

DTIC FILE COPY

2

AD-A229 716



DTIC
ELECTE
DEC 14 1990
S D^{CS} D

CLIC PAPERS

THE UNITED STATES
AND THE POLITICS OF CONFLICT
IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for public release
Distribution Unlimited

Army - Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict

Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

90 12 12 0411

THE UNITED STATES
AND THE POLITICS OF CONFLICT IN THE
DEVELOPING WORLD

by

Todd R. Greentree, Department of State

Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia 23665-5556

August 1990

DISCLAIMER

This paper represents the views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, the Department of the Army, or the Department of the Air Force. The paper has been cleared for public release by security and policy review authorities.


THE ARMY-AIR FORCE CENTER FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

The mission of the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (A-AF CLIC) is to improve the Army and Air Force posture for engaging in low intensity conflict (LIC), elevate awareness throughout the Army and Air Force of the role of the military instrument of national power in low intensity conflict, including the capabilities needed to realize that role, and provide an infrastructure for eventual transition to a joint and, perhaps, interagency activity.

CLIC PAPERS

CLIC PAPERS are informal, occasional publications sponsored by the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict. They are dedicated to the advancement of the art and science of the application of the military instrument of national power in the low intensity conflict environment. All military members and civilian Defense Department employees are invited to contribute original, unclassified manuscripts for publication as CLIC PAPERS. Topics can include any aspect of military involvement in low intensity conflict to include history, doctrine, strategy, or operations. Papers should be as brief and concise as possible. Interested authors should submit double-spaced typed manuscripts along with a brief, one-page abstract to the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, Langley AFB, VA 23665-5556.

Statement "A" per telecon LTC Wayne Kirk-
bridge. Army-Air Force Center for Low
Intensity Conflict/A-AF-CLIC. Langley
AFB, VA 23665.
VHG 12/14/90



Accession For	
NTIS CRA&I	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution /	
Availability Codes	
Dit	Avail and/or Special
A-1	1

PREVIOUS CLIC PAPERS

Previous CLIC PAPERS are available in most major military libraries. Copies can be obtained from the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), Defense Logistics Agency, Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA 22304-6145, telephone (202) 274-6434, or Defense Switched Network (DSN) 284-6434, or through your local DTIC account representative. Copies can also be obtained from the Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE), US Army Logistics Management College, Ft Lee, VA 23803-6043, telephone (804) 734-4255, or DSN 687-4255. These papers together with their DTIC and DLSIE reference numbers are listed below.

<u>DTIC AD#</u>	<u>DLSIE LD#</u>	<u>SHORT TITLE</u>
A185 972	073892A	Operational Considerations in LIC
A185 973	073893A	Logistical Considerations in LIC
A185 974	073894A	Security Assistance and LIC: A Challenge to Excellence
A185 975	073896A	The Role of Reserve Forces in LIC
A185 976	073895A	Compilation of LIC References and Bibliography, Vol I
A185 977	073897A	Army Medical Department Roles and Functions in LIC
A185 978	073899A	Operational Art in LIC
A186 280	073898A	LIC Imperatives for Success
A193 702	077085A	Logistic Support for LIC An Air Force Perspective
A193 703		Framework for Competitive Strategies Development in LIC
A193 704	077084A	US Armed Forces Public Affairs Roles in LIC
A193 705	077086A	LIC Education and Training Within the DOD
A193 706		Planning for Combat Employment of Air Power in PCOs
A198 670		Modern Terrorism: Potential for Increased Lethality
A198 668		Aid to Democratic States Facing Revolutionary Warfare
A198 669		Technology Guidelines and Military Applications in LIC
A199 026		Introduction to Understanding Latin Americans
A203 707		The Literature of Low-Intensity Conflict
A205 084		Compilation of LIC References and Bibliography, Vol II
A205 085		US Military Civic Actions in Honduras, 1982-1985
A205 086		Psychological Strategies in LIC
A207 890		Arms Transfers and the Third World
A208 614		LIC Policy and Strategy Statements
A209 046		LIC Overview, Definitions, and Policy Concerns
A209 047		Peacekeeping Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
A209 048		Security Assistance Example, African Coastal Security
A209 049		A Theater Approach to Low Intensity Conflict
A209 050		Reserve Component Support to LIC Strategy
A209 072		Liberation Theology, Two Views
		Key LIC Speeches, 1984-1989
		Counterinsurgency in the Philippines: Problems and Prospects
		The Role of Military Working Dogs in LIC

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PRINCIPAL POLICY CONCLUSIONS	5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	6
I. INTRODUCTION	9
• <i>The Significance of Conflict in the Third World</i>	
• <i>Study Objectives and Scope</i>	
II. LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT: CLARIFYING DEFINITIONS	11
• <i>What's Wrong with LIC?</i>	
• <i>LIC and U.S. Policy Problems</i>	
III. THE POLITICS OF INTERNAL CONFLICT IN THE THIRD WORLD	15
• <i>The Third World as a Useful Category</i>	
• <i>Internal and External Dimensions</i>	
• <i>Political-Military Features</i>	
• <i>Strategies of Conflict</i>	
IV. INTERNAL WAR, LIMITED WAR, AND TOTAL WAR	21
• <i>The Asymmetries of Power and Perspective</i>	
• <i>Limits of Policy and Capability</i>	
V. THE U.S. AND INTERNAL CONFLICT: THE MISSION	24
• <i>History and the Mission</i>	
• <i>Containment and the Mission</i>	
• <i>The Mission and Lessons Learned (?)</i>	

VI. LIMITS TO REFORM: THE ENEMY WITHIN	27
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>The Democratic Contradiction</i> • <i>The Counterinsurgency Contradiction</i> • <i>The Insurgency Contradiction</i> 	
VII. GENERAL ELEMENTS OF POLICY AND STRATEGY FOR U.S. ENGAGEMENT IN THIRD WORLD CONFLICT	32
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Criteria to Follow the Demise of Containment</i> • <i>Military Action and the Brushfire Corollary</i> • <i>Some Guidelines</i> • <i>Selective Engagement</i> 	
VIII. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS	36
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>U.S. Government Limits</i> • <i>The Inadequacy of Coordination</i> • <i>Interagency Coordination: A Distant Ideal</i> • <i>Interagency Coordinating Mechanisms</i> • <i>The Policy Management Support Team</i> • <i>Training</i> 	
IX. APPLICATIONS: THE POSSIBILITIES OF REFORM	42
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>U.S. Assistance Reform</i> • <i>Civil-Military Action</i> • <i>Support for Democracy</i> 	
NOTES	45

PRINCIPAL POLICY CONCLUSIONS

- Low Intensity Conflict is useful as a concept of U.S. military doctrine and force structure, but does not provide a basis for policy.
- No unifying principle replaces the diminishing importance global containment as a justification for U.S. involvement in Third World conflicts. Rather a policy of "selective engagement" requires clear definition of specific interests and objectives, along with the exercise of extreme discretion in protracted conflicts.
- A "brushfire corollary" paradoxically constricts the U.S. from achieving global "mission" objectives of promoting democratic development and preventing conflict. Decisive U.S. will and resources tend to be applied in geopolitically peripheral areas only when crisis has erupted and underlying problems have become most difficult to address. Third World conflict situations contain serious ambiguities and contradictions which limit the ability of the U.S. to apply reform-oriented policies. U.S. domestic politics tends to skew U.S. responses to conflicts in ways that are not always relevant to the situation on the ground.
- The principal obstacle to effective U.S. action in Third World conflict is not lack of resources, but inadequate coordination between executive agencies. A priority objective should be the creation of a small inter-agency coordinating body and development of a cadre of civilian and military officials from the core foreign affairs agencies specifically to deal with U.S. involvement in Third World conflict. Refinement of existing agency roles rather than creation of a new bureaucracy is also required.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

It appears evident that violent internal conflict which exists in one out of three countries in the Third World today will continue at least at its present level. It is equally certain that geopolitical circumstances will continue to compel external powers, including the United States, to engage directly and indirectly in these struggles, even though the declining security dimension of East-West competition removes global containment as the central justification for U.S. involvement.

The term Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) has recently come into use to define military action at the low end of the violence scale--insurgency and counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, peacetime contingency operations, and peacekeeping. Although valuable as a conceptual basis for U.S. military doctrine and force structure that corresponds to the nature of Third World conflict, LIC can not substitute for the broader range of diplomatic, political, economic, informational, cultural, and regional considerations of a comprehensive policy.

Third World conflicts generally emerge from deep social, economic, and political antagonisms, and reflect an ambiguous mix of internal and external factors. More than combat between military forces, these conflicts hinge on political factors, with the functioning and legitimacy of a government a primary issue of struggle. Violence can be intimate and protracted, with the rules of conventional warfare inverted. General political and military strategies of internal warfare are well established, with insurgents on the strategic offensive and governments on the defensive.

From a modern military perspective, most of these Third World conflicts are "inferior copies of the real thing," but they often present daunting political and military problems for the external powers that get involved in them. An important aspect of this problem is the asymmetry of power and perspective which lead external participants to fail to distinguish between their own limited warfare objectives and the total objectives of the internal participants. Although significant limits restrain the scale of Third World conflict, for external powers these are limits of policy to avoid escalation, whereas for the internal participants these are limits of capability not of will.

The U.S. record of involvement in small wars is controversial and results are mixed. Success is more likely in limited contingencies than in larger, more protracted conflicts. Common elements of U.S. involvement are limited mobilization and escalation, national security objectives defined in terms of excluding foreign powers from local situations, and goals defined in terms of a "mission" with the U.S. as nation builder, policeman, and democratic reformer. The present LIC phase has two principal antecedents, the global containment counterinsurgency doctrine which President John F. Kennedy formalized, and a prohibition against committing U.S. combat troops directly to Third World conflicts as a result of the Vietnam War.

The U.S. tends to confuse geopolitical and internal objectives when it becomes involved in Third World conflicts, and runs afoul of the contradictions between what is considered "right" and what is considered "effective." These problems are most evident in the tension between reform and repression in U.S. counterinsurgency efforts. In such situations, Third World government tendencies to favor repression and resist reform can make it an "enemy within," imposing critical limits to U.S. effectiveness.

The delinking of peripheral conflicts in the Third World from geostrategic competition lessens but does not eliminate the rationale for U.S. involvement. This transformation requires a reassessment of U.S. policy and strategy. Many of the conflicts the U.S. is now involved in, for example, in El Salvador, Afghanistan, and Angola, can be considered residual. However, the U.S. must be prepared for crises in areas of strategic significance such as Mexico, or from new threats evolving out of population growth and resource depletion in the Third World.

A central problem for the U.S. Government derives from the paradox of the "brushfire corollary," whereby significant U.S. resources and attention can be justified for areas of normally peripheral interest only when a situation of crisis has erupted and its contradictions make resolution the most difficult.

The central recommendation of this study is for a policy of "selective engagement." Selective engagement recognizes that no single unifying principle replaces global containment as a rationale for U.S. involvement in Third World conflict, that these conflicts present multiple ambiguities and contradictions, and that there are generally significant limits to U.S. involvement. It also recognizes the need for rapid action in short-term contingencies where objectives are clearly and specifically defined, while extreme discretion is required for involvement in more protracted conflicts.

The policy problems of U.S. involvement in Low Intensity Conflicts have correspondingly complex operational requirements. There is widespread agreement that inadequate interagency coordination leads to a lack of command and unity of effort.

The creation of a new bureaucratic structure to deal with LIC would be intrusive and almost certainly impractical. Instead, formation of a small interagency coordinating mechanism that would serve as an operational link, a troubleshooter, and a source of expertise might help resolve this inadequacy. One alternative would be a Policy Management Support Team made up of a permanent interagency core staff and configured for specific conflict situations, that would serve as a link between interagency coordinating committees in Washington, country teams in overseas missions, and the regional CINC's.

Additionally, the formation of a cadre of civilian and military officers that would be accustomed to working in an interagency environment and would specialize in Third World conflict situations might also improve government performance.

Increased support for democracy and civil-military action are examples of potential cost-effective applications of selective engagement strategy that are consistent with the U.S. national ethic. Designed, implemented, and coordinated to avoid the contradictions and limits to reform, civil military action and support for democracy can contribute to long-term Third World nation-building in peacetime situations, while creating experience and precedent for conflict applications.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Significance of Conflict in the Third World

Violent conflict exists in at least one out of three countries in the developing world today. In Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa these conflicts range from smoldering internal dissent to raging regional warfare. As diverse in form and location as they are, most of these conflicts are internal struggles of peoples and systems rather than external clashes of armies and nations. They generally manifest deep social, political, and economic divisions and inequities that have little possibility of quick or exclusively military resolution.

Taken individually, these Third World conflicts may have limited geopolitical importance. Many of them evolve from civil unrest rather than warfare, and by the standards of modern military technology and organization, as wars they tend to be rather low grade. But for the protagonists these are total and brutal struggles for survival. These individually small conflicts become cumulatively monumental when measured in millions of lives lost and billions of dollars in damage during the decades since World War II, and even more so when measured by social and economic development foregone to war and instability.

Without a countervailing trend to point to, it appears evident that internal conflict in the Third World will continue at least at its present level. Further, it is altogether possible that such conflict will expand in coming decades with population growth and environmental degradation adding new pressures to weak economies and unstable political systems. It is equally certain that geopolitical circumstances will continue to compel regional and world powers, including the United States, to engage directly and indirectly in these struggles.

United States engagement in small wars has a long and controversial history. At present, with the historical transformations underway in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union causing the security dimension of East-West competition to fade, global containment of communist expansion has become a largely residual justification for U.S. involvement in Third World conflicts.

With the end of the Cold War signifying a fundamental geopolitical change, where, how, and why the U.S. should become engaged in these conflicts is the central subject of this paper.

Study Objectives and Scope

This study has two basic objectives: The first is to outline some of the general political and political-military dimensions of conflict in the Third World. The second is to offer a general conceptual basis for United States policy, strategy, and organization when it engages in these conflicts. Such a broad arc of observation precludes full analysis of specific and unique situations. As a result, comments on specific conflicts and policies are offered as illustrations, not as fully developed critiques. Similarly, important issues such as development economics and Soviet or other external country policies are included as secondary topics.

Also excluded from consideration are the forms of modern armed conflict: high technology warfare, strategic nuclear war, and sustained conventional warfare between regular armed forces of two or more states. On the other hand, because these wars tend to involve multiple forms in complex ways, certain Third World conflicts involving conventional forces are relevant when internal conflict is a significant component.

This paper begins with a consideration of the nature of conflict in the Third World, including a critique in Section II of Low Intensity Conflict as a basis for U.S. policy. Following an analysis of common features in Third World conflict in Section III, Section IV links theories of total war, limited war, and internal war as a general conceptual basis for defining U.S. interests and actions. U.S. policy and strategy in Third World conflicts are taken up in Sections V through VII. To conclude the study, Sections VIII and IX offer operational and organizational recommendations based on the preceding analysis.

II. LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT: CLARIFYING DEFINITIONS

What's Wrong with LIC?

The term Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) has recently come into use within the U.S. Government to describe protracted conflict in the Third World and other forms of military action at the low end of the violence scale. Unfortunately, along with its constructive aspects, the concept of LIC and its formidably obtuse definition encompass some difficult ambiguities which constrain application and understanding.

LIC has primary value as a military definition. Its formalization removes some of the stigma that unconventional warfare and U.S. involvement in Third World conflict have traditionally carried within the U.S. military. As a concept, Low Intensity Conflict establishes for the first time the basis for a doctrine and force structure within the U.S. military that corresponds to the nature of these conflicts.

NSD 277, which establishes general LIC policy, defines Low Intensity Conflict as:

...Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups at a level below conventional war and above routine, peaceful competition among states. It involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low Intensity Conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications. 1

Four types of not necessarily related military activities are specifically included under the LIC designation: insurgency and counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, peacetime contingency operations, and Peacekeeping. The key reference in the definition is to localized, protracted conflicts between states or groups in the Third World, which have geopolitical security implications. This emphasis is critical for distinguishing the international dimensions of internal conflicts.

At the heart of conflict in the Third World are the internal struggles for political convention and power over individual states. At their most intense these conflicts take the form of guerrilla warfare by insurgents attempting to seize power and counterinsurgency by those in government attempting to defend it. Although geopolitical and regional conflict between states may be crucial dimensions of these wars, their most distinguishing feature derives from Clausewitz's dictum that "war is a continuation of politics by other means". In these internal wars the separation of political and military action and issues customary in conventional war is fundamentally modified. 2

Other forms of conflict which occur at the low end of the violence spectrum have specific operational implications, but are less directly struggles for internal political power. These include, for example, terrorism and counterterrorism, narcotics trafficking and counternarcotics operations. Most of the policy, doctrinal, and operational issues encountered in these forms of conflict are also found in insurgency and counterinsurgency.

U.S. Low Intensity Conflict military doctrine de-emphasizes traditional reliance on large forces heavily armed with high technology, high firepower weapons intent on achieving total control through violent combat. Instead, LIC doctrine emphasizes decentralized, light forces prepared to apply a flexible variety of means that will influence the outcome of a given situation in coordination with other "instruments of national power". LIC is distinct from Special Operations which are generally unconventional military activities that may be conducted in a low intensity or any other type of conflict environment. The basic principles of LIC military doctrine emphasize: indirect military assistance with direct involvement of U.S. combat troops only in exceptional circumstances, discriminate use of force, adaptability and perseverance, recognition of the "primacy of politics" with emphasis on "legitimacy", and unity of effort within the U.S. Government.

LIC and U.S. Policy

As noted above, however, Low Intensity Conflict as a military concept contains several ambiguities and limitations:

First, as a concept derived from in the spectrum or continuum of war, Low Intensity Conflict may give the impression that these are low priority conflicts on the periphery of U.S. interests, implying that they do not merit significant resources or attention. While this is true in the absolute context of U.S. interests, capabilities, and perception of threat, this conclusion does not hold for the cumulative threats of multiple conflicts, for the intensity of the threat to those directly involved in them, nor for the political implications of U.S. engagement.

Second, the military definition of LIC is intended as a partial rather than comprehensive definition, limited to the application of the military instrument of power to conflicts with very high political content. Thus the definition of LIC, while it may be adequate and useful from a military point of view, is not able nor intended to encompass the major ambiguities and complexities of such situations as a whole.

In this sense, the definition of LIC as it stands contributes to but cannot substitute for the much broader range of issues and objectives — diplomatic, political, economic, informational, regional, cultural — which are essential to government wide policy-making, and which could be incorporated into a single definition only with severely distorting constraints.

A third set of problems derives from the policy implications of U.S. engagement in Third World conflicts. For example, of the 15-plus major insurgencies underway world wide at the present time, the United States has determined that national security interests warrant significant involvement with counterinsurgent efforts by the governments of El Salvador and the Philippines, and with support for insurgents in Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Nicaragua. In each of these situations, difficulties have arisen at at least one of three levels of policy-making: 1) in the definition of national security in terms of global security interests, 2) in translating that definition of interests into a strategy for using limited means to support limited ends in areas of nominally secondary interests, and 3) in devising effective applications of the diplomatic, political, economic, military, and informational instruments of policy. 3

Defining national security interests in Low Intensity Conflicts is a general problem. In a 1986 conference held at the National Defense University, then-Secretary of State George Shultz called conflicts in the Third World "ambiguous wars...that have exposed a chink in our armor."⁴ From a military perspective, it is clear that no single conflict in the Third World poses an explicit threat to U.S. national security. It also is generally assumed that the U.S. has a limited call to action in cases such as terrorist threats to citizens, but taking direct action may encounter serious constraints.

The rationale for U.S. involvement in the more protracted and political forms of LIC is more complex. Added to the direct protection of U.S. security interests overseas, is the belief that because U.S. defense policy based on deterrence and collective security has successfully prevented direct geopolitical confrontation, this confrontation is realized by proxy at a lower level in the Third World. In this sense, it is almost always the external rather than internal dimensions of a conflict that justify U.S. involvement. As a result, U.S. attention to specific conflicts tends to shift according to geopolitical determinants, and is unlikely to focus on a particular conflict until it has emerged in crisis.

The predominance of external factors in determining U.S. interests is not necessarily misplaced, but it does lead to a set of fundamental problems in dealing with the internal aspects of Low Intensity Conflicts. Although there is a tremendous asymmetry of power between the United States and the Third World nations, the internal problems which give rise to the multiple conflicts in the Third World are usually deep and long-term. Even where directly applied, U.S. power can only provide a partial solution to these problems.

Just as the internal and external ambiguities of LIC, make the application of U.S. power difficult, other constraints to action flow from the U.S. role in the world and the nature of the democratic political system. The U.S. role as a leader in the international community requires it to attend to views of other nations, and to maintain relative concordance with allies and the principles of international law. The

U.S. political system tends to restrict independent executive action via constitutional, Congressional, media, and public constraints. The particular applications of these constraints are expressed as unwillingness to support use of U.S. combat forces for anything other than short interventions as a result of the Vietnam war, limits on economic and military aid to the Third World, and the need to justify involvement in terms of a national ethic of support for human rights and democracy. 5

III. THE POLITICS OF INTERNAL CONFLICT IN THE THIRD WORLD

The Third World as a Useful Category

The list of Low Intensity Conflicts in the Third World is long. Depending on which countries are included and how the conflicts are classified, at least 25 of these are conflicts with military aspects. Some are obscure, such as the native insurgency on the island of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea. Others are well known, such as the protracted struggle between the Soviet backed Government of Afghanistan and the U.S. backed Mujaheddin. But where the military aspects of internal warfare that tend to draw the greatest attention and to provoke the most immediate sense of crisis, it is the political situation in combination with the military on which such events turn.

First, another definitional problem requires outlining. As with Low Intensity Conflict, the Third World as a term can obscure as much as it illuminates. It is especially unsuitable as a geographical and political reference, including an enormous range of regional and country-specific political, economic, physical, and cultural characteristics.

The Third World does retain validity, however, in its original sense as defined by the founding nations of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to distinguish themselves geopolitically from the Western Alliance and the Eastern Bloc. The "Third World" thus takes on meaning as a relative term in reference to the "world metropolitan powers." Likewise, the term "developing world" establishes economic relativity, allowing for the dynamic of "joining" implied in the term "newly industrialized country or NIC", but it also implies a dynamic of progress which is not necessarily accurate, especially for nations embedded in conflict.

Most nations of the Third World have peripheral roles in the global balance of power, although they may occupy strategic geographical locations, possess significant resources, or be themselves important regional powers. Both internal and external disparity and dependence are other distinguishing features of the Third World. For example, Brazil and Saudi Arabia have some of the common measures of advanced development, such as technological capacity and infrastructure, yet at the same time they sustain major socio-economic and political disparities and they remain highly dependent on links to the industrialized world for their advancement. Such considerations become important in trying to distinguish the particular conditions and dynamics of conflict in the Third World.

Internal and External Dimensions

Defense theorist Robert Osgood defined the the most fundamental distinction in war as that between internal and external conflict, or between revolutionary war and inter-state war. 6

Because Third-World conflicts generally contain an ambiguous mix of internal and external dimensions, they resist clear cut scale or definitional categories. The geopolitical locations and alignments of antagonists and the resulting availability of external economic and military resources from external actors can have a critical influence on instigating, prolonging, or resolving the internal situation. However, the strategies of participants and the course of a conflict will derive primarily from internal factors. Internal factors include: geographical conditions such as population distribution, terrain, and climate; political conditions such as regime type, stability, and legitimacy; economic conditions such as resources, infrastructure, and productive base; and socio-cultural conditions such as ethnic relations, class structure, and religion..

Conflict in the Third World has its own scale of violence, ranging from street demonstrations to civil war. But whether they consist of racially based civil strife, terrorism, religious fanaticism, or guerrilla war, internal conflicts tend to share certain basic elements. They are almost always based on deep social, economic, and political antagonisms, and as such their ultimate outcomes hinge on political objectives. This holds true whether the antagonists are fanatic terrorists, greedy drug dealers, marxist-leninist revolutionaries, reactionary oligarchs, or democratic governments. Whether the objective is running an interference free criminal empire or seizing power through a coup, insurrection, or protracted warfare, the the functioning and legitimacy of the government, rather than the defeat of military forces is of overriding importance.

Political-Military Factors of Third World Conflict

In the same sense that political objectives predominate over military objectives in most Third World conflicts, the operational conditions and strategies of what Eliot Cohen calls "distant battles" also have important political-military features in common. 7

These conflicts tend to become intimate and protracted. Participants have generally lived among one another with antagonisms lasting for decades and generations. When relatively small forces are pitted against one another violence can become personalized and locked in a cycle of revenge and escalation. In this type of situation, military stalemate is likely, negotiated resolution can appear impossible, and outcomes that reduce violence are often politically inconclusive.

Military action tends to invert the rules of conventional combat. For example, there is usually no massing of forces for decisive battle, static defense has little advantage, civil and military populations are not separate. These wars may be fought in crowded Third World cities, but are more likely to take place in underpopulated expanses of difficult terrain and climate — mountains, deserts, jungles. With infrastructure and development generally limited, logistical problems hamper conventional military operations. Control of territory by armed action may be more significant politically than militarily, by, for example, demonstrating the ability or inability of a government to exercise authority and maintain security.

Military offensives rarely strike a decisive blow. They are usually of limited duration and thrust due to lack of resources and logistical capability. Operating in secret with marginal resources, guerrillas or terrorists raid and withdraw after their political point is made or economic or military damage is done. Government forces tend to rely primarily on a combination of police action and preponderance of force and secondarily on surprise and small unit action. Sporadic offensives usually yield insignificant results for the resources expended, and for the most part they remain on the defensive. As a result, strategies of exhaustion or marginal attrition imposed by default tend to characterize internal wars.

One of the major features that separates this type of conflict from modern conflict is that it is primarily ground warfare employing light infantry weapons. The basic set of low tech, widely available weapons — machine guns, artillery, and mines — remain the most widely employed. Aircraft, helicopters, and boats may play important logistical, mobility, interdiction, and ground support roles, but control of seas and navies, strategic bombing, and tactical air dominance have little relevance for internal conflict. Likewise, there is little role for mechanized forces. Other factors

which limit the roles of sea and air power are high cost and technological sophistication, difficulty of combined operations, potential for regional spillover, and absence of strategic objectives requiring the concentration of heavy forces.

The application of technology to Low Intensity Conflict offers advantages and disadvantages. For example, potent and hard to detect plastic explosives enhance the lethality and efficacy of terrorists. Insurgent forces can obtain superior command and control through the use of sophisticated hand held communications equipment and can offset government air superiority with shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles. For government forces, communications and intelligence technology, force multipliers, especially airlift, can suppress fire, limit civilian casualties and provide an effective edge. On the other hand, the evolution of open markets for relatively sophisticated arms has put much greater military capability into the hands of a greater number of government and non-government forces in the Third World. As small armies and insurgents achieve higher firepower, casualties and collateral damage will inevitably increase.

Strategies of Conflict

In virtually all internal wars, insurgent forces are on the strategic offense and government forces on the defense in both military and political realms. Each has its own advantages and weaknesses.

Nicaragua is a classic case. The Sandinistas used guerrilla warfare and infiltration of the political opposition to instigate a popular insurrection which successfully overthrew the authoritarian Somoza dictatorship in 1978. Immediately upon taking power, the Sandinista government adopted the same mechanisms of an authoritarian state, relying on a large police apparatus, army, and political support organizations. Internationally, Cuba and the United States switched roles as principal insurgent and counterinsurgent patrons.

The general strategies of insurgency and counterinsurgency are fairly well established, even accounting for differences between subtypes of revolutionary warfare such as protracted rural based insurgency vs. urban insurrection. The major insurgent advantage comes from its ability to attack on broad fronts with surprise forcing the government to react. Political subversion, sabotage, strikes, terrorism, and guerrilla warfare can be used to attack political, economic, and military targets. The government's principal advantage is that it is in power and must be dislodged. But the need to protect multiple targets—cities, economic infrastructure—makes its defensive posture inherently difficult. This is all the more true when, as is generally the case, an insurgency feeds on already severe socio-economic problems.

It is in the political arena that the course of military action generally has its greatest impact, for the objective is not necessarily military defeat, but system change through violence. For example, attacks against the economic infrastructure can be a strategic weapon of attrition by provoking scarcities and insecurity in a population. Still, it takes tremendous determination against hardship and difficult odds and a rare convergence of factors to overthrow a government. Even the most marginally functional and legitimate government can usually sustain itself in power through repression given lack of popular motivation and minimum sources of supply, and can show remarkable resiliency in the face of attack, defeat, and incompetence.

Even if insurgents have very little popular support, this lack is rarely enough to eliminate civil strife through repression alone, much less to defeat an armed insurgency. The evolution of a conflict signifies deeper rooted problems and it is the system itself that is under challenge. Once violence takes hold of a society, it begins to erode the regime. Legal and political institutions, which are often weak and unstable, begin to disintegrate, and the use of violence becomes legitimate. Leaders may attempt to coalesce the population around traditional ideological or religious motives, but may be consumed with problems of internal instability.

Counterinsurgency experts such as Sir Robert Thompson and Edward Lansdale believed that "the triangle" of links between the people, the government, and the armed forces were critical. When these links become dysfunctional, for example when a government becomes overly corrupt and repressive as was the case of South Vietnam, an internal war can then obtain distinct political and military fronts, with political reform becoming as important as military action. All too often, Third World governments possess a host of ills that make reform extremely difficult, while at the same time contributing to instability and providing insurgents with a target of political attack.⁸ These may include: concentration of power in family, class, or tribe; lack of representative or transition mechanisms; corruption; limited economic redistribution; and weak administrative and legal institutions. Even when a government does not suffer these problems, it still faces a difficult challenge of defending its functioning and its legitimacy with a mix of reform and repression. As is the case with military action, the political struggle is likely to be protracted, without clear results, filled with ambiguity and uncertainty.

Returning to the international dimension of Third World conflict, as Eliot Cohen notes, the phase of "national liberation" wars against foreign colonial powers is over.⁹ Today's Low Intensity Conflicts are post-colonial; local ambitions and animosities dominate. With no colonies to defend, the direct external involvement of external powers tends to depend on distance to borders and to be limited by difficulties of projecting force. As with other wars, efforts by antagonists to bring allies into the struggle or to neutralize or exclude others can be key to the conflict. For

coalition warfare in the Third World, logistics and supplies are generally the greatest need and the greatest source of leverage for external powers. 10 However, even as external powers generally intervene for balance of power interests beyond the internal resolution of the conflict, the understanding of the internal dimensions and how the external intervention affects them is critical for success.

IV. INTERNAL WAR, LIMITED WAR, AND TOTAL WAR

The Assymetries of Power and Perspective

From a modern military perspective internal war in the Third World can generally be considered an "inferior copy of the real thing." 11 Nevertheless, these conflicts have often presented daunting political and military problems for the external powers that get involved in them. Recent examples abound: the U.S. in Vietnam, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, India in Sri Lanka, Vietnam in Cambodia. Likewise for aggressors-- guerrillas and terrorists alike-- the record of success is not much better, for example: the FMLN in El Salvador, the Sendero Luminoso in Peru, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan.

To get to the root of understanding these conflicts and how to influence them, it is worthwhile to return to Clausewitz:

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. 12

For the external power, it is not sufficient to focus only geopolitical conditions and the scale of violence applied to a conflict. It is also necessary to distinguish between internal and external objectives and to adopt policies and strategies that correspond to the internal "nature" of the conflict in both its political and military dimensions. For this purpose, it is useful to consider internal war in terms of the contrast between limited and total war.

A century before the two "general wars" of the 20th century, Clausewitz argued that there is no logical military limit to the level of war up to total conflict other than the physical capabilities of the opposing sides, but that it is the political objectives and associated factors— most importantly will— that set the limits of a particular conflict. In this dynamic of limited war:

The smaller the sacrifice we demand from our opponent, the smaller it may be expected will be the means of resistance which he will employ; but the smaller his preparation, the smaller will ours require to be. Further, the smaller our political object, the less value shall we set upon it, and the more easily shall we be induced to give it up altogether.

Thus, therefore, the political object, as the original motive of the war, will be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force and also the amount of effort to be made. 13

According to the theory of limited war, an outcome is reached through compelling an opponent to bargain prior to reaching total defeat. This is based on an assumption of symmetry between the political and military strategies of the two sides. Limited wars are wars for control of territory or to maintain or upset a balance of power. Although their consequences may be great, they generally stop short of being wars for survival.

In internal war, however, a fundamental asymmetry inevitably prevails between external powers and the direct participants in that war. Clausewitz' discussion of motivation helps explain this asymmetry in terms of will:

One and the same political object may produce totally different effects upon different people, or even upon the same people at different times; we can, therefore, only admit the political object as the measure, by considering it in its effects upon those masses which it is to move, and consequently the nature of those masses also comes into consideration. It is easy to see that thus the result may be very different according as these masses are animated with a spirit which will infuse vigor into the action or otherwise. 14

In other words, one man's limited war can be another man's total war. The critical asymmetry then is not of power, but of will, between the motivation of total vs. limited objectives. From this dynamic relationship between the subjective and objective conditions of conflict derive some of the most difficult ambiguities of conflict in the Third World.

Limits of Policy and Capability

In his writings on limited war, Robert Osgood distinguishes between two basic types of limits in war: limits of policy and limits of capability, which correspond to limits of will and limits of power. 15 For external powers, resources applied to obtain objectives are in theory constrained by policy, not military capability, whereas for smaller power the reverse is true.

In this sense, motivation can be a critical advantage over firepower, technology, and organization. It helps to explain the motivation of the weak terrorist to commit terrible violence in pursuit of his own "total war", or how the United States pursuing limited objectives lost to North Vietnam pursuing total objectives, despite the major asymmetry of power between the two. 16

Internal war and limited war also have significant features in common, particularly in regard to international factors. Direct confrontation of external sponsors is avoided to prevent escalation. Weapons employed and the level of mobilization are restrained. Communication between belligerents and sponsors remains open to permit negotiation, often with third party intermediaries. Conflict is geographically confined. Borders and sanctuaries are generally recognized.

For the U.S., involvement in internal wars since World War II has been as an extension of limited war undertaken to prevent another total war. A particular set of limits applies to U.S. involvement in internal wars. First, limited objectives from the U.S. perspective mean that escalation, particularly the threat of nuclear escalation, must be avoided. But deterrence, the primary tool for avoiding direct conflict, does not apply to internal conflict. Second, except for special operations and short, overwhelming interventions, the direct application of U.S. combat forces has proved both politically and militarily infeasible. Third, limited domestic political support for indirect involvement in most internal wars tends to restrict resources, and to require scrupulous and constant justification in Congress for those that are provided.

V. *THE US AND INTERNAL CONFLICT: THE MISSION*

History and the Mission

The history of United States involvement in small wars, including internal conflicts, is long and controversial. Recent attempts at developing military doctrine under the general heading Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) represent only the latest of several phases.

The first phase lasted from 1775 through approximately 1885 in struggles to establish independence and extend national territory. It began with the 1776-81 War for Independence from Great Britain, an early anti-colonial insurgency which combined democratic insurrection with conventional and unconventional military action. This phase also included the political-military struggle against Mexico to incorporate Texas, California, and other Western states into the Union; guerrilla actions of the Civil War; and the protracted Indian counterinsurgency campaigns during the expansion of the Western frontier. The Spanish-American War of 1898 established the pattern for numerous internal interventions overseas during in the first third of the 20th century, primarily in Central American and the Caribbean, which included protracted counterinsurgency campaigns in Nicaragua and the Philippines. Support for partisan and guerrilla operations in both European and Asian theaters during World War II set a precedent for subsequent U.S. support to insurgent groups. Counterinsurgency support, extended worldwide during the Cold War to contain communist expansion, reached its culmination with the concurrent deployment of combat troops to Vietnam. The present Low Intensity Conflict phase has seen continued indirect support for both insurgency and counterinsurgency, two brief military interventions in Grenada and Panama, and a recent requirement to respond to the threats of international terrorism and narcotics trafficking. 17

These successive phases have paralleled the United States evolution from an anti-colonial insurgent movement on the geopolitical periphery to a predominant global power. Nonetheless, each phase contains significant common elements: mobilization and escalation are limited, national security objectives are defined in terms of excluding "foreign" powers from local situations, and goals are defined in terms of a "mission", with the U.S. in a role as nation builder, policeman, and democratic reformer.

Containment and the Mission

The current phase of U.S. involvement in Third World conflict has evolved from the tenets of limited war as the U.S. applied them to contain the spread of communism by the Soviet Union and China. This constant struggle for influence over Third World nations, many of them emerging to independence through wars of colonial liberation, was perceived as a mission to defeat a conspiracy of revolutionary aggression. The ultimate manifestations of this aspect of the Cold War were the counterinsurgency doctrine of the 1961-63 Kennedy era and the Vietnam War.

In his 1961 Special Message to Congress, President John F. Kennedy put counterinsurgency at the forefront of US defense policy, defining it as a mission:

The Free World's security can be endangered not only by nuclear attack, but also by being slowly nibbled away at the periphery, regardless of our strategic power, by forces of subversion, infiltration, intimidation, indirect or non-overt aggression, internal revolution, diplomatic blackmail, guerrilla warfare, or a series of limited wars.

In a major top down effort, Kennedy appointed a high level Special Group to study the problem, directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a counterinsurgency doctrine, and began setting up a special counterinsurgency apparatus, notably establishing interagency committees and reinvigorating the U.S. Army Special Forces. The counterinsurgency doctrine which emerged made military strategy the guarantor of democratic political reforms and economic development. A fundamental belief in American values and problem solving ability infused this initiative.

For the most part, however, the results of application differed from stated intentions, with geopolitical and military objectives overriding the theoretically more important political and economic objectives. For example, the widely proclaimed Alliance for Progress in Latin America, rather than ushering in a new era of stability and economic well-being, ended up supporting anti-communist repression by military, authoritarian regimes in Brazil, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and elsewhere.

Similarly in Vietnam, despite insistence by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson that the "other war" was more important, the political objectives of counterinsurgency — security, good government, and well-being — took second place to military and geopolitical objectives. Leaving aside facile arguments that the U.S. would have won the war if Congress and the media had not opposed it, many of the analyses of the war point to three fundamental errors of U.S. judgement: First, as recognized in the Nixon Guam Doctrine, U.S. combat troops should not be used to fight protracted internal wars in foreign countries. Second, U.S. fighting doctrine of controlling war through overwhelming application of technology, firepower, and organization did not work, because the assumption that a limited war strategy of attrition in the ground war and signalling through strategic bombing of the North would bring the Government of North Vietnam to negotiate an end to the war did not account for the North's total commitment. Third, as an external power engaged in an internal conflict, it is essential to understand the nature of that conflict and in particular to distinguish between internal and external objectives.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to verify the argument that certain aspects of the U.S. counterinsurgency were on the right track, because U.S. combat operations so totally overshadowed those efforts. However, it does seem apparent that even if success in breaking the back of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam can be claimed, the absence of a functional and legitimate South Vietnamese Government was a fatal weakness. 18

The Mission and Lessons Learned (?)

In summary, four of the important lessons learned from the Vietnam War are: 1) Avoid using U.S. troops to fight protracted internal conflicts in foreign countries. 2) Standard U.S. military doctrine does not necessarily apply in such conflicts. 3) It is essential to understand the nature of each particular conflict and to distinguish between internal and external objectives. 4) A functioning and legitimate political body is necessary for success in an internal conflict. Although there are certainly no absolutes, these lessons would seem to be valuable for U.S. involvement in Third World conflict today.

VI. *LIMITS TO REFORM: THE ENEMY WITHIN*

The Democratic Contradiction

The contemporary record of United States performance in internal conflict in the developing world is mixed. Limited short-term direct actions of overwhelming force against much smaller military forces, have generally been successful, but halting the spread of Soviet-allied movements has more often been achieved through slow perseverance than through military victory. When unable to resolve conflicts favorably, the U.S. has frequently settled on prolonging them. Rarely has it been possible to achieve broader mission objectives of securing economic and democratic development for countries in conflict. The reason for these mixed results does not lie so much in lack of U.S. military or political power, but rather in the ambiguities and contradictions inherent to such situations.

Especially since Vietnam, the requirements of U.S. democracy have placed serious and often contradictory constraints on the conduct of U.S. policy in Third World conflicts. Geopolitical objectives are not enough to free the U.S. for long from the constraint to act on the democratic basis of "what is right" rather than the more Machiavellian basis of "what is effective". For example, probity requires counterterrorist and counternarcotics operations to take account of national sovereignty and the opinions of allies. Insurgents and counterinsurgents must demonstrate some adherence to democracy in order to be worthy of Congressionally appropriated assistance.

The Counterinsurgency Contradiction

This contradiction is deepest when the U.S. publicly supports a government involved in counterinsurgency, associating itself with the effort, but not directly controlling it. U.S. military counterinsurgency doctrine, reflecting the extension of democratic principles to internal war, is based on the idea of reform, of "winning hearts and minds" as a long-term solution. The primary function of military action is theoretically to suppress insurgency and to provide security for the reform process to take place.

However, the typical response of a Third World government threatened by an insurgency is weighted toward repression, not reform. Wherever the U.S. has become involved in a long-term counterinsurgency, the tension between reform and repression has kept this contradiction in play. When members of the Congress and the media judge by generalized standards of "just war", a government that the U.S. supports is itself perceived as a serious problem. But likewise, when judged by standards of internal effectiveness, that government can also be identified as the "enemy within".

El Salvador is the clearest current example. After ten years and several billion dollars, the U.S. has successfully prevented the FMLN insurgents from seizing power, which it probably would have otherwise done in the early 1980's. The U.S. mission to democratize the country has achieved the appearance of success. But, progress such as it is has come in the context of stalemate. El Salvador has severe economic inequities, its military governments a repressive history, and violence has severely eroded the roots of its society. The strategy of turning peasants into citizens as a means of defeating marxist guerrillas is a long and expensive task, even in a tiny country like El Salvador. The obstacles presented by those within the country on both sides who have pursued their own strategies of terror and repression present persistent and formidable limits to the middle road of democratic reform. 19

Reform and Repression

If both strategy and the U.S. political system require the U.S. to emphasize reform over repression when it becomes involved in sustained counterinsurgency situations, it is essential to recognize the nature of the country and its government ally, to know the "enemy within" as well as the insurgent enemy.

A starting point is to recognize the limits to reform in the contradiction of reform and repression. By their nature, Third World governments tend to resist reform, as do the societies and economies on which they are based, particularly when the reforms are introduced from the outside. The list of ills these governments suffer from may be long. However, by definition a government inevitably protects the interests of the groups with sufficient economic and military influence to wield power, regardless of how unhealthy the links between government, military, and the people are by democratic standards.

Even if it were to violate the widely accepted principle that the U.S. will support but not take over a counterinsurgency effort, the ability to effect reforms through persuasion, leverage, and assistance has severe if ambiguous and subjective limits.

Most developing nations are beset with a multitude of problems which tend to become acute during internal conflict. Social and economic inequities, which may be further imbedded in ethnic, tribal, or religious discrimination, are often fundamental and rigid sources of tension. For example, this is especially true in agrarian economies. Land reform is generally perceived as a key to defusing conflict, but concentrated ownership of land and agro-facilities along with widespread low wage

labor and subsistence farming, present severe obstacles. Land owners, who are generally associated with the power elite, will resist any attempt to remove their source of wealth and power.

Along the same lines, political legitimacy, a key target of insurgent strategy, can be extremely difficult to maintain even with reforms, especially if a government has relied heavily on repression. Additional limits to reform will emerge from traditional problems, some or all of which may be present: concentration of power, lack of representation, no mechanisms for transition of power, ponderous bureaucracy with weak administrative apparatus, weak judiciary, corruption, and ineffective leadership. For example, attempts to apply a program of reforms to the justice system will be publicly suspect if they depend on traditionally corrupt police or military for enforcement.

The eruption of violence, particularly of an organized insurgent opposition, inevitably pressures the normal civil state of affairs and erodes the political legitimacy and economic health of the nation. Even if a government reacts with reform efforts, minimal security requirements may require erosion of civil order and bring repression into the open through measures ranging from censorship to suspension of civil liberties with martial law or states of emergency. At its extreme, a cycle of violence may take root, replacing the purported rule of law with the open rule of violence. The army and other security forces may behave as an occupying force, with the civilian population identified as "the enemy". In such situations the citizens of the country become victims, the poor generally suffering the most from direct effects of violence; the wealthy and the intermediate classes suffering economically. The economy will likely begin to erode, suffering capital flight, destruction of infrastructure and productive facilities, and unemployment.

Under such circumstances, the U.S. is going to face severe limits to its leverage, regardless of intentions, resources, and will. Attempts to introduce reforms may have the advantage of crisis, but, to use the medical analogy, the patient may already be critically ill. Resistance from conservative forces with considerable power and wealth may actually contribute to further erosion of the situation. Moderate reform leaders who are the most likely candidates for U.S. support are likely to be few, divided, and untested in power. With constant perseverance, the U.S. may be able to implant some reforms and even to change regime behavior significantly, but transforming the beliefs and the nature of a society in the American image is a deeper matter. It is one thing to hold elections and another to make a system democratic.

In parallel with the impact of democratic reform efforts, the presence of the U.S. itself often has a contradictory effect. Rooted in positivism, the U.S. government tends to involve itself in situations with a programmatic, problem solving approach that may be only partially suited to the society it is intending to reform. The negative effects of applying large quantities of resources and technical solutions to deep political problems often results in an increase in corruption and dependence. At the same time, coercive tactics through threats of reducing aid have limited effect, because those supported generally recognize the U.S. cannot carry them through when no alternates exist.

The Insurgency Contradiction

Although this is not a study of covert action per se, the record and problems of U.S. support for insurgencies where a Third World government is a target is in many ways similar to those of counterinsurgency where a government is an ally. The geopolitical motives for involvement have frequently led to prolonged military spoiling operations by proxy against communist expansion, without building internally authentic political-military insurgencies.²⁰ Even though executive latitude is conveniently greater with support for insurgencies than for counterinsurgencies, Congressional and public oversight of these covert wars has led the U.S. to place its "covert" support to insurgents in Angola, Cambodia, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua in a democratic context of public diplomacy where parallel problems of legitimacy, erosion, and limitations to U.S. leverage as occur in counterinsurgency can become openly exposed.

The problem of political management is central. Two contemporary examples include Nicaraguan contra leaders with a shallow commitment to democracy and weak political links to the peasant army they were supposed to lead, and Afghan Mujaheddin, essentially tribal warriors as likely to fight among themselves as against the Soviet-backed government and under the nominal direction of Pakistan whose objectives only loosely fit those of the U.S.

The U.S. record of support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies since World War II has an additional cost to bear in the resulting lack of trust felt toward the U.S. throughout the Third World. Judgement about what is both right and effective is extremely difficult, both for its long-term and short-term effects. Understanding the ways in which contradictions and constraints of U.S. efforts can limit as well as promote reforms is essential to successful policy. To take two examples where U.S. involvement has been prolonged: in El Salvador political power of the U.S.-

backed military has increased rather than decreased despite U.S.-sponsored democratic reforms. And in the Philippines, West Point trained officers have been central figures in the chronic coup attempts against the U.S.-backed government of Corazon Aquino. In another sense, even when such activities can be undertaken in a "joint venture" spirit, groups the U.S. intends to support are bound to represent the influence of a powerful foreign executive and legislature.

The United States originated in an authentic democratic insurgent movement which drew its strength from the beliefs and values of its early leaders and their supporters. That essential belief in democratic values as a positive force continues to motivate the U.S. today. However, when assisting Third World allies in internal conflicts, traditional U.S. emphasis on a problem solving, reform oriented mission often gets tangled in the contradictions and limits to reform. Even when pursuing broader geopolitical objectives, it is essential to understand and attend to the enemy within.

VII. GENERAL ELEMENTS OF POLICY AND STRATEGY FOR U.S. ENGAGEMENT IN THIRD WORLD CONFLICT

Criteria to Follow the Demise of Containment

The fundamental reduction in U.S. - Soviet confrontation, essentially removes global containment as the unifying rationale for U.S. involvement in Third World conflicts. It is also now possible to argue that the U.S. has been freed to attend to the problems of the developing world, but the delinking of the relatively small conflicts in the the Third World from significance as arenas for bipolar geostrategic competition in reality lessens rather than increases the rationale for US involvement in every corner of the globe.

While the absence of a cumulative threat to the U.S. from Third World conflicts reduces the motivations for U.S. involvement, it does not eliminate them. Rather, this transformation and the resulting change in the U.S. role in the world, requires careful reassessment of U.S. policy and strategy. Two general questions need to be addressed: First, which of a multiplicity of conflicts throughout the Third World truly affect U.S. interests to a degree warranting involvement? And second, how should the U.S. be involved?

As a starting point, it is apparent that some of the conflicts in which the U.S. is engaged are residual in terms of containment, El Salvador and Afghanistan for example. The country specific and regional implications of each conflict must be analyzed in terms of corresponding U.S. internal and external objectives. For example, the primary motivation for contemporary U.S. involvement with the Philippine counterinsurgency, which has flared on and off since the U.S. first intervened in 1898, will become contingent on the redefinition of the U.S. role in Southeast Asia, and specifically the future of the U.S. military bases there. But the degree of U.S. determination to maintain the bases will in turn affect and be affected by the dynamics of Philippine politics and the course of U.S. - Philippine relations. If the Philippine bases are no longer essential to the U.S. regional security role, what is the degree of political and financial commitment the U.S. wishes to sustain there?

Similar issues arise regarding Latin America, and particularly Central America. Is the region a vital sphere of interest, and is the objective of excluding foreign powers, first defined under the Monroe Doctrine in 1829, still a valid rationale for military involvement there?

In addition to specific regional threats, what other types of conflicts in the Third World may require U.S. engagement? For example, the world's population has been projected to nearly triple from 5.3 billion to 14 billion over the next century without additional control measures.²¹ The bulk of this increase will occur primarily in the Third World. If resource and population pressures add to internal conflict, particularly in countries of strategic significance for the United States, such as Mexico, when and how should the U.S. be engaged?

Military Action and the Brushfire Corollary

In addition to determination of threats, the manner of U.S. engagement must also come under scrutiny. On the military side, it appears to have become fairly well embedded within the government that U.S. combat troops will not be committed to long-term internal conflicts in the Third World. Rather, the approach is to provide indirect assistance, either to a government or insurgent movement. At the other side of the spectrum, a precedent if not a consensus has been established for direct military action with circumscribed and clearly defined objectives more akin to special operations in specific contingencies, such as counterterrorism, or the invasion of small countries in Latin America.

Major ambiguities remain, however, in the spectrum of military action. For example, U.S. military involvement in counter-narcotics operations is subject to several ambiguities, including its impact on the political power of host country armed forces, and the differing orientation of these governments, which tend to favor economic rather than military solutions.

The essential judgement regarding military action is the truism in Low Intensity Conflict that, if military action is required, the problem has already advanced to a critical degree. The application of the other tools of U.S. policy that are intended to resolve the underlying causes of conflict— support for long-term democratic and economic development —may come too late and run afoul of the contradictions and limits to reform.

These are twin weaknesses of U.S. action in Third World conflict: to engage seriously only when conflict has emerged, and to assume the ability to resolve crises through the direct application of resources. This might be termed the “brushfire corollary”, a chronic problem deriving from the global spread of U.S. commitments where the demand for resources and policy attention in countries generally on the geopolitical periphery far exceeds the capabilities of the U.S. Government.

Such brushfire situations contain a fundamental paradox. If a country is peripheral, why apply scarce resources and attention when crisis is at a low level? Other constraints to policy include legal requirements and ethical ideals, the total nature of the conflicts as opposed to limited external objectives, and the limits to reform within Third World countries. For example, in El Salvador it has proven possible to prevent the FMLN guerrillas from coming to power, but in the cost has already been over 5 billion dollars and ten years in a very small country of five million people.

Correspondingly, given a high degree of commitment, it is extremely difficult to construct a disengagement strategy without it being perceived as a defeat. This is especially true when government or insurgent armed forces have obtained significant force buildups dependent on U.S. support.

Some Guidelines

The main conclusion of this analysis might imply a pessimistic assumption of U.S. engagement in conflict in the Third World. It is true that when judged in terms of the broadly stated objectives of building the basis for internal democratic and economic development, the record is not particularly good. When judged in terms of the external objective of preventing forces hostile to the United States from increasing their power, the record is better.

At present, the diminishing of containment as a national security justification for involvement in Third World conflict exposes the definition of U.S. interests to a new range of ambiguities regarding the where and how of U.S. policy. This would be relatively simple, for example, for direct threats to major sea lines of communication or terrorist acts against U.S. citizens. It is less clear, for example, where internal revolts seem to threaten U.S. interests or challenge U.S. prestige.

A set of general policy guidelines do emerge from the historical and theoretical elements of this analysis:

- 1) Determine how a specific conflict is linked to U.S. specific U.S. interests, with emphasis on the involvement of foreign powers or other geopolitical dimensions.
- 2) Distinguish between internal and external objectives.
- 3) Understand the nature of the conflict; analyze the specific internal dimensions of a conflict in terms of economic, political, social, and military factors.
- 4) Limit escalation and mobilization.
- 5) Assess the degree of engagement, ranging from minor assistance to full invasion, likely to be required to achieve specific defined objectives.
- 6) Avoid committing U.S. troops to protracted conflicts and attempting to apply conventional U.S. military doctrine.
- 7) Determine obstacles to achieving objectives in terms of resources and the limits to reform.
- 8) Emphasize support for a functioning and legitimate political entity.

Selective Engagement

The essential conclusion suggested here is that there no single unifying principle replaces global containment as a rationale for U.S. involvement in Third World conflict. The general objective of excluding foreign powers as a function of the balance of power must now be further refined in terms of specific interests in specific countries and regions.

Such a policy might be termed "selective engagement". Selective engagement signifies recognition of the multiple ambiguities, contradictions, and limits to U.S. involvement in Third World conflicts. As a conceptual guide to strategy, it confirms the U.S. commitment to deterring aggression and to democratic reform, but it applies resources to pursue those objectives with circumspection. Selective engagement recommends against proclaiming too ambitious a "mission" in protracted conflicts, but at the same time encourages rapid action free from idle threats in specific short-term contingencies. It also recognizes the ambiguities of this type of conflict and the political uncertainty of the outcome, and particularly the need for perseverance. Finally, selective engagement in the context of declining East-West conflict suggests the possibility of increased opportunities for UN peacekeeping or other forms of international cooperation to deal with Third World conflict. 22

The restructuring of U.S. forces to provide for small specialized forces trained and equipped to cope with low intensity conflicts in the Third World is an important asset, but does not in itself justify involvement. Engagement must focus on political objectives, with careful attention to the contradictions and limitations imposed by both the situation and the U.S. system.

Although not applicable to all situations, Sir Robert Thompson's prescription for counterinsurgency is an excellent example of the clarity of purpose the U.S. should strive for:

Government must have clear political aim — To establish and maintain a free, independent, and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable; The government must function in accordance with the law; the government must have an overall plan; the government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas; in the guerrilla phase of an insurgency a government must secure its base areas first. 23

As a mature nation, the U.S. should come to grips with these problems, and should do so effectively and consistently, within a context of democratic political debate about interests and goals.

VIII. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

U.S. Government Limits

If the policy issues concerning U.S. involvement in Third World conflict are frequently difficult, the corresponding operational requirements can be complex in the extreme.

The U.S. Government has an impressive array of political, economic, military, and informational tools, and where they are effectively applied, even a small amount of resources can decisively influence a situation. The list of possibilities is long: international diplomacy, internal persuasion, support for democracy, public diplomacy, political warfare, psychological operations, judicial and law enforcement assistance, development assistance, balance of payments support, food aid, humanitarian relief, security assistance, civil military action, covert action, and intelligence assistance.

Struggles tend to be deeply rooted and long-term, making them intractable to quick applications of outside influence and resources — the brushfire corollary. The ambiguities of these conflicts, particularly the relation between their total internal dimensions and their limited geopolitical importance, make it difficult to clarify how U.S. national interests are involved and to devise effective methods of influence. Significant constraints and limits to both policy and capability will apply in most situations, imposed first by the internal dimensions of the conflict itself, and second by the often conflicting diffusion of power within the U.S. Government with the additional requirements of Congressional and public accountability.

The Inadequacy of Coordination

There is widespread recognition both within and outside of the Government that interagency coordination within the national security apparatus is seriously inadequate. For example, three former Ambassadors to El Salvador have identified coordination of policy and operations as the most serious problem of their tenures as Chiefs of Mission in that country.

Even in situations where basic policy choices and commitment are clear, all too frequently the major obstacle to effective execution is not necessarily limited resources, but rather the inability to achieve unity of command and effort among various competitive authorities. A certain degree of bureaucratic tension and competition is part of the character of the American system and is undoubtedly constructive. However, in numerous cases, this dynamic comes to resemble a football game where every player on the field is taking signals from a different coach.

Problems of interagency coordination which have serious impact on efforts to deal with Third World conflict include problems of inward focus, diffusion of power, and exclusivity. The standard U.S. approach to a conflict is to identify problems to be solved, to make policy decisions, to devise programs and strategies, and to mobilize resources accordingly. The U.S. Armed Forces and its general war fighting doctrine is the ultimate expression of this approach. However, this philosophy when combined with a programmatic reformist mission can lead to crippling problems in a Third World conflict situation. The approach itself emphasizes an inward focus on resource mobilization and organizational management, which is effective when overwhelming power and influence can be brought to bear. However, when applied to Third World conflicts where U.S. interests and power capabilities are limited by policy, this approach can result in dysfunctional inflexibility, draining efforts to mobilize resources, and insensitivity to critical features of the situation on the ground.

Associated with the problem of inward focus, diffusion of power throughout the government tends to be manifested in the eternal dilemmas of resource and turf conflicts, with loyalties to office, bureau, service, agency, and department dominating over more comprehensive objectives, what Hedrick Smith calls "tribal warfare."²⁴ Information and operations are "stovepiped" directly between agency and field representatives without cross reference, secondary issues can take on disproportionate importance, broad consideration of goals and strategies can get sidetracked, decision-making on even minor matters at the working level becomes extremely difficult if not impossible, and decisions when taken at a higher level are not acted on.

Finally, differences in bureaucratic culture and institutional orientation between various services, departments, and agencies become subjective, leading individuals to avoid rather than seek opportunities for coordination with colleagues in other agencies. These differences may be overt and carefully cultivated as between the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. They may take an intermediate form, such as that between authorities with functional or technical responsibilities and those with regional or country-specific responsibilities. Or they may reflect the even deeper qualities of institutional mandate, for example between the soldier and the diplomat. Where the diplomat by experience and training is accustomed to ambiguity and emphasizes agreement and resolution through persuasion, the military officer tends to seek certainty and emphasizes victory in conflict through coercion. Where the diplomat's principal field of action is negotiation, the officer's is operations.

Interagency Coordination: A Distant Ideal

Because they are deeply ingrained in the American system of government, it is highly unlikely that any of these dynamics will change fundamentally. Nor is it necessarily desirable that competitive tension should be eliminated. However, to the extent that it becomes dysfunctional, preventing the U.S. from acting effectively when faced with the challenges posed by Third World conflict, every attempt should be made to recognize and overcome the obstacles to interagency coordination.

The need for an integrated approach to dealing with conflict in the Third World has been periodically recognized since the early 1960's. Attempts to devise an approach have included President Kennedy's high level Special Group on counterinsurgency, the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Staff (CORDS) program in Vietnam, and the current efforts of the Low Intensity Conflict Board. 25 None of these have resulted in permanent modifications of the decision-making and execution apparatus, although the general mechanisms of the Policy Coordinating Committees in Washington and the Country Team in Embassies overseas do provide the basic structure for doing so in a variety of forms.

The following section presents an ideal concept of interagency coordination, based on the following set of basic principles:

- unity of command,
- maximum flexibility and adaptability,
- a balance between policy and operations,
- a situation-oriented, outward looking perspective,
- special empathy and understanding of the conflict situation,
- an emphasis on political management as a first priority, and
- primary commitment to national rather than agency specific interests and objectives.

An interagency coordinating body should have the following features:

- designated overall command,
- designated lead agency for specific activities,
- defined mechanisms and procedures for coordination of both policy-making and operations,
- short- and long-term planning and review functions
- oversight and monitoring authority.

A coordinating body should have responsibility for ensuring execution of policy decisions in the following areas:

- planning,
- external and public relations
- resource requirements,
- crisis management,
- legal and legislative matters,
- operational coordination,
- program evaluation, and
- trouble shooting.

A coordinating body would normally be required to maintain close contact between Washington and the U.S. mission in the conflict country, as well as with the regional military CINC. The specific form of a coordinating body should be ad hoc, with participants, structure, command, and procedures tailored to the particular situation.

Interagency Coordinating Mechanisms

If there is general agreement that better interagency coordination than currently exists is needed to deal with low intensity conflict in the Third World, there is no consensus on the form that such coordination should take.

The U.S. military has taken the first concrete steps toward improving the effectiveness of the command and control structure for low intensity conflicts. After prodding by Congress, the Department of Defense has now established an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) and the Joint Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Each of the services and the unified CINCS has also increased its attention to special operations and low intensity conflict roles and missions. But addressing the military dimension of LIC can only be part of a solution to the need for better overall government coordination.

Among the multitude of recommendations that have been put forward over the years, several have gone to the extreme of advocating the creation of a new government agency specifically to deal with low intensity conflict. For example, the 1973 Department of Defense study "Restricted Engagement Options" recommended establishing an integrated, multipurpose, low-cost, low-visibility agency at the same level as the Department of Defense, Department of State, and CIA. Less ambitious plans of a similar nature would establish a smaller coordinating body, as an

independent office tied to the White House like the U.S. Trade Representative, within a new bureau in the Department of State, or at the regional level in a manner similar to the military joint theater commands (CINC's).

Neither the State Department, nor any other department is prepared to attempt to assert leadership over U.S. Third World conflict policy. What seems to be called for is a less intrusive and cumbersome mechanism that would provide a closer degree of integration than currently exists without requiring erection of a major new bureaucratic structure.

While it may be beyond the realm of practicality to set up another intermediate bureaucratic player that would draw authority from current functions, it would be a good idea to refine the roles of individual agencies without attempting to modify their present structures. For example, the central problem of political management needs to be addressed at the operational level. The objectives of refined coordination would include, for example, a better match between public diplomacy and covert action, incorporate civilians into counterinsurgency along with the military, and build an economic development cadre distinct from the peacetime orientation of AID. A small coordinating body would ideally serve as a bridge between policy level bodies, such as the Deputies' Committee and PCC's, and working level activities in the Departments and the Country Team.

The Policy Management Support Team

One alternative would be to establish a small permanent inter-departmental group based on the concept of the Working Group or Task Force. Designated a Policy Management Support Team, it would consist of a small permanent staff from the core national security agencies. Once a specific country or situation was designated a critical conflict for the U.S. by the LIC Board or other policy level group, the team would go into action to serve as liaisons between agencies and between Washington and in the field. Headquartered, for example, in the Department of State or the National Security Council, the group would be responsive primarily to the inter-departmental group, but also to individual agencies and country teams and ultimately the National Command Authority. Its permanent members would provide expertise and crossfeed lessons learned from similar contexts worldwide. Other members would be added to the team as specific situation requires, to represent the regional and functional authorities who would then coordinate decision-making in inter-departmental groups. A principal task of the Policy Management Support Team would be to draft a comprehensive interagency action plan that would serve as the basic guide for coordination and evaluation of policies and programs.

The problem of coordination lies primarily in Washington. The Country Team under the leadership of the U.S. Ambassador embodies the concept of inter-agency coordination. In the field any number of ad hoc interagency subgroups of varying effectiveness have been used to deal with conflict situations. These range from the CORDS program in Vietnam, to Country Team subgroups under the direction of the Deputy Chief of Mission or other officer. A matching Washington level organization with which the Country Team can relate as a whole, and with a small, flexible support team acting as bridge would greatly improve the match between intentions and execution.

Training

The establishment of a cadre of civilian and military officers who would specialize in low intensity conflict operations would be another way to improve U.S. Government performance. One important objective of this training would be to develop a group of professionals accustomed to working in an interagency environment. For these officers, evaluation reports should include a section on interagency coordination, including comments by representatives of other agencies.

The most important payoff would come from having State Department political and economic officers, Defense Attaches, Security Assistance Officers, and AID officers, and intelligence officers working side by side in the field. Training would provide individuals with specialized knowledge and skills. For example, State political officers would handle promoting democracy and the administration of justice. Military officers, along the lines of the Army's Foreign Area Officers, would benefit from working side by side with political officers to build sensitivity to the relations between political and military action. Field based AID officers working in tandem would be active in coordinating civil-military action, and familiarize themselves with the political impact of assistance efforts. The ideal result would be a hands on team of officers able to work effectively together and to speak each others' language, with special empathy for the situation on the ground. A potentially effective starting point would be to provide cross-training for State Department and AID officers in Army Special Forces qualifications courses, or other special warfare courses.

A prototype for such training dates from the Vietnam era, when from 1964 to 1972 the Foreign Service Institute offered a course for senior government officials about to go to Vietnam called the National Interdepartmental Seminar on Problems of Development and Internal Defense, and a Vietnam Training Center prepared officers for field service in the CORDS program. 26

IX. APPLICATIONS: THE POSSIBILITIES OF REFORM

U.S. Assistance Reforms

Just as coordination within the government is a serious problem, many of the instruments of U.S. policy themselves are less than optimally applicable to conflict situations. Major constraints have emerged through the legislative process as reactions to perceived Executive excesses in past conflicts, resulting, for example, in a prohibition on police assistance. Earmarks on foreign aid and security assistance are other widely recognized constraints on effective U.S. action in Third World conflicts.

However, more important than the quantity of aid Congress is willing to authorize is the appropriateness and manner in which it is applied. Even though it is globally generous, the U.S. has neither the mandate nor the capacity to develop the world through bilateral aid. Where it does have a major interest, the cost of direct U.S. sponsorship is high and rising, as in the cases of El Salvador and the Philippines. It is very difficult to measure the quantitative benefits of this aid in terms of its value to U.S. interests. U.S. largesse also tends to generate resentment and corruption in the recipient, thus limiting its effectiveness. Third World countries frequently express their preference for self-reliance, for example, with the theme "trade not aid".

The analysis of U.S. involvement in low intensity conflicts presented here emphasizes the primacy of political issues and the ways in which various ambiguities and contradictions limit U.S. capabilities. These factors combined with the delinking of Third World conflict from global containment as a motive for U.S. involvement suggest a policy of selective engagement and the creation of new mechanisms for interagency coordination and training. The following discussions of civil-military action and support for democracy illustrate how these concepts might be applied in a manner consistent with U.S. geopolitical interests, capabilities, and national ethics.

Civil-Military Action

Civil-military action has played an immeasurably important role in the history of U.S. development. On the Western frontier the U.S. Army was often the only representative of government, providing not only the security for settlement, but also the manpower and skills to survey and map, to build roads, to construct towns and open new areas.

Throughout the Third World, national Armed Forces are frequently the only effectively organized representatives of central government. The potential for the military to forge constructive nation-building links between a government and the people exists in many Third World Countries today.

U.S. military participation in civil-military activities overseas, ranging from the Navy's Project Handclasp to extensive disaster relief, is part of a long-standing tradition. Other than generalized objectives of cultivating a positive image of the U.S. military and of providing humanitarian assistance to civil populations, these activities are not usually conducted as part of an articulated strategy.

As with all other aspects of U.S. involvement in the Third World, a strategy of civil-military action would require inter-agency and inter-governmental coordination. Several well-developed civil-military policy applications are currently in effect world wide. USCINCPAC's Peacetime Strategy makes comprehensive use of resources such as Title 10 and the WESTCOM Expanded Relations Program to articulate civil-military activities to broader objectives. The 1987 interagency memorandum of understanding between DOD and USAID formalizes a mechanism for interagency cooperation in humanitarian relief projects. Country Teams regularly coordinate militarily civic action projects on an ad hoc basis. Unfortunately, the lack of active duty civil affairs units limits the scope for conducting civic action, while legal, bureaucratic, and institutional barriers to interagency cooperation tend to limit its effectiveness.

There are other objectives which offer special justification for a concept of U.S. military-civil operations in peacetime. Principal among these are obtaining access and influence to Third World governments, and building military-to-military relations. Three circumstances can make the conduct of civil-military operations by U.S. forces unique: 1) Disaster relief where civilian logistics are inadequate; 2) Combined operations with the host country military; and 3) Projects in which particular military skills, such as demolitions or field medicine, can be applied.

Recognizing the logic of counteraction and nation-building as the rationale for peacetime engagement of U.S. forces, the problems of political limitations, coordination, and flexibility recommend a cautious approach to setting objectives and conducting civil-military operations. For example, ten years of U.S. counterinsurgency experience in El Salvador has demonstrated that U.S.-sponsored civil defense programs and national campaign plans cannot fundamentally affect military-government people relations in the absence of authentic host country mobilization. Similarly, U.S. peacetime civil-military operations are most effective when directed at specific objectives— flood disaster relief in Bangladesh or civic action projects in communities adjacent to U.S. bases in the Philippines.

Support for Democracy

The changes underway in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the concurrent decline in East-West confrontation should greatly boost U.S. legitimacy as a patron of democracy in the Third World. In attempting to translate this national ethic into political solutions to internal conflict, though, great care must be taken to recognize contradictions and limits to reform. The ability to "export" democracy, while it may appear to be the surest way to secure long-term growth, stability, and security, must be accomplished through selective engagement. Just as it cannot be up to the U.S. to fight another country's internal war, it cannot be up to the U.S. to impose a political system. In both cases the result is likely to be a grotesque distortion.

At the same time, the belief that democratic government is an evolutionary benefit to all nations that would develop themselves, does not mean the removal of rivals for the U.S. Democratic governments may be more rather than less likely to become corrupt and inefficient, and are very likely to assert their own definitions of independence.

A crisis of conflict can provide an opportunity to help build democracy, but the crucial ingredients are will and time. There is no U.S. theory that can be taught nor introduced with the deceptively easy catch phrases of marxist-leninist revolution. It is the United States as a nation, not just government policies and programs, that serves as an example of democracy and economic opportunity.

Instead the challenge of democracy is at once more superficial and deeper. There are no concise rules and the mechanics of elections and parties and constitution drafting are fairly transparent. What is truly difficult is not, however, the encouragement of elections and democratic leaders in the midst of conflict. The true challenge lies in the overcoming of the limits to reform presented by history, culture, religion, education, and class structure that belie the forms and rights of a democracy. The possibility exists, as it did in Germany and Japan following World War II, that the crisis of conflict will provide the setting for the establishment of equality before the law, civil rights, separation of powers, dominance of civilian government, and elected representation which are the essence of democracy, but which tend to fall far short in the Third World. The U.S. government can provide assistance to help accomplish this, but it must be organized, it must have the political will to do so, and it must have tremendous perseverance.

ENDNOTES

1. JCS PUB 3-07, *Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict* (draft); JCS PUB 1, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 1989.
2. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, (London: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 109.
3. Robert E. Osgood, *Limited War Revisited*, (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 104-7
4. George P. Shultz, "Low Intensity Warfare: The Challenge of Ambiguity," address before the Low Intensity Warfare Conference, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., January 15, 1986.
5. Michael J. Engelhardt, "America Can Win, Sometimes: U.S. Success and Failure in Small Wars," *Conflict Quarterly*, Winter 1989, pp. 20-35; and William F. Olson, "U.S. Objectives and Constraints: An Overview," in Richard H. Shultz, et al (eds), *Guerrilla Warfare and Counterinsurgency*, (Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath and Company, 1989), pp. 13-42.
6. Robert E. Osgood, "Limited War and Power Projection," in Reichart, John F. and Steven R. Strum (eds), *American Defense Policy*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), P. 375.
7. Eliot A. Cohen, "Distant Battles," in Stephanie G. Neuman and Robert E. Harkavy (eds.), *The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World*, Volume II, (Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath and Company, 1986), pp. 7-32.
8. Edward G. Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); and Sir Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam*, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1966).
9. Cohen, p. 9.
10. Patrick O'Sullivan, "The Geography of Wars in the Third World," in Neuman and Harkavy (eds.), *The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World*, Volume II, pp. 33-52.
11. Cohen, p. 11.
12. Clausewitz, p. 387.
13. Clausewitz, p. 109.

14. Clausewitz, p. 109.
15. Osgood, *Limited War Revisited*, p. 13.
16. Harry G. Summers, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*, (Novato, Ca: Presidio Press, 1982); Stephen P. Rosen, "Vietnam and the American Theory of Limited War," *International Security*, Vol. 7, No. 1, Fall 1982, pp. 83-113.
17. Ian F. W. Beckett (ed.), *The Roots of Counter-Insurgency*, (London: Blandford Press, 1988).
18. D. Michael Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).
19. A.J. Belavich, et al, *American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1989); Manwaring, Max G. and Court Prisk (eds), *El Salvador at War, An Oral History from the 1979 Insurrection to the Present*, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988).
20. John Prados, *President's Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II through Iranscam*, (New York: William Morrow, 1986).
21. Susan Oakie, "World Population Tallied," *Washington Post*, February 26, 1990, p. 8.
22. Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, "Discriminate Deterrence," January 1988.
23. Sir Robert Thompson, *Revolutionary War in World Strategy, 1945-69*, (London: Taplinger Pub. Co., 1970), p. 126.
24. Hedrick Smith, *The Power Game*, (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 118-66.
25. Shafer, pp. 21-24.
26. Foreign Service Institute, Vietnam Training Center and Interdepartmental Seminar documents, 1964-72.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bacevich, A.J., et al. *American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador*. Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1989.
- Beckett, Ian F. W. (ed.). *The Roots of Counter-Insurgency*. London: Blanford Press, 1988.
- Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luchman. *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. Garden City, N.Y.: 1967.
- Blaufarb, Douglas. *The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance*. New York: Free Press, 1977.
- Bruce, Robert H. "Human Rights and U.S. Training of Third World Police." *Conflict Quarterly* (Winter 1988): 48-60.
- Cariucci, Frank C. *Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress on the FY 1990/FY 1991 Biennial Budget*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989.
- Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. London: Penguin Books, 1968.
- Engelhardt, Michael J. "America Can Win, Sometimes: U.S. Success and Failure in Small Wars." *Conflict Quarterly* (Winter 1989): 20-35.
- Evans, Ernest. "Wars without Splendor: Low Level Conflict in World Politics." *Conflict* (Summer 1987). 35-46.
- Greene, Fred (ed). *The Philippine Bases: Negotiating for the Future*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988.
- Hart, Liddel. *Strategy*. London: Farber and Farber, 1967.
- Homser, Stephen T. *Constraints On U.S. Strategy in Third World Countries*. New York: Crane Russak and Company, 1987.
- Johnson, Loch K. "Covert Action and Accountability: Decision-Making for America's Secret Foreign Policy." *International Studies* 33:1 (March 1989): 81-110.

- Johnson, U. Alexis. "Internal Defense and the Foreign Service."
Foreign Service Journal (July 1962): 20-23.
- Karnow, Stanley. *In Our Image, America's Empire in the Philippines*
New York: Random House, 1989.
- Klare, Michael T., and Peter Kornbluh (eds.) *Low Intensity Warfare*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1988.
- Lansdale, Edward G. *In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia*. New York: Harper & Row, 1972.
- Laquer, Walter. *Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study*.
Boston: Little, Brown, 1976.
- Lord, Carnes and Frank R. Barnett. *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1989.
- Luttwak, Edward N. *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976.
- COMPLETE ENTRY Luttwak, Edward N. "Notes on Low Intensity Conflict".
Parameters *The First Century A.D. to the Third*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976.
- Maechling, Charles, Jr. "Counterinsurgency: the First Ordeal by Fire." In Klare and Kornbluh. *Low Intensity Warfare*.
- Manwaring, Max G. and Court Prisk (eds). *El Salvador at War, An Oral History from the 1979 Insurrection to the Present*.
Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988.
- Murphy, Robert. *Diplomat Among Warriors*. New York, Pyramid Books, 1964.
- Prados, John. *President's Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II through Iranscam*. New York: William Morrow, 1986.

- Osgood, Robert E. *Limited War Revisited*. Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1979.
- Reichart, John F. and Steven R. Strum (eds). *American Defense Policy* (Fifth Edition). Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987.
- Shafer, D. Michael. *Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988.
- Sheenan, Neil. *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam*. New York: 1988.
- Shultz, Richard H. Jr, et al (eds). *Guerrilla Warfare and Counterinsurgency*. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1989.
- Summers, Colonel Harry G., Jr. *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*. Novato, Ca: Presidio Press, 1982.
- Tanham, George K., and Dennis J. Duncanson. "Some Dilemmas of Counterinsurgency." *Foreign Affairs* 48 (January 1970): 113-22.
- Thompson, Loren B. *Low Intensity Conflict*. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1989.
- Thompson, Sir Robert. *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam*. London: Chatto and Windus, 1966.
- From Strategy p 185 need pub. Thompson, Sir Robert. *Revolutionary war in World Strategy, 1945-1969*. London: Chatto and Windus, 1970.
- Wolf, Eric R. *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century*. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1969.
- U.S. Department of Defense. *Proceedings of the Low-Intensity Warfare Conference*. Sponsored by the National Defense University, 14-15 January 1986. Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.