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EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND SOVIET BEHAVIOR

Roy F. Phillips

December 1988

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PREFACE

This paper resulted from an exploratory project, undertaken in 1983, to consider the connections between East-West economic relations, on the one hand, and Soviet international behavior, on the other. At the start of the project, I asked Roy Phillips, a graduate fellow in the RAND Graduate School, to review the writings and statements of several well-known policy makers and commentators, chosen to reflect various parts of the political spectrum. The aim of this review was to try to derive from remarks, comments, and assertions by these sources the precise, though typically implicit, relationships they posited between various external economic variables (such as trade, credits, etc.) and Soviet behavior. This draft summarizes Mr. Phillips' work in its original form. The work was interrupted by Mr. Phillips' temporary departure from RGS for an internship at the North Atlantic Assembly in Brussels, Belgium. When he returned to RGS, Roy became involved in other RAND research that led to completion of his Ph.D. dissertation at RGS, *European Reserve Forces and the Conventional Defense of Europe*.

The original paper was completed in November 1983, and is being issued at the present time, without changes from the original text, because of the renewed--indeed, increased--current interest and relevance of the subject.

The project originally received support from a grant to RAND and the RAND Graduate School by The Ford Foundation for research and training relating to security and arms control.

Charles Wolf, Jr.
December 15, 1988

SUMMARY

Actors in the international arena sometimes design policies to influence the behavior of other nations. Difficulty lies in determining actual cause-and-effect relationships. This difficulty is strikingly observed in discussion surrounding the effect of Western economic policies on the behavior of the Soviet Union. Do our economic policies actually affect the foreign, military, and domestic actions of the Soviet Union? The choice of policies is influenced by the implicit answer to this question. Unfortunately, for the observer, convoluted prose and comments often cloud what particular commentators perceive to be the precise relationship between policy and behavior. This study attempts to extract the precise relationships from the clouded prose, and to express them as formal, causal models.

One independent and three dependent variables were used in the modeling process. The independent variable, economic relations, consisted of three components: Western trade, credits, and investment. In principle, any or several of these could be used to measure "economic relations." The dependent variables were Soviet military policy, foreign policy, and domestic policy. Military policy was considered in terms of strategic and conventional forces; foreign policy in terms of military aid and aggression; and domestic policy in terms of human rights.

Statements and writings of six prominent people--George Ball, Henry Kissinger, Samuel Huntington, Marshall Shulman, Richard Pipes, and Hans-Dietrich Genscher--were analyzed to illustrate the method. The period investigated spanned the time immediately before detente (1968) to 1982. The individuals whose positions were examined represented sharply different points of view.

The method of analysis clarifies the personal tendencies of these six commentators to view economic relations as having the capacity to generate either positive or negative Soviet behavior. Positive behavior, e.g. strategic force reductions, is considered behavior

conducive to relations with the West. Similarly, negative behavior is that which would be perceived as non-conducive to relations with the West, i.e., military force improvements, military assistance to allies and support of aggression. In clarifying the premises guiding Western economic policies toward the Soviet Bloc, my hope is that the method will assist in focusing a debate that is typically, and unfortunately, shrouded in ambiguity.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Influential political strategists, both in the United States and Western Europe, have sometimes suggested that Western economic policies could, to some degree, influence the foreign policy, military policy, and/or domestic policy of the Soviet Union. These views raise a number of questions.

Do U.S. and West European external economic policies actually affect the foreign policies or behavior of the Soviet Union? For example, if the West were to promote increased trade with the East, would the Soviet Union's foreign policy tend toward cooperation with the West, or toward the pursuit of or support of aggression in the Third World?

Would expansion of economic relations with the West lead to increases or decreases in Soviet military expenditures? For example, would increased trade lead to improvements in Soviet military capabilities, or would the benefits of trade translate more into improvements in the living standard of the Soviet consumer?

Concerning possible effects on Soviet domestic policies, would non-restrictive trade practices by the West lead the Soviets to relax controls and persecution of dissidents, or have no effect? For example, would expanded economic relations promote increased emigration from the Soviet Union?

From the often convoluted comments of policymakers, academics, and the media, it is usually difficult to unravel the precise answers that are implied.

This study attempts to model the answers and causal relationships that are implied in statements by several influential observers over the past fifteen years. The aim of the analysis is to express the implicit relationships so they might, in principle at least, be testable, while staying as close to the original formulation as is consistent with this aim. In the process, some of the nuances are lost as part of the price of avoiding the ambiguities expressed in the original formulations. It

is hoped that the richness that is lost is outweighed by a clearer presentation of the basic hypotheses.

The sample has been selected principally to illustrate the method, and second, to suggest the wide range of implicit hypotheses advanced with respect to these issues. Differing policy positions usually reflect this range of implicit hypotheses. Pessimists about the effect of trade on Soviet behavior base their policy positions on the hypothesis that trade increases the capabilities of the Soviet Union to pursue anti-Western activity. Optimists base their policy positions on the argument that trade causes evolution toward a more liberal economic system, and a recognition in the long-run of the similarities between peoples of the Soviet Union and the West. A third group of commentators base their policy positions on the argument that the Soviets are cognizant of the benefits and costs associated with particular policy choices. Behavior can thus be influenced through an explicit linkage between it and trade policy.

Section II describes a general model for evaluating the causal relationships implied by verbal answers to the questions above. Section III applies the model to particular individuals. The main conclusions are presented in Section IV.

II. MODEL

The model expresses the effect on Soviet behavior of economic relations with the West, allowing for the separate effects of other variables. In formulating the model, I do not pretend that the complex relationships and interactions that are involved can be "fitted" or estimated with the precision that mathematical symbols imply. In this instance, such an implication is surely unwarranted. As one reads through the voluminous literature on this subject, one is struck by the looseness and confusing complexity that hides as often as it reveals the essential behavioral relationships in the commentator's mind. The model is of use in sifting and specifying these relationships.

The model can be summarized as follows:

$$B_{i,T} = B(E_{j,T-t}, X)$$

where,

B = Soviet behavior

i = dimensions of Soviet behavior, (i.e. military, foreign, domestic)

T = time when the behavior is observed

E = economic relations

j = dimensions of economic relations (i.e. trade, credit, investment)

t = lag between economic relations and behavioral effect

X = vector of other variables influencing Soviet behavior

Soviet behavior is divided into three major variables--military policy, foreign policy, and domestic policy. Each of these variables can be thought of as a vector of component variables comprising a particular policy. For example, military policy can be construed in

terms of strategic forces and conventional forces; foreign policy in terms of external military aid and aggression; and domestic policy in terms of human rights.

Economic relations is construed as a vector of three variables: Western trade, credits, and investment. Government efforts to promote or impede one of these component variables are often linked to the promotion or impedance of the others. I have therefore reduced these to a single economic variable when the model is applied.

Many factors are included in the vector X. For example, X should include non-economic relations with other nations; the historical, cultural, and societal characteristics of the Soviet Union; internal political and economic circumstances; and the personal inclinations of the leadership.

Relationships between the independent economic variable and the dependent behavioral variables may be either positive, negative or zero.¹ Our analysis illustrates the implied signs, but not their magnitudes. For non-zero relationships, the independent variable may be contemporaneous or lagged.

The rationale for including each variable was based on its components. The independent components were viewed as having the potential, through explicit government policy, to affect the dependent components. The following explanations offer an indication how, in principle, each item might be measured, or at least thought about.

Economic Relations

- Trade--the exchange of consumer and high technology goods, machinery, and agricultural products, measured in constant dollars.
- Credit--extensions to the Soviet Union, measured in constant dollars.
- Investment--in Soviet industry, measured in constant dollars.

¹More precisely, $\frac{\partial B}{\partial E} > 0$

Military Policy

- Strategic Forces--may be considered in terms of the number and type of missile launchers and warheads, and the accuracy (CEP) of the associated delivery systems.
- Conventional Forces--may be measured qualitatively and quantitatively. The morale and leadership of military forces would be qualitative measures of potential military performance. Military equipment per se (e.g. tanks, military transports, and fighter-airplanes), would lend itself to quantifiable measures.

Foreign Policy

- Military Aid--may be considered in terms of amount of military equipment delivered to client states. The number of military troops and/or advisors might also be useful measures of military aid.
- Aggression--may be considered as the military invasion and subjugation of another country (e.g., Afghanistan), or support of the same by a client state (e.g., Vietnam--Cambodia).

Domestic Policy

- Human Rights--may be considered in terms of three components: emigration, dissident treatment, and the severity of internal control. Emigration may be viewed in terms of the number of exit visas issued and the number of persons leaving the country. Dissident treatment and the severity of internal government control, because of their ambiguous natures, are not so easily measured. Commentaries by political dissidents (in the Soviet Union) and emigrants might permit a qualitative evaluation to be made.

In deriving relationships between economic relations and Soviet behavior, the behavioral variables were formulated so that, from a Western perspective, positive relationships are viewed as desirable and negative relationships are viewed as undesirable. Thus, for example, strategic forces is formulated as *fewer* strategic forces and human rights is formulated as *more* human rights.

III. APPLICATION AND EVIDENCE

Statements and writings of six people--George Ball, Henry Kissinger, Samuel Huntington, Marshall Shulman, Richard Pipes and Hans-Dietrich Genscher--have been analyzed to illustrate the method. The period under investigation spans the time immediately before detente to the present, from 1968 to 1982. The individuals whose positions are examined represent sharply different points of view. The Americans are presented chronologically to match their views with the years in which they were most influential.

The modeling process for each individual is divided into two parts. In the first, "Application," the general beliefs of the individual are noted. Then a summary of the implied causal relationships is presented in tabular form. In each table the relationship between the dependent behavioral variables, and independent economic variable, is shown. The second part, "Evidence," presents the specific quotations used to derive the imputed causal relationships.

GEORGE BALL

Application

George Ball has been an influential proponent of East-West economic relations since the late 1960s. He feels that while Soviet and Western ideologies differ, a free polling of the Soviet public would discern a majority of pro-marketeers in favor of de-nationalization. Liberal trade policies would therefore encourage an evolution in economic decisionmaking away from the Communist Party cadres toward managers. Internal and external change would occur with this evolution. Internally decentralization would yield a greater appreciation for domestic human rights. Externally, the movement toward a Western-style economic system would yield greater political cooperation with the West.

Ball perceives behavioral changes occurring essentially in the long term (through economic change). His views can be summarized as follows¹:

¹Ball perceives no relationship between variables in the short term.

MILITARY POLICY

FOREIGN POLICY

DOMESTIC POLICY

Fewer Strat. Forces	Fewer Conventional Forces	Less Milit. Assist.	Less Aggression	More Human Rights
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Ball

Economic Relations	+	+		+	+		+
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The positive signs indicate that Ball perceives a positive relationship between variables (e.g. improved economic relations, he contends, ultimately reduce strategic force levels). This recording device will be used in each of the following "Application" sections to summarize the causal relationships implied by the verbal statements of the person who is being analyzed. Positive signs (+) are used to indicate a positive relationship between variables (e.g. when improved economic relations are believed to decrease strategic force levels). Zeros (0) are used to indicate no relationship between variables.

Evidence

The following statements, which illustrate Ball's philosophy, were made before the Senate Subcommittee on International Finance during hearings on East-West trade on June 4, 1968:

[N]one of these [trade] restrictions contributes in any material way to the weakening of the Communist system or to impeding or impairing the warmaking ability of the Communist nations. . . . [T]he United States did [at one time] have the ability by unilateral action to deny certain articles and equipment and technology to Communist countries. But those days are gone, probably forever. . . . [W]e can no longer, merely by our own unilateral action, limit the economic strength of the Communist countries in any significant way, nor can we obtain the cooperation of other nations in a combined effort that might yield significant results except with respect to items on the Cocom list.² (p. 30)

²In this statement Ball implies that there is no relationship

I can think of nothing more useful, from the American point of view, than for the ordinary Soviet citizen to acquire mobility--to be able to move about and learn at firsthand that the world is not like the picture painted in Soviet propaganda. If we are right--as I am sure we are--in believing that a monolithic Communist system depends on the blind adherence of people who are forbidden the knowledge of a larger world, then we have every reason to wish to open the windows and let in some light and air. Mobility is a long step in that direction. . . . I think, therefore, that the Congress should remove the restriction on the extension of our Export-Import Bank credits. In addition I think it should authorize the President to accord most-favored-nation treatment to imports from Communist countries when he feels that it is in our national interest to do so.³ (p. 31)

I firmly believe that commerce is one way in which more normal relations can be created between countries and therefore the exchange of ideas can be promoted. . . . We are going to sit for quite a long period of time with a considerable tension and the only hope in the long future is for changes to take place in the Communist countries, very slowly, over generations. . . .⁴ (p. 34)

My own feeling is that had [all the Western European countries adopted our policies of restricting trade with Eastern Europe, then] we would have done the Stalinist forces a favor in the whole communist system. We would have made it much harder for the more liberal forces to begin to move and show themselves in Eastern European countries.⁵ (p. 41)

[W]e see emerging in the Soviet Union, and even faster in Eastern Europe, a kind of modified market mechanism. They are

between American trade with the Soviets and the size of their military forces. In the following pages, the model presented in Section II will be used to illustrate (in footnotes) hypothesized relationships between variables. If a particular time frame is implied, it will be subscripted on the dependent variable. For this quotation (where no time frame is indicated) the following convention would be observed: Fewer Military Forces $\neq f(\text{Trade})$.

³More Human Rights = + $f(\text{Trade})$.

⁴Reduced Tension_{Long-term} = + $f(\text{Trade})$. Reduced tension implies: reduced military forces, cooperative foreign policies, and recognition of basic human rights.

⁵Ball does not make an explicit connection here. He implies that the strength of Stalinist forces in the Soviet Union is negatively correlated with trade volume. Underlying his statement is the belief that by definition Stalinism is poorly disposed to human rights. Thus his underlying contention is: More Human Rights = + $f(\text{Trade})$.

finding out that by letting the market do the pricing for them, determine the prices and thus adjust the production, are they able to make the machinery work in a way that isn't monstrously inefficient. . . . Once they break this monolithic control from the center, where a small body of men make all of the economic decisions, then they also set in motion forces which are going to decentralize political decisions. . . . And over time, with the exchange of ideas and the compulsion to imitate the West [we] will begin to see people who are not orthodox, rigid adherents to the Communist church. [T]his will take time. It will be stimulated by contacts with the West through businessmen talking to businessmen, through industrialists talking to industrialists.⁶ (pp. 38-39)

HENRY KISSINGER

Application

Dr. Henry Kissinger, and the theory of detente, dominated American foreign policy during the Nixon and Ford years. Kissinger's views on East-West economic relations differ from those of Ball in that his choice of policy does not follow directly from the belief that trade generates good behavior. Instead he argues that American trade policy should reward good Soviet behavior and penalize adverse behavior. Over time, as these penalties and rewards have their effect, larger increments of trade should yield larger or continuous increments of good Soviet behavior.

Kissinger linked improved economic relations with Soviet restraint in foreign policy (specifically in the Middle East, Berlin, and Southeast Asia) and strategic arms limitations. He also expected higher emigration levels as a by-product of the detente process. Kissinger's perceptions can be summarized as follows⁷:

⁶In this statement Ball ties together a number of functional relationships to arrive at his underlying conclusion. He implies that trade will stimulate contact between businessmen from East and West. Through these contacts Soviet and East European businessmen will recognize the advantages of and ultimately adopt the efficiency of the market mechanism. As the market decentralizes business decisionmaking so will political decisionmaking be decentralized. The functional relationships hypothesized in this statement end here; but the implication does not. Ball's implication is that anything that is less communist must be more pro-Western. As such his underlying conclusion is: (Arms Control, Foreign Policy Restraint, Human Rights) Long-term = + f(Trade).

⁷Kissinger's writings suggest his belief that these relationships could be induced in both the short and the long term.

MILITARY POLICY		FOREIGN POLICY		DOMESTIC POLICY
Fewer Strat. Forces	Fewer Conventional Forces	Less Milit. Assist.	Less Aggression	More Human Rights

Kissinger

Economic Relations	+	+	+	+	+
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Evidence

The following quotations, taken from two books, *White House Years* (WHY), published in 1979, and *Years of Upheaval* (YOU), published in 1982, underscore his philosophy:

My own view was of a piece with my general attitude. Given Soviet needs, expanding trade without a political quid pro quo was a gift; there was very little the Soviet Union could do for us economically. It did not seem to me unreasonable to require Soviet restraint in such trouble spots as the Middle East, Berlin, and Southeast Asia in return.⁸ (WHY, pp. 152-153)

Our strategy was to use trade concessions as a political instrument. Withholding them when Soviet conduct was adventurous and granting them in measured doses when the Soviets behaved cooperatively. In general, we favored projects that required enough time to complete for us to have continued leverage on Soviet conduct.⁹ (WHY, p. 840)

[My belief was] better political relations lead to improved trade.¹⁰ (WHY, p. 154)

[With respect to linkage and U.S.-Soviet relations, our idea was that] we would, in short, make economic relations depend on some demonstrated progress on matters of foreign policy importance to the United States.¹¹ (WHY, p. 1134)

⁸Trade = + f(Soviet Foreign Policy Restraint).

⁹Trade Concessions = + f(Cooperative Soviet Behavior).

¹⁰Trade = + f(Better Political Relations).

¹¹Trade = + f(Foreign Policy Cooperation).

The Nixon Administration held to its course. We eased restrictions [on trade and credits] slightly after the first breakthrough in SALT in May 1971 and the completion of the Berlin negotiations in August of that year. Only after the 1972 Moscow summit did we agree to a progressive improvement--always taking care to relate our moves to Soviet restraint in foreign affairs. We granted credits only to specific projects, never on a blanket basis. The Soviets were given to understand that our relative flexibility would not survive a foreign policy challenge.¹² (YOU, p. 247)

The pro-trade coalition of liberals and entrepreneurs was gradually overtaken by another grouping of conservatives and liberals who sought to hold East-West trade as hostage to changes in Soviet emigration policy. They accepted our doctrine of linkage but gave it its most extreme formulation--far beyond the original intention. Concessions on trade were now related not to Soviet foreign policy, with which we agreed, but to Soviet domestic practices.¹³ (YOU, pp. 248-249)

[With respect to the domestic policies of the Soviet Union] we proceeded without publicity, calculating that the Soviets could alter practices within their domestic jurisdiction more easily if they were not overtly challenged. Starting in 1969, I approached Dobrynin with the proposition that we would take note of any voluntary Soviet regard for the moral concerns of our people with respect to Soviet emigration practices. The effort was low-key but persistent; we sought action, not acclaim. Whether as a result of our representations or for reasons of its own that it did not divulge to us, Moscow changed its emigration policy. Whereas only 400 Soviet Jews had been allowed to emigrate in 1968, the number rose to nearly 35,000 in 1973.¹⁴ (YOU, p. 249)

SAMUEL HUNTINGTON

Application

Dr. Samuel Huntington was coordinator of security planning at the National Security Council during 1977-1978. He feels that the United States, through economic diplomacy, can induce Soviet restraint in foreign policy, cooperation in arms control, and support of human

¹²Reductions in Trade Restrictions = + f(Foreign Affairs Cooperation, Strategic Arms Limitations).

¹³Trade Concessions = + f(Foreign Policy Cooperation).

¹⁴Economic Relations = + f(Human Rights).

rights. Huntington's "economic diplomacy" is similar to Kissinger's notion of inducing Soviet good behavior by linking actions to rewards and penalties. Huntington's long-term behavioral views can therefore be summarized as follows¹⁵:

	MILITARY POLICY		FOREIGN POLICY		DOMESTIC POLICY	
	Fewer Strat. Forces	Fewer Conventional Forces	Less Milit. Assist.	Less Aggression	More Human Rights	
Huntington						
Economic Relations	+	+		+	+	+

Evidence

Two works were used to model Huntington's beliefs. The first was his 1978 *Foreign Policy* article entitled "Trade, Technology and Leverage: Economic Diplomacy" (TTL), and the second, a chapter from *The Strategic Imperative* entitled "The Renewal of Strategy" (ROS), published in 1982.

In the following four statements Huntington brings forth his convictions that economic relations can affect Soviet behavior:

It is often alleged that economic leverage is impossible because Soviet foreign trade is so small compared to its gross national product. In fact . . . imports are crucial to many key aspects of the Soviet economy.¹⁶ (TTL, pp. 71-72)

Another misconception is that the potential for economic leverage, even if it exists, cannot be translated into effective pressure against the Soviets, because they will not make political concessions for economic purposes. . . . [However,] the deepening economic problems that they confront will increase the value of the economic benefits that the West

¹⁵Huntington, like Kissinger, believes these relationships can be induced in both the short and the long term.

¹⁶For this statement, and the three following, the causal relationship would be: Soviet Behavior = non-zero f(U.S. Trade).

can offer and, presumably, the price they may be willing to pay to get those benefits. (TTL, pp. 72-73)

The argument is also made that any U.S. effort to use economic leverage against the Soviet Union will be undermined by the Soviet ability to get whatever it wants from Western Europe or Japan. In several critical areas, however . . . the United States has a virtual monopoly. (TTL, p. 73)

Finally, the argument has been advanced that . . . the United States should only use economic pressure or leverage to counter economic moves by the Soviet Union. [This logic denies] the United States the ability to capitalize on its strengths (TTL, p. 74)

The following statements underline Huntington's belief in specific causal relationships:

[One of the components of Presidential Directive No. 18 was] that American policy in the economic sphere should reflect the mixed cooperative-and-competitive nature of the U.S.-Soviet relationship and the distribution of economic strength and technological superiority to encourage Soviet cooperation in resolving regional conflicts, reducing tensions, and achieving adequately verifiable arms control agreements. [President Carter] said that these advantages, together with other means if necessary, should be used to counterbalance adverse Soviet influence in key areas of the world and to promote human rights and national independence. In short, economic capabilities and economic relations must serve the basic U.S. foreign policy objectives of encouraging East-West cooperation, containing Soviet expansion, and promoting American values.¹⁷ (TTL, pp. 64-65)

[For the United States,] the central need is to provide the president with the means to engage in creative and flexible economic diplomacy with the Soviets. . . . [T]he United States can capitalize on its economic resources in its relations with the Soviets, either to induce them to be cooperative, where that is possible, or to compete with them more successfully, when that is necessary. I am not issuing a call for a return to economic warfare; nor am I espousing economic laissez faire in relations with the Soviets. I am saying that we should be prepared to engage in economic diplomacy.¹⁸ (TTL, p. 79)

¹⁷Foreign Policy Cooperation, Arms Control, Human Rights = + f(Economic Relations).

¹⁸Cooperative Soviet Behavior = + f(Economic Relations).

An economic deterrent policy might involve proposing to the Soviets the following: 1. . . . the removal of satellite military personnel from Afghanistan, Southwest Asia, the Arabian peninsula, and the Horn of Africa. 2. Western governments should undertake to promote . . . [trade with and investment in] . . . the Soviet Union. 3. If the Soviets turn down this proposal or refuse to negotiate seriously concerning it, the [West should severely restrict: trade with; investment in; and credits to] the Soviet Union.¹⁹ (ROS, p. 18)

MARSHALL SHULMAN

Application

Marshall Shulman was a Special Adviser to the Secretary of State on Soviet Affairs in the Carter Administration. He believes Soviet behavior can be separated into the pursuit of primary and secondary objectives. The former directly influences the security of the Soviet Union, the latter indirectly. Shulman feels matters of primary importance--military policy and foreign policy toward contiguous states--cannot be affected by economic relations. He feels matters of secondary importance--human rights and foreign policy toward non-contiguous states--can, however, be affected by economic relations. His perceptions are modeled as follows²⁰:

¹⁹Economic Relations = - f(Military Assistance and Aggression). With this statement Huntington recognizes the Kissinger notion that there may be a second, variable-transposed equation in operation. His general thrust, however, remains that of using economic relations to influence behavior.

²⁰For Shulman these relationships are operative in both the short and the long term.

MILITARY POLICY		FOREIGN POLICY		DOMESTIC POLICY
Fewer Strat. Forces	Fewer Conventional Forces	Less Milit. Assist.	Less Aggression	More Human Rights

Shulman

Economic Relations	0	0	0 or +	0 or +	+
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Evidence

Six sources were used to model Shulman's hypothesized relationships between variables. These included his 1973 *Foreign Affairs* article "Toward a Western Philosophy of Coexistence," and statements in Congressional testimony from 1976 to 1980.²¹ The following statements

²¹The sources used were:

(1973), Marshall Shulman, "Toward a Western Philosophy of Coexistence," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall, 1973, pp. 35-58.

(1976), "American Role in East-West Trade," *Hearings Before Senate Commerce Committee*, January 30, 1976, pp. 166-170.

(1977), "The Soviet Union: Internal Dynamics of Foreign Policy, Present and Future," *Hearings Before House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East*, Sept./Oct. 1977, pp. 287-326 and 332-333.

(1978), "United States-Soviet Relations, 1978," *Hearings Before House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East*, Aug./Sept. 1978, pp. 131-171 and 176-192.

(1979), "United States Policy and United States-Soviet Relations, 1979," *Hearings Before House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East*, October 16, 1979, pp. 1-51.

(1980), "East-West Relations in the Aftermath of the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan," *Hearings Before House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East*, January 30, 1980, pp. 25-73.

underlie Shulman's philosophy with respect to the influence of economic relations on foreign policy:

If we were to withhold trade and investment in the expectation that it would oblige the Soviet Union to institute fundamental economic reforms, this would be a risky course, and the consequences would be unpredictable, whereas the influx of American technology and businessmen is more likely over a period of time to encourage internal pressures for modernized administration, some decentralization in planning, and a greater reliance upon market mechanisms.²² (1973, pp. 55-56)

As I mentioned in my prepared statement, the relations we develop now can have a significant influence on the policy preferences of the next generation of Soviet leaders. One way to encourage their receptiveness to modernizing rather than orthodox trends (or, as you put it, toward liberalization) is to promote trade, business, cultural and professional relationships now. I think we must recognize, however that the Soviet perception of their national security situation will also influence their attitudes toward the West, and there are a host of other domestic factors over which we have little control. (1977, p. 332)

[Modernization is defined as] movements toward the use of market mechanisms or incentives. (1977, p. 309)

A modest affirmative response, in grain, consumer goods and machinery, with the prospect of a gradually upward-sloping increase over the years, involving an increasing mix of long-term investments in jointly financed resource-development projects, would represent a conservative course, and would hold out a continuing incentive to the Soviet leadership to conduct itself with restraint.²³ (1973, p. 55)

Whether they will tend to move toward nationalism and orthodoxy, or toward Western-style modernization, we cannot now predict. All that we can say, perhaps, is that to the extent they see their interest in a responsible involvement of their country on the world economy and the world community, they should not feel from what we do or say that this option is closed to them. (1977, p. 300)

²²In this, and the following two statements, Shulman brings forth his belief that trade leads to economic reform (toward use of market mechanisms) in the Soviet Union. $\text{Market Economy} = + f(\text{Trade})$.

²³In this, and the following five quotes, Shulman relates trade and the resulting economic reform to restraint in foreign policy. $\text{Foreign Policy Restraint}_{\text{Long-term}} = + f(\text{Trade})$.

But perhaps the most important element and this is one that seems plausible to me is that to the extent that there was the possibility of increasing the flow of goods to the Soviet Union, creating an economic interest on the part of the Soviet Union in the maintenance of a relationship of low tension, this would strengthen their incentive for behavior with constraint in the crisis areas of the world. (1976, p. 168)

In my own view what we ought to project is an upward slope, perhaps over a 15- or 20-year period in which there would be a gradual increase in the volume of trade and a change in mix, with the most advanced technology down the road, 5 years, 10 years, 15 years, with the understanding that progress along the upward slope would depend on responses of restraint by the Soviet Union in crisis areas. It would be difficult for us to move up that slope if the Soviet Union were to behave provocatively in crisis areas. (1976, p. 169)

Suppose the 1974 Trade Reform Act had turned out differently, the 1972 trade agreement had been in place and we had a modest level of economic relations with them and MFN and EximBank credits. We would have had a positive incentive for the Soviet Union. We would have had an instrumentality in our hands which could be adjusted if we judged that the Soviet Union was exacerbating local conflicts. One of the unfortunate aspects of the collapse of that effort is we have been deprived of such an instrument. If, for example, the Soviet Union is considering what to send in the way of weapons or military personnel to Nkomo or Mozambique in the southern part of Africa, the Soviet Union will carefully weigh what are the disadvantages. If they know that a lack of restraint in that regard could cost something that mattered to them, they might exercise more restraint than they do now.²⁴ (1979, p. 16)

Foreign trade prospects could reinforce tendencies of the new [succession Soviet] leadership toward policies of liberalization and decentralization. Conversely, a poor outlook for foreign trade could be a factor contributing to decisions toward greater centralization and control.²⁵ (1978, p. 180)

[With respect to the impact of our human rights policy on human rights in the Soviet Union] I think one can only tell after the passage of some years, whether the long-term effect

²⁴Restraint in Africa = + f(Trade).

²⁵In this, and the following two quotes, Shulman relates trade with human rights. Human Rights = + f(Trade).

of it will be to encourage an observance of international norms in this country. My own faith and belief is that will be the case.²⁶ (1978, p. 170)

[We have an] overriding objective of gradually encouraging the Soviets to adopt a less defensive, less harsh and more forthcoming policy in the human rights area. . . . we have sought to use our leverage to maximum effect by carefully measuring our responses to Soviet actions. Our policy is best illustrated by our responses to the series of trials of Soviet human rights activists and the harassment of American journalists and an American businessman which took place this spring and summer. To demonstrate our displeasure with these Soviet actions . . . we took a number of steps which included canceling the sale of a large Sperry-Rand computer to the Soviet news agency Tass and placing oil and gasfield equipment and technology on the list of items which require explicit approval in order to be exported. . . . We believe our responses to the Moscow trials may have been a contributing factor in the Soviet impositions of somewhat lesser sentences toward the end of the wave of trials than in the beginning and the unusual Soviet effort to observe formal legal processes. . . . However, it is difficult . . . to judge the effectiveness of our human rights policy except in the long run.²⁷ (1978, pp. 184-185)

Another series of statements provides an alternative, but consistent, source of Shulman's views. In 1978 and 1979 testimonies he discusses Soviet behavior with respect to the following areas:

1. Strategic Arms Limitation
2. Other Arms Control Issues
 - Comprehensive Test Ban
 - MBFR
 - Conventional Arms Transfers Limitations
 - Anti-Satellite Arms Control
 - Indian Ocean Force Levels
 - Chemical Weapons and Radiological Weapons
3. International Political Issues
 - Africa
 - The Middle East
 - China
4. Human Rights
5. Scientific, Academic and Cultural Exchanges

²⁶Human Rights_{Long-term} = + f(Trade).

²⁷Human Rights_{Long-term} = + f(Trade).

Shulman separates this list into areas of primary (which cannot be influenced) and secondary (which can be influenced) interest to the Soviet Union:

But the nature of our trade with the USSR is such that we cannot expect its presence or absence will influence the Soviet Union in regard to policy objectives which it considers to be of basic importance. It is possible, however, that certain more limited, less important goals of the Soviet Union may be influenced by considerations of the impact certain actions would have on our trade with them. (1978, p. 177)

In the case of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, this was clearly recognized as being an area that the Soviet Union had staked out as a primary security zone and while we have not had any spheres of influence agreement with them it was generally understood in the West that there would not be any military action to try to reverse those measures.²⁸ (1980, p. 61)

I want to make an observation that in the Soviet calculations about whether or not the United States would respond forcibly, what I believe played an important part in their calculations was the judgement that Afghanistan was not of primary interest to the United States. Part of the protest that they have been making about the U.S. reaction has been: 'Here was an area on our borders, not on your borders, Here was an area that is not primarily a matter of security concern for the United States.'²⁹ (1980, pp. 63-64)

While the Soviet Union has asserted that it has no objections to the movement toward normalization [between the United States and China], it has expressed particular concern that steps in this direction may be presented as directed against the Soviet Union, and it has shown special sensitivity to the prospect that the United States or the West may become a source of military technology or hardware for the People's Republic of China. Soviet apprehensions are deeply rooted and the issue seems certain to remain a sensitive one in the Soviet-American dialogue.³⁰ (1978, p. 148)

In the course of your question, Congressman Pease, what price should we pay for SALT. My answer is, we should not pay any

²⁸Soviet Behavior in Eastern Europe ≠ f(Economic Relations).

²⁹Soviet Behavior in Afghanistan ≠ f(Economic Relations).

³⁰Soviet Behavior toward China ≠ f(Economic Relations).

price for SALT. That is, we should not make any concessions in any other field in any other aspect of our relationship for SALT. SALT has to stand on its own feet.³¹ (1980, p. 57)

RICHARD PIPES

Application

Richard Pipes served on the National Security Council Staff of the Reagan Administration. He notes that the Soviets have pursued policies that are against the interests of the West. Because Soviet dogma supports such policies he expects this trend to continue. Therefore, trading with the Soviets, because their capabilities are enhanced, serves only to encourage their anti-Western behavior. His perceptions are modeled as follows³²:

MILITARY POLICY		FOREIGN POLICY		DOMESTIC POLICY
Fewer	Fewer	Less	Less	More
Strat.	Conventional	Milit.	Aggression	Human
Forces	Forces	Assist.		Rights

Pipes

Economic							
Relations	-	-		-	-		-

³¹SALT ≠ f(Economic Relations).

³²Behavior can be separated into attitudes and capabilities. Pipes believes that Soviet attitudes are by definition anti-Western. Their behavior is held in check by resource limitations. Adding to those resources, through trade, should therefore increase their anti-Western behavior in both the short and the long term. An apparent exception to this rule occurs with respect to emigration. Pipes allows for the possibility of a direct swap, i.e. trade concessions for emigrants. This allowance does not deny his underlying belief that economic relations generally induce anti-Western behavior.

Evidence

The following quotations were taken from articles and congressional testimony of Richard Pipes, spanning the period 1972 to 1980³³:

The fundamental differences [between my views and those of Marshall Shulman] pertain to the view of the Soviet society in general and the utility of nuclear weapons in particular. Those of us who are against SALT II, who are pessimistic about Soviet behavior, who are in favor of linkage, we take a historical, long-term view of Soviet behavior. We believe that the Soviet system has a certain inner drive, that it has certain objectives which it pursues. We believe that these objectives are not materially affected by what we do or do not do. . . . The people in the opposing camp will deprecate Soviet theory, their dogma, their pronouncements, as being essentially for internal consumption.³⁴ (1979, p. 1325)

The very first objective of Soviet foreign policy is to make certain that all the territory which at any time has come

³³The sources used were:

(1972), Richard Pipes, "Operational Principles of Soviet Foreign Policy" (first published in 1972), *U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Era of Detente*, pp. 19-46, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1981.

(1974), Richard Pipes, et al., "Detente: An Evaluation," originally printed in *International Review*, No.1, Spring, 1974. Reprinted for the Subcommittee on Arms Control of the Committee on Armed Services, June, 1974.

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(1980), "First Concurrent Resolution on the Budget--Fiscal Year 1981," *Hearings Before Senate Committee on the Budget*, February 26, 1980, pp. 1-65.

³⁴Soviet Behavior ≠ f(Economic Relations). In this and the following quotation Pipes is addressing the ultimate nature of the Soviet regime as opposed to the actual effect on behavior of limiting the economic capabilities of the Soviet Union.

under Russian or Communist rule remains so. . . . Russian Communists consider the status of lands and peoples presently under their control entirely beyond discussion. In this respect, Soviet foreign policy adheres consistently to the principle 'what is mine is mine, what is yours is negotiable.'³⁵ (1972, pp. 39-40)

[I think the grain embargo was appropriate] . . .and I am even more pleased by the embargo on the sale of phosphates. These are not measures that will bring down the Soviet Government or cause it to pull its troops out of Afghanistan. But they are measures which tell the Soviet Government in no uncertain terms that it will have to pay a price for its aggressive moves, not only a price in excited public opinion for 3 months as happened after Czechoslovakia and Hungary, but in terms of real costs for the Soviet economy.³⁶ (1980, p. 45)

For centuries Russia has sought (with some success) to import Western technology, but this has never had any effect on the internal nature of its regime, Tsarist or Soviet. The Soviet authorities are, of course, well aware of the fact that the USA and other Western countries believe that detente will lead to a liberalization of the Soviet regime, and that is why there has been a progressive tightening-up of controls in the Soviet bloc during the period when detente has been mooted. There are certainly signs of fear inside the USSR among the hardliners, or those who fear for their own privileges (the hack writers and venal intellectuals, for example, or the KGB officials), that the U.S. arguments for detente may be right: this is why Brezhnev has repeatedly been reassuring them in his speeches that detente provides the best platform for ideological warfare, and, following up words with deeds, he has been intensifying persecution of dissent.³⁷ (1974, p. 4)

The Soviet government expects the policy of detente [among other things] to . . . secure from the West financial and technological assistance which would directly enhance Soviet military power by making easier the continuous build-up of the military sector of the economy.³⁸ (1974, p. 2)

³⁵Aggression \neq f(Economic Relations). In this context aggression is considered to be the continued subjugation of Eastern Europe and Afghanistan.

³⁶Aggression = + f(Trade).

³⁷More Human Rights = - f(Economic Relations).

³⁸More Military Forces = + f(Trade).

[Trade and investment] may produce the opposite effect from the one of 'intermeshing' Western and Soviet economic interests, or 'Gulliverization' of the Soviet Union. Trade and investment generate friction and conflict even among friends; history provides enough examples to show that they do not ensure peace.³⁹ (1974, p. 2)

I approve of the Jackson Amendment. It was one of the very few tactical devices we have brought into being for making our economic support conditional on domestic reform in the Soviet Union. It fits in with my idea of barter, annual accounting, immediate returns, and so on.⁴⁰ (1976, p. 111)

HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER

Application

Hans-Dietrich Genscher has been Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany and also leader of the Free Democratic Party since 1974. Genscher's beliefs are similar to those of Marshall Shulman. Like Shulman, he feels that economic relations leave little potential for affecting the military policies of the Soviet Union. He differs from Shulman in that he sees economic relations having no effect on Soviet behavior in the short-term.⁴¹ His main philosophy, however, lies in the idea that in holding the possibility for long-term economic cooperation, the Soviets may incline towards political-military behavior conducive to East-West relations.⁴² Thus his perceptions may be modeled as follows:

³⁹Cooperative Soviet Behavior = - f(Trade).

⁴⁰More Human Rights = - f(Trade).

⁴¹Genscher makes an exception for potentially affecting matters lying in the "humanitarian sphere."

⁴²Genscher's statements imply some sort of probability function. The relationship between variables is not certain.

MILITARY POLICY		FOREIGN POLICY		DOMESTIC POLICY
Fewer Strat. Forces	Fewer Conventional Forces	Less Milit. Assist.	Less Aggression	More Human Rights

Genscher

Economic Relations	+	+		+	+		+
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Evidence

The following quotations were taken from an article entitled "Toward an Overall Western Strategy for Peace, Freedom and Progress," which appeared in the Fall 1982 edition of *Foreign Affairs*:

The Soviet economy . . . is largely self-sufficient and not reliant on the West. While the Soviet Union's economic relations with the West have reached a magnitude making the country seriously interested in cooperation, they have not reached a volume that affords the West leverage for inducing the Soviet Union to make major political concessions. The 'carrot' and 'stick' are simply too small for this purpose.⁴³ (p. 53)

The prospect of trade may perhaps prompt the Soviet Union to make concessions in the humanitarian sphere. But trade incentives cannot make the Soviet Union abandon its arms buildup if it sees in this an opportunity for acquiring superiority. Nor can they prompt the Soviet Union to exercise restraint in the Third World if it sees chances of expanding its predominance there without incurring any risks. The Soviet challenge is political and military in nature--it can be countered effectively only by political and military means.⁴⁴ (p. 53)

There is even less hope of making the Soviet Union incapable of continuing its arms buildup by denying it trade. The Soviet economy is made up of two components: the military economy and the civilian one. The military economy is given absolute priority, and there can be no doubt that the Soviet leadership will and can at all times allocate to it the resources it considers necessary.⁴⁵ (pp. 53-54)

⁴³Soviet Behavior \neq f(Economic Relations).

⁴⁴Human Rights = + f(Trade). Military Policy, Foreign Policy \neq f(Economic Relations).

⁴⁵Military Forces \neq f(Economic Relations).

While Soviet policy can thus not be influenced in the short term by either economic incentives or economic 'punishment,' it must be clearly recognized that economic ties are of major importance for the long-term development of East-West relations. . . . Maintaining the Western readiness for trade means maintaining the offer of cooperation and constantly reminding the Soviet Union of the possibility of comprehensive East-West economic cooperation--that is, if the Soviet Union abandons its policy of predominance and seeks 'genuine coexistence.'⁴⁶ (p. 54)

⁴⁶Cooperative Soviet Behavior_{Long-term} = + f(Economic Relations).

IV. CONCLUSIONS

The preceding analysis has tried to clarify the underlying premises guiding the policy positions of our six commentators. Their statements suggest personal tendencies to view economic relations as having the capacity to generate either positive or negative Soviet behavior.¹ The hypotheses and concluding policy positions implicit in these tendencies are summarized as follows:

Ball

Soviet behavior is driven by ideology on the one hand, yet influenced by the proclivities of the Soviet people on the other. In their desire for economic growth and efficiency the Soviet people are not unlike us. The West can utilize this similarity, through trade, to encourage structural change in the Soviet Union toward a free market economy. As communism yields to a modified capitalism the Soviet leadership will recognize economic advantages associated with political cooperation with the West. With Positive Behavior = $+ f(\text{Trade})$, at least in the long run, the policy prescription is to encourage economic relations with the Soviets.

Kissinger, Huntington

Soviet behavior is driven by their assessment of relative costs and benefits associated with an action. One might think of American trade policy as a game with continuous replay: rewards accruing to good play (pro-Western behavior) and penalties accruing to poor play (anti-Western behavior). Ultimately these commentators believe the Soviets will be induced to play the game successfully (maximizing rewards and minimizing penalties): Positive Behavior = $+ f(\text{Trade})$. In the interim the

¹Positive behavior is that which would be perceived as conducive to relations with the West, e.g., military force reductions. Negative behavior is the converse.

prescription for trade policy is concessions for positive behavior and restrictions for negative behavior.

Shulman

In some areas, Soviet behavior is driven singularly by security concerns. In these areas economic relations do not affect behavior. In areas of secondary importance, however, the Soviets assess probable benefits and costs associated with possible actions. Shulman would argue that to realize positive Soviet behavior we must first motivate it by giving some trade concessions. When the Soviets respond with positive behavior we respond with more trade concessions. The process continues such that positive behavior and trade move in the same direction. The policy prescription is to reward positive behavior with trade.

Pipes

Soviet behavior is driven by ideology and history, not by economic relations with the West, thus Behavior $\neq f(\text{Trade})$. However, because Soviet ideology seeks the ultimate destruction of capitalism, and economic relations increase Soviet capabilities to pursue this goal, Negative Behavior = $+ f(\text{Trade})$. Therefore, the policy prescription is to limit trade relations with the Soviets.²

Genscher

Genscher, like Shulman, sees areas of primary importance unaffected by Western trade policies. Unlike Genscher, however, he argues first that economic relations do not affect Soviet behavior in the short term. Second, it is hoped, but by no means certain, that the prospect of improved economic relations will ultimately yield positive behavior. Thus the policy prescription for economic relations, while ambiguous, tends toward its improvement.

²Human rights, because they are not a security concern per se, fall into a grey area for this commentator. When it suits overriding Soviet objectives he allows for the possibility of trade having a positive effect on domestic human rights.

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