

1

## EXPANDED USE OF DRAFTEES

Report FP801R1

AD-A232 062

DTIC  
ELECTE  
FEB 21 1991  
S B D

February 1990

Dayton S. Pickett  
Patricia I. Hutzler  
John R. Brinkerhoff  
David A. Smith

Prepared pursuant to Department of Defense Contract MDA903-85-C-0139.  
The views expressed here are those of the Logistics Management Institute at  
the time of issue but not necessarily those of the Department of Defense.  
Permission to quote or reproduce any part must – except for Government  
purposes – be obtained from the Logistics Management Institute.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINED  
BLANK PAGES THAT HAVE  
BEEN DELETED

LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE  
6400 Goldsboro Road  
Bethesda, Maryland 20817-5886

Reproduced From  
Best Available Copy

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release;  
Distribution Unlimited

91 2 19 245

## **Executive Summary**

### **EXPANDED USE OF DRAFTEES**

The nation's need for defense manpower in the event of a major war cannot adequately be met by present arrangements, including activation of the current draft system. Of particular concern is the requirement for filling more than 300,000 Defense billets marked for civilian occupancy in DoD's support base during the first 30 days of hostilities. Plans for meeting the need with new hires are likely to fail.

Expansion of the military draft can solve the problem. Military manpower – provided quickly and with minimal training – can be used to fill positions requiring little skill and experience. Properly designed, an expanded draft also can produce skilled and experienced manpower for more demanding positions. In the support base, barriers between "civilian" and "military" positions are largely arbitrary, and it is both legal and feasible to fill both kinds of positions with military personnel.

But the arrangements to do so are difficult. A major overhaul of the draft system and a blending of the civilian and military manpower planning systems are required. The complete overhaul is both costly and detailed, but it can be approached successfully through a series of carefully drawn and progressive draft system options.

In the table at the end of the summary, we describe systematically 13 of the options open to DoD. They begin with the present draft and progress through draft options of increasing complexity and difficulty of implementation to a total draft of a major portion of the nation's human resources. Ten of the options are designed to be implemented in addition to the present draft. The final two options are intended to supplant present draft plans.

In conjunction with preparation for an expanded draft, other actions are necessary to improve, simplify, and streamline wartime manpower planning. Specifically, we recommend the following.

- *Improve estimates of wartime manpower requirements.* Estimates contained in the Wartime Manpower Planning System – particularly those covering civilian positions – need refinement and updating. Several wartime missions, including the land defense of the United States and installation

security, are not now reflected in statements of wartime manpower needs. Base operating support requirements need validation. DoD's standing draft call in the hands of the Selective Service System is 9 years old; it requires updating.

- *Improve plans for the current wartime draft.* Independent of the need for expansion, there exist both the authority and the need for important improvements in draft plans now. Flexibilities, such as peacetime classification of registrants, allowed by the present Military Selective Service Act should be exploited. The Selective Service System should begin collecting and storing information on registrants' work and training experience. The present policy on accepting volunteers during a wartime draft should be re-examined. Discussions should begin on exemptions for critically skilled persons in defense industries.
- *Establish a better statutory basis for defense manpower mobilization.* Present legal strictures on mental accessions standards should be relaxed in wartime draft plans. Standby Federal legislation on draft-for-skills, drafting females, and selected occupational deferments should be prepared.
- *Integrate the military and civilian manpower systems.* For wartime planning, segregation of jobs – particularly in the CONUS support base – as "military" or "civilian" is inappropriate. Most positions should be coded so that they can be filled by the best qualified individual available, whether civilian or military.
- *Establish a comprehensive policy for accession standards under mobilization conditions.* Because of their vagueness, DoD's present policies would require extraordinary effort and review once mobilization begins. That task should be accomplished now, as part of peacetime preparedness.
- *Institute detailed planning for several of the proposed draft system options.* At a minimum, the CONUS Health Care Draft option (#10) and the Total Draft option (#13) should be developed to the point where they can be executed fairly quickly at mobilization. Thereafter, other options can be developed as time permits.

## OPTIONS FOR EXPANDING THE USE OF DRAFTEES

Option	Draft type <sup>a</sup>	Sex	Ages	Standards <sup>b</sup>	Type training <sup>c</sup>	Serviced <sup>d</sup>	Application type
1. Current Draft System	SCYF	M	19-25	High	Full	FD	Fillers and replacements
2. Fort Swampy Surge	SCYF	M	19-25	High	Short	LD	Temporary support activities
3. The Long Haul	SCYF	M	19-25	Modified	Short	LS	Long-term support activities
4. New Units for Support	SCYF	M	19-25	High	Unit	LD	Temporary support activities
5. Security Units	SCYF	M	19-25	High	Unit	LD	Base and domestic security
6. Single-Cohort Skills Draft	SCOF	M	19-25	High	Short	LD	Support activities
7. More Ages - More Skills	MCR	M	19-25	Modified	Short	LS	Support activities
8. Classic Draft-for-Skill	MCS	M	19-25	High	Short	LD	Support activities
9. The SeaBee Draft	MCS	M	19-25	High	Unit	FD	Naval construction battalions
10. CONUS Health Care Draft	MCS	M/F	19-32	Low	Short	LD/LS	CONUS medical units
11. Military Veteran Draft	MCS	M/F	19-44	Low	Refr	FD	Replacements with military skills
12. Comprehensive Draft	MCS	M/F	19-25	Modified	Full	FD	Fillers and replacements
				Modified	Short	LD	Temporary support activities
				Modified	Unit	LD	Base and domestic security
				Low	Short	LS	Support activities
13. Total Draft	MCS	M/F	18-44	Modified	Full	FD	Fillers and replacements
				Modified	Short	LD	Temporary support activities
				Modified	Unit	LD	Base and domestic security
				Low	Short	LS	Support activities

**Note:** Options 2 through 11 are intended for implementation in addition to the present draft system. Options 12 and 13 are multipurpose drafts incorporating the present draft.

<sup>a</sup> SCYF - single-cohort, younger-first; SCOF - single-cohort, older first; MCR - multiple-cohort random; MCS - multiple-cohort selective

<sup>b</sup> High - medical, mental, and moral standards approximating present peacetime standards; Modified - standards reduced somewhat from peacetime levels; Low - standards reduced substantially from peacetime levels. A specific set of standards accompanies the discussion of each draft system option

<sup>c</sup> Full - full military training qualifying incumbent for deployment; Short - a 1-week orientation providing minimum information in preparation for on-the-job training or support job using civilian experience; Unit - military training by unit (rather than training center) cadre; Refr - refresher training

<sup>d</sup> FD - full duty; LD - limited duty in support role prior to attending full military training later; LS - limited service (incumbent is not medically qualified for full military training)



<b>Accession For</b>	
NTIS GRA&I	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification _____	
By _____	
Distribution/ _____	
Availability Codes _____	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	



# CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Executive Summary .....	iii
List of Tables .....	xiii
List of Figures .....	xv
Chapter 1. Introduction .....	1- 1
Purpose of the Study .....	1- 1
Purpose of the Report .....	1- 1
Background .....	1- 2
Organization of the Report .....	1- 4
Chapter 2. Requirements, Assumptions, and Complicating Factors .....	2- 1
Requirements .....	2- 1
Assumptions .....	2- 3
Complicating Factors .....	2- 5
Chapter 3. The Defense Manpower Mobilization System .....	3- 1
General .....	3- 1
Wartime Manpower Planning System .....	3- 2
Understated Demands .....	3- 4
Wartime Manpower Supply .....	3- 6
The Current Wartime Draft System .....	3- 9
Evaluation of the Current Draft System .....	3-11
Chapter 4. Generation of Draft System Options .....	4- 1
Draft System Composition .....	4- 1
Kind of Draft .....	4- 2
Accession Standards .....	4- 4
Training Strategies .....	4- 9
Assignment Limitations .....	4-10
Application .....	4-12

## CONTENTS (Continued)

	<u>Page</u>
Chapter 5. Draft System Options .....	5- 1
General .....	5- 1
Draft System Options .....	5- 2
Draft System Option 1: The Current Draft System .....	5- 5
Concept .....	5- 5
Application .....	5- 6
Costs .....	5- 6
Benefits .....	5- 6
Implementation Difficulties .....	5- 7
Political .....	5- 7
Organizational .....	5- 7
Evaluation .....	5- 7
Draft System Option 2: Fort Swampy Surge .....	5- 9
Concept .....	5- 9
Application .....	5-10
Costs .....	5-10
Benefits .....	5-10
Implementation Difficulties .....	5-11
Political .....	5-11
Organizational .....	5-11
Evaluation .....	5-11
Draft System Option 3: The Long Haul .....	5-13
Concept .....	5-13
Application .....	5-14
Costs .....	5-14
Benefits .....	5-14
Implementation Difficulties .....	5-15
Political .....	5-15
Organizational .....	5-15
Evaluation .....	5-16
Draft System Option 4: New Units for Support .....	5-19
Concept .....	5-19
Application .....	5-19
Costs .....	5-19

## CONTENTS (Continued)

	<u>Page</u>
Benefits .....	5-20
Implementation Difficulties .....	5-21
Political .....	5-21
Organizational .....	5-21
Evaluation .....	5-21
 Draft System Option 5: Security Units .....	 5-25
Concept .....	5-25
Application .....	5-25
Costs .....	5-25
Benefits .....	5-26
Implementation Difficulties .....	5-27
Political .....	5-27
Organizational .....	5-27
Evaluation .....	5-27
 Draft System Option 6: Single-Cohort Skills Draft .....	 5-31
Concept .....	5-31
Application .....	5-32
Costs .....	5-32
Benefits .....	5-32
Implementation Difficulties .....	5-33
Political .....	5-33
Organizational .....	5-33
Evaluation .....	5-33
 Draft System Option 7: More Ages – More Skills .....	 5-37
Concept .....	5-37
Application .....	5-38
Costs .....	5-38
Benefits .....	5-38
Implementation Difficulties .....	5-39
Political .....	5-39
Organizational .....	5-39
Evaluation .....	5-39
 Draft System Option 8: Classic Draft-for-Skill .....	 5-43
Concept .....	5-43
Application .....	5-44

## CONTENTS (Continued)

	<u>Page</u>
Costs .....	5-44
Benefits .....	5-44
Implementation Difficulties .....	5-45
Political .....	5-45
Organizational .....	5-45
Evaluation .....	5-46
 Draft System Option 9: The SeaBee Draft .....	 5-49
Concept .....	5-49
Application .....	5-49
Costs .....	5-49
Benefits .....	5-50
Implementation Difficulties .....	5-50
Political .....	5-50
Organizational .....	5-51
Evaluation .....	5-51
 Draft System Option 10: CONUS Health Care Draft .....	 5-55
Concept .....	5-55
Application .....	5-55
Costs .....	5-55
Benefits .....	5-56
Implementation Difficulties .....	5-57
Political .....	5-57
Organizational .....	5-57
Evaluation .....	5-58
 Draft System Option 11: Military Veteran Draft .....	 5-61
Concept .....	5-61
Application .....	5-62
Costs .....	5-62
Benefits .....	5-62
Implementation Difficulties .....	5-62
Political .....	5-62
Organizational .....	5-63
Evaluation .....	5-63
 Draft System Option 12: Comprehensive Draft .....	 5-67
Concept .....	5-67

## CONTENTS (Continued)

	<u>Page</u>
Application .....	5-68
Costs .....	5-68
Benefits .....	5-68
Implementation Difficulties .....	5-68
Political .....	5-68
Organizational .....	5-69
Evaluation .....	5-69
 Draft System Option 13: Total Draft .....	 5-71
Concept .....	5-71
Application .....	5-72
Costs .....	5-72
Benefits .....	5-72
Implementation Difficulties .....	5-73
Political .....	5-73
Organizational .....	5-73
Evaluation .....	5-73
 Chapter 6. Implications for National Manpower Policy .....	 6- 1
Meeting Total National Manpower Demand .....	6- 1
Occupational Exemptions and Deferments .....	6- 3
Drafting Women .....	6- 4
 Chapter 7. Conclusions and Recommendations .....	 7- 1
Conclusions .....	7- 1
Current Estimates of Wartime Demand for Manpower Are Inadequate .....	7- 1
Current Wartime Draft Plans Are Inappropriate .....	7- 1
Current Laws on the Wartime Draft and Manpower Mobilization are Inadequate .....	7- 1
Separation of Military and Civilian Manpower Systems Impedes Mobilization Planning and Execution .....	7- 2
Drafting Military Personnel to Substitute for Civilian Employees Is Feasible and Advantageous .....	7- 2

## CONTENTS (Continued)

	<u>Page</u>
Information Available at the Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) for Assignment of Draftees Will Be Inadequate for an Expanded Wartime Draft System .....	7- 2
Failure to Draft Both Men and Women Implies Inefficient Utilization of the Nation's Human Resources .....	7- 2
Accession Standards To Be Used During Mobilization Are Poorly Defined .....	7- 2
Expanding the Use of Wartime Draftees Is Feasible and Warrants Additional Consideration .....	7- 3
Recommendations .....	7- 3
Improve Estimates of Wartime Manpower Requirements .....	7- 3
Improve Plans for the Current Wartime Draft .....	7- 4
Establish a Legislative Program to Improve the Statutory Basis for Defense Manpower Mobilization .....	7- 4
Integrate the Military and Civilian Manpower Systems .....	7- 5
Establish a Comprehensive Policy for Accession Standards in Mobilization .....	7- 5
Institute Detailed Planning for Several of the Proposed Draft System Options .....	7- 5
Glossary .....	Gloss. 1-6
Appendix A. Use of the Draft in American Wars .....	A-1 - A-11
Appendix B. Selected Assumptions .....	B-1 - B-10
Appendix C. Factors Complicating a Change .....	C-1 - C-11
Appendix D. Statutory and Regulatory Basis for the Current Draft .....	D-1 - D- 4
Appendix E. DoD Military Manpower Accession Standards .....	E-1 - E-38
Appendix F. Support Cadres .....	F-1 - F- 5

## TABLES

	<u>Page</u>
4- 1. Comparison of Skill Levels Possessed by Two Age Cohorts ...	4- 5
4- 2. Aggregate Classes of Accession Standards .....	4- 8
5- 1. Draft System Options .....	5- 3
5- 2. Current Wartime Draft System .....	5- 5
5- 3. Capacity of Current Wartime Draft System .....	5- 6
5- 4. Fort Swampy Surge Draft System Option .....	5- 9
5- 5. Capacity of Fort Swampy Surge Draft System .....	5-10
5- 6. The Long Haul Draft System Option .....	5-13
5- 7. Capacity of Long Haul Draft System .....	5-15
5- 8. New Units for Support Draft System Option .....	5-20
5- 9. Capacity of New Units for Support Draft System Option .....	5-21
5-10. Security Units Draft System Option .....	5-26
5-11. Capacity of Security Units Draft System .....	5-27
5-12. Single-Cohort Skills Draft System Option .....	5-31
5-13. Capacity of Single-Cohort Skills Draft System .....	5-33
5-14. The More Ages – More Skills Draft System Option .....	5-37
5-15. Capacity of More Ages – More Skills Draft System .....	5-39
5-16. Classic Draft-for-Skill Draft System Option .....	5-43
5-17. Capacity of Classic Draft-for-Skill Draft System .....	5-45
5-18. The SeaBee Draft System Option .....	5-50

## TABLES (Continued)

	<u>Page</u>
5-19. Capacity of SeaBee Draft System .....	5-51
5-20. CONUS Health Care Draft System Option .....	5-56
5-21. Capacity of CONUS Health Care Draft System .....	5-57
5-22. Military Veteran Draft System Option .....	5-61
5-23. Capacity of Military Veteran Draft System .....	5-63
5-24. Comprehensive Draft System Option .....	5-67
5-25. Capacity of Comprehensive Wartime Draft System .....	5-69
5-26. Total Draft System Option .....	5-71
5-27. Capacity of Total Draft System .....	5-72
5-28. Summary of Options for Expanding the Use of Draftees .....	5-74



## FIGURES

	<u>Page</u>
5- 1. Option 1: Current Draft System .....	5- 8
5- 2. Option 2: Fort Swampy Surge Draft System .....	5-12
5- 3. Option 3: The Long Haul Draft System .....	5-17
5- 4. Option 4: New Units for Support Draft System .....	5-23
5- 5. Option 5: Security Units Draft System .....	5-29
5- 6. Option 6: Single-Cohort Skills Draft System .....	5-35
5- 7. Option 7: More Ages – More Skills Draft System .....	5-41
5- 8. Option 8: Classic Draft-for-Skill Draft System .....	5-47
5- 9. Option 9: The SeaBee Draft System .....	5-53
5-10. Option 10: CONUS Health Care Draft System .....	5-59
5-11. Option 11: Military Veteran Draft System .....	5-65
5-12. Options 12 and 13: Comprehensive and Total Draft Systems .....	5-70

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **PURPOSE OF THE STUDY**

The Department of Defense is concerned about its ability to meet its projected demands for military and civilian personnel to wage a sustained major conventional war. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel asked the Logistics Management Institute (LMI) to examine DoD's system for meeting demands for Defense manpower and to suggest improvements, focusing on the wartime draft as the mechanism for these improvements.

#### **PURPOSE OF THE REPORT**

The purpose of this report is to suggest — by means of illustrative options — how DoD might expand its use of draftees to meet wartime manpower requirements. The current draft system and 12 additional draft system options are presented.<sup>1</sup> The 12 additional options are arrayed according to the degree to which they differ from the current draft system, which generally reflects the degree of difficulty in putting them into effect. We could, of course, formulate many additional workable wartime draft system options. The particular ones presented in the report have been selected to illustrate how the use of draftees in wartime can be expanded beyond the limits of the current system.

Some options presented in this report are designed to fill DoD's civilian personnel shortages in addition to military personnel shortages. Barriers between "civilian" and "military" positions are largely arbitrary, and it is both legal and feasible to fill both kinds of positions with military personnel. Expansion of the military draft can produce additional military personnel to fill unidentified or understated military personnel demands. It can also be used to provide military personnel to fill Defense positions traditionally thought of as "civilian." Indeed, it is for this latter purpose that the draft system options presented here may prove most useful.

---

<sup>1</sup>For definitions of draft-related and mobilization-related terms, see Glossary.

## BACKGROUND

During wartime, the United States will be forced to use the draft to obtain recruits. This has been the case for all major wars fought by the United States in the twentieth century. The nation depends on volunteers to maintain the armed forces at authorized strengths in peacetime. Upon full or total mobilization, however, a draft will be instituted to induct large numbers of young men into military service. DoD plans to accept voluntary enlistments after the wartime draft is started, but the major means of meeting expanded wartime needs for military personnel will be the draft.

DoD forecasts serious shortages of military and civilian personnel during the early days of a full mobilization. Shortages of military personnel will exist even after all of the reserve force units and individual reservists<sup>2</sup> and many military retirees are ordered to active duty. They will exist even if additional volunteers are accepted, for the volunteers face the same training time requirements and training base constraints that the draftees do. Conventional ways to increase the supply of military personnel to meet wartime demand are already being relied on to the maximum. The only other way to increase this supply is to use a wartime draft in new and different ways.

The wartime draft currently planned is a legacy of the Vietnam era. The draft system authorized in the current Military Selective Service Act (MSSA) and supporting regulations reflects ideas influenced more by the conditions existing toward the end of the Vietnam War than by the requirements for setting up a wartime draft for a future conflict. The current draft system satisfies many of the objections to the Vietnam era draft. It will not, however, meet all DoD's genuine manpower needs during full or total mobilization.

The goal of the Defense manpower system is to match the supply of qualified personnel with the demand for work to be done. The demand side of this equation deals with jobs, expressed as authorizations, positions, or spaces to be filled. The supply side deals with people, described as assets, personnel, or sometimes as "faces."

---

<sup>2</sup>The words "reserve" and "reservist," in lower case type, are generic. They refer collectively to units and members of the National Guard and to units and individuals of the Military Service Reserve Forces.

The total demand for Defense manpower consists of descriptions of the many different jobs to be done. These jobs are translated into positions. Some positions can be filled only by military personnel. Others, including many in DoD's CONUS logistical support base, are marked for civilian occupancy. During peacetime, there has been a tendency to expand the proportion of civilian positions or billets authorized in many support installations and headquarters and decrease the proportion designated for occupancy by military personnel although the jobs in question -- and many others -- can be performed about equally well by civilians or military personnel. Defense manpower includes, of course, both the military personnel in the armed forces and DoD's civilian employees.

The ability of the armed forces to accept new accessions in time of war is limited not by the capability of the draft to supply registrants for induction, but by the ability of the armed forces -- particularly the Army -- to accept new recruits quickly for training once mobilization begins. The current draft system can provide inductees faster than the Army and the other Military Services can accept them.

In the first month of a full mobilization, DoD estimates that it will need more than three times as many additional civilians as additional military personnel. There is no assurance that the additional civilian employees can be hired. In the event of a NATO war, shortages of DoD civilian employees will exist even after the return and re-employment of the tens of thousands of U.S. citizens employed by DoD in Europe and the expected voluntary return to the work force of several thousand retired DoD employees. And the shortfall is expected despite adoption of emergency wartime procedures designed to facilitate rapid hiring on a decentralized basis. Three consecutive major exercises testing procedures for hiring new civilian personnel to meet wartime surge requirements have shown that plans and preparations for meeting the demand are inadequate. Current plans depend on voluntary cooperation among state and local government employment offices and competing defense installations in the same region. These plans do not take into account other demands on local labor markets for workers for defense and other industries, all of which will also increase during mobilization.

Considering the urgent nature of the work to be done by DoD's civilian employees in mobilization, using the draft for the nontraditional purpose of meeting some of the demand for employees now classified as civilian may offer a great improvement. The draft relies on compulsion rather than on voluntary acceptance of

employment. Draftees, as members of the Armed Forces of the United States, can be assigned to remote military installations that may be supported by inadequate labor pools, and they can be moved around more easily than civilian employees to conform to changing demands for manpower.

The use of a draft to obtain military personnel in wartime is compatible with American experience in previous wars. Although volunteers and the citizen soldiers of the militia have traditionally been the first source of troops to expand meager standing armies, the draft was relied on in the larger and longer wars of our history. During World War I and World War II, the draft was the primary source of military manpower. The drafts for both of these wars were based on the principle of selective service, in which the determination of "who shall serve when not all serve" depended on a combination of chance, qualifications, exemptions, and locality. The experience of the United States with the military draft is discussed in Appendix A. This historical experience reveals what the American people have accepted with regard to compulsory wartime military service in the past, providing an indication of the type of wartime draft that might be politically possible.

The challenge of this study has been to find ways of using a draft system to provide the right kind of military personnel to offset shortages — both predicted and unforeseen — during mobilization. Providing these personnel means delivering more of the right kinds of people to more jobs faster than the current system could.

## **ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT**

The report is organized into seven chapters followed by a glossary and six appendices. Following this introduction is Chapter 2, which discusses wartime demand, states the study assumptions, and outlines some complicating factors. Chapter 3 describes the present Defense manpower mobilization system. Chapter 4 addresses the process used in generating our family of draft system options. Chapter 5 presents the illustrative options. Chapter 6 comments on some of the implications of the wartime draft for national manpower policy. Chapter 7 presents the study conclusions and recommendations. The six appendices provide additional information and discussion. Appendix A is an historical survey of the use of the draft in wartime. Appendix B discusses selected assumptions. Appendix C discusses some of the factors complicating a change in the current system. Appendix D cites the

legal authorities for the current draft. Appendix E treats the subject of accession standards. Appendix F deals with the support cadres required for the additional draftees who would be produced if the draft system options outlined in the body of the report are adopted.

## CHAPTER 2

### REQUIREMENTS, ASSUMPTIONS, AND COMPLICATING FACTORS

#### REQUIREMENTS

In order to provide a vehicle for generating draft system options aimed at meeting reasonable and legitimate demand, we made some assumptions regarding requirements for enlisted military manpower. The limited scope of the study clearly prevented the study team from identifying and validating precisely the demands discussed, so we simply made some assumptions as to the kinds of demands that we could meet with an expanded wartime draft and then assigned some reasonable numbers to those kinds of demands. The purpose of the study is to extend the use of the wartime draft, not to validate DoD wartime manpower requirements.

We started with the DoD's authoritative statement of wartime manpower demands – the Wartime Manpower Planning System (WARMAPS). WARMAPS estimates both military and civilian demands and supply for a full mobilization. WARMAPS compares demand and supply and calculates shortfalls along a time line from M-day. We focused on the shortfalls of enlisted military personnel which occur within the first 100 days after M-day. Enlisted shortfalls which occur after  $M + 100$  possibly could be satisfied by the current wartime draft system by producing newly trained military personnel. It was the early shortfalls which have proved to be intractable and for which a different kind of draft system might be a solution. We found four major areas in WARMAPS that showed sizable early shortfalls; three of these were enlisted military manpower shortfalls, and one was in civilian employees.

*WARMAPS Military Personnel Requirements.*<sup>1</sup> Three significant enlisted military manpower shortfalls in WARMAPS appeared as follows:

- The Navy shows a shortfall of military personnel with construction skills to man construction battalions already in the force structure. We estimated that shortfall to be about 30,000 personnel.

---

<sup>1</sup>Based on WARMAPS for the FY90 Program Force.

- The Army, Navy, and Air Force each show a shortfall of enlisted military personnel with health care skills. We estimated that shortfall to amount to about 50,000 personnel.
- The Army shows a significant shortfall in military personnel with combat skills. We estimate that shortfall to be about 80,000 personnel.

While other shortfalls appeared in WARMAPS, these three were selected as being useful vehicles to illustrate the way a particular kind of draft system option could be applied to meet a specific problem.

*WARMAPS Civilian Personnel Requirements.*<sup>2</sup> WARMAPS also shows a significant shortfall in civilian employees immediately after M-day. The total net shortfall in the first 30 days is about 300,000 civilian employees, and DoD must hire this number of new people to meet this requirement. We estimate that draftees could be used to substitute temporarily or permanently for up to 240,000 of these employees. Additional discussion of the requirements for civilian employees is presented in Chapter 3.

*Additional Military Requirements.* When considering how to use partially trained, nondeployable personnel in the early days of a mobilization, we found it useful to look beyond the full mobilization estimates to consider requirements not included in WARMAPS. WARMAPS is constrained to deal with full mobilization and estimates demand and supply only for personnel to man units in the currently approved force structure. In a total mobilization, additional force structure units would be created to meet demands existing at the time. We were able to identify three areas for which WARMAPS estimates are understated and which we believe are possible areas of force expansion after M-day:

- Draftees could be used to man security units to assist United States Forces Command (FORSCOM) with its Land Defense of CONUS mission. This mission does exist and is widely acknowledged to be insufficiently supported. We do not assert that our estimates are correct – only that there is a perceived demand which can be met by an appropriate draft system option.
- Draftees could be used to provide unskilled labor to assist in the initial mobilization and deployment of the forces. We believe that the urgent demand for people to do this work after M-day may be understated in WARMAPS. If so, it is possible to use the draft to provide that labor, either as individuals assigned to existing support units or as separate labor units.

---

<sup>2</sup>Based on WARMAPS U.S. Civilian for FY87.



We make little attempt to quantify or validate this kind of demand, but if it exists, we show how additional military personnel can be provided to meet it.

- Draftees could be used to perform a variety of functions at bases, depots, ports, and other military facilities either to replace new civilian employees or simply to provide extra workers. As with the other requirements, we have neither validated nor sought support for assuming that this requirement exists. We suspect there is such a need, and we provide a means for meeting it.

*Summary of Requirements.* The purpose of this study is to illustrate how various kinds of wartime draft systems could be used to meet DoD manpower requirements. At this stage, it is sufficient simply to assume – or assert – realistic requirements that are reasonable so that we can generate for discussion draft system options that are also reasonable. Refinement and validation of some or all of these assumed requirements will be necessary when detailed analysis of particular options is performed.

## ASSUMPTIONS

In order to develop options to expand the use of draftees, we made the following simplifying assumptions:

- *Military personnel can be used to fill mobilization positions currently designated for civilian incumbency.* Many DoD jobs can be accomplished either by a military member or a civilian employee, particularly in support activities.<sup>3</sup> DoD policy is that jobs will be filled by civilians in peacetime unless it can be demonstrated that military incumbency is necessary. This policy carries over into mobilization planning: there are many mobilization positions designated for civilian fill that could be filled as well by military personnel. It may be difficult in a mobilization to hire large numbers of additional civilian employees to fill mobilization positions. In this event, it would be useful to be able to fill some of these newly activated positions by using military personnel obtained from the wartime draft. Since the actual fill of most DoD positions is based on a policy determination rather than on statutory constraints, the policy could be changed in wartime in order to use draftees to fill many positions currently coded for civilian incumbency. For

---

<sup>3</sup>Support activities are listed and described in the *Defense Manpower Requirements Report for FY1988*, as a major category of the Defense Planning and Programming Categories. Support activities include a variety of work at bases, depots, headquarters, and other facilities, most of which are in CONUS. For FY89, the term "Support Activities" has been eliminated, and the separate kinds of activities have been identified as major categories. We use the older term because it is a comprehensive expression of the kinds of supporting work which draftees could accomplish without having to receive standard military training.

the purpose of formulating wartime draft system options, it is assumed that this is possible.

- *All draftees will become military personnel.* It has been suggested that it might be desirable to conscript some persons for service in a civilian employee status rather than as military members of an armed force. This notion was conceived as a way to fill civilian spaces in DoD by compulsion if it is not possible to attract employees voluntarily. Upon examination of this concept, it was excluded as not falling within the basic thrust of the current MSSA or within the experience and tradition of the United States. The draft has always been used to compel citizens to enter *military* service; there is no history of compulsory civilian service, except of course slavery, which is expressly forbidden by the 13th Amendment to the Constitution. Accordingly, it is assumed that all draftees will be sworn into military service. More discussion of this assumption is presented in Appendix B.
- *All draftees will be assigned to an existing armed force.* Consideration was given to forming a new armed force for administering and supporting the additional draftees brought in under the wartime draft system options. One way that this might be done would be to create a "limited service corps" for military personnel performing support activities. However, the logistical, administrative, and political problems of creating a new military organization of national or international scope during mobilization would be significant. Such an organization would duplicate the existing structures of the five armed forces. Since the work to be done exists within the organizational framework of the current forces, the desirability of having military personnel from a new armed force perform work for an existing armed force is not great. Using this approach for augmentation of the defense agencies should not cause a major problem with workload assignments, but it would require a small, new armed force with a relatively large overhead structure. For these reasons, it is assumed that all of the additional draftees brought in under a draft system option will be assigned to one of the five existing armed forces. Additional discussion of this assumption is presented in Appendix B.
- *No new form of national service will be created.* The draft options considered in this study do not create a system of national service. Only a relatively small proportion of each annual age cohort will be drafted. The wartime draft must balance DoD's needs for military and civilian personnel against the nation's needs for manpower to work in defense industry and provide essential civilian goods and services as well. National service, if enacted, would be a peacetime program intended to pay dividends in wartime; it is not intended to be a wartime system. Accordingly, it is assumed that draft system options will apply to DoD's needs only. We will not consider the broader context of national service applications during mobilization. Additional discussion of this assumption is presented in Appendix B.

- *This report will not consider a civilian job referral service.* Another possibility is that the wartime draft could be expanded into a system for referring rejected registrants to critical civilian jobs, either as DoD employees or in defense industry. This idea is not addressed in this study, which is concerned with registrants who meet accession standards and are inducted into an armed force. The draft is not a mechanism for referring disqualified registrants to any kind of civilian jobs. However, it is possible that this concept may have merit outside the scope of the wartime draft. This idea is discussed further in Appendix B.

## COMPLICATING FACTORS

It was necessary to take into account certain factual considerations in addressing draft system options. These considerations tend to limit the variety of options that can be implemented. In effect, they are the factors complicating any change from the current draft system. Additional discussion of them is presented in Appendix C.

- *There is a statutory requirement for 12 weeks of basic training before a military member may be deployed overseas.* Title 10, United States Code, specifies that a volunteer enlistee or draftee must receive 12 weeks of basic training or their equivalent before being deployed outside the United States. The MSSA of 1971 also requires 12 weeks of training for each recruit. This requirement is intended to prevent sending into battle troops with insufficient training. In addition, however, it reduces DoD's ability to put newly trained military personnel into jobs rapidly during the first few days and weeks of mobilization. Draft system options that comply with the letter and spirit of the law but also allow draftees to be put to work in less than 12 weeks need to be considered.
- *The current wartime draft is designed to take only young males without regard to skills or experience.* This is the consequence of the policy to call the 20 year-old cohort first in the current wartime draft. This "younger first" approach means that most of the registrants called will be too young to have acquired many skills or have much job experience. This fact puts the burden on the armed forces to train these draftees before they can be assigned to any job in the military forces.
- *The current wartime draft does not provide for drafting women.* Although women are accepted as volunteers in peacetime, there are no plans to draft women for general wartime service. Authority has already been granted by Congress, however, to plan on drafting women with health profession specialties. Women presumably will be allowed to volunteer during mobilization, but plans for using them in wartime are not clear, and the accession of large numbers of women could exacerbate the training base constraints that limit the number of male draftees that can be accepted. We

believe that there is now great sentiment against compelling women to serve in combat in wartime. Nevertheless, considering their importance in the national work force and the number of women serving in the peacetime armed forces, drafting women for general wartime service is a possibility that should be addressed.

- *Accession standards for peacetime are set at a very high level.* The standards are designed to achieve low failure rates in training and low demands on health care during the ensuing years. In effect, the peacetime accession standards screen out men and women who could not be expected to serve a full career with a minimum of health problems. This objective may not be valid for a full or total mobilization to fight a war. In wartime, ability to serve usefully in the short term will outweigh long-term considerations. During previous wars, standards were lowered to obtain the numbers of personnel needed to man the forces. Each draft system option should specify the accession standards appropriate for the group of inductees brought in under that option.
- *Processing and assignment of draftees is a complex matter.* The ability of an armed force to cope with additional draftees must be considered. Either the needed processing capacity is available or it must be expanded. Processing in wartime may be less complex than in peacetime, and mobilization plans should take that into account. Draft system options must include provision for processing the additional inductees, including an information system at the Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS) to match draftees with unfilled positions at the time of assignment to an armed force.
- *There are resource implications associated with bringing into the armed forces additional draftees over and above those presently planned.* Even though funds may be less constrained in a mobilization, the draft system options will need additional personnel and other resources that will themselves be constrained. It will be necessary to provide supervisors, facilities, equipment, food, administrative support, and other resources just to accommodate the additional military personnel. Comprehensive information systems and increased processing capability will also be required. The availability of these additional resources at the outset of mobilization must be considered in evaluating draft system options.
- *There are difficulties inherent in changing current law and policy to adopt draft system options.* If draft system options are adopted, something will have to change, even if they are to be established only on a standby basis for implementation upon mobilization. Changing current practice within current law and policy is relatively easy to do. Changing current policy within DoD while still conforming to the law is more difficult but can be accomplished within the executive branch with the informal consent of Congress. Changing the law itself is very difficult and would require the explicit assent of Congress. Many of the options can be realized by changing

current practice or current policy. Several would require changes in the law. In evaluating the options, it is useful to consider the degree of difficulty in implementing each. In general, the more the option departs from the current draft system, the more difficult it will be to implement.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE DEFENSE MANPOWER MOBILIZATION SYSTEM

#### GENERAL

The Defense manpower mobilization system is designed to accomplish the following tasks:

- *Fill* all active and reserve units in the peacetime force structure to full wartime strength
- *Replace* losses to maintain the units at full wartime strength
- *Man* additional force units as they are activated.

The first two tasks are included in full mobilization, and their magnitude can be estimated. The third task is part of total mobilization, and the number and kinds of additional force units may vary appreciably depending on the circumstances.

DoD units may be staffed with both military personnel and civilian employees. Bases, depots, major headquarters, and numerous other support units include both military personnel and civilian employees. Every civilian employee is assigned to a DoD unit. Large numbers of both military personnel and civilian employees are needed to bring these units from peacetime to wartime strength immediately upon initiation of a full mobilization.

The personnel who bring units from peacetime to wartime strength in the early days of a conflict are called "fillers." The primary sources of military fillers are active duty individuals not already assigned to units, Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs), members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), members of the Standby Reserve, and retired military personnel. These military personnel are already trained and qualified for deployment. They can be ordered to active duty and to their units within a few days after mobilization. The primary sources of civilian fillers are employees transferred from positions made excess by mobilization to new positions on mobilization manning documents, retired employees who agree to be re-employed, and new employees hired into mobilization positions.

Once the units are filled to wartime strength, they are maintained at that strength by replacing losses. While many losses occur among military personnel as a result of combat operations, military personnel and civilian employees are also lost because of illness, injury, and – for the civilian employees – resignation or retirement. Military personnel can be compelled to remain in the armed forces for the duration of the war, but civilians may resign or retire at any time – even wartime. Additional military and civilian personnel will be required continuously to offset losses.

The personnel who offset losses are called "replacements." The primary sources of military replacements initially are individual ready reservists and – to a lesser extent – retired personnel. Later on, newly trained military personnel who volunteer for or are drafted into military service will provide most of the replacements, but their availability is delayed because the first draftee or volunteer to enter military service upon mobilization will not reach his unit for about 100 days. The replacements for civilian personnel losses are employees transferred from other positions and new employees.

New units activated during mobilization consist primarily of military personnel. The cadres of experienced military personnel to organize and train these new units come from existing units or the pool of individual reservists and retirees. Fillers for the new units consist almost entirely of newly trained volunteers and draftees.

DoD's current manpower mobilization system relies heavily on the wartime draft to provide newly trained inductees to replace losses of military personnel. A major problem with the current process is that it is a narrow application of a wartime draft that solves only part of the overall problem.

#### **WARTIME MANPOWER PLANNING SYSTEM**

The authoritative estimates of the wartime manpower demand and supply for major DoD elements (the armed forces, defense agencies, and OSD) are compiled by the WARMAPS. WARMAPS provides estimates for both military personnel and civilian employees.

The military supply part of WARMAPS provides estimates of the following for each armed force:

- *Pretrained Individual Manpower* (active individuals, Individual Mobilization Augmentees, individual ready reservists, and retired military personnel) to meet early demands
- *Post-Trained Individual Manpower* (draftees and volunteers) that can be provided by the military training base to meet demands after completion of 12 weeks of initial training.

The civilian supply part of WARMAPS provides estimates of the following:

- *Civilian employees to be transferred from overseas positions to positions in CONUS*
- *New employees to be hired to meet wartime demands.* Most of these new hires are to occur in the first month of the mobilization.

At present, the military and civilian processes are separate. One process deals with military demand and supply; another process deals with civilian demand and supply. This separation starts at the installation level and continues up to OSD.

The consequence of this separation is to restrict DoD's flexibility. The current system makes it difficult to plan to use civilian employees to meet military demands or use military personnel to meet civilian demands. Even though interchangeability might make sense at the installation, unit, or work center level, the separate processes militate against it.

The manpower process starts with a job to be done. The job is translated into a demand for the skill and experience needed to do the work. The skill and experience are translated into a demand for a person to do the work, and this becomes a position or billet in a work center or unit. At this stage of the process there is no differentiation between a military person and a civilian.

About the time the formulation of a formal position description begins, policy is applied in the coding of that position as "civilian" or "military." DoD's policy is that a civilian will be assigned to a position unless there is a necessity for a military person; that is, DoD uses civilians for all billets unless it can be proven that military personnel are required. Many positions are obviously military, such as those in combat units to be employed in a theater of war. On the other hand, there are few jobs that only a civilian can accomplish. Many DoD billets can be suitably occupied



either by a civilian employee or a military person. This is particularly true of central support functions, such as base operating support, management headquarters, research and development, and administration. The important consideration is whether the person has the skills, experience, and capability to do the job.

The peacetime policy of preference for civilian employees makes sense given the high cost of attracting and retaining military personnel in a volunteer environment. In wartime, with the draft available to provide military personnel at relatively low cost, it does not make as much sense.<sup>1</sup> Some of the draft system options suggest the use of military draftees to fill — either temporarily or permanently — some positions intended for civilian incumbency under peacetime policies. The total demand for mobilization billets has been addressed without regard to notions of what is military and what is civilian. By approaching the military and civilian manpower processes on an integrated basis, it has been possible to explore how an expanded military personnel system could meet some of the hard-to-fill civilian positions.

## UNDERSTATED DEMANDS

The requirements identification process in the current system underestimates or fails to take into account certain demands that are likely to occur during a full or total mobilization. The present requirements process is based on the peacetime force structure and estimates of personnel losses. It is designed to keep the peacetime force structure at full wartime strength while incurring those losses. It does not take into account the following other kinds of demands:

- *Friction Losses.* Friction losses are bound to occur during the mobilization process as military personnel are diverted from their intended tasks to perform necessary but unprogrammed work. The present requirements process is "pure" in that it does not recognize this friction. Despite the urgency of mobilization, for example, there will still be a need to police the streets and cut the grass at training centers. Diversion of trainees to perform this work will cut down on their training time and may even delay their delivery to units. The result will be a continual understrength in force units. This phenomenon is common and well understood. Borrowing troop

---

<sup>1</sup>A consideration in the military-versus-civilian-incumbent dialogue is the relative amount and cost of the training involved. A supply clerk at a military installation need not have attended recruit or other combat training, it is argued, and can learn the modest requirements of the job by training on the job. As will be seen, a number of the draft system options offered in Chapter 5 provide only the briefest of initial training for some draftees. This type of draftee is a military person organizationally but is untrained in expensive military skills. Those skills may be acquired later if the armed force requires them.

labor is accepted in peacetime as a fact of life, but it should not be accepted in wartime. Draft system options have been devised to offset these friction losses.

- *Underestimated Support Work.* When planners estimate wartime manpower requirements in support activities, they commonly begin with peacetime work standards, such as "X tons loaded per hour" or "Y requisitions processed per day." By increasing the organization's operating tempo, extending the work week, and similar measures projected to be adopted in a wartime environment, wartime manning levels are computed. Once mobilization begins, however, accelerated progress in the initial surge may be more important than smooth and economical use of the work force.

One example of underestimated support work is loading unit equipment for deployment. The use of unit labor to load their own equipment is an economical practice, and most military units have had some experience in accomplishing that task. Moreover, it is unlikely that the wartime manning levels of mobilization stations and air and sea ports of embarkation are sized to perform this job. So units deploying urgently to combat areas will have to move, load, and secure their own equipment on ships and aircraft. It might be better, however, to provide *extra* labor to perform this work *for* the deploying units, especially in view of the very short deployment preparation times allowed some of them. As ships and aircraft become available for loading unit equipment, the labor urgently required to do this work will exceed that planned. Extra labor applied at these times will free deploying unit personnel to complete last-minute preparations for combat, even while surge-condition deployment loading progresses. Draft system options have been devised to accomplish some of this underestimated support work.

- *Major Unrecognized Missions.* There are some major wartime missions for which no peacetime forces have been allocated. The manpower requirements process does not recognize a demand for these missions because it is based on the existing peacetime force structure. Units not in the peacetime force structure are simply not included in the demands. Even though the peacetime cost of planning to activate wartime units to accomplish these missions would be minimal, they are not presently considered.

One example of this understated demand is the mission of land defense of CONUS. Included in this requirement is provision for local security forces to secure and guard military installations and key industrial facilities. The FORSCOM has been assigned this mission, but there are insufficient units to do the work. The National Guard will be in Federal service as part of the active Army and Air Force. After deployment, not enough forces will remain in FORSCOM to accomplish this mission. State defense forces are planned at least to replace the National Guard and provide the governors with some armed force, but these are not Federal troops. There is no plan to form units to accomplish the land defense of CONUS mission, even though this has very

little peacetime cost associated with it. A draft system option has been devised to provide forces for this mission without detracting from any other mission.

## WARTIME MANPOWER SUPPLY

WARMAPS indicates some areas where the projected wartime manpower supply does not meet projected wartime manpower demand. This study has not attempted either to challenge or to validate demand and supply estimates. The data are used simply to generate applications for wartime draft system options. There are four general areas of supply to be considered: pretrained individual manpower, civilian new hires, volunteers, and draftees.

- *Pretrained Individual Manpower.* In general, DoD's pool of pretrained individual manpower is insufficient to meet *all* early demands for trained military personnel. This condition varies by skill group. WARMAPS indicates that there are many skill groups for which supply equals or exceeds demand.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, we have identified three major skill groups for which WARMAPS projects significant shortfalls:
  - ▶ *Health professionals* are in short supply for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The situation is particularly severe in the Army. The supply of pretrained individual health professionals is insufficient to meet demand for the first 6 months. A health professional draft has been authorized for planning purposes by Congress, and a draft system option has been devised to show how the need might be met.
  - ▶ *Naval construction skills* are in short supply. The supply of pretrained individuals is insufficient, and the current system cannot meet demands for the first 6 months. A draft system option to meet this demand has been devised.
  - ▶ *Combat skills* are in short supply, particularly in the Army. The supply of pretrained individual manpower with combat skills is insufficient, and the current system cannot begin to meet early demands prior to M + 100 days. A draft system option has been generated to provide a partial solution to this problem, which cannot be solved directly by expanded use of the current system because the shortages occur before M + 100 days. However, production of combat skills in the Army training base could be increased if some of the training strategy suggestions in this report were

---

<sup>2</sup>It is generally accepted that a masking of some specialty shortages occurs as a result of the choice of aggregations used in the WARMAPS reporting process. The armed forces are aware of their own masked shortages, but the shortfalls are invisible at the OSD level.

adopted for noncombat skills, thus freeing resources to support combat training.

- *U.S. Civilian New Hires.* DoD projects a requirement to hire about 305,000 new employees in the first 30 days of a mobilization, computed as follows:<sup>3</sup> DoD's authorized peacetime civilian strength is about 920,000 employees. About 340,000 new wartime civilian positions are created during the first 30 days of mobilization, while about 190,000 peacetime positions are terminated, for a net gain in civilian authorizations of 150,000. The resulting total wartime demand is 1,070,000. Of the approximately 915,000 U.S. employees working in peacetime, about 170,000 are reservists and retirees expected to enter active military service. Another 80,000 will be lost because of transfers and turmoil associated with mobilization. DoD estimates, however, that 100,000 civilian employees from terminated overseas positions will be available to be reassigned to CONUS positions. Therefore, the net available civilian strength will be about 765,000 employees to fill 1,070,000 wartime positions. This leaves an M+30 day shortfall of about 305,000 civilian employees, to be made up by hiring new people.

The 305,000 new hires required urgently by DoD include the following skills: 32,700 unskilled workers; 101,300 skilled workers; 54,700 clerks; 51,200 technicians; 29,700 managers and administrators; and 35,400 professionals.<sup>4</sup> All of the professionals, managers, and administrators will be officer-equivalent civilian employees, and this means that about 65,000 of the total demand would have to be met by military officers. That leaves a maximum of about 240,000 civilian employee new-hire positions that could be met by enlisted draftees. Of these, about 60,000 enlisted new-hire positions could be met by unskilled draftees (all the unskilled plus half the clerks), and the remaining 160,000 new-hire civilian positions would require enlisted personnel with appropriate civilian skills. Almost all of the civilian new hires are required for positions in the United States.

There is some doubt that DoD can hire 300,000 new employees in the first 30 days of a mobilization. Despite implementation of Office of Personnel Management emergency hiring procedures and the establishment of local and regional employment councils, this remains a formidable task. At the same time that DoD is looking for 300,000 new employees, the defense contractors who provide services to military installations and produce war

---

<sup>3</sup>All civilian data cited are taken from WARMAPS FY1987.

<sup>4</sup>WARMAPS provides skill and location data for the civilian employee shortfall and not the new hires alone. The variable would be the composition of the personnel returning from overseas, who would most likely be skilled personnel and officer-equivalent civilians. We have assumed that the composition of the new hires would be the same as the composition of the shortfall in order to describe the composition of the new hires group. This approach probably understates the number of unskilled enlisted military personnel who could substitute for civilian new hires.

materiel will also be hiring new employees. It is likely that private companies will be able to offer higher wages than the Government. Given the current low level of unemployment, it is unlikely that DoD will be able to hire all of the new people it needs in the first 30 days of a mobilization, particularly for bases in remote areas.

It would be useful, therefore, to explore ways to use drafted personnel to fill some of these "civilian" new hire spaces. If military personnel can do work now intended for civilians even on a temporary basis, it would ease the burden on the civilian personnel system and allow it to concentrate on hiring employees with critical professional and managerial skills. Several draft system options have been devised to assign military draftees to positions currently earmarked for civilian incumbency.

- *Volunteers.* Present plans are to allow men and women to volunteer for military service during mobilization and wartime. Since the current draft calls only 20-year-old males initially, this policy allows women and men older than 20 to join the armed forces. The problem with relying on volunteers is that the numbers that join cannot be predicted with great confidence. The Air Force and the Navy want to continue using volunteers along with a draft so that they can obtain higher quality recruits than they believe would be made available to them by a draft alone. In fact, the Air Force and Navy do not want to accept draftees in wartime. The Army and the Marine Corps want to eliminate voluntary enlistments when the draft is started so that they will receive a larger share of high-quality recruits than would be available through voluntary enlistment. The primary advantage of continuing to accept voluntary enlistments in mobilization is that it will allow women and older men with more skills to join the armed forces. As the type of draft system changes, the policy on voluntary enlistment in wartime should be adjusted appropriately.

Some groups in the population should be encouraged to volunteer for wartime service. These are groups whose availability has been underestimated. One of these is the large number of military veterans who have fulfilled their military service obligation. These personnel have already received extensive training and could be utilized after a brief period of refresher training. Even if a draft system option to recall them is not adopted, it would be useful to have a program to encourage them to volunteer during mobilization. Another underestimated source of supply is the large number of retired DoD civilian employees, who also should be encouraged to volunteer for re-employment during mobilization.

- *Draftees.* The ability of the current wartime draft to deliver draftees exceeds DoD's capacity to train them. The Selective Service System is projected to supply 100,000 draftees between M+13 and M+30 days. These draftees will be trained and available for assignment to units and deployment overseas starting at about M+100 days. This is the earliest that any draftee

who meets the statutory requirement for deployment can be available to units of the force.

The number of draftees who can go through the prescribed minimum of 12 weeks of training is constrained by the capacity of the training base. In fact, the projected deliveries by the Selective Service System are based primarily on training base capacity and not on DoD requirements. It is impossible to take more draftees using the current training strategy. When the peacetime backlog of participants in the Delayed Entry Program is large, and as the number of Army individual ready reservists requiring refresher training or retraining increases, the ability of the Army training base to accept draftees decreases. Thus, it is possible that even fewer draftees could be trained in the training base at the outset of a full mobilization than called for in current plans.

Expansion of the wartime draft, therefore, depends on using training strategies that do not increase demands on the training base but do provide *de facto* augmentation to DoD training capacity. This means providing any training required by our draft system options in nontraditional ways outside the conventional training base. Most draft system options have been devised to do just that.

## THE CURRENT WARTIME DRAFT SYSTEM

The current system can be described in terms of the nature of the draft itself, the accession standards to be applied, the training strategy employed, and the assignments and applications for which it is intended. The statutory and regulatory bases for the current wartime draft system are presented in Appendix D.

- *Type of Draft.* The current wartime draft system is a single-age-cohort, male-only, younger-first draft.

The registrant population consists of all males from 18 to 25 years of age. All young men are ordered to register for the draft upon attaining their 18th birthday. They remain in the registrant pool until they reach their 26th birthday.

The method of call is random by a lottery. Upon initiation of a wartime draft, a lottery will be held by birth dates. Each registrant will be assigned a random sequence number corresponding to the order in which his birthday was drawn in the lottery. If the first number drawn is for 12 July, all registrants with that birthday will be assigned random sequence number 1.

Preprocessing for this draft is an individual's initial registration, which is accomplished by filling out a registration form obtained from a U.S. Post Office and sending it to the headquarters of the Selective Service System. The registrant provides his name, birth date, Social Security number, and

current address. The Selective Service System tries to maintain current addresses for the registrant pool by mailing postcards to about 20 percent of the pool each year asking for updated address information.

The order of call is by a single age cohort. All registrants in the 20-year age cohort will be called first in order of random sequence number within the cohort. When all 20-year-olds have been called, the 21-year cohort will be called, then the 22-year cohort, 23-year cohort, 24-year cohort, and 25-year cohort. When the 25-year cohort has all been called, the 19-year cohort will be called. The 18-year cohort (older than 18.5 years) may be called only after all of these other registrant cohorts have been called.

- *Accession Standards.* The current policy is that the wartime draft system will use peacetime accession standards, at least initially. If necessary, other less demanding standards presumably will be used later to increase the supply of personnel who qualify for military service. The DoD policy on this is not clear. A detailed discussion of DoD accession standards for both peacetime and wartime is presented in Appendix E. There are three kinds of accession standards: medical, mental, and moral.<sup>5</sup>
  - ▶ *Medical Standards.*<sup>6</sup> The current peacetime standard will be used, along with waivers. While a "mobilization standard" exists at the Military Service level, there is no plan to implement this standard for the wartime draft. The decision on the wartime medical standard rests with the Secretaries of the Military Departments.
  - ▶ *Mental Standards.* Congress has directed that no more than 20 percent of all accessions, whether volunteers or inductees, may be in Mental Category IV. Presumably this restriction will remain in effect upon initiation of the wartime draft.
  - ▶ *Moral Standards.* The present peacetime moral standards are expected to be implemented for the current wartime draft system. Wartime standards exist in a joint Military Service/Military Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM) regulation regarding mobilization procedures; however, the conditions for implementing these alternative standards are not defined.

---

<sup>5</sup>There are several other "legal constraints" used to determine an individual's acceptability for military service that fall outside the three groupings listed here. Lower limits imposed by the law on the number of high school diploma graduates admitted is an example of one such stricture. Our use of three major categories of accession standards is chosen for ease of understanding. Appendix E discusses these issues more fully.

<sup>6</sup>Some of the regulatory literature and historical documents refer to medical standards as "physical" standards. They mean the same thing.

- *Training Strategy.* The current draft system employs one major training strategy, with some minor variations. The major features of this current draft system training strategy are as follows:
  - ▶ *Recruit Training.* All inductees and wartime volunteers are processed at a reception station or reception center for 2 to 3 days and then begin military training for 7 to 10 weeks of recruit training. The purpose of this recruit training is to socialize the recruit to military life, provide basic information on how to function in that armed force, and (for the Army and Marine Corps) to impart basic combat skills.
  - ▶ *Specialized Skill Training.* Almost all recruits are sent on to service schools to be trained in an entry-level skill. Some recruits in the Navy and Coast Guard are sent directly from recruit training to units or ships for on-the-job training and sent back to the training base later for additional schooling. There is inadequate provision for identification and utilization of civilian-acquired skills in the current wartime draft system.<sup>7</sup>
  - ▶ *Assignment Limitations.* All inductees and wartime volunteers will be qualified for full duty and worldwide assignment.
  - ▶ *Application.* The current wartime draft system is designed to provide fillers and replacements to bring the M-day force structure to full wartime strength and keep it at full wartime strength in sustained combat. Its orientation is toward filling the training base rather than filling particular jobs, and it is generally not concerned with special qualifications of the draftees.

## EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT DRAFT SYSTEM

The current wartime draft system is effective in providing young, physically fit men to be trained in military skills and available for assignment worldwide. It can provide substantial numbers of these newly trained recruits starting at about M + 100 days. It can meet most – but not all – demands for replacements after that time. Starting at about M + 150 days, it will also begin to provide fillers to staff newly activated units.

This system cannot, however, provide trained military personnel to meet demands for fillers to bring force units from peacetime to wartime strength upon

---

<sup>7</sup>The armed forces do identify civilian skills during reception and processing of volunteers in peacetime, and each Military Service has a program for making appropriate training and job assignments on this basis. There are no clear indications among the Services' mobilization planners, however, that civilian-acquired skills will be considered seriously once the wartime drafting of 20-year-olds starts.



M-day, nor can it meet manpower shortfalls that occur in the first 100 days of the mobilization. Further, it does not take into account most skills already possessed by the registrants.

The system is based on "last war" thinking. It is a draft inherited from the political and social climate at the end of the Vietnam War, using standards adopted for a peacetime volunteer force and a training strategy changed little from World War II. It is focused narrowly on providing fillers and replacements for existing force units in a major conventional war. The current wartime draft system is based on peacetime policies that would have to change at the outbreak of war. It does not contemplate the wider implications of a sustained global war for which full or total mobilization would be necessary.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **GENERATION OF DRAFT SYSTEM OPTIONS**

#### **DRAFT SYSTEM COMPOSITION**

A "draft system" is more than just the draft itself. It includes the draft, but it also includes the accession standards prescribed by DoD, the training strategy to be used for each group of draftees, the assignment limitations for each group, and the intended application or use of the draftees produced by the system. This study considered the entire draft system for each option generated.

The method devised to generate draft system options starts with the current system as the base case and then departs from the base case incrementally. This is done by changing values of the following five major variables of a draft system:

- Kind of draft
- Accession standards
- Training strategies
- Assignment limitations
- Application.

A group of discrete values was identified for each of these variables. Combinations of variable values were generated systematically to provide the universe of possible draft system options. The more interesting and useful combinations were selected for presentation here as illustrative draft system options.

In this process, the complicating factors discussed in Chapter 2 were considered. In some cases, the factors were important enough to be heeded as constraints; in others, the importance or power of a draft system option made it worthwhile to seek to change or overcome one or more of the complicating factors affecting that option.

Options 2 through 11 generated in this manner augment rather than supersede the current system. Many of the less difficult options are not mutually exclusive; several of them can be used simultaneously. The last two new options presented as

illustrative examples, however, are so comprehensive they constitute completely new systems, although they include the current draft system within their boundaries. Together, the options demonstrate how the wartime draft can be modified systematically to expand the use of draftees upon mobilization.

In this chapter, the variables will be explained and the discrete values used to generate options will be presented and explained. The options themselves will be presented in Chapter 5.

## KIND OF DRAFT

The kind of draft is, in turn, described by four sets of characteristics: registrant population, method of call, preprocessing actions, and order of call.

- *Registrant Population.* The registrant population comprises the set of people who are subject to being drafted and are registered with the Selective Service System. The pertinent descriptors are gender (male and female), age ranges, and exemptions. Citizens and resident aliens are subject to being drafted. The current law provides for drafting men only, and adding females to the registrant population would be a major change in the kind of draft. Present policies governing exemptions for conscientious objectors remain in all options.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>The MSSA specifies that any person who "by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form" may not be required to undergo combatant training and service in the armed forces upon induction. These personnel will be assigned to noncombatant duties. The Act states further that a person "conscientiously opposed to participation in such noncombatant service" will not be inducted but will be required to perform, for an equal period, "such civilian work contributing to the maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest . . ." as is prescribed by the Director of Selective Service.

The law thus establishes two categories of conscientious objectors: those inducted for noncombatant service in the armed forces and those who undertake alternative service.

Conscientious objectors inducted into the armed forces for noncombatant duties are similar to several groups of draftees proposed in the draft system options. Conscientious objectors are limited in their duty assignments and must receive modified initial training to avoid handling weapons and engaging in training for combat. These personnel could be included in the limited service categories and assigned to noncombatant duties in CONUS or a theater. There is no need to qualify them for overseas deployment unless they also have skills, such as those of a medical specialist, that can be used in the overseas theater. While it is questionable judgment to utilize scarce training seats for conscientious objectors, it does seem reasonable to provide them with orientation training and to assign them directly to work at CONUS support bases in appropriate jobs.

Conscientious objectors who are not inducted into the armed forces are required to perform alternative service under the direction of the Selective Service System, which has established a plan to set up an alternative service work program upon institution of the wartime draft. These conscientious objectors are unlikely to be good candidates for jobs in defense industries or in civil defense organizations. They will be employed, according to present plans, in social services positions in local communities. They will not provide direct support to the war effort, which is of course their intention.

- *Method of Call.* The method of call determines how registrants are selected from the registrant pool to report for induction. There are two methods:
  - ▶ *Random Lottery.* This method uses a lottery in which registrants are assigned a random sequence number by birthday. When the draft starts, all registrants with Sequence Number 1 will be called first. When those have been processed, registrants with Sequence Number 2 will be called, and so on until the demand is met.
  - ▶ *Selective Skill.* In this method, a special set of registrants is called on the basis of having a particular skill. To do this, the identity of each registrant having the requisite skill and experience must be known in advance. The call is for those registrants having the skill in demand. If there are more registrants in a skill group than the size of the draft call, the order of call within the skill group may be accomplished by the random sequence method.
- *Preprocessing Actions.* The amount of preprocessing that has to be accomplished prior to calling a registrant for induction is an important descriptor of a draft. This study considered three different kinds of preprocessing:
  - ▶ *Registration.* This is the minimum preprocessing required for rapid activation of a wartime draft. The target population provides name, address, Social Security number, and birth date to the Selective Service. This action is now performed in support of the current draft.
  - ▶ *Preliminary Skill Screening.* In addition to registration, information is obtained on education, experience, and skills by sending questionnaires to registrants. Although the information obtained by this method is suspect and time sensitive, it is better than nothing and can, over time, provide valuable information. This is the minimum preprocessing required for a selective skill draft.
  - ▶ *Classification.* This involves having registrants report to Military Entrance Processing Stations before activation of the wartime draft to receive physical and mental examinations, and to be interviewed to determine moral fitness, education, and skill qualifications. This is the most satisfactory form of preprocessing; it is also the most expensive, difficult, and controversial. Classification, however, could be an event in the graduated activation of a wartime draft. This action was the predominant model used in World Wars I and II and during the Korean War.
- *Order of Call.* The order of call determines the sequence in which registrants are ordered to report for induction. Three different orders were considered in this study:
  - ▶ *Single Cohort, Younger First.* A single-cohort draft is one in which all registrants born in one calendar year are called before any registrants

born in other calendar years. In this usage, a cohort refers to all of the people born in the same calendar year. In the younger-first version of a single-cohort draft, the youngest registrants (those born in the most recent year included in the registrant population) are called first, then the next older year group, and so on until the oldest year group in the target population has been called. This is the order to be followed under the present draft system, except for those under age 20.

- ▶ *Single Cohort, Older First.* In this version of a single-cohort draft, the oldest year group in the target population is called first, then the next oldest, and so on down to the youngest age group in the target population.
- ▶ *Multiple Cohort.* In this type of draft all age cohorts in the target population are called simultaneously according to the particular method used in the draft. If the random lottery method is used, all registrants in the entire target population holding the first sequence number would be called simultaneously.

Order of call is important because it influences the proportion of the inductees who will have civilian skills attractive to DoD. Generally, the older the registrant, the more likely he is to have acquired useful skills in civilian life. Table 4-1 shows the range of skills available in the 20- and 26-year cohorts, respectively.

Between ages 20 and 26 there is a significant increase in the number of young men with high-skilled/professional occupations. Although the categories in Table 4-1 are occupational groupings, they serve as proxies for skill levels. The ability of the members of these occupational groups continues to increase with experience and time on the job.

The upshot is that a single-cohort, younger-first draft starting with 20-year olds would provide significantly fewer inductees with usable skills and experience than an older-first draft starting with 25-year olds.

## **ACCESSION STANDARDS**

All new members of the armed forces must qualify for membership by meeting the minimum standards set for medical condition, mental aptitude, and moral character. A distinction has to be made between peacetime accession standards and wartime accession standards. DoD now applies peacetime medical, mental, and moral standards to men and women volunteering for military service. The peacetime standards are intended to provide a long-term career service member capable of assignment anywhere without limitation. In wartime, it may be desirable to modify

**TABLE 4-1**  
**COMPARISON OF SKILL LEVELS POSSESSED BY TWO AGE COHORTS**  
 (Percentage of male population by occupation group)

Skill levels and occupation groups	Age cohorts	
	20 years percent	26 years percent
<b>Unskilled/low-skilled</b>	50.1	27.4
Administrative/Clerical	9.1	6.4
Service Workers	16.9	9.3
Farming/Forestry/Fishing	7.0	4.2
Handlers/Equipment Cleaners/Helpers	17.1	7.5
<b>Mid-skilled</b>	24.5	27.5
Transportation/Material Moving	5.6	7.1
Machine Operators/Assemblers/Inspectors	8.9	9.6
Sales Occupations	10.0	10.8
<b>High-skilled/professional</b>	25.4	45.0
Precision Production, Craft, and Repair	16.9	22.3
Technicians and related support	1.9	3.6
Executive, Administrative, and Management	3.7	9.1
Professional Specialties	2.9	10.0

*Source: Current Population Survey for 1987, United States Bureau of Labor Statistics.*

the minimum standards to accept and utilize persons not eligible for military service according to the peacetime standards. The subject of accession standards is highly complex and technical, and responsibility for setting standards is diffuse. A more complete discussion of the standards is in Appendix E.

Historically, accession standards have been the mechanism used by the armed forces to adjust the flow of inductees in wartime. During World War II, as it became more difficult to obtain the men required by the armed forces, accession standards were adjusted to be less restrictive. The relaxation of standards was a response to an

existing situation. It would be preferable to plan in advance to apply suitable accession standards at the outset of mobilization to particular groups intended to be used for specific jobs. Some of the alternative standards described in this section are designed to make it possible to utilize marginally qualified personnel in wartime.

- *Medical Standards.* As part of the entrance qualification process, each volunteer or potential inductee is given a thorough physical examination by MEPCOM, usually at a MEPS. The results of the physical exam are compared to medical standards to determine whether the person should be admitted or rejected on medical grounds. Three new kinds of medical standards were created to generate draft system options in this study:<sup>2</sup>
  - ▶ *General Medical Standards.* The general medical standards are intended to provide a military person who is fit physically to withstand the rigors of service in a theater of operations, including combat. The general standards are different from the standards used in peacetime, which are designed to qualify volunteers for a military career without imposing undue burden on the military health care system. While peacetime standards presumably also provide young men and women who are fit for arduous duty in wartime, they may be too strict for wartime application. The general standards are focused on the immediate problem and not on the long-term consequences. They may be administered flexibly through the process of granting waivers. When used in wartime draft system options, general standards mean those necessary to assure a combat-ready service member available for service worldwide.
  - ▶ *Intermediate Medical Standards.* These standards are less demanding than the general standards but still require a high degree of physical fitness. Retention standards now used to determine when a person already on active duty is to be retained on active duty can serve as a model for these intermediate medical standards. When used in the wartime draft system options, intermediate standards mean those that allow a person to perform satisfactorily in a support position in CONUS.
  - ▶ *Minimum Medical Standards.* These medical standards establish the minimum physical condition for a person to enter into military service at any time. They represent a physical capability significantly more

---

<sup>2</sup>The three new kinds of medical standards were created to avoid the use of the terms "peacetime standards" and "mobilization standards," both of which are too vague to use in generating new draft system options. It is our intent to create a system of three distinct standards which may be used to identify and draft groups who do not meet the highest standard (general) but do meet one of the less demanding standards. Since there is adequate supply in gross terms to meet demands for military manpower, the theoretical increase in supply if the entire DoD went to a less demanding standard is not germane to this study, and we have not addressed this point. We do not propose that DoD lower its standard for all draftees but instead use the standards to manage the induction of personnel for appropriate utilization.

limited than that currently acceptable for military service in peacetime. Some of these personnel would not, for example, be capable of completing standard recruit training satisfactorily. Personnel meeting these standards could be utilized, however, to perform support functions in the United States. These minimum medical standards would be similar to the mobilization medical standards now promulgated in an Army regulation<sup>3</sup> to which all of the armed forces subscribe nominally. There is no plan, however, to institute the mobilization medical standards automatically upon mobilization. The minimum medical standard used in the draft system options will be in effect for specific purposes. When used in the draft system options, minimum medical standards mean those that allow a person to perform a limited function under particular circumstances.

- ***Mental Standards.*** Each volunteer or potential inductee is given the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) at the MEPS. The results of this test are used to compute an Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score. The AFQT score is the primary mental standard determining whether a volunteer or registrant may be accepted. The AFQT is considered a measure of "trainability" or potential to complete recruit and initial skill training satisfactorily.

Each person falls into one of five AFQT categories according to his or her AFQT score. The armed forces are forbidden by law from accepting a person in the lowest group, Category V, with scores from 1 to 9 inclusive. Presently, Congress also includes restrictions on the number of persons who may be enlisted from Category IV, with scores of 10 to 30 inclusive. Two values of the mental standards are used on the draft system option generation process:

- ▶ ***Peacetime Mental Standards.*** Current congressional guidance is that not more than 20 percent of the accessions for each armed force may be in Category IV. This restriction applies both to volunteers and inductees and unless changed would apply in wartime as well as peacetime. Translated to AFQT score, this means that the minimum score that qualifies for entrance is 21.<sup>4</sup>
- ▶ ***Mobilization Mental Standards.*** The minimum permissible score for Category IV is 10, and this is adopted as the minimum standard for wartime.
- ***Moral Standards.*** The moral standards are designed to keep out of the armed forces persons who are likely to present disciplinary problems or be security risks. Screening of moral qualifications is based on examination of

---

<sup>3</sup>Army Regulation 40-501, *Standards for Medical Fitness*, 1 July 1987.

<sup>4</sup>Congress actually specifies that each armed force may access no more than 20 percent of Category IV personnel. DoD has elected to conform to that guidance by establishing the minimum AFQT score cited above.



the individual's civilian offense record. Conviction of a felony is disqualifying, although waivers may be granted by the Secretaries of the Military Departments. Insanity, drunkenness, desertion from an armed force, or drug use are also grounds for disqualification. Two values of this variable are used in the draft system option generation process:

- ▶ *Peacetime Moral Standards.* The peacetime moral standards are set deliberately high and are based on a combination of specific "bad marks" on a person's record. Prospective members are evaluated on a "whole person" concept that takes into account physical condition, education, and AFQT score when applying the moral standards. Records of minor traffic offenses, minor nontraffic offenses, misdemeanors, and felonies are considered when determining whether or not a person should be accepted. Waivers for minor offenses may be granted by recruiters. Waivers for felony convictions may be granted by the Commander, MEPCOM. Persons with criminal charges pending against them are not acceptable.
- ▶ *Wartime Moral Standards.* The moral standards for wartime may be less demanding than the peacetime standards. Persons with more convictions for traffic violations might be admitted. The intent would be to admit to the armed forces more persons who can contribute to the war effort without creating major disciplinary problems. There are examples from World War II of prison populations being screened for additional manpower for the armed forces.
- *Values of Accession Standards.* Incremental values of the three standards can be combined to define categories of personnel with discrete, marginal capabilities. Individuals can be assigned to these combined qualification categories on the basis of their medical, mental, and moral qualifications. The aggregate classes of the three standards used to generate draft system options are shown in Table 4-2.

TABLE 4-2

AGGREGATE CLASSES OF ACCESSION STANDARDS

Class	Medical	Mental	Moral
General	General	AFQT > 20	Peacetime
Intermediate	Intermediate	AFQT > 20	Peacetime
Minimum	Minimum	AFQT > 9	Wartime

## TRAINING STRATEGIES

The training strategy adopted for inductees has great influence on how soon the new recruit can be put to work. The traditional training strategy is designed to produce a fully trained and deployable service member who has an entry-level skill. This process takes at least 12 weeks, which is too long to meet demands in the first 3 months of mobilization.

The alternative training strategies used to generate draft system options are based on two concepts. First, the training is to be delivered in nontraditional ways outside the training base. Second, the nontraditional training is to be tailored to provide only the minimum training needed for a particular job. This is done by taking advantage of civilian-acquired skills and focusing on specific jobs rather than on general utility. The alternative training strategies put new personnel on the job rapidly and allow them to perform useful work in many cases while receiving on-the-job training. The two elements of a training strategy are recruit training and specialized skill training.

Recruit training is provided by the armed forces to socialize the recruit to military life and teach essential military skills needed by all members of a particular armed force. Recruit training is also called basic training or boot camp. The emphasis in the Army and Marine Corps is on survival and combat skills, including battle drill, physical fitness, and marksmanship. The emphasis in the Air Force, Navy, and Coast Guard is on military life and essential common skills. Standard recruit training lasts from 7 to 10 weeks.

Upon completion of recruit training, most recruits receive specialized skill training. They are sent either to schools or to skill training at training centers where they are taught the essentials of an entry-level skill. Some recruits in the Navy and Coast Guard are sent from boot camp to a generalized seamanship or airmanship training called apprentice training, or are sent directly to units or ships to learn a skill on the job; many of these personnel return later to a school for advanced skill training. Peacetime recruits with validated civilian-acquired skills may be sent directly from recruit training to units to work in their skills. There is much emphasis in all the armed forces on skill training.

As has been noted, however, the ability of the Army and the other armed forces to train new recruits is limited, and this fact is the most important constraint on the

number of draftees that can be accepted during mobilization. It is primarily to avoid this constraint that we have devised additional training strategies in connection with the generation of draft system options. From the large number of training strategies that are possible, we selected the four discussed below for use in this study to define draft system options.

- *Standard Training.* In this strategy, the inductee is processed into his armed force at a reception station or center and then is sent to a military training center to receive 7 to 10 weeks of recruit training. Upon completion of recruit training, the recruit will usually receive specialized skill training in a military school or training center. In the Navy and Coast Guard, some recruits may be given apprenticeship training or may be assigned directly to units for on-the-job training in a skill before being sent to a more advanced school.
- *Orientation.* In this strategy, the inductee receives 1 week of orientation at a reception training site and then reports to a unit for work. The orientation is designed to provide the inductee with minimum essential knowledge of service life and values and the disciplinary requirements of a Military Service member under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The work begins at a rudimentary level, and the inductee continues to learn job skills as the work continues. Supervision is provided by work supervisors or by support cadre or both.
- *Unit Training.* In this strategy, the inductee reports directly to his unit from the reception station. He receives orientation, recruit training, and necessary skill training from the officers and non-commissioned officers of his unit. Upon completion of training, the recruit is retained in the unit for work.
- *Refresher Training.* In this strategy, an inductee or volunteer with prior military service is sent to a training center for 2 to 3 weeks to be refreshed in military skills already attained through the prior service. The purpose of this training is to bring the veteran up to date and stimulate recovery of old skills now partially lost. Upon completion of refresher training, the veteran is assigned to a unit.

## **ASSIGNMENT LIMITATIONS**

Not all military personnel have to be capable in wartime of service in a combat area. Personnel whose medical condition is marginal for combat can still perform useful work in the United States and in support areas of a theater of operations. Those not physically fit for all duties may be limited in their assignments. For example, sending people with some physical disability to a theater of operations could

provide some benefit but could also impose excessive burdens on the theater medical system. It may be better in wartime to limit the locations and duties to which marginally fit personnel may be assigned.

In order to be deployed outside the United States, each volunteer or inductee must have received at least 12 weeks of basic training or its equivalent. Marginally fit personnel who are not going to be sent outside of the United States need not be given the training that would make them deployable. Primarily on the basis of deployability, three groups have been defined for this variable in the draft system option generating process:

- *Full Duty.* These service members have served more than 12 weeks and have completed the initial training required by their Military Service so that they may be assigned worldwide without any limitation.
- *Limited Duty.* These service members have either served fewer than 12 weeks or have not received basic training or its equivalent.<sup>5</sup> Until they have met both of these criteria, they are ineligible for assignment outside the United States. Limited duty servicemen may qualify for full duty status after 12 weeks of service by receiving basic training or its equivalent. This is a temporary assignment limitation.<sup>5</sup>
- *Limited Service.* These service members have either served fewer than 12 weeks or have not received basic training or its equivalent. There is no intention, however, of sending these people back to receive basic training or its equivalent even after they are in military service longer than 12 weeks. This is a permanent assignment limitation for members of marginally qualified groups.

The groups of additional draftees provided by the draft system options outlined in Chapter 5 will require support by two kinds of cadres: training cadres and command/control cadres. In the case of those draftees who undergo unit training, the two kinds of cadre become one: a command/control cadre that also teaches. A more detailed discussion of cadres for the support of the additional draftees is contained in Appendix F.

---

<sup>5</sup>It is generally understood that the "basic training" of the statutory language is not simply recruit training, although Army recruit training has long been called basic training. The intent of the Congress is that soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are to be sent away from their homeland only after completing training in the fundamentals of combat survival skills considered appropriate by the Secretaries of the Military Departments. The completion of this training is widely interpreted to coincide with the award of a military specialty. When that award occurs in less than 12 weeks, more time is required in CONUS before the military person may be deployed.

## **APPLICATION**

Each draft system option has, in addition to combinations of values for the four variables described above, one or more specific applications in the overall manpower mobilization program. An application is a shortfall or understated demand that a particular draft system option is designed to meet. Synthesis is achieved by combining values for each of the variables and designating a specific application. The combination of variable values provides over 100 logical combinations, and there are numerous possible applications, with the result that there could be as many as 50 feasible wartime draft system options. In the next chapter, some of those options are explained to illustrate the process.

## CHAPTER 5

### DRAFT SYSTEM OPTIONS

#### GENERAL

Thirteen illustrative draft system options are presented in this chapter. Option 1 is the current system, which is described in the same manner as the new options to make it easy to compare them all.

Options 2 through 7 are all variations of the current draft system in that they all use a random lottery sequence as the method of call. By varying the accession standards, training strategy, order of call, and application we present six distinct options – each of which can be implemented by adding it to the current system.

Options 8 through 11 are quite different from the current system because the method of call is changed to the selective skill method. All of these are multiple-cohort drafts. Variations in accession standards, training strategies, and applications are used to develop options that, again, can be implemented singly or altogether. The current draft system option and Options 2 through 7 may also be implemented simultaneously, with modifications to allow for a multiple-cohort draft.

Options 12 and 13 are complete revisions to the current wartime draft system; they include various subsystems for using draftees to meet separate specific demands. Both options also *include* the current draft system capability to provide young, physically fit males to meet demands for combat replacements and fillers.

Each new option has been designed to meet one or more unmet demands. Six of the options are intended to provide personnel for support activities, either as additional manpower for understated demands, or to perform "civilian" work, or both. Three are designed to provide manpower to meet specific shortages. Two of the options (including the current system) are designed to provide fillers and replacements for force units. Finally, two of the options are multipurpose in scope, providing several different ways to obtain, train, and utilize wartime draftees to meet a variety of demands.

The 12 new draft system options described here illustrate both the substance and the promise of the method used to generate them. It is possible to use this development process to generate still more feasible draft system options as necessary.

Each option is presented under the following headings:

- **Concept.** A brief description of the option's purpose and general characteristics.
- **Characteristics.** The values adopted for kind of draft, accession standards, training strategy, and assignment limitations, shown in tabular format. *Values that are changes to the values for the current draft system italicized.*
- **Application.** The particular DoD manpower need the option is designed to meet.
- **Costs.** A qualitative description of the peacetime costs and the additional costs upon mobilization, by major cost category. No quantitative cost estimates have been developed.
- **Benefits.** A qualitative description of the likely benefits to DoD of the draft system option. A rough estimate is presented of the number of additional draftees this option could accommodate and the time schedule for their delivery to units.
- **Implementation Difficulties.** A discussion of the political and organizational difficulties the draft system option would encounter before being implemented. Groups likely to oppose and support the option are identified.
- **Evaluation.** A general discussion of the value of the option, considering costs, difficulties, and benefits from the overall DoD mobilization manpower perspective.
- **Flow Diagram.** A diagram showing how the draft system option operates in conjunction with the current draft system.

## DRAFT SYSTEM OPTIONS

Table 5-1 lists all 13 draft system options. Succeeding pages provide the detailed characteristics of each option, using the standard format.

**TABLE 5-1**  
**DRAFT SYSTEM OPTIONS**

Option	Option name	Application
1.	The Current Draft System	Fillers and replacements
2.	Fort Swampy Surge	Temporary support activities
3.	The Long Haul	Long-term support activities
4.	New Units for Support	Temporary support activities
5.	Security Units	Base and domestic security
6.	Single-Cohort Skills Draft	Support activities
7.	More Ages – More Skills	Support activities
8.	Classic Draft-for-Skill	Support activities
9.	The SeaBee Draft	Naval construction battalions
10.	CONUS Health Care Draft	CONUS medical units
11.	Military Veteran Draft	Replacements with military skills
12.	Comprehensive Draft	All demands
13.	Total Draft	All demands



## DRAFT SYSTEM OPTION 1: THE CURRENT DRAFT SYSTEM

### CONCEPT

The current draft system is designed to provide large numbers of healthy young men to be trained in the military training base for duty worldwide as members of units. The system is designed to provide a high-quality individual, with no particular regard for civilian-acquired skill. Large numbers of registrants are called for examination, and only those meeting peacetime accession standards are inducted. Table 5-2 summarizes the characteristics of this option.

**TABLE 5-2**  
**CURRENT WARTIME DRAFT SYSTEM**

<b>Kind of draft</b>	
<b>Type</b>	Single cohort, younger first
<b>Registrant population</b>	Males, 18 through 25
<b>Method of call</b>	Random lottery
<b>Pre-processing action</b>	Registration
<b>Order of call</b>	20-year cohort; 21; 22; 23; 24; 25; 19
<b>Accession standards</b>	
<b>Medical</b>	General
<b>Mental</b>	AFQT > 20
<b>Moral</b>	Peacetime
<b>Objective</b>	High quality and physically fit
<b>Training strategy</b>	
<b>Recruit training</b>	7 to 10 weeks at training center
<b>Skill training</b>	Service school or training center; some on-the-job training (OJT)
<b>Concept</b>	Complete training for entry-level skill
<b>Assignment limitations</b>	Full duty

## APPLICATION

This option provides fillers to bring existing force structure units from peacetime to wartime strength and replacements to keep the units at wartime strength.

## COSTS

The current draft system requires considerable investment in processing and training capability, most of which is already in place. The mobilization capacity of the training base limits the number of draftees that can be inducted by the armed forces. Expansion of the capability of the current draft system would require investment in additional training equipment units, installations, and supporting organizations.

## BENEFITS

This system will provide large numbers of newly trained military personnel with a wide variety of military skills starting at about M + 100. For most military skill groups, sufficient newly trained military personnel will be provided to meet demands for full mobilization. After about M + 180, large numbers of fillers for newly created units are also generated by this system. Table 5-3 shows the capacity of the current system.

TABLE 5-3

CAPACITY OF CURRENT WARTIME DRAFT SYSTEM

Number of inductees	Initial delivery to units	Completed delivery
100,000 (by M + 30)	M + 100	As necessary

## **IMPLEMENTATION DIFFICULTIES**

### **Political**

The system is presently authorized in law.<sup>1</sup> Initiation of this or any other wartime draft might meet political opposition, but this applies to all draft system options.

### **Organizational**

The system is presently an integral part of DoD and Selective Service System (SSS) plans and regulations, and it could be implemented when needed.

## **EVALUATION**

The current draft system is well designed to provide trained combat replacements and fillers for demands starting at about M + 100 to M + 120. It does not satisfy earlier demands, and it cannot remedy shortfalls in particular skill groups for which insufficient pretrained individual manpower is available. It is not designed to meet understated demands, and it cannot provide more than its current capability without expansion of mobilization training capacity. Figure 5-1 is the flow diagram for this option.

---

<sup>1</sup>Except for Section 17(c) of the MSSA [50 U.S.C. App. 467(c)]. Section 17(c) is the peacetime prohibition against implementation of the draft. The rescinding of this provision is one of those actions that will be proposed in the event of hostilities or similar emergency.




FIG. 5-1. OPTION 1: CURRENT DRAFT SYSTEM

## DRAFT SYSTEM OPTION 2:

### FORT SWAMPY SURGE

#### CONCEPT

The Fort Swampy Surge draft system is designed to provide an early, temporary pool of untrained labor at mobilization stations, training centers, and depots to perform unprogrammed work in support of mobilization and deployment. Draft calls will be increased over the capacity of the training base, and some draftees selected at random will be given minimal training, formed into labor battalions, and put to work promptly. After the surge, these draftees will be sent to the training base for standard training. Table 5-4 summarizes the major characteristics of this option.

TABLE 5-4

FORT SWAMPY SURGE DRAFT SYSTEM OPTION

Kind of draft	
Type	Single cohort, younger first
Registrant population	Males, 18 through 25
Method of call	Random lottery
Pre-processing action	Registration
Order of call	20-year cohort; 21; 22; 23; 24; 25; 19
Accession standards	
Medical	General
Mental	AFQT > 20
Moral	Peacetime
Objective	High quality and physically fit
Training strategy	
Recruit training	<i>1-week orientation</i>
Skill training	<i>OJT</i>
Concept	<i>Minimum for military socialization</i>
Assignment limitations	<i>Limited duty</i>

## APPLICATION

This option provides extra labor to accomplish unprogrammed work and to assist force units in mobilization and deployment, minimizes diversion of labor from deploying and training units, and helps to offset lag in the civilian new hire program.

## COSTS

The only peacetime cost for this option is for planning the system. Additional costs upon mobilization include the following: faster SSS readiness time; additional processing capability at MEPS and reception stations; instructors, facilities, and equipment for the orientation; pay, clothing, food, housing, and support for the additional military personnel; command and control cadre for the labor battalions; some additional supervision personnel at bases; and additional personnel management system and administrative support system workload.

## BENEFITS

This system will provide a significant amount of unskilled labor during the initial mobilization surge period. It provides a hedge against underestimation of manpower requirements and any inability of the civilian personnel system to obtain new hires in a timely manner. It also is a safety factor to minimize diversion of troop labor during deployment and hedge against the unexpected. SSS will deliver the first inductee to the MEPS at M + 7 days so that the first of these draftees could be put to work at M + 14 days after 7 days of orientation. Based on using 1,000 additional men at each of about 100 Army and Navy bases in CONUS, the additional draftees to be provided in the M + 3 to M + 13 time frame would be about 100,000. Table 5-5 summarizes the capacity of this system.

TABLE 5-5

CAPACITY OF FORT SWAMPY SURGE DRAFT SYSTEM

Number of additional inductees	Initial delivery to bases	Completed delivery
100,000	M + 14	M + 21

## **IMPLEMENTATION DIFFICULTIES**

### **Political**

This option can be implemented under the present law.<sup>2</sup> Congress would have to be advised, but opposition is unlikely.

### **Organizational**

Authorization of the Fort Swampy Surge draft system would require a minor change to DoD policy. Actually inserting this option into mobilization plans would require acceptance by the armed forces. Once the benefits and resource implications are understood, this probably could be done without much difficulty. SSS might object to having to provide the first inductee by M+7 days, but DoD could likely prevail on this issue.

## **EVALUATION**

The Fort Swampy Surge draft system performs a useful function with only a minor change from the current wartime draft system. It will provide additional labor to do the hard work involved in loading units and performing other mobilization tasks. More important, perhaps, is that it would allow commanders of deploying units to focus their own troops on training and preparing for combat. Figure 5-2 is the flow diagram for this option.

---

<sup>2</sup>Except for Section 17(c) of the MSSA [50 U.S.C. App. 467(c)]. Section 17(c) is the peacetime prohibition against implementation of the draft. The rescinding of this provision is one of those actions that will be proposed in the event of hostilities or similar emergency.




FIG. 5-2. OPTION 2: FORT SWAMPY SURGE DRAFT SYSTEM



## DRAFT SYSTEM OPTION 3: THE LONG HAUL

### CONCEPT

The Long Haul draft system is designed to provide additional military personnel who do not meet the general medical standards for induction but are physically qualified to work at military installations in CONUS. Registrants who otherwise would be disqualified are inducted, sent to an orientation course, and then assigned to work at military installations for the duration of the conflict. Table 5-6 summarizes the major characteristics of this option.

TABLE 5-6

THE LONG HAUL DRAFT SYSTEM OPTION

<b>Kind of draft</b>	
Type	Single-cohort, younger-first
Registrant population	Males, 18 through 25
Method of call	Random lottery
Pre-processing action	Registration
Order of call	20-year cohort; 21; 22; 23; 24; 25; 19
<b>Accession standards</b>	
Medical	Intermediate
Mental	AFQT > 20
Moral	Peacetime
Objective	<i>Capable of duty in CONUS</i>
<b>Training strategy</b>	
Recruit training	<i>1-week orientation</i>
Skill training	<i>OJT</i>
Concept	<i>Minimum for military socialization</i>
<b>Assignment limitations</b>	<i>Limited service</i>

## **APPLICATION**

This option provides (1) additional, low-skilled military personnel to perform unprogrammed work and (2) substitutes for some civilian new hires for the duration of the conflict.

## **COSTS**

The only peacetime cost for this option is for the additional planning. Additional costs upon mobilization include the following: earlier setup time for SSS; additional processing capability at MEPS and reception stations; instructors, facilities, and equipment for the orientation; command and control cadre for the new units formed; pay, clothing, food, housing, and support of the additional military personnel; supervision of on-the-job-training; and additional personnel management system and administrative support system workload. Some of these costs would be offset by not having to hire and pay civilian employees.

## **BENEFITS**

This draft system option can provide a significant amount of unskilled labor, starting at the initiation of mobilization and continuing throughout the war. As the workers gain experience through on-the-job-training, they will become increasingly skilled and valuable. This option involves no appreciable peacetime cost and only limited additional cost during mobilization. It provides a hedge against underestimation of manpower requirements and failure of the civilian personnel system to obtain new hires in a timely manner. It also provides a safety factor if DoD finds it difficult to attract civilian employees for low-skilled positions during a national industrial mobilization.

Sending about a thousand of these limited service personnel to each of 100 major military installations would utilize 100,000 additional draftees. That number would substitute for about one-third of the civilian new hire requirement. Table 5-7 shows the estimated capacity of this option.

**TABLE 5-7**  
**CAPACITY OF LONG HAUL DRAFT SYSTEM**

Number of additional inductees	Initial delivery to bases	Completed delivery
100,000	M + 14	M + 180

## **IMPLEMENTATION DIFFICULTIES**

### **Political**

This option can be implemented under the present law.<sup>3</sup> Congress would have to be consulted and informally approve this option for planning in peacetime and implementation upon mobilization. Since the concept of limited service has precedent, it should be possible to obtain the necessary approval.

### **Organizational**

Authorization of the Long Haul draft system would require a major change to DoD policy. Opposition might appear from the civilian personnel system and the unions, since these limited service military personnel would be replacing new hire civilian employees for the duration of the war.

Some leaders of the armed forces might object to having limited service personnel in their enlisted ranks. However, the benefits of the option would probably be sufficient to win acceptance in the Army, Air Force, and Navy. The Marine Corps and Coast Guard are small and probably would prefer not to have limited service personnel.

Resistance from the military medical community can be expected, because using these marginally qualified draftees might cause an increased requirement for health care and possible disability compensation.

---

<sup>3</sup>Except for Section 17(c) of the MSSA [50 U.S.C. App. 467(c)]. Section 17(c) is the peacetime prohibition against implementation of the draft. The rescinding of this provision is one of those actions that will be proposed in the event of hostilities or similar emergency.

## EVALUATION

The Long Haul draft system provides additional military personnel for installation support for the duration of the war. Although these personnel do not meet the general medical standards for full duty, they will be representative in mental ability and can learn to perform necessary work in CONUS. These personnel will free full duty military personnel to serve as replacements overseas. Moreover, this limited service corps will serve as an organizational structure for the utilization of returning wounded military personnel who are no longer fit for combat but can still contribute to the war effort. This option provides much wartime benefit for little peacetime cost. Figure 5-3 is the flow diagram for this option.




FIG. 5-3. OPTION 3: THE LONG HAUL DRAFT SYSTEM

## **DRAFT SYSTEM OPTION 4:**

### **NEW UNITS FOR SUPPORT**

#### **CONCEPT**

The New Units for Support draft system is designed to provide military personnel, organized into base support units, for use at military installations in CONUS. More draftees will be inducted than can be trained in the training base. Some will be assigned at random to support battalions at CONUS installations for training in their units. Support battalions will provide an additional administrative and training structure for the draftees, who will be assigned to work at the other support activities on each facility. As experienced military personnel return from overseas and are assigned to the support units and as training seats become available, original members of the support battalions may be returned to the training base for full duty qualification. This system is similar to Option 2, except for the type of training given the new draftees. Table 5-8 summarizes the major characteristics of this option.

#### **APPLICATION**

This option provides organized military support units at military installations to perform unprogrammed work and hedge against lags in the civilian new hire program.

#### **COSTS**

The only peacetime cost for this option would be for the additional planning. Additional mobilization costs for this option include the following: faster setup time for SSS; additional processing capability at MEPS and reception stations; cadre for organization, training, and operation of units; pay, clothing, food, facilities, and support for the additional military personnel; and additional personnel management system and administrative support system workload. Some of these costs would be offset by not having to hire and pay civilian employees.

TABLE 5-8

## NEW UNITS FOR SUPPORT DRAFT SYSTEM OPTION

<b>Kind of draft</b>	
<b>Type</b>	Single cohort, younger first
<b>Registrant population</b>	Males, 18 through 25
<b>Method of call</b>	Random lottery
<b>Pre-processing action</b>	Registration
<b>Order of call</b>	20-year cohort; 21; 22; 23; 24; 25; 19
<b>Accession standards</b>	
<b>Medical</b>	General
<b>Mental</b>	AFQT > 20
<b>Moral</b>	Peacetime
<b>Objective</b>	Physically capable of duty
<b>Training strategy</b>	
<b>Recruit training</b>	<i>Unit training in base support units</i>
<b>Skill training</b>	<i>OJT</i>
<b>Concept</b>	<i>Train for specific duties</i>
<b>Assignment limitations</b>	<i>Limited duty</i>

**BENEFITS**

This draft system option can provide a significant amount of high-quality, unskilled labor starting at the initiation of mobilization and continuing throughout the war. As the workers gain experience through on-the-job-training, they will become increasingly skilled and valuable. This option involves little peacetime cost and limited additional cost during mobilization. It provides a hedge against underestimation of manpower requirements and inability of the civilian personnel system to obtain new hires soon enough. Finally, it provides a pool of military personnel for assignment to the training base as seats become available.

Approximately 100 military installations in CONUS will need additional support during mobilization and deployment. If one support unit of about 1,500 personnel were made available to each of these installations, the total number of draftees that could be used in this option would be roughly 150,000. These draftees

would be formed into their units at about M + 7 days and would be ready to start work about a week later.

Table 5-9 shows the estimated capacity of the New Units for Support draft system option.

**TABLE 5-9**  
**CAPACITY OF NEW UNITS FOR SUPPORT DRAFT SYSTEM OPTION**

Number of additional inductees	Initial delivery to bases	Completed delivery
150,000	M + 14	M + 14

## **IMPLEMENTATION DIFFICULTIES**

### **Political**

This option can be implemented under the present law.<sup>4</sup> Congress would have to be consulted and informally approve this option. The concept of base support battalions would have to be justified on the basis of need, but it should be possible to obtain the necessary approval.

### **Organizational**

Authorization of the New Units for Support draft system would require a major change to DoD policy. Opposition might appear from the civilian personnel system and the unions since the base support battalions would be replacing some potential new hire civilian employees. Some of the armed forces might object to using base support battalions. However, the benefits of the option would probably win acceptance in the other armed forces.

## **EVALUATION**

The New Units for Support draft system can provide additional military personnel for installation support shortly after the start of mobilization and for as

---

<sup>4</sup>Except for Section 17(c) of the MSSA [so U.S.C. App. 467(c)]. Section 17(c) is the peacetime prohibition against implementation of the draft. The rescinding of this provision is one of those actions that will be proposed in the event of hostilities or similar emergency.



long as necessary. These personnel meet the general medical standards for full duty and will be representative in mental aptitude. As installation workload decreases or civilian new hires come aboard, these military personnel could be sent back to the training base to qualify for full duty. These personnel will free other military personnel for service overseas. The base support battalions can be used also as an organizational structure for the assignment of returned, wounded military personnel who are no longer fit for combat. This option provides much wartime benefit for little peacetime cost. Figure 5-4 is the flow diagram for this option.




FIG. 5-4. OPTION 4: NEW UNITS FOR SUPPORT DRAFT SYSTEM

## **DRAFT SYSTEM OPTION 5:**

### **SECURITY UNITS**

#### **CONCEPT**

The Security Units draft system is designed to provide additional military manpower to provide security in CONUS for military bases, ports, and other critical facilities. More draftees will be inducted than can be trained in the training base. Some extra draftees will be assigned at random to security units at CONUS installations for several weeks of security training in units. The security battalions will use obsolete weapons and equipment and will be trained by a cadre of military retirees and individual reservists. As personnel returning from overseas are assigned to the security battalions, and as training seats become available, original members of the security units may be trained for full duty. Table 5-10 lists the major characteristics of this option.

#### **APPLICATION**

This option provides security units dedicated to security missions in CONUS and the land defense of CONUS mission.<sup>5</sup>

#### **COSTS**

The peacetime costs for this option are for the additional planning required, and for the stockpiling and maintaining of the obsolete arms and equipment (rifles, uniforms, radios, and vehicles) to be used by the security battalions when they are activated. Additional mobilization costs for this option include the following: earlier setup for SSS; additional processing capability at MEPS and reception stations; cadre for organization, training, and operation of units; mission equipment for units; pay, clothing, food, housing, and support for the additional military personnel; additional personnel management system and administrative support system workload; and a larger command and control system for CONUS security.

---

<sup>5</sup>This mission involves providing physical security for key installations and providing reaction forces for protection against threats to civil security. It does not involve repulsing an invasion of the United States by the armed forces of another nation.

TABLE 5-10

## SECURITY UNITS DRAFT SYSTEM OPTION

<b>Kind of draft</b>	
<b>Type</b>	Single cohort, younger first
<b>Registrant population</b>	Males, 18 through 25
<b>Method of call</b>	Random lottery
<b>Pre-processing action</b>	Registration
<b>Order of call</b>	20-year cohort; 21; 22; 23; 24; 25; 19
<b>Accession standards</b>	
<b>Medical</b>	General
<b>Mental</b>	AFQT > 20
<b>Moral</b>	Peacetime
<b>Objective</b>	Physically capable of duty
<b>Training strategy</b>	
<b>Recruit training</b>	<i>Unit training</i>
<b>Skill training</b>	<i>Unit training</i>
<b>Concept</b>	<i>Training for security duties</i>
<b>Assignment limitations</b>	<i>Limited duty</i>

**BENEFITS**

This draft system option will provide a significant number of military personnel trained to perform security missions in CONUS. These security units will provide forces not now included in wartime manpower requirements for this mission. This option involves little peacetime cost for planning, but it will entail significant additional cost upon mobilization. It provides a hedge against having insufficient resources to meet a threat to domestic security once the existing units have been deployed into theaters of operations. Finally, it provides a pool of already-inducted military personnel for assignment to the training base as seats become available.

The number of troops required for the security mission is not known, but about 250 security battalions with 800 personnel each would utilize about 200,000 additional draftees. The estimated capacity of the Security Units option is shown in Table 5-11.

**TABLE 5-11****CAPACITY OF SECURITY UNITS DRAFT SYSTEM**

Number of additional inductees	Initial delivery to bases	Completed delivery
200,000	M + 30	M + 90

**IMPLEMENTATION DIFFICULTIES****Political**

This option can be implemented under the present law.<sup>6</sup> Congress would have to be consulted and informally approve this option. The concept of security battalions for an evidently important mission is likely to obtain the necessary approval since there is little peacetime cost.

**Organizational**

Authorization of the Security Units draft system would require a major change to DoD policy. The Army and Navy are likely to favor this option. The Coast Guard will favor the option for its port security mission. The Marine Corps and Air Force may not find this option necessary for their own security missions. FORSCOM, in all likelihood, would have to assume major responsibility for execution of the option.

**EVALUATION**

The Security Units draft system option can provide appropriately trained security battalions for the very important land defense of CONUS mission, which is now undermanned. Members of the security battalions will meet the general medical standards for full duty and will be representative in mental ability. If necessary, these military personnel could be sent back to the training base to qualify for full duty. The security battalions can be used also as units to receive returned, wounded military personnel who are no longer fit for combat but can still contribute to the war

---

<sup>6</sup>Except for Section 17(c) of the MSSA [so U.S.C. App. 467(c)]. Section 17(c) is the peacetime against implementation of the draft. The rescinding of this provision is one of those actions that will be proposed in the event of hostilities or similar emergency.

effort. This option provides much wartime benefit for little peacetime cost. Figure 5-5 is the flow diagram for this option.




FIG. 5-5. OPTION 5: SECURITY UNITS DRAFT SYSTEM

## DRAFT SYSTEM OPTION 6: SINGLE-COHORT SKILLS DRAFT

### CONCEPT

The Single-Cohort Skills Draft system is designed to provide skilled military personnel for immediate assignment to military installations. The oldest age cohort will be called first, to collect a higher proportion of usable skills than is present in the youngest cohort. More draftees will be inducted than can be trained in the training base. Draftees with needed skills will be assigned directly to existing work centers at military installations after 1 week of orientation. They may be reassigned later to the training base to be qualified for full duty. Table 5-12 lists the major characteristics of this option.

TABLE 5-12

SINGLE-COHORT SKILLS DRAFT SYSTEM OPTION

Kind of draft	
Type	<i>Single cohort, older first</i>
Registrant population	Males, 18 through 25
Method of call	Random lottery
Pre-processing action	Registration
Order of call	<i>25-year cohort; 24; 23; 22; 21; 20; 19</i>
Accession standards	
Medical	General
Mental	AFQT > 20
Moral	Peacetime
Objective	Physically capable of duty
Training strategy	
Recruit training	<i>1-week orientation</i>
Skill training	<i>OJT</i>
Concept	<i>Reinforcement of current skills</i>
Assignment limitations	<i>Limited duty</i>



## **APPLICATION**

This option provides skilled workers rapidly for short-term assignment to military bases.

## **COSTS**

The only peacetime cost for this option is for the additional planning.<sup>7</sup> Additional mobilization costs for this option include the following: additional processing capability at MEPS and reception stations; instructors, facilities, and equipment for the orientation; command and control cadre for the new military units; pay, clothing, food, housing, and support for the additional military personnel; supervision of OJT; and additional personnel management system and administrative support system workload. Some of these costs would be offset by not having to hire and pay civilian employees.

## **BENEFITS**

This draft system option will provide a significant number of high-quality military personnel with civilian-acquired skills to work at military installations until additional skilled civilians can be hired. While the option involves some peacetime cost for planning, it will have only limited additional cost upon mobilization since the military personnel will be filling approved wartime positions. It provides a hedge against not being able to attract new civilian hires, particularly at remote locations. Finally, it provides a pool of already-inducted military personnel for assignment to the training base as seats become available. These draftees could be used to offset about one-third of the projected new civilian hires. That estimate is reflected in Table 5-13, which shows the general capacity of this draft system option.

---

<sup>7</sup>Drafting individuals with usable skills implies the ability to assign the draftees to positions requiring those skills. There is presently no information system providing real-time mobilization demand information describing civilian positions but coded by military specialty. This system should be established if this option is to be executed.

**TABLE 5-13**

**CAPACITY OF SINGLE-COHORT SKILLS DRAFT SYSTEM**

Number of additional inductees	Initial delivery to bases	Completed delivery
100,000	M + 14	M + 90

**IMPLEMENTATION DIFFICULTIES**

**Political**

This option can be implemented under the present law.<sup>8</sup> Congress would have to be consulted and approve this option. Calling the older members of the registrant pool first may incur opposition from the public and Congress.

**Organizational**

Adoption of the Single-Cohort Skills Draft system would require major changes to DoD and SSS policy and regulations. The armed forces are likely to accept this option which is similar to peacetime lateral-entry programs for skilled volunteers. Since these people would be substituting only temporarily for civilian employees, the unions and the civilian personnel system may not object strenuously. Representatives of the ground forces may object to taking the older 25-year olds before the younger 20-year olds for combat replacement duties.

**EVALUATION**

The Single-Cohort Skills Draft system can provide a substantial number of military personnel with civilian-acquired skills who could be placed rapidly into mobilization positions at military installations. These personnel will meet the general medical standards for full-duty and will be representative in mental ability. As installation workload decreases or civilian new hires come aboard, these military personnel could be sent to the training base to qualify for full duty. These personnel will free full-duty military personnel to serve overseas. This option provides much

---

<sup>8</sup>Except for Section 17(c) of the MSSA [50 U.S.C. App. 467(c)]. Section 17(c) is the peacetime prohibition against implementation of the draft. The rescinding of this provision is one of those actions that will be proposed in the event of hostilities or similar emergency.

wartime benefit for little peacetime cost. Figure 5-6 is the flow diagram for this option.




FIG. 5-6. OPTION 6: SINGLE-COHORT SKILLS DRAFT SYSTEM

## DRAFT SYSTEM OPTION 7: MORE AGES – MORE SKILLS

### CONCEPT

The More Ages – More Skills draft system is designed to provide skilled manpower. Registrants from all seven cohorts will be called simultaneously to obtain a rich mix of skills. Registrants who meet the intermediate medical standards but not the general medical standards will be inducted into military service in a special “limited service” status. After 1 week of orientation training, they will be assigned directly to CONUS military installations. They will use civilian-acquired skills at these installations for the duration of the war. Table 5-14 summarizes the major characteristics of this option.

TABLE 5-14

THE MORE AGES – MORE SKILLS DRAFT SYSTEM OPTION

<b>Kind of draft</b>	
Type	<i>Multiple cohort</i>
Registrant population	Males, 18 – 25
Method of call	Random lottery
Pre-processing action	Registration
Order of call	<i>19 – 25-year cohorts simultaneously</i>
<b>Accession standards</b>	
Medical	<i>Intermediate</i>
Mental	AFQT > 20
Moral	Peacetime
Objective	<i>Capable of CONUS duty</i>
<b>Training strategy</b>	
Recruit training	<i>1-week orientation</i>
Skill training	<i>OJT</i>
Concept	<i>Reinforce civilian skills</i>
<b>Assignment limitations</b>	<i>Limited service</i>

## **APPLICATION**

This option provides skilled workers rapidly for permanent assignment to military installations.

## **COSTS**

The only peacetime cost for this option would be the additional planning.<sup>9</sup> Additional mobilization costs for this option include the following: earlier setup for SSS; additional processing capability at MEPS and reception stations; instructors, facilities, and equipment for the orientation; command and control cadre for the new military units; pay, clothing, food, facilities, and support for the additional military personnel; some supervision of OJT; and additional personnel management system and administrative support systems workload. Some of these costs would be offset by not having to hire and pay civilian employees.

## **BENEFITS**

This draft system option will provide a significant number of military personnel who do not meet general medical standards to work at military installations for the duration of the war. The option makes good use of a group that otherwise would be rejected for military service. It inducts seven age cohorts of draftees with a richer mix of skills and more job experience than the youngest cohort alone has. It frees up other military personnel who are fully deployable. While the option involves some peacetime cost for planning, it will have only limited additional cost upon mobilization, since the military personnel will be filling approved wartime positions.

This option provides a hedge against not being able to attract new civilian hires, particularly at remote locations. If 100,000 draftees were inducted for this option, about one-third of the civilian new hire requirement would be satisfied. Table 5-15 shows the estimated capacity of this option.

---

<sup>9</sup>Drafting individuals with usable skills implies the ability to assign the draftees to positions requiring those skills. There is presently no information system providing real-time mobilization demand information describing civilian positions but coded by military specialty. This system should be established if this option is to be executed.

TABLE 5-15

## CAPACITY OF MORE AGES – MORE SKILLS DRAFT SYSTEM

Number of additional inductees	Initial delivery to bases	Completed delivery
100,000	M + 14	M + 180

**IMPLEMENTATION DIFFICULTIES****Political**

This option can be implemented under the present law. Congress would have to be consulted and approve this option. Inducting marginally qualified registrants who do not meet general medical standards but are selected for their skills may incur opposition from the public and Congress.

**Organizational**

Adoption of the More Ages – More Skills draft system would require major changes to DoD and SSS policy. The intermediate medical standards would have to be defined. Jobs suitable for this substandard group would have to be identified.

The armed forces are likely to greet this draft system option with mixed views. The Marine Corps and Coast Guard, both smaller armed forces with traditions of quality, may oppose having members who are less than fully qualified medically. Since the Air Force is highly dependent on technical skills; it may welcome the opportunity. The Army and Navy are likely to agree reluctantly.

Since these personnel will be assigned to their positions for the duration of the war, the civilian personnel system and the unions may oppose execution of the option because it would reduce the number of positions for civilian employees.

**EVALUATION**

The More Ages – More Skills draft system option can provide a substantial number of military personnel with civilian-acquired skills who can be placed rapidly into mobilization positions at military installations. Although these personnel will

meet only the intermediate medical standards, they will be representative in mental ability. They will provide increasingly valuable service on long-term assignments. This option will make good use of people who otherwise would be disqualified. The establishment of a limited service status also creates an organizational structure for the effective utilization of returning, wounded veterans. This option provides much wartime benefit for little peacetime cost. Figure 5-7 is the flow diagram for this option.






FIG. 5-7. OPTION 7: MORE AGES - MORE SKILLS DRAFT SYSTEM

## DRAFT SYSTEM OPTION 8: CLASSIC DRAFT-FOR-SKILL

### CONCEPT

The Classic Draft-for-Skill draft system is designed to provide skilled manpower. Registrants with specific skills will be called simultaneously for induction from all cohorts in the registrant pool, and those meeting the general medical standards will be inducted into military service. After 1 week of orientation training, they will be assigned directly to work centers at CONUS bases and depots. They will receive OJT to refresh and expand their civilian-acquired skills. These personnel may receive standard military training later. Table 5-16 lists the major characteristics of this option.

TABLE 5-16

CLASSIC DRAFT-FOR-SKILL DRAFT SYSTEM OPTION

<b>Kind of draft</b>	
Type	<i>Multiple cohort</i>
Registrant population	Males, 18 – 25
Method of call	<i>Selective skill</i>
Pre-processing action	<i>Registration and pre-induction screening</i>
Order of call	19 – 25 year cohorts simultaneously
<b>Accession standards</b>	
Medical	General
Mental	AFQT > 20
Moral	Peacetime
Objective	Physically capable of duty
<b>Training strategy</b>	
Recruit training	<i>1-week orientation</i>
Skill training	<i>OJT</i>
Concept	<i>Refresh civilian skill</i>
<b>Assignment limitations</b>	<i>Limited duty</i>

## **APPLICATION**

This option provides personnel having specific skills rapidly for assignment to military installations.

## **COSTS**

Peacetime costs for this option include more than just planning. There would be appreciable costs in conducting a pre-induction screening program on a continuing basis to assure that the skill data are current. Costs would be incurred also for an information system to identify and quantify demand for significant skill groups so that appropriate skill-based orders may be placed with SSS upon mobilization. Additional costs upon mobilization include the following: early setup by SSS; additional processing capability at SSS, MEPS, and reception stations; instructors, facilities, and equipment for the orientation; command and control cadre for the new military units; pay, clothing, food, facilities, and support for the additional military personnel; supervision of OJT; and additional personnel management system and administrative support systems workload. Some of these costs may be offset by not having to hire and pay civilian employees.

## **BENEFITS**

This draft system option will provide precise numbers of inductees needed with specific civilian-acquired skills to work at military installations as substitutes for skilled civilians who cannot be hired through the new hire process. This option involves appreciable peacetime cost for planning and pre-induction screening, but it will have only limited additional cost upon mobilization. In effect, the option facilitates the matching of demand and supply for particular skills.

This option provides a hedge against not being able to attract new civilian hires, particularly at remote locations. It provides a pool of military personnel with specific skills to receive standard training as seats become available. It is difficult to estimate DoD demand for specific skills, but utilization of 100,000 skilled draftees would meet about one-third of the demand for civilian new hires. The estimated capacity of this option is shown in Table 5-17.

TABLE 5-17

## CAPACITY OF CLASSIC DRAFT-FOR-SKILL DRAFT SYSTEM

Number of additional inductees	Initial delivery to bases	Completed delivery
100,000	M + 14	M + 180

## IMPLEMENTATION DIFFICULTIES

**Political**

This option will require a major revision to the current draft law. A selective call based on existing skills is very different from the current draft system, which relies on calling everyone in a "random" manner. The lottery sequence method of call is perceived to be fair. The selective skill method of call is certain to be perceived as unfair. However, there is precedent for this kind of draft system in the health professionals draft discussed and approved by the Congress for planning purposes.

A law covering all skills in general might be difficult to obtain. It would be easier to obtain approval to draft specific skill groups for which there is a wartime shortfall. Using the health professional draft as a precedent, it may be possible to enact similar legislation for civil engineering, railway operations, or other skills with projected shortages.

**Organizational**

Adoption of the Classic Draft-for-Skill draft system would require major changes to DoD and SSS policy. The armed forces are likely to accept this option, which would provide skilled persons to offset some shortages that now appear intractable. Since using this option would allow skill training conducted in the training base to be reduced significantly, the armed forces might become enthusiastic about this opportunity to put more resources into training combat skills.

Since these people would be replacing potential new civilian employees, the unions and the civilian personnel system will probably object.

## EVALUATION

The Classic Draft-for-Skill draft system should be able to provide the required number of personnel with particular civilian-acquired skills, who could be placed rapidly into specific mobilization positions in units or at military installations. These military personnel will meet the general medical standards for full duty and will be representative in mental ability. As installation workload decreases or civilian new hires come aboard, these military personnel can be sent back to the training base to qualify for full duty. In the early days of mobilization, they also will free full-duty military personnel to serve as replacements overseas. This option provides much wartime benefit, but there will also be significant peacetime cost. Establishing this kind of draft in law during peacetime, even as a wartime standby, will be difficult. Figure 5-8 is the flow diagram for this option.




FIG. 5-8. OPTION 8: CLASSIC DRAFT-FOR-SKILL DRAFT SYSTEM

## **DRAFT SYSTEM OPTION 9: THE SEABEE DRAFT**

### **CONCEPT**

The SeaBee Draft system is designed to provide inductees to man naval construction battalions. Registrants with construction skills, as identified in preinduction screening, will be called simultaneously from all cohorts in the registrant pool. Those meeting the general medical standards will be inducted and assigned directly to Navy bases for training in newly formed units by cadres of officers and petty officers. Upon completion of 12 weeks of basic training or its equivalent, these personnel, and their battalions, are deployable. Equipment for these units will be obtained from military stocks or purchased from standard commercial sources upon mobilization. Table 5-18 lists the major characteristics of this option.

### **APPLICATION**

This option provides personnel with construction skills for assignment to naval construction battalions.

### **COSTS**

Peacetime costs for this option include planning and pre-induction screening by SSS to identify skilled registrants. Additional costs upon mobilization include the following: earlier setup by SSS; additional processing capability at SSS, MEPS, and reception stations; cadre for organization, training, and operation of units; mission equipment for units; pay, clothing, food, facilities, and support for the additional military personnel; additional administrative and support system workload. Since this draft system option fills a shortfall in the stated demand for military personnel for these units, the costs for personnel support, unit cadres, and unit mission equipment should be in the mobilization program already. These personnel will be filling authorized wartime positions.

TABLE 5-18

## THE SEABEE DRAFT SYSTEM OPTION

Kind of draft	
Type	<i>Multiple cohort</i>
Registrant population	Males, 18 – 25
Method of call	<i>Selective skill</i>
Pre-processing action	<i>Registration and pre-induction screening</i>
Order of call	<i>19 – 25 year cohorts simultaneously</i>
Accession standards	
Medical	General
Mental	AFQT > 20
Moral	Peacetime
Objective	Physically capable of duty
Training strategy	
Recruit training	<i>Unit training</i>
Skill training	<i>Unit training</i>
Concept	<i>Form cohesive unit</i>
Assignment limitations	Full duty after 12 weeks of training

**BENEFITS**

This draft system option should provide precise numbers of inductees with civilian-acquired construction skills to fill the Navy's shortage of about 30,000 military personnel for naval construction battalions, as shown in Table 5-19. It solves a specific military manpower problem. This option involves significant peacetime cost for planning and preinduction screening but will have only limited additional cost upon mobilization. The same approach could be used to meet other specific demands for military personnel with civilian-acquired skills.

**IMPLEMENTATION DIFFICULTIES****Political**

This option will require a major revision to the current draft law. A selective call based on skills is very different from the current draft system, which relies on calling everyone in a "random" manner. The lottery sequence method of call is



**TABLE 5-19**  
**CAPACITY OF SEABEE DRAFT SYSTEM**

Number of additional inductees	Initial delivery to bases	Completed delivery
30,000	M + 14	M + 60

perceived to be fair. The selective skill method of call is certain to be perceived as unfair. However, there is precedent for this kind of draft system in the health professionals draft discussed and approved by Congress for planning purposes. Since this option pertains to a specific wartime shortfall, it may be possible to obtain approval for drafting persons with construction skills.

### **Organizational**

Adoption of the SeaBee Draft system would require major changes to DoD and SSS policy. It would also require a system to identify and quantify demand for specialized skill groups so that appropriate skill-based orders may be placed with SSS upon mobilization.

The Navy is likely to accept this option, which offers a solution to one of its major mobilization problems. It is possible that the other armed forces may object to having this system for the Navy only. The Air Force, for example, might want a similar program for its Red Horse squadrons. Since these new draftees would be filling military positions, the government employee unions and the civilian personnel system will not object.

The construction industry and construction workers' unions may object to being singled out for special attention in the wartime draft. Since construction skills will be both in short supply and increased demand during mobilization, other claimants for construction resources may object to having the Navy take a large number of these persons out of the general labor pool.

### **EVALUATION**

The SeaBee Draft system should provide the precise number of personnel with construction skills to meet the Navy's requirement for additional construction

battalions. It will do this in a reasonable time so that the new construction battalions will be available in the United States after about M+60 days and available for deployment after 12 weeks of training of their members. The unit "train-and-retain" training strategy will provide cohesive and useful units, depending on the abilities of the cadres and commanders. These personnel will meet the general medical standards for full duty and will be representative in mental ability. This option provides much wartime benefit, but there will also be significant peacetime cost. Establishing this kind of draft in law during peacetime, even as a wartime standby, will be difficult. Figure 5-9 is the flow diagram for this option.




FIG. 5-9. OPTION 9: THE SEABEE DRAFT SYSTEM

## **DRAFT SYSTEM OPTION 10: CONUS HEALTH CARE DRAFT**

### **CONCEPT**

The CONUS Health Care Draft system option is designed to provide skilled health care workers, both as officers and enlisted personnel.<sup>10</sup> Male and female registrants with health care skills will be called simultaneously from all cohorts in an expanded registrant pool. After 1 week of orientation, they will be sent directly to CONUS medical facilities for work. There, they will augment existing staffs; in some cases their presence will free incumbent military people for deployment. Those draftees who meet general medical standards will serve in a limited-duty status until they qualify for full duty. Those who do not meet general medical standards will be in a limited-service status. Table 5-20 lists the major characteristics of this option.

### **APPLICATION**

This option provides personnel having health care skills for assignment to military medical facilities in CONUS.

### **COSTS**

Peacetime costs for this option include planning and a program by SSS to identify and register persons with health care skills. Additional costs upon mobilization include the following: earlier setup by SSS; additional processing capability at SSS, MEPS, and reception stations; instructors, facilities, and equipment for the orientation; pay, clothing, food, facilities, and support for the additional military personnel; some supervision of OJT; equipment and supplies to perform work at medical facilities; and additional personnel management and administrative support systems workload. Since these personnel will be filling authorized wartime positions,

---

<sup>10</sup>Men and women with all needed health care skills are to be drafted in the execution of this option. Those commonly called "health care professionals" (e.g. doctors, nurses, and dentists) will be commissioned after entering one of the armed forces. The other draftees brought in under this option will serve in enlisted grades as health care technicians of various types.

TABLE 5-20

## CONUS HEALTH CARE DRAFT SYSTEM OPTION

<b>Kind of draft</b>	
<b>Type</b>	<i>Multiple cohort</i>
<b>Registrant population</b>	<i>Males and females, 18 – 35</i>
<b>Method of call</b>	<i>Selective skill</i>
<b>Pre-processing action</b>	<i>Registration and pre-induction screening</i>
<b>Order of call</b>	<i>19 – 35-year cohorts simultaneously</i>
<b>Accession standards</b>	
<b>Medical</b>	<i>Intermediate</i>
<b>Mental</b>	<i>AFQT &gt; 20</i>
<b>Moral</b>	<i>Peacetime</i>
<b>Objective</b>	<i>Capable of work in CONUS</i>
<b>Training strategy</b>	
<b>Recruit training</b>	<i>1-week orientation</i>
<b>Skill training</b>	<i>OJT</i>
<b>Concept</b>	<i>Learn military medicine</i>
<b>Assignment limitations</b>	<i>Limited duty or limited service</i>

the costs for personnel support and mission equipment should already be included in the mobilization program.

## BENEFITS

This draft system option will provide inductees with civilian-acquired health care skills to fill the needs of DoD for military health care personnel in CONUS medical facilities. This option involves significant peacetime cost but will have limited additional cost upon mobilization. Utilization of 50,000 of these personnel will meet a large part of the health care workload in CONUS and free some full-duty military personnel for deployment. The estimated capacity of this draft system option is shown in Table 5-21.

TABLE 5-21

## CAPACITY OF CONUS HEALTH CARE DRAFT SYSTEM

Number of additional inductees	Initial delivery to bases	Completed delivery
50,000	M + 14	M + 30

## IMPLEMENTATION DIFFICULTIES

## Political

Something like the option presented here has already been suggested by the Congress for planning purposes. Properly constituted, a health care draft system should not only be approved but may also provide precedent for other forms of specialized skill drafts for wartime. Although a selective skill method of call is perceived as unfair in general, it may not be perceived as unfair for health care professionals. It should be pointed out, for example, that the general principle of drafting women has been accepted already – at least by the Congress – for a health professional draft. Given the acceptance of a draft for this particular set of skilled personnel, expanding the concept to other skills may be possible.

## Organizational

The present version of the health professional draft has already been accepted by OSD and the armed forces. Extending the draft to obtain other health care personnel is also likely to be accepted. Since these health care specialists would be filling military positions, the unions and the civilian personnel system will not object.

The CONUS Health Care Draft system option does require a system to identify and quantify demand for significant skill groups so that appropriate skill-based orders may be placed with SSS upon mobilization. It also requires a method of identifying in advance those personnel with the necessary skills. The present approach relies heavily on voluntary cooperation by health care specialty societies to identify members. This approach is weighted toward the officer skills – doctors and nurses primarily. It may not be feasible for enlisted health care skills.

## EVALUATION

The CONUS Health Care Draft system can provide significant numbers of enlisted personnel with health care skills to help meet DoD's demands for military health care personnel. It would provide additional skilled men and women for CONUS installations to do work and also to release for deployment active duty health care personnel serving at those installations. Draftees meeting the general medical standards will be available for deployment after serving 12 weeks and receiving appropriate training. Those meeting only the mobilization medical standards will serve at CONUS installations for the duration of the war. This option provides much wartime benefit, but there will also be significant peacetime cost. Congress has already approved this draft system option idea. Discerning the best way to implement the option may be a difficult task for SSS and OSD. Figure 5-10 is the flow diagram for this option.




FIG. 5-10. OPTION 10: CONUS HEALTH CARE DRAFT SYSTEM



## DRAFT SYSTEM OPTION 11: MILITARY VETERAN DRAFT

### CONCEPT

The Military Veteran Draft system is designed to recall persons with prior military service who have fulfilled their statutory Military Service Obligation and are neither members of the Ready Reserve nor retired from military service. They will be called according to their military skills. These personnel are already trained and qualified for deployment, but their skills may have eroded. They will be sent to training centers for refresher training and then assigned as replacements or to positions in support installations where they will release other military personnel for deployment. Table 5-22 lists the major characteristics of this option.

TABLE 5-22

MILITARY VETERAN DRAFT SYSTEM OPTION

<b>Kind of draft</b>	
<b>Type</b>	<i>Multiple cohort</i>
<b>Registrant population</b>	<i>Males and females, 26 – 44</i>
<b>Method of call</b>	<i>Selective skill</i>
<b>Pre-processing action</b>	<i>Screening military records</i>
<b>Order of call</b>	<i>26 – 44-year cohorts simultaneously</i>
<b>Accession standards</b>	
<b>Medical</b>	<i>Intermediate</i>
<b>Mental</b>	<i>Not applicable</i>
<b>Moral</b>	<i>Wartime</i>
<b>Objective</b>	<i>Physically capable of duty</i>
<b>Training strategy</b>	
<b>Recruit training</b>	<i>None</i>
<b>Skill training</b>	<i>Refresher course at training center</i>
<b>Concept</b>	<i>Update previous military skill</i>
<b>Assignment limitations</b>	<i>Full duty</i>

## **APPLICATION**

This option provides personnel with military skills for assignment to military units and facilities in CONUS or overseas.

## **COSTS**

The peacetime costs of this option include planning and prescreening by DoD and SSS. DoD would have to establish a system to identify veterans by their skills. SSS would have to establish a system to register and call veterans for induction. Additional costs upon mobilization include the following: earlier setup by SSS; additional processing capability at SSS, MEPS, and reception stations; instructors, facilities, and equipment for the refresher training; pay, clothing, food, facilities, and other support for the additional military personnel; and additional personnel management and administrative support systems workload. These personnel will fill authorized wartime positions, and the cost of their support and equipment should be in the mobilization program already.

## **BENEFITS**

This draft system option will provide significant numbers of veterans with military skills to meet the needs of the armed forces for replacements and fillers for force units. It solves a specific military manpower problem. Availability of these veterans between M+40 and M+100 could bridge the gap between pretrained individual manpower and newly trained draftees from the standard training programs. This option involves significant peacetime cost for planning and preinduction screening, but it will have only limited additional cost upon mobilization.

About 80,000 of these veterans could be utilized to meet demands from the time that the supply of pretrained individual manpower is exhausted until newly trained recruits emerge from the training base in large numbers. The estimated capacity of this option is shown in Table 5-23.

## **IMPLEMENTATION DIFFICULTIES**

### **Political**

It will be very difficult to obtain approval for this option either from Congress or from the public. Subjecting veterans to "double jeopardy" by drafting them for a

TABLE 5-23

## CAPACITY OF MILITARY VETERAN DRAFT SYSTEM

Number of additional inductees	Initial delivery to bases	Completed delivery
80,000	M + 40	M + 100

second tour of military service will be perceived as unfair, particularly in wartime. Veterans groups can be expected to resist this idea with vigor unless there is widespread public recognition of the threat and the urgency of mobilization.

### Organizational

The concept of a veterans draft would be accepted by OSD, the Army, and the Marine Corps if it were first found to be politically acceptable. The Army has tried several times to find a way to obtain the services of these veterans in wartime, either voluntarily or by means of a wartime draft.

Of course, veterans who have completed their Military Service Obligation but are ineligible for military retirement may be difficult to find. In all probability they will not have registered for the draft, and locator information will not have been filed in any of the large military personnel databases that are updated routinely. How then can they be located and summoned for service? In the very worst case, their military records will be held at the National Personnel Records Center in St. Louis, Missouri. The Center is an agency of the Archivist of the United States. Beginning with that file, veteran searches can be undertaken and the veterans draft begun.

There is some sentiment in DoD that holds that the nation would not hesitate to draft veterans if the war were going badly. It is not clear whether the nation would contemplate drafting veterans *until* the war is going badly. Even planning for a veteran draft system would likely be politically unacceptable.

### EVALUATION

The Military Veteran Draft is a way to help offset the serious shortfall projected for military and combat skills in the Army. It may be the only way to do that in the first three months of a war. It also could help with projected shortfalls of lesser

magnitude for the Air Force and Navy. And it would provide experienced personnel to help form the cadres for some of the other draft system options. In addition, however, it would place a further demand on the already overloaded military training base. The attitude of the veterans who are drafted would depend in large part on the nature and progress of the war. This option has much merit. It also has problems in obtaining approval even for planning. Figure 5-11 is the flow diagram for this option.




FIG. 5-11. OPTION 11: MILITARY VETERAN DRAFT SYSTEM

## DRAFT SYSTEM OPTION 12: COMPREHENSIVE DRAFT

### CONCEPT

The Comprehensive Draft system is designed to meet most of DoD's demands for wartime military manpower. SSS will call various groups simultaneously according to skill, age, and physical condition. Men and women with skills will be drafted for specialties in short supply. Young, physically fit males will be drafted as combat fillers and replacements. Marginally qualified persons of both sexes will be drafted for permanent support of CONUS bases. The training strategy for each draftee will depend on the intended utilization of that inductee. Table 5-24 lists the major characteristics of this option.

TABLE 5-24

COMPREHENSIVE DRAFT SYSTEM OPTION

<b>Kind of draft</b>	
<b>Type</b>	<i>Multiple-cohort</i>
<b>Registrant population</b>	<i>Males and females, 19 – 25</i>
<b>Method of call</b>	<i>Selective skill and random lottery</i>
<b>Pre-processing action</b>	<i>Registration and pre-induction screening</i>
<b>Order of call</b>	<i>19 – 25-year cohorts simultaneously</i>
<b>Accession standards</b>	
<b>Medical</b>	<i>Minimum</i>
<b>Mental</b>	<i>AFQT &gt; 9</i>
<b>Moral</b>	<i>Wartime</i>
<b>Objective</b>	<i>Service during war</i>
<b>Training strategy</b>	
<b>Recruit training</b>	<i>Variable, depending on skill and quality</i>
<b>Skill training</b>	<i>Variable, depending on skill and quality</i>
<b>Concept</b>	<i>Train for intended assignment</i>
<b>Assignment limitations</b>	<i>Variable, depending on medical condition</i>

## **APPLICATION**

This option provides a variety of personnel to meet a variety of DoD demands.

## **COSTS**

The peacetime costs of this option include planning, preinduction screening by SSS, a billet-driven information system to match individual draftees with specific positions, and a command and control structure to manage the flow and allocation of wartime draftees to various applications. Additional costs upon mobilization include all of the costs enumerated for previous draft system options. Many of these costs are already in DoD's mobilization plan and program, and the others should be included, since all of them meet legitimate requirements for war.

## **BENEFITS**

This draft system will provide the numbers and kinds of new military personnel needed by DoD to meet most of the demands of the armed forces. It provides DoD a positive management mechanism to control the flow of new inductees to meet billet-driven demand. It will allow DoD to avoid both excesses and shortfalls. This option gives DoD the ability to fill mobilization positions with either military personnel or civilian employees as appropriate. The additional military personnel can be brought into service rapidly to fill wartime positions temporarily or permanently. Although this option involves significant peacetime costs, it provides a significant advantage during mobilization.

The current demand for wartime draftees is 650,000 by M+180 days. To provide for some of the understated demands discussed earlier, and to substitute for about one-third of the civilian new hires, another 150,000 draftees will be required. The estimated demand would total about 800,000 for the first 180 days of a mobilization. The estimated capacity of this option is shown in Table 5-25.

## **IMPLEMENTATION DIFFICULTIES**

### **Political**

It will be difficult to obtain approval for the Comprehensive Draft from Congress or the public. This draft system covers many different groups of prospective draftees, and each group may object on behalf of its own members, while agreeing, perhaps, that others should go. It is a complicated system, and Congress may not be

**TABLE 5-25****CAPACITY OF COMPREHENSIVE WARTIME DRAFT SYSTEM**

Number of inductees	Initial delivery	Completed delivery
800,000 +	M + 14	As necessary

ready to approve it for that reason alone. It will also be difficult to obtain approval for drafting women.

**Organizational**

The concept of a Comprehensive Draft should meet approval in principle in OSD and in the armed forces. Implementation would be difficult, however, because this is a complex idea whose realization would require substantial agreement and cooperation among the DoD components. It would require a complete revision of DoD and SSS policies and procedures with respect to manpower mobilization. It would also require establishing a sophisticated information system with detailed data from the armed forces made available to OSD and SSS.

**EVALUATION**

The Comprehensive Draft is an excellent way to meet the needs of the nation for wartime military manpower. It provides positive control so that the right kinds and numbers of people can be obtained to meet the actual demands. In this sense, it can be highly efficient. It requires, however, a good set of demand estimates by skill group and a good information system to match people with skills before they are called for induction processing. This is simple in concept but difficult to accomplish in practice. Significant peacetime costs would be associated with the Comprehensive Draft system. These costs could be limited by preparing a standby package to be implemented at some defined stage of mobilization. The Comprehensive Draft could be useful as an overall framework into which other, lesser draft system options could fit. Figure 5-12 is the flow diagram for this option and for Option 13.






FIG. 5-12. OPTIONS 12 AND 13: COMPREHENSIVE AND TOTAL DRAFT SYSTEMS

## DRAFT SYSTEM OPTION 13: TOTAL DRAFT

### CONCEPT

The Total Draft system is like the Comprehensive Draft system except that the registrant pool is increased to cover ages 18 to 44 inclusive. This system provides DoD maximum flexibility to draft the kinds and numbers of people it wants to meet wartime manpower requirements. Men and women with particular skills, ages, medical condition, or mental aptitude are drafted and provided training tailored to their specific applications. The Total Draft system provides DoD a positive management method for meeting all mobilization manpower demands. Table 5-26 lists the major characteristics of this option.

TABLE 5-26

TOTAL DRAFT SYSTEM OPTION

Kind of draft	
Type	<i>Multiple cohort</i>
Registrant population	<i>Males and females, 18 – 44</i>
Method of call	<i>Selective skill</i>
Pre-processing action	<i>Registration and pre-induction screening</i>
Order of call	<i>18 – 44 -year cohorts simultaneously</i>
Accession standards	
Medical	<i>Minimum</i>
Mental	<i>AFQT &gt; 9</i>
Moral	<i>Wartime</i>
Objective	<i>Service during war</i>
Training strategy	
Recruit training	<i>Variable, depending on skill and quality</i>
Skill training	<i>Variable, depending on skill and quality</i>
Concept	<i>Train for intended assignment</i>
Assignment limitations	<i>Variable, depending on medical condition</i>

## APPLICATION

This option provides a variety of personnel to meet a variety of DoD demands.

## COSTS

The peacetime costs of this option include planning, preinduction screening by SSS, a billet-driven information system to match draftees with positions, and a command and control structure to manage the flow and allocation of wartime draftees to various applications. Additional costs upon mobilization include all of the costs enumerated for previous draft system options. Many of these costs are already in DoD's mobilization plan and program, and the others should be included since all of them meet legitimate requirements for war.

## BENEFITS

This draft system option should be able to provide the numbers and kinds of new military manpower needed by DoD to meet all of the demands of the armed forces. It provides DoD a positive management mechanism to control the flow of new inductees to meet billet-driven demand. It will allow DoD to avoid both excesses and shortfalls. This option gives DoD the ability to fill mobilization positions with either military personnel or civilian employees as appropriate. The additional military personnel can be brought into service rapidly to fill wartime positions temporarily or permanently. Although this option involves significant peacetime costs, it provides a significant advantage during mobilization.

The estimated capacity of this option is the same as for the Comprehensive Draft system and is shown in Table 5-27.

TABLE 5-27

### CAPACITY OF TOTAL DRAFT SYSTEM

Number of inductees	Initial delivery	Completed delivery
800,000 +	M + 14	As necessary

## **IMPLEMENTATION DIFFICULTIES**

### **Political**

It will be difficult to obtain approval for the Total Draft from Congress or the public. This draft system will meet the same objections as the Comprehensive Draft, including the objection to drafting women. Since it includes older people in the registrant pool, it will generate opposition also from this older group. It is just possible, however, that such a total approach could gain the support of members of Congress who understand the importance of mobilization preparedness. This is the kind of draft that would be adopted if a war were going badly.

### **Organizational**

Implementation of the Total Draft system would require a complete revision of DoD and SSS policies and procedures with respect to manpower mobilization. It would also require establishing a sophisticated information system with detailed data from the armed forces made available to OSD and SSS.

The Total Draft system is likely to have approval in principle in OSD and the armed forces. The implementation would be difficult, however, because the Total Draft is a complex idea whose realization would require substantial agreement and cooperation among the DoD components.

## **EVALUATION**

The Total Draft is the best way to meet the needs of the nation for wartime military manpower. It has the same good features as the Comprehensive Draft, and it provides access to older people with more experience and skills. It also requires a good set of demand estimates by skill group and a good information system to match people with skills before they are called for induction processing. Significant peacetime costs would be associated with the Total Draft. It would be useful to prepare a standby Total Draft package to be implemented at some defined stage of mobilization. The Total Draft could be useful as a goal and an overall framework into which other, less comprehensive draft system options could fit. The flow diagram for the Total Draft system is the same as that shown in Figure 5-12. All the options are summarized in Table 5-28.

**TABLE 5-28**  
**SUMMARY OF OPTIONS FOR EXPANDING THE USE OF DRAFTEES**

Option	Draft type <sup>a</sup>	Sex	Ages	Standards <sup>b</sup>	Type training <sup>c</sup>	Served <sup>d</sup>	Application type
1. Current Draft System	SCYF	M	19-25	High	Full	FD	Fillers and replacements
2. Fort Swampy Surge	SCYF	M	19-25	High	Short	LD	Temporary support activities
3. The Long Haul	SCYF	M	19-25	Modified	Short	LS	Long-term support activities
4. New Units for Support	SCYF	M	19-25	High	Unit	LD	Temporary support activities
5. Security Units	SCYF	M	19-25	High	Unit	LD	Base and domestic security
6. Single-Cohort Skills Draft	SCOF	M	19-25	High	Short	LD	Support activities
7. More Ages - More Skills	MCR	M	19-25	Modified	Short	LS	Support activities
8. Classic Draft-for-Skill	MCS	M	19-25	High	Short	LD	Support activities
9. The SeaBee Draft	MCS	M	19-25	High	Unit	FD	Naval construction battalions
10. CONUS Health Care Draft	MCS	M/F	19-32	Low	Short	LD/LS	CONUS medical units
11. Military Veteran Draft	MCS	M/F	19-44	Low	Refr	FD	Replacements with military skills
12. Comprehensive Draft	MCS	M/F	19-25	Modified	Full	FD	Fillers and replacements
				Modified	Short	LD	Temporary support activities
				Modified	Unit	LD	Base and domestic security
				Low	Short	LS	Support activities
13. Total Draft	MCS	M/F	18-44	Modified	Full	FD	Fillers and replacements
				Modified	Short	LD	Temporary support activities
				Modified	Unit	LD	Base and domestic security
				Low	Short	LS	Support activities

**Note:** Options 2 through 11 are intended for implementation in addition to the present draft system. Options 12 and 13 are multipurpose drafts incorporating the present draft.

<sup>a</sup> SCYF - single-cohort, younger-first; SCOF - single-cohort, older first; MCR - multiple-cohort random; MCS - multiple-cohort selective

<sup>b</sup> High - medical, mental, and moral standards approximating present peacetime standards. Modified - standards reduced somewhat from peacetime levels. Low - standards reduced substantially from peacetime levels. A specific set of standards accompanies the discussion of each draft system option

<sup>c</sup> Full - full military training qualifying incumbent for deployment; Short - a 1-week orientation providing minimum information in preparation for on-the-job training or support job using civilian experience. Unit - military training by unit (rather than training center) cadre. Refr - refresher training

<sup>d</sup> FD - full duty; LD - limited duty in support role prior to attending full military training later; LS - limited service (incumbent is not medically qualified for full military training).

## CHAPTER 6

### IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL MANPOWER POLICY

The nature of the wartime draft system has important implications for national manpower policy during mobilization. This study was focused rather narrowly on the wartime draft as a way to provide inductees for the armed forces. As a result of this restricted view, several important related considerations were left unresolved. Revision of the current wartime draft system will require addressing in addition the following three major issues:

- Meeting total national manpower demand
- Exemptions and deferments from the wartime draft
- Drafting women.

#### MEETING TOTAL NATIONAL MANPOWER DEMAND

Even in full or total mobilization, the armed forces will not be able to draft anyone or everyone they want without regard for competing claims for scarce manpower. The national labor force situation must be considered when designing a wartime draft system. In World War II, manpower was a critical – perhaps the most critical – constraint on the national war effort. In any future war, the demands of industry for labor to produce war materiel and sustain the civilian population must be met. This necessity limits the number and quality of people who can be drafted into the armed forces. Since the Military Services want most to draft highly qualified young men, the problem becomes one of quality allocation as well as a competition for quantity.

In addition to the armed forces, there are three major claimants for young men (and women) during mobilization and war:

- *Defense Industry* includes those companies and plants under contract to DoD to provide goods and services. Defense industry builds the planes, tanks, ships, missiles, and ammunition needed by the armed forces to sustain combat. Upon mobilization, these companies will surge to increase production of war materiel. This surge will be accomplished to a great extent by adding labor to go to a multishift operation and reopen some standby

production lines. The critical constraint in the initial surge may well be skilled labor for production lines. Subsequently, as plants convert from civilian to military production, still more workers will be needed. Finally, new plants will be built to produce war materiel; they will also need new workers.

Another part of defense industry provides services to military staffs and installations. Because of recent trends toward "contracting-out," many base operating functions formerly performed by military personnel or DoD employees are now being accomplished by private contractors. On many military bases, the entire food service operation is being performed by a food service contractor. On some military bases, security for the installation is provided by a private company. Many of the operations essential to the peacetime functioning of DoD are performed by defense contractors. In mobilization and wartime, the workloads for most of these contractors will increase dramatically, and they will need extra workers.

- *Civilian Industry* must continue to function in wartime to provide the goods and services needed to sustain the civilian population – including food, shelter, and transportation for the workers themselves. Large reductions in civilian goods are difficult to achieve and may cause adverse impact on morale and support for the war effort. Thus, there are practical limits on the extent to which it will be possible to move large masses of workers from civilian to military production.
- *Basic Industry* provides the raw materials, semi-finished goods, commodities, and major components for both defense industry and civilian industry. Basic industry produces steel, aluminum, microchips, composite materials, ceramics, and many other products that may be transformed into war materiel or items for civilian use. As defense industry increases its output, the required inputs from basic industry also will increase, and additional workers will be needed for basic industry.

All of these competing demands are likely to occur at a time when it will be difficult to expand the size of the work force very much. Low unemployment and widespread participation by women in the work force minimize the potential contribution of women and the unemployed to a wartime expansion of the work force. Thus, expansion of the total national labor force will have to come largely from re-entry into the work force of housewives, retired persons, immigrants, aliens, and young people. The numbers and, perhaps more important, the skills of these additional workers are unlikely to match the demands of a war economy for production-line work.

The *present* wartime draft system does not pose a major problem in this respect. Simply "skimming" the highest quality young men from the 20-year-old cohort does not deprive industry of many highly skilled people. As the number of draftees increases, and older and more experienced persons are inducted, the quality question becomes important. If the armed forces take the "best," are they also well served by having the disqualified men and women produce the war materiel? A national policy on the optimum distribution of people by skill and by qualification is needed.

A wartime draft system for full mobilization should be designed to ensure that DoD takes only a "fair share" of the total work force rather than just all the highest quality people who can be ordered to report for induction. The armed forces have fought previous wars successfully with large numbers of less qualified people. An effective national manpower mobilization policy involves careful consideration of quality standards, skills, experience, and numbers to ensure that all parts of the wartime economy function smoothly. This is a large order, but at least the wartime draft ought not contribute to the national manpower problem by simply ignoring other legitimate demands for people.

## **OCCUPATIONAL EXEMPTIONS AND DEFERMENTS**

The current wartime draft system does not provide for exemptions or deferments on the basis of civilian occupation. Even though the law permits such exemptions and deferments, there are now no plans to allow them. In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, such exemptions or deferrals were perceived as unfair, and the draft was designed to eliminate ways to avoid induction other than failure to meet accession standards or conscientious objection.

It should be noted that about 1.6 million ready reservists have been required by law to register for the draft. Upon mobilization, they will be ineligible for a draft call because of their prior obligation to serve their respective armed forces on active duty. This group exemption is likely to be the largest such action of its kind by the Selected Service System.

The current "no excuses" approach is substantially different from previous wartime draft systems in which the guiding principle was "selective service." During World War II, the local draft boards effectively determined whether the registrant's current occupation was important to the war effort. If so, an exemption was granted. If not, the person was liable for induction. Other things being equal, the bias was to



retain a person in an essential civilian job rather than draft him. Exemption was based primarily on the job, not just the qualifications of the individual. If an exempt person shifted to a nonessential job, the possibility of being drafted was reestablished. Liability for the draft was continuous. There was no concept of one-time limited liability based on the luck of the draw. The draft lottery then served only to establish the order of call for those considered available for military service because they were not working in war-supporting jobs. There were also some general classes of men who were exempt or deferred simply because of their status (as fathers) or age.

The wartime draft system options presented in this report do not include specific provisions for occupational exemptions or deferments, but any comprehensive program for management of wartime manpower can and should. Any draft system option based on other than a single-cohort, younger-first draft must have some provision for exemptions and deferments. The focus of this study was solely on how DoD could expand the use of draftees to obtain additional military personnel. The overall interests of the nation and the armed forces might not be served best, however, by a wartime draft system that ignores non-DoD demands. A selective skill draft putting all master welders in uniform would probably have great adverse impact on the production of tanks and ships. Drafting large numbers of health professionals into the armed forces might cause great problems in delivery of health care services to civilians, including key defense workers and dependents of military personnel.

It would be beneficial to have some kind of overall positive method to *manage* the manpower mobilization process. This management must include the allocation of people according to their qualifications, skills, aptitudes, and experience in a way that helps the total effort and does not create great problems in specific areas.

## **DRAFTING WOMEN**

Women comprise 10.4 percent of the peacetime armed forces. They may perform in all military specialties except direct combat. They fly aircraft, serve on ships, and work in Army divisions. They are ubiquitous, and they do good work. There is no reason to believe that they will not be able to perform equally usefully in wartime. In fact, experience during World War II in particular emphasized the value of utilizing women in military service when men were not available for all that had to be done.

The present widespread opposition to the drafting of women has many sources. Perhaps the most pervasive resistance has an emotional basis: there is genuine aversion among both males and females to the idea of exposing women to the terror, indignities, and ugly death of combat. If that were the only basis for resistance to a female draft, however, those concerns could be offset by introducing military assignments constraints into the MSSA. Opposition to drafting women also comes from those who simply do not believe that military service is morally appropriate for women, those who hold that the breeders of the race must be specially protected, those who advocate protecting the purity of women, and those females who themselves do not wish to serve in the armed forces. Whatever the source of opposition, it is difficult to justify excluding women from a wartime draft on the basis of rational manpower utilization.

If women are included in a wartime draft, it will have to be on an "as needed" basis to fill jobs not directly involved in combat. Women draftees will have to receive the kinds of training and assignments for which they are best suited. This will probably mean that fewer women will be drafted than men. Having an unequal number of draftees might lead to a perception that women are being favored in the wartime draft. However, a requirement that men and women be equally vulnerable to being drafted is foolish and would result in large numbers of excess women being drafted so that the number of men needed could be obtained. Equal treatment in the wartime draft will have to give way to utilization of each individual — man or woman — where he or she can serve the nation best within the limits of the law.

If women are not included in a wartime draft, additional numbers of them will still be needed in the wartime armed forces. It is not logical to utilize military women to do 10 percent of the work in peacetime and then to restrict the size of the group in wartime. This means at least that women will have to be allowed to volunteer for wartime service. However, having two systems for obtaining manpower for war — a draft for men and a volunteer system for women — does not make good sense from a management viewpoint.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>Relying on women volunteers instead of drafting them, however, makes good political sense. The feasibility of relying on women volunteers depends on whether enough women volunteer for wartime service. This cannot be predicted with confidence.

Discussion of national policy on how to obtain military personnel in wartime to meet DoD needs must consider the implications of omitting women from a comprehensive wartime draft. Half of the national labor force are women. Can the nation afford to neglect that half when addressing DoD's needs for military personnel in wartime? The answer to that question depends on how many women can be used and on how many would volunteer. To obtain agreement from the nation and Congress to draft women in wartime, a national need must be demonstrated. This has been done for some specialties, such as health care professionals, but not generally (except perhaps philosophically).

## **CHAPTER 7**

### **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **CONCLUSIONS**

The primary purpose of this study was to provide draft system options for expanding the use of draftees. This work has led to the following general conclusions on the overall Defense manpower mobilization system.

##### **Current Estimates of Wartime Demand for Manpower Are Inadequate**

The Wartime Manpower Planning System (WARMAPS) estimates understate DoD's real needs. Friction losses and the diversion of military labor are not considered in the current estimating process. At least one major mission – the land defense of CONUS – is not considered fully. Other major military missions may be omitted or underestimated. Civilian manpower requirements estimates, while probably not overlooking any major missions, are a source of continuing uneasiness to the very planners who accumulate and report them.

##### **Current Wartime Draft Plans Are Inappropriate**

The present wartime draft plans do not meet complete demands of a full or total mobilization. They provide insufficient flexibility for meeting a wide variety of potential mobilization demands. Current plans do not take full advantage of the provisions of the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA). They are suited only for peacetime or for a partial mobilization.

##### **Current Laws on the Wartime Draft and Manpower Mobilization Are Inadequate**

Some constraints imposed by law for peacetime use have been carried over inadvertently to wartime. Standby legislation for wartime manpower mobilization needs review and updating. The MSSA itself is out of date.

## **Separation of Military and Civilian Manpower Systems Impedes Mobilization Planning and Execution**

It is almost impossible under the current system to consider meeting civilian personnel shortfalls with military personnel or using civilians to meet military personnel shortfalls. There is no unified manpower system to establish job-related demands, which could then be met either by the military or civilian personnel supply systems as appropriate.

## **Drafting Military Personnel to Substitute for Civilian Employees Is Feasible and Advantageous**

Having a qualified person to perform necessary work is the prime consideration. Military personnel can be compelled to serve, while civilians cannot. Military personnel can be ordered to remote locations, while civilians cannot. Many positions, if coded appropriately, can be filled equally well by civilian or military personnel.

## **Information Available at the Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) for Assignment of Draftees Will Be Inadequate for an Expanded Wartime Draft System**

The current wartime draft does not emphasize matching jobs with individual skills or experience; all inductees are sent to standard training for complete skill training. The matching of civilian-acquired skills and experience with unmet demands will require real-time information at the MEPS both on the inductee and on available jobs.

## **Failure to Draft Both Men and Women Implies Inefficient Utilization of the Nation's Human Resources**

Women comprise a significant portion of the labor force. Future wartime drafts are likely to call groups of workers on the basis of skill and experience needed to meet DoD's demands. While drafting women does not imply using women in combat, they can serve usefully in most military and civilian jobs.

## **Accession Standards To Be Used During Mobilization Are Poorly Defined**

The mental, medical, and moral standards themselves are not clear, and it is not certain which standards will be applied. The policy for implementation of

mobilization standards is confusing. This situation is a barrier to effective wartime manpower planning.

### **Expanding the Use of Wartime Draftees Is Feasible and Warrants Additional Consideration**

The proposed draft system options have been reviewed from the perspectives of procedure, policy, regulation, and statute. They require additional analysis to establish dollar costs and final feasibility. The options have been described in outline, but more work is required to assess their full utility for manpower mobilization. Additional draft system options are possible. Each wartime draft system option would operate in the broader context of Defense and national manpower mobilization.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

DoD can act now to improve the Defense manpower mobilization system and provide a basis for expanding the use of draftees in wartime. The following recommendations have been grouped into major categories for ease of review and understanding:

### **Improve Estimates of Wartime Manpower Requirements**

Several specific actions should be taken:

- Include in WARMAPS demands appropriate allowances for friction and troop labor diversion
- Include in WARMAPS demands estimates of forces necessary for the land defense of CONUS
- Validate the processes used for establishing base operating support manpower for mobilization
- Revalidate DoD's wartime demand for manpower – both military and civilian – on the basis of full mobilization
- Review and improve the time-phasing of civilian manpower demand
- Restate for planning purposes DoD demands on the SSS for wartime draft deliveries of inductees.

## **Improve Plans for the Current Wartime Draft**

Even without additional authority, improvements in the plans for a wartime draft can be made:

- Determine the outer limits of options and policies permitted by the current MSSA.
- Request the SSS to collect job and experience information from current and future registrant pools.
- Prepare a plan to conduct peacetime classification of draft registrants at the discretion of the President.
- Prepare plans to upgrade the present assortment of information systems used by the Military Services to support wartime manpower planning to include a real-time, integrated (among the Services), and consolidated system that matches wartime billets with inductees. Terminals would display the information at all the MEPS. The system would include all wartime required billets.
- Consider an exemption policy to accommodate the manpower demands of industrial mobilization.
- Re-examine DoD policy on wartime volunteers in light of an expanded wartime draft system.
- Examine the concept of adopting alternative training strategies to produce more military manpower despite the constraints of the training base. Specify the minimum orientation content and time for new military recruits who are to be put to work without standard training.

## **Establish a Legislative Program to Improve the Statutory Basis for Defense Manpower Mobilization**

Several actions should be taken now to save time upon implementation of manpower mobilization measures:

- Ask Congress to remove restrictions on Mental Category IV content for wartime draft accessions
- Obtain congressional approval to solicit education and job experience information from draft registrants in peacetime at the discretion of the President

- Prepare standby legislation to authorize selected occupational deferments upon initiation of the wartime draft to allow for meeting the demands of defense industry and basic industry for skilled workers
- Prepare standby legislation to authorize drafting women upon initiation of the wartime draft
- Prepare standby legislation to authorize a selective skill draft upon initiation of the wartime draft
- Prepare a legislative proposal for a new MSSA to replace the current law with a total draft.

### **Integrate the Military and Civilian Manpower Systems**

Establish within DoD a single, unified manpower system:

- Integrate military and civilian wartime demand estimates and identify positions that may be filled by either military or civilian personnel
- Establish a wartime military-civilian personnel mix policy based on supply considerations during mobilization
- Designate mobilization positions in support activities as being suitable for military as well as civilian fill.

### **Establish a Comprehensive Policy for Accession Standards in Mobilization**

- Establish objective goals for each set of standards and enunciate the purposes to be served by applying the standards
- Establish policy for the institution of wartime standards during mobilization.

### **Institute Detailed Planning for Several of the Proposed Draft System Options**

- Prepare a detailed description and cost analysis of the Total draft system option
- Prepare a detailed description and cost analysis of the CONUS Health Care draft system option
- Perform detailed analyses of other draft system options as desired.



## GLOSSARY

Mobilization planners have developed a number of specific terms that are very useful to their work. Similarly, those planners who deal with manpower issues routinely use terms particularly useful to their work. Because of the nature of this project, we have used many mobilization terms and manpower terms – especially those related to conscription. In addition, however, we have devised terms to which we give meanings unique to this project. This glossary lists potentially confusing words and phrases related to this specific mobilization-manpower-draft project.

Age cohort	=	A group of people all born in the same year; same as cohort.
Application	=	A general area of work or potential work to be accomplished either in peacetime or wartime.
Armed forces	=	The Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. The Coast Guard is assigned to the Department of Transportation in peacetime but transfers to the Department of the Navy in wartime.
Assignment limitation	=	Work boundaries constraining the ability of an armed force to assign or reassign a military member to particular jobs, units, or locations.
Civilian employee	=	An individual appointed to a position in the Federal Civil Service.
Cohort	=	A group of people all born in the same year; same as age cohort.
Conscript	=	An individual drafted into military service; same as draftee or inductee.
Current draft system	=	The specific draft system now planned to be implemented during mobilization when authorized by Congress and ordered by the President.
DoD civilian employee	=	A civilian employee of a DoD component.

DoD components	=	The Military Departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force); the Military Services; the Defense Agencies; and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Draft	=	The process by which individuals are compelled to enter military service and join an armed force.
Draft mechanism	=	The process by which an individual is declared eligible to be drafted, identified, notified, and ordered to report for preinduction examination and processing; part of a draft system.
Draft system	=	The process of compelling an individual to join an armed force, preparing the individual, and assigning him to a job in a unit. A draft system is described by an application, kind of draft, accession standards, training strategy, and assignment limitations.
Draftee	=	An individual drafted into military service; same as a conscript or inductee.
Enlistee	=	An individual who has volunteered for military service; same as a volunteer.
Enlistment	=	The process of bringing an individual who will not be an officer into military service voluntarily.
Full mobilization	=	The process of marshalling resources to bring the entire peacetime approved force structure to full wartime readiness and sustaining it in combat thereafter.
Inductee	=	An individual drafted into military service; same as a draftee or conscript.
Induction	=	The process of bringing an individual into military service involuntarily by execution of the military oath of allegiance. The process is one product of a draft.
Kind of draft	=	The character of a particular draft mechanism.

Limited duty	=	A temporary assignment limitation that restricts military service geographically to the United States. The limitation is imposed because the incumbent has not yet met the statutory 12-weeks-of-training requirement to be eligible for deployment outside the United States. Once the required training is completed, the assignment limitation is lifted.
Limited service	=	A permanent assignment limitation for members of marginally qualified groups. These members have not received enough training to be qualified for deployment, and there is no intention that they ever do so.
Manpower	=	A collective term for the entire field dealing with the demand for, and allocation and utilization of, personnel of various types.
Manpower process	=	The process by which authorizations or positions for personnel are established. The manpower process starts with work to be done and translates that work into positions.
Military Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM)	=	A joint military organization that commands the Military Entrance Processing Stations and conducts all pre-enlistment or preinduction personnel processing for the armed forces.
Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS)	=	A military facility under the command of MEPCOM at which registrants or volunteers are processed for induction. Processing includes a physical examination, the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, and other tests and interviews. On the basis of the test results, the registrant is assigned to an armed force. Those registrants who qualify for membership are sworn in to serve in an armed force and sent to a reception station.
Military member	=	An individual who has been sworn into an armed force by vowing to support and defend the Constitution and to obey the lawful orders of superior officers. Military members are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Same as Service member.

Military services	=	The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. The Military Services are those armed forces which are assigned to the DoD in peacetime.
On-the-Job training (OJT)	=	A process in which an individual learns how to do a job or do a job better while actually performing the job under supervision.
Orientation training	=	A brief (1-week) period of military training designed to impart the most rudimentary socialization of the individual into military service and to acquaint the trainee with the foundations and basic rules of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. This training is to be given to new draftees inducted under a number of our draft systems options. Orientation training is not a part of, and in no way offsets, recruit training.
Partial mobilization	=	The process of marshalling resources to bring a portion of the peacetime approved force structure to wartime readiness and sustaining it in combat. This process includes the activation of at least some individuals or units of the Ready Reserve.
Personnel	=	A collective term for individuals in groups.
Personnel process	=	The process by which qualified individuals are assigned to positions established by the manpower process.
Position	=	A formally described and defined job, normally designated by a military or civilian job code or both. Positions are the product of the manpower process, and collectively they express demand for people whose skills match the job codes. Positions are sometimes called billets in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, and spaces in the Army.
Random sequence number	=	A number assigned to each registrant indicating the order in which the registrant will be ordered to report for preinduction examination and processing. A lottery is conducted to draw dates in sequence. All registrants will have the sequence number drawn for their birth dates.

Ready Reserve	=	A collective term for the Selected Reserve (SELRES) [including SELRES units and all Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs)] plus the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Inactive National Guard (ING).
Reception center	=	Same as a reception station.
Reception station	=	A military facility at which inductees are received from the Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS) and further processed into military life and assigned to the training base or a unit. At a reception station, the inductee is issued uniforms and equipment, tested for job assignment, entered into the military personnel and pay systems, and provided rudimentary instruction on military life. Reception stations are often located at the site of recruit training.
Recruit	=	A new military member who has volunteered or has been inducted but has not yet completed initial military training.
Recruit training	=	The initial training for a new military member designed to impart basic military skills and socialize the new members to military life. Recruit training is called basic training in the Army, basic military training in the Air Force, and recruit training or boot camp in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.
Registrant	=	An individual who is eligible to be drafted and has registered with the Selective Service System (SSS).
Registrant pool	=	The people who are eligible to be drafted and are required to be registered with the SSS. Same as registrant population.
Registrant population	=	Same as registrant pool.
Selectee	=	An individual selected to report for preinduction examination and processing.
Service member	=	Same as military member.
Skill	=	The knowledge and capability of an individual to perform a job or group of related jobs.

Specialty	=	A designation assigned to an individual indicating that that person is capable of performing a job or group of related jobs.
Support activities	=	(1) Work associated with the operation of support installations such as depots, headquarters, and training centers, and (2) centralized, miscellaneous work that helps and augments operations logistically or administratively.
Total mobilization	=	The process of marshalling resources in addition to those required for full mobilization to support new force units in addition to the peacetime force structure. The process of marshalling all national resources to achieve victory in war.
Training base	=	The training centers, units, schools, maneuver areas, support activities, and headquarters devoted by an armed force to individual training of Service members.
Training strategy	=	The overall plan or approach used for qualifying a new military member to perform a job in a unit.
Unit training	=	The training of individuals in military units, rather than in the training centers and schools of the training base. Unit training may range in length and complexity from orientation training (brief, simple) to full military training (at least 12 weeks' duration, resulting in award of a military specialty). Unit training is conducted by training cadre members of the very same military units to which the trainees are assigned. If, after the training of individuals is complete, the unit is equipped and deploys to perform a wartime mission, the unit training is said to have followed the "train and retain" principle.
Volunteer for the draft	=	An individual who asks to be inducted through the draft mechanism.

## **APPENDIX A**

### **USE OF THE DRAFT IN AMERICAN WARS**

Compulsory military service has been used to provide manpower to the armed forces of the United States during wartime since the Revolutionary War. The Militia Act of 1792 required all free, white, physically fit males from 18 to 45 years of age to be members of the militia and liable to be called to Federal service in time of war. This is the true meaning of the term "citizen-soldier." In the early days, citizens were formed into militias and called for service in defending their own localities. As wars grew larger in scope and size, it proved necessary to conscript individuals for military service. Except for the War with Spain, volunteers have proven to be an unreliable basis for providing manpower to fight America's wars. Even in the Civil War, when the number of men drafted was a small proportion of the total, the existence of a draft proved to be a powerful stimulus to patriotic participation. Use of a wartime draft to provide men for the armed forces is an accepted element of the military policy of the United States.

In the last 10 years, however, changes have taken place that raise questions about whether the draft mechanism as currently constituted would meet the needs of DoD in a future full mobilization. These changes include the increased technological sophistication of weapon systems, the need for more highly skilled personnel to operate and support these weapon systems, a lack of time for lengthy training in a mobilization that anticipates a short-notice war, the American public's unhappiness with the draft as used during the Vietnam War, and a wide range of potential conflicts and adversaries worldwide.

#### **THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR PERIOD**

In early Colonial days, all adult males were liable for military service in time of need. *Every* able-bodied man within prescribed age limits was compelled to possess arms, be carried on muster rolls, train periodically, and be mustered into service for

military operations whenever necessary.<sup>1</sup> The citizen-soldiers were formed into militias under the control of each individual colony or, later, state.

During the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress authorized a Continental Army and appointed George Washington to its command. Although it was generally recognized that the army would benefit from men volunteering for the duration of the war, this was not considered possible. An attempt was therefore made to enlist men for 2 years.

Initially, General Washington tried to enlist men for this army through direct recruiting. Finding himself in direct competition with the militias, which offered shorter terms and larger bounties, he requested the assignment of militia members from the colonies. Frustrated with the limited results of his recruiting attempts, in November 1777 he informed the President of the Continental Congress, "There must be some other stimulus besides love for their country, to make men fond of the service."<sup>2</sup>

Eventually, not able to compete with recruiters for the militias, General Washington asked the Congress to require each colony to draft men for the Continental Army from the militia rolls. This was a state militia draft, and the details varied from state to state. Most states resorted to the draft reluctantly and only when all other possible methods of raising men were exhausted. The operation of this draft usually involved a drawing by lot of all eligibles on the militia muster rolls. Attempts to draft from the militia were not very successful.

The experience of the Revolutionary War manpower system pointed to problems with short-term enlistments, the inability to obtain volunteers, the vices of a bounty system, and lack of provisions for recruit training.<sup>3</sup> These same problems were to recur in later wars. However, the Revolutionary War established three basic principles of later selective service drafts: impartiality, selection by lot, and an exemption for married men.

---

<sup>1</sup>Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, *Military Mobilization in the U.S. Army*, Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-212, November 1955, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 22.



## THE WAR OF 1812

A draft was not used during the War of 1812. Congress attempted to rely on the Militia Law of 1792, which required each man between 18 and 45 to be enrolled in the militia and provide his own arms and accoutrements. Recruiting for a force consisting of 36,000 Federal volunteers and 100,000 militia was to be accomplished by recruiters with the aid of bounties. Terms of service were from 18 months to 5 years in the Federal force but could be as short as 2 to 3 months in the militia. Many men took several short tours in the militia, receiving a bounty each time.

The shorter militia tours made recruiting for the Federal volunteer force impossible. Therefore, it was necessary for the President to call on the various states to provide men from their militias to the Federal Army. The use of a draft was threatened if enough militia did not "volunteer" to meet a State's quota. Substitutes could be provided, and little or no training was provided the new recruits. The total number of Federal volunteers was only about 10,000. As a result, the various state militias ended up doing most of what little fighting was accomplished during the war.

## THE MEXICAN WAR

Manpower for the Mexican War consisted of volunteers recruited directly into the Federal Army. This practice was based in part on the experience of the War of 1812, which indicated that the militia was generally unreliable. Congress authorized a volunteer force of 50,000 and increased slightly the size of the regular Army. Volunteers were enticed with cash bonuses and land and were told to report with "clothes and uniforms."

The mobilization went very well. About 61,000 volunteers were enlisted. The early volunteers were enlisted for 1 year. These relatively short enlistments stalled the drive on Mexico City halfway from Vera Cruz when over one-third of General Scott's army went home.<sup>4</sup> As a result, later enlistments were made for the duration of the war. Training for the volunteers was better than before, and most soldiers were "reasonably well drilled and disciplined."<sup>5</sup> The total manpower required was not great, the war did not last long, and it was a relatively easy victory.

---

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 76.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 80.

## THE CIVIL WAR

During the Civil War, national conscription was attempted on both sides, but with poor results. The large numbers of soldiers required early in the war were raised by appeals for short-term volunteers. The Union Army numbered 661,000 in December 1861, and 335,000 volunteers were sought during 1862.

A national draft was instituted by the United States in 1862 to overcome any shortfalls should there be insufficient volunteers. The governors, while recognizing Lincoln's authority to order a draft, protested both the time allowed and the quotas assigned. Draft riots took place in some states, and the draft call was rescinded.

A new draft act was passed by Congress in 1863, imposing liability on all males between 20 and 45 years of age. The primary group of draft eligibles included all men between 20 and 35 and all unmarried men between 35 and 45. Exemptions were given to the mentally or physically unfit, felons, the Vice President, Federal judges, heads of Federal executive departments, governors of the states, and men with certain types of dependents. As a result of excessive exemptions, commutations, substitutions, and more rioting, this draft was also a failure.

The draft was not a significant source of manpower in the Civil War. Only about 36,000 men were actually drafted in 1863. For the entire war only 162,500 persons, or 6 percent of a total 2.7 million men raised by the United States, were actually drafted. The mere existence of the draft had the effect, however, of encouraging significant numbers of volunteers.

Conditions of military service were chaotic throughout the Civil War. Voluntary terms of service generally were short, with some lasting only 90 days. The term of service for draftees was 3 years or the duration. Discharges and desertions were numerous. Deserters often re-enlisted elsewhere and obtained another bounty. Training and discipline in the forces were rudimentary. The War Department never developed a comprehensive training program. Whatever training was given in the Union Army was due to the foresight and initiative of individual officers.

In 1863, the pressing need for manpower led to the establishment of a special corps to utilize the services of partially disabled veterans. This group, initially called the Invalid Corps and then renamed the Veteran Reserve Corps, was composed of

officers and enlisted men no longer fit for frontline service.<sup>6</sup> They were available for any work except combat. They provided valuable rear area services, such as guarding prisoners and buildings, and served as clerks and orderlies. More than 60,000 men served in this corps during the war.

The major lessons for manpower mobilization during the Civil War were as follows:

- Manpower for a major mobilization cannot be obtained solely by a volunteer system, either under state or Federal control
- The militia (as then organized) could not provide a reservoir of military manpower
- Conscription based on principles of selective service was the most efficient and fair method of obtaining military manpower
- An effective draft should forbid the use of bounties, substitution, or commutation
- The term of service for draftees should be for the duration of the war
- Training programs should be carefully planned and organized
- Finally, provision should be made for limited service by disabled veterans.

## THE WAR WITH SPAIN

There was no difficulty obtaining enough volunteers for the 4-month Spanish-American War. At the outset of the war, President McKinley requested 200,000 volunteers. The Army grew quickly to about 264,000 men. This manpower was obtained by levies for volunteers from units of the state militias (also called National Guard at the time). The volunteers were to be between 18 and 45, and they would serve for 2 years. Training of the volunteers varied considerably. The need for an immediate campaign reduced available training time. Even the best units had seldom progressed beyond proficiency in close order drill before being sent into action. This was a popular, short war with limited manpower demands, and a draft simply was not needed.

---

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 115. See also Appendix E.

## **WORLD WAR I**

The draft was used to provide the large numbers of men required during World War I (WW I) for the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. The Selective Service Act of 1917 provided initially for drafting the 21 to 31 year age group, but the act was amended in 1918 to expand the age group to 18 to 45. A total of 2.8 million men were drafted in 1917 and 1918, complementing another 1.4 million men who enlisted voluntarily. By 1918, draftees were being distributed to "every camp, post, and station,"<sup>7</sup> including line organizations, depots, recruiting, schools, and staff corps.

The selective service mechanism in WW I was entrusted to local civilians in response to objections to the military-dominated and military-operated Civil War draft. Substitutions and commutations were prohibited. Conscientious objectors were inducted into the Army and provided noncombatant jobs. Volunteer enlistments were allowed and counted against each state's quota. Training was good, although lack of equipment and facilities slowed the rate of mobilization. Officer training was provided at special camps during 1917 and 1918. Enlisted training was accomplished at the receiving camps. The period of service was for 2 years or the duration of the war. As in the Civil War, significant numbers of men with reduced physical capabilities were inducted (see Appendix E).

During WW I, the Selective Service System (SSS) served as the chief agency for coordinating the allocation of national manpower. The draft was based on the policy "that one man should bear arms, that another should remain in industrial employment, and that a third should be transferred from one occupation to a different one regarded as more essential."<sup>8</sup> This policy was enforced by a "work or fight" order that channeled manpower in deferred classes from nonessential to essential employment. The SSS developed an organizational structure and methods that subsequently became the model for the World War II draft.

## **WORLD WAR II**

During WW II, the nation relied heavily on the draft to meet extraordinary demands for military manpower. With the approach of World War II, a draft was

---

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 279.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 263.

instituted for the first time in peacetime. The Selective Service Act of 1940 was tailored after the successful World War I draft of 1917.

After an initial surge, voluntary enlistments ceased to be a major source of military recruits for World War II. The draft system was by far the most important source of new military manpower. This draft provided 11 million of a total of 15 million men who served during World War II. The draft provided the bulk of the manpower for an Army that attained a peak strength of 8.3 million.

The World War II draft was administered with great flexibility. Draftees were assigned for training in required specialties within each armed force as needed. Draftees scoring high on qualification tests were assigned to the Army Air Corps, the Army Specialized Training Program, and other special programs, possibly to the detriment of the ground forces. Limited service assignments were utilized in appreciable numbers after August 1942 for personnel with less than full combat physical capability (see Appendix E). Training provided at training centers was effective. Manuals, pamphlets, and visual aids were used extensively in training. About 57,000 reserve officers who otherwise would have left the Army during 1940 and 1941 were retained on active duty to provide the required training capability. Conscientious objectors were drafted for service in noncombatant roles. The term of service was the duration of the war plus 6 months.

The World War II draft system was larger and more sophisticated than the draft systems in previous wars. Manpower proved to be a major constraint on the national mobilization, and the draft mechanism was used to influence workers to take jobs supporting the war effort through its deferment policy. Deferments were available to fathers, farmers, men over 40, and skilled workers needed for war industry. The classification of registrants and draft calls were handled at the local level by draft boards composed of local dignitaries. The local board approach resulted in some regional variation in policy, but overall it worked without much dissent from those drafted.

## **THE KOREAN WAR**

Large numbers of recruits for the armed forces were needed for the Korean War. About 1.5 million men were inducted to allow the armed forces to reach a peak strength of 3.7 million members during the 3-year war. Many of the policies and procedures of World War II were followed during Korea. Deferments were permitted

for high school and college students and members of the reserve components.<sup>9</sup> Married men without children were drafted. Overall, the draft worked well in the Korean War.

## THE VIETNAM WAR

After the Korean War, the draft was used to obtain the recruits required to sustain the armed forces at large peacetime strengths. Draft calls were 213,000 in 1955 just after the Korean armistice, to support a total armed force of just under 3 million, and slowly decreased to 61,000 in 1961, to support a total military force of 2.4 million. In 1962, with the Berlin and Cuban crises, military buildup commenced again. In 1964, the armed forces were back up to 2.8 million, with draft calls of 151,000 that year.

The Vietnam War started imperceptibly as an advisory and counterinsurgency effort involving only a few military personnel, mostly career officers and soldiers. This situation changed dramatically with the introduction of large numbers of U.S. forces into Vietnam in 1965. Combat casualties and early releases for Vietnam veterans short of the nominal 2-year term of service caused large increases in the draft calls needed to sustain the forces. More important, draftees were being sent to combat, and many were killed or wounded. Although large numbers of men were required to support the Vietnam War, the annual cohorts were so large that only a small percentage of draft registrants were required to serve. This drew attention to the process used to select those to be inducted.

The 1965 draft was highly selective, and young men could use several loopholes to avoid service. Many chose to do that, particularly college students. Thus, the draft in the early part of the Vietnam War was neither equitable nor hard to beat. As political opposition to the war grew, the draft came under attack. Lawsuits and injunctions threatened to stop the draft process.

In response to these problems, changes were made in the latter part of the Vietnam War to correct perceived inequities and to make the draft more fair. The first lottery since 1942 was held on 1 December 1969. A uniform national call was established in which all available men with the same lottery number would be drafted at the same time. This replaced the old quota system for each state. College

---

<sup>9</sup>Not all reserve units were mobilized during the Korean War or during the Vietnam War.

deferments provided only for finishing the current semester or, for seniors, the academic year. Divinity students were provided deferments rather than exemptions. Occupational, agricultural, and fatherhood deferments were abolished. Sole-surviving-son rules were instituted if a father, brothers, or sisters had lost their lives in military service. These changes made the draft more fair, but they did not stop the avalanche of court cases questioning the underlying legality of the draft as a mechanism to compel young men to serve in Vietnam.

## **THE POST-VIETNAM ERA**

As the American commitment to Vietnam diminished in about 1970, the nation also decided to stop using the draft to obtain recruits for its armed forces in peacetime. Draft calls ended in December 1972. Effective 1 July 1973, the law was changed to eliminate the President's authority to draft without the approval of Congress. The SSS was placed in standby status. The draft had been in operation for 25 consecutive years since the Selective Service Act of 1948 had been passed with the development of the Cold War. This long period of draft use during war, peace, crises, and assistance to Vietnam was unprecedented in American history. Previously, during World War I, the draft had been used only for just over 2 years, and during World War II, for 6.5 years.

Based on the work of the Gates Commission, appointed by President Nixon, it was determined that a 2-million-person military force could be sustained by volunteers. Pay was raised to be competitive with civilian compensation, and many missions were transferred to the reserve components to allow the active components to be reduced to the 2 million level.

Henceforth, the armed forces would rely on volunteers to meet peacetime strength goals. There would, however, be a standby draft system in place for use in the event of war or any other emergency requiring the drafting of military personnel. This is the wartime draft for which the SSS and DoD are planning.

After a thorough review, it was decided to backup the planned wartime draft system with peacetime registration. In 1980, draft registration was reinstituted. All men aged 18 to 26 are required to register. A "youngest first" registration system was instituted, with the initial emphasis on 20-year-old men. The first age group to be registered was born in 1960, with each succeeding year group registering upon reaching 18 years of age. Ten year groups are now registered, providing a registrant

pool of more than 20 million men. During the year when a cohort reaches its 26<sup>th</sup> birthday, the SSS sets that cohort aside and does not manage it further, although the computer records for that cohort are not destroyed.

The present wartime draft system, therefore, is an artifact of the final phase of the Vietnam War. It was largely inherited and is not particularly well suited to meet the military manpower demands of a major war.

## **LESSONS OF PREVIOUS MANPOWER MOBILIZATIONS**

The experience with previous manpower mobilizations suggests some important lessons:

- Manpower in a major war is so scarce that plans to utilize it must be comprehensive and must be prepared well in advance of mobilization. The general allocation of manpower among the armed forces, the DoD civilian work force, defense industry, agriculture, and other important functions should be planned in advance.
- Upon mobilization, the size of the manpower pool should be increased by using women, retirees, persons with limited physical capacity, veterans, indigenous personnel (in their own countries), aliens (in the United States), prisoners of war, and younger men and women.
- Relying only on volunteers to provide recruits for the armed forces in major wars has not worked. After an initial surge, the number of volunteers decreases, and a draft is necessary. Voluntary enlistments have resulted in an uneven distribution of high-quality recruits among the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.
- Assignment of draftees should be in accordance with an overall plan for all armed forces in which intelligence, physical stamina, leadership aptitude, and mechanical skills are allocated in accordance with overall DoD needs.
- Inadequate recruit training continued to be a problem up to WW II. In an effort to assure adequate future recruit training, Congress passed a law in 1948 requiring 4 months of basic training for every new member of the armed forces. That law has since been modified to require 12 weeks of basic training or equivalent.
- Such practices as short terms of enlistment, payment of bounties, and allowing substitution or commutation for draftees are poor measures for raising and maintaining armed forces for wartime service.



- The experience of the Civil War and WW II shows that personnel with less than full physical capability for combat can be used in the armed forces for noncombatant duties.
- Conscientious objectors can be used in the armed forces for noncombatant duties.
- In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the draft has been successful in delivering large numbers of physically fit recruits to the armed forces in a short period of time. To be effective, a draft has to be supported popularly and be perceived to be fair. Fairness depends on impartiality of selection and a consistent exemption policy. Changes to the draft mechanism made over the years, particularly during the Vietnam War, have made the draft system more equitable and predictable than before.

## **APPENDIX B**

### **SELECTED ASSUMPTIONS**

In order to narrow the scope of the study and conform to the guidance to examine ways of expanding the use of the draft for meeting mobilization manpower requirements, it was useful to exclude some potential approaches. These approaches were "assumed" away, but that action warrants further discussion. We assumed that an expanded draft would not include any of the following:

- Drafting citizens to fill civilian positions
- Creating a separate armed force for selected draftees
- Beginning a system of national service
- Establishing a referral service for civilian jobs.

Each of these ideas had been suggested to the study group for consideration, but each of them for one reason or another fails to fall within the scope of the study. This appendix provides an explanation of why these were excluded from the study itself.

#### **DRAFTING CITIZENS INTO CIVILIAN POSITIONS**

The basic question incorporating this idea is, can the draft mechanism be used to draft personnel into civilian positions where they would remain in civilian status?

It cannot. The reasons follow.

The 13<sup>th</sup> Amendment to the U.S. Constitution contains the following language:

"Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for the crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."

Article I of the Constitution, however, provides authority for drafting citizens into military service. The Supreme Court has upheld with sweeping language the constitutionality of conscription for military service in wartime, based on the Federal Government's power "to raise and support armies" under Article I. These decisions stem from draft law challenges during World War I.

Conscription for military service in peacetime has not been decided explicitly by the Supreme Court. However, the history of the peacetime draft — first established in 1940 and continued after World War II during the undeclared wars of Korea and Vietnam — suggests that the Court would support a peacetime draft.

The Court has upheld consistently the requirement that conscientious objectors perform civilian work in lieu of military service.

The Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality of compulsory civilian service. Although this issue is usually addressed in the context of a program for compulsory national service, it would also apply if the draft were used to compel citizens to serve as civilian employees of DoD, as opposed to being members of the armed forces.

Charles L. Black, Jr., a constitutional lawyer and professor at Yale, wrote in 1967 that the 13<sup>th</sup> Amendment's prohibition on involuntary servitude probably includes any form of involuntary labor.<sup>1</sup> Some exceptions, however, such as jury duty and road work, seem to exist. He concluded that mandatory civilian service (and the disciplinary control it implies) would be "foreign to our tradition and to our Constitution."<sup>2</sup>

A more comprehensive treatment of the constitutionality of mandatory civilian service was completed in 1985 by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.<sup>3</sup> The bar association found that no form of public service — from jury duty to road work — has ever been struck down as a violation of the 13<sup>th</sup> Amendment. These activities fall far short, however, of a compulsory national-service program or the drafting of personnel for civilian employment in DoD.

---

<sup>1</sup>Charles L. Black, Jr., "Constitutional Problems in Compulsory National Service," *Yale Law Report* 13, no. 19, Summer 1967, pp. 9 – 21.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 20.

<sup>3</sup>Committee on Federal Legislation, "The Constitutionality of a Mandatory Non-Military National Service Obligation," *The Record* (of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York) 40, no. 6, November 1985, pp. 1 – 29.

The bar association report concluded, on the basis of precedents, that a national service program, conceived as an alternative to military service, would be permissible under the 13<sup>th</sup> Amendment. It believed that a government empowered to obligate its citizens to perform military service could give citizens the option of performing civilian tasks instead.

The bar association report also concluded that if the draft were primarily a means to produce civilian servers, it would violate the 13<sup>th</sup> Amendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude.

Overall, this country's lack of a tradition of national service suggests that a purely civilian compulsory program would almost surely incur serious constitutional problems.<sup>4</sup> A more limited program of drafting personnel to work as civilian employees of DoD would face the same problems. Such a program may be viewed in the context of the bar association report's interpretation that a draft as a means of producing civilian servers would be unconstitutional.

It appears that a program to draft personnel into civilian positions in DoD is not an acceptable means of filling wartime requirements for civilians. Should the country develop a program of compulsory national service that encompasses civilian as well as military service, this question could be revisited.

#### **CREATING A SEPARATE ARMED FORCE FOR SELECTED DRAFTEES**

One way the utility of the draft can be expanded is to draft people into military service to fill positions designated for fill by civilian employees. Even though the draftees would be military personnel, they could do the required work. This practice would help offset shortages of civilian employees. If this were done, the question remains of how to organize and administer these particular draftees. Should they be assigned to one of the existing armed forces to fill civilian positions in that armed force, or should they be assigned to a new, separate Military Service? The latter would be possible but not desirable. We believe that all draftees should be assigned to one of the five existing armed forces.

---

<sup>4</sup>Charles C. Moskos, *A Call to Civic Service*, The Free Press, 1988, p. 126.

It is useful to clarify the distinctions among the terms: uniformed services, armed forces, and Military Services. Table B-1 shows the organizations included within each of these terms.

**TABLE B-1**  
**UNIFORMED SERVICES, ARMED FORCES, AND MILITARY SERVICES**

Uniformed services	Armed forces	Military services
Army Navy Marine Corps Air Force Coast Guard Public Health Service National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration	Army Navy Marine Corps Air Force Coast Guard	Army Navy Marine Corps Air Force Coast Guard <sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup>The Coast Guard becomes a Military Service *only* when transferred to the Department of the Navy from the Department of Transportation by order of the President. This may occur in peacetime, but is a normal accompaniment of the period of rising tensions preceding war or of mobilization

The overall group consists of the uniformed services. The armed forces are uniformed services entitled to bear arms. The uniformed services not authorized to bear arms are the Public Health Service and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. These are highly technical organizations with specific missions and are composed entirely of commissioned officers. The Military Services are armed forces that are part of DoD. The Coast Guard is a part of the Department of Transportation in peacetime; at that time it is an armed force but not a Military Service. During wartime, however, the Coast Guard becomes a Military Service as part of the Department of the Navy and may obtain military personnel from the wartime draft.

The Military Selective Service Act (MSSA) authorizes persons to be drafted "for training and service in the Armed Forces of the United States." Therefore, a new organization formed for selected wartime draftees would have to be an armed force and entitled to bear arms. It would most likely be a new Military Service, since the

civilian positions to be filled by the draftees would be in DoD. The issue then is whether to have another Military Service in DoD.

A separate Military Service to manage these inductees would be feasible. A separate Limited Service Corps, for example, could be established within DoD. The precedent for this kind of organization is provided by the Defense Agencies, which employ civilians on their own authority but utilize military personnel assigned to them by one of the armed forces. In this case, the Limited Service Corps would assign its military personnel to work in the Defense Agencies and the other Military Services.

A new Limited Service Corps would require an organizational framework and a cadre of officers and non-commissioned officers to manage the draftees. The draftees would have to be organized in units and sent to military installations where work has to be done. A system for pay, supply, equipping, administration, training, and military justice would have to be set up. A distinctive uniform would have to be provided. In short, the whole paraphernalia of another Military Service would have to be set up.

A Limited Service Corps would be a short-term, noncareer military force established for the current emergency and operated on an ad hoc basis, and would distribute its people to work among the existing armed forces. Plans for such a Limited Service Corps could be drawn up in peacetime for implementation during mobilization.

There are no compelling reasons to create a new Military Service for this group of draftees. There are, however, significant disadvantages.

There is no precedent for creating a new, separate armed force to administer limited service troops. Military limited duty corps have been established several times in past wars, but they were part of an existing armed force — the Army or the Navy. These limited duty corps included military members recuperating from wounds or accidents as well as personnel with medical problems or limited mental capability. They were used in rear area work involving supply, transportation, and medical care. They provided valuable services while conserving the able-bodied troops for more arduous duty.

Creation of a new, separate Military Service would incur significant start-up and overhead costs. There would be significant duplication with the existing Military Services. Facilities for the exclusive use of the Limited Service Corps probably would not be possible. Another superstructure of headquarters and bureaucracy would be neither advantageous nor efficient.

There are other disadvantages to creating a new, separate Service for military personnel who have not received standard recruit training and who are utilized exclusively in support positions. A separate Service would highlight the differences between these personnel and both the military personnel and civilians in the "real" armed forces. The members of a Limited Service Corps would not bear the same ultimate risks as other military personnel and could be looked down on as "draft dodgers." This could create significant morale and leadership problems within the organization.

The civilian and military leadership of DoD can be expected to oppose any new, separate Military Service. The armed forces would not welcome members of a quasi-military group over whom they would have no legal authority and with whom they would have no common fraternal bond. They would discourage mixing this group with the members of their own Services even at the workplace.

The disadvantages and costs of setting up a new, separate armed force for these new draftees far outweigh the advantages. They would not receive standard recruit training and they would be reserved for support tasks. It is simply much easier to allocate these people to the existing armed forces. In time of mobilization, the additional work force increment provided by this draftee group can be accommodated relatively easily by the organizational structures and support systems already generated by the mobilization. Finally, they can be put to work in an existing armed force with less difficulty than would be the case for a new armed force.

## **BEGINNING A SYSTEM OF NATIONAL SERVICE**

Several proposals for some form of national service are now under consideration. Some of these proposals involve voluntary service by young men and women; other proposals involve an element of coercion, either by withholding or granting of financial rewards or by some form of conscription.

We are not taking a position on the merits of any system for national service. If such system were in place and if it provided a large number of well-trained military reservists, many of the problems of manpower mobilization would be eased. All such programs would involve increases in the peacetime training capacity of the armed forces, with accompanying increases in wartime training capacity as well. These increases would also ease the problems of manpower mobilization.

A program of national service involving both military and civilian service is essentially a peacetime program designed to accomplish useful work and build up potential military strength. If there were such a program, the entire nature of the military draft would have to be reconsidered in light of the wartime aspects of the national service program. The existence of such a program would make the current apparatus of a wartime draft obsolete. The study task was to devise ways to adapt and augment the current draft system to expand the use of draftees.

#### **ESTABLISHING A REFERRAL SERVICE FOR CIVILIAN JOBS**

One suggestion for aiding in the manning of DoD's civilian jobs during mobilization is to establish a referral service at each Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS). After the registrant group has been examined and a portion of the group has been qualified for induction, the remaining group might provide a source for filling civilian positions. The relevant question here is, can the MEPS be utilized to provide a referral service for civilian jobs during mobilization for those registrants examined at the MEPS but not inducted?

The MEPS can indeed be used this way, but not as part of the draft system itself. A civilian referral service may be a good idea, but it is not a legitimate function of the Selective Service System (SSS) and is not included in the draft system options because it does not involve drafting people into military service.

It does make sense to try to steer disqualified registrants to jobs in support of the war effort. The group not selected would consist of the following personnel:

- Those meeting mental and moral requirements but failing medical standards
- Those meeting medical and moral standards but failing mental standards
- Those meeting moral standards but failing mental and/or medical standards



- Those failing moral standards but meeting mental and/or medical standards.

Group 1 would include bright, capable persons who would either have civilian-acquired skills or who could be trained. Most medical problems would not be disqualifying for civilian positions in DoD or industry.

Group 2 would include healthy persons capable of work, but with limited trainability. They would be capable of low-skill positions requiring some on-the-job training (OJT).

Group 3 would include some persons able to fill certain civilian positions where their medical condition would not be a problem and the job would demand only limited trainability.

Group 4 personnel would not generally be desired as civilian employees although there might be some exceptions.

The SSS estimates that 35,000 induction orders per day, after noncompliance or claims for postponements, exemptions, deferments, and conscientious objection, will result in about 12,500 registrants reporting to the MEPS each day for examination. About half, or 6,250, of those examined will be inducted into the armed forces. The other 6,250 registrants will be found not qualified for military service. This daily rate will provide approximately 100,000 disqualified registrants from M + 13 through M + 29. About 66,000 of this group will be disqualified for medical reasons only. These disqualified registrants can be recruited or referred to civilian positions within the DoD or in other essential war work.

Historical data from the Vietnam War (results of preinduction examinations, 1969), indicates that approximately 9.2 percent of the registrants failed selection for mental reasons, 32.8 percent for medical reasons, 2.2 percent for both mental and medical, and 0.7 percent for administrative reasons. The total disqualification rate was 44.9 percent, a little lower than the current rate planned by the SSS for a future mobilization. The 50 percent planning factor appears to be reasonable.

It makes sense to try to recruit some of these rejected registrants into positions where they will be in support of the war effort. The number of these persons with needed skills, however, is likely to be small. The current wartime draft calls 20-year-old males first, and most of the members of this group have not had time to

develop skills. So the immediate utility of the rejected registrants, from the current wartime draft at least, is likely to be low.

Since there would be no element of compulsion in a referral service, the number of rejected registrants who would accept civilian positions cannot be predicted with confidence. The mental attitude of the disqualified registrant is important. Having escaped being inducted into the armed forces, would he be inclined to volunteer for a civilian job in DoD at some other, perhaps distant, location? The propensity of these personnel to accept the jobs offered would depend to a great extent on the way in which the offer is made and the alternatives available. Further study would be needed to determine if there would be enough acceptances to justify the resources required to support the recruiting.

To accomplish the recruiting there would have to be personnel specialists at the MEPS to explain the overall need, provide information on explicit job openings by location, provide the necessary counseling and recruiting, make the job offer, and provide transportation to the individual recruited. There would also have to be a real-time information system to keep track of which positions have been filled and which are still open.

Three general categories of civilian positions could benefit from a referral service:

- Positions as DoD employees at military bases requiring additional civilian employees during mobilization
- Positions with defense contractors providing services or goods to military bases
- Positions with defense contractors producing war materiel.

To fill DoD civilian positions, the respective civilian personnel officers could set up a desk at each MEPS to outbrief disqualified registrants and offer jobs at military installations using emergency hiring procedures. This could be done within DoD resources and might be tied into the overall recruiting effort for all new hires. The MEPS are centrally located and have communications links within DoD.

To fill positions with private-sector companies, a different approach would have to be taken. State employment offices and the Department of Labor could establish desks at the MEPS to outbrief the disqualified registrants and offer employment in

private companies. Managing this process would be much more complicated than just referring for DoD employee positions, but it could be done.

To be effective, this program would have to be an active one. Simply passing out literature and answering general questions is not likely to be successful. An ability to match job to applicant on the spot and close the deal, however, might be highly successful.

More work needs to be done on recruiting disqualified registrants at the MEPS, but the idea appears to have merit.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup>It is possible that a proactive referral service could help DoD recruit personnel to fill the requirement for new-hire civilian employees. If so, it would not be necessary to draft military personnel for this purpose. We have no basis for estimating the effectiveness of such a system without further study.

## **APPENDIX C**

### **FACTORS COMPLICATING A CHANGE**

Inherent in the current draft system are several important factors that complicate any attempt to augment or modify that system. These factors are the result of laws, policies, and traditions that have been adopted for good reasons. It is necessary to understand and contend with these factors in devising practical draft system options. The following sections discuss the seven most important of these:

- Minimum training required
- Younger-first draft
- Use of limited-capacity personnel
- Training base capacity
- Accessions processing capacity
- AIDS testing
- Allocation of inductees.

#### **REQUIRED PERIOD OF INITIAL TRAINING FOR DEPLOYABILITY**

There is a statutory requirement that new recruits – either volunteers or draftees – must receive a specified amount of initial training before they can be assigned outside the United States. Both the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA) and Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.) require at least 12 weeks of training for new members of the armed forces. Any draft system option designed to expand the use of draftees has to do so without violating the law.

The MSSA states that “every person inducted . . . shall, following his induction, be given full and adequate military training for a period of not less than 12 weeks, and no such person shall, during this 12 week period, be assigned for duty at any installation located on land outside the United States . . . .”<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>Title 50, U.S.C., Appendix 454.

Title 10, U.S.C. states that

... a member of the armed forces may not be assigned to active duty on land outside the United States and its territories and possessions until the member has completed the basic training requirements of the armed force of which he is a member. In time of war or a national emergency declared by Congress or the President, the period of required basic training (or its equivalent) may not be less than 12 weeks.<sup>2</sup>

The requirement is aimed at stopping the practice of sending untrained or poorly trained soldiers into battle, as happened in some previous wars. The first legislation for required training appeared in 1948 in Title 10, U.S.C., Section 671, stating simply that "no member of an armed force may be assigned to active duty on land outside the United States and its Territories and possessions, until he has had the equivalent of 4 months of basic training." This proviso was modified slightly in 1956 by substituting "four months of basic training or its equivalent" for the original "the equivalent of at least four months of basic training."

Title 10, U.S.C. and the MSSA both were changed in 1975 to shorten the required training period from 4 months to 12 weeks. The Services believed that 12 weeks of basic training was sufficient for most combat specialties, and that the 13<sup>th</sup> through 16<sup>th</sup> weeks that a recruit still could not be sent overseas was often "dead time."<sup>3</sup> The Senate concurred with a House amendment to reduce the required period of initial training to 12 weeks but wanted to ensure that adequate safeguards against the use of insufficiently trained personnel remained in the law. The Senate further stated that "this language, with its constraints, should be uniformly interpreted within the Department of Defense."<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup>Title 10, U.S.C., Section 671.

<sup>3</sup>In the event of war, the mobilization planners of the Military Services have always planned to conduct full and complete mobilization training programs for volunteers and inductees before sending them in harm's way. Mobilization training programs typically differ from their peacetime counterparts in their emphasis on combat survival skills and deletion of instructional units dealing with peacetime-only matters. Such "mobilization programs of instruction" (Army term) are sometimes longer than corresponding peacetime programs, but in some cases the peacetime and mobilization programs are identical. In 1975, however, the complete training of infantry soldiers required some 12 weeks; it still does. It is possible, therefore, that that program became the minimum standard for the legislative changes made that year.

<sup>4</sup>Conference Report, House of Representatives, No. 94-448, authorizing appropriations for FY 1976, p.65.

A final change was made to Title 10, U.S.C. in 1986 to recognize that basic training itself need not last 12 weeks and to permit shorter periods of basic training in peacetime, while still requiring 12 weeks of training for deployment overseas in wartime.<sup>5</sup> The intent was "to insure that personnel were not shipped into combat situations without sufficient training to equip them for battle."<sup>6</sup>

The current wording of the MSSA does not specify that the required training must be basic training, consist of all formal training, or be continuous. It does specify that the training be full and adequate. The MSSA does not cover and probably did not envision the training requirement for persons inducted but not deployed overseas.

As long as the training is judged to be adequate, it would be possible to assign inductees to work in the United States without formal basic training and with reliance on on-the-job training to reinforce civilian acquired skills or to provide new skills. These military personnel, however, would not be deployable outside the United States until they had served at least 12 weeks and had also received "basic training or its equivalent."

This interpretation of the MSSA allows a variety of training strategies to be employed to place inductees immediately in jobs in CONUS without a delay for basic training.

## **YOUNGER-FIRST DRAFT**

As a result of public concerns, several changes were made in 1971 to the MSSA to make the draft more equitable. One of these changes was to stop drafting older registrants and to begin a younger-first draft, in effect inducting only 20-year olds. Numerous draft system options can be devised while retaining the younger-first concept. Four of the draft system options presented in the report are of this type. All of these share, however, the fundamental defect of this kind of draft, which is that it calls forward a portion of the adult population with the least job experience and fewest skills. Maximum flexibility in the development of useful draft system options is obtained when the younger-first order of call is abandoned or broadened as with older-first or multiple-cohort drafts.

---

<sup>5</sup>Defense Authorization Act for FY 1987, P.L. 99 - 661, Section 501, also p. 219.

<sup>6</sup>Conference Report, p. 65.

Prior to 1971, the Selective Service System (SSS) drafted the oldest registrants in the eligible pool, trying to draft as many eligibles as possible before they became too old. Since overall draft requirements were only a small percentage of the total registrant pool during the Vietnam War, younger men had to undergo an extended period of uncertainty as to whether they ultimately would be drafted. In order to eliminate the burden of this anxiety, the system was changed so that the 20-year cohort would be drafted first. Moreover, if a registrant were not drafted during his 20<sup>th</sup> year, his draft liability was effectively ended, unless a major war requiring significantly larger draft calls occurred. This modification was adequate to meet the demands of the armed forces in the final days of the Vietnam War. When the war ended and an all-volunteer force was established, the younger-first principle was adopted for the standby wartime draft.

For full mobilization, the younger-first approach causes some problems. Large numbers of inductees are required for this case. Selecting only from the 20-year cohort initially will allow those in the registrant pool who are approaching their 26<sup>th</sup> year to avoid draft eligibility. Drafting 20-year olds first will limit the intake of recruits with civilian-acquired skills. Few members of the 20-year cohort have had time to learn professional or technical skills of interest to the armed forces. Concerns about leaving a person at risk for several years, as during the Vietnam War, will not apply during a full mobilization. The objective will be to meet the wartime manpower demands for qualified personnel as rapidly as possible. A draft for a full mobilization should not be limited to only the 20-year age cohort.

The MSSA does allow the SSS to call registrants from all cohort years in the registrant pool simultaneously. This can be done by using the same random sequence numbers to select groups from each age cohort from 20 through 25. This will increase the number of draftees with civilian skills and provide a broader base from which DoD can assign the draftees to meet the needs of the wide variety of wartime requirements.

#### **USE OF PERSONNEL WITH LIMITED CAPACITY**

Current standards under the all-volunteer force result in very highly qualified personnel entering the armed forces. Peacetime medical standards exclude those with actual or potential health problems. Mental standards limit accessions of Mental Category IV personnel to 20 percent for each Military Service, per

congressional guidance. Moral standards prohibit enlistment of persons with criminal records, serious legal problems, a history of substance abuse, or questionable moral character. Personnel meeting these standards are fully qualified for duty of any kind anywhere. The utility of a wartime draft system, however, is limited by this insistence on only the best. Several useful draft system options can be devised to make good use of less well qualified personnel.

Under scenarios calling for partial mobilization, sufficient draftees will be available to meet all manpower demands without using all of each year's cohort and without reducing the quality standards (since there are about 2,000,000 men registered in each age year, each age cohort should produce over 350,000 high-quality inductees). In the event of a full mobilization, however, and especially when passing through full mobilization toward total mobilization – the number of high-quality registrants in the initial seven age cohorts can be exhausted in a few months. More draftees can be obtained by drafting personnel from cohorts older than age 25. More draftees also can be obtained by lowering the accession standards for each of the initial seven cohorts. This will increase the yield from each cohort.

The first step to increase the yields from draft calls is to waive certain parts of the peacetime standards. In the medical area, each Military Service already may grant waivers in individual cases and issue Service-specific exceptions with the approval of OSD. In the mental area, congressional relief must be obtained for inducting more personnel in Category IV than the current 20 percent. Some waivers of the moral standards can be authorized for certain types or quantities of civil offenses.

For a full mobilization, however, further actions may be required. OSD can approve the use of the mobilization medical standards currently published<sup>7</sup> by the Army; they are significantly lower than the peacetime standards. Additional waivers of moral standards are also possible.

The result will provide significantly more inductees to the armed forces, but will also mean that large numbers of these personnel will be available for limited service only. Limited-service personnel must be identified and accounted for. Since

---

<sup>7</sup>See Army Regulation 40-501, *Standards for Medical Fitness*, 1 July 1987, Chapter 6.



they are not to be assigned overseas or to combat units, they do not need as much training as personnel qualified for full or unrestricted duty.

The use of limited-service personnel has historical precedent. In the Civil War, a group of physically impaired noncombatants, initially called the Invalid Corps, was used in support functions including guarding prisoners of war and manning supply yards.<sup>8</sup> Limited-service personnel were used extensively in World War II but only after significant resistance from military commanders and after it became clear that these manpower resources were necessary to the war effort.<sup>9</sup>

It is likely that this concept will be useful in a future war, serving not only as a way to expand the use of wartime draftees but also as a way to retain the use of wounded combat veterans returned to duty from patient status.

### **TRAINING BASE CAPACITY**

The number of draftees accepted into the armed forces in the early days of a major war is constrained by the ability of the Services' (principally the Army's) training establishment to accept recruits for training. The United States Military Entrance Processing Command has reported that the combined ability of the Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS) to receive and process selectees and volunteers exceeds the Services' combined training base input capacity by over 200,000 persons in the first 6 months of mobilization.<sup>10</sup>

The capacity of the training base to accept draftees is determined by two major factors: the training resources (primarily facilities, equipment, and trainers) available to train new Service members, and the number of people already awaiting training when mobilization begins. These waiting individuals, already under obligation to the Services, will precede inductees to fill the training seats available, thus limiting or postponing the need for draft calls.

Training resources available for mobilization begin with those centers, schools, equipment, and trainers now committed to the mission of recruit training. When mobilization begins, of course, these resources are largely occupied with peacetime

---

<sup>8</sup>Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, *Military Mobilization in the U.S. Army*, Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-212, November 1955, p. 115.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 642.

<sup>10</sup>FY 1985 USMEPCOM *Mobilization Plan 1-85*, p. 13.

trainees. Upon mobilization, training centers and schools will consolidate and compress their classes and training cycles, and they will be augmented substantially by reserve units and individuals mobilized especially for that mission. In the case of the Army's large training base, the number of training centers devoted to training new soldiers (not considering those centers and schools that conduct advanced training) will expand from 9 to 14 immediately. Twelve reserve training divisions and two separate brigades -- about 22,000 reservists in all -- will reinforce the expanded training establishment by M + 10 days. The resulting input capacity will swell from a peacetime level of about 20,000 recruits per month to almost 100,000 during the first month of mobilization. A similar but smaller augmentation occurs in the training base of the Marine Corps, which will continue to operate only two recruit training centers, one at San Diego, California, and the other at Parris Island, South Carolina.

Unfortunately, almost all the new training seats made available in the first month of mobilization by this expansion activity are already obligated. Each Military Service maintains a group of participants in its Delayed Entry Program (DEP) who are awaiting training. The numbers of these so-called DEP participants are large: they can exceed 40,000 to 50,000 recruits for a single Service during times of successful recruiting, especially during the seasonal peak that occurs late each spring. In addition, a backlog of reserve unit members awaiting their first active duty training exists in most of the Services most of the time. The size of this backlog ebbs and flows along with that of the DEP group, but in the Army the number of reservists awaiting training approached 20,000 in mid-1987.<sup>11</sup>

Taken together, these groups of potential trainees are imposing in size. But they are not the only groups to consider before determination of "drafter capacity" can begin. Volunteers and women present special challenges. Current plans call for accepting volunteers (the numbers expected are estimates; deviations may be accommodated by calling more or fewer DEP participants per week) simultaneously with draftees during the early days of mobilization. Female volunteers (no female draftees are now anticipated) pose two special challenges to mobilization planners.

---

<sup>11</sup>Alone among the Services, the Army has gradually accumulated within its Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) a group of soldiers who are obligated to attend full training programs upon mobilization. These "zero-skilled IRR" members currently number more than 10,000 persons. This demand for training seats is in addition to that created by the reserve unit members who are awaiting their initial training.

The first relates to facilities: if a training center does not receive women in peacetime, certain facility changes must be completed to accommodate any new women expected. Initially, therefore, female trainees will be sent only to facilities that train women in peacetime. The other challenge relates to the allowable male/female mix (which translates into an upper limit of the number of women allowable in a specific specialty) for those military jobs that are performed both in support units and in combat units: male populations adequate to replace combat casualties must be maintained.

As a result of these several considerations, the capacity of the training base available for draftees is a variable. As a result, we have devised a group of training strategies for our draft system options that produce a useful military person while avoiding levying any additional requirements on the already saturated training base of the Military Services. Chapter 4 contains a full discussion of these strategies.

#### **PROCESSING CAPACITY AT MEPS AND RECEPTION STATIONS**

Processing capacity for inductees and volunteers may be a constraint during the first days or weeks of a mobilization. All draft system options will call more registrants for induction than the current draft system. That is, all options will increase the processing load for both MEPS and reception stations. Each draft system option must provide, therefore, for the additional processing capacity to support the additional inductees it will generate.

There appears to be significant elasticity in the capacity of the MEPS and reception stations. The time required to process each registrant at the MEPS and each inductee at reception stations can be reduced below peacetime norms by streamlining the process. The number of persons who can be processed simultaneously can be expanded by augmenting resources. Current plans call for single-day processing at the MEPS during mobilization. Constraints include physical space, medical professionals, and lodging space for any personnel held over one night at each location.

The MEPS will be processing volunteers and DEP participants as well as inductees. The unpredictable element of this workload is the number of volunteers. There needs to be a mechanism for limiting the flow of personnel to MEPS and reception stations to the capacity of the training base for receiving new trainees. There also needs to be a mechanism for balancing the respective flows of volunteers and

inductees. Particularly important is the question of how many women would be allowed to volunteer. The accession of women should not be permitted to hinder the processing and training of men who are needed for essential combat skills.<sup>12</sup> The current processing of women requires two to three times as much time as the processing of men. Most of the additional time is needed for medical examinations.

Overall, it is unlikely that the processing capacity of the MEPS or reception stations will be the bottleneck for delivery of the needed manpower to the armed forces during wartime. Adoption of the Fort Swampy Surge draft system (Option 2) would help by providing additional manpower to perform labor at the reception stations on a temporary basis.

### **Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome Testing**

Testing for the human immunodeficiency virus is an essential step in qualifying prospective enlistees medically for enlistment in peacetime. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) testing will also have to be accomplished during a wartime draft, but the process would have to be modified. This is one aspect of the overall processing problem discussed above. It has no bearing on adoption of draft system options, for it applies equally to all.

Initial AIDS testing is now accomplished at the MEPS. For those men and women who then leave the MEPS and proceed directly to their new Service's training centers for further processing and training, the results of this test are forwarded to the reception station along with the enlistee.<sup>13</sup> If the results get lost or are late getting to the reception station, the AIDS test is repeated at the reception station. It is also repeated at the reception station if the first test is out of date by the time the enlistee arrives at the station. An enlistee may not receive all of his or her immunizations until a negative AIDS test report is on hand. This procedure does not slow the process during peacetime because the enlistee is allowed to begin the activities of basic training while waiting for the results of the AIDS test.

---

<sup>12</sup>Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of the Army (M&RA), Navy (M&RA), and Air Force (MRA&L), *Subject: Management of the Department of Defense Mobilization Manpower Acquisition Process*, from ASD (MI&L), 21 May 1985.

<sup>13</sup>This procedure is not followed, however, for those members of the DEP who are to return home from the MEPS to await future training. Any members of this group who test positive for HIV are recalled to the MEPS and informed of their test results by the MEPS commander and chief medical officer.

For those who test positive on the first test given at the MEPS, a second test is performed at the reception station. This second test is the Western Block test, and a positive result on that test is final affirmation that the individual has the AIDS virus. In this event, the individual is discharged immediately.

AIDS screening must be accomplished before routine inoculations are given with live viruses. These live viruses would react adversely on persons with the AIDS virus in their bloodstream.

During wartime, the AIDS test will not be accomplished at the MEPS but will be completed in its entirety at the reception station. In this situation, however, it would make sense to retain those testing positive on the initial test at the reception station for a second test. Occupying scarce training seats with recruits who have a high probability of immediate discharge is not a good idea in mobilization. The personnel retained at the reception station for continued AIDS testing could be utilized as a temporary work force at the reception station as proposed in the Fort Swampy Surge draft system (Option 2).

#### **ALLOCATION OF INDUCTEES AMONG THE ARMED FORCES**

Another consideration in changing the current wartime draft system is the method of allocation of the inductees to the various armed forces. Any draft system option would have to be agreed upon beforehand by the armed force that is to be the recipient of additional inductees.

This is complicated by the fact that the Air Force presently refuses to take any inductees from the current wartime draft system, and the Navy will accept only a token number of inductees. The Air Force plans to rely on a flow of high-quality wartime volunteers to meet its needs for military manpower upon mobilization. These attitudes toward the wartime draft are based primarily on quality considerations, combined with only modest expectations of limited wartime manpower requirements.

The current policy is that draftees being processed through the MEPS during a mobilization would be assigned randomly to the Services requiring draftees. DoD Directive 1145.1 states that this distribution will be made on a qualitative basis: "Qualitative distribution shall be accomplished on an equitable basis in any of the

aptitude groupings outlined . . . by control of chargeable accessions to the active and reserve components of each Military Service.”<sup>14</sup>

This policy would preclude assigning personnel on the basis of civilian-acquired skills to the armed force requiring those skills or capabilities. Demands will exist within each armed force for personnel to fill headquarters, support, or base operations positions that do not require deployment overseas. These positions will encompass a wide range of skills, from low-skilled (laborers), to mid-skilled (clerks, equipment operators), to high-skilled professionals (such as physicians and lawyers), and highly skilled technicians (such as computer operators). These demands – along with those for combat and combat-related skills – must be met for successful accomplishment of a wartime mobilization.

For a wartime draft, a system for allocating inductees solely on the basis of Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores is likely to be unsatisfactory. Some of the draft system options in this report try to identify and draft particular groups to meet specific needs. As long as the minimum accession standards are met, the skills of the draftees are more important than their AFQT scores. The AFQT score is important for those draftees who proceed through the current draft system to be trained *de novo* by the military training base. It may not be as important for other assignments of draftees.

The ultimate answer to the problem of allocating draftees and volunteers to the various armed forces in a mobilization is a billet-driven system in which draftees are matched with positions. Filling the positions with the right people provides each armed force the number and kind of people it says are needed. However, reconciling the precision of a billet-driven system with the need for simplicity and urgency in a mobilization will not be easy. Expanding the use of the wartime draft depends, however, on finding a workable solution to this problem.

---

<sup>14</sup>DoD Directive 1145.1, *Qualitative Distribution of Military Manpower*, 22 January 1986. This directive applies both to peacetime and to wartime conditions. During mobilization, of course, the reference to “. . . the active and reserve components . . .” is inappropriate.

## **APPENDIX D**

### **STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BASIS FOR THE CURRENT DRAFT**

#### **GENERAL**

The basis for the current wartime draft system is contained in law and regulation. The Military Selective Service Act (MSSA) of 1948, as amended by the Defense Authorization Act of 1980, is the statutory basis for the current wartime draft. Regulations implementing the law have been promulgated by the National Security Council, the Selective Service System (SSS), DoD, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Department of Labor. In addition, certain practices that influence the nature of the current wartime draft system are due to custom or the influence of other manpower policies. This body of law, regulation, and practice is an essential starting point for this and other studies dealing with the draft. Any new draft system option that is to be implemented will have to change the current basis in some respects.

#### **THE MILITARY SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT**

The MSSA of 1948, as amended, traces its history back to the Selective Service Act of 1917, which was the first national conscription law of the United States. The purpose of the MSSA is to "provide for the common defense by increasing the strength of the armed forces of the United States, including the reserve components thereof, and for other purposes."<sup>1</sup> Within the Act, "the Congress further declares that in a free society the obligations and privileges of serving in the armed forces and the reserve components thereof should be shared generally, in accordance with a system of selection which is fair and just, and which is consistent with the maintenance of an effective national economy."<sup>2</sup> The MSSA sets broad policies and clear rules for conducting a selective draft.

---

<sup>1</sup>MSSA (50 U.S.C. Appendix 451 *et seq.*), Introduction.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, Section 1(c).

The MSSA is administered by the SSS. The MSSA specifies that the SSS shall be an independent Federal agency.

### **Registration**

The MSSA provides for the registration of every male citizen and resident of the United States between the ages of 18 and 26. Males register with the SSS immediately after their 18<sup>th</sup> birthday. They move beyond the primary registrant group upon attaining their 26<sup>th</sup> birthday. Current registration commenced with those born in 1960. As of 1988, with the registration of those born in 1970, there were 11 year groups with over 20 million men registered with the SSS. The registration process requires each individual to provide such identifying information (including date of birth, address, and Social Security number) as such regulations may prescribe. Registrants must also keep SSS informed of their current addresses.

### **Classification**

The MSSA provides that the President shall set the rules and regulations for selection and classification of persons for training and service. Classification and examination are to be accomplished as soon as practicable after registration.<sup>3</sup>

### **Accession Standards**

According to the MSSA, physical and mental standards shall be established by the Secretary of Defense. During war or national emergency, these standards may be modified by the President under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe (see Appendix E).

### **Method of Selection**

Selection is required by the MSSA to be conducted in an impartial manner with no discrimination against any person on account of race or color. Random selection may be used as determined by the President, with national calls made on the basis of random sequence numbers. Persons registered at any particular registration may be selected before, together with, or after persons registered at any prior registration or

---

<sup>3</sup>Since no funds are currently provided for classification and examination, those actions are not being accomplished.



registrations. Registrants who are 19 years old will not be selected until all others have been selected.

### **Induction**

After selection, the MSSA calls for registrants to be inducted into military service as members of one of the armed forces. They may be assigned to stations or units of the armed forces. They will serve for 2 years. The MSSA specifies that inductees must receive 12 weeks of training following induction (see Appendix C).

### **Exemptions and Deferments**

The MSSA specifies that certain categories of personnel are exempt or may be deferred from military service. Exemptions are provided for members of the uniformed forces, cadets and midshipmen, members of the reserve components, certain public officials, nonresident aliens, foreign diplomats, and other aliens as designated by the President. Veterans of previous wars are sometimes exempt, but are not exempt after a declaration of war or national emergency by Congress. Ministers are exempt from training and service but must register.

Students for the ministry are deferred from training and service but must register. The President may defer all categories of personnel who are needed in industry, agriculture, or other occupations for maintenance of national health, safety, or interest. Personnel who are deferred are liable for training and service until the 35<sup>th</sup> anniversary of their birth. Medical, dental, or allied specialists not otherwise deferred or exempted shall be liable for registration, training, and service until the 35<sup>th</sup> anniversary of their birth.

Ready Reservists not participating satisfactorily in training lose their exemptions and can be called for training and service.

### **Conscientious Objectors**

The MSSA also provides for exemptions of conscientious objectors. Persons claiming exemptions from combatant training and service because of objections stemming from "religious training and belief" and opposed to participation in war in any form will be assigned to the armed forces for noncombatant service as defined by the President.

Some people are conscientiously opposed to service in an armed force in a noncombatant status. In lieu of induction into the armed forces, those individuals will be ordered to perform for the same period of time such civilian work contributing to the maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest as determined by the Director of the SSS. The Director is responsible for specifying that work and supervising such persons in the appropriate civilian work.

## **SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM REGULATIONS**

The SSS has promulgated MSSA-related regulations, which are published in the combined Federal Register.<sup>4</sup> These SSS regulations provide specific rules for operation of the SSS. The following specific rules bear on this study:

- *Registration.* Information that must be provided at time of registration includes name, date of birth, sex, Social Security number, current and permanent mailing addresses, date, signature, and evidence of identity. The SSS must be kept informed of changes in any of this information. Additionally, as requested, registrants must submit all information concerning their status within 10 days after the date requested. Every registrant is provided a selective service number (other than the Social Security number).
- *Classification.* A registrant cannot be classified 4-F (not acceptable for military service) unless the Secretary of Defense has made that determination.
- *Method of Selection.* Random selection will be based on a drawing, using 365/366 days per year, and will be impartial.
- *Order of Selection.* Selection shall be by age group, age 20 first, followed by ages 21 through 26, 26 through 34, then ages 19 and 18, in that order.

## **DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REGULATIONS**

DoD has a large number of regulations implementing the MSSA and planning for use of the draft in time of mobilization.

---

<sup>4</sup>Code of Federal Regulations (32 CFR Chapter XVI).

## **APPENDIX E**

### **DoD MILITARY MANPOWER ACCESSION STANDARDS**

This appendix is comprised of two parts. Part 1 is a brief review of the major changes that have been made to military manpower accession standards in this century. The discussion focuses on the circumstances under which changes in standards were related to each major military conflict – World War I, World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. Part 2 provides a brief description of the accession standards currently used for screening manpower for the U.S. armed forces.

## PART 1

### ACCESSION STANDARDS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

#### BACKGROUND

The acquisition of manpower suitable for military service has been an issue as long as there have been armies. While the "desirable" characteristics of the eligible manpower pool have varied greatly, depending on the circumstances of the time, the intention generally has been to secure the "best and the brightest" for military service. The 20<sup>th</sup> century has seen the refinement of general statements of desirability into a set of standards for the assessment of the physical,<sup>1</sup> mental, and moral suitability of young men and women for admission into the armed forces.<sup>2</sup>

Accession standards tend to vary according to the urgency of the demand for manpower. Peacetime standards have emphasized the admission of physically fit, mentally sharp, and morally upright youth. Wartime plans have generally recognized that the supply of these high-quality people usually cannot meet the demand. While wartime mobilization planning starts with the idea of "only the best will do," by war's end the nation's leaders have recognized the necessity for accepting people with lesser capabilities and some limitations.

The determination of the minimum acceptable capabilities for individuals entering the Services, and the identification, training, and assignment of these individuals once accepted, becomes a particular concern as increased manpower demand has forced the Military Services to accept and integrate personnel with lower capabilities. The U.S. Army in World War I and World War II saw the need for recognizing and dealing with this reality. The result was the development and application of standards to admit, train, and use "limited service" personnel.

---

<sup>1</sup>Throughout this appendix, the term "physical" is used synonymously with the term "medical" when applying to accession standards.

<sup>2</sup>During World War II, a psychiatric evaluation was also conducted as a result of concern about the high failure rates because of neuropsychiatric conditions experienced in World War I. This evaluation has since been incorporated as part of the medical screening.

## WORLD WAR I EXPERIENCE

The concept of "limited service" called for the drafting of men who, while not meeting the physical, mental, or moral standards for full, general service duty, could be utilized effectively in noncombat roles. Three categories were used in conjunction with the June 1918 draft call, in which limited service manpower was first inducted into the U.S. Army.

- *Rating 1* – a satisfactory physical, mental, and moral assessment, with no restrictions on assignment
- *Rating 2* – usable for anything but heavy combat service
- *Rating 3* – usable for limited service within the United States.<sup>3</sup>

These individuals who did not meet the full standards for nonrestricted assignment in the military forces were admitted for only a brief period during World War I, from May to November 1918. Little analysis has been accomplished on the effectiveness of the limited service men in fulfilling their assignments, so the impact of this World War I program is poorly understood. This does not mean, however, that the Government learned nothing.

The experience of the Army during World War I demonstrated the need for including marginal personnel in mobilization planning. World War I also showed that the Army must use men with startling individual differences. No future manpower planning could ignore the necessity for using such men in any massive buildup of Armed Forces.<sup>4</sup>

## WORLD WAR II EXPERIENCE

World War II witnessed the initial adoption of an idealistic approach to screening for acceptable manpower for military service. At first, only men who were capable of performing full duty or "general service" were acceptable. By 1942, however, the Army had recognized that the supply of fully fit young men was not sufficient to meet the overall demand for manpower. Accession standards would need to be modified. Some men with limited capabilities would need to be accepted.

---

<sup>3</sup>*Marginal Man and Military Service: A Review*, Department of the Army, December 1965. p. 55.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 59.

Once again, the Army adopted the term "limited service" to describe that category of inductees who were to be restricted in their assignments. In July 1942, three groups were classified as limited service:

- *Class A* – Conscientious objectors, as certified by Selective Service Boards
- *Class B* – Physically limited men
  - ▶ Classified unfit for general service but fit for limited service
  - ▶ Classified for limited assignment in noncombat duties
- *Class C* – Mentally limited men, those with limited capability for military service as evidenced by individual tests.<sup>5</sup>

### Physical Standards

The term "limited service" initially referred to men with either physical or mental limitations, or both. In November 1942, the physical standard under which personnel with both physical and mental limitations could be inducted was revised, allowing induction of individuals with physical limitations only. Many of the men inducted under this standard were desirable because of their civilian-acquired skills.

These men brought to the military service many useful civilian skills which were directly related to the needs of the service. While they could be assigned only to designated positions – which were limited in number – or in some cases were restricted to certain geographic areas, their prior skills and generally higher mental level permitted greater flexibility of assignment than was possible with men who were mentally limited.<sup>6</sup>

The Army policy continued to change throughout the war. Between 1942 and 1945, the U.S. Army implemented 13 major policy changes regarding the use of limited service men. These are summarized in Table E-1. Although use of the term "limited-service" was discontinued in August 1943, the Army continued to draft and utilize personnel who did not meet the standards for full duty.

Army experience and policies during World War II included trading off capabilities among the three accession evaluation areas: physical, intellectual/aptness, and moral. This was particularly apparent in the accession of physically marginal men. Controlled numbers of men in the "low physical categories" were admitted "... when their potential value to the service was 'obvious, due to ability,

---

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 62.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 2.

**TABLE E-1**

**SIGNIFICANT POLICY CHANGES INVOLVING  
PHYSICALLY MARGINAL PERSONNEL, 1942 THROUGH 1945<sup>a</sup>**

<b>27 September 1942</b> <b>(Cir. 327)</b>	Limited-service personnel retained if physically capable of performing in duty positions; assigned only to noncombat positions; effort to be made to move men from limited to general service.
<b>5 December 1942</b> <b>(Cir. 395)</b>	Established induction standard for physical marginals: must have high-demand civilian skills and be physically capable or have physical capability of performing in skill on a day-to-day basis. Training provided later.
<b>7 December 1942</b> <b>(Cir. 397 and</b> <b>Cir. 39, 1943)</b>	Authorized discharge of men 38 years of age or over who could not perform military service but who could assist on the national war effort.
<b>14 July 1943</b> <b>(Cir. 116)</b>	Term "limited service" for physical marginals discontinued. Those not meeting minimum standards for induction to be discharged unless Commanding Officer desired to retain. Term to be deleted from the records.
<b>21 August 1943</b> <b>(Cir. 189)</b>	Disqualified for overseas service those with neuropsychiatric condition of any kind.
<b>9 November 1943</b> <b>(Cir. 290)</b>	Assigned neuropsychiatrist to division staff to screen out those emotionally unfit for military service and to provide for prevention and early treatment.
<b>11 November 1943</b> <b>(Cir. 293)</b>	Major policy liberalizing use of physical marginals. Prohibited discharge of enlisted men who could perform in less exacting positions. Indicated that the elimination of term "limited service" positions did not mean that men so classified were to be discharged. Provided retention of men in duty assignments even though they did not fulfill the minimum standards for induction.
<b>24 April 1944</b> <b>(Cir. 164)</b>	Reaffirmed 11 November 1943 policy on fuller utilization of men with limited physical capacity. Discharge authority to be exercised with extreme care.
<b>29 May 1944</b> <b>(Cir. 212)</b>	Provided for retention of combat-wounded men if below MR 1-9 <sup>a</sup> standards if they requested and could perform reasonable duty.
<b>12 September 1944</b> <b>(Cir. 370)</b>	Provided for discharge of enlisted personnel in the United States who did not meet minimum standards for limited service in MR 1-9, and for whom no position was available, and the return of such personnel from overseas.
<b>13 March 1945</b> <b>(Cir. 81)</b>	Established major policy for administration and medical disposition of noneffective personnel. Denied the term "psychoneurosis" for use in deciding disposition. Indicated that a medical defect did not constitute adequate cause for medical discharge unless the defect itself was genuinely disabling for military service. This applied especially to the psychoneurotic. Preventive psychiatry was made a function of command.
<b>2 June 1945</b> <b>(Cir. 162)</b>	Provided major policy for care, treatment, hospitalization, and discharge of neuropsychiatric patients.
<b>30 June 1945</b> <b>(Cir. 196)</b>	A major policy declaration governing use of military manpower based upon physical capacity; reaffirmed previous policies, especially 24 April 1944, on more liberal utilization consistent with the military duties available for such utilization.

**Note: Marginal Man and Military Service: A Review, Department of the Army, December 1965**

<sup>a</sup> MR 1-9 was the Army's physical standard used as the basis for determining the physical acceptability of inductees during World War II

skill, intelligence, and aptitude'." The rate for induction of these personnel was set at 5 percent of the daily induction goal for each induction station.<sup>7</sup> The need for manpower to replace combat casualties and the increased manning needs of the European Theater had resulted in the decision to lower the physical standards for induction.

It was also during 1943 that the Army strengthened its policy regarding the retention of less physically capable personnel. The revised policy on retention emphasized conservation of manpower already in the Army. These men were considered too valuable because of "training, experience, ability, and demonstrated capacity to render service in a specific assignment" to be released from service solely because they had limited physical capabilities.<sup>8</sup>

The discharge of an enlisted man for physical reasons because he is incapable of serving in a physically exacting position when he may well render adequate service in a less exacting assignment is a waste of military manpower and is prohibited. Such men will be retained in the service and given appropriate assignments even though they do not fulfill the minimum standards for induction . . .<sup>9</sup>

The overall policy of the War Department regarding the use of physically marginal personnel was restated in April 1944 and again in June 1945.<sup>10</sup> This policy emphasized matching of personnel to the jobs for which they were most physically suitable, and amounted to a tighter, more restrictive policy on the granting of discharges for physical conditions:

- Those who were currently in positions beyond their physical capabilities were to be reassigned to appropriate jobs, not discharged.
- Personnel not qualified to perform duties in their Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) under field conditions were not eligible for overseas movement.
- Those already overseas were not to be returned to the United States if their defects were nonprogressive or remedial.

---

<sup>7</sup>War Department Circular No. 161, 1 July 1943, as cited in *Marginal Man and Military Service: A Review*, p. 67.

<sup>8</sup>War Department Circular No. 293, 11 November 1943, as cited in *Marginal Man and Military Service: A Review*, p. 67.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 67 – 68.

<sup>10</sup>War Department Circular No. 193, 30 June 1945.



- Commanders and surgeons were to exercise extreme care and judgment in arriving at a decision to discharge an enlisted man on physical grounds.
- Combat-wounded personnel were to be retained if they so requested and if an appropriate duty position was available.
- Each of the three major forces (Air, Ground, and Service) were to make the best use of their physically handicapped personnel and to refrain from transferring them from one force to the other without concurrence of the commanders concerned.
- No individual was to be discharged if he met the minimum standards for induction.
- Specific physical standards for induction were established for overseas service. Those who did not meet the standards were to be reassigned to installations, activities, or units assigned to duty in CONUS until their defects were remedied.<sup>11</sup>

To help determine those jobs of which individuals were capable, the Armed Forces introduced a new method for evaluating the physical condition of personnel entering military service. Unlike the assessment of the learning capability of personnel, the area of physical standards had no method for expressing an individual's physical condition in consistent, quantifiable, or comparable terms for the purpose of job-capability classification.

On the basis of a physical classification system developed by the Canadian Army, the United States Army developed the PULHES profile system. This system classified the overall condition of an individual in terms of six major physical areas:

- P – Physical capacity or stamina
- U – Upper extremities
- L – Lower extremities
- H – Hearing and ear
- E – Eyes
- S – Psychiatric.

---

<sup>11</sup>*Marginal Man and Military Service: A Review*, p. 68.

The system was designed to categorize the physical condition of applicants in one of four grades of capability in each of the six areas:

- *Grade 1* indicates that the individual is within the acceptable standards in the area.
- *Grade 2* indicates mild, nonprogressive defects.
- *Grade 3* indicates borderline defects.
- *Grade 4* indicates functional capacity below the physical standards for admission into the military service.

### **Psychiatric Screening**

World War II saw increased attention being given to the problem of identifying and treating individuals with neuropsychiatric conditions. On the basis of World War I experience, the military forces could expect potentially large numbers of personnel to be admitted to hospitals for treatment of neuropsychiatric disorders during the course of the conflict. The SSS recommended that psychiatric screening of applicants and registrants be performed in an effort to identify individuals with current or potential problems of a psychiatric type.

In conjunction with this effort, the War Department improved the screening capability available at the induction centers, mental hygiene clinics were established at replacement training centers, preventive psychiatry programs were established, and policies for treatment of combat neurosis near the front were established. The SSS established a medical survey system through which social and medical histories could be collected and made available for review at the induction stations.<sup>12</sup>

In addition to screening potential accessions to determine their neuropsychiatric condition, the War Department also undertook programs to improve the performance of individuals with marginal pre-existing psychoneurotic conditions or disorders developed while in military service. Special training regimens, combined with restrictions on assignments, resulted in 70 percent of the test population being made available for limited duty in noncombat units within CONUS.

---

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 70.

## Mental Standards

The mental qualifications of an applicant or selectee have tended to be thought of in two ways. On the "high side," consideration is given to those special qualifications or aptitudes that make the individual particularly desirable to the Military Services. On the "low side," recognition is achieved of the minimum aptitudes and capabilities someone must have in order to be a useful member of an armed force. The armed forces have had to develop the capability to screen applicants and selectees in order to identify those with highly desirable mental capabilities and those with marginal or below-acceptable capabilities. Changing demands for manpower often have meant trading off physical limitations against desirable mental capabilities, or accepting physically able individuals at the margin of mental capabilities. Individuals not fully physically qualified, but with useful civilian-acquired skills, training, or aptitudes would be more desirable than those without such special qualifications.

Individual mental capability has usually been considered in the context of the accession decision as an indication of the person's ability to understand and follow orders. The criterion for determining acceptability of an individual for military service has at times been as simple as being able to understand English. As the demands placed on the average member of the armed forces have become more complex, the mental requirements have also become more demanding. At issue has been the "trainability" of the individual, or the capability of the person to understand and absorb training required to perform a particular job.

As with the other accession standards, wartime manpower demand has sometimes led to changes in mental standards that in turn have resulted in lower-quality individuals entering the Service. Men entering the Army after November 1940 were required only to have an understanding of "simple orders in the English language."<sup>13</sup> Within 6 months, however, it had become clear that individuals with greater reading comprehension and writing ability were required. The policy was changed in May 1941 to prohibit induction of those "who do not have the capacity of reading and writing the English language as prescribed for the fourth grade in grammar school."<sup>14</sup> This policy remained in effect until August 1942, when

---

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 59.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 60.

illiterates were once again accepted into military service: another example of changing standards reflecting changing needs.

As the criteria for determining mentally marginal men have changed in response to the needs of the Services, the Services have had to develop new ways of making effective use of these personnel. Non-English-speaking and illiterate personnel have been admitted into the Services at various times with the stipulation that these deficiencies be corrected within a certain period of time. To accomplish this goal, special training units (STUs) were established during World War II.

The mission of these units was to qualify trainees as literate in English at or beyond the fourth grade level and to train them in certain basic military subjects so that they could take their places successfully in regular training. Additionally, the units were to give appropriate training to men who were emotionally unstable to a degree that prevented their adjustment to the normal military program. Finally, they were to provide the physically limited with rehabilitation training designed to prepare them to meet the requirements of the service.<sup>15</sup>

STUs served both newly admitted personnel and those already in the service at the time increased standards were implemented. Table E-2 lists the major milestones in the evolution of STUs by the War Department.

**TABLE E-2**  
**MILESTONES IN SPECIAL TRAINING UNITS**

Date	Event	Type of trainee
<b>28 July 1941</b>	Creation of special training units at replacement training centers	Illiterates, non-English-speaking, Grade V, <sup>a</sup> physically handicapped, and emotionally unstable.
<b>November 1942</b>	STUs sited at Army corps, service commands, divisions, and field units	Illiterates in excess of those being sent to the replacement training centers
<b>1 June 1943</b>	Consolidation of all special training units at reception centers	Illiterates, non-English-speaking, Grade V
<b>December 1945</b>	Special training units disbanded	

*Note: Adapted from Marginal Man and Military Service: A Review. p. 75.*

<sup>a</sup> Grade V refers to the lowest category on the Army General Classification Test (AGCT).

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 76.

The maximum time allowed for completing this special training was 3 months, after which individuals failing to meet the required standards were sent back to the replacement training center for further disposition. The reinstitution of the policy of accepting illiterates resulted in the Army's placing responsibility for conducting this special training at all levels of the organization. This approach was adopted for two reasons: first, the STUs could not accept all of the inductees needing this training. Providing special training within each unit relieved some of the demand placed on the STUs. Second, despite the screening, some individuals needing special training were not identified initially and were assigned directly to units. "The War Department recognized the dilemma by officially permitting Army, Corps, Service Command, Division, and other unit commanders to establish special training units within their commands [in] November 1942."<sup>16</sup> Records show that in February 1943, 30,592 Army personnel were assigned to STUs at 118 installations.

The STUs were relocated to reception centers in 1943 in order to centralize and standardize training and to reduce the stigma associated with this training. From this time until the end of the war, personnel needing special training received it immediately following induction and before being assigned to a unit. The mission of the STUs at the reception centers did not change.

The special training units were designed to provide the illiterate with skills in reading, writing, arithmetic, and in military subjects sufficient for the soldier to make his way properly through military life as a member of a regular military unit. But the key item was his ability to absorb military training and to function creditably in a military duty position.<sup>17</sup>

The Army General Classification Test (AGCT) was used from October 1940 on to categorize all individuals in one of five categories of learning capability, with Grade V the lowest level of learning. The AGCT was the World War II version of the current Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), used both to evaluate the mental capability of the applicants and as the basis for job classification by the Services. The policy regarding mental capability was changed again in July 1943. The percentage limitations on the induction of illiterates were abandoned, and all men possessing mental capacity above the lower three-fifths of Grade V on the AGCT became qualified for induction.<sup>18</sup>

---

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 77.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 81.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 78.

In order to determine whether personnel scoring in Grade V of the AGCT were categorized as such because of mental capacity or because of illiteracy/lack of English, additional tests were given as part of induction. On the basis of these test results, the decision was made to accept the individual for further remedial training, or not to accept the individual. The dropping of the literacy requirement made the development of more refined testing instruments and the creation of new instructional materials necessary. Instructional materials were needed for teaching English to non-English speakers who might be illiterate in their native languages as well as in English, in addition to improving the skills of illiterate English speakers. Altogether, from 1 June 1943 until the STUs were closed in 1945, 302,000 men were trained.<sup>19</sup>

### **Moral Standards**

The issue of an individual's morality has always been a consideration when determining the kind of person who should be admitted into military service. As with the other accession standards, the determination of what is minimum acceptable moral behavior for someone entering military service has been determined by the needs of the time.

Up until World War II, the Military Services prohibited anyone from entering who had been convicted of a felony. Enlistment policies allowed admission of men with a record of juvenile delinquency, and occasionally with a record of minor adult misdemeanors. One problem with this policy, however, was that the definition of a felony varied from state to state.

As of 1940, this policy was still in effect. By the beginning of World War II, however, the need for more flexibility in personnel acquisition policies had resulted in a review of the moral standards as well. The policy was modified initially in 1941 to allow exceptions in special cases so that some individuals convicted of a felony could be accepted for military service.

As the demand for manpower increased during the war, the moral standards were lowered for this area as well as for medical condition and mental capability. Ex-prisoners who were first offenders without serious records of juvenile delinquency were admitted; then men still under the control of the civil authorities were inducted.

---

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 86.

When the critical point in the manpower demand was reached during World War II, the whole felon population in and out of penitentiary walls became a possible source of military procurement. By August 1944, the policy excluded only those who were under confinement as a result of heinous crimes such as treason, murder, rape, and kidnapping.<sup>20</sup>

Sizable numbers of men with criminal backgrounds were accepted into the Army under this program, with 2,000 men inducted directly from prison, and another 100,000 men previously convicted of a felony also admitted for service during World War II.<sup>21</sup>

## THE KOREAN WAR ERA

Interest in the quality of manpower entering military service, and the quality of manpower needed by the military forces, continued after the end of World War II. Of the various efforts undertaken in the postwar period leading to the beginning of the Korean War, the Conservation of Human Resources Project is worthy of special mention.

The Conservation of Human Resources Project was undertaken by Columbia University to study the work performance of marginal manpower in the Army during World War II. The study was initiated in 1949 because of the recognition that sizable numbers of men could be considered handicapped because of one of a number of disabilities, and because over one-third of the population screened during World War II had been found unqualified or marginally qualified for military service.<sup>22</sup>

The portion of the study dealing with uneducated men concluded that the Armed Services' policy positions regarding educationally marginal personnel were based upon five assumptions:

1. Relatively few men could become acceptable soldiers.
2. The cost involved in special training outweighed the value of the service of the men.

---

<sup>20</sup>Ibid, p. 212.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 213.

<sup>22</sup>The findings of the Conservation of Human Resources Project were documented in four volumes published between 1953 and 1959: Eli Ginzberg and D. W. Bray, *The Uneducated*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1953; Eli Ginzberg, *The Lost Divisions*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1959; Eli Ginzberg, *Breakdown and Recovery*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1959; and Eli Ginzberg, *Patterns of Performance*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1959.

3. Acceptance of men with the fewest handicaps was preferable [in 1951], leaving until mobilization the acceptance of the marginal.
4. The [1951] AFQT was adequate for determining training potential.
5. Research should be conducted [during the Korean build-up] to determine minimum intelligence needed to absorb military training, but no policy change was to be made until valid results were obtained from the research.<sup>23</sup>

Overall, the study reached the following major conclusions regarding the use and applications of marginal manpower:

1. Less should be expected of the initial selection system as the proportion of individuals to be screened increases.
2. The selection system becomes less reliable as the assignments for which men are selected become broader and less specific. A screen can eliminate men who will not perform effectively at a simple job. Setting the sights higher may needlessly reject useful people.
3. Personnel charged with the initial selection process must know the nature of the manpower pool and the real manpower requirement of the Army. The limitations of the pool must be recognized in setting the demands.
4. Educational achievement is an acceptable index for future performance. It must, however, be considered in its application within the limitations . . . under which it was or was not acquired.
5. Psychiatric appraisal is not indicated for appraisal of the potential performance of all men. It should be accomplished only when there is evidence of disturbance or instability.
6. Indoctrination and training of supervisory personnel are essential, since performance of large groups of individuals is directly associated with the quality of leadership.
7. The effective utilization of manpower can be enhanced by exploiting more fully the wide range of duty positions available for assignment or reassignment of personnel.
8. Situations which best motivate individuals in a work environment should be emphasized. The creation or continuance of conditions which weaken individual motivation should be distinctly avoided.

---

<sup>23</sup>Eli Ginzberg, and D. W. Bray, *The Uneducated*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1953, as quoted in *Marginal Man and Military Service: A Review*, pp. 96 – 97.



9. Policies should be established with the equitable treatment of individuals in mind. A consideration of those who have done their best enhances the level of future performance.
10. Manpower utilization, to be effective, must be the result of careful consideration of the future as illuminated through long-range planning.<sup>24</sup>

In addition, DoD examined separately the issue of the capabilities required of military personnel in the decade between 1949 and 1959. The focus of interest was on determining wartime personnel capabilities, both for individuals being inducted into military service during mobilization and for individuals being retained in military service during wartime.

During this period, the armed forces were confronted with a basic conflict. On one hand, technology and the increased complexity of weapons highlighted the need for ever-higher standards for accession. On the other hand, organizations such as the Office of Defense Mobilization and the SSS were urging the Services to make greater use of less capable people, reducing the mental and physical requirements to the lowest possible level in order to realize "maximum national strength." The latter organizations were concerned with the competition for skilled and intelligent manpower between the Military Services and the civil sector. The emphasis of Service activities during this period was on understanding how best to use less capable personnel and on developing appropriate accession standards.

### **Physical Standards**

Following World War II, the PULHES system formed the basis for identifying "limited service" personnel, in that Profile C individuals were the physically marginal personnel acceptable for military duty with certain restrictions. Beginning in 1951, selected Profile C personnel were given specially modified basic training in a special physical training unit to improve their physical condition sufficiently to allow them to assume combat duties. Personnel eligible for this modified training were those with certain leg and back ailments. Unlike the special training programs intended to improve the mental capabilities of inductees, the special physical training produced clear improvements in individuals completing the course, with some qualifying for Profile B or A. Those who remained as Profile C after completing

---

<sup>24</sup>Eli Ginzberg, *Pattern of Performance*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1959, pp. 157-159, as quoted in *Marginal Man and Military Service: A Review*, pp. 102 - 103.

the course were assigned to appropriate jobs and given on-the-job training. This special physical training unit operated from 1 April 1951 until 1 December 1963.

The major post-World War II legislation affecting eligibility for military service was the Universal Military and Training Service Act.<sup>25</sup> Among other things, this act specified minimum standards for physical acceptability to the Army. Standards were to be set no higher than those which applied to persons between the ages of 18 and 25 in January 1945. The standards in use at the end of the World War II were actually more liberal than these.

Toward the end of the Korean War and afterward, the Army became interested in increasing the use of personnel with certain nonlimiting psychiatric conditions, enlisting combat-disabled veterans, and retaining on active duty other physically disabled soldiers.

The move toward increased use of physically incapacitated personnel originated with the desire of combat-disabled veterans to be allowed to stay in military service, or to return to military service following release. Based on the determination that these personnel could continue to perform useful roles, policies were established for re-enlistment of combat-disabled World War II veterans as of 1 November 1946. An initial quota for re-enlistment of these veterans was established at 5,000.

The standards used for combat-disabled veterans were specific:

- Physical standards for general military service had to be met except for the specific combat-related disability.
- The men had to be capable of meeting their personal needs unaided.
- The combat-incurred disability should not require additional hospitalization.

The emphasis of this policy was on individuals being functional in the occupation for which they were trained although the attainment of a new occupational specialty was allowed. DoD's interest was twofold: taking advantage of the experience and leadership these men could bring to their assignments, and filling critical positions within the armed forces. In conjunction with this effort, the Army

---

<sup>25</sup>Public Law 51, 82nd Congress, 1951.

developed guidance describing the disqualifying physical disabilities for certain MOSs, as well as prerequisites for qualifying for training in these occupations.

This program of re-enlistment of disabled veterans was continued into the Korean War. During this period, the policy was expanded to include re-enlistment of non-combat disabled veterans as well as retention of disabled veterans. Non-combat-disabled veterans were classified as those disabled while in military service through disease, injuries, or infirmities other than combat wounds. As of January 1953, the number of partially disabled personnel retained in the Army was still comparatively small, with 467 personnel in 110 MOSs.<sup>26</sup> The policy of retaining partially disabled veterans in military service continues today.

### **Mental Standards**

During the post-World War II period, mental standards and the capability of the armed forces to train mentally marginal personnel were given major attention. This emphasis occurred in recognition of the potential need during a mobilization for the induction of sizable numbers of personnel who had poor English comprehension or who could be categorized as illiterate — as opposed to individuals with insufficient intellectual ability to perform assigned jobs competently.

Part of this effort was intended to capitalize on the experiences gained from World War II and the Korean War. A major problem, however, was in the lack of data demonstrating the results of the various efforts to use marginal personnel during World War II. Observations on the utility of the STUs were made, but data on the increased utilization of personnel produced from these units were not collected, making any assessment of the costs versus benefits of these approaches almost impossible. The same problem existed regarding physically limited personnel and the other limited-capacity Service personnel.

Emphasis during this period was given to the need to prepare for the less-than-fully-literate inductee, the non-English-speaking inductee, and the inductee in the lower range of intellectual capabilities. Particular concern was given to development of necessary testing instruments and determination of the remedial training requirements to bring these inductees up to a level of competence. The Army was the leader in this field. The limited information available on the Navy and Air Force

---

<sup>26</sup>*Marginal Man and Military Service: A Review*, p. 182.

activities in this area indicates that less comprehensive programs were undertaken. The need to adjust physical standards during wartime to allow for the accession of individuals with less than the desired physical capabilities was recognized, although little emphasis was placed on preplanning for this contingency.

In the course of examining the uses and restrictions on the employment of marginal manpower in wartime, several approaches for managing assignments were identified:

- Specify percentages of marginal personnel to be assigned to units of a given type
- Restrict assignment to certain geographic areas
- Restrict MOS options
- Restrict assignments to special units, such as those in which a particular foreign language is used, or to labor-type units
- Place no special restrictions on those proving apt in the military service and at their jobs.<sup>27</sup>

Between 1952 and 1954, efforts were undertaken by the armed forces to examine and measure the impact of special training as a tool for improving the proficiency of low-aptitude personnel. The Army (in its Basic Education Project), the Navy (in its Recruit Preparatory Training), and the Air Force (in Project 1000) attempted separately to evaluate the utility of different, specially designed training programs as methods for improving the capability and job performance of mentally marginal personnel. The emphasis of these projects was on augmenting training for illiterates, with the Army and Navy efforts concentrated on prebasic training while the Air Force effort centered on an expanded and modified (12-week) basic training regime. The Army and Air Force studies emphasized additional education in arithmetic, reading, language, and military arts. The Navy study addressed improving literacy; unfortunately, the results have been largely discounted as a result of problems in defining the control group.<sup>28</sup>

The Army Basic Education Project produced very little improvement in the aptitude of the marginal personnel entering the program. The Air Force study, using

---

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 112.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 151.

expanded basic training (12 weeks versus 6 weeks) produced no difference in capability, either immediately following the course or 8 months later.

Throughout the Korean War, the Services struggled to identify an appropriate minimum aptitude standard, as indicated by completion of a specific level of schooling, or by work experience. The intention was to identify individuals who were legitimately limited, who were malingering, or who were poorly motivated to do well on the AFQT. At issue was identification of true failures.

Standards were lowered to specify completion of the 9<sup>th</sup> grade or successful work performance in semiskilled or skilled occupations. On the basis of this criterion, it was determined that the inductee should be able to complete training successfully and perform military duties satisfactorily. Activities in this area for the remainder of the conflict emphasized tightening procedures for review of questionable cases, improving testing of individuals to determine basic capabilities and aptitudes, and devising new techniques for ascertaining individual motivation regarding military duty.

Efforts during the remainder of the 1950s in the area of accession standards, accession testing, and remedial training focused on bringing quantitative tools to bear on analyzing the problem and on creating improved methods and procedures for managing manpower. As in World War II, modified accession standards were used during periods of great manpower need during the Korean War. Unlike the period between World Wars I and II, the post-Korean War period saw intensive efforts to institutionalize DoD's experience in the screening, training, and use of individuals not meeting the desired mental standards for acceptance into military service.

Between 1954 and 1957, the Army undertook to decide how best to use marginal manpower in time of war. To do that, it mounted a research program intended to address minimum standards for marginal manpower, special training requirements for marginal manpower, accelerated training for high-aptitude personnel, equipment design for manpower mobilization, and job assignments for marginal manpower.<sup>29</sup> This research effort was discontinued before testing on an experimental group of marginal personnel could actually begin.

---

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 116–117.

Table E-3 gives the history of changes in the minimum mental standards from the beginning of World War II to the early days of the Vietnam War. It shows a progression from very general requirements of verbal competency to more specific minimum test scores, with additional special subject testing in order to refine the aptitude profile for the individuals.

### **Moral Standards**

Following the Second World War, the Army returned to the practice of disqualifying felons for military service, a policy continued until 1951, when the Universal Military Training and Service Act specified that anyone convicted of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for more than 1 year was ineligible for military service. This policy was further expanded by the armed forces to exclude registrants with the following histories:

- Individuals convicted by a civil court
- Individuals who had received an unfavorable judgment by a juvenile court for any offense punishable under the terms dictated in the Universal Military Training and Service Act
- Individuals with a history of alcoholism, drug abuse, or sexual misconduct
- Individuals on parole or probation from any civil court, or on conditional release from any term of confinement.

These policies continued through the 1960s, with the mechanism of waivers being the real determinant of the acceptability of an individual for military service. Offenses other than felonies were subject to review and waiver by the Military Department, Department Headquarters, or the Induction Station, depending on the nature of the offense.

### **VIETNAM WAR ERA**

#### **Background**

As with previous wars and mobilizations, DoD was faced with the need to acquire significant manpower for military service in the mid-1960s because of the increasing military presence in Vietnam. In order to meet this need, military

TABLE E-3

## MINIMUM MENTAL STANDARDS FOR INDUCTION (1941 THROUGH 1964)

Date	Standard
15 May 1941	Excluded men who did not have capacity for reading and writing the English language as commonly prescribed for the 4 <sup>th</sup> grade in grammar school.
1 August 1942	Induction permitted of men who could not meet literacy standards, provided they possess sufficient intelligence to absorb military training rapidly.
31 October 1942	Special test introduced for induction of limited service (physically restricted) personnel. Minimum acceptable score of 90.
1 June 1943	Standard for induction: mental capacity above the lower three-fifths of Grade V on AGCT.
1 November 1945	No inductions. Accessions by enlistment only.
1 November 1948	Inductions begun under Selective Service Act of 1948. Inductions continued for a 3-month period (November 1948 through January 1949) and were then terminated until August 1950. Minimum induction standards on tests the same as for enlistment: AGCT standard score of 70. Included in Selective Service Act as the minimum acceptable score.
August 1950	Inductions restarted under Selective Service Act of 1948.
2 November 1950	Minimum acceptable score on AFQT for induction set at "converted score" of 13 (adjusted standard score of 70). Administrative acceptee program begun.
19 June 1951	Minimum acceptable score on AFQT set at 10 <sup>th</sup> percentile (standard score 65).
30 June 1951	Minimum standard "converted score" of 10 on AFQT (adjusted standard score of 65).
5 November 1951	Continued "converted score" of 10 AFQT supplemented by additional screening with the AFQT special subject area test. Supplemental screening given to AFQT failures to classify them for possible future induction.
23 November 1951	Minimum standard score on AFQT set at Percentile Score 10 (standard score 65). "Converted score" table for determining AFQT norms replaced by original percentile norm table.
4 August 1958	Minimum standard score on AFQT set at Percentile Score 31 (standard score of 90) without further testing. Registrants attaining AFQT scores 10 through 30 inclusive had to attain a score of 90 or more in two or more aptitude areas of the Army Classification Battery (ACB).
1 May 1963	Minimum standard AFQT score set at Percentile Score 31 (standard score 90) without further testing. Registrants attaining scores of 80 or higher in the General Technical Aptitude Area and a score of 90 or above in two or more additional aptitude areas of the ACB.

Source: Adapted from *Marginal Man and Military Service: A Review*, pp 241-42

manpower accession standards were lowered from the higher peacetime levels. A truly major modification of accession standards during the Vietnam War occurred in conjunction with Project 100,000, which lasted from October 1966 to December 1971.

### **Project 100,000**

Project 100,000 had a threefold purpose. It was intended to broaden the opportunities for enlistment, thereby reducing draft calls, while at the same time increasing the manpower pool subject to the draft. These ends would be accomplished by reducing the number of men being rejected for military service for reasons of physical, mental, or educational unacceptability, by annually accepting as many as 100,000 of them for military duty on the basis of the application of modified accession standards. In addition to these two goals, Project 100,000 was intended to upgrade the qualifications of disadvantaged youth to prepare them for more productive civilian lives following military service. It was a component of the national War on Poverty, accepting as it did "disadvantaged" youth with a view toward improving their chances for employment following the experience of military service.

In October 1966, Project 100,000 was initiated. A principal challenge to the program was the task of identifying the portion of the youth population with poor mental qualifications who could usefully perform military service. To accomplish this, the program used lowered mental standards for accession, in combination with the special training curricula to improve the literacy levels of men accepted under the new standards. Some of the men inducted also had certain physical conditions that normally would have prevented induction.

#### ***Physical Standards***

While general physical standards had not been lowered, the Medically Remedial Enlistment Program (MREP) had brought men with more medical problems into military service. This program sought to improve the physical capability of those men enlisted under the modified mental standards who also suffered from selected minor physical infirmities, and – through the use of medically remedial enlistments – to accept into military service fully mentally qualified personnel with correctable physical conditions. Over 80 percent of the medically remedial enlistments involved men with weight conditions (either overweight or



underweight). In all, just 9 percent of the new mental standards men entered military service under MREP.<sup>30</sup>

Table E-4 lists the medical deficiencies acceptable by waiver for the MREP. Medically remedial men comprised less than 2 percent of the total number of non-prior-service (NPS) accessions during this period, as established by quotas: 1 percent of the Army and Marine Corps NPS accessions, and 2 percent of the Navy and Air Force NPS accessions, for an average of 1.3 percent of all DoD accessions.

**TABLE E-4**  
**MREP ACCEPTABLE MEDICAL DEFICIENCIES**

- Under minimum weight by not more than 10 percent
- Undescended testicle and inguinal hernia, same side
- Hydrocele and inguinal hernia, same side
- Orthopedic fixture at site of old fracture
- Simple goiter
- External otitis
- Hyperdactylia (hand and feet)
- Deviated nasal septum
- Pilonidal cyst or sinus cyst
- Hemorrhoids
- Undescended testicle, unilateral
- Varicocele
- Hydrocele
- Hernia of the abdominal cavity
- Over maximum weight by not more than 20 percent

### ***Mental Standards***

Mental standards were lowered for Project 100,000 although not to the level used during the Korean War. The mental standards applied in this program consisted of a combination of AFQT scores, educational level (e.g., attainment of a high school diploma), and scores achieved on special supplementary tests. Each of the Services had its own admission standards and special test batteries. The Army

---

<sup>30</sup>DoD Fact Sheet, *Project 100,000: New Standards Program*. Undated.

continued to allow "administrative acceptees" (a practice started in the Korean War) on the basis of individual interviews for those not achieving the minimum necessary score. Also included were individuals classified as 1-Y for mental reasons (i.e., those acceptable for military service only in a war or national emergency).

Beginning in November 1965, a distinction was made between high school graduates and non-high school graduates in qualifying individuals for military service. Qualification was based on the AFQT test score, on the presence or absence of a high school diploma, and – for those without sufficiently high standardized test scores (i.e., AFQT 10 through 15 and a General Technical (GT) score of 80 or greater) – the scores on supplemental aptitude tests. With the introduction of Project 100,000, accession was based on the AFQT and high school graduation. Non-high school graduates with low AFQTs continued to need supplementary tests in order to qualify June until 1972. Mental standards began to be raised at this time, with high school graduates requiring a minimum AFQT of 21 through 30 and achievement of minimum test scores on supplementary aptitude tests in order to qualify for military service. Table E-5 lists the minimum aptitude requirements in use during the Vietnam era.

Project 100,000 differed from previous accession programs using lowered or modified standards in that extensive records of the progress and performance of the "new standards" men were kept.

There were two major areas of interest to manpower policymakers in Project 100,000. One concerned the performance of low-aptitude men, and whether their presence "degraded" the forces, as critics had asserted would be the case. . . . the second area of interest was whether military service actually improved the education and employability of disadvantaged youth.<sup>31</sup>

Between December 1966 and 30 June 1971, 341,127 men entered the service under Project 100,000; 91 percent entered on the basis of lowered mental standards, and 9 percent as medically remedial men. Of this total, approximately two-thirds of the new mental standards men went into the Army; 34,979 went into the Navy; 34,626 went into the Marine Corps; and 31,389 entered the Air Force.<sup>32</sup>

---

<sup>31</sup>Thomas G. Sticht, et al., *Cast-off Youth: Policy and Training Methods from the Military Experience*, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1987, p. 41.

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 41 – 42.

TABLE E-5

## MINIMUM APTITUDE REQUIREMENTS FOR INDUCTION (1963 THROUGH 1972)

Date	High school graduate	Minimum AFQT score	Additional tests
5/63 - 10/65	N/A	a. 31 b. 10 - 30	b. General Technical (GT) score of 80 + and 90 + in two or more AQB aptitude tests
11/65 - 3/66	Yes	a. 16 - 20 b. 10 - 15	b. GT score of 80 + and 90 + in two or more AQB aptitude tests
	No	c. 31 d. 10 - 30	d. GT score of 80 + and 90 + in two or more AQB aptitude tests
4/66 - 9/66	Yes	a. 16 - 20 b. 10 - 15	b. GT score N/A, 90 + in two or more AQB aptitude tests needed
	No	c. 21 - 30 d. 10 - 20	c. GT score N/A, 90 + in two or more AQB aptitude tests needed d. GT score of 80 + and 90 + in two or more AQB aptitude tests
10/66 - 11/66	Yes	a. 10 - 20	a. GT score N/A, 90 + in two or more AQB aptitude tests needed
	No	b. 21 - 30 c. 10 - 20	b. GT score N/A, 90 + in two or more AQB aptitude tests needed c. GT score of 80 + and 90 + in two or more AQB aptitude tests
12/66 - 6/72	Yes	a. 10 - 20 b. 31	a. No AQB tests needed
	No	c. 16 - 30 d. 10 - 15	c. 90 + score in one AQB aptitude test d. 90 + score in two AQB aptitude tests
7/72 - 12/72	Yes	a. 31 b. 21 - 30 c. 16 - 20	b. 90 + in one AQB aptitude test c. 90 + in two AQB aptitude tests
	No	d. 21 - 30 e. 16 - 20	d. 90 + in one AQB aptitude test e. GT 80 + and 90 + in two AQB aptitude tests

**Source:** Mark J. Eitelberg, et al; *Screening for Service: Aptitude and Education Criteria for Military Entry*, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics), and Human Resources Research Organization, September 1984, pp 138 - 139.

**Note:** N/A = Not available

While the new mental standards men registered lower performance levels than those entering military service fully qualified, their rate of success in completion of training was still acceptable. Over 94 percent of the new mental standards men completed basic training, compared with the completion rate of 97.5 percent for fully qualified individuals. The attrition rate during entry-level skill training for new mental standards men was notably higher than for fully qualified personnel – 10 percent versus 4 percent.

Records also indicated that the new mental standards men performed better in jobs emphasizing practical work not requiring significant reading or mathematical skills. Rates of advancement for the new standards men were generally slower than for fully qualified men but with notable differences observed among the Services. The Navy and the Air Force, both of which rely heavily on paper-and-pencil testing for advancement in grade, experienced much slower rates of advancement among the new standards men than did the Army and the Marine Corps. "Despite their slower progress in pay grade, in each branch of the service about 85 percent of the new standards men received a rating that classified their performance as good, highly effective, or better [at the end of 24 months in service]."33

New standards men also appear to have improved their prospects for employment following service. Opportunities for additional training using the GI Bill allowed these veterans to upgrade their education and employment skills. "They had greater rates of employment, higher-status jobs, and higher earnings per hour than similar groups of nonveterans, and this was true for both black and white veterans."34

## SUMMARY

The DoD historically has reduced accession standards for entering the military forces in time of war in order to meet the increased need for manpower. In peacetime, standards have tended to rise again (reflecting the reduced need for manpower). All three types of standards (medical, mental, and moral) have been modified to support the wartime manpower demand, with each standard being gradually lowered in stages as the demand continues. No preset minimum standard has been defined, with adjustments being made as the need arises. Changes tend to be made to the

---

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 52.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p. 64.

medical, mental, and moral standards concurrently, with the modified standards together intended to provide an increased pool of eligible manpower.

Experience has shown that while the military manpower accession system can produce and process the increased numbers of men acquired by the implementation of lowered accession standards, the armed forces have a more difficult time training and assigning these individuals. Identification of jobs appropriate for special standards personnel, and creation of alternative training regimens before the lowered standards are implemented, appear to have improved the integration of these personnel into military service.

## PART 2

### OVERVIEW OF CURRENT ACCESSION STANDARDS

This part of the appendix addresses the following areas:

- The purpose and current application of military manpower accession standards
- A description of the current peacetime and mobilization accession standards.

#### PURPOSE OF ACCESSION STANDARDS

Military manpower accession standards are the means by which DoD controls the *quality* of the personnel enlisted, inducted, appointed, or commissioned into military service, and the *rate* at which individuals enter the armed forces.

Accession standards are the terms of qualification according to which men and women may volunteer for membership in the armed forces or men may involuntarily be inducted into military service.<sup>35</sup> They are the mechanism used to eliminate those individuals who could be expected to be unsuccessful in the performance of normal military duties, and to select those capable of satisfactorily completing training and attaining a military career. They are also the mechanism used by the Federal Government to maintain an adequate flow of manpower to support wartime needs. As such, they are at times changed as manpower needs change.

Standards for accession have evolved as the tool for evaluating the capabilities of an individual in three major ways:

- Medical standards are used as the basis for evaluating the physical and psychological condition of the individual.
- Mental standards are used to determine the intellectual aptitude and "trainability" of the individual.
- Moral standards are used to assess the individual's self-discipline and social behavior.

---

<sup>35</sup>The focus of this study was the draft; therefore the ensuing discussion addresses accession standards as applicable to enlisted military personnel exclusively.

To accomplish this screening, a variety of tools and techniques have been developed. In some cases, the tools used today can only measure approximately the individual's actual capabilities. These approximations are made through the use of standardized testing or by attainment of specific documentation of success, such as a high school diploma. Accession standards are, in effect, the entrance examination for military service.

Because their needs are often different occupationally, the Services have the authority to develop their individual implementing regulations, which refine the basic standards established by DoD. While reiterating the basic medical, mental, and moral standards, the regulations provide further definition regarding Service-specific needs for physical capabilities, aptitudes, or limitations regarding civil or criminal offenses.

In addition to these standards, legal constraints are placed on the portion of the population that is eligible for military service. Both men and women between the ages of 17 (with parental consent) and 35 may now volunteer for entrance. Young men between the ages of 18 and 26 must also register with the SSS, forming the draft-eligible pool should conscription be reinstituted by Congress. Some of these peacetime requirements may be modified in time of war or mobilization.

An important factor in considering the accession standards is the distinction between their use in peacetime and their use in wartime. Peacetime accession standards represent the ideal individual, desirable for any of the armed forces. These same standards tend to be decremented during wartime, to allow somewhat less capable individuals to be inducted for service, usually for the duration of the conflict only. The degree to which standards are lowered is dependent on the nature and magnitude of the conflict.

In addition to these standards, DoD has a separate set of standards for retention of military personnel who have developed a physical infirmity while on active duty. These retention standards are distinct from the accession standards employed during peacetime or wartime.

All the standards and terms for membership in the armed forces are intended to support the DoD goals of having members who are representative of all segments of American society, and who are physically capable of carrying out the responsibilities and duties associated with military service; who have the intellectual capacity to be

trained in a needed occupation; who have the character to achieve the discipline necessary for the responsible conduct of their duties; and who do not have a history of repeated criminal offenses.

When the Army is small or manpower is plentiful, standards may be very high. It is then possible to require that a person be completely free of almost all physical and mental defects if he is to be accepted into the Army. As the need for men increases in time of war or national crisis, or when the size of the manpower pool decreases, standards . . . must be lowered to allow the induction of an adequate number of men. It is then that the standards must be formulated and administered with greatest care. When the standards are low, many people with physical defects will be inducted, but if the standards have been wisely devised and efficiently used, these people should be capable of making valuable contributions . . . without risk that they may become medical or financial burdens, or a danger to the health of others.<sup>36</sup>

## OVERVIEW OF CURRENT DoD MANPOWER ACCESSION STANDARDS

DoD currently uses three sets of standards for evaluating the suitability of an individual for accession in the Military Services:

- Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 6130.3, *Physical Standards for Enlistment, Appointment, and Induction*, 31 March 1986
- Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 1145.1, *Qualitative Distribution of Military Manpower*, 22 January 1986
- Title 10 U.S. C., Section 504, *Persons not Qualified* (for Military Service).

In peacetime, these sets of standards are implemented through the military manpower accession system, with each Service applying the basic standards, granting waivers for specific conditions, and applying any Service-unique requirements related to particular jobs. In wartime, the Military Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM) oversees application of the accession standards. As currently planned, wartime application of these standards occurs at the Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS), at the time the registrant is considered for acceptance into the armed forces. During previous conflicts, specifically during the Vietnam War, preinduction screening of individuals was conducted before call-up, with a review at the time of induction.

---

<sup>36</sup>Medical Department, U.S. Army, *Physical Standards in World War II*, Col. Robert S. Anderson, editor in chief; Wiltse, Charles M., editor for Physical Standards, Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1967, p. 1.



It is important to note in a discussion of accession standards that while the policies and procedures for applying the standards may differ in peace and war, OSD, as the oversight authority, makes no distinction between the accession standards to be used in peacetime or in wartime. Although history has demonstrated that in times of war, accession standards are lowered to expand the pool of eligible manpower, the changes to the standards are made only in response to the immediate need. The Army has developed a set of physical standards, endorsed by the other Services, for use in a mobilization. At the present time, however, there is no plan for implementing these standards in the event of mobilization. (These standards are addressed more fully in the discussion of physical standards, below.)

The three basic sets of standards currently used by DoD in acquiring military manpower are briefly described below.

### **Physical Standards**

DoD has defined the required physical capabilities of individuals in terms of physical conditions prohibiting the acceptance of a person into the armed forces, rather than an ideal level of physical capability for which each person should aim. DoDI 6130.3, *Physical Standards for Enlistment, Appointment and Induction*, 31 March 1986, is the primary guidance forming the foundation for determining of physical qualifications. This instruction defines the roles and responsibilities of DoD organizations and identifies prohibited conditions for all of the major physical functions. An assessment of the psychological well-being of the individual is one of the areas identified in these standards.

As shown in Part 1 of this appendix, the standards for evaluating the physical condition of a candidate for military service have evolved over time. The medical standards currently employed by DoD address an individual's physical condition in 19 major physical areas:

- Abdominal organs and gastrointestinal system
- Blood and blood-forming tissue diseases
- Dental
- Ears and hearing
- Endocrine and metabolic disorders

- Extremities
- Eyes and vision
- Genitourinary system
- Head and neck
- Height, weight, and body build
- Lungs, chest wall, pleura, and mediastinum
- Mouth, nose, sinuses, pharynx, trachea, and larynx
- Neurological disorders
- Mental disorders
- Skin and cellular tissues
- Spine, scapulae, ribs, and sacroiliac joints
- Systemic diseases and miscellaneous conditions and defects
- Tumors and malignant diseases
- Sexually transmitted diseases.

The physical standards promulgated by OSD have been defined with a peacetime perspective. The goal of the DoD military manpower physical accession standards in peacetime is the acquisition of personnel who will be able to perform a full range of military duties, with the potential of a long-term military career, without the need for extensive medical care and support due to pre-existing physical conditions. In peacetime, individuals not meeting specific minimum capabilities or having pre-existing physical conditions may be admitted to a Military Service on the basis of a waiver granted by the Secretary of that Service. Blanket waivers are generally not granted; instead, the Service may issue a notice of a modification of a specific term of the standards, such as a change to the minimum or maximum weight allowed.

The wartime medical standards have in the past been intended to support the induction of individuals with potentially significant physical conditions. In wartime, the issue has not been the individual's potential to achieve a long-term military career, but rather whether he has sufficient physical capability to be fully deployable, and to perform an adequate range of required military duties. Waivers for particular

conditions are still granted on a case-by-case basis; but this practice is sometimes augmented by many modifications implemented in response to significant increases in the demand for personnel.

DoD currently has two sets of medical standards available for use during wartime: the current DoDI 6130.3, and *Medical Fitness Standards for Mobilization*, developed by the Army and documented as Chapter 6 of Army Regulation (AR) 40-501, *Standards of Medical Fitness*.<sup>37</sup> These mobilization standards have been developed by the Army and subscribed to by the other Services. The mobilization standards are intended to define the absolute minimum physical capabilities acceptable for personnel entering the armed forces in wartime. As such, they define capabilities below any adjusted physical standards previously used. Under these standards, individuals with significantly more severe physical limitations are acceptable. As an example, while DoDI 6130.3 prohibits admission of most individuals with a missing hand or any portion of a hand missing, the mobilization standards prohibit admission of anyone having an "[amputated] arm or forearm if suitable prosthesis is not available, or double amputee regardless of available prostheses."

While the mobilization standards have been published, no guidance exists for determining the circumstances under which they would be invoked. It is also unclear whether the decision to implement them would be made by OSD or by the Services. AR 40-501 states that "These standards will be implemented only upon specific instruction from the Service secretaries, and will apply to personnel categories as directed, including recall of Army retirees for mobilization purposes."

In addition to confusion regarding the implementation of the mobilization standards, there is also uncertainty about how best to use the personnel who would qualify for the armed forces under them. When physically limited personnel have been inducted in previous wars, issues of training requirements and job assignment have become critical. Personnel admitted under the mobilization standards can represent potentially more significant limitations regarding job assignment than ever previously experienced by the armed forces. To date, the physical capabilities represented by the mobilization standards have not been related to specific jobs, so

---

<sup>37</sup>AR 40-501, *Standards of Medical Fitness*, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Issue Number 1, 1 July 1987.

that the Services have no plans for integrating personnel with significant physical limitations into their list of occupations.

A potential source of guidance for the problem of how best to use physically limited personnel may be found in the Services' planning for the use of disabled personnel, as defined in DoDD 1332.18, *Separation from the Military Service by Reason of Physical Disability*. This directive defines the circumstances and acceptable conditions under which a member of an armed force may be retained on active duty following the onset of a disability while in the Service. Service physical evaluation boards are tasked to decide whether an individual should be retained as a member of that Service. The board takes into account whether the condition

- Significantly interferes with the reasonable fulfillment of the purpose of the individual's employment in the Military Service
- May seriously compromise the health or well-being of the individual if he or she should remain in the Military Service
- May prejudice the best interests of the Government if the individual were to remain in the Military Service.

Preplanning for the employment of significant numbers of physically limited personnel is an important requirement for the implementation of significantly reduced physical standards.

### **Mental Standards**

The military manpower aptitude requirements, like the physical standards, are comprised of a combination of DoD-wide policy and Service-specific implementing standards. DoD sets out the policy regarding the minimum aptitude requirements for admission into the armed forces in DoDD 1145.1, *Qualitative Distribution of Military Manpower*, 22 January 1986. In addition, the Services define the minimum aptitude requirements for qualifying for particular training.

DoDD 1145.1 establishes the minimum aptitude test score for acceptance in the armed forces as a score of the 10<sup>th</sup> percentile in the AFQT. The AFQT test scores are categorized in one of six AFQT mental categories (see Table E-6).

TABLE E-6

## AFQT MENTAL CATEGORIES

Category	AFQT percentile scores
I	93 - 99
II	65 - 92
IIIA	50 - 64
IIIB	31 - 49
IV	10 - 30
V	1 - 9

Further, DoD policy allows for changes during mobilization:

Qualitative distribution of military manpower accessions may be instituted during any mobilization for which induction has been authorized by Congress [and]... shall be accomplished on an equitable basis in any of the aptitude groupings... by control of chargeable accessions to the active and Reserve Components of each Military Service.<sup>38</sup>

DoDD 1145.1 also reiterates the legal limits placed on the maximum proportion of AFQT Category IV personnel to be allowed in the armed forces. According to the directive, the FY81 Defense Authorization Act directs that "... the total number of AFQT Category IV enlistments and inductions may not exceed 20 percent of the total number of each Military Service's accession."

The basis of DoD's aptitude evaluation is the ASVAB. The ASVAB is comprised of 10 subtests:

- General Science
- Arithmetic Reasoning
- Word Knowledge
- Paragraph Comprehension

---

<sup>38</sup>DoDD 1145.1, *Qualitative Distribution of Military Manpower*, 22 January 1986, p. 2.

- Numerical Operations
- Coding Speed
- Auto and Shop Information
- Mathematics Knowledge
- Mechanical Comprehension
- Electronics Information.

Each of these tests is designed to evaluate the registrant's aptitude and knowledge in a particular area. The AFQT is calculated from the results of four of the ASVAB subtests: Arithmetic Reasoning, Word Knowledge, Paragraph Comprehension, and Mathematics Knowledge. In addition, the four Services use various combinations of the subtests and associated minimum scores as the basis for determining the person's qualification for specific occupational training.

The attainment of a high school diploma continues to be part of the aptitude screening criteria used for entering the armed forces. As set out in the FY81 Defense Authorization Act, the Army can accept no more than 35 percent of accessions classified as non-high school graduates.

### **Moral Standards**

The standards for screening the morality of individuals are based on Title 10, U.S.C., Section 504, *Persons not Qualified* (for Military Service). The law states that:

No person who is insane, intoxicated, or a deserter from an armed force, or who has been convicted of a felony, may be enlisted in any armed force. However, the Secretary concerned may authorize exceptions, in meritorious cases, for the enlistment of deserters and persons convicted of felonies.

The Military Selective Service Act, Title 50, U.S.C., Section 456, also addresses the issue of criminal behavior by prohibiting from service all those who have been convicted of a criminal offense " . . . punishable by death, or by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year."

There does not appear to be any OSD-level directive stating the policy regarding the moral standards to be used in screening persons for entrance into the Military Services. Rather, the Army regulation governing the MEPS, AR 601-270,

*Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS)*, 15 April 1986, is the primary regulation describing moral standards used in screening accessions.

As described by this regulation, registrants are unacceptable when:

... their record of convictions or adverse juvenile adjudications reflects frequent difficulties with law enforcement agencies, criminal tendencies, a history of antisocial behavior, alcoholism, drug abuse, sexual misconduct, or questionable moral behavior.<sup>39</sup>

Moral screening is based on the review of a personal background questionnaire and a state and Federal agency background review of the individual's civil and criminal record.

As noted in Title 10, U.S.C., Section 504, waivers may be granted for certain types of offenses. The Services' recruiting commands have control over the granting of waivers in this area.

---

<sup>39</sup>AR 601-270, *Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS)*, 15 April 1986, Chapter 9, Section III, "Determination of Moral Qualification and Waivers."

## **APPENDIX F**

### **SUPPORT CADRES**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

Throughout this report we have acknowledged the saturated condition of the Services' – principally the Army's – training base in the early days of mobilization according to present plans and the conditions anticipated. We have avoided placing further stress upon that training base in any of the draft system options presented in Chapter 5. Near the end of Chapter 4 we disclose the principal means we propose to use in providing for the many new draftees produced by any of the options chosen: support cadres. The purpose of this appendix is to describe in greater detail the cadres that will be necessary as part of any options representing a new, expanded use of draftees.<sup>1</sup>

The new draftees should be organized into squads, platoons, companies, and battalions. They will come to the organizations directly from the processing centers or stations of the Military Service into which they have just been inducted. The locations and number of these draftee organizations will be determined in peacetime on the basis of projected need. The suggested organization of a company of the new draftees is shown in Figure F-1.

#### **COMMAND AND CONTROL CADRES**


The new draftees are members of a military force. The organization is a traditional one for the control, movement, and work of military people. The leaders of the draftees are the command and control cadre. The cadre's duties amount to overall supervision, leadership, and coordination of movements and schedules for training and work. Since the administration of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) is in the hands of this cadre, it may be desirable that the draftees receive their training in UCMJ from the command and control cadre. Figure F-2 shows the

---


<sup>1</sup>The terminology used in this appendix reflects Army, Navy, and Marine Corps organizational use. Air Force terms such as squadron and element can be substituted easily as required.



suggested manning of a new draftee company by 35 command and control cadre personnel. The company's total complement will average 190 to 200 personnel.



**FIG. F-1. TYPICAL LABOR COMPANY OF ABOUT 160 DRAFTEES  
(Less cadre)**



**FIG. F-2. TYPICAL LABOR COMPANY WITH CONTROL CADRE**

## **Platoon Cadre**

Six military people, probably all noncommissioned or petty officers, are suggested for each platoon. One platoon commander, one assistant commander, and four squad leaders should suffice for each platoon of four squads.

## **Company Headquarters Cadre**

About 11 military persons should staff the headquarters of each labor company. A company commander, second-in-command, first sergeant (or Chief Petty Officer), two clerks (who may be draftees), three noncommissioned or petty officers (to coordinate work plans and transportation), and three supply personnel (unless the supply function is performed by another organization or by contractor) comprise the staff. No food service or motor transport – including maintenance – workers are suggested, because these services should probably be supplied by another organization or by contractors.

## **Battalion Headquarters Cadre**

Each battalion headquarters should have a small command section and three working staff sections: personnel, operations and training, and supply (which will be very small if the supply work is performed by others). A total staff of about 24 to 28 should be adequate.<sup>2</sup> No health care staff is suggested, because that service should be provided by others. When the command and control cadre is added to the draftees, the total for each four-company battalion will just exceed 800 personnel.


## **TEACHING CADRE**

The training or teaching of the new draftees – except for training in the UCMJ – will be accomplished by a teaching cadre, which is separate from the command and control cadre. For the sake of economy of effort, this cadre should be coordinated and managed at battalion level (unless there are too few companies of new draftees required at an installation to warrant a battalion headquarters). Figure F-3 shows the suggested arrangement.

If the new draftees are to receive orientation training only, the teaching cadre should number about 35 officers and noncommissioned or petty officers (eight per

---

<sup>2</sup>The requirement for several cadre members may be saved in the battalion headquarters if, as is the case in each company headquarters, draftees are used as clerks.



**FIG. F-3. LABOR BATTALION, SHOWING LOCATION OF TEACHING CADRE**

company plus a control group of three). A teaching group of that size will permit simultaneous – and therefore rapid – instruction of each of the 16 separate platoons of the entire battalion. Once the orientation training is completed and the draftees begin work at a number of locations throughout the installation, the duties of the teaching cadre change to providing help in acclimating these new military workers to their assorted jobs. Job supervisors are assisted by the teaching cadre in on-the-job training, where possible. After this initial surge of training, the teaching cadre can be reduced to a size needed to sustain skills already learned.

If more extensive training than the simple, 1-week orientation is required, the size of the teaching cadre must be increased accordingly.

### **CADRE SOURCES**

Two pools of pretrained military manpower should provide adequate quantities of cadre personnel: military retirees and Individual Ready Reserve members whose specialties are surplus to early wartime needs. These cadre jobs are well-suited to military retirees, many of whom are working or have retired from jobs requiring skills in management or coordination, rather than in technical fields.

## PEACETIME PREPARATION

Peacetime efforts required to prepare for the building of these cadres are complex, and they need to be coordinated carefully with DoD's other wartime manpower utilization plans. These efforts must begin with a master plan based on the projected, installation-by-installation need for new draftees produced by the draft system options DoD decides to execute. The make-up and detail of that master plan are proper subjects for later planning work. That planning work depends, of course, on just which of our recommendations are accepted.

# REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved  
OPM No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources gathering, and maintaining the data needed, and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave Blank)		2. REPORT DATE Feb 90		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Final	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Expanded Use of Draftees				5. FUNDING NUMBERS C MDA903-85-C-0139 PE 0902198D	
6. AUTHOR(S) Dayton S. Pickett, Patricia I. Hutzler, John R. Brinkerhoff, David A. Smith					
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Logistics Management Institute 6400 Goldsboro Road Bethesda, MD 20817-5886				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER LMI-FP801R1	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Dr. Sellman OASD(FM&P) The Pentagon Washington, D.C. 20301				10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution unlimited				12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)  The nation's need for defense manpower in the event of a major war cannot adequately be met by present arrangement, including activation of the current draft system. Of particular concern is the requirement for filling more than 300,000 Defense billets marked for civilian occupancy in DoD's support base during the first 30 days of hostilities. Plans for meeting the need with new hires are likely to fail.  Expansion of the military draft can solve the problem. Military power – provided quickly and with minimal training – can be used to fill positions requiring little skill and experience. Properly designed, an expanded draft also can produce skilled and experienced manpower for more demanding positions. In the support base, barriers between "civilian" and "military" positions are largely arbitrary, and it is both legal and feasible to fill both kinds of positions with military personnel.  But the arrangements to do so are difficult. A major overhaul of the draft system and a blending of the civilian and military manpower planning systems are required.  We describe 13 options open to DoD. They begin with the present draft and progress through draft options of increasing complexity and difficulty of implementation. Ten options are designed to be implemented in addition to the present draft. The final two options are intended to supplant present draft plans.					
14. SUBJECT TERMS Manpower, military draft				15. NUMBER OF PAGES 215	
				16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL		