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US ARMY WAR COLLEGE

PARAMETERS
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Parameters is a journal of ideas, providing a forum for the expression of mature professional thought on the art and science of land warfare, national and international security affairs, military strategy, military leadership and management, military history, military ethics, and other topics of significant and current interest to the US Army and the Department of Defense. It serves as a vehicle for continuing the education, and thus the professional development, of War College graduates and other military officers and civilians concerned with military affairs.

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The Military and the Media: A Troubled Embrace

BERNARD E. TRAINOR

At first they are polite, respectfully prefacing each question with "sir," but when faced with their own prejudices, the veneer of civility evaporates, hostility surfaces, and the questions give way to a feeding frenzy of accusations. No, these aren't journalists asking the questions. They are young officers and cadets, and I have experienced this phenomenon repeatedly when discussing relations between the military and the media at service academies and professional military schools. It is clear that today's officer corps carries as part of its cultural baggage a loathing for the press.

Indeed, military relations with the press—a term I apply to both print and television mediums—are probably worse now than at any period in the history of the Republic. I say this recognizing that Vietnam is usually cited as the nadir in military-media relations. But at least during the Vietnam War military men actually experienced what they judged to be unfair treatment at the hands of the Fourth Estate, and the issue was out in the open.

The majority of today's career officers, however, have had no such association with the press. Most of them were children during the war. In the case of those at the academies, some were probably still in diapers when Saigon fell. But all of them suffer this institutional form of post-traumatic shock syndrome. It is a legacy of the war, and it takes root soon after they enter service. Like racism, anti-Semitism, and all forms of bigotry, it is irrational but nonetheless real. The credo of the military seems to have become "duty, honor, country, and hate the media."

Although most officers no longer say the media stabbed them in the back in Vietnam, the military still smarts over the nation's humiliation in Indochina and still blames TV and the print media for loss of public support for the war. Today the hostility manifests itself in complaints that the press

will not keep a secret and that it endangers lives by revealing details of sensitive operations. The myth of the media as an unpatriotic, left-wing, anti-military establishment is thus perpetuated.

Having spent most of my adult life in the military and very little of it as a journalist, I am more qualified to comment on military culture than that of the media. I must admit that in the post-Vietnam years I too was biased against the press. But having had feet in both camps gives me a unique perspective which I now try to share with each, particularly the military.

Did the press stab the military in the back during Vietnam? Hardly. The press initially supported the war, but as casualties mounted and the Johnson Administration failed to develop a coherent strategy to bring the war to a satisfactory conclusion, the press became critical. Whether the press influenced public opinion or simply reflected it will be argued for years to come. But it was a misguided policy that was primarily at fault for the debacle, not the media.

The media was, however, guilty of instances of unfair and sensational reporting which veterans of that war still resent. This was particularly true in the latter stages, when the nation was weary of nightly war news and when cub newspaper and television journalists tried to make headlines out of thin gruel. More responsible supervision should have been exercised by editors, but it was not, and many in the military, already frustrated by the war, felt the press as a whole was deliberately trying to humiliate them.

The legacy of the war sharpened the tension which exists between the media and the military, but it is not its cause. The roots of tension are in the nature of the institutions. The military is hierarchical with great inner pride and loyalties. It is the antithesis of a democracy—and must be so if it is to be effective. It is action-oriented and impatient with outside interference. Many things it legitimately does make little sense to civilians who have scant knowledge of military matters. The military wants only to be left alone to carry out its assigned mission.

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To the contrary, a free press—one of the great virtues and elemental constituents of a democracy—is an institution wherein concentration of power is viewed as a danger. The press is a watchdog over institutions of power, be they military, political, economic, or social. Its job is to inform the people about the doings of their institutions. By its very nature, the press is skeptical and intrusive. As a result there will always be a divergence of interests between the media and the military. That they are both essential to the well-being of our nation is beyond question, but the problem of minimizing the natural friction between the two is a daunting one.

The volunteer force in a subtle way has contributed to this friction. At the height of the cold war and throughout the Vietnam War, the military was at the forefront of American consciousness. Scarcely a family did not have a son or loved one liable to the draft. The shadow of national service cast itself over the family dinner table and generated in virtually all Americans a real and personal interest in the armed forces. This interest was heightened by the experiences and memories of fathers and older brothers who had fought in World War II and Korea and who maintained a lively interest in soldiering. With the end of the draft and the advent of a volunteer army this awareness disappeared, along with the pertinence of the older generation of warriors. Only the families of those who volunteered for the service kept touch with the modern Army.

The military, which for so long had been bound to civil society, drifted away from it. Military bases were few and far between and located in remote areas unseen by much of urban and suburban America. A large percentage of volunteer servicemen married early and settled down to a life where their base and service friends were the focal points of their lives. No longer did uniformed soldiers rush home on three-day passes whenever they could get them. When servicemen did go home, they did so wearing civilian clothes and, given the somewhat more tolerant attitude of the military toward eccentricity in dress and hair style, they were were no longer as sharply marked by short haircuts and shiny shoes. Off post they were nearly indistinguishable in appearance from their civilian cohort.

To the average civilian, the term military soon came to be equated with the Pentagon, with fearsome intercontinental missiles, and with $600 toilet seats and other manifestations of waste, fraud, and abuse. The flesh and blood association the civilian formerly had with the armed forces atrophied, and he came to regard the military as just another bureaucracy. For its part, the military settled into the relative isolation of self-contained ghettos and lost touch with a changing America. It focused on warlike things and implicitly rejected the amorality of the outside world it was sworn to defend. In an age of selfishness, the professional soldier took pride in his image of his own selflessness. A sense of moral elitism emerged within the armed forces which is apparent today to any civilian who deals with those institutions. The all-volunteer force not only created a highly

DOD Photo

A CBS reporter interviews a Marine lance corporal in Vietnam, August 1966.

competent military force, it also created a version of Cromwell's Ironside Army, contemptuous of those with less noble visions. It is no wonder that those who chose the profession of arms looked with suspicion upon those members of the press who pried into their sacred rituals.

Oddly enough I have found striking similarities between my colleagues in both camps. Both are idealistic, bright, totally dedicated to their professions, and technically proficient. They work long hours willingly under arduous conditions, crave recognition, and feel they are underpaid. The strain on family life is equally severe in both professions. But there are notable differences as well. A journalist tends to be creative, while a soldier is more content with traditional approaches. Reporters are independent, while military men are team players. And of course one tends to be liberal and skeptical, the other conservative and accepting.

There is another big difference which bears directly on their interrelationship. The military is hostile toward the journalist, while the journalist is indifferent toward the military. To the journalist, the military is just another huge bureaucracy to report on, no different from Exxon or Congress. But whereas businessmen and politicians try to enlist journalists for their own purposes, the military man tries to avoid them, and when he cannot, he faces the prospect defensively with a mixture of fear, dread, and contempt.

Most of my military brothers in arms would be surprised to know that when asked for an opinion about the military profession, young journalists having no prior association with the military rate career officers highly. They view officers as bright, well-educated, dedicated, and competent, although they wonder why anyone would make the service a career. Their prejudgement of enlisted personnel is far less flattering. Most journalists—mistakenly, of course—have the image of an enlisted man as a disadvantaged, not-too-bright high-school dropout who comes from a broken home and cannot fit into society.

Ask a journalist for his opinion of servicemen after his first reporting assignment on the military, and the view will be radically different. The journalist will lavishly praise the enlisted personnel he met and relate how enthusiastic they were. He will remark how well they knew their jobs. He'll note how proud they were of what they were doing, and how eager they were to explain their duties. Genuine admiration and enthusiasm come through in the reporter's retelling of his encounters. But what of the officers? "The officers? . . . Oh, they're a bunch of horses' asses."

To understand such a critical assessment of officers, one only has to take a hypothetical, though typical, walk in a journalist's shoes as he goes for his first interview with a senior officer. In this interview, it happens to be a general:

After a seemingly endless round of telephone calls to set up the interview, you arrive—a well-disposed journalist, notebook and tape recorder in hand—at headquarters. You are met by a smiling public affairs officer who signs you in and gets you a pass. You then are led through a series of offices under the baleful stare of staff factotums, while your escort vouches for the legitimacy of your alien presence. At last you arrive at a well-appointed anteroom where everyone speaks in hushed, reverent tones.

After a wait, the door to a better-appointed office opens, and you are ushered in with the announcement, "THE GENERAL will see you now." Not knowing whether to prostrate yourself or simply to genuflect, you enter the sanctum sanctorum vaguely aware of others entering with you, but grateful for their presence. Graciously received by the General, you are invited to sit down THERE, while the General resumes his place behind his imposing desk backed by colorful flags and martial memorabilia. In addition to the General and the public affairs officer, there are several other officers of varied ranks present to whom you are not introduced. All of them take seats at the nod of the General, one of whom places himself facing the General but slightly to your rear, at the outer edge of your peripheral vision.

Following introductory pleasantries, the interview gets underway. You set your tape recorder on the coffee table and open your notebook. This triggers a duplicate reaction on the part of those around you, and an elaborate

choreography begins. Your tape recorder is immediately trumped by at least two others, and the General's entourage poises with pencils and yellow legal pads to take note of the proceedings. Throughout the interview, marked by elliptical responses to your questions, you are aware of knowing looks, nods, and shrugs being exchanged around the room. More disconcerting is the series of hand and arm signals being given to the General by the officer sitting to the rear, in the manner of an operatic prompter. You are given your allotted time down to the second, at which time you are escorted out of the office as the General returns to important matters of state.

After turning in your badge and being bidden a good day, you are back out on the street wondering what it was all about. Why all the lackeys? Were they hiding something? Why the signals? Didn't the General know enough about the subject to discuss it without a prompter? Puzzled, you walk away wondering whether your host was a charlatan or a fool.

Obviously the little scenario above is an exaggeration, but those who have been through the process know that it is just barely so.

The attitude of the military is bound to affect that of the press and vice versa. If it is one of mutual suspicion and antagonism, the relationship will never improve, and in the end the American public will be the loser.

There is nothing more refreshing than an open relationship. Senior officers know their business and can talk about it sensibly without a bunch of flacks around. Journalists know that some topics are off-limits in any meeting with the press, and they respect the obligation of a military officer not to disclose information he should not. It is a poor journalist indeed who tries to trap an officer into a disclosure that is legitimately classified. The counter-battery of tape recorders and legions of witnesses are of course intended as protective devices in case a journalist does a hatchet job on the person he is interviewing. This is useless protection, however, because if a reporter is out to paint a deliberately unfair picture of a person or institution, he will do it regardless of recorded safeguards of accuracy. The best protection against the unscrupulous few is not to deal with them.

Each of the services has expended great effort at improving military-media relations. Public affairs officers are trained at Fort Benjamin Harrison, and all major commands have graduates of the school to act as a bridge between the warrior and the scribe. Installations and war colleges sponsor symposia and workshops to improve relations with the media. Special tours of military installations and activities are conducted for the press by the Defense Department and the services, and some components of the Fourth Estate even reciprocate. But these efforts have little effect on military attitudes and make few military converts because most of them end up focusing on the mechanics of the interrelationship rather than its nature. Discussing

how best to improve military press pool coverage in the wake of Panama, while a useful exercise, does little to minimize the underlying prejudice between the two institutions, much less eliminate it.

What is frequently overlooked by the military is that the profession of journalism is as upright as that of the military, with pride in its integrity and strict norms of conduct for its members. For example, it is absolutely forbidden at *The New York Times* to secretly tape an interview, by phone or in person, or to mislead a source as to the identity of the reporter. Most newspapers have similar restrictions. As a result there are few instances of yellow journalism today. The journalistic world knows who the unscrupulous are within its ranks and gives them short shrift. An unscrupulous journalist will never last on a reputable paper, and advertisers upon whom a newspaper depends for its existence are not inclined to place ads in papers with a reputation for unfair reporting.

This is not to say that journalists will shy from using every legitimate means to dig out a story. The reputation of government agencies, including the military, for overclassifying, for withholding the truth, and for putting a spin on events is well known, and a good reporter will never take things at face value. The tendency of journalists to disbelieve half of what they are told also adds to the military's paranoia.

There is no question, of course, that some journalists go too far in reporting a story, and so do some newspapers. Journalism, besides being a profession, is also a business, and businesses must show profit. This leads to fierce competition. A scoop means sales, sales mean profits, and that is hat free enterprise is all about. For a reporter it also means reputation, and if his editors were not pushing him for exclusive stories he would be pushing himself so as to enhance his reputation and maybe win a Pulitzer prize. Thus a journalist may uncover a story relating to national security which would jeopardize that security if it were made public. This is particularly true if it is on operational matters, the favorite complaint of today's officer corps. In his eagerness to be on the front page, the journalist may disregard the security sensitivity of his story and file it to his newspaper. But that is where editors come in. They are mature people with long years in the business and good judgment on the implications of a story. In truly critical instances an editor will withhold a damaging story.

The record of the American press in this regard is good, despite unsubstantiated claims made by military officers that the press leaks operational information. Let two examples suffice to illustrate the point. Newsrooms knew beforehand of the planned airstrikes on Libya in 1986 and held the news until the raids had taken place so as not to endanger the air crews. Likewise, every Washington newsman knew that Marine Lieutenant Colonel Richard Higgins had held a sensitive job in the office of the Secretary of

The credo of the military seems to have become "duty, honor, country, and hate the media."

Defense immediately prior to his United Nations assignment in Lebanon, where he was kidnapped and later executed. Yet in hopes that his captors would remain ignorant of this possibly compromising information, no mention was made of it in the American press until after it appeared in a Lebanese newspaper.

Whether the press acted responsibly during the December 1989 Panama invasion, when it reported air movement of troops on the night of the operation, is the latest subject of debate. News of the airlift was on television before H-Hour, but nothing was said of a planned airborne assault. Whether anyone in the press knew for certain that an assault was about to take place is in doubt, but if it was known, nothing was disclosed publicly. The air activity was alternately reported as a buildup for military action or part of the war of nerves against the Noriega regime. Our government itself actually contributed to the "leak" with its cute reply to newsmen's questions about the unusual air movements. The government spokesman said they were routine readiness exercises unrelated to Panama, but he withdrew the "unrelated to Panama" part of his statement *prior* to the assault the following day, thus giving away the show.

On the whole the military was satisfied with press coverage of its Panama intervention. Certainly Just Cause received more favorable reporting than the Grenada operation in 1983. However, the one vehicle designed to improve military-media relations during military operations was a failure—the press pool.

The idea of a press pool came about as the result of the exclusion of journalists from the Grenada operation. At the time, the press howled that the people had the right to know what their armed forces were doing and that journalists should not be denied entry to a war zone. The press concluded that they were shut out more to cover up military incompetence than to preserve operational security. They were more convinced of it when stories of that incompetence surfaced. As a result, DOD-sponsored press pools were established to allow selected journalists from the various mediums to represent the press as a whole during future operations. The pool reporters were rotated periodically and were told to be ready on short notice to accompany military

units. A list of names was held at the Pentagon for that purpose. They were not to be told beforehand where they were going or what was about to happen.

The system was tested in some peacetime readiness exercises to everybody's satisfaction. But in its first real test, during the 1987-88 operations in the Persian Gulf, reporters complained that they were isolated from the action and kept ignorant of events. Many complained that their military hosts were more interested in brainwashing them than exposing them to the news.[1]

Panama was the second test, and again the pool concept failed.[2] Reporters were flown to Panama but kept at Howard Air Force Base and given briefings during the highpoints of the operation. When they were finally taken into Panama City, it was to view events and locations of little news value. Meanwhile, journalists not in the pool were streaming into Panama on their own and providing vivid firsthand accounts of the action. Pool reporters cried foul. The military, for their part, complained that the pool journalists made unreasonable demands for transportation and communications facilities and that they were callous of the dangers involved in taking them to scenes of fighting. Nobody was or is happy with the pool arrangement.

The pool concept suffers three fatal flaws. The first is that the military is always going to want to put on its best face in hopes of influencing the reporters it is hosting. When the military is faced with the choice of taking a reporter to the scene of a confused and uncertain firefight or to the location of a success story—well, take a wild guess which the military will choose, regardless of its relative newsworthiness. Second, because the military brings pool reporters to the scene of action, it also feels responsible for transporting them around, and this may not be logistically convenient at times. Third, the military is protective and feels responsible for the safety of any civilians they are sponsoring. Keeping the press pool isolated at an air base in Panama was a genuine reflection of military concern for the reporters' safety. It is only during long campaigns like Vietnam that the protective cloak wears thin, and then usually because journalists find ways of getting out from under the military's wing.

Implicit in the military attitude toward the pool is not only its institutional sense of responsibility, but also its lack of understanding of journalists. If the pool is to work better, the services must recognize that they have no obligation to the pool other than to get them to the scene of the action and brief them on the situation. Beyond that, reporters are on their own. They are creative people who can take care of themselves. Any additional assistance rendered is appreciated but not necessary; it certainly doesn't provide grounds to restrict coverage of the story. Naval operations and in some instances air operations can be an exception because no facilities may be available other than those aboard ships or in a plane. But as the Persian Gulf illustrated, journalists proved to be a resourceful lot by hiring civilian helicopters to overfly the fleet—even at the risk of being shot down.

The press, on the other hand, should be selective in whom they send to war. Pool membership should require a physically fit, versatile journalist who knows something about the military. Few reporters have previous military experience, unfortunately, and few editors can afford the luxury of a military specialist on their payrolls. But the Defense Department would be happy to provide pool members with orientations and primers on military matters. At least then a reporter could learn some military jargon and the difference between a smoke grenade and a fragmentation grenade.

Old-timers long for the days of Ernie Pyle and Drew Middleton, when the military and the press saw events as one, and there was a love bond between the two. In those days the military could do no wrong—but even if it did, a censor saw to it that the public did not find out about it. Those were the days when the nation was on a holy crusade against the evil machinations of Fascism and Nazism. In this desperate struggle, propaganda was more important than truth. Had it been otherwise, many of the World War II heroes we revere today would have been pilloried by the press as butchers and bunglers.

Today's generals have no such friendly mediation. Moral crusades are no longer the order of the day, and unquestioned allegiance to government policy died with our involvement in Vietnam. The government lied once too often to the American people and lost their confidence. Today the press does what Thomas Jefferson envisaged for it when he rated it more important than the Army as a defender of democratic principles. It keeps a sharp eye on the military and on the government it serves.

This should not dismay the professional soldier. After all, parents have a right to know what the military is doing to and with their sons and their tax money. If the services act responsibly and honestly, even with mistakes, there is little to fear from the press.

This is the challenge to today's and tomorrow's military leaders. They must work to regain the respect and confidence of the media as their predecessors once had it in the dark days of a long-ago war. The press is not going to go away. Hence, the anti-media attitude that has been fostered in young officers must be exorcised if both the military and the media are to serve well the republic for which they stand.

NOTES

1. See Barry E. Willey, "Military-Media Relations Come of Age," *Parameters*, 19 (March 1989), 76-84; Tim Ahern, "White Smoke in the Persian Gulf," *Washington Journalism Review*, 9 (October 1987), 18; and Mark Thompson, "With the Press Pool in the Persian Gulf," *Columbia Journalism Review* (November/December 1987), 46.

2. Fred S. Hoffman, "Review of Panama Pool Deployment, December 1989," unpublished report, March 1990.

New Rules: Modern War and Military Professionalism

A. J. BACEVICH

"We had made up our minds to play whist, and when we sat down we found that the game was poker."[1]

— J. F. C. Fuller

Once again, as in Fuller's day, these are disorienting times for soldiers. Recent events have torn history from its moorings, sweeping aside the constants that have defined our world since 1945. The usual hucksters grope about—to little avail thus far—to explain the implications of titanic changes now under way. Amidst the prognostications of self-anointed seers, Fuller's quaint metaphor provides as good an azimuth as any: the old rules no longer pertain; woe be to those who fail to take heed.

In truth, no one can foresee what new order will emerge once the flood-waters recede. Contemplating the result thus far, optimists proclaim it a triumph: the long, bloodless NATO campaign bids fair to culminate in a satisfactory resolution of the Cold War. Yet even if that expectation holds true, now is hardly the time for self-congratulation. A world in flux will not deal gently with those caught resting on their laurels.

Moreover, as they affect the Army, the blessings of success are proving to be mixed. Having prevailed, we now dismantle the instrument of victory. The prospect of drawing down to pre-Korean War levels—a prospect only momentarily forestalled by Iraqi aggression in the Gulf—does not show us at our most enlightened. Budget wars spur parochialism. Combined arms become competing arms. The instinct for self-preservation focuses institutional energies on a narrow range of bread-and-butter issues: justifying end strength, preserving division flags, and salvaging valued weapon programs.

In the long run, such efforts may well miss the point. However great our anguish about what the Army might *look like* during the decade now

beginning, the larger question is what the Army might eventually *do*—where, in what fashion, and to what end will it bring force to bear in support of American interests? The Army's prospects for institutional health in the 1990s rest on our ability to provide in short order an answer to that question—an answer that satisfies ourselves but, no less important, one that compels popular and political support. Thus, even as it endures upheaval, the officer corps confronts the challenge of grappling with that most elusive and complex subject—the future.

A Dangerous Nostalgia

How should we begin? With a clear head and an open mind—no small requirement. For despite claims of pragmatism, military institutions display a pronounced weakness for woolly-headed sentimentality especially on any subject relating to their own past. Thus, one precondition for useful thinking about the future is that we suppress our penchant for nostalgia. We must free ourselves from notions about warfare that however cherished no longer conform to objective reality. In this regard, the insights of Major General Franz Uhle-Wettler, an independent-minded German officer, ought to command our attention. Although written a decade ago, Uhle-Wettler's prescient critique of a nostalgic *Bundeswehr* remains fresh and timely. It also provides an example of the instructive, even idiosyncratic thinking to which any army in an era of rapid change should be responsive.

Uhle-Wettler chastised his fellow German officers for embracing a static and romanticized version of their past. Despite the fact that the terms of European war circa 1980 hardly resembled those that the *Wehrmacht* had faced decades before, Uhle-Wettler accused the *Bundeswehr* of languishing contentedly in the "shadow of Guderian," fancying itself heir to the old *panzer* traditions, assuming without reflection that Guderian's methods would apply directly to future wars.[2] Cataloging the ways in which any prospective European battlefield differed from the storied campaigns of World War II—the

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latter-day dependence on fragile, support-intensive technology, the huge cost and resultant scarcity of spares, the dearth of infantry, the spread of cities and forests uncongenial to armored formations—Uhle-Wettler noted with dismay that these factors had seemingly had no effect on how the *Bundeswehr* planned to fight. The German army's expectations of war had hardly changed since it had reached the outskirts of Moscow and fought its way back toward the suburbs of Berlin.

The theme underlying Uhle-Wettler's critique applies to the present-day American Army. Like so many of their fellow citizens, American officers profess an interest in history but actually prefer heritage—prettified versions of the past designed to make us feel good: events as interpreted by the brush of Don Stivers, whose sentimental depictions of the Old Army adorn so many soldiers' mantels. We are prisoners of our own romanticized history, captivated like our *Bundeswehr* comrades by the images of World War II.

If the *Bundeswehr* has lounged in the shadow of Guderian, we have for our part basked in the reflected glory of George S. Patton. The achievements of General Patton and his contemporaries as commanders of huge mechanized forces slashing their way to victory in continent-spanning campaigns have shaped our images of battle. Pattonesque triumphs provide the model for what we tend to think of as "real" war, in which the clash of materiel-rich opponents—presumably unfettered by complex political considerations—produces a decisive outcome. This model has achieved an exalted status akin to an article of faith, off-limits to skeptical reexamination.

Since 1950, the American Army has girded itself for such a conflict against the might of an aggressive Warsaw Pact. To say that recent world developments have rendered such an occurrence less likely as well as less fearsome is to put it mildly. Yet even as daily newspapers and the nightly news bombard us with breathless accounts of change, Patton retains his grip on the Army's collective psyche. The current boom in techno-military thrillers provides one indicator. The officer corps's appetite for such fiction—acclaimed as "realistic" and invested in some quarters with the capacity to teach "lessons" about combat—is astonishing. The staff duty officer whose desk drawer once hid a copy of *Playboy* now reads *Team Yankee* and feels virtuous at having done so. But what message is such fiction peddling? Simply this: that future war will be a reprise of World War II in the fancy dress of high technology. The officer corps is quick to embrace this reassurance that the way we have envisioned warfare need not change, that our soldierly aspirations and daydreams can remain intact.

This predisposition to see the future as a linear extension of the past finds its official counterpart in the efforts of the Army's doctrine developers. Their latest offering—known as Future AirLand Battle—begins with a "threat" that is yesterday's Soviets juiced up with ten years of technology but retaining

their old devotion to echeloned armies and fronts hell-bent on reaching the English Channel. Future AirLand Battle's postulated response updates existing doctrine with our own technological wonders—near-perfect intelligence and long-range precision weapons—to attrit the attacker with massive firepower and then to administer the coup de grace in the classic manner of mobile armored combat. Despite a gloss of new terms, it offers a vision of war with which Patton himself would have felt right at home.

The fact that the Soviets are rethinking their belief in early, unrelenting offensive operations receives scant consideration. The political (and moral) acceptability of such a weapons-intensive doctrine in the urban landscape of Western Europe—still the point of origin for scenario-writers—receives no mention. The suggestion that the American Army's focus just might be something other than high-intensity war against the Soviet Union is deflected with the specious assertion that Future AirLand Battle will apply universally, being as suited for anti-drug smuggling operations as for defending the Fulda Gap. Rather than a blueprint for adapting to a changing world, Future AirLand Battle testifies to our devotion to the status quo, our doggedness in clinging to the role we have insisted upon since Patton last led us to victory. Notwithstanding claims that it breaks new ground, Future AirLand Battle is a sterile manifestation of nostalgia—a self-indulgence that the Army today can ill afford.

Corrupted Professionalism

In truth, the roots of our attachment to a Pattonesque style of warfare go deeper than mere nostalgia. Historically, armies have devised operational styles—codified as doctrine—as much to protect self-defined institutional values as to advance the interests of the state they serve. In this regard, the very notion of "professionalism"—the attribute in which armies such as our own put so much stock—becomes a two-edged sword. On the one hand, professionalism implies competence and responsibility, with the latter requiring in the military's case subordination to legitimate civilian authority. In return, society endows professionals with a virtual monopoly over their field of expertise and concedes to the profession broad autonomy. Society's reliance on professionals to perform their critical role provides the source of prestige and prerogatives, underpinning professional self-esteem. Thus, members of any profession have powerful incentives to cherish and protect their "ownership" of the service that they provide to society as a whole.

In Western armies, the concept of professionalism incorporates the belief that the use of force to achieve political ends is exclusively the province of regular military establishments. Professional soldiers have a stake in preserving the tradition of war as a gladiatorial contest—a conflict between opposing regular forces, governed by rules and customs and directed by an officer elite.

They conjure up doctrine that assumes such a paradigm of war and that reinforces their monopoly. Thus, self-interest competes with—and may ultimately corrupt—their ability to view with detachment war and its political context.

In a highly original assessment of German military thought from 1914 to 1945, the historian Michael Geyer explores the consequences of allowing military self-interest to distort what he terms "the principled analysis of war."[3] Geyer's subject is blitzkrieg, the most lavishly admired and probably the most imitated doctrinal concept of this century. According to Geyer, the stimulus behind the *Wehrmacht*'s development of the blitzkrieg during the interwar period went far beyond a perceived need to restore the battlefield mobility lost in the trenches of World War I. In the eyes of German officers, the real problem stemming from that conflict was that professionally designed and directed battle had failed to yield the expected decisive results in the late summer of 1914. Reacting to this failure, the adversaries had pursued policies of escalation that grotesquely increased the bloodletting yet only deepened the stalemate on the battlefield. The escalatory spiral culminated in a desperate attempt to stave off defeat by undermining the enemy's popular will to resist, thereby rendering obsolete the expectation that the clash of armies would decide the outcome of war. In this sense, the Imperial German Army's demise dates not from November 1918, but from 1916 when Field Marshal Erich von Falkenhayn unleashed his assault on Verdun. In terms of traditional military practice, Verdun was a "battle" devoid of objectives, conceived instead with the radical aim of employing mindless, unendurable slaughter to incite a popular revulsion against the war. Falkenhayn hoped to bludgeon the Allied peoples into demanding peace at any price.

Postwar German analysis exposed the full implications of such a strategy: The officer corps itself had "abandoned the concept of battle- and decision-oriented land warfare," tacitly conceding its inability to deliver the one commodity that society demanded of its army—victory.[4] Thus, the real task confronting German military reformers after 1918 was to salvage the raison d'être of their profession, devising techniques that would make swift, decisive victory once again a realistic possibility and thus making war once more the domain of military elites. To this end, comments Geyer, "The battle itself had to be rebuilt."[5]

The *Wehrmacht*'s invincibility during the early stages of World War II seemed confirmation that German officers had succeeded in their task. Once again, battle produced victory—in Poland, Norway, France, Yugoslavia, and Greece. In Russia and North Africa too, for a tantalizing moment, German operational brilliance brought decision within reach. To the commanders who planned and directed them, these campaigns seemed to demonstrate that war in its traditional form had once again become a useful instrument and that their own status and prerogatives were thereby preserved.

We must free ourselves from cherished notions about warfare that no longer conform to reality.

Geyer shows that this was an illusion. Despite the *Wehrmacht*'s string of early successes, the war culminated in disaster for Germany and its military. Dazzled by the achievements of Guderian, Rommel, and Manstein, most historians attribute Germany's defeat to the overwhelming weight of Allied forces, combined with Hitler's bungling intervention into matters that he should have left to his generals. Geyer refuses to let the *Wehrmacht* off the hook so easily. Instead, he argues that in their headlong rush to restore elite control of war, German military leaders abandoned any pretense of operational purposefulness. Seemingly "modern" in their outlook, their real goal had been profoundly reactionary. They sought to undo the effects of World War I, closing the Pandora's box of war between peoples and restoring "the era of institutionally contained warfare between armed forces." Intent upon a paradigm of warfare in which their own highly technical skills reigned supreme, when it came to strategy, German generals contented themselves with the facile assumption that "the mere accumulation of success" in the field would somehow eventually produce final victory.[6] Thus, in pursuing its own institutional aims, the *Wehrmacht* succumbed to operational aimlessness. The Third Reich's centrifugal inclinations fed a continuous expansion of war aims, offering ample opportunity for dazzling tactical success that might earn for its architect a field marshal's baton. But ultimately such achievements contributed nothing except to the exhaustion and collapse of Germany. In the end, the generals themselves—at least the better ones—understood this, as exemplified by Erich von Manstein's bewildered admission that on the Eastern Front "no one was clear any longer . . . what higher purpose all these battles were supposed to serve."[7]

The German army's failure serves as a warning, one with particular relevance to times such as our own. The essence of that failure was hubris. Instead of adapting their army to the evolving character of warfare, German military leaders insisted that war conform to their own self-defined needs. Despite the German officer corps's much-touted genius, such an effort was doomed.

First principles do matter. Adherence to false principles destined the *Wehrmacht* to fail. For any army entering a new historical era, a commitment to principles derived from anything other than a detached, objective analysis of modern war—not war as we would *like* it to be—may likewise spell future defeat. Hence, the imperative at this moment in history is to challenge

orthodoxy, to question institutional biases, even to risk a lapse of internal consensus if required to develop a cogent vision of the tasks ahead.

Political Soldiers

Prior to undertaking such a critical self-examination, any army would do well to consider the counsel of a senior officer from a half-century ago: "He who follows a false tradition of the unpolitical soldier and restricts himself to his military craft neglects an essential part of his sworn duty as a soldier in a democracy." Such a provocative invitation for military professionals to become politically engaged becomes altogether chilling when one learns the identity of the author: General Ludwig Beck.[8] Germany's last great Chief of the General Staff, the last to speak with any semblance of independent authority, Beck's own professional conduct was sufficiently ambiguous to make him an unlikely source of wisdom. He toiled loyally and effectively to rebuild the German army during the very years when the Nazis were in fact snuffing out German democracy. Yet he alone among the first rank of military leaders later resigned in protest against the aggressive course upon which Hitler had embarked. And ultimately he sacrificed his life in an attempt to rid Germany of Hitler, an effort that combined clumsiness, high courage, and estimable patriotism, yet left its own discomfiting legacy. The conspiracy that Beck directed posed a question from which professional soldiers ever since have studiously averted their eyes: can circumstances exist that justify—even compel—direct military action against political authority or do the traditions of civilian control and an apolitical soldiery require obedience to the state regardless of how evil its leadership and how odious its policies?

The moral dilemma that embroiled Beck is precisely what qualifies him to speak to modern-day soldiers about the political dimension of their profession. Almost alone among senior German officers, Beck had come to see by the late 1930s that war was no longer (if it had ever been) a distinct phenomenon existing somehow apart from the rest of history. Rather, war was integral to history, affecting and affected by every other facet of human activity. Soldiers might pretend otherwise, might argue that military craft—*their* special competency, *their* preserve—decided the outcome of wars. But in Beck's eyes, such thinking was parochial and obsolete.

For Beck, the essence of genuine professionalism was the recognition of war as a political act. Rather than treating Clausewitz's axiom as a threadbare cliché, however, Beck would make it the starting point for all calculations about war—its aims, its risks, its conduct. History and Beck's own experience had persuaded him that political, social, economic, and moral factors as much as events on the battlefield determined the outcome of war. For soldiers to argue that such considerations lay outside their proper sphere

of interest was absurd. To Beck, such claims amounted to an abdication of professional responsibility.

Thus, to serving officers today—absorbed in their pursuit of "technical and tactical competence"—Beck offers a caution and a challenge. He warns us that an officer corps that restricts itself to matters of craft may become morally indistinguishable from those *Wehrmacht* officers—honorable men by their own lights—who in doing their duty to the very end only propelled Germany that much further into the darkness. And he challenges us to embrace a mature vision of professionalism, one skeptical of faddish checklists of tenets, imperatives, or operating systems that promise shortcuts to professional mastery. Instead, he insists that soldiers—those in the field no less than those assigned to lofty staffs—appreciate the role of politics broadly defined in motivating, defining, and guiding any genuinely effective military policy.

Those who would protest the danger of soldiers becoming "involved" in politics miss the point. The exclusion of soldiers from politics does not guarantee peace. It only guarantees that those who command armies in wartime will be politically obtuse. This, in turn, increases the likelihood of irresponsibility in the conduct of war, leading, as Russell F. Weigley has observed, "to the emergence of war not as the servant but as the master of politics."[9] The military history of the 20th century is strewn with examples that support Weigley's contention. Absent politically astute military leaders, this trend may prove irreversible.

Uncomfortable Wars

Does the need for a broader professionalism imply the prospect of wars that are entirely "new"? Not at all. Although the character of warfare is continuously evolving, that evolution is by no means random. Change in warfare adheres to a pattern, albeit one that is the product of many forces. Thus, the wars and skirmishes that will involve the United States for the foreseeable future are sure to reflect the salient characteristics of wars in the recent past. Although by no means hidden, those characteristics have elicited little interest on the part of an army absorbed in its preparations for "real" war, the World War III that has yet to occur. Thus a task of some urgency is for American soldiers to catch up on the insights and lessons derived from the last 40 years of conflict—lessons that various potential adversaries have already absorbed.

Of the lessons that demand attention, the foremost concerns the role of *the people* in warfare. However much soldiers may cling to old-fashioned notions of war as their special preserve, the truth is that the direct involvement of civilians—or, to use an anachronistic term, "the masses"—has become a hallmark of war in our time. They may be the medium within which conflict occurs; they may sustain the combatants or double as fighters themselves; or they may constitute a strategic objective whose support determines war's

outcome—but almost without exception in modern wars, *the people* play an integral part. Events have indeed confirmed Falkenhayn's dimly perceived hypothesis—crudely and ineffectively exploited during World War I—that popular will forms the center of gravity of a nation's ability to wage war.

With this complicating presence of the civilian population in mind, General John R. Galvin has characterized ours as an age of "uncomfortable wars." Nor does he intend the label to apply only to so-called "low intensity conflicts." Rather, the Galvin hypothesis applies as much to the concerns of a SACEUR as it does to those of CINCSOUTH—perhaps even more so. "If war comes," he writes, "we will continue to see involvement of the entire population," pointedly emphasizing that "this will be true of all war, not simply of conflict at the lower end of the spectrum."[10]

Does the Galvin hypothesis stand the test of recent history? A host of examples come to mind to illustrate popular involvement as the unifying theme in wars that are otherwise remarkably diverse: Vietnam, Afghanistan, El Salvador, Northern Ireland, Angola, Lebanon, and the Iran-Iraq War with its total mobilization of populations to fuel a conflagration that, like World War I, the professionals proved unable to win.

But what about the Arab-Israeli Wars and the Falklands? Characterized by the bold employment of large mechanized formations on remote, isolated battlefields, the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973 seemed to suggest that the tradition of gladiatorial combat remained alive and well, a message especially well-received in the US Army. Israeli victories did preserve the state of Israel from destruction. Yet if one aim of military strategy is security, those wars no more achieved their objective than did the massive German victories on the Eastern Front in 1941 and 1942. Instead, as Israel has poured ever more treasure into big-ticket weapon systems, its adversaries have turned to alternative people-based strategies against which fleets of tanks and fighter-bombers, no matter how skillfully employed, have little effect. And so the once-indomitable Israeli Defense Forces have found themselves bogged down first in Lebanon and more recently on the West Bank, engaged in "wars" far more complex, modern, and likely to recur in other parts of the world than the lightning campaigns for which the IDF first became famous.

As for the Falklands, that brief war may well be an exception—but one that serves only to prove the rule. From start to finish, the campaign was a throwback to an earlier era, a self-contained struggle ostensibly originating in that most ancient of disputes: rival claims to territory. Yet the economic and strategic insignificance of the Falklands suggests that in seizing the islands the Argentine junta had other aims in mind. Indeed, they did. A politically bankrupt regime mired in permanent crisis, the junta invaded the Falklands with the hope of distracting Argentines from the spectacle of their nation's internal decay. Gambling that the citizenry would embrace the euphoria of conquest as a

substitute for competent governance, Argentina's generals miscalculated by a wide margin. Caring little about the fate of the distant Malvinas, Argentines were content to leave the war to the warriors. Argentine ennui thus set the stage for British regulars to swat aside an opponent whose isolation on the Falklands stemmed as much from their countrymen's lassitude as from the blockade established by the Royal Navy and Air Force. The campaign for the Falklands may, indeed, show that war can occur in which the people are mere bystanders. But the war's outcome seems unlikely to inspire many to imitate the junta. Indeed, the unhappy fate of the generals suggests that to make war without the assurance of popular support is foolhardy in the extreme.

A New Synthesis

The armies of the West have arrived willy-nilly at the culminating point of a dialectical process whose origins coincide with the beginnings of modern history. The dialectic originated in 17th- and 18th-century Europe as an understanding between soldiers and statesmen over the proper conduct of warfare. That agreement had two key points. The first was that wars would be fought for limited aims with limited means, the goal being, according to General Sir John Hackett, "not a world title by a knockout" but rather "winning a modest purse on points."[11] The second part of the agreement was that responsibility for the direction of war belonged not to statesmen, scholars, clergymen, or aristocrats but to those who had embraced the military vocation. War was *soldiers'* business.

Not later than the time of Napoleon, that compact had begun to unravel. Spurred by technology and national enthusiasms, ends and means grew exponentially. It fell to the generation of World War II to abandon the agreement altogether. The actual conduct of that war—the vast pretensions of campaigns such as Operation Barbarossa, the terror bombing of European and Asian cities, the emergence of "unconditional surrender" as an acceptable war aim, and the American employment of atomic weapons—shattered the final restraints on war. Whatever vestige of warfare's classical theories survived Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the aftermath of World War II disposed of the ashes. The fever of Cold War legitimized the use of unlimited violence to achieve unlimited ends (the preservation of "our way of life"). The arcane hocus-pocus of deterrence theory justified the expansion of violence to the absolute maximum that technology could support. Although the product of civilian "defense intellectuals," too few professional soldiers questioned the concept of deterrence with its emphasis on violence without limit.

As the Soviet-American rivalry began to wane so did the support that such notions once enjoyed. With the postulated end of the Cold War, it has all but collapsed. Any Western army that fails to appreciate this—that persists in planning for apocalyptic war, for example, by retaining nuclear weapons as

integral to its warfighting doctrine—will forfeit its claim to popular and political support. An army deprived of such support can scarcely hope to serve a useful function.

Thus the Army's most daunting task becomes the completion of this dialectic, devising a new paradigm to supersede the concept of "total war" that has dominated our thinking since World War II. The rough outline of that paradigm is already visible: as a precondition of political and moral acceptability, armies will employ force only in discrete amounts and for specific, achievable purposes, with commanders held accountable for needless collateral damage; force will constitute only one venue among many that states will employ to achieve their aims, with military means integrated with and even subordinate to these other means—as has been the case throughout the recent Kuwait crisis; although senior military commanders should have a voice in this process of integration, the importance of these non-military instruments—diplomacy, information policies, economic leverage, and the imperatives of culture and morality—suggests that American soldiers will never again be permitted the latitude that Eisenhower enjoyed in World War II nor wield the authority that Marshall did as Army Chief of Staff. Yet these perceptions provide at best a bare glimpse of this new model of warfare. What remains is to spell out the model with all its implications and to undertake the difficult task of translating it into doctrine, organization, weapon systems, and training methodologies—a departure from recent practice no less dramatic than that entailed by the so-called Atomic Revolution.

Brodie vs. Bradley

Thus five challenges confront the Army as it enters a new era:

- To grasp the extent to which global developments have rendered obsolete many of our customary routines and assumptions;
- To be wary of our own selves—our penchant for nostalgia, our yearning to retain a distinct, elevated status in society—as obstacles to seeing war and its requirements objectively;
- To recognize that war long ago outgrew the boundaries of traditional military craft and to expand our conception of professionalism accordingly;
- To factor into any consideration of future wars the involvement of civilian populations—ours, the enemy's, and those of non-belligerents who nonetheless are more than mere observers—as central to the definition of war aims, strategy, and the methods that soldiers will employ in accomplishing their mission; and
- To postulate a new theory of warfare deriving not simply from the limits of technological possibility but from the political and moral dictates of our age—dictates that can redefine themselves with disconcerting suddenness.

Only by embracing these challenges can we hope to preserve that relevance to the national interest that must comprise the basis of any army's existence. The task is first and foremost one of intellect. And there lies the rub. Whether the officer corps can find within itself the intellectual muscle and creativity required remains very much in doubt.

American Army officers pride themselves on being doers rather than thinkers. Despite America's decades as a superpower, our ranks have yet to produce a theorist even remotely comparable to the Navy's Alfred Thayer Mahan. One is hard-pressed to think of any book by a senior American Army officer worth reading a second time. Not that we are inclined toward serious reading: given the choice, we much prefer Clancy or Coyle to Clausewitz or Sun Tzu.

Just as we get our fiction from pop militarists, so also have we come to rely on civilian defense intellectuals to guide our thinking about strategy and war. Since the 1950s at least, we have been *consumers* of ideas, conceding to others responsibility for *producing* them. When it came to spinning elegant theories that would make sense of warfare in the Atomic Age, Bernard Brodie outclassed Omar Bradley and RAND eclipsed the Army War College with ease. So the officer corps gave up, submitting, in Eliot Cohen's words, to "intellectual castration" at the hands of academics, whiz kids, and self-styled military reformers.[12]

At this time of epochal change, one yearns to believe that today's officer corps will reassert its authority on matters pertaining to war—a revival critical to the nation's well-being as well as to the Army's. Yet a wish alone offers poor basis for hope. After all, castration is irrevocable.

NOTES

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3. Michael Geyer, "German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914-1945," in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986), p. 546.
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7. Erich von Manstein, *Lost Victories* (rpt.; Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1982), p. 202.
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9. Russell F. Weigley, "The Political and Strategic Dimensions of Military Effectiveness," in *Military Effectiveness, Volume III: The Second World War*, ed. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1988), p. 341.
10. John R. Galvin, "Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm," *Parameters*, 16 (Winter 1986), 7.
11. General Sir John W. Hackett, *The Profession of Arms* (New York: Macmillan, 1983), p. 75.
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Defining the American Warrior Leader

JOHN C. BAHNSEN and ROBERT W. CONE

The term "warrior leader" conjures up an image of a heroic figure who leads soldiers on the modern battlefield, always winning and never being hurt. In actual fact, warrior leaders often die for their country. In many cases, warriors lead youngsters to their deaths. This morbid side of the modern warrior image is often neglected or downplayed. But there is no higher calling in our society than to be selected to lead American soldiers into combat to preserve our freedoms. America's soldiers are by definition the best we can find and train; therefore, they deserve the very best leadership we can develop.

The US Army has shown significant concern in recent years for insuring that leaders measure up to this challenge, and increasing attention has been focused on the development of the "warrior spirit." Despite the Army's renewed emphasis on the importance of this attribute, we are facing an identity crisis among insecure officers, untested in combat, who dearly want to be warriors. Unfortunately, many of these officers have seized on the more basic and visible features of warriorship to the exclusion of other more important and complex aspects. Worse yet, some have misinterpreted the fundamental meaning of warriorship to justify uncaring, roughshod treatment of subordinates, shallow showmanship, or poor professional preparation on their own part. No course could be more misguided. The purpose of this article is to examine the origins of the American "warrior spirit" and provide some insight on what it should mean to the officer in today's Army.

The Army defines the warrior spirit in "The Professional Development of Officers Study." This document specifies the need to "have a warrior

spirit" as a foundation for the officer professional development process. Officers imbued with the warrior spirit act as follows:

> Officers accept the responsibility of being entrusted with protection of the Nation; are prepared physically and mentally to lead units to fight and support in combat; [are] skilled in the use of weapons, tactics, and doctrine; inspire confidence and an eagerness to be part of the team; have the ability to analyze, the vision to see, and the integrity to choose, and the courage to execute.[1]

Many young officers read this statement and orient almost exclusively on the images of superb physical readiness, outstanding tactical and technical competence, and extraordinary courage. These are the basic attributes that allow the warrior to lead by example from the front. They are important. To achieve and maintain these highly perishable attributes requires almost constant attention and focus. Fortunately, we have no shortage of young leaders who are willing to persevere in such efforts. Although these critical attributes are an absolutely essential foundation, they alone do not compose the total makeup of the American warrior leader in his manifestations throughout America's military history.

The complete character of the American warrior leader must be fleshed out with deeper but less glamorous qualities. Although not as colorful, these qualities distinguish the unique heritage of American arms. The first is a sincere recognition of the privilege of *special trust and confidence* accorded those whose responsibility is to defend our democracy. S. L. A. Marshall here describes the unique bonding between the nation and the officer that accrues through the commissioning process's solemn acknowledgment of the apprentice leader's "patriotism, valor, fidelity, and abilities":

> Having been specially chosen by the United States to sustain dignity and integrity of its sovereign power, an officer is expected to maintain himself, and so to exert his influence for so long as he may live, that he will be recognized as a worthy symbol of all that is best in the national character. In this sense the trust imposed in the highest military commander is not more than what is enjoined upon the newest ensign or second lieutenant. Nor is it less. It is the fact of commission that gives special distinction to the man and in return requires that the measure of his devotion to the service of his country be distinctive, as compared with the charge laid upon the average citizen.[2]

This special trust and confidence, symbolized by the commission, distinguishes our officers from those of many other nations, whose citizens live in fear of or are uncertain of their armies' support for civilian rule.

The second less glamorous but no less vital component of the warrior spirit is *mental readiness*. Mental readiness goes beyond simple mental toughness by insisting on a mastery of doctrine combined with the ability to think,

analyze, and develop a vision for success. This means that the warrior leader uses intellect to solve problems and find solutions. The warrior leader is confident in subordinates' ability to withstand hardship, but works intently to avoid abusing that confidence. The warrior leader uses the same aggressive spirit in planning and thinking through tactical operations that is expected of subordinates in execution. The warrior leader's goal is to be successful without unnecessarily risking soldiers' lives. Only the intellectual mastery of the art of war makes this goal achievable.

The warrior leader must also possess the *integrity and moral character* to do the harder right instead of the easier wrong. This means more than the ability to pass judgment on others or adhere to the party line. It means that the warrior has the strength of character to always do what is right for the Army and the nation. This may sometimes mean taking unpopular or controversial stands that result in damage to one's own career. Some of the very best careers are short but outstanding—marked by integrity and honor and shortened by casualty or a stand of conscience. Quality of service, not length, is the measure that should be used to evaluate a soldier's career. The warrior leader owes his absolute integrity above all else to his soldiers, the Army, and the nation.

The final element is *inspiring leadership*. The origins of this kind of leadership are deeply rooted in the history of the communal warlord and are the basis for charismatic authority.[3] Beyond the tools of rank and position, the warrior leads with a sense of personal magnetism drawing upon the subordinates' recognition of the leader's exceptional character and qualifications. Soldiers desire to follow the warrior leader because they are confident of his abilities and trusting in his judgment. Given a free choice, they would elect the warrior leader as their captain. Soldiers may not always like their warrior leaders, but they respect them above all else.

An important dimension of inspiring leadership is a manifest solicitude for subordinates' welfare. Major General John M. Schofield brilliantly

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Some officers have misinterpreted warriorship to justify uncaring, roughshod treatment of subordinates, shallow showmanship, or poor professional preparation. . . . No course could be more misguided.

captured this form of caring leadership in an address to the United States Corps of Cadets at West Point on 11 August 1879:

> The discipline which makes the soldiers of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment. On the contrary, such treatment is far more likely to destroy than to make an army. It is possible to impart instruction and to give commands in such manner and such a tone of voice to inspire in the soldier no feeling but an intense desire to obey, while the opposite manner and tone of voice cannot fail to excite strong resentment and a desire to disobey. The one mode or the other of dealing with subordinates springs from a corresponding spirit in the breast of the commander. He who feels the respect which is due to others cannot fail to inspire in them regard for himself, while he who feels, and hence manifests, disrespect toward others, especially his inferiors, cannot fail to inspire hatred against himself.[4]

The essence of this style of leadership is found in mutual trust and respect between leader and follower. General Schofield's definition of discipline has been required memory work for all West Point plebes for many years.

Most of the traits of the ideal American warrior are well represented in the character of Colonel Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain as displayed during the American Civil War. A description of Colonel Chamberlain's performance as the Commander of the 20th Maine Regiment in the Battle of Gettysburg serves as the introduction to the Army's Field Manual 22-100, *Military Leadership*. Chamberlain's creative and cerebral leadership were the keys to Union success during the actions at Little Round Top, Quaker Road, and Five Forks. His willingness to lead from the front was evidenced by his being wounded six times and cited four times for valor, including the Medal of Honor. His exceptional abilities were recognized by General Ulysses S. Grant, who chose Chamberlain to receive the Southern surrender at Appomattox.[5]

This superb officer clearly possessed the basic warrior attributes—the physical readiness, tactical and technical competence, and courage that allowed him to lead from the front. But beyond those, he possessed the more

complex and subtle characteristics of warriorship. Chamberlain understood the obligation of service to nation and community. As a professor of rhetoric at Bowdoin College, he took a sabbatical in order to volunteer to serve the Union cause. Following the war, he returned to Maine to serve as Governor and later Dean of Bowdoin.

Colonel Chamberlain also possessed superior intellectual traits. Many observers, focusing on the devastation and brutality of war, erroneously place a low premium upon the intellectual qualifications demanded of its practitioners. They are advised to heed the wise warning of Sir William Francis Butler, England's 19th-century soldier-statesman: "The nation that will insist on drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking done by cowards."[6] Chamberlain's own high intelligence merged with battlefield savvy and a deep understanding of basic tactics. This combination resulted in brilliant improvisation on the battlefield, as reflected for example in his inspired bayonet counterattack at Little Round Top.

Perhaps most significant was Chamberlain's caring leadership of soldiers and his insistence on avoiding unnecessary human suffering. Such attributes, combining the quintessentially martial virtues with the intellectual qualifications for warfare and a psychological mastery of human motivation, place Joshua Chamberlain in the forefront of prototypes of the American warrior.

Our message to aspiring young warrior leaders should thus be clear. The heritage of the American warrior is indeed rich. It combines the finest elements of gung ho, lead-from-the-front captaincy, on one hand, with the assurance that our soldiers are led in the right direction, with the best possible plan, and with the least possible suffering and loss of life, on the other hand. Our task as warrior leaders is not simply to get out in front and brave the bullets, but to know where we are going, why we are going there, whether it is the right place to go, and the best way to get there.

NOTES

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Close Air Support: Which Way Do We Go?

THOMAS GARRETT

One can hardly pick up a publication in the defense arena these days without seeing an article on close air support. The need to replace the aging A-10 ground attack fighter—the "Warthog"—has fanned the flames of a controversy that has smoldered since World War II.

In compliance with The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 and in response to a congressional call to study close air support (including the feasibilty of transferring the mission to the Army), then-JCS Chairman Admiral William Crowe submitted a roles and functions report including the following statement:

> CAS is not an issue only for the Army and the Air Force. . . . All four services perform the CAS function. CAS for naval operations is assigned to both the Navy and the Marine Corps. CAS for land operations was assigned to the Air Force when it became an independent service, and the Army was permitted to maintain organic aviation with relatively unspecified tasks. All four services have CAS-capable aircraft employed under joint doctrine. In this manner we have insured that CAS is available to lower-level ground commanders on a regular basis, while still providing the theater commanders the capability to focus significant combat power in a specified area. The issue cannot be whether to transfer CAS from the Air Force to the Army; it is already present in both services, as well as in the Navy and Marine Corps.[1]

Under the new spirit of jointness ushered in by Goldwater-Nichols, the word from the Chairman sounded sensible. But wait—the Army and Air Force chiefs submitted a joint dissenting opinion:

> The Army and the Air Force do not regard attack helicopters as CAS weapons systems. Attack helicopter units lack the speed, lethality, and flexibility to enable the theater commander to mass, concentrate, or shift air support intratheater, which is a vital characteristic of CAS. We both firmly believe that the original concept of Air Force fixed-wing aircraft providing support in close proximity to friendly forces remains valid and properly defines CAS today.[2]

On 2 November 1989, the new Chairman, General Colin Powell, forwarded a new roles and functions report, reversing Crowe's position on CAS and supporting the Army and Air Force service chiefs.

Why all this energy surrounding the close air support mission? Is CAS broken? Are the customers not satisfied? Is the notion of close air support obsolete? This article will survey the close air support debate and offer a perspective.

Service Rivalry

Prior to World War II, the Army and the Navy lived separate lives, waging their own battles against "civilian isolationists, pacifists, and economizers."[3] With respect to Congress, they had separate legislation, separate service committees, and separate appropriations subcommittees. Competition between the services was almost nonexistent.[4]

Even though the Air Force had risen to a semi-independent status during World War II as the Army Air Force (including having its own member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Hap Arnold), the thirst for total autonomy never really abated. Incredibly, the AAF formed a planning cell in 1943 (well before the outcome of the war was decided) to produce plans for gaining autonomy for the postwar Air Force.[5]

Central to Air Force thinking, both then and now, were the premises espoused by Giulio Douhet:

- Air power can be the decisive instrument of war.
- The decisive use of that instrument requires air superiority.
- Achieving air superiority requires centralized control of air power.[6]

Centralized control equated to being independent and autonomous: freedom to prosecute the air war as the air warriors saw fit. Yet the theory behind the need for an independent Air Force, in spite of being pushed as gospel by Air Force planners, was never proved. In fact, one could argue that it had been proven false:

> The four years of air battles across the Channel would seem to provide about as fair a test of military theory as history is ever likely to yield. But the traceable military results were uniformly disappointing. One can hardly doubt that all this death and destruction helped to prepare the ultimate German collapse, yet the United States Strategic Bombing Survey reported after the war that German war production increased throughout to reach its peak in late 1944, well after the ground armies were ashore to make good the job at which the air fleets had been unsuccessful.[7]

With the advent of the atomic bomb, an independent strategic air force became a foregone conclusion. Once the Air Force was armed with this new weapon, the drive for independence became a drive for power and

dominance in the postwar era. The 1947 National Security Act, its 1949 amendments, and the roles and missions specified by the Key West and Newport Conferences established an independent Air Force and assigned it the airlift and close air support missions in support of the Army. The Navy managed to keep its aircraft, as did the Marines.[8]

The competition would go on, however, as new capabilities and technologies emerged. Which service would constitute the strategic force? Which would control nuclear weapons? Were rockets and missiles artillery or aircraft? Whose "turf" was space? Each service had its own answers. With such fundamental issues holding center stage, one can understand the shrinking interest a support mission such as CAS might generate within a service like the Air Force, which literally was going for the moon. America's next armed conflict highlighted the Air Force's marginal interest in CAS:

> The jet fighters of the Korean War, the F-84s and F-86s, had been conceived and constructed for air-to-air battles first and as ground support aircraft a reluctant second. At lower altitudes they burned so much fuel they had little time over the target. Their guns and rockets, designed for aerial combat, were not highly effective against ground troops. Communications between air and ground had deteriorated since World War II so that as late as the second year of the Korean War, infantry and airplane radios often could not talk to each other.[9]

After the Korean War, the Air Force again pushed CAS to the back burner. As the war heated up in Vietnam, the Air Force's inability to provide adequate close air support was so bad that it prompted a congressional investigation by the House Armed Services Committee.[10] The Air Force had to borrow 25 L-19 light observation aircraft from the Army to serve as forward air controller aircraft. The Air Force had none of its own, despite the demonstrated need from Korea. It also had to borrow A-1 Skyraider attack aircraft from the Navy. And it had to convert a trainer aircraft, the T-37, to an attack plane, the A-37 Dragonfly, to carry out its close air support mission.[11]

The Army, in its frustration, developed the attack helicopter and continued to refine it. As Vietnam drew down, the Army began to adapt the helicopter to the antitank role and started work on the Cheyenne, an expensive, high-tech attack helicopter capable of carrying 8000 pounds of external ordnance, flying aerobatic maneuvers, and achieving high air speeds.[12]

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The Air Force then got worried about its CAS role and reluctantly fielded the A-10, the only dedicated close air support aircraft ever bought by the Air Force. Cheyenne was canceled. The Air Force then tried to back out of the A-10 commitment, but Congress made them go ahead with it.[13]

Carl H. Builder, in a new book on service perspectives, *The Masks of War*, concludes that

> close air support has been the most consistently neglected mission of the Air Force. Flying down in the mud instead of up in the blue and taking directions from someone on the ground are encroachments upon the freedom of flight that is so cherished by airmen.
>
> Coordinating with other airmen in a complex strike, centrally controlled by airmen, is one thing. But losing the freedom to apply air power independently to decisive ends is to lose that which pilots have striven so hard to achieve for much of the history of the airplane.
>
> Thus, close air support will always be an unwanted stepchild of the Air Force. The job will not be given back to the Army lest it create a rival air arm; and it will not be embraced because it relinquishes the central control of air power. The Air Force has the dilemma of a rival in air power or a sharing of its control, neither of which is acceptable. So the Army tries to make do with helicopters.[14]

Combat Effectiveness

Like the famous US Strategic Bombing Survey at the end of World War II, the history of CAS effectiveness, or lack thereof, is invoked to support both sides of the argument, depending on the author's bent. In 1989, Dr. Richard P. Hallion spent a year as the Harold Keith Johnson Visiting Professor of Military History at the US Army Military History Institute, where he produced a paper titled "Battlefield Air Support: A Time for Retrospective Assessment." In it, he attempted an objective historical analysis of CAS, battlefield air interdiction (BAI), and air interdiction effectiveness in combat. His analysis is thorough, timely, and neutral. Relevant points follow.

> BAI operations have always been of more value—as well as more extensive—than CAS operations. By its very nature, CAS tends to be "in extremis" air support. . . . BAI operations clearly have been more useful in their impact upon the land battle; the "Blitzkrieg," Western Desert Campaign, the Italian Campaign, breakout across France, and the epic air-land battles of the Russian Front in 1943-45 were essentially campaigns where BAI was predominant.[15]
>
> Battles emphasizing CAS reflect its peculiar or more desperate nature: "Bloody Ridge" on Guadalcanal in 1942; Hellzapoppin Ridge on Bougainville in 1943; the Naktong and Chosen Reservoir fighting in 1950; outpost, column, and

hamlet defense in Indochina and South Vietnam; and siege-breaking at Dien Bien Phu and Khe Sanh. In all of these cases, CAS substituted for a lack of available artillery assets, and often to offset huge force disparities between opposing sides.[16]

Hallion postulates that "classic (non-BAI) air interdiction has proven disappointing, and of questionable value in its impact upon battlefield operations."[17] Further, he shows that command and control problems are not new, since "the single greatest recurring problem in battlefield air support has been that of effecting timely strikes with satisfactory communications, control, and coordination."[18] He also found that "the ground-to-air threat environment has always posed a serious challenge to battlefield air operations."[19]

Other interesting historical observations by Hallion include his assertions that "armies traditionally fear an enemy air force more than they respect their own,"[20] that "air forces traditionally view almost all their missions as contributing to the success of friendly land forces in battle," and that "armies and air forces traditionally bicker over the nature and control of CAS/BAI operations."[21]

Close Air Support Operations

Doctrinally, the Air Force lists counter air, air interdiction, and close air support as its fundamental "tactical" fighter missions.[22] The counter air mission receives top priority because the gaining of air superiority allows friendly air forces freedom of action to conduct the other missions of interdiction and CAS.[23]

The term "battlefield air interdiction" has only recently come into use. BAI is defined as "air interdiction attacks against land force targets which have a near-term effect on the operations or scheme of maneuver of friendly forces, but are not in close proximity to friendly forces."[24] Other terms are also popping up. Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA) and Joint Attack of the Second Echelon (J-SAK) are new terms both of which Tactical Air Command feels are air interdiction.[25] Many writers, however, link BAI more closely with CAS and refer to them as a single mission called CAS/BAI. This usage distinguishes air attacks against enemy forces that are affecting directly or are about to affect the ground battle from those deeper attacks against enemy facilities, communications, and transportation systems. The distinction is important.

CAS applies to attacks against "targets in close proximity to friendly surface forces."[26] CAS "missions require detailed coordination and integration with the fire and maneuver plans of friendly surface forces."[27]

Air forces traditionally favor centralized control under the air component commander for "planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking."[28] Air warriors feel strongly that air forces fight at the operational level of war (as

opposed to strategic or tactical) and fear most a situation where they "just service target lists at the tactical level."[29]

AirLand Battle

The Army introduced its present doctrine, AirLand Battle, in 1981, and updated it in 1986. This doctrine revitalized thinking at the operational level (i.e. theater or campaign level) of war. The Army called its new doctrine AirLand Battle "in recognition of the inherently three-dimensional nature of modern warfare. All ground actions above the level of the smallest engagements will be strongly affected by the supporting air operations of one or both combatants."[30] The doctrine emphasizes the joint nature of modern warfare and admonishes its commanders to understand "the techniques of integrating air, naval, and ground firepower effectively in the conduct of campaigns and major operations."[31]

It is not surprising that the Army considers air forces a necessary and critical player in the execution of its doctrine. Air forces possess the theater commander's (CINC's) major capability to conduct deep operations, epitomizing agility—"speed, range, and flexibility."[32] It is interesting that most Air Force officers are quick to remind their Army counterparts that AirLand Battle is Army doctrine, not Air Force doctrine.[33] Yet, if one reads both the Army's FM 100-5 and the Air Force's AFM 1-1, he will find that the section devoted to tactical air operations in FM 100-5 (Chap. 3, pages 47-50) is duplicated word for word in AFM 1-1, complete with emphasis on counter air, importance of centralized control, and the purpose and desired effects of air interdiction, BAI, and CAS.

The Threat—and the Difficulty of Meeting It

Most of the current writing concerning CAS invariably and appropriately begins by describing the modern threat, using the central region in Europe as the worst-case scenario, and the Yom Kippur War as the last "real operational test." The Soviet system of tactical air defenses is well known. It consists of overlapping systems arranged in depth and covering all altitudes from the surface upward. The system has been modernized at an amazing rate and now includes fielded tactical missile systems numbered SA-6 through SA-19.

In the initial stages of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Israelis took such terrible losses in fighter aircraft that they had to abandon the CAS mission until Syrian air defenses (based on Soviet equipment and doctrine that is now 15 years old) could be effectively neutralized or suppressed. Of 109 aircraft lost by the Israelis, 61 were lost performing CAS. It went both ways: the Arabs lost 65 aircraft, out of 101 total losses, to ground air defense systems.[34]

Beyond the threat to be faced by CAS aircraft is the plain difficulty of the CAS mission itself as executed on the swirling, nonlinear battlefield

envisioned by AirLand Battle doctrine. Most CAS pilots agree that the target must be marked by some means and somebody.[35] The pilot simply cannot fly at tree-top levels, navigate, maneuver to avoid enemy defenses, keep track of friendlies, acquire enemy targets, maneuver to attack enemy targets, and live. With the proliferation of sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons in the Third World, this may even be the case in the low-intensity conflict environment.

Command and Control

Command and control of CAS assets are as much of a problem as the threat. The Army's emphasis on decentralized execution, with units fighting the nonlinear AirLand Battle using initiative and the commander's intent as guidance, makes responsive support by the centralized control methods of the Air Force difficult, to say the least.[36] The Forward Air Controller (FAC) is a problem. Ground-mobile now because the threat has negated the flying FAC, "his ability to assist the fighters in target location and identification [is] significantly reduced."[37] Most agree that the present FAC system is inadequate, and any improvements in aircraft have to include improvements in the FAC/fighter interface.

Integrating a CAS attack into the swirling combined arms battle is also no easy task for the ground commander and his staff. If a ground maneuver is going well, it is often easier to scrub the fighters than shut down everything so they can attack. If the ground units are in trouble, command and control are usually also breaking down; thus setting up the fighter attack "by the book" may be impossible.

The Aircraft

The spark that rekindled the CAS debate was the need to replace the aging A-10. There is little consensus on which aircraft should replace the A-10, or even whether the A-10 should be replaced at all. Many like the notion of a dedicated CAS aircraft and would prefer to upgrade the A-10 or adopt the Marines' AV-8B, thus retaining the "flexibility and responsiveness of rugged, forward-based aircraft."[38] Others argue that a multi-role fighter, one that can accomplish the additional tactical missions of counter air and interdiction, makes the most sense, both economically and operationally. The Navy's F/A-18 falls into this category and is already in production.[39]

An adapted F-16 (A-16) seems to be the Air Force favorite, but an upgraded A-7, the A-7+, has also been studied.[40] More than a few authors say the modern helicopter is the right CAS aircraft.[41] One point no one argues over is the cost. A fixed-wing, close air support aircraft that can cope with the threat, accomplish the mission with accuracy in adverse weather or darkness, and has the command and control, navigation, and pilot-workload-reducing



The A-10 Warthog. A recent *Washington Post* dispatch from Saudi Arabia optimistically proclaimed of its potential use: "Here, this homely toad of a plane has emerged a prince, a mighty tank-killer that will slay Iraqi armor in its tracks."

systems necessary to rapidly and flexibly integrate itself into the battle at the front line is the most expensive fighter one can buy.

Is CAS Broken? Ask the Customers.

Judging from the literature, it appears that CAS is, indeed, broken. In the mid- to high-intensity environment, air defense systems in the vicinity of the front line have rendered our current CAS fighter, the A-10, non-survivable. The difficulties of target acquisition, low-level navigation, accurate situation awareness, and adverse weather and darkness have not been overcome. The integration of air and ground forces at the tactical level is in bad shape, including the forward air controller system, communications, target location means, and responsiveness.

The Army views land combat as central to war, and closing with and destroying the enemy as central to land combat. The infantry and armor mudsoldier has the "close with" role. All other branches of the Army, as well as the other services, are in support of the mudsoldier and his decisive mission.

> The soldier views the enemy army as the prime focal point of war, and all else should properly be subordinate. The soldier is impatient with the navy when the navy finds tasks that might interfere with taking the soldier where he wants to go, where the enemy camp is, and keeping his supplies coming steadily. He is impatient with the airman who wants to put a machine tool factory out of business; he wants the airman to work on the enemy tank across the valley from him. And the soldier, few men realize, is the only one of the military men who cannot do his part of the war alone. . . . His flanks are bare, his rear is vulnerable, and he looks aloft with a cautious eye.[42]

His is the ultimate commitment. The soldier generally lives in close contact with the enemy and is therefore in constant danger and in mostly uncomfortable conditions. He does not view himself or his men as expendable. When he engages in battle, he is usually decisively engaged—that is, he wins or he dies. He expects all those supporting him to commit themselves as fully as he has to in accomplishing the mission. The soldier cannot simply RTB (return to base); he cannot stop at night or in bad weather.

Few of today's tactical commanders, brigade and below, have much confidence that CAS will play a major role in their part of the battle. First of all, no ground commander in his right mind would commit himself to mortal combat relying on a key weapon system that might or might not be there. Within the current system, a particular ground commander could get outprioritized in at least three ways. First, the air-to-air battle in general or in another region would have doctrinal precedence. Second, the interdiction campaign might cut down on the sorties allocated to CAS. And finally, another ground commander may be deemed in more trouble or have a more important mission in the operational scheme of things.

Should luck smile on our particular ground commander and he be allocated CAS, the vagaries of weather, light, and timing may degrade his ability to effectively employ CAS. If our ground commander finally hears the call of a couple of fighters as the battle rages, he has a difficult coordination drill to go through under a severe station-time constraint: shut down or shift artillery, mark friendlies, pick and identify targets—all for four or six bombs and some 30mm, and maybe a Maverick missile.

Is it any wonder that most ground commanders have the nagging feeling that they will never see CAS, and would never count on it as a decisive factor even in planning? With the A-10, a CAS-only aircraft, at least someone was going to get CAS—if it was daylight and the weather was good.

Despite the gut feelings of many in the Army that the Air Force is not truly dedicated or committed to the CAS mission, there are fully nine fighter wings that train full-time to do it,[43] and others maintain CAS as one of several missions. The pilots and airmen involved in Air Force combat duties are every bit as brave and committed as the mudsoldiers. Unfortunately, fat pay incentives; big officers' clubs, golf courses, and swimming pools; reams of regulations keeping dirty Army vehicles from being loaded onto pristine clean aircraft; and mission halts for crew rest are what the mudsoldier remembers most about the Air Force.

The Few, The Proud, The Marines

If close air support is indeed broken and the customers are not exactly satisfied, what are the alternatives? A prominent alternative espoused by many writers is to turn the mission back over to the Army and do it like the Marines.

The Marine "air force" includes aircraft covering the entire tactical spectrum: helicopters of all types, including attack helicopters; fixed-wing fighters; and airlift/aerial refueling assets. The large number of fixed-wing fighter aircraft owned by the Marines is justified by the lightness of Marine ground forces and their lack of heavy artillery or other fire support means.[44]

An examination of Marine air doctrine shows that it is quite similar to that of the Air Force, e.g. establishing air superiority is the first order of business, and centralized control with decentralized execution is desirable. There is one noticeable exception—the Marines' emphasis on close air support. Rather than a last-priority mission, CAS is the *main* mission, with air superiority de-emphasized but still a necessary prerequisite to both amphibious operations and CAS, as well as other air operations.[45]

The Marines' claimed need for such a robust air support system could be challenged. Naval air could provide required support until the shore situation was stable enough to bring in Air Force tactical air support. Lack of artillery is compensated for to some degree by naval gunfire support. Certainly artillery is cheaper to buy and support and easier to move than jet fighter aircraft and their necessary support systems. The reason the Marines maintain the air capability they do is the same reason any commander would if allowed—dedicated, flexible, far-ranging, potent, reliable, organic combat power that fights (and wants to fight) your fight—not prosecute an independent air campaign or stay aloof at the "operational level."

Passing CAS?

More than a few authors, many of them Air Force, have advocated transferring CAS to the Army.[46] If CAS were unloaded by the Air Force, it would relieve them of a dangerous and low-priority mission. It would also save them money. As we have seen, a CAS fighter is the most expensive fighter aircraft there is. The systems necessary to effectively command and control CAS in the high-threat environment are also going to be costly in both hardware and personnel. The notion becomes more attractive still as air commanders, operating on broad mission guidance from the CINC, pursue their independent air campaign at the operational level, leaving ground commanders to their tactical troubles.

It sounds good. The Army tailors itself as an independent, self-contained, combined arms, land fighting force (Marine-style), completely owning and fighting a land theater of operations. The Air Force becomes the strategic force (bombers, missiles, inter-theater airlift, and strategic reconnaissance), pursuing space systems and other technological frontiers on which the Air Force has always sought leadership. It fits nicely their service persona.

But is it in the Army's interest to take over CAS, much less all of tactical aviation? No. The Army cannot afford the force structure it desires now, nor the

modernized tanks and helicopters it needs. The size and expense of CAS, not to mention all of Tactical Air Command, is enormous—aircraft, pilots, mechanics, bases, training centers, simulators, ranges, research and development, and more. The near term would see more force structure and dollars to support a transfer of roles, but as the Air Force opened new frontiers and pursued these with the effectiveness they have always shown in garnering budget support for their systems, the pie would eventually be back to its traditional tripartite division and the Army would be trying to do a lot more but with its old budgetary allotment. The trade-offs and compromises necessary to support an Army Tactical Air Command or even just a CAS apparatus would result in an overall loss in combat power—probably a significant loss as land formations were traded off with fighter wings. The Army will clearly end up with more forces in support of the land campaign if it makes the Air Force fulfill its assigned roles and functions and meet the Army's CAS requirement.

Is it in the Air Force's interest to give the CAS mission to the Army? In an era of shrinking defense dollars and emphasis on joint service operational capability, the CAS role, especially if a multi-role fighter can be wrangled as the replacement for the A-10, will preserve Air Force force structure and even justify more high-tech equipment for their aircraft. The same command and control systems that are needed to upgrade CAS capability will also upgrade the capability of the more favored missions of air interdiction, BAI, and counter air. Thus it would not appear to be in the Air Force's interest to pass CAS.

Can Attack Helicopters Fill the Bill?

With the ever more lethal air defense threat, the historical finding that BAI rather than CAS has been the more effective mission, the ever-escalating costs of the CAS system, the increasing sophistication and capability of helicopters, and other rapid changes affecting the air-land interface, one must ask whether fixed-wing close air support is obsolete. And if the answer is yes, then could attack helicopters do the job?

There are numerous eloquent arguments in the literature for the CAS function to be handled by the Army's organic attack helicopters.[47] Helicopters have some clear advantages over fixed-wing fighter aircraft. They can more effectively use terrain to mask themselves from detection and enemy weapons, although they must generally expose themselves to employ their own weapons. This last problem is partially offset by the increasing range of stand-off weapon systems. At the present time, helicopters have a decided edge over fixed-wing aircraft in night and adverse weather conditions. Basing requirements and support systems are lean and flexible for helicopters as compared to jet fighters. In general, a modern helicopter is cheaper than a CAS-capable modern fighter.

The organizational effectiveness gained by single-service forces as enjoyed by the Marines accrues to Army attack helicopters. The Marines,

however, have their choice of systems and use both. Why not just helicopters? Helicopters do not have the speed, range, or load carrying capability of fixed-wing fighters. Helicopters are more efficient tank killers, but cannot perform strike, interdiction, or defensive air operations on a par with fighters, if at all.

The air defense threat at the Forward Line of Own Troops is equally tough for both types of aircraft. Although the helicopter can mask, sneak, and peek, it is more vulnerable to small arms, artillery, and even tank main gun fire. Mock battles at the National Training Center have shown that attack helicopters used head to head against enemy forces at the forward line are ineffective. When properly employed, that is, used as maneuver forces to attack the enemy flanks and rear or in depth, their effectiveness increases dramatically.

Attack helicopters are not considered CAS systems in the Army's view, and justly so. They are not even considered fire support systems. Attack helicopters are found in only two types of units in the Army: attack helicopter battalions and cavalry squadrons or regiments. These are combat arms maneuver formations, and Army doctrine is absolutely clear on this point despite the occasional artilleryman who still wants to count them as flying artillery. Richard Hallion's history of air support correctly points out that the attack helicopter is "an airborne armored fighting vehicle, and in intent and purpose is more closely related to the tank than to the airplane."[48]

How About Future Systems?

Work on new weapons never ends, and efforts to enhance the close air support system are ongoing. One joint Army/Air Force system, the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), currently under full-scale development, will aid targeting and, along with the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS), will aid command and control.[49] These capabilities will help commanders set priorities, decide how to attack enemy forces, and concentrate the right combat power, but they will do little to alleviate the difficulties associated with the execution of the actual CAS mission. They do offer potential substantial improvements in BAI effectiveness. The services are also getting heavily involved in remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).[50] These have great promise as weapons, weapon platforms, intelligence gatherers, sensors, target designators—you name it. They can be cheap compared to a modern fighter *and* its pilot.

The Army's modernization program is concentrating on weapons and other systems with greater range, allowing deeper targeting and attacks—Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), and Sense And Destroy Armor (SADARM), to name a few. The emphasis is on smart, brilliant, and genius weapons, all trying to achieve greater depth, stand-off, and probability of kill.

At some future date, close air support may indeed become the least economical means for providing fire support, *but that day is not here yet*. CAS capability, even in a multi-role aircraft, will always be an attractive, flexible option.

Politics

What implications do the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations and budget-induced defense drawdowns have on this issue? Fewer fighter aircraft in the aggregate is one obvious outcome. Fewer aircraft would seem to favor a multi-role fighter over a single-mission CAS aircraft. The Air Force might even change its stance and opt to give away the CAS mission so it could afford the B-2 and the Advanced Tactical Fighter. Talk of stopping the F-16 buy to save ATF is already being heard. Does that mean the A-16 (a version of the F-16 adapted for CAS) is no longer a CAS option? Or would the Air Force retrofit CAS mission packages on existing F-16s? That ploy might save some force structure.

If the disappearing Soviet threat in the central region permits defense spending to be slashed while contingency forces for other regions—e.g. the Persian Gulf—grow in priority and interest, has the CAS requirement changed? Our last large-scale low-intensity encounter, in Vietnam, brought back the prop-driven A1-E, produced the low-cost A-37, and had much to do with the design of the A-10. With a less dense air defense threat, isn't the existing A-10 just what the doctor ordered? Or does the prospect of high-intensity tank warfare in the deserts of Kuwait and northeast Saudi Arabia raise the same spectres we faced across the Elbe?

These developments and the questions they evoke definitely play in the broad CAS debate, but none of them renders the close air support mission obsolete. The battlefield endlessly grows in lethality, depth, and tempo. The attack jet aircraft characterized by speed, range, and flexibility has not seen its last close air support mission.

A Closing Perspective

Roles and functions allocations over the years have not followed any specific logic other than a series of compromises to give each service a piece of the action. The Navy, after all, has its own army and air force. Service roles and functions, although debated, have remained stable for several decades now. As Carl Builder points out,

> Whatever the logic or merit of revisiting the Key West Agreements, it is a simplistic answer to an enormous problem now rooted in the nation's institutions, history, and responsibilities. Though realigning the service roles and missions may be the "right" approach, it almost certainly is not the workable approach.[51]

Further, a little service rivalry has some benefits. Competition always fuels creativity and generates options. Rather than duplication, it may produce weapon systems and warfighting capabilities that add depth, robustness, and redundancy, increasing overall strength and effect. On balance, then, maintenance of current roles and functions is in all the services' best interests. Helicopters alone are not sufficient, while passing CAS to the Army is simply not practical.

In all spectrums of conflict, close air support is still an essential mission, although it is increasingly blurred with BAI. The systems necessary to improve CAS, both in terms of aircraft and of command and control, will perhaps enhance BAI capability as much as or more than that of CAS. Given AirLand Battle doctrine and Army fire support weapons in development that add power, depth, and accuracy to the ground commander's arsenal, BAI appears to be emerging as a more important mission than CAS. Historically BAI has had more effect than either CAS or traditional air interdiction. Taken together, these arguments favor a multi-role fighter as the next CAS aircraft. Fixing CAS is going to be an expensive proposition. But the systems—JSTARS, JTIDS, etc.—have applications for both services beyond CAS and, with joint support, have a better chance to reach fruition.

So, our leaders are right. Our current position and efforts make the most sense. However, there is still one glaring deficiency. The Air Force needs to mount an all-out attack to dispel the perception that it doesn't care to get dirty helping its Army brothers down at their lowly tactical level. As long as this perception exists, there will be calls to change roles and functions, ill-will, and plain open distrust. Even the Congress sees a perceived disdain on the part of the Air Force for CAS. Why else would they order a study on a change of roles? Come on, Air Force! Get down, get funky!

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Military Misfortunes: Pitfalls in Understanding

ROBERT A. DOUGHTY

A Review Essay on *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War.* By Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch. 296 pages. New York: The Free Press, 1990.

This book by Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch is an intriguing analysis of military misfortunes that have occurred during 20th-century wars. The book also represents an unusual approach to the study of military affairs because one of the authors—Eliot Cohen—is a political scientist who is interested in history while the other is a historian who evidently accepts some of the methodology of political scientists. The authors offer some provocative theories about military misfortune while also providing brief analyses of five cases of well-known military failures: the British expedition to Gallipoli in 1915; the fall of France in 1940; the American anti-submarine campaign of 1942; the defeat of the US Eighth Army in Korea by the Chinese in 1950; and the Israeli defense of the Suez and Golan fronts in 1973. Despite the best efforts of the authors, both of whom are known widely for their intellectual gifts, the model for analyzing military misfortunes leads to an oversimplification of some very complex developments, and the analyses of the five cases offer little that is new.

To analyze military misfortune, the authors offer a method involving five steps: (1) identifying the failure; (2) identifying the "critical tasks" that went incomplete or unfulfilled and thus are at the root of the overall failure; (3) analyzing the contributions of different layers of organization to the failure; (4) constructing an "analytical matrix" that graphically presents the key failures leading to military misfortune; and (5) marking a "pathway" of misfortune through the "analytical matrix."

The most important step within this method is the first step, the identification of the precise failure which led to the misfortune. For example, in their examination of the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor in 1941, which is not one of their five primary cases, the authors assert that the key nature of

the failure was "the absence of a stout defense." Having identified the nature of the failure, they then search for the subordinate lapses or mistakes that contributed to the broader failure. According to the authors, the critical tasks that went unfulfilled in this case were "communication of warning," "appropriate level of alert," and "coordination." The next step is the construction of the analytical matrix, in which the actions or failures of each command level are shown for each of the critical tasks. The authors then trace a "pathway to misfortune" through this matrix and conclude that of the possible pathways through the matrix, the pathway through the "failure of coordination" offers the "most important explanation" for the Pearl Harbor disaster.

The limitations of Cohen and Gooch's methodology is best illustrated by the difficulty of their first step. One who is conversant with the controversy over Pearl Harbor knows that numerous explanations have been offered for that disaster. Yet, if one has different ideas about the most important failure leading to a misfortune, one will have fundamental disagreements with the "pathway" of misfortune. The same can be said about the subordinate failures along which the pathway follows. The debate about these failures has been at least as controversial as the identification of the larger failures. The authors implicitly acknowledge this limitation in their preface where they justify their omission of a case about Vietnam on the ground that a discussion of that misfortune "would require not a chapter but a separate book." Anyone who is at all familiar with the five cases upon which the authors focus will recognize that numerous fine books exist on most of the subjects they have chosen for study and that one's perception of their complexity depends on the depth of one's understanding of the subject.

Having identified their methodology, the authors state that there are three basic kinds of failure: failure to learn, failure to anticipate, and failure to adapt. They add that when two types of failure occur together, an "aggregate" failure will result, and then when three types of failure occur together, a "catastrophic" failure will result. Having identified the broad categories, the authors then devote individual chapters to the five different types of failures. For example, they offer analyses of the Israeli defense on the Suez and the Golan Heights in 1973 as an example of the "failure to

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anticipate" and the French defense against the German attack in 1940 as an example of "catastrophic" failure.

The authors treatment of "aggregate" and "catastrophic" failure are no different from their treatment of the three basic kinds of failure. For example, in their analysis of the Eighth Army in Korea, they find two types of failure—failure to learn and failure to anticipate. Nevertheless, their analytical matrix identifies no less than five "critical" failures ranging from excessive faith in air power to tactical units being poorly sited and roadbound. Meanwhile, their analysis excuses American political leaders for allowing the Army to be dismantled and downplays the effects of the US Army units' having been drained by several months of heavy fighting. In contrast, they offer a very positive assessment of the 1st Marine Division and its withdrawal from the Chosin Reservoir and attribute the better performance of the Marines to their emphasis on basic skills. Only as an afterthought do the authors acknowledge the importance of geography, the advantages for the Marines of being fresh and nearly full-strength, and the "easy access" of the Marines to naval supply ships and a nearby port. In short, one could easily disagree with the causes of the "critical" failures in the Eighth Army, and the authors have definitely not offered the last word on the subject. The same comment could be made about several of the cases discussed in other chapters.

After wading through the theoretical and historical chapters and trying to comprehend the analytical matrices, the reader must ask whether he or she knows anything more or anything new about military misfortune. For most readers the answer will depend on whether they accept the authors' methodology and theories. In addition to the reservations mentioned above, an obvious shortcoming in the authors' approach is that the three types of failure they have identified are extremely broad, being somewhat akin to a pathologist's having only three choices in the identification of the causes of death: poor health, accident, or suicide. Beneath such broad categories, one could list innumerable other types of failure, particularly if one had different ideas about the causes of the misfortune.

Cohen and Gooch also cast doubt on their own theories. They admit that they have not identified a "universal" cause of failure and that the understanding of military misfortunes must be based on an understanding of a "particular organization" and the critical tasks confronting it. They also state that the "embryo of misfortune" resides in the shortcomings of individual organizations confronted with specific tasks. In the last few pages of their book, the authors generate further doubts about their theories by concluding that misfortune is like a "ghost in a machine" that lurks within the "bowels" of every military organization. In other words, their construction of a five-step method and their offering of three types of failure cannot provide a "remedy" for the deficiencies of particular organizations.

Despite the authors' reluctance to provide a remedy, they do offer suggestions about avoiding the three specific types of failure (learning, anticipation, and adaptation) on which their book focuses. Their suggestions emphasize the importance of inculcating an open-minded approach in officers, fostering a willingness in leaders to adapt and apply judgment to doctrine, and recognizing that command must be equated with positive leadership. One wonders what the authors' methodology and matrices have to do with their suggestions. Returning to the analogy of the pathologist, their remedies—even though one agrees with them—are little more than to maintain your health, avoid accidents, and seek therapy.

Though there are portions of the book that are well-researched and well-written, a perceptive reader will disagree with some of its points. For example, in their analysis of the US Army's use of doctrine, the authors cite Lieutenant Colonel Paul H. Herbert's excellent work on the writing of the 1976 edition of FM 100-5.[1] They quote him on General William E. DePuy's conception of doctrine in an attempt to illustrate the US Army's use of doctrine to stifle initiative.[2] The fact that this conception of doctrine is an aberration and bears little resemblance to the Army's recent view of doctrine apparently escaped the authors. Similarly, the authors talk about the reluctance of official historians to reflect on contemporary problems. The authors evidently have no knowledge of the existence of the Combat Studies Institute at the US Army Command and General Staff College and of its several important contributions to the development of doctrine, even though they cite several of its published works, including that of Lieutenant Colonel Herbert.

The response of a reader to this book will depend on whether he or she is more historian or political scientist. For those of us who are historians, the chapters on methodology and theory will appear involved and at times convoluted, while the five case studies of failure will be appealing despite their brevity. A well-informed reader, nevertheless, will recognize that more cogent explanations for several of the misfortunes studied by Cohen and Gooch are to be found in specific studies on those subjects. Despite these reservations, the book is interesting and stimulating reading if for no other reason than two very bright individuals have attempted to grapple with an extraordinarily complex topic. That they may have failed is perhaps due more to the difficulty of the task than the quality of their efforts.

NOTES

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Lying to the Troops: American Leaders and the Defense of Bataan

MATTHEW S. KLIMOW

For the American people, the fall of the Philippines in 1942 evoked neither the shock of Pearl Harbor nor the defiance born of the Alamo's fight to the last man. Bataan and Corregidor, while not forgotten, were overtaken by the swift currents of other World War II battles, as Americans found new losses to lament and growing victories to celebrate. Survivors of the Philippine campaign quietly languished in squalid prisoner of war camps or, in the case of the few who avoided capture, struck at the Japanese in unpublicized guerrilla raids.

Many of these soldiers felt betrayed by both their government and commander. Their grievance went beyond President Roosevelt's order to General MacArthur to depart the Philippines in March 1942. It was rooted in widely disseminated promises Douglas MacArthur made to his soldiers beginning in the first weeks of the war. In message after message, the charismatic commander bolstered the hopes of his Filipino-American force by conjuring images of a vast armada steaming to relieve the besieged archipelago. Without revealing details, MacArthur told his warriors: "Help is on the way from the United States. Thousands of troops and hundreds of planes are being dispatched. The exact time of arrival in unknown as they will have to fight their way through."[1]

Buoyed by this hope, the half-starved soldiers fought gallantly and continually frustrated the timetable established by the Japanese army. However, the hopes of these brave Americans and Filipinos were misplaced. Even before his harrowing escape from the Philippines, General MacArthur knew that relief of the Philippines was all but impossible. Yet, the myth of a large force bringing desperately needed reinforcements and supplies was perpetuated. As the Bataan perimeter shrank, soldiers kept straining to hear or

see the planes and ships promised by their commander. Almost three years would pass before the promise was fulfilled.

Although the soldiers stranded on the Philippines cursed MacArthur for deceiving them, it is clear that the Philippine commander was initially the victim of lies from his superiors in Washington. The venerable Secretary of War Henry Stimson, revered Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, and the Commander-in-Chief Franklin Roosevelt are sullied by half-truths and false denials they conveyed to their field commander in the Pacific. Apologists for these World War II heroes argue that false promises made during those dark days of early 1942 were justified. In their view, official words of hope were essential to foster a fighting spirit, not only among the starving and outnumbered soldiers scattered among the Philippine Islands, but on the American home front as well.

There is no denying that assurances of relief raised morale of the beleaguered Philippine garrison. But actions taken by American leaders to create false hope were wrong on two counts. First, the decision not to level with the troops proved, in hindsight, to be a prudential error. The practical outcome of the Philippine campaign might have been favorably altered had local commanders been given a truthful assessment of the relief situation. Second and more important, the lies by Roosevelt, Stimson, Marshall, and MacArthur were unethical. Their infidelity was an unconscionable breach of faith that only deepened the final disillusionment of gallant fighters essentially abandoned by the United States.[2]

Formulation of a Lie

From the disastrous beginning of the Philippine campaign on 8 December 1941, key leaders sensed the hopelessness of the situation. On that day, Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War and former governor general of the Philippine Islands (1928-1929), noted in his diary: "While MacArthur seems to be putting up a strong defense, he is losing planes very fast and, with the sea cut off by the loss of the [Pacific] fleet, we should be unable to reinforce him probably in time to save the islands. However, we have started everything going that we could."[3]

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Stimson's thoughts, recorded on the second day of America's entry into World War II, captured the attitude that would prevail in official Washington from the start of the war until the archipelago fell almost five months later. No one believed relief of the Philippines was possible but most felt there was a moral obligation to try.

There were some, however, who felt attempts to relieve MacArthur were not only futile, but a waste of limited resources. This was certainly the Navy's view. Admiral Thomas C. Hart, commander of the United States Asiatic Fleet, told General MacArthur that resupply of the Philippines was impossible because of the Japanese blockade and lack of sufficient Allied naval forces. The Joint Board in Washington concurred with Hart and ordered the cancellation of a convoy destined for MacArthur's United States Forces Far East (USAFFE).[4]

Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall felt, as Stimson, that despite limited resources, the men and women fighting in the Philippines could not be abandoned without some effort being undertaken to relieve them. Marshall appealed directly to President Franklin Roosevelt for support. The Commander-in-Chief responded by overruling the Joint Board's decision that would have stopped the relief convoy. Roosevelt also told Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal that the President was "bound to help the Philippines, and the Navy had to do its share in the relief effort."[5] Two weeks later in a cheerful New Year's message, President Roosevelt exuded optimism regarding relief of the besieged garrison that many in the islands interpreted as a promise of immediate aid.[6]

General Marshall also sought to reassure MacArthur, sending the USAFFE commander encouraging cables detailing weapons and equipment waiting on docks or already en route to the Islands. However, on 3 January 1942, Marshall's War Plans Division issued a frank and pessimistic assessment of the relief situation. The staff officer who developed the report was Brigadier General Dwight D. Eisenhower, an old Philippine hand who knew MacArthur and the archipelago's defense plan. Eisenhower told the chief of staff that "it will be a long time before major reinforcements can go to the Philippines, longer than the garrison can hold out." He concluded that a realistic attempt to relieve the Philippine defenders would require so vast a force that it was "entirely unjustifiable" in light of the priority given to the European Theater.[7]

In his diary, Secretary Stimson noted receipt of the "very gloomy study" from the War Plans Division. In Stimson's words, the report encouraged the senior leadership to recognize that "it would be impossible for us to relieve MacArthur and we might as well make up our minds about it." However, either Stimson couldn't make up his mind or he was unwilling to confront MacArthur and others with the growing evidence that supported

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Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson confers with General George C. Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, in the War Department on 16 January 1942.

Eisenhower's conclusion. The Secretary went on to write, "It is a bad kind of paper to be lying around the War Department at this time. Everybody knows the chances are against our getting relief to him [MacArthur] *but there is no use in saying so before hand*"[8] (emphasis added).

Reflecting Stimson's attitude, Marshall apparently never shared Eisenhower's report with MacArthur nor made its contents public. D. Clayton James, the respected biographer of Douglas MacArthur, likened Roosevelt's and Marshall's hopeful words to the false encouragement given by some physicians to dying patients. The President's and Chief of Staff's intent, as surmised by James, was to brace the Philippine defenders to fight longer than they might have if they were told the truth. According to James, promises made by Roosevelt and Marshall deceived MacArthur and were "an insult to the garrison's bravery and determination."[9]

General MacArthur may have initially been duped into believing the cheery news from his superiors. But it seems highly unlikely that the savvy MacArthur could have long been deluded as the weeks dragged on and convoys

destined for the Philippines were diverted to Australia or Hawaii. Historian Louis Morton, whose book *The Fall of the Philippines* is recognized as the definitive work on the topic, notes that USAFFE headquarters was indeed aware that the promised help was unlikely to reach Philippine shores in time. Those who knew the full story told no one. When one American colonel asked a friend on the USAFFE staff when relief might arrive, the staff officer's eyes "went poker-blank and his teeth bit his lips into a grim thin line." The troops were encouraged to assume help was weeks, perhaps only days away.[10]

MacArthur hammered General Marshall with repeated early messages insisting that the blockade could be broken and demanding that the Navy increase its efforts. Marshall, however, acknowledged on 17 January 1942 that the only reason the Navy should continue to challenge the Japanese blockade was for "the moral effect occasional small shipments might have on the beleaguered forces."[11]

MacArthur eventually saw the grim reality of no meaningful relief coming from the United States. By February, his cables to Washington began to raise issues concerning the fate of Philippine President Quezon once the Islands were lost to the Japanese. However, General MacArthur did nothing to alter the original picture he painted for his troops. Thousands of malnourished soldiers, riddled with intestinal disease, clung to the belief that if they could hold out for a short time, they would be saved.[12]

There is no evidence that MacArthur and General Jonathan Wainwright had a frank discussion of the relief situation as the latter took charge of the Filipino-American force. The change of command was a hurried affair, with MacArthur promising Wainwright to "come back as soon as I can with as much as I can." Wainwright's reply, which he came to regret, was, "I'll be here on Bataan if I'm alive."[13]

Impact on the Soldiers

As word of Douglas MacArthur's escape to Australia spread among American and Filipino troops, morale plummeted. For some, it was a sign that they had been abandoned to face death or capture by the brutal Japanese. While many experienced this disillusionment, others believed the charismatic MacArthur would return from Australia posthaste leading the relief force. Indeed, once in Australia, MacArthur's first message was again one of hope. This time he said that the relief of the Philippines was his primary mission. In a pledge that was continuously broadcast and printed on everything from letterheads to chewing gum wrappers, the general simply stated, "I made it through and I shall return."[14]

There is ample evidence that soldiers placed great stock in MacArthur's renewed pledge from Australia. When "Skinny" Wainwright made the fateful decision to surrender the entire Philippine command in May 1942,

hundreds of Americans refused to obey the order. One often-cited reason for this disobedience was the belief that General MacArthur would be back to retake the Islands by the end of 1942. Based on that assumption, many GIs disregarded surrender orders and took their chances in the jungles, waiting for MacArthur's supposed imminent return.[15]

Even Major General William F. Sharp, who refused to surrender his Visayan-Mindanao Force for a number of days after Wainwright's capitulation, appeared to believe MacArthur might return at any time. Sharp's staff chaplain wrote after the war that the general cabled MacArthur for guidance regarding Wainwright's order to surrender. MacArthur's reply appears to have been a surprise to Sharp, as revealed in this published account:

> "We sent out your message [to General MacArthur], Sir, and we have just decoded a message from down south [Australia]."
>
> All eyes were on General Sharp as he read the message. There was no expression on his face. "Gentlemen, this is MacArthur's final message: 'Expect no immediate aid!'"
>
> . . . This was a hard blow, as rumors flew thick and fast that our fleet was on its way to save the Philippines. None of us had doubted this and we had expected to hear soon the skies thunderous with many planes.[16]

Not surprisingly, disillusioned soldiers directed their resentment and animus toward MacArthur. The depth of this enmity was apparent in Brigadier General William Brougher's after-action report written in a Japanese POW camp. Brougher, a division commander on Bataan, concluded his report in extraordinarily condemnatory language:

> Who took responsibility for saying that some other possibility [relief of the Philippines] was in prospect? And who ever did, was he [MacArthur] not an arch-deceiver, traitor, and criminal rather than a great soldier? . . . A foul trick of deception has been played on a large group of Americans by a Commander-in-Chief and small staff who are now eating steak and eggs in Australia. God damn them![17]

Although 47 years have passed since the fall of the Philippines, some survivors of that ordeal express undiminished bitterness at being deceived by the promise of imminent relief from the United States. One veteran recently wrote,

> We all knew when General MacArthur . . . was ordered by President Roosevelt to desert us, he left General Skinny Wainwright holding the bag. We knew we would be killed or captured. As a kid in school, we were taught the captain was the last man to leave the ship. He said, "I shall return." Three years later, by the time he returned, two thousand of his men . . . had died.[18]

Nor is the acrimony expressed by the veterans reserved for General MacArthur. As one former soldier wrote, "After fighting in the jungle for five months without any support whatsoever except lip service from our US government, I felt our government had deserted me."[19]

Regardless of how the blame is spread for this prevarication, the fact is that Roosevelt, Stimson, Marshall, and MacArthur all refused to level with the troops. Failing to inform the soldiers that substantial relief of the Philippines was several months or even years away may be described as an exaggeration or half-truth rather than a lie. Whatever label given to this false promise, it was a breech of ethical standards. Soldiers in the Philippines fought gallantly and held out longer than expected, but at the cost of distrust, bitterness, and resentment toward their leaders and government.

Professional Ethics, Military Necessity, and Exceptions to the Rule

The implicit question posed by this episode—when is lying to the troops justified?—is likely to elicit an immediate and resounding "Never!" from most military officers. As retired Major General Clay Buckingham wrote in an essay on ethics, the oath of a professional officer should be "to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth."[20] Half-truths or deceptions do not fall within the military's concept of honor and integrity. Not surprisingly, a plethora of books and articles on military ethics echo this view, using vignettes or case studies to illustrate the critical nature of honesty in the military.

While the US Army has never published a formal code of ethics, Field Manual 100-1, *The Army*, does devote a chapter to the professional Army ethic and individual values. Among the key values listed is candor, described as "honesty and fidelity to the truth. . . . Soldiers must at all times demand honesty and candor from themselves and from their fellow soldiers."[21]

The values espoused in FM 100-1 are a distillation of ethical standards and moral beliefs that have been operative in the US Army from its conception. Lying and deception as devices to motivate soldiers to accomplish the mission were ethically wrong in 1942 just as they are today. True, anyone can concoct a hypothetical situation where a lie or half-truth may be used to save an innocent life. But a moral dilemma that offers lying as the *only* means to preserve life is extremely rare. Building morale on a deception or motivating soldiers with a lie remains unethical.

Did our towering leaders of World War II—Roosevelt, Stimson, Marshall, MacArthur—set a course knowing their acts were unethical or, as more likely, did they hold to some other ethical precept they felt to be more compelling than honesty and candor? In questions of morality and ethics, even the most sacred values are challenged when they collide with other bedrock principles. The promise of help to the Philippines is a case in point. America's

Did our towering leaders of World War II set a course knowing their acts were unethical?

war planners in Washington and MacArthur in the Pacific may have viewed their deception to the troops as a "military necessity." Simply put, military necessity is action that is necessary in the attainment of the just and moral end for which war is fought.[22]

Even military necessity, however, does not excuse all steps taken in the name of a "just war." There must be some sense of proportion. Philosopher Michael Walzer of the Princeton Institute for Advanced Studies points out that we must weigh the damage or injury done to individuals and mankind against the contribution a particular action makes to the end of victory.[23]

To appreciate this argument it is important to recall the military and political situation in the Philippines. In the first months of America's entry into World War II, victory over Japan was far from certain. For Marshall and Stimson, and particularly for the nation's political leader, Franklin Roosevelt, the battle for the Philippines was a symbol of America's resolve to stay in the fight despite repeated setbacks in the Pacific. It was feared that early capitulation or mass desertions in the Philippines would have great moral and political significance for the nation. This can be inferred from the revealing and startling passage Secretary Stimson wrote in his diary on the eve of Bataan's surrender:

> [It has been suggested] that we should not order a fight to the bitter end [in the Philippines] because that would mean the Japanese would massacre everyone there. McCloy, Eisenhower, and I in thinking it over agreed that . . . even if such a bitter end had to be, it would be probably better for the cause of the country in the end than would surrender.[24]

Obviously, the War Department was willing to go to great lengths to keep Wainwright and his troops in the fight. There was apparently the presumption that final victory over Japan would be hastened and morale at home bolstered by frustrating the enemy's timetable in the Philippines. However, the United States lacked sufficient war materiel to ship to the islands and had no means to pierce the blockade. Roosevelt, Stimson, and Marshall therefore chose to send the brave defenders words of hope regarding relief efforts in order to encourage them to hold on as long as possible.

Although those in Washington knew that their promises lacked veracity, this may not have been an inconsequential gesture. Soldiers, faced with the possibility of capture and starvation, cannot endure long as an isolated force. MacArthur, probably more so than those in Washington, understood that the source of a soldier's strength is not altogether in himself, but in being part of a mighty, glorious, and indestructible army.[25] As the American-Philippine army began to crumble, MacArthur not only passed on promises of help issued from Washington, he embellished the story with talk of thousands of men, planes, and equipment coming to the rescue. As a result, the men and women of Bataan and Corregidor became part of a mighty army, if only in their minds.

In Eric Hoffer's seminal book on mass movements, *The True Believer*, he writes that "the impulse to fight springs less from self-interest than from intangibles such as tradition, honor, and, above all, hope. Where there is no hope, people either run, or allow themselves to be killed without a fight."[26] At least some of the Philippine veterans agree with this premise. In a recent interview, one of the "Battling Bastards of Bataan" rhetorically asked, "What else could MacArthur do? You can't create doubts in war. You must be very positive and can't afford any negativity . . . [even if you] need to stretch the facts."[27]

An Ethical Alternative

Retired Admiral James Stockdale writes that truly great leaders don't simply analyze what they think their people want and then give them part of it, hoping they'll receive accommodation in return. Great leaders raise their soldiers above their "everyday" selves to accomplish, at great sacrifice, the just goals asked of them by their nation.[28] MacArthur, as well as Roosevelt and Marshall, knew the soldiers wanted to hear that help was on the way, so that is what they told the troops. In return, the nation received the continued sacrifice of those battered and surrounded soldiers despite impossible odds. In short, the leaders took the easy way out, raising morale and building expectations on a falsehood.

As the field commander, the man who had to serve as buffer between Washington and his soldiers, MacArthur must bear much of the responsibility for feeding false hopes to the troops. It is ironic that of all World War II leaders, Douglas MacArthur would resort to perpetuating a falsehood. His stature and reputation at the start of World War II were unparalleled in the American military. US soldiers trusted the former Chief of Staff of the Army and Filipino troops unabashedly idolized him. MacArthur also possessed charisma and a worthy goal with which to motivate his soldiers. Yet, he passed up the high road, complete candor, which alone enables a leader to ask for and receive the greatest sacrifice from one's soldiers. Instead, MacArthur took the low road, sacrificing his integrity by misleading his troops.

In the final analysis, using military necessity to cloak the lies and half-truths that were fed to American soldiers does not wash ethically. Contemporary philosopher and military commentator Donald Zoll notes that the suspension of rudimentary morality is hardly ever justifiable by soldiers even "in extremis," when society itself is threatened. Zoll argues that the "choice of saving the society by ostensibly immoral means is rarely a dilemma for the field commander" (as MacArthur was in the Philippines).[29]

As for those who were charged with protecting American society—Roosevelt, Stimson, and Marshall—it might appear that their actions had an ethical basis. On the surface, they simply withheld information from MacArthur and only then to serve the higher interest of defending the nation. However, on closer examination it becomes clear that the leaders in Washington intended to deceive MacArthur, not just to deny him the facts. Further, it is hard to argue that those in Washington were forced into the ethical dilemma of choosing between saving the nation or telling a lie. No one believed that the loss of the Philippines would threaten America's overall war effort in the long run. These top leaders agreed that Europe had first priority, not the Pacific. Even in the Pacific Theater, the key to victory over Japan was not linked to the Philippines but to reestablishing America's naval power.

The claim of military necessity did not justify the lack of candor official Washington displayed in dealing with MacArthur. It was less a case of necessity and more a matter of expediency. Simply put, those in Washington found it easier to imply to MacArthur that sufficient help was forthcoming rather than to look him in the eye and tell him the unfortunate truth. Nor would it have been politically easy to tell the American people in the weeks following Pearl Harbor that the only combat troops engaged in fighting the hated Japanese were being all but abandoned.

Beyond Ethics: Would the Truth Have Made a Difference?

History shows that through tremendous effort, Wainwright's gallant soldiers forestalled the Japanese onslaught weeks longer than expected. The question remaining is what would have happened if the soldiers trapped on the Philippine Islands had been told the truth regarding the impossibility of relief. Would they still have achieved the same level of success in delaying the Japanese in the spring of 1942?

The Philippine campaign of 1941-1942 accomplished more for the United States war effort than anyone had hoped for. Militarily, American and Filipino troops frustrated Japanese war plans, holding out months longer than predicted. Politically, Roosevelt got a hero or heroes in the form of Jonathan Wainwright and his captured soldiers, and without the feared massacre of the Corregidor garrison. Their valiant defense, conducted without reinforcements from the United States, inspired rather than demoralized the nation.

One can speculate endlessly on what might have happened had the soldiers been told from the outset that they would have to fight without expectation of relief. Perhaps little would have changed. Even before America was catapulted into the war by the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese army had an established record of atrocities and disregard for human life. This was verified in the first weeks of the Philippine campaign when soldiers found evidence of prisoners being tortured and executed by their Japanese captors. In short, Americans and Filipinos had little incentive to surrender. With departure of the bulk of the US Asiatic Fleet in December 1941, there was no means of mass evacuation or escape from the various islands. The soldiers had every reason to fight on toward an uncertain end.

However, had the truth been served, the combined American-Filipino force might have succeeded in frustrating Japanese plans to a far greater degree. MacArthur and Wainwright could have done more to plan for and establish a guerrilla organization if they had realized earlier in the campaign that adequate resupply and assistance would not be forthcoming. Final conquest of the archipelago might have been delayed by several more months by abandoning the stubborn defense of Bataan and infiltrating guerrilla teams north into the Luzon hills. One Japanese general noted that "a well-planned guerrilla defense should have prolonged the warfare after the conquest [of the Philippines] and should have made [MacArthur's] comeback much easier."[30]

Perhaps this was more than could have been expected from the malnourished soldiers who were virtually all ravaged by disease. But by hanging onto the false hope of relief convoys steaming to the rescue, there was no thought given to abandoning the Bataan Peninsula with its key city of Manila and deep harbor at Subic Bay. Only a handful of soldiers ever made it to northern Luzon, where cool mountain hideaways offered an excellent base from which to launch guerrilla operations and a reprieve from Bataan's malaria-ridden jungles.

On a more basic level was the effect MacArthur's promises had on individual soldiers. Had the troops on Bataan been told the truth and dealt with in a forthright manner, they might have been better prepared psychologically for the fate that surely awaited them. Perhaps some who perished during brutal

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In the final analysis, using "military necessity" to cloak the lies and half-truths that were fed to American soldiers does not wash.

Japanese captivity would have survived. We will never know, but the possibility alone makes this a point worthy of consideration by today's leaders.

Conclusion: A Lost Opportunity and An Inexcusable Breach of Integrity

Exactly how much each of the key players knew about the Philippine relief effort as the first weeks and months of the war unfolded is unclear. However, there is no doubt that early in the war, Roosevelt, Stimson, and Marshall were not candid with MacArthur about the impossibility of supplying adequate relief for the Philippines. MacArthur's promise of massive convoys steaming toward the Philippines may have initially been a reflection of his faith in Washington to deliver on promises of immediate aid. However, at some point, MacArthur clearly came to know his repeated pledge of relief was years away from fulfillment. Despite this knowledge, he continued to talk of massive relief and did nothing to quash the rampant rumors of resupply and support which he had fostered.

One can hypothesize about how pure the motives were for each actor. Few question that those in Washington felt hopeless and distressed at being unable to give the Philippines the assistance that was so desperately needed. MacArthur's cables to Washington made clear his own frustration at being denied priority over war plans for Europe when his men were fighting for their very lives. However, in the trenches of Bataan and the bunkers on Corregidor, the result was the same. Soldiers built their hopes on a phantom army that failed to materialize before the Japanese overwhelmed them.

Ethically, the claim of military necessity is a transparent attempt to justify unfaithfulness to the basic moral obligation of honesty and candor. One must sadly conclude that four distinguished figures of World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, General George Marshall, and General Douglas MacArthur, stained their honor by perpetuating a lie. It should come as no surprise that the military's civilian masters in Washington were willing to expend soldiers' lives without concern for the truth. Throughout our country's brief history, politicians have shown a limited regard for candor and honesty in both peace and war. But it is hoped that the commander in the field will always be truthful. His honor as a soldier must be absolute.

Taking the high road and being honest with the troops would probably not have changed the final outcome in the Philippines. The success of the Japanese invasion was inevitable. Honesty and candor might have made a difference after the fall of the Philippines as soldiers stole away into the jungle or marched toward wretched prisoner of war camps. Had these soldiers not been deceived, they would have at least been sustained by faith in their leaders, trust in their country, and belief in the military ethic. As it was, these moral anchors were undermined when it became clear that the promises their

leaders made regarding relief of the Philippines were lies. Perhaps this loss of the moral underpinning of an army was as regrettable as the military loss of the Philippine Islands themselves.

NOTES

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2. D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur: Vol. II* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), p. 52.

3. Henry L. Stimson Diaries, Yale University, New Haven, Conn., 8 December 1941, hereinafter cited as Stimson.

4. Morton, pp. 91-92.

5. Stimson, 14 December 1941.

6. Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope 1939-1942* (New York: Viking Press, 1965), p. 51.

7. James, p. 51.

8. Stimson, 5 January 1942.

9. James, p. 51.

10. Morton, p. 387.

11. Ibid., p. 399.

12. Ibid., pp. 387-89; Radiogram MacArthur to Marshall, Fort Mills, P.I., 8 February 1942, Record Group 319, National Archives, Washington, DC.

13. Duane Schultz, *Hero of Bataan: The Story of General Jonathan M. Wainwright* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 200.

14. Morton, pp. 388-89.

15. The decision of many American soldiers to disobey the order to surrender is well documented in Morton's *The Fall of the Philippines* and in other published accounts. The assertion that this disobedience was, in many cases, founded on the mistaken belief that a relief force was only weeks away is based on a written survey of 100 American veterans of the Philippine campaign, conducted by the author in November 1988, along with personal interviews. See Klimow, "Surrender—A Soldier's Legal, Ethical, and Moral Obligations; With Philippine Case Study," MMAS thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1989.

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22. Kenneth Wenker, "Military Necessity and Morality," in *Military Ethics: Reflections on Principles—The Profession of Arms, Military Leadership, Ethical Practices, War and Morality, Educating the Citizen Soldier*, ed. Malham Wakin, Kenneth Wenker, and James Kempf (Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1987), p.179.

23. Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p. 129.

24. Stimson, 8 April 1942.

25. Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements* (New York: Harper and Row, 1951), p. 62.

26. Ibid., p. 74.

27. Interview with Brigadier General Donald Blackburn, USA Ret., December 1988, McLean, Va.

28. Admiral James B. Stockdale, USN Ret., "Machiavelli, Management, and Moral Leadership," in Wakin, Wenker, and Kempf, *Military Ethics*, pp. 43-44.

29. Donald Zoll, "The Moral Dimension of War and the Military Ethic," in Matthews and Brown, *The Parameters of Military Ethics*, p. 115.

30. John J. Beck, *MacArthur and Wainwright: Sacrifice of the Philippines* (Albuquerque: Univ. of New Mexico Press, 1974), p. 239.

Combat Leadership Styles: Empowerment versus Authoritarianism

FARIS R. KIRKLAND

Recent research in Israel and the United States suggests that trusting and empowering subordinates is more likely to lead to success in combat than the traditional authoritarian mode of structuring relationships within a military hierarchy.[1] My purpose in this article is to step back from contemporary research and experience into recent history to see if empowerment is just a fresh cliché, or a principle of leadership with a record that can stand up to scrutiny. I have selected three campaigns that are of limited scope and short duration in which to compare the effectiveness of the opposing forces with the relative emphasis in each force on empowerment and authoritarianism. These campaigns are the German invasion of France in 1940, the Japanese seizure of Malaya and Singapore from the British in early 1942, and the Chinese intervention against American forces in Korea in 1950.

As long as the combat power of an army derived from closely packed masses of human beings—archers, musketeers, horsemen—and the general could see most of the battlefield, unquestioning obedience and submission by subordinates was a prerequisite for coordinated action on the battlefield. Independent thinking by subordinates was not necessary, and it could lead to disarticulation of the general's battle plan. In the 19th century, rifled small arms and explosive artillery shells ended the era of close-order combat. Subsequent developments in weaponry have imposed progressively greater dispersal on the battlefield.[2] The evidence of the three campaigns to be discussed indicates that while coordinated action still requires quick and complete compliance with orders, blind obedience by subordinates who have only limited understanding of the context in which they are acting reduces combat power. On the other hand, autonomous obedience by subordinates who understand their commander's

objective and have discretion to act as they see fit to further the achievement of that objective can assist numerically inferior forces to win.

This discussion is a necessarily narrow and inevitably selective analysis of the subject campaigns, each of which has been the topic of several books. A plethora of military, political, physical, and psychological factors were operative in their outcomes. I do not argue that the battles were decided on the basis of empowerment or authoritarianism; rather, I invite the reader to include this facet of superior-subordinate relations in reassessing these familiar campaigns in the light of the expected nature of future wars.

The Battle of France

The perception of the German army as the archetype of military authoritarianism reflects command behavior in 17th- and 18th-century Prussia.[3] In the latter half of the 19th century, Prussian military leaders identified a need to prepare company-level officers to function as independent decision-makers—a process that came to be labeled by American writers *Auftragstaktik*.[4] After several false starts, by 1916-18 command practice was moving toward reliance on subordinate leaders.[5] The German army during the interwar years emphasized trust across ranks, decentralization of authority, and developing in junior leaders the competence and judgment that would make empowering them militarily feasible.[6]

By the time of the Second World War, German generals usually trusted the judgment of junior leaders.[7] After the campaign in which Germany conquered Poland in 40 days, the army undertook a thorough self-evaluation in which soldiers of all ranks felt secure enough to criticize their own and others' actions as well as procedures and policies of higher headquarters.[8]

The experiences of French officers during the First World War led them to value centralization. Between the wars they saw themselves as rejected by the public and in an adversarial relationship with the political regime. The officers feared Germany, doubted the reliability of their troops, and mistrusted the government.[9] To minimize their exposure to uncertainties they withdrew almost all discretion from subordinate leaders, curbed initiative, and demanded unquestioning conformity[10] to a rigid, methodical, and obsolete doctrine of war.[11]

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The decisive battle between the French and the German forces took place at Sedan on 12-15 May 1940. The German commander, Lieutenant General Heinz Guderian, had established a climate of trust, respect, and open communication across ranks. He and his subordinate commanders led from the front, paid attention to the opinions of junior leaders, were supportive rather than punitive toward subordinates who made errors or lost their nerve, and concerned themselves with their men's welfare.[12] His XIX Corps comprised three and one-third divisions with 750 tanks and 120 guns, and he could call on a force of 340 dive bombers for close support. His task was to assault across the Meuse River against infantry protected by concrete bunkers and strong artillery.

The French Second Army had the mission of holding the Meuse River line in the vicinity of Sedan. Its commander, General Charles Huntziger, was its youngest full general and enjoyed a reputation as the most brilliant officer in the French army. He was expected to be its next commander-in-chief.[13] Second Army comprised 11 divisions, 400 tanks, more than 500 guns, and the best fighter group in the French air force.[14] Though his resources were more than adequate to destroy the German forces, the French general, behaving in accordance with the authoritarian values of the French army at the time, squandered the valor of his soldiers and the fighting power of his positions.

On the 10th of May, General Huntziger directed an additional division from within X Corps to enter the forward defensive lines in front of Sedan. Huntziger did not discuss this move with the corps commander, Lieutenant General Charles Grandsard. It deprived the corps of a reserve divisional headquarters, and it entailed a night march and relief in place the night before the defenders would face a major assault.[15] The Germans reached the Meuse across from Sedan on 12 May. General Huntziger withheld from Grandsard motor transport for his infantry, authority for his artillery units to stock ammunition at their positions, and tank units to support counterattacks. Further, he detached two divisional reconnaissance battalions from X Corps for service in the rear.[16]

The next day the French artillery pinned down and demoralized the German bridging units and assault forces.[17] General Guderian called for aerial support, and dive bombers attacked the French artillery. General Huntziger refused his corps commander's request for fighter aircraft to protect the gunners, saying, "They [the artillerymen] have to have their baptism of fire."[18] The Germans, freed from bombardment by the French artillery, forced a crossing. Most of the assaults failed, but the individual squads and platoons that got across operated independently to attack the French pillboxes from the rear with demolitions and flamethrowers. According to one account, General Huntziger reported to his superior that when he learned that some of his fellow Frenchmen had surrendered he ordered his own artillery to fire on them.[19] The

Germans destroyed the defending division and made a deep penetration that dislocated the French defensive position. General Huntziger reported only that "a small slice south of Sedan has been bitten off."[20]

As the situation at Sedan deteriorated, Huntziger provided his corps commander with no additional resources. Rather, he walked out on him and refused to talk to him or send orders through him to his units.[21] He withheld authority from adjacent divisions to counterattack the flanks of the German penetration.[22] He gave his mechanized reserve corps orders both to hold and to counterattack. The order would protect him from blame, whatever happened. Given the French emphasis on obedience rather than initiative, the order guaranteed that the commander of his most powerful striking force would not act.[23] Huntziger withdrew his command post 50 miles, then swung his left wing to the south, abandoning the isolated elements of the French 55th Infantry Division, which continued a stubborn resistance.[24] He opened a path for the German forces to surge westward in the decisive maneuver of the campaign. General Huntziger dismissed four of his divisional commanders to deflect criticism that might arise.[25] He then reported to his superiors that the counterattacks they had ordered had not been made "because of unfavorable technical conditions" and "mechanical breakdowns."[26]

The French general's disdainful treatment of his subordinate commanders, and his indifference amounting to hostility toward his troops, reveal how foreign any notion of empowerment of subordinates was to him. His misleading reports to his superiors reflected the absence of trust at the top of the French army. Though his behavior directly caused a defeat which was immediately recognized as decisive, and which violated basic norms for senior commanders, the critical point is that the military hierarchy found no fault with his conduct. Three weeks later he was promoted to the command of an army group.

The French army was defeated by an army that was numerically inferior in trained men, armor, aircraft, and artillery[27]—but in which commanders dared to empower subordinates. Though the outcome of an event as complex as the Battle of France cannot be attributed to a single factor, one compelling difference between the two armies was in the nature of the relationships across ranks.

The Battle of Malaya and Singapore

The Japanese army had played no significant role in the First World War, and it fell behind European armies in technology, weaponry, and training. The officer corps was divided among samurai officers loyal to the Meiji oligarchs, and non-samurai graduates of the military academy who looked for support to the nascent political parties.[28] Rather than unite to experiment and

modernize their army, the Japanese officers consecrated their energies during the interwar years to internecine struggles for control of promotions and key positions.[29] They denied the validity of foreign ideas and technology, downgraded such concepts as retreat and defense, and reaffirmed their belief in the superiority of the Japanese warrior spirit—the superiority of flesh over steel.[30] Yet while the Japanese officers were authoritarian in requiring complete submissiveness to superiors, and in being harshly punitive, they empowered their subordinates and respected their judgment.[31] Officers shared soldiers' hardships, led them personally in time of danger, and did not hesitate to entrust autonomous missions to junior officers and NCOs.[32]

The British army between the World Wars was organized, as it had been since the Middle Ages, along class lines. Officers were gentlemen, and their right to command was vested in that status. "The men would not follow an officer who was not a gentleman."[33] Competence was not expected; in fact, an excess of "cleverness" (intelligence) was undesirable. Officers were to serve as models of honor and courage.[34] Paternalism, not respect, was the essential characteristic of officers' treatment of enlisted personnel.[35] Though the system worked, it became anachronistic as Britain evolved into a universally educated, middle-class society.[36] Between the World Wars, British officers protected their privileged positions by becoming progressively more conventional, arbitrary, intolerant of unfamiliar ideas and people, and dependent on corporate myths.

British leaders in Malaya and Singapore preferred to present a tough, optimistic facade to subordinates who expressed concern about the war with Japan. They asserted that Japanese troops were second-rate, that Japanese airmen could not fly at night, that the Japanese army would never attack Singapore through Malaya, and that no one could use tanks in the Malayan jungle. The commander-in-chief, an RAF officer, declared: "We can get on all right with the Buffaloes [substandard fighter aircraft] here. They are quite good enough for Malaya."[37] When his chief engineer asked for authority to fortify Singapore, the army commander said, "I believe that defenses of the sort you want to throw up are bad for the morale of troops and civilians."[38]

The Japanese invaded Malaya with three divisions in December 1941. Commanders entrusted junior NCOs with independent missions to infiltrate the jungles and attack the British rear, block lines of retreat, destroy supplies, and kill specific officers.[39] The Japanese put tanks ashore and sent them through the jungle. Because British doctrine stated that tanks could not be used in Malaya, the commander of the land forces declined to issue manuals on antitank combat to troops. The commander of the Australian division responsible for preparing a final defensive line on the mainland declined to build antitank obstacles, saying, "Personally I have little time for those obstacles . . . preferring to stop and destroy tanks with antitank weapons."[40]

Within 54 days the three Japanese divisions had walked 500 miles through jungle against a more-numerous, better-armed, and better-supplied opponent, and attacked Singapore. Four of the five British divisions were exhausted and demoralized.[41] The high command had not built fortifications for Singapore's defense. British resistance lasted only a week.

Leaders of both forces in the Malayan campaign were doctrinaire, punitive, submissive, and preoccupied with presenting an image of toughness. The Japanese, in their respect for military realities, and in their practice of trusting their subordinates, broke free from some authoritarian practices. The British leaders withheld trust, respect, and power from their subordinates. They centralized authority, ignored input from below, and kept even senior subordinate leaders in the dark. Again, one must be wary of attributing too much influence to human factors, but the Japanese prevailed over a numerically superior and better-equipped adversary who occupied a potentially strong defensive position.

The Chinese Intervention in Korea

It is reasonable to expect that in centralized communist states such as the Peoples' Republic of China, military officials would be reluctant to empower subordinates. But in their modes of operation the Chinese army leaders of 1950 showed that they were prepared to trust their most junior leaders. The Chinese sent 300,000 soldiers into North Korea between September and November 1950.[42] They were disciplined in the sense that commanders believed, correctly, that they could depend on platoon- and squad-sized elements to perform effectively in the absence of supervision by or communications with higher headquarters. They routed an American-led United Nations Force of 350,000 men.[43]

The Chinese in Korea had no tanks, antitank weapons, or close air support, and few vehicles.[44] The strength of the Chinese army lay in the confidence its commanders reposed in junior leaders, and in the supportive psychological climate in the squad. There were three cells of three to five men in each squad. The cell leaders were in daily face-to-face contact with their soldiers and lived by a high standard of courage, dedication to the mission, and caring attention to their subordinates' welfare. They served their soldiers as teacher, friend, advocate, critic, and comrade under fire. The cell always acted as a unit. The intimacy of the cell assured that no soldier could stray or fail to do his duty in the field and in combat. The soldiers did not have to subscribe to communist dogma, but they did have to put the welfare of the cell and their comrades above their own interests. Discipline, though backed up by surveillance and coercive power, was based primarily on interdependence and loyalty to members of the cell.[45]

Chinese commanders would brief their junior leaders about an entire operation, then entrust them with carrying out their parts of it on their own.

Commanders had only bugles, whistles, flares, and flashlights with which to communicate with their subordinate units once an attack began. Because they knew the overall plan, small-unit leaders acting independently usually produced coherent operations. They moved so quietly, used ground so skillfully, and attacked so violently that Americans reported that "hordes of Chinese" had "risen up out of the ground" to overrun them.[46]

The United Nations army that faced the Chinese in Korea had just completed, in less than two months, the annihilation of the 130,000-man North Korean Peoples' Army. UN forces had advanced 350 miles from the southern tip of Korea to, at some points, the Yalu River border with Manchuria. They had uncontested control of the air, massed artillery, motorized logistics, and 600 tanks. The Americans, who made up most of the United Nations forces, enjoyed superiority over their Chinese adversaries in every dimension except the human, and that weakness proved to be decisive.

The US Army had expanded from 190,000 to 7,400,000 between 1939 and 1945.[47] Regular Army officers, who made up only about 1.6 percent of the officer strength during the Second World War, found themselves assigned command and staff responsibilities that were far more extensive than any they had experienced before. Personal concerns about their own abilities to cope were aggravated by their having to rely on subordinates who were relative amateurs. Their responses were, in most cases, to centralize control and prescribe the actions of subordinate units in detail.

When the Second World War ended, the Army was cut back to a little less than three times its prewar strength, but it retained almost five times as many officers as were on duty in 1939.[48] Many of the officers on duty in 1947 could never have aspired to commissioned rank before the war. The Army offered them undreamed-of status and authority, but it could not make them secure in that status and authority. Many of the officers adopted authoritarian behavior patterns such as uncritical submission to superiors, hostility to innovation, and indifference toward subordinates. They did not trust their troops or teach small units how to act on their own. Together with their Regular Army colleagues who had developed habits of mistrusting their subordinates during the war, these new officers structured human relations in the American Army in an authoritarian mold. The conventional view of the US Army of 1950 is that it was permissive, democratic, and undisciplined—a victim of liberal democratization following the Doolittle Report in 1945-46.[49] I submit that it was insecurity and authoritarian behavior, with consequent loss of respect and trust downward, that had undermined discipline.[50]

American units had captured Chinese soldiers in Korea on several occasions in October 1950, and had reported each event to higher headquarters. The intelligence staff in Tokyo had conceived the belief that the Chinese would not intervene in Korea in force. The Chinese first attacked on

1 November. They killed or captured 600 out of the 800 men in a US infantry battalion, and almost annihilated a neighboring South Korean regiment.[51] The Supreme Command gave no credence to reports from below, stuck to its beliefs that there were no major Chinese forces in Korea, and ordered advances to more exposed positions.[52] Fearing to challenge their superiors, intermediate commanders denied the evidence before them and acquiesced in the dogma from the supreme command.[53]

Junior commanders, made wary by bloody encounters with aggressive Chinese troops, were reprimanded by superiors for not moving faster. Chinese soldiers had surrounded many United Nations units before they launched their main attacks. In the midst of intense danger, officers sought to rally and reorganize their men to defend themselves, but when the officers looked away, many of the men disappeared. Chinese roadblocks manned by a score of men provoked the disintegration of American companies and battalions.[54] Officers who had given no respect inspired no trust. With one officer for every seven enlisted men, the Army as a whole was overstrength in officers,[55] thus offering a large pool from which to pick unit commanders. Yet, in Korea, senior officers knew they had in their units some "officers wholly unfitted for troop command."[56] Though many individual officers and soldiers behaved courageously, with bonds of trust and respect developing in many units, the absence of those bonds at the beginning of the war led to the worst defeat in American history. As the war continued, less experienced leaders were brought in, trust disappeared totally, and centralization reached absurd levels.[57]

Trust, Respect, Empowerment, and Combat Effectiveness

The three campaigns discussed above tend to confirm the Israeli and American findings that trust, respect, and empowerment of subordinates can assist an army to fight outnumbered and win. This type of leadership philosophy, encapsulated as we have seen in the German term *Auftragstaktik*,[58] is more than the new conventional wisdom. It has a solid record for enhancing the combat power of forces operating on a dispersed battlefield. Though in the campaigns discussed in this article the losers claimed they were outnumbered, or inferior in equipment, or both, in fact it was the *victors* who were inferior in numbers and in materiel. Soldiers and historians will debate indefinitely the factors that gave each force its margin of victory, but one factor common to all three campaigns was the difference in the relationships across ranks. The leaders of the victorious forces had the vision to recognize that the dispersed nature of the battlefield made it impossible to control directly the action of small-unit leaders, and they had the courage to entrust them with discretion to execute parts of operations. The losers clung to the familiar authoritarian patterns. Many leaders in the US Army today do so also.

Trust, respect, and empowerment of subordinates can assist an army to fight outnumbered and win.

Granting discretion to subordinates increases the uncertainty and tension the superior must bear. He remains responsible for what his subordinates do. By their nature military activities entail an abundance of uncertainty and tension as a matter of course, so most military professionals have been reluctant to relinquish the illusion of certainty conferred by authoritarian practices.[59] Behavior that is deeply rooted both in culture and in practical psychological utility tends to persevere even though the circumstances in which it was objectively useful have changed. Commanders who do not wish to empower their juniors insist that obedience to command is essential for coherency; the senior commander and other subordinate leaders need to know what each element is doing. They are correct about the need for coherency; however, the evidence of recent history indicates that they are wrong about how to achieve it. What has changed is that the optimum form of obedience on dispersed battlefields is not immediate and unquestioning, it is thoughtful and adapted to the situation as seen through the eyes of subordinates who understand their commander's intent.

Even if trusting, empowering leadership makes armies more effective, it is extremely difficult to institutionalize. A few officers of the US Army are currently experimenting with empowering leadership based on the concept that each act, word, and policy sends a message to their subordinates. They seek to behave in ways that convey trust, respect, and common purpose. They listen to their troops; pay attention to the troops' personal, professional, and familial welfare; and treat them as competent members of the military profession. This kind of behavior has produced significant improvement in teamwork, cohesion, confidence, and military proficiency in the few units in which it has been implemented.[60] Sergeants, lieutenants, captains, and a few field grade officers have succeeded in building islands of trust, respect, and competence in punitive, micro-managed, and event-oriented commands, but they have had to be extremely wary. Many have been relieved.[61]

The question for the US Army is how long is it going to continue to tolerate authoritarian practices that limit the development during peacetime

of the command relationships needed in wartime. The alternative to authoritarianism is support, trust, and empowerment from senior to junior. But such a posture puts the superior at risk. Unless each commander can count on support from his boss, authoritarianism will continue to seduce even the best-intentioned officers. Change must therefore originate at the top—with senior officers whose psychological integrity and organizational independence are strong enough for them to sustain a commitment to empower and support their subordinates, rather than mistrust and intimidate them.

NOTES

1. See Reuven Gal, *A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986); Faris R. Kirkland, *Leading in COHORT Companies*, Report NP-88-13 ADA 192886 (Washington: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, 1987); Dandridge M. Malone, *Small Unit Leadership: A Commonsense Approach* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1983); David H. Marlowe, *New Manning System Field Evaluation*, Technical Reports 1 ADA 162087, 3 ADA 207195 (Washington: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, 1985-1986); and J. A. Simonsen, H. L. Frandsen, D. A. Hoopengardner, "Excellence in the Combat Arms," *Military Review*, 65 (June 1985), 19-29.

2. In 1906 the frontage of a German infantry battalion on the offensive was 300 to 400 meters; a brigade of six battalions (two regiments) attacked on a 1500-meter front. See *Drill Regulations for the Infantry, German Army, 1906*. trans. F. J. Behr (Washington: War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff, 1907), p. 84. The frontage of a current US Army infantry battalion in the attack is 2000-2400 meters. See US Department of the Army, *The Infantry Battalion (Infantry, Airborne, Air Assault, Ranger)*, Field Manual 7-20 (Washington: GPO, 1978), pp. 4-10, 4-32.

3. Martin Kitchen, *A Military History of Germany* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1975), pp. 2-3, 7-14, 24-25.

4. *Auftragstaktik* is a concept that emerged after the Second World War to describe the German philosophy of warfighting, with its complementary system of leadership and leader development, that had evolved between 1866 and 1945. The principal tenets of *Auftragstaktik* are rapid and decisive offensive action, mission-type orders, implementation of orders entrusted to subordinate leaders, trust in subordinates, and careful, supportive mentoring of subordinate leaders to develop in them the judgment, confidence, and trust that make decentralized operations effective in combat. For a concise and comprehensive exposition of *Auftragstaktik*, see John T. Nelsen II, "*Auftragstaktik*: A Case of Decentralized Battle," *Parameters*, 17 (September 1987), 21-23.

5. Lieutenant Erwin Rommel's forthright memoir of his three years commanding a mountain infantry company in the First World War illustrates command behavior in a unit that was disciplined, but not authoritarian. Erwin Rommel, *Attacks*, trans. J. Driscoll (Vienna, Va.: Athena Press, 1979) (first published in 1937 as *Infanterie Greift An* when Rommel was a lieutenant colonel).

6. Martin van Creveld, *Fighting Power* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1982), pp. 127-28, 138, 151; Antulio J. Echevarria II, "*Auftragstaktik*: In Its Proper Perspective," *Military Review*, 66 (October 1986), 52-54.

7. Heinz Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, trans. C. Fitzgibbon (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1952), pp. 70, 78, 92, 128.

8. Williamson Murray, "The German Response to Victory in Poland: A Case Study in Professionalism," *Armed Forces and Society*, 7 (Winter 1980), 286-87, 289, 295; Robert M. Kennedy, *The German Campaign in Poland*, Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-255 (Washington: GPO, 1956), pp. 130-5; Guderian, p. 89.

9. Philip C. F. Bankwitz, *Maxime Weygand and Civil-Military Relations in Modern France* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1967), pp. 41-42, 50-67, 87-115, 165-66, 378.

10. Faris R. Kirkland, "The French Air Force in 1940: Was it Defeated by the *Luftwaffe* or by Politics?" *Air University Review*, 36 (September-October 1985), 103-05; and "The French Military Collapse in 1940: A Psychohistorical Interpretation," *Journal of Psychohistory*, 12 (Winter 1985), 317-19.

11. Robert A. Doughty, *The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Military Doctrine*, 1919-1939 (Hamden, Conn.: Shoe String Press, 1985).

12. Guderian, pp. 70, 76, 81, 102, 105, 108, 153, 156, 188.

13. Claude Paillat, *Dossiers secrets de la France contemporaine, Vol. IV, Le désastre de 1940 - La guerre immobile* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1984), pp. 336-38, 351, 358-59; Edmond Ruby, "Un grand français,

le Général Huntziger," *Ecrits de Paris* No. 129, (1955), pp. 48-49, 52-53, and No. 130 (1955), pp. 85-86; Martin Alexander, "Prophet Without Honor? The French High Command and Pierre Taittinger's Report on the Ardennes Defenses," *War and Society*, 4 (May 1986), 57-58, 60-62.

14. For detailed composition and condition of ground forces, see Charles Grandsard, *La 10e Corps d'Armée dans la bataille, 1939-1940* (Paris: Berger Levrault, 1949), pp. 11-16, 18-20, 28, 45-48. For air defense Second Army had Fighter Group I/5, which had 85 confirmed victories. Other groups in the top five had only 40 to 51 victories. See Paul Camelio and Christopher Shores, *Armée de l'air* (Warren, Mich.: Squadron/Signal Publications, 1976), p. 64.

15. William L. Shirer, *The Collapse of the Third Republic* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), p. 645; Charles Leon Menu, *Lumière sur les ruines: Les combattants de 1940 réhabilités* (Paris: Plon, 1953), pp. 202-06; Guy Chapman, *Why France Fell* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1968), pp. 116-17; Grandsard, pp. 97, 100-01, 108, 110-12, 116, 133.

16. Grandsard, pp.106, 112-16.

17. F. W. von Mellenthin, *Panzer Battles*, trans. H. Betzler (New York: Ballantine Books, 1956), pp. 17-19; J. A. von Kielmansegg, *Panzer zwischen Warschau und Atlantik* (Berlin: Verlag "Die Wehrmacht," 1941), pp. 113ff.

18. Priority on French aviation assets went to First Army on 10, 11, and 12 May. During this period Second Army had Fighter Group I/5, Reconnaissance Group II/22, and four observation squadrons. On 13 and 14 May priority on aviation assets went to Second Army. These assets included, in addition to the units listed above, Fighter Wing 23 with six additional fighter groups (all but two of those available in the Northern Zone of Aerial Operations) and all of the French and British bomber units in France. On the 14th even night bomber units were committed in daylight low-level assault missions against the German pontoon bridges at Sedan and in support of a counterattack Huntziger was ordered to make but did not execute. See François-Pierre-Raoul d'Astier de la Vigerie, *Le ciel n'était pas vide* (Paris: René Julliard, 1952), pp. 83-87, 91-92, 95-97, 104-06; Lieutenant Colonel Salesse, *L'aviation de chasse en 1939-1940* (Paris: Berger Levrault, 1948), pp. 83, 85, 91, 96, 99; Grandsard, pp. 132-33.

19. Alistair Horne, *To Lose a Battle: France 1940* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), p. 341.

20. Shirer, p. 650.

21. Grandsard, p. 138, note 1.

22. The 3d North African Infantry Division was the right flank division of X Corps and was therefore on the eastern shoulder of the penetration. Rather than order it to counterattack, or even to hold the shoulder, Huntziger detached it from X Corps and attached it to XVIII Corps, then ordered XVIII Corps to withdraw its left wing—which then included 3d North African Division—in a southerly direction out of the Chiers River defensive line to a line south of Carignan. The order specified abandonment of the pillboxes on the Chiers and all heavy equipment.

The 2d Light Cavalry Division and 1st Colonial Infantry Division were in position immediately to the west of 3d North African Division in contact with the southern flank of the German westward thrust. These two divisions, reinforced with a tank battalion, were to operate as a group under General Roucaud, commander of the Colonial Division. Though 2d Light Cavalry Division was prepared to counterattack, it was not permitted to do so.

The XXI Corps with 3d Armored Division and 3d Motorized Infantry Division was to the west of 2d Light Cavalry Division, around Stonne and Mont Dieu. The corps was sent there for the purpose of counterattacking into the southern flank of the German penetration. Huntziger's contradictory orders paralyzed the corps.

The XVIII Corps had two divisions—3d Colonial Infantry and 41st Infantry—east of 3d North African. These divisions were not in contact with the penetration, but neither were they engaged. Their sectors were protected by Maginot Line fortifications.

23. Gaston Roton, *Années cruciales* (Paris: Charles Lavauzelle, 1947), p. 168.

24. See Menu, *Lumière* . . ., p. 218.

25. The generals dismissed were La Fontaine of the 55th Infantry Division, Baudet of the 71st Infantry Division, Brocard of the 3d Armored Division, and Roucaud of the 1st Colonial Infantry Division.

26. Roton, p. 182.

27. Faris R. Kirkland, *The French Officer Corps and the Fall of France: 1920-1940* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Univ. Microfilms, 1982), pp. 2-3, 492-516.

28. Yoshihisa Nakamura and Ryoichi Tobe, "The Imperial Japanese Army and Politics," *Armed Forces and Society*, 14 (Summer 1988), 518-19.

29. L. A. Humphreys, "Crisis and Reaction: The Japanese Army in the 'Liberal' Twenties," *Armed Forces and Society*, 5 (Fall 1978), 73-92.

30. Carl Boyd, "Japanese Military Effectiveness," in Allan R. Millett an ' Williamson Murray, eds., *Military Effectiveness, Vol. II: The Interwar Period* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1988), p. 136.

31. Ibid, p. 157.

32. US Department of the Army, *The War with Japan, Part I* (West Point, N.Y.: US Military Academy, Department of Military Art and Engineering, 1950), pp. 39-40.

33. John Keegan, *The Face of Battle* (New York: Viking Press, 1976), pp. 220-22.

34. John Baynes, *Morale, a Study of Men and Courage: The Second Scottish Rifles at the Battle of Neuve Chappelle, 1915* (New York: Praeger, 1967); Simon Raven, "Perish by the Sword: A Memoir of the Military," *Encounter*, 12 (May 1959), 3, 43, 45, 48.

35. Simon Raven, *The Decline of the Gentleman* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962).

36. Robert Graves, *Goodbye to All That* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1929, rpt. 1957); Brian Bond, "Doctrine and Training in the British Cavalry—1870-1914," in Michael Howard, ed., *The Theory and Practice of War* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1965), pp. 100-02.

37. Norman Dixon, *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1976), pp. 134, 139.

38. Neal Barber, *Sinister Twilight* (London: Collins, 1968), p. 65.

39. US Department of the Army, *The War with Japan, Part I*, pp. 39-43.

40. Barber, p. 60.

41. The divisions were 9th and 11th Indian Divisions, 8th Australian Division, a fresh division that arrived just in time to take part in the surrender, and a reserve Indian brigade, two Malayan volunteer brigades, and fortress troops that together were more than the equivalent of a fifth division: "138,708 British, Indian, and Australian soldiers either died or went into captivity" (Dixon, p. 144). Japanese forces totaled about 70,000.

42. Roy E. Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, June-November 1950* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1961), pp. 750, 765-68.

43. Ibid., p. 606.

44. John A. English, *On Infantry* (New York: Praeger, 1984), pp. 169-70.

45. T. R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War* (New York: Macmillan, 1963), pp. 428, 618; William Darryl Henderson, *Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat* (Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1985), pp. 118-26.

46. English, pp. 171-72. For detailed descriptions of Chinese small-unit tactics from the perspective of their adversaries, see S. L. A. Marshall, *The River and the Gauntlet*, (New York: William Morrow, 1953), and *Pork Chop Hill* (New York: William Morrow, 1956).

47. Russell F. Weigley, *History of the United States Army* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1984), pp. 599-600.

48. US Department of the Army, *Strength Reports of the Army* (Washington: Office of the Army Comptroller, 1 January 1948), pp. 3, 14.

49. Fehrenbach, pp. 429-39.

50. Others who saw the the Army during the Korean Conflict in a similar light are David R. Campbell, *Fighting Encircled: A Study in Leadership* (Washington: US Army Center of Military History, 1987), pp. 9-10, 21; David R. Hackworth, *About Face* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), pp. 200, 253, 260, 262-65, 286-87; and Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann, as his perceptions are portrayed in Neil Sheehan, *A Bright Shining Lie* (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 453, 461.

51. Appleman, pp. 689-708.

52. James F. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction: The First Years* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1972), pp. 197-201, 230, 233-36, 239-41, 251; Appleman, pp. 757-70.

53. Schnabel, pp. 257, 259, 266.

54. Appelman, p. 698.

55. For comparison, the trusting and empowering German army of 1944 had one officer for every 28 enlisted men. Van Creveld, p. 152.

56. Fehrenbach, p. 151; Appelman, p. 84; for vivid examples see Hackworth, pp. 57-58, 116, 137, 142, 152, 160-61, 228-38, 252-55, 265-66, 272.

57. Hackworth, pp. 262-65, 460-61, 465, 469.

58. Echevarria, pp. 51-53.

59. Nelsen, pp. 30-31.

60. Simonsen, Frandsen, and Hoopengardner, pp. 23-24, 27.

61. Faris R. Kirkland et al., *Unit Manning System Field Evaluation*, Technical Report No. 5 ADA 207193 (Washington: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, 1987), pp. 12-13, 17-19, 22-24, 47-48, 50-51.

Integrating the Total Army: The Road to Reserve Readiness

JEFFREY A. JACOBS

In 1973, the Secretary of Defense announced the "total force" policy, which integrated the Army's reserve components—the US Army Reserve and the Army National Guard—with the active component. The total force policy mandated the equality of the reserve components and the active component, thereby significantly increasing the role of the reserves. Under the total force policy, the reserve components are no longer a second-string force to be employed only when the active force has been totally committed; the reserve components are now heavily counted on to contribute to the Total Army.

The reserve components have made significant strides toward achieving the readiness demanded by their increased responsibility. Nevertheless, readiness problems persist; the Army Reserve, for example, has been plagued by equipment shortages that have directly impaired its readiness. The Army has seemingly accepted these shortcomings, at least tacitly. However, recent world events, particularly the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the resultant mobilization of US reserves, have highlighted reserve component issues. These events have thrust the total force policy into the forefront of the Army's conscience and, perhaps more important, into the congressional limelight as well.

As the total force policy nears the completion of its second decade, critics in Congress have begun to call for its reexamination. As but one example of increased congressional scrutiny of the reserve components, Congress directed the Army in the fiscal year 1990 defense appropriations act to study the feasibility of establishing an Army Reserve command that would give the Chief of Army Reserve both command and budgetary authority over US Army Reserve units.[1] As explained by the House Appropriations Committee in its report, the

Army "has steadfastly maintained that the Army Reserve should be integrated into the active Army command structure. This we believe has resulted in excessive bureaucratic layering; the diversion of resources; and the stigmatization of reserve soldiers."[2] The House Appropriations Committee implied that in contrast to the current USAR structure, the command structure of the US Air Force Reserve, under which the Chief of the Air Force Reserve commands USAFR units, has been the catalyst for the attainment of the Air Force Reserve's continuing high rate of readiness.[3] Congress's idea was for the Army to adopt the Air Force Reserve command structure as a way to increase the readiness of the Army Reserve.

Congress apparently agrees with one study that suggested that much of the blame for the lack of readiness of Army reserve component units "must be attributed to a neglect of the reserves in Pentagon planning, programming, and budgeting, processes that have been controlled largely by [the active Army]."[4] The readiness problem, however, is not so simple. Although Congress's solution—creating an Army Reserve command—would increase the stature of the USAR within the Total Army and would help solve the Army Reserve's equipment problems, a separate command would not significantly improve the readiness of the USAR in one critical area: unit training. The problems inherent in the current USAR structure, which indeed exist, are more complex than Congress evidently believes them to be, and the creation of a new Reserve command is only one component of a solution to those problems.

To fully address the problems identified by Congress, reforms beyond establishment of a separate Reserve command are necessary. Despite current Army rhetoric, the Army Reserve is not fully integrated into the Army, with regard to command structure or otherwise. The creation of a USAR command would help to solve planning, programming, and budgeting problems at the Department of the Army level, but only greater integration of the USAR and the active Army at lower levels will ensure that those plans, programs, and budgets are translated into increased combat readiness. Thus, in addition to establishing a separate Reserve command, the Army must expand and actively implement its policy of full integration to the greatest extent possible to ensure that the USAR can function effectively as part of the Total Army when called upon to do so.

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Current USAR Organization Ensures Nonintegration

The present USAR command structure is distinct from that of the active component (see Figure 1). US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) commands most USAR units in the continental United States. (Command of USAR special operations units has recently been transferred to the US Army Special Operations Command.) Below the FORSCOM level, command of USAR units is based on their geographic locations. The Continental United States Armies (CONUSAs), commanded by active Army lieutenant generals, are the headquarters immediately subordinate to FORSCOM. The CONUSAs command Army Reserve units within their geographic areas, and they are the lowest level at which active Army officers command USAR units.

Below the CONUSA level, the command structure of the USAR becomes more confusing. Major US Army Reserve commands (MUSARCs) constitute the echelon directly subordinate to the CONUSAs. MUSARCs are either Army Reserve commands (ARCOMs), which are geographically oriented and command USAR units within a certain area, or general officer commands (GOCOMs), which, although composed of subordinate units within the same region, are functional commands (e.g. USAR theater army area commands). The ARCOMs are administrative headquarters with no overseas wartime mission (although they are responsible for the mobilization of their subordinate units).



Figure 1. Current USAR Command Structure.

The separate active and USAR command structures ensure that active and Reserve units are *not* integrated. FORSCOM, headed by a four-star, is the lowest level at which active and Reserve units have a common commander; a CONUS corps commander, for example, does not command in peacetime any USAR units that would be assigned to his corps in wartime. Thus, to say that the current structure integrates the active component and the USAR is akin to saying that the Army and Air Force are integrated because they are both subordinate to the Department of Defense.

A Separate USAR Command: Not a Panacea

The creation of a Reserve command under the Chief of Army Reserve will not alone solve all the problems identified by Congress. Although the creation of a separate command would presumably cut the CONUSAs out of the loop, bureaucratic layering would still exist. A separate Reserve command would still need subordinate headquarters in order to reduce its span of control. Because the USAR consists of predominantly combat support and combat service support units (and small ones at that), establishment of subordinate tactical headquarters (i.e. corps and divisions) would be infeasible. The ARCOMs would thus likely remain. The ARCOMs, however, are the essence of bureaucracy; they have no overseas wartime mission, yet are commanded by USAR major generals and accordingly have sizable staffs. The ARCOMs are simply a layer of command that exists because of the lack of integration of active and Reserve units.

Furthermore, although a separate Reserve command would give the Chief of Army Reserve more clout within the Total Army, it would do nothing to change active soldiers' perception of Reservists as "second class citizens."[5] In describing this phenomenon, the House Appropriations Committee may have been referring to slights in the budgetary process; the USAR, however, is also "stigmatized" by the active Army in terms of attitudes and perceptions.[6] Only greater contact between active and Reserve soldiers will solve this problem. The proposed Reserve command offers no more opportunities for active-USAR interaction than now exist.

Finally, and most important, a separate Reserve command would not change the quality or effectiveness of USAR training, a cornerstone of readiness. And training indeed requires improvement. Although the USAR is ostensibly an equal partner in the Total Army, as a broad generalization it "can be said with a reasonable degree of confidence . . . that Army reserve units are [not] as well trained as their active counterparts."[7]

The Army has found that the difficulties of effectively training combat service support units experienced in the active component are "magnified in the [reserve components] and particularly in the [US Army Reserve] in which most of the [combat service support] units are located."[8] The magnitude of the USAR training challenge makes an efficient training management structure imperative.

The current system fosters an "out-of-sight, out-of-mind" approach toward the USAR on the part of active component units.

The current USAR command structure, however, is inefficient from a training management perspective, and a separate USAR command will not eliminate this inefficiency. USAR units within Forces Command report to higher headquarters based not on their missions, but on their locations. The ARCOMs therefore command a diverse range of units, from infantry brigades to field hospitals. Although this diversity alone makes training management at the ARCOM level extremely difficult, the challenge is made even tougher by the fact that the ARCOMs' subordinate units are slated for assignment to several different wartime commands.

The Army's CAPSTONE program "allows reserve component units to focus training on wartime tasks [as] defined by gaining commands."[9] Because the active wartime gaining commands do not command USAR units in peacetime, however, those active commands are relegated to providing "training guidance." The wartime commander does not supervise the implementation of his guidance, as he does for his subordinate active units. In many instances, the ARCOMs are charged with supervising the implementation of training guidance they did not issue.

Although most USAR units treat wartime training guidance seriously and implement it insofar as possible, this disconnect in the training structure unavoidably affects training for wartime missions in many Army Reserve units. The Army itself, for example, has concluded that reserve commanders have difficulty developing mission-essential task lists (METLs), which form the foundation of coherent collective training programs for their wartime missions.[10] This problem exists because reserve commanders lack experience or because guidance from higher reserve component headquarters is vague[11]—reasons that are the plausible result of a system that segregates peacetime training responsibility from wartime command.

In sum, the active commander's control over the training of the USAR units essential to the accomplishment of his wartime mission does not depend on the ability of that wartime commander as a trainer or training manager, or even on his command authority. It depends on *cooperation*

between the wartime gaining command and its USAR units, which, no matter how many CAPSTONE regulations are written, will always retain some degree of voluntarism.[12] And while most USAR units voluntarily comply to the extent feasible, the system fosters an "out-of-sight, out-of-mind" approach toward the USAR on the part of active component units after training guidance has been delivered. The onus of conducting integrated active-USAR training—to "train as you will fight"—as well as the sole responsibility for ensuring that wartime training guidance is implemented sits squarely on the shoulders of the subordinate Reserve unit, rather than on the superior unit that should be charged with supervision. This system is a by-product of the nonintegration of the active component and USAR; it is backwards and detrimental to readiness. A new Reserve command would only perpetuate this structure.

A Lesson to be Learned from the Air Force Reserve

As we have seen, the House Appropriations Committee pointed to the US Air Force Reserve command structure as the reason for the success of that component. The attribution of the USAFR's success solely to its command structure, however, rests upon superficial analysis. Comparing the USAR to the USAFR is the proverbial comparison of apples to oranges. The nature of the USAFR—with its dependence largely on *machines* (i.e. aircraft) for mission accomplishment—differentiates that component from the USAR, which depends on *people*. As Martin Binkin and William W. Kaufmann have pointed out,

> basing expectations for the Army reserve components on the successes achieved by the Air Force Guard and Reserve overlooks some important differences between the services. Although the Air Force units' need to operate and maintain sophisticated equipment would appear to be demanding, paradoxically Air Force reserve units have found it easier than, say, infantry units have to maintain their proficiency. More Air Force reserve units are collocated with active units; the logistics, maintenance, and administration support is an obvious advantage. . . . The nature of the Air Force missions permits a greater concentration on individual training and proficiency, as opposed to the larger maneuver exercises necessary to simulate land combat activity.[13]

The validity of these observations is underscored by the fact that the US Naval Reserve's carrier air wings, in contrast to the problems that have beset the rest of the Naval Reserve, also have maintained consistently high readiness rates.[14]

The high state of readiness of the USAFR is more closely related to its integrated active-reserve training structure than to its command structure. All USAFR training is conducted "directly with, or under the wartime tasking of, the gaining command." In contrast, in fiscal year 1988 only a third of Army reserve component units trained with their wartime gaining commands.[15]

A 1982 study conducted by six National War College students (four of whom were Reserve or National Guard officers) provides further evidence of the importance of active-reserve training integration. The study concluded that in addition to the vesting of command of the USAFR in the Chief, Air Force Reserve, several other factors have contributed to the evolution of the Air Force reserve components as the services' most effective. The study attributed the USAFR's effectiveness, among other reasons, to close and formalized relationships between USAFR units and their wartime gaining commands, the high proportion of USAFR personnel with prior active Air Force service, and the technologically intensive nature of the Air Force.[16]

Thus, the difference between the readiness of the USAR and the USAFR, according to both the 1982 study and common sense, is largely attributable not only to the differing nature of ground and air operations, but to the *integration* of the active Air Force and the USAFR. Despite the dissimilarities between the USAR and the USAFR, the Army can apply to the Army Reserve a significant lesson learned from the Air Force—the value of an integrated active-reserve training structure. Indeed, the National War College study recommended that in all services, gaining wartime commands should "assume greater if not full responsibility for the training and readiness" of the reserve component units allocated to them, and that active units must "increase their role in the quality control of the readiness of reserve units."[17]

The creation of a separate Army Reserve command, therefore, is not the sole answer to the USAR's problems. In fact, by itself, a new Reserve command may even magnify the distinctions between the active component and the USAR: by cutting the CONUSAs out of the chain of command, active Army control of USAR units will be elevated from the three-star to the four-star level. Furthermore, the Army cannot modify the USAR structure to create more prior-service soldiers, nor can it alter the intrinsic technological dissimilarity between the Army and the Air Force. The USAFR, however, does offer a model of active-reserve integration that the Army would be wise to consider.

An Integrated Training Structure Will Improve Readiness

To achieve the greater active-USAR integration that has been the linchpin of the USAFR's success, active Army wartime gaining commands should exercise operational control of USAR units in peacetime. Wartime gaining commands should exercise complete authority over the training of the USAR units that those active commands will receive upon mobilization.[18] The current administrative USAR commands should be limited to administrative and logistical functions. Thus, the training of USAR training divisions, for example, which will be assigned to the US Army Training and Doctrine

Command upon mobilization, would be directly controlled by TRADOC. Similarly, USAR corps "slice" units would be trained by their parent active corps. Units whose wartime gaining commands are already deployed overseas would remain under FORSCOM control, just like active units with overseas contingency missions.

As the General Accounting Office has bluntly stated, "The Army has not fully applied its principles of training to its reserve component soldiers."[19] The USAR, whose units train together 38 days annually, cannot possibly maintain the level of expertise and proficiency in training and training management that is maintained in the active Army. Only by increasing the participation of the active component in USAR training programs will Reserve training be improved. Further, giving active commanders operational control of USAR units would impress upon active officers below the general officer level the importance of the USAR and would allow active units to share their expertise with their USAR counterparts. An integrated training structure would force the active component at lower levels to accept the USAR as a partner in fact as well as rhetorically.

Giving the Chief of Army Reserve budgetary authority probably will eliminate diversion of training funds. Money alone, however, cannot guarantee effective training. The Army's first principle of training is to train as combined arms teams: "Peacetime relationships must mirror wartime task organization *to the greatest extent possible*."[20] Moreover, current contingency plans calling for early deployment of USAR units presume that those units are trained well enough so that "the teamwork and coordination required . . . between the unit[s] and higher echelon staffs" of the wartime gaining commands become realities.[21] Practicing this teamwork and coordination in training is the only way to make the presumption a valid one.

The ARCOMs and CONUSAs would have a reduced role in my proposed system, enabling those layers of bureaucracy to be cut back. Under my proposal, the ARCOMs' role would be limited to administrative and logistical support of USAR units. Similarly, many of the functions performed by the CONUSAs and their subordinate readiness groups would be assumed directly by the gaining wartime commands.

For USAR units with overseas wartime gaining commands, new active component headquarters would be necessary in the United States (see Figure 2). These headquarters would be nondeployable, perhaps established from the staffs of the current CONUSAs (what these headquarters are called is immaterial; for argument's sake, I have called them corps). Although these US-based corps would be akin to the CONUSAs, they could be kept from becoming an additional bureaucratic layer; they would be smaller than the CONUSAs and would have a narrower focus—training for combat. Unlike the ARCOMs under the present system, these corps would coordinate closely



Figure 2. Proposed Active-USAR Relationships.

with the overseas gaining commands (a role much better suited to an active than a reserve unit); they would focus on the war plans of those commands; and, with regard to training, they would function exactly like any other corps headquarters in FORSCOM. Essentially, these corps would perform the same functions for USAR units with overseas gaining commands that gaining commands located in the United States would perform for their USAR units.

Although geography could be a factor in assigning USAR units with overseas gaining commands to these new corps, the primary criterion for assignment should be the identity of a USAR unit's wartime gaining command. All USAR units controlled by a single corps would have CAPSTONE missions assigning them to the same overseas command. For example, US Army Europe might be supported by two or three of these corps, each perhaps commanded by a lieutenant general; US Army South, on the other hand, might be supported by one smaller unit commanded by a colonel or brigadier general. This system, unlike the present one, would mirror precisely the one used by active FORSCOM units; III Corps at Ft. Hood, Texas, for example, responds to FORSCOM training guidance, bases its own training guidance on its wartime mission in Europe, and maintains close contact with US Army Europe.

In essence, the proposed system expands upon the restructuring of the lines of command already accomplished for USAR special operations units. If USAR special operations forces can be assigned to US Army Special Operations Command, why should USAR training divisions not be operationally controlled by TRADOC? Although geography, the basis for the current system, would be an obstacle to be overcome in implementing the proposed system, that obstacle is certainly not insurmountable. All US-based corps have active component units at more than one post.

Adding dispersed USAR units may necessitate an increase in staffing and travel funding for active component units, but these increases could come from reducing the current separate bureaucracy of the CONUSAs. By reconfiguring the CONUSAs and disestablishing their subordinate readiness groups, the operations and training sections of active units charged with operationally controlling USAR units could be appropriately augmented, and travel funds now used by readiness group personnel to visit and assist reserve component units could be allocated to those supervising active headquarters.

Consider two hypothetical examples, one of a USAR unit whose wartime gaining command is in the United States, the other of a USAR unit whose gaining command is overseas. In the first case, assume that III Corps' 13th Support Command (COSCOM) at Fort Hood is the wartime gaining command for a notional USAR transportation brigade headquartered on the West Coast. Under the proposed system, the 13th COSCOM would send a permanent liaison officer to the transportation brigade. This liaison officer would actually be assigned to the COSCOM, and would receive his marching orders from, and be rated by, the COSCOM commander (or his representative). In addition to serving as an adviser to the transportation brigade commander, the liaison officer would ensure that the brigade commander received the COSCOM commander's training guidance, and he would report directly back to the COSCOM commander on the training status of the transportation brigade.

Conversely, the transportation brigade would establish a presence in the COSCOM headquarters by assigning a full-time, Active Guard/Reserve officer as liaison to the COSCOM. Thus, the transportation brigade, although located nearly 1500 miles from the COSCOM, could interact "face to face" with its superior headquarters daily.

The COSCOM commander would be directly responsible for supervising and evaluating the training of the transportation brigade. In this regard, he would rate the transportation brigade commander. The COSCOM would supervise, support, and evaluate the transportation brigade's two-week annual training periods, which the COSCOM commander could integrate with the training of his active units. Of course, this system would require the COSCOM commander to send his soldiers from Fort Hood halfway across the country

on occasion. The 13th COSCOM, however, already supports III Corps units in locations remote from Fort Hood (the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, for example), and most active component units in the continental United States spend significant portions of the summer supporting the reserve components even under the current system. With the increase in staffing and funding that would result from restructuring the CONUSAs, this system should not detract from the COSCOM's training program for its active units at Fort Hood.

In the second case, assume that a medical brigade in New England has a wartime mission in support of Seventh Army in Europe. In peacetime, the brigade would be controlled by a new US-based corps headquarters, which would issue training guidance to the medical brigade based on FORSCOM guidance and US Army Europe war plans. The corps would establish liaison in Germany with US Army Europe. The US-based corps and the medical brigade would exchange liaison officers, and the US-based corps would perform all the functions that the 13th COSCOM in the previous example would perform for its subordinate transportation brigade.

A Model for Success

At first blush, this proposal seems diametrically opposed to my earlier assertion that a separate USAR command is necessary. The two ideas, however, can work together to ensure that the USAR is integrated into the Army at all levels. As a parallel, the Commander in Chief of US Special Operations Command has both budgetary and training authority over all special operations units in the continental United States.[22] In practice, however, he has elected, to good effect, to leave much of the training of his units in the hands of the services.[23] This model demonstrates the feasibility of giving the power of the purse strings to a commander who may not exercise day-to-day control over the training of his units.

Although still in its infancy, the US Special Operations Command experience has been a success; giving its commander budgetary authority has increased the stature and priority of US special operations forces. Giving the Chief of Army Reserve similar authority will have a similar—and much needed—effect on the USAR. Establishing a separate command, however, will not significantly improve training or lessen the stigmatization of Reservists. Only greater active-USAR integration will accomplish those goals.

Of course, a separate USAR command and a fully integrated training structure will not by themselves solve all of the problems imposed on the reserve components by geography and the weekend drill system. Given the training time constraints and lack of access to suitable collective training facilities inherent in the Army's current reserve system, reserve units will always be disadvantaged in comparison to their active brethren. A truly

integrated Total Army, however, will maximize the reserve components' readiness potential.

The Army has paid only lip service to its policy of totally integrating the active and reserve components. To ensure that the USAR's contribution to the Total Army measures up to expectations and achieves its full potential, the Army must vigorously implement its proclaimed policy. The USAR must train as it will fight: as an integrated part of the active-reserve combined arms team.

NOTES

1. US House of Representatives, *Making Appropriations for the Department of Defense for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1990, and for Other Purposes*, Conference Report, H. Rep. No. 345, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 1989, p. 14.

2. US House of Representatives, *Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 1990*, Report of the Committee on Appropriations, H. Rep. No. 208, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 1989, p. 24 (hereinafter cited as H. Rep. No. 208).

3. *Ibid.*

4. Martin Binkin and William W. Kaufmann, *U.S. Army Guard and Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1989), p. 62.

5. H. Rep. No. 208, p. 26.

6. See James W. Browning II et al., "The U.S. Reserve System: Attitudes, Perception, and Realities," in *The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force*, ed. Bennie J. Wilson III (Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1985), p. 86. The authors conducted a study as National War College students, concluding that the "reserve components suffer unnecessarily through ignorance and biased treatment on the part of regulars. Those who [do not] know and work with Reserves . . . tend to view Reserves as 'part-time' workers who do not belong in the military club, and they fail to understand the need of the Reservist to identify with both the military and civilian worlds."

7. Binkin and Kaufmann, pp. 96-97. The authors continue: "The situation would be less worrisome if many reserve units were not being counted on as equivalents of active-duty units, to be deployed early in a war."

8. *US Army Training Board, as quoted in* Binkin and Kaufmann, p. 83.

9. Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1988: Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board* (Washington 1989), p. 15 (hereinafter cited as *Reserve Forces Policy Board Report*). Many USAR units have more than one CAPSTONE affiliation, further complicating matters.

10. General Accounting Office, *Army Training: Management Initiatives Needed to Enhance Reservists' Training* (Washington: General Accounting Office, 1989), p. 20 (hereinafter cited as *GAO Training Report*).

11. Ibid.

12. The GAO has stated the problem succinctly: "The effectiveness of the [CAPSTONE] program depends on extensive, informal coordination between the active Army and reserve units, since the alignment does not change peacetime command relationships." General Accounting Office, *Reserve Components: Opportunities to Improve National Guard and Reserve Policies and Programs* (Washington: General Accounting Office, 1988), p. 76. Moreover, the benefits of CAPSTONE have been reaped largely by reserve component combat units, which are concentrated in the Army National Guard, rather than by the USAR, which contains the preponderance of the reserve component combat service support units. Binkin and Kaufmann, p. 83.

13. Binkin and Kaufmann, pp. 99-100.

14. W. Stanford Smith, "Reserve Readiness: Proving the Total-Force Policy a Success," in Wilson, p. 118.

15. *Reserve Forces Policy Board Report*, pp. 92-93.

16. Browning, pp. 68-69.

17. Ibid., p. 87.

18. Obviously, the problem of units with multiple CAPSTONE missions would have to be resolved.

19. *GAO Training Report*, p. 24.

20. US Department of the Army, *Training the Force*, Field Manual 25-100 (Washington: GPO, 1988), p. 1-3 (emphasis added).

21. Binkin and Kaufmann, p. 97.

22. *Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987*, P. L. 99-661, sec. 1311, 100 Stat. 3984-85 (1986).

23. Remarks of General James J. Lindsay, Commander in Chief, US Special Operations Command, at the American Defense Preparedness Association Symposium on Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict, Alexandria, Va., 4-5 December 1989.

The Challenges of *Glasnost* for Western Intelligence

ROBERT H. RIEMANN

Contrary to current widespread usage in the West, *glasnost* does not mean "openness." Its most proximate English definition in standard Russian usage would be "publicity," i.e. making public or making known. Appreciating this difference is critical to better understanding the original intent of *glasnost* in terms of its domestic political context. It is also critical to better assessing the implications of *glasnost* for us in the West. In particular, it is vital to a better understanding of the challenges and wider implications of this concept for Western intelligence communities.

Glasnost represents an attempt by President Mikhail Gorbachev to motivate the generally impassive Soviet public to help carry out his restructuring (*perestroika*) of Soviet society.[1] It was meant to be used to point out deficiencies in the system, and does not represent an end in itself. Although *glasnost* as intermittent Russian policy dates back to tsarist times, Gorbachev makes one to understand that he takes his cue instead from Lenin:

> Lenin said: More light! Let the Party know everything! . . . *glasnost* . . . makes it possible for people to understand better . . . what is taking place now, what we are striving for, and what our plans are, and on the basis of this understanding to participate in the restructuring effort consciously. . . . Social and economic changes are gaining momentum largely thanks to the development of *glasnost*.[2]

Glasnost was also intended to serve Gorbachev's purposes by putting additional pressure on officials reluctant to follow his lead. It remains one of his weapons for breaking bureaucratic resistance while trying to mobilize broader support for his agenda.[3] Gorbachev is honest in his aims: "Not everyone . . . likes the new style. This is especially true of those who are not used to . . . working in the conditions of *glasnost* and broad criticism."[4]

Elsewhere, he tells us that "broader publicity is a matter of principle to us. Without publicity there is not . . . political creativity of the citizens and participation by the citizens in administration and management."[5] Above all, *glasnost* shares with *perestroika* the aim of strengthening Soviet society by making it more efficient: "*Glasnost* is aimed at strengthening our society. Criticism is a bitter medicine, but the ills that plague society make it a necessity."[6]

Gorbachev's *glasnost* is a peculiarly Russian phenomenon, as it is part of an attempt to impose reform from above. It is also to some extent an effort to equip an undemocratic government with a semblance of public accountability. But this is a matter of style more than of substance. Gorbachev has sought to assuage his more cautious colleagues by urging that *glasnost* can serve as a means of mass control as well.[7] Nonetheless, the Soviet leaders themselves do have a use for *glasnost*. It helps them to know better what is happening in the domestic economy and it exposes problems within the lower echelons of the bureaucracy.[8] However, the situation has gone well beyond the original intent, as evidenced by the nationalist unrest in various republics, especially Lithuania and more recently the Ukraine.

Glasnost serves Gorbachev another purpose traditionally valued by Russian leaders. It helps him to discredit some of his predecessors—especially Leonid Brezhnev—and, in turn, the functionaries and institutions that Gorbachev has inherited from him.[9] Gorbachev is enabled to blame the ills of Soviet society on bankrupt leaders and policies of the past. He can also purge the elites left over from earlier times by indicting them as incompetent, corrupt, or both.[10] This process thus puts pressure on the Soviet establishment from both above and below.

Gorbachev appears to be facing demands and hopes not unlike those that faced Nikita Khrushchev a generation before, during the post-Stalin thaw. But Gorbachev wants to avoid Khrushchev's mistakes.[11] One tactic to accomplish this is to use *glasnost* in an effort to build domestic public pressure to his own advantage. Another is to use *glasnost* to improve the Soviet image in the West. Improved political relations can then be used to pursue more advantageous economic relations and thereby help the badly ailing Soviet economy through an infusion of desperately needed technology, capital, and know-how from the West. This is yet another traditional Russian stratagem employed repeatedly over the centuries to Moscow's advantage. Not only

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Glasnost does not mean "openness." Its most proximate English definition in standard Russian usage would be "publicity."

would this approach, if successful, serve to bolster Gorbachev's own political standing at home, it would help make the Soviet Union economically more resilient and thereby bolster the Soviet regime's hold on power. However, this intent has not been realized.

The Impact of Glasnost in the West

Whatever his domestic standing, Gorbachev is enjoying a public relations coup in the West. In this regard, *glasnost* could hold tremendous consequences for overall Western defense efforts, including intelligence. By exploiting the atmosphere engendered by *glasnost*, Gorbachev is projecting a vastly more benign image of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev and other Kremlin leaders are indeed depriving the West of a threat perception upon which to focus its defense efforts. They are now doing this at an almost frenetic pace. Recent events elsewhere in the Warsaw Pact are dramatically intensifying this process of diminishing the threat as well.

Gorbachev's liberalization has provided the cornerstone of an extremely successful effort to appeal directly over the heads of Western leaders to intellectual elites and mass opinion.[12] Because the Western approach toward the East is so complex and multifaceted, it is readily undermined in the public eye by patently simplistic and short-term ploys. It is in the field of arms control and disarmament that Gorbachev has been most adept at such maneuvering. One of his principal goals is to convince the West that it no longer needs to keep up its guard, even while Moscow yields relatively little.[13] But this process also seems to be assuming a powerful dynamic of its own.

In such an environment, the potential adverse impact on Western defense efforts overall, including intelligence, becomes worrisome. The diminished threat perception is undercutting public support for defense. This in turn is decreasing support for defense spending by legislators. This in its turn will hasten and exacerbate cuts in national defense efforts among the Western allies because of budgetary pressures. Whatever is undone in this manner will not be remedied so quickly should the perceived threat ever change again for the worse. Ironically, it may take a threat from an entirely different quarter—e.g. the current Iraqi-fomented crisis in the Middle East—to forestall the defense complacency induced by Gorbymania.

What Historical Precedent Tells Us

The haste engendered by public euphoria in the West raises concern in the light of historical experience. First, there is Russian and Soviet history. An old adage has it that everything in Russia has happened before, Moscow's centuries-old tradition of flirtatious openings to the West being a prime example.[14] These episodes were cleverly exploited by leaders who initiated such contacts to gain some clear material advantage—usually to strengthen their own power position. Among the earlier practitioners were Peter the Great and Catherine the Great, both of whom used Western technical advances to strengthen military capabilities and cement central governmental control—and then employed these enhancements to Moscow's advantage. This tactic has survived through Lenin's time down to our own era.

Another area of concern is the manner in which democratic societies have assessed the threat posed by totalitarian societies. Generally, it seems difficult for people of one society to realistically assess its adversary, especially if that adversary possesses an alien political culture. Such ethnocentrism seems to be a severe handicap for Western democracies when confronted by totalitarian rivals.

A sobering example is provided by the erratic British intelligence assessment of Nazi Germany during the 1930s. Despite an initial appraisal of Germany as Britain's ultimate threat in Europe, London's perception of where the real danger lay underwent a succession of wild swings. These were driven by a variety of competing interest groups within the British government. Such drastic vacillations contributed to the disastrous policies followed by Britain before World War II. The British intelligence effort of the 1930s was hobbled in large measure by the following factors:

- The government's lack of emphasis on the intelligence effort.
- A penchant for mirror-imaging and wishful thinking, such as imputing benign democratic values to the Nazis.
- Acceptance of Nazi propaganda and official pronouncements at face value when lacking pertinent information from other sources.
- Information overload, much of it conflicting, at critical decision junctures.

The result of the factors above was that bad policy was matched by a grave misreading of the threat.[15] Indeed, the biases and preconceptions of London's policymakers were so strong as to render the British receptive to much of the faulty intelligence they received.[16]

Great Britain's effort to assess Nazi Germany went through several phases of alternating optimism and despair. This progression included a honeymoon period in the mid-1930s. That interlude was marked by protracted efforts on the part of London to attain arms limitation agreements with Berlin. These years even witnessed visits by service attachés to German bases,

maneuver sites, and production facilities—albeit on carefully controlled itineraries—as well as cordial officer exchanges.[17] The immediate parallels to recent, well-publicized US-Soviet interactions appear rather striking.

Although there was much overt collection at this time, British intelligence officials persisted in their failure to present a consistent and even-handed assessment of Nazi Germany's strengths and weakness.[18] Worse yet, the British were unable to fathom the ideology and mentality behind Nazi policies. As a result, the perceptions and biases of the political leadership in London—selectively reinforced by the erratic intelligence it received—exerted enormous influence on the final, flawed assessments of Nazi Germany.[19] London thus reacted to a Germany perceived variously as more awesome or more benign than in reality it was.

The Challenges of Glasnost for Western Intelligence

If British intelligence in the 1930s underwent drastic vacillations, US-led Western allied efforts to assess the Soviet threat since the late 1940s have tended consistently toward pessimistic scenarios. Moscow's penchant for secrecy, coupled with the ambiguous appearance of much Soviet activity, forced Western allied officials to assume the worst. This process was compounded by the political atmosphere that prevailed over the Cold War era.[20]

Now Washington and its allies are faced with a situation that brings into question the interpretations of Soviet intentions as understood over the past 40-odd years. Moscow appears to be undergoing an ostensibly extreme discontinuity in its historical pattern of behavior. Many of the Western public and political elites have been quick to accept this phenomenon at face value. Promising events elsewhere in Eastern Europe have intensified their hopeful expectations. Western governments that have consistently taken pessimistic views in the past are now being greeted with criticism and skepticism, even when simply trying to take a prudent, long-term, and balanced approach.

Glasnost poses an array of challenges for Western intelligence over the coming years. Many of these challenges will broadly parallel the problems that plagued the British intelligence effort of the 1930s. One persistent obstacle of long standing is the traditional Russian penchant for secrecy. This conspiratorial mentality remains difficult for Westerners to fathom fully, rooted as it is in Russian and Soviet history. It will leave Moscow as enigmatic to foreigners as ever. Gorbachev himself has subscribed to the continued need for it:

> In the context of the growing subversive activity by imperialist special services against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, greater responsibility devolves upon the state security bodies. We are convinced that Soviet security forces . . . will always . . . display vigilance, self-control, and tenacity in the struggle against any encroachment on our political and social system.[21]

Accordingly, *glasnost* does not apply equally to more sensitive areas such as defense and industrial production. Nor does it apply equally to the secret police or to the current party elite.

Those occasions during which Western media have access to Soviet officials or sensitive activities or installations remain tightly controlled.[22] *Glasnost* has been more shallow when applied to the Soviet military, though this appears to be gradually changing. If anything, *glasnost* generates concern among Soviet military officers for its potentially disruptive effect on military morale and unit effectiveness.[23] Nonetheless, top military leaders have become selectively vocal on topical and newsworthy issues, even if these occasional forays are intended largely for Western consumption.[24]

Another major challenge will be to sift the wheat from the chaff. The limits and the rules of the game regarding *glasnost* are still not always clear. Different Soviet officials seem to be applying diverse interpretations.[25] There is also the lingering concern that the Soviets at any given instance could be engaged in their traditional ploy of disinformation.

Ironically, the attendant confusion on the part of Western observers seems only to help encourage unrealistic and speculative readings in the West regarding Soviet intentions. For example, the recent stir of interest among Western observers created by open discussion of defense policy in Moscow has its basis in the willingness of prominent Soviet officials to publicly challenge the party line. But such dissenting views, despite the prominence of those who voice them, should not be taken as a new official line embraced by the Soviet government.[26]

Nevertheless, the domain of public discussion has expanded dramatically. As a result, a wide range of topics concerning the ills of Soviet society, including data once deemed compromising, is now being made public. These range from the unflattering realities of contemporary Soviet life, such as the poor state of health care or the status of women, to sordid episodes from the past, such as the brutal excesses of the Stalin era. The result has been an unprecedentedly frank disclosure about certain facets of life in the Soviet Union.[27] This has allowed analysts, historians, and other specialists in the West to make comparisons of their previous estimates with the newly released information. But, at the same time, this proliferation of data demands careful sorting.[28] Validating and exploiting this inundation of material still requires discriminating and in many cases excruciating detective work. In the more critical and sensitive areas, it will still remain necessary to read between the lines and look for hidden messages in official statements.[29]

One sensitive area that does appear to offer some promise of progress over the near term is arms control. This process is being pushed by Gorbachev out of dire economic—above all, fiscal—necessity and the challenges posed

by Western technological superiority. Particularly helpful in this respect is Gorbachev's unprecedented acceptance of on-site verification. He has stated:

> In today's international situation, with its deficit of mutual trust, verification measures are indispensable. Whether it is verification using national monitoring facilities or international verification procedures, it should necessarily mean control over compliance with concrete agreements.[30]

The first actual opening in this regard has been Gorbachev's acceptance of intrusive verification procedures for the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force treaty. It remains to be seen how far this precedent with INF will be extended to arms control regimes more urgent to Soviet interests and perceived security needs.

The arms control process will present a challenge as well as an opportunity. The challenge over the longer term will be to help maintain a steady vigilance on the part of the West despite popular optimism. It will take years to draw conclusions with any certainty regarding the dynamic processes now under way. Particularly critical will be the need to support prudent allied efforts in arms control negotiations, and to help maintain public support in pursuing Western security interests in those negotiations.

A very different challenge for intelligence will come from Western electorates and their political leaderships, especially in Western Europe. This challenge will entail coping with swings in mood and the impact these swings could have upon government priorities and budgetary support for intelligence efforts. The problem will be to maintain a steady policy course in the face of the public suspicion generated by the consistently pessimistic intelligence reportage over the past 40 years.

These problems will be confronting Western intelligence communities precisely at a juncture when accurate data will be especially vital to verifying or disputing Soviet claims in the arms control arena and elsewhere. In such a setting, the role of intelligence will be particularly critical in assessing the direction of Soviet policy and all of the implications it will hold for US—as well as allied—policies and plans.

The increasing involvement of Congress in foreign affairs is causing intelligence information to take on larger significance in domestic politics. The temptation for politicians to use privileged intelligence information when appealing to voting publics or legislatures is particularly strong in democratic societies.[31] (Indeed, in recent times unauthorized leaks of information have become a recurrent plague for administrations of whatever party.) Gorbachev himself appears to appreciate this phenomenon and seems to be gauging his public performance accordingly.

Swings in public and leadership moods—ranging from euphoric optimism to panic or alarm—could provide an uncertain and ambiguous domestic political setting for Western intelligence communities. There will

In the arms control process, the challenge will be to help maintain a steady vigilance on the part of the West despite popular optimism.

be considerable political pressure and temptation for elected leaders and their appointees to conform the interpretation of intelligence information to their own evolving views of the world, as happened in Britain in the 1930s. Intelligence could then become increasingly a pawn of politics as some Western leaders try to react to or even seek to shape events in the East. They may well exploit intelligence in efforts to support their particular views or agendas in domestic and interallied debates over how to deal with Moscow.

The very ambiguity of the evolving environment will likely be further complicated by the mixed signals to be expected from the East. Such a state of affairs will leave the intelligence process even further vulnerable to manipulation or exploitation by political leaders to suit their respective political expediencies, again a situation not unlike that in Britain in the 1930s. That in turn would present a particularly dangerous state of affairs if the leadership in Moscow continues to play so masterfully to Western hopes and fears as it does at present.

Related to the question of avoiding excessive swings in political mood is the question of old-versus-new paradigms, as well as paradigms traditionally favored respectively by liberals and conservatives. The debate over how to deal with the Soviet Union has been going on in some form since 1917. All too often, Westerners of whatever political persuasion have been able to see in the Soviet Union whatever they wanted to see.[32] In turn, the present controversy over what is transpiring in the Soviet Union will in the end actually be a debate over American and allied policy direction toward Moscow.[33]

In dealing with political leaders, Western intelligence agencies could be caught in another dilemma. They could face either a leadership that is so dogmatically caught up in old paradigms that it is not receptive to new information, or a leadership so receptive to new paradigms that it changes opinions frequently and fails to provide steady political direction.[34] Either excess would present a difficult working environment for the intelligence communities. This can be compounded by the regular and frequent changes of governments in the West that result in a discontinuity or shift—or even drift—in policy.

Perhaps the most fundamental challenge facing Western intelligence agencies will be working on a long-term process in the face of short-term

demands in an environment characterized by the most profound uncertainty and change since the start of the Cold War. Only careful analysis over time will produce tangibly verifiable intelligence results. In the meantime, events can take unexpected or alarming turns. The profundity, drama, speed, and scope of change may be as great or even greater than that which confronted the British before World War II.

A particularly painful duty for the intelligence community could become that of serving as "Persian messenger," delivering unwanted bad news that contradicts popular expectations. This task would be critical to keep the West alert to the worst possible cases of Soviet behavior. Yet it is often a reluctance by the intelligence community's political masters to believe the bad news that forms the weakest link in the intelligence process, thus allowing unpleasant surprises.[35] (The agonizing dilemmas that were involved in assessing the progress of the Vietnam War come readily to mind in this respect.) It is this role as Persian messenger, then, that could prove to be the most thankless for the leaders of the intelligence agencies and put their moral courage to the severest test.

The Impact on Western Intelligence and Its Implications

Barring significant changes in prevailing circumstances, *glasnost* will continue to serve as Gorbachev's apple of discord to be used to divide the West. (Indeed, interpreting the very nature, extent, and motive of his agenda has provided the basis for considerable debate and dispute among Western experts since the start of the Gorbachev era.) *Glasnost* will help foster controversy within allied intelligence communities and the government leaderships which they serve. Intense debate elsewhere—in the press, in academic forums, and in think tanks—will further compound the confusion. The paradigms of more than 40 years appear to lie shattered without any clearly defined substitutes as yet in sight to help the West manage historic change.

During this period of flux, it will remain extraordinarily difficult for the intelligence community to do well all that it must do: assess overall developments in the East; support allied arms control negotiations with the Soviets; and prepare threat estimates to support the force planning of their respective governments in the face of budget cuts and diminishing resources.

The impact of discord over how to deal with the East will be felt increasingly not only within individual allied intelligence services and governments, but even more so collectively among alliance intelligence services and governments. NATO solidarity could be severely eroded as the United States and other allies find it hard to agree in their assessments of the Soviet threat, its likely future evolution, and the appropriate responses to developments in the East. These divergent assessments and interpretations will likely be symptomatic of wider defense and foreign policy schisms which, if not

properly addressed in a timely manner, could presage the ultimate unraveling of NATO efforts to manage security change in Europe.

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The First Congressional Investigation: St. Clair's Military Disaster of 1791

JAMES T. CURRIE

With all of the attention focused these days on defense procurement scandals and congressional involvement in military management, it may be useful to recall that events of this nature are nothing new for the United States. Indeed, the story of the first congressional investigation—then and now perhaps the ultimate congressional involvement in executive branch activities—brings to mind Yogi Berra's comment that "It was déjà vu all over again."

The underlying cause of the incident was an expanding wave of civilization. As the decade of the 1780s drew to a close, American settlers moved across the Allegheny Mountains and encroached on Indian-occupied lands in the West, meaning what is now Ohio. The Indians, naturally enough, resented these intrusions by people who moved in, chopped down the trees, planted crops, and otherwise disturbed the existence they had enjoyed for hundreds of years.

Soon enough these first inhabitants of the land resisted violently the incursions of the pale-faced men and women from the east. Warfare—intermittent, bloody, and unacceptable to the settlers—was the result. It did not take long for the demand to go out from them to the federal government: "Send help!"

This was easier asked than done. The Continental Army had been disbanded at the end of the American Revolution, and the entirety of the US Army during the remaining years of the 1780s consisted of a few companies of regulars scattered across a vast territory. Growing troubles with the Indians led Congress in 1790 to authorize an increase in the enlisted strength of the army to 1216 men, organized into an infantry regiment of three battalions of four companies each, plus a separate artillery battalion. Each infantry company consisted of a captain, a lieutenant, an ensign, four sergeants, four corporals, two musicians, and 61 privates. Each battalion headquarters was composed of a major, an adjutant, a surgeon, and a quartermaster.[1]

Arthur St. Clair was Governor of the Northwest Territory, which embraced the lands north of the Ohio River. He decided to capitalize upon this new troop strength by asking Brigadier General Josiah Harmar, senior officer in the US Army, to lead a punitive expedition against the Indians. Under the authority of President George Washington, Harmar called out 1500 militia to reinforce his regulars. Harmar was an experienced officer, having commanded the First American Regiment from its creation in 1784, but he committed an unpardonable military mistake: he divided his barely adequate forces in the face of the enemy. Traveling in three columns, Harmar's men were defeated in detail by Indian warriors under the leadership of Little Turtle, and Harmar lost 183 killed.[2]

This first attempt at deterrence having failed, Congress authorized in 1791 the creation and recruitment of a second regiment and provided for the enlistment of six-month militiamen. President Washington then appointed Governor St. Clair, who had been a general officer in the Revolutionary War, to the rank of major general and gave him command of a new expedition against a now-confident group of Indians.[3]

Recruitment proceeded slowly, the pay of $3.00 per month (minus $1.00 for clothing and medical expenses) resulting in something less than the highest quality of men being enticed to join the enlisted ranks. A contemporary observed that the men were "purchased from prisons, wheelbarrows, and brothels."[4] Given this inauspicious recruiting effort, it would have helped had the process of outfitting the expedition proceeded with both alacrity and efficiency. Unfortunately, this was not to be. Secretary of War Henry Knox, a Revolutionary War officer whose better days were behind him by 1791, had appointed one Samuel Hodgdon as Quartermaster General. Hodgdon had in turn entered into procurement contracts with a sometime business partner of Knox's, an unscrupulous character named William Duer.[5]

The St. Clair expedition of 1400 men, accompanied by more than a hundred camp followers—including wives and prostitutes—finally departed Ludlow's Station (near present-day Cincinnati) on 17 September 1791 and moved slowly into the wilderness. The cumbersome assortment of troops and their hangers-on marched no more than five or six miles a day, sometimes covering even less distance than that. On the evening of 3 November the

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expedition reached the banks of the Wabash River, where scouts found indications that Indians were nearby.[6]

It was almost dark by this time, and the troops were cold and wet after a day of wading across creeks and slopping through marshes. Not wishing to impose further on his men, the commanding general did not have them throw up breastworks, as he had done on other occasions, nor did he take other precautions for self-defense. An enterprising group of officers, however, took it upon themselves to go out with a volunteer patrol, ambushed a half dozen Indians near camp, and allowed a much larger group of the enemy to pass unchallenged. Despite these indications that hostile forces were near, St. Clair still took no special defensive precautions.[7]

The next day, as St. Clair's troops were preparing breakfast, they were hit by a carefully coordinated attack of some 1000 Indians under Little Turtle—victor over General Harmar—and Blue Jacket. The poorly trained volunteer militia broke and fled, while the regulars attempted a stand. St. Clair's artillerymen, firing both canister and ball, posed the greatest threat to the Indians' success. Little Turtle, however, had anticipated this danger and had assigned men to pick off the gunners. They succeeded in doing so, and before long St. Clair's force was receiving fire from four sides and had no effective way to overcome its growing numerical disadvantage.[8]

The surviving members of St. Clair's command fought on, but within two hours the general—who was unhurt in the battle though he took six bullets through his clothing—decided that the only option was to fight through the encircling enemy. He thereupon gathered about him the remnants of his command and attacked toward the rear of the camp. Two hundred men finally broke out, and St. Clair led this desperate and panic-stricken band 29 miles south to Fort Jefferson. The Indians gave up the chase after a few miles and returned to the scene of their success to plunder and pillage.[9]

The totality of the Indian victory was unprecedented: 657 US soldiers dead and 271 wounded, not counting an unknown number of fatalities among the camp followers. It was a devastating defeat for American arms. It would be the greatest win ever for an Indian army fighting against a US force, far surpassing the better-known victory over George Armstrong Custer's 7th Cavalry 85 years later.[10]

Congress was in session in Philadelphia when word of the disaster filtered back from the field, but for several months it took no action. On 27 March 1792, however, Representative William Branch Giles of Virginia offered a resolution calling upon President Washington to "institute an inquiry into the causes of the late defeat of the army under the command of Major General St. Clair." After a period of debate in which a majority of the speakers made clear their belief that it was not proper to request the President to undertake such an

National Archives

Major General Arthur St. Clair

Smithsonian Institution

Little Turtle

investigation, Giles's motion was defeated 21 to 35. A second resolution establishing a select committee of the House of Representatives to investigate the defeat then passed 44 to 10. This committee was authorized to "call for such persons, papers, and records as may be necessary to assist their inquiries."[11]

President Washington, acutely aware that precedents he established would influence the actions of his successors in office, was concerned about the congressional request for papers on the expedition. On Saturday, 31 March, he assembled his cabinet—Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton, Secretary of War Henry Knox, and Attorney General Edmund Randolph—to seek advice. On the following Monday, the President's men informed him of their unanimous conclusion: the House had every right to conduct its inquiry and to request papers from the President.[12] This conclusion carried extra weight if only because it was backed by both Jefferson and Hamilton, who rarely agreed on anything.

The Cabinet members also recommended that the President give the House such papers as the "public good would permit and ought to refuse those the disclosure of which would harm the public." They suggested further that requests for executive branch documents should be made to the President himself, and not to the head of a department. That same day—2 April—Washington directed that copies of the relevant documents be furnished to the House investigating committee.[13]

The committee, consisting of seven House members, began its work immediately. Witnesses testified under oath at public sessions and were paid $1.00 per day for their time. The committee heard from most of the principals on the US side, including St. Clair and Knox. St. Clair also submitted a lengthy

written statement. The War and Treasury departments provided voluminous records on the expedition, and in barely a month the committee was ready to present its report to the House.[14]

Speaking for the special investigating committee, Representative Thomas Fitzsimons of Pennsylvania delivered the report on 8 May 1792. The committee did not find St. Clair to have been at fault in the defeat. Indeed, the committee found that his conduct "in all preparatory arrangements was marked with peculiar ability and zeal" and that "his conduct during the action furnished strong testimonies of his coolness and intrepidity." Neither did the officers under St. Clair's command come in for censure. The militia, reported the committee, had "fled through the main army without firing a gun," but some of the troops "behaved as well as could be expected from their state of discipline and the suddenness of the attack." The committee placed primary blame on Quartermaster General Hodgdon and his contractors (including William Duer)—and indirectly on Secretary of War Knox—for most of the problems of the expedition.[15]

Contractor fraud was at the heart of many of the problems identified by the investigating committee. "Repeated complaints were made," said the report, "of fatal mismanagements and neglects, in the quartermaster's and military stores department, particularly as to tents, knapsacks, camp kettles, cartridge boxes, packsaddles &c. all of which were deficient in quantity and bad in quality." The committee found specifically that the packsaddles and many of the muskets were unfit for use, that the gunpowder "was not of good quality," and that the shoes, hats, and clothing supplied to the expedition were of shoddy construction, the shoes lasting only four days in some instances. Even the axes furnished the expedition were inferior, one officer testifying that "when used [they] would bend up like a dumpling."[16]

National Archives

Secretary of War Henry Knox

National Archives

Quartermaster Samuel Hodgdon

The House did not act immediately upon the committee report, and Knox took advantage of the delay to stage a public counteroffensive. Complaining that the committee report had been "founded upon an *ex parte* [one-sided] investigation," he complained that the report had been leaked to the press, thereby unfairly injuring his reputation. Knox requested that he be allowed to explain his side of the story to the House before it voted on accepting the committee's report. He thereupon presented a detailed rebuttal of more than a hundred pages, together with a sheaf of affidavits which contradicted the charges that the organizers and suppliers of the expedition were guilty of malfeasance or worse.[17]

In a counter-rebuttal of his own, General St. Clair pointed out the questionable validity of the affidavits. All but two of them, he observed, were in the same handwriting—that of Hodgdon's clerk—and most of them were from contractors whose work had been questioned. "Would the tent maker . . . come forward," asked St. Clair, "and swear that he had imposed upon the public, or the gunsmith that he had done his work unfaithfully?" No, said St. Clair, they would undoubtedly swear that they had given good value in their contracts, despite convincing evidence to the contrary.[18]

As for Hodgdon's claims, St. Clair found them to be "so replete with insolence and folly, that to make large remarks upon them would only serve to place those qualities in a less conspicuous point of view." The general nevertheless offered a ten-page refutation of Hodgdon's statement, concluding with the observation that the Quartermaster General wanted only to turn public attention away from himself. "He is, I trust, mistaken," opined St. Clair; "the public may be misled, but they are never long wrong, and want nothing but the truth fairly laid before them, to be always right."[19]

St. Clair's faith in the public probably did not in the end extend to the members of the House of Representatives. After considering all the claims, counterclaims, and additional conflicting testimony, the investigating committee issued a watered-down version of their original report which softened the criticisms of Hodgdon, though it gave no relief to Knox. In 1793 a new session of Congress briefly considered the issue, then discharged the committee without taking any further action.[20]

St. Clair felt that his reputation had been tarnished by the failure of the House to accept the report, and he lobbied unsuccessfully to reopen the matter. As an old man he attempted to persuade the House to publish a collection of documents on the affair, and when that attempt failed, he published by subscription his own 275-page volume.[21]

The St. Clair expedition is today a little-known episode in American history, though it resulted in a defeat which fairly well wiped out the US Army at the time. More important, the investigation of the incident by the US House of Representatives set the pattern and the precedent for congressional inquiries into executive branch operations of all types. St. Clair was largely

exonerated by the House investigating committee, but it is apparent that he made a number of mistakes which contributed materially to the disaster—mistakes, incidentally, that continue to have application today:

• He underestimated his enemy. Despite the defeat suffered by his predecessor, General Harmar, St. Clair seems to have suffered from a common military syndrome: opponents without the latest in weaponry cannot possibly be as good as we are. Little Turtle, on the other hand, realized that he was at a disadvantage in firepower—principally because of St. Clair's artillery—and made plans to overcome the deficit.

• In failing to have his men do what was prudentially required for their safety and survival (digging in when they reached the Wabash) because it was uncomfortable and inconvenient, St. Clair violated a cardinal rule of defense. If he had ordered his men to throw up even hasty breastworks or prepare modest entrenchments on the night of 3 November, his command might have survived the next day largely intact.

• He did not act on the intelligence that was furnished him. Patrols had detected the presence of the enemy nearby, and many of his officers believed that an attack was likely. Intelligence reports are often ambiguous, but that does not seem to have been the case here.

There are also some non-tactical lessons from this expedition and its aftermath that have contemporary application:

• Do not count on your troops to rise above their level of training. The "volunteer militia" recruited for St. Clair were considerably below the level of the regulars in both training and motivation. They might more appropriately be compared to untrained draftees rather than to members of today's Guard and Reserve. Nevertheless, as more and more assignments are handed off to the Reserve components for budgetary reasons, it is important for national leaders to realize that 48 paid drills and two weeks of active duty per year may not allow Reservists to consistently achieve the level of performance that can be reached by those on full-time active duty. Army Reserve units performed admirably in Vietnam in 1968 and 1969, at times outperforming their active-duty counterparts. These units, however, had received anywhere from three to seven months of intensive post-mobilization training before being sent to Vietnam.[22]

• Some defense contractors will cut corners in supplying materiel no matter what the consequences. Whether it is steel axes that bend like dumplings in 1791 or steel bolts that shear under stress in 1990, procurement and quality-control specialists must be ever vigilant. Most defense contractors are simply trying to make an honest profit, but that small percentage that cares only for profit and forgets the modifier "honest" can cause equipment failures and unnecessary casualties and losses.

• Congress will not hesitate to become deeply involved—even to micromanage—if it feels that the Department of Defense and the services are

not doing their job. Having worked as a US Senate staffer for almost six years, I can say with a high degree of confidence that few staff members or their bosses really enjoy mucking around at a nit-picking level in DOD. Most of them have plenty of larger issues on which to concentrate, but if they perceive that commanders, managers, auditors, and inspectors in the Department of Defense are not doing a proper job of watching the taxpayer's money, then they will not hesitate to step in.

Whether by reading Sun Tzu, taking a staff ride at Gettysburg, or pondering the lessons of Chief Little Turtle, today's military leaders can learn from the past. Defeats are often as important as victories for such purposes. The story of Arthur St. Clair's expedition and the first congressional investigation has value still—and a remarkably contemporary ring to it—even after the elapse of two hundred years.

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Commentary & Reply

IKE'S VICTORY: A CINCH? LUCKY? CAUTIOUS?

To the Editor:

Stephen E. Ambrose's panegyric, "Eisenhower's Generalship" (*Parameters*, June 1990), brought to mind an experience in the early 1950s while I was an instructor of military art at the United States Military Academy.

A cadet asked whether I considered Eisenhower to be another "Great Captain." I replied that it was at least a decade too early to so baptize him, that we should wait until the historical evaluation of World War II had been completed, and that meanwhile we had to acknowledge that he had waged a victorious campaign in Western Europe.

The cadet fixed me with a sharpshooter's beady eye: "He *did* win it, sir. But could he possibly have lost it?"

Colonel John R. Elting, USA Ret.

To the Editor:

In his article "Eisenhower's Generalship," Professor Stephen Ambrose has given us an interesting and concise overview of his subject. Clearly and succinctly he leads us to his conclusion that Dwight D. Eisenhower "was the most successful general in the greatest war ever fought." He does so without minimizing General Eisenhower's errors, such as his failure to insist on the opening of Antwerp at the earliest possible moment.

Still, he bases his judgment that Eisenhower was "the most successful general" wholly on Ike's campaign in northwestern Europe in the final eleven months of the war in that theater. In contrast, he is harsh on the general's conduct of his campaigns in the Mediterranean, characterizing them as "excessively cautious" and summarizing them as "a strategic failure."

A more favorable judgment might be made of Eisenhower's achievements in the Mediterranean. To do so it would be helpful to widen the focus of our attention, for the war was not fought wholly ashore or wholly in Europe, and the various parts of the war affected one another. Moreover, the decisions to land on North Africa and then to invade Italy were made at a higher level than his.

In the light of the circumstances, the decision to make the multi-pronged landing on the North African coast in November 1942 was bold and the results, if coming slower than we would have liked, were well worthwhile.

The circumstances were, among other things, that in the Atlantic the U-boats were still winning. November 1942 was to be the best month yet for them and, for the Allies, the worst was yet to be. The enemy was still winning in the Soviet Union, China, and Burma. MacArthur's forces were still on the defensive in

New Guinea. It was not yet a sure thing that the Guadalcanal campaign, over which Halsey had just been placed in command, was not going to collapse in failure.

The results of Eisenhower's North African campaign were the adherence to our side of the French African empire with all its resources and its position; the clearance of the Axis armies from the continent of Africa, with the capture by the Allies of more enemy troops than the Soviets had taken at Stalingrad; the opening through the Mediterranean of the short logistical route between Britain and the Persian Gulf and India; and the rescue of Malta with its swift transformation from a beleaguered outpost to a powerful advanced base for the Allied air forces.

Were the subsequent Allied landings in Sicily and at Salerno cautious? Yes they were. Would it have been bolder to have landed near Rome, say at Anzio? Yes it would.

But in order to make an assault landing on a hostile shore, command of the air over the beaches and nearby waters is essential. Even had the Allies concentrated in the central Mediterranean all the carriers they then had ready for action, there would have been too few such ships present to assure command of the air where it was needed. So the landings had to be made within range of aviation based ashore, with the Sicilian landings covered by aircraft from Malta and North Africa and the Salerno landing at the very edge of fighter range from captured Sicilian fields. Even so, while the landings on Sicily in July, aided by the weather, went well, that at Salerno in September was a near thing. A parachute landing might have been made in the vicinity of Rome, far beyond fighter range. How it would have fared, and how it would have been supported logistically, we will never know. But at about the same time the British attempted to rescue some of the Greek Aegean islands from their German captors. They failed dismally, largely because the Germans maintained control of the local air.

It would have been nice to have acquired Naples and Rome in September. But Naples fell in October and, as it turned out, Rome wasn't necessary after all. As for Sardinia, that came cheaply after the Germans evacuated the island (and Corsica too) without a fight.

So caution, at least to the degree Eisenhower exercised it in the Mediterranean, seems to have been wise. To be sure, it may also have been that caution which led to the stalemate in Italy after the capture of Naples. But if the choice is to be between possible stalemate and probable defeat, stalemate is to be preferred.

In any event, after their Mediterranean achievements of November 1942 through October 1943, the focus of Allied military attention in western Europe had properly shifted to the coast of France. By that time the U-boats had been beaten in the Atlantic. The Soviets (many of them carried in US- and British-built trucks delivered via the Persian Gulf) were thrusting westward toward Germany, MacArthur and Halsey together were completing their reduction of the Japanese stronghold at Rabaul to impotence, Spruance was about to begin the central Pacific drive which was to end with the siege of Japan, and the stalemates which had developed in Italy, Burma, and China no longer much mattered. The most important military event in the Mediterranean after the capture of Naples was the acquisition and opening of the port of Marseilles in August 1944, which for three months was the best substitute available for Antwerp and the other Atlantic ports still occupied or dominated by the Germans.

It was through his caution as well as through his boldness, in the Mediterranean as well as in northwestern Europe, that General Eisenhower made his essential contribution to the victory in 1945.

Frank Uhlig
Editor, *Naval War College Review*
Newport, Rhode Island

The Author Replies:

With respect to the question from Colonel Elting's cadet, perhaps we could ask George McClellan "whether he could possibly have lost it."

A variant of the "Ike couldn't have lost it" thesis is the "Ike was lucky" thesis. Basketball star Bill Russell once remarked, "People say the Celtics were lucky. I never figured that. I always thought the best team won. I was told that is why they keep score."

Frank Uhlig's letter argues powerfully and persuasively that Eisenhower's caution in the Mediterranean in 1942-43 was appropriate to the situation, and that his limited victories paid large dividends later.

I agree entirely. Still, one must at least wonder what would have happened if he had been bolder (or even more cautious). Certainly something different—perhaps a setback, which would have delayed the end of the war and might have allowed the Red Army to overrun all of Germany, maybe even France—but perhaps a quicker victory, achieved in 1944, before the Russians had overrun East and Central Europe. We can never know. For my part, I believe the possible dividend from a quick victory would have been worth the risk of more boldness.

Stephen E. Ambrose

DISPLACED PERSONS: CRITICAL FACTOR IN SOUTH VIETNAM'S DEFEAT?

To the Editor:

The review of my book, *Victims and Survivors* (*Parameters*, June 1990), by my friend Dr. Richard Hunt recognizes war victims as a significant aspect of the calculus of war, but misinterprets the evidence about how they affected the Vietnam War. The reviewer was troubled by my assertion that lack of support from millions of disaffected victims meant that their government (the GVN), faced by a united enemy, was bound to lose. He asked what difference greater "political" support (a word I avoided) would have made in preventing military defeat in 1975.

Dr. Hunt's disagreement with my book is traceable to the following passage (pp. 362-63):

> I do not share the belief that the Vietnam War was won . . . until the withdrawal of American aid opened the way for [the final] invasion from the North. The war was being steadily lost in the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people, and in their refugee camps and villages,

except for those brief years between the Tet offensive [1968] and late 1971. . . . Refugees and evacuees were both passively and actively involved in that decline.

Would greater popular support have made a difference? Yes. Tet illustrates that. The Viet Cong prepared for months, using thousands of cadres and guerrillas in and around 100 cities and towns. Yet the people in whose midst this occurred remained mute. Had there been a bond of trust between the populace and their government, the enemy personnel would have been identified and apprehended. Or the communities might have eliminated them directly, as the Hoa Hao did in some Delta provinces and various Montagnard tribes did under US Special Forces leadership. In either case, the Tet offensive would have been aborted. During the actual fighting the people helped neither side.

Tet became a military victory for the GVN and US forces, but it was a political disaster in the United States. It destroyed confidence in our government, drove Lyndon Johnson from office, and led to the decision to get out of Vietnam. In a sense Tet 1968 rather than the collapse in 1975 was the decisive point in the war.

Was there a better way? Yes there was: the area-security concept, which after Tet replaced the terribly destructive search-and-destroy (attrition) strategy. The watchword became: Bring security to the people, not people to security. Political, social, and economic reforms went with it. The combination was an astonishing success, permitting a million and a half refugees (about a third of the displaced) to go home, restoring the economy and some trust in the government. However, the momentum slackened as American forces departed. People were still being forcibly relocated from insecure areas. The extreme north and most of the west, including the territory previously inhabited by the now "consolidated" Montagnards, were largely abandoned to the enemy.

It was through those abandoned areas that the North Vietnamese army poured during the 1972 offensive. The GVN forces were well equipped and led, and they had strong US air and logistical support. It was not enough. The communists expanded into substantial territories from which 1.3 million refugees fled, and were confirmed in possession by the 1973 Paris Agreement. Thereafter, it was all downhill.

Had the area-security concept been adopted earlier and implemented more consistently, the outcome of the war might have been different.

Some lessons regarding war victims have still not been learned.

Louis A. Wiesner
Chocorua, New Hampshire

The Reviewer Replies:

I am glad to have this opportunity to respond to Louis Wiesner about my review of his *Victims and Survivors*. The issue he raises is whether more enlightened and humane treatment of war victims would have made a difference in the outcome of the war. In my mind that was a necessary but not sufficient precondition to Saigon's survival. If the GVN had ruled in such a way as to foster long-term and deep-rooted support, then its rule would have surely rested on a firmer

foundation. Yet, even if the Thieu regime had eradicated its many fundamental weaknesses (corruption, weak leadership, poor administration, the list could be easily extended), I doubt it could have overcome what was in 1975 a superior military force, the well-trained and well-armed PAVN troops. The Hanoi government wanted to unify Vietnam and was willing to do whatever it could to prevail. One might even argue, as William Colby has recently in *Lost Victory*, that the invasion occurred because the communists had lost the political war, and were forced to resort to extreme measures to realize their goal.

Mr. Wiesner's comparison of 1968 and 1975 is telling. A key factor in the 1975 defeat was the withdrawal of American aid, which, as he states on page 363, opened the way for invasion from the North. The American military presence was decisive in the military defeat of the communists in 1968 just as its absence was critical in the communist victory of 1975. On the basis of this comparison, might not the devil's advocate argue that the firepower of American forces, however egregiously employed at times, was more influential at critical points in the war than humane treatment and the popular support such treatment might engender?

Richard A. Hunt

Book Reviews

On Leadership. By John W. Gardner. New York: The Free Press, 1990. 220 pages. $19.95. **Reviewed by General Donn A. Starry, USA Ret.**, formerly an executive vice president of Ford Aerospace.

When someone with Dr. John W. Gardner's credentials writes a book about leadership, it demands the attention of anyone interested in the subject. Dr. Gardner's credentials are impressive and extensive. Advisor to six US presidents, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare in the Johnson Administration, President of the Carnegie Corporation, presently a distinguished professor at Stanford University Business School, to mention but a few of his offices, Dr. Gardner brings to his task a lifetime rich in experience and full of relevant observation.

Dr. Gardner defines his subject—leadership—as "the process of persuasion or example by which an individual (or leadership team) induces a group to pursue objectives held by the leader or shared by the leader and his or her followers." There follows a discussion of leaders, what they do, and finally leader attributes—the traits which those who would lead need to learn about, acquire, and practice. Tasks performed by effective leaders are: envisioning goals; affirming values; regenerating values; motivating; serving as a symbol; managing; achieving workable unity; establishing and maintaining mutual trust; and explaining.

Effective leaders must have followers or, better, constituents ("follower" being too passive a word). A whole chapter is devoted to leader-constituent interaction—the important leader art of communicating with those who do the work.

The important leader attributes are physical vitality and stamina, intelligence and judgment in action, willingness to accept responsibility, task competence, understanding constituents and their needs, skill in dealing with people, need to achieve, capacity to motivate, capacity to win and hold trust, capacity to manage/decide/set priorities, confidence, ascendance/dominance/assertiveness, adaptability, and flexibility of approach.

The subject of power, leaders' perceptions of their power, and reactions to the holding of power is given a whole chapter, as is the subject of ethics—the moral dimension of leadership. Larger organizations—bureaucracies—have impressed Dr. Gardner negatively. Several chapters describe dimensions of bureaucracies, including the insidious ways bureaucracies have of frustrating the best intentions of leaders. The need to act for the common good is ever at odds with interest groups within. In fact, Dr. Gardner goes so far as to claim that "the war of the parts against the whole is the central problem of pluralism today." This fact highlights the urgent need for "Knitting Together," as a chapter setting forth the need to develop a sense of community is titled. Building and rebuilding community is one of the highest and most essential skills a leader can possess.

Leaders are differentiated from managers in important ways. They—

- Think longer term, beyond the quarterly report.
- Relate their organization to larger realities and external conditions.

• Reach and influence constituents beyond organizational boundaries.

• Put heavy emphasis on intangibles—vision, values, motivation.

• Have the political skills to cope with the conflicting requirements of multiple constituencies.

• Think in terms of renewal, seeking revisions of structure and process.

Can leadership be taught or is it inherited? Since leadership is the product of training, teaching, coaching, and experience, of course it can be taught and developed. But there are certain inhibitors to the process:

• Creeping or gradual crises do not seem to raise up leaders dramatically as do explosive crises.

• Large organizations have a suppressive effect on the incidence of leaders in the system.

• Most leaders are trained as specialists, but to become good leaders they need generalist skills.

• The nation's education system emphasizes individual performance and skills, grossly neglecting the need for individuals to work effectively as team members.

• The rigors of public life, particularly exposure to public criticism, tend to drive capable people off.

In the last chapter, "The Release of Human Possibilities, Dr. Gardner argues that there is enormous untapped potential for performance and excellence in our nation; the task of leadership is to seek out that talent and provide an outlet for its potential to "lift and move" the nation to grand achievements. Though we are a people able to perform splendidly, we are troubled in our efforts to find a future worthy of our past. We are a people so capable of greatness, but so desperately in need of encouragement to achieve that greatness.

At first reading—I read it on a cross-country flight—one is inclined to cast *On Leadership* off as just another collection of homilies on leadership. Indeed, one could reduce the book to checklists of subject categories—some are recited above. There is a legitimate urge to observe that if a leader tried to tackle all the things Dr. Gardner sets forth as leader tasks, he simply couldn't find the time or opportunity. The checklists could have been drawn up in a few comfortable afternoons in a seminar or business conference room. The anecdotal material in which this book is so rich would have taken a longer time to collect, but the task would be manageable. The anecdotes involve important people from Jesus Christ to George Bush, and with every one of them Dr. Gardner appears to be on a first-name basis. Lots of name-dropping here, including illustrations not relevant to matters at lower levels where the real business of leadership confronts its greatest challenges.

Then I read *On Leadership* again—during another cross-country flight—but between readings I had glanced over the bookshelves which reflect the recent spate of writings about management, leadership, and related matters. At that point my perspective changed. For *On Leadership* is in truth solid gold—a perceptive accounting of how to get things done through people—which is what leadership is all about. It is a true textbook—worth carrying around in one's saddlebags. It is a most comprehensive lay-down of leadership's essential ingredients, components, challenges, requirements, pitfalls, and all-too-frequent frustrations, inhibitors, and woes. It is clearly not in the genre of most current writings on the subject. For here there is no hype, no magic formula—we are not going to swim with sharks and not be eaten, nor

stomp with elephants and not be trampled. There is no tired cliché that suggests a universal solution to leadership's complex and perplexing set of problems.

Let's face it: we live in an imperfect world, one in which there are a few real doers and a greater number of nondoers, with everyone else somewhere in the middle. The real challenge of leadership is to somehow take that large gathering in the middle and get it up toward the level of performance of the achievers at the top. That, in a very few words, is what Dr. Gardner is telling us. It's a challenge well cast and brilliantly illustrated. Read it—at least twice. Then reflect.

World War II in the Mediterranean: 1942-1945. By Carlo D'Este. Chapel Hill, N.C.: Algonquin Books, 1990. 218 pages. $22.50.
Reviewed by Martin Blumenson, author of *The Patton Papers*.

Although the scene of fierce fighting during the course of World War II, the Mediterranean region hardly determined the outcome of the struggle in Europe. The area remained subsidiary, even though it was, for quite some time, the only place where the adversaries met. An Italian lake, its environs consigned by Adolf Hitler to the appetites of Benito Mussolini's initiatives as a "parallel war," the Mediterranean was also Britain's shortest route to India, along which Gibraltar, Malta, and the Suez Canal were at risk. Eventually, the main conflict developed on the Eastern front and in northwest Europe, where the climactic actions ultimately strangled the principal enemy, Nazi Germany.

Nevertheless, much of importance took place in the Mediterranean, starting in 1940 when Italy entered metropolitan France and annexed part of the French Riviera and Savoie. Italian forces in Albania then invaded Greece, while others in Libya attacked the British in Egypt. These ventures led to disastrous defeats, and Hitler came to the rescue. He sent two highly efficient officers, Albert Kesselring with air assets, and Erwin Rommel with ground units, to help in North Africa, and their astonishing offensives almost overwhelmed the British. Meanwhile, Hitler cleared Yugoslavia and Greece, as well as Crete, thus aiding his partner and friend but, more to the point, obtaining flank protection for his onslaught against the Soviet Union.

The early period of Mediterranean operations ended late in 1942 when US troops appeared and opened a new phase of the war, and that is where Carlo D'Este begins his account. He takes the Anglo-Americans from their descent on French Northwest Africa—Operation Torch—through their successive victories in Tunisia, Sicily, and the Italian mainland. In what he calls "a general overview," he examines the strategies, leadership, and tactical performance of both sides.

His book is one of a series titled *Major Battles and Campaigns* under the general editorship of John S. D. Eisenhower, who is interested, he says, in updating the older histories. Carlo D'Este has carried out the mandate. This work, like his previous texts on Normandy and Sicily, both superb, is thoroughly researched, beautifully written, and quite sound.

An American writer, Carlo D'Este is unique in his extraordinary knowledge of the British military establishment and in his understanding of how that system worked during the war. His most valuable insights concern British operations—for example, Oliver Leese's conduct of the Eighth Army in Italy. D'Este also knows the American way, and his judgments in that context are equally astute. His criticisms of

Dwight Eisenhower and Bernard Montgomery are perhaps muted, while those of Mark Clark are probably too harsh. Exceptionally fine are his descriptions of combat on a variety of fronts.

What distinguishes the Mediterranean locality during D'Este's time frame is the rich presence of controversy. No other theater produced so much postwar argument. Decisions of dubious wisdom, deemed as such contemporaneously or afterwards—for example, why the Allies failed to hinder the Axis evacuation from Sicily—marred the campaigning on both sides. A good deal of difficulty stemmed from the strains imposed by the Italo-German and Anglo-American coalitions. Some embarrassment emerged from a few inept commanders.

A list of the critical events is long. It includes the initial Allied inability to capture Bizerte and Tunis, and the bungling at Kasserine, Sicily, Salerno, Anzio, Cassino, Rome, and other sites. These names still produce shudders. Debatable issues present a wonderful opportunity for lively discussion. Unfortunately, Carlo D'Este has sacrificed gusto for restraint, no doubt in the interest of balance, and the result is sometimes bland. Further, the book is simply too short for a proper examination of the burning questions still tormenting military historians. Yet the text is a masterful survey of happenings held together by the literary unities of time, place, and action, with the important addition of character.

Finally, there is one inexplicable omission. However the war in the Mediterranean, 1942-1945, is defined, the invasion of southern France belongs. Operation Anvil/Dragoon, mounted from Mediterranean resources, is an integral part of the Mediterranean story, from the landings east of Toulon by elements of US VI Corps on 15 August 1944 perhaps through Montelimar. Its absence is a pity.

The Suicide of an Elite: American Internationalists and Vietnam. By Patrick Lloyd Hatcher. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1990. 429 pages. $35.00. **Reviewed by Guenter Lewy**, author of *America in Vietnam.*

According to political scientist Patrick Lloyd Hatcher, the American debacle in Vietnam was the result of the mistaken policies of the "internationalists"—men such as John Foster Dulles, Richard Helms, Paul Nitze, Dean Rusk, Henry Kissinger, McGeorge Bundy, and Robert McNamara. Supported by a succession of presidents, this elite group of policymakers applied to Southeast Asia strategies which had worked well in the Soviet-American conflict: collective security agreements, limited war theory, selective political intervention, and economic development. The result, according to Hatcher, was disaster. Together, "they lost the best-managed war ever fought by a great power."

The failure of the American effort in Vietnam was the result of many cumulative mistakes by a large number of civilian and military leaders. The final humiliating defeat was probably overdetermined, that is, it had more causes than necessary to bring about the result. Small wonder, therefore, that Hatcher's indictment makes some valid points: The internationalists failed to convince our allies that Vietnam represented a global test of collective security; the coup against Ngo Dinh Diem, encouraged by us, led to fatal political instability; American military leaders were ill-prepared for the crucial role of pacification in a counter-insurgency war; the

speed with which economic and political reforms were introduced in the middle of a war contributed to social turbulence.

Other conclusions are more debatable. President Johnson, Hatcher argues, concentrated only on his own domestic political agenda, which made a winning strategy for the war impossible. The President and his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, dispossessed the military leaders of their roles as strategic planners and gave these tasks to civilian analysts. By limiting the geographic area of the American intervention and by failing to apply maximum conventional force in a short time frame, the internationalists facilitated Hanoi's victory. These charges, made many times before by military analysts of the war in particular, are argued by the author with great assurance but not always with convincing evidence. Emphasizing as he does the mistakes of the civilian policymakers, Hatcher comes close to absolving the military, both American and South Vietnamese, of their share in the debacle.

Unfortunately, this book is written in a turgid style and uses a private terminology that will put off many readers. The author divides his internationalists into Whigs and Tories, the latter being subdivided into "high" and "low" Tories. He speaks of "Niebuhrian steps" and "Lockean peasant-pupils." To say that this kind of vocabulary does not facilitate readability is to be charitable. More basically, the book suffers from a tone of intellectual arrogance. It is the work of a pundit who unabashedly engages in Monday-morning quarterbacking. This leads to absurd assertions such as that President Johnson should have known that he would lose the war in Vietnam.

There is nothing wrong in analyzing the past in order to learn from mistakes made. Yet such an analysis must always take into account the fact that statesmen and policymakers are necessarily forced to act on uncertain assumptions and limited information. In the case of Vietnam, these uncertainties included the future performance of an ally and the actions and reactions of an enemy. "History is lived forward," the English author C. V. Wedgewood has written, "but it is written in retrospect. We know the end before we consider the beginning, and we can never wholly recapture what it was like to know the beginning only." This important insight is ignored in Mr. Hatcher's book.

The Japan That Can Say "No" ["No" to ieru Nihon]. By Akio Morita and Shintaro Ishihara. Tokyo: Kobunsha, Kappa Homes Series, 1989. 160 pages. **Reviewed by Louis Allen,** Honorary Fellow at Northumbrian Universities East Asia Centre and author of *Burma: The Longest War, 1941-45.* (Editor's note: The text here reviewed, translated anonymously, is a 74-page copier-machine version of a typescript of uncertain origin.)

How does one review a 70-odd-page machine-copied manuscript, of dubious provenance, written in six parts by two people in Japanese and translated into a style that not only lacks elegance but is frequently incorrect and, here and there, plain gibberish? Well, in this particular case, with care and attention, because the text is the product of two significant minds in the political and business world of contemporary Japan.

The Japanese original of this "book" is a best-seller, having sold around 800,000 copies at last count. The case it makes has been viewed with sufficient alarm

for this sub-rosa translation to have been hurriedly produced (and it shows) and then distributed, with a wink and hushed tones, around Washington. One of the authors, with a grieved eye to vanished royalties, is reputed to have decided to sue the anonymous translators, though how he will communicate with them is another matter.

In fact, difficulties of communication have dogged Mr. Ishihara for some time. He is the political element in the text. A popular member of the Japanese Diet and winner of the largest electoral majority in Japanese history, he is a prolific novelist and a member of one of the extreme nationalist groupings of modern Japan. His part of the book reflects this group's predictable stance in the commercial skirmishes that have threatened US-Japanese relations in the last half decade.

Exasperated by US claims to an increased share in Japan's consumer markets, Ishihara is eager to establish not merely Japan's financial acumen, but also her creativity, her technological ingenuity, and the potential dependence upon her of the major military powers. Japan, he tells us, has the advanced production management that can use the fifth-generation computers which alone guarantee absolutely accurate targeting (zero error) of ICBMs. If Japanese semi-conductors are not used, such accuracy cannot be assured. If Japan sold them to the Soviet Union instead of to the United States, it would upset the world's military balance to such an extent that, according to Ishihara, the Americans would occupy Japan to prevent it happening. This proposition seems to have caused a great deal of alarm and despondency in the American press, which failed to notice that Ishihara was using conditional terms.

Ishihara is convinced that US racial prejudice lies at the heart of the hostility to Japan which surfaced a year ago during the semi-conductor debate. US politicians agreed with Ishihara that the prejudice existed, but ascribed it to memories of World War II. Instead of assuming—which would be correct—that this prejudice results from vulgar untutored reaction to physical difference, Ishihara gratuitously takes it to derive from a feeling of *cultural* superiority. Now that world power is shifting from west to east, it is in the United States' interest "to rid itself of prejudice against Asia," he advises.

Ishihara (and Morita) have an interesting concept of Japanese creativity. In portraying the effect of the Japanese-invented transistor radio on American culture, Ishihara concludes with a grossly absurd comparison: "The concept of making radio a personal appliance was nothing other than the exhibition of creativity on the order of that shown by Columbus." He seems quite incapable of distinguishing between an idea and its application, which is all the more astonishing since Morita in his part admits that transistors and semi-conductors were invented by America's Bell Laboratories. To go on, as the authors do, to claim other orders of creativity such as product planning, production, and marketing is simply an abuse of language.

America's attitude to the Japanese is one of bluster, says Ishihara, characterized by the sight of Congressmen publicly and histrionically taking sledgehammers to a piece of Toshiba electronics. This shows what a powerful card Japanese technology is, but it is wasted in the hands of Japan's politicians and diplomats. Ishihara, who claims to have introduced Premier Nakasone to President Reagan, says Nakasone never once said No to Reagan. All he got for making strategic technology available to the United States was Reagan's friendship.

One such piece of technology, very much at the forefront of the current debate, was developed by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries during Nakasone's premiership: the FSX next-generation fighter aircraft, which no existing fighter can match.

But there is a snag. The FSX needs a powerful jet engine, which Japan has not developed and would have to buy from the United States—or from France or the Soviet Union, says Ishihara, if the United States turns nasty. Under American pressure, this marvelous machine was mothballed by Nakasone, and in November 1988 a joint US-Japan plane replaced it. Ishihara thinks it preferable to scrap the whole project or go it alone, rather than yield to US pressure. Which leads to the burden of the whole book: Japan must learn to say No.

Japan does not need the so-called US nuclear umbrella, which Ishihara describes as an illusion. Japan must develop her own deterrent, adequate to inflict "unbearable damage to the aggressor from both a strategic and a tactical viewpoint." At the behest of the United States, tanks have been built to operate in Hokkaido. Ishihara prefers the verdict of the Israeli tank general who said Hokkaido needed no tanks for defense: Soviet attacks should be destroyed at sea. Japan will protect herself, and it will cost less.

But whereas Ishihara is an avowed and articulate nationalist, Morita is the very model of the international Japanese, equally at home in Washington, on Wall Street, in London, or dining with Lee Kuan Yew. What has ruffled *his* apparently imperturbable feathers? Chiefly, his case is that the United States blames Japan for American economic misfortunes, when the fault lies with the US confusion about the source of prosperity. It does not lie in the provision of services, nor in the skillful and profitable circulation of money, but in production. The US economy lacks substance because Americans have forgotten how to produce goods. There is no central government agency—no Department of Industry—responsible for industrial policy. Afraid of losing votes, US politicians will not implement unpopular tax policies. This is not merely an internal problem, since sizable European and Japanese assets are in US dollars. The ripple effects of Wall Street's Black Monday were stopped by Japan's Ministry of Finance, which persuaded Japanese institutional investors to support prices. Since Japan has shown she has such financial clout, and since at least 37 US states have offices in Tokyo lobbying for investment, how is it that US politicians can indulge in the sport of Japan-bashing? Japan-bashing has become popular not because Americans dislike Japanese products—they like them—but because there is an American mass reaction against foreign intervention in American society.

Morita acknowledges that the behavior of Japanese business communities abroad may encourage this. They fail to conform to local usages, for example, by neglecting to join in such communal activities as Parent-Teacher Associations. Japanese in the United States play golf on Sundays when their neighbors are at church. They don't participate in charitable community services or fund-raising activities. This is all the more important in the rural areas where Japanese firms obtain space to set up their new factories. They will be disliked simply for being Japanese in such areas if they do not contribute to the local life.

It will be evident that Morita, here, is making a case totally different from Ishihara's. Japan must invest in the areas in which she sells goods. Only by bringing manufacturing and sales to the United States will the trade imbalance be rectified. Though he accepts Ishihara's contention that racism lies at the root of the problem, if racial problems persist *after* the Japanese take the ameliorative steps described above, then responsibility can be fixed firmly on American shoulders. At the moment, Morita seems to acknowledge that Japanese behavior abroad is partly to blame.

The Japanese, according to Morita, compel no one to buy their products. There are few things in the United States the Japanese want to buy, but many things in Japan Americans want to buy. Preference is the key. This, of course, puts the ball firmly in the US court. Or does it? On the issue of rice, for instance, still fundamental to the Japanese diet, can the Japanese freely express a preference for US rice, which might cost them one-fifth of what their own local rice costs? Or are they prevented from buying it freely in the shops because of a government commitment to bolstering the Japanese agricultural community? The same question could be asked of oranges and numerous other US products.

Morita then passes on to other observations about Japan's role in the world. Of 18 countries who provide foreign aid, Japan is 15th in terms of aid proportional to GNP. In terms of aid for which there is no remuneration, she is bottom of the class, 18th of 18. He concludes that Japan fails to return sufficient of the benefits it reaps from the world back to world society.

Let us understand Morita as honestly Janus-faced. He tells the United States there must be a time when Japan refuses to accept moral responsibility for the US imbalance of payments. And he tells the Japanese that their participation in other societies, whether on a local or a worldwide level, is inadequate.

He has, too, some interesting lessons for US industry. In its single-minded pursuit of maximum profit, it never hesitates to lay off workers when market conditions deteriorate. The loyalty a Japanese firm commands is not available to a similar US company, because all the US firm offers in return for labor is a wage (hence the confrontational attitude of labor unions). The gap between rich and poor in the United States is enormous, and the visible poverty affects minority groups. Company executives are concerned with short-term results and quick profits. The long-term planning which has assured Japan's economic success is simply alien to them. For instance, US semi-conductor companies moved plants to other countries when production costs at home were high. The result has been to deprive the United States of capacity to produce anything other than 256-bit chips. So the companies then buy back their semi-conductors from Japan and complain about Japan's trade surplus.

On the company level, Morita gives credit to General MacArthur (usually a bugbear for revisionist Japanese historians) for creating the conditions under which Japanese companies now operate a lifetime hire system. Americans do not understand how Japanese companies can make profits when they cannot reduce their work force at will. The Japanese company, says Morita, benefits in the end from being "a community bound together by a common destiny."

Morita insists that saying No does not make for disagreement, but fresh collaboration. Japanese in normal everyday life find it difficult to say No anyway, and from a junior to a senior its use can seem like insubordination. In contrast, an American, to repair a misunderstanding, will directly approach his boss and a verbal explanation will result. Japanese prefer non-verbal communication, and simply hope that in time their attitudes will be conveyed. Since this won't happen on the international stage, Japanese must learn the art of verbal refusal. The need to say No is an indication of friction, but friction itself indicates closeness. We all live in "inescapable independence."

Both Morita and Ishihara have since amplified their arguments. Morita quite correctly states that *A Japan That Can Say "No"* is as critical of Japan as it is of the

United States and that his criticisms of US business, blinkered by focusing on short-term gains, is echoed by Senator Lloyd Bentsen and the director of the Office of Management of the Budget, Richard Darman. But he insists that now-oriented US consumers place spending before saving, unlike the Japanese. He quotes *Business Week's* opinion poll (7 August 1989) in which—almost a mirror image of Ishihara—a majority of US citizens now believe the economic threat from Japan to be greater than the military threat from the Soviet Union. The United States is *still* insisting that Japan solve the trade imbalance problem by modifying her economic structure, which is held to impede imports of foreign goods. He then repeats his assertion that the United States imports not merely consumer goods from Japan but capital goods, which increases US dependence on Japan. In the five years between 1983 and 1988, US imports of electronic appliances from Japan dropped by 53 percent. At the same time there was a steady increase in imports of capital goods by US manufacturers: semiconductors and computer-related equipment. Non-electronic machine imports in this period rose by 82 percent and computers by 83 percent. Even vital aviation control equipment such as accelerator sensors is being imported from Japan. Japan guarantees quality and secure supply in these fields, so naturally the overall volume of imports from Japan does not decline. He repeats: if the US manufacturers want to correct the trade imbalance, they must cut down on purchases from Japan and make what they need themselves. More surprisingly, he asserts that balance in merchandise trade should not be the sole indicator. If services and capital transactions are included, then Japan has a net deficit in relation to the US.

In a visit to Washington earlier this year, Ishihara refused to recant what Representative Sander Levin, who had a long lunch with him, described as his erroneous view that white Americans' racial bigotry was the basic cause of friction. US critics termed Ishihara "arrogant and ignorant." But there can be little doubt that many Japanese—whatever they may think about his "hypothetical" case of Japan selling computer chips to the Soviet Union—share his views that in the very deepest layer of this bilateral friction lurks the psychological factor of prejudice.

Three results of all this can be foreseen. First, militant technological-economic nationalism will build up in the United States while at the same time the mainstream US defense establishment remains keen to profit from access to superior Japanese technology. The second is that the United States might take a leaf from Morita's ideas and reshape the Commerce Department by creating a Department of Industry and Technology to promote strategic civilian industries. The third reaches beyond the US-Japan debate as outlined by Morita and Ishihara, and is nourished by the far less rhetorical and more professional distancing from US interests proposed by Motofumi Asai, the Japanese diplomat who retired from the Foreign Ministry and now holds a chair of international relations at Tokyo University. Asai believes the US-Japanese security treaty is now, quite simply, pointless. Rather than continuing its policy of economic, military, and political amalgamation with the West, Japan will increasingly be drawn to a rapprochement with and orientation toward her Asian neighbors.

Of course, Asai does not represent the orthodoxy of the Foreign Ministry or the business world of Japan at this time. Far from it. He is a maverick who has resigned. But his diplomatic expertise ensures him an audience, and should indicate to readers of the Morita-Ishihara book that the commercial issues between the United

States and Japan, though looming large in American minds, are by no means the only problems that occupy the Japanese.

Off the Press . . .

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From the Archives

From Whence the Holocaust?

Though the impulse for man's inhumanity to man has been an object of mystery to philosophers of all ages, the search for the wellsprings of the Jewish Holocaust in Nazi Germany has been a particularly pressing—and poignant—mandate for post-World War II moderns. It is easy and tempting to lay the Holocaust solely at the feet of a deranged Adolph Hitler, but the fact remains that ordinary folk were enlisted to do the unspeakable dirty work. How was that psychologically possible? Interviews with commandants of extermination camps point to a bizarre trick of the mind, whereby they came to perceive the inmates as something other than humans. Tom Segev reports as follows:

> Gitta Sereny, a British writer and historian, spoke of this with Franz Stangl, once the commandant of the Treblinka extermination camp. She interviewed him in 1971 in the Düsseldorf Prison. "Could you not have changed that? In your position, could you not have stopped the nakedness, the whips, the horror of the cattle pens?" she asked.
>
> Stangl: No, no no. This was the system. . . . When I was on a trip once, years later in Brazil, my train stopped next to a slaughterhouse. The cattle in the pens, hearing the noise of the train, trotted up to the fence and stared at the train. They were very close to my window, one crowding the other, looking at me through that fence. I thought then, "Look at this; this reminds me of Poland; that's just how the people looked, trustingly, just before they went in the tins—"
>
> Sereny: You said "tins." What do you mean?
>
> Stangl:—I couldn't eat tinned meat after that. Those big eyes—which looked at me—not knowing that in no time at all they'd all be dead.
>
> Sereny: So you didn't feel they were human beings?
>
> Stangl: Cargo. They were cargo.
>
> Sereny: When do you think you began to think of them as cargo? The way you spoke earlier, of the day when you first came to Treblinka, the horror you felt seeing the dead bodies everywhere—they weren't "cargo" to you then, were they?
>
> Stangl: I think it started the day I first saw the *Totenlager* in Treblinka. I remember [SS officer Christian] Wirth standing there, next to the pits full of blue-black corpses. It had nothing to do with humanity—it couldn't have; it was a mass—a mass of rotting flesh. Wirth said, "What shall we do with this garbage?" I think unconsciously that started me thinking of them as cargo.
>
> Sereny: There were so many children, did they ever make you think of your children, of how you would feel in the position of those parents?
>
> Stangl: No. I can't say I ever thought that way. You see, I rarely saw them as individuals. It was always a huge mass. I sometimes stood on the wall and saw them in the tube. But—how can I explain it—they were naked, packed together, running, being driven with whips like. . . .

Source: Tom Segev, *Soldiers of Evil: The Commandants of the Nazi Concentration Camps*, trans. Haim Watzman (New York: McGraw Hill, 1987), pp. 201-02.