREA OF INTEREST IS 15 KM FORWARD OF THE FLOT FOR DIVY ORG. 50 KM ABN/AASLT)

COMPANIES
AVIATION
FIST
ENGINEERS
CHEMICAL
SIGNAL
ATTACHED ASSETS
MI ASSETS
SCOUTS

1. PLANS/CONDUCTS IN AREA OF OPERATIONS (AO).
2. REPORTS TO BDE.

1. FIGHTS COUNTERRECON BATTLE
2. CONDUCTS SECURITY OPERATIONS.
3. TAKES OPERATIONS SECURITY MEASURES (OPSEC) ACTIVE AND PASSIVE.
4. CONDUCTS DECEPTION OPERATIONS.

BDE

(AREA OF INTEREST IS 50 KM FORWARD OF THE FLOT)

BATTALIONS,
ARTILLERY (FSD)
ENGINEER
MI CO ASSETS
CHEMICAL
MP'S
AIR CAV
SIGNAL
ATTACHED ASSETS
DIV CAV

1. PLANS/ CONDUCTS IN AO.
2. SENDS INFORMATION TO DIVISION.
3. DISSEMINATES INFORMATION TO BN AS REQUIRED.

1. WILL FIGHT IN COUNTERRECON BATTLE.
2. CONDUCTS SECURITY OPERATIONS.
3. TAKES OPERATIONS SECURITY MEASURES(OPSEC) - ACTIVE AND PASSIVE.
4. CONDUCTS DECEPTION OPERATIONS.

DIV

(AREA OF INTEREST IS 80 KM FORWARD OF THE FLOT)

BRIGADES
LRSU
A V
ARTY
MI (CEWI), AD, EN
CAV, CHEM, SIG
MP'S
ATTACHED ASSETS

1. PLANS/CONDUCTS IN AO.
2. SENDS INFORMATION TO CORPS.
3. DISSEMINATES INFORMATION TO BDE (AS REQUIRED).

1. DETECTS-LOCATES-IDENTIFIES-TRACKS ENEMY IN AO.
2. REPORTS AND DISSEMINATES CRITICAL INFORMATION TO HIGHER AND LOWER, RESPECTIVELY.
3. PROVIDES SURVEILLANCE SUPPORT TO BDE (AS REQUIRED).
4. RELIES ON CORPS TO PROVIDE INFORMATION BEYOND DIVISION CAPABILITY.
5. MAY REQUEST SURVEILLANCE SUPPORT FROM DIV TO COVER AREA OF INTEREST.
8. COORDINATED COVERAGE OF SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS.

1. WILL FIGHT COUNTERRECON BATTLE
2. CONDUCTS SECURITY OPERATIONS (COVERING FORCE, SCREEN, GUARD)
3. TAKES OPERATIONS SECURITY MEASURES (OPSEC)-ACTIVE AND PASSIVE.
4. EMPLOYEES ELECTRONIC WARFARE.
5. PLANS, DIRECTS, CONDUCTS DECEPTION OPERATIONS.

CORPS

(AREA OF INTEREST IS 150 KM FORWARD OF THE FLOT)

DIVISIONS
LRSU, ACR
ARTY, AD, MI
MI BRIGADE (AERIAL COLLECTION)
AIR FORCE
EAC ASSETS

1. PLANS /CONDUCTS IN AO.
2. SENDS INFORMATION TO ARMY GROUP OR JOINT/HIGHER.
3. DISSEMINATES INFORMATION AS REQUIRED TO SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS.

1. DETECTS-LOCATES-IDENTIFIES-TRACKS ENEMY IN AO.
2. REPORTS TO HIGHER.
3. PROVIDES SUPPORT TO SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS AS REQUIRED OR AS AVAILABLE.
4. MAY REQUEST FURTHER SURVEIL-LANCE SUPPORT FROM EAC AND NATIONAL AGENCIES/SYSTEMS.

1. CONDUCTS SECURITY OPERATIONS (COVERING FORCE, SCREEN, GUARD)
2. TAKES OPERATIONS SECURITY MEASURES (OPSEC)-ACTIVE AND PASSIVE.
3. PLANS COORDINATES, EMPLOYEES ELECTRONIC WARFARE.
4. PLANS, DIRECTS, CONDUCTS DECEPTION OPERATIONS.

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