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**Living on the Edge:
Cohesion and Contingency Operations**

**A Monograph
by
Major Robert W. Madden
Field Artillery**



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ABSTRACT

LIVING ON THE EDGE: COHESION AND CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
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The Army of the future will assume an increasing role in force projection through the conduct of peacetime contingency operations. In preparation to accomplish these crisis-oriented, time-sensitive missions, soldiers and units will have to maintain an unprecedented physical and mental state of readiness to deploy. This study examines the factors which foster the will to win in soldiers living on the edge of peace--soldiers who must instantly make the psychological transition from peace to war. It is the goal of this monograph to answer the question: What are the implications of psychological readiness for combat in contingency operations?

Classical and contemporary theory are first examined with emphasis on the moral domain of battle applicable to contingency operations. Next, two historical case studies--The British Battle for the Falklands and Operation Urgent Fury, are examined using the criteria of antecedent variables consisting of individual, unit, and combat characteristics. These same criteria are then applied to assess the contemporary nature of contingency operations and highlight the individual characteristics of today's US Army soldier. Finally, the components of unit characteristics are examined which develop cohesion and instill an aggressive will to fight in the individual soldier. Unit characteristics must prepare the soldier to deal effectively with the nature of combat.

The conclusions show that cohesion is a force-multiplier as Napoleon, Clausewitz, and du Picq had theorized. In both case studies, the forces which had sewn the seeds of cohesion in peacetime had greater battlefield success. Leadership and training are the two most essential components contributing to the development of unit cohesion in peacetime. The study establishes that the leader's efforts to build cohesive units must be supplemented by a deliberate plan to ensure that the aims of the primary group conform to the values of the unit. Training must replicate the hardships, intensity, and duration of contingency operations so the soldier forms accurate preconceptions regarding the combat characteristics. AirLand Battle doctrine is based on well-trained soldiers in cohesive units. It does not work if the force is composed of soldiers who lack the resolve to execute that doctrine.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
I. Introduction	1
II. A Theoretical Perspective on Preparing Soldiers for Combat	5
III. The Case Studies	
The Battle for the Falklands	12
Operation Urgent Fury	16
IV. Analysis	
The Impact of Combat Characteristics on the Individual Soldier	23
A Profile of the US Army Soldier	28
The Unit Delivers on a Promise	29
V. Conclusions and Implications	38
Endnotes	43
Bibliography	49
Appendices:	
A. Psychological Aspects of Combat Stress: A Model Derived from Israeli and Other Combat Experience	53
B. Correlation of Forces and Losses: Falklands and Grenada	55
C. The Elements of Spirit	56

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I. Introduction

The irony of the United States' post-WWII military experience is that the Army, preoccupied with deterring Soviet expansionism, found itself fighting in places far different from those our soldiers had been led to expect. Soldiers comforted by the concept of deterrence, confident that there would be weeks, perhaps months, of build-up as diplomacy failed, found themselves fighting desperately, virtually without warning. American troops have faced North Koreans, Chinese communists, Vietnamese peasants, Dominican leftists, Cuban construction workers, and Panamanian Defense Forces.¹ In fact, the United States has demonstrated a willingness to employ ground combat forces on a contingency basis no less than seven times since 1958.

The March 1990 version of The National Security Strategy of the United States recognizes that the Soviets are no longer the chief threat to American security. It emphasizes a shift to a global strategy and redefines one of the primary military components of strategy as force projection. The strategic shift is in anticipation of a reduced forward presence in alliances and the realization that conflicts occur on the political periphery. The global orientation requires ready forces in the United States and the means to move them to project power where we have no permanent presence.

They [US forces] must be able to respond quickly, and appropriately, as the application of even small amounts of power early in a crisis usually pays significant dividends. Some actions may require considerable staying power, but there are likely to be situations where American forces will have to succeed rapidly and with a minimum of casualties.²

Therefore, intervention by American ground forces will continue to occur on short notice, without a formal declaration of war.

The Army of the future will assume an increasing role in force projection through the conduct of contingency operations. For the purposes of this study, contingency operations refer to the politically sensitive military activities normally characterized by short-term, rapid projection or employment of forces short of declared war. Such operations include: shows of force and demonstrations, noncombatant evacuation, rescue and recovery missions, strikes and raids, peacemaking, disaster relief, and unconventional warfare. Peacetime contingency operations place political limitations on the use of force and are distinguished from contingency operations in war which are conducted primarily for military objectives.³

In preparation for contingency operations, soldiers and units will have to maintain an unprecedented physical and mental state of readiness to deploy. The transition from peace to war may only be a matter of hours. A major lesson of the Korean Conflict is that the Army can no longer count on a period of extended preparation before being committed to combat.⁴ The AirLand Battle concept is based on the premise that the Army in peace must consist of "well-trained, physically fit soldiers in cohesive units" who possess the will to fight and win with little notice in an environment of uncertainty.⁵ This will to fight must carry the individual soldier through the entire spectrum of conflict.

To the individual soldier committed to combat, there is no such thing as low-intensity conflict. Once the shooting starts,

hostilities quickly escalate on the operational continuum. The most important measure of a unit's combat effectiveness is how well its soldiers are prepared to withstand the stress of battle. This is crucial to the unit's success or failure. Consequently, it is the goal of this monograph to answer the question: what are the implications of psychological readiness for combat in contingency operations?

This study examines the factors which foster the will to win in soldiers living on the edge of peace--soldiers who must instantly make the psychological transition from peace to war. First, I will examine classical and contemporary theory and doctrine on the moral domain of battle applicable to contingency operations. I will then introduce two historical case studies representing the nature of contingency operations--The British Battle for the Falklands and Operation Urgent Fury.

The case studies will be examined using criteria of antecedent variables: individual, unit, and combat characteristics. Antecedent variables determine what expectations the soldier has of the combat situation. Individual characteristics are: prior combat experience, perceived technical and tactical proficiency, time spent in the unit prior to battle, role in combat, marital status, rank, age, and level of education. Additionally, the soldier is a product of the culture, norms, and values of society and his organization. His attitude is affected by the national will to support military action. Unit characteristics are: cohesion, discipline, leadership, unit training, personnel turnover, military tradition and history, medical care, physical

fitness, tactics, doctrine, technology and logistics. These characteristics must reflect overarching organizational values. Combat characteristics are: the type of battle (offensive or defensive), intensity, lethality, duration, uncertainty, environmental factors, and command, control, communications, and intelligence. An in-depth discussion of antecedent variables is contained in Appendix A.⁶

After creating a framework for evaluating unit effectiveness, I will use the criteria to assess the nature of contingency operations and highlight the individual characteristics of today's US Army soldier. Additionally, I will examine the components of unit characteristics which develop cohesion and instill an aggressive will to fight in the individual soldier. Unit characteristics must prepare the soldier to deal effectively with the combat characteristics. In addressing this issue, the study establishes that the leader's efforts to build cohesive units must be supplemented by a deliberate plan to ensure that the aims of the primary group conform to those of the Army.

Finally, I will present the conclusions of my research and possible implications for the future. Contingency operations place different psychological demands upon soldiers than do conventional operations. If the US Army is to effectively execute contingency operations, soldier psychological readiness for combat must be a high priority.

II. A Theoretical Perspective on Preparing Soldiers for Combat

Preparing soldiers and units to withstand the stress of combat has occupied the thinking of theorists and great battle captains alike. They have echoed throughout the centuries, Xenophon's assertion: "You know I am sure that not numbers or strength bring victory in war; but whichever army goes into battle stronger in soul, their enemies generally cannot withstand them."⁷ This is further supported by the oft-quoted Napoleonic maxim, "in war, the moral is to the material as three is to one."⁸

Writing early in the 19th century, Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz clearly understood the value of moral factors, referring to them as among the most important in war. "One might say that the physical seem little more than the wooden hilt, while the moral factors are the precious metal, the real weapon, the finely-honed blade."⁹ Clausewitz believed that an army gained its discipline and will to fight from an internalized military spirit.

An army that maintains its cohesion under the most murderous fire; that cannot be shaken by imaginary fears and resists well-founded ones with all its might; that, proud of its victories will not lose the strength to obey orders and its respect and trust for its officers even in defeat; whose physical power, like the muscles of an athlete, has been steeled by training in privation and effort...such an army is imbued with the true military spirit.¹⁰

He stated that the true military spirit can be created only in war. "Discipline, skill, goodwill, a certain pride, and high morale are the attributes of an army trained in times of peace."¹¹ They command respect but they are fragile in war and have no strength of their own. He advised that we should be careful not to confuse the real spirit of an army with its mood.¹² Further he

embellished: "No general can accustom an army to war. Peacetime maneuvers are a feeble substitute for the real thing..."¹³

Clausewitz identified danger, physical exertion, intelligence, and friction as the elements which form the abrasive nature of war. Only one lubricant exists to reduce the abrasion--combat experience.¹⁴ If we accept this assertion as true, then it raises two issues. First, the number of experienced combat soldiers in the US decreases each year. Grenada and Panama notwithstanding, the US Army is transitioning to a generation of soldiers with no combat experience. How does this impact on unit readiness for combat? Second, since we cannot realistically duplicate the element of danger in peacetime training, what mitigates the psychological impact of combat for inexperienced troops?

Though he stated that the military spirit can only be created in war, Clausewitz conceded that it may endure for several generations, even under leaders of average ability and through long periods of peace. This means that military leaders must capitalize on the traditions and lessons of the past to maintain the spirit in the present. Military spirit springs from two interactive sources: a series of victorious wars and frequent exertions of the army to the utmost limits of its strength. Clausewitz wrote, "Nothing else will show a soldier the full extent of his capacities. The more a general is accustomed to place heavy demands on his soldiers [and subordinate leaders], the more he can depend on their response."¹⁵

Clausewitz's concept of training focuses on preparing the army to endure great hardships. As war is the realm of exertion and

suffering, he states that these alone will defeat us unless we can make ourselves indifferent to them. Indifference by birth or by training provides a certain strength of body and soul.¹⁶ He strongly believed that exertions must be practiced in peacetime to prepare the mind even more so than the body. Habit hardens the body for exertions and trains the judgment of soldiers and leaders to calmly deal with adversity. Finally, friction must be incorporated into training to exercise officers' judgment, common sense, and resolve.¹⁷ Thus, according to Clausewitz, tough realistic training which closely simulates the stresses of combat, serves to mitigate the psychological impact of combat.

Though Clausewitz concentrated primarily on the unit characteristics in his writings, he did not ignore the value of the individual soldier to unit effectiveness.

An army's military qualities are based on the individual who is steeped in the spirit and essence of this activity; who trains the capacities it demands, rouses them, and makes them his own; who applies his intelligence to every detail; who gains ease and confidence through practice, and who completely immerses his personality in the appointed task.¹⁸

However, he also pointed out that the army is composed of individuals, each of whom possesses his own potential for friction.¹⁹

The effects of battle on the individual soldier became a career-long study by French military thinker Colonel Ardant du Picq. Writing prior to the Franco-Prussian War (1870), his work reflected the insights of a soldier who had experienced first-hand the demands of war. Du Picq pointed out that while all other circumstances change with time, the human element remains the same,

capable of just so much endurance, fear, sacrifice, effort and no more. He recognized that the increased lethality on the battlefield, resulted in greater dispersion which, in turn, hindered supervision. Decisions were gained by action in open order, where each soldier acted individually with will and initiative to attack the enemy and destroy him. Additionally, the soldier seemed to fight alone in the smoke, dispersion, and confusion of battle. Unity was no longer assured by mutual surveillance.²⁰ He believed these conditions created a need for cohesion greater than ever before.

Du Picq's concept of cohesion is best illustrated by this analogy: "Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare to attack a lion. Four less brave, but knowing each other well, sure of their reliability and consequently of mutual aid, will attack resolutely."²¹ This unity and confidence springs from mutual trust. Confidence appears out of discipline to orders, living together, obeying the same leaders, and sharing fatigue and hardship. Confidence also develops from the cooperation among men who quickly understand one another in stressful situations. "It is that intimate confidence, firm and conscious, which does not forget itself in the heat of action and which alone makes true combatants."²²

Perhaps du Picq's legacy is his recognition that unit effectiveness is enhanced within "an organization which will establish cohesion by the mutual acquaintanceship of all."²³ Mutual acquaintanceship refers to a knowledge of comrades, a trust in officers providing visible leadership, a sense of duty,

discipline, and pride. This sustains the soldier in combat and prevents his fear from becoming terror.

His concept of discipline bears further elaboration. Du Picq stated that, "The purpose of discipline is to make men fight in spite of themselves."²⁴ He acknowledged that the customs of a democratic society did not permit Draconian discipline whereby soldiers advanced forward in battle because of the fear of death from behind if they fell back. Other techniques had to be applied in order to instill discipline. He believed that the cohesion resulting from the mutual acquaintanceship of men and officers created effective discipline. "Today, why should not the men in our companies watch discipline and punish themselves. They alone know each other, and the maintenance of discipline is so much to their interest as to encourage them to stop skulking."²⁵ He also pointed out that as wars become shorter and more violent, cohesion must be created in advance.²⁶

Almost a century later, SLA Marshall echoed the views of du Picq. The battlefield trends of increased lethality and dispersion had reached new proportions during WWII. His interviews with soldiers fresh from the front lines reaffirmed du Picq's thoughts on mutual acquaintanceship. Marshall concluded, "I hold it to be one of the simplest truths of war that the thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep going with his weapons, if any, is the presence or presumed presence of a comrade."²⁷ He also discovered the value of instilling unit cohesion during peacetime. He stated: "It is from the acquiring of the habit of working with the group and of feeling responsible to the group that his thoughts are apt

to turn ultimately to the welfare of the group when tactical disintegration threatens in battle."²⁸

The landmark study by Samuel Stouffer, et al, The American Soldier, offered extensive insights into the social psychology of WWII soldiers. They concluded that the primary or informal group served two principal functions in combat motivation: "It set and enforced group standards of behavior, and it supported and sustained the individual in stresses he would otherwise not have been able to withstand."²⁹

The various theories regarding the moral domain of battle have greatly influenced American doctrine. The architects of FM 100-5 acknowledged, "Wars are fought by men, not by machines. The human dimension of war will be decisive in the campaigns and battles of the future just as it has been in the past."³⁰ The US Army recognizes that the increased lethality of modern battle requires the dispersion of forces. This in turn requires a command and control system which emphasizes decentralized execution. FM 100-5 states, "In the chaos of battle, it is essential to decentralize to the lowest practical level."³¹ Units will find themselves isolated on the future battlefield which "will place a premium on sound leadership, competent and courageous soldiers, and cohesive, well-trained units."³² However, given closer scrutiny, AirLand Battle doctrine is based on certain key assumptions.³³

First, this doctrine of decentralized execution accepts the assertion that "on the battlefield, self-discipline plays a much greater role in modern combat than discipline imposed from without."³⁴ It assumes that the individuals composing the primary

group and formal unit structure will, in the absence of higher authority, actively seek to defeat the enemy. Individuals will pursue a course of action contrary to human nature, forsaking relative safety and comfort to risk their lives in actively seeking to engage and destroy the enemy. It supposes that soldiers and leaders have so internalized their concepts of discipline and will to fight, that their actions in the face of the enemy will conform to the expectations of doctrine. The Army takes stock in Lord Moran's advice, "discipline, control from without, can only be relaxed safely when it is replaced by something higher and better, control from within."³⁵

The conclusion from this section is that many of the motivations which influence soldiers in battle clearly have peacetime garrison roots. The cohesion and discipline which comes from training, leadership, and individual readiness must be accomplished in advance. This is especially important in maintaining readiness for contingency operations. There will not be a predeployment period to train-up for the conflict.

I will now present two case studies which illustrate the impact of psychological readiness for contingency operations. The British Battle for the Falklands and the US invasion of Grenada are modern examples of contingency operations. They provide valuable insight into the human factors which make contingency forces successful.

III. The Case Studies

The Battle for the Falklands. As a contingency operation, the Battle for the Falklands was a mid-intensity raid requiring forced entry. In the space of seven weeks, a task force was assembled and sailed over 8,000 miles, to defeat the Argentine navy, air force, and ground forces employed in the Falklands. The land battle lasted from 21 May to 14 June 1982. As an indicator of the level of intensity, a correlation of ground forces and losses between the British and Argentines is provided in Figure 1 of Appendix B.³⁶

By any mathematical model, the British should have had no chance of success against an Argentine land force. The Argentines possessed a superiority of soldiers and weaponry, fought from prepared defensive positions, and operated on considerably shorter lines of communication (LOCs). Yet, they were unable to secure victory. The reasons for this are found in the moral domain as the antecedent variables reveal.

The individual characteristics of British soldiers greatly enhanced unit combat effectiveness. The war had struck a sentimental chord among the British people--the British colonial empire was threatened! British national will was firmly galvanized behind the armed forces. With the memories of two World Wars indelibly etched on the British psyche, soldiers were better prepared psychologically for the nature of modern warfare. Although few British soldiers were experienced combat veterans, many had served in Northern Ireland which made them more confident of their response in combat.³⁷

In the Falklands, British enlisted soldiers were, on the

average, 20 years of age. These volunteer soldiers were a product of the British regimental system which gave them a sense of identity and commitment. Presently, soldiers enlist for a minimum period of four years which gives them adequate time to find their niche in the unit. The officers and NCOs usually serve for a minimum of nine years. Thus, ties to the regiment, ties to the group, and ties of friendship are all strengthened by mutual acquaintanceship.³⁸

Argentine soldiers, on the other hand, were not adequately prepared for hostilities. Though they were fully convinced of the historical and political justification for their invasion, they failed to anticipate the British reaction. The Argentine leadership "decided the islands lacked strategic importance for Britain. They apparently did not take into account the role that British domestic pressures and the 'End of the Empire' psychology would play in determining the British response."³⁹ Argentine soldiers were sent to invade the Falklands amidst great fanfare. A telethon was held raising 11 million dollars to help support the war effort. Argentine women knitted scarves and socks for their soldiers. School children wrote letters of encouragement to the soldiers on the islands. The national will was firmly behind them.⁴⁰

Since Argentina did not fear a British response, a majority of the soldiers deployed were nineteen year old conscripts with only one month's training. Many soldiers expressed concerns for their personal readiness. They were not confident about their ability to fight pitched battles.⁴¹ The Argentine people had never experienced the devastation which was wrought during the World Wars

and could not fathom the horror of artillery and air barrages.

Thus, the conditions for unit disintegration were set.

The British Armed Forces have over 400 years of experience in overseas wars, extended supply lines, and forced entries. Their doctrine, tactics, and logistics procedures are well-established and practiced. In contrast, the Argentine military has dealt primarily with subversive elements of their own society. The last war involving Argentina against another nation was 1870. With no living memory of modern battlefield conditions, Argentine military doctrine and tactics were rigidly applied without practical experience to temper judgment.

The British deployed elite units to the Falklands. The traditions of the regimental system did much to enhance cohesion and reduce personnel turnover. British units trained as they would fight. British officers and NCOs shared discomfort and danger with soldiers. They possessed an open organizational climate which enhanced mutual trust between leaders and subordinates. The British were much more prepared to deal with casualties. Soldiers were well-versed in buddy aid, and hospital ships were available for casualties. In contrast, the Argentines relied heavily on soldiers who had just completed one month's basic training. In most cases, units were formed just prior to the takeover of the Falklands. Because of the enormous social gap between officer and enlisted, Argentine units were characterized by an authoritarian organizational climate. Argentine officers were aloof and not willing to share the hardships and privations of their soldiers. Finally, Argentine forces had inadequate medical personnel and

facilities. The fear of becoming wounded and not receiving medical attention contributed to a deterioration of the will to fight.⁴²

The combat characteristics were also a factor in determining the outcome of the battle. For the British, the intensity and the duration of combat did not approach the standards of WWII. The Argentines were not prepared for the intensity and lethality of modern day warfare. Both armies had significant intelligence difficulties and operated in varying degrees of uncertainty. Environmental factors greatly decreased the effectiveness of Argentine forces. Shortages of water, basic supplies, and cold weather gear decreased their will to fight.

The few Argentine regular forces whose conscripts had completed one full year with the unit gave a good account for themselves. However, those units formed just prior to the takeover of the Falklands did not have sufficient time to establish cohesion and mostly disintegrated. As an example, Harry Summers recounts the response of Argentine forces when attacked by the UK 2nd Parachute Battalion at Goose Green:

The four hundred and fifty soldiers of 2 Para had ... beaten a well-entrenched, well-armed defender four times their strength. At a cost of seventeen men killed and thirty-five wounded, they killed some two hundred and fifty Argentine soldiers and took over twelve hundred prisoners of war.⁴³

The British confirmed Clausewitz's caution for predicting the outcome of a battle based on the superiority of numbers. Though it was not a perfect campaign, the British were overwhelmingly victorious. Brigadier David Chaudler, Commander of the UK 5th Airborne Brigade, was quick to give credit: "No matter how sophisticated the weaponry, the ultimate test is the man himself on

the battlefield. It is always a soldier with a fixed bayonet and rifle who wins the war."⁴⁴

As a postscript to this historical vignette, it is important to note that British analysts laid part of the blame for the Argentine defeat on their American training which "had taught them to rely too heavily on resources rather than human endeavor."⁴⁵ This criticism foreshadowed those American forces were to receive during Operation Urgent Fury.

Operation Urgent Fury. Unlike the Falklands, the US invasion of Grenada was not fought for nationalistic reasons. In fact, there was no national outcry for military action prior to the deployment of troops. Officially, Operation Urgent Fury was a rescue mission conducted to protect and evacuate American students at Saint George's Medical University and to restore law, order, and democracy to the island of Grenada. The underlying purpose, however, was to eliminate the growing Cuban influence on the island. The operation was launched while Grenada was in the midst of a bloody political coup. It was shrouded in a cloak of secrecy, ostensibly to gain surprise over an enemy believed to be much stronger in strength, resolve, and weaponry. The press was not informed of the action until President Reagan held a press conference at 0900 hours on the first day. The press was not allowed on the island until four days later.

The invasion commenced at 0500 hours on 25 October with an airborne assault by the Rangers to seize the Salines airfield. By the morning of 28 October, virtually all resistance was eliminated with the exception of occasional sniper fire. Mopping up

operations continued through 2 November. As an indicator of the level of intensity, a correlation of ground forces and losses between the US, Grenadians, and Cubans is provided in Figure 2 of Appendix B.⁴⁶ Once again, antecedent variables were a major factor in determining the outcome.

The individual characteristics of US soldiers affected their combat effectiveness. Unlike conflicts of the past, very few American soldiers understood why they had been committed. Most believed they were alerted to reinforce the Marines in Beirut after the terrorist attack on the Marine barracks. However, their cause was legitimized when they were welcomed as liberators by students and most Grenadians. Their morale was further enhanced by the news that the action met with popular support in the United States.

Only three percent of the US soldiers had prior combat experience; primarily the senior officers and NCOs who had served in Vietnam. However, those men who believed that they received realistic training prior to deployment stated that they fought the war as they had trained. Their training provided them confidence in themselves, their weapons, their squad members, and their leaders.⁴⁷ Some soldiers, however, deployed with excessive emotional baggage.

The sudden shock of family separation negatively affected US soldiers. Having been rapidly alerted and deployed under conditions of enforced secrecy, soldiers were concerned about the notification and support of their families. Questions arose such as: How will they pay the bills? How will she manage with her pregnancy? Single soldiers worried about other issues. How will

my girlfriend and parents find out that I have been deployed?⁴⁸

Other individual characteristics which affected soldiers' physical and mental acuity were sleep discipline, dehydration, overloaded rucksacks, and the wearing of flack vests. The compressed deployment sequence contributed to the fatigue of soldiers and leaders. By the time they hit the ground, they had reached the threshold where lack of sleep degrades performance. Soldiers were not accustomed to carrying overloaded rucksacks and wearing flack vests. Many soldiers of the 82nd Airborne Division complained that their overloaded rucksacks hindered their ability to fight. Many soldiers suffered from dehydration due to the increased physical demands and the tropical climate. They had not trained under these conditions.⁴⁹ Despite these hindrances, US soldiers maintained their will to fight.

On the other hand, the Grenadians and Cubans put up only a half-hearted fight. This was primarily due to a lack of national will to oppose the invasion. The reasons for this lie in the events leading up to October 1983. Maurice Bishop assumed power in March 1979 with a bloodless coup and quickly established diplomatic and economic relations with Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Soviet Union. Gradually, the Marxist-Leninist intentions of the government became more conspicuous. Political indoctrination of the masses became the focal point of the government's efforts to win the support of the people. This caused problems within the country: "The teachings of the church, and many people's religious beliefs, ran contrary to the new communist theories."⁵⁰ The growing discontent was shown by the decline in population on the island from over

100,000 to 90,000, as many Grenadians fled. The final straw was broken when Maurice Bishop was executed during the coup on 19 October 1983, by General Hudson Austin. This incident not only provided the catalyst for US intervention, but it virtually eliminated the national will to oppose the invasion. Despite hysterical appeals for mobilization to defend the homeland, only a tiny fraction responded. Of the People's Revolutionary Army (PRA), 475 of 600 regulars responded. With a paper strength of some 3,000, fewer than 250 soldiers of the People's Revolutionary Militia (PRM) responded.⁵¹ The newly-formed government appealed to Fidel Castro for military support.

Castro sent a small contingent of Cuban officers to help organize the Cuban workers for the invasion. Not wishing to provoke a confrontation with the US, Castro placed restrictive rules of engagement on the Cuban forces. They were to defend their work and living areas and were to resist only if the Americans attacked or fired on their positions. Cuban personnel were not to interfere with actions to evacuate US citizens from the medical school. The bulk of the Cuban personnel were construction workers, not professional soldiers. The average age of these 635 men was 38, and a substantial number were over 50. Although virtually all had received military training in Cuba at some time, many were unfit and overweight.⁵²

Unit characteristics of the US Army greatly enhanced combat effectiveness. The US has a long history of fighting on foreign soil. Many of these conflicts have involved forced entry through amphibious or airborne means. All US Army ground forces which

participated in Operation Urgent Fury are unofficially classified as elite units. The 82nd Airborne Division has a proud history going back to participation in several major operations of WWII, most notably, leading the Allied invasion of Normandy. The Ranger Battalions also have a history dating back to WWII. Soldiers are inculcated with the "Rangers lead the way" mentality. These units capitalize on their history with well-documented stories of the heroic actions of soldiers in combat. Strong bonds form between soldiers who share the danger of a parachute drop. Airborne and Ranger soldiers also wear distinctive uniform accoutrements which set them apart. All of this gives soldiers a common bond and a sense of identity not only to the present, but also to the past. Soldiers are told from the time they join the unit that they are the best and that they have a "real world mission."

There were, however, some unit problems which surfaced. Personnel turnover in the 82nd Airborne Division was a factor. During the summer of 1983, the commanding general, two brigade commanders, and the DISCOM commander changed command.⁵³ Although no statistics were available, one can presume the turbulence at the battalion and company level to be similar.

Perhaps due to a lack of combat intelligence, the 82nd Airborne Division was criticized for overcautiousness. According to military reform advocate William S. Lind:

...the Army command on the scene seems to have had some difficulty adjusting to the situation as it unfolded...The overestimation of enemy strength seems to have led to great cautiousness by the Army units then engaged, and also to requests for assistance."⁵⁴

As an example, units progressed only two kilometers against minimal

resistance on 27 October. When engaged by sniper fire, small units would hit the dirt and then call for air or artillery support before proceeding.⁵⁵ These tactics suggest a reliance on resources rather than on an aggressive will to win.

There also appeared to be some small unit discipline problems. Soldiers were often observed bunched together in small groups, lounging about in the open with little regard for local security. When halted, US troops rarely dug-in and established coordinated defensive positions. There was no attempt to move at night.⁵⁶

Finally, some units were better trained to provide medical care to their soldiers. For example, Ranger units had a habitually assigned medic with each platoon which greatly enhanced the confidence that if you became wounded you would be taken care of. Additionally, 40-50 percent of the soldiers attended Emergency Medical Technicians Training (EMT). Soldiers, knowing what symptoms to look for, took care of one another. In units which did not place as much emphasis on buddy-aid, such as the 82nd, the sum total of heat casualties in one day was 29 soldiers in one battalion, 48 in another, and a third battalion used up its entire supply of intravenous solution on heat cases.⁵⁷ The Rangers, on the other hand, had only one heat casualty.

The unit characteristics of the Grenadian and Cuban forces did not contribute to unit effectiveness. PRA units were poorly trained and poorly equipped. Their lack of cohesiveness reflected the national will not to oppose the invasion. The Cuban delegation came to Grenada to assist Cuban forces in defending themselves, not

to help the PRA prepare the island for defense. Cuban workers were not organized as a military unit until the last moment, when the military advisors formed them into ad hoc subunits. There was no cooperation or coordination between the PRA and Cuban forces to provide for a joint defense of the island. The unique characteristics of Grenadian/Cuban forces established the conditions for the combat characteristics.

The initial assaults into Grenada were not strongly opposed. Units arriving later met only sporadic resistance. The enemy did not possess significant forces, firepower, or weapons technology. The conflict lasted nine days, with virtually all resistance eliminated within the first 36 hours.

The tropical climate exacted its toll on unit effectiveness. The hills were steep and many soldiers were overburdened. The hills and the heat were as effective as enemy action in causing losses.⁵⁸

Combat was shrouded in uncertainty. Planning for the operation was done in a compartmentalized manner. This caused participating units to plan in isolation and fight in ignorance of what others were doing. Even though the invasion was launched to rescue US medical students, US forces had almost no idea where the students were. There was no hard intelligence on enemy locations, strength, or intentions. Enemy strength was grossly exaggerated as was their will to fight. Positions to be occupied by invading forces were not well-defined in advance. The maps available were inadequate. Ranger battalions had to make due with black and white photocopies of out-of-date British 1:50,000 tourist maps. Adequate

maps became available only after US forces captured them from the enemy. The lack of proper map grid coordinates led to the destruction of a mental hospital and an aerial attack on an Army command post. These problems existed despite the fact that Grenada had been the center of communist activity in the region for over four years.⁵⁹

The case studies illustrate the utility of antecedent variables in analyzing the psychological readiness to conduct contingency operations. Those forces which were cohesive, well-trained, and well-led were better able to withstand the impact of the combat characteristics. Though this an obvious conclusion, further investigation is needed to answer the following questions. What are the combat characteristics of contingency operations? What are the individual characteristics of today's US Army soldiers? What unit characteristics are essential to prepare soldiers to deal with combat characteristics?

IV. Analysis

The Impact of Combat Characteristics on the Individual Soldier. Contingency operations are a subset of low-intensity conflict: operations "generally confined to a geographic area and [are] often characterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and the level of violence."⁶⁰ They are often undertaken in crisis avoidance or crisis management situations which are time-sensitive. Contingency operations are characterized by political pressure for a quick, decisive victory; an uncertain mission and enemy situation; joint and/or combined operations; and are usually of

short duration. Military forces are employed to make a political statement of resolve. Soldiers may or may not receive popular support prior to deployment. In the case of the Falklands, British forces knew the nation was behind them. In Grenada, US forces did not know how the American public would react. They just did their duty.

Therefore, today's soldiers are expected to fight and win without a clear understanding of purpose. Colonel A.J. Bacevich explains how the political nature of contingency operations changes the moral justification for military involvement:

Engaged in dirty wars where moral certitude may be in short supply, these professionals will fight not for ideals but to advance the interests of the state. Their effectiveness will stem less from having the right cause or even the right hardware, than from the toughness, resilience, and cohesion of individual units.⁶¹

Political restrictions in the form of rules of engagement will usually be placed on combat forces. These rules can become a source of frustration to soldiers who are trained to maximize combat power. For example, US forces will have to minimize civilian casualties and collateral damage to cities and villages. The strategies of massive and indiscriminate bombing against German and Japanese cities during WWII are not acceptable uses of force for contingency operations. The soldier with his M16 becomes the precision tool to surgically remove an enemy in order to reduce the risk to the local population. Additionally, limiting US combat losses to retain public support is a strong consideration. Increasing television and other media coverage of Third World conflicts reinforces the decision maker's concerns about minimizing noncombatant and US soldier casualties.⁶² These

constraints weigh upon the minds of soldiers and leaders who grew up in the shadow of the My Lai incident. In many cases, the only way to distinguish an enemy soldier from a noncombatant is when he opens fire.

The soldier's preconceptions about the combat characteristics are an important part of his mental preparation. Beforehand, he assesses the risks, hardships, intensity, duration, etc., based on training, information from the chain of command, and popular conceptions from books and movies. This allows him to measure in advance the amount of inner strength he will need. The potential, therefore, exists for the soldier to become demoralized if actual combat characteristics drastically differ from his mental image.⁶³

We may be in trouble if the soldier bases his mental image on recent contingency operations. American involvement has been characterized by intervention into underdeveloped countries who possess limited military capability during periods of political and civil instability. Hostilities were of short duration. Units experienced sporadic rather than intense resistance, and little exposure to indirect fire, resulting in few casualties.

This may not always be the case, however. As we have found in the Persian Gulf, the Third World no longer equates with second rate. Forces deployed in future contingency operations may face adversaries who possess significant heavy force capabilities, ballistic missiles, artillery, chemical weapons, etc. Additionally, they may possess a strong, perhaps even fanatical resolve, in defense of their national objectives. In a study of the Falklands, indirect fire was more stressful to the soldiers than direct fire.

However, these weapons, proportionally, did not account for many casualties.⁶⁴ This confirms Stouffer's finding during WWII in North Africa that the threat of certain weapons evoked exaggerated fear reactions among those soldiers who have been in combat only a short time. Although the German dive bomber elicited the most fear, it accounted for a small percentage of overall casualties.⁶⁵ In contrast to the experience of WWII and the Falklands, the psychological impact of indirect fire on US forces in Grenada was negligible. US forces were engaged by only a few inaccurate rounds from small caliber mortars.

In addition to the physical characteristics of a potential adversary's weapons, rapid deployment places unique stresses on individual soldiers. The circumstances surrounding the deployment are often unforeseen and unanticipated by the soldier. They are deployed without a clear understanding of what national interests are at stake or what the enemy situation is. In order to maintain operations security, soldiers are alerted at the last minute and are restricted from making outside phone calls prior to their deployment.

Predeployment activities also affect the soldier's sleep cycle. This contributes to the biological tension which leads to fatigue and exhaustion even before he steps into combat. Studies have shown that soldiers are likely to be militarily ineffective after 48 to 72 hours without sleep; the effects of sleep loss are mainly psychological--mental ability deteriorates and tasks requiring cognitive ability, such as vigilance on the perimeter are significantly impaired.⁶⁶ In the case of the Division Ready

Brigade (DRB) of the 82nd Airborne Division, soldiers were alerted at 2100 hours on 24 October after a full work day which began with physical training at 0600. They prepared for deployment all night, departed Green Ramp at Pope Air Force Base at 0930 hours on 25 October, and arrived at the Salines air strip at 1330. They were immediately engaged. By this time, leaders had been awake for almost 30 hours. It was not until after midnight that leaders were able to sleep, not by design, but by physical necessity. They could not stay awake.⁶⁷ Fortunately, there was little to no resistance during the first night.

In addition to overcoming the physical demands, contingency operations are more dependent upon the initiative of the individual soldier. He fights isolated actions in small groups. "Decisions in combat that once were reserved for the aristocracy of battle--the commanders--were pushed down to the ranks of the ordinary soldier. Do I advance? Do I take cover? Do I fire now? Do I retreat? Do I surrender?"⁶⁸ The fear of isolation on the battlefield is a major factor in maintaining the soldier's will to fight. Napoleon realized the importance of this when he stated this maxim: "Make the enemy believe that support is lacking; isolate; cut off, flank, turn, in a thousand ways make his men believe themselves isolated."⁶⁹ Du Picq also theorized, "Today the soldier is often unknown to his comrades. He is lost in the smoke, the dispersion, the confusion of battle. He seems to fight alone. Unity is no longer insured by mutual surveillance."⁷⁰

A soldier need not be located apart from his comrades to feel isolated. He can be isolated by his own fear and a perceived

lack of support from his primary group. Studies done as a result of the Yom Kippur War found that men who suffered combat reactions reported little or no identification with their unit or team, no trust in their leaders, frequent transfers and rotations, or feelings of not belonging to their units.⁷¹

Having described the combat characteristics of contingency operations, I shall now analyze the individual characteristics which exemplify today's US Army soldiers. Although every soldier is different in his own way, these characteristics depict a common psychological make-up.

A Profile of the US Army Soldier. SLA Marshall probably best described the social conditioning and moral restraints placed upon the modern soldier.

He is what his home, his religion, his schooling, and the moral code and ideals of his society have made him. The Army cannot unmake him. It must reckon with the fact that he comes from a civilization in which aggression, connected with the taking of life, is prohibited and unacceptable... It stays his trigger finger even though he is hardly conscious that it is a restraint upon him.⁷²

The following facts profile today's US Army soldier fresh out of basic training. He is typically 20 years old. 91 percent are high school graduates. 12.4 percent of first term enlistees are married. 38 percent came from broken homes as a result of divorce. 94 percent came from homes whose parents had a combined income of less than \$50,000.⁷³ They are all volunteers.

Since 1973, the US has relied on an all volunteer force. However, to sustain this policy, it has had to resort to numerous incentives to enlist and retain quality officers and soldiers. The results of a survey of infantry recruits conducted by George C.

Wilson and published in Mud Soldiers, indicate that 70 percent joined the Army to obtain money for college, a steady job, discipline, or an enlistment bonus.⁷⁴ Basically, these recruits joined the Army in the belief that it would get them somewhere in life and provide them with some fun and adventure along the way. "They were looking for a sliver of America's good life and would risk their lives for a chance to get it."⁷⁵ It is clear that a majority of these recruits, by their own admission, did not join the Army to be soldiers. This means that it is up to the Army to instill the soldierly values and live up to its promise to enable these new soldiers to "be all you can be." Basic training is the starting point for shaping these soldiers. However, the actual commitment of the soldier to organizational values does not occur until he reports for duty to his first unit.

The Unit Delivers on a Promise. It is the responsibility of the unit leadership to overcome the inertia of the individual characteristics in order to develop the soldier's commitment to unit values. In so doing, the unit psychologically hardens the soldier to the exertions and danger posed by the combat characteristics. In essence, unit leaders set the conditions necessary to execute US Army doctrine.

Doctrine suggests that the foundation of success in our units is based on creating cohesive, disciplined teams which can withstand the stress of combat and maintain the will to win under the most adverse conditions. Cohesion is defined by FM 22-100 as "the existence of strong bonds of mutual trust, confidence, and understanding among members of a unit."⁷⁶ DA PAM 350-2 defines

unit cohesion as "the feeling of belonging to a team of soldiers who accept a unit's mission as their mission."⁷⁷ To combine the two definitions, a unit becomes cohesive when its members share unit values and develop relationships of trust, confidence, and a sense of belonging.

The contribution of unit cohesion to combat effectiveness is demonstrated by the Israeli experience of war. The Yom Kippur War in 1973 and the Lebanon War in 1982 were conducted suddenly and unexpectedly. In these conflicts, psychiatric casualties accounted for 30.0 and 23.0 percent, respectively, of all wounded.⁷⁸ It was difficult for the individual soldier to prepare his psychological defenses. Studies conducted by Israeli psychologists conclude: "Soldiers who were confident in their military skills and in their leaders, and who were members of stable, cohesive units...showed themselves more resistant to combat neuroses, even under the most severe stress situations."⁷⁹ Hence, there is a direct correlation between unit cohesion and combat effectiveness. A greater number of soldiers maintain their will to fight in a cohesive unit.

Though Israeli soldiers fought to preserve their nation's existence and protect their families, the unexpected transition from peace to war parallels contingency operations. The soldiers who deployed to the Falklands and Grenada had a low rate of psychiatric casualties. Nora Kinzer Stewart attributed this to: "...a number of positive factors. The use of elite units, short duration of combat, little exposure to indirect fire...and a consistently successful posture, all of which influenced the rate of psychiatric casualties in past American wars."⁸⁰ In a future

conflict, in which contingency forces face an adversary possessing modern technology and a strong resolve, cohesion developed in peacetime is a prerequisite for maintaining combat effectiveness.

There can, however, be a dark side to unit cohesion. Units of the French Army were cohesive when they mutinied in 1917. Contemporary examples also emerged during the Vietnam War. In August 1969, a rifle company of the Americal Division refused to attack when so instructed. "Refusals to fight became commonplace, so much so that units formed separate companies for those refusing to go on combat operations. 'Fraggings' of commissioned and noncommissioned officers increased every year."⁸¹ There were "at least 1,013 documented cases of killing superiors or attempted killings by fearful troops" reported during the Vietnam conflict.⁸² These incidents illustrate a lack of unit cohesion. The soldiers had developed strong bonds, but they did not share the unit values. Thus, the definition of unit cohesion implicitly includes the values of the group and individual as being commensurate with values of the organization.

Leadership and training are interactive unit characteristics which instill unit values and provide the foundation for the fostering of cohesion. These two components account for all other unit characteristics in psychologically preparing soldiers. Efforts for instilling unit cohesion focus on the primary group.

First and foremost, strong leadership forges and maintains unit cohesion. FM 100-5 states: "The most essential element of combat power is competent and confident leadership. Leadership provides purpose, direction, and motivation in combat."⁸³ It

accounts for the unit characteristics of discipline, personnel turbulence, traditions and history, and dealing first-hand with individual characteristics. Good leadership synergizes the collective energy of a cohesive unit.

Leaders can design unit activities which generate the kind of bonding or behavior they want to encourage in their units. First, they should decide which values they want to instill in their soldiers, such as commitment to the established Army values of courage, candor, commitment, competence, integrity, loyalty to unit, loyalty to country, selfless service, and personal responsibility.⁸⁴ Then they should include values which are unit specific, such as: go anywhere, do anything; death from above; steel on target; teamwork; physical fitness; and the warrior ethic. Next, these values should be integrated into all facets of unit operations using the elements of spirit to maximum advantage. The elements of spirit are such things as unit mottos, symbols, traditions, history, records for high performance, and jody cadences. Essentially, they are a means by which a unit displays its identity. A more in-depth discussion of the elements of spirit is contained in Appendix B.

The elements of spirit in many Army units today exist simply because of inertia--they have always been there. But they must mean something to the soldier or they become nothing more than excess baggage.⁸⁵ Norman F. Dixon refers to the elements of spirit as bull. Although he recognizes the purpose of bull is to allay anxiety, he warns that such indoctrination can lead to rigidity, conformity, traditionalism, overobedience, and aversion to

progress.⁸⁶ Such can be the case if spirit is developed without regard to the realities of the modern battlefield.

Another means of quickly instilling unit values into soldiers is by the use of a bonding cycle. This is a carefully selected set of experiences designed for the soldiers of a unit to make them into family.⁸⁷ The bonding cycle begins with the integration of the soldier into the unit. This is the stage when a soldier is most impressionable as he is transferring his loyalty from his old unit. Early on, he forms his opinions and attitudes toward the unit which could last for the remainder of his tour. He should be welcomed with open arms and made to feel a part of the unit from the very start.

Loyalty is further developed by ensuring soldiers understand the importance of their role in combat and how they fit into the big picture. As Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery said, "...every soldier must know, before he goes into battle, how the little battle he is to fight fits into the larger picture, and how the success of his fighting will influence the battle as a whole."⁸⁸ This is accomplished by keeping soldiers informed through command information periods and informal training evaluations.

As a means of rapidly integrating the soldier into the unit, I recommend a Rites of Passage/Qualification exercise followed by an official acceptance ceremony. The ceremony clearly shows other members of the unit that the new soldier is now qualified to be "one of us." Ranger units use the Ranger Indoctrination Program (RIP) to accomplish this.

To further enhance the bonding of soldiers, leaders must

reduce personnel turbulence by maintaining continuity of job assignments. US personnel assignment policies hinder the development of unit cohesion as soldiers and leaders are rotated frequently. Therefore, we must not add to the turbulence by continually reassigning subordinate leaders and soldiers to different jobs and sections. "Bonds of respect, trust, confidence, and understanding take time to develop. When soldiers or leaders are shifted, bonds are broken, and new ones must be built. While they are building, the unit does not function as well."⁸⁹ Maintain unit integrity whenever possible. In so doing, an environment is created for shared experiences and enhanced teamwork.

It is foolish to believe that a soldier's loyalty, trust, and commitment belong to their leaders and organizations alone. Leaders must be sensitive to the needs of the family. Figures show that approximately 25% of the young soldier population, 80% of the NCO's, and 95% of the officers are married. Families often feel isolated and lack a sense of belonging.⁹⁰ They need both a formal and informal support structure, especially when their soldier is deployed. Likewise, the soldier needs to feel secure that his family is being taken care of during his deployment.

Soldiers also feel more secure about facing combat when they possess confidence in their leaders. This places a heavy psychological burden on leaders. They know that their actions are greatly scrutinized by their men, and they are afraid of showing weakness or indecision.⁹¹ Most likely, leaders at the lower levels will not have had combat experience. They have to build their credibility during peacetime. How the leader reacts in the first

few critical minutes of exposure to hostile fire is directly related to how his soldiers will react. If he exudes confidence and aggressiveness, then so will his men. In the Mediterranean Theater in 1944, infantrymen rated "leadership by example" as the most important attribute of officers who had done a particularly good job of helping their men to feel confident in a tough or frightening situation.⁹²

Finally, leaders are not just born, they have to be nurtured. As Bernard Baruch once said, "Don't begrudge the time you spend developing, coaching, and helping your people grow so they can carry on when you're gone. It's one of the best signs of good leadership."⁹³ This becomes the leader's legacy to the unit.

Leaders gain confidence and become more tactically and technically proficient by planning and conducting realistic training. Likewise, through the conduct of challenging training, soldiers gain confidence in themselves, their fellow soldiers, and their leaders. Additionally, they gain personal confidence in their weapons and equipment.⁹⁴

The expression, "train as you will fight," is more than just catchy rhetoric. Training is the heart of creating cohesive units. It accounts for unit characteristics such as physical fitness, tactics, doctrine, technology, logistics, medical care, and discipline. As was previously stated, soldiers who perceived themselves well-trained for combat performed extremely well. There must be a clear focus on replicating the combat characteristics unique to contingency operations--predeployment conditions, uncertainty, political constraints (rules of

engagement), etc. Dr. Roger Spiller contends:

Armies have had a great and abiding faith in the idea that military training can prepare a soldier for combat, and many soldiers have testified that training can physically toughen the man destined for the fighting lines...However, even the best training is never equal to combat. When training is deficient or indifferent or misguided, based upon an ill-founded idea of what combat may be like, it is as dangerous to the fighting soldier as an enemy bullet.⁹⁵

Training must harden soldiers to the factors of fear, fatigue, exertion, and privation which limit combat effectiveness if soldiers are not exposed to them in peacetime. FM 22-100, Military Leadership, advises, "Put soldiers through significant emotional and physical experiences in which they do things they did not believe they could do as individuals or as a unit."⁹⁶ Clausewitz believed that the frequent exertion of the army to the utmost limits of its strength must be practiced in training, "A soldier is just as proud of the hardships he has overcome as of the dangers he has faced."⁹⁷ This is further illustrated by Guy Sajer's experience in the German Wehrmacht in WWII. His training for acceptance into the elite Gross Deutschland Division stretched the limits of his endurance. When he completed training, he was extremely proud of his accomplishment:

...[I] joined the ranks of those who had already completed the ceremony, in a high state of emotion, ready to convert the Bolsheviks, like so many Christian knights by the walls of Jerusalem...Despite all the hardship we had been through, my vanity was flattered by my acceptance as a German among Germans, and as a warrior worthy of bearing arms.⁹⁸

Other bonding activities include the Ten Foot Tall experience which is usually some physical feat that associates good performance with the unit and its contingency mission. Examples include a 100 mile road march and adventure training such as

rappeling, confidence courses, etc.⁹⁹ Physical fitness programs must be tailored to prepare the soldier to perform his combat skills in the specific geographic and climatic conditions of the unit's assigned contingency mission.

Arduous training expands the boundaries of a soldier's endurance giving him both a sense of accomplishment and confidence. Response to various combat situations must become automatic to overcome these factors. As Clausewitz pointed out: "Routine, apart from its sheer inevitability, also contains one positive advantage. Constant practice leads to brisk, precise, and reliable leadership, reducing normal friction and easing the working of the machine."¹⁰⁰ Battle drills help reduce the level of anxiety as men develop a high degree of self-confidence about their ability to handle themselves when exposed to danger. Additionally, the level of fear is reduced once the soldier begins to execute the specific drill in a skilled manner.¹⁰¹ Rehearsals prior to deployment give the soldier greater confidence that his mission can be accomplished. The caution is that training cannot be too rigid. As most combat situations in contingency operations are characterized by uncertainty and sudden change, leaders must inject the unexpected into each training situation.

Realistic training must also expose soldiers to battle stimuli such as the noise and shock waves of explosions. In this way, soldiers sense the imminence of annihilation and develop an expectation of what combat is like. Stouffer asked WWII veterans the question, "Is there any particular kind of training you did not get that you wish you had received before you went into combat?"

The most frequent response was, "Yes...training under live ammunition, under realistic battle conditions."¹⁰² The Rangers attributed their superior performance in Grenada to the fact that they continually train with live ammunition in realistic training scenarios at least twice a month. Numerous soldiers stated in interviews afterwards that they fought as they had trained.¹⁰³

VII. Conclusions and Implications

Contingency operations place different psychological demands upon soldiers than do conventional operations. The circumstances surrounding the deployment are shrouded in secrecy. Predeployment activities disrupt the soldier's sleep cycle and do not allow him to inform loved ones. The requirement for a rapid response to a remote country often does not allow time to develop a thorough intelligence picture, contributing to an environment of uncertainty. The political nature of the conflict may not provide the soldier the moral justification for his involvement, or even the knowledge that the nation is behind him. This is critical, because he will fight more from a sense of duty than from outrage against threats to vital national interests. Finally, the soldier's leadership and training establish certain preconceptions about the nature of contingency operations. If the combat characteristics are considerably different than what the soldier had been led to expect, the preconditions for demoralization are set.

The research analyzing contingency operations such as the Falklands and Grenada indicates that cohesion is a force-multiplier

as Napoleon, Clausewitz, and du Picq had theorized. Units which had sewn the seeds of cohesion in peacetime had greater battlefield success. Additionally, they were better able to maintain their will to fight and withstand deprivations of climate and deficits of supply compared to less cohesive units.

Developing cohesion and the will to fight in individual soldiers and units is a dynamic process. Leadership and training are the two most essential components contributing to unit cohesion. Together they account for individual and other unit characteristics. They enhance and strengthen the bonds of trust and mutual respect between soldiers and soldiers and their leaders.

The soldier's willingness to fight reflects the leader's efforts to shape the soldier's character and to solidify his commitment to unit values. As Lord Moran stated,

Character...is a habit, the daily choice of right instead of wrong; it is a moral quality which grows to maturity in peace and is not suddenly developed on the outbreak of war. For war, in spite of much that we have heard to the contrary, has no power to transform, it merely exaggerates the good and evil that are in us, till it is plain for all to read; it cannot change, it exposes. Man's fate in battle is worked out before war begins.¹⁰⁴

Unit values are built into and derived from the elements of spirit. The leader must develop cohesion through activities designed to instill unit values into the individual soldier. If these factors are to be effective motivators, they must be made an integral part of a soldier's training and a part of his daily life.

Additionally, soldiers must know their families are being looked after. Efforts must be made to quickly and efficiently deal with legal issues of divorce, alimony, child support, indebtedness, and sole parenthood as they arise in peacetime. Pre-established

support programs such as family outreach and deployment information briefings will relieve the soldier's concern and reduce his psychological baggage.

Training must harden soldiers to the factors of fear, fatigue, and physical exertion which limit combat effectiveness. Arduous training expands the boundaries of a soldier's endurance giving him a sense of accomplishment and confidence in his own abilities, his fellow soldiers, and his leaders. Training must also replicate the combat characteristics of contingency operations. This can be done by frequent (at least semi-annual) Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises (EDRE). The 18-hour alert sequence needs to be re-evaluated for its cost effectiveness regarding operations security vis-a-vis well-rested soldiers and leaders who are alert enough to fight once deployed. If possible, soldiers should be alerted with sufficient time built into the alert sequence to allow for a sleep plan.

Every unit in the US Army is assigned a priority contingency mission. This should provide the focus for tailored programs which address the specific physical and psychological demands of a particular geographical region. Efforts must be made to stay abreast of political situations in likely areas where contingency operations may be conducted. War plans should be updated accordingly. Soldiers should receive training on the geography, culture and military capabilities of potential adversaries in these areas. This helps reduce the element of surprise.

While the US Army teaches military history to its officer cadets, there is little emphasis on military history within the

training cycles of the individual soldiers. Using the British example, the US Army should also inculcate soldiers with a sense of military history. In so doing, the soldier's pride in the traditions of his unit is enhanced, as is his determination to be worthy of them himself.

Unfortunately, stabilization is required to solidify the soldier's allegiance and loyalty to his unit. For this reason, US Army peacetime personnel policies hinder the development of unit cohesion by creating personnel turbulence. All theories of cohesion development include stability of unit members and their leaders as a first condition. The attempt to regimentalize the Army seemed to be a step in the right direction. However, there no longer appears to be a concerted effort to do so. As the Army nests itself within the confines of our geographic borders, and no longer concerns itself with significant overseas commitments, personnel policies should be developed which allow a soldier to identify with a specific unit for a prolonged period of time.

The major implication from the study is that contingency operations are a come as you are conflict. Therefore, the will to fight and win must be developed in peacetime. The soldier may find himself decisively engaged a mere eighteen hours after he was alerted.

The tactical units which will conduct future contingency operations must take deliberate steps to instill in their soldiers an aggressive will to fight and win. As du Picq stated, "what must be inculcated [in the soldier] is a will of his own, a personal impulse to send him forward."¹⁰⁵ If the combat units of the US

Army fail to instill this impulse in their soldiers, the employment of AirLand Battle doctrine is in jeopardy. The doctrine is dependent upon the aggressiveness and initiative of individual soldiers and leaders. It does not work if the force is composed of soldiers who do not have the resolve to execute that doctrine.

Thus far, the US has been fortunate in its force projection efforts. We have not faced a formidable opponent. Conflicts have been short and have not been very intense or lethal. However, the Army cannot rely solely on the performance or availability of elite units. Some contingencies may call for a heavy-light mix. After the initial forced entry to secure a lodgment, follow-on forces provide a combined arms capability and a more lethal punch. As the Army reduces its forward presence, virtually all CONUS-based units are subject to become part of a tailored force in support of contingency operations. This means that soldiers in all units, not just the light infantry, must be physically and mentally prepared to the same level of readiness.

We cannot allow ourselves to be lulled into a false sense of security that, like Operations Urgent Fury and Just Cause, future missions will consist of the same combat characteristics. The contingency soldier on the battlefield of tomorrow wins or loses the battle based on the level of unit cohesion developed in peacetime. Confidence in himself, in his weapons, in his comrades, in his leaders, virtually his entire psychological readiness, is a result of the efforts of his leaders and the quality of training he has received in advance.

ENDNOTES

1. Summarized from A.J. Bacevich, "Old Myths: Renewing American Military Thought," Parameters, (March 1988), p. 20-23.
2. National Security Strategy of the United States, (The White House, March 1990), pp. 26-27.
3. FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Approved Final Draft) (Washington, D.C.: HQ Department of the Army, 1 December 1989), p. 5-1.
4. Bacevich, p.20.
5. FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: HQ Department of the Army, May 1986), p. 26.
6. E.R. Black, Working Paper 88-1, "Human Performance in Combat," (Canadian Forces Mobile Command, 1988), p. 11. The criteria are adapted from a behavior model, "Psychological Aspects of Combat Stress: A Model Derived from Israeli and Other Combat Experience," by Dr. Reuven Gal and Dr. F.D. Jones. The model stresses the impact of antecedent variables on unit performance. Based on the antecedent variables and leader influence, the individual soldier will make an appraisal of the combat situation and determine a method of response.
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
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Appendix A: Psychological Aspects of Combat Stress: A Model
 Derived from Israeli and Other Combat Experience.¹



In the interaction process presented by the model, the soldier responds to a combat situation based on his appraisal of the event. The appraisal is based on experience, expectations, and the nature of the stressor. The leader has an important intervention role in which he can have a positive influence on methods of responding and coping.

The antecedent variables, which have been discussed in the text of the monograph will determine what baggage the soldier brings to the combat situation. They are both cognitive knowledge of and feelings about the combat situation based on individual, unit, and combat characteristics.

These variables have a strong influence on the appraisal process and methods of coping; however, the exact reaction is determined by mediating variables. At this point in the behavioral model, the leader can intervene and provide positive feedback and direction which can ensure that the soldier reacts to the situation in a positive way. For example, a confident commander, who conveys

¹This discussion is excerpted from E.R. Black, Working Paper 88-1, "Human Performance in Combat," Canadian Forces Mobile Command, March 1988. The model "Soldiers Behavior in Combat Conditions" is extracted from "Psychological Aspects of Combat Stress: A Model Derived from Israeli and Other Combat Experience" by Reuven Gal and F.D. Jones (1985) contained in the aforementioned reference.

to his soldiers an optimistic view, will increase the chances of success. On the other hand, an unenthusiastic, subdued or frightened presentation will create uncertainty or fear, increasing the possibility of disintegration.

The leader's central role in the individual's appraisal process is clear and cannot be overstated. The leader must be trained to present and interpret information concerning the antecedent variables so as to enhance the soldier's expectation of success.

Once the soldier has chosen a method of coping based on the appraisal process, he will act toward achieving the objective. Both the mode of coping and the mode of response will further influence the appraisal process. Again, it is the leader's responsibility to provide continuous information and feedback to enhance further positive appraisals.

Modes of response are categorized as follows:

Physical--abnormally rapid heart rate, constriction of blood vessels, sweating, increased gastrointestinal activity, increased muscle elasticity and blood supply, or release of hormones from the adrenal glands.

Emotional--expressed in a variety of affective reactions varying from enthusiastic excitement to fear, anxiety or depression.

Cognitive--including distortion of perception with a narrowing of attention span, hyper-alertness to certain stimuli, and increased use of automatic or overlearned responses such as loading and firing weapons.

Social--increased dependency on leadership and need affiliation, sometimes seeking reassurance and physical clustering.

Making the soldier aware that these responses are normal and can be expected under stressful conditions, will help the soldier to cope.

Modes of coping result from the interaction between the soldier's appraisal of the situation and the modes of response. They are expressed in a variety of ways from activity through passivity to breakdown. Mission oriented activity during combat is expressed in controlled aggression such as seeking shelter, firing weapons, and reconning terrain. This method of activity usually results in greater initiative, innovation, bravery, and success. Inactivity, prior to combat allows the soldier to dwell on the negative aspects of battle and normally heightens the soldier's anxiety. Inactivity during combat can cause soldiers to be less mobile, apathetic, and to lack initiative. Ultimately, failure to cope can lead to psychological collapse resulting in the soldier becoming a combat stress casualty.

Appendix B: Correlation of Forces and Losses: Falklands and Grenada.

FIGURE 1 FALKLANDS: Correlation of Forces and Losses

	BRITISH	ARGENTINE
Ground Forces	9,500 Total: 3rd Commando Brigade 3-Royal Marine Bns 2- Parachute Bns	12,150 Total: 5-Infantry Regiments 1-Marine Battalion
KIA	256	746
WIA	777	1,336
Captured	80	11,400

FIGURE 2 GRENADA: Correlation of Forces and Losses

	US	CUBAN	GRENADIAN
Ground Forces	[25-27 Oct 83] 22 MAU 2 Bde, 82nd Abn 1st Bn, 75th Ranger (-) 2nd Bn, 75th Ranger (-) [28 Oct-2 Nov 83] Above units (+) 3rd Bde, 82nd Abn	45 Cuban military 600 Cuban construction workers	[Mobilization largely ignored] PRA-600 (475 reported for duty) PRM-3000 (250 reported for duty)
KIA	19	25	67
WIA	116	59	358

Appendix C: The Elements of Spirit.²

The elements of spirit exist in virtually every US Army unit today. However, the elements of spirit must mean something to the soldier or else they become excess baggage. They must be carefully chosen to illustrate the type of values the leader wishes to instill in the soldiers of the unit.

--Unit history. Many soldiers do not know the proud history of their units. Task a talented officer to research and write a factual, yet interesting, account of the unit's history with stories of teamwork, heroism, and overcoming adversity. This brings history alive and gives the soldier something he can relate to rather than the lackluster lineage and honors of the battalion.

--Unit symbol/mascot.

--Unit greeting/motto/song.

--Unit records for high performance. Keep records on all elements of soldiering from the best scores/times on the PT test to the fastest time on the EIB 12 mile forced march to the highest score on the howitzer section test.

--Unit traditions. These are easy to establish if they are not already in place. Make sure they align with your established values. The rites of passage and acceptance ceremonies are meaningful traditions.

--Unit Jody cadences. Consider the PT run as a learning opportunity for soldiers--a mobile classroom where the leader shouts an idea and the followers repeat it in unison. The problem is that the cadences are often mindless statements. For instance, why would units of an armored division sing about the exploits of an airborne outfit? Take this great opportunity to pound home the most important ideas about combat effectiveness while you have a captive audience 2-4 hours each week. Use the Jody as a teacher. For example, you could write a Jody about any one of the following important subjects: the best accomplishments of the unit in the last 3-5 years, the battle streamers on your unit's guidon, role models you admire (who display the values of your unit), your SOP on battle drills, etc.

Although the information presented here may seem nothing more than a mere statement of the obvious, the key is to recognize the individual elements contributing to unit cohesion and put this knowledge to practical use. The leader is bounded only by his imagination.

²The information for this appendix was taken from an oral briefing by LTC James D. Channon, "Cohesion Technology," presented to the Commanding General, 9th Infantry Division, March 1982.