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SHAPING THE U.S. MILITARY
FOR THE GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
OF THE YEAR 2000

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A Dissertation
submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of Georgetown University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Government

By

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→ With the Cold War concluded, what kind of military should the U.S. have? What capabilities should this force possess? Is the Defense Department likely to produce the forces the nation needs, and if not, why not?

To answer these questions, the study first examines the factors and influences that make changes and adjustments in the military likely and advisable. Second, the study examines defense adjustments made after the Korean and Vietnam wars. The dissertation then examines future defense requirements. Next it examines the Defense Department's process for strategic planning and force structuring, reaching judgements about its adequacy as a force design instrument. The final two chapters offer an alternative approach to strategic planning and force design.)

The study finds that the current strategic planning process is unlikely to produce the optimal future force structure for three reasons. First, a fissure has developed in the process that separates policy considerations from military-technical issues. Second, the defense establishment is a neocorporatist structure organizationally, which limits the breadth of choices it can consider in adjusting to new conditions and requirements. Finally, the President and Congress engage in bureaucratic politics, often bargaining with each other on military questions, since each has roughly equal constitutional powers over the military. The practice of bureaucratic politics often results in suboptimal decisions: acceptance of settlements neither party would have suggested.

The study concludes that, though the presidential-congressional struggle will likely continue, radical change could correct the other two dysfunctional aspects of the present strategic planning system. The current elaborate bureaucracy should be dismantled and replaced with a small national defense staff composed of the Administration's political appointees and defense professionals. Such a staff would consider policy and military-technical issues together in an integrated fashion, avoiding any fissure between them.



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CHAPTER ONE

GLOBAL POLITICS AND INFLUENCES FOR CHANGE

A multitude of forces and influences are causing a major re-evaluation and adjustment to the U.S. national military strategy. The current, on-going crisis in the Middle East, change in Eastern Europe, backlash to the Reagan spend-up, the economic realities confronting the nation, the perception of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev as less aggressive and more involved in its own internal difficulties, the rise of regional powers, frustration and dissatisfaction with the performance and support from U.S. allies, and many other factors are contributing to a major re-appraisal of U.S. national security requirements. As a part of this re-evaluation, each of the military departments--the U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force--is the object of scrutiny. Among the questions being asked by the public, the Congress, and by military professionals themselves are the key questions to be examined by this study: What size and type of military forces should the United States have? What capabilities should these forces possess? What will they cost? Is the Defense Department's institutional threat analysis and force development process likely to deliver the armed forces the nation needs? If not, why not, and what

changes in the process might help insure that it does deliver the optimal military instrument?

Investigative Procedures. This study begins with the notion that there are a number of discernable, major influences that will make change in the United States military likely or advisable. The study seeks to examine these influences, together with the expected global security environment, the history of military adjustments following the Korean and Vietnam wars, and the performance of the defense establishment's planning system, to reach conclusions about how these factors collectively shape the U.S. military. The study then seeks to determine what size and type of general purpose military forces (sometimes called conventional forces) the United States will require at the turn of the century, and the ability of the defense planning process to deliver such forces. Finally, the study offers its own approach to force design and an illustrative example of what size and type forces might result from such an alternative approach. There are six steps in this investigative process.

Chapter one takes the first step. It accounts for influences that are most likely to cause a change or make change advisable in the national military strategy and the instruments that support it. Selection of significant influences is not arbitrary, but is based upon consideration of historical influences.

Next, two historical cases will be considered: the post-Korean War and Vietnam War adjustments to the national security posture. In each case, the relationship between the global security environment, the federal budget and domestic influences, the national military strategy and force structure

will be examined. Perhaps generalizable propositions will emerge that can guide decisions for the future; perhaps not. At a minimum, the Korea and Vietnam cases will serve as reference points, highlighting choices and offering contrasting approaches to adjustments in the national security posture.

The third step is to examine the likely future global security environment. Forecast events will be interpreted through a theory of international relations. This process will outline the contours of the international security scene in which the United States can be expected to operate, and for which the nation must craft its national military strategy.

Once the future security environment has been completely described, the next step is to describe and examine the current U.S. Joint Strategic Planning System. Three case studies will be considered which will suggest the capability of the planning system to deal with three different types of change. These cases will be interpreted through decision theory and interest group politics theory, which will suggest the strengths and weaknesses of the current governmental process, and will suggest whether or not the current system is likely to produce an adequate future national military strategy and the forces to support it under the conditions expected in the future security environment.

Fifth, based upon the Korea and Vietnam postwar experiences, and anticipating conditions to be those of the future security environment described in chapter three, the study will examine how budget, strategy, and force structure optimally relate to meet the nation's security requirements. At this point, a

comprehensive approach to force development--a set of guiding propositions--will be developed.

Finally, based upon these guiding propositions, the study will suggest a strategy and force structure for the expected future global security environment, paying particular attention to the role of the U.S. Army and its relationship to the other services.

The Literature. The national defense and security literature is extensive and wide-reaching, examining issues ranging from tactics and operational art to defense procurement policies and problems of fraud, waste and abuse. None of the literature, however, has attempted to provide a complete, integrated approach to force development and national military strategy necessary to avoid the so-called "strategy-force mismatch" that conventional wisdom so frequently attributes to the current configuration of U.S. forces. Carl Builder's *The Masks of War*¹ concludes that each of the military services has a specific set of values, an internal culture, that guides its evolution. The U.S. Army, for example, is configured as it is based upon an institutional self-image of the Army's most prestigious era, in the last few years of World War II. This explanation suggests that internal cultural values and preferences are significant in making force development choices, but Builder's analysis does not illustrate conclusively or precisely how self-image influences the force development process.

¹Carl H. Builder, *The Masks of War*, (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

In the earlier *The Army in the Strategic Planning Process: Who Shall Bell the Cat?*² Builder argued that there was an institutional Army strategy that drove choices in force development. He sought to refine this strategy by devising a way of placing "price tags" on equipment and organizational options. Builder stopped short, however, of explaining how such price tags might assist decision makers; indeed, they may be interpreted as mere quantifications of decision maker preferences in the first place.

Joshua M. Epstein has contributed a good deal of quantitative analysis to questions of force size and adequacy. His *Strategy and Force Planning: The Case of the Persian Gulf and the earlier Measuring Military Power: The Soviet Air Threat to Europe*³ both offer innovative approaches to the question of force size adequacy and related issues, e.g., quantity vs quality vs mobility.

William W. Kaufmann came closest to the project anticipated here with his book *Planning Conventional Forces 1950-80*.⁴ In it, Kaufmann arrived at a set of conditions he believed were necessary for the establishment of an all-purpose, nonnuclear deterrent force. He then proceeded to calculate force requirements for this deterrent on a theater-by-theater basis to reach total force requirements for the Army and Marine Corps not too different from today's actual totals. At the end of

²Carl H. Builder, *The Army in the Strategic Planning Process: Who Shall Bell the Cat?*, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1987).

³Joshua Epstein, *Strategy and Force Planning*, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987). *Measuring Military Power: The Soviet Air Threat to Europe*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

⁴William W. Kaufmann, *Planning Conventional Forces 1950-80*, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1982).

the study, however, Kaufmann was unable to overcome completely the force-strategy mismatch. His force array was overly dependent upon forward-deployed units and short of critical strategic lift.

Kaufmann also sought insights into the difficulties confronting the U.S. defense establishment in constructing a sound defense for the nation. In *A Reasonable Defense*,⁵ Kaufmann examined dysfunctional aspects of the military services' planning and of the many agencies within the Defense Department. He concluded that there was no single, institutional answer to the question of "how much (military capability) is enough?" and that the most important problem in force development is service resistance to central planning. Democratic values, Kaufmann argued, obstruct the Secretary of Defense from controlling the services. The military services, he claimed, go their own ways behind a façade of a force development system.

Edward N. Luttwak has examined the organizational and bureaucratic failures of the Defense Department in *The Pentagon and the Art of War*.⁶ In the course of his critique, he has touched on a number of issues that will influence this dissertation, including force size, preferences for different styles of warfare, and requirements for deterrence with conventional forces. Luttwak's *Strategy and History*⁷ provides further analysis of different styles of

⁵William W. Kaufmann, *A Reasonable Defense*, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1986).

⁶Edward N. Luttwak, *The Pentagon and the Art of War*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984).

⁷Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy and History*, (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1985).

warfare and the implications preferences for each style may bear for the military establishment holding those preferences.

Finally, Luttwak's *Strategy*⁸ identifies an important phenomenon he calls the "culminating point of effectiveness." The theory of the culminating point of effectiveness has important implications for many areas of military activity from the formulation of strategy down to development of new weapons. It claims that tactics, strategy, and weapons, as they become more effective, either produce the desired results if the military moves quickly enough to exploit their advantage, or are rendered ineffective by enemy countermeasures. Thus no element of military art, technical or operational, enjoys an absolute or permanent advantage. This phenomenon should be a significant factor in any consideration of future force requirements.

Barry R. Posen's *The Sources of Military Doctrine*⁹ offers an explanation of how doctrine influences other aspects of military organization and development. He reaches a number of conclusions about the military's inability to innovate and to accommodate break-throughs in either technology or military theory. Perhaps the most important contribution of this book is its examination of two alternative explanations for military doctrine--organizational theory and balance of power theory. This book and Luttwak's several books probably identify most of the problems and shortcomings that any new force development process must overcome.

Jeffrey Record's work emphasizes strategy and the potential means for adjusting strategy to changing circumstances. In

⁸Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy*, (Cambridge MA & London: Belknap Harvard, 1987).

⁹Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1984).

Revising U.S. Military Strategy,¹⁰ Record demonstrated how the United States might adjust its force posture in Western Europe in the mid-1980s. In his most recent work, *Beyond Military Reform*,¹¹ Record argues that the military reform effort has concentrated on operational art and issues that relate to getting the military to fight better at the expense of questions about strategy. It is time, he contends, to re-evaluate U.S. strategy. This study will make such a re-evaluation en route to an adequate force development process.

Moreover, this study will seek to integrate the work of the authors mentioned above into a useful and comprehensive approach, allowing due consideration of a variety of factors--political, strategic, technical and others--in determining what kind of military the United States ought to have for the year 2000. This undertaking is not an attempt to wedge the ideas of others into a rigid, military-technical analysis or to produce some mechanical process that will render judgements about army, navy and air force size and configuration. On the contrary, the objective here is to examine military requirements in a broader security policy context, and to address a weakness in the international security studies literature identified by Joseph S. Nye and Sean M. Lynn-Jones.¹² Specifically, Nye and Lynn-Jones pointed to a lack of studies dealing with operational issues: how organizations implement policy, conduct military operations, and similar matters. This study's contribution to the literature will be to examine one such

¹⁰Jeffrey Record, *Revising U.S. Military Strategy*, (McLean: Pergamon-Brassey International, 1984).

¹¹Jeffrey Record, *Beyond Military Reform*, (McLean: Pergamon-Brassey International, 1988).

¹²Joseph S. Nye and Sean Lynn-Jones, "International Security Studies. A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field," *International Security* 12 (Spring 1988): 14.

operational issue, the future requirements of the United States military.

Influences for Change. The foregoing questions about the adequacy of the current force development process and the kind of forces the United States should have at the turn of the century cannot be answered without a clear sense of the factors and conditions that make changes and adjustments to the military likely or advisable. Moreover, contemplation of changes in the Army--only one part of the nation's military instrument--cannot be undertaken without broader consideration of the Army's role in the national military strategy and the military strategy's place within national security policy. Determination of what attributes are desirable in the U.S. forces for the year 2000 thus involves consideration of a variety of domestic, international and technical issues, including:¹³

- The end of the Cold War and policy options beyond containment
- The limits of deterrence
- Threats to U.S. security
- Changing relationships with allies and antagonists
- Arms control
- Military technology

¹³Samuel P. Huntington first conceived of military policy as a political process that blended strategy (international politics-related questions) and structure (domestic political questions) in *The Common Defense* (New York & London: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp 2-4. This study takes the same view.

- Economics and the limits of the U.S. defense budget
- Domestic attitudes toward the defense establishment

The End of the Cold War. The Cold War and containment, the United States' policy for managing the Cold War, has probably been the most influential element of the post-World War II global security environment. The Cold War and containment have together largely defined the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union and have influenced U.S. decisions on deterrence, defense, alliances and similar security arrangements with other states throughout the world. The Cold War left Europe divided after World War II, and set the ideological, economic, and military terms of U.S.-Soviet competition in much of the rest of the world. Containment was envisioned by its creator, George Kennan, as a policy through which,

...Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence.¹⁴

But, as Kennan himself has observed, the Cold War is over.¹⁵ The West has won, as evidenced by the waning appeal of Marxism, the reforms sweeping the Eastern European states and the Soviet Union, the manifest economic weakness of the Soviet Union, the appearance of capitalist economic mechanisms

¹⁴George Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* 25 (July 1947): 576.

¹⁵George Kennan, "Containment Then and Now," *Foreign Affairs* 65 (Spring 1987): 888.

and the tentative emergence of popular governments in those states. Soviet behavior in international politics, a principal target of containment policy, has moderated somewhat, at least in Europe, taking a laissez-faire approach to the reforms of its Warsaw Pact partners. The "German Question"--an ultimate post-war settlement--also seems to be on the verge of resolution, with reunification officially accomplished October 3, 1990.¹⁶

The end of the Cold War means the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union will be a less contentious one. It also means that containment will be overtaken by a new policy toward the Soviet Union based upon the relationship that gradually emerges between the two superpowers. The post-containment approach to the Soviet Union, moving beyond the parameters of the Cold War, has the potential to influence the overall U.S. national security policy, the national military strategy, and ultimately the roles, missions, size and configuration of the U.S. military, including the Army.

Although the exact nature of post-containment policy remains obscure, it is possible to speculate about some of the more dramatic changes that might result, depending of course on the nature of the future East-West relationship that emerges in the post-Cold War era. If the East-West relationship is generally less contentious and conflict-ridden than it has been in the

¹⁶A new German Question, however, has already appeared. Will Germany as a regional hegemon continue to view its interests as being in consonance with those of its neighbors and thus support the status quo, or will united Germany at some point dispute the status quo in Europe in pursuit of its own, individual interests? Will the other European states, rightly or wrongly, align against Germany out of balance of power instincts? See Michael Howard, "The Remaking of Europe," *Survival* 32 (March/April 1990): 105.

recent past, the United States as well as other nations may find their diplomatic and economic instruments relatively more important than the military instrument in dealing with the Soviet Union. If the resulting post-Cold War environment reflects growing economic cooperation and cordial political arrangements, the rationale for continued forward-deployment of U.S. forces in Europe would certainly be questioned. Indeed, the current U.S. Army Posture Statement for fiscal year 1991 already anticipates some troop reductions based on the expectation of continued improvements in East-West relations.¹⁷

On the other hand, if the Cold War brought with it stability, providing order if not justice, as John L. Gaddis has argued,¹⁸ the end of the Cold War also marks a departure from the stability of the old East-West relationship. The East European nations, emerging from a period in which their legitimate political concerns were suppressed by communist authorities, must resolve a host of issues that have been dormant since the end of the Second World War. Ethnic conflict, territorial disputes, and vestigial political cleavages from the end of World War I remain to be resolved. Similarly, it remains to be seen what a united Germany will perceive as its interests and how its relations with its neighbor states develop. While there is currently reason to be optimistic about the outcome of these issues, there is also a chance that the instability and turmoil of change will lead to

¹⁷Michael P.W. Stone and Carl E. Vuono, *The Posture of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 1991*. Before Committees and Subcommittees of the United States Senate and the House of Representatives, Second Session, 101st Congress, p. II-2.

¹⁸John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace," *International Security* 10 (Spring 1986): 110.

conflict.¹⁹ Any significant instability in Europe would certainly have to be carefully considered before the United States withdrew substantial military forces.

Speculation cannot lead to a clear understanding of the post-containment era, but it can suggest the variety of different developments that might occur in East-West relations. Speculation aside, the end of the Cold War era marks a transitional point in international politics. The ideological content, Marxism-Leninism versus capitalism, is gone. This fact alone has the potential to make U.S. relations with other states, in Europe and the Third World, somewhat more objective, removing an important point of contention.

Limits of Deterrence. Perhaps one of the most important considerations when contemplating future military requirements is deterrence and, more specifically, the limits of deterrence. Since the United States' defense strategy is explicitly one of deterrence,²⁰ it is essential to know what threats to the nation can and cannot be deterred. Once the limits of deterrence are established, it should then be possible to

¹⁹Though it is difficult from the present vantage point to conceive of a regional conflict among the smaller European states threatening U.S. interests or the interests of the major European states, there remains the danger of unanticipated consequences from such a conflict. For a compelling argument about future instability in Europe, see John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *International Security* 15 (Summer 1990): 5-56. Jack Snyder also argues that such conditions might lead ultimately to a Hobbesian Europe marked by multipolarity and instability. See Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," *International Security* 14 (Spring 1990): 5.

²⁰Casper W. Weinberger, "U.S. Defense Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* 65 (Spring 1986): 676.

examine requirements for deterrent forces and warfighting forces.²¹

In Thomas Schelling's view, deterrence is the anticipation of coercive violence. To create an effective deterrent, one requires knowledge of what the enemy treasures and what scares him. At the same time, the enemy must understand what behavior of his will cause violence to be inflicted and what will cause it to stop.²²

Others have found deterrence to consist of two components, a punitive component and a denial of victory component. In other words, one approach to deterrence involves threatening to inflict violence as conceived by Schelling so that the adversary concludes the costs incurred from his act would not be worth the potential gains. The victory denial component results when the adversary considers the current state of affairs and concludes by his own calculations that he cannot achieve his ends.²³

John J. Mearsheimer believes there are three variables involved in deterrence, cost, chance of success, and speed. His notion of cost is analogous to the previously mentioned punitive component, while chance of success is equivalent to the notion of victory denial (chance of success reflects the aggressor's view while victory denial reflects the defender's).

²¹Deterrent and warfighting forces may be the same or different, depending upon circumstances. For example, an armored division, posed on one's border, may be an excellent deterrent, but, if committed to combat in a dense, urban area, may prove less satisfactory as a fighting instrument.

²²Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1966), p 3.

²³Morton Halperin is credited with originally conceiving deterrence in this way. The conception is so widely held today that it is almost public domain.

Speed has to do with how quickly the adversary estimates he can achieve his objectives when confronted by the opposition with its current capabilities. Ultimately, in Mearsheimer's opinion, for deterrence to work, the attacker must fear the risks and costs of war more than the pressures associated with remaining at peace.²⁴

Golden, Clark and Arlinghaus emphasize the policy-strategy link in their conception of deterrence. In their view, deterrence is guidance that restores the link between policy and strategy. The policy is to prevent war and strategy is to make sure that the adversary is deterred from it. It follows, in their view, that the strategy must show how to fight to a successful conclusion: "The promise to wage war if a potential enemy attempts to assert its will can be successful in preventing the attempt only if there is a strategy to conduct the war."²⁵

From the foregoing examination of the mechanics of deterrence, it seems clear that crafting a successful deterrent for a specific threat depends upon accurate, detailed information about the adversary's goals and motives for action; an equally accurate understanding of what he most values and most fears; and the ability to design a military strategy for the effective application of punitive violence or victory denial. Other instruments, economics for example, might also be used. Threat of an economic boycott might serve as one approach to victory denial.

²⁴John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence*, (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp 23, 24.

²⁵James R. Golden, Asa A. Clark, and Bruce E. Arlinghaus, *Conventional Deterrence*, (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books DC Heath & Co, 1984), pp 8-10.

But strategy is not static. Edward Luttwak has identified three influences on belligerents' strategies that typically occur in warfare. First is the culminating point of effectiveness, at which the strategy either succeeds in its ultimate objectives or is defeated by the adversary. Strategies that succeed produce victory, while those that have been effectively parried lead to new strategies. A first corollary to the notion of the culminating point is that strategies that appear effective (i.e., very dangerous) to the enemy will receive the enemy's maximum effort at circumvention. Thus, especially effective strategies must produce victory quickly or the enemy will likely find a way to counter them. This leads to the second dynamic of strategy, an action-reaction cycle in which the belligerents attempt to counter each other's strategic adjustments, focusing on blocking the most effective aspects of the strategy. Finally, there is the paradoxical nature of strategy itself, in which, very often, the ideas that seem most logical and appropriate in conventional, "linear logic" are ineffective and ideas that would normally seem inefficient and downright dangerous often produce astonishingly effective results.²⁶

The practical result for any actor, deterred by the dynamics of changing strategies and a difficult adversary, is a choice among three options. Realizing that its current strategy will not lead it to prevail, the actor can move toward a political settlement, thus hoping to achieve some of its objectives or at least to prepare the way for continued struggle later on. Alternatively, the actor may simply disengage and accept the status quo. Finally, the actor may change the level of

²⁶Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy*, (Cambridge MA & London: Belknap Harvard, 1987), pp 5-17, 21.

engagement to a higher or lower intensity of warfare, and continue pursuit of its original objectives.

This last option, changing the level of engagement to a higher or lower intensity of warfare, also has its limits. At the high-intensity extreme, the threat of a strategic nuclear exchange deters escalation. In the realm of modern, conventional warfare, deterrence may still be attained, though it is less certain than at nuclear levels.²⁷ Moving to lower levels of warfare, that amorphous collection of psycho-social pressures, demonstrations, guerrilla action, bombings and terror, and small unit raids--subconventional war²⁸--deterrence becomes progressively more tenuous.

An actor's decision to engage in this kind of combat reveals certain of its expectations about the course and character of the war. This view, the actor's broad attitudes about what lies ahead, is likely to be important in determining whether or not the actor can be deterred. Most important of the implications deriving from a subconventional strategy is that the struggle will be a protracted one. While exceptions exist, most such wars, in Vietnam, Algeria, Oman, El Salvador and

²⁷The reasons for failure of conventional deterrents are far-reaching. Some authorities, William V. O'Brien and Avner Yaniv among them, believe conventional deterrents must be periodically demonstrated in order to be effective. For a thorough treatment of deterrent failures see John Orme, "Deterrence Failures: A Second Look," *International Security* 11 (Spring 1987): 96-124.

²⁸The term "subconventional war" is used to avoid becoming entangled in existing terminology--unconventional warfare, low-intensity conflict, counterinsurgency, and a host of related terms--each which has a very specific definition, and instead to settle on a single collective term to mean other ways of fighting besides conventional warfare without any of the "baggage" associated with the other terms.

Nicaragua, are waged over many years. In choosing such an approach, the actor embarks on a struggle that is more political than military in its essence. The actor must seek to create conditions for ultimate victory, avoiding a direct, decisive engagement with the military forces of the enemy. The military instrument, in contrast to its use in most conventional wars, enjoys a role of reduced importance vis-a-vis other instruments (propaganda, shadow government activities, international diplomacy and related activities). Creating conditions for ultimate victory under the circumstances just described is, in most instances, a long-term project.

Recognizing that a subconventional strategy will take a long time to produce victory, actors who choose this strategy accept a long-term undertaking. They are unlikely to become discouraged if their goals are not achieved quickly.²⁹ Their choice of tactics indicates that they are psychologically prepared for protracted struggle. Indeed, they may have adopted an historic perspective of change, in which victory is associated with some future generation. They may determine their short-term objectives to be mere survival of their movement. To create the motivation necessary to sustain itself over the long term, most actors build revolutionary cadres. These cadres typically serve to recruit new members, to provide the ideological content to inspire heroic acts and to maintain the cohesiveness of the movement in the face of set-backs and reversals. Thus, while it may be possible for the enemy to kill or demoralize much of the rank-and-file followers, the

²⁹Consider, for example, the fatalistic view of ultimate victory contained in Tro'ung Chin's *The Resistance Will Win*, (New York: Praeger, 1963).

cadres present a "hard core" that has been inured to struggle and that is dedicated to the ultimate goals of the movement, no matter how dire current circumstances become.

The next implication about the actor's view of the war has to do with the expectation of seizing territory or important facilities. In deciding to pursue subconventional warfare, a movement has accepted that it will not directly contest the enemy forces for control of key terrain or infrastructure. Since the irregulars, as discussed above, cannot compete in a conventional conflict for whatever reasons, they will not attempt to measure their successes in terms of measures more applicable to conventional combat. Rather than expend their few military resources on tactical objectives they could not hope to hold in the face of determined opposition, such as key power plants, rail yards, or bridges, the movement will conduct hit-and-run attacks on such facilities to demonstrate the enemy's inability to protect property or the civilian community at large. Nor will the subconventional forces attempt to acquire much in the way of infrastructure of their own. They will maintain relatively austere base camps, offering the enemy little in the way of targets. By conceding control over terrain and facilities to the enemy and placing relatively little emphasis on facilities of their own, the irregular forces remove an important measure of conventional force success from the equation. Their strategy is not about control of territory and infrastructure, at least in the early stages of the campaign, but about influencing the attitudes of the population.

The third implication from the actor's choice of strategies is that political developments are at least as important as military activities. While this may at first seem obvious, it is an important consideration. It means that, since the military instrument is not the primary means of struggle, the subconventional forces will not allow themselves to become engaged where they can be decisively defeated. That is, knowing that no single engagement can provide them with complete attainment of their goals, the practitioners of subconventional warfare will never commit themselves to a single engagement to the point that they risk complete destruction of their forces. Since it is their expectation that ultimate victory will come through some combination of politico-military activities, they will not risk the loss of their military arm for any one engagement.

The choice, then, of a strategy of subconventional warfare marks a clear distinction from more traditional military strategies. First, the movement is operating without an immediate expectation of success. The strategy requires a long time to reach its goals and its practitioners accept this fact. Second, the movement has systematically stripped what military conflict there is of its traditional measures of success. The enemy's ability to command the countryside is largely meaningless since the irregulars never sought to contest it, yet by demonstrating that the enemy cannot guarantee protection for the population or the security of the local infrastructure, the movement succeeds in inserting a wedge between the government and the population. Third, while denying the enemy traditional military success by simply surviving, the movement maintains all of its instruments of coercion to reach its final

objectives. The longer the movement endures and survives and is able to bring its case before international bodies like the U.N., the better are its chances in the long run of achieving some sort of international legitimacy.³⁰ Considered in this light, the subconventional forces of the movement do not require significant military success to accomplish their tasks.

Subconventional warfare seems well-designed to resist all forms of deterrence. It does not present targets for decisive military action, since those pursuing such a strategy are frequently without a homeland or critical infrastructure to protect, and with no sizeable military formations. Threats of attacks on its leadership and other targets lack credibility. In Schelling's terms, subconventional warfare keeps its adversary largely ignorant of what the enemy treasures and where it is located, making the threat of coercive violence less effective than it might be in other circumstances. Viewed from Mearsheimer's perspective, the forces seeking to deter subconventional warfare cannot make the enemy's acts too costly because there is little to punish. They cannot promise the enemy he will not succeed, because success is not an immediate consideration. Speed, the third of Mearsheimer's criteria, does not matter, since the subconventional warrior expects a protracted struggle anyway. In the terms laid out by Golden, Clark and Arlinghaus, the promise to wage war against subconventional forces is often not a daunting threat.

The limits of deterrence produce important considerations for design of military forces, since forces can be designed

³⁰Consider the history of the PLO and the recognition that now seems to be coming to it after years as an international political non-entity.

either principally for deterrence or for warfighting.³¹ Nuclear war is deterred by the maintenance of certain nuclear deterrent forces. Likewise, much of conventional warfare can be deterred by conventional deterrent forces, though, since conventional deterrence does fail from time-to-time, a nation's conventional forces must also be designed to fight optimally against the expected threat should deterrence fail. At the subconventional level, a nation needs warfighting forces, since subconventional warfare cannot usually be deterred and since the subconventional forces have so many options.³² Forces intended to fight subconventional enemies must therefore be very flexible, able to beat the enemy on its own terms. Ultimately, successful deterrence rests on the ability to estimate the enemy's own calculus of costs and risks and to convince him that the status quo is preferable to the costs and risks of warfare.

³¹ For an illustrative example of why this is so, see John E. Peters, "Evaluating FOFA as a Deterrent," *RUSI Journal* 132 (December 1987): 39-44.

³²For example, Palestinians in the West Bank have prosecuted their war by many means from assassinating local officials to paramilitary raids to rock-throwing mobs of the Intifada. As the Israeli forces develop some facility at countering one kind of activity, the subconventional forces shift to other instruments of violence; they fight on. See Avner Yaniv, *Deterrence Without the Bomb*, (Lexington & Toronto: Lexington Books, 1987), p 275 for an alternative view. Yaniv argues that conventional deterrence cannot be considered a failure based upon single acts of violence. He contends that in the long run the Israelis have deterred the Palestinians, whereas I argue the struggle goes on; only the means have changed. Deterrence has therefore failed.

Active Threats to U.S. Security. No matter how relations between the United States and its allies change, how technology affects military capabilities, how arms control, economics and budget issues constrain military options, the most basic issue is U.S. security. Where are the threats to American interests? Until very recently, the "threat" has been broadly understood in military, economic and ideological terms, rather than in a narrower sense that would only involve direct threats to U.S. security. Cast in the context of the Cold War and containment, many remote wars and conflicts became potential venues for U.S.-Soviet competition and hence were often perceived as threats to U.S. security. In the aftermath of the containment era, it seems appropriate to re-examine threats to U.S. security without the lens of the Cold War to affect the view, asking, what kinds of regional disputes really pose a threat to the United States' security interests and what kind do not?

The Army Global Forecast (AGF) provides the most basic tool for examining security interests of the United States.³³ The AGF approach recognizes the dynamic nature of the global community of nations and seeks to measure the constant shifts in the distribution of perceived power among nations in terms of their territory, population, economic performance, military power, national security strategy and the national will to pursue their respective goals.³⁴

³³U.S. Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, *The Army Global Forecast*, (draft for comment) 1990. This document is considered "estimative intelligence." It attempts to forecast, in a scientifically rigorous way, changes in the global security environment and to interpret these changes into specific implications for the U.S. Army.

³⁴Ibid, p 1.

Because shifts in the regional distribution of power can ruin the equilibrium in the area, local states must readjust their relationships with their neighbors, "balancing or bandwagoning" in Walt's terms.³⁵ As Robert Gilpin has pointed out, conflict is most likely in these periods of disequilibrium, where non-status quo actors seek to change the regional terms of relations among states--the regional system and balance of power--to favor their own interests. War, he further observed, is the main instrument for such system change.³⁶

In the containment era, adjustments in international relationships were most often understood as part of the competition between the superpowers. Each adjustment was examined to determine if it shifted regional alignment toward the East or toward the West. Each adjustment was examined for its potential to produce violence, even when the United States' military interest in the area was remote and indirect, out of concern that regional violence might escalate to include the superpowers. Each international adjustment also had a strong ideological component, in which an increase in Soviet influence in the poorest parts of the Third World was often decried as a significant loss for the Western world.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, competition for alignment or balancing East vs West is probably less important. The Soviet Union has failed to achieve any useful accretion of power through its relationships with Third World states, and

³⁵Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and Balance of Power," *International Security* 11 (Spring 1985): 7.

³⁶Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, (London & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp 10, 15.

the military power it has amassed has not brought the political leverage that the Soviets probably hoped for. The ideological debate, Marxism-Leninism vs capitalism, has been resolved in capitalism's favor.³⁷ The basis for viewing regional shifts in the distribution of global power in terms of the U.S.-Soviet competition is over. In the absence of this containment era competition, the United States ought to deal with individual trouble spots on an individual basis, objectively evaluating the dangers that regional conflicts bring to U.S. security.

Where, then, are the likely future threats to United States security? There is some disparity in official estimates, arising in part from the fact that they were written before the revolutions of Autumn 1989 dramatically changed the state of East-West relations, and before the events of August, 1990 in Kuwait. Disparities also exist, in part, from the different purposes of the estimates. Some, like the Secretary of Defense's *Annual Report to Congress*, seek to justify funding; others, such as the *Joint Military Net Assessment*, focus exclusively on the Soviet Union; while others, such as the *Army Global Forecast*, as a service-level estimate, tend to emphasize the diversity of threats that the service may encounter in fulfilling its missions. For the purpose of this study, the AGF, emphasizing diversity, is the best starting point, since it is least likely to over-emphasize capabilities as a budget document might, and has a broader scope than a Soviet-oriented document would.

³⁷Paul Linz, political officer of the German Democratic Republic's Chancellory in Washington, said so explicitly while discussing prospects for German unification at Georgetown University, 29th March, 1990.

The AGF claims that certain persisting conflicts may produce contingencies for U.S. forces over the long term. Figure I-1 summarizes these conflicts and the regional likelihood of war. As the figure indicates, over the long term, the AGF expects contingencies in Central America to be the most likely for U.S. forces. These contingencies would probably involve either civil war or drug-related warfare, or might take the form of regional warfare, with a coalition of Nicaragua and Cuba confronting Honduras.

Figure I-1: Persisting Conflicts and Regional Potential for War

Persisting Conflicts	Regional Potential for War	
Civil and drug wars in Latin America Nicaragua/Cuba vs Honduras Israel vs Syria Civil and interstate wars throughout Africa Persian Gulf violence Indo-China regional wars Philippines insurgency Terrorism and insurgency	<u>Likelihood</u>	<u>Region</u>
	More	Central America
	Less	Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean Middle East North Africa Europe

Source: Army Global Forecast, p 28.

Other contingencies mentioned in the AGF, wars between the Koreas, India-Pakistan, India-China, and China-Taiwan, should also be considered. A war between North and South Korea would bring U.S. involvement if U.S. troops remain in South Korea. In the other cases, however, it seems unlikely that U.S. forces would become involved, since these wars would not impinge significantly on U.S. interests. Even in World War II, the U.S. did not send troops to the China-Burma-India theater, leaving General Stilwell to prosecute the war there with native and British colonial forces.

Indeed, it is difficult to envision circumstances within the conflicts forecast by the AGF (except, obviously, for the current crisis with Iraq) that might produce U.S. military involvement. Recent history, for example, suggests that restraint rather than active military participation would be the preferred U.S. posture in all regions. For example, despite the threat the Executive Branch has attributed to the Sandanista regime in Nicaragua,³⁸ the Administration pursued its policy objectives through the Contras and the Contadora Process with other regional powers. Similarly, military involvement in El Salvador has been limited to training and material assistance. Interventions in which armed force played a key role have been limited to the Dominican Republic, Grenada and Panama, in which cases protection of U.S. nationals was publically announced as a major consideration. Other recent U.S. interventions, such as the Marine deployment to Lebanon in 1983 and joint operations in the Persian Gulf have been peace keeping missions with severely constrained rules of engagement. Given the history of limited use of the military instrument the United States has shown over the last several decades, one would expect even greater restraint in the post-Cold War era, now that ideological competition and containment are no longer primary considerations.

One area, however, in which U.S. security may not benefit from the end of the superpower military competition is in restraint of client states. For example, in previous iterations of Arab-Israeli conflict, both the United States and the Soviet Union sought to moderate the actions of Israel and

³⁸Frank C. Carlucci, *Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1990*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1989), p 52.

Syria, respectively, by causing them to negotiate almost immediately after the out-break of hostilities.³⁹ Leverage to force negotiations was provided by the military and economic assistance each major power provided to its client state. If the superpower leverage over various regional actors is degraded in the post-Cold War period, one possible result would be the escalation of regional conflicts to greater levels of violence, and potentially greater threats to U.S. interests.

No one can foresee with any precision what specific contingencies might arise that would involve commitment of U.S. forces over the long term. Some propositions about future involvement, based upon the foregoing discussion are possible, however. First, conflicts in which the principal interest has been U.S.-Soviet competition will produce proportionately smaller responses from the United States so long as the superpower competition is not revitalized. Second, the United States will be able to ignore some conflicts altogether since, though regrettable in their loss of life, they have no bearing on U.S. security. Third, where no threat to U.S. life and property exists, the United States will prefer other instruments over the use of military force to attain its security objectives. Fourth, the need for extended security interests, e.g., the need to protect some resource because it is vital to an ally who is crucial in the competition with the Soviet Union, will likely be reduced. Finally, however, there emerges a new danger from the possibility of unrestrained regional warfare resulting from the absence of superpower

³⁹For a thorough examination of this fight-and-negotiate process, see William V. O'Brien, *The Conduct of Just and Limited War* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), pp 289-294.

controls and constraints. Active threats to U.S. security are likely to be fewer than in the past, but those that do appear are likely to be more dangerous and to escalate to crisis levels more quickly than in the past.

Changing Relationships with Allies and Antagonists. The end of the Cold War is a transitional period of great potential, offering an opportunity to reshape the U.S.-Soviet relationship, and to reassess relationships with allies and antagonists alike. It does not, however, alter the fact that the nations of the world live in a state of formal anarchy. There is no supranational power that can coerce a rogue state into acceptable behavior. The nations of the world continue, as they have for centuries, to live with the need for self-help, i.e., devising protection for their own interests. The "security dilemma" is still with us, in which an improvement in the security of one state is perceived as a threat by its neighbors, and in which self-interest makes cooperation impossible, even though all parties have an interest in cooperating.⁴⁰ To protect their own interests, states have traditionally relied upon policies of either security or cooperation: alliances to provide security and international regimes to provide cooperation.⁴¹ Thus, any assessment of

⁴⁰Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30 (January 1978): 167-69.

⁴¹There is a large body of literature on security régimes and the notion of a security community. See Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); and Kenneth Oye, ed., *Cooperation Under Anarchy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986) for a good discussion of the various approaches. Keohane defines regimes as quasi-agreements, legally unenforceable, but mutually beneficial, in which low transaction costs and incentives not

changing relationships with friends and enemies should begin with an examination of alliances and regimes.

The United States currently maintains alliances with 43 different states.⁴² Despite this elaborate framework of alliances, there is long-standing disagreement about the theoretical basis for alliances and persistent doubt about the wisdom of policies underlying U.S. commitments. As Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan have noted:

...the literature on alliances is marked by competing explanations, none of which appears sufficient for a general theory, and contradictory findings: whether discussing the formation, performance, termination, or effects of alliances, we have repeatedly cited propositions which allegedly explain some fundamental issue, only to find that its exact opposite has been proposed in another source.⁴³

Arnold Wolfers provided one of the earlier theories of alliances in his book, *Discord and Collaboration*.⁴⁴ In it, Wolfers contended that alliances arise to take advantage of cooperation and to counter commonly held threats. Cooperation would be difficult, he believed, in the absence of a threat since cooperation necessarily impinges upon the freedom of the actors entering in to any state-to-state relationship.⁴⁵

to violate the rules produce economies for all parties. The common interests of the leading capitalist states make sustained cooperation possible.

⁴²The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1988), p 19.

⁴³Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann and John D. Sullivan, *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances*, (New York & London: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), p 41.

⁴⁴Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962).

According to Wolfers, the reason states join alliances is to balance--offset--the power of an adversary so that, "the costs (to the adversary) of adequate power for self-extension may at a certain point become excessive or prohibitive."⁴⁶ To this end, nations accrue power and influence by banding together in alliances as the "currency of foreign policy."

Robert Osgood found there were four functions of alliances: accretion of external power, internal security, restraint of allies, and international order.⁴⁷ He further posited that a change in the distribution of power between an alliance and its opponents might affect cohesion of the alliance. Like Wolfers, he recognized the impingement, the "costs," of alliances on individual states, noting alliances tend to cost more than other military commitments because they limit members' policy options and freedom of action.⁴⁸

Turning his attention to an assessment of U.S. alliances, Osgood observed there was no other major power with convergent interests to complement U.S. power and that:

The problem of American preponderance is rooted in a sense of disproportion between the nation's conception of its interests and the price it must pay to support them. (H)ow can the U.S. support the whole range of its interests as effectively as possible, with a level of effort and involvement that the political will and genius of the nation can sustain?⁴⁹

⁴⁵Ibid, p 27.

⁴⁶Ibid, p 96.

⁴⁷Robert E. Osgood, *Alliances and American Foreign Policy*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p 21.

⁴⁸Ibid, p 20, 24.

⁴⁹Ibid, p 5.

Osgood determined that the price of escaping the burden of extended alliance obligations was to recognize multipolarity and pluralism, and to accept less direct control of events.⁵⁰

George Liska, by comparison, conceived of alliances in terms of alignment and dealignment. When security was the prime concern, conflicts would be the main determinants of alignment. Major powers, "core powers" in Liska's terms, would not attract lesser nations to them. Rather, less powerful nations would seek alignment with geographically remote powers to counter the influence of a regional core power--as Saudi Arabia has recently done with the United States to counter Iraq. The basis for seeking alignment would be to maximize gains, share liabilities, supplement a state's own capabilities, and to reduce the impact of antagonistic power.⁵¹

Dealignment within an alliance might result if the ratio of identical, disparate and conflicting interests of the alliance partners changed. A lesser power might seek a separate peace, for example, as the ratio of interests changed, or as a result of coercion or enticement by an adversary.⁵²

Liska valued alliances with smaller states, especially in the nuclear era. He explained,

In the age of nuclear weapons, the superpowers still need lesser allies; there is no fundamentally new balance of reciprocal need and, consequently, influence. The loss of even a small ally may be more painful in a nuclear situation than in a conventional one, despite the ally's insignificance in nuclear terms. For the

⁵⁰Ibid, p 14.

⁵¹George Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), pp 12-31.

⁵²Ibid, pp 42, 46.

core power to lose such an ally may mean diminished capability to fight non-nuclear wars successfully; and the loss constitutes a political defeat which cannot be easily redressed by military or other counteraction.⁵³

Liska's conception of alliances as dynamic, with some forces promoting alignment and others dealignment, also provided for a shift in the roles of alliance members. One nation, in the ascendent, developing greater capabilities, might assume greater responsibilities from another nation that was in decline, he suggested.⁵⁴

Yet another perspective on alliance theory was offered by Stephen M. Walt. Nations align either to balance--counter--a core power and avoid its domination or they "bandwagon," joining a powerful state, attracted by its strength. Weak states tend to bandwagon when confronted by a major power and when no allies are available. But power is not the most important variable, according to Walt; states align against the most threatening actor. The provision of military and economic assistance, while important in some respects, does not usually cause alignment, but is a result of alignment. In other words, allies cannot be "bought" with aid. Moreover, provision of assistance is unlikely to give the senior ally authority to direct the activities of the junior aid recipient.⁵⁵

Looking beyond theoretical concerns to recent considerations of U.S. alliance policy, a number of important criticisms have been raised. Terry L. Deibel has studied U.S. alliances since World War II and found that they fall into three categories.

⁵³Ibid, p 141.

⁵⁴Ibid, p 181.

⁵⁵Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and Balance of Power," *International Security* 9 (Spring 1985): 5-8, 27-8.

Those made by Acheson were strategic, setting the terms of the post-war competition with the Soviet Union; those made by Dulles were tactical, undertaken to shore up the policy of massive retaliation on a regional basis; and those of the Carter-Reagan era were "mere" commitments and less explicitly first-order policy instruments.⁵⁶

Deibel urged caution in forming new alliances. More recent U.S. commitments, he argued, have acquired rights to troop placement but do not aggregate power or establish a perimeter for containment. The United States should concentrate on allies who have the potential to become real partners, and should learn to recognize the "outer limits of the truly vital" in the Third World.⁵⁷

Finally, Deibel identified a cyclic process in which requirements for more military forces and more allies to support the force's deployment were mutually reinforcing:

Greatly expanded U.S. military forces are considered necessary to support new allies; but the bigger, more deployable forces also need more enroute access, more in-area facilities, more overseas training and exercising--each in itself a committing activity that tends to create new security partners whose defense demands still more American forces.⁵⁸

Alan Sabrosky has been even more critical of the quality of American alliances, concluding:

On balance, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the American system of alliances is now more entangling

⁵⁶Terry L. Deibel, "Changing Patterns of Collective Defense," Alan N. Sabrosky, ed., *Alliances in U.S. Foreign Policy*, (Boulder & London: Westview Press, 1988), pp 108-111.

⁵⁷Ibid, pp 123, 128.

⁵⁸Ibid, p 116.

than it is supportive of American interests, and that the United States has come to find itself in the company of relatively few genuine allies, many clients, and several obvious encumbrances.⁵⁹

Amos A. Jordan describes U.S. alliances as in transition. The threats the alliances were created to oppose have eased; the U.S. has become engaged in other problems, such as the trade deficit; and our partners have become more assertive. The U.S. should seek burden sharing help on political and economic issues instead of just on security issues to revitalize its alliances, according to Jordan.⁶⁰

But burden sharing, in the opinion of Earl C. Ravenal, "is not the point or the problem. The question has always been whether the U.S. is getting its own money's worth out of its forward strategy, and would be getting its money's worth even after a putative redistribution of burdens."⁶¹ Ravenal offers two alternative approaches to current U.S. alliance policy: devolution, in which the U.S. confers upon its allies the necessary capability, including nuclear technology, to defend themselves; and disengagement, which leads progressively to insulate the United States from conflicts elsewhere, including Europe. Ravenal believes the U.S. could reap a large peace dividend from disengagement, saving \$130 billion a year and

⁵⁹Sabrosky in Alan N. Sabrosky, ed., *Alliances in U.S. Foreign Policy*, (Boulder & London: Westview Press, 1988), p 8.

⁶⁰Amos A. Jordan, "U.S. Alliances in Transition," in Robert E. Hunter, ed., *Restructuring Alliance Commitments*, (Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1988), pp 1-5.

⁶¹Earl C. Ravenal, "The Price and Perils of NATO," in David Boaz, and Edward H. Crane, eds., *Beyond the Status Quo*, (Washington, DC: The Cato Institute, 1985), p 129.

reducing force requirements to eight divisions, 20 tactical air wings and six carrier battle groups.⁶²

Misgivings about U.S. alliances are not developments of just the past few years. Henry Kissinger's 1965 analysis of NATO concluded that nuclear weapons discounted the value of any accretion of power and alignment of forces that an alliance might bring. The main task of strategy in such circumstances is not to amass power, but "to make the available power relevant to objectives likely to be in dispute."⁶³

Yet despite the misgivings of the observers noted above, the United States continues to expect its alliance relationships to add additional elements of national power, claiming that they "mitigate the understandable reluctance of the American people to shoulder security burdens alone."⁶⁴ In return for this burden sharing, the U.S. supports its alliance commitments with the following rationale:

...to deter adventurism by the Soviets and their client states, we maintain forward deployed forces in other regions of strategic importance. These global forward deployed forces serve several functions. They are essential to the creation of regional power balances which deter Soviet aggression and promote overall regional stability. They support the political independence of nations on the Soviet periphery, hence are key to the fundamental U.S. security objective of avoiding Soviet domination of the Eurasian landmass.⁶⁵

⁶²Ibid, pp 130-36.

⁶³Henry A. Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership*, (New York & London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965), pp 11, 18.

⁶⁴*National Security Strategy of the United States*, p 7.

⁶⁵Ibid, p 19.

From the foregoing comparison of U.S. alliance policy with the theoretical and specific, objective criticisms of scholars, several points emerge. First, there is no way to test scientifically the current utility of U.S. alliance policy. The United States' various alliances are all intended to support deterrence, but the lack of war with the Soviet Union does not necessarily result from deterrence. It may be that, rhetoric aside, the Soviet Union has been genuinely satisfied with the order and stability of the Cold War era and has been content to take advantage of opportunities at the margin, e.g., in the Third World, when they have presented themselves, without ever seriously considering a deliberate challenge to the post-war order.

Second, the disparity between the expectations from alliances indicated in *The National Security Strategy* of the United States and what theory describes as the limits of utility for alliances suggests that the U.S. expects too much from its alliance arrangements, and therefore probably invests too many resources in them. This suspicion that alliances have more limited value than the U.S. realizes seems borne out by recent events. During the Cuban missile crisis, for example, the Organization of American States (OAS) did vote for the naval quarantine requested by the United States, and some member states contributed men, supplies and ships during the following weeks as well.⁶⁶ But such assistance did not mitigate the fact that the United States would be the target for the Soviet Union's medium-range ballistic missiles if the crisis escalated to a nuclear exchange, or that it was U.S. Navy ships that would be the targets of a Soviet challenge to

⁶⁶Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1968), p 35.

the quarantine line. In other words, despite burden-sharing, there was little-or-no shared risk. Similarly, in the present Middle East operations, the United States enjoys excellent burden-sharing, while risk-sharing is less equitable with some participants.

In Grenada and in Panama, the United States took unilateral action. Although assistance of constabulary forces from other Caribbean islands was provided from the first day of the operation, these forces did not participate in the fighting. In the case of Panama, the United States faced criticism from its OAS partners for its actions against the regime.⁶⁷

The evidence suggests that the network of alliances the United States has fostered does not provide the accretion of power, alignment and burden sharing support that official policy statements indicate are desired. Moreover, with the consequences of war being what they are--especially in a confrontation with the Soviet Union--the incentives to inaction for a smaller ally are powerful.

Third, most of the U.S. alliance network was developed in response to the Cold War, as part of the containment policy, and thus is subject to review. At issue is the prospect for continuing cohesion and alignment within the various alliances if the Soviet threat and the threat posed by its surrogates abates. The point is that, no matter what the perceived value of the alliances may be to U.S. policymakers, the alliances may

⁶⁷Admittedly, this is a sensitive issue. On one hand, Noriega's removal was certainly beneficial to all states in the region, but on the other hand, the U.S. action was questionable under international law since Article 51 of the United Nations charter provides no grounds for intervention in a sovereign state. The U.S. action, a "desirable evil," did not receive OAS approval.

deteriorate in the post-containment era for the reasons identified by Kissinger, Liska and Walt.

Finally, as Deibel and Ravenal observed, alliances create requirements for American troops. If security issues, and hence alliances become relatively less important in the spectrum of U.S. policy considerations, troop requirements could be reduced. To do this, the United States need not undertake a massive repudiation of previous agreements, but, instead of assigning and ear-marking specific units for deterrence and defense of specific regions as the United States currently does, it might be possible to rely on a smaller, central reserve of forces once overseas commitments and security risks were reduced.⁶⁸

Having examined the security--alliance--component of relations with friends and enemies, it is time to turn to consideration of opportunities for cooperation and the potential value of international regimes. Traditionally, cooperation among nations has been limited. Matters of trade, air traffic control, movement of the mails and similar issues have been areas of cooperation. But the closer issues between two or more states approached the vital interests or security of one state, the more difficult cooperation became.⁶⁹

Recently, however, a growing body of thought suggests greater cooperation may be possible in security matters as well. Robert O. Keohane, although principally concerned with cooperation in areas of international political economy, has brought attention to the Coase Theorem, which highlights the

⁶⁸Details of U.S. force planning and apportionment will be discussed in chapter four.

⁶⁹Robert J. Lieber, *No Common Power*, (Glenview, Boston & London: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1988), p 270.

value of bargaining without a central authority. The theorem suggests opportunities for bargaining in other areas of concern, including security matters.⁷⁰ Keohane's work further indicates that cooperation may develop from complementary interests and institutions, and from each state being willing to adjust to the needs of others. However, cooperation is predicated upon the presence of a hegemon, and patterns of cooperation become less effective if the hegemon is in decline.⁷¹

Robert Axelrod also believes that cooperation can evolve as an alternative to alliances as a means to manage security issues. In his study of the U.S. Senate, Axelrod found that cooperation emerged as the senators each pursued their own respective interests. Axelrod concluded that similar cooperation could emerge in international relations as well.⁷²

Kenneth Oye has also examined extensively cooperation between nations. Oye has used game theory to understand international cooperation and break-downs in cooperation that have occurred in the past, e.g., the out-break of World War I. He concluded that the potential for more extensive international cooperation exists, but that certain preconditions must be established. If gains from cooperation can be increased for all parties--perhaps through economic inducements; if all parties are aware that the circumstances of their cooperation will recur; if all parties are aware of the mutually beneficial nature of their cooperation and are careful not to disrupt the benefits for their partners, Oye believes

⁷⁰Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp 85-88.

⁷¹Ibid, pp 244-59.

⁷²Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, (New York: Basic Books, 1984), p 68.

the chances for extended international cooperation improve. The biggest problem with Oye's preconditions for more extensive cooperation is his last recommendation, to reduce the number of participants in a cooperative relationship. This is clearly a major impediment to international cooperation with over 150 nations in the world.⁷³

Robert Jervis has focused more specifically on the security aspects of cooperation than have other scholars. Jervis believes that security regimes, "...principles, rules, and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate" can be established which offer an alternative to alliances as a means of enhancing security.⁷⁴ There are four criteria that must be met for a security regime to be successful, according to Jervis. First, the great powers must want it. Second, all parties to the regime must believe that the other parties share the value they put on mutual security and cooperation. Third, no party to the regime may believe that expansion is necessary for security. Fourth, war must seem too costly to all parties.⁷⁵

The Coase Theorem and Axelrod's study of behavior in the U.S. Senate suggests that there may be more impulses toward cooperation in international relations than is commonly recognized. At the same time, the work of Keohane, Oye and Jervis suggests that real prospects of extended cooperation are highly conditional. It is doubtful, for example, that most

⁷³Kenneth A. Oye, ed., *Cooperation Under Anarchy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). See Oye's introductory chapter, "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies," pp 1-25.

⁷⁴Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., *International Regimes*, (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1983), p 173.

⁷⁵Ibid, pp 176-78.

nations in the world would subscribe to Jervis' criteria for a security regime. War continues to prosper, especially in the Third World, and irredentist causes abound. Nevertheless, it may be possible to create security regimes on a regional basis.

Cooperation for security on a regional basis is more likely for several reasons. It reduces the number of participants, an important criterium from Oye's perspective. Regional great powers are more likely to be influential in the creation of a security regime limited to their own venue, whereas they would be less influential in a larger security relationship. In addition, states within the same region are more likely to share traditions, values and out-looks--a regional culture--that will allow them to understand mutual cooperation and security in the same terms and thus improve their chances of succeeding in establishing it. A regional culture, that is, having certain important things in common, allows states to make use of what Axelrod found in the U.S. Senate, where the senators, though representing different states and interests, all subscribed to a common culture, a common way of doing business and resolving problems. Finally, geography of the region plays a role, since status quo powers that are difficult to conquer are more likely to be disposed toward cooperation than states vulnerable to attack by their neighbors.⁷⁶

Expectations of security regimes, even regionally limited ones, should be tempered with caution. At a major point of transition in history like the end of the Cold War, when it may be tempting to slip into utopian musings, Susan Strange's skepticism about international regimes should be considered. Strange finds regimes a fad, charges that they are imprecise,

⁷⁶Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30 (January 1978): 173.

value-based distortions of relations between states that over-emphasize static attributes of international relations. Furthermore, she finds there are too many disparate definitions of international regimes.⁷⁷ If Strange's objections to regimes were answered with a single, limited-scope definition that held fewer expectations of what international regimes could accomplish, another problem awaits; even status quo states do not remain satisfied with the status quo.⁷⁸

Aware of such short-comings, security regimes pose an alternative relationship to alliances only under a narrow set of conditions that may be very hard to establish and maintain, even on a limited, regional basis. First, a security regime would have to be narrowly understood as an arrangement for mutual security among parties for whom security is not the highest priority. Such a condition might arise naturally, among parties with few points of contention and a homogeneous culture and outlook, as in Western Europe, or might be engineered through a series of confidence building measures.⁷⁹ All participants would have to support the territorial status quo. Next, there would have to be a material basis for mutually-beneficial arrangements beside security issues. In other words, the distribution of wealth, technology, raw materials and industrial infrastructure would have to be such that parties to the security regime could all derive more benefit from cooperation than from competition and withholding their own respective assets from the other parties. Or,

⁷⁷Susan Strange, "Cave! hic dragones," in Krasner, p 137.

⁷⁸Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," p 169. According to Jervis, this is one of the principal reasons why cooperation among states in the condition of formal anarchy remains difficult despite most states' good intentions.

⁷⁹Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," p 181.

conversely, distribution of material resources would have to be uniform so that all parties were independent of the others for material support, which would still provide incentives to avoid regional conflict by preserving existing mutual prosperity. Alternatively, such cooperation could result from shared values, or type of government, such as democracy. Third, there could be no significant ideological disputes, e.g., between secular and fundamentalist religious groups.

A regional hegemon might support such a security regime by offering further inducements for cooperation. A regional hegemon could help create any confidence building measures necessary to reduce the priority security issues receive; offer or support regional economic programs that would benefit all parties; or expand the number of issues for cooperation so that, if a party were required to compromise on one issue, that party would receive a more advantageous settlement on some other issue. The hegemon might serve as an additional source of critical assets, so that in the event an important resource is disputed, the hegemon could guarantee the needs of all parties would be met, avoiding zero-sum confrontations within the security regime's community of actors.

A hegemon would not be obligated, as it would be in an alliance, to send troops or to intervene if war did occur. The hegemon's role would be to promote equally the well-being, prosperity and security of all parties to the regional security regime. If war were to occur, it would necessarily end the security regime and all parties, regional major powers and the hegemon alike, would then re-examine their interests and align with other actors as their own respective needs dictated.

A third security arrangement, until recently in disrepute, is collective security. Collective security was poorly

regarded during the Cold War for several reasons. First, historically, it failed. The collective security arrangements of the League of Nations, in which theoretically, all members of the League should have joined to counter the acts of an aggressor, did not stop Nazi Germany. This was in part because of the unanimity rule for action by the League, in part because some states found it easier to side with some states rather than with others, and in part because peace was not the highest priority.⁸⁰ Second, in addition to the historical failure of collective security, such an approach could not work in a world with superpowers, since the collective might of the other nations could not counter a superpower with a nuclear arsenal. Yet in light of recent events in the Middle East, however, where the United States is participating with other nations in a collective security action against Iraq, traditional collective security arrangements now appear workable for dealing with regional conflicts where a regional power rather than a superpower is to be restrained.

Collective security differs from alliances because alliances typically determine who the adversary is from the outset-- e.g., two countries enter an alliance to counter a threat posed by a third nation. In collective security, the enemy is not identified in advance. The members of a collective security agreement promise each other assistance in the event they are threatened by any member to the pact. In other words, in collective security, the potential aggressor is a party to the collective security pact, while in alliances, the aggressor is outside the pact. Today, the United Nations provides the

⁸⁰Critiques of the League and collective security abound. A concise one is found in Edward H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp 13-19.

collective security pact, with all members of the UN subject to article 2(4) of the UN charter, which renounces the use of force except for self-defense under article 51. Chapter 7 of the charter provides for enforcement action against members who resort to force outside the limits prescribed by the charter.

At the end of the Cold War, then, there appear to be three arrangements available for structuring relationships with friends and enemies in international affairs. Security regimes, as redefined above, offer one kind of relationship for circumstances where security issues are subordinate to other concerns and when the likelihood of armed conflict is remote. These regimes constitute regional "rules of the game" for ordering relations and specific activities among status quo states. For a hegemon or a regional major power, the security regime is a vehicle that enables influence and participation in regional affairs without the necessity of aligning with one party against others, and without the necessity of guaranteeing military assistance or promising troops. Such an arrangement does, however, oblige the regional major power or hegemon to commit other resources, diplomatic, economic and technical, to perpetuate harmonious relations within the region.

Alliances and collective security remain the principal instruments for security in areas where recourse to war is likely, where the status quo is not accepted and where ideological conflict persists. What may have changed in the post-Cold War era is the frequency of need for alliances. The demise of the ideological contest between Marxism-Leninism and capitalism may make cooperation possible in regions where it was previously very limited or impossible. While some alliances will remain essential for the protection of vital national interests, it may nevertheless be possible to

restructure some alliances into security regimes, or into regional collective security organizations.⁸¹ Such restructuring could reduce requirements for forward-deployed troops, requirements for assigned and earmarked forces, and potentially, even for active duty forces.

Arms Control. Although arms control has been a variable within the security equation for years, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the on-going Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks and recent events in Eastern Europe re-emphasize the importance of arms control as a tool for shaping the U.S. military. Of course, the primary purpose of arms control is enhancement of national security through improving deterrence, reducing risks and supporting alliance relationships.⁸² Toward these goals, the last several U.S. Administrations have accepted constraints and limitations on their military forces when required to achieve what they concluded was greater overall security. As a result, the INF Treaty was concluded, although it deprived NATO of important, theater-level nuclear forces, reduced the Army end-strength by about 14,500 and prompted then-SACEUR, General Bernard Rogers to comment that the treaty gave him gas. Indeed, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Crowe, acknowledged the limitations the treaty placed on the theater strategy, but concluded the limitations were worth sustaining for a better overall security posture.⁸³

⁸¹Indeed, President Gorbachev is making overtures to this effect for Europe. See David Remnick, "Gorbachev Pledges to use Powers for Economy, New Security Plan," *The Washington Post*, 16 March 1990, p A1.

⁸²*National Security Strategy of the United States*, p 15.

⁸³Statement of Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., USN, in Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate,

Likewise, the 1986 Stockholm Agreement, in its confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM), accepted constraints on troop movements, exercise size, parachute and amphibious assaults and other activities.⁸⁴ Although such limitations may reduce unit levels of proficiency by constraining their training, military requirements were subordinated to the larger goal, an improvement in national security and theater stability vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

With military effectiveness subordinate to broader security considerations, it is reasonable to expect that CFE and the post-Cold War environment presently taking shape in Eastern Europe might also produce limitations. These limitations--especially those derived from CFE--could include prohibitions against certain weapons; they most certainly will include asymmetrical reductions in troop strength. The Bush Administration proposals initially envisioned reductions of 10-to-20 percent, and Congress has commissioned studies considering the impact of reductions of 25 and 50 percent.⁸⁵ The former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General RisCassi, believes that the Vienna talks are a primary factor in what the future Army will look like:

I think that the Vienna talks...will cause a change in the (Army) conventional force structure. President Bush's initiative called for reducing our European troop

Second Session, Part 1, January 1988, pp 47, 48.

⁸⁴U.S. Department of State, *Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe*, (Washington: USGPO, 1986), pp 28-32.

⁸⁵Jonathan Dean, "Can NATO Agree on Arms Control?," *Technology Review* (October 1989): 63.

strength by 30,000, 21,000-plus of which would be Army. We would like to recoup that in our CONUS base structure. If we don't, then that's a division and a half that would come out of our force structure...But coming down to 500- or 550,000 (total Army end strength) in five years, I don't see that.⁸⁶

Secretary of the Army Stone, contemplating the same issues, likewise concluded that "force structure is probably going to be the most important problem we need to manage over the next few years."⁸⁷

Regarding changes in Eastern Europe, both Gregory F. Treverton and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff believe that the current course of events is greatly reducing tension between East and West. Pfaltzgraff believes the relaxed atmosphere will influence CFE, inducing NATO nations to accept deep reductions, noting:

If NATO has lived for such a long period with large disparities favoring the Warsaw Pact under conditions of greater international tension than exist at this time, it will be argued, the force structure needed for the future to assure equilibrium in Europe can safely be reduced on NATO's side to a level well below that set forth in a CFE Treaty.⁸⁸

⁸⁶Benjamin F. Schemmer, "An Exclusive AFJI Interview with General Robert W. Riscassi, USA," *Armed Forces Journal International* (October 1989): 70, 72.

⁸⁷L. James Binder, "Vital to Army that Reductions be Managed," *Army* (February 1990): 16.

⁸⁸Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., "The Army as a Strategic Force in 90s and Beyond," *Army* (February 1990): 23. See also Gregory F. Treverton, "The Defense Debate," *Foreign Affairs* 68 (1989/90): 183-196.

The recent past makes clear that senior officials are willing to make significant changes in force structure and armaments in exchange for what they perceive to be greater enhancements to overall national security. The new-found impulse for peace and cooperation that is sweeping European public opinion--and hence bringing pressure on elected officials--is likely to support further arms control efforts. That the results will produce a smaller U.S. military presence in Europe is almost a certainty. Enthusiasm generated by successful arms reductions in Europe may produce attempts to reduce forces elsewhere, e.g., in Korea. In any event, no serious consideration can be given to the future of the U.S. Army without examining the influence of arms control. At a minimum, as a result of arms control measures, there are likely to be fewer U.S. forces deployed globally. If forces withdrawn from theater deployment are not returned to the United States but disbanded, the influence of arms control upon future forces would obviously be far more significant.

Technology and its Impact on Military Issues. Technological progress since the mid-1960s has manifested itself in several important respects. On one hand, technology has provided a variety of alternative methods and means to accomplish the same mission on the battlefield. Technology offers many new solutions to old military problems, and offers the potential to reduce human risk and suffering as well. On the other hand, as many nations have adopted technically sophisticated, state-of-the-art arms, the surplus of older but still capable weapons has reached the poorest states in the Third World, producing an important increase in global net military capability. In addition, "Toyota Wars"--wars such as the civil war in Chad--

have demonstrated that in certain circumstances, forces equipped with commercial vehicles and the proper mix of light, export-quality arms and equipment can hold a substantial mechanized force at bay.⁸⁹ Moreover, as table I-1 indicates, some Third World nations have developed formidable military establishments, many of them larger than the forces maintained by the European states.

Table I-1: Military Capabilities
of Third World and European Powers

	COMBAT AIRCRAFT	MAIN BATTLE TANKS	GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL*
FRG	645	5,000	341
FRANCE	732	1,340	293
U.K.	865	1,290	156
LIBYA	515	1,800	55
SYRIA	499	4,050	300
PAKISTAN	455	1,750	480
INDIA	867	3,650	1,100
S. KOREA	472	1,560	550
N. KOREA	650	3,200	930
IRAQ	513	5,500	955
VIETNAM	394	1,600	1,100

* Thousands

Source: United States Army Posture Statement, Fy 1991

Nor is the proliferation of technically sophisticated weapons limited to the realm of conventional forces. Some 20 states have acquired a chemical warfare capability.⁹⁰

⁸⁹Export arms include models of weapons designed for foreign sale. These weapons are not surplus nor obsolete, but sometimes are less capable than like models intended for the domestic arsenal since the export versions are often missing proprietary technology in sights, electronics and similar areas.

⁹⁰Frank C. Carlucci, *Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1990*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1989), p 42.

Similarly, although there has been no documented nuclear proliferation in the 1980s, many observers suspect that more states have developed nuclear weapons, or at least the capability to produce them. South Africa and Israel are often considered as likely candidates for admission to the nuclear weapons club.⁹¹ These advances in military technology and the proliferation of sophisticated military hardware suggest that it is time to re-assess the threat posed by potential adversaries and to re-examine some of the practices of U.S. forces in light of technological progress.

Beginning with the effects of technology on the threat, it should be noted that technology does not proliferate evenly. Some states adopt new technology more quickly than others. Similarly, not all states are equally successful at integrating new, technically advanced equipment into their forces. Some states, for example, may simply use new weapons as replacements for older, less capable ones. When this is the case, the state may not gain full advantage from the new weapon, since it will be constrained by tactics and doctrine developed for its predecessor system. Other constraints can limit the effectiveness of new weapons as well, including inflexible or otherwise inadequate command and control, suboptimal distribution of the new weapon within the forces, or poorly trained troops. Other states may make the necessary adjustments to their tactics, doctrine, training and force structure to maximize the benefits the eapon can bring.⁹²

⁹¹William J. Taylor, Jr., Steven A. nen and Gerrit W. Gong, eds., *Strategic Responses to Conflict in the 1980s* (Lexington: DC Heath & Co., 1984), p 13.

⁹²The failure to integrate technology fully into their forces has been offered as an explanation for the relatively limited impact of new weapons in the Iran-Iraq war. International

When considering the effects of technology on the relative conventional military capabilities, it may be helpful to conceive of three levels of capabilities. What might be called first-order states have the latest equipment, including reconnaissance, and command and control systems that allow them to see more of the battlefield and shoot at targets located at greater depths on the battlefield. First-order states have a sound, combined arms capability, enabling them to coordinate the efforts of air forces, ground maneuver forces, and fire support in a single engagement. First-order states are capable of continuous operations, fighting at night and in bad weather.

Second-order states have equipment inventories drawn from the world arms market, and thus have selected weapons nearly as capable as the best in first-order state arsenals. Second-order states lack the command, control, reconnaissance and related resources necessary to exploit fully the capabilities of their weapons. Their view of the battlefield lacks depth relative to that of first-order states, and they may not have weapons able to engage accurately targets at extended ranges. Second-order states may also suffer tactical, doctrinal and training deficiencies that limit the effectiveness of their forces.

Third-order states--and stateless actors--are generally supplied from the world-wide surplus of older weapons. Much of their equipment is obsolete by western military standards, but proves effective for their purposes.⁹³ At the same time, Security Studies Program Conference Report. *Emerging Doctrines and Technologies: Implications for Global and Regional Political-Military Balances* (Cambridge, MA, 1986), pp 18, 19.

⁹³Obsolescence is based upon a cost/effectiveness calculus. Thus a weapon system that is obsolete by western standards because its fire control system costs too much to maintain when

third-order actors may have a few weapons that are state-of-the-art. Afghan rebels armed with Stinger surface-to-air missiles would be an example. Third-order actors may be capable of very limited types of military activities. Shortfalls in command, control and communications may hamper their ability to direct their forces. Despite the lethality of some of their weapons, they may find it difficult to mass forces for coordinated operations, and may prefer to fight in smaller bands, accepting battle only when they can limit the fight to a series of small engagements.

Turning to the effects of technology on U.S. military options, the first point to be made is that one item of technology can have multiple effects, good and bad, depending upon where in the technological life cycle one looks. As Edward Luttwak noted, the enemy responds most forcefully to those things that present the greatest threat to him. This is also the case with new technology. Thus, during World War II, when a new radar on Allied bombers that helped find enemy fighters proved to be very effective, it provoked countermeasures from the Germans to blind it. Later still, the Germans were able to detect the signals emitted by the radars, and followed the radar signals to attack the Allied bombers. The radar technology, over its life cycle, was first very effective for the allies, later less effective because of jamming, and ultimately dangerous because it led enemy fighters to the bombers.⁹⁴ In more recent times, the Soviets may have more accurate systems available, may not be obsolete in the calculus of a third-order military whose principal interest in the weapon is not in its fire control effectiveness but, for example, in its armor protection.

⁹⁴Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy*, (Cambridge MA & London: Belknap harvard, 1987), pp 28-32.

recognized the potential threat posed by thermal-imaging sights on NATO tanks and countered it by adopting millimeter wavelength radar sights for their own tanks and special obscurants to blind NATO thermal sights. Thus the most promising technology may become worthless or even dangerous over time. In other words, no piece of technology has an absolute value for military application. The various technological possibilities must be constantly re-evaluated to make sure they have not been overtaken by other developments or by deliberate countermeasures.

A second point about technology is that it provides similar capabilities to different weapons. Helicopters, tanks, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM), field artillery and air force aircraft can all be used effectively to destroy enemy tanks. The traditional roles and missions of the field artillery, among others, have become blurred by the proliferation of new capabilities resulting from modern technology. While some redundancy and overlap is essential to success in warfare, the new technical possibilities for killing tanks and for performing other tasks suggests that it may be time to re-assess the tasks assigned to each arm of the ground and air forces, to review doctrine and to re-distribute tactical requirements in accordance with the emerging capabilities.

A third aspect of technology's influence on the military is battlefield crowding. Both the ground and the airspace over it that constitute the battlefield have become crowded. On the ground, the appearance of increasing amounts of artillery creates demands for more space among and immediately behind maneuver units. Similarly, the addition of electronic warfare units, attack helicopter units and a variety of combat support units have crowded the area immediately behind the FLOT--

forward line of own troops. Airspace use, always difficult, has become increasingly complicated to coordinate, as the artillery shoots through the same areas that the air forces and helicopters fly. The addition of combat and reconnaissance drones may add another level of complexity.⁹⁵ It may be time to re-apportion forces over the various dimensions of the battlefield to adjust for the crowding that has occurred. That is, it may be prudent to redistribute friendly forces behind the FLOT and to re-assign targeting in the enemy's depth to different arms, taking maximum advantage of current capabilities.

Re-assessment is due elsewhere as well. A number of questions should be examined: are light forces more capable than they have previously been considered to be? Are they perhaps more vulnerable, in light of technical advancements, than they are currently thought to be? What about heavy forces? Are light, expeditionary forces still important, or have even minimal, third-order states become formidable enough to put such expeditionary forces at risk?

Finally, technology influences the quality of conventional deterrence. Since the United States' conventional deterrence has rested upon qualitatively superior forces, in which technical sophistication has been one measure of superiority, it follows that if the nation's technical lead is reduced, the quality of conventional deterrence will also be affected. The Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy has concluded that

⁹⁵How much airspace coordination is needed seems to be a matter of national preference. U.S. forces have always insisted on very elaborate fire support coordination measures to limit risk to manned aircraft. In contrast, the Israeli Defense Forces do relatively little, relying instead on the "big sky, little bullet" theory--that there is little chance of an aircraft being hit.

this is in fact the case. The Commission found that the technical base was deteriorating, that the United States lacked an effective mechanism to turn technical and military concepts into weapons that would meet known needs, and that defense industries had traded their once-great capability for innovation for a safe policy of risk avoidance.⁹⁶ It is therefore important to consider future forces from the perspective of their contribution to conventional deterrence.

The foregoing observations about technology suggest some general propositions about the influence of technology on the future U.S. Army. First, technology has no absolute value in military applications. New technology, once fielded and discovered by the enemy, may be countered, resulting in that technology being less valuable than expected or outright dangerous. Second, improvements in command, control, communications and intelligence (C³I) are as important as improvements in weapons. Developing new tactics, doctrine and forces ought to consider the C³I of likely adversaries as much as their weaponry and other capabilities. Third, technology offers a chance to redistribute combat roles, missions and tasks within the Army and between the Army and Air Force. Finally, if the technical edge of the United States is eroding, other adjustments in conventional forces may be required to maintain conventional deterrence.

Economics and the Limits of the Defense Budget. Warner R. Schilling wrote about the defense budget and the many choices confronting those who must formulate it:

⁹⁶See *Technology for National Security*. Report by the Working Group on Technology, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1988), pp 1, 3.

Choice is unavoidable: choice among the values to be served, the choice among the divergent conceptions of what will happen if such and such is done...It is for this reason that the defense budget, while susceptible to rational analysis, remains a matter for political resolution.⁹⁷

Schilling understood that some important decisions on the defense budget reflected preferences--politics--for one approach to problem-solving over another to meet the nation's security requirements. The different political choices or preferences carried with them different conceptions of international relations, different world-views and different notions of the United States' role in the world. From these disparate preferences and political out-looks, a foreign policy process based upon compromise emerged which would, according to Schilling, run and remain in effect regardless of changes in circumstances. Such a political process, no matter that it accommodated the various foreign policy elites, produced unstable policy.⁹⁸

The instability of defense budget policy is very much in evidence today. The threat posed by the Soviet Union, which once served as the foundation for the defense budget, is, according to both the Defense Intelligence and Central Intelligence Agencies, greatly diminished. Both agencies agree that Soviet governmental reforms are irreversible (and these

⁹⁷Warner R. Schilling in Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond and Glenn H. Snyder, *Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets*, (New York & London: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp 14, 15.

⁹⁸Ibid, pp 19-27, 219. Policy could be unstable since there are "alternative means and no clear optimum" for defense requirements; moreover, "there is no way to determine objectively how much insurance it is rational to carry."

reforms are thought to make the Soviet Union less likely to pursue confrontational policies toward the West).⁹⁹

Adding to the instability is the changing relationship between the United States' European allies and the Soviet Union. These states, until recently security adversaries, increasingly view each other as economic partners, the West Europeans eager to penetrate the Soviet retail and manufacturing economy and the Soviets just as eager to reap the benefits of Western technology.

The old NATO debate about burden sharing has re-emerged as well. According to the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, William H. Taft IV, the United States should redefine its role in Europe, but faces difficulties doing so since the Europeans are reluctant to take their place "alongside the superpowers." Taft expressed frustration that the West Europeans were moving so slowly toward a new architecture for Europe.¹⁰⁰


In addition to these factors, all indicative of instability in defense policy, the out-lay in defense spending have been generally stable. As figure I-2 indicates, except for peaks at the Korean and Vietnam war eras, defense spending has been generally stable on two plateaus: one around eight percent of gross national product during the mid-1950s to mid-1960s, and one around six percent throughout the decade of the 1980s. In broadest terms, defense spending accounted for approximately one-quarter of the federal budget.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹R. Jeffrey Smith and Patrick E. Tyler, "Cheney, DIA Said to be at Odds on Soviet Threat," *The Washington Post*, 8 March 1990, p A7.

¹⁰⁰David Tarrant, "U.S. Military Role Should be Shifted to Allies, Taft Says," *European Stars and Stripes*, 8 March 1990, p 1.

¹⁰¹Richard Stubbing, "The Defense Budget," in Joseph Kruzal, ed., *American Defense Annual*, (Lexington & Toronto: Lexington

Figure I-2: Defense Outlays as a Share of Gross National Product



Source: Adapted from Frank C. Carlucci Annual Report to Congress, FY 1990, p 88.

In light of the changes just mentioned--a reduced threat from the Soviet Union, West European economic initiatives and the re-appearance of burden-sharing as an intra-NATO issue, it is difficult to see how support for high defense spending can be sustained. Indeed, there is a sizeable expectation within the United States of a "peace dividend"--savings directly related to reductions in defense spending. Some commentators have already begun preparing lists of programs that can be cut safely. One such article ear-marks three billion dollars-worth of Army weapons and proposes an overall cutback that would save \$150 billion per year on defense.¹⁰²

The desire to save money by trimming the defense budget is further supported by the perception that the nation's defense dollars have not been well-spent. Richard Stubbing, for example, has pointed to the FY 1988-89 defense budget which

Books, 1988), p 45.

¹⁰²*New York Times*, "\$150 Billion a Year," 8 March 1990, p 24.

claimed concern about a major Soviet weapons build-up, but did nothing directly to counter the supposed build-up, spending most of the additional funds on research, development, testing and experimentation (RDT&E).¹⁰³ Lawrence J. Korb also attributes decline in support of the defense budget to perceptions of mismanagement during the Reagan years. He calls attention to the fact that Casper Weinberger submitted his first Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) before announcing the national security policy or even completing all key staff appointments.¹⁰⁴

Yet another school of thought looks beyond the differing political orientations that lie at the root of the budget debate as it is described above, and instead focuses on a more fundamental issue, the role of economics in the continued vitality and security of the nation. Robert Gilpin offers a theory of hegemonic decline, in which the central mechanism is economic. The costs of maintaining the global status quo rise faster than the hegemon's economic capacity to support the status quo.¹⁰⁵ Based upon Gilpin's ideas, confronted with such circumstances, a nation should emphasize revitalization of its economy rather than further developing its defense establishment, which is counter-productive because it is capital intensive. Paul Kennedy followed a similar line of thought when he argued that, historically, great powers have

¹⁰³Richard Stubbing, "The Defense Budget," p 63.

¹⁰⁴Lawrence J. Korb, "Spending Without Strategy," *International Security* 12 (Summer 1987): 166, 167. Since budgets and defense plans must be submitted in January and since strategy and personnel appointments take longer, this criticism could be raised for every administration.

¹⁰⁵Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, (London & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), especially chapter four.

declined when they extended their military reach beyond their economic capacity to support it.¹⁰⁶ Paul Krugman, in contrast, has argued that the debt burden and slow growth great powers sometimes encounter and the other evils often attributed to economic over-extension are not the real source of trouble, but that a decline in a nation's productivity is the larger danger to its great power status.¹⁰⁷

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., disputes the America in decline hypothesis altogether. He argues that the Pax Americana myth exaggerates the decline of U.S. power. Nye claims that it has been the political context of the military balance (i.e., the Cold War) that has kept the U.S. from wielding its economic power effectively, making it more urgent for the United States to promote allied economic performance than to compete against it.¹⁰⁸

Although various scholars may attribute the specific sources of danger to different aspects of a state's economic condition, there is growing agreement that defense spending on the levels that the United States has sustained for the past three decades poses a threat to the nation's vitality and security. Until recently, however, the United States saw its security requirements through the lens of the Cold War, containment, and the elaborate network of alliances it had built. There was little room, under such circumstances, to examine seriously the

¹⁰⁶ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, (New York: Random House, 1987), pp 347-57. No economist, Kennedy has been criticized for some of his conclusions. His general ideas, however, seem valid and in consonance with recognized experts in international economics, like Gilpin.

¹⁰⁷ Paul Krugman, "We're No. 3--So What?" *The Washington Post*, 25 March 1990, p C1.

¹⁰⁸ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Bound to Lead*, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1990), pp 4, 90, 108.

potential for improving national security through redirection of economic resources. Concerns like those of Richard Feinberg, that the health of the international economy was the greatest threat to U.S. security, were ignored.¹⁰⁹

Now, however, at the end of the Cold War, opponents of the current level of defense expenditures will surely point out that the military threat to U.S. interests is greatly reduced. Now is the time, they will claim, to examine closely the potential of national economic policy to enhance the United States' security while simultaneously revitalizing what many see as an ailing economy.¹¹⁰

There are many influences likely to limit future defense budgets. The reduced risk of aggression against U.S. interests, perceived by many to be the result of new-found cooperation with the Soviet Union, is certainly a key ingredient in the widely-held expectation of a "peace dividend." The wide-spread cooperation among many nations in dealing with the on-going Middle East crisis and the first-ever enforcement action under chapter seven of the United Nations charter suggests that coalition approaches to security issues may ease the defense burden of the United States through cooperative actions with other nations. Dissatisfaction with recent defense planning, and a sense that the threat has been manipulated (or at least used to support one set of political preferences) to support greater expenditures on military programs than necessary casts doubt on the credibility of the entire defense planning and budgeting process. At the same

¹⁰⁹Richard E. Feinberg, *The Intemperate Zone*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1983), pp 216, 231-39.

¹¹⁰Even faced with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the current federal budget proposal cuts defense spending by \$180 billion. John E. Yang, "Bush, Hill Leaders Approve Budget Package," *The Washington Post*, 1 October 1990, pp A1, A6.

time, the notion that future American security rests more on economic performance and less on security policy provides a direct challenge to the defense budget and proposes to spend defense dollars elsewhere.

The military establishment must deal successfully with each of these factors in designing the future Army, providing a force that is affordable as well as capable. "Affordable" may not mean inexpensive, but it will likely mean that the force can be maintained at spending levels significantly below current levels.

Domestic Attitudes Toward the Defense Establishment. All of the influencing factors examined thus far have generally been unambiguous about the nature and direction of changes they are most likely to precipitate in the U.S. military. Domestic attitudes toward the defense establishment, however, produce cross currents that do not necessarily reveal their ultimate direction. These cross currents result from four separate groups of influences: the historical experience of the military in America; the domestic economic impact of the military; popular desire for other, competing federal programs; and vestigial issues left unresolved since the end of the Vietnam War.

The Army has moved through three phases in the 200-plus years of its existence.¹¹¹ It began as colonial militia and remained largely a home defense force through the Indian Wars. During this era, the Army consisted of a small standing force that accompanied the migration westward, continuing the home defense duties much as the colonial militia had before them.

¹¹¹I am indebted to Dr. John Tashjean for this idea.

When major challenges to the nation's security arose, such as the Civil War, national conscription and mobilization of state militias was required to generate full field armies. Even in instances of a rather limited contingency, a call for volunteers was necessary to raise adequate forces. This was the case as late as the Spanish-American War.

The second phase of the Army's existence began with World War I and ended with World War II. This phase, the Pershing era, transformed the Army from a home defense force to an expeditionary force. It continued to rely on mobilization of reserve formations and on conscription to attain its full capabilities, and maintained a relatively small regular component. Unlike in the earlier phase of its existence, however, the Army was oriented toward action overseas. General Lesley McNair began to redesign Army divisions to make them smaller and easier to transport. Redesign included modifications to meet specific requirements of the different theaters of assignment. The Army even began training regional experts, sending Joseph Stilwell to China to learn Chinese in the early 1920s.¹¹² Yet expeditionary forces, when not deployed, were generally stationed in the United States. The Philippines proved the only significant exception.

The third phase of the Army's existence came in the wake of World War II and endures today: the era of forward deployment. Redeployed to Europe as a counter to Soviet expansion in 1950, the Army also found its occupation-duty garrisons in the Far East important to support the Korean War. After Korea, the Army remained forward-deployed with the 11th Airborne Division

¹¹²Russell F. Weigley, *History of the United States Army*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), pp 641-64. Also, Barbara W. Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China*, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1970), p 61.

on Okinawa (later replaced by the 173d Airborne Brigade), two divisions in Korea and a variety of other forces in Japan and elsewhere. Forward-deployment contributed to deterrence during the Cold War and also eased--although it never entirely eliminated--the strains on the nation's strategic mobility capacity.¹¹³

Probably the most significant characteristic of the forward-deployment era has been the relatively large size of the standing force. For the first time in its history, the Army has maintained a regular force structure of armored, mechanized and infantry divisions, largely configured, although not exclusively, for war in Europe. Moreover, until the advent of the All Volunteer Army, conscription filled much of this force structure.¹¹⁴

Viewed historically, the maintenance of a large, standing Army is an anomaly for the United States. That is, it is a practice that has come only lately in the history of the Army, and is contrary to the greater part of the Army's experience. In addition, at the end of the Cold War, continued maintenance of a large, forward-deployed force may be increasingly difficult to justify, since there are, in some eyes, fewer threats to be deterred, and potentially fewer contingency operations to contemplate, at least in some theaters.¹¹⁵

¹¹³The specific rationale behind deterrence changed from time-to-time, but can generally be understood as putting U.S. forces in a position to threaten that, if challenged, some combination of nuclear and conventional retaliation would result.

¹¹⁴For a detailed account of the transition of the Army from conscription to all-volunteer force, see Andrew J. Goodpaster, Lloyd H. Elliott and J. Allan Hovey, Jr., *Toward a Consensus on Military Service*, (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), pp 20-50.

¹¹⁵Threats to U.S. interests will be dealt with separately in a later section.

At the same time, there may be growing interest in using the Army for more domestic tasks. Anti-drug operations have already been undertaken, albeit on a limited scale, but the Army is committed to support drug interdiction operations.¹¹⁶ The Army role in other domestic programs could similarly be expanded. The Army has traditionally participated in engineer activities involving bridges, rivers, shorelines and related projects. Expansion of the Army's civil role to include environmental protection, toxic waste disposal, and related activities is conceivable.


The Army thus, stands at a crossroad. Two basic choices confront it: domestic versus foreign orientation, and small versus large standing force. While it is doubtful that the Army will return to its earliest status as a small, home defense force, the apparent absence of serious threats, domestic dissatisfaction with burden-sharing as discussed earlier, and the end of the Cold War may lead policymakers, responding to domestic pressure, to consider major reductions in the Army and a reorientation of its roles and missions.

There are domestic interests that can be expected to compete with the Army and dominate local economic considerations including, among other things, a desire for more federal assistance in countering drugs; more federal assistance with education; federal assistance to control the spread of homelessness; a federal program to provide quality medical care to all citizens. Moreover, other sectors of the federal budget are growing, in part reflecting the needs of a population that is aging, a population in which progressively more households include two full-time wage earners. Daycare for children and

¹¹⁶JTF-6, for example, is a joint task force established at Fort Bliss, TX, to support federal, state and local drug enforcement activities. See *Army Focus*, November 1989, p 29.

the elderly are also likely to make increasing demands for federal assistance, as many communities find they cannot provide such services without external support.

No one can foresee accurately all the domestic issues that are likely to seek federal funding and assistance. The point here is to identify current issues that have the potential to make greater budgetary demands, and to illustrate that the American public may want more of its tax money spent on programs other than defense. Figure I-3 illustrates recent trends in federal spending. Obviously, there have been claimants other than defense that have received increasing shares of the budget: social security, for example.



Source: Adapted from Frank C. Carlucci Annual Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 1990, p 88.

The final group of influences to be dealt with here can be called vestigial issues. These are issues that arose during

the course of the Vietnam War which have faded from the scene, including popular sentiment toward conscription and foreign intervention. These issues were never resolved; they lay dormant, having lost their salience after the war, but are likely to emerge in any subsequent debate over the future of U.S. military forces. They therefore deserve consideration here.

Conscription was hotly contested during the Vietnam War. While much of the resistance to conscription was based in opposition to the war itself, there were a number of criticisms directed at the selective service practices of the nation. These included charges that conscription was unfair, that it placed a disproportionate burden on the socially disadvantaged who could not qualify for any of the deferments that protected the sons of the middle class. The power of local draft boards was also at issue, since some, especially minorities, found their local boards unsympathetic and arbitrary in their decisions.¹¹⁷ Any future consideration of conscription will have to begin with resolution of these perceptions. To these complaints will be added questions about the role of women in the military. Should they be included in future conscription or not?

Nor does the Vietnam era conscription system provide the only basis for involuntary service. Young people could undergo a universal national service period, in which all youth, men and women, would be obliged to serve their country in some capacity. Alternatively, conscription might provide manpower to the reserve rather than the active force structure, providing the nation with a large pool of personnel with

¹¹⁷Andrew J. Goodpaster, Lloyd H. Elliott and J. Allan Hovey, Jr., *Toward a Consensus on Military Service*, pp 40-46.

military training, but without the overhead of a large active force structure.¹¹⁸

Whatever system of conscription may be proposed to the American people, an emotional debate should be expected. The anti-conscription feelings of the country are traditional. These feelings produced draft riots in New York during the Civil War; they fueled the Over the Hill in October (OHIO) movement during the Louisiana maneuvers of 1940; and they were at the heart of the draft card burnings and riots of the Vietnam era. Any future consideration of conscription as a basis for manning an army must give serious thought to the prospect that the population may not support it. If popular support for conscription is to be had, it will be based on the perception that the system is fair, that the service provided by those conscripted is important to the nation, and that the nation cannot adequately protect itself otherwise.

Military intervention is another issue that has been left unresolved since Vietnam. In the aftermath of the Vietnam war, Congress, the population at large and the military services were all concerned about future military interventions abroad. Congress acted to prohibit U.S. involvement in Angola, and the War Powers Act can be broadly interpreted as an attempt to limit U.S. military activity until the executive and legislative branches of government can agree on the objectives and limits of involvement in such operations. Casper Weinberger's six conditions for the commitment of U.S. forces likewise sought to preclude unpopular military operations, assuring support of the people and the Congress and committing troops only as a last resort.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁸Ibid, chapter 8.

¹¹⁹Casper W. Weinberger, "U.S. Defense Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, 65 (Spring 1986): 686.

Some observers frankly doubt a democracy can support a policy of military intervention, while others point out that most of the wars the United States has fought have been limited ones, fought by expeditionary forces. Guenter Lewy argues that intervention is no policy for democracies, especially if it leads to a protracted engagement.¹²⁰ Harry G. Summers, Jr., also analyzing the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, nevertheless concludes that limited wars, and military intervention are within the ability of a democracy, but notes:

Prior to any future commitment of U.S. military forces, our military leaders must insist that the civilian leadership provide tangible, obtainable political goals. The political objective cannot be merely a platitude, but must be stated on concrete terms.¹²¹

Recent interventions in Grenada and Panama have enjoyed widespread support because they were brief. If support for continuing U.S. presence in the Middle East endures, it may suggest that much of the post-Vietnam syndrome has abated. Nevertheless, there remains a strong sense in America that military intervention is wrong or at least unwise. Anyone contemplating an activist policy for the use of the military instrument should bear in mind that the public debate on the worth and wisdom of military intervention has not been concluded; it is only in recess.

What conclusions can be drawn about the likely effects of domestic attitudes on the future Army? First, it is unclear whether or not the Army will undergo a major reorientation

¹²⁰Guenter Lewy, *America in Vietnam*, (New York & London: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp 430-33.

¹²¹Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*, (New York: Dell Publishing, 1982), pp 246-47.

toward domestic missions. Public interest in a greater domestic role for the Army will probably be a function of public perception of the severity of domestic problems and the effectiveness of other institutions in dealing with them. The more severe the problems and the less effective other institutions are seen to be, the greater the likelihood that Army involvement will be sought. Of course, some domestic missions, such as limited anti-narcotics work, can be accommodated without a major reorganization of Army units. If a significant expansion of the Army's domestic role is desired, it will have substantial influence on the Army's structure and organization since foreign intervention and domestic works make different demands.¹²²

More troublesome are likely to be the unresolved issues of conscription and military intervention. Without some form of conscription as an option, the Army's alternatives for manning its force are limited to volunteers. In an era where innovative and inexpensive solutions to defense are likely to be at a premium, the Army should have no option foreclosed.

No commander-in-chief should expect the unqualified support of the people for a policy of military intervention. The decision to intervene should always be a difficult one, since it necessarily involves the loss of American lives. On the other hand, if a general consensus cannot be established as to when and for what purposes the United States deploys its forces, the nation's leadership may be put in a position where

¹²²There are limits to what the military can do in civilian law enforcement. Under Article IV of the Constitution, they may serve *posse comitatus* to support law enforcement officials. Members of the military except for the Coast Guard cannot, however, be law enforcement officers and do not have the power of arrest.

it must forego relatively low-risk interventions, and wait until the risks to U.S. interests build to the point that general support for military action can be attained.

By far the biggest domestic influence on the military is likely to be the desire to redirect the resources of the federal budget toward areas other than defense. Most Americans, in seeking federal assistance to deal with the problems their communities confront, will not be turning their backs on defense, but will likely believe their defense needs are minimal and are being met. Increased demands for social services are likely to be the chief contenders for tax dollars.

As it enters the 1990s, the U.S. military is confronted by some profound opportunities and limitations. The most important change is the end of the Cold War, which offers the first opportunity since World War II to restructure completely and comprehensively the United States' security posture and with it, the roles and missions of the services. Attendant to this change is the likelihood that the role of the military instrument will be reduced vis-à-vis other national policy instruments. Recasting relationships with friends and enemies in the aftermath of the Cold War shows promise, with security regimes potentially reducing requirements for assigned and earmarked troops.

Technology is perhaps the most mixed blessing of the influences on the future military. On the one hand, it offers the possibility to redistribute roles and missions among the services in more effective ways. On the other hand, it provides a general improvement in military capabilities, makes significant changes in the nature of future battle fields, and

has grave implications for the endurance of conventional deterrence.

Arms control appears to be a major determinant of force size, configuration, armament and deployment, assuming conventional force agreements are reached. Arms control may foreclose forward deployment options to a substantial degree, and may also limit mixes of arms heretofore preferred by military professionals, causing a search for alternative approaches to force design.

Economics, budget considerations and domestic expectations likewise serve mostly as constraints. It is widely held that substantial military spending compromises the economic health of the nation, whether or not this is actually the case. A peace dividend is also widely expected from the improvement in East-West relations. Moreover, there are increasing demands for major federal expenditures in other domestic areas, including the social and welfare services. In addition, the Army finds itself at an historical crossroad, where the public must choose the kind of Army it wants: domestically or overseas-oriented, and affordable as well as capable. The Vietnam-era issues of conscription and military intervention further complicate the choices.

Deterrence makes its own demands on force design. Confidence in deterrence is high when considering strategic nuclear confrontations. Confidence in conventional deterrence is less certain and more contingent upon specific conditions, meaning that the Army must design some of its forces to optimize both their value as deterrents and their value as warfighting instruments. Confidence in deterrence at the

subconventional level is very low, meaning that the Army must design some of its forces specifically to prosecute subconventional wars.

Finally, while there may be fewer threats to U.S. security that require military solutions, the proliferation of very capable military forces and possible lack of hegemonic constraints on regional conflicts means that, when the U.S. Army intervenes, it will face more formidable adversaries. It also means that regional wars have greater potential to threaten U.S. interests.

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The United States' national security posture has undergone three major changes in recent history. At the conclusion of World War II there was the massive demobilization of wartime forces and creation of new policies--the Truman Doctrine and containment--for dealing with the emerging security environment. Similarly, after Korea, major changes were made to account for the Soviet nuclear capability and the prospects of future warfare in a nuclear environment. The policy of containment became more global as the United States constructed new treaty organizations in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere. At the same time, although Eisenhower is said to have ended the Korean War with the threat to use nuclear weapons, the Korean War also demonstrated that nuclear weapons would not deter all threats to U.S. interests, with the result that the United States also had to contemplate new conventional and guerrilla warfare challenges. After the Vietnam War, confronted with widespread domestic resistance to further military interventions, realizing that the Soviet Union had conducted a major build-up of its conventional forces¹ while

¹Between 1966 and 1974 Soviet regular conventional forces increased from 3,165,000 in 140 divisions to 3,425,000 in 164 divisions. These divisions also received improved equipment,

America was preoccupied in Vietnam, and confronted by the fact that it had not been able to translate battlefield victories into desired political outcomes, the United States further adjusted its national security posture.

Of the three major adjustments to the national security strategy and military strategy that supports it, the post-Korean War and post-Vietnam War experiences seem most likely to offer valuable insights as to how the United States might react during the current period of post-Cold War readjustment. The post-World War II experience, while important, seems less appropriate since it dealt with general demobilization and return to a peacetime footing from one of total war. The Korean-era and Vietnam-era experiences, on the other hand, were both more limited readjustments since no general mobilization had taken place. This chapter will examine how the post-war draw-down was conducted after Korea and Vietnam, and what adjustments to national security strategy, the defense budget and military force structure resulted. Examining these two historical cases may yield some generalizable propositions that will suggest how the Department of Defense will likely conduct the current restructuring of strategy and forces. At a minimum, it will provide a look at past practices and an opportunity to evaluate their adequacy for the nation's security requirements.

Post-Korea National Security. The the post-Korea and post-Vietnam U.S. defense postures can be understood principally as reactions to the influences examined in chapter one: the Cold especially in tanks, self-propelled artillery, and air defense weapons. International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*, (London: IISS, 1966, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72, 74), pp 2-6.

War and containment, the limits of deterrence, threats to U.S. security, changing relations with allies and adversaries, arms control, military technology, economics, and domestic factors. Of these influences, domestic factors were probably the most significant. After the Korean War, the nation's internationalist consensus and commitment to the policy of containment was badly shaken.² The "Old Wing" of the Republican Party, lead by Robert Taft, was isolationist in its foreign policy outlook. These conservative Republicans also demanded reduced federal spending and reduced taxes. At the same time, others--liberal Republicans and Democrats--were demanding an increase in health, education, and welfare services from the federal government.³

President Eisenhower had been elected in the 1952 campaign with the support of Robert Taft. To gain his support, Eisenhower had entered into a formal agreement with Taft, in which Eisenhower promised to reduce federal spending from \$74 billion at the time of the campaign to \$70 billion by fiscal 1954, and to \$60 billion by fiscal 1955. After revising the lame duck Truman budget in May 1953, it became apparent to Eisenhower that a radical new approach to defense would be necessary if his administration was to meet the reduced spending goals promised to Taft while meeting the other demands on the federal budget.⁴

²Richard A. Melanson, "The Foundations of Eisenhower's Foreign Policy: Continuity, Community, and Consensus," in *Reevaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the 1950s*, ed. Richard A. Melanson and David Mayers (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p 54.

³Richard M. Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, volume 1 (New York: Warner Books, 1978), p 145.

⁴Ibid, p 100.

After the 1952 election, the Republicans controlled both houses of Congress, though by very narrow margins. To keep his party together, Eisenhower had to avoid a factional dispute over isolationism versus internationalism and containment. One proposed amendment to the Constitution, from Senator John Bricker of Ohio for example, would have seriously limited a president's role as the sole instrument of foreign policy. Though defeated by one vote in the Senate, the Bricker Amendment was indicative of conservative sentiment in Congress.⁵ There was also a "liberation" faction that sought to roll back the advances communism had made around the world, also raising the risks of factionalism. At the same time, Eisenhower had to meet conservative demands for spending and tax reductions while meeting demands from other quarters for increased federal services. The defense budget was the only area in which he had much latitude for change. He therefore had to design a strategy that would fit within the significant budget constraints facing him, while at the same time providing the nation with the means to continue the policy of containment, but without dependence upon large, forward-deployed conventional forces, or risking another war similar to Korea.⁶

⁵The real fear of conservatives like Bricker was that foreign policy initiatives, such as endorsement of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations charter and the Genocide Convention would have domestic impact, damaging the conservative stand on segregation. The objective of the amendment was to limit a president's ability to use international agreements to enlarge federal jurisdiction in domestic social and economic concerns. See Duane Tananbaum, *The Bricker Amendment Controversy*, (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1988).

⁶Eisenhower had promised to extricate the United States from the Korean War as one of his campaign pledges. There was

These domestic factors were not forcing an unwelcome solution upon Eisenhower. His own instincts lead him to prefer a smaller, reconfigured military. At their first meeting at NATO headquarters in Paris in 1951, Eisenhower told Richard Nixon that, "Being strong militarily just isn't enough in the kind of battle we are fighting now." He told Nixon economic factors were important as well.⁷ Moreover, Eisenhower was already frustrated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The chiefs continued to send him proposals that maintained the military near their strength at the time, and refused to offer any reasonable alternatives for adjusting the military instrument.⁸ Eisenhower was prepared to create his own alternative.

Turning from domestic factors to the Cold War, containment, and threats to U.S. security, Eisenhower was confronted by a dangerous world. The State Department indicated to him that there was an "inherent conflict" between the United States and the Soviet Union.⁹ Some saw a monolithic communist bloc that stretched from the Soviet satellite states of Central Europe to China, the Soviet Union's new communist ally. By 1955, two pacts, NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, confronted each other in divided Europe. Communism seemed to threaten everywhere. It appealed to many insurgent movements within the European nations' colonies that were moving toward independence. Civil war in Vietnam, a coup in Iran and

wide-spread dissatisfaction with the "no win" Korean War. Richard A. Melanson, "The Foundations of Eisenhower's Foreign Policy: Continuity, Community, and Consensus," p 41.

⁷Richard M. Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, p 100.

⁸Douglas Kinnard, *President Eisenhower and Strategic Management: A Study of Defense Politics*, (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1977), p 5.

⁹*Ibid*, p 6.

concerns for Israel's security also influenced the widely-held perception that America was besieged by a variety of hostile forces. Eisenhower remained committed to containment as the best means to counter Soviet expansion.¹⁰

Relations with allies and adversaries during the first Eisenhower administration were not encouraging insofar as national security was concerned. Eisenhower personally doubted the ability of Britain and France to do much for mutual security beyond their own borders.¹¹ The French in Indochina needed United States logistic support to sustain their losing efforts there. Besides the French surrender at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, further evidence of the decayed state of French and British military capabilities came during the Suez crisis of 1956, when it took a combined task force from two of the formerly premiere powers in Europe and Israeli assistance to seize the Suez canal. The Suez incident temporarily soured U.S. relations with its British and French allies as well. Relations with adversaries, more specifically with the Soviet Union, were tense. Berlin served as the focal point for much of the East-West confrontation of the time.

While domestic factors, relations with allies, the state of the Cold War and containment produced most of the constraints on a new military posture for Eisenhower, deterrence and military technology provided possibilities for a fresh alternative approach to security. The President became convinced that nuclear weapons could make up for inferiority in conventional forces. Nuclear weapons integrated with conventional forces would make them more capable if forced to

¹⁰Richard A. Melanson, "The Foundations of Eisenhower's Foreign Policy: Continuity, Community, and Consensus," p 54.

¹¹Richard M. Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, p 144.

fight. Otherwise, most adversaries could be deterred from ever crossing the "tripwire" into an actual war with the threat of strategic nuclear attack.¹²

Arms control was one influence that played no significant role in shaping the new U.S. security posture. Relations with the Soviet Union were such that discussions of arms control never progressed beyond ideologically-charged rhetoric. Of the several arms control meetings that occurred during the Eisenhower era, the first to go beyond rhetorical exchanges and to consider actual military-technical issues of arms control was the ultimately unsuccessful Geneva 1958 "counter-surprise" conference.¹³

The "New Look" emerged as Eisenhower's defense posture. In just over a year, the administration negotiated a series of regional security pacts that placed primary responsibility for defense in local hands, but that promised U.S. assistance if aggression occurred. A strategic nuclear strike force was developed that depended initially upon bombers, and later included nuclear missiles. Finally, the conventional forces were reconfigured and equipped with tactical nuclear weapons. All essential elements of the "New Look" were not completely in place until mid-1957.

Thus, the end of the Korean War was not marked by massive demobilization. There was instead a lengthy period of transition, in which the U.S. military and the overall national security posture were reshaped to meet the needs of what was

¹²Douglas Kinnard, *President Eisenhower and Strategic Management: A Study of Defense Politics*, p 28.

¹³The 1955 Open Skies conference, proposed by President Eisenhower, was the first. For a summary of the Geneva conference, see U.S. Department of State, *Documents on Disarmament*, volume II, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1960), pp 1244-1250.

believed to be the new security environment, subject to the opportunities and constraints imposed by the foregoing key influences. Underlying this period of transition was the notion that the threat, global communism, had not been decisively defeated, but that the East-West struggle was mutating. The nation had to reorganize its security resources to meet effectively the new threats posed by the enemy.¹⁴

The United States' post-Korea security posture marked a departure from traditional postures as well. As C.E. Wilson, the Secretary of Defense noted:

The course that has been charted does not commit us to a single strategy. While it provides flexibility, it places emphasis on the most effective weapons systems available. Emphasis on the types of military power in which we have the greatest advantage is dictated not only by security requirements but also by economic considerations. In the uncertain years ahead, we must not establish security forces which by their cost undermine the way of life that they have been created to defend. The new policies furnish the guidelines for avoiding this danger.¹⁵

In pursuit of a robust security posture that would meet the nation's needs, defense budgets remained large, considering the pressures on Eisenhower to reduce them. Defense spending dropped from \$43.7 billion in 1953 to a low of \$35.5 billion in 1955.¹⁶ The distribution of the funds, however, changed

¹⁴Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Semiannual Report, January 1 to June 30 1954*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1955), pp 47-49.

¹⁵Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Semiannual Report, January 1 to June 30 1954*, p 61.

¹⁶Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Semiannual Report, January 1 to June 30 1953*, (Washington, DC: USGPO,

greatly. Instead of funding large conventional ground forces, the Army's appropriation was spent on fielding a large number of air defense units to protect the continental United States. Combat power was increased in Army units with the addition of Corporal and Honest John tactical nuclear rockets. Air defense improvements came with development of Nike-Ajax and Nike-Hercules nuclear-armed guided missiles. Matador missiles were also fielded to provide Army units with close support. The Air Force also underwent major adjustments, organizing strategic wings of B-47 and later B-52 bombers for the new Strategic Air Command. By 1957 it had 44 strategic wings, 31 air defense (interceptor) wings and 50 tactical wings.¹⁷ Table II-1 summarizes the early transitional measures within the defense establishment.

Modernization and efficiency were emphasized throughout the defense establishment. The services were brought into a centralized procurement system to reduce duplication of effort. Centralized management was sought wherever practical.¹⁸ The objective was to produce a more capable military through technology and modern management practices. As the introduction to the 1956 *Department of Defense Semiannual Report for January 1 to June 30* observed, "In the present age, 1954), p 2 and Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Semiannual Report, January 1 to June 30 1955*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1956), p 12.

¹⁷Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Semiannual Report, July 1 to December 30 1957*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1958), p 3.

¹⁸The process was a slow one. The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 was the first to produce centralized authority over research and development of new weapons systems, for example. See James E. Hewes, Jr., *From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration 1900-1963*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1975), p 297.

neither the number of men under arms nor the number of combat units gives a meaningful picture of the striking power of the various segments of our armed forces."¹⁹ In the "New Look" era, the decisive difference would be in the technical capabilities of the equipment the military had at its disposal.

Table II-1: Defense in Transition

Budget (Billions of 1957 Dollars)	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958
Army	\$16.3	\$12.9	\$8.8	\$8.7	\$9.0	\$9.1
Navy	11.9	11.3	9.7	9.7	10.4	10.9
Air Force	15.1	15.7	16.4	16.8	18.4	18.4
Office of Secretary of Defense	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7
TOTAL	43.7	40.3	35.5	35.8	38.4	39.1
Force Structure						
Army: Divisions			20	18	15	15
Regiments/Regimental Combat Teams			12	10	7	5
Separate Brigades					6	14
Air Defense Battalions			126	133	89	87
Navy: Total Ships			948	973	907	891
War Ships			403	404	401	396
Carrier Air Groups			17	17	17	17
Marine Corps: Divisions/Air Wings			3/3	3/3	3/3	3/3
Air Force: Total Wings			127	131	125	117

Source: Compiled from Department of Defense, *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense*, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957 and 1958 (Washington, DC: USGPO), chapters I, III, IV, V.

Although the "New Look" military strategy of the Eisenhower years has sometimes been characterized as a brittle trip-wire,²⁰ it did in fact provide an array of resources that was integrated to provide various options to threats ranging from political agitation to strategic nuclear war. NSC 162/2, the

¹⁹Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Semiannual Report, January 1 to June 30 1956*, p 2.

²⁰President Kennedy is said to have complained that it left him no options between suicide and surrender.

basic Eisenhower strategy document, sought to provide three types of defense resources: a strong military posture able to inflict massive damage by offensive striking power; a U.S. military and allies with ready general purpose forces, prepared to counter enemy moves, hold vital areas and lines of communication; and a secure mobilization base adequate to assure victory in a general war.²¹ These resources included military and economic aid to friends and allies, intended to assist them in maintaining their own security. The general purpose forces were designed to operate in a variety of conditions as well, from guerrilla warfare and sub-theater conventional war (regional war in today's jargon) to theater conventional and nuclear war in Central Europe. Massive retaliation was intended to deter theater- and strategic nuclear war, but was contingent upon nuclear superiority. Two types of forces supported massive retaliation: theater nuclear forces that would support the general purpose forces, and strategic forces, that could execute an all-out strike against an adversary.

Yet, too much has been made of the massive retaliation part of the Eisenhower nuclear strategy. The "massive retaliation" label resulted from a speech given by John Foster Dulles before the Council on Foreign Relations in January, 1954. The label obscured the fact that the nuclear strategy itself was better termed "flexible retaliation." By 1953, the United States had a variety of weapons, large and small yield, in its nuclear arsenal. It was theoretically possible to select the appropriate weapon for any set of circumstances, responding to one act of aggression with a punitive tactical nuclear strike,

²¹David A. Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy 1945-60," *International Security*, 7 (Spring 1983): 29.

while, when the case of aggression warranted it, a large, strategic nuclear strike might be the U.S. response. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were able to promise aggression would be met by nuclear weapons whenever it was appropriate. In addition, with a variety of nuclear weapons at their disposal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not have to let the enemy dictate the terms of warfare, as they believed had been the case in Korea; the U.S. would determine the scope of the conflict and the level of violence with its nuclear resources.²²

The Eisenhower nuclear strategy also anticipated limitations on the utility of nuclear weapons that would eventually arise from nuclear proliferation. NSC 162/2 observed, "as general war becomes more devastating for both sides the threat to resort to it becomes less available as a sanction against local aggression."²³ The "New Look" thus also provided for other instruments of influence beyond conventional and nuclear forces.

Economic and military aid in the post-war era was substantial. In addition to the on-going programs of economic and military aid that sought to assist the NATO allies in the reconstruction of their economies and defense forces, the United States was now assisting other nations besieged by communism. These assistance programs were aimed primarily at countering the effects of political agitation and insurgency among friendly countries, but also provided assistance to the French in their struggle to retain control of Indochina.

In addition to its aid programs, the United States developed a new set of alliances to support its post-Korean War security

²²Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, (New York: St Martin's Press, 1983), pp 76-87.

²³Ibid, p 83.


perimeter. In 1955, the United States created the Central Powers Treaty Organization (CENTO) with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, and the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) with Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines. South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos were protected under a separate protocol of the treaty, signed at the same time.

How then, should the post-Korean War approach to national security be characterized? Figure II-1 provides a summary of its features. The Eisenhower Administration sought to attain its security objective, the containment of communist aggression, but recognized the United States would have to be capable of responding to a variety of challenges posed by the communist adversaries. To meet multiple challenges, the Administration made a departure from the traditional approach of raising large conventional forces to counter threats and instead created a mixture of instruments, running from aid to allies and covert activities through general purpose forces to strategic nuclear forces. The expectation was that nuclear superiority and technical sophistication within the smaller general purpose forces would provide the required security at a price the public would be willing to pay.²⁴

²⁴Michael Mandelbaum sees the Eisenhower strategy in a different light, claiming it was the beginning of the strategy-force mismatch. "With the Korean War and the second expansion of the postwar American security perimeter, a gap opened between the security definition to which the American government had committed the country and the resources necessary to sustain it, which the American public was reluctant to authorize." Michael Mandelbaum, *The Fate of Nations*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p 169. This criticism seems overly harsh if one views the nation's security perimeter as a deterrent instrument under the broader framework of containment policy. There have been few tests of the U.S. deterrent perimeter, and none have caused the nation

to mobilize or commit all of its forces.

Figure II-1: Summary of Post-Korean War National Strategy and Policy Instruments



** Includes three training divisions that did not have a combat assignment.
 Source: Adapted from Department of Defense Annual Report 1972 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1971), p 155.

Total Active Forces:
 3.6 Million (1953)
 2.5 Million (1960)

Budget Levels
 (Outlays for Mil. Functions & Mil. Assistance in Billions of 1964 Dollars):
 1953 \$60.7 1957 \$45.5
 1954 56.3 1958 45.8
 1955 46.6 1959 46.7
 1956 44.7 1960 46.1

The post-Korean War national security strategy can thus be seen to have laid the foundation for current strategy planning practices. That is, the Eisenhower Administration sought to counter specific developments within the global security environment that had emerged after the war, establishing a clear link between threat analysis and force development, but within certain budget limitations. For example, in response to the perceived threat from the Soviet air force, the United States developed a large air defense capability. In response to the threat of insurgency and guerrilla warfare, a wider economic and military assistance program was created.

The Eisenhower era also established the nation's faith in technology as an alternative to a larger military force. The preference for smaller, more capable forces began in the aftermath of Korea and endures today. NSC 162/2 was the first plan to weave together nuclear forces, air power, and a small but technically advanced general purpose force into a seamless fabric of deterrence and defense that would offer the nation security across a wide "spectrum of conflict."

Nevertheless, the Eisenhower era clearly acknowledged the importance of other factors beyond the military-technical. From the earliest days of his first term, Eisenhower was heavily influenced by domestic political considerations in shaping his plans for the national security posture. The domestic element became even more important in Eisenhower's second term, when Democrats gained control in Congress.²⁵

²⁵Matters were delicate enough with Congress that Eisenhower often dealt personally with the more troublesome members, e.g., Senator Stuart Symington. Douglas Kinnard, *President Eisenhower and Strategic Management: A Study of Defense Politics*, p 94.

The Post-Vietnam Era. In February 1971, President Nixon announced a new national security strategy which he called "realistic deterrence." The main features of the new strategy included a new nuclear posture called "strategic sufficiency" that accounted for nuclear parity with the Soviet Union, and strong conventional capabilities supported by better burden sharing which would produce adequate peacetime general purpose forces to meet simultaneously a major communist attack in Europe or Asia, assist allies against non-communist threats in Asia, and contend with yet another contingency elsewhere: a one and one-half war strategy as opposed to the earlier two and one-half war strategy.²⁶ U.S. active forces were smaller than before, but with greater emphasis on readiness and effectiveness, including modernization. International security assistance and the roles of other free-world forces were stressed, reducing requirements for direct commitment of U.S. forces.²⁷

According to the secretary of defense, the new strategy was influenced by seven key factors. First was the recognition of growing Soviet military capability and technological modernization. While the United States was preoccupied in Vietnam, the Soviet Union had undertaken a large-scale modernization and expansion of its conventional forces. Second was expanding Soviet influence around the world, primarily the result of world-wide deployment of the growing Soviet navy. Also during the period, Communist China had emerged as a regional nuclear threat. Fourth among the key influencing factors was a re-ordering of national priorities, with a

²⁶William W. Kaufmann, *Planning Conventional Forces 1950-80*, p 8.

²⁷Department of Defense. *Department of Defense Annual Report FY 1972-76*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1971), pp 16, 17.

reduced percentage of gross national product allocated for defense. Fifth was recognition of the sharply rising U.S. personnel costs and a start toward a zero-draft, all-volunteer military force. The changing world economic environment was also a significant influence, especially since many free-world economies were experiencing vigorous growth and therefore could shoulder a larger role in defense of the free world. Finally, there was increased awareness among NATO members of a need for burden sharing and among Asian friends for regional support of U.S. policies.²⁸

In addition to the influences mentioned above, there were at least three other factors that were key in shaping the military forces of the United States in the immediate aftermath of Vietnam. First of these was the re-assertion of Congress' role in foreign policy. Senator J. William Fulbright, a long-time critic of U.S. policy in Vietnam and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, believed that Congress had abdicated its responsibilities under the Constitution, noting:

Out of a well-intentioned but misconceived notion of what patriotism and responsibility require in a time of world crisis, Congress has permitted the President to take over the two vital foreign policy powers which the Constitution vested in Congress: the power to initiate war and the Senate's power to consent or withhold consent from significant foreign commitments.²⁹

²⁸Ibid, p 14. Whether or not the allies shouldered their share of the defense burden is still debated. Frank C. Carlucci argued that burden-sharing objectives were met in Europe, but that help was needed elsewhere. Frank C. Carlucci, *Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1989*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1988), p 74.

²⁹J. William Fulbright, "The Legislator, Congress, and the War," remarks delivered at the University of South Florida 4

As a result of Senator Fulbright's efforts, Senate Resolution 85 was passed 25 June 1969, asserting:

That a national commitment by the United States to a foreign power necessarily and exclusively results from affirmative action taken by the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government through means of a treaty, convention, or other legislative instrumentality specifically intended to give effect to such a commitment.³⁰

Other senators also moved to reassert Congress' authority and to constrain the president's war-making ability. By January 1973, several plans were in motion within the Senate to withhold funding for further combat in Vietnam. The Senate Democratic Caucus, for example, voted to cut off all funding for the war.³¹ Finally, Senator Fulbright, angered and frustrated by President Nixon's unilateral order to resume bombing in Cambodia, attached an amendment to a continuing resolution that already had House approval. The Fulbright amendment directed that bombing would cease 15 August 1973, and that no funding, past present or future, could be used to support U.S. military action in Laos, Cambodia, or in either North or South Vietnam. President Nixon signed the Fulbright-amended resolution into law on 1 July.³²

Congressional sentiment against the war also led to the second key factor, the War Powers Act. This act, which became February 1971 cited in Eugene Brown, *J. William Fulbright, Advice and Dissent*, (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1985), p 118.

³⁰U.S. Senate, Senate Resolution 85, *Congressional Record*, 4 February 1969, p 2603.

³¹William C. Berman, *William Fulbright and the Vietnam War*, (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 1988), p 166.

³²Ibid, pp 177, 178.

law in 1973 over a presidential veto, limits a president's ability to commit U.S. forces for periods in excess of 90 days, and provides for withdrawal of U.S. troops if a concurrent resolution in Congress, not subject to presidential veto, directs.³³

The re-assertion of Congress' role in foreign policy, and more specifically in committing the nation to war, reflected the country's dissatisfaction with the Vietnam War and the desire to avoid similar wars in the future. Confronted with such sentiment, military planners were limited in their ability to design forces as contingency forces or as instruments of intervention. The conventional wisdom of the day claimed that if the military had the means to intervene, it would find a way to use them.

Yet, not all concern in Congress was a direct reaction to the American experience in Vietnam. Some, lead by Senator Mike Mansfield, felt that U.S. foreign policy was generally in need of re-evaluation. As early as March 1967, Mansfield and six colleagues were calling for a complete review of U.S. foreign policy and the withdrawal of some forward-deployed forces from Europe and elsewhere. The legislation they proposed was defeated, but Mansfield and his colleagues would periodically renew the call for force reductions.³⁴

The third factor influencing the redesign of the U.S. military after Vietnam was disillusionment with counterinsurgency. There was widespread dissatisfaction with

³³See Jacob Javits, "War Powers Reconsidered," *Foreign Affairs* 64 (Fall 1985): 130-40 for an examination of the Act and the recent criticisms it has faced.

³⁴Louis Baldwin, *Hon. Politician: Mike Mansfield of Montana*, (Missoula: Montana Publishing Co., 1979), pp 165-70.

counterinsurgency doctrine.³⁵ U.S. Army doctrine was reoriented toward Europe, emphasizing conventional operations by mechanized and armored forces. No mention of counterinsurgency even appeared in the 1976 edition of FM 100-5, *Operations*. Units of the Army's Special Forces, long associated with counterinsurgency operations, were scaled back. Even the John F. Kennedy U.S. Army Special Warfare Center, the hub of counterinsurgency training, underwent a name change, becoming the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance. At the schools of the various Army combat arms, "modern battlefield" working groups were established that refocused all attention on mechanized combat in Europe.

As the military withdrew from Vietnam, its restructuring reflected all of these influences. This restructuring process, just as the one after the Korean War, did not result in a substantial demobilization of forces, but rather a consolidation of military capabilities. The years 1973 and 1974 saw the transition from a conscript force to an all-volunteer force. Over the same period, the force structure was consolidated and reorganized as units returned from Vietnam and found new home stations in CONUS. The U.S. Army in 1973 had 13 regular divisions backed up by eight reserve divisions and 21 separate brigades, compared to 1965, when it had 18 regular divisions and 10 separate brigades/regiments and six reserve divisions. In 1974, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Abrams, announced restoration of 16 active divisions, returning

³⁵Colonel Harry G. Summers, for example, has attributed this dissatisfaction to the mistaken notion that counterinsurgency doctrine could be a substitute for a sound strategy in Vietnam. Colonel Harry G. Summers, *On Strategy*, p 125.

the Army essentially to its Kennedy-era structure.³⁶ Table II-2 highlights some of the major details of the transition.

Table II-2: Post-Vietnam Defense Transition

Budget (Millions of 1973 Dollars)	FY1968	1972	1973	1974
Army	\$24,972	22,214	21,817	22,191
Navy	20,765	24,094	25,635	27,275
Air Force	24,917	23,860	24,856	25,399
Other/Office of Sec Defense	4,353	6,629	7,651	8,823
Military Assistance	588	935	989	1,330
TOTAL	75,597	77,731	80,947	85,025
Force Structure				
Army: Active Divisions		12 2/3	13	13
Air Defense Batteries		21	21	21
Navy: Attack & Antisubmarine Carriers		17	16	15
Nuclear Attack Submarines		56	60	62
Escort Ships		279	244	191
Amphibious Assault Ships		77	65	65
Carrier Air Wings		14	14	14
Marine Corps: Divisions/Wings		3/3	3/3	3/3
Air Force: Tactical Air Wings		21	21	21
Interceptor Squadrons		10	8	8
Strategic Bomber Squadrons		30	30	28
Strategic Lift Squadrons		17	17	17

Source: Compiled from Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Annual Report FY 1974*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1973), pp 118, 119.

The Nixon-era strategy, like the earlier Eisenhower strategy, sought to adjust the proportions of the elements of military power in the national defense establishment to current conditions. Just as Eisenhower reduced the Army to 11 combat-

³⁶Russell F. Weigley, *History of the United States Army*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), pp 527, 538, 573. For details on the draw-down of Army forces see Shelby L. Stanton, *The Rise and Fall of an American Army*, (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1985), pp 359-62.

effective divisions while building formidable strategic and theater nuclear arsenals, the Nixon strategy also sought to reduce the general purpose forces while deploying more theater nuclear forces. Simultaneously, the Nixon Administration sought to manage the strategic nuclear balance through SALT--the strategic arms limitation talks.³⁷ As in the Eisenhower era, nuclear weapons and technology would substitute for numbers of general purpose forces.

The Nixon nuclear strategy confronted the conditions the Eisenhower strategy had anticipated: a Soviet Union of equal nuclear and superior conventional force capabilities. The option of escalating to a nuclear strike in a limited contingency, which had been a key element of the Eisenhower era, was closed to Nixon. Initially, President Nixon sought to regain nuclear superiority, but a 1971 study done by Henry Kissinger and the National Security Council concluded that attainment of superiority was impossible. The administration settled for a policy of nuclear sufficiency, which meant having enough nuclear force to inflict damage that would deter an aggressor from attacking. Sufficiency also meant having enough nuclear force to avoid being coerced.³⁸

The U.S. strategic deterrent force that resulted was a TRIAD of bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). There was some concern over the TRIAD initially because only the ICBMs had the speed and accuracy to strike silo-based enemy missiles. The bombers were too slow and the SLBMs too inaccurate, leaving

³⁷Department of Defense. *Department of Defense Annual Report FY 1972-76*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1971), p 161.

³⁸Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, p 341.

them only enemy cities as retaliatory targets.³⁹ Eventually accuracy improvements would make all three legs of the TRIAD effective counter-force weapons.⁴⁰

Tactical nuclear forces were also expanded. New battalions of nuclear-capable artillery were deployed to Europe; the Pershing 1a missile was deployed, giving the European commanders a theater-wide nuclear reach; and the Air Force nuclear inventory was also expanded. The net result, it was hoped, was to create powerful incentives--a deterrent--at all levels against attack.

The Nixon strategy, summarized in figure II-2, like its predecessors, attempted to produce a security posture that left no gaps from strategic nuclear war down to the lowest levels of conflict. The departures the Nixon strategy made from earlier security postures were necessitated by changing conditions both on the American domestic front and on the international scene. The idealism of the Kennedy years, when Americans had been exhorted to bear any burden and pay any price for freedom had disappeared with over 55,000 dead in Vietnam. The activist spirit that had caused the United States to confront what it perceived to be communist aggression head-on, anywhere in the world was gone, too. The Nixon strategy recognized this and therefore adjusted its approach to deterring aggression by calling (in vain) on more help from friends and allies.


³⁹In practice, the counter-value/counter-force distinction, which seeks to protect purely civilian targets from attack, is difficult to observe since the majority of military targets are located in or near population centers. Even the most accurate weapons are likely to produce some collateral damage to civilian targets.

⁴⁰Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, pp 352-54.

Figure II-2: Summary of Nixon Strategy

NIXON DOCTRINE

STRATEGY OF REALISTIC DETERRENCE



STRENGTH-PARTNERSHIP
NATIONAL SECURITY

POLITICAL AGITATION	INSURGENCY	GUERRILLA WARFARE	SUB-THEATER CONVENTIONAL WAR	THEATER CONVENTIONAL	THEATER	NUCLEAR WARFARE	STRATEGIC
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SPECTRUM OF POTENTIAL CONFLICT

* FY 1972 Baseline Forces
** FY 1972 Program
Source: Adapted from Department of Defense Annual Report 1972 (Washington, DC: USG 971), p 161.

Total Active Forces
3.5 Million (1969)
3.1 Million (1970)
2.7 Million (1971)
2.5 Million (1972)

Budget Levels
(Outlays for Mil. Functions & Assistance in Billions of 1964 Dollars):
1969 \$65.4
1970 59.4
1971 53.2
1972 50.8

The Nixon strategy also recognized that the strategic nuclear balance had changed, leaving the United States with sufficient nuclear forces to destroy the Soviet Union, but no longer enjoying strategic superiority in every class of weapons. A new condition, "essential equivalence" was thought to exist. Moreover, by 1974, relations between the Peoples' Republic of China and the U.S., as well as Soviet-U.S. relations had improved.⁴¹ The result of better relations and SALT-established ceilings on strategic nuclear weapons meant not only strategic nuclear stability, but also that fewer general purpose forces would be needed in Europe and elsewhere to reinforce deterrence.

Unlike the Eisenhower Administration, then, the post-Vietnam strategy reduced the number of instances in which U.S. troops would be committed directly: a change from a two and one-half war strategy to a one and one-half war strategy. In this respect, the Nixon strategy reduced the United States' security perimeter from its pre-Vietnam dimensions, indicating there were fewer areas where the United States would defend its interests directly.⁴²

Evolution of Military Theory, Doctrine and Tactics. Although this chapter focuses on the broader post-war changes in the American military instrument, it is worthwhile to examine briefly some of the internal changes that took place within the Army. The Navy and Air Force underwent important internal changes as well, but most of their changes were in equipment

⁴¹Department of Defense. *Department of Defense Annual Report FY 1974*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1973), p 2.

⁴²The security perimeter was reduced even further after conciliation with the Peoples' Republic of China, which meant it no longer had to be contained. Michael Mandelbaum, *The Fate of Nations*, p 183.

and material, while the Army faced substantial changes in its organization, doctrine and tactics.⁴³

The post-Korea period was filled with innovation and imagination. After initially concluding that Korea merely validated its operational practices,⁴⁴ the Army began examining its experience for lessons learned. At the same time, it began investigating tactical nuclear weapons and developing field manuals to guide their employment. Among the many issues the Army considered were prospects for fighting outnumbered in future wars; an appropriate response to the increased lethality first encountered on Korean battlefields, but expected to emerge in future conflicts as well; optimal organization for divisions to meet the expected requirements of nuclear combat and to fit aboard the available strategic lift.⁴⁵

Some of the better, more enduring results of the Army's efforts were the concept of airmobility and the ROAD division model. The new airmobile doctrine was a significant departure from traditional Army conceptions of maneuver. It brought the infantry not only improved battlefield mobility, but a new

⁴³The Navy would acquire nuclear-powered ships and submarines and would be given the submarine-launch of ballistic missiles mission, but the basic instrument of sea power would remain carriers and command of the seas. The Air Force would continue building SAC, but would essentially maintain its three functions within the established Military Airlift Command, Tactical Air Command and Strategic Air Command.

⁴⁴Training Bulletin Number 8, Combat Information, Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, Fort Monroe, VA, 16 November 1951, p 16, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College document 17055.1

⁴⁵See Robert A. Doughty, *The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76*, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: The Combat Studies Institute, 1979), for a detailed description and thorough analysis of tactics and doctrine, especially pp 16-25.

agility and flexibility as well that had the potential to make light infantry more effective than ever.

The ROAD division model sought to remedy several problems in the organization of Army forces. Until the ROAD concept was adopted, infantry, armor and airborne divisions had different organizations that did not provide adequate logistics or fire support. The ROAD division provided a common division base to which combat battalions could be attached, tailored for the circumstances.

Other developments had potentially disastrous consequences. The Davy Crocket nuclear rocket, for example, had a warhead that was too big for the effective range of the weapon. Had one ever been fired, its effects would have produced casualties in the very units it was supposed to be supporting. The pentomic organization, the immediate predecessor of the successful ROAD organization, and the Army's attempt to organize for operations in nuclear combat, produced serious command and control problems, lacked combat service support and generally proved ineffective. Fortunately, the Army faced only limited contingencies while using this organization: Lebanon in 1958 and the Dominican Republic in 1965.

By far the most dangerous conclusion drawn from the Korean War experience had to do with the Army's interpretation of the importance of firepower. In reacting to what it perceived as a higher level of lethality in the Korean War, the Army concluded that future operations should concentrate on getting the most firepower possible forward. In annual training tests, this became interpreted in terms of the number of riflemen on an objective, i.e., the force with the most men forward would be declared the winner of the engagement. When the Army's first

units in Vietnam were committed to direct combat with the enemy, this type of training resulted in extremely high casualty rates.⁴⁶

The significance and value of post-Vietnam developments in theory, doctrine and tactics is less clear. On the one hand, the level of innovation remained high. The evolution of doctrine for war in Europe moved relatively quickly from static defense to active defense to the present concept, AirLand Battle.⁴⁷ A new conceptualization of warfare in terms of near, deep and rear battles enabled the Army to adjust its posture in Europe to enable it to provide a more robust defense though confronted with a larger and increasingly capable Red Army.⁴⁸ New organizational plans for divisions and the inclusion of armor, airmobile and air cavalry forces within a single, "Tricap" division reflected both imagination and a sense of lessons learned from Vietnam.

Yet, on the other hand, many of these innovations and new developments found powerful critics. AirLand Battle, though it remains the Army's doctrine for conducting warfare in Europe, was severely criticized by other members of NATO, who feared, among other things, that it might unnecessarily escalate any war to the nuclear level.⁴⁹ Both the Tricap division model

⁴⁶David H. Hackworth, *About Face*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), p 455. Hackworth claims the units of the 173d Airborne Brigade took inordinately high numbers of casualties because, trained to fight forward, they failed to exploit opportunities to maneuver.

⁴⁷See John L. Romjue, *From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973-1982*, (Historical Office, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1984), for a complete discussion.

⁴⁸John O. Marsh, Jr. and Carl E. Vuono, *The United States Army Posture Statement FY 90/91*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1989), p 19.

⁴⁹In fact, a number of the NATO allies' concerns regarding

and a later model, Division 86, proved too expensive to implement.

Robert A. Doughty attributes these mixed results to the interplay of national security policy, new technology, service and branch parochialism and battlefield experience.⁵⁰ There was something dysfunctional about the process the Army used to produce new theory, doctrine and tactics.

Comparative Reorganizations. In some respects, the post-Korean and Vietnam war reorganizations of the defense establishment were similar. In both instances, the defense establishment saw the end of the war as a major transitional point and tried to re-evaluate the security environment and adjust the nation's forces accordingly. In both cases, as the force structure summaries above make clear, the Army and Air Force changed rather significantly, while the Navy's role remained largely constant. Both reorganizations took place in the context of the Cold War and the U.S.-Soviet competition.

But in other respects, the two reorganizations were very different. The changes that swept through the defense establishment after Korea were revolutionary, while the changes following Vietnam were evolutionary. The focus on nuclear warfare after Korea accounts in part for the revolutionary

Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA), a new NATO defense concept, stemmed from fear that FOFA was an American ruse to cause the Europeans to adopt AirLand Battle. Congress of the United States Office of Technology Assessment, *New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-on Forces Attack*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1987), p 130. For other AirLand Battle-related concerns, see Peter H. Langer, *Transatlantic Discord and NATO's Crisis of Cohesion*, (Washington, DC and Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1986), pp 72, 73.

⁵⁰Robert A. Doughty, *The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76*, pp 46-50.

nature of the reorganization. General purpose forces were reorganized into "pentomic" divisions; ground force doctrine was adjusted to account for nuclear effects on the battlefield; surface-to-surface missiles proliferated in the ground forces structure in anticipation of tactical nuclear warfare. Thus, while a complete spectrum of conflict was acknowledged, the emphasis was on nuclear combat.⁵¹ Similarly, in the Air Force, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) initially carried responsibility for strategic nuclear strikes. SAC wings increased from 30 to 45 aircraft each as the bomber force expanded for the nuclear mission.⁵²

The post-Korean War reorganization was revolutionary in another respect as well. Concurrently with the reorganization of the U.S. military, the Defense Department itself had undergone major changes as a result of the National Security Act of 1947 and its amendments in 1949, 1953, and 1958. For the first time in its history, the United States had a massive, centralized peacetime defense establishment. Following the 1958 amendment, the military departments no longer had Executive Department status (they had lost Cabinet status in 1947, and were here further relegated to the lower status of military departments) and could no longer present their positions directly to the President and Budget Bureau. Power was centralized in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD); the Joint Chiefs of Staff were relegated to being an advisory committee, whose access to the President could be

⁵¹A. J. Bacevich, *The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam*, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1986), pp 60-68.

⁵²Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Semiannual Report, January 1 to June 30 1958*, p 3.

blocked by the Secretary of Defense. The President was effectively denied broad-based civilian and military advice.⁵³

Ironically, these successive reorganizations of the Defense Department, each in pursuit of greater centralization, ultimately complicated the defense planning process. As centralization proceeded, the Defense Department generally took control of many key functions. Civilian control and direction also took over what had previously been purely military matters.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, the military departments still had an interest in these areas, and still had expertise on the issues in question. They continued to involve themselves, even after centralization of control at Defense Department level. The services continued to testify before Congress, for example. Thus, as each successive reorganization created a new Defense Agency or office to supervise a given function, the practical result was an increase in the number of participants in the defense planning system, not a reduction in numbers as the Defense Department intended. The post-Korean War restructuring of the military services was probably the last major Defense undertaking to be conducted before the expansion of the defense establishment in the wake of the 1958 reorganization.

⁵³This was a major departure from the way World War II had been managed, where the Joint Chiefs of Staff did the strategic planning, directed operations of fighting forces and were even involved in industrial mobilization and other issues. Victor H. Krulak, *Organization for National Security*, (Washington, DC: United States Strategic Institute, 1983), pp 15, 57-71.

⁵⁴Alain Enthoven describes how the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis moved in to such areas and the conflict that resulted with the JCS. See Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program 1961-1969*, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1972), p 76.

The post-Vietnam changes were evolutionary by comparison. There were no further amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 in the immediate aftermath of Vietnam. Adjustments were made to the Army and Air Force, but a balanced set of military instruments resulted. The Army gradually reconstituted itself with 16 regular divisions and embarked on a program of modernization.⁵⁵ The Navy retained most of its major combatants, retiring mostly escorts and service support ships. The Air Force retained an inventory of capable aircraft in both its strategic and tactical wings, and added a more robust strategic lift capability. Indeed, as the budget data in figure seven indicate, the defense budget grew steadily in the post-war years, and the budget shares of the individual services were fairly consistent.⁵⁶

The sense of competition between the United States and Soviet Union which had dominated the post-Korean War era was also somewhat mitigated. Limited cooperation--détente--led to a cap on some strategic nuclear forces in SALT I and to the sale of U.S. grain to the Soviet Union. It also led to a less confrontational atmosphere in Europe, although détente would ultimately founder because of continued Soviet activity within the Third World.

In addition to the early, tentative steps toward cooperation that détente represented, the United States also sought to use diplomacy to balance the Soviet Union's military power. The

⁵⁵In contrast, conventional re-equipping went very slowly after the Korean war. A. J. Bacevich, *The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam*, p 100.

⁵⁶Nor was budget growth the result strictly of the transition to an all-volunteer force with attendant higher personnel costs. Personnel costs accounted for 56 percent of the FY 74 budget as compared to 53 percent of Fy 72. Department of Defense. *Department of Defense Annual Report FY 1974*, p 97.

rapprochement with the Peoples' Republic of China may have helped to divert Soviet attention from Europe to its long and sometimes troubled border with the Chinese.

The revolutionary-evolutionary distinction between the post-Korean and post-Vietnam defense changes applies to management of the defense budget as well. As table II-3 illustrates, in

Table II-3: Comparative Budget Allocations FY 1953-56

Year	Service	Percent of DOD Budget Received	Percentage of Own Budget Allocated to:				
			Mil Pers	O & M	Procurement	R, D, T & E	Other
1953	Army	37	18	21	39	2	20
	Navy	27	13	22	43	1	21
	Air Force	34	8	12	68	2	10
1954	Army	32	50	34	5	4	7
	Navy	28	38	34	10	1	17
	Air Force	39	34	31	20	4	11
1955	Army	25	42	27	21	3	7
	Navy	27	38	32	14	5	11
	Air Force	46	24	24	39	3	10
1956	Army	25	39	31	17	4	9
	Navy	27	28	20	26	5	21
	Air Force	46	22	23	42	4	8

Source: Author's calculations based upon the presentations of the Service Secretaries in the Semiannual Reports of the Secretary of Defense, January-June 1953, 1954, 1955, and 1956. Specifically, pp 156, 161, 241, 293 in the 1953 report; pp 316-318 in the 1954 report; pp 281-283 in the 1955 report; and pp 325-329 in the 1956 report.

Note: Numbers may not add up to 100 because of rounding.

Mil Pers= Military Personnel

O&M= Operations and Maintenance

R, D, T & E= Research, Development, Test and Evaluation

the years immediately following the Korean War, the defense establishment demonstrated flexibility in the way it apportioned the reduced defense budget among the services. In 1953 the Army consumed 37 percent of the DOD budget. By 1955,

however, the DOD budget was reapportioned, leaving the Army with 25 percent while the Air Force received 46 percent.

Adjustments as to where the services spent their funds were equally significant. In 1953, the Air Force spent 68 percent of its funds in procurement, buying aircraft and equipment needed for the new Strategic Air Command. The Air Force's personnel account also changed dramatically from 1953 when it consumed eight percent of the Air Force budget to the following three years when it consistently consumed over 20 percent. The post-Korean War adjustments illustrate how major re-allocations of funds--even within significantly reduced budgets--made a substantial difference in the make-up and structure of the nation's military instrument.

The post-Vietnam budget allocations were different. As table II-4 shows, there was no major re-allocation from one service to another. The budget shares for each service changed relatively less than during the post-Korea period, leaving the proportional support to each of the services fairly constant. Instead, after Vietnam, the relative support to defense programs changed. A fairly constant level of funding was maintained for strategic forces, while general purpose forces received reduced levels of support. Other programs, including military construction, Defense Agencies, and the like received increased funding levels necessary to implement the All-Volunteer Force.

Yet another reason that the post-Korean reorganization appears revolutionary and the post-Vietnam reorganization appears evolutionary is because the post-Vietnam adjustments took place in the strategic context of the nation's post-Korea defense posture. In other words, it was Korea that established the U.S. security perimeter for the containment era. It was

the Korean War and its aftermath that saw the movement of U.S. troops to Europe and that established the basic global distribution of U.S. forces that endures today.

Table II-4: Post-Vietnam Defense Budget Allocations (Percent of DOD Budget)

By Service:	Fiscal Year				
	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
Army	32	33	28	27	26
Navy	29	27	31	32	32
Air Force	32	33	31	31	30
OSD/ Agencies	7	7	10	10	12
<hr/>					
By Program:					
Strategic Forces	11	10	10	9	9
General Purpose Forces	39	40	32	32	31
Intelligence & Communications	7	7	7	7	7
Air & Sea Lift	2	2	1	1	1
Guard & Reserve	3	3	4	5	5
Others	38	38	46	46	47

Source: Author's calculations based upon data from Department of Defense, Department of Defense Program and Budget, Fiscal Year 1971, p 159 Table 1, Fiscal Years 1972-76, p 163 Table 1, Fiscal Years 1970-74, p 157 Table 1, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1970, 1971, 1972 respectively).

Vietnam saw only a small adjustment to the nation's global security posture, conducted within the framework of containment and without the wholesale revisions of national security strategy that the post-Korea reorganization had brought. The general distribution of U.S. forces around the globe was unchanged, save for the withdrawal of ground forces from Southeast Asia. Defense spending was somewhat reduced, but the general trend in the wake of the Vietnam War was to reconstitute the U.S. general purpose forces in both size and quality: the opposite of the post-Korea reorganization.

The post-Korean and post-Vietnam reorganizations thus seem to have very little of substance in common. On the one hand, as the United States adjusted its security posture after Korea, it found itself in a relatively contentious world that included the Berlin crises. Still, the United States concluded it needed relatively few general purpose forces and built instead a large theater- and strategic nuclear forces arsenal. On the other hand, the aftermath of Vietnam presented a somewhat less contentious world, but the United States chose to maintain a broader, more flexible and more capable set of military instruments while at the same time taking the first steps toward cooperation with its principal adversary.

Comparison of the two post-war reorganizations indicates there has been no single, consistent, deterministic approach to military requirements since the Korean War. The defense establishment has not sought to derive requirements for U.S. forces solely from the perceived threat in the global security environment in any consistent way. During the Eisenhower years, with defense spending consuming between eight and nine percent of the federal budget, the "New Look" policies barely sustained 11 combat-ready divisions, preferring instead investment in strategic forces. Nevertheless, the Eisenhower Administration showed real innovation in its radical redesign of the defense budget. During the Nixon years, the defense establishment designed its forces with an eye toward reducing costs, explicitly trying to provide required forces while consuming less than seven per cent of the budget,⁵⁷ yet produced more forces capable of fighting across the spectrum of conflict. However, the budget restructuring of the Nixon era

⁵⁷Department of Defense. *Department of Defense Annual Report FY 1972-76*, p 11.

perhaps reflects less innovation and an interest in equal budget shares for the services. Nevertheless, both the Eisenhower and Nixon defense adjustments reflect the bargaining between the President and Congress claimed in Schilling's bureaucratic politics hypothesis. Both presidents had to reach an agreement with the legislative branch on the upper limit of defense spending, and both presidents were under pressure to reduce spending.

Eisenhower also encountered the rigidity, service preferences, and reluctance to innovate noted by Posen and Builder. The Joint Chiefs who failed to offer him innovative suggestions for the redesign of U.S. forces were not stupid; their opinions reflected their experience--success in World War II--and they were reluctant to stray too far from the force design principles they believed contributed to that success.

Within the confines of their budgets and similar constraints, both the Eisenhower and Nixon administrations reflected William Kaufmann's approach to planning general purpose forces. Both administrations began by considering what the most demanding contingencies they confronted were, and then sought to create forces to meet those contingencies. Although the Eisenhower assessment found more contingencies than the Nixon assessment and nevertheless concluded that it needed fewer general purpose forces than the Nixon assessment, the approach taken was the same.

The foregoing examination of the post-Korea and post-Vietnam reorganizations and adjustments to the U.S. military structure shows a number of influences. In part, military requirements have been determined by the budget and desired budget-related ceilings on spending levels. In part, military requirements have been determined by strategy. For example, the early

Eisenhower Administration believed that few general purpose forces would be required if the U.S. maintained nuclear superiority. In part, military requirements have been determined by technology. For example, the technical capacity to make tactical nuclear weapons influenced the structure of the "pentomic" era forces. In part, military requirements have been determined by the conditions in the global security environment. But whatever the influence of budget, strategy, technology and the security environment, political preferences have been key in determining force structure for the United States.

The examples from the post-Korea and Post-Vietnam experiences illustrate how political preferences influence--and ultimately determine--the security posture of the United States. The Eisenhower Administration, confronted with the same global and domestic circumstances, could have placed more emphasis on general purpose forces than it did, arguing that Korea was an example of wars likely in the future. But it did not. The Nixon Administration, similarly, could have reduced general purpose forces more than it did, arguing that détente, European allies' capacity for self-defense and nuclear sufficiency adequately protected American interests. But it did not. In both instances, the administration's policy preferences, informed by the many considerations and influences discussed earlier in this chapter, intervened to temper any purely military-technical calculus as to how the nation's security needs could best be met. This sustains Schilling's point, noted earlier in the chapter, that while some defense organizations are certainly better than others, there are no optimal solutions to defense organization that can be tested and demonstrated to be superior to all alternative

organizations. It is possible, however, to evaluate a given security posture and the forces that support it, and to reach conclusions about its adequacy. And that is the task of chapter four.

CHAPTER THREE

OPERATING SECURITY FRAMEWORK FOR THE YEAR 2000

Chapter one indicated there are many influences likely to cause change in the military or make change advisable. But what about the global security environment itself? What will be its contours in the years ahead? Will current security relationships endure, or undergo major changes? Will conflict or cooperation predominate? What will be the contentious issues? Chapter three seeks to sketch the possible developments in the global security environment to serve as the basic framework in which changes to the military can be considered.

Attempts in the literature to anticipate the future security environment have been plentiful. The Department of Defense produces a number of documents which include forecasts and estimates of future developments. Among these are the *Joint Long-Range Strategic Appraisal (JLRSA)*, the *Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning (JIEP)*, the *Long-Range Planning Estimate*, the *Thirty Year Forecast*, the *Army Global Forecast* and the *Army Long-Range Planning Guidance*.¹ *The*

¹The JLRSA and JIEP are prepared periodically by the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) as part of the Joint Strategic Planning System, discussed in Chapter Four. The other documents are U.S. Army publications produced biannually.

Future Security Environment, though not a DOD publication, was produced as supporting documentation for the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy's report, *Discriminate Deterrence*.² All of these documents typically examine potential developments on a region-by-region basis, adding discussions at the end of the estimate to deal with more general issues such as the impact of technological advances, terrorism, or other topics.

Private, scholarly endeavors at forecasting tend to be somewhat more eclectic, ranging from detailed computer simulations of expected relations between economics and arms control to broader contemplations of structural, political and cultural trends at global level.³ Between the two extremes are works that try to identify major shifts in some aspect of a nation's policy, such as Alvin Z. Rubinstein's examination of the long-term impact of a Soviet shift in grand strategy from a continental-based strategy to a global strategy.⁴

The methodological approach in this chapter is to construct a mid-level framework for examining the future security

²*The Future Security Environment*. Report of the Future Security Environment Working Group, submitted to the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy. Andrew W. Marshall and Charles Wolf, Chairmen, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1988).

³The GLOBUS Research Group, Berlin Scientific Center for Social Research, *Reducing East-West Conflict and the North-South Gap*, (Berlin: GLOBUS Research Group, 1987) is an example of the former approach; Daniel Bell, "The World and the United States in 2013," *Daedalus*, 116 (Summer 1987): 1-31, is an example of the latter. See also The Library of Congress, *International Security Environment to the Year 2020: Global Trends Analysis*, (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, 1990).

⁴Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy, Environment to the Year 2000," *Naval War College Review*, LX (Summer 1987): 19-37.


environment. In other words, synthesizing the conclusions from a number of forecasts, the objective is an approach that will take cognizance of major shifts in the global distribution of power, account for likely developments in enough detail to be useful for subsequent consideration of military options, and yet be general enough to avoid disputes over individual details. In addition, to be most helpful, the framework will follow the approach taken by Robert Gilpin, identifying the locus of change: in the nature of international actors, in the governance of the international system, or in a change in the interstate process.⁵

Among the official forecasts cited, there is general agreement that the global distribution of power will shift in a number of significant ways. One measure of power, economic capacity, is expected to alter the hierarchy of economic capability in the world. Figure III-1 illustrates the expected adjustments, though it does not account for European Community integration in 1992 or for German reunification. Brazil will rival the UK and India will approach France in gross national product. Likewise, military capital stocks are expected to approach the levels shown in figure III-2. As the figure indicates, Western European countries maintain approximately the positions they hold today relative to the United States and Soviet Union. Because of the expansion and size of its economy, even a relatively small defense expenditure results in a rising real level of Japanese defense spending that will, toward the end of the century, approach the spending levels of each of our principal West European allies.⁶

⁵Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, p 40.

⁶*The Future Security Environment*, p 23.

Figure III-1: Comparative Gross National Products as Forecast for 2010




Source: *The Future Security Environment*, p 8.

The Working Group report further notes:

Although the military capital of a number of emerging regional powers (South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, Brazil, Egypt) remains quite small relative to that of the larger powers, it represents a formidable stock of weapons, very likely including advanced systems...Along with increases in their military capital stocks,...these countries will acquire a growing capacity to produce and export a wide range of weapons, featuring all but the most advanced technologies.⁷

⁷Ibid, p 24.

Figure III-2: Military Capital Stock, Share of Seven Country Total



Source: The Future Security Environment, p 23.

The Army Global Forecast, as discussed in chapter one, uses additional measures of power to complement GNP and military capital stocks. In the calculus of the AGF, by 2010 states can be clustered in a new way based on the amounts of power they possess. "Great powers" account for about 50 percent of the power in the world. Included hierarchically as great powers are the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and United Germany. "Major powers" share 20 percent of the power

in the world and consist of India, France, Brazil, Italy, the UK, United Korea, and Canada. Finally, "middle powers" collectively account for 10 percent of world power and consist of Indonesia, Mexico, Spain, Turkey, Iran, Poland, Taiwan, and Pakistan.⁸

By all accounts, the Asian Rimlands become more important. The official estimates emphasize the economic importance of the region, which is made abundantly clear by the figures above. Six of the 20 nations counted in the power clusters of the AGF are in the Asian Rim. Daniel Bell makes an even more emphatic case for the importance of the region, asserting, "we have seen the decline of the historic Euro-centered civilization and a shift to Asia as the matrix of activity in the twenty-first century."⁹

In addition to the redistribution of power in the world and a shift in the global center of gravity toward Asia, a number of other expected developments are thought to be likely influences on the future global security environment. Demographic changes may exert pressure on both the developed and developing portions of the world. In the West, the population is generally aging, reducing the ratio between retirees and workers from today's level of four-to-one to about three-to-one by 2000. Retiree requirements for health care and other services are expected to become more burdensome on the working segment of the population as this retiree-worker ratio declines.¹⁰ The developing world will continue its population explosion and have a population that is relatively younger than that of the developed world. Mexico, for example, currently

⁸*The Army Global Forecast*, p 4.

⁹Daniel Bell, "The World and the United States in 2013," p 6.

¹⁰*The Future Security Environment*, p 13.

has over 40 percent of its current population under the age of 15. By 2000, less-developed countries will need 600 million new jobs in order to employ people already born.¹¹

AIDS too may be a significant influence and source of pressure on societies, especially in Africa and perhaps elsewhere.¹² Although the AIDS epidemic postulated in the mid-1980s has not materialized, and some, albeit limited progress in AIDS research has been made, care of AIDS patients remains very expensive and could make tremendous financial demands on societies where the disease advances quickly. Moreover, in societies where AIDS manifests itself in the mainstream of the population, the disease has the potential to cripple an important part of the work force, limiting economic and industrial development.

Also to be considered are current but enduring problems in the international security environment. The Iran-Iraq confrontation, the on-going Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the tensions that persist between the Arabs and Israelis, and Middle East internal strife, e.g., the fundamentalist religious vs secular movements within Islam, are all based upon deep-seated ideological, ethnic, and perhaps irrational conflicts that have defied permanent resolution and that could reappear as full-blown violence at any time.

Such enduring conflicts are not limited to the Middle East. Continuing insurgencies in Latin and South America, and spreading drug violence are also likely to shape the future security environment by increasing instability in the region. In Asia, Indian relations with both China and Pakistan are sources of potential violence since the grounds for recent

¹¹Ibid, p 14.

¹²Ibid, p 16.

disputes--contested borders and tribal rivalry--remain unresolved.¹³

China's relations with the United States and the Soviet Union likewise could be very influential in shaping the future. A triangular relationship between the three nations appears to be emerging, in which each nation watches the other two and tempers its relations with each state in consideration of the other's likely response. In such a relationship, China may limit its rapprochement with the Soviet Union out of fear it will damage relations with the U.S. and the West; an important consideration since China shares with the U.S. goals of a balanced strategic and economic environment in East Asia. Alternatively, China could move closer to the Soviet Union to balance a perceived U.S. advantage over the Soviet Union. While the relationship between China and the U.S. thus has potential for further cooperation, providing U.S. relations with Taiwan do not intervene to anger the Chinese, there is also potential for Chinese opposition to U.S. troops in Asia, to more vocal Chinese opposition to U.S. policy in the Third World, and less cooperation with the United States on regional stability, e.g., in Cambodian, Korea and Afghanistan.¹⁴

Prospects for the future of Europe in the post-cold war era include three alternative paths of development. The first possibility is that new, liberal, market-oriented regimes will remove all sources of conflict and that Europe will embark on an era of peace and cooperation. A second, more pessimistic possibility is that Europe will revert to pre-1945 patterns of nationalism, multi-polarity and instability. The third

¹³*The Army Global Forecast*, pp 8-12.

¹⁴Wenguang Shao, "China's Relations with the Super-Powers," *Survival*, (March/April 1990), pp 166, 67, 69.

possibility is that institutions for cooperation will develop, which will serve as an antidote for anarchy.¹⁵

Michael Howard emphasizes the building of institutions that can moderate and mitigate conflict in the new Europe. Neither a subscriber to the optimistic, liberal era of peace offered above as the first possible outcome for Europe, nor a pessimist subscribing to the second possibility described, Howard seeks a European Commonwealth that will use reformed existing institutions, NATO and the EC, to mitigate fears and resolve problems. The European Commonwealth resulting from these efforts will include the United States, albeit in a supportive rather than dominant role, Western Europe, and the states of Central Europe, i.e., Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Germany and Poland.¹⁶

The future of the Soviet Union is more difficult to anticipate. The Soviet state has recently passed from guided reform under perestroika to revolution, in which President Gorbachev is not in control of most of the key events. The Russian Republic has, for example, undertaken its own economic reforms. The national-level "500 Days" program to transform the Soviet economy to a free market system has similarly been endorsed over the objections of President Gorbachev, and a variety of alternative proposals have appeared. The main political processes underway are polarization and radicalization, creating a Right that fears "Eastern Europeanization" and a fate like that of the communist regimes there, and a Left that thinks perestroika is a dead end. The nationalities question is a formidable challenge, raising the

¹⁵Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," *International Security* 14 (Spring 1990): 5, 6.

¹⁶Michael Howard, "The Remaking of Europe," *Survival*, (March/April 1990), pp 99-106.

possibility the Soviet Union may break up into separate republics and the specter, though less likely, of civil war. Economic reform is in serious doubt, producing plans that cannot be implemented or that do not work. These convolutions and conflicts are not transitional, but are likely to persist and intensify for the foreseeable future.¹⁷

International Relations Theory. The forecast developments just described--global redistribution of economic and other power, the increase in military capital stocks, and the uncertainties developing in Europe, the Soviet Union and China--do not lead in any clear way to a single set of conclusions about the future security environment. A theory of international relations is needed that will arrange the forecast developments, account for other factors such as the state of formal anarchy in which nations operate (the security dilemma again), and assist in weighing, scaling and measuring these forecast developments to see which are likely to be most influential. Without such a theory to assist in the analysis of the future security environment, no contemplation of the future is likely to produce more than loose speculation.

Viotti and Kauppi have classified international relation theory into three broad categories, realism, pluralism and globalism.¹⁸ Globalism, which casts its argument in the context of the world capitalist economy, has an essentially Marxist outlook. The globalist paradigm tends to blame

¹⁷Seweryn Bialer, "The Passing of the Soviet Order," *Survival*, (March/April 1990), pp 107, 108, 112, 116.

¹⁸Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations Theory*, (New York & London: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987). Chapter two addresses realism, chapter three pluralism and chapter four globalism.

capitalist economic behavior for most of the ills of the world and over-emphasizes economic factors as the source of conflict, dependency and underdevelopment. While there are non-Marxist globalists, the theoretical congruence between Marxism and globalism is so extensive that the wide-spread abandonment of Marxism in Eastern Europe and the revisionism of Marxism in the Soviet Union thoroughly undermines globalism as a theory of international relations.¹⁹

Pluralism emphasizes a multitude of actors in international relations including non-state actors and multi-national corporations. The theory does not treat states as either the principal or rational actors in international relations. The emphasis in pluralism is on international cooperation. The theory has been criticized as utopian for its expectations of extensive cooperation among international actors. It has also been criticized as ethnocentric, since it seeks to transfer cooperative activities as they evolved in the United States polity to international affairs. Perhaps its greatest shortcoming is its failure to give adequate consideration to security issues and the use of force.

The realist paradigm stresses security issues over economics, tends to treat states as single, rational actors and focuses on the accretion of power. Realism has also been criticized for its failure to provide for change in relations between states, for the many ways its "balance of power" has been misinterpreted and for its pursuit of national power. Yet there is evidence that realism as it was explained by Morgenthau has been perverted for private ends.²⁰

¹⁹Viotti and Kauppi make their own, extensive critique. See *International Relations Theory*, pp 416-20.

²⁰Stanley Hoffmann, "Realism and Its Discontents," *The Atlantic Monthly*, (November 1985), p 132. Hoffmann argues

Hoffmann claims that there is room within the realist construct to accommodate many of the criticisms raised against Morgenthau. Specifically, power is understood to be a complex of means that can be directed toward different ends. The means and ends must be carefully matched, especially in the nuclear era. Nor is power a crude instrument to be wielded indiscriminately; moderation and prudence are important as well. Finally, according to Hoffman, realists recognize that national interests cannot be exercised without accounting for sweeping movements in the international environment. In other words, realism is capable of fluid, flexible statecraft.²¹

No theory of international relations will escape criticism on all counts. But globalism lies in complete disrepute after the collapse of Eastern Europe, and pluralism is heavily tainted by utopianism. Realism, however, can serve as a framework in which to consider the forecast developments in the global security environment with the following modifications. States remain the principal actors in international relations, but are accompanied by other actors, including sub-national actors, multi-national corporations and international cartels. Power has many components, and international economics is emerging as a more important component all the time. Furthermore, international economics are becoming politicized as more international actors realize that economic conditions do not result from "invisible hand" global market forces as much as they do from political decisions made by various actors in the international economy. The interests of states and of the international market economy are converging in a single Washington perverted Morgenthau's ideas to justify limitless use of power.

²¹Ibid.

political arena.²² Moreover, conflict is not a structural element of international relations. That is to say, conflict and cooperation are simultaneously both possibilities for managing international relations, depending upon the relative satisfaction of the actors with the status quo, perception of benefits from either cooperation or conflict, the presence of anti-system actors, and other forces.

The importance of economic influences within this new realism must be stressed. The global distribution of economic activities--industry, technology and related activities--are becoming a central concern of statecraft. Each state seeks to maximize the autonomous performance of its economy. Yet economic interdependence exceeds anything in the experience of sovereign nations. The continuing integration of the United States and Japanese economies, for example, currently accounts for 30 percent of world output.²³ The greater the penetration of each other's economies, the more vulnerable states become; not in the sense that a new economic weapon emerges, but in the sense that interdependency is sensitive, meaning events in one state's economic health have far-reaching consequences for other states and the international system. As Gilpin notes:

When many states pursue independent economic policies in a highly interdependent world and do not coordinate their macroeconomic policies, these policies can and do conflict with one another so that everyone may suffer more than if they had cooperated with one another. Until policy coordination can be achieved and the international monetary system brought under international control, the prospects

²²Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, (Princeton & New York: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp 116, 229.

²³Ibid, pp 6, 64.

for the continued existence of a liberal world economic order are dim.²⁴

Realism, as it will be used here, places equal importance upon security and economic issues. It recognizes the importance of equilibrium in the international system to preserve the status quo and the norms that govern interstate relations, and the role of economic forces in disrupting the equilibrium through the mobility of capital and technology, and through the transitory nature of comparative advantage.²⁵ The modifications to classical realism that have been made here can be consolidated in a set of realist propositions about change in international relations.

First, maintaining equilibrium over the long-term in the international system is impossible. Even status quo powers, as Jervis pointed out, become dissatisfied with the status quo.²⁶ Moreover, constantly shifting economic forces, uneven growth among nations, the appeal of ideology, the emergence of an anti-system actor, among other things, each can serve to disrupt the condition of equilibrium of the international system.

Second, when disruptions to the equilibrium are small, it may be possible to make adjustments that temporarily restore it. For example, regional powers may spend more on military power, temporarily off-setting the industrial growth of a neighboring state. In the long term, however, temporary adjustments cannot stave off fundamental shifts.

Third, when a major shift occurs, disequilibrium results. The international actors seek to establish a new equilibrium

²⁴Ibid, p 170.

²⁵Ibid, p 262.

²⁶Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," p 167.

that favors the interests of the major actors. Traditionally, the new equilibrium has been disputed and war was the instrument for resolving the dispute. The interdependent world includes prospects of cooperation as well as conflict in establishing a new equilibrium, depending upon the perceptions of likely costs and benefits from cooperation or conflict on the parts of the international actors.²⁷

Interpreting the Global Security Environment. Using the foregoing perspective to guide the inquiry, the forecast conditions described earlier in the chapter can be re-examined to determine what system-level and regional consequences they may have.

System-Level Consequences. The redistribution of global power will gradually change the world from a Euro-centric to an Asian, Pacific-centric orientation. This shift will destroy the current state of equilibrium. China, Japan, Taiwan and the industrializing states of the region will be in the ascendant, and will have much to do with establishing a new equilibrium. The new equilibrium is unlikely to be contested from Europe, since Western Europe will likely focus its scarce capital on redevelopment projects in Eastern Europe and on penetration of Soviet markets in regions adjacent to Europe. The new equilibrium cannot be expected to have much effect on Africa. A major problem for Africa will be competition for aid from Eastern Europe and the enduring problems African states have in

²⁷This is a revision of Robert Gilpin's theory of change in *War and Change in International Politics*, pp 23-29. Cooperation may be more likely in the interdependent world since interdependence provides, by definition, more avenues of access to critical resources, markets and technology.

absorbing and effectively using foreign aid. Latin and South America will likewise be affected only in a peripheral way. The Middle East will be a more important actor, potentially, since Japan is an important oil market. The Soviet Union may be a major beneficiary of the new equilibrium, since cooperation under the new equilibrium with Japan may provide the wherewithal to develop the Soviet Far East.

Of course, this shift of power to the Pacific has already begun. Why, then, has there not been more evidence of disequilibrium? The answer lies in the United States' role as security guarantor. The political and security ties the U.S. developed over the course of the cold war with many different states have delayed the on-set of disequilibrium. The U.S. economic position has been shored up by its allies through their support of the current monetary system because there was no sound alternative to American security guarantees.²⁸ With the cold war in the past, now, the economic support the United States has received is likely to be withdrawn. Once this occurs, signs of disequilibrium will likely appear.

Conflict or cooperation--which is likely to characterize the new equilibrium? If the majority of international actors find that their needs are met, that the new equilibrium produces an equitable distribution of economic, technical and political benefits, then cooperation will probably predominate. On the other hand, if actors believe they can benefit from contesting the new equilibrium, or if the leading actors in the new system seek to obstruct the efforts of other states to gain from the new equilibrium, the chances for conflict increase. The potential for cooperation seems good in light of current

²⁸Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, p 168.

Japanese policies which make very limited use of the military instrument, i.e., deterrence only, and the wide number of potential beneficiaries from the new equilibrium, including China and the Soviet Union: the two powers most capable of contesting the system if their needs were not met.

Regional Consequences. System-level theory can only assist in describing the broadest, most general contours of the future security environment. In other words, having said that the new equilibrium is potentially a system in which cooperation would be more prevalent than conflict, other considerations, specifically, conditions influencing regional relations, must also be brought to bear. Is it not possible to apply the same calculus of costs and benefits from conflict and cooperation at regional level? It is not. There are at least two problems in trying to account for regional developments with a system-level approach.

The first problem involved in the use of system-level theory to interpret likely regional developments is that the theory, cut from realist cloth, assumes rational actors. At a regional level of analysis, rational actors cannot be assumed. This is so because at regional levels, irrational forces can be identified: race hatred, tribal rivalry, the influence of messianic leadership, and radical ideologies. The mechanism of value maximization that lies at the heart of the rational actor assumption does not necessarily operate with such regional actors. Thus the system-level theory is inadequate as the sole basis for examining responses to regional events.

The second problem is equally troubling. It is what Giovanni Sartori has called concept stretching.²⁹ That is, a

²⁹Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 64: December

concept formulated to work well at one level of analysis is stretched to explain conditions at another level of analysis, but the underlying assumptions and other critical ingredients are inappropriate to the new application. A related concern is context. For a concept to be applicable, all subjects studied with it must behave more-or-less the same, responding to similar stimuli in similar fashion. The value-maximizing calculus attributed to international actors works well enough at system-level, but when specific states, stateless actors and other participants in regional affairs are considered, they are not a homogeneous group; their individual judgements may be influenced by different cultures, histories, traditions and other factors. All actors, in other words, do not share a common context.

The regional analyses must, therefore, proceed with due consideration of local factors and conditions. These analyses can obviously be informed by the greater body of system-level theory, but cannot depend exclusively on it for judgements about likely future conditions. Each analysis must be tempered by local history and conditions.

Europe faces what may be the greatest amount of change in attempting to find a new regional equilibrium. Formerly, during the era of cold war, the superpowers kept Europe "pacified" and subordinated most intra-bloc issues to the East-West confrontation.³⁰ In the post-cold war era, however, local/regional issues need not remain subordinated, and may complicate the ability of the states in the region to agree on

1970, p 1036.

³⁰Josef Joffe, "After Bipolarity: Eastern and Western Europe: Between To Ages," *Adelphi Paper 247, The Strategic Implications of Change in the Soviet Union Part 1*, (Winter 1989/90), p 71.

a new regional equilibrium. On the other hand, it appears that most of the actors in the region have interests that overlap to some degree, providing a loose consensus on the future.

The Western states want more complete economic integration, access to Eastern states' and Russia's markets, and a new security agreement. The Western states will probably seek to expand the European Community 1992 economic regime to the East European states and perhaps to adjacent markets in the Soviet Union. The likely regional security mechanism is more difficult to anticipate. It may begin in the form of NATO and other extant institutions, but given the role NATO and the other institutions have played in the cold war, it seems doubtful that they can be transformed into wholly satisfactory instruments for Atlantic-to-Urals security issues.

The Eastern European states want economic, technical and political benefits from their association with the Western nations. The European Development Bank, currently capitalized at 12 billion dollars, is a recent benefit of the East's rapprochement with Western Europe.³¹ Technical and political benefits are also forthcoming. For example, representatives of new, East European governments frequently visit the United States and other Western nations seeking advice and assistance in parliamentary practices and the mechanics of governance.³²

While there may be strong congruence between the West's desire to integrate the East and the East's desire for a variety of benefits, there are other influences in East Europe that may disrupt or complicate the creation of a new

³¹Hobart Rowen, "Bank Created for East Bloc Development," *The Washington Post*, April 10, 1990, sec. 1., p A12.

³²Helen Dewar, "Capital Hill's Seminar on Democracy," *The Washington Post*, April 10, 1990, sec. 1., p A1.

equilibrium. One of these is that many local issues remain unresolved and could become very disruptive. There remain enduring ethnic hatreds, border disputes and feuds among the East European states that must be resolved. Another factor complicating creation of a new equilibrium is politics. Though there has been a wholesale rejection of communism throughout the East, democracy is not the only alternative. Fascism and other authoritarian forms of government may still have latent support. There may be an extended period in which old political and social cleavages emerge and are resolved. This period may be fraught with instability and uncertainty and may delay the establishment of a pan-Europe equilibrium.

The Soviet Union also wants a position in the new European system that will enable it to benefit from economic and technical assistance. The dire circumstances in which the Soviet Union finds itself make receipt of economic and technical help more critical than perhaps ever before. Although the Soviet Union may remain an "alien power" in Europe,³³ it will probably observe the rule of law in its dealings with the European states, if only because it finds observing the rules is most expedient to its ends. Thus, although the Soviet Union's internal crises will undoubtedly affect its ability to cooperate with its European neighbors, on the whole the Europeans can expect a generally cooperative Soviet Union that obeys international law, observes borders and honors its treaties.

United Germany remains the central problem for Europe. At issue is not merely economic hegemony; the Federal Republic was the economic hegemon in the region before unification. At issue are not merely border claims; CSCE provides a mechanism

³³Michael Howard, "The Remaking of Europe," p 100.

for consultation to resolve border disputes and the Helsinki Final Act signatories--among them both Germanies--accepted the existing borders. In the near term, questions about Germany's role in NATO and about the maintenance or withdrawal of U.S. forces create uncertainty. Will Germany continue to host foreign forces on its soil? Will Germany ultimately prefer some other organization--CSCE perhaps--to NATO as the principal instrument of security? Beyond the near-term concerns, the fundamental fear is more likely that Germany's interests and those of the rest of Europe will diverge and Germany will have the requisite power to pursue its interests at the expense of the other states--as it did in 1870, 1914, and 1939. The principal concern, then, is to make certain German interests are those of the other European states insofar as possible. To the extent that the future economic, security and political institutions of Europe manage a confluence of European interests, the German Problem will be mitigated.

The road to a new regional equilibrium in Europe may be convoluted, but the prospects for a peaceful and cooperative resolution of regional issues seem good. The ideological battle appears to be over; institutions to create the beginning of a new security system exist; the Western Europeans have the economic, technical and political incentives to produce cooperation on the part of the Eastern European states; and there are reasonable expectations that German interests can be adequately integrated with those of the other European states.

The Middle East will likely be a region in which many struggles persist. It is difficult to anticipate which conflicts will resort to violence because there are no clear thresholds beyond which peaceful means of conflict resolution

are foregone. Nevertheless, a number of factors can be used to examine possible developments in the region.

First of these are economic pressures. Although the region possesses great wealth, it is unevenly distributed. The wealthiest kingdoms subsidize the utilities of their subjects and often offer interest-free home loans. In contrast, millions of impoverished Arabs struggle to survive in the filthy slums of Cairo and other cities. In addition to the distribution of wealth problem, some states face up to 40 percent unemployment.³⁴

Closely associated with the region's economic difficulties are its social problems. A population explosion continues in the Arab states. The lowest population growth rate is 3.5 percent, which has already produced over-crowding in some parts of the region, and which out-strips the region's ability to create jobs. Many people, confronted by such circumstances--poverty, unemployment, and no prospects of improvement--turn to Islam for comfort.³⁵

Desire for democracy is an emerging sentiment in much of the population in the region, but there is little hope of achieving it. Some powerless parliaments have been created, in Kuwait and Jordan, for example, but these have often been suspended by the monarch, and even when allowed to convene, frequently split along secular-Islamic lines. In some states, such as Iraq, despotic rulers have made no attempt to introduce democratic reforms, concentrating instead on their own, expansionist plans that can only be completed at a neighbor's expense.³⁶

³⁴Peter David, "The Arab World Squeezed," *The Economist*, 315 (12 May 1990): 6.

³⁵Ibid, pp 9, 19.

³⁶Ibid, 23.

Another factor influencing prospects for conflict in the region is the secular-religious cleavage among Islamic regimes. Secular regimes, though by no means embracing Western culture, at least value the technical and economic benefits that the West has produced. Often draconian in their rule, these regimes may at some point moderate when they feel less threatened by the demands of the modern world. Religious regimes, on the other hand, represent a rejection of the West and modernity, and seek to promote and protect traditional islamic values.³⁷ There is less hope of deradicalization of religious regimes because of the high ideological content of their make-up.³⁸ That a secular regime may sometimes make a religious appeal to its population, as Saddam Hussein has done recently to mobilize Iraq against the UN coalition confronting it, should not obscure the fact that the regime's basic outlook is secular. Regional conflict along the secular-religious faultline e.g., Iran-Iraq, can be expected to continue until the cleavage itself is somehow mitigated.

Next among the factors influencing conflict in the region is Soviet involvement. A recent concern, though perhaps of doubtful merit, has been a Soviet invasion of Iran in response to ethnic violence on the frontier. With the Soviet Union's current nationalities problem, it seems less likely that the

³⁷G. H. Jansen, *Militant Islam*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), p 123.

³⁸Robert C. Tucker has examined deradicalization of Marxist regimes, finding that deradicalization takes place in states surrounded by non-Marxist regimes. Deradicalization seems less certain for regimes based on religious tenets, since these are likely to be more deeply-held than any secular ideology. See Robert C. Tucker, *The Marxian Revolutionary Idea*, (New York & London: W. W. Norton, 1970), chapter 6. See also Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," *Atlantic* 266: (September 1990), pp 47-69.

Soviet Union would undertake a large-scale campaign in Iran. On the other hand, the spread of violence in Soviet Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenstan could spill over into Iran where peoples of the same tribes and ethnicities reside.³⁹

A key influence in the region is personality. Saddam Hussein's personality clearly determines the character of the Iraqi regime and its posture vis-à-vis other nations. If Saddam leaves the scene in the aftermath of the current Middle East crisis, the successor government would very likely have a different character and nature. Syria, for another example, has become isolated, having failed to create the Greater Syria its leader, President Assad, sought by bringing Lebanon and Jordan into its orbit.⁴⁰ With the passing of Assad, his Alawite minority might lose control of the state and a successor regime might take a conciliatory approach to its neighbors to end Syria's isolation.

One factor that can quickly unify the many disparate Arab interests is hatred of Israel. Arab leaders, beset by domestic problems they cannot solve, such as the economic and social problems described above, may continue to exploit hatred of Israel to redirect their populations' concerns away from their own domestic plight. Thus, as conditions in Arab states worsen, confrontation between Israel and its Arab neighbors may become more severe.

The final factor involves ethnic and religious entities and their struggles for self-determination, a homeland and related goals. Far too numerous to examine in detail, these groups and

³⁹See Gerard Chaliand and Jean-Pierre Rageau, *A Strategic Atlas*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), p 133 for an illustration of the ethnic overlay in the region.

⁴⁰Ibid, p 118.

small, stateless actors are likely to be a destabilizing influence for the foreseeable future. For example, the Palestinians will continue their struggle--in one form of conflict or another--against Israel. Likewise, for the reasons noted above, the Arab-Israeli confrontation will probably continue, though the form of that conflict is uncertain.⁴¹

The year 2000 will likely see the Middle East still beset with conflict. Although there are some prospects for amelioration of some of the contentious points in the region, the number of changes necessary to produce lasting peace and stability are great and therefore doubtful. It would be wishful thinking, for example, to expect moderation of very many Ba'athist regimes, or to expect deradicalization of religious ones.

Latin and South America will remain an area beset with insurgency. Insurgencies currently under way in El Salvador, Honduras, Colombia, Guatemala and Peru will continue. External support for these insurgencies will likely be reduced. On one hand, as Nicaragua transitions to democracy, it will discontinue sponsorship of guerillas in neighboring states. Cuba will probably find that, with reduced levels of support from the Soviet Union, Cuban support for regional insurgencies must also be reduced somewhat. On the other hand, since much of Cuban assistance is in the form of advisors and specialists (in other words, not very capital-intensive), expectations of major reductions in aid to insurgents might not be realistic.

⁴¹Avner Yaniv would probably argue that the Arabs had been effectively deterred from most forms of organized violence. Another perspective might be that Arab actors have not been deterred from their ultimate objectives, but have merely been dissuaded from pursuing them through military means. See Yaniv, *Deterrence Without the Bomb*, p 275.

Moreover, many Eastern European nations have arms industries. As these states search for hard currency to finance their own redevelopment, they may pursue arms sales in the region as a means to acquire the needed cash.⁴² Other actors, such as Vietnam, may provide support to regional insurgent forces as well.⁴³

Drug cartels are another source of potential instability. Their business may produce a "second economy" that damages indigenous society by radically changing local price structures. Corruption of local governments is also a consequence of drug operations. It is conceivable that the cartels may achieve such a level of influence that they reach a condominium with the regime. Alternatively, a cartel might challenge a regime for control of a region. Although it is difficult to anticipate the details of increased drug cartel influence in the region, one thing is clear. For the areas that grow drugs, i.e., cultivate cocoa, the drug cartels preclude economic development by perpetuating dependence on a single crop. Underdevelopment may foster further insurgencies and conflict later on.

Asia and the Pacific are likely to reflect a mixture of cooperation and conflict. With the ideological impediments of Marxism vs capitalism removed, Japan may reduce its energy dependency on the Middle East by reaching import agreements

⁴²There is currently no data to test this hypothesis against. It would require that insurgents find financing for their efforts, perhaps through drug trafficking or robbery.

⁴³MAJ Victor M. Rosello, "Vietnam's Support to El Salvador's FMLN: Successful Tactics in Central America," *Military Review*, (January 1990), pp 71-78.

with the Soviet Union for natural gas and oil. A mutually beneficial relationship could emerge if the Japanese are able to help the Soviets develop new energy sources while containing costs.⁴⁴ Over time, a regional partnership including Japan, Korea, the Soviet Union and China might evolve based upon joint exploration and extraction of petroleum products from the Pacific Basin.

One point contributing a degree of uncertainty to the future of Japanese relations with its neighbor states is the growing Japanese military capital stock. If the Japanese attempt to create a larger defense establishment from these stocks, relations with other states in the region may suffer if neighboring nations perceive a re-emergence of Japanese militarism. That the Japanese would risk such a consequence when their current policies are bringing them such good results, however, seems doubtful.

The conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia drags on. Even if a near-term settlement is reached, deeply-rooted ethnic animosity, among other things, may cause future trouble between these two states.

The Korean peninsula will likely remain peaceful. South Korea has enjoyed much stronger economic performance than North Korea and will reach rough military parity with the North in the late 1990s. With such a regional balance, finding an incentive for either side to challenge the status quo is difficult. Nevertheless, there is a growing pan-Korean nationalism which introduces some uncertainty into the

⁴⁴Although the Soviet Union has large reserves of gas and oil, they lack the technology to extract them at an economical price. The Japanese have the technology to help them. Thane Gustafson, *Crisis Amid Plenty*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), p 332.

equation.⁴⁵ Stability on the Korean peninsula might also deteriorate if the U.S. withdrew its remaining forces. Some South Koreans have favored forcible reunification since the cease-fire.⁴⁶

India has emerged as a regional military power. In addition to its new military capabilities, India's future intentions toward its neighbors, China and Pakistan, are unclear. It has clashed with both of them since 1959, losing to China in 1959 and 1962, while defeating Pakistan in Bangladesh in 1971. Issues of borders and prestige still are points of contention. China seems an unlikely future adversary for more than a short-duration border clash because the frontier is a remote area making sustained logistic support of a large Chinese field force problematic. Pakistan has been significantly weakened by its protracted involvement in Kashmir, which it claims as its own (and which was the cause of the 1965 war), and by the war in Afghanistan.

Relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, and between the Soviet Union and China seem to be improving. The Soviet Union has taken limited but important steps to improve relations with both states. The USSR seeks Japanese assistance to explore and develop the Soviet Far East.⁴⁷ With regard to China, the Soviets seek normalization of relations along the Sino-Soviet border and also hope to achieve a regional "peace

⁴⁵Army Global Forecast, p 12.

⁴⁶This was a concern of the United States as early as the Spring of 1953 when Richard Nixon was sent to deliver a note to Syngman Rhee from President Eisenhower, warning Rhee that the U.S. would not tolerate a re-opening of the war. Richard M. Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, p 155.

⁴⁷Zhang Yebai, "The New Soviet Policy and its Impact on Superpower Rivalry in the Asia-Pacific Region," in *Pacific Security Toward the Year 2000*, ed. Dora Alves (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1988), P 32.

dividend" from troop reductions in Mongolia.⁴⁸ Much of the improvement in relations between the Soviets and others has been rhetorical, based upon grand pronouncements. Nevertheless, the incentives for cooperation--economic development for the Soviets, eventual return of the northern territories for the Japanese, and reduced risk and economic gain for China--are there.

Based on this sketch of the region, the early years of the next century may find Northern Asia emphasizing cooperation and joint economic ventures. At the same time, security issues will get more attention in the South, where conflict will temper relations between India and its neighbors, even if no resort to war is taken.

Like greater Asia, Africa is also a tapestry of attempts at cooperation and of conflict. North of the Sahara, the Arab states of the Maghreb, all members of the Arab League, have been unable to avoid regional disputes.⁴⁹ Morocco and Algeria have disputed ownership of the Western Sahara. Libya's recent involvement in the civil war in Chad may be indicative of future interventions by Gaddafi. Gaddafi has also become a radical champion of traditional Islamic values, placing him in conflict with the more secular regimes of Egypt and Algeria as they have attempted to modernize their societies. Disputes between these states often reflect the religious-secular fault-line described earlier. In addition, several states have long-term visions of what they would like to be, and these visions can only come to fruition at the expense of another

⁴⁸v. P. Lukin, "The USSR and the Asia-Pacific Region," in *Adelphi Paper 248: The Strategic Implications of Change in the Soviet Union, Part II*, (London: IISS, 1989/90), p 23.

⁴⁹G. H. Jansen, *Militant Islam*, p 121.

actor in the region. "Greater Mauritania" envisions, for example, inclusion of Western Sahara into current Mauritania. Accomplishment of "Greater Mauritania" would likewise preclude Algeria's long-sought goal, indirect access to the Atlantic.⁵⁰

In black Africa, tribal violence flares periodically though not frequently. In the Horn, Ethiopia and Somalia remain trouble spots, though their war may de-escalate if Soviet and Cuban assistance is reduced. In general, much of black Africa is heavily influenced by France and a significant French presence in the region--over 200,000 technical assistants in addition to the military⁵¹--which produces a certain stability. The French commitment in the region has been fairly consistent, and there are no indications of an impending reduction of it. Thus, relative stability should remain for the near-term at least.

The Southern portion of Africa, in contrast, finds itself in a significant transition. Namibian independence, the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola and the expected settlement of that war, Cuban and Soviet disengagement from the region and the growing momentum for change in South Africa itself could combine in any number of unpredictable ways. With so much change on-going, the danger of unintended consequences may increase. While the possible out-comes are too numerous for thorough examination, a conservative conclusion would be that the area will remain volatile for some time to come.

From the current vantage point, reaching a net assessment of the global security environment requires extreme caution. The

⁵⁰Gerard Chaliand and Jean-Pierre Rageau, *A Strategic Atlas*, p 106.

⁵¹Ibid, pp 108-09.

world is at the beginning of a transitional era, in which all of the consequences of the redistribution of global power have not yet emerged, and in which a new global equilibrium has not been established completely; there could, therefore, be surprises. There is, also, an unavoidable tendency to forecast the future in the image of the past.⁵² With these limitations in mind, the foregoing analysis suggests that the new security environment will facilitate cooperation better than the era of cold war.

At system-level, all of the major powers (the United States, Soviet Union, China, Japan and United Germany) stand to gain from cooperation. There are technical and economic benefits for all, as well as potential assistance with pressing domestic programs. Moreover, the shift from a Euro- to an Asian-centric world does not represent a loss for the West. It means that history has entered a new epoch in which the center of productive activity has moved. In the interdependent world of 2000, however, the benefits of progress will be widely available within the developed world.

At regional level, Europe and much of Asia will likely find improvements in cooperation and security. The Middle East, Central and South America, and portions of Africa will continue to find many of their internal conflicts unresolved. In broadest terms, though, there are no indicators to suggest that regional security and stability will deteriorate significantly from the present conditions, except perhaps, in South Africa.

Alliances, Coalitions and Security Guarantees. Cooperative international relations in the emerging global security

⁵²Daniel Bell, "The World and the United States in 2013," pp 2, 3.

environment will not simply materialize. The nations of the world will need a variety of institutions and mechanisms in which they can operate and with which they can resolve problems and disputes as they arise. Moreover, because the memory of recent history makes it impossible for some nations to deal with others dispassionately and fosters a tradition of enmity between some actors, security considerations still count in even the most pacific regions. Each region of the world will need two kinds of institutions and mechanisms with which to maintain international relations: economic instruments for cooperation and political-military instruments for security.

Economic Institutions. As Gilpin observed, the distribution of technical, industrial and financial activities around the world has become increasingly politicized.⁵³ The key to effective regional economic institutions, then, is to construct them in such a way that they provide rules for determining what the internal distribution of economic activity will be. The institutions thus become a mechanism for creating regional political consensus on economic issues: i.e., cooperation. Several different kinds of economic institutions might be possible.

Regional development banks, supported by multi-national funding, seem promising. The objectives of the banks would include economic development, especially diversification of individual state economies to prevent their remaining dependent upon a single crop or export. In some regions, debt management would be the immediate objective, while in others industrialization might be the priority. Overall, the objective would be to develop the economic infrastructure to

⁵³Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, p 64.

the point where all regional actors have mutually-supporting economic roles but with enough redundancy of capabilities to off-set the increased vulnerability that results from interdependence. In other words, the regional economy would be flexible and resilient enough to withstand dips in the fortunes of member states.

Another institution would be similar to the European Community. At one level, it would function as a customs union to regulate intra-community trade; at another level, it would serve to coordinate the macroeconomic policies of the members to avoid the conflicts that result from autonomous decision-making in a highly interdependent system.⁵⁴ Ideally, it would be possible to agree to the regional distribution of labor-- which countries provide what services and which countries produce what commodities.

In some regions, the community's biggest task would be to integrate the economies of the less developed states with those of the more developed states in the region. This activity would be crucial to avoid the less developed states becoming economic colonies of the more developed states and to develop fully the weaker states so that they ultimately contribute as much to the regional community as they extract from it.

Security Institutions. There seem to be three viable types of security institutions available: alliances, collective security pacts, and security regimes as described in chapter one. Alliances are appropriate in regions where the threat of hostilities is significant and regional powers are able to

⁵⁴Ibid, pp 117, 262. Coordination of macroeconomic policy will keep competition among states and MNCs within reasonable bounds.

align against a common adversary. Collective security under UN auspices may be appropriate when local cooperation to form a regional alliance is absent. Security regimes are appropriate in regions where the threat is remote and security issues are not the first priority.

One traditional approach to security that is of uncertain value is the security guarantee. In such an arrangement, one nation guarantees the security of another by promising military assistance in the event the other party is attacked. Such guarantees stand distinct from normal alliances because the benefit from the relationship is one-sided. The guaranteed party gains more, at least in the short run, than the guarantor. Historically, such guarantees have produced poor results. Such guarantees contributed to the beginning of the First World War, and to the Munich compromise on Czechoslovakia in 1938. Moreover, there are often practical problems in acting on a security guarantee, as both France and Britain found out. How could they effectively support either Czechoslovakia or Poland, since Nazi Germany lay between them? On the basis of history and practicality, security guarantees seem problematic at best. If a security guarantee is perceived as an alliance with unequal burden-sharing, it is still unattractive, though it sometimes still occurs, e.g., the U.S. guarantees of Japan and Taiwan.

Returning to consideration of alliances and security regimes, one might ask, why not just reduce all military forces to minimum defense level. Where no state could expect to attack any other state successfully?⁵⁵ First, major powers may have alliance commitments beyond their borders, in regions where

⁵⁵Alice M. Rivlin has made just this proposal as a step in re-shaping Europe. See Alice M. Rivlin, "New World, New Dangers," *The Washington Post*, April 10, 1990, sec. 1., p A23.

security issues rather than economic cooperation predominate. The military capability necessary to fulfill these commitments would supercede minimum defense levels in their own area. Second, no matter how cooperative it becomes, the international community of nations still lacks a supranational entity with coercive power. Self-help solutions to the security dilemma thus still loom in the background.

Yet another problem is the anti-system actor, the state that wants to dispute the international equilibrium for its own purposes. Anti-system actors will not abide by the solutions produced by the cooperative and security institutions of a region. The anti-system actor seeks to disrupt these institutions. Generally, such actors abide by institutional decisions only when they further the actor's own interests. If such actors are present, the other states must have sufficient power to deal with them. Faced with such considerations, most states will favor retention of some military capability beyond mere minimums.

The United State's Role in Security and Cooperation. If regional developments unfold along lines similar to those described above, it would be probable that Europe and parts of Asia, especially North Asia, would emphasize cooperation and institutions that foster further cooperative activity, while much of the rest of the world would continue to rely on alliances and security institutions. Faced with such a future world, how should the United States array its political, economic and military instruments, and in what proportions?

Economics-Military Balance. Historically, there have been two views of the role of economics in international relations. Those with confidence in national domestic economic performance have generally placed greater emphasis on the economic role in global politics and have used economics "symmetrically" with the military instrument, i.e., taken a balanced approach. Those with less confidence in the domestic economy have placed less emphasis on economics as an international instrument and have placed correspondingly more weight on the military instrument.⁵⁶

The United States, according to Becker, has never been able to adjust its domestic economy to the international economic conditions it created after World War II. He notes that, by the late 1960s, "the heavy deficits the United States incurred to finance its expansive economic and containment policies had inexorably weakened the domestic economy and reduced its position in the international economy."⁵⁷ As a result of the poor coordination of domestic and international economic activity, the United States' use of the economic instrument in global politics during the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations suffered from domestic constraints.⁵⁸

⁵⁶The characterization of policy as symmetrical or asymmetrical appeared in John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, (New York, 1982), pp 354-57. William H. Becker reviews recent administrations' use of the economic instrument in "Containment and the National Economy" in Terry L. Deibel and John Lewis Gaddis, eds., *Containment: Concept and Policy* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1986), pp 135-60.

⁵⁷William H. Becker, "Containment and the National Economy" p 144.

⁵⁸Ibid, p 151.

Others have pointed up the difficulties in applying the economic instrument in international relations.⁵⁹ Angela Stent, examining the economic component of containment, found that the United States use of economics had three elements: economic warfare to weaken Soviet economic performance; strategic embargo to deny high technology that would promote Soviet development; and economic leverage to restrain Soviet behavior. She concluded that, despite the fact that U.S. policy could produce hardship for the Soviet Union, the policy brought mixed results at best. Stent found that even very effective measures, such as the grain embargo, were lifted in response to U.S. domestic pressures; that Congress often blocked policy adjustments proposed by the administration, limiting the policy's effectiveness; and that, since detente, America's allies did not support its economic policy toward the Soviet Union.⁶⁰

David P. Calleo has pointed to the long-term trend of steadily weakening of the United State's economic competitiveness, despite its capacity to manipulate the world monetary system. The economic sphere, like the military and political spheres, is growing increasingly plural. Thus, not only is the United States less of an economic power than it was before, it must also contend with competing centers of economic

⁵⁹Two excellent examinations of the problem are David A. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) and Klaus Knorr's examination of 35 cases in "International Economic Leverage and Its Uses," in *Economic Issues and National Security*, (Lawrence, KS: Allen Press, 1977), pp 99-126.

⁶⁰Angela Stent, "Economic Containment" in Terry L. Deibel and John Lewis Gaddis, eds., *Containment: Concept and Policy* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1986), pp 162, 170, 174.

influence, including reserves of dollars outside of the hands of central banks, e.g., "Eurodollars" and "petrodollars."⁶¹

These conditions--the relative economic decline of the United States, domestic limitations on the use of the economic instrument, and the uncertainty of the results from global economic policy--all suggest that it will not be an easy task simply to shift emphasis from the military instrument to economics--as the sanctions in the present Middle East crisis make clear. Yet the national security strategy envisions a reduction in the military and greater reliance on economics to secure the United States' objectives in the future security environment. Specifically, it notes, "As East-West tensions diminish, these political and economic instruments become more centrally relevant to an era of new challenges..." Economics are seen as key to fostering democracy, stability, economic and humanitarian development, countering drugs, terror, environmental problems and arms proliferation.⁶²

The Political Instrument. Since both the military and economic instruments will clearly be subjected to constraints and limits, the political instrument--diplomacy--will be the principal tool for the conduct of the United States' international relations. The U.S. can pursue its objectives for cooperation much as it has pursued its objectives for security: on a coalition basis. Just as the U.S. has relied on its alliances to build regional coalitions for security and containment, so it can, in the future, create coalitions to foster its cooperative interests. By making a distribution of

⁶¹David P. Calleo, *Beyond American Hegemony*, (New York: Basic Books, 1987), p 107.

⁶²*National Security Strategy of the United States*, The White House, March 1990, P 18.

labor among friends and allies for economic as well as security objectives, no state need find its economic or military capital over-taxed.

Taking such an approach, the United States would not find it necessary to commit large amounts of resources of any kind in regions where cooperation was progressing, such as in Europe and North Asia. In other regions, where an indigenous balance was possible, the United States could also commit only very limited resources, relying on its friends in the region to maintain a favorable equilibrium. Only in areas where no indigenous balance was obtainable, and where significant U.S. interests are at risk, e.g., the Persian Gulf, would the U.S. have to commit substantial resources.⁶³

A final factor in placing increased emphasis on the political instrument is that, in the post-cold war era, there are some conflicts in the Third World that the United States can afford to lose. Stripped of the U.S.-Soviet competition, some Third World conflicts have no bearing on the strategic balance in a world that is no longer strictly bipolar. Moreover, it is likely that in the long-term, even the more radical regimes will modify their stance toward the United States and the West, since the West is the sole source of the economic, industrial and technical assistance these states need in order to survive and develop.⁶⁴

⁶³David P. Calleo, *Beyond American Hegemony*, p 124.

⁶⁴Richard Feinberg and Kenneth Oye make this case in "After the Fall: U.S. Policy Toward Radical Regimes," *World Policy Journal*, 1 (Fall 1983): 201-15. Feinberg develops the argument in *The Intemperate Zone: The Third World Challenge to U.S. Foreign Policy*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1983), especially p 135.

As the United States faces the new global security environment, it will adjust the proportions of its power invested in economic, military and political power to the new requirements of its international relations. If the forecast conditions materialize, the United States should find itself relying more on its political instrument in some regions such as Europe and North Asia, where it can take a coalition approach to both security and cooperation with its friends and allies there. In other regions, Latin and South America, for example, the U.S. will find that its economic instrument is also necessary to assist friendly states. In still other regions, there will be no substitute for military power.

The Transitional Phase. The post-cold war system will develop gradually. A lengthy period of transition will be required in which the United States and other nations can move slowly from the framework of the cold war and containment into the post-cold war system. In regions where cooperation and trade are the priority, old security arrangements may be left in place for a time while the states in the region devote their energies to erecting cooperative economic mechanisms. In other cases, alliances may serve as the initial framework for promoting peaceful cooperation. NATO may be one such case.⁶⁵

⁶⁵Some argue NATO can remain the apparatus for future cooperation in Europe based upon Article Two of the North Atlantic Treaty which states "The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them." *NATO Handbook*, (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1978), p 9.

Elsewhere, for example, between Japan, Korea, China and the Soviet Union, a multilateral economic pact may be the mechanism to coordinate oil exploration and development assistance as discussed above.

During this transitional period, the United States will have the opportunity to make the adjustments in its global posture, relying relatively more on its political instrument and relatively less on its economic and military instruments. This is not to suggest that the United States will have to renounce any important treaty obligations; it may want to, or it may find it useful, to redefine some of those obligations. Such a redefinition process could likewise accommodate a period of transition, in which troops are gradually withdrawn and other adjustments to economic assistance are made.

While the transitional period will probably provide some opportunities for significant adjustments in international relations, a shift to security regimes should not be too heavily emphasized. Such structures may eventually appear, but are likely only in Europe and perhaps North Asia. The more likely development in areas where cooperation is expanding would be for security issues and the mechanisms that handle security questions simply to be subordinated to the more salient economic and trade issues. In other words, while the future global security environment may offer more cooperation than conflict in some regions, the structural manifestations of the change will be limited and will appear only gradually.

Implications for the U.S. Military. As the cases in chapter two indicated, many influences converge to shape a nation's military posture. The circumstances found in the

global security environment collectively constitute only one of these influences. As a result, it is impossible to extrapolate directly from specific changes in the global security environment to specific adjustments in the U.S. military. It is possible to see what options and alternatives for the United States' military posture are suggested by forecast global conditions, however.

Most significant, perhaps, is the end of the cold war. Without the cold war, there is no need for containment, and without containment, there is no need for a security perimeter that integrates defense of U.S. interests around the world. The U.S. can contemplate point defense of specific interests without the requirement for an over-arching and seamless defensive network. Under such conditions, the military would require fewer forward-deployed forces. With fewer forces deployed forward, it might become possible to create a central reserve of general purpose forces in the United States. As Kaufmann noted, earlier attempts were derailed as deployment to Europe and Vietnam made the necessary units unavailable, and inadequate strategic transportation was built.⁶⁶ A shortage of strategic transportation remains a problem to be dealt with, although the current transportation system has managed to move over 110,000 troops and their equipment to the Middle East and to sustain them there.

Second, collective security may be reinvigorated, depending upon the outcome of the UN-Iraq confrontation. If collective security proves to be effective in resolving regional conflicts, the U.S. military may not be required in all conflicts that threaten U.S. interests. A collective force with little or no U.S. participation, perhaps assembled from

⁶⁶William W. Kaufmann, *Planning Conventional Forces 1950-80*, pp 14-19.

states in the region, acting as the agent of the United Nations, might be sent. Certainly, there would be few circumstances involving American interests where no U.S. participation were required, but collective security may make possible a U.S. coalition warfare strategy that requires relatively fewer U.S. troop units than a unilateral action strategy would.

Third, the more effective the political, economic and other instruments of power, the less the need for U.S. military forces. In regions where security concerns are relegated to the background, no U.S. military presence would be necessary.

Fourth, no clear, Sarajevo-like events seem to be on the horizon that could plunge the United States into world war. Dangerous though they are, the regional conflicts described in this chapter are likely to have only regional military consequences (though their economic consequences may be farther-reaching). This suggests that the U.S. military no longer must maintain active forces for a worst-case global war, but should instead create forces for the most likely contingencies and regional wars. Designing a military instrument for the more limited circumstances of regional wars may offer more latitude for mixing active and reserve component forces, redistributing roles and missions, and similar adjustments.

Fifth, if collective security does not produce a satisfactory conclusion to the UN-Iraq confrontation, the U.S. military might better serve the nation's interests by configuring for unilateral action. Such a posture would require more forward facilities, equipment stockpiles and deployed forces. It might also require greater long-range

transportation, since other states might refuse the U.S. either overflight rights or use of regional facilities as intermediate staging bases.

Whether or not a coalition warfare or unilateral action strategy develops, two aspects of the future security environment will influence the U.S. military. Compared with present circumstances, there will be less need for forward-deployed forces since even unilateral point defense of American interests will probably require fewer troops than those currently deployed. Second, despite the new-found cooperation with the Soviet Union, there will likely be other adversaries, many of them with sophisticated armies of their own. Whatever adjustments the U.S. military undergoes, therefore, the forces that result must be capable of deploying quickly over great distance, and defeating the best-equipped opponent upon arrival.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE U.S. JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS

Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the former Deputy Chief of the National Security Division, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Richard Stubbings, asserted that there are two myths about the United States' national security planning. The first myth is that each administration adopts an overall national defense strategy, defines forces needed to implement it, and then totals the costs to produce its budget for national defense. The second myth is that there is a clear relationship between the defense strategy adopted and the defense program that flows from this strategy. The reality, Stubbings said, was that the military services determine preferred force and modernization programs independently of the overall defense strategy. Stubbings concluded his remarks noting: "The thing that shows up remarkably consistent, at least since 1960, is that the forces whatever our adopted strategy, the forces required to implement this strategy always tend to be the same."¹

Samuel Huntington recognized there was a "strategic pluralism" that existed, with supporters of every security concept and weapons system in Congress, competing for roles in the national defense. Huntington also noted a tendency for the

¹Senate Committee on Armed Services. "National Security Strategy." Senate Hearings 100-257, pp 364-67.

military services to play the Congress and Executive Branch of government against each other for the benefit of the service.²

Confronted with such facts, it is reasonable to ask if there is, in fact, a national-level strategic planning system, and how it works, and more importantly, how it can allow the acts described by Stubbings and Huntington. This chapter describes the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), the primary system by which the Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the individual services distribute roles and missions, determine force requirements and similar issues. The description of the Joint Strategic Planning System is drawn from the manuals used by officers on the Army Staff and Joint Staff since these manuals shape the officer's understanding of the system and guide his use of the system. Thus, these manuals are primary sources. A configurative description of the JSPS alone will not explain policy outcomes, however. Therefore, once the system has been adequately described, the chapter will examine the Army's latitude to make choices and to exercise its preferences on issues of force size, structure and equipment.

The JSPS, though a key process, does not constitute the only national-level defense process, so it must be examined in the context of the other systems with which it operates. Therefore, insofar as it is necessary to explain the JSPS, the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System and other national-level systems will be described.³

²Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier at the State*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp 18-20.

³These include the National Security Council System, the DOD Acquisition System, the Worldwide Military Command and Control System, the National Military Command System, and the joint

Finally, three different bodies of theory will be used to interpret the joint strategic planning process: interest group theory, bureaucratic politics theory, and neocorporatist theory. Just as it was necessary to view the forecast security environment through the lens of international relations theory to reach conclusions about future security requirements, it is necessary to examine the joint strategic planning process through the lens of theory to understand fully what the likelihood is that it can produce the kind of force--and specifically the Army--the United States will need in the year 2000.

The Extended Joint Strategic Planning System. The Department of Defense's Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) is the over-arching process for defense resource management and planning. Operating within the PPBS, the JSPS seeks to array the nation's military resources. More specifically, the JSPS is the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff's means of discharging his responsibility to prepare strategic plans in consonance with forecast resource levels; to assist the President in giving strategic direction to the armed forces; to review the programs of the military services and to conduct risk assessments; to state the combatant commanders' (CINCs') concerns in terms of global perspective; to set guidance and apportion resources for contingency planning; to furnish planning continuity for the strategic planning process; and to submit input to the PPBS.⁴

operational planning process.

⁴Armed Forces Staff College, *Armed Forces Staff College Publication 1* (hereinafter AFSC Pub 1), *The Joint Officer's Staff Guide 1988*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1988), p 103.

The JSPS makes use of a six year cycle, with a new cycle beginning every other year. The cycle begins with intelligence estimates of threats and risks to the national security and culminates in the budget, forces and defense posture to secure the nation from such threats. JSPS can be understood best in the framework of the documents it produces that support planning and decision making.

The JSPS begins with a publication of the *Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning (JIEP)*, which incorporates global and regional appraisals and estimates of enemy capabilities that could affect U.S. security interests. The JIEP draws on the combined resources of the national intelligence community, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence resources of the individual services.⁵

The JIEP provides the basis for the *Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD)*. Really three documents, the JSPD provides an illustrative planning scenario so that all parties to subsequent planning follow the same base-case assumptions and plan in the contest of a uniform course of events. The *Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis (JSPDSA)* volume I gives the national military objectives, strategy and planning guidance. This is based upon the last issue of *Defense Guidance*, but updated. The JSPDSA I also gives guidance to the CINCs as to their roles in responding to the illustrative planning scenario.

JSPDSA II incorporates the estimates of the CINCs in arriving at a minimum risk force. This force represents the

⁵Ibid, pp 104-5.

level of forces required to achieve the national military objectives with "virtual assurance of success."⁶

JSPDSA III produces a planning force--a force considered necessary to provide a reasonable assurance of success in executing the national military strategy. The planning force is designed after consideration of simultaneous world conflicts and allied and friendly capabilities. It is based on the minimum risk force, but also reflects service-recommended planning force levels, resource availability, industrial capacity and technological capability.⁷

The JSPD is prepared biennially and summarizes the supporting analyses from the JSPDSA volumes. The JSPD serves as a yardstick with which to measure the adequacy of the *Program Objective Memorandum (POM)*.

When a new administration takes office, the President sends the Secretary of Defense a *National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)* that outlines the President's position on the national purpose, policy, objectives, and strategy. The NSDD also contains tentative budget levels for each of the years of the programming period. The Secretary of Defense then directs the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conduct a military net assessment that will produce a recommended strategy and a range of options for the President. The JSPD and its supporting analyses normally serve as the JCS response.⁸

The Joint Chiefs of Staff forward their JSPD to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary holds a strategy and options review to consider the JCS recommendations and to formulate the Secretary of Defense's recommendations to the

⁶Ibid, p 106.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid, p 107.

President. The Secretary ultimately provides the President with an array of strategy and force package options. The President's final choices and adjustments to the national military strategy are then incorporated in the Secretary of Defense's document, the *Defense Guidance*.

The *Defense Guidance* is drafted under the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The *Defense Guidance* reflects Congressional budget data, previous editions of *Defense Guidance*, and other pertinent NSDDs. The *Defense Guidance* results from extensive staffing and coordination within and among the services, the CINCs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The military services use the *Defense Guidance* as the basis to begin developing their individual programs. The final draft of the *Defense Guidance* is reviewed by the Defense Planning Resource Board (DPRB), the JCS, and the CINCs before the Secretary of Defense signs it.⁹

The *Defense Guidance* is the link between planning and programming. It provides the military departments with planning guidance and resource constraints for development of their own POM. All programming is guided by a document called *Fiscal Forecasts and Guidance*, which is developed by the OMB and issued to the services and OSD each January. *Fiscal Forecasts and Guidance* provides information on the expected value of the dollar that allows each service to estimate the costs of the items in their respective programs and construct realistic POMs.

The CINCs in recent years have received more attention during creation of POMs. They not only submit their requirements through their parent services, but also transmit

⁹Ibid.

their highest priority requirements directly to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense through an Integrated Priority List (IPL). The services are required to explain how their POMs support needs identified by the CINCs.¹⁰

The services' POMs must conform to the strategic concepts and fiscal guidelines found in the Defense Guidance. POMs are submitted in even-numbered fiscal years, normally in April. The POMs are reviewed by the Joint Staff which assesses their overall balance and ability to fulfill the national military strategy. This review is published as the *Joint Program Assessment Memorandum* (JPAM). The JPAM represents a consolidated assessment of defense capabilities.¹¹

The Office of the Secretary of Defense reviews the JPAM and the services' POMs. If OSD differs with one of the services or prefers alternative approaches to certain issues, the matter is referred to the Defense Planning Resource Board in one of several "issue books" that organize the points of contention into nine separate issue areas: strategy and risk assessment, nuclear forces, conventional forces, modernization and investment, readiness and other logistics, manpower, intelligence, management issues, and CINC issues. Program decision memoranda announce the DPRB decisions on the various issues in question, and the service POMs are modified to reflect the DPRB guidance.¹²

The first two program years of each service's POM become its Budget Estimate Submission. These budget submissions are

¹⁰Ibid, p 108.

¹¹U.S. Army War College, *Army Command and Management: Theory and Practice*, (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1989), p 14-8.

¹²Ibid.

reviewed and consolidated by the DPRB and ultimately incorporated into the defense budget. Between September and November, OSD/OMB issue Program Budget Decisions after reviewing and revising certain programs within a service's budget submissions. Although the services have the right to dispute and reclama such decisions, the budget process rarely allows enough time for the services to reclama a Program Budget Decision successfully. The service chiefs and secretaries meet with the Secretary of Defense or his deputy on major unresolved issues.¹³

Service-Level Planning. For the U.S. Army, the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) is the "strategic management system" linked to JSPS and PPBS.¹⁴ Each of the services operates a similar system, but since the focus of this study is on the Army, it is the Army system that will be examined. Although PPBES develops and maintains the Army portion of the six year defense plan¹⁵ and defense budget, provides operations and maintenance budgets for major commands and related activities, the emphasis here is on its role in shaping Army forces and ground force strategy to meet requirements of the national military strategy.

Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) is organized into a series of committees to operate the PPBES. The most important of these is the Select Committee (SELCOM) which acts as the Army's board of directors for resource management. It is chaired by the Vice Chief of Staff and the Under Secretary

¹³Ibid, p 14-10.

¹⁴Ibid, p 14-11.

¹⁵The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 introduced two year budgets. The Five Year Defense Plan was expanded to six years to incorporate three complete budgets.

of the Army. The SELCOM may make decisions on its own or refer certain issues to the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army.¹⁶

The Strategy and Planning Committee (SPC) is headed by the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. The committee provides guidance and directs studies relating to policy, plans, force planning, international activities policy and strategy. The SPC reviews *Army Guidance Volume I (The Army Plan)* to insure that it provides clear and affordable guidance to the programmers of the Army's nine functional areas.¹⁷

The Program and Budget Committee (PBC) is co-chaired by the Director of the Army Budget and the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E). The committee provides oversight of budget and resource decisions, and recommends adjustments to the Army leadership during the programming, budgeting and execution phases of the PPBES.¹⁸

The final committee is the Prioritization Steering Group (PSG). Headed by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, the group includes important staff principals and the military deputies to the Assistant Secretaries of the Army for Financial Management and Research, Development and Acquisition. The group resolves conflicts that arise during construction of

¹⁶Ibid, p 14-12.

¹⁷The Army manages all its activities through nine functional areas: structuring, manning, training, mobilizing and deploying, providing facilities, managing information, equipping, sustaining, and managing. In some years, the Chief of Staff designates special areas. Most recently, these have included health care, space, and intelligence. HQDA, *Army Long-Range Planning Guidance*, Revised edition, July 1988, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1988), pp A4-A6.

¹⁸U.S. Army War College, *Army Command and Management: Theory and Practice*, p 14-13.

the POM involving unresourced requirements--things for which no funds have been allocated. It provides a recommendation to the SELCOM that includes a prioritized and balanced program that fits within the resource and manpower constraints imposed by OSD.

Within the structure of the committees just described, Army planning takes place in a manner very similar to that at the level of JCS and the OSD. That is, the threat is first developed by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Next, force requirements planning is conducted. Army planners attempt to translate guidance from the *Defense Guidance, Program Decision Memorandum* and *Joint Strategic Planning Document* into force structure requirements. The process of translation is supported by computer-assisted analyses known as mid-range force studies (MRFS). The first of these studies (MRFS I) produces a force model unconstrained by fiscal or other resource considerations.

During the next phase, known as objective planning, Army planners develop alternative force packages based upon the constraints and other guidance from OSD. These alternatives are presented to the SPC for consideration. The force package selected becomes the "objective force" that appears in the next draft edition of *The Army Plan*. This document is reviewed at the annual commanders conference, where modifications are made. The objective force then serves as the guide to mid- and long-range force levels in the POM.¹⁹

Force modernization and equipment procurement is managed through the *Long Range Research and Development Acquisition Plan* (LRRDAP). The Army's large research and development community, which includes the major commands, Army Material

¹⁹Ibid, p 14-14.

Command and the Training and Doctrine Command, among others, develops the LRRDAP to respond to weaknesses in the Battlefield Development Plan.²⁰ The Battlefield Development Plan is essentially a detailed description of modern combat that considers equipment needs across the spectrum of conflict from low-intensity conflict to high-intensity, nuclear and combined-arms mechanized warfare. Requirements from the LRRDAP are incorporated in the POM.

Below the level of the JSPS, where decisions on the basic shape of the U.S. military are made, e.g., how many divisions and tactical air wings there should be, the services work on what might be called the operational aspects of the force. In the Army, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) develops the Army's doctrine, tactics and techniques for modern combat. While the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth works on advanced warfighting concepts like "AirLand Battle Future" and "Army 21," TRADOC headquarters, in association with its infantry, armor, and artillery centers (as well as the centers for combat support and service support) develop notions of how each element and arm of the Army should operate. It is TRADOC that recommends how units should be trained, organized and employed in combat.

The Breadth of Choices. Structurally, the extended strategic planning system seems sound. It appears to offer a process with clear transmission channels, carrying information up and down the organizational hierarchy of the defense establishment, from the national policy level NSDDs to the individual services and their POMs. The various committees, with representation

²⁰Ibid, p 14-15.

from throughout the official defense community, would seem to provide a series of fora for virtually all opinions and outlooks to be given due consideration.

But structure alone does not necessarily make an effective system. The real issue is latitude in making strategic choices and how well the national strategic planning system provides for the pursuit of innovative approaches to national security. Put another way, the test of the nation's strategic planning system at service level is its ability to provide a variety of answers to the following questions: Where should Army forces be stationed? What kind of forces, equipped in what way, should the Army have? How should Army forces be employed in combat?

As Richard Stubbings noted, since 1960, there have been few really different answers to these questions.²¹ In other words, choices have been constrained somehow. Each administration has followed in the footsteps of its predecessor. As former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger observed, strategy is inherited by a president. The president also inherits certain forces and their deployments, and strategic goals; he is able to make prudent changes in any of these realms only at the margins. Significant change in the U.S. strategic position can only come, Schlesinger asserted, through major changes in the international scene.²²

During the Cold War, at least, there was little latitude for change. Forces in Europe, Korea and elsewhere had to remain

²¹For a comparison that points up the similarities between the Carter and Reagan Administrations, for example, see John A. Williams, "Defense Planning: The Carter-Reagan Record," *Washington Quarterly*, 6 (autumn 1983): 77-92.

²²Remarks before the Senate Armed Services Committee 14 January 1987 as reported in Senate Committee on Armed Services, "National Security Strategy," Senate Hearings 100-257, p 231.

for reasons of deterrence and reassurance²³ as well as by dint of agreements made with allies, such as the guarantee of ten divisions in ten days to Europe in the event of war with the Warsaw Pact. Indeed, President Carter found he could not prudently withdraw the remaining U.S. ground forces from Korea, despite his desire to do so.

More recently, other obstacles to change have appeared as well. During staffing of the 1987 *Army Long-Range Planning Guidance*, all mention of potential troop reductions in Europe was removed at the direction of Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, who feared that any contemplation of such reductions might create a "self-fulfilling prophecy," despite the fact that the Conventional Force Reductions in Europe (CFE) mandate talks were already well under way.²⁴

Procedural weaknesses of the strategic planning system also limit choices. Some of the most important such weaknesses are the reliance on Mid-Range Force Studies (MRFS) and other computer-assisted modelling efforts--"wargames"--to analyze certain aspects of force design and operational concepts; the cyclic nature of the strategic planning process; and the demand for consensus among members of the strategic planning community.

Computer simulations, when used to examine force structure and operational concepts, tend to focus on weapons and their effects on the battlefield. This focus results from the nature of the simulations and their dependence upon attrition

²³Michael Howard, "Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s," *Foreign Affairs* 61 (Winter 1982-83): 310.

²⁴Author's personal experience. The Secretary's concern was probably well-grounded. See Rick Maze, "Did merely explaining 25 percent cut turn it into reality?" *Army Times*, 9 July 1990, p 3. The article examines how mere discussion of a similar action, a budget cut, made it occur.

coefficients as the basis for measures of unit effectiveness. Certain times, weapons effectiveness must be estimated since the weapons considered in the simulation have not yet been built. Optimistic assessments of effectiveness can therefore bias the results.²⁵

Moreover, even if all measures of effectiveness are very conservatively assessed or based upon field tests, the results of the simulation are opaque; it is not always clear what attributes in the force or its operations during the simulation contribute most to the final outcome. The results of such simulations are often portrayed on video tape, illustrating the position of the FLOT--front line of own troops--after certain periods of time have elapsed. In an analysis of war in Central Europe, a FLC^m closer to the inter-German border would typically indicate a more effective force package than a FLOT deeper in West German territory, for example. Thus it is also difficult for those who are not extremely familiar with the simulation to understand fully its results.

Finally, larger modelling attempts are very difficult. Algorithms that have been empirically tested and that have worked well at lower level simulations sometimes do not aggregate well at theater warfare level, and skew results.²⁶

Even if modelling were more perfect than it is, its orientation toward hardware and its inability to simulate and evaluate the relative benefits of different approaches to

²⁵The comments in this portion of the chapter necessarily emphasize the shortcomings of military modelling. For a more complete picture, see Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., ed., *Military Modelling*, (Washington, DC: The Military Operations Research Society, 1986).

²⁶Interview 29 March 1990 with COL Daniel M. Evans, U.S. Army retired, formerly director of modelling at the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency.

warfare (in the grossest of terms, attrition vs relational maneuver), tends to draw attention to hardware solutions to military problems. That is, since the simulations are best at measuring the effects of introducing new or more weapons of various types into the force structure, they tend to lead decisionmakers to solutions that involve adding more or new weapons, rather than toward other alternatives. The computer approach emphasizes technical and hardware solutions to military problems because it cannot simulate military art--maneuver, leadership, tactical adroitness, bravery and the like.

The cyclic nature of the planning process is also a significant functional weakness. Attention throughout the Army staff, as well as within the Joint staff and DOD focuses on the biennial "battle of the budget" and the continuous process of updating Defense Guidance, and refining the POM. This process provides no room for major transitions. Change is incremental, and limited by what can be accomplished within the timeframes allowed by JSPS, PPBS and the Army's own PPBES procedures. As a result, there is no time to stop and make significant re-evaluations; updates of existing programs must suffice. This process leaves no room for the comprehensive review and redistribution of service roles and missions that might be advisable periodically to account for changes in the security environment and to take advantage of new developments and capabilities.

"Consensus is nothing but polished mediocrity" as an anonymous Army staff officer once noted. Nevertheless, the requirement for consensus has an important influence on the strategic planning process. The reason for the importance of

consensus lies in part with the relationship between the services and the CINCs, or combatant commanders in the field. Considering the Army case, the Chief of Staff of the Army does not command the CINCs, even where these officers are Army generals. The chain of command runs from the CINCs to the Secretary of Defense. However, the Army involves the CINCs in its PPBES as described above and is tasked to provide forces to the CINCs. Thus the Army and the CINCs must cooperate in fulfilling their respective responsibilities.²⁷

Likewise, within the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Army Chief of Staff operates in a collegial relationship with the chiefs of the other services. Consensus and compromise are essential in such an environment, even now that the Chairman has greater power and is more than "first among equals."

Even within the Army staff itself, there is great need for consensus. The committee system examined earlier in this chapter illustrates how senior officials operate, requiring group decisions, though in most cases there is no formal vote. When an issue is on the agenda of the Strategy and Planning Committee, for example, it will have been previously discussed before a "council of colonels." The colonels involved are the division chiefs within the Army staff that have responsibility for some aspect of the issue. They will attempt to forge a common position on the issue that can be recommended to the SPC. If the colonels are unable to reach an agreement, the members of the SPC will discuss the issue through "back

²⁷The CINCs exert strong pressure on the services for support. The pressure on the Army to re-orient force development more toward the CINCs was so great that the Army staff created a working group to document all the actions taken to support the CINCs and to be more responsive to their needs. HQDA, DAMO-FDW Information Memorandum, "After Action Report, Warfighting CINCs Work Group," 1 July 1988.

channels" in order to reach a tentative agreement before their formal meeting.²⁸

In any event, the result of the committee and working group orientation of the Army staff is that most of the issues produce "mainstream positions." These positions naturally tend to include the needs of all the participants from the staff and therefore cannot be extremely innovative or daring, since to do so would disrupt the extant distribution of roles, missions and responsibilities.

Ultimately, the need for consensus produces a compromise force structure. The CINCs want warfighting forces, normally armor and mechanized forces, that will defeat the type of adversaries the CINCs face. On the other hand, the Army staff wants forces that will fulfill the requirements of the Defense Guidance, which generally calls on the Army to provide flexible forces in a mix of heavy, light and special operations forces appropriate for global conventional deterrence.²⁹ This desire for different types of forces became most pronounced at the 1987 Autumn Commanders Conference which met at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The Army was in the process of fielding five new light infantry divisions, and the CINCs were asked how many they wanted earmarked for their respective regions. CINCUSAREUR (Commander-in-chief, U.S. Army Europe) indicated he might have use for one. The other CINCs were silent.³⁰ In other words, the CINCs did not want the forces the Army was building. As a result of differing demands, the

²⁸Based on the author's experience while assigned to the Strategy, Plans and Policy Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, HQDA.

²⁹HQDA, *Army Long-Range Planning Guidance*, Revised edition, July 1988, p 3.

³⁰As reported by a senior official who was present. Eventually, the other CINCs accepted some light units.

Army fielded heavy forces for the CINCs and light forces for deterrence and contingencies rather than a more coherent force structure.

There is perhaps another perspective on consensus that is worthwhile. The consensus on force structure, i.e., producing some of what all constituents want, may be interpreted as the linkage between political requirements and military-technical requirements. That is, the policy determinations that produce NSDDs and Defense Guidance, and that guide the individual service secretaries are inherently political in nature, reflecting the administration's political preferences for providing national security. Within the Army staff and at the level of the individual CINCs, the processes that yield The Army Plan, POM and budget submissions reflect the military-technical considerations, which attempt to create the most effective forces possible for the threats the nation faces. The consensus building that results in the final force package represents the fusion of policy and technical considerations.³¹

Illustrative Cases. The foregoing description of the strategic planning system has focused on organizational process and may therefore be too sterile to impart a true sense of how the system works. That is, while it documents the formal procedures for developing the overall structure of the national military instrument, it does not show how the actors within the defense establishment actually work, compromise and resolve disputes. Three cases are presented to overcome this

³¹Alain Enthoven would dispute this analysis, arguing that there are no purely military or technical issues. Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program 1961-1969*, p 82.

sterility: one that examines two services' ability to work together on a common problem that has doctrinal, organizational and force structure implications; one that examines the Army's ability to respond to portions of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act, and another that examines the Army's ability to identify change and to respond to it. These cases are not intended as conclusive evidence as to how all strategic planning is conducted, but are meant to illustrate the kinds of difficulties that constrain the operation of the strategic planning system.

The first case involves close air support (CAS): the aerial delivery of fire on enemy troops in close proximity to friendly forces. The Air Force (or its ancestor, the Army Air Corps) has provided CAS in support of Army ground forces since World War I. JCS Pub 2 assigns the mission of providing CAS to the Air Force, but the exact requirements for CAS derive from the Army's doctrine.³² The Army's current doctrine, known as "AirLand Battle," places heavy emphasis on CAS and its counterpart mission, battlefield air interdiction (BAI), which provides air support against targets at a greater range.³³

The Air Force, however, while carefully guarding the CAS mission as its exclusive domain,³⁴ accorded much less emphasis

³²Joint Chiefs of Staff, *JCS Pub 2: Unified Action Armed Forces*, p 2-12. See also U.S. General Accounting Office Report GAO/NSIAD-88-211, *Close Air Support*, (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 1988), p 2 for a description of the relationship between aircraft requirements and Army air support requirements.

³³U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, indicates air support is crucial in the conduct of two battles that are fought simultaneously: the near battle at the line of contact with enemy forces, and the deep battle, to prevent the enemy from reinforcing or exploiting his successes in the near battle.

to CAS than the Army. CAS is the fourth priority mission for the Air Force listed in JCS Pub 2, and is placed at the bottom of the list of air combat operations priorities in more public statements.³⁵ The Air Force's preferred missions include gaining and maintaining general air superiority, defeating enemy air forces, and controlling vital air areas--in other words, manned, aerial combat.³⁶

By the mid-1970s, it was becoming clear that the A10, the primary CAS aircraft, would not be effective in the expected combat environment of the 1990s. This was so because the Soviet Union had become increasingly sophisticated in battlefield air defense, raising the risk for low, slow-flying aircraft like the A10, and because the Soviet ground forces were training in conducting continuous operations, i.e., at night and in bad weather. The A10 had no night capability and was not an "all weather" aircraft, either.

Air Force consideration of replacement aircraft for the A10 was influenced by Air Force tradition, internal culture, and the reform movement as well as by Army requirements. The Air Force as an institution favored complex, high-technology aircraft with multiple capabilities, while the reform movement argued for simpler aircraft, which they believed would provide better availability rates and reduce maintenance--even if it meant giving up night and foul weather flying. The Army

³⁴To the point that in the late 1950s, when the Army was experimenting with armed helicopters as a source of responsive ground support, the Air Force objected, claiming armed helicopters impinged on its JCS-mandated CAS mission. Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, *History of Army Aviation*, (Fort Monroe: HQ TRADOC, 1976), p 115.

³⁵See for example, Department of the Air Force, *Doctrine Information Publication Number 2*, November 1980, p 10.

³⁶*Ibid.*

required only that the new aircraft have night and bad weather capabilities but did not otherwise enter the debate.³⁷

While its internal debate on the next CAS aircraft continued, the Air Force went ahead and began reconfiguring some of its A10s for the mission of forward air controller, thus reducing the availability of CAS aircraft even before a successor design was found.³⁸ The Army, despite its interest in CAS, was unsuccessful at helping to resolve the debate.³⁹

The Air Force eventually proposed a program that would consider a modified F16, to be called the A16 in its CAS configuration, and modification of A7 aircraft in the Air National Guard for the CAS role. Neither OSD nor the Congress was satisfied with this proposal. Both the Senate and House Armed Services Committees noted that the

Air Force has devoted insufficient attention to the area of modernizing close air support. The Air force has programmed to spend some \$13 billion to develop a new generation of air to air fighter, but has budgeted

³⁷The internal debate on CAS requirements is fully explained in Walter Kross, *Military Reform: The High-Tech Debate in Tactical Air Forces*, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985), pp 84-89, 141-49. Army conventional wisdom on CAS prefers A10s over other aircraft since they carry more fuel and larger ordnance loads, allowing them to stay in the target area for longer periods and to strike multiple targets. More high-performance aircraft tend to lack "station time" and cannot carry the mix of ordnance the A10 can. The Army may have preferred an A10 upgraded for night and bad weather over the Air Force-preferred alternatives.

³⁸U.S. General Accounting Office Report GAO/NSIAD-88-211, *Close Air Support*, p 10.

³⁹Even though the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force, in an effort to resolve the CAS problem, signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Joint Force Development in 1984.

virtually nothing to develop a new generation replacement aircraft for close air support.⁴⁰

Similarly, OSD did not accept the quick-fix approach based upon consideration of only two existing aircraft and ordered a wider study. Subsequently, the Air Force did investigate other aircraft, including similarities between Air Force and Marine Corps requirements and consideration of the AV8B Harrier.⁴¹ Nevertheless, to date no clear successor to the A10 has emerged.

This illustrative case points up several significant characteristics about the strategic planning system. First, the Air Force's ability to consider all available options was constrained by institutional preferences. The place CAS held in the Air Force culture was such that CAS issues did not get the attention that would have been given to more highly-regarded missions. The importance of CAS to a sister service apparently made little impact upon the way the Air Force sought to deal with the successor aircraft question. Second, the statutory relationship between the Army and Air Force on CAS issues did not enable the Army either to assist the Air Force in selecting a new aircraft or to force the Air Force to meet Army CAS requirements in a timely fashion. Even a memorandum of understanding between the chiefs of staff could not pave the bureaucratic road to a sound, mutually agreeable solution. Third, it took congressional interest and the threat of intervention along with direct action from OSD to cause the

⁴⁰Ibid, p 11.

⁴¹U.S. General Accounting Office Report GAO/NSIAD-89-218, *Close Air Support. Comparison of Air Force and Marine Corps Requirements and Aircraft*, (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 1989), p 4.

Air Force to consider the broader field of options. Formalized procedures could not produce cooperation on an important issue. Oversight and intervention from above the services was required to produce any results. Finally, it should be noted that there will be no new CAS aircraft by 1993 as originally planned. In other words, despite the procedures, organization and processes of the strategic planning system, and intervention by other influential actors, the system has not produced the required aircraft for the needs of the greater defense establishment.

The next case, the Army's response to Title V of the Goldwater-Nichols 1986 Defense Reorganization Act, while not specifically a part of the strategic planning system, nevertheless influenced the workings of that system. The redistribution of functions within Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), which will be discussed below, had implications for the Headquarter's ability to make force structure and other key decisions within the strategic planning system. Moreover, the way the Army sought to implement the requirements of the Act provides insights into the amount of flexibility and adaptability the Headquarters has--factors that are also crucial to its ability to innovate in the realm of strategy and force design.

Title V of the Act required two major changes in HQDA. First, it required that functions of acquisition, auditing, comptroller, information management, the inspector general, legislative liaison, public affairs, and most research and development activities be moved from the Army staff to the Secretary of the Army's staff--the Secretariat.⁴² This was no superficial change. It meant that each of these critical

⁴²Section 501, U.S. Public Law 99-433.

functions were conducted under the guidance and supervision of a principally civilian staff. These functions would no longer be under the purview of the Chief of Staff of the Army, whose task it was (and remains) to provide forces for the combatant commands. The reorganization thus added distance between the military leadership in the Headquarters and key questions of what to acquire for future forces, what technologies to pursue and develop, and similar issues relevant to managing force development.

The second significant feature of Title V was a requirement to reduce HQDA manpower by 15 percent, including a 15 percent reduction in general officers. The intent was to reduce duplication of effort.⁴³

John O. Marsh, Jr., Secretary of the Army, formed an Army Steering Group to determine the best way to comply with the Act. Considering Title V, the group acknowledged observations made by Tom Peters and Elliott Jacques, two civilian experts on large organizations, that "it is an almost universal disease of bureaucratic systems that they have too many levels of organization" and "It appears to us that there is only one crucial concomitant to the excellent company's simple structural form: lean staff, especially at the corporate level."⁴⁴

The Army Steering Group proposed five options for meeting the requirements of the Act and for producing a "lean staff" in the process. First was to eliminate the overlap of functions

⁴³Ibid. House Armed Services Committee Hearings No. 100-34, *DOD Reorganization Implementation*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1988), pp 1, 2 elaborate on the original rationale behind the provisions of the Act.

⁴⁴Cited in the Army Steering Group's briefing to the Director of the Army Staff, 18 September 1986. HQDA, DAMO-SSP staff papers, "DOD Reorganization Act General, 1986," Tab H.

within the Army staff. This would mean re-alignment of functions within the existing organization. The second option was a 15 percent "salami slice"--by which the group meant decrementing all staff elements equally, regardless of the relative importance of their functions. Third was to eliminate functions, tasks and organizations within the Headquarters. This option did not mean that the eliminated features would cease to exist; most would be relocated to other agencies, such as local field operating agencies, other major commands and the like. The next option was to increase productivity and efficiency, which to the group meant to import technology to improve communications and reduce time lost to coordination and staffing activities. They envisioned a "smart building" with all offices computer-linked. The final option was to produce a new organization along optimal lines for the functions to be performed.⁴⁵

Despite some innovative ideas as to how the Headquarters might reorganize, the Steering Group recognized many of the obstacles and objections that detracted from each option. It cautioned the Director of the Army Staff that eliminating functional overlap would spark "turf battles" as staff sections struggled to preserve their roles in current functions. Increasing productivity and efficiency, though very attractive, was finally discounted when the Steering Group could not show where it would support the mandated 15 percent personnel reductions. An equally significant problem associated with this option was a lack of officers with knowledge of how the Army really works, implying an expensive educational program would be required to make the option possible. The final option, a major realignment and reorganization, was discounted

⁴⁵Ibid.

because of the problems in doing it. It was feared it would confuse the major subordinate commands, create tremendous turbulence within the Headquarters itself, and that it would be difficult to coordinate.⁴⁶

By the time Secretary Marsh returned to Congress to testify on Army progress in implementing the provisions of the Act, the Army had met all the requirements of Title V. Its methods, however, involved little of the innovation sought by the Army Steering Group. The functions that were required to be transferred to the Secretariat were duly transferred. In most cases, the offices formerly assigned to the Army staff were simply moved to the Secretariat.⁴⁷ On issues of manpower and reduction of duplication of effort, the Secretary testified that HQDA had been reduced from 3,653 to 3,105 personnel. Only 163 of these were removed in eliminating duplication of effort, however. The Headquarters was actually reduced by three percent, while 351 jobs were transferred to other Army agencies.⁴⁸

The Army response to Title V of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act was a good faith effort; nevertheless, as the foregoing narrative of the Army's actions makes clear, there was little the service could do beyond meeting the minimum requirements of the Act. There are a number of reasons for this. First, HQDA contains by dint of its size and complexity, a certain amount of inertia. A gradual, incremental approach to change is necessary under such conditions. This inertia resulted in part because the

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Statement of Secretary John O. Marsh Jr., in the House Armed Services Committee Hearings No. 100-34, DOD Reorganization Implementation, pp 458, 460.

⁴⁸Ibid, p 455.

Headquarters continued to have operational responsibilities. It could not cease operations, reorganize and then continue its missions. Even the members of the Army Steering Group, senior military officials accustomed to performing multiple, complex tasks simultaneously, were daunted at the prospect of undertaking a major change concurrently with the press of daily business.

In addition, "turf battles" are real. They normally result from the sincere belief on the part of the incumbents that their contributions to various functions are important and make a difference. They are therefore loath to give them up.⁴⁹

Second, the Army did not get a "lean staff" from the reorganization, but this must be seen in perspective. Since the reorganization did not produce a comprehensive streamlining of the entire defense establishment, there remain multiple layers of bureaucracy above the individual services. Thus, even if the Army had been able to take more innovative steps in restructuring its Headquarters, it and the other services would still have had to contend with an extended bureaucracy. Under such circumstances, it is open to question how influential the Army changes could have been.

Finally, the movement of key functions from the Army staff to the Secretariat is indicative of the kinds of major change that can be made in a large bureaucratic organization. This change is undoubtedly the most significant readjustment to HQDA under Title V, and it was directed by the Congress. The point is, the specific change had to be directed from outside the

⁴⁹Edward N. Luttwak has made a less charitable assessment of their motives in *The Pentagon and the Art of War*, p 268. In the author's 20 years of military experience, however, careerism and office politics have rarely seemed to be key determinants of officer behavior.

defense establishment. Although this does not necessarily mean that all significant change must be directed from the outside, it strongly suggests that this is the case.

The direct implications of the Defense Reorganization Act for the strategic planning system include two main points. First, the movement of key functions to the Secretariat, especially those of acquisition, comptroller, and research and development, was probably for the better. By moving these functions to the Secretariat, they can consider a wider variety of options, political as well as military. At the Army staff level, which tends, as noted earlier, to concentrate on the military-technical issues of fitting means to ends in fulfilling requirements of the national military strategy, issues of acquisition, and research and development were probably constrained by this narrower military-technical outlook. Located in the Secretariat, they can now consider policy options as well as technical options. In other words, they are now located where they can better consider the political preferences that come to play in the national military strategy. This part of the reorganization therefore constitutes an improvement in the strategic planning system.

Second, the Army's inability to be innovative and its preference for business-as-usual, evidenced by its approach to reducing the staff 15 percent, bodes ill for the strategic planning system. Although it is clear that the Army staff analyzed its options for streamlining itself carefully, the senior leadership nevertheless passed up a significant opportunity to make potentially important improvements, settling instead for minor adjustments. While certainly the Army staff had to consider its operational responsibilities,

the fact remains that the conditions for change were optimal. The nation was not at war, defense spending was still on the up-swing, providing funding levels unmatched since the end of the Vietnam war, and the Army had the opportunity to redress many of the ills it had been criticized for.⁵⁰ If the senior leadership could not bring itself to undertake a comprehensive reorganization with a Congressional charter to do so, with relative stability in the security environment, and with abundant funding, when would it ever? If the senior leadership behaved so cautiously when considering a peacetime, administrative change, how can the nation expect imagination and flexibility when confronting higher risk questions of strategy?

The final case for examination is that of the *Army Long-Range Planning Guidance* (ALRPG). The ALRPG is significant because it illustrates one service's ability to anticipate future military requirements and operational conditions. This ability to anticipate and to plan for the future has clear implications for the effectiveness of the strategic planning system as well. The more effective a service is in planning for the future, the more effective it is likely to be in producing appropriate forces for that future environment.

The project of writing the planning guidance began in July, 1987. As its cover memorandum from the Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Army indicates:

The Army Long-Range Planning Guidance is the lead document in the Long-Range Planning System. It provides direction for the future, establishes guidance for preparing future concepts and long-range plans, and lays out a common

⁵⁰Indeed, the military reform movement was at its height, producing critical books almost continually.

perspective for decisionmaking. This guidance is intended to enable us to shape the future Army and ensure our resources are used to field the best possible land force for the United States.⁵¹

Within HQDA, a long-range planning working group had responsibility for production of the ALRPG. The working group was chaired by the Strategy, Plans and Policy Division Chief, from the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS). The members of the group came from each of the nine functional areas found on the Army staff and the three special areas. The working group members had responsibility to draft a portion of the ALRPG appropriate for each member's respective functional area and to get the text approved by the functional area managers.⁵² Once a complete draft had been assembled in accordance with the outline agreed to by the working group as a whole, the ALRPG was to be staffed and approved through both the Army staff and the Secretariat. After approval, the document was to be issued Army-wide for guidance to the field.

The staffing, coordination and approval process proved to be the ALRPG's undoing. The principals of the Army staff, lieutenant generals, were eventually satisfied with the content of the document. The Secretariat continued to raise objection after objection as each successive draft was presented. Moreover, in an attempt to mollify the critics in the Secretariat, each successive draft became more general in

⁵¹Army Long-Range Planning Guidance, p i.

⁵²HQDA, DAMO-SSL Memorandum, Subject: Long-Range Planning Working Group, 6 July 1987.

nature, with fewer specific notions of what future conditions and circumstances might hold for the Army.⁵³

As of this writing, no approved edition of the ALRPG has been issued. A number of draft editions have been circulated internally in HQDA, but the staffing, coordination and approval process has yet to yield an approved edition, despite the fact that three years have been invested in the project.

The ALRPG experience seems to reinforce impressions from the other cases, that the extended bureaucracy finds it very difficult to handle issues that are mildly controversial or that bring with them moderate risk. This conclusion suggests that the current strategic planning system would have severe difficulties in dealing with an issue that was very controversial, or included great risk--especially if it had to respond within limited timeframes. But closer examination of what happened to the ALRPG highlights again the fissure that seems to exist in HQDA between policy issues and military-technical issues. It was the Secretariat, dealing with policy questions, that could not be satisfied by the draft editions of the ALRPG, which was written principally by members of the Army staff: people engaged primarily in military-technical areas. While it is beyond the scope of this study to speculate about the full extent of the policy/military-technical fissure that seems to exist, it is nonetheless noteworthy that the Army staff and Secretariat are not more tightly integrated than they appear to be. The point then, is that a strategic planning system in which all options, policy and military-technical, are not dealt with collectively will not operate optimally.

⁵³Interview, HQDA, DAMO-SSP official, 13 March 1990. The official must remain anonymous since he is still on the Army staff.

Impeded by a complex bureaucracy and by disputes between a Secretariat with policy concerns and an Army staff with military-technical concerns, the present system cannot be expected to produce inspired solutions to the nation's strategic requirements.

How can the performance of the strategic planning system be summarized? It seems marginal at best. It is marginal because it seeks to deliver a single set of military forces that can satisfy at least four different sets of expectations. The president wants a mix of military capabilities within certain cost parameters; the congress wants the same thing, though it has generally preferred a smaller force and lower cost than the president. The JCS and the military services want to preserve their traditional roles and methods of operation⁵⁴ while fulfilling the requirements of the Defense Guidance and NSDD. Finally, the CINCs want forces designed to win wars in their theaters of operations.

Since no single set of forces can satisfy all four groups completely, a compromise emerges that delivers some of forces in line with each group's expectations. The president does not get the entire budget he wants for defense, but nevertheless gets a mix of forces with the flexibility for employment across the spectrum of conflict. Congress appropriates more for defense than it might prefer, but manages to place some constraints on the president's original request, although questions of a strategy-force mismatch endure. The services preserve what they see as their roles in national defense, but

⁵⁴Carl H. Builder, *The Army in the Strategic Planning Process: Who Shall Bell the Cat?* p 19. Builder goes farther than Edward N. Luttwak on the strength of service preferences, asserting that each service has its own institutional strategy that guides its approach to meeting its responsibilities.

face pressure from congress and the CINCs to provide the "right" forces. The CINCs receive some forces designed for warfare in their theaters of operations, but not as many as the CINCs believe they need.

During the Cold War, when as Schlesinger noted, only marginal changes were prudent, the strategic planning process was adequate. Except in the immediate aftermath of the Korean War, it provided for small, incremental adjustments without ever endangering the fundamental distribution of roles and missions among the services, the policy of containment, or the principle of forward deployment of forces, i.e., world-wide basing.

Since the end of the Cold War, however, as noted in chapter one, a multitude of forces are at work in the world that may make--and indeed are currently making--sweeping change necessary. Can the strategic planning system make the major changes in the national military posture required by these changes? This section has just concluded that the system is presently marginal at best. However, no conclusive judgements can be made about its ability to deliver the proper forces for the future until we understand why it works as it does.

Understanding the Strategic Planning Process. Having described the strategic planning process it remains to explain it, to interpret it and gain some notion of why it operates as it does. The reasons for the system's behavior are obviously key to reaching conclusions about the future prospects of it producing forces optimally suited for the conditions of the year 2000 and beyond.

Theoretical assistance for explaining the strategic planning process is abundant. Two models of politics from the structural-functional school suggest themselves: pluralism or interest group politics and neocorporatism. Pluralism may offer some insight to the strategic planning system since pluralism accounts for a variety of disparate interests, promoted by different constituencies--not unlike the multitude of layers found in the joint strategic planning system, each with its own interests and needs. Neocorporatism may offer other perspectives, since it concentrates on matters of organization, associational interests and intra-organizational discipline. These attributes seem to be found in the hierarchical nature of the greater defense establishment.

A third body of thought from the realm of decision theory may also prove helpful: bureaucratic politics theory. Bureaucratic politics theory emphasizes bargaining, diffusion of power and related attributes that seem, at least at first glance, to be present in the joint strategic planning process. The two other principal constructs of decision theory, rational policy and organizational process models, are excluded from consideration.⁵⁵ The rational policy model emphasizes value maximization and goal orientation. As a result, it offers little help, since it is normally possible to establish, ex post facto, sound though debatable reasons and objectives for defense decisions. The organizational process model is really nothing more than a description of the defense establishment's

⁵⁵The rational policy and organizational process models are succinctly explained in Graham Allison's "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," Paul R. Viotti, and Mark V. Kauppi. *International Relations Theory*, (New York & London: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987), pp 282-331. See also Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), pp 4-7.

formalized procedures. It does support some observations, made above, about the nature of the strategic planning process--its resistance to large-scale change and preference for incremental changes, for example--but its explanatory value is limited to uncovering the organizational routines that produced the decisions under examination. Moreover, it conceives of leadership decisions as dependent upon certain organizational routines,⁵⁶ whereas the strategic planning process, as described above, has clear top-to-bottom or leader-to-staff organization characteristics. Since the organizational process model's important but limited ability to explain the strategic planning process has already been applied in the descriptive portion of this chapter, bureaucratic politics will be the only element of decision theory used further to examine the strategic planning system.

Definitions. Pluralism, neocorporatism and bureaucratic politics all require clear definitions before proceeding further. Lehmbruch and Schmitter have provided one consistent set of definitions for pluralism, and corporatism.⁵⁷ For Lehmbruch and Schmitter, pluralism is:

...a system of interest intermediation in which the constituent units are organized into an unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, non-hierarchically

⁵⁶Paul R. Viotti, and Mark V. Kauppi. *International Relations Theory*, p 287.

⁵⁷Schmitter first wrote them in 1974 and the two authors have stuck to them since. Although Jessica Kuper has made some distinctions between "corporatism" and "corporativism" in *Political Science and Political Theory*, (London & New York: Routledge & Kegan, Pual, 1987), p 39, Schmitter and Lehmbruch deal with neocorporatism though they only use the term "corporatism."

ordered, and self-determined (as to type or scope of interest) categories that are not specifically licensed, recognized, subsidized, created, or otherwise controlled in leadership election or interest articulation by the state and that do not exercise a monopoly of representational activity within their respective categories.

Corporatism is defined as a system of interest intermediation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered, and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.⁵⁸

Kuper adds to the definition of pluralism offered by Schmitter and Lehmbruch, observing that it usually involves representation of the interests of small groups within a society.⁵⁹ Castles points out that pluralism may be present in the most underdeveloped societies, in which political action is conducted by aristocratic cliques.⁶⁰ Lehmbruch further elaborates that in pluralist systems, government is the recipient of pressure from various interests, whereas in corporatist systems, the government has a cooperative arrangement with the various interest entities.⁶¹

⁵⁸Gerhard Lehmbruch and Philippe Schmitter, eds., *Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation*, (Beverly Hills & London: SAGE Publications, 1979), pp 65, 66.

⁵⁹Ibid, p 104.

⁶⁰Ibid, p 281.

⁶¹Lehmbruch's introduction, "Neo-corporatism in Comparative Perspective" to *Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making*, Gerhard Lehmbruch and Philippe C. Schmitter, eds., (London: SAGE Publications, 1982), p 8.

Additional details as to the meaning of neocorporatism are offered by Schmitter and others. Schmitter provides a series of elements he claims are common to and further define neocorporatist systems. First, he emphasizes that hierarchies emerge among associations that subordinate and coordinate activities of whole economic sectors and social classes. Second, all kinds of arrangements are made to prevent the rise of competing organizations. Third, these interest associations are not passive, but are active in forming the interests of their members.⁶² Pike and Stritch observe that neocorporatist interest representation is compatible with a variety of regime types and that attempts to identify corporatism too closely with regime structures is unlikely to be helpful.⁶³

Klaus von Beyme has emphasized the distinctive role of neocorporatism in handling minority-majority disputes. He observes that neocorporatist systems tend to let highly integrated, relatively elite groups come forward to negotiate disputes that could not be settled by the majority. Indeed, he points out, the state's role is often that of mediator among these elites.⁶⁴

Gerhard Lehmbuch adds that neocorporatism represents a symbiotic relationship between political parties and organized interests.⁶⁵

⁶²Philippe C. Schmitter, "Reflections on Where the Theory of Neo-Corporatism has gone and Where the Praxis of Neo-Corporatism May be Going" in *Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making*, Gerhard Lehmbuch and Philippe C. Schmitter, eds., (London: SAGE Publications, 1982), p 260.

⁶³Ibid, pp xv, 89-92.

⁶⁴Klaus von Beyme, "Neo-Corporatism: A New Nut in an Old Shell?" *International Political Science Review* 4 (1983): 174, 176.

⁶⁵Gerhard Lehmbuch, "Interest Intermediation in Capitalist and Socialist Systems: Some Structural and Functional

Charles W. Anderson defines neocorporatist distinctions from pluralism in terms of process. In pluralism, he observes, representatives of different interests compete in a "political marketplace" and make demands on government. In contrast, the process in neocorporatism is legislative, in which the interests are brokered by government.⁶⁶

A general definition of pluralism, then, must emphasize the autonomous and voluntary nature of the interest representatives. They emerge independently of government license or approval to put forward their demands. They tend to define their interests for themselves and to compete with other groups for attention to their respective point of view. That interest groups emerge spontaneously when they perceive their interests to be ignored or at risk from some government or other group's initiative suggests that pluralist interest group politics is most likely to exist in systems where the political process is sufficiently open and transparent so that the various interest groups are aware of the system's agenda and can identify agenda items that are contrary to or supportive of their own positions.

Returning to neocorporatism, the general definition must emphasize the collaborative relationship between government and interest associations. The interest organizations are all partners with government, albeit with varying degrees of influence. The interest organizations differ from the "natural associations" that emerge in pluralism in that the

Perspectives in Comparative Research" in *International Political Science Review*, 4 (1983): 167.

⁶⁶Charles W. Anderson, "Political Design and the Representation of Interests" in Edward S. Malecki and H.R. Mahood, eds., *Group Politics: A New Emphasis*, (New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1972), p 291.

neocorporatist organs enjoy a monopoly of representation and are limited in the scope of their activities by their contract with the government. They have been completely co-opted.

The bureaucratic politics model offers an alternative approach. The model assumes that power in the political system is diffused to the extent that no single actor can impose a decision upon the other actors. To reach decisions, therefore, the participants must bargain, build coalitions around certain issues, and take other political steps to reach a consensus. Decisions resulting from this way of doing business are sometimes suboptimal. That is, they do not maximize the values of any one actor who was party to the compromise, and likewise do not offer a position on the issue at hand that any of the parties to the bargain would have proposed. Finally, the outputs of the bureaucratic politics model are the policy decisions that result from the internal bargaining.⁶⁷

Pluralism. The large number of interests that influence decisions in the strategic planning system suggests the pluralist model as an appropriate means for explaining the operation of the strategic planning system. However, mere plurality of interests is not enough to conclude that the system is an example of the pluralist model. Also important are questions about whose interests are represented, how these interests are represented, and how the interests are organized.

The interests represented in the strategic planning system, as described above, are not public interests, but institutional interests: those of the services, the JCS and the CINCs, among others, which may be considered interest groups. This

⁶⁷Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, pp 4-7.

contradicts the pluralist model's expectation that public interests are represented.

Nor do the interest groups pressure the government, as expected by the pluralist model, to adopt their points of view. To the contrary, the interest groups champion their causes cautiously and take guidance from the government hierarchy, of which they are themselves members. In other words, the interest groups are not outside government, but internal participants. While they may aggregate issues to present to higher authority, the interest groups make no demands.

In addition, the interest groups found in the strategic planning system do not compete freely with each other, as the pluralist model claims. Instead, they function within the framework of the PPBS and JSPS, along carefully prescribed lines. Considered from this perspective, the pluralist model is a limited tool for describing the strategic planning system. It therefore cannot be used to explain the system's behavior.

Bureaucratic Politics. Congruence between the strategic planning system and the bureaucratic politics model is somewhat greater than that found with the pluralist mode.⁶⁸ The foregoing description of the system and its operations showed there is a diffusion of power, as the bureaucratic politics model expects. The Army force structure compromise, in which no one actor, President, Congress or service got exactly what it originally sought, is illustrative of the diffusion of power.

⁶⁸Schilling, in fact concludes that it is the appropriate model for explaining defense decisionmaking. See Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond and Glenn H. Snyder, *Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets*, (New York & London: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp 19-27.

However, not all decisions within the strategic planning system result from bargains and compromise in accordance with the bureaucratic politics model. The NSDD promulgated by the President is not subject to service objection, for example. Nor was the Secretary of Defense's decision to withhold funding from the Air Force CAS prototype A16; he took the decision unilaterally. Moreover, although the participants in the system, especially the services, may have room to bargain and compromise under some circumstances, their decisions are subject to scrutiny by JCS, OSD, and the Congress.

This suggests that the bureaucratic politics model may be adequate to account for the way the services handle routine matters, but it is only partially adequate for explaining significant decisions in the strategic planning system. The biggest shortcoming of bureaucratic politics as a model for strategic planning is that it does not account for the top-down, directive characteristics present in the system.

Neocorporatism. Organizationally, the defense establishment fits the neocorporatist model well. The many groups and actors of the defense establishment are licensed by JCS Pub 2 to perform their functions; they are recognized by the state; and they are singular and functionally differentiated as neocorporatism would expect. The hierarchical organization called for by the neocorporatist model is also clearly in evidence, as is the clear framework for handling various interests--PPBS and JSPS.

The CAS case is illustrative of neocorporatist interest intermediation as well. The Army and Air Force had a certain amount of latitude in which to try to resolve their mutual

desire for a new CAS aircraft. When they proved incapable of producing a sound solution, other agents stepped in and brokered a solution, albeit a mutually unsatisfactory one.

No organization, be it a national political system or the strategic planning system, is likely to reflect exclusively bureaucratic politics, pluralism, or neocorporatism. From this brief examination of the extended strategic planning system, it appears there are some bureaucratic politics attributes and some neocorporatist attributes present. Neocorporatism appears most influential within the defense establishment, where the services pursue their interests within the carefully defined structure of their roles and missions, as brokered by the Secretary of Defense. Bureaucratic politics seems most influential between the Congress and President. These parties, more-or-less equally empowered by the constitution on matters of defense, have no recourse to higher authority to resolve their disputes. They bargain and ultimately compromise on defense issues. The bureaucratic politics attributes complicate decisionmaking. The system encourages debate and input from all participants, but lacks a mechanism for intermediating among their interests, at least for routine issues. There is no clear mechanism to settle such disputed issues; they must compromise.

The senior actors in the strategic planning system, JCS and OSD, intervene and broker decisions on major, disputed questions, but they have not substantially altered the basic procedures and practices that the services must follow while operating within the strategic planning system.⁶⁹ The

⁶⁹There have been some adjustments at the margin. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued Memorandum of Policy Number 7, *Joint Strategic Planning System*, 30 January

military services are constrained to plan within the narrow confines of respective roles within the neocorporatist structure of the defense establishment.

The cases examined in this chapter illustrate the difficulties the current strategic planning system has encountered in dealing with three types of issues. The cases themselves present only anecdotal evidence of trouble, and no conclusions should be drawn about the overall effectiveness of the strategic planning system solely from these three examples. However, since the strategic planning system reflects attributes found in neocorporatism and bureaucratic politics theory, it is possible to use these theories to suggest where the weaknesses of the strategic planning system lie.

The foregoing examination of the strategic planning system suggests three sources of problems: the nature of the services; the neocorporatist structure in which the services operate; and the bureaucratic politics that occur between the President and Congress that influence the planning system's performance.

As noted earlier in the chapter, each service has its own character and preferences: a "corporate culture" of sorts. The corporate culture seeks to preserve the service's share in the national defense mission. The corporate culture provides the rationale for the service's being, explains why it values the things it does, and establishes the basis for the relationship with the other services, e.g., the level of cooperation between the two. The corporate culture will normally encourage the service to preserve its own out-look and organization, and may limit the service's appreciation of new developments in 1990, which replaced the earlier MOP 84 JSPS. The changes, however, merely reduced the number of documents in the system and provided for more guidance from the Chairman. It did not change the strategic planning process materially.

military art or science, especially if these developments challenge tenets of the corporate culture. It was corporate culture that caused the Air Force to under-value the CAS mission, for example. It was corporate culture, in this case a self-image as the United States' first line of defense, forward-deployed against the Soviet threat, that impeded the Army's ability to contemplate troop reductions in Europe, even though they were highly likely and it was in the Army's best interest to plan for reductions.

Corporate culture tends to make the services resist change. Although this has presented relatively few strategic planning problems in the cold war era, when latitude for change was constrained by the relatively static conditions of the East-West bi-polar system, in times of transition like the present, such rigidity may be dangerous. Rigidity may cause the services to misinterpret significant developments or fail to recognize the emergence of a new threat.

The other major problem associated with the organization of the services is the separation of military-technical and policy considerations. With policy questions handled principally in the secretariat of the service and military-technical issues in the service staff, as the ALRPG case illustrated, the military and civilian leadership do not coordinate as closely as they might, producing a fissure between policy and military-technical issues. A consequence of this fissure is that the military over-concentrates on technical and tactical issues, leaving policy to their civilian superiors. Strategic planning done in such an environment is likely to produce mismatches between the needs of policy and the capabilities of the military instrument.

The neocorporatist structure in which the services operate also limits the effectiveness of the strategic planning system. The basis for the relationship among the services is the distribution of roles and missions. This distribution limits each service's options for dealing with major developments, since a service cannot normally intrude into the realm of its sister services. Multi-service issues are manageable only when service preferences, roles, and missions are not challenged. A new development, however, that calls into question the current distribution of roles and missions, or that challenges an element of corporate culture will likely produce a dispute. Although the services may be able to compromise on some questions, the result will be just that--a compromise--and not an optimal solution. On major disputes, a brokered solution will be imposed by the secretary of defense. As the CAS case indicated, brokered solutions can be sub-optimal as well, producing general dissatisfaction.

More fundamentally, the neocorporatist structure is not designed to produce inspired solutions to problems, but to regulate behavior among participants. The neocorporatist structure of the Defense Department lays out "turf," establishes rules for its protection, and provides a process of mediation through which the services have their disputes resolved by a higher authority. The neocorporatist structure is designed for routine, not exceptional circumstances, where all questions fit neatly into categories and where all participants have clearly-defined, stable roles. But it is for exceptional circumstances that the strategic planning system must prepare, where flexibility and new ideas that challenge conventional wisdom are valuable. As long as the services

operate in the present system, where their respective shares of the defense mission and issues of equity among them remain relatively important, innovative and inspired strategic planning will elude the greater defense establishment.

Bureaucratic politics, found in the bargaining between the President and Congress, adds its own complications to the strategic planning system. Two equals, with no higher authority to mediate their disputes, must bargain to reach agreement. As the cases in chapter two indicated, both Presidents Eisenhower and Nixon found themselves confronted by Congresses with their own notions about defense spending and use of the military. Both Presidents found their options in defense planning and budgeting constrained by Congress. For the strategic planning system, the requirement for the executive and legislative branches to reach a bargain introduces still more uncertainty into an already uncertain process--What level of spending will Congress authorize? What constraints will it place on the military? In present circumstances, with a two year defense budget and a six year defense plan, the ability of the President and Congress to reach agreement is especially critical, since the President requires congressional approval at least twice to fund defense appropriations during a single presidential term. Congress may get its own notions about national security posture as well. Senator Mansfield's several proposed amendments to reduce U.S. troop strength in Europe, had they been successful, would have certainly changed the shape of the U.S. defense posture regardless of the President's wishes as commander-in-chief. The Fulbright Amendment and War Powers Act may have consequences yet to be discovered. For example, Congress may yet claim that the President requires Congressional approval to

undertake deliberate offensive action against Iraq. Any strategic planning system that is subject to such unpredictable influences will necessarily be less effective than it might otherwise be.

Most of the fundamental changes in the defense establishment have resulted from Congressional action. The amendments to the National Defense Act of 1947, discussed in chapter two, and the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act all came from Congress. Presented with opportunities for major change, the services have opted for minor adjustments, preserving, insofar as possible, the status quo. The strategic planning system has spent much of its time reacting to directions from Congress. Given the neocorporatist and bureaucratic politics influences present in the strategic planning system and the defense establishment in general, it is unlikely that the strategic planning system will perform better in the more dynamic conditions expected of the future than it has in the past. It is equally unlikely that the system will produce a more capable Army than it has in the past.

CHAPTER FIVE

MILITARY REQUIREMENTS: A NEW APPROACH TO FORCE DEVELOPMENT

A new approach to force development must not only provide the best possible military forces to the nation, it must put in place a system that overcomes the flaws of the strategic planning process described in the preceding chapter. A new planning process must develop that is flexible enough to adjust to changes large and small, both in the political preferences of the administration and in the conditions in the global security environment. Put another way, the new strategic planning system must better integrate political and military-technical issues. It cannot treat force development as a means-ends calculus; it must recognize that in the United States, it is a means-costs-preferences-ends calculus.

This chapter will suggest a new defense planning system to address the flaws discussed in chapter four. Once the new defense planning system is in place, the study will consider some of the key issues that any force development process must resolve in answering the question, What kind of an Army should the United States have at the turn of the century?

Answering this question requires a detailed process of investigation. As the examination of the post-Korea and post-Vietnam military postures in chapter two indicated, the U.S. has historically included budgetary, strategic, technological

and global security considerations in its determination of military requirements. The first step is to examine the effects of nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons proliferation, since this kind of technological proliferation will to a large degree describe the military environment, just as the political-economic examination of future international relations largely describes the expected state of the global security environment. The second step is to determine the role of the military and especially of the U.S. Army. Are requirements for an army constant, or should they be adjusted to fit future circumstances? Third, since deterrence theory has influenced much of the post-World War II security environment, it is critical to see what role deterrence may have on future military requirements. In addition, there are some force design issues that ought to be considered, since they have had a bearing on the recent force development debate. These issues include limited contingencies and how best to plan for them; quantity versus quality of forces and whether or not quality can reliably off-set quantity; the desirability of general-purpose forces as opposed to forces designed for use in a specific theater of operations; and the relative merits of heavy versus light forces.

Defense Organization. Redressing the flaws in the current defense establishment involves at least two actions: streamlining the Department of Defense, and creating a new strategic planning system. There are too many layers in the current defense bureaucracy. As chapter four indicated, no matter how inspired the leadership, or how clearly pressing the problem, the current system is unable to respond effectively.

All too often it becomes entangled in its own bureaucratic practices.

The remedy for this organizational morass is a radical cutback in the size of the agencies involved in defense planning and an equally radical change in the roles of these agencies. The individual services should be removed from force planning and should have their roles restricted to the training and command of operational forces. The JCS should likewise be chartered only to do current operational and contingency planning and to control the combatant commands for the Secretary of Defense. Decisions on size, configuration and equipment of forces ought to be made within a single, integrated defense staff that responds directly to the Secretary of Defense.¹ Such a staff would consider both political and military-technical issues at once, would be relatively free of service prejudices, and would simplify the process of strategic planning to a great extent. Service headquarters, relieved of their force planning responsibilities, could easily sustain personnel reductions of 25 percent. The Joint Staff could likewise be reduced.²

¹Edward N. Luttwak recommends a similar solution with the creation of a corps of national defense officers who would lose their service identities and operate a general staff for national defense. However, rather than consider policy and military issues together, Luttwak's staff would present the "true choices" of national military strategy to the political leadership for policy decisions, thus making policy choices dependent upon military options--a condition unlikely to appeal to defense secretaries or presidents. Edward N. Luttwak, *The Pentagon and the Art of War*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), p 268.

²The Vander Schaaf Report identified over 250 positions within the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that could be eliminated even without any major reform. Derek J. Vander Schaaf, *Review of Unified and Specified Command Headquarters*,

A new defense organization would also take advantage of the conditions forecast in chapter three. That is, without the Cold War, there is no need for a continuous U.S. defense perimeter around the world. Most U.S. interests no longer require direct defense by a forward-deployed network of combatant commands that cover the globe. Relatively few U.S. interests in the year 2000 will require point defense and most may be secured by the United States' possession of capable, flexible general purpose forces and the strategic transport to move them in response to any threat.

The nation's defenses could be reorganized to account for these new circumstances and to correct the deficiencies in the strategic planning system. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would assume larger responsibility for current operations of the military forces. They would replace the current system of combatant commanders (the CINCs) in most circumstances, since large, forward-based commands would in most instances no longer be necessary. If a large expeditionary force were required, the JCS would provide staff support and recommend a single officer to command it.

The National Defense Staff would be created to do long-range planning. Its main purpose would be to plan adjustments to the nation's security posture, taking into account the policy preferences of the administration and the other key influences--those examined earlier in this study--that are likely to shape the military instrument.

The National Defense Staff would be a relatively small organization. It would have approximately 200 military and civilian staff officers who would bring with them expertise in
(Washington, DC: USGPO, 1988), p 6.

military, technical, strategic and political concerns. The Chief of Defense Staff would be a civilian deputy of the Secretary of Defense. The Chief of Defense Staff would be the equivalent of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thus providing the Secretary of Defense with two key deputies: one for current operations (the Chairman, JCS) and one for defense planning (Chief of Defense Staff). The Director of Defense Staff would be a general officer appointed by the President. The Director of Defense Staff would serve as the principal deputy to the Chief of Defense Staff and oversee the staff's routine operations.

The remainder of the staff would be organized along broad, functional lines. At least ten "functional areas" would serve to organize the staff's efforts. The functional areas would be established in such a way that they break free of current service orientation and focus upon some objective of military operations, i.e., tasks that U.S. forces would have to perform to succeed against any adversary.

The first functional area would be Long-Range Transport and Support of U.S. Forces. The objective would be to integrate consideration of all cogent ideas about force projection and sustainment. The people working in the functional area would be free to consider all options, and not have any assumptions made that could impinge upon their ability to innovate, such as an assumption that the Air Force would provide the transportation. The team in this area could take a fresh look at all options.

The second functional area would be Forced Entry. The objective for this portion of the staff would be to consider everything germane for the successful insertion of U.S. forces

into a hostile theater of operations, even when the insertion is directly opposed by enemy forces.

Isolate the Battlefield would examine ways to isolate enemy forces at all levels, strategic through tactical, to deny the enemy support of any kind. At the strategic level, the team might consider continental blockade and any new possibilities for conducting it, e.g., satellite monitoring and targeting. Or they might examine ways to undermine the enemy state's currency, thus limiting its access to foreign goods. At the tactical level, the team might consider how best to break the link between an enemy combat unit and its logistic support or the local population.

Close Combat, the third functional area, would consider all of the alternatives for defeating enemy forces in a direct, force-on-force engagement. Similarly, Deep Combat would examine the alternatives for striking an enemy in depth.

Defend CONUS would consider all of the possibilities to secure the continental United States from attack, whether the danger came from missile attack, infiltration of enemy agents, or some other threat. All potential sources of attack and all means at circumventing them would be under discussion.

The seventh functional area would analyze and forecast threats to the global security environment. As with the other functional areas, broad scope would be emphasized, so that a few people would consider the widest range of possible threats.


Strategic Attack would work on alternative methods of striking at an enemy over great distances for decisive results. Thus this one functional area might be contemplating new nuclear weapons and economic subversion at the same time. Again, the reason for functional orientation is to make sure no

options are foreclosed because of service orientation or because of an inclination toward any one kind of solution.

Assist Friendly Governments would consider all of the ways that the U.S. might protect its own interests by assisting a friendly government. The final functional area, Special Operations, would examine potential roles for SOF.

Although not a functional area, a small Program Assessment and Evaluation Office would serve to assemble the staff's proposals, budget estimates and similar activities. Figure V-1 illustrates the National Defense Staff organization.

Figure V-1: National Defense Staff



Service resistance to such a move would be extreme. Certainly any such sweeping reorganization would have to come from outside, probably through Congressional action. As chapter two and the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act case indicated, major change is unlikely to come from within the services or the DOD.

Such a reorganization would reduce the amount of bureaucracy and staffing necessary to conduct defense planning, but would not reduce innovation. The services, as the illustrative cases showed, do little innovation in the first place. Removal of bureaucratic layers from the system would reduce the impediments to whatever amount of innovation remains in the revised strategic planning system.

The second requirement is for a new strategic planning system. The new planning system would not only be operated by the Secretary of Defense's integrated defense staff, it would be structured differently from today's system. The new system would be cyclic in its operations like the current system, but the new system would also provide for periodic, comprehensive defense reviews.³ At the end of each four year defense plan, for example, the system would undergo complete re-examination of roles, missions and distribution of duties among the services. Such a process would create clear points of departure within the system, at which major adjustments would be considered. This process would avoid the business-as-usual, incremental approach that has come to dominate the current

³JCS Memorandum of Procedure 7, p 20, indicates that the current strategic planning system provides for periodic review at the start of each planning cycle. The problem, as noted in chapter four, is that there is no time for a thorough review because of the time constraints resulting from the need to involve agencies of the extended bureaucracy.

system and limit its ability to adjust to major changes in the security environment. The planning cycle would be synchronized to start with the President's inauguration. Defense appropriations would be planned as a four year block, requiring Congressional approval perhaps every two years. An extended planning period of four years beyond the initial Defense appropriation period would give the strategic planning system a planning phase in addition to the program phase of the first four years.

Technological Proliferation. The forecast nuclear, biological, chemical and conventional proliferation is expected to be extensive. Nuclear proliferation will probably be not only quite extensive, but the states that have a weapons production capability will all have at least a tactical delivery capability aboard their SRBM.⁴ Some states will have intercontinental reach as well. This nuclear proliferation introduces a new degree of uncertainty in military planning.

For example, the range of military options in responding to a regional war may be severely limited. Imagine a Libya-like state threatening to launch a nuclear strike against an American-allied state if the United States undertakes certain steps. A horizontal deterrent becomes possible. In other words, rather than threatening a major power directly, a

⁴Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, for example, expects about 15 states to have a nuclear weapons production capability by 1999. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., "The Army as a Strategic Force in the 90s and Beyond," *Army*, February 1990, p 23. For a more detailed examination of arms proliferation, see Ralph Sanders, *Arms Industries: New Suppliers and Regional Security*, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1990) and David Carlton, ed., *The Arms Race in the 1980s*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982).

nuclear-capable smaller state might use its small arsenal to hold some friend or ally at risk, thus dissuading resolute U.S. action in the region. Of course, finding a non-nuclear capable small state to threaten will also become increasingly difficult.

Kenneth Waltz, on the other hand, suggests that nuclear proliferation may not be as destabilizing as is often thought. He argues that states are unlikely to risk more in the presence of nuclear weapons than they did previously, in their absence. Furthermore, he believes nuclear weapons induce caution, especially in weak states.⁵

James Schlesinger has used the term "codeterrence" to describe the condition he expects exists between nuclear-armed actors, even in cases where the nuclear balance is one-sided, as in the case of Britain and the Soviet Union. Even though one state has a nuclear advantage in absolute terms, the smaller state's arsenal is still large enough to dissuade the larger state from action.⁶

Whether or not stability obtains despite nuclear proliferation, forces deployed against nuclear-armed states will have to operate under a deterrent and be equipped so that they can fight and survive on a battlefield that includes nuclear fires. The forecast degree of proliferation suggests

⁵Kenneth N. Waltz, "Toward Nuclear Peace," in Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., *The Use of Force*, (Lanham: University Press of America, 1988), p 692.

⁶Statement of the Honorable James Schlesinger in Senate Committee on Armed Services, "National Security Strategy," Senate Hearings 100-257, pp 620-25. Schlesinger's analysis assumes the smaller state's arsenal is secure against a disarming first strike.

that even forces earmarked for Third World contingencies would need a defensive capability.

The proliferation of chemical and biological weapons is expected to be even greater than that of nuclear weapons. Chemical weapons are already widely held, and can be employed by relatively simpler means than nuclear weapons. Some chemicals, for example, can be dispensed by aerosol spray from aircraft, sprayed on the ground from tanker trucks, or fired from conventional artillery and multiple rocket launchers. Biological weapons represent an especially dangerous threat since they are typically as deadly as chemical weapons and less controllable.⁷ Like many diseases, they are borne by the winds and survive exposure to the air. Thus, unlike non-persistent chemical agents which evaporate relatively quickly, or persistent agents that remain active only in the area where they have been deployed, biological weapons drift, remain active and can permanently contaminate a region. The lack of control makes chemical agents preferable to biological agents.

Like nuclear weapons, the use of chemical weapons must be deterred. Deterrence results--as it does with nuclear weapons--from convincing likely adversaries that the use of chemical weapons will cause them greater difficulties than fighting without them. In other words, if the enemy is convinced that his use of chemical weapons will lead to chemical retaliation, or to some other retaliatory act--a nuclear strike, perhaps--then combat will have to proceed on a contaminated battlefield, degrading the enemy's own ability to operate. Thus intervention forces will need the means to deter

⁷Typical biological weapons are anthrax and strains of plague. Mycotoxins or "yellow rain," though organically occurring, are chemical agents.

chemical attacks just as they need a nuclear deterrent. Similarly, they will need defensive measures to protect them in the event deterrence fails.

Conventional forces will also have benefitted substantially from technological proliferation. By the turn of the century, there will be a number of first-order states (the U.S. and Israel, for example), that can see the battlefield in its depth and engage long-range targets accurately; that can conduct combined arms operations, coordinating armor, infantry, artillery and air assets effectively; and that can conduct sustained and night operations. There will also be more second-order military powers (e.g., Brazil, South Korea) that, despite the limitations of their command and control and perhaps some tactical deficiencies, will nonetheless be formidable adversaries. The proliferation of short-range ballistic missiles alone will be daunting. Third-order powers, including the likes of Lebanon and Afghanistan, make clear the level of violence even lesser powers will be able to generate.

The operational implications for U.S. forces are significant. Light forces, as they are currently understood, will be less useful against adversaries that have nuclear or chemical capabilities. They have only limited self-defense capabilities against such weapons and cannot, for example, cross large contaminated areas because they do not have vehicles to carry all of their personnel. Among other things, they also lack sterile shelters in which to treat casualties. Although they do have the ability to decontaminate themselves, they must stop combat operations to do so. Similarly, without

armored, sealed vehicles, they are far more vulnerable to nuclear effects than mechanized infantry or armor troops.

The expected conventional capabilities of the year 2000 pose their own problems for U.S. expeditionary forces. The wide availability of conventional artillery, multiple rocket launchers and short-range ballistic missiles will be a major threat, and will require a corresponding increase in fire support for U.S. forces that must face such weapons. Against a first-order military power, it may be impossible to maneuver, since the enemy would be able to observe such movements and bring his substantial fire power to bear against them.⁸ Opposing a first-order power will require forces that have the requisite fire power and protection, and that are technically sophisticated themselves so that they can blind, jam and disrupt the enemy's view of the battlefield.

Second-order powers, lacking the ability to see the battlefield in depth and to attack targets accurately over great ranges, may make a return to maneuver possible. Nevertheless, such adversaries will remain dangerous. If U.S. forces are to be successful against such an enemy, the U.S. forces will require sufficient fire power to fix the enemy in place, cause him to seek cover rather than return fire, and thus allow part of the U.S. force to maneuver to an advantageous position, forcing the enemy to withdraw, surrender or be defeated.

⁸The Army's advanced warfighting concept, AirLand Battle Future, anticipates that the Army may have to "maneuver by fire" rather than attempt to move forces on the ground in the face of such capabilities. Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) TRADOC Pamphlet XXX-X (Draft), 9 December 1987, p A1-3.

Third-order powers, despite their short-comings relative to the more sophisticated states, will increasingly be more capable. They will have air forces, an abundance of artillery and other weapons that, even if their training is severely deficient, will likely make them a difficult foe for light forces.⁹

How should the United States respond to such technological proliferation? One approach would be to counter the emerging technology with still better technology. However, as the theoretical discussion of technology in chapter one indicated, there are at least four considerations to be dealt with before deciding to adopt a purely technical solution to new developments. First, the more effective a technology is, the greater will be the effort made to counter it. Second, improvements in C³I are as important as improvements in weapons themselves. Third, technology offers a chance to redistribute roles and missions among the services, capitalizing on their respective new capabilities. Fourth, if the U.S. technological lead is eroding, there are other measures that can contribute to force effectiveness.

Application of these propositions to the expected technological proliferation suggests the following responses. First, keep one generation of technology in reserve. That is, rather than field equipment employing new technology as soon as it becomes possible, it may be better to hold the equipment in stock for a national emergency (which most contingency operations will not be). In addition, as Edward Luttwak has

⁹Algeria currently has 299 combat aircraft and 48 armed helicopters, for example. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1989-90*, (London: Brassey's, 1989), p 96.

suggested, it may be wise to deploy weapons based upon different technologies for similar tasks so that one countermeasure will not render all weapons ineffective.¹⁰

Next, improve C3I and weapons integration so that a commander can see and shoot accurately over the same distances. Use of drones, radar, and links to national reconnaissance satellites (TENCAP in jargon--theater exploitation of national capabilities) would better enable an expeditionary force commander to see the enemy's disposition on the battlefield, locate his most dangerous weapons, and destroy them. Conversely, provide U.S. forces with the ability to jam or blind the enemy so he cannot see U.S. battlefield dispositions and locate U.S. major weapons.

Third, redistribute missions with the Air Force. An important mission that the Air Force could undertake would be destruction and jamming of enemy surveillance, reconnaissance, and fire control means, thus improving the Army's ability to maneuver. At the same time, the Army might provide more of its own close air support, either with attack helicopters or by acquiring fixed-wing aircraft. To counter the expected SRBM threat, the Army might operate anti-ballistic missile systems to defend itself against in-coming missiles, but the Air Force could have principal responsibility for destroying the enemy launch sites. Similarly, because the Air Force can deploy itself relatively more easily than the Army can, during the early stages of an operation, the Air Force might provide a larger proportion of ground support until Army heavier artillery arrives in the theater of operations.¹¹ Another

¹⁰Edward N. Luttwak, *The Pentagon and the Art of War*, p 136.

¹¹This is not as far-fetched as it might first seem. The author employed USAF aircraft stationed on Guam for strikes on

redistribution of missions might involve the use of Army fire support to destroy enemy air defenses, thus enabling the Air Force to penetrate enemy airspace.

Finally, if the enemy's technological development is such that the United States does not enjoy an advantage, there are other measures that can be taken. If the U.S. lacked the strength relative to the enemy to conduct a forced entry into the trouble spot, why not enter elsewhere unopposed, and then move to the fighting on the ground? Down-sizing troop units could likewise assist U.S. Army forces in avoiding detection. Smaller units with relatively greater fire power would be another related adjustment. The most important adjustment that can be made may be to develop enough air and sea transport to move the size and type of force required into the theater of operations. Thus, if light forces are inadequate for the task, the capability to move heavier forces would be available.

Although it would be inappropriate to try to design future Army forces based solely on the forecast technological proliferation, some requirements are clearly indicated. At a minimum, the Army will need adequate air- and sealift to transport required forces to the area of operations. Reliance upon light forces, merely because they can be moved with the available resources, will be unsatisfactory. A new distribution of labor between the Army and Air Force will be needed to counter first- and second-order powers, especially their short-range ballistic missiles and better C3I, and to provide the Army with the supporting fires it will need until its own artillery and gunships arrive. In addition, Army forces will have to be configured so that they have their own the Cambodian frontier in 1971.

transportation for battlefield mobility and limited protection from enemy weapons effects. Finally, U.S. forces must operate in a context that provides nuclear and chemical deterrents to limit future engagements to the realm of conventional weapons.

Roles of the Military Services. Much of the military reform literature has dealt with the redundancies in service overhead, i.e., multiple finance services, health services and the like.¹² While the point has some merit, the objective here is not to re-examine duplication of administrative and logistic support, but rather to turn to the examination of the operational roles and missions of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force. An overlap occurs here as well. While some duplication is necessary and prudent to enable the services to work effectively together, major redundancies in missions ought to be avoided--especially by a nation that is seeking budgetary relief by reducing its military forces.

One action specifically not contemplated here is the abolishment of separate military services. Although freedom from service influence may be valuable at the National Defense Staff level, attempts to merge military services have met with uncertain results. For example, Canada has recently abandoned its experiment with an integrated defense force. The expected efficiency from centralization and pooled expertise, especially in the realm of combat support and service support functions apparently did not materialize. Moreover, the traditions, symbols, distinctions and honors of separate services seem to be sources of inspiration and motivation to the respective service members. As long as strategic planning takes place

¹²Luttwak's *The Pentagon and the Art of War* covers this ground adequately, for example.

along functional lines as proposed above, maintenance of separate service distinctions in the operational force structure should provide no major obstacles to innovation and modernization.

Service Functions. JCS Publication 2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, documents the primary and collateral functions of each of the services.¹³ Both the Army and Air Force are tasked to organize, train and equip forces for air and missile defense and space control operations. Similarly, the Army, Navy and Air Force are each tasked to organize, train, equip and provide forces for joint amphibious, airborne and space operations. All three services likewise are responsible to organize, equip and provide forces for support and conduct of special operations. Certainly each of the just-mentioned functions must be accomplished, but proponenty for each such function ought to be assigned to a single service. The choice of a proponent service should be influenced principally by the relationship between the redundant function and each service's primary function. Thus, when considering a proponent for space operations, for example, the Army seems an unlikely candidate since its principal function is to "organize, train and equip forces for prompt and sustained combat operations on land--specifically forces to defeat enemy land forces, seize, occupy and defend land areas."¹⁴

¹³Joint Chiefs of Staff, *JCS Pub 2: Unified Action Armed Forces*, (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1986), pp 2-1- 2-14.

¹⁴Ibid, p 2-4.

In addition to scrutinizing service functions to eliminate duplications and to insure the greatest congruence between service requirements and capabilities, it is necessary to re-evaluate historic roles. For example, the Army has had a civil works role in the continental United States (CONUS) since frontier days.¹⁵ The Corps of Engineers has worked with local communities and the states to develop waterways, maintain bridging and a variety of related tasks. Such functions may be better performed by the U.S. Department of the Interior, or by private enterprise; they are in any case difficult to justify for a military service straining to meet fundamental national security requirements in an era of peace dividends and budget reductions.

There are also some vestigial missions that harken back to concerns for continental defense; for example, the requirement to "interdict enemy sea and air power and communications through operations on or from land."¹⁶ The Coast Artillery and Anti-aircraft Artillery, the branches that once had these missions, were disbanded before and during World War II.

Reserve Forces. Another important influence on the roles and missions of the services is structural in nature. Over the course of the nation's history, a system of reserve, National Guard and active component forces has evolved. The active component forces consist of the full-time, active duty Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force units. The Army and Air National Guards provide additional combat formations, and the Army National Guard has additional responsibilities to the governors of the states in which each unit is stationed for

¹⁵This role is still mandated in JCS Pub 2, p 2-5.

¹⁶Ibid.

disaster relief, civil disturbance control and related missions. Reserve forces vary greatly in nature, from individual reservists on mobilization lists to combat service support units. Marine Corps Reserve units integrate cadres of active Marines with reservists.¹⁷

Historically, this organization has provided a certain economy, but has been slow to provide forces in times of emergency. It took two years to mobilize reserve component forces for service in World War II and one year to produce division-sized combat formations for service in Korea.¹⁸ In light of the domestic resistance to mobilization and intervention operations described in chapter one, the organization of reserve and active component forces remains sub-optimal.

Reliance on reserve forces poses other problems as well. Once called to active service, the domestic pressure for demobilization begins almost at once. Israel found its reliance on reservists problematic in 1973, when extended mobilization but no out-break of war began to strain the economy through all the civilian jobs that were left unattended.¹⁹

¹⁷For a complete overview of Army reserve, National Guard and active components and their interrelationships, see The Association of the United States Army Special Report, *The Active and Reserve Components: Partners in the Total Army*, (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, 1989).

¹⁸Ibid, pp 8,9. For a detailed account of the problems involved in reserve component forces, see also Martin Binkin and William W. Kaufman, *U.S. Army Guard and Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks*, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1989).

¹⁹On this last point see Avner A. Yaniv, *Deterrence Without the Bomb*, p 194.

Nevertheless, some functions lend themselves to accomplishment by reserve units. These functions are typically analogous to civilian tasks and often require a great deal of individual skill, but relatively little collective training. Aviation, medicine, automotive maintenance and similar skill areas lend themselves to accomplishment by reservists since they can be practiced in civilian life little changed from their military applications.

Other skills, requiring access to large training facilities and range complexes, or requiring practice maneuvering combined arms units, are less effectively performed by reservists.²⁰ The obvious problem that arises is that the military establishment needs relatively few of the civilian-based skills at which reservists excel, and more combat and combat support units without a civilian analogue.

Other nations have solved these and related reserve organizational problems in innovative ways. The Dutch RIM system, for example, makes maximum use of reserve troops that can be mobilized into units with regular army leadership. The Federal Republic of Germany likewise integrates approximately one reserve company into every maneuver battalion of its Field Army upon mobilization.²¹ The Swiss have for centuries

²⁰Army National Guard units typically have about 39 days per year for training. When these units are assembled for training, they must also accomplish their administrative tasks, further reducing the amount of time actually available for training. Regular units often find it difficult to accomplish the same mandatory training tasks in the scope of an entire calendar year.

²¹For a summary of European manning practices, see David Isby and Charles Kamps, Jr., *Armies of NATO's Central Front*, (London & New York: Jane's Publications, 1985). German force structure reserve-active mix is documented in Heeres Struktur

depended upon citizen-soldiers, who continue to maintain their combat equipment at their homes and are mobilized for national emergencies.

The U.S. Army has recently introduced "round-out" brigades made up of National Guard troops into several of its active divisions to improve the functional support of reserve forces to active forces.²² As the global security environment becomes somewhat less dangerous, especially in light of the problems just noted, the practice of making round-out units may no longer be the best approach to force structure design. Perhaps the optimal approach is to design an active component that can fill the majority of requirements for the most likely contingencies. This part of the force would be matched with strategic transport to take it to expected theaters of operation. It would also be integrated with the Air Force and Navy to insure that the capabilities of each of the services were complementary.

The worst-case contingencies would be met by national mobilization, which would bring a larger reserve structure to active duty.²³ This reserve structure would have a cadre of regular army officers and noncommissioned officers assigned to it during peacetime to maintain a higher standard of readiness, enabling the U.S. to meet some alliance requirements with reserve component troops. In other words, the cadre would be

IV, FueH VI 1, 1978.

²²There are six round-out brigades and three battalions in current active Army divisions. Frank C. Carlucci, *Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1990*, p 128.

²³A worst-case contingency, by definition, puts U.S. national survival at risk. It seems reasonable, under the circumstances, to presume that objections to mobilization, conscription and intervention could be overcome in such a case, thus making reserve forces a viable response.

able to do much of the administrative work, some of the equipment maintenance and other tasks that currently detract from training. They would serve their most important function, however, in keeping the unit abreast of current tactics, techniques and skills necessary for accomplishment of its mission. The regular army cadre would provide a fresh infusion of expertise and information that would improve the operational capabilities of their unit.

Since strategic transportation is not available to move the entire force to a theater of operations at once, reserve units could be organized to make use of the waiting time. That is, some units, located near good facilities that would support advanced training, might have a relatively larger regular army cadre, mobilize quickly, and be deployed immediately after the last of the active component forces. Other units, located away from good training facilities, would have smaller regular cadres, and require more time to achieve any kind of proficiency. These units would be phased into the transportation scheme later in the flow so that, in the interim, they could move to a training facility and get up to standards.

Underpinning the organization of reserve and active component units would be a mobilization base that would produce company-sized units to replace losses from the force structure. As the forces engaged in combat sustained losses, they would receive replacement packages of company size that could be committed as a unit (the expectation would be that unit replacements would provide a more effective combatant capability immediately, whereas individual replacements require

time to "break in," learn how the unit works, and to bond with the other members).²⁴

But force structure must be designed not only to react to contingencies as they arise; it must also be designed to provide a deterrent. Thus, no calculus of active and reserve proportions can be undertaken accurately without first considering what the requirements of deterrence might be.

Deterrence and Force Structure. The examination of deterrence theory in chapter one was thorough enough to illustrate the basic mechanisms that cause deterrence to function. It remains, however, to apply this understanding of deterrence to choices in force structure. The first and obvious conclusion that can be drawn from the earlier discussion of deterrence is that, since sub-conventional wars cannot be deterred reliably, the United States will need forces capable of fighting such wars when it is in the national interest to do so. What about deterrence and the large inventory of conventional forces the United States currently maintains? If these forces play a role in deterrence, what size of force reduction can the U.S. Army sustain before the basis for conventional deterrence is damaged?

Samuel P. Huntington summed up the important aspects of deterrence insofar as conventional force structure issues are

²⁴In an interview at BDM Corporation, McLean, Virginia in 1976, both Generals von Mellenthin and Balck attributed German combat success with inexperienced troops to the unit replacement system they used. On the other side of the equation, many observers have commented on the demoralizing effects of the U.S. individual replacement system. See David H. Hackworth, *About Face*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), p 49 for a personal account.

concerned. For conventional forces to have a credible deterrent capacity, he argued, they must have a significant retaliatory capability (punitive deterrence as discussed in chapter one). Conventional forces that only defend (deterrence by denial) do not exact a great enough price from the enemy. The most effective conventional force is one that can promise retaliation without escalation, and hence a sound deterrent.²⁵

Viewed from this perspective, deterrent conventional forces should have a large capacity for what Thomas Schelling called "latent violence"²⁶--the ability to punish. Deterrent forces would therefore seem to require at least enough destructive capacity and lethality to overcome the adversary they seek to deter. Deterrence influences force structure then, by requiring some forces that are at least as capable as likely enemies.

A deterrent posture requires fewer forces than a purely defensive posture. This is so because heavy forces in a central reserve may possess enough "latent violence" to dissuade a potential enemy from challenging the status quo, even though there are severe difficulties in actually deploying and operating the forces in question. The point remains, if such forces were deployed, they could extract a heavy price from their adversary. A defensive posture, on the other hand, requires forces forward-deployed, in position ready to protect specific objectives from enemy capture. Forces for defensive postures must be apportioned out in the regions they defend, or

²⁵Samuel P. Huntington, "Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe," *International Security*, 8 (Winter 1983/84): 37-41.

²⁶Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, p 3.

face the prospect that the enemy will seize its objectives before friendly forces can respond.

Put another way, deterrent forces may be maintained in a central reserve, and need not be promptly deployable, since if they fail to dissuade an enemy from action, their task is retaliation. Defensive forces, in contrast, can only be held in a central reserve if strategic transportation is lightning fast and adequate for the forces to be moved. Otherwise, defensive forces must remain deployed and, if attacked, deny the enemy victory.

Sometimes, however, forces serve both as deterrents and as defenses; it is often difficult to tell the difference. For example, the 2D Infantry Division, stationed in Korea, seems poorly configured for deterrence since it has only six infantry battalions--just enough to maintain a U.S. division-sized presence in South Korea and hardly enough to promise a resolute fight. The division has relatively little defensive capability, but creates conditions in which North Korea would have to engage the United States and risk retaliation in any invasion of the South. In these circumstances, the division is not a conventional deterrent per se, but a trigger for wider U.S. retaliation.

The point of this discussion is that conventional forces may be best forward deployed where immediate defense of U.S. interests is necessary, yet may be entirely adequate in a CONUS-based central reserve when the global security environment requires nothing more than a deterrent to underwrite the status quo.

Limited Contingencies. Limited contingencies have played an important role in force planning since the Kennedy administration. Kennedy sought to plan for two and-one-half wars, while later on, Richard Nixon would try to plan for one and-one-half. These half-wars have considered very different circumstances, from counter-insurgency, low-intensity conflict, counter-terrorism and the like to small conventional wars.²⁷ Complicating the understanding of limited contingencies--and limited war in general--has been the wide-spread misunderstanding of the Vietnam experience and the fact that there has been no comprehensive review of limited war theory since the end of the war in Vietnam.²⁸ What are limited contingencies, and how do they differ from other challenges to U.S. interests?

The very definition of limited contingency is the subject of debate. Harry G. Summers, Jr. describes them as the actions of an enemy who thinks he has found a hole in the U.S. deterrent shield.²⁹ Robert P. Haffa, Jr. defines them as "any non-

²⁷For an historical overview of force planning, see Robert P. Haffa, Jr., *Planning U.S. Forces*, (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1988), pp 37-45. See also Michael M. Boll, *National Security Planning*, (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1988).

²⁸COL Harry G. Summers, Jr. points out that even within the U.S. Army, Vietnam is widely misunderstood--especially the fact that the U.S. won the guerrilla element of the war and the implications of that victory for U.S. military doctrine. Harry G. Summers, Jr., "A War Is a War Is a War Is a War," in Loren B. Thompson, ed. *Low-Intensity Conflict*, (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), pp 33, 41. Colin S. Gray observed the lack of review of limited war theory in *Strategic Studies and Public Policy*, (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1982), p 135.

²⁹Harry G. Summers, Jr., "A War Is a War Is a War Is a War," p 31.

nuclear attack on alliance interests at the periphery."³⁰ On the other hand, the Regional Conflict Working Group of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy made no attempt to define limited contingencies or low-intensity conflict in its report, *Supporting U.S. Strategy for Third World Conflict*.³¹ It was apparently satisfied to proceed based upon a conventional wisdom, intuitive level of understanding of the issue.

The committee may have been right not to quibble over rigorous definition. As one analyst has observed,

The principal problem in the limited war/military intervention field is not so much tailoring general-purpose forces to a range of possible contingencies; nor is it devising ingenious conceptual frameworks that may be raided by policymakers in search of guidance. Rather, it is exercising extreme care in choosing where to intervene.³²

A rigorous taxonomy may be impossible, but a general classificatory scheme can be constructed. Essentially, limited contingencies consist of small wars on the one hand and a vast array of sub-conventional, political-military activities on the other. Small wars tend to be characterized by the use of conventional forces along more-or-less conventional military lines, e.g., as in Panama. The rest of the sub-conventional contingencies resist clear description, other than to note that the political character of the struggle is more apparent than

³⁰Robert P. Haffa, Jr., *Planning U.S. Forces*, p 75.

³¹The Regional Conflict Working Group, Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, *Supporting U.S. Strategy for Third World Conflict*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, June 1988).

³²Colin S. Gray, *Strategic Studies and Public Policy*, p 136.

in other forms of warfare; that the combatants may have little infrastructure--political, economic or military--to target; and that they will probably respond quickly, adjusting their tactics to counter techniques that are proving effective against them.

Limited contingencies may be characterized, then, as a loose collection of small wars and sub-conventional political-military activities that put a U.S. interest at risk. They differ from other contingencies in that the United States can afford to lose them. They may be important to U.S. interests, but each instance, by itself, does not pose a significant, near-term threat to U.S. vital interests. The United States engages in limited contingencies in pursuit of "a stable and secure world, fostering political freedom, human rights and democratic institutions."³³ Moreover, there are alternatives to conducting limited contingencies; for example, the U.S. could simply live with the results of an insurgency and learn to deal with radical regimes (indeed, there will be instances where the insurgents have the interests of the population at heart and the incumbent regime does not). In addition, there may be political and economic measures that can be taken with greater effect than military action. In other words, there is a cost-benefit calculus that must be performed. The nation must consider whether or not the level of effort required in a given set of circumstances is worth the likely outcome. That said, the guidelines proposed by the Regional Conflict Working Group seem appropriate for contemplating limited contingencies and their force structure requirements:

³³*National Security Strategy of the United States*. The White House: March 1990, p 2.

The United States should be prepared, when its own key national interests are engaged:

- To strengthen allies and friends against internal and external threats, and thus helping to defend governments undertaking political, economic, or social reforms that ameliorate basic vulnerabilities

- To support resistance movements that oppose regimes hostile to United States interests, provided our aid can favorably affect the outcome, so that friends and foes alike know that our strategic options are not limited to defense or retreat

- To aid governments that suppress international traffickers in illegal drugs

- To deter, preempt when we can, and react decisively to terrorism.³⁴

Preparation for low-intensity conflict, and hence for many of the limited contingencies, should, according to Paul Gorman, seek to confine the Third World use of U.S. troops to indirect roles. The security assistance program must be reformed, and ways must be found to provide more and better cooperation to help friends help themselves. The U.S. must also find alternatives to Third World bases (often a source of contention with local factions).³⁵

The force structure requirements for limited contingencies, it would seem, are highly dependent upon the size of the threat to U.S. interests and upon the determination of U.S. policymakers to use the military instrument rather than political or economic means. While small wars will obviously

³⁴*Supporting U.S. Strategy for Third World Conflict*, p 19. The measures recommended against drug traffic and terrorism are both difficult and controversial insofar as use of the military is concerned.

³⁵*Ibid*, p 3.

require some conventional forces, the sub-conventional operations will require, among others, more medics, engineers, civil affairs specialists and military assistance specialists.

Quantity versus Quality and the Limits of Technology. Can quality of forces make up for their relative scarcity? Can technology improve force effectiveness to overcome a larger adversary? These are the questions at the heart of the quantity-quality debate. Attempts to answer these questions have been charged with emotion; witness the spirited debate over the conventional balance in central Europe.³⁶ This debate has raged on, inconclusively, for years. It is doubtful that, in light of this extensive debate, the quantity-quality issue can be resolved by further study of the European case. It will be necessary to look elsewhere for answers.

Before looking to alternative sources, however, it should be noted that the United States has long sought to improve its forces through qualitative measures. A relatively small number of improvements in quality of forces rests on the quality of personnel and improved readiness. For example, the Fiscal Year 1991 Army Posture Statement asserts:

³⁶*International Security*, 13 (Spring 1989), encapsulates the debate with articles by John J. Mearsheimer and Joshua M. Epstein, "Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics," and "The 3:1 Rule, the Adaptive Dynamic Model, and the Future of Security Studies," respectively. Letters from Barry R. Posen, Eliot A. Cohen and Mearsheimer continue the debate. See also Barry R. Posen, "Measuring the European Conventional Balance," *International Security*, 9 (Winter 1984/85): 47-88 and John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe," *International Security*, 7 (Summer 1982): 3-39.

A quality force is essential for a trained and ready Army. While the key to this quality force is quality people, quality is an all encompassing characteristic that requires not only solid recruiting practices and acceptable levels of pay and benefits, but also realistic living and working conditions, challenging training opportunities, and the potential for advancement consistent with the private sector.³⁷

The Army pursues personnel quality by seeking to attract more high school graduates and people who would be competitive in civilian life. Fewer enlistees are accepted who fall into the lower mental classifications. Beyond attracting quality personnel, the Army has sought to improve its overall combat effectiveness through more training, under more demanding circumstances. But these attempts at quality have been at the margin.

The real arena in which the Army has sought to achieve qualitative advantages has been technology. The Secretary of Defense's annual reports to Congress routinely stress modernization and the purchase of new technical capabilities for all military forces. One need only consider that, since the recognition of the Soviet conventional force build-up in the early 1970s, the United States has done relatively little to increase the size of its own conventional forces.³⁸ Most

³⁷Honorable Michael P.W. Stone and General Carl E. Vuono, *The Posture of the United States Army Fiscal Year 1991*. Before the Committees and Subcommittees of the United States Senate and the House of Representatives, Second Session, 101st Congress, p III-1.

³⁸For example, the United States reconstituted 12 active Army divisions in the immediate aftermath of Vietnam, built up to 16 by the early 1980s (which were much criticized as a "hollow army") and grew to only 18 active divisions by the end of the

of the effort has been to equip them with weapons that would enable them to "fight out-numbered and win."

Is it reasonable to expect a numerically inferior, but technically superior force to fight out-numbered and win? A sizeable body of literature suggests it is not. Lanchester Square theory suggests there are severe limits to the impact of technology on battle outcome.³⁹

Robert Haffa has studied the implications of Lanchester theory for modern weapons and concluded that, although technology may make some weapons more effective, armament designers tend to over-estimate the advantage that technical innovation has provided them. As a result, individual technical advances intended as combat multipliers are often not adequate to offset the numerical superiority of the expected adversary.

For an example of a problem of quantity versus quality in Lanchester's laws, consider a tank battle on the plains of Central Europe between 60 Warsaw Pact tanks and 20 NATO tanks. Under the linear law, if the tanks are equally effective and decade. By comparison, the Army had 11 active divisions in 1962, which should have required greater reliance on nuclear weapons and less on conventional forces. See William W. Kaufmann, *Planning Conventional Forces 1950-80*, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1982), pp 6, 7, 15. It is also noteworthy that the JCS Joint Integrated Priority List routinely contains requests for over 60 divisions from the combatant commanders, while the entire U.S. force structure only contains 31.

³⁹This theory rests on the work of Frederick W. Lanchester, a British mathematician, who examined results of land combat in World War I. Although more sophisticated attrition coefficients have evolved in military modelling, Lanchester theory is still generally illustrative of the problems confronting combatants.

not given the advantage of the defensive, then the 20 NATO tanks destroy 20 enemy tanks and are similarly annihilated, leaving 40 Pact tanks. If the NATO tanks are M1s and prove to be about three times as effective as the Soviet T54s, then the forces break even. But if the square law is applied, the NATO tanks must prove nine times more effective just to draw the battle.⁴⁰

Joshua M. Epstein, while conceding that a smaller force may lose to a larger force if events lead to a fight, points out that a smaller force may be adequate to deter aggression. In his examination of the Persian Gulf, in which a U.S. rapid deployment force would oppose a Soviet force, Epstein concluded that the Soviets might be able to field a force of 10.8 divisions, and the U.S. only five. The five U.S. divisions would not be adequate as an after-the-fact response to Soviet invasion, i.e., they would lose the ensuing fight, but would likely deter the Soviets from undertaking the operation if the U.S. forces were already in place.⁴¹ Thus, in a purely deterrent role, size matters less. Speed of strategic movement and the ability to place forces in a theater of operations matter more. Of course, this presumes that the adversary is a rational actor, that he is dissuaded by the presence of military forces from attacking.

However, when actual combat performance is the issue, evidence collected from the historical analysis of many wars suggests that smaller forces fare poorly. Smaller forces tend to take more casualties than larger forces. Combat multipliers do exist, but, in an analysis of 14 break-through operations

⁴⁰Robert P. Haffa, Jr., *Planning U.S. Forces*, p 52.

⁴¹Joshua Epstein, *Strategy and Force Planning*, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987), pp 67, 82, 89, 101.

from 1918 to 1967, Dupuy found the four principal multipliers of combat power to be combat effectiveness, tactical mobility, air superiority, and surprise.⁴² Technology has not proved itself to be a major combat multiplier historically. This evidence suggests that smaller, technically sophisticated forces should probably not be preferred as an alternative to larger forces. As Lenin is said to have observed, quantity has a quality all its own.

Theater of Operations versus General Purpose Forces. One of the perennial criticisms of U.S. forces has been that they are designed for the wrong war--the war in Europe, which is highly unlikely. The heavy armor and mechanized infantry units that result may be perfect for combat on the North German Plain, but are completely inadequate for more likely contingencies in the Third World.⁴³

This criticism points up two general approaches to force design: a general-purpose force designed against the worst case threat, that considers all other contingencies as lesser-included cases (e.g., if the force is capable of defeating the Soviets, it will certainly defeat the Vietnamese); and a theater of operations orientation, that tailors forces for the specific region and circumstances in which they are most likely to be employed. Which approach makes the most sense? If forces designed to counter the worst case can be characterized as heavy, mechanized units emphasizing tactical mobility, high

⁴²Trevor N. Dupuy, *Understanding War*, (New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1987), pp 6, 175, 263.

⁴³Senator Sam Nunn (D-Georgia) is prominent among those who have often made this charge. See Sam Nunn, "The Five Defense Blanks, *The Washington Post*, 25 March 1990, sec. 3, p C7.

degrees of protection for combat crews and extremely accurate, lethal weapons, forces designed for specific regions of the world have been tailored to include special equipment such as snow cats for the arctic or tropical uniforms for the jungle. Weapons have been selected with the region in mind as well. For example, Dragon anti-tank guided missiles have been replaced by recoilless rifles in Ranger battalions, since the Rangers have arctic contingencies and the guidance wires on Dragons become brittle in extreme cold. They have also developed skills especially germane to their regions: jungle warfare, mountaineering, cold weather operations, and the like. The U.S. military has never completely embraced either extreme in force design. It has made several attempts at establishing a central reserve--STRIKECOM and the Army's Strategic Army Corps--but at the same time has oriented certain units toward specific areas of operation. Thus, some divisions were "earmarked" for Europe as reinforcements for NATO and generally were armor or mechanized infantry, while others were earmarked for the Pacific and tended to be infantry.⁴⁴ The current mix of forces, as table V-1 illustrates, can hardly be considered overly heavy. If anything, given the declared importance of Europe to the United States, one might expect more armor and mechanized divisions.

The issue underlying the debate over theater-oriented or general purposed forces might be called strategic tailoring. On one hand, the forces created must be capable of defeating their likely adversaries in the conditions and on the terrain where they are most likely to meet them. On the other hand, U.S. forces must be transportable in a timely fashion if they

⁴⁴This earmarking of forces continues today. See *The Posture of the United States Army Fiscal Year 1991*, p II2.

are to be an effective policy instrument. At the same time, there are numerous missions short of war that make other demands on the capabilities of U.S. forces.⁴⁵

Table V-1: Numbers and Types of Army Divisions
(Active and Reserve Components)

Type	Number
Airborne	1
Air Assault	1
Armor	6
Mechanized Infantry	8
Infantry	12

Source: *Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1990*, p 130.

The U.S. military has tried to meet the demands of strategic tailoring before. No satisfactory all-purpose nonnuclear force has resulted, according to William Kaufmann, because of the United States' inability to meet the three minimum conditions for creation of such a force. The first requirement is to reduce overseas deployments of ground and tactical air forces in order to create a large, ready force in CONUS. Second, such forces would have to be equipped and trained for employment in multiple theaters. Third and most critical, adequate strategic airlift would have to be provided.⁴⁶

STRIKE Command, established in 1961, sought to meet the requirements for a large, ready force in CONUS. However, it

⁴⁵Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-1, *The Army*, (Pre-publication Edition, January 1990), pp 7-9. FM 100-1 assigns functions of conflict prevention, control and termination to the Army. Specific tasks to support these functions run from "peacetime competition" to all-out combat.

⁴⁶William W. Kaufmann, *Planning Conventional Forces 1950-80*, p v, vi.

was never able to acquire the units necessary for a strong, centrally-based force; indeed, after 1965, its forces were rapidly absorbed by the war in Vietnam. Training was arguably somewhat better. Strategic airlift, however, was the premier problem.⁴⁷ STRIKE Command suffered from a lack of joint and unified service participation, i.e., interservice cooperation, struggle over roles and missions among the services, and the inability to deploy and employ its attached forces in the regions of responsibility.⁴⁸

Is the Army still bound by these problems? Is there no way around them? Carl H. Builder has proposed a mix of forces that might alleviate at least one of them. The Army's active component could be configured as a rapid deployment force, with different elements within that force oriented toward different regions of the world. The reserve, mobilization component of the force would contain the Army's heavy units, which would follow and reinforce the rapid deployment forces, if required.⁴⁹ With such a configuration, active component forces would reflect the strategic tailoring to make them most effective within their assigned mission areas, and for the specific contingencies they face. In addition, they would, to the extent possible, fit the available strategic transport. The reserve component forces would be phased in to a theater of operations as air and sealift to move them became available.

The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 also deals with some of the problems encountered during the STRIKECOM era. The new role of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of

⁴⁷Robert P. Haffa, Jr., *Planning U.S. Forces*, p 85.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Carl H. Builder, "A Few Dusty Camps in Kansas," (Santa Monica: RAND Corp.).

Staff provides a degree of leadership that was heretofore missing in joint-service deliberations. This leadership will probably reduce somewhat the amount of interservice rivalry and competition for roles and missions. In addition, since STRIKECOM's days, the chain of command between the combatant commanders and the national command authority has been shortened and simplified, making it easier for theater commanders to raise issues of concern directly with the secretary of defense.⁵⁰

Strategic transportation remains the largest obstacle to a CONUS-based, all-purpose conventional force. Air and sealift requirements for such a force could exceed those necessary to support the current force posture, which relies on forward-deployed units, prepositioned stores and makes limited use of indigenous resources from allies and friends. Even so, the current force posture requires an airlift capacity of 66 million ton-miles-per-day and a sealift capacity of one million tons of noncontainerizable unit equipment. The airlift goal will not be met until the turn of the century, and attainment of the sealift goal is in doubt.⁵¹

One possible solution would be to build fast sealift--surface-effect ships--capable of rapidly deploying forces, complete with their equipment, over great distances. Such ships would not be dependent upon modern port facilities, but would have the ability to unload cargo over the shore. The ships would also have the ability to negotiate some rivers,

⁵⁰"White House Fact Sheet," (2 April 1986), reprinted in H.A.S.C. No. 100-34, *DOD Reorganization Implementation*, 100th Congress, First Session, pp 55-58.

⁵¹Frank C. Carlucci, *Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1990*, pp 172, 73.

enabling them to move inland before off-loading their cargos.⁵²

On balance, none of the obstacles to a CONUS-based general purpose force seem insurmountable. Strategic transportation remains the greatest problem, but may be less troubling in the emerging global security environment, where there seem to be fewer potential demands for U.S. troops, and where more strategic warning time is likely to be available: perhaps 40 days instead of the currently expected 14.⁵³ Transportation demands could also be reduced by making preemptive deployments as the Epstein analysis of the Persian Gulf suggested, positioning a U.S. contingency force as a deterrent to acts by an adversary. Such a deployment would ease the transport requirements because the deterrent force would be smaller than a defensive force and, since hostilities had not yet commenced, would not place the demands on the logistic system for ammunition, medical supplies and other commodities typically rapidly consumed in combat. Nevertheless, a follow-on force would have to be ready to reinforce the deterrent force if fighting did break out.

Beyond the need to increase strategic transportation, the biggest requirement will be to adjust the mix of forces--heavy,

⁵²Interview with Major Peter Kinney, Headquarters Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, 20 August 1987. The Army Staff continues investigating surface effect ships with the Navy as a means to rapid reinforcement in Europe and elsewhere.

⁵³For example, the CDE CSBMs mentioned in chapter one, together with the reduction in Soviet Army presence in Eastern Europe offer less ambiguous indicators of a coming attack. Similar confidence-building measures could be constructed in other regions. See "Secret Pentagon Planning Document Emphasizes Continued U.S.-Soviet Rivalry," *The Washington Post*, 13 February 1990, sec. 1, p A9.

light and special operations--in the U.S. Army.⁵⁴ With the proper inventory of forces at its disposal, the United States would be able to package contingency forces for the conditions they face. Thus, for example, an airborne division might seize an airfield, which would accommodate landing of heavier forces. An infantry division might follow the airborne into the airfield to take an adjacent city, while a mixed task force of armor and mechanized infantry might conduct the decisive battles with the enemy's armed forces.

Generally, however, the conditions Kaufmann thought were prerequisites for creation of a viable central reserve of general purpose forces seem to be attainable. Point defense of a relatively few number of U.S. interests around the world, as expected from the post-Cold War security environment, would make the forces for a central reserve available--especially if forces were returned from duty in Germany. These forces--or portions of them--could be retrained and reorganized for employment in all theaters, and equipped to give them the greatest combat power possible commensurate with strategic transport requirements. Traditional heavy forces, armor and mechanized infantry, in the reserve component of the military could provide the muscle necessary to reinforce these general purpose forces in the event of a protracted or particularly intense war. The third of Kaufmann's criteria, adequate strategic transport, might be more accessible with a smaller portion of the defense budget spent on general purpose forces

⁵⁴For an explanation of the current mix of forces and the philosophy that guides the Army in its current choices, see *The Posture of the United States Army Fiscal Year 1991*, pp VI-V4.

and more funds therefore available to buy additional transportation.

Heavy versus Light Forces. If there is a need for a mix of forces, how can the optimal mix be determined? Or, are heavy forces simply inherently better suited for modern combat than light forces? Are preferences for one type of forces over another really based on objective considerations, or do they betray other influences?

The U.S. Army, as mentioned above, believes that a mix of forces is necessary. This belief is based upon the notion that each type of force--heavy, light and special operations--has certain inherent characteristics that make it advantageous when confronting an adversary armed with certain weapons and operating in a certain type of terrain. The mix of forces must be varied for each theater of operations and fine-tuned for the enemy, weather, and terrain found there. To arrive at the proper mix of forces, it is necessary to know their respective advantages and limitations.

Heavy forces, the armor, mechanized infantry, and self-propelled artillery, enjoy great battlefield mobility, substantial armor protection and provide the greatest amounts of combat power. These are the forces most able to maneuver under enemy fire, most able to breach enemy obstacles such as mine fields and to cross areas contaminated with chemical agents. They bring firepower and shock action to any engagement. The price for heavy forces mobility, agility and pure combat power is a large logistics burden of fuel, lubricants, and spare parts. Moreover, although heavy forces are highly mobile on the battlefield, they make tremendous

demands on strategic mobility. Presently, only sealift can efficiently move a heavy force from CONUS to a theater of operations, since single large armored vehicles take up entire airplanes, as table V-2 illustrates.

Table V-2: Air Transportability/ Load Capacity

Aircraft	C141B (max load 59,800 lbs)	C5A (max load 265,000 lbs)
Equipment		
M1 Abrams Tank (134,000 lbs)	X	1
M109A2 Howitzer (62,000 lbs)	X	2
M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle (60,000 lbs)	X	2
M113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier (27,200 lbs)	2	3

Source: Compiled from *Jane's World Aircraft Recognition Handbook* (London: Jane's Publishing, 1986), and *Weapons Systems United States Army 1989*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1989).

In addition to the logistics demands heavy forces make, they are not well-suited to all terrain and conditions. Woods, forests, and cities all leave heavy forces vulnerable. When operating in such terrain, heavy forces need infantry to accompany them to protect them from enemy infantry with anti-armor weapons. Marshlands and jungles can present mobility impediments as well.

Light forces, infantry and airborne, have little battlefield mobility since they move primarily on foot; only the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) has its own organic helicopters to move all of its personnel and equipment. The light

divisions lack the armor protection and firepower found in the heavy forces. They cannot maneuver as easily as heavy forces, because they lack the battlefield mobility and they lack the firepower to suppress the enemy's fires, enabling U.S. forces to move. The 82d Airborne Division has more firepower than the rest of the light infantry does, but still lacks the internal mobility to get around the battlefield. Light forces are very effective in cities, wooded and mountainous terrain--anywhere mobility is restricted.

However, they are vulnerable when confronted by heavy forces, especially in open terrain, and require time and engineer support to prepare defensive positions. However, as an offset to their tactical limitations, light forces have great strategic mobility. Light infantry divisions have been specifically tailored to fit the available lift.⁵⁵ Table V-3 provides a comparison of some U.S. Army division characteristics.

Table V-3: Comparison of U.S. Divisions

	Light Infantry	Mechanized Infantry	Armor
Personnel	10,500	16,923	17,110
Tanks	0	248	356
APCs	0	498	515
Artillery	62	75	75
ATGMs	137	380	334
Machine Guns	1096	1480	1360
Mortars	60	107	89

Source: Compiled from James F. Dunnigan, *How to Make War*, (New York: Quill, 1933), p 34 and Peter A. Wilson, "U.S. Reinforcement Options," in *NATO-Warsaw Pact Force Mobilization*, ed. Jeffrey Simon (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1988), p 169.

⁵⁵Robert P. Haffa, Jr., *Planning U.S. Forces*, pp 113, 114.

In responding to a contingency, the Army must have forces that fit the available lift so that the United States' reaction can be timely, yet the Army must also have forces that can be tailored to the enemy, weather and terrain in the region where the contingency takes place. According to this theory of force tailoring,

The Army contains a mix of heavy and light divisions to maintain the flexibility to respond to varied missions as a strategic force. In many situations, a task force composed of heavy and light units is necessary to achieve adequate deployability and combat power.⁵⁶

Not all observers agree that the heavy, light and special operations forces mix results from such a rational process. Barry R. Posen argues that preferences develop for some forces over others, and that these preferences reflect those of the military establishment itself.⁵⁷ Edward N. Luttwak argues that armies create forces based upon their approach to warfare. Those stressing attrition favor heavy forces, while those stressing relational maneuver to defeat the enemy favor lighter, more agile forces.⁵⁸

While there is some truth to the cases made by Posen and Luttwak, service preferences and approaches to warfare alone do not shape force structure, as chapters two and four illustrated. Civilian control, for one thing, reaches deeply into the operation of each of the services. Within the Army, the Assistant Secretaries of the Army are very influential.

⁵⁶Department of the Army, *Army Focus*, (November 1989), p 28.

⁵⁷Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, p 53.

⁵⁸Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy and History*, pp 169, 198.

The Assistant Secretary for Research, Development and Acquisition, for example, makes most of the equipment recommendations to the Secretary of the Army. Nor are the services free to make their own choices. As chapter four indicated, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others, in a complex process, shape the overall military structure for the nation. They, too, are subject to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Specifically, the OSD Systems Analysis office has since 1965 progressively involved itself more and more in what were once exclusively military decisions.⁵⁹

The point is, within the strategic planning process, the preferences of the professional military have been steadily subordinated to more detailed civilian control at both service and national level. As former Assistant Secretary of Defense Enthoven observed,

As for the formulation of military needs, at the strategic level there is no such thing as a 'pure' military requirement, only alternatives with varying risks and costs attached. Choosing among these alternatives is the main job of the Secretary of Defense.⁶⁰

The heavy versus light forces calculus, ultimately, is a rational one, but not a direct means-to-ends calculus. As the cases in chapter two illustrated, costs and political preferences intervene on military considerations to play a role. The Army legitimately seeks to obtain the heavy, light and special operations forces it believes it needs to meet its responsibilities, but must do so within the elaborate structure

⁵⁹Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program 1961-1969*, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1972), pp 73-5.

⁶⁰Ibid, p 2.

of the JSPS and PPBS. The resulting process is an ends-costs-preferences-means calculus, in which operational requirements must be influenced not only by considerations of enemy, weather, terrain and strategic lift, but also by considerations from a broader policy venue.

Returning to the questions posed at the beginning of this section, it seems clear that heavy forces are not a universally desirable thing; there are many circumstances where lighter forces are desirable. It follows that a mix of forces is also desirable, though the process of determining the proportions of heavy, light and special operations forces within the overall structure is not as direct a military calculus as the services might prefer. Generally, the active component of the Army ought to have a variety of capabilities at its disposal, since it is the component that must respond to immediate contingencies. The reserve component, though still containing some mix of forces, might be less heterogeneous.⁶¹

The Role of Strategy. There remains a final, critical consideration: the role of military strategy. Few nations have ever enjoyed the luxury of being able to field forces entirely of their own larger than those of their enemies. None have been able to presume that, given the best technology and the proper mix of forces, they would prevail.⁶² All have had to

⁶¹Special Forces (not including psychological operations and civil affairs units) and Special Operations Aviation might be all active component, for example, since typical long-term, peacetime deployments are ill-suited for reserve component units.

⁶²A charge Harry G. Summers, Jr. levels at the United States' approach to war in Vietnam. Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*, pp 110-16.

rely on military strategy in order to create conditions that would produce the decisive battle under circumstances favorable to them. In other words, even when a nation has at its disposal an abundance of military means, careful military strategy is still necessary to produce the desired results. Moreover, the military results must be in harmony with and complementary to the greater national political objectives.⁶³ Thus it is not sufficient to reach wise decisions about the size and composition of forces. Military strategy must evolve along with, and influence the design of the military instrument.

Hierarchy of Strategies. The importance of strategy rests in the fact that a nation's means--political, economic and military--can each be applied in different ways toward the same policy objectives; it is the task of strategy to find the most effective way. A modern nation normally arrays its resources in accordance with multiple strategies. At the top is the state's national security strategy (or grand strategy), which sets the objectives to secure national survival (or other principal goal) and arrays the political, economic, and military instruments toward those objectives. Next in the strategic hierarchy is the national military strategy, which plans for the use of the state's military resources in certain ways to attain the military objectives that support the greater national security strategy. This military strategy may be further refined into theater or regional military strategies.

⁶³See Edward N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire*, (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976) for a clear case study of brilliant military strategy with a very limited military instrument.

An historical example will make the importance of strategy clearer. The Peloponnesian War was principally a contest between the Athenians and the Spartans. The Spartans, though the primary military power among the Greeks, were never strong enough to assault Athens directly. Over the long years of the war, the Spartans tried different strategies to overcome their adversary. They laid waste to the countryside, hoping to inspire revolt within Attica, as the demos feared for their olive trees and other meager possessions. The Spartans next tried to strip Athens of its allies, reducing the net amount of military power available to her for her defense. Finally, the Spartans and their Sicilian allies succeeded in trapping the Athenian forces at Syracuse, depriving them of the harbor and withdrawal of their forces by sea, and forced the Athenians into an over-land retreat, during which they ultimately surrendered.⁶⁴

The Spartans had many ways in which they might have applied their military means. They could have attempted an assault on Athens; they might have laid siege to it, calling on the Peloponnesian Congress for support. They did avoid Athen's main strength, her navy, and pursued a campaign on land. Ultimately the Spartans succeeded in creating conditions that brought victory: coalition warfare with several Sicilian cities, denying the Athenians the harbor at Syracuse as a way of withdrawal, and harassing attacks on the retreating columns of Athenian infantry, until they surrendered in exhaustion.

In the fifth century, BC, strategy was straightforward since the polis staked its future and its survival on the success of

⁶⁴Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, translated and edited by Sir Richard Livingstone (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), books II, VI, & VIII.

its relatively small forces. In those days, generalship was the direct application of the polis' only instrument of coercion in pursuit of its objectives. Today, strategy remains the process through which a nation determines the best ways to use the means at its disposal to achieve its objectives. Over the ensuing 2500 years, however, with the development of the political and economic instruments as well as the military, it has become more difficult to translate national policy into military capability, and to turn a general military strategy into specifications for military forces.⁶⁵ Unless force structure evolves within the context of a nation's military strategy, it will likely be inadequate.

Modern Military Strategy. Since the end of World War II, various authors have offered different conceptions of military strategy. Liddell Hart stressed the "indirect approach," pointing out the essence of sound strategy was a constant objective, but a circuitous route to it, avoiding enemy strengths and exploiting enemy weaknesses. Hart's notion of military strategy was broad enough to include psychological and other instruments beyond military force in reaching the military objective of any campaign, and to include both defensive and offensive operations.⁶⁶

Barry R. Posen has defined strategy in somewhat broader terms, conceiving of strategy as an ingredient in a comprehensive plan of political-military integration that

⁶⁵Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program 1961-1969*, p 199.

⁶⁶B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1967), pp xx, 146.

states must have to be successful in pursuit of their objectives. Strategies can be offensive, defensive, or deterrent in nature, according to Posen. Offensive strategy is likely to be attractive to the military because it lets the armed forces impose their own scenarios and routines, and because it increases military establishment size and wealth. Defensive strategy is reactive to the initiative of an adversary, and is not preferred, since it is often difficult for the military to improvise. Similarly, deterrent strategy is not favored because of its dependence upon the adversary's will (and rationality) rather than upon capabilities.⁶⁷

Other approaches to strategy have emphasized a preeminent role for one military service or another. For example, the "maritime strategy" has focused on naval and amphibious operations. Yet none of the service-oriented strategies claims to be a comprehensive plan for the application of the military instrument.⁶⁸

Military strategy clearly offers a nation many options for the use of its military instrument. Strategy is not static, however, but extremely dynamic. When a strategy becomes effective at thwarting an adversary, the foe will seek a countermeasure to it.⁶⁹ Thus, while a nation may follow a given set of general security policy guidelines for an extended

⁶⁷Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, pp 14, 25, 34, 48. Throughout his book, Posen uses the term "doctrine" rather than "strategy," preferring to avoid confusion over the many levels of strategy that range from battlefield generalship to grand strategy. His focus is nonetheless the alternative ways for the application of military instrument.

⁶⁸Admiral James D. Watkins, *The Maritime Strategy*, (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1986), p 41.

⁶⁹Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy*, pp 32-35.

period of time, at the level of military strategy, a state will be engaged with its adversaries in a continuously changing set of moves and counter-moves. The more contentious the relationship with other states, the more dynamic a nation's strategy is likely to be. Of course, since the evolution of military strategy and force development proceed together, turbulence in one will influence the other.

A New Approach to Force Development. So far in this chapter, the individual military and political considerations for force development have been scrutinized carefully. The general options for military strategy have also been examined. The next step is to organize these considerations into a coherent process of force development, based upon the recommendations made at the beginning of the chapter. It is assumed that the required defense reorganization has transpired, and that a national defense staff exists. The services and the JCS have new roles, limited to the training and operation of current forces.

The New Strategic Planning System. The new strategic planning system is simplified relative to previous processes. The President issues his national security decision directive as before, but there the similarity with the old system ends. The national defense staff, headed by the Secretary of Defense, is composed of two groups--defense professionals and political appointees. The professional members of the staff include military officers who have given up any relationship with their original military service and have become career staff members, and staff civilians, who bring some particular expertise to the

organization. Like their military colleagues, they too have foregone any association with a particular service to devote themselves fully to the national defense staff. The political appointees bring with them the President's defense agenda and assist the Secretary of Defense with the process of translating the Administration's policy preferences and priorities into requirements for the national defense staff. Thus the military-technical and political considerations receive attention together in a single, integrated planning process.

Upon receipt of the NSDD, which would include budgetary guidelines as it does now, the national defense staff would prepare alternative approaches for achieving the President's security objectives. The Secretary would present these alternatives to the President, and the one selected--perhaps with presidential modifications--would become the national military strategy.

Once the national military strategy was established, the national defense staff would conduct a general defense review to re-align the services with the requirements of the new strategy. Each service would find its size, structure, organization and funding level adjusted to conform with its new role in national security. The national defense staff would then issue a new four year defense plan to support the re-alignment of the services.

The services themselves would have to execute the defense staff's orders for re-alignment and restructuring. Most of the time, such adjustments would be small and would not produce major turbulence within the services. However, such a system would have the capacity to respond rapidly to significant

changes in the global security environment, such as the end of the Cold War, or to a radical change in the Administration's policy preferences toward national security.

How Much is Enough? No military-technical calculus will ever be adequate to set the upper limit on the size of U.S. forces. Ultimately, the President and his Administration must make judgements about the size forces required to meet the national security objectives: judgements tempered by a sense of what the American people are willing to pay for as well as the immediacy of the threat. Military-technical calculations can, however, contribute to an understanding of what the minimum force levels might be, and how certain types of forces relate to different theaters of operations, the enemy, weather, and terrain. Seven military-technical propositions or rules of thumb have been developed in the early part of this chapter, as well as in chapters one and three that can aid deliberations on force design. These are, first, that a national military strategy of deterrence requires fewer forces than one of offense or defense, since a central reserve of general purpose forces can normally be counted upon to provide enough "latent violence" to dissuade many adversaries from a direct military challenge to one's national security interests.

Second, defense of specific interests normally requires forward deployment. A corollary to this proposition is that, the more interests there are to be defended directly, the more forces must be forward-based to secure them.

Third, alliances usually require commitment of forces--at least "earmarking"--which tends to make these forces unavailable for other, unforeseen, contingencies. Security

communities place no such constraints on forces.

Forth, general purpose forces require organic mobility and the capacity to deter their opponents from nuclear or chemical attack.

Fifth, technology has limits as a combat multiplier. The level of technical capability required to offset the advantage of a larger opponent, as Lanchester square theory suggests, is more demanding than often realized, and makes relatively low levels of loss more damaging than in a less technologically-dependent force.

Sixth, heavy forces are not ideal for all circumstances and conditions, but light forces are becoming less capable and increasingly vulnerable. Some mix of forces is necessary.

Finally, active forces should be maintained to counter the most likely--not the most dangerous--threats to national security interests. Reserve forces should provide the depth of organization and equipment necessary to mobilize the nation when confronted with the gravest of perils. These guidelines cannot be applied in a mechanistic way.

In creating the alternative approaches from which the President selects a national military strategy, the national defense staff must consider not only the President's objectives for national security, but also the circumstances in which those objectives must be achieved and the budget to support their pursuit. Considering the global security environment and making use of the appropriate planning estimates, the staff would ask itself where the threats to national security arise. Who are the significant enemies? Where are the major points of contention?

From study of the environment, the staff's questions move on to options and preferences. Is the military to be the primary instrument of national policy, or a secondary instrument behind diplomacy or economics and trade? Does the Administration anticipate an activist foreign policy, or a laissez-faire posture? What level of foreign involvement will the Administration tolerate: direct U.S. involvement, or only indirect activity in a region, through surrogates? Where can the military instrument be reinforced by foreign resources: alliances, international law, security communities, international regimes? What must be attacked? What must be defended? What must be deterred?

Affordability is the next criterion. Each alternative proposal must be considered from the standpoint of the available budget. It would be futile to propose resource-intensive alternatives without the budgetary support to pay for them. It might be that defense spending is insufficient to provide forces capable of simultaneous defense of all national interests. In such a case, the defense staff would recommend priorities in which different regions, interests, or objectives might be secured, providing for the most critical interests first.

As the foregoing outline of the new strategic planning process indicates, the proposed system is streamlined and less structured than the current system. The national defense staff can calculate its minimum force requirements by region or by some other method as policy requirements dictate. In any case, the force planning process is not complicated by conflicts between CINCs wanting theater-tailored forces and service headquarters trying to create general purpose forces. Reduced

rivalry among the services is another benefit of the new system, resulting from the fact that the national defense staff should reflect fewer parochial interests than the current joint staff system which is manned by members from each of the services.

The biggest benefit of the proposed system is that it would consider the means and ends of national military strategy together. The national defense staff would spend much of its time examining different ways to use the available means to achieve the Administration's desired security ends. The study of alternative ways would accommodate both policy preferences and military-technical considerations. There would be no problem, as there is in the current system, where the services tend to try to design forces based exclusively on military-technical issues, without adequate regard for the political policy considerations important to the Administration.

It is difficult to envision the proposed system from a limited description. Therefore, the next chapter will illustrate its functioning by producing a force structure for the United States in the year 2000.

CHAPTER SIX

DEVELOPING FORCES FOR THE YEAR 2000

Chapter five tried to describe the new approach to force development. This final chapter will illustrate how the process would function to produce forces.

Budget. With the Cold War over and the Soviet threat at its most remote since the end of World War II, by the mid-1990s domestic support for high levels of defense spending will no longer exist. Even continued U.S. presence in the Middle East will be unlikely to provide higher levels of defense appropriations.¹ Three percent of gross national product (GNP) will be the target level for defense spending in the early years of the next century. The Administration will plan to reach the three percent level in the year 2000 by systematically reducing defense spending over the mid-1990s. Table VI-1 illustrates the expected GNP and defense budget levels. The Administration expects it will be able to maintain support for this level of defense spending since three percent is the guideline that had been used within NATO and that had dominated burden-sharing disputes. The American people will

¹For example, the fiscal year 1991 budget proposal from Congress is \$4.1 billion less than President Bush's January proposal despite the costs of Reserve call-ups and deployment. See Helen Dewar, "Pentagon Keeps All Major Programs," *The Washington Post*, 18 October 1990, p A1.

accept three percent, at least for the near term. Three percent, once achieved, thus represents a maximum level of defense spending.

Table VI-1: Forecast GNP and Defense Budget

	1995*	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Gross National Product (Billions)	\$ 6818.6	6995.9	7163.8	7335.7	7511.8	7692.1
Defense Budget						
Percentage of GNP	5.2	4.4	4.0	3.8	3.4	3.0
Billions of Dollars	311.8	307.8	286.6	278.8	255.4	230.8

* As reported in *Budget of the United States, Fiscal Year 1991*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1990), p 157.

Source: Compiled from *Budget of the United States, Fiscal Year 1991*, and The WEFA Group, *U.S. Long-Term Economic Outlook, Volume 1, First Quarter 1990*, (Cynwyd, PA: The WEFA Group, 1990), pp 5.2-5.3. GNP for the years 1996 through 2000 were calculated based upon WEFA's moderate growth scenario.

National Security Policy. The President's NSDD replaces containment with a new policy of strategic conflict management. Underlying this policy is the Administration's belief that the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons and the means to deliver them over long ranges makes the avoidance of violence important in many regional conflicts even though these conflicts have little or no political consequences for the United States. Otherwise, the President's objectives remain much the same as those of the containment era:

The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.

A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and a resource base for national endeavors at home and abroad.

A stable and secure world, fostering political freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions.

Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.²

In addition, the Administration desires a flexible nuclear deterrent within the limits of START, but that considers the proliferation of nuclear-armed states in the world. The President also wants the United States to retain its role as world leader. He is especially concerned that he not be perceived as the man who presided over America's withdrawal from world affairs; a concern raised somewhat because U.S. forces were recently reduced in Europe pursuant to CFE. Thus, while willing to re-evaluate the nation's security commitments in the light of changing circumstances, the President wants a role in the restructuring of Europe and foresees the United States in an activist role limiting other states' recourse to war.

National Security Strategy. Once the Secretary of Defense receives the President's NSDD, the guidance from the NSDD must be transliterated into a national security strategy. The Secretary has the National Defense Staff prepare two options for the President's consideration, both of which would achieve the objectives of strategic conflict management.

Option One. The first option stresses military means as the principal instrument for managing regional conflicts. Asserting that the end of the Cold War competition between the United States and Soviet Union has removed the leverage that the two superpowers once wielded to impose restraint upon their client states, option one calls for a strong military posture

²*National Security Strategy of the United States*, pp 2, 3.

to dissuade any regional actors from resorting to war. The option relies on a network of alliances and aid packages to promote U.S. interests and to exert U.S. leadership in deterring regional wars by creating local coalitions that support the U.S.

Option one recommends the maintenance of all current alliances (including forward deployment of U.S. troops) and creation of new ones in regions experiencing armed conflict or nuclear proliferation. It seeks to produce regional stability by underwriting local allies with an array of assistance, from technical and economic aid to deterrence and defense. The option would also foster a series of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in troubled regions to mitigate the effects of the local security dilemma. Option one is thus not a major departure from present national security strategy, but merely a re-orientation of military assets away from the Soviet Union and toward multiple regional troublespots.

Option Two. This option places less emphasis on the military instrument and seeks to use military and economic means in a balanced fashion to further U.S. objectives. The option asserts that the risks attendant with nuclear proliferation are less severe than option one indicated. Option two is based on the notion that states will not risk more with nuclear weapons than they would without them, and that the presence of such weapons imposes a certain caution on local actors similar to the restraint the super powers once sought to exert over the actions of their client states. Thus, while nuclear proliferation is a matter of concern, it does not automatically imply regional instability.

Option two emphasizes improved economic performance for the U.S. and its friends. It seeks to use technology licensing, trade agreements and similar instruments to foster mutually beneficial programs. It seeks commercial arrangements with the new governments in Central Europe and elsewhere with enough economic penetrativity to make Central European markets safe and stable, and to provide new markets for the U.S. economy.

Option two reduces involvement in alliances. It would maintain token troop levels in Europe as the price for a role in determining the final security arrangements there, but otherwise views forward deployment as generally unnecessary. The option would support security regimes wherever they could be established, expecting that such structures would provide security and stability without the need for a large military apparatus. This option might expand cooperation with the Soviet Union in both military and non-military areas if such an arrangement were seen as contributing to greater regional stability. Similarly, the U.S. would support United Nations operations aimed at limiting regional conflict.

Despite its more optimistic outlook, option two nevertheless recognizes the need for strategic nuclear forces that are flexible enough to deter regional nuclear powers wherever they appear. The option also provides for conventional force intervention to deter the recourse to war and to defend U.S. interests if war should occur.

The National Military Strategy. Once the President selects option two as the national security strategy, the National Defense Staff must design a military strategy to implement the military component of the national security strategy. The National Defense Staff prepares three options for the

President's consideration, each of which takes a different approach to serving the objectives of national security policy while meeting the budgetary guidelines established by the NSDD.

Forward Deterrence. The first military strategy option places heavy emphasis on U.S. presence to deter war via the navy carrier battle group. The carrier battle groups would cruise extensively to maintain U.S. regional presence, provide local nuclear deterrence and to project Marine forces ashore in the event of hostilities. Fourteen such battle groups would be maintained. The Navy/Marine presence in Japan and on Okinawa would continue, and new facilities would be established in Singapore to provide better control of the Malaccan Straits. Bases in the Philippines would be abandoned. The Marine Corps would be maintained at present levels, with three divisions and air wings, as the major source of ground combat power.

The Army would maintain only limited forces in Europe, consisting of a two-division corps. Elements of an infantry division would be maintained in Korea as well. A strategic reserve of the 82d Airborne and 101st Airborne (Air Assault) divisions would be maintained in CONUS. The rest of the Army's force structure would be in the reserve component, consisting of 10 divisions. These divisions would maintain varying degrees of readiness through the assignment of active duty personnel as cadre. Some divisions would be deployable in 30 days, while others with less cadre and poorer access to training facilities would require up to 120 days to reach ready status. Figure VI-1 summarizes the force structure provided by this option.

Figure VI-1: Forward Deterrence

<p>Eastern Mediterranean: 3 Carrier Battle Groups* Fleet Marine Force Contingent</p> <p>Western Pacific: 3 Carrier Battle Groups 1 Marine Division and Air Wing on Okinawa</p> <p>Indian Ocean: 3 Carrier Battle Groups 1 Marine Division and Air Wing on Diego Garcia and afloat</p> <p>Persian Gulf: 3 Carrier Battle Groups Fleet Marine Force Contingent</p> <p>Europe: 2 Army Divisions, 1 Armor and 1 Mechanized</p> <p>Korea: Elements of 1 Army Division</p>
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<p>Strategic Reserve: (in CONUS)</p> <p>Army: 1 Airborne Division 1 Air Assault Division 10 Reserve Divisions</p> <p>Air Force: 4 Tactical Fighter Wings 20 Reserve Tactical Fighter Wings</p>
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* Assignment of three carrier battle groups per region provides for one on station, one enroute and one in refit. Of remaining two, one is in nuclear refueling and one is an operational training group, patrolling the Caribbean basin.

The Air Force's Tactical Air Command would also be radically down-sized. Four tactical fighter wings would be maintained on active duty, while 20 would be maintained in the reserves. Reserve wings would nevertheless be highly capable, since they could be based at local airports and would maintain much of

their required proficiency. Active Air Force personnel would cadre key positions in these wings.

This strategy option would take its largest reductions in the active Army and Air Force Tactical Air Command. It would maintain the U.S. global presence, making forces rapidly available in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the Western Pacific and Persian Gulf. Its weakness would lie in the lack of readily available ground combat power, depending heavily on Marine Expeditionary Forces which are not intended for sustained combat. If a large contingency were to occur, the U.S. might have to limit its involvement until adequate Army reserve forces could be brought to bear.

Peaceful Engagement. This military strategy option, illustrated in figure VI-2, emphasizes the use of the U.S. military for regional assistance, development and local defense. The Army is the principal instrument of involvement, working with the Agency for International Development to provide medical support, engineering and construction, civil affairs assistance, police support and military training to friendly states and groups around the world. The Army's active force structure reflects this strategy. The Army is organized into expeditionary corps tailored to the theater of employment, but that generally include engineer, medical, transportation, civil affairs, psychological operations and Special Forces units.

The Army maintains a reduced conventional military presence in Europe and a CONUS-based strategic reserve as it did in the Forward Deterrence strategy option. Its forces have been withdrawn from Korea.

Figure VI-2: Peaceful Engagement

Theater Forces	
Persian Gulf/Eastern Mediterranean/Middle East:	
2 Army Expeditionary Corps	
3 Carrier Battle Groups with Marine Contingents	
Western Pacific/Pacific Rim:	1 Army Expeditionary Corps
2 Carrier Battle Groups with Marine Contingents	
Indian Ocean:	2 Carrier Battle Groups with Marine Contingents
Europe:	2 Army Divisions
South America:	1 Army Expeditionary Corps
Carrier Battle Group provided on same basis as under Forward Deterrence	

Strategic Reserve (in CONUS)	
Army:	1 Airborne Division
	1 Air Assault Division
	10 Reserve Divisions
Air Force:	14 Tactical Fighter Wings
	12 Reserve Tactical Fighter Wings

The Air Force maintains 14 tactical fighter wings in its active component and 12 in its reserve component as the primary means of rapidly projecting U.S. power and of assisting deployed Army forces.

The Navy maintains nine carrier battle groups. Although the regional assignment is the same as it was in the Forward Deterrence option, no continuous presence in all areas is attempted. A carrier battle group is generally within four days of the Eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf.

Maintenance requirements are accommodated through shorter periods of deployment. The Marines remain the primary combat intervention force.

This option provides the means for regional leadership that the President sought and puts the United States in the position not only of promoting peace, but also of supporting the developmental efforts of its neighbors. In addition, it meets the criteria set by the Nixon Doctrine and echoed by Paul Gorman, mentioned earlier in this study, that American forces be only indirectly involved (i.e., in a support capacity) in the regions of the world, leaving the fighting to local troops. The weaknesses of the option are that it requires more foreign alliances and may lead to long-term involvement in a region. Moreover, the strategy does not provide fully for areas where the United States has no friend to invite its aid. As in the case of the Forward Deterrence option, the strategy lacks forces for sustained combat. Finally, the American people remain ambivalent to foreign intervention and are unlikely to support a strategy that relies heavily upon it.

Strategic Readiness. The third military strategy option, summarized in figure VI-3, emphasizes a balanced mix of forces kept in readiness for any contingency. The strategy limits long-term deployments of the Navy's nine carrier battle groups to reduce operating costs and to increase the impact sending a carrier force to a troubled region may have. No attempt is made to maintain a presence in all regions of the world. Short-duration training cruises are the norm. The Marine Corps continues to provide three divisions and air wings as the

primary intervention forces. Marine forces not afloat are located at Camp Lejeune, NC, Okinawa and Diego Garcia.

Figure VI-3: Strategic Readiness

<p>Forward Deployed Forces: 2 Army Divisions in Europe 2 Carrier Battle Groups with Marine Contingents</p> <p>CONUS: Army Contingency Corps of 5 Divisions supported by 14 Air Force Tactical Fighter Wings Strategic Reserve of 10 Army Reserve Divisions 7 Carrier Battle Groups 3 Marine Divisions and 3 Marine Air Wings less deployed contingents 12 Air Force Reserve Wings 62 Strategic Lift Squadrons</p>

The Air Force is more robust than in the previous strategy options. It provides 14 active and 12 reserve fighter wings, and 62 airlift squadrons. The Tactical Air Command is based completely in CONUS.

The Army maintains seven active divisions and 10 reserve divisions. Two of the active divisions are stationed in Europe, but train and operate at reduced levels. The five remaining active divisions are located in the United States as a contingency corps. These divisions include one airborne division and four motorized divisions of a new design that provides light vehicles offering limited troop protection while improving battlefield mobility and increasing firepower. The 10 reserve divisions make use of active Army cadres to produce varying states of readiness. Reserve divisions are armor, mechanized infantry and infantry units.

This strategy option allows the President great flexibility. Navy resources are sufficient to dispatch a carrier battle

group to the site of trouble or to create a U.S. presence as the President desires. The force structure also provides reinforcement for the initial Marine intervention forces with Army divisions designed for sustained combat, meaning the force structure can handle larger contingencies and more formidable adversaries. The Air Force provides both the lift necessary to transport the initial reinforcing Army echelons and the tactical air forces to support Army maneuver on the battlefield. Such a force structure would also accommodate requirements for low-intensity conflict, providing a civil affairs, psychological operations and special forces capability within the contingency corps supporting units.

Strategic Nuclear Forces. Since this study concerns itself with general purpose forces, assume that the President has selected the following approach to nuclear forces from among the options presented by the National Defense Staff. The small ICBM and rail-based MX were both lost in the START negotiation process, as were Minuteman II and III. The current strategic nuclear forces posture seeks to provide a secure second strike capability against the Soviet Union since that nation remains the only one capable of destroying the United States. It further seeks to extend nuclear deterrence to friendly states around the world who may be threatened by the on-going nuclear proliferation of its neighbors. As a result, the strategic nuclear arsenal contains 50 MX in silo basing; 17 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines armed with 150 Trident D5 missiles and 150 older C4 missiles; 97 B1B bombers and 100 B52Hs with air-launched cruise and short-range attack missiles. The bombers have appropriate tanker support. So equipped, the strategic nuclear force can use its bombers with great

flexibility while maintaining targeting on the Soviet Union with its SLBMs and land-based ICBMs. The Soviet Union remains covered by a strategic nuclear diad while the bomber portion of the force, which could not penetrate Soviet air defenses anyway, is used for targeting third world nuclear forces that may emerge.

In addition to its nuclear capabilities, the strategic forces package includes funding for Over the Horizon-Backscatter radar, an anti-satellite program and a space asset restoration program.

Implementation Questions. Assume that the President selects Strategic Readiness as the appropriate military strategy. The defense staff must next create a four year defense plan to support it (i.e., demonstrate that the desired forces can in fact be attained for three percent of GNP). In addition, there is the question of capability. Is the force structure described in the strategy option capable of countering the likely threats present in the future security environment?

Affordability: The Four Year Defense Plan. As the examination of defense budgeting practices in chapter two indicated, widely varied forces are possible within similar spending parameters, depending upon the allocation of funds between the services and the subsequent distribution of funds among major programs: military personnel, operations and maintenance, procurement, R, D, T & E, and others. The forces required to support the strategic readiness military strategy can be produced within the President's spending guidelines in part because the national defense staff is not constrained by service preferences and similar obstacles such as those

described in chapter four. Free of the inertia favoring the status quo, the defense staff is prepared, for the first time since the Korean War, to make radical changes in the services' roles, missions and levels of funding. Table VI-2 indicates how the defense budget might be manipulated to support the President's new military strategy.

Table VI-2: Budget Allocations by Function and Service
(Percent of Defense Budget)

Program	FY 95*	96	97	98	99	2000
Mil Pers	27	26	25	24	24	24
O&M	31	30	30	30	30	30
Procurement	26	33	34	35	35	35
R,D,T&E	13	10	10	10	10	10
Other	3	1	1	1	1	1
Service						
Army	27	26	25	24	26	27
Navy	34	35	35	35	33	33
Air Force	32	32	34	35	35	34
Defense Agencies	7	7	6	6	6	6

* 1995 figures are drawn from the *FY 1991 Budget of the United States* (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1990) p 157.

The military personnel account would decline as the force was reduced in size. The lower percentage allocated to military personnel also reflects the fact that the Army, the most manpower-intensive of the services, has been substantially reduced.

Operations and maintenance is relatively constant at levels that are the lowest since 1974. Maintaining operations and maintenance functions with this level of funding is possible only because there are relatively few active forces to support and because the Navy has severely limited its extended cruising

program. Nevertheless, it should be noted that all of the forces in the Army Contingency Corps must be kept at a high state of readiness. Combat proficiency takes time to acquire but is quick to decay with lack of training. Since these are the only forces with which the nation could respond to a threat immediately, they must be ready.

Procurement enjoys unusually high allocations in each successive budget year despite the fact that the services have relatively new major items of equipment. This is necessary to prevent "hollow" forces by stockpiling adequate spares, consumables, and perishables. In addition, elevated levels of procurement make possible the improvements in command, control, communications and intelligence alluded to in chapters one and four that will enhance the performance of the forces. The Navy ought to begin acquisition of a new carrier by 1996 in order to sustain a nine carrier force into the next century.³

Research, development, testing and evaluation and other functions receive small but constant levels of funding consistent with peacetime conditions. With no arms race in progress, and with no direct military competition with the Soviet Union, there is no basis for accelerated R, D, T & E. Other functions receive less funding as well, since military construction, family housing and related expenses will be reduced. The services, each reduced in size, will be able to live within the existing infrastructure, at least for the near term.

³Based upon current planning, the Midway and at least one Forrestal-class carrier will be retired by 1995. Another three carriers will be unavailable for deployment because of nuclear refueling and overhaul. Frank C. Carlucci, *Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1990*, p 144.

Can such a process of budget re-allocation really sustain the proposed force structure? It can. A Congressional Budget Office study examined five alternative force structures and the costs associated with each of them. In its most radical alternative force structure, which still left the Army with eight active divisions, the Air Force with 14 active tactical air wings and the Navy with 500 ships, the Congressional Budget Office concluded it could save 91.5 billion dollars.⁴ In the example under consideration here, to move from the funding levels in the current forecast 1995 budget to the three percent of GNP goal by 2000, only 81 billion dollars must be saved. There is room, in other words, for unforeseen developments while staying within the funding parameters required by the President.

Capability. No one can anticipate the specific requirements that may confront the United States in the future, but the forecasts of technical and military capabilities made earlier in this study suggest that there will be a number of formidable potential adversaries in the year 2000. It is also possible to compare the proposed force structure's capabilities with requirements from recent history's limited contingency operations and to draw conclusions about the probable adequacy of the new force.

In the case of the Korean War, the U.S. Army had a maximum of six divisions committed on the Korean peninsula as of July 1st, 1951; the Marine Corps had one (the bulk of the fighting was done in the summer of 1950 with even fewer troops). Two

⁴Congressional Budget Office, *Meeting New National Security Needs: Options for United States Military Forces in the 1990s*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1990), pp 4, 27.

National Guard divisions were in Japan, still training for deployment into combat.⁵ The proposed force structure would be able to commit similar forces, since it would have three Marine and five Army divisions immediately available (not including the two Army divisions deployed in Europe).

In the case of Vietnam, although the United States did deploy a large assortment of units, most of the Army's combat capability rested in seven divisions and two brigades. Moreover, these units were not deployed simultaneously; the build-up took place very gradually over the course of three years.⁶ The proposed force structure would be capable of meeting the demands of a similar build-up, although it would have to resort to federalization of reserves to sustain a protracted combat effort.

Turning to more recent contingencies, the operation in Panama required approximately 27,000 personnel.⁷ The Army Contingency Corps or the Marine Corps alone could provide such levels.

Although it is clear that the proposed force structure could provide combat forces at levels equal to the United States' most recent combat experiences, numbers of forces alone do not answer the question of capability. Would such a force be adequate for the circumstances that might confront the United States? Based upon the expected security environment and the

⁵James P. Finley, *The U.S. Military Experience in Korea, 1871-1982*, (Headquarters U.S. Forces Korea, 1983), p 84.

⁶Shelby L. Stanton, *Vietnam Order of Battle*, (Washington, DC: US News Books, 1981), pp 69-84. The first major combat units in Vietnam came from the 3d Marine Division. They were followed in March, 1965 by the 173d Airborne Brigade. The last major combat unit to deploy was the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division in March, 1968, responding to the Tet offensive.

⁷Author's estimate based upon the units known to have participated.


expected level of technical sophistication in likely adversaries, as discussed in chapters three and five, the proposed force structure seems adequate. The U.S. would, after all, be a first-order power, able to see and dominate by fire great expanses of any battlefield. Its ground forces, Army and Marine Corps, would have a mix of capabilities at their disposal, enabling them to fight conventional engagements or participate in unconventional warfare.

A detailed description of the entire force structure would be tedious and would detract from the broader theme of this study. However, a short description of the proposed Army new-type motorized division, mentioned only briefly above, may provide a clearer notion of one key element of the notional force structure. The motorized division, sketched in figure VI-4, would be small, agile and flexible, but with enough built-in logistics and combat support to sustain it in an extended operation. As the figure shows, it would have its own engineer support that could be turned either toward civic action projects or toward construction of defenses and the breaching of enemy obstacles. Its accompanying air defense battalion would provide low-altitude air protection to reduce the effectiveness of enemy close air support. Its communications battalion would not only link it to its higher headquarters, but would also provide the links to the new command, control, communications and intelligence capabilities. The division would also have its own maintenance and medical battalions.

The division's combat power derives from its five brigades. The two brigades equipped with LAVs provide 3000 troops in lightly armored vehicles with the agility and firepower to maneuver against and defeat most enemies. The infantry brigade

provides 2100 "light fighters" that can be employed as airmobile troops using the aviation brigade's 60 utility helicopters to transport them, or as conventional light infantry. The aviation brigade would also provide an important anti-armor capability with its 36 attack helicopters--the division's own close air support. Finally, the artillery brigade (more traditionally known as the division artillery) provides the division's fire support with 54 light howitzers and a battery of six 230 mm multiple rocket launchers.

Figure VI-4: Motorized Division



EN= Engineer AD= Air Defense
 SIG= Communications MAINT= Maintenance
 MED= Medical LAV= Light Armored Vehicle
 MPG= Mobile Protected Gun INF= Infantry
 AVN= Aviation ARTY= Artillery MLRS=
 Multiple Launch Rocket System

A contingency force, comprised of such units, could be air- and sea-lifted with relative ease, compared to the current mechanized infantry and armor divisions in the force structure of 1990. Accompanied by tactical air wings from the Air Force, such units could defeat any second- and third-order military powers that might challenge them. Indeed, exploiting the

flexibility of the motorized division, an expeditionary force could operate successfully against first-order powers as well. When confronted with a first-order adversary, the motorized forces would rely more on their firepower and armor protection, maneuvering by fire as mentioned briefly in chapter four to achieve victory. When facing less capable foes, the motorized force would also be able to exploit its capability for rapid battlefield maneuver and agility to produce victory (Of course, for the most severe military challenges, the United States would mobilize all or part of its reserve forces).

The contingency corps, with its civil affairs, psychological operations, Ranger and Special Forces units, would have the flexibility and adaptability necessary for unconventional operations as well. An expeditionary force could be deployed that would be capable of pacification, internal defense and development missions, and special operations. Although these capabilities are often associated with low-intensity conflict, they are also important for some conventional conflicts as well. Historically, unconventional and special operations have been used in roles complementary to the primary military campaigns.⁸ The special operations units assigned to the contingency corps would continue to fulfill this complementary role.

The units of the proposed force structure could deter as well as fight. In addition to the "latent violence" present in the CONUS-based Army Contingency Corps, the forces would be deployable enough to take advantage of the tactic suggested by Joshua Epstein, cited in chapter five. A small force could be sent to the scene of potential trouble before hostilities broke

⁸For example, Office of Strategic Services missions in World War II, Ranger operations in Korea and the pacification program in Vietnam.

out. Even with limited Marine forces afloat and deployed abroad, it would still be possible to project a capable force, using the airborne division and one or more of the motorized divisions, into a potential trouble spot so that the enemy would know, if he initiated hostilities, he would be confronting the U.S. through its forces already present in the region.

Considered in the context of recent history and the threats inherent in the future security environment, military technology and strategy, the proposed force structure appears to be adequate for the likely threats to U.S. security. The force structure resulted from choices based upon alternative strategic options that were crafted with both the policy preferences of the Administration and the military-technical considerations clearly in mind. One question remains: What makes this force structure the exclusive product of an alternative approach to force development?

The sheer magnitude of change is the answer. The current strategic planning process fails to integrate fully the political preferences of the Administration with the military-technical considerations of the military services. Burdened in addition with service preferences and an inability to reconsider the traditional distribution of tasks among the services, the current system could not--as chapter four demonstrated--produce such major re-adjustments to force structure.⁹ The complete integration of policy preferences

⁹Currently, a closely held defense review is being conducted for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. How far-reaching its changes will be remains to be seen. In any case, such a review is not the product of the current planning system, but is a departure from the practices of the system: further evidence that the system does not work adequately for

with military-technical issues becomes possible only when the current defense establishment is streamlined and reworked into a national defense staff free of service preferences and parochial outlooks.

The proposed force structure could result only from a new approach to strategic planning for another reason, noted by Posen. Organizations, the defense establishment included, favor incremental change. Their people are co-opted by current processes. Innovation comes only when organizations fail, when pressured from the outside, or when they wish to expand. Political-military integration, he contends, is always poor in modern states. Soldiers--or as has been shown in chapter four, members of the defense bureaucracy--elevate narrow technical requirements of preferred operations above the needs of policy.¹⁰

Conclusions. The questions posed at the beginning of this study--What sort of forces should the United States have? Can the current strategic planning process yield the forces necessary for conditions at the turn of the century? And if not, why not?--can now be answered in detail.

It is possible, as the alternative military strategy options illustrated, to design a variety of effective force packages. Except in the rarest cases, no single force package will appear superior to all others in any absolute sense. Political present circumstances. See also "Services May Face Major Changes in Size, Mission," *The Washington Post*, December 17, 1989, sec 1, p A18. The changes contemplated here are also at the margin, cancelling selected weapons, reducing service end-strengths incrementally, saving \$39 billion as opposed to the \$81 billion considered here.

¹⁰Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, pp 47, 53, 54.

preferences matter as much as military-technical capabilities in designing forces. The effectiveness of any force structure will change as circumstances evolve and adversaries act to counter the most dangerous attributes of the force as they perceive it. Force structure must evolve to fit the changing conditions in which it will operate. That said, it appears for the time frame under consideration here, that a military establishment built along the lines of that in the illustrative force structure would meet the nation's needs. More specifically, an Army contingency force built around highly mobile, agile and lightly armored vehicles provides the sustained ground combat capabilities desired at a price the nation will pay.

It seems doubtful, however, that the current strategic planning system can produce such forces. The current process is only capable of small, incremental changes: far less sweeping than the amount of change contemplated by the illustrative example. Nor does the current planning system conceive of forces in the same way. Instead of conceiving of active forces as the asset used to counter the most likely threats and reserve forces against the threats most dangerous to national survival, the current planning system attempts to build forces for the worst case and treats all other contingencies as lesser included cases. There is thus a tremendous "conceptual distance" between the current strategic planning system and the one contemplated in chapter five: a distance the current planning system cannot overcome.

Nor is the conceptual distance the only problem. The strategic planning process includes so many actors and organizations it is structurally incapable of major change. As the illustrative cases in chapter four indicated, the current

process can barely keep up with current business. Within the defense establishment itself, neocorporatist practices result in brokered decisions that distribute benefits equally among the services, preserve the status quo and protect each service's own realm of operations. This internal neocorporatism would naturally resist any change, such as the illustrative force structure, that would upset the carefully brokered relationship between the services and the other agencies within the defense establishment.

Beyond the defense establishment, where Congress and the Executive Branch must bargain over the operation of the military, bureaucratic politics influences their relations and the outcomes they reach on military issues. This relationship, based in the constitution's distribution of powers in articles one and two, nevertheless produces what E.S. Corwin has called an "invitation to struggle."¹¹ In this struggle, the Congress with its control of appropriations is often a match for the President as Commander-in-Chief. Thus problems of defense planning brought by the structural rigidity found under the neocorporatist operations of the extended defense establishment are further compounded by the bureaucratic political bargaining that goes on between Congress and the President, which often disturbs carefully developed plans by the military services.¹²

But the flaws in the current strategic planning process do not result solely from organizational or constitutional problems. The most fundamental problem confronting current

¹¹E.S. Corwin, *The President, Office and Powers*, (New York: New York University Press, 1948), pp 208-14.

¹²See, for example, then-Secretary of the Army Marsh's complaint in the FY 89 Army Posture Statement about how subsequent budget reductions by Congress caused reprogramming within the Army budget and POM. Department of the Army, *Army Posture Statement FY 89*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1988), P 3.

strategic planning practices is that policy and military-technical issues have been separated from each other. No integrated, coherent consideration of the two together is undertaken. Instead, both policy and military-technical concerns are scattered over a large bureaucracy that makes decisions on individual questions in isolation from each other.

If Posen's criticism, noted earlier, that the military departments have raised military-technical issues to be the principal concerns is accurate, then the defense establishment has not only failed to consider policy and military-technical questions together, it has promoted the wrong group of issues to the fore. As Clausewitz noted:

...for the conduct of war, the point of view that determines its main lines of action, can only be that of policy... We can now see that the assertion that a major military development, or the plan for one, should be a matter of purely military opinion is unacceptable and can be damaging.¹³

No military reform effort can correct all of the problems that keep the defense establishment from producing appropriate forces. Certainly the difficulties resulting from the relationship between the President and the Congress are resolvable only through a constitutional amendment: an unlikely prospect. Nevertheless, military reform can correct many of the difficulties that result from the neocorporatist nature of the current extended defense establishment. Creation of a small national defense staff in lieu of the multiple layers of military services, Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of

¹³Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p 607.

Defense would be one step that would provide a single locus for consideration of policy and military-technical issues and that could consider all of the ways, means, ends, and preferences that are part of the strategic planning business in an integrated and coherent fashion.

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