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THE BASES OF FUTURE
SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY

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THE BASES OF FUTURE SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY

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August 1990

The views expressed here are those of the
Soviet Army Studies Office. They should not
necessarily be construed as validated threat doctrine.

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Introduction

Since the formation of the Soviet state the concept of military strategy [voyennaya strategiya] has occupied a dominant position in the intellectual framework the Soviets use to explain the nature and content of war. In their view military strategy is the highest realm of military art [voyennoye iskusstvo] "encompassing the theory and practice of preparing a country and its armed forces for war and of planning for and conducting war and strategic operations." Within the context of national and military policy, military strategy investigates the laws, mechanisms, and strategic nature of war and methods used to conduct it, and works out theoretical bases for planning, preparing for, and conducting war and strategic operations.¹

The Western concept of national strategy approximates what the Soviets refer to as policy [politika], which they have, until now, defined as a class-derived, party-oriented, and historically predetermined concept related to the organic evolution of class and, hence, state relations. The Soviets recognize the unique realm of military policy [voyennaya politika] as "the relations and activities of classes, governments, parties, and other socio-political institutions, directly connected with the creation of military organizations and the use of means of armed force for the achievement of political ends."² Military policy "by its essence and content represents a distinct limited component of the general policy of classes and governments."³ Military policy receives concrete expression in military doctrine and military strategy. The Soviets claim their military policy and the derivative fields of military doctrine and military strategy reflect the unique policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, although this may change in the future.

While policy determines the goals and means of statecraft, military policy governs the use of the nation's armed forces within the context of general state policy.

Thus, military strategy reflects the political aims and policies of the state as well as its economic and socio-political character. Conversely, military strategy in peacetime and wartime "exerts an inverse influence on policy."⁴ As such, strategy also reflects military doctrine, whose tenets guide strategy in the fulfillment of practical tasks and are grounded upon the data of military science. Military strategy provides a framework for operational art and tactics, the other components of military art, and exploits the capabilities of operational art and tactics to convert operational and tactical successes into strategic success--the achievement of strategic aims.

Strategic force posture is the peacetime manifestation of military strategy and facilitates transition of the Soviet armed forces from peace to war. Force posture embraces active forces

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and forces which can be mobilized in time of crisis or war, and it provides the fundamental basis for deployment [razvertyvaniye] of the armed forces prior to and during war. In essence, armed forces deployment encompasses the creation of armed forces groupings to conduct war and operations.⁵ The Soviets consider the most basic and important level of armed forces -- that is deployments in accordance with strategic plans.

Strategic deployment [strategicheskiye razvertyvaniye] consists of a series of interrelated issues, the most important of which are:

- transition of the armed forces from a peacetime to a wartime footing;
- concentration of forces on selective strategic directions [axes];
- operational deployment of forces to required wartime locations;
- deployment of "the rear" (rear services).⁶

Strategic deployment has "traditionally" been expressed in peacetime by Soviet force generation (mobilization) systems and in wartime by the creation of strategic echelons. Force generation involves the distinct and varied processes for either manning the force during transition from peace through crisis to war [mobilization] and, conversely, for shrinking the force in transition from war or crisis to peace [demobilization]. Strategic echelonment permits phased generation and application of military forces in combat on a geographical basis. Strategic echelonment embraces all Soviet armed forces designated to perform strategic missions and achieve strategic objectives. It normally consists of two echelons and a reserve, each assigned a specific function.⁷

The first strategic echelon includes formations of all types of forces charged with conducting initial operations during the initial period of war. The initial period of war [nachal'nyy period voyny], by Soviet definition, is

the time, in the course of which, warring states conduct combat operations with armed forces groupings deployed before the beginning of war, to achieve immediate strategic aims at the start of war or to create favorable conditions for the introduction into the war of main forces and to conduct subsequent operations.⁸

Throughout the initial period of war, states conduct strategic deployment of the armed forces, mobilize the nation's economy for war, and negotiate with potential allies, as well as the enemy, to improve their international position. The Soviets identified and defined the term during the 1920s, and it has been

a focal point of Soviet military strategy since. It has, in fact, become a major subtopic in Soviet study of future war. Throughout subsequent years, the duration of the initial period of war has varied from several weeks to several months.

The second strategic echelon consists of formations located or forming within the depth of the nation as well as other newly-formed units created throughout the nation over time. Strategic reserves include existing or mobilizable additional forces and materiel available to the High Command. The strategic second echelon and reserve serve the function of narashchivaniye or strengthening the nation's armed force, permitting it to make the transition from initial to subsequent strategic operations.

Soviet military strategy, strategic force posture, and the related concepts of armed forces deployment, strategic deployment, force generation, and strategic echelonment all directly reflect the threat as defined by Soviet political authorities. As such, they have evolved and will continue to evolve in consonance with existing or forecasted political, economic, social, and military realities of the time.

Context for the Future

Post-Second World War Military Strategy

Since the end of the Second World War, Soviet military strategy has been conditioned by "experiences of the war and the new distribution of military-political forces in the world."⁹ The Soviets claim their policy has been based on the "fact that the governments of the former allies in the anti-Hitlerite coalition (primarily the United States and England) had departed from the principles agreed upon for the postwar organization of the world."¹⁰ During the ensuing Cold War, which the Soviets now infer began in 1949, Soviet military strategy recognized the dual realities of nuclear and conventional war. While their views regarding the domination of nuclear weapons have on several occasions shifted, until recently they have steadfastly insisted that "the offensive was the main type of strategic operation, in either a nuclear or non-nuclear context."¹¹

During the 1950s Soviet military strategy sought to defend the gains made by communism in the Second World War and immediate post-war years against what they perceived as a concerted Western effort, led by the U.S., to "contain" the expansion of communism. Containment, in their view, was typified by Western political efforts to restore the global status quo by the restoration of Germany (western) and Japan, the ultimate creation of anti-communist political-military alliances, such as NATO, CENTO, and SEATO, and direct military and political assistance in the form of the Truman Doctrine to nations

threatened by communism, such as Turkey and Greece. The economic corollary of these political programs was the Marshall Plan.

Militarily, the Soviets saw the threat as, first, the U.S. atomic monopoly (broken in 1949) and, second, the emergence of U.S. dominated military alliances, the most threatening of which was NATO. The Soviet strategic response was to maintain a large, expandable peacetime military establishment, maintain large military forces in conquered regions of eastern Europe, and cloak these forces in the political guise of an alliance which would contend with NATO on a multilateral basis (the Warsaw Pact). The major thrust of Soviet military strategy was to maintain a conventional military force whose offensive capabilities would negate Western atomic and conventional military power.

The growing Western thermonuclear threat caused the Soviets in the 1960s to modify their strategy. In the early 1960s Khrushchev adopted a strategy, soon delineated in Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky's work, Military Strategy [Voyennaya strategiya], which was based on Soviet creation of a thermonuclear capability equal to that of the West and a presumed reduced Soviet conventional capability, designed, in part, to respond to internal Soviet imperatives and facilitate expansion of the Soviet economy.¹² The central feature of this strategy was the assumption that future war would be inescapably global and nuclear in nature.

Although Khrushchev fell from power in 1964, the "single option" concept of global nuclear war continued to dominate Soviet military strategy for several years thereafter. Lessons of the 1960s, including the Cuban missile crisis, and the reluctance of key personnel in military-theoretical circles to accept fully the implications of the "single option" led to a gradual shift in Soviet strategy, which was apparent by the end of the decade. In short, the shift involved a lessened emphasis on the nuclear component of strategy and an acceptance that the role of conventional forces still maintained significance.

From the early 1970s to the mid 1980s, in response to the perceived U.S. and NATO threat, the concept of the theater-strategic operation dominated Soviet military thought, having replaced the nuclear-dominant strategy of the 1960s.¹³ With broadening prospects for large-scale combined-arms operations occurring in future war, with or without the use of nuclear weapons, the Soviets sought to develop concepts which could produce strategic victory within continental theaters of military operations. As a vehicle for understanding the potential for theater-strategic operations, the Soviets thoroughly analyzed their Great Patriotic War operations, believing that basic principles and combat techniques of that period retained their relevance.

Soviet study of the Second World War produced a series of models, which seemed to provide a sounder basis upon which to formulate contemporary concepts for the conduct of theater-strategic operations. Among the many criteria for selecting models were those features of modern war which the Soviets considered most significant. These included great scale and scope of operations, the participation of highly mobile forces as the motive force for development of the operations, rapid development of operations to operational and strategic depths, large-scale conduct of complex missions, and sustainment of the operations in terms of manpower, equipment, and logistics to great depths over ever-lengthening periods. The four models the Soviets focused on were the Belorussian Operation (June-August 1944), the Yassy-Kishinev Operation (August 1944), the Vistula-Oder Operation (January 1945), and the Manchurian Operation (August 1945). The last two, in fact, become virtual models of the theater-strategic offensive for Soviet strategists in the early 1980s.¹⁴

During the mid-1980s a wide range of new influences coalesced to significantly influence Soviet military strategy. First, there occurred a fundamental reassessment by the Soviet military of the nature and requirements of future war, especially regarding a perceived technological revolution in new weaponry (in particular, high-precision weaponry), whose effects could not readily be predicted. Second, a wave of internal uncertainty swept through the ruling and intellectual circles within the Soviet Union regarding the political, economic, and, finally, ideological basis of the Soviet state. Third, there occurred a growing disenchantment with the nature and effects of existing Soviet military policy and strategy, characterized by Soviet active intervention abroad and an intense and seemingly unlimited arms race, which placed immense burdens on the Soviet economy and seemed to offer little real gain in the Soviet international stature.

All of these influences led to the adoption by a new Party Secretary and Premier, Mikhail Gorbachev, of a series of programs to reform the Soviet state, principally in an internal sense. These internal reform programs inexorably involved the realm of military policy, doctrine, and, ultimately, strategy as well. In 1987, within the context of these changes, the Soviets adopted a new defensive military doctrine, which is now producing revolutionary changes in Soviet military strategy.

Initial Historical Models for Defensiveness

Beginning in 1985, the Soviets designated a new period in military development, soon defined within the context of a recast military doctrine emphasizing "defensiveness" in its political component, but clearly shaped in many of its military-technical aspects by reassessments which had begun during the previous

decade.¹⁵ Subsequently, the Soviets have articulated several variations of their future military strategy couched analogously in historical terms. The Soviet analysts, A. Kokoshin and V. Larionov, have publicly advanced four strategic variants (or models), distinguished by the relative offensiveness or defensiveness of each, and have begun to postulate several additional paradigms as new political realities emerge.¹⁶ It is likely the debate over strategy and changing political conditions will continue to ensure the strategic realm will remain a topic of uncertainty and redefinition. Quite naturally each model is subject to interpretation.

On a scale of decreasing offensiveness, the four original Soviet models proposed by Kokoshin and Larionov are:

-- Opposing coalitions possessing strong, offensively-oriented force groupings, which intend to conduct operations on enemy territory. Mutual offensive intent and suspicion of their opponent's motives characterize contending parties in this model, which replicates pre-First World War Europe, and, in the Soviet view, the Cold War as well. More important, this model inevitably increases the likelihood of nuclear warfare.

-- The Kursk model for premeditated defense, which postulates one side's absorbing a major enemy blow and then delivering a decisive counteroffensive that carries into enemy territory.¹⁷ Although labelled by the Soviets as "defensive," circumstances surrounding the Kursk operation underscore its inherently offensive nature. For this reason, Soviet theorists have recently turned away from the Kursk model as an example of future defensiveness to another which seems more appropriate.

-- The Khalkhin-Gol model of 1939 operations against the Japanese and United Nations operations in Korea (1951-1953) now seem more appropriate to today's doctrinal pronouncements.¹⁸ This model postulates that each side possesses the capability of routing an enemy force on its own territory but is not capable of penetrating enemy territory. Close examination of the circumstance at Khalkhin-Gol, however, indicate other facets of the operation which make it less relevant. These include the secret Soviet force build-up prior to the operation, which accorded the Soviets considerable surprise; Soviet numerical advantage; and political circumstances associated with the German threat to the Soviet Union, which restrained the Soviets at Khalkhin-Gol.

The Soviets also cite the period 10 June 1951 to 21 July 1953 of the Korean War as representative of this model. During that period warring parties tacitly agreed not to cross a certain demarkation line and not to expand the scale of military operations. Here, difficulties in determining the territorial

limits of combat, compensation for losses and degree of restraint on both sides cloud the model's utility.

-- Opposing coalitions possessing only limited tactical capabilities, both of which are unable to undertake any operations of strategic consequence.¹⁹ This model addresses relative capabilities and falters on the amorphous definition of defensive adequacy or, in current parlance, "sufficiency." It implies war is considered imminent by neither side, and there is a degree of mutual agreement among opposing parties regarding how "limited tactical capabilities" are defined.

President Gorbachev's current program of "defensiveness" postulates Soviet maintenance of a defensive capability sufficient to absorb and repulse an enemy blow. It leaves several fundamental questions unanswered. First, "Is defensiveness genuine?" Second, if it is genuine, "Is it based upon the Kursk or Khalkhin-Gol models or on yet another model?" And, finally, will events in the USSR permit a rational model based on military considerations to be implemented, and will the General Staff and Ministry of Defense view of military models prevail in the face of other realities?

Emerging Models

There are additional models which will better suit future Soviet strategic intentions should Soviet defensive doctrine persist. The Soviets have already surfaced the first new model with their publication in 1989 of a document which they claim was their defensive plan for the Group of Occupation Forces Germany (GOFG) in 1946.²⁰ The Soviets have begun internal discussions of new paradigms related to Soviet strategic posture from 1921 to the commencement of war on the Eastern Front in 1941. Recent and prospective changes in the Soviet Union and in the European political and economic structure, to some extent, recall conditions that existed during that period. Close analysis of that period reveals a second and third potential model: the second, regarding Soviet strategic policy during the 1920s and up to 1935 postulates a Soviet Union beset by severe internal problems, attempting to develop a military strategy to cope with post-Treaty of Versailles realities -- specifically, a Europe whose central feature was a militarily weak but dissatisfied Germany bordered on the east by a group of newly-emerged independent, but politically unstable successor states and on the west by war-wearied capitalistic powers bent on maintenance of the post-1919 status quo. The reduced threat to the Soviet Union posed by post-World War One European nations and the necessity for dealing with serious internal problems dictated Soviet adoption of a defensive military strategy characterized by maintenance of a smaller peacetime armed force and a mechanism for a transition to stronger forces in the event of war.

The third paradigm reflects Soviet strategy from roughly 1935 to 1941, when the Soviets were compelled to meet the challenge of sharply changing conditions within the Soviet Union and Europe as a whole. The increased industrial strength of the Soviet state and the emerging threat of German Nazism and Japanese militarism sharply increased the potential external threat and Soviet capabilities for responding to it. The 1930s paradigm was characterized by a more aggressive Soviet military strategy (although still ostensibly defensive) involving the maintenance of a large peacetime military force and a more efficient system for making the transition from peace to war -- a system ultimately characterized by the term "creeping up to war" [vpolzaniye v voynu].

These three tentative models address a wide range of emerging military and political realities and provide a framework for analysis of likely political and military implications of future Soviet military strategies. The Soviets believed the first model was applicable at a time when the USSR planned to retain the groups of forces in the forward area. That is no longer the case. The two pre-Second World War models provide a framework for analyzing Soviet strategy when Soviet forces complete their withdrawal to a national bastion. It is against the backdrop of these models that the following future judgements are made.

Conclusions

If Soviet military strategy continues to evolve in consonance with defensive Soviet military policy and doctrine, a Soviet strategic posture will emerge which is altogether different from that of the 1970s and early 1980s. The new posture is likely to accord with models or paradigms which the Soviets have either already openly discussed or implied. Whichever model emerges, it is clear that it will be based on thorough analysis of past Soviet strategic experiences juxtaposed against changes in the contemporary and future political and military environment. Analysis of Soviet strategic defensive experiences permits further speculation regarding other prospective models. It remains for us to judge which model is most likely to emerge and then to assess its ramifications.

The original models proposed by Kokoshin, Larionov, and others are a good starting point for analysis, for they offer a thorough range of options. The first model the Soviets suggested, that of premeditated defense at Kursk, appeared defensive only in a superficial historical light. Closer examination revealed features which contradicted its purported defensive nature. Specifically, defensive fighting took place within the framework of a Soviet strategic offensive plan, and large Soviet strategic reserves earmarked to conduct the offensive tilted the correlation of forces decisively in the Soviets' favor. Soviet maintenance of similar large combat-ready forces and reserves in peacetime would contradict the principle of "defensive sufficiency" and render the strategy clearly offensive.

The Khalkhin Gol and Korean model, which the Soviets advanced after the flaws of the Kursk paradigm became apparent, better matches articulated Soviet intent. It too, however, has weaknesses which cast doubt as to its suitability. Soviet strategy regarding the Japanese in 1939 was but a part of a larger strategy toward the more menacing foe, Germany. While overall Soviet strategy had, as yet, not become totally defensive in Europe, clearly the Soviets were adopting a defensive posture in the Far East. Restraint against the Japanese at Khalkhin Gol served the larger purpose of greater readiness against the Germans. Moreover, Soviet secret reinforcement of its forces in Mongolia and her achievement of surprise make the case of Khalkhin Gol less convincing.

Subsequently, the Soviets have suggested a new model based on a pre-cold war strategy. By providing details of their 1946 GOFG operational plan, the Soviets have argued that their pre-cold war strategic posture was defensive and have provided strong hints as to the nature of their desired post-cold war strategy in a circumstance of forward defense.

This defensive model provided a valid basis for discussion of the future Soviet strategic stance, but only if Soviet groups of forces had remained in the forward area. As balanced force reductions continue and forward forces withdraw, the justification for and credibility of this strategic posture will disappear.

When Soviet forward groups of forces complete their withdrawal to the Soviet Union, entirely new models will be required to define Soviet strategic posture and its degree of "defensiveness" in a reshaped European balance. Two such paradigms exist, one derived from the 1920s and early 1930s and one based on conditions existing from 1935 to 1941.

A paradigm which warrants the most attention is that of the 1920, when the Soviet Union assessed the threat potential of Eastern European successor states, alone or in concert with Western powers. This paradigm best represents future geopolitical, strategic, economic, and military relationships within a post-CFE Europe and addresses the key issue of Soviet attitudes toward Eastern European successor states and to new European threats. As such it offers the most valuable insights into probable Soviet military strategy of the 1990s. The 1920s paradigm suggests the Soviets will maintain lower peacetime levels of military preparedness, supplemented by a complex mobilization system capable of rapidly transforming the Soviet Army to a wartime footing.

Another less appealing paradigm upon which future Soviet strategy may be based is that of pre-22 June 1941, when a strong and hostile Germany in the west and Japan in the east had borders contiguous to the Soviet Union. Now that the Soviets have admitted that their failed 1941 prewar strategy was defensive, the Soviet strategic posture of that period can provide a basis for thoroughly analyzing future strategies for defense of the Soviet Union. While this emerging model will provide an excellent basis for evaluating military "defensive sufficiency," it will also inherently require detailed discussion of the political and military context -- namely the European political and military balance as a whole.

The model of June 1941, however, poses three problems for the Soviets. First, Soviet theorists have recently accorded the adoption of a 1941 model a very low degree of probability because nuclear deterrents have largely neutralized all analogous threats.²¹ Second, Soviet military theorists have only recently admitted their military strategy on the eve of war was defensive. Third, and most important, the defensive strategy of 1941 failed. Despite these problems the 1941 model warrants attention. Soviet implementation of a similar strategy in a post-cold war period will have to deal more effectively with potential threats similar

to that of 1941, particularly, if nuclear deterrence erodes as a valid defensive concept. Adoption of a new 1941-type strategy will provide the Soviets with the potential collateral benefit of being able to insist on external political and military concessions to reduce the threat and, hence, validate the strategy.

Should the Soviets rid themselves of the ghosts of 1941, this defensive strategic paradigm or that of the 1920s has the potential for offering considerable leverage to the Soviets in their political and military negotiations with the West. If, in fact, defensiveness failed in 1941 because the Soviets seemingly underestimated the external threat, then Soviet adoption of a similar strategy in the future will require the negation of any possibility of such a threat.

Two such potential threats immediately come to mind. The first, in the form of NATO, exists today in Soviet perceptions. The second, in the form of a unified and militarily powerful Germany, within or outside of NATO, looms as a potential future threat. Each threat, in its own right, must be dealt with for a Soviet 1920s- or 1941-type strategy to be viable in the future. It is indeed possible that such a Soviet strategy could become a vehicle for resolving both problems. This strategy would be viable if the USSR (and Europeans themselves) can be convinced that NATO's military power has been reduced to clearly defensive proportions, and if a weaker NATO emerged in lieu of the creation of a larger German military establishment. This would offer better chances for future political stability in Europe through continued (although reduced) U.S. presence, thus avoiding the major problem following the First World War, when a power vacuum existed in Europe, ultimately filled by warring nations.

Throughout any discussions which occur concerning whatever model the Soviets propose and implement, another model requires tangential study -- that of Manchuria.²² The Manchurian model stands as a classic case when a clearly defensive posture was secretly transformed into an offensive one. Admittedly, Manchuria was an extreme case, carried out within a particular political and military context. Yet it was representative of a host of lesser examples when a defensive or less threatening posture was secretly and effectively transformed into a major offensive threat. Although many would argue that such a transformation would be unlikely to occur in contemporary or future circumstances, prudence dictates caution. In short, verification must ensure that at all times and in all circumstances, in the case of whatever model emerges, Soviet forces not "be more than they seem."

The 1990s promise revolutionary changes in existing political and military relationships in Europe and, in fact, throughout the world. In large part, this revolution has occurred

because of important political, economic, and social pressure within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, which are, in addition, affecting Soviet military policy, doctrine, and strategy. The most apparent effects to date have been the Soviet Union's proclamation of "defensiveness" in its military doctrine and its ensuing search for new strategic solutions. Whatever future strategic posture the Soviet Union adopts, it will be a key element in this revolution. It will dictate the nature of future political and military relationships in Europe and the world and the degree of stability of any new political and military structures which evolve.

The future Soviet strategic posture will, in the last analysis, reveal the true nature of Soviet military doctrine and dictate the form and mission of the Soviet Army. There are issues within the realm of strategy that the Soviets must work out anew or refine. Among these issues are the nature of the threat; concept of future war; scope of theaters of war and military operations; peacetime military strength, dispositions, and force readiness; and strategic deployment and force generation [mobilization] schemes. All of these issues must be resolved without violating Soviet security interests, and each must facilitate smooth transition from peace to war.

Resolution of these strategic issues will have major implications at lower levels of military science, for operational and tactical concepts will be constrained and governed by strategy and the realities of contemporary and future war. Hence, operational art and tactics will emphasize concepts for non-linear warfare, maneuver, and long-range fires, and evidence greater defensiveness than before. Force structure at all levels will likewise conform to strategic, political, and budgetary constraints to become smaller, leaner, more flexible, defensively oriented, and, if Soviet desires are realized, higher quality. Most important, the force structure will be more expandable to meet wartime requirements.

All of these critical issues have their roots in the past. A clearer understanding of the past will better enable us to comprehend and manage the transition to the future.

ENDNOTES

1. N. V. Ogarkov, "Strategiya voyennaya" [Military strategy], Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya [Soviet military encyclopedia], 8 vols., (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976-1980), 7:555-556. Hereafter cited as SVE with appropriate volume.
In a practical sense, military strategy:
 - determines the strategic missions of the armed forces and the manpower and resources necessary to accomplish these missions;
 - formulates and implements measures to prepare the armed forces, theaters of military operations, national economy, and civilian population for war;
 - plans war and strategic operations;
 - organizes the deployment of the armed forces and their guidance during the conduct of strategic-scale operations; and
 - studies the capabilities of probable enemies to wage war and conduct strategic operations.
2. A. M. Plekhov, "Politika voyennaya" [Military policy], SVE, 6:413.
3. Ibid.
4. Ogarkov, 556.
5. I. N. Khaustov, "Razvertyvaniye vooruzhennykh sil" [Deployment of the armed forces], SVE, 7:38.
6. Ibid.
7. A. K. Zaporozhchenko, "Strategicheskiy echelon" [Strategic echelon], SVE, 7:554; V. I. Belyakov, N. I. Reum, "Strategicheskiye rezervy" [Strategic reserves], SVE, 7:553.
8. S. P. Ivanov, M. M. Kir'ian, "Nachal'nyy period voyny" [The initial period of war], SVE, 5:554-555.
9. Ogarkov, 563.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., 565.
12. V. D. Sokolovsky, ed., Voyennaya strategiya [Military strategy], Moscow: Voenizdat, 1963). Two additional editions of the work appeared in 1966 and 1968.
13. Lecture Materials from the Voroshilov General Staff Academy, supplement to the lecture "Principles and Content of Military

Strategy."

The basic strategy lecture, along with the 1975 supplementary material, may be found in The Voroshilov Lectures: From the Soviet General Staff Academy--Issues of Military Strategy, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1989). The basic lecture itself, without the supplement, has been published in The Journal of Soviet Military Studies, Vol. 1 (April 1988), 29-53. Theater-strategic operations relied on high-speed combined-arms offensives designed to seize the initiative and achieve strategic objectives quickly and without employment of nuclear weapons.

The concept of the theater-strategic operation provided a broad framework for understanding the full scope and complexity of strategic military endeavors, although the Soviets never implied that such a complex and risky concept would be fully implemented in future war. The theoretical structure of the full theater-strategic operation provided insights as to what strategic objectives smaller--scale operations over shorter durations could achieve. More importantly, the larger model of the full theater-strategic operation vividly underscored the possible consequences should the smaller-scale operations fail.

The Soviets reassessed the nature of strategic operations in a five-article series appearing in Voyenno-istoricheskii zhurnal [Military-historical journal, hereafter cited as VIZh] from October 1985 to July 1986. The articles in this Soviet-designated "Diskussiia" [Discussion or Debate] included V. V. Gurkin and M. I. Golovnin, "K voprosu o strategicheskikh operatsiyakh Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny, 1941-1945" [On the question of strategic operations in the Great Patriotic war, 1941-1945], VIZh (October 1985), 11; N. K. Glazunov and B. I. Pavlov, "K voprosu o strategicheskikh operatsiyakh Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny," VIZh (April 1986), 48-50; A. I. Mikhalev and V. I. Kudriashov, "K voprosu o strategicheskikh operatsiyakh Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny, 1941-1945," VIZh (May 1986), 48-50; and Kh M. Dzhelaukhov and B. N. Petrov, "K voprosu o strategicheskikh operatsiyakh Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny, 1941-1945," VIZh (July 1986), 46-48. Also appearing at this same time, though not formally a part of the "Diskussiia," was the related article, A. P. Maryshev, "Nekotoryye voprosy strategicheskoy oborony v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [Several questions on strategic defense in the Great Patriotic War], VIZh (June 1986), 9-16. In the fall of 1987, an unsigned article, "Itogi diskussii o strategicheskikh operatsiyakh Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny, 1941-1945" [Results of the discussions on strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945], VIZh (October 1987), 8-24, capped the series. Among the conclusions reached in these assessments was an approach to classifying operations as "strategic." The Soviets have formulated and generally accepted three "fundamental criteria" for describing an operation as strategic. Specifically, a strategic operation: 1.) resolves important strategic missions and attains important military-political aims; 2.) in most cases

consists of combat operations of great spatial scope and includes the participation of a considerable quantity of forces and means; and 3.) is planned by the Stavka of the Supreme High Command (VGK), with the coordination of actions by fronts, fleets, and other Services of the Armed Forces carried out by VGK representatives. Thus, as these criteria and associated Soviet discussions make clear, a strategic operation is centrally controlled at the highest level of command, is usually large and of combined arms composition, and, most importantly, accomplishes critically important military-political goals regardless of its size and scope, or the length and intensity of operations.

14. The most extensive English language works on these operations are David M. Glantz, ed., From the Vistula to the Oder: Soviet Offensive Operations -- October 1944 -- March 1945, 1986 Art of War Symposium, A Transcript of Proceedings, (Carlisle, PA: Center for Land Warfare, U.S. Army War College, 1986); D. M. Glantz, August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, Leavenworth Papers No. 7, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1983); D. M. Glantz, August Storm: Soviet Tactical and Operational Combat in Manchuria, 1945, Leavenworth Papers No. 8, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1983).

15. This assessment, for example, appeared in connection with a review of A. Babakov, Vooruzhennyye Sily SSSR posle voyny (1945-1986) [The Armed Forces of the USSR after the war (1945-1986)], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1987) in V. G. Reznichenko, "Sovetskiye vooruzhennyye sily v poslevoyenny period" [Soviet armed forces in the postwar period], Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil [Communist of the armed forces], January 1988), 86-88.

16. A. Kokoshin and V. Larionov, "Protivostoyaniya sil obshchego naznacheniya v kontekste obespecheniya strategicheskoy stabil'nosti" [The counterposition of general purpose forces in the context of strategic stability], Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya [World economics and international relations, hereafter cited as MEMO], June 1988), 23-31. These have been widely discussed by Western analysts to include a number of forums with Western, Soviet, and East European participation.

17. Considerable Western interest in the "Kursk model" was generated by the A. Kokoshin and V. Larionov article entitled "Kurskaya bitva v svete sovremennoy oboronitel'noy doktriny" [The Kursk battle in light of contemporary defensive doctrine], which appeared in the August 1987 issue of MEMO. Numerous other Soviet analyses of Kursk have appeared prior to and since publication of this article.

18. Kokoshin and Larionov, 27.

19. "Soviets Shifting Military Strategy," The Kansas City Times, 11 March 1989, p. A9, which quotes testimony of A. A. Kokoshin in March 1989. Testimony before the U.S. Congress' House Armed Services Committee.

20. "Operativnyy plan deystviy Gruppy sovetskikh okkupatsionnykh voysk v Germanii" [Operational plan for actions of the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany], VIZh, No. 2 (February 1989), 26-31 (with map).

21. V. V. Zhurkin, S. A. Karaganov, and A. A. Kortunov, "Vyzovy bezopostnosti--staryye i novyye" [Challenges to security--old and new], Kommunist, No. 1 (January 1988), 43.

22. A more disturbing model, which the Soviets have understandably not advanced, is the Manchurian model. In this case, a defensive force structure and posture is rapidly converted into an effective offensive one through a combination of khitrost' [strategem], maskirovka [deception], and a massive covert strategic and operational regrouping of forces with the use of fortified regions to cover the mobilization. This extreme example replicates numerous documented cases of similar transformations during operations on the Eastern Front in the Second World War. In a future context, this model embraces the circumstances of "creeping up to war" over an extended period. Inherent in it are issues such as transition to war and mobilization of the front and rear. Soviet military theorists and planners continue to assess this three-front strategic operation in detail. L. N. Vnotchenko, Pobeda na dal'nem vostoka [Victory in the Far East], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1966), is one of the best book-length Soviet assessments of the Manchurian operation, while David M. Glantz, August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, Leavenworth Papers, Vol. 7 and 8, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1983), is the most substantial Western treatment.