AN HISTORICAL STUDY:
THE U.S. ARMY VIETNAM INDIVIDUAL TRAINING
GROUP (UITG) PROGRAM, 1971-1973

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL KENNETH R. BOWRA
United States Army

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During the period from 24 February 1971 until 14 December 1972, one of the most successful Foreign Internal Defense (FID) missions was conducted by a small group of U.S. Special Forces, Australian, and New Zealand soldiers within South Vietnam. This group, never numbering more than six hundred, completely trained and equipped seventy-eight Cambodian light infantry battalions and completely retrained 40% of the maneuver battalions of the Army of South Vietnam following the 1972 Easter Offensive. This training program and lessons learned from it are detailed in this case study. The case study is built on declassified official documents, to include the final after action report of the program, and by the author's personal experiences as a member of the program during the period March-November 1972. The lessons learned from this program still apply to future Foreign Internal Defense training assistance missions.
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THE U.S. ARMY VIETNAM INDIVIDUAL TRAINING GROUP (UITG)


by

Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth R. Bowra
United States Army

Colonel John N. Sloan
Project Adviser

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Kenneth R. Bowra, LTC(P), USA


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During the period from 24 February 1971 until 14 December 1972, one of the most successful Foreign Internal Defense (FID) missions was conducted by a small group of U.S. Special Forces, Australian, and New Zealand soldiers within South Vietnam. This group, never numbering more than six hundred, completely trained and equipped seventy-eight Cambodian light infantry battalions and completely retrained 40% of the maneuver battalions of the Army of South Vietnam following the 1972 Easter Offensive. This training program and lessons learned from it are detailed in this case study. The case study is built on declassified official documents, to include the final after action report of the program, and by the author's personal experiences as a member of the program during the period March-November 1972. The lessons learned from this program still apply to future Foreign Internal Defense training assistance missions.
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INTRODUCTION

This paper attempts to serve as a historical study and analysis of a successful Special Forces Foreign Internal Defense (FID) Operation, the U.S. Army Vietnam Individual Training Group (UITG), later re-designated FANK (Forces Armée National Khmer) Training Command and Field Training Command, conducted from 24 February 1971 until 14 December 1972. This operation is one of the least known, but most effective FID training assistance missions conducted by U.S. Special Forces and can serve as a model for future FID missions in support of U.S. policies and objectives.

Foreign Internal Defense is one of the five primary missions assigned to Special Forces. The other missions are Unconventional Warfare (UW), Direct Action (DA), Special Reconnaissance (SR), and Counter-Terrorist (CT) Operations. These missions provide the National Command Authority with a wide range of options, based on the nature of the threat and U.S. policies and objectives in the region. FID is perhaps one of the most effective missions. Through it, we provide support to an ally, other friendly government or nation against an internal threat. Special Forces' organization and capabilities make it ideally suited to conduct or support FID programs in a counterinsurgency environment. The primary Special Forces mission in FID is
to advise, train, equip, and lead, as required, host-nation and allied military and paramilitary forces. The intent is to improve the tactical and technical proficiency of these forces so they can defeat the insurgency without direct U.S. involvement.¹ Per FM 31-20, dated Feb. 1990, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations, the capabilities that Special Forces employ to perform its FID mission are inherent to its basic Unconventional Warfare (UW) mission, with only the operational environment changed. To accomplish its FID mission, Special Forces participates in the following types of operations: training assistance, advisory assistance, intelligence operations, psychological operations, civil-military operations, populace and resource control, and tactical operations.² This paper will focus on training assistance operations. Training assistance may require Special Forces to develop, establish, and operate centralized training programs for the supported host-nation force. Subjects can range from leadership training to a basic training program for battalion-size units.

FID training assistance operations enable the U.S. to train a large number of host-nation troops, with a minimum number of personnel. One 12-man Special Forces detachment (A-Team) is capable of training a 500-man indigenous light-infantry battalion. Therefore, these missions require no large influx of U.S. forces, while at the same time, provide training to a large number of host-nation battalions.
ASSISTANCE TO THE KHMER REPUBLIC BEGINS

In 1970, the political leadership in Cambodia under
Prince Norodom Sihanouk clearly supported the North
Vietnamese Communist war efforts, despite the official "non-
alignment" policy announced by Cambodia. Cambodians
finally overthrew Sihanouk in March 1970. Shortly
thereafter, at the request of the new Khmer Republic,
President Nixon reinstated a military assistance program for
Cambodia. The first U.S. military aid program had
terminated in 1963 when Sihanouk had broken diplomatic
relations with the United States.

The United States' initial Security Assistance
Objective for Cambodia was to assist in the development of
the Armed Forces of the Government of the Khmer Republic
(GKR) so that they would be capable of defending the GKR
from Communist insurgency and providing their own logistics,
training and maintenance support.

The Tripartite Agreements

In March of 1970, the Governments of the Republic of
Vietnam and the Khmer Republic executed an agreement which
permitted the training of personnel of the Armed Forces of
the Khmer Republic at locations within the Republic of South
Vietnam. Later, in March 1971, a military working
arrangement was formalized and adopted between the
Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, the Chief, Joint General Staff, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, and the Commander-in-Chief, Armed Forces of the Khmer Republic. The objective of the Tripartite Agreement was to increase the ability of the Cambodians to act against invaders and insurrectionists, and to act with the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) in collective self-defense against such forces as the need may arise. Key elements of this agreement were as follows:

"(U) Pursuant to the authority granted by their respective governments, the Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, the Chief, Joint General Staff, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, and the Commander-in-Chief, Armed Forces of the Khmer Republic, desiring to enter into necessary arrangements of details concerning members of the Armed Forces of the Khmer Republic who are within the Republic of Vietnam for military training under training programs involving personnel, facilities, equipment and material of the Government of the United States and the government of the Republic of Vietnam located in the Republic of Vietnam, enter into the following working arrangements:

1. (U) GENERAL: In response to requests from the Khmer Republic, the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and the United States (US) have provided military training for members of the Armed Forces of the Khmer Republic (FANK) at locations within the RVN and, under the provisions of this working arrangement and its annexes, will continue to provide similar training, using training facilities, equipment, supplies, instructional material and instructors provided by both the Government of Vietnam and the Government of the United States of America, with the objective of increasing the ability of the FANK to act against invaders and insurrectionists, and to act with the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) in collective self-defense against such forces as the need may arise.
2. (U) **COMMAND:** All military units and members of the Armed Forces of the Khmer Republic within the RVN are under the command of the Senior FANK Representative to RVNAF and US Forces in Vietnam designated by the Government of the Khmer Republic.

3. (U) **CONTROL:** A Military Training Policy Council is established for the Armed Forces of the Khmer Republic Military Training in Vietnam, which consists of the Chief, Joint General Staff, RVNAF, or his designee, as chairman, the Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV), or his designee, and the Commander-in-Chief, FANK, or his designee, as members. The members of the Military Training Policy Council will be assisted by working level representatives of each Armed Force. The basic function of the Military Training Policy Council will be to develop and prescribe training programs for units or members of the Armed Forces of the Khmer Republic within the RVN, insuring that task assignments and use of facilities, equipment, supplies and material connected with the training programs are mutually suitable to the requirements and capabilities of the RVNAF, USMACV, and the FANK. The Military Training Policy Council will determine the training subjects, control, coordination and program arrangements for the Khmer Republic Military Training in Vietnam in a manner calculated to achieve the maximum military training results.

4. (U) **TRAINING PROGRAMS:** Units or members of the FANK in accordance with the training program in Vietnam will be assigned to receive instruction at facilities within the RVN in such numbers and for such training programs as may hereafter be designated by the Military Training Policy Council.

5. **PERSONNEL SUPPORT:** Support for units or individuals connected with the Armed Forces of the Khmer Republic Military Training in Vietnam will be provided by the RVNAF and/or USMACV, depending upon whether the training programs are in operation at facilities administered by the former or the latter."

In summary, the Tripartite Military Assistance Working Arrangement was absolutely critical for the conduct of the training assistance program to the Khmer Armed Forces and
U.S. SPECIAL FORCES TRAINING BEGINS

In May 1970, the U.S. 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) began training Khmer infantry battalions inside South Vietnam. Two training camps were established to support this mission - Long Hai in the third military region and Dong Ba Thin in the second military region. A third camp was later built at Chi Lang in the fourth military region. From May 1970 until the end of October 1970, a total of eight Khmer battalions were trained by Company A, 5th Special Forces.* The program of instruction (POI) consisted of an 8-week training program, during which the battalions were trained along the lines of the Special Forces Mobile Strike Force (MSF) battalion, which consisted of 512 men.7

In October 1970, the Khmer Ministry of Defense made a formal request for a military Assistance Program (MAP) supported by U.S. forces in South Vietnam. Under the MAP, U.S. Army Vietnam (USARV) was tasked to train a total of 30 Khmer Infantry battalions, organized under the Mobile Strike Force battalion TOE.*

Even though Company A, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) had officially retired its colors from Vietnam on 5 March 1971, most of the Special Forces-qualified officers and non-commissioned officers remained in place at the
above noted Cambodian training sites. The Special Forces trainers were tasked by USARV to conduct the program of instruction, and reorganized under a new command, designated the USARV Individual Training Group (UITG). The training program could not be conducted inside of Cambodia, due to legislative restrictions. This legislation was the Cooper-Church Assistance Act of 1970, enacted on January 5, 1971. This prohibited the use of funds for the introduction of United States ground combat troops into Cambodia, or to provide United States advisors. Thus the United States was barred by law from giving the Cambodians the kind of advice and training that they needed to become an effective fighting force. The training program remained classified until late in 1971, shortly after the following article was published:

"Reports Berets Training Cambodians in Vietnam
by Alan Dawson

LONG HAI, Vietnam (UFI) - The U. S. Green Berets, Officially pulled out of the Vietnam war last January, are in reality still hard at work training Cambodian Army soldiers.

About 300 of the elite Special Forces troops, aided by other hand-picked officers with Airborne and Ranger training, have instructed 30,000 Cambodians at three American-run camps in South Vietnam in the past 18 months.

The Americans accompany the Cambodians on combat missions during the training, searching for guerillas in Vietnam's coastal jungles.

According to one officer, Cambodian Prime Minister Marshal Lon Nol asked specifically that the Green Berets handle the training of his troops in South Vietnam. They are not listed as "Special Forces" in Army records but they still wear the green beret.

At his headquarters inside a South Vietnamese compound at Bien Hoa, 15 miles north of Saigon, Rybat says the Cambodian training program "is the most important mission in the U.S. Army today."

The training is different from what the Green Berets are used to. Experienced counter-insurgency officers now find themselves teaching basic infantry tactics to the Cambodian troops.

Though the Cambodian units often include obviously underage boys and old men, "We don't question their ages", said one officer. "So far as we're concerned, they are all between 18 and 35."

Rybat's somewhat shadowy training group is officially part of the U.S. Army, but he reports directly to Brig. Gen. Stan L. McLellan, a special assistant of U.S. troop commander Gen. Creighton W. Abrams and director of Abrams' training directorate.

Known as the U.S. Army Vietnam Individual Training Group (UITG), Rybat's men have taken over former secret training bases used in the hey-day of the Green Berets to train their 35,000 mercenary soldiers in South Vietnam.

Two of them are at Long Hai, a sleepy district capital 48 miles southeast of Saigon. The other is at Dong Ba Thin, 195 miles northeast of the capital on the central coast.

The third camp used to be in the old Green Beret compound at Chi Lang, in the Mekong Delta. But its proximity to the Cambodian border led to hundreds of trainees going absent without leave, and the camp was moved to Long Hai and is now known as Phuoc Tuy.

The training is paid for from the U.S. military aid program to Cambodia.

The troops arrive from Phnom Penh aboard U.S. C130 transport planes, and whirl through three days of shots and equipment issue. They are given full field uniforms, packs, and M16 rifles, mortars, and machine guns.

Americans run the entire training program. There are no South Vietnamese on the bases, except for small security elements.

 Interpreters for the camps, and many of the security guards, are former Green Beret-trained forces from the old mercenary program. They are Cambodian residents of South Vietnam.

"There was a plan for the South Vietnamese to
take over this program after we trained 18 battalions," said one officer. "But that fell through." He said the South Vietnamese were both unwilling and unable to handle the combat training of the Cambodians, even if the Americans paid them to do it.

Close to 60 battalions of 512 men each have passed through the schools, and nearly a battalion a week is now being "graduated" back to the Cambodian battlefields.

To a man, the instructors at the camps are unhappy because under U. S. law they are not allowed to accompany the troops back to Cambodia and the field.

"I know why I can't go," said one. "But you get very close to these people. I'd sure like to go, just to see how they do."

The training includes 18 days in the field, trying to find an increasing number of Viet Cong in northern Phuoc Tuy Province. American advisers are allowed to accompany the troops in field exercises.

In one case, contact was made, resulting in one Viet Cong killed and several Cambodians wounded.

"Considering what they send us," said an instructor, "I think these guys are really good soldiers when they leave. And their best troops should be ready to handle the North Vietnamese."

The battalions sent to Vietnam range from elite airborne troops to newly-recruited peasants without military training. The instructors are not as optimistic about the ability of the raw recruits.

Commanders at both the Long Hai and Phuoc Tuy camps firmly denied their troops were conducting any "secret training," a steady rumor in Vietnam.

It is known that training of long range patrols and helicopter pilots has taken place in Vietnam, Laos and Thailand with American instructors, but they apparently have no connection with the Green Berets in the UITG.

Once the program became common knowledge, the Green Beret and Special Forces shoulder patch were authorized for wear by the U. S. Special Forces personnel. As the program
was not assigned to any specific Special Forces Group. The flash worn on the beret was that of the Khmer Republic. This proved to be very popular with the Cambodians, as it readily identified the Special Forces teams with the Khmer units. A rapport was established and continued to grow.

ORGANIZATION

The table of organization (TOE) for the new command authorized 423 positions for Special Forces qualified U.S. Army personnel. Personnel were assigned to either the UITG Headquarters in Bien Hoa, or at one of the three training camps: Chi Lang, Long Hai, and Dong Ba Thin. The training cadre was augmented by 19 members of the New Zealand Army Training Group, Vietnam (NZATGV), from March 1972 until 21 December 1972, and 30 members of the Australian Task Force, hand-picked to form the Australian Army Training Team, Vietnam (AATT). Members of AATT were employed according to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Employment of The Australian Army Training Team Vietnam Employed with USARV Individual Training Group. This memorandum, initially signed as an interim memorandum on 11 January 1972, established the following:

1. "...the administrative procedures and powers of command to be exercised in the assignment, transfer, administration and control of members of the Australian Army Training Team, Vietnam (AATT) assigned to duties with USARV individual Training Group (USARV ITG) in Phuoc-Tuy Province.

2. Copies of this memorandum are to be furnished by HQ USARV ITG to each officer commanding a detachment in which an AATT member is serving and..."
by HQ AATTV to each member of AATTV serving with USARV ITG.

Command and Control

3. Members of AATTV assigned to USARV ITG will be under the operational control of the Commanding Officer USARV ITG, but their employment will be restricted by the following limitations:

   a. No member of AATTV is to become involved in any incident along the Cambodian Border nor are they to cross the Border of South Vietnam into an adjacent country.

   b. Personnel of AATTV may not be used to aid the civil power in quelling a civil disturbance such as a riot, religious uprising or looting. Should a civil disturbance occur, AATTV personnel are to take appropriate measures to safeguard themselves and to safeguard government property entrusted to their care irrespective of the government of origin. They may be used to aid the civil authorities in the event of a natural disaster, such as a flood or major fire.

   c. When assigned for duties in subordinate Advisory Teams or Detachments, AATTV personnel will be under the operational control of the Senior Advisor to which they are assigned. However the security and safety of the Australian Team is the responsibility of the Senior Australian in the Team, therefore the operational employment of the Team members is to be arranged with the concurrence of the Commanding Officer AATTV.¹

UITG MISSION

The mission of UITG was to conduct basic and advanced combat training and small unit leadership training of individuals as directed by the office of the Chief, Training Directorate, MACT. To perform such other missions as may be directed by COUSMACV.²
THE TRAINING PROGRAM

The initial Special Forces training program originally was of a 12-week duration. UITG reviewed this program of instruction and expanded it to a length of 15 weeks (See Appendix 1, FANK Battalion POI) by the addition of a three-week leaders' course given to each battalion's leaders (battalion and company commanders, platoon leaders and sergeants, and squad leaders) prior to the arrival of each battalion to its respective training camp. The aim of this innovation was to give the 43 key battalion leaders an advanced overview of the training program to prepare them to assist the U.S. training cadre during the training of their battalion.

Once a battalion arrived at a training camp, the first two or three days was generally used to organize and equip it under the Mobile Strike Force organization (MSF TOE). (See Appendix 2, FANK Training Battalion TOE.) The leaders of the battalion had now completed their leadership training and participated in a seven week period of basic combat training, infantry advanced individual training, basic unit training, and specialist training with their battalion. During the eighth week, the battalion, led by the Special Forces Advisers, went on a six-day field operation in an enemy-contested area within South Vietnam. Many battalions made contact with the enemy during these operations, which resulted in much-needed combat experience for them. The
experience gained was not without cost. During 1972, Khmer battalions killed, wounded, or captured 15 VC/NVA, but lost 26 killed in action. During the same year, four U.S. Special Forces Advisers were killed in action.17

When the battalion returned from its first six-day field operation, it began one week of advanced unit training.

Instructors from three camp training committees: weapons, general subjects and tactics used this week to refine any deficiencies which were observed in the six-day field exercise. The battalion's remaining two weeks of the training program were spent on a 12-day field operation, during which company and battalion offensive operations were conducted, again in an enemy-contested area. Following this operation, the battalion returned to the training camps and prepared for its return to Cambodia. It was issued a complete basic load of ammunition and was then flown to Phnom Penh, Cambodia, aboard U.S. C-130 aircraft.

In September 1971, the area around the Chi Lang training site had a violent upsurge in enemy activity. During one field operation, four U.S. and 16 Khmer soldiers were killed, four supporting U.S. helicopters shot down, and 21 Khmer soldiers captured during an engagement with seasoned NVA forces.18 The Khmer battalion was nearly overrun, and the Cambodian Government requested urgent consideration by USARV/MACV officials to move the Chi Lang
training site to another location. Accordingly, Chi Lang ceased operations on 23 September 1971, with the graduation of the 30th Khmer battalion, the last battalion of the FY71 group. A new training site was established four kilometers from Long Hai Training Battalion (LHTB) and designated Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion (PTTB), which commenced training of its first Khmer battalion of 15 September 1971.

For FY 1972-1973, the Cambodian government requested that USMAP support the training of a total of 48 infantry battalions in Vietnam. Additionally, between 1970 - 1973, special requests for training were made by the Cambodian government, and met by USARVUITG (later FANK Training Command and Field Training Command) for certain specialized training. Nine special categories of Cambodians were trained during this period - nurses, shotgunsers, training center cadre, artillery cadre (trained in use of the 75mm howitzer), basic officer course (leadership training), counterintelligence, Mobile Training Team (MTT) cadre, methods of instruction, and Medium Range Recon Patrol (MRRP). (See Appendix 3, Specialist Training Summary.)

The various cadre groups trained in the specialist program were utilized upon their return to Cambodia, to start National Training Centers, a program which eventually
assumed the responsibility of all training once the U.S. program was ceased.

1972 EASTER OFFENSIVE: THE UITG MISSION EXPANDS

On 30 March 1972, the Communists launched the Easter Offensive. Numerous ARVN units were decimated and needed to be re-equipped, rebuilt, and retrained. Accordingly, USARV UITG was tasked to form combined U.S. - ARVN training teams to train the decimated ARVN units, the first being the 3rd Infantry Division and 20th Tank Regiment.

From the initial two mobile training teams which deployed to MRI, the ARVN battalion retraining program quickly expanded into a major program. During this period, UITG was re-designated FANK (Forces Armee National Khmer) Training Command on 15 May 1972, thereby becoming a part of MACV. UITG's higher headquarters, MACT, was redesignated Army Advisory Group (AAG). Due to the 1972 Easter Offensive, FANK's mission had expanded from the original mission of training Cambodians at the three training camps in South Vietnam to being additionally charged to retrain, in-place, ARVN infantry and ranger battalions. During the period from May 1972 until the cease-fire on 28 January 1973, Special Forces MTT's from FANK Training command (later designated Field Training Command) conducted on-site ARVN retraining at over 18 sites, throughout all four military regions. Over sixty-four ARVN battalions were trained by these MTT's and the Chief of the Joint General Staff, AVNAF
and General Abrams, COMUSMACV, agreed and publicly expressed their conviction that the UITG/FANK program MTT's were key in stopping the NVA advance north of Hue.2

Key elements of the MTT program were as follows:

"Searching for a fast way to assist, and with approval of COMUSMACV and the new I Corps Commander, MACT, on 6 May 1972, directed UITG to form joint U.S. - ARVN training teams to supervise the re-equipping and retraining of these two units. In two days, the teams were in place near Hue/Phu Bai, and started to train the badly mauled 3rd Division and 20th Tank Regiment. As replacements and materiel arrived, ARVN battalions were assembled just behind the line of contact in their area of operation, and rigorous training was conducted to put the unit back into a combat-ready status.

The toughest job of all was to train the leaders. Many of the best leaders had been killed in April and early May. ARVN leaders who met the training teams were mostly new replacements, or officers who had been badly shaken when the fighting became fierce. Leader motivation was at an all-time low, and it was frequently difficult to inspire them to overcome day-to-day problems.

The original retraining concept (MTT), as agreed to by MACV and RVNAF, specified that the MTT's should be composed of U.S. personnel and ARVN trainers from ARVN National Training Centers. In all cases, the team was to be commanded by a U.S. Special Forces officer. The number of trainers had to be adequate to train three battalions concurrently under a three-week program of instruction (see Appendix 4). The first team which deployed consisted of 25 officers and NCO's drawn from the three Cambodian training sites and the Bien Hoa headquarters. The team was commanded by a U.S. Army Major. After a week in place at Hue/Phu Bai, the MTT was augmented by 15 ARVN trainers from Lam Son National Training Center, and the joint concept was launched.

A three-week program of instruction was initially developed, but it soon proved impossible to hold a battalion out of action for that long. A somewhat modified version, which lasted fourteen days (see Appendix 5) was developed and tested by the early MTT's. This length of time, used diligently, worked well, and it was found that it
was better to train two battalions concurrently, rather than three. When one battalion completed the five-day weapons portion of the POI, the next battalion would start training. All MTT training conducted by the command was under the 14-day POI, with the exception of the 1st Airborne Division MTT, which used a 7-day POI (see Appendix 6).

Most MTT’s found that the ARVN trainers which augmented their teams were outstanding instructors in the weapons field, but were ineffective in teaching tactics, and marginal in leadership subjects. Generally, then, most of the responsibility for weapons training was turned over to the Vietnamese trainers, while the U.S. trainers concentrated primarily on tactics and leadership training. A strong point of the 14-day POI was the nightly officer’s class. Each day, usually after the evening meal, the battalion’s officers attended a two-hour class on various subjects. Most MTT commanders used this class as an opportunity to critique the battalion’s leaders on their performance during the day. It was also an opportunity to try to develop their leadership. It was found that the practice of openly discussing a leader’s shortcomings was a very effective technique to use to build their leadership qualities and improve their performance.

The key to the ARVN training program was a "hands-on, learn by doing" approach. MTT instructors used the following rule of thumb: 10% lecture, 25% demonstration, and 65% practical exercise. The method worked well with the average Vietnamese soldier. Units trained by the MTT’s consistently displayed better performance and achieved higher kill ratios after the training program was completed. LTG Pham Trong Chinh, Chief of the ARVN Central Training Command, is credited with the following statement, in tribute to the effectiveness of the MTT program: "If it had not been for FANK Training Command, there would not be an I Corps today."

In late June 1972, FANK Training Command requested that additional Special Forces trainers be augmented to the command from the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), then stationed in Okinawa. FANK Training Command, with its
authorized strength of 399 officers and NCOs, was spread too thinly to handle both the Khmer and ARVN commitments without assistance. The request for trainers was approved, and on 4 July 1972, over 100 Special Forces personnel from the 1st SFG(A) arrived in country on a Temporary Duty (TDY) status. Some of these personnel were used to augment existing MTTs or to form entirely new MTTs.

In August 1972, FANK Training Command received yet another mission from its Army Advisory Group Headquarters. The mission was to conduct security training for the South Vietnamese Regional Forces (RF), Popular Forces (PF), and ARVN personnel to upgrade security at 38 highly sensitive ammunition and POL storage sites throughout Vietnam. Accordingly, FANK Training Command organized Security Training Teams (STT's) to accomplish this new mission. Each STT was commanded by a Special Forces Captain, and augmented with five ARVN trainers. A total of nine STT's were created. All 38 Physical Security sites specified in the original request were completed by 30 November 1972. (See Appendix 4, Physical Security Sites Summary)

On 1 December 1972, the FANK Training Command was reorganized and re-designated as the Field Training Command. This re-organization coincided with the closing of two of the three Cambodian Training sites, Long Hai and Phuoc Tuy. Long Hai and Phuoc Tuy completed their last scheduled
battalions under the FY 1972-1972 request on 19 and 21 November 1972, respectively. The camps were closed on 27 and 29 November 1972.

During the early part of FY 1973, the Cambodian government was ready to begin training battalions at their own National Training Centers. The last U.S. Training center at Dong Ba Thin graduated its last Khmer battalion on 14 December 1972, and Field Training Command continued training only the ARVN units, until at 0800 hours on the morning of 28 January 1973, Army Advisory Group ordered the Field Training Command to cease all training and prepare to redeploy to the United States and disband the command within twenty-five days.  

SUMMARY AND LESSONS LEARNED

During the period from 24 February 1971 until 14 December 1972, a total of seventy-eight Cambodian battalions were equipped and trained by the U.S. Special Forces personnel of the JITG/FANK/Field Training Command. During the nine-month period preceding the cease-fire, the UITG/FTC program completely retrained 40% (a total of 64 battalions) of the ARVN ground maneuver battalions, using only 150 Special Forces trainers. The 9th, 21st, 22nd, and 23rd ARVN Divisions were completely retrained, and the 1st Airborne, 3rd, 5th, and 25th Divisions were nearly completed. In addition, 14 ranger battalions, eight
reconnaissance companies, and the 20th Tank Regiment were completely retrained in basic light infantry combat skills. (See Appendix 8, Summary of Training.)

It is impossible to measure the full effect of the UITG/FANK/Field Training Command Program. A small group of professionals were able to train major portions of the Cambodian and South Vietnamese armies and thereby significantly contribute to their defense. It was a classic FID mission, conducted by "light infantry" experts. As recognition for FTC's contribution, the unit was awarded a Meritorious Unit Citation. (See Appendix 9, FANK/UITG Meritorious Unit Citation.)

The lessons learned and recommendations from the FANK Training Command After Action Report are still applicable to future similar programs, and serve as an excellent starting point. Key elements are as follows:

1. "In training both Vietnamese and Cambodian units, it soon became clear that the most important subject to be covered in the training program was leadership. In the ARVN POI, only one two-hour class was specifically devoted to this subject. In the FANK POI, more time was scheduled. Despite the relatively small amount of time formally devoted to the subject, leadership training turned out to be a 24-hour a day process throughout all our training programs. It was found that the only effective way to accomplish anything with a unit was by working through the unit's leaders. If the unit's leaders were weak, the unit could accomplish nothing. To get better performance from the unit, then leaders had to be improved. This was a continuous process in both ARVN and FANK training. Techniques which we found
effective in improving leadership included challenging and/or publicly discussing shortcomings. Challenges included innovations in the training schedule, such as Command Post Exercises (CPX's), and Tactical Exercises Without Troops (TEWT's). If done properly, the public discussion technique was also effective. One key to success was to not shame a leader in front of his troops. It is, however, acceptable to the oriental mind to openly shame a man within a group of peers, or to shame a whole group, such as a group of officers.

2. A danger which must be guarded against in future training is the tendency of U.S. personnel to "take over" a unit he is training. At times, some U.S. officers and non-commissioned officers attempted to assume the leadership of some units. Sometimes, the indigenous troops would accept this, especially if their own leaders were weak; sometimes they would not accept it, and the American's life was at times placed in jeopardy. Though it was a natural tendency for some U.S. officers and NCO's, the practice of attempting to "take over" a unit defeated our training goal of improving the unit's leadership.

3. The most effective training programs conducted by this command were those programs which properly used the time-tested military instructional techniques of rewards and punishments awarded for unit and individual performance. The soldiers trained by UITG-FTC were simple people, with a peasant-type mentality, and they responded even better than U.S. Troops to this type of approach. A marksmanship medal awarded to the best shooter on the rifle range made him a hero to his friend. Distinctive scarves awarded to the squad which did best in the squad attack made one squad stand out from another, and gave the members a deep sense of pride. In the MTT program, some commanders oriented their goal toward selection of a best company at the end of the cycle. Throughout the 14 days, every unit was evaluated and graded on a daily basis to provide a yardstick for the selection of the best company. The spirit of competition which arose greatly aided the effectiveness of the training. Similarly, properly awarded punishment for poor performance, such as push-ups, reinforced in the soldier's mind the fact that he should not repeat a mistake.
4. When establishing training sites to be used in training of third country nations, it is important to consider the relationship between Americans, host country, and third country people. Many times, deep-seated racial animosities exist in a majority of the population. This was the case in RVN during the time we operated our FANK training program. Cambodians and Vietnamese generally did not get along with one another. We found that we created many problems which cropped up whenever we brought the two groups of people close together. If this problem exists in a host country, it is recommended that training sites be established far from centers of population to minimize the possibility of incidents.

5. In the ARVN training program, a problem which plagued U.S. effort throughout all training was the problem of obtaining Vietnamese support for the U.S. MTT, particularly in the field of providing sufficient ammunition to effectively meet the subjects required by the POI. It is of paramount importance, in all future training of this nature, that the question of support be resolved before the training begins. Particularly when support is to come from a host country source, it is important that a clear-cut, concise, and formal request for all required support be submitted to the host country as early as possible. Further, it must be certain that the request is approved and the support is available before any training begins.

6. Both FANK and ARVN officers are very rank-and protocol-conscious. It was found that it is best to understand and abide by this peculiarity in order to effectively deal with them. The question of rank is sometimes an important consideration when dealing with host country and third country officials. For example, it was found that it required at least a U.S. Army major to command our Mobile Training Teams. A captain or a lieutenant could have handled the Americans just as effectively, but he would not have been able to deal with the ARVN battalion commander, who was usually a major. Also, in most cases, it would have been impossible to obtain the required support for MTT training. Similarly, it was discovered that it was extremely difficult to obtain a firm commitment from an ARVN division unless the Special Forces commander, a colonel,
made direct, face-to-face coordination with the division commander concerned. After the commanders made the initial coordination, U.S. - ARVN staffs were able to work out the details.

7. The question of personnel stability had a large impact on the effectiveness of MTT training. It was concluded that the MTT commanders should occupy their positions a minimum of six months to become truly effective trainers. Similarly, it was found that MTT trainers should occupy their positions at least two months. It took a period of about two weeks before a trainer grasped the program concept, and realized what was expected of him. MTT service was not always the most pleasant duty, and personnel were often anxious to be rotated to a "softer" assignment on a staff or at the Cambodian training sites. The above-mentioned time limits were eventually adopted as a matter of command policy.

8. Interpreters are an important point of consideration in any foreign national training program. Generally, there were two classes of interpreters. One class was employed and administratively controlled by FTC. When MTT training started, the program was augmented with interpreters employed by ARVN National Training Centers. It was nearly impossible to rely on the second class of interpreters. They were not paid or administratively controlled by FTC headquarters, so they came and went at will. While many of them were a great asset to the program, their unreliability made their overall value questionable. In any future programs of this nature, it is recommended that all interpreters be employed and controlled by the agency conducting the training. If an augmentation from another source becomes necessary, the administrative control for personnel should be transferred to the agency conducting the training.

9. Field operations in a combat environment were an important part of the FANK POI. Toward the end of the program, however, Dong Ba Thin Training Battalion began to question the overall concept of the field operations. Throughout the period of FANK training, field operations had been used as an extension of the training conducted at the base site. The only difference was that the battalion was put in a field environment, where contact
with the enemy was possible, and training continued 24 hours a day. Dong Ba Thin experimented with the field operations by attempting to make the field operations a testing phase of training. When a battalion was on an operation, it was given a series of problems, and asked to solve them. The battalion received a formal score based on how it solved the problem. The Army Training Test (ATT) program has been a very successful technique used in training in CONUS, and it could be just as effective in a combat zone. In future programs of this nature, it is recommended that ATT-type testing programs be implemented for use during the field operation period of the training."

AN EXAMPLE FOR THE FUTURE

Into the next century, and beyond, Special Forces can conduct similar training assistance FID missions in support of U.S. policies and objectives. A historical study of the UITG/FANK/FTC program shows significant lessons learned which, when applied to future FID training assistance missions, can be the building blocks for the future and success.

First, FID training assistance missions need not be conducted in the host country. As seen in our historical study, the Cooper-Church Amendment prohibited U.S. Advisers in Cambodia. By setting up the training program in an adjacent allied country, in this case, South Vietnam, the mission was successfully conducted without violating the law or expanding the U.S. role in the Cambodian war. This could be applied in future missions where the host nation forces
being trained cannot operate in their homeland, due to occupation by hostile forces or when similar legislative restrictions are imposed.

Second, Special Forces FID training assistance missions require minimum expenditure of resources or the commitment of large numbers of personnel. As seen in this historical study, one twelve-man Special Forces operational detachment (A-team) was utilized to train a 512-man Cambodian battalion. Special Forces' "force multiplier" role is early demonstrated in this type of mission. A Special Forces Group, consisting of three battalions, each with three line companies, consists of 54 such A-Teams capable of training, equipping, advising, and when authorized, leading 54 host nation battalions - the equivalent of 18 brigades of three battalions each, which equates to six (6) light infantry divisions, with three brigades per division.

Third, Special Forces soldiers are light infantry experts. The Special Forces Operational Detachment (A-Team) is specifically designed to organize, equip, train, advise, lead, direct, and support indigenous military or paramilitary forces in Internal Defense and Development or UW operations. The detachment has two enlisted specialists in each of the five SF functional areas: weapons, engineer, medical, communications, and operations and intelligence.

Fourth, Special Forces operations, as seen in this historical study are easily expanded to support additional
missions, as seen in the requirements to create MTT's and train 40% of the ARVN maneuver divisions following the 1972 Easter Offensive, conducting the Security Training Team (STT) missions in over 38 locations and training over nine specialties consisting of over 967 personnel, and still, while tasked to operate three major training sites to continue the training of Cambodian battalions. (See Appendix 10, UITG/FTC Training Locations Map.)

Fifth, and perhaps most important in distinguishing Special Forces from other U.S. forces, is the fact that in conducting FID training missions, Special Forces soldiers study and learn the customs and languages of the indigenous troops they work with, and can therefore relate better to them and show the host nation personnel that they care and respect their way of life and customs.

Foreign Internal Defense training missions for the future are a viable option to support U.S. policies and objectives, and can be conducted by U.S. Special Forces in all operational environments, in peace, conflict, and war. This historical study is a classic example of one such success story.

Although both South Vietnam and Cambodia were overrun by their enemies, Special Forces enabled the end to be significantly delayed. As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger stated: "America has nothing to be ashamed of in having tried to help a brave people defend itself against a
group of genocidal murderers. Those who actively prevented adequate assistance, have the more reason to be uncomfortable.
APPENDIXES

1. FANK Training Battalion POI
2. FANK Training Battalion TOE
3. Specialist Training Summary
4. Battalion 21-Day Training Program Chart
5. 14-Day Training Program Chart
6. 7-Day Training Program Chart
7. Physical Security Sites Summary
8. Summary of Training
9. Meritorious Unit Citation
10. UITG/FTC Training Locations Map
APPENDIX 1

Note: See Abbreviation Explanation next page.

FANK BATTALION POI

WEEK OF TRAINING

HOURS OF TRAINING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Week</th>
<th>LOR</th>
<th>BCT</th>
<th>IAT</th>
<th>BUT</th>
<th>POP</th>
<th>AUT</th>
<th>POP</th>
<th>RTO</th>
<th>MG</th>
<th>MTR</th>
<th>MED</th>
<th>REC</th>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>118</td>
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<td>288</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>108/218</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>246</td>
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-29-
APPENDIX 1 ABBREVIATIONS

LDR - Leader Training
BCT - Basic Combat Training
IAT - Infantry Advanced Individual Training
BUT - Basic Unit Training
FOP - Field Operations
AUT - Advanced Unit Training
RTO - Radio Telephone Operator Training
MG - .30 M1919A6 Machinegun Training
MTR - Mortar Training
MED - Medical Training
REC - Reconnaissance Training
APPENDIX 2
FANK TRAINING BATTALION TOE
(BASED ON SPECIAL FORCES MOBILE STRIKE FORCE BN)

HEADQUARTERS
Battalion Commander 1 (A)
Executive Officer 1 (B)
Sergeant Major 1 (B)
RTO 1 (B) (E)

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

Headquarters Section
Company Commander 1 (A)
First Sergeant 1 (B)

S-1 Section
S-1 Officer 1 (B)
Clerk/RTO 1 (B) (E)

S-2/3 Section
S-2/3 Officer 1 (B)
Operation NCO 1 (B)

S-4 Section
S-4 Officer 1 (B)
Supply Sergeant 1 (B)
Armoer 1 (B)
Clerk/Radio Mech. 1 (B)
Medic 1 (B)

Mortar Platoon - 81MM
Platoon Leader 1 (B)
Platoon Sergeant/FO 1 (B)
Computer/RTO 2 (B) (E-1 ea)
Squad Leader 3 (B)
Gunner 3 (A) (F)
Assistant Gunner 3 (B)
Ammo Bearer 6 (B)

RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON

Platoon Headquarters
Pit Leader 1 (B)
Pit Sergeant 1 (B)
RTO 1 (B) (E)
Medic 1 (B)

Recon Squad (3)
Squad Leader 1 (B)
Team Leader 2 (B)
Grenadier 2 (C)
Rifleman 5 (B)
RIFLE COMPANY (148 MEN) 3 EACH

COMPANY HEADQUARTERS SECTION

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<tr>
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<td>First Sergeant</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medic</td>
<td>1 (B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk/Radio Mechanic</td>
<td>1 (B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armorer</td>
<td>1 (B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTO</td>
<td>1 (C) (E)</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Company Commander</td>
<td>1 (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Officer</td>
<td>1 (B)</td>
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MORTAR SECTION - 60MM

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<tr>
<td>Assistant Section Leader/FO</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squad Leader</td>
<td>2 (B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunner</td>
<td>2 (A) (G)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Gunner</td>
<td>2 (B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition Bearer</td>
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RIFLE PLATOON (3)

Platoon Headquarters

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Platoon Leader</td>
<td>1 (B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platoon Sergeant</td>
<td>1 (B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTO</td>
<td>1 (C) (E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medic</td>
<td>1 (B)</td>
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Rifle Squad

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Quantity</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Squad Leader</td>
<td>1 (B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Team Leader</td>
<td>2 (B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenadier</td>
<td>2 (C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Gunner</td>
<td>1 (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Machine Gunner</td>
<td>1 (B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifleman</td>
<td>5 (B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammo Bearer</td>
<td>1 (B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BN HQ CO</td>
<td>3 RIFLE CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.45</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-16</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-79</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-6</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.25</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**NOTE:**
- **A** - .45 Cal. Pistol
- **B** - M-16
- **C** - M-79
- **D** - M1919A6
- **E** - AN/PRC-25
- **F** - 81MM Mortar
- **G** - 60MM Mortar

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## APPENDIX 3
### SUMMARY OF SPECIALIST TRAINING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group (Size)</th>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Dates</th>
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<tr>
<td>Nurses (60)</td>
<td>Long Hai</td>
<td>May 70 - Jan 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shotgunners (6)</td>
<td>Long Hai</td>
<td>Jun 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tng. Center Cadre (1)</td>
<td>Long Hai</td>
<td>Mar 71 - Aug 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery Cadre (unk)</td>
<td>Long Hai</td>
<td>Oct 71 - Nov 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Trained in the use of the Pack 75mm Howitzer)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer Basic Course (235)</td>
<td>Dong Ba Thin</td>
<td>Jan 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Leadership training) (5)</td>
<td>Long Hai</td>
<td>Mar 72 - Apr 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterintelligence (30)</td>
<td>Dong Ba Thin</td>
<td>Aug 72 - Sep 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTT Cadre (96)</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Feb 72 - Jun 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Training Team (15)</td>
<td>Dong Ba Thin</td>
<td>Jan 72 - Apr 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dong Ba Thin</td>
<td>Oct 72 - Jan 73</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dong Ba Thin</td>
<td>Nov 72 - Jan 73</td>
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<tr>
<td>Methods of Instruction (180)</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>Apr 72 - Jul 72</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRRP Cadre (100)</td>
<td>Long Hai</td>
<td>Sep 72 - Nov 72</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Medium Range Recon Patrol)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
BATTALION 21 DAY TRAINING PROGRAM

DAYS OF TRAINING

1. INTRO TO TNG PROGRAM, TI MG & MORTARS
2. M16 MARKSMANSHIP, FUNDAMENTALS & M16 ZEROING

LIVE FIRE EX INCLUDES: GO ATK, PASSAGE THRU LINES, ESTABLISHING FETTA, COP & DEFENSE IN DEPTH, COUNTER ATK ON RETROGRADE OPNS, DRAW UP OF FIRE PLANS, COMBINED ARMS ATTACKS, CRITIQUE
Appendix 4 Abbreviations

M16 - 5.56 M16A1 Rifle
M60 - 7.62 M60 Machinegun
M72 - M72 LAW
57 RR - 57mm Recoiless Rifle
MTR - 60mm Mortar
ATK - Attack Drills (Squad, Platoon, Company)
FO - Forward Observer procedures
APPENDIX 5 ABBREVIATIONS

M16 - 5.56 M16A1 Rifle
M79 - 40mm M79 Grenade Launcher
TAC - Squad and Platoon Tactics
60 MTR - 60mm Mortar
81 MTR - 81mm Mortar
SEVEN DAY TRAINING PROGRAM
(NOTE: OFFICER'S CLASS EVERY NIGHT)

DAYS OF TRAINING

CONCURRENT SUBJECTS: CLAYMORES, AMBUSHES, FIRST AID, IA DRILLS, PATROLLING, COMMUM
APPENDIX 6 ABBREVIATIONS

M16 - 5.56 M16A1 Rifle
M79 - 40mm M79 Grenade Launcher
RR - 57mm Recoilless Rifle
SOD TAC - Squad Tactics
PLT TAC - Platoon Tactics
CO TAC - Company Tactics
CMB ARMS - Combined Arms Training
<table>
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<td>I</td>
<td>512 AMMO</td>
<td>06 OCT 72</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAMP EVANS</td>
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<td>THUAN AN (TAN MY)</td>
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<td>DA NANG</td>
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<td>DA NANG</td>
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<td>CAM RANH BAY</td>
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<td>20 OCT 72</td>
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<td>PLEIKU</td>
<td>II</td>
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<td>27 SEP 72</td>
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<td>THANH TUY HOA</td>
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<td>GIA DINH (Extended)</td>
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<td>27 OCT 72</td>
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<td>III</td>
<td>AMMO/POL</td>
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<td>III</td>
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<td>POL</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAY NHINH</td>
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<td>536 AMMO</td>
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<td>08 NOV 72</td>
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<tr>
<td>GO VAP</td>
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<td>16 SEP 72</td>
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<td>III</td>
<td>531 AMMO</td>
<td>16 SEP 72</td>
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APPENDIX 8
SUMMARY OF TRAINING

1. FANK Training Completed (May 1970 - January 1973)

   FY 1970
   Infantry Battalions 08
   FY 1971
   Infantry Battalions 30
   FY 1972-3
   Infantry Battalions 47
   Marine Battalions 01
   TOTAL Battalions Trained 86

2. ARVN Training Completed (May 1972 - January 1973)

   Infantry Battalions 54
   Ranger Battalions 14
   TOTAL Battalions Trained 68
   TOTAL Infantry/Ranger Battalions in ARVN Order of Battle 170

Percentages Trained 40%

*Note: In addition, training was completed for 8 Reconnaissance Companies, and the 20th Tank Regiment.

3. ARVN Divisions Retrained (May 1972 - January 1973)

   Divisions Completely Trained
     9th Inf Div
     21st Inf Div
     22nd Inf Div
     23rd Inf Div

   Divisions Nearly Completed
     3rd Inf Div
     5th Inf Div
     25th Inf Div
     1st Abn Div

   Divisions Not Trained
     1st Inf Div
     2nd Inf Div
     7th Inf Div
     18th Inf Div
APPENDIX 9

ANNEX C

Award of Unit Meritorious Unit Commendation
to U.I.T.G./FANK Training Command

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam/MACV Support Command
APO San Francisco 96375

GENERAL ORDERS 15 March 1973
NUMBER 738

AWARD OF THE MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMENDATION

TC 439. The Following AWARD is announced.

By direction of the Secretary of the Army, under the provisions of paragraph 203, AR 672-5-1, the Meritorious Unit Commendation is awarded to the following named unit of the United States Army for exceptionally meritorious achievement in the performance of outstanding service during the period indicated:

UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM INDIVIDUAL TRAINING GROUP (UITG)/FORCES ARMEE' NATIONALE KHMER (FANK) TRAINING COMMAND and assigned and attached units:


Chi Lang Training Battalion, UITG, 24 February 1971 to 1 September 1971.


GENERAL ORDERS NUMBER 738, dated 15 March 1973, DA, Headquarters United States Army Vietnam/MACV Support Command, APO San Francisco 96735 (Cont)

The citation reads as follows:

The USARV INDIVIDUAL TRAINING GROUP (UITG)/FORCES ARMEES' NATIONALE KHMER (FANK) TRAINING COMMAND, ARMY ADVISORY GROUP, and assigned units distinguished itself in support of military operations in the Republic of Vietnam during the period 24 February 1971 to 30 November 1972. The members of this unit continually demonstrated extreme diligence, extraordinary aggressiveness and consummate skill in the conduct of training operations with Allied forces throughout the combat zone. Form its conception the USARV INDIVIDUAL TRAINING GROUP/FORCES ARMEES' NATIONALE KHMER TRAINING COMMAND provided training to seventy-eight Cambodian battalions located at three sites. In addition to the demanding efforts of improving and upgrading two of these sites, one site, complete with training areas, weapon ranges, billets, and other facilities, had to be built from the ground up. When tasked with the requirement to organize, re-equip and train Vietnamese Armed Forces units which had been badly mauled during the Spring 1972 Offensive, members of this unit formed highly skilled Mobile Training Teams (MTT). This MTT concept and the implementation of this program has significantly increased the fighting effectiveness and morale of over sixty Vietnamese battalions. Maintaining the highest caliber of professionalism and superior demonstrated ability, members of this unit successfully rendered the finest possible training. The remarkable proficiency and devotion to duty displayed by members of the USARV INDIVIDUAL TRAINING GROUP/FORCES ARMEES' NATIONALE KHMER TRAINING COMMAND are in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit upon themselves, their unit and the Armed Forces of the United States.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL

P. B. WELCH
Colonel, GS
Acting Chief of Staff

/signed/
JAMES C. GRIFFITH
COL, AGC
Adjutant General

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ENDNOTES

1 FM 31-20, Doctrine For Special Forces Operations, April 1990; Page 10-2.

2 Ibid.


5 Memorandum. U.S. Headquarters MACV, MACJA. 16 March 1971


7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.


12 AAG After-Action Report, Headquarters FANK Training Command, Tab D, p. 2

13 Ibid.


15 AAG After-Action Report, p. 2

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid. p. 3

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid. p. 4
22 Ibid. p. 5
23 Ibid. p. 6
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid. pp. 6-7
26 Ibid. p. 7
27 Ibid. p. 8
28 Ibid. p. 9
29 Ibid.
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31 Ibid. p. 4
32 Kissinger, Henry. Letter to BG (Ret.) Theodore C. Mataxis. 30 June 1980. Authorized for use by Dr. Kissinger in letter to LTC (then MAJ) Bowra, 8 April 1983.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Figure 3
Figure 4
Figure 9
Figure 12
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Figure 19
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Figure 25