



**Research Product 90-32** 

### Implementation Guide for Assessing Intelligence Production Effectiveness



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September 1990

Fort Huachuca Field Unit Systems Research Laboratory

**U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences** 

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
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### Implementation Guide for Assessing Intelligence Production Effectiveness

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### FOREWORD

A concern of the U.S. Army intelligence Center and School is the development of methods for assessing military intelligence. The Implementation Guide for Assessing Military Intelligence provides the division commander and G2 a low cost method of determining how well intelligence is meeting the needs of the command. While the guide is primarily directed at assessment within an operational environment, it also has implications for instruction within the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School.

The Implementation Guide is a result of research conducted within the Fort Huachuca Field Unit of the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences under a contract to Science Applications International Corporation. The project was sponsored by the Directorate of Training and Doctrine, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, in a Letter of Agreement dated 14 March 1986. The Implementation Guide was provided to the Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School.


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The authors are grateful to the 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colorado for permitting us to use its time and personnel to evaluate this methodology during a command post exercise. The lessons learned from implementing the methodology in the 4th Infantry Division exercise have been incorporated throughout this guide.

XX FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE



\*Observer-Participant (See Section 2, Personnel)

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The Assessment Methodology Includes Exchanges of Information Needs, Rating, Diagnosis, and Feedback

### IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE FOR ASSESSING INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION EFFECTIVENESS

### PROLOGUE

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The schematic on the preceding page is a summary of the Military Intelligence Unit Effectiveness Assessment Methodology. It involves the exchange of information needs, the rating of intelligence output, the diagnosis of intelligence production deficiencies, and feedback to the commander and G2.

### TO THE COMMANDER

As the commander, you have many tools to use to assess effectiveness within your command. The Skill Qualification Tests, the Army Training and Evaluation Programs, and your own internal assessment programs provide information you need to determine your command's capabilities to carry out its mission.

The method for assessing intelligence production effectiveness described in this guide is a tool designed for you to use in an operational setting to determine how well intelligence is meeting the needs of your command. The method can be used in command post or field training exercises where intelligence must serve many organizational elements or where intelligence production is limited.

This methodology has low overhead. It doesn't take a dedicated division team or outside team of evaluators to implement. It will provide you a pragmatic view of how the intelligence staff is supporting the divisional command and control. It also provides a way for the divisional personnel to improve their ability to communicate their intelligence information needs and the standards used to judge the intelligence. Finally, it provides a feeder mechanism for intelligence training that will enhance division command and control performance.

### TO THE G2

This Implementation Guide for Assessing Intelligence Production provides you a tool for measuring and assessing how well your section meets the intelligence needs of the command. It permits you to look at performance inside the intelligence production system-based intelligence requirements, standards, and assessments from the division user. It provides you a method for isolating production areas that need improving from those that don't and can give you insight into how to improve the usefulness of intelligence for the user. In addition, the method will identify functional problems outside the intelligence infrastructure that may have been incorrectly attributed to Military Intelligence.

### IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE FOR ASSESSING INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION EFFECTIVENESS

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### IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE FOR ASSESSING INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION EFFECTIVENESS

### SECTION 1

### INTRODUCTION

The methodology presented in the Implementation Guide is driven by the users of intelligence. It depends on users identifying their intelligence requirements and judging how well the requirements have been met. Figure 1 shows the steps required in the assessment. Using the tools provided, the user of intelligence first identifies and prioritizes his information requirements. Then, using a simple procedure, he determines the standards he uses to judge the information he receives. Finally, he rates the information he received. The analysis of the ratings results in a pattern of intelligence production performance that is used to determine where deficiencies might be occurring within the intelligence production process. The ratings are also used to develop a diagnostic plan to determine the causes for the deficiencies. Then the intelligence production system is diagnosed. The result of the diagnosis, along with the patterns of performance and the ratings, form the basis of the feedback to the commander and G2.

### Organization of the Implementation Guide

Section 2 covers who is involved in the assessment. It describes the qualifications the participants should have and the roles they play in the assessment. Section 3 discusses the administrative procedures necessary to plan and implement the assessment. The next four sections, identified in Figure 1, cover the steps necessary to carry out the assess ent, diagnosis, and Each step includes the procedures and forms necessary feedback. to carry out the step and administrative concerns relevant to the completion of the step. Section 4 covers the procedures necessary to identify and prioritize the information requirements and identify standards used to assess intelligence. Section 5 discusses the steps the user must take to rate the information received from intelligence. Section 6 provides suggestions for analyzing the user ratings. Section 7 provides guidelines for planning and diagnosing intelligence production deficiencies. Section 8 offers suggestions for providing feedback.

**Identify and Prioritize** STEP 1 Information Requirements Section 4 **Determine Standards for** STEP 2 the Information Section 4 Rating the Information STEP 3 Received Section 5 Analyze the Ratings STEP 4 Section 6 **Determine Where Deficiencies** STEP 5 Might Have Occurred Section 6 Develop a Diagnostic Plan STEP 6 Section 7 Diagnose the Intelligence STEP 7 Information Processing System Section 7 STEP 8 **Provide Feedback** Section 8

Figure 1. Overview of the steps in the intelligence assessment methodology.

### SECTION 2

### PERSONNEL

The assessment methodology is implemented by a team of soldiers each having specific responsibilities, some which are done individually and others done as part of the team effort. This section identifies the team members, their roles, and general qualifications. The team has three roles: the administration of the assessment, the assessment of Military Intelligence performance, and the diagnosis of deficiencies in the production of intelligence. The size of the team is as large or as small as is warranted by the exercise and assessment objectives.

### A. COMMANDER AND G2.

Although the commander and the G2 may not be involve in the actual assessment, they are critical to the assessment. They have made the decision to do the assessment and it is carried out under their authority. The results of the assessment are provided to the G2 and the commander through the G2. Therefore, each has a vested interest to ensure the assessment is conducted as completely, effectively, and efficiently as possible.

### B. ASSESSMENT TEAM CHIEF.

Role: The assessment team chief manages the assessment. He is the administrative component of the assessment team. He is responsible for assembling and training the other team members. With assistance of the other team members, he determines how the assessment methodology can best be implemented, ensures the other teams members have the time and resources to carry out their functions, and serves as the liaison for the team.

- Qualifications: The assessment team chief should be knowledgeable of the division intelligence operations and personnel. He should be able to easily communicate with personnel at all levels of the division command and within its operations.
- Suggested Candidate: Deputy G2 or Military Intelligence Battalion Executive Officer

### C. INTELLIGENCE USERS.

Role:	The users of intelligence are the soldiers who will assess how well the intelligence information production system is working. They are active participants in the exercise and at the same time assess how well the information received met their intelligence needs. Because they are active participants, they will be referred to as OBSERVER-PARTICIPANTS in the rest of this guide
	in the rest of this guide.

- Qualifications: Since the observer-participants are active participants in the exercise, it is required they have some knowledge and experience in the mission related role they will be playing.
- Suggested Candidate: Officers from G3 Operations and Plans, the Fire Support Element, Targeting, the Division Airspace Management Element (DAME), etc. Representatives of subordinate command echelons may be included.

### D. DIAGNOSTICIANS.

- Role: The diagnostician will try to determine the reasons for the deficiencies identified by the observer-participants.
- Qualifications: The diagnostician must have experience in Military Intelligence and know intelligence doctrine. He must know or learn the Standard Operating Procedures for the division G2 section being assessed.
- Suggested Candidate: Any senior 350B Military Intelligence Warrant Officer.

### SECTION 3

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### ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

While the administrative burden for the assessment falls on the assessment team chief, all members of the team should be aware of the overall requirements of the methodology. This will help each person better understand the various roles and how everyone contributes to the assessment.

The administrative procedures concern those involved in planning and organizing the assessment and those that must be carried out during the exercise.

### A. SELECTING THE TEAM MEMBERS.

Assessment Team Chief:	The commander or his designate must make this selection.
Observer-Participants:	The assessment team chief should prepare a list of recommended observer-participants representative of key division staff agencies and functions. Approval of the list should be made by the commander or his designee. How many and who should be on the list depends on the purpose and desired scope of the assessment.
EXAMPLE	If the assessment is to be conducted in a short duration2 5 daysdivision headquarters and staff command post exercise intended to shake out staff planning procedures, the observer-participants may be limited to one from G3 Plans and one from G3 OPS.
	If the assessment is to be conducted during a Divisional Field Training Exercise with a control cell and all organization elements, maneuver and staff, participating or conducting

participating or conducting operations, then numerous observer-participants are needed to ensure assessment of the broadest aspects of intelligence production and support. All staff agencies, selected special staff, and alternate command posts should be considered.

Diagnostician:

The team chief should submit a name for approval to the commander or his designee based on the qualifications mentioned previously. One diagnostician is enough unless the exercise environment is so extensive that it might require full shift coverage for diagnosis.

Upon approval, team members should be made available for the assessment training at least two weeks before the start of the exercise. Two weeks is a rule of thumb, but team members must be trained and exercise administrative details worked out before the assessment can be implemented.

In addition, the assessment team chief must perform the following administrative duties:


### B. BRIEFING THE KEY STAFF.

While the commander may have informed his staff an assessment will be done, it is a good idea to provide key staff members more detail. Since headquarters or unit soldiers are being used as observer-participants, it is only right that the key staff members know who from their staff are participating, what is going to be done, and how much time it is going to take. In fact, the key staff should be consulted for recommendations for the observer-participants roles.

If a group briefing can not be done, each key staff member must be told what the assessment entails. This may be done if and when the key staff is consulted to provide names for the assessment team.

### C. TRAINING THE TEAM.

It is the responsibility of the team chief to train the rest of the team. If this is the first time he has administered an assessment, his knowledge will be as limited as the other team members. The training should be considered a team effort, with team members helping each other. An example training-time plan is shown in Figure 2. The events can occur within the windows indicated by the triangles, but no later. To facilitate such a situation, all team members need to receive copies of the



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Figure 2. An example schedule for observer-participant training.

## TIME TO EXERCISE

implementation guide well before the scheduled training period. By training time, everyone should be prepared to discuss the assessment procedures.

NO LESS THAN 8 HOURS SHOULD BE ALLOTTED FOR ASSESSMENT TEAM TRAINING TIME. THE SUCCESS OF THE ASSESSMENT IS BUILT UPON THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE PREASSESSMENT TRAINING.

The goal of the training is to ensure that everyone--team chief, observer-participants, and diagnostician--knows what forms to use and when and how to use them. If possible, a practical exercise should be part of the training to give the observerparticipants experience filling in the forms. Also, the observer-participants need to know how the data they produce will be analyzed so that it can be used by the diagnostician. Finally, everyone needs to know the administrative procedures that will be followed during the exercise. These procedures need to be established during the team training meeting.

### D. CONDUCTING A PRE-EXERCISE CONFERENCE.

The entire team must meet before the exercise begins. The purposes of this meeting are to review the assessment administrative procedures that will be in effect, hand out and ensure everyone has enough forms, and obtain the initial information requirements profile and benchmarks from the observer-participants.

### E. PREPARING ASSESSMENT MATERIALS.

All team members must have a copy of the Implementation Guide for their training. All the forms, in the appropriate quantities, needed by the observer-participants and diagnostician should be provided at the preconference exercise. Blank forms are in the appendices and can be reproduced in whatever quantity is necessary.

There are administrative assessment procedures for which the team chief should get input from the observer-participants. The details of these procedures need to be determined during the training session.

### F. RATING MI PERFORMANCE.

The team should decide the best time in each exercise day to rate MI performance. The best time may depend on the nature and length of the exercise, as well as the objectives for the assessment. Whatever the time frame for rating, all observerparticipants must rate MI performance within the same time window. In determining when to rate, the team should consider:

The amount of intelligence each observerparticipant will be getting within the selected time interval. The interval should not be so long that it would be difficult to remember the intelligence that had been used, nor so short that there is little to assess.

The natural breaks which provide good assessment points. For example, at the end of shift or before the beginning of the next shift may be good times to take the time necessary to do the rating. Also, natural phases of the exercise are meaningful points to assess. For example, rating after the planning phase, after an attack, etc., assess how well intelligence was provided for that phase.

The observer-participants duties and responsibilities during the exercise. It takes time to rate. Even though the observer-participant is committed to assessing, he is still an active player and the assessment can not interfere with the exercise.

If it becomes necessary to change the rating period, the assessment team chief must inform all members of the team so they can rate within the new time window.

### G. DATA COLLECTION.

Ratings must be analyzed by the team chief and diagnostician in order for the diagnostician to carry out his function. The team should determine the time window to complete the rating and the best means to get the ratings to the team chief. Most likely, how the ratings are delivered will depend on the physical layout of the exercise and the distribution of observer-participants within it.

### H. QUALITY CONTROL OF THE DATA.

The success of the assessment depends on the quality of the data that is collected. Each individual on the team knows what is required of him and how to accomplish his responsibilities. Each is responsible for the quality control of their own data. If the diagnostician or the observer-participants run into any problems in data collection that they cannot resolve, they need to take the problem to the team chief immediately.

Additional administrative concerns are addressed later in each section.

### SECTION 4

### INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

The assessment of MI information production effectiveness is based on how well MI has satisfied the information requirements of the observer-participant. The first step in the assessment is to determine the information requirements of the various observer-participants. This is done by the observer-participants assigning weights to the information items in a list of information requirements. The weights produce an information requirements profile. Once weighed, the observer-participant determines the standards he will use to judge the information he receives (Step 2).

### A. INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS PROFILE.

A copy of a blank Information Requirements Profile is shown in Figure 3. A copy of the profile, the definitions of the terms in the profile, and a complete set of directions for weighing the items are in Appendix A.

### B. <u>DESCRIPTION OF THE PROFILE</u>.

In the box at the top left corner of the Information Requirements Profile are abbreviated instructions on how to complete the profile. The first time the form is completed, the full set of directions (Appendix A-2) need to be used. After that, the abbreviated set can be used.

Below the instructions in the left hand vertical column is the list of information requirements. The column is divided into four major sections:

> BATTLEFIELD AREA ENEMY SITUATION ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION OPERATIONS SECURITY

These headings characterize the kind of information item found in the section. They also provide the most general level of definition.

Each of the major sections are broken down into sub-sections. For example, BATTLEFIELD AREA has three kinds of information items, weather, terrain, and battlefield area conditions. The subsections also have general definitions.

Each subsection contains the information items. Each item has a more specific definition than the major sections or subsections. The individual information items will be weighed.

### INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS PROFILE

2. As 3. As	sign zero to any information items you do not want. sign 100 to your most important information items, sign a number between 0 and 100 to remaining items reflect the relative importance of the item.	POSITION	
i. Lis 89	t specific data items you want emphasized under secial notes	IMPORTANCE WEIGHT (0 - 100)	SPECIAL NOTES
1	Weather		
	Weather situation		
RE	Weather effects on EN		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
₹,	Terrein		
EFIELD	Terrain situation		
분	Terrain effects on EN		
	Terrain effects on FR		
_ `	Battlefield area conditions Existing battlefield conditions		
BA.	Effects on EN operations		
	Effects on FR operations		
	EN Disposition and composition		
	Forward trace	╺┼╼╍╌┾	
	Unit locations		······································
	Combat support		
	Echelonment		
	Reserves		
	Staging areas		
	Combat service support		
ž	Air Forces		
ENEMY SITUATION	52 Strength of EN forces by echelon	_ <u>+</u>	
₹ `	Readiness by echalon		
E	Supply status/rates by echelon		
≥	Enemy critical nodes/HPTs		
N.	1.evel of EN morale		
Ľ	Strength of Air Forces NBC		
,	Recent/present significant activities		
	Combat action	1 1	
	Maneuver/movement		
	C2 activity		
	Sustainment Intelligence activities		
	Enumerate Possible ECOAs		
	Mission		
z	Objectives		
₫	Forces		
ទ្ធ	Terrain considerations		
	Echelonment		
0	Fires (including air support)		····
ŭ	Time/Distance factors		
OURSES OF ACTION	Threat advance		
	Probability		
ں ≥	Analysis of Probable ECOAs Enemy strengths		
ENEMY	En Vulnerabilities		······································
Ī	Friendly high value targets		
-	Enemy Intentions		
	EN RECCE/Intelligence		
	EN RECCEAntelligence capabilities		
	Recent RECCE/Intelligence activities/indicators Effects of EN Intelligence on FR operations		
	EN Redio Electronic Combat		
	REC capabilities		
Ę	Recent & significant REC activities	_	
ត្ត	Effects of REC on FR operations		
3	EN Special Operations EN special operations, capabilities		
g	Recent/significant EN special operations		
ĝ.	Effects of EN special operations on FR operations		
5	Friendly Vulnerabilities		
OPERATIONS SECURITY	Friendly high value targets		
	Effects of winerabilities on FR operations		
	Deception		
	<u>Deception capabilities</u> <u>Recent/significant deception activities</u>		

Figure 3. An information Requirements Profile Form

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ۍ ۱ In the center column, the observer-participant places the weights he assigns the information item.

The "special notes column" is not part of the weighing procedure. The observer-participant can identify specific requirements concerning that item.

EXAMPLE An observer-participant may not only be interested in the weather situation in general, but may also be interested if there will be 30 mph winds between 0400 and 0600. He would make that note in the special notes column.

C. <u>STEP 1, PROCEDURES FOR IDENTIFYING AND PRIORITIZING</u> <u>INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS</u>.

1. Reviewing the Information Items.

The observer-participant reviews each item and its definition (Appendix A-3) to ensure he knows their meaning. The definitions should be referred to during weighing when the observer-participant has any doubt about the meaning of an item. The review is an important step because it helps establish consistent meanings for an observer-participant and between different observer-participants.

2. Initial Weighing.

All items are reviewed as to their importance within the specific rating period. For example, if the rating period is the planning phase, the importance of the items would be relative to the planning phase.

The items that are most important are given 100 points. If there are any items the observer-participant does not want during that period, they are given a 0. There is no limit to the number of items that can be given 100 or 0.

EXAMPLE As seen in Figure 4, the most important items and the items not needed have been identified. Seven items were identified as being most important, i.e., given 100 points. Two items were not needed, i.e., given 0 points. The items without assigned weights are needed, but are less important than those having the 100. Every remaining item in the requirements list must have a weight from 0 to 100.

	INFORMAT	ION REQUIREMENTS PRO	OFILE
INST	RUCTIONS:	NAME	
2. A	ssign zero to any information items you do not want- ssign 100 to your most important information items.		
l x	ssign a number between 0 and 100 to remaining items preflect the relative importance of the item. Ist specific data items you want emphasized under	DATE	
	special notes	IMPORTANCE WEIGHT (0 - 100)	SPECIAL NOTES
	Weather		
<	Weather situation Weather effects on EN		
AREA	Weather attacts on FR		
	Terrein		
BATTLEFIELD	Terrain situation		
Ē	Terrain effects on FR		
ĪĒ	Battlefield area conditions		
	Existing battlefield conditions		
٣	Effects on EN operations		
	EN Disposition and composition		
	Forward trace	100	
	Unit locations	100	
	Main efforts		
	Echelonment		
	Reserves		
	Staging areas		
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Figure 4. The Information Requirements Profile completed for the most important items and the items not needed.

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3. Determining Relative Weights.

The remaining items, one at a time are compared to the items given the weight of 100. The question which needs to be answered is, how important is that item, compared to the most important items. The item is given points accordingly. For example, if the item was half as important it would be given 50; if the item was almost as important, but not quite, it might be given a 90; if the item was needed but not very important in relation to the most important items, it might be given a 10 or 15; and if the item is as important as the other 100s, it is given 100.

4. Review of Weights.

The weights need to be reviewed to ensure that all items have been weighed and the reviewer has a chance to look at all the weighings as a group. Any changes to the weights can be made at this time, as illustrated in Figure 5.

### D. IMPORTANCE OF THE WEIGHING.

The weights are used in the assessment procedure to determine how well MI has met the observer-participant's needs. The weights may also be used to determine priorities for diagnosing the information production function.

### E. STEP 2, DETERMINING THE STANDARDS FOR THE INFORMATION.

It is necessary for the observer-participant to determine the standards he will use to assess the information he receives from intelligence. This is done by identifying, on a series of scales, the point where acceptable information becomes unacceptable. This point is the benchmark for later determining MI effectiveness. There are five dimensions which can be used to assess information: timeliness, frequency, operational perspective, clarity, and completeness.

### F. DESCRIPTION OF THE DIMENSIONS AND SCALES.

The five dimensions with their scale and the directions for setting benchmarks are found in Appendix A. The timeliness dimension and scale is shown in Figure 6. Since each of the scales for the five dimensions are in the same format, only one is described. At the top of the page is the name of the dimension, Timeliness, in this case. Next is the definition and explanation

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Figure 5. The weighed and reviewed information Requirements Profile.

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### TIMELINESS

TIMELINESS - is a measure of whether the information item was received in time for the user to take action on it. Timeliness applies to situations where there is no stated operational deadline for the information, but a window exists during which the user must take action based on that specific information.

### Timeliness Scale:

1. Item received and user had ample time to take operational action within the time window.

2. Item received in time to take action, but user had to rush.

3. Item received in time to take action, but user had to rush and use additional resources.

- 4. Item received too late for user to take action.
- 5. Item not received.

FIGURE 6. The timeliness dimension and scale.

of the dimension. Following the definition is the scale. It has five levels numbered 1 through 5. One (1) on the scale is meant to represent the best possible case, the 5 is meant to represent the worst case. The items in between represent different degrees of performance between the best and worst cases.

- G. DETERMINING THE BENCHMARKS.
  - 1. For any dimension review the five levels of performance indicated by the scales.
  - 2. Select the point on the scale that best describes the minimum level of performance which would be acceptable to you.
  - 3. Draw a line under that scale number.
  - 4. Review the items under that line to ensure they describe performance unacceptable to you. If not, redetermine the benchmark.


EXAMPLE As seen in Figure 6, a line has been drawn between Items 3 and 4. Therefore, any item rated 4 or 5 by the observer-participant indicates unacceptable performance on timeliness.

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### H. ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS.

Initial weighing and setting benchmarks are done during the preexercise conference and subsequently during the exercise within the time windows determined by the assessment team. The new weights and benchmarks completed during the exercise should be turned over to the team chief with the rating form. During the exercise, weighing and setting benchmarks will always take place after the rating and will be done in relation to the next rating period.

The time schedule shown in Figure 7 indicates EXAMPLE that the first weighing is done in the preexercise conference, which is held within two days of the exercise start. The rating period for the exercise is 12 hours. Within the window the assessment of MI performance for the preceding 12 hours occurs. When that is completed, the second weighing is done for the next 12 hour period. The cycle continues for the 48 hour exercise shown. The arrows pointing to left indicate the assessment is for previous 12 hours. In contrast, arrows to the right indicate that weighing is to be done in terms of the next 12 hours.



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### SECTION 5

### RATING MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PERFORMANCE

Sometime after the observer-participants begin to receive and use intelligence, they will rate how well the information met their requirements. Each item will be assessed and rated on the five dimensions for the rating period previously determined. The ratings will be analyzed by the team chief and diagnostician. The analysis will form the basis for the diagnosis of the intelligence production system and performance feedback to the commander and G2.

### A. <u>PERFORMANCE RATING FORM</u>.

A blank copy of Part 1 of the Performance Rating Form is shown in Figure 8. Part 2 follows the same format. A copy of the rating form and instructions on how to do the rating are in Appendix B.

### B. DESCRIPTION OF THE RATING FORM.

At the left of the rating form is the column containing the five dimensions used to rate the information items. Each dimension, timeliness, frequency, operational perspective, clarity, and completeness are described by five point scales. The description for each level of the scale is abbreviated. The complete scales are located in Appendix A. There is also a box to check in order to identify the benchmark.

The next column gives examples of the kinds of deficiencies that could occur for the dimension on the left. The lists are not inclusive.

The third column contains the information item. These are the same items, in the same format, that are in the Information Requirements Profile. To the right of the information items are the columns to be filled in when rating intelligence performance. Each column is headed by the dimension on which the information item will be rated.

### C. STEP 3, RATING MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PERFORMANCE.

1. Review the Five Scales.

When the time window opens for the first rating of the information items, the observer-participant should review the definitions and scales for the five dimensions (Appendix A). On later ratings, the review needs to be done only as necessary since abbreviated scales are on the rating forms.

# **Performance Rating Form**

### (part 1 of 2)

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Figure 6. Part 1 of the Pert

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2. Rate Timeliness.

Each information item is rated on timeliness by determining which scale value, 1 through 5, represents how well that information item was provided. Starting with the first item on the Performance Rating Form, weather situation, the scale value selected is placed in the column "timeliness rating". Each item on the list is rated for timeliness until all the items have been rated. If any of the items were not received, give a scale value of 5 and draw a line across the page in the row for those items. If not received, an item cannot be rated on the other dimensions.

- NOTE: An information item may have been received more than once during the rating period. The procedure requires a rating for the information item in general. Thus, it is left up to the observer-participant to determine a final judgment for a composite of items.
- EXAMPLE Figure 9 is an example of the second page of the Performance Rating Form completed for the timeliness rating. Note there were four items not received. They were given ratings of 5 and cannot be assessed on the other dimensions. In addition, three items were rated as having been received too late for any action to be taken, e.g. given ratings of 4. Two items were given 3 ratings because they were received in time to take action, but the observer-participant had to rush and use extra resources to accomplish the desired follow-up action. All the other items were received in time to take the appropriate action.
- 3. Rate Frequency.

After all the items have been rated for timeliness, they are rated for frequency. The rating is done in the same manner. Each information item is rated on frequency by determining the scale value, 1 through 5, which represents how well the item was provided. Starting with the first item on the Performance Rating Form, the scale value selected is placed in the column "frequency rating." The same procedure is carried out for all the remaining items, except those that were rated 5 for timeliness.

# **Performance Rating Form**

### (part 2 of 2)

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- EXAMPLE Frequency ratings have been added to the previous example (Figure 10). The ratings indicate that four items, rated 4, were not received often enough, and one item, rated 2, came too often, but was not disruptive. The rest were received often enough.
- 4. Rate Operational Perspective.

The procedure for rating operational perspective is done in the same manner as the timeliness and frequency ratings. However, in addition to the scale value being placed in the column "operational perspective--rating," the observer-participant needs to describe the deficiency. Sample deficiencies are listed on the Performance Rating Form. The deficiencies A through G, are examples of aspects of the information which would result in an observer participant being unsure as to why the information was received. For example, if the information did not relate to either the area of operations or the area of interest, it would lack operational perspective.

If one of the sample deficiencies describes the deficiency in the item, the letter from the sample list is put in the column "operational perspective--deficiencies." If the deficiency in the item is not in the sample list, an abbreviated description of the deficiency should be written in the column.

- EXAMPLE The previous example is further expanded to include operational perspective (Figure 11). One item is a 4 in that it didn't relate to current or future operations. The remaining items were rated either 2 or 3. Two of the items were deficient in "area of interest." (Item B from the sample Operational Perspective Deficiencies List). Although not shown in this example, an item may have more than one deficiency, thus more than one letter per item can be put in the deficiency column.
- 5. Rate Clarity.

The procedure for rating clarity is the same as that used to rate operational perspective. Scale ratings are selected and placed in the appropriate column for each item. Deficiencies are identified by either a letter from the sample deficiency list or writing in the deficiency. An item may have more than one clarity deficiency. Performance Rating Form

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## (part 2 of 2)

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# **Performance Rating Form**

# (part 2 of 2)

SAMPLE OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE DEFICIENCIES OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE NOT RELATED TO: A Aven of Operations of Apprentice	D Interiors of Ingrine, James, or adjacent units E Unit contrigency planes in Phaces or in Annorage F FRI capabilities without its current or future ope O EM capabilities without its current or future ope	SAMPLE CLARITY DEFICIENCIES A Porty organized of Too technical Too auch jergen M Too technical C Too damid I Explorate in wrong areas C Too darva J Content have integraphies to E Too brog accession and F Too mary accorpted K ingeograms presention and	SAMPLE COMPLETENESS DEFICIENCIES A MARDIT SAUTE A WHA A Manon O Sta M Who B Eveny H Activity N What C Terrain I Lacation O When D Wenter J UNI F Time Polity L Equipment R Hum F Time Polity L Equipment R Hum
	· - 2 <u>1</u> · - 2 <u>1</u> · - 2 · -		COMPLETENESS RATINGS         SAMPLE COMPLETENES           Match         Match <t< th=""></t<>

Ž	NANE	Timeliness	imeliness Frequency		Oberational Persoective		Clarity	5 	Completeness
<b>2</b> 3	POSITION	Rating (1 - 5)	Rating (1 - 5)	Rating (1 - 5)	Deficiencies	Rating (1 - 5)	Deficiencies	Rating (1 · 5)	Rating Deficiencies (1 - 5)
L	Enumerate Possible ECOAs								
	Mission	1	-	4					
		1	1	7					
	-	3	-	7					
	-	З	-	7					
	L	2		Ţ				$\left\{ \right\}$	
20	_	/ /	4	3	8				
			4	2					
		S							
	Threat advance	5	}	}				Ţ	
	L.,	-	~	て					
	Analysis of Probable ECOAs								
-	Enemy strengths	4	-	4					
12	_	4	*	7					
	Friendiy high value targets	S	{			$\left[ \right]$			
	Enerty intentions	4	4	*	B				
L	EN RECCEMINIQUICO								
_	EN RECCE/Intelligence capabilities	-	1	٣					
-	Recent intel activities/indicators		-	n					
_	Effects of EN intel on FR operations		7	2					
~	EN Radio Electronic Combat			(					
-0	REC canabilities	-	-	m				ļ	
	Becent & significant REC activities	1	-	~					
33	<b>B</b> Effects of REC on FR operations		1	~					
3				1					
	Q EN special oos capabilities	1	-	2					
	_	1		3					
	_		- 7 - 1	3					
-ac	Friendly Vulnerabilities								
	Friendly high value targets			~					
_	Effects of vulnerabilities on FR operations	-	-	~					
_	Deception								
	Deception capabilities	-		-					
	Recent & significant deception activities	-	<b>`</b>	~					
	Effects of deception on FR operations		-	m					_

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- EXAMPLE The previous example is expanded to include clarity (Figure 12). Eight of the items had deficiencies. Three had only 1, three had 2 and the rest had 3 deficiencies. Deficiency A "poorly organized" was the most frequent deficiency.
- 6. Rate Completeness and Reestablish Benchmarks.

Completeness is rated in the manner as clarity. Both scale values and the letter representing the deficiency are placed in the appropriate column for each item. As before, an item may have more than one deficiency. When you have completed the rating, be sure the benchmarks for each dimension have been identified.

EXAMPLE The example is now complete (Figure 13). All of the items have been rated for each of the five dimensions and the deficiencies, where appropriate, have been identified.

NOTE THAT THE BENCHMARKS FOR EACH DIMENSION ARE IDENTIFIED.

7. Quality Control.

After the Performance Rating Form has been completed, it should be reviewed to make sure all the items have been rated and the deficiencies identified. The form should be turned in to the team chief according to the procedure determined in the training meeting. Although the observer-participants have previously established their benchmarks, they should reestablish them for each of the dimensions for each rating period, by marking the appropriate boxes in the left column.

#### D. ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS.

The ratings take time, but because of their importance to the assessment, they must be accomplished. The ratings must also be passed to the team chief and diagnostician so that timely diagnostics and feedback can be given. It is the responsibility of the observer-participant to do what is necessary to accomplish the ratings. One hour should be enough to complete the ratings, although the time it takes will vary depending on the amount of information received, the number of deficiencies, and the experience of the observer-participant in doing the ratings.

The procedure outlined above represents one found to be fast and effective. If the observer-participant develops a different procedure which is comfortable to him, that is acceptable. The primary requirements are accurate and complete ratings.

# Performance Rating Form

## (part 2 of 2)

SAMPLE OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE	DEFICIENCIES OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE NOT RELATED TO: A Area of Operations C TamphenyAmation of operation D Manimum of Inform, 2 many, or operation		SAMPLE COMPLETENESS DEFICIENCIES METLE SAUTE SWH A Marin 0 Star W Who A Marin 0 Star W Who C Terrin 1 London 0 When C Terrin 1 London 0 When E Trons K Time 0 Why F Terrine Marine 0 Why F Terrine Marine 1 Explored R How
	0-FEALTIONAL PERSPECTIVE RATINGS OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE RATINGS Obstant Range Obstant Range	CLARITY RATINGS CLARITY RATINGS CLARITY RATINGS CONTRACT RATINGS CONTRACT RATINGS CONTRACT RATINGS CONTRACT RATINGS CONTRACT RATINGS	7 Response service se

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NAME		Timeliness	Frequency	Operation	<b>Operational Perspective</b>		Clarity	l S	Completeness
DATE		Rating (1-5)	Hating (1 - 5)	Rating (1 - 5)	Deficiencies	Rating	Deficiencies	Rating	Rating Deficiencies
٣	Enumerate Possible ECOAs								
	Mission	/	/ /	2		3	æ		
_	Objectives	1	1	7		ч		Ļ	
-	Forces	Ð	/	2		9	H		
_	Terrain considerations	3	`	7		-			
	Echelonment	հ						1	
10 10	Main/supporting efforts		4	2	B	4	ABE		
-	Fires (including air support)	(	4	4		4	AET		
÷	Time/distance factors	5							
	Threat advance	S	$\prod$	$\left[ \right]$					
	Probability		-	4		5			
	unalysis of Probable ECOAs		ſ						
_	Enerry strengths	4		7		~	QA	_	
_	EN Vulnerabilities	4	*	2		~	0		
-	Friendly high value targets	γ		Ī				ļĮ	
<u>۳</u>	Enemy intentions	4	4	ŀ	8	~			
3	EN RECCE/Intelligence			ſ					
w	EN RECCE/Intelligence capabilities	1	/	3					
	Recent intel activities/indicators	1	/	3					
_	Effects of EN intel on FR operations	1	2	٣		/			
-	EN Radio Electronic Combet								
-	REC capabilities	/	/	~		1			
- Cn	Recent & significant REC activities	/	/	3		/			
_	Effects of REC on FR operations	/		٩		/			
-	EN Special Operations								
_	EN special oos capabilities	/ /	/ /	3		1			
_	Recent/significant special ops activities			S					
	Effects of EN special ops on FR ops	/	/	3		/			
-	Friendly Vulnerablibles								
_	Friendty high value targets	/	`	2					
Ľ	Effects of vulnerabilities on FR operations	/	/	3		1			
<u>م</u>	Deception								
9	Deception capabilities			~		-			
œ.	Recent & significant deception activities	/	/	3					
ш —	Effects of deception on FR operations	/	~	3		/			

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**Performance Rating Form** 

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(part 2 of 2)

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SAMPLE OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE DEFICIENCIES OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE A Aves of Operations A Aves of Operations	E Unit contregency plane in plane of the comment of Planethiker waterield to current or have ope of Planethiker waterield to current or have ope of Planethiker waterield to current or have ope SAMPLE CLARTY DEFICIENCIES A Prevy organized of Teo activities of the outer planethin waterield of the planet of the activities of the activities of the	form
THELINESS RATINGS Contained the second seco	CLUATY ANTHORS S to reveal the second secon	Figure 13. A completed Performance Rating Form

ž	NAME	Timefiness	Frequency		Constinued Boundaries			ļ	
8	POSITION	Rating	Rating		Deficiencies		Ciamy		Completeness
۶	DATE	(1 - 5)	(1 - 5)	(s-i)	Denciencies	(; - ;)	Deficiencies	Rating	Rating [Deficiencies (1 - 5)
	Enumerate Possible ECOAs								
	Mission	'	1	7		m	۲	ہے	
	Objectives		1	2		4		•	
NO	_	3	/	4		n	I		
ų		3	1	4					
)7	Echelonment	2							
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Ek	_	4	4	4		5	00		
	Friendly high value targets	ς							
_	Enerty intentions	4	4	J	ď	-		ŀ	
	EN RECCE/Intelligence					ł			
	EN RECCE/intelligence capabilities	/		~		~		~	
	Recent intel activities/indicators		1	5		-			
_	Effects of EN intel on FR operations		2	5		-		~	
<u>, 11</u>	-	1							
B	_		-	7				5	
10	_	~	-	5				3	
3\$	_	`	-	5		-		~	
SN	EN Special Operations								
101	EN special ops capabilities	`		^		1		3	
TA	Recent/significant special ops activities		-	5		1		5	HW
НЭ	Effects of EN special ops on FR ops	/		\$		-		~	
dO	Friendly Vulnerabilities								
)	Friendity high value largets	/		3		7		3	
_	Effects of vulnerabilities on FR operations	/	1	2		-		5	đ
	Deception								
	Deception capabilities			~				~	
	Recent & significant deception activities	-	1	\$		-		~	
	Effects of decention on FR operations	Ì	,	~		-		2	

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Depending on the objectives and the extent of the exercise, it may not be necessary for the observer-participants to rate all the items. There are other options.

Rating only deficient items. This is the fastest and easiest option. The observer-participant rates only those items that were deficient. The rating can occur when the deficiency is noted, or within the agreed upon time window. While an acceptable method for assessment purposes, it does not provide data on what is being done well.

Rating only the most important information items. When this is done the weights for the most important items must be a recorded on the rating form. Again, ratings can be done as deficiencies occur or during the time window. While this method is also satisfactory, it reduces the amount of data for feedback to the G2 and commander.

Rating both important information items and deficient items. This is a combination of the above. Once again, this method offers less feedback data than the suggested method.

The seriousness of the consequences of not rating all the information items must be considered. While the options permit diagnosis, they severely limit the feedback that can be given the commander and G2. In the case of rating deficient items only, the feedback can only be negative since there will be no data on the non-rated items. In the other cases, it will be difficult to track improvement in performance except for a limited number of items. As a result, the entire picture may not be presented. Potential problems may be overlooked and preventive action not taken. It is strongly recommended that the complete assessment method be implemented.

Rating all the items, while time consuming, gives a full picture for both diagnosis and feedback.

E. <u>SUMMARY</u>.

The steps necessary to rate the effectiveness of Military Intelligence information production are as follows:

- 1. Review scales and definitions for the scales.
- 2. Rate all information items using the timeliness scale.
- 3. Rate all information items using the frequency scale.

- 4. Rate all information items using the operational perspective scale and the sample operational perspective deficiencies.
- 5. Rate all information items using the clarity scale and the sample clarity deficiencies.
- 6. Rate all information items using the completeness scale and the sample completeness deficiencies.
- 7. Reestablish the benchmarks.
- 8. Review the ratings for completeness and turn in to the team chief.

#### F. IMPORTANCE OF THE RATING.

The ratings from the observer-participants are the basis of the diagnostic plan which is used to determine the cause of the deficiencies in the intelligence. The ratings also provide the basis for the feedback to the commander and G2. Thus, they are the backbone of the assessment procedure. Because of their importance, the ratings must be as accurate and as comprehensive as possible.

#### SECTION 6

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#### DIAGNOSING MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PERFORMANCE ANALYZING THE RATINGS

While the ratings provided by observer-participants form the basis for conducting an assessment, common sense and an understanding of what the unit is trying to achieve are the critical elements of a successful diagnosis. There are two phases of the diagnosis. The first phase, the analysis, includes combining the rating from data provided by the different observer-participants and analyzing the combined deficiency data. The second phase, the inquiry, involves developing an inquiry strategy for conducting the diagnosis, the actual gathering of data, data analysis, and recording of the findings.

#### A. DEFICIENCY CONSOLIDATION WORKSHEET.

The analysis of the observer-participant ratings must be done rapidly so that diagnosis can be carried out during the exercise. The Deficiency Consolidation Worksheet provides a means to rapidly record data from the various rating forms to produce a visual display of how the deficiencies cluster.

#### B. <u>DESCRIPTION\_OF\_THE\_DEFICIENCY\_CONSOLIDATION\_WORKSHEET.</u>

A copy of the worksheet is in Figure 14. Copies are also in Appendix C-1, along with instructions on its use (C-2). There are four different worksheets, one for each of the four major information categories. The worksheets are in the same format. In the left column are the information items for the information category identified at the top of the column. Across the top of the matrix and identifying the remaining columns are the five dimensions the items were rated on. A cell is described in terms of both the vertical and horizontal dimensions. For example, the cell with the A in it will contain data about the "terrain effect on the EN operation" which was deficient on operational perspective.

#### C. <u>STEP 4, ANALYZING THE RATINGS: CONSOLIDATING THE PERFORMANCE</u> RATING FORM DATA.

A deficient item is one that falls below the observerparticipant's benchmark. For example, if the benchmark for operational perspective is 3, any item rated 4 or 5 on operational perspective is deficient according to that observerparticipant. Therefore, in order to fill in the worksheet, the benchmark for each dimension for each observer-participant must be known. The benchmarks are in the left column of the Performance Rating Form. DEFICIENCY CONSOLIDATION WORKSHEET

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•	עבר	ICIENCI CONSOLID	DEFICIENCE CONSULIDATION WORKSHEET		
BATTLEFIELD AREA	Timeliness	Frequency	Oper Perspective	Clarity	Completeness
Weather situation					
Weather effects on EN					
Weather effects on FR					
Terrain situation					
Terrain effects on EN			A		
Terrain effects on FR					
Existing battlefield conditions					
Effects on EN operations					
Effects on FR operations					
Figure 14. A Deficiency Consolidation Worksheet	dation Worksheet				

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There are many procedures for filling in the worksheet. The procedure used will depend upon how many observer-participants are involved in the assessment. If there are many, say more than 10, a mechanical data consolidation is necessary. If there are fewer, the diagnostician might be able to consolidate just by looking over the Performance Rating Forms.

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The method suggested and illustrated is when there are many observer-participants. However, the diagnostician should use whatever procedure he is most comfortable with for the amount of data that must be consolidated.

- D. SUGGESTED PROCEDURE FOR COMPLETING THE WORKSHEET.
  - On each Performance Rating Form, circle the deficient ratings. For example, if the benchmark for timeliness is 3, circle all the 4s and 5s in the timeliness column. If the benchmark for frequency is 2, circle all the 3s, 4s, and 5s in the frequency column. Do the same for the other dimensions.
  - 2. When all the rating forms have been completed, place the deficient items in the appropriate cell of the consolidation worksheet. Place a line across the circled number on the rating form as the data is recorded. This should prevent recording the same data more than once.
  - 3. Record in the appropriate cell of the consolidation worksheet the position that did the rating, for example G2 OPS. For the timeliness dimension, also indicate if the item was not received. When the deficient items from an observer-participant have been recorded, a check should be placed at the top of the rating form to indicate the data has been recorded.
  - 4. Record the deficiencies for all the rating forms.
  - EXAMPLE The example uses a rating form for one observerparticipant (Figure 15) and shows one of the four completed worksheets for that observerparticipant (Figure 16). The example illustrates how the data from the rating form fell into the different cells of the consolidation worksheet. It shows that there are 15 deficiencies. Note that there are information items on the Performance Rating Form which have letters in the deficiency column, but don't have circled ratings. While that item may

# Performance Rating Form

# (part 2 of 2)

THELENESS RATINGS President Auto		NAME	Timeliness	imeliness Frequency	Operation	<b>Operational Perspective</b>		Clarity	Como	Completeness
		POSITION DATE	Rating (1 - 5)	Rating (1 - 5)	Rating (1 · 5)	Deficiencies	Rating (1 - 5)	Deficiencies	Rating (0 (1 - 5)	Rating Deficiencies (1 - 5)
		Enumerate Possible ECOAs								
3 Austral, aquint eats meruna		Mission	1	1	2		3	<	4	
		_	1		7		4		1	
		_	3		2		٣	н	2	
FREQUENCY RATINGS		-	3		2		1		4	
	Λ	Echelonment	Q							
			1	6)	3	8	Ø	A 86	2	
. "		Ľ_	/	Ø	2		¢	ACE	2	
		Ľ.	DY I							
	SAMPLE OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE	Ľ	ତ୍	}					ł	
	DEFICIENCIES	-			ľ		3	Ь	4	
5 Did net accive Access transits descentants Barnaries	OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE	Analysis of Probable ECOAs	9				1			
	NOT RELATED TO:	W Enemy strengths			4					
	A Area of Operators	EN Vulnerabilities	6	Ø	2		9	90	n	
	B Area of Interest	Friendly high value targets	SV I							
<ul> <li>Particular by second of conversion on</li> </ul>		Enemy intentions	€¢	Q	Ð,	R	£	A D	£	
	E Unit contingency plans in place or in development	EN RECCE/miniligence								
	F FR capabilities related to current of helpen opt	EN RECCE/Intelligence capabilities	~	,	7		-		-	
		Recent intel activities/indicators	1	1	~		1		m	
5 No proposite previous		Effects of EN intel on FR coerations	-	٦	٦		-		~	
CLARTY RATINGS	~				•					
Conditions of Easy to make and	A Poorty enganized G Teo technical R Ten such inner H Teo states dans	-	_				-			
		ර Recent & significant REC activities	/		-		-		7	
	7	_	-	~	-				-	
$\mathbf{X}^{-} = -$	E Teo kong necipient F Teo meny econyme K Intepropriete presentation media	EN Special Operations	•	``	~					
		1			ſ		-		~	1 N
		<u> </u>			~				~	
COMPLETENESS RATINGS	SAMPLE COMPLETENESS DEFICIENCIES									
automat Refin	METT-T SAUTE SWIH	Friendiv high value targets	-	,	3		1		~	
	20 Star	Effects of vulnerabilities on FR operations		-	5		-		~	٩
	C Tenter I Locator O Where	Deception							•	
		Deception capabilities	1	,	~		-		~	
2) 4 Mary pape with no extrimations	E Troops X Time O Wry F Time prediction L Excitoment R Haw	Recent & significant deception activities	1	~	•		-		7	
		Effects of deception on FR operations	1	1	3		/ /		2	
Figure 15. A completed flating form for one observer, the G3 Plans Officer	chearver, the G3 Plans Officer									

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DEFICIENCY CONSOLIDATION WORKSHEET

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ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION	Timokness	Frequency	Oper Perspective	Clarky	Completenese
Mission					
Objectives					
Forces					
Terrain considerations					
Echelonment	C3P- NR				
Main/supporting efforts		63P		G-3 P - ABE	
Fires (including air support)		63P		G3P - AEE	
Time/distance factors	G3P-NR				
Threat advance	G3P-NR				
Probability				G3P-J	
Enemy strengths	G3 P				
EN Vuinerabilitties	G3 P	63 P			
Friendty high value targets	G3P-NR				
Enemy intentions	G3P	G3 P	G3 P		

Figure 16. Data from Figure 15 recorded on the Deficiency Consolidation Worksheet.

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have had a deficiency, the observer-participant still rated it as acceptable.

AN ITEM TO BE DEFICIENT MUST BE RATED BELOW THE BENCHMARK.

The worksheet (Figure 16) shows that the G3 plans identified seven timeliness, four frequency, one operational perspective, and three clarity deficiencies. Note also the short hand for the position, G3P. The short hand is whatever the person filling in the form wants it to be, but anyone who has to use the worksheet later needs to know how to interpret the short hand.

EXAMPLE Figure 17 shows a Deficiency Consolidation Worksheet completed for five different observerparticipants from: FSE, G3 OPS, G3 plans, ADA, and G2 OPS. For example, it shows 13 timeliness deficiencies, 10 because the item was not received (circled and labeled A).

> The example represents the consolidation of one rating session having observer-participants for five positions. If there was more than one person rating from the same position, each identifying the same deficiency, then each deficiency must be recorded.

> If it is necessary to consolidate the deficiencies over several rating periods, a combined consolidation worksheet can be made. It is done by recording the number of times the item was rated deficient for each position. Thus, an entry, G30-nr(6) in the objectivestimeliness cell would mean that over the course of the exercise that item was rated as not received by the G3 operations on six ratings.

#### E. <u>STEP 4, ANALYZING THE RATINGS: ANALYZING OF THE DEFICIENCY</u> <u>CONSOLIDATION WORKSHEET</u>.

The worksheet presents a clustering of the deficiencies. From the clustering, the diagnostician can determine deficiencies and their priorities for diagnosing. However, the most important criteria for determining the diagnostic priorities is the objective of the exercise.

Completienee FSE - KI A - 404 . A STATE 63P- ABE 630 - A 63P - ACF 6-30 - A FSE - A 63P-J 620-A 620-A **Oper Perspective** G 3 P Frequency 160 **C**3 P 25 63 P 4 • A ~ Timelines 63 P-MR 63 P-MR 63 P-MR 63 P-MR F36-MR 63P- NR 630 - NR 63 P. NE 63 P. NE 63 P. NR 63 P. NR 63 P. NR 639 GJP ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION Fires (including air support) Friendly high value targets Main/supporting efforts Time/distance factors Terrain considerations EN Vulnerabilities Enemy strengths Enemy intentions Threat advance Echelonment **Objectives** Probability Mission Forces

**DEFICIENCY CONSOLIDATION WORKSHEET** 

Figure 17. A Deficiency Consolidation Worksheet for 5 observes participants.

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EXAMPLES If the exercise has a limited training objective, such as to train intelligence to rapidly analyze and produce targeting data, the diagnostician may want to focus on deficient items related to enemy unit locations and critical nodes/high payoff targets.

> If the training objective is the rapid handling of all intelligence information, the diagnostician may want to concentrate on timeliness deficiencies.

If the assessment environment is a full division exercise where a full range of MI functions are exercised, the diagnostician may prioritize deficiencies based on their potential effect on the outcome of the exercise.

If in doubt, the diagnostician may prioritize based on the assigned weights of the deficient items. A general rule is that it is more important to diagnose items that observerparticipants place a high weight on than an item that was assigned a low weight.

#### F. <u>STEP 5, DETERMINING WHERE DEFICIENCIES OCCUR: INTERPRETING</u> THE WORKSHEET.

Each cell represents a cluster of deficiencies. Reading down the deficiency column indicates how often the specific deficiency occurred. Reading across item row indicates how often that specific item was deficient. Looking within the cells indicates who (the position) was having the problems.

EXAMPLE An example analyses of the information on the Deficiency Consolidation Worksheet is in Figure 18. There were five observer-participants, one each from: G3 plans, G3 operations, FSE, G2 operations, and ADA. What stands out are the four items, labeled A, that neither the G3 OPS or G3 plans received. Also, timeliness errors predominate (there are 13 deficiencies listed in the timeliness column as opposed to nine in the clarity column). The G3 plans is identifying the most deficiencies (the circled data in the cells), and clarity deficiencies seem to stem from poor organization (note the A by all but one of the deficiencies in the clarity column. The A from the sample deficiency list for clarity was poor organization).

Completenese F3E-K1 APA- B (530- ABE (530- A (530- AET (530- A Carity 630-A 630-A 620-A F36-A 620-9 **Oper Perspective** AF. Frequency E 93 6 (C3) Timeliness 630-NR 63 P MA 63 P MA 63 P MA 63 C MA 63 C MA 63 P. NR 630-NR 630-NR 63P (ES) 63 ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION Friendiy high value targets A ∢ イ Fires (including air support) Main/supporting efforts Time/distance factors Termain considerations **EN Vulnerabilities** Enemy strengths Threat advance Echelonment **Objectives** Probability Mission Forces

**DEFICIENCY CONSOLIDATION WORKSHEET** 

Figure 18. Deficiency Consolidation Worksheet

Enemy intentions

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This example is for one of the consolidation worksheets. The worksheets for the other information items would be included in an actual interpretation.

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In this example, item weights are not considered. If they were to be considered, a different format for consolidation would have to be used or it would be necessary to concentrate on a particular observer-participant. In the latter case, the information requirements profile would be used along with the Performance Rating Form and worksheet.

#### SECTION 7

#### DIAGNOSING MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PERFORMANCE: THE INQUIRY STRATEGY

During this step, the plan for collecting the data necessary to determine the reasons for the deficiencies is laid out. It includes determining where to go to collect the data, determining the questions the diagnostician needs to answer, determining the best way to get the answers, and recording the data after the inquiry.

#### A. THE PLANNED INQUIRY GUIDE.

The Planned Inquiry Guide is shown in Figure 19. There is another copy in Appendix C-3, along with instructions on its use. The inquiry guide helps to organize the inquiry strategy.

#### B. DESCRIPTION OF THE PLANNED INQUIRY GUIDE.

The inquiry guide has four vertical columns, "deficiency or areas to diagnose," "potential causes," "where to start," and "questions to be answered." The columns of the guide have been left open to indicate that it may take more than one page to plan the inquiry. How many it takes, or how many deficiencies go on a page depends entirely on the diagnostician, how big he writes, how many deficiencies there are, and how he wants to organize the inquiry.

#### C. STEP 6, DEVELOP A DIAGNOSTIC PLAN: USING THE INQUIRY GUIDE.

1. Deficiency or Areas to Diagnose.

In the first column, the diagnostician should put the deficiency areas that he wants to diagnose. These were determined from prioritization of information from the Deficiency Consolidation Worksheet.

2. Potential Causes.

Filling in this column is at the discretion of the diagnostician. Because of the experience of the diagnostician, he may have some ideas on why the deficiencies occurred. He may want to note in this column some things to check out.

3. Where to Start.

The inquiry must begin somewhere. The types of deficiencies and the experience of the diagnostician are

Deficiency or Arres to Diagnose	Potential Causes	Where to Start	Question Which Must Be Answered
Figure 19. The Planned Inquiry Guide Form	E		

PLANNED INQUIRY GUIDE

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the major factors in defining a place to start seeking answers. The Information Item Deficiency to Source Matrix in Figure 20 and in Appendix C-5, is an aid to determining where to go to begin the inquiry.

Information Item Deficiency to Source Matrix:

In the left column are the major categories of information items. Across the top are the types of deficiencies. Within the cell is the recommended place to begin the inquiry.

EXAMPLE If possible courses of enemy action had not been received, the place to begin inquiry is the all source production section.

If weather information was deficient because of lack of completeness, the place to begin inquiry is G2 operations.

4. Questions Which Must be Answered.

In order to determine why the deficiencies occurred, the diagnostician must find the answers to questions based on the observed information deficiencies. The Diagnostic Question Inventory and its flow charts are aids to help determine the most appropriate questions to ask. The aids, with a complete set of directions on how to use them, are in Appendix C-6, C-7 and C-8. Using the diagnostic question inventory, the diagnostician determines the questions he wants answered. They are recorded in the "questions which must be answered" column of the inquiry guide.

#### D. DIAGNOSTIC QUESTION INVENTORY.

The question inventory contains sequenced questions, organized by type of deficiency. An example from the inventory is shown in Figure 21. The question inventory should be reviewed to ensure that all the questions, relevant to the particular deficiency being diagnosed, are considered. The question inventory is not comprehensive and only serves as a guide. It may be supplemented by questions or areas of inquiry that experience indicates are important and related to the deficiency.

## INFORMATION ITEM DEFICIENCY TO SOURCE MATRIX

Information Item	Items Omitted	Poor Qual	ity Items
Category	Timeliness/ Frequency	Operational Perspective	Clarity Completeness
BATTELFIELD AREA	G2 Ops	G2	ASPS G2 Ops
Weather	USAF WO	G2	G2 Ops G2 Ops
Terrain	ENG TM	G2	ASPS
Area conditions	ASPS	G2	ASPS
ENSIT	G2 Ops	G2	G2 Ops
Disposition & Comp.	G2 Ops/CM&D	G2	G2 Ops
Strength	G2 Ops/CM&D	G2	G2 Ops
Activities	G2 Ops/CM&D	G2	G2 Ops
ENCOAS	ASPS	G2	ASPS
Possible COAs	ASPS	G2	ASPS
Other Info on Prob. COAs	ASPS/CM&D	G2	ASPS
OPSEC	G2/CI TEAM	G2	G2 Ops
EN Recce/Intel	ASPS/CM&D	G2	ASPS/G2 Ops
EN REC	ASPS/CM&D	G2	ASPS/G2 Ops
EN Special Ops	ASPS/CM&D	G2	ASPS/G2 Ops
FR Vulnerabilities	G2/ASPS	G2	ASPS/G2 Ops
Deception	G2/ASPS	G2	ASPS/G2 Ops

UNIT SPECIFIC COMMENTS:

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Figure 20. The Information Item Deficiency to Source Matrix Form.

#### **DEFICIENCY Dimension 1: TIMELINESS**

Timeliness is unusual in that if you find a possible cause for a deficiency, correcting it might not provide enough additional time to have prevented the deficiency. You may be dealing with multiple causes, which together contributed to the deficiency. As a result, you will not always stop asking questions when you have discovered a cause. Follow questioning in sequence unless you are to go to a different question.

The first set of questions is to determine whether something went wrong with dissemination. In other words, something got fouled up getting the information out to the observer-participant. Stop asking questions about an information item when you have fully identified what went wrong. Go through each information item on your data sheet. It may become apparent that the same problem is responsible for a deficiency in many items. Use common sense on when to stop asking questions. Item 1a below is a good example, if there are no procedures for prioritizing information, that may affect all deficient items, but that doesn't mean questions 1d and 1e should not be asked since they have nothing to do with prioritization.

Questions 1 and 2 are concerned with the dissemination of information from the MI producer to the user without respect to form; it makes no difference if dissemination is a formal briefing, phone call, or radio transmission.

- Was information item <u>sent</u> to the user? If no, go to Question
   If yes, then:
  - a. Was a priority placed on getting the information sent? If no, check to see if there were adequate procedures for prioritizing communications. If there weren't, maybe there should be. If there were, why weren't they followed?
  - b. Did the priority cause other information to be sent first, thus delaying dissemination? If yes, was information prioritized correctly, were procedures followed, or was everything done correctly, but more important information needed to be sent out first?
  - c. Did the person responsible for dissemination respond to the priority? If no, why not? If yes, the problem may be identified by questions 1d or 1e.
- Figure 21. Example questions from the diagnostic question inventory on timeliness.

Figure 21. (Cont)

- d. Did the person responsible for dissemination select the best means/alternate means to send the information? If no, look again at procedures to determine if they exist, cover the situation, and were followed.
- e. Was it confirmed that the user received the information? If no, did procedures exist, did they cover the situation, and were they followed? Could confirmation be carried out?

2. If you identified a possible cause for timeliness deficiency, would correcting it have resulted in <u>enough</u> time being saved to have prevented the deficiency? If yes, have you identified the entire cause?

In addition to the question, the diagnostician should consider how he wants to find the answer. There is considerable flexibility in obtaining answers to the questions. The diagnostician may conduct interviews with individuals in the MI production system, observe procedures and production flow, review documents, or any combination of these. The questions are those the diagnostician must answer. The diagnostician continues answering questions until he determines what could have caused the deficiency.

EXAMPLE A completed Planned Inquiry Guide is shown in Figure 22. Three different deficiencies are addressed. Note that included in the right column is where to go based on the answer to the question. The questions in this column are derived from the Diagnostic Question Inventory in Appendix C. Note also that column 2 reflects the unique unit and situational knowledge of the diagnostician.

#### E. <u>STEP 7, DIAGNOSING THE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION PRODUCTION</u> <u>SYSTEM</u>.

Using the Planned Inquiry Guide, the diagnostician moves through the intelligence production system, acquiring data through observation, interviews with intelligence producers, and reviews of documents. The inquiry should result in a series of chained events triggered by responses to the questions started from the Planned Inquiry Guide.

EXAMPLE If the diagnostician is working to determine the cause of an omission deficiency reported by a G3 observer-participant, the inquiry may have begun with a review of the PIR/IR listing in the CM&D. Upon determining through observation that G3 information items were included in the collection plan, the diagnostician must move to other segments of the production system to determine if the information was received, processed, and dispatched to the G3.

While appearing straight forward, the inquiry process is detailed and complex. The diagnostician must be as rigorous as possible given the available time he has to conduct the inquiry.

#### F. <u>RECORDING THE RESULTS</u>.

Diagnostic Record: Figure 23 is a completed Diagnostic Record. A blank copy is provided in Appendix C-9, along with directions for its use (Appendix C-9). The format parallels the Planned Inquiry Guide. Although the example is for three

Figure 22. A completed Planned Inquiry Guide

DIAGNOSTIC RECORD

Inquiry Deta (Include tocation)	Problem(s) Identified	Intormation Deficiencies	Causes	Recommended Solutions
C2 OPS had no idea of FSE priorities. Info was evaluable.	All Tgt info goes out Ope Immediale. Large comm backlog.	FSE high payoff Tigt info in support of attack.	Poor ops relationship with FSE. No updating of priorities. G2 OPS not sware it can get help from ASPS.	Get C2 involved. The whole priorities process needs emphasis.
ASPS/CI Team coordination of OPSEC EEI not being done. Desired into available or can be developed from on hand date.	OPSEC EE) not used in output development.	OPSEC Friendly vulnerabilities.	Failure to develop output which incorporates user needs.	Tighten ASPC/Ci teem and CM&D dialogue.
SWO/GZ Ops - SWO needs training on Divisions use and need for weather with special attn to ADA.	Standard Wx report form doean't meet ADA needs. During attack phase frequency of reports inad.	Wx effect (ADA needs rapid refresh).	SOP is inadequate to meet ADA needs, for sure during offensive ops.	Revise SOP ASAP.
Additional Comments: High Value payoff Inform and doing a good job. On each others capabilities.	Additional Commants: High Value period information is available in great volume. Managing it may require dedicated soldier. New analyst is well supervised and doing a good job. On the ADA matter, in addition to SOP, there is a real need to cross train some intel and ADA people to appreciate each othere capabilities.	t volume. Managing it may requ	uire dedicated soldier. New an	alyst is well supervised DA people to appreciate
Flores 27 A conclusion (Nacionalic Bacond	main Record			

Figure 23. A completed Diagnostic Record

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deficiencies, how many pages or how many deficiencies should go on a page depends on the amount of information and how the diagnostician organizes it. The form has been left open to provide more space for recording data and making notes when preparing feedback. The purpose of the Diagnostic Record is to help organize the findings. It is a tool to help prepare for giving feedback, not a document that is handed out as part of the feedback.

Inquiry Data: In this column is recorded all the data gathered to support the identification of the cause(s) of the deficiency.

Problems Identified: This column has a description of the problem(s) discovered.

Related Information Deficiency: This column is a restatement of the deficiencies that resulted from the problem.

Causes of Deficiencies: The conclusions drawn from the data in the first column are recorded here. This column indicates why the deficiency occurred.

Recommended Solutions: This column does not have to be filled out. It can be if the diagnostician believes that he may have an acceptable solution. However, it is not the purpose of the diagnosis within this assessment procedure to advise on remedy.

#### G. ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS.

The planning and conducting of the inquiry into causes of information deficiencies takes time and is done while the exercise is in progress. It must be done with tact and without disruption to the exercise. Because the diagnostics is so time constrained, only the most critical deficiencies should be diagnosed during the exercise.

NOTE: A diagnosis could be done after the exercise, but it would have to be modified some. Procedures couldn't be observed, some of the staff might be difficult to get to to interview, etc.

It cannot be stressed enough that a successful diagnosis is based on the common sense and understanding of the unit of the experienced person conducting the diagnosis.

#### H. <u>SUMMARY</u>.

The steps in diagnosing Military Intelligence performance are as follows:

- 1. Consolidate the performance rating data using the Deficiency Consolidation Worksheet.
- 2. Analyze the consolidation worksheets by identifying clusters of performance deficiencies or deficiencies of high weighted information items.
- 3. Plan the inquiry strategy using the Planned Inquiry Guide.
- 4. Gather data to determine the causes for the deficiencies.
- 5. Record the data and the conclusion based on that data on the Diagnostic Record.

#### SECTION 8

#### PROVIDING FEEDBACK

The purpose for conducting the assessment is to provide feedback to the commander and the G2 on how well Military Intelligence met the needs of the command during the designated exercise. While the commander and the G2 should determine how frequently they want to receive feedback, the team chief and diagnostician need to work together to prepare and provide the feedback.

Unless directed by the commander or G2 to only provide specific feedback, the content of the feedback should be determined by when the presentation of the feedback is scheduled. Feedback can be given periodically during the exercise and at the end of the exercise.

FEEDBACK SHOULD ALWAYS BE TO THE G2 AND TO THE COMMANDER FROM THE G2.

#### A. PERIODIC FEEDBACK DURING THE EXERCISE.

The periodic feedback should not be a presentation of a statistical analysis of the Performance Rating Forms.

Just as the diagnosis was based on common sense and an understanding of the unit, providing feedback during the exercise requires the same traits. Since time is limited for preparing as well as presenting, the feedback should be limited to major findings.

The best source of data for preparing feedback is the Deficiency Consolidation Worksheets which provide clustered information. The most important periodic feedback should concern the deficiencies that the diagnostician selected for inquiry and the findings from the inquiry.

The weights of the information items which were deficient might also be of value in the periodic feedback. This information can be obtained from the observer-participants' Information Requirements Profile (items weighted 100).

Finally, if there has been more than one rating period, or more than one feedback session, changes in performance, either positive or negative will be good feedback. This kind of trend information can be obtained by comparing changes showing up in the consolidation worksheets.

#### B. <u>POST-EXERCISE FEEDBACK</u>.

The post-exercise feedback must include the information listed above for the periodic feedback. That information is essential. If time is limited, it is the highest priority feedback. The commander and the G2 must at least know what went wrong where and why, so they can implement training or operational fixes. Time permitting, however, the Performance Rating Forms, used in conjunction with the Information Requirements Profile, can provide a wealth of quantitative data. Because there is potentially so much information, it may be necessary to combine it in order to present a structured picture of the assessment results. There are many ways the data can be analyzed, therefore, only a few are presented. The following are some useful techniques for consolidating the data:

Consolidating across deficiency dimensions: Never combine the data for deficiency dimensions: timeliness, frequency, operational perspective, clarity, and completeness should never be combined. Such a consolidation would not be meaningful since important information would be hidden.

Consolidating deficiencies by observer-participants: Very important feedback can be provide by consolidation of data within an observer-participant group. For example, if there are several representatives from the G3 section it is all right to combine their data. It is not acceptable to combine data from the G3 with the FSE. When combining the deficiency data, all that is needed is a total count for certain types of deficiencies. For example, the G3 section for Enemy Courses of Action rated the information item "objective" deficient on 6 occasions during the exercise.

Feedback should be provided in terms of each observerparticipant group.

Consolidating across rating periods: This could be done for each observer-participant for any deficiency dimension if it is desired to present a total "score" or a big picture of what happened during the exercise. However, it is best not to present the total "score" alone. It should be presented along with the data for the rating periods, so that the audience has the opportunity to see what makes up the total score and what trends are revealed.

#### C. ANALYZING THE DEFICIENCY CONSOLIDATION WORKSHEET.

The feedback from the analysis should not be "one measure," but rather a pattern of "measures." There are four measures we propose (details for computing them are in Appendix D): Comprehensiveness indicates the number of information items which were acceptable. For example, if one item out of the 58 was rated deficient, then 57 would be acceptable. The comprehensiveness score is 98% (57/58 x 100). The higher the percent, the better the performance.

Criticality indicates the importance of the information items which were missed. It is based on the weight given the items by the observerparticipant. The higher the number, the worse the performance. For example, if only one item was missed, but it was a 100 weighted item, a critical item was not acceptable.

Effectiveness represents the overall usefulness of the information to the observer-participant. It is based on the number of information items which were not deficient and the weights of the items. It is expressed as a percent. The higher the percent, the better the performance.

Distribution of performance ratings represent how the observer-participant rated each dimension (timeliness, frequency, etc.) on the scale. If a benchmark had been between 3 and 4, for example and the rating showed all 1s, then performance in that dimension would have been as good as it could get.

The four measures can be presented in many different ways. The first three could be shown for the deficiency dimensions combined, or for each deficiency dimension. They could be shown for the exercise, or broken out by rating periods to show trends. The distribution of ratings can be shown for the exercise or broken out by rating periods to show trends.

Trends in Performance as Feedback: Providing the commander and G2 feedback on the trends in MI performance is next in importance to the what, where, why of the deficiencies. The trends place performance in the time perspective of the exercise events. With the trend data, the commander is better able to judge, for example, the impact on intelligence performance of a jump or communications breakdown.

Positive and Negative Feedback: The purpose of having the five point rating scales is to have a means of getting positive information as well as negative. It is critical that positive as well as negative feedback be provided. Often the reasons for doing something well can provide solutions for improving inadequate performance. Conflicting Data: It would not be unusual to discover that the observer-participant rated information deficient and the diagnostician couldn't find any deficiency in MI information production performance. While it may be difficult to explain the conflicting data, it should at least be brought up for consideration. (If it is important to resolve the conflict, so that direction can be given).

Comparing Performance Across MI Units: The methodology presented for assessing MI information processing effectiveness has one purpose, to assist MI in improving their performance. It is not a grade, nor should it be used as such. Exercises operate with different objectives and under different situational constraints. This requires the assessment results to be interrupted within the constraints of the specific exercise.

#### APPENDIX A

#### SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR IDENTIFYING AND PRIORITIZING INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

- A-1 Blank Copy of the Information Requirements Profile
- A-2 Instructions for Weighing the Information Hierarchy
- A-3 Definitions of the Information Items in the Information Hierarchy
- A-4 Timeliness Dimension Scale
- A-5 Frequency Dimension Scale
- A-6 Operational Perspective Dimension Scale
- A-7 Clarity Dimension Scale
- A-8 Completeness Dimension Scale
- A-9 Instructions for Setting Benchmarks

### APPENDIX A-1

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### BLANK COPY OF THE INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS PROFILE

### INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS PROFILE NAME \_\_\_

POSITION \_\_\_\_

DATE \_

\_\_\_\_\_

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#### INSTRUCTIONS:

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Assign zero to any information items you do not want.
 Assign 100 to your most important information items.
 Assign a number between 0 and 100 to remaining items to reflect the relative importance of the item.
 List specific data items you want emphasized under a specific data items.

4. 8	ist specific data items you want emphasized under		
4. L'ist speciel cata itema you want emprissized under special notes		IMPORTANCE WEIGHT (0 - 100)	SPECIAL NOTES
Γ	Weather Nicetie		
	Weather situation Weather effects on EN	+	
AREA	Weather effects on FR	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
	Terrain		
l 🗒	Terrain situation		
	Terrain effects on EN Terrain effects on FR	+	
12	Battlefield area conditions	·/	
BATTL	Existing battlefield conditions	1	
0	Effects on EN operations		
┣	Effects on FR operations EN Disposition and composition		
i i	Forward trace		
1	Unit locations		
	Main afforts	<u> </u>	
	Echelonment		
	Reserves		
	Staging areas		
	Combat service support Air Forces	<u> </u>	
l ₹	C2		
ENEMY SITUATION	Strength of EN forces by echelon	1	
15	Readiness by echelon Supply status/rates by echelon		
5	Enemy critical nodes/HPTs		
×.	Level of EN morale		
	Strength of Air Forces		
<u>ا</u>	NBC Recent/present significant activities	{	
1	Combat action		
	Maneuver/movement C2 activity		
	Sustainment		
	Intelligence activities		
	Enumerate Possible ECOAs Mission		
7	Objectives		
₫	Forces		
5	Terrain considerations		
L.	Main/supporting efforts		
ŝ	Fires (including air support)		
ş	Time/Distance factors Threat advance		
Ž	Probability		
ŭ	Analysis of Probable ECOAs		
ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION	Enemy strengths		
N.	EN Vulnerabilities Friendly high value targets		
-	Enemy intentions		
	EN RECCE/intelligence		
	EN RECCE/Intelligence capabilities		
	Recent RECCEAntelligence activities/Indicators Effects of EN Intelligence on FR operations		
ہ ج	IN Redio Electronic Combet		
E	Recent & eignificant REC activities		
3	Effects of REC on FR operations		
OPERATIONS SECURITY	EN Special Operationa		
¥2	EN special operations capabilities Recent/significant EN special operatione		
F	Effects of EN special operations on FR operations		
2	riendly Vulnerabilities		
Ű.	Friendly high yelve targets Effects of vulnerabilities on FR operations		
	Deception		
-	Deception capabilities		
	Recent/significant deception activities		
	Effects of deception on FR operations		

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#### APPENDIX A-2

#### INSTRUCTIONS FOR WEIGHING THE INFORMATION HIERARCHY

The weighing of the items in the information hierarchy results in the prioritization of your information requirements. A copy of the Information Requirements Profile form and the definitions of elements in the information hierarchy are necessary in order to complete the weighing.

- Step 1. Review the information items in the left column and their definitions.
- Step 2. Based on the scoring period previously defined, identify the information items that are most important for you to have. Give those items 100 points by placing 100 in the importance weight column in space by that item.
- Step 3. If there are any information items you do not need, give them a score of 0 and record in the appropriate space.
- NOTE: There is no limit on the number of information items that are most important or are not needed. You may consult the definitions as often as necessary during the weighing.
- Step 4. Compare the remaining information items with the ones you have given 100 points. Give each item points based on how important you think it is relative to the 100 point item(s). For example, if "main efforts" was given 100 points and you think "threat advance" is only half as important, give it 50 points. You can give an item anywhere from 0 to 100 points. Record the weights you give for each item in the appropriate space.
- Step 5. Make sure that there is a weight for each item.
- Step 6. Review the weights and change any weights that you think may not be appropriate. Make sure your name, position, and the date are on the information requirements profile form.

#### APPENDIX A-3

#### INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS HIERARCHY DEFINITIONS OF ELEMENTS

Definitions for information items contained in the information requirements hierarchy are presented under their area and group headings. The term <u>information</u> is used instead of <u>intelligence</u> to ensure that all possible output forms are included. While information such as unit locations may be in another broader information area, the hierarchy treats each as a discrete output of intelligence production. Therefore, information items at all levels are mutually exclusive or independent of each other, i.e., do not assume that because "description of enemy courses of action might include "unit locations" is redundant. Remember, all information items are independent.

#### Level 1: BATTLEFIELD AREA

Specific aspects of the battlefield which includes the unit's area of operation and area of interest, are delineated into three topical groups: weather, terrain, and other battlefield area conditions.

Level 2: WEATHER

Weather in the battlefield is divided into three output subsets of information:

Level 3:

WEATHER SITUATION. Current and projected weather types, including, but not limited to what weather will occur, when, and where.

WEATHER EFFECTS ON EN. How, when, and where current and projected weather types will affect current and projected enemy operations or courses of action.

WEATHER EFFECTS ON FR. How, when, and where current and projected weather types will affect current and projected friendly operations or courses of action.

Level 2: TERRAIN

Battlefield terrain is divided into three output subsets of information:

Level 3:

TERRAIN SITUATION, i.e., elevation, vegetation, mobility, and soil conditions.

TERRAIN EFFECTS ON EN, i.e., degree of slope, vegetation, and soil conditions in the battlefield that will shape enemy operations.

TERRAIN EFFECTS ON FR, i.e., degree of slope, vegetation, and soil conditions in the battlefield that will shape friendly operations.

Level 2: BATTLEFIELD AREA CONDITIONS

Information, other than weather or terrain, pertaining to physical aspects of the battlefield.

Level 3:

EXISTING BATTLEFIELD CONDITIONS. Other physical aspects of the battlefield, excluding weather or terrain as described above, such as avenues of approach, status of lines of communication, or obstacles within the area of operations.

EFFECTS ON EN OPERATIONS. How, when, and where other battlefield conditions will shape the enemy operations.

EFFECTS ON FR OPERATIONS. How, when, and where other battlefield conditions will shape the friendly operations.

Level 1: ENEMY SITUATION

Current, dynamic, and changing enemy situations within the units area of operation and area of interest are delineated into three topical groups: enemy disposition and composition, strength of enemy forces by echelon, and recent and present significant activities.

Level 2: EN DISPOSITION AND COMPOSITION

Organization for combat and current deployment pattern of enemy elements is further subdivided into ten information items:

Level 3:

FORWARD TRACE. Portrayal of actual linear deployment of the most forward enemy forces in contact within the area of operations.

UNIT LOCATIONS. Identifies location using point, center of mass, or area for all enemy units in the area of interest.

MAIN EFFORTS. Enemy tactical efforts in the area of operations in which he has committed significant portions of available combat power, including location, disposition, and composition. COMBAT SUPPORT. Disposition, composition, and location of enemy combat support elements in the area of interest.

ECHELONMENT. Disposition, composition, subordination, and location of related enemy echelons, i.e., divisions, fronts and armies, in the area of interest.

RESERVES. Disposition, composition, and location of uncommitted enemy combat units in the area of interest.

STAGING AREAS. Information on location of enemy assembly/staging areas, either in use or available, in the area of interest.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT. Disposition, composition, and location of enemy combat service support elements in the area of interest.

AIR FORCES. Disposition, composition, and location of enemy air forces in the area of interest.

C2. Disposition, composition, and location of enemy command and control elements in the area of interest.

Level 2: STRENGTH OF EN FORCES BY ECHELON

Numerical status or combat readiness of enemy units based on attrition in the area of interest, by specific echelons is divided into five information items:

Level 3:

READINESS BY ECHELON. Available combat potential of enemy units in the area of interest.

SUPPLY STATUS/RATES BY ECHELON. Enemy resupply status/rates for items such as fuel or ammunition in the area of interest.

ENEMY CRITICAL NODES/HPT (HIGH PAYOFF TARGETS). Formations, locations, or facilities whose capability, strength, or presence is pivotal to continuation of enemy operations within the area of interest and whose destruction or disruption provides advantage to friendly forces.

LEVEL OF EN MORALE. Morale, well-being, and willingness to fight of enemy units which effects their capability in the area of interest.

STRENGTH OF AIR FORCES. Strength/capability of enemy air forces in the area of interest.

NBC. Strength/capabilities of enemy nuclear, biological, and chemical elements in the area of interest.

## Level 2: RECENT/PRESENT SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

Recent (up to 36 hours old) and present significant activities are divided into six information items:

Level 3:

COMBAT ACTION. Enemy combat activities, including but not limited to unusual aspects such as actions involving nuclear, biological, or chemical combat in the area of interest.

C2 ACTIVITY. Enemy command and control activities, i.e., communication activity or command post relocations, in the area of interest.

SUSTAINMENT. Enemy sustainment activities, i.e., resupplying or repairing, in the area of interest.

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. Enemy intelligence activities, i.e., reconnaissance patrolling, radio intercept, or other covert or overt activities, in the area of interest.

Level 1: ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

Enemy courses of action (intentions) that are likely or possible are delineated into two topical groups: enumerate possible enemy courses of action and other information for probable enemy courses of action.

Level 2: ENUMERATE POSSIBLE ECOAs

Possible enemy courses of action are divided into the following information items:

Level 3:

MISSION. Probable or known specific tasks/missions of related enemy elements in the area of interest.

OBJECTIVES. Assigned objectives of enemy units, whether force or terrain oriented, in the area of interest.

FORCES. Specific enemy forces related to specific courses of action, including, but not limited to their composition, locations, strength, and disposition.

TERRAIN CONSIDERATIONS. Influence of terrain related to specific enemy courses of action, i.e., routes of advance or crossing sites.

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ECHELONMENT. Echelonment or subordination of enemy elements such as battalions, regiment, divisions, or corps to specific courses of action.

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MAIN/SUPPORTING EFFORTS. Where, when, and in what strength main and supporting efforts will occur related to specific enemy courses of action.

FIRES (including air support). Where, when, and in what strength fires and types of fires will occur related to specific enemy courses of action.

TIME/DISTANCE FACTORS. Movement in terms of times and distances, i.e., how long it will take for a unit to get from point A to B, related to specific enemy courses of action.

THREAT ADVANCE. How rapidly forces can or will move related to specific enemy courses of action, and influenced by doctrine or terrain.

PROBABILITY. Probability of occurrence for enemy courses of action, i.e., most and least likely COA with rationale, in the area of interest.

Level 2: ANALYSIS OF PROBABLE ECOAs

Probable enemy courses of action are divided into information items:

Level 3:

ENEMY STRENGTHS. Specific aspects of each enemy COA, i.e., force ratios or terrain which are to their advantage.

ENEMY VULNERABILITIES. Specific aspects of each enemy COA, i.e., force ratios or terrain which can make them vulnerable.

FRIENDLY HIGH VALUE TARGETS. Potential friendly high value targets, i.e., friendly units or key terrain held by friendly units that may influence specific enemy courses of action.

ENEMY INTENTIONS. Independent of the assessed probability, information on which courses of action the enemy intends to execute.

Level 1: ENEMY ACTIVITIES AFFECTING OPERATIONS SECURITY

Specialized enemy activities that may influence command operations security posture in both forward and rear battlefield areas are delineated into five topical groups: reconnaissance (RECCE)/intelligence, radio electronic combat (REC), special operations, friendly vulnerabilities, and deception.

## Level 2: EN RECCE/INTELLIGENCE

Enemy reconnaissance and intelligence activities that may influence command operations security posture are divided into three information items:

Level 3:

EN RECCE/INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES, i.e., imagery or human intelligence that may influence how the friendly command conducts operations.

RECENT RECCE/INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES/INDICATORS. Most current and significant enemy intelligence activities and indicators that may influence command operations security posture.

EFFECTS OF EN INTELLIGENCE ON FR OPERATIONS. Effects, as determined either by friendly analysis or enemy information, of enemy RECCE and intelligence activities on our operations.

Level 2: ENEMY RADIO ELECTRONIC COMBAT

Enemy jamming and signals collection activities that may influence the command operations security posture is divided into three information items:

Level 3:

REC CAPABILITIES. Enemy radio and electronic warfare <u>capabilities</u> that may influence how the command conducts operations.

RECENT AND SIGNIFICANT REC ACTIVITIES. Most current and significant enemy radio and electronic warfare <u>activities</u> that may influence how the command conducts operations.

EFFECTS OF REC ON FR OPERATIONS. Effects, determined by either friendly analysis or enemy information, of enemy Radio Electronic Combat activities on friendly operations.

Level 2: EN SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Enemy special operations activities, i.e., special operating forces and espionage/sabotage operations, that may influence command operations security posture is divided into three information items:

Level 3:

ENEMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES. Enemy's special operations capabilities, i.e., special operating forces and espionage/sabotage resources, that may influence the command operations security posture.

RECENT/SIGNIFICANT EN SPECIAL OPERATIONS. Enemy's recent special operations, i.e., special operating forces, espionage, or sabotage.

EFFECTS OF EN SPECIAL OPERATIONS ON FR OPERATIONS. Effects, determined either by friendly analysis or enemy information, of enemy special operations on friendly operations.

Level 2: FRIENDLY VULNERABILITIES

Friendly vulnerabilities determined either by the enemy or friendly analysis, that may influence command operations security posture, is divided into two information items:

Level 3:

FRIENDLY HIGH VALUE TARGETS. Friendly vulnerability information, derived from either friendly analysis or enemy information, that concerns our own potentially high value targets.

EFFECTS OF FRIENDLY VULNERABILITIES ON FRIENDLY OPERATIONS. Vulnerability information, derived from friendly analysis or enemy information, that concerns the effects of our vulnerabilities on current or projected operations.

Level 2: DECEPTION

Enemy deception or spoofing activities, that may influence command operations security posture, are divided into three information items:

Level 3:

DECEPTION CAPABILITIES. Present enemy deception capabilities that may influence command operations security posture. These may contain numerous specific data possibilities that need not be further specified.

RECENT/SIGNIFICANT DECEPTION ACTIVITIES. Current and significant enemy deception or spoofing activities that may influence command operations security posture or friendly combat operations.

EFFECTS OF DECEPTION ON FRIENDLY OPERATIONS. Effects, determined by friendly analysis or enemy information, of enemy deception of spoofing activities on our operations.

## TIMELINESS DIMENSION SCALE

TIMELINESS - is a measure of whether the information item was received in time for the user to take action on it. Timeliness applies to situations where there is no stated operational deadline for the information, but a window exists during which the user must take action based on that specific information.

Timeliness Scale:

- 1. Item received and user had ample time to take operational action within the time window.
- 2. Item received in time to take action, but user had to rush.
- 3. Item received in time to take action, but user had to rush and use additional resources.
- 4. Item received too late for user to take action.
- 5. Item not received.

- 5

## FREQUENCY DIMENSION SCALE

FREQUENCY - is a measure of how often the information item needs to be provided to a user in order for the user to carry out designated routine functions. FREQUENCY involves routine information delivered according to an SOP, by a specified time or in a specified cycle.

## Frequency Scale:

- 1. Item received often enough.
- 2. Item received more than necessary, but did not disrupt SOP functions.
- 3. Item received more than necessary and disrupted SOP functions.
- 4. Item not received often enough.
- 5. Item not received.

## OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE DIMENSION SCALE

OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE - is the measure of how well the information item is put in the context of current or future friendly force operations. To contribute to OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, the following context characterizations apply:

Area of operations Area of interest Time/Phasing/Duration of the operation Missions of higher, lower or adjacent units Unit contingency plans in place or in development Friendly capabilities related to current or future ops Enemy capabilities related to current or future ops

## **Operational Perspective Scale:**

- 1. Operational perspective identified a new or different perspective on current or future operations.
- 2. Operational perspective related to key aspects of current or future operations.
- 3. Operational perspective related to less significant aspects of current or future operations or were limited in scope.
- 4. Operational perspective did not relate to current or future operations.
- 5. Item not placed in any operational context.

## CLARITY DIMENSION SCALE

CLARITY - is a measure of how easily the content of the information could be grasped, understood, comprehended or followed by the user, without regard to the presentation format. The following factors detract from the CLARITY of information items:

Poorly organized Too much jargon Too detailed Too general Emphasis in wrong areas Too long Too many acronyms Too technical Content level inappropriate for recipient Inappropriate presentation media Too abbreviated Poor use of graphics

Clarity Scale:

- 1. Item easily understood without effort or clarification.
- 2. Item easily understood with comparison to other information readily available to user.
- 3. Item understandable with time, effort, and/or clarification.
- 4. Item took extensive time, effort, and/or clarification to understand.
- 5. Item not understandable.

- 4

## COMPLETENESS DIMENSION SCALE

COMPLETENESS - is a measure of the factual content of the information item as represented by the 5 W's, SALUTE and/or METT-T. The absence of facts does not distract from completeness if the gaps are identified. The following relate to the COMPLETENESS of information:

METT-T	SALUTE	<u>5 W's &amp; H</u>
Mission	Size	Who
Enemy	Activity	What
Terrain (Weather)	Location	Where
Troops	Unit	When
Time Available	Time	Why
	Equipment	How

## Completeness Scale:

- 1. No factual omissions/gaps.
- 2. Fully-identified and explained factual omissions/gaps.
- 3. Partially-identified and explained factual omissions/gaps.
- 4. Unexplained factual omissions/gaps.
- 5. Information unusable because there were too may unexplained omissions/gaps.

## INSTRUCTIONS FOR SETTING BENCHMARKS

## Determining the Benchmarks:

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- 1. For any dimension, review the five levels of performance indicated by the scales.
- 2. Select the point on the scale that best describes the minimum level of performance which would be acceptable to you.
- 3. Draw a line under that scale number.
- 4. Review the items under that line to ensure they describe performance unacceptable to you. If not, redetermine the benchmark.

## APPENDIX B

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## SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR RATING MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PERFORMANCE

B-1 Performance Rating Form, Part 1 and 2

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B-2 Instructions for Rating Military Intelligence Performance

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PERFORMANCE RATING FORM, PART 1 AND 2

## **Performance Rating Form**

## (part 1 of 2)

Completeness Rating Deficiencies

Clarity Rating Deficiencies

Timeliness Frequency Operational Perspective Rating Rating Duitciencies (1 - 5) (1 - 5)

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Weather situation Weather effects on EN Weather effects on FR

Weather

POSITION

NAME DATE

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SAMPLE OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE DEFICIENCIES

OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE NOT RELATED TO:

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EN Disposition and Composition Forward trace

Main efforts Combat support Echelonment Reserves

**Jnit locations** 

Bartifefield Area Conditions Existing battlefield conditions Effects on EN operations Effects on FR operations

Terrain effects on EN Terrain effects on FR

A Weather situation Weather effects on Terrain situation Terrain effects on E Terrain effects on E B Bettheffeld Area C

OPERATOWAL PERSPECTIVE RATINCS Destant Name Order Name Destant Name De

A Aver of Operations B and a finances C Theophenicychemics of operation D Manusche of Negres, lineur, er unglacent und B Manusche Angeler, lineur, er unglacent und B FM compatises nutured is current or have ope Q EM compatises nutured is current or have ope

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Staging areas Combat service support

**EVENT SITUATION** 

Air Forces

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Strength of EN Forces by Echelon Readiness by echelon Supply status/rates by echelon Enemy critical nodes/HPTs Lavel of EN morale

Recent/Present Significant Activities Combet action

Strength of Air Forces

**BAMPLE COMPLETENESS DEFICIENCIES** 

Maneuver/movement C2 activity Sustainment Intelligence activities

## Performance Rating Form

## (part 2 of 2)

THELHESS PATHOS Pathon Anto Content Anto

sample operational perspective deficiencies

OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE RATINGS

OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE NOT RELATED TO: A Anna of Operation A Anna of Operation A Anna of Markow of Apple a particular Distance of Markow of Apple a particular Proceedings and and a conseq of the apple FIR considering a state of a conseq of the apple of Discontinues and and a conset of the apple

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A Party operated OT to technical To another HT to activities CT operated I Construction D to group I Construction To any compared Register present

SAMPLE CLARITY DEPICIENCIES

CONFLITURES INTHOS

SAMPLE COMPLETENESS DEPCIENCIES

Friendiv high velue tensite Effects of vulnerabilities on FR operations Deception

Recent & significant deception activities Effects of deception on FR operations

Deception capabilities

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Completeness Rating Deficiencies (1 - 5) Clarity Rating Deficiencies Operational Perspective Rating Deficiencies (1.5) Frequency Rating (1 - 5) Timeliness Rating (1 - 5) Recentrationificant apecial one activities. Effects of EN apecial one on FR one. Friendly Vuinerabilities Effects of EN intel on FR operations. EN Redio Electronic Comber EN RECCE/melligence capabilities Recent Intel activities/indicators Recent & significant REC activities Effects of REC on FR operations EN Special Operations Probability Analyzis of Probable ECOAs Enumerate Possible ECOAs EN special cos capabilites. Fires (including air support) Time/distance factors Friendly high value targets Enerty Intentions EN RECCE/Intelligence Main/supporting efforts Terrain considerations Enerny strendths EN Vutnerabilities REC canabilities Threat advance Echelonment **Objectives** Forces Mission POSITION NAME DATE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION OPERATIONS SECURITY

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## INSTRUCTIONS FOR RATING MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PERFORMANCE

A copy of the Performance Rating Form, part 1 and part 2, and scales and definitions for the five dimensions: timeliness, frequency, operational perspective, clarity, and completeness are required for rating.

- Step 1. Review the scales and the definitions of the scales (Appendix A-4 thru A-8). The definitions should be consulted during the rating, as necessary.
- Step 2. Rate all the information items for timeliness. For each item, place the number of the scale level selected in the "timeliness rating" column in the space next to the information item. For all information items rated 5, not received, draw a line through rest of the spaces in the row, for those items. Those information items cannot be rated on the other dimensions.
- Step 3. Rate all information items for frequency. Place the number of the scale level selected in the "frequency rating" column in the row for the information item.
- Step 4. Rate all information items for operational perspective. Use the same procedures as previously, placing the rating in the appropriate row and column. Where there was a deficiency refer to the sample deficiencies. If the deficiency is described, place the letter for that deficiency in the "operational perspective--deficiencies" column in the row for the deficient item. An item may have more than one deficiency. If the deficiency is not in the sample list, write in the deficiency you observed.
- Step 5. Rate all the information items for clarity using the same procedures as for the other dimensions. Place your rating in the appropriate row and column and identify the deficiencies where necessary.
- Step 6. Rate all the information items for completeness using the same procedures as for the other dimensions. Place your rating in the appropriate row and column and identify the deficiencies where necessary.
- Step 7. Review the rating form to ensure that all items have been rated for each dimension.
- Step 8. Reestablish the benchmark for each dimension.

Step 9. Turn in the ratings according to the previously determined procedure.

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## APPENDIX C

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## SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR DIAGNOSING MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PERFORMANCE

- C-1 Deficiency Consolidation Worksheets
- C-2 Instructions for the Use of the Deficiency Consolidation Worksheets
- C-3 Planned Inquiry Guide Form
- C-4 Instructions for the Use of the Planned Inquiry Guide
- C-5 Item Deficiency to Source Matrix
- C-6 Instructions for the Use of the Diagnostic Question Inventory and Flow Charts
- C-7 Diagnostic Question Inventory and Flow Chart: Timeliness
- C-8 Diagnostic Question Inventory and Flow Chart: Frequency
- C-9 Diagnostic Question Inventory and Flow Chart: Operational Perspective
- C-10 Diagnostic Question Inventory and Flow Chart: Clarity
- C-11 Diagnostic Question Inventory and Flow Chart: Completeness
- C-12 Diagnostic Record
- C-13 Instructions for the Use of the Diagnostic Record Form

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## DEFICIENCY CONSOLIDATION WORKSHEETS

BATTLEFIELD AREA	Timelinees	Frequency	<b>Oper Perspective</b>	Clarity	Completenese
Weather shuetton					
Weather effects on EN					
Weether effects on FR					
Terrein altuation					
Terrain effects on EN					
Termin effects on FR					
Existing bettlefield conditions					
Effects on EN operations					
Effects on FR operations					

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**DEFICIENCY CONSOLIDATION WORKSHEET** 

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# DEFICIENCY CONSOLIDATION WORKSHEET

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ENERY SITUATION	Timelines	Frequency	Oper Perspective	Clarity	Completenees
Forward trace					
Unit Locations					
Main efforts					
Combet support					
Echelonment					
Banesa					
Staging areas					
Combat service support					
Air Forces					
ខ					
Readiness by echelon					
Supply status/rates by echelon					
Enemy critical nodee/HPTs					
Level of EN morale					
Strength of Air Forces					
NBC					
Combet Action					
Maneuverimovement					
C2 activity					
Sustainment					
Intelligence activities					

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**DEFICIENCY CONSOLIDATION WORKSHEET** 

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OPERATIONS SECURITY	Timeliness	Frequency	Oper Perspective	Clarity	Completeness
EN RECCE/melligence capabilities					
Recent Intel activities/Indicators					
Effects of EN intel on FR operations					
REC capabilities					
Recent & significant REC activities					
Effects of REC on FR operations					
EN special ope capablitites					
Recent/Significant special ope activities					
Effects of EN special ops on FR ops					
Friendty high value targets					
Effects of vulnerabilities on FR operations					
Deception capabilities					
Recent & significant deception activities					
Effects of deception on FR operations					

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DEFICIENCY CONSOLIDATION WORKSHEET

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ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION	Timetines	Frequency	Oper Perspective	Clarity	Completeness
Mission					
Objectives					
Forces					
Terrain considerations					
Echelo ument					
Main/supporting efforts					
Fires (including air support)					
Time/distance factors					
Threat advance					
Probability					
Enerry strengths					
EN vulnerabilities					
Friendity high value targets					
Enerry intentions					

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## INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE USE OF THE DEFICIENCY CONSOLIDATION WORKSHEET

There are four different worksheets, one for each of the four major information categories, that must be used. This worksheet helps to consolidate data from the observer-participant Performance Ratings Forms. A deficient item is one that falls below the user's benchmark. The following steps are suggested when there are so many Performance Rating Forms to be consolidated that a mechanical procedure is required.

- Step 1. On each Performance Rating Form, circle the deficient ratings for each of the rated dimensions. Complete this step before consolidating the data.
- Step 2. Record in the appropriate cell of the worksheet the user who rated the item deficient. Do this for each of the dimensions. For the timeliness dimension deficiencies, identify when the information item was not received.
- Step 3. Complete step 2 for all observer-participant worksheets. Make some kind of mark on the worksheet as you finish recording the data to ensure the same information is not recorded more than once.

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PLANNED INQUIRY GUIDE FORM

		<u> </u>	 	]
Question Which Must Be Anewered				
Where to Start	- <u></u>			
Potential Causes				
Deficiency or Areas to Diagnose				

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## INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE USE OF THE PLANNED INQUIRY GUIDE

The Planned Inquiry Guide is used in conjunction with the Deficiency Consolidation Worksheet, the Information Item to Source Matrix, and the Diagnostic Question Inventory and Flow Charts. Its purpose is to systematize and document the diagnostic strategy.

- Step 1. Determine which deficiencies will be diagnosed using the Deficiency Consolidation Worksheet. Record the first deficiency on the worksheet in the "deficiencies or areas to diagnose" column.
- Step 2. If, based on experience, you have any ideas on what the possible cause of the deficiency may be, record them. If not, leave the "potential cause" column blank.
- Step 3. Use the Information Item Deficiency to Source Matrix to determine the best place to begin gathering data. Record the location in the "where to start" column.
- Step 4. Review the Diagnostic Question Inventory and flow charts to select what kind of questions needed to be answered to identify the cause of the deficiency. Record those questions and any others you may want answered in the "questions to answer" column.
- Step 5. Repeat the above steps for each deficiency you intend to diagnose.
- Step 6. When you have finished the planned inquiry, begin collection data.

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ITEM DEFICIENCY TO SOURCE MATRIX

## INFORMATION ITEM DEFICIENCY TO SOURCE MATRIX

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Information Item	Items Omitted	Poor Qual	ity Items	
Category	Timeliness/ Frequency	Operational Perspective	Clarity	Completeness
BATTELFIELD AREA	G2 Ops	G2	ASPS	G2 Ops
Weather	USAF WO	G2	G2 Ops	G2 Ops
Terrain	ENG TM	G2		ASPS
Area conditions	ASPS	G2		ASPS
ENSIT	G2 Ops	G2	G	2 Ops
Disposition & Comp.	G2 Ops/CM&D	G2	G	2 Ops
Strength	G2 Ops/CM&D	G2	G	2 Ops
Activities	G2 Ops/CM&D	G2	G	i2 Ops
ENCOAS	ASPS	G2		ASPS
Possible COAs	ASPS	G2	ASPS	
Other Info on Prob. COAs	ASPS/CM&D	G2		ASPS
OPSEC	G2/CI TEAM	G2	G	i2 Ops
EN Recce/Intel	ASPS/CM&D	G2	ASPS/G2 Ops	
EN REC	ASPS/CM&D	G2	ASPS/G2 Ops	
EN Special Ops	ASPS/CM&D	G2	ASP	S/G2 Ops
FR Vulnerabilities	G2/ASPS	G2	ASP	S/G2 Ops
Deception	G2/ASPS	G2	ASP	S/G2 Ops

UNIT SPECIFIC COMMENTS:

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## INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE USE OF THE DIAGNOSTIC QUESTION INVENTORY AND FLOW CHARTS

Both the diagnostic question inventory and the flow charts present a logical way to identify the questions needed to determine the cause(s) of deficiencies in the intelligence information production system. The flow charts provide a rapid view of possible general questions that might be used, and the relationships to other questions which may have to be answered to obtain a complete diagnosis. The Diagnostic Question Inventory presents a more detailed breakdown of the general questions. The general questions, along with their breakdown and the specific information item, can provide some very focused questions for diagnostics.

Diagnostic Question Inventory

The person doing the diagnosis of military intelligence information production must be experienced MI. That background, the diagnostic procedures, and the questions in this inventory will help determine why observer-participants rated some of the information they received as unacceptable.

To determine the cause(s) of the deficiencies, the diagnostician must determine the answers to a series of questions. The inventory provides the diagnostician an aid or guide in determining what questions, in what sequence, he must answer in conducting his inquiry. The inventory is used to assist the diagnostician in filling out column four "questions which must be answered" of the Planned Inquiry Guide.

Organization of the Diagnostic Question Inventory

The inventory is in five sections, each corresponding to one of the dimensions for which an information item could be deficient: timeliness, frequency, operational perspective, clarity, and completeness. There are a set of primary questions with directions on where to find the next set of questions. The directions are based on the answer to the primary question.

There are sets of secondary questions which should be answered in order to identify the cause of the deficiency.

Since the two deficiency areas, frequency and completeness have questions in common, the questions are not repeated for each deficiency area. For example, a primary question for diagnosing completeness may direct you to go to question 3 of the frequency deficiency diagnosis. That is because, with proper modification, the same questions are relevant to deficiencies in both areas.


Flow Charts for the Diagnostic Question Inventory

For each deficiency area there is a flow chart of the questions in the inventory. The flow charts provide a view of the entire diagnostic questioning for each deficiency dimension. The numbers on the flow charts refer to the questions in the inventory. For example, the number 5b in the timeliness deficiency flow chart refers to the b secondary questions in primary question 5 for the timeliness deficiency dimension. In the case of completeness which has overlapping questions with timeliness, a number with two letters following is direction to go to a different flow chart. For example, 2af in the completeness flow chart means to go to the secondary questions a for question 2 on the frequency flow chart.

On the flow charts for operational perspective, clarity, and completeness are the specific deficiencies which may have occurred. They are listed only as reminders.

The flow charts can be used to gain a fast overview of the questions for a deficiency dimension and skip directly into the middle of the inventory instead of reading through each set of questions.

FINAL NOTE: THE DIAGNOSTIC QUESTION INVENTORY AND FLOW CHARTS ARE GUIDES. THEY ARE NOT INTENDED TO BE A COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF ALL THE QUESTIONS WHICH COULD POSSIBLY BE ASKED DURING THE DIAGNOSTIC PROCESS.



## DIAGNOSTIC QUESTION INVENTORY AND FLOW CHART:

## TIMELINESS

Timeliness is unusual in that if you find a possible cause for deficiency, correcting it might not provide enough additional time to have prevented the deficiency. You may be dealing with multiple causes, which together contributed to the deficiency. As a result, you will not always stop asking questions when you have discovered a cause. Follow questioning in sequence unless you are to go to a different question.

The first set of questions is to determine whether something went wrong with dissemination. In other words, something got fouled up getting the information out to the user. Stop asking questions about an information item when you have fully identified what went wrong. Go through each information item on your data sheet. It may become apparent that the same problem is responsible for a deficiency in many items. Use common sense on when to stop asking questions. Item la below is a good example. If there are no procedures for prioritizing information, that may affect all deficient items, that doesn't mean questions 1d and le should not be asked since they have nothing to do with prioritization.

Questions 1 and 2 are concerned with the dissemination of information from the MI producer to the user without respect to form; it makes no difference if dissemination is a formal briefing, phone call, or radio transmission.

- Was information item <u>sent</u> to the user? If no, go to Question
   If yes, then:
  - a. Was a priority placed on getting the information sent? If no, check to see if there were adequate procedures for prioritizing communications. If there weren't, maybe there should be. If there were, why weren't they followed?
  - b. Did the priority cause other information to be sent first, thus delaying dissemination? If yes, was information prioritized correctly, were procedures followed, or was everything done correctly, but more important information needed to be sent out first?
  - c. Did the person responsible for dissemination respond to the priority? If no, why not? If yes, the problem may be identified by Questions 1d or 1e.


d. Did the person responsible for dissemination select the best means/alternate means to send the information? If no, look again at procedures to determine if they exist, cover the situation, and were followed.

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- e. Was it confirmed that the user received the information? If no, did procedures exist, did they cover the situation, and were they followed? Could confirmation be carried out?
- 2. If you identified a possible cause for timeliness deficiency, would correcting it have resulted in <u>enough</u> time being saved to have prevented the deficiency? If yes, have you identified the entire cause? If you didn't identify a cause, or if correcting the cause you identified wouldn't have saved enough time, you will have to begin asking about information processing. Go to Question 5.
- 3. The information item was <u>not sent</u> to the user. Did the item get sent to the person responsible for disseminating it? If yes, why didn't it get sent? If no, the cause of the deficiency is almost certainly not in the dissemination process.
- 4. Did the organization get the <u>information</u> required to produce the information item? If no, determine the organization that should have sent the information. You must go to that organization and ask questions on timeliness.
- 5. Did data received meet organization <u>standards</u> necessary to effectively process it? No matter what the answer, proceed with questioning. However, if no, identify and examine the organization(s) from which the data came.
  - a. Was the <u>potential</u> significance of the data or information recognized? If no, it may be that the importance of the data could be recognized only after it had been processed or placed in context with other information. If that is the case, go to Question 5d. If the potential significance could have been recognized, then why wasn't it? Were procedures established to screen incoming data for significance? Did the person have the experience necessary to do the screening? Did he have the training? Where job aids available to assist in the screening? Were aids possible? If available, were they used?
  - b. Was the significance passed on to the people required to process the information? If no, why not?

- c. How long did it take to process the information? The organization may have done everything possible, yet still was unable to get information out in time to be of use. If answers to the next four questions are negative, identify the organization that sent the information to determine if the problem can be solved there. These questions can be asked in any order, but all need to be considered.
  - (1) Would <u>additional</u> resources speed information processing? What resources? More people? How many? More equipment? What kind? Automated? Manual? Job aids? What kind? Would additional resources make a difference?
  - (2) Would <u>more effective</u> resources speed information processing? Do all personnel have necessary training and experience? Is correct equipment available and working? Would more effective resources make a difference?
  - (3) Would more effective <u>use</u> of resources speed information processing? Are proper procedures followed? Could procedures be improved? What procedures? Is unnecessary work done? Are all personnel used properly? Equipment? Would more effective use of resources make a difference?
  - (4) Would changes in any combination of the three above make a difference? If changes would have entirely prevented the timeliness deficiency, has the complete cause been identified?
- d. Was the significance of the processed information recognized? If no, were procedures established to identify significant information? Were they followed? Were there job aids to assist? Were they used? Were personnel properly trained? Did they have adequate experience?
- e. Was the information item prioritized for dissemination? Were prioritization procedures established and used?
- f. Was the information sent to the dissemination point? If not, why?

Even when cause(s) are identified, correction must make a difference. Would the time saved, including time saved by correcting dissemination deficiencies, have eliminated the timeliness deficiency? If not, continue questioning the organization which sent the information. If all questions are answered "yes," the problem is not getting information to the organization fast enough. Do a timeliness diagnosis on the organization from which the information is coming.



### DIAGNOSTIC QUESTION INVENTORY AND FLOW CHART:

### FREQUENCY

There are three ways an information item can be rated unacceptable, based on a frequency deficiency. First, information was not received. Second, it was received, but the user did not get it as frequently as needed; implicit in this deficiency is that information may be late. Finally, information could come in more frequently than required, disrupting operations.

The first set of questions is to determine whether something went wrong with the dissemination, without respect to form; it doesn't matter if dissemination is a formal brief, phone call, or radio transmission.


- 1. Did the user <u>receive</u> the information: If yes, go to Questions 4 and 5.
  - a. If no, was item sent to the person responsible for disseminating it? If not, diagnose the organization that should have sent it.
  - b. If the item was received, why wasn't it forwarded to the user? Did anyone know the information was there to be sent on? Was a conscious decision made not to send it on? If so, why?
  - c. If it was forwarded, did it go to the correct user? Was it confirmed that the user had received the information? Were there procedures on confirmation? Were they used? Was confirmation possible?
- 2. Did the organization responsible for producing the information item have information required for processing into the item? If yes, go to 2c.
  - a. If not, did anyone realize they didn't have the information? Were any quality control procedures in effect to identify when or what information might be missing? Were quality control procedures used? Why didn't they work? Did anyone know the information was needed to meet a suspense?
  - b. Were requests made for the information? If not, why? If requests were made, were they made according to procedure? Were requests followed-up? Confirmed? Was

the suspense passed on? If information was requested and not received, diagnose the organization responsible for collecting the information. Go to Question 3.

- c. If they had the information, did it meet standards required to adequately process? If no, did it have any effect on not meeting the suspense? If yes, what was the impact? (This question is to help determine where in the organization you might want to go, or what other questions you may be able to eliminate to identify the cause of the deficiency).
- d. If the information did not get processed, was the crew aware of the suspense? Was there time enough to produce the information item? Were there higher priority items to be taken care of? Were there enough resources? Human? Material? Were there too many resources? Were there procedures in place to ensure work got done and the suspense met? Did the procedures work?
- e. If the information was processed, were results reported? If not, why? If so, were they removed from the dissemination? Why?
- 3. We know from item 2b that requests for the information were made; was the data <u>collected</u>? If not, why? If so, why wasn't it passed on?
  - a. Were data requirements passed on to staff responsible for collecting? Were the requirements correctly translated into collection requirements? Were there higher collection priorities which precluded the collection of the data? Were assets available for collecting the data? Were all possible assets considered? Were they assigned? Was an attempt made to collect the data?
  - b. If collected, was collection acknowledged? Were there procedures for passing on the data? Were they followed?
- 4. Was the item received <u>too frequently</u>, disrupting the operations?
  - a. Is there guidance concerning the frequency at which information is to be provided? Guidance can be in the form of SOP, supervisory input, or user feedback. Was guidance used?
  - b. Were user's frequency requirements known? Was action taken to meet them? Were alternative actions possible?
- 5. Was the information item received <u>less frequently</u> than the user required? Implicit in this situation is that

information could have been consistently provided late; specific instances would be evaluated as a timeliness deficiency.

- a. Was there guidance concerning the frequency the information was provided the user? This guidance could be in the form of SOP, supervisory input, or feedback from the user. Was the guidance used?
- b. Did the data to be processed into the information item meet the standards required for processing? If not, would it have contributed to the information being provided less frequently than required? If so, how?
- c. Were there higher priority information requirements that needed to be processed? Were alternative resources available to produce the information? Were they considered? Did the processing procedure contribute to delay in processing?
- d. Was the deficiency in meeting the frequency standards as a result of the dissemination procedure? Questions 1a through 1e from the timeliness diagnosis can be used for this diagnosis.
- e. Were the user's frequency requirements known? Was action taken to meet them? Were alternative actions possible?



### DIAGNOSTIC QUESTION INVENTORY AND FLOW CHART:

### OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE


An item can be deficient because operational perspective was not provided or was provided ineffectively. Aspect(s) or operational perspectives not provided or provided poorly should be identified, i.e.:

Area of operations Time/phasing/duration of the operation Missions of higher, lower, or adjacent units Unit contingency plans, in place or in development Friendly capabilities related to current or future operations Enemy capabilities related to current or future operations

- 1. Was the information item <u>placed</u> in operational perspective? If no, then:
  - a. Was there any guidance to indicate the information should have been put into the specific operational context? Guidance could include SOP, doctrine, suggestions from supervisors or cohorts, or feedback from the user. Training and experience in providing operational context should be considered. Guidance can be implicit or explicit. If no, why? Go to Question 2 to determine if having guidance would have made a difference, and to Questions 3 and 4 to determine if there was a reporting or dissemination problem.
  - b. Was there either explicit or implicit guidance that information should NOT be put in operational perspective? The purpose of this question is to determine if there is a disconnect between what should be done and what is done. If the answer is yes, note the problem and proceed to Question 2. The problem of the disconnect will be addressed outside the diagnostics.
- 2. Were the necessary <u>factors</u> in place so the information could adequately be put in operational perspective?
  - a. Is there time to place the information in operational perspective? Is the workload such that adding this attribute is traded-off in order to accomplish other requirements?
  - b. Does the staff have the training or experience necessary to put information into operational perspective? Consider formal military training, on-the-job training,

and experience based on previous jobs, in relation to operational perspective in general and the deficient aspect of operational perspective in specific.

- c. Is the staff knowledgeable of procedures that facilitate placing information in operational perspective? Do they use them? Procedures might include wargaming, consulting with staff external to the group, internal discussion, and brainstorming.
- d. Does the staff have the job aids, data bases, references, etc., which would help them place information in operational perspective?
- 3. If information was in operational perspective which wasn't forwarded to the user, was it <u>removed from the report</u> (without regard to how it was presented)? If yes, why?
- 4. If operational perspective was in the report, why was it removed from the dissemination?



### DIAGNOSTIC QUESTION INVENTORY AND FLOW CHART:


### CLARITY

A clarity deficiency concerns information which is difficult to understand or comprehend by the user, regardless of how information is presented. Reason(s) for a clarity deficiency may include any combination of:

Poor organization Too technical or detailed Too long or redundant Too general or abbreviated Too much jargon, too many acronyms Wrong areas emphasized Content level inappropriate for the user Wrong means of presentation

Four major sets of questions should be addressed:

- Were <u>procedures</u>/guidance available on how to prepare and present information? This could include message formats, briefing guides, Army writing style manuals, field manuals, and internal SOPs within the unit and the command. Were they used? Did they contribute to the problem? Why weren't they used?
- 2. Was the <u>audience</u> for the information identified? Was it considered when producing or presenting the information? If a multiple audience, were key players identified? Was production or presentation adjusted for each? If one key player, was he identified? Were his unique requirements identified and considered?
- 3. Was there <u>quality</u> control of the production? Was someone responsible for checking the clarity of the information? Was it done? Was there enough time for quality control? If it was done, were corrective actions initiated? Followed up?
- 4. Was the staff adequately <u>trained</u> to produce or present the information? Did they understand what was being produced/presented? Was it SOP to use jargon, acronyms, or technical language? Was it SOP to be brief or detailed in carrying out their responsibilities? Was lack of organization a common characterization or a unique event?



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### DIAGNOSTIC QUESTION INVENTORY AND FLOW CHART:

### COMPLETENESS

An item is deficient if missing factual content (5W/H, SALUTE, METT-T). An absence of facts, however, does not distract if the absence is identified and explained. Diagnosis must be guided by specific mission fact(s).

- 1. Were the missing facts <u>available</u> for dissemination? If no, go to Question 2.
  - a. Why didn't they get sent to the user? Did anyone know they were there to be sent on? Was a conscious decision made not to send it on?
  - b. If they were forwarded, did they go to the correct user? Was it confirmed that the user received them? Were there procedures for confirmation? Were they used? Was confirmation possible?
- 2. If data had to be <u>processed</u> in some way to develop the factual content of the information item, did the staff doing the processing have the necessary data? If no, diagnose data collector as well as data processor.
  - a. If the processor didn't have the data, then Questions 2a and 2b in the frequency analysis are appropriate.
  - b. If the processor had the data, why wasn't it processed? Was it lost in the normal course of events? Did the staff know the data was supposed to be processed for the item? Were guidelines or references available to help the staff? Did they have necessary training or experience to carry out the processing? Was someone responsible for quality controlling the outputs? Did it get done? Were corrections for deficiencies noted during quality control directed? Was the direction followed up?
  - c. If the data was processed, was it included in the reporting? If not, why not? If it got reported, did it get lost in the dissemination?
- 3. Was the data <u>collected</u>? With minor modifications, Question 3 of the frequency diagnosis is appropriate.

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DIAGNOSTIC RECORD

DIAGNOSTIC RECORD

Recommended Solutions	
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Information Deficiencies	
Problem(s) Identified	
(Include tocation)	
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### INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE USE OF THE DIAGNOSTIC RECORD FORM

The purpose of this form is to help you document your analysis so that you can systematically present and support the conclusions from your diagnosis. The form should be filled out one deficiency at a time.

- Step 1. Record in the "inquiry data" column the important data that you gathered when asking questions about the deficiency.
- Step 2. Record in the "problem(s) identified" column your conclusion as to what the problem(s) was based on the data from the first column.
- Step 3. Record what the deficiency resulted. This is a restatement of the original deficiency you diagnosed.
- Step 4. In the cause of the deficiency column, record your conclusions based on the first column, as to what caused the problem identified in the second column.
- Step 5. Filling in recommendations to solve the problem is optional. If by experience or comfort you think you have a good solution to the problem, record it. However, the purpose of the diagnostics is to identify problems and the causes, not offer remedy.

### APPENDIX D

### COMPUTING SCORES FROM THE DEFICIENCY CONSOLIDATION WORKSHEET

Computing the four scores, comprehensiveness, criticality, effectiveness, and distribution of ratings is described below. The scores are computed from the example consolidation worksheet and Performance Rating Form). The example is only for one section of the worksheet, enemy courses of action, and one rating period. Also, the observer participant's weights have been recorded on the worksheet (identified by the A) from the Information Requirements Profile. ITEMS ON THE WORKSHEET AND FORM ARE IDENTIFIED FOR PROVIDING THE EXAMPLES. IT IS NOT PART OF THE COMPUTATION. The scores based on all the worksheets for each rating period are computed in the same manner described.

WHEN COMPUTING A TOTAL SCORE AN INFORMATION ITEM IS ONLY COUNTED AS BEING DEFICIENT ONCE, EVEN IF IT WAS DEFICIENT IN MORE THAN ONE DIMENSION.

Comprehensiveness--total score

There are a total of 14 items which were rated. Four (identified by the C) show no deficiencies in any of the five areas. The comprehensiveness score is the number of non-deficient items divided by the number of items rated. The result is multiplied by 100 to get a percent.

Comprehensiveness = (4/14) x 100 = .29 x 100 = 29% (this is probably not a good score)

Criticality--total score

There are 10 items that were rated deficient. They had weights of 40, 70, 80, 100, 70, 100, 80, 70, 40, and 90. The weights came out of the column identified with the A for items identified by the D. The sum of the weights of the deficient items is 740.

The criticality score is the sum of the weights of the deficient items divided by the number of deficient items.

Criticality = 740/10 = 74 (Moderately critical items were deficient)

### Effectiveness--total score

There are 4 items not deficient (identified by the C). They have weights of 70, 80, 80, and 60. The sum of these weights is 290. The effectiveness score is the sum of the weights of the non-deficient items divided by the sum of the weights of all items. The result is multiplied by 100 to get a percent.

Effectiveness = (290/1030) x 100 = .28 x 100 = 28% (not a good score)

The three scores illustrated can also be computed for each dimension. Computation of the clarity scores is described. Scores for the other deficiency dimensions are computed the same way.

Comprehensiveness--clarity

There were only 10 items that were rated for clarity. Since four information items were not received by the G3 plans, they could not be rated on any area except timeliness. There were seven items not deficient on clarity.

Comprehensiveness for clarity =

 $(7/10) \times 100 = 70$ %

Criticality--clarity

The three deficient items for clarity had weights of 70, 80, and 100.

Criticality-clarity =

250/3 = 83

Effectiveness--clarity

The seven non-deficient items for clarity had scores of 70, 80, 80, 60, 80, 70, and 90.

Effectiveness-clarity =

 $(530/780) \times 100 = 68$ 

### Distribution of performance ratings

The distribution of performance ratings, while not a score, represent the percent of time a specific performance scale value was selected for any of the dimensions. It is determined by counting how many times the item was given a performance scale value, divided by the number of times the item was rated.

From the example Performance Rating Form, enemy courses of action, there were 14 timeliness ratings. To compute the percent for any performance scale value, divide the number of times the specific value occurred by the number of items rated. Multiply that result by 100 to get the percent.

### **Timeliness Performance**

Scale Value	Frequency	Percent
1	5	36
2	0	0
3	2	14
4	3	21
5	4	29

The line between performance scale value 3 and 4 represents the benchmark identified by the observer-participant.

The other areas are done the same way, except they only have 10 ratings. Four items were not received and could only be rated for timeliness.

The scores can be presented in graphs or tables as shown on the following pages.

## **Performance Rating Form**

### (part 2 of 2)

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
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# If you wanted to show MI performance on a rated dimension for the different

Effectiveness

rating periods:




This figure shows that on the dimension of timeliness performance got worse on all measures.

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If you wanted to show MI performance on a measure for a rating period for all dimensions:







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If you are interested in rating distributions, the presentation should be by individual dimension. How well did MI perform on timeliness during the first rating period?

1



If you were interested in the rating trend for a dimension then:



Scale Value

This figure shows relative flat performance, i.e., nothing bad, but not perfect either. The trend shows rating period 3 to have the most variable performance, even though no item was below the benchmark for completeness.

DIMENSION	MEASURE	R	ATING PER	IOD
		1	2	3
SSa	Comprehensiveness	80%	85%	90%
Timeliness	Criticality	20%	20%	75%
Ē	Effectiveness	95%	95%	95%
5				
Frequency	Comprehensiveness	90%	100%	100%
Frec	Criticality	40%	0	0
	Effectiveness	95%	100%	100%

What can be shown on a graph can be shown in tabular form also.

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### RATING PERIOD 1 MEASURES

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DIMENSION	COMPREHENSIVENESS	CRITICALITY	EFFECTIVENESS
Timeliness	60%	50%	75%
Frequency	80%	30%	70%
Operational Perspective	95%	90%	95%
Clarity	95%	30%	95%
Completeness	95%	40%	95%

,