NATO

WARSAW PACT FORCES

MOBILIZATION

Edited by
Jeffrey Simon

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Foreword

Recent demographic and economic trends present mobilization problems for both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact. When the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to rid Europe of intermediate-range nuclear weapons, their agreement naturally increased the emphasis on conventional force balances—thus creating new strains within and between the alliances. These developments make the time ripe for a comprehensive study of NATO and Warsaw Pact capabilities to mobilize their conventional forces.

This book draws upon essays prepared for a NATO-Warsaw Pact conference, sponsored by the Mobilization Concepts Development Center of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, held at the National Defense University. In these essays, US and European specialists discuss developments and vulnerabilities in the two blocs. They address four issues: (1) mobilization and reinforcement, (2) developments in front-line states, (3) communications and transportation problems, and (4) difficulties on the flanks. The editor, Jeffrey Simon, makes suggestions for US and NATO policy.

These individual studies and the book as a whole represent the most current and thorough examination of NATO-Warsaw Pact capabilities available today. At a time when the United States and its allies are reflecting on their collective security responsibilities for the future, this work is a welcome addition to the discussion.

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL, US AIR FORCE
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This book evolved from a conference held in November 1987 sponsored by the Mobilization Concepts Development Center, Institute for National Strategic Studies, and held at the National Defense University. The conference participants, drawn from the academic world and government in the US and European NATO, came together to discuss NATO-Warsaw Pact force mobilization.

Twenty specialists discuss the problems that the US and USSR have in mobilizing and reinforcing Europe: developments in the Warsaw Pact’s front-line states and NATO’s core; problems in reception of reinforcements and their transport to the forward areas; and developing vulnerabilities on the flanks. A summary of the contributors’ major points is found in the Overview. In the concluding chapter I offer suggestions for US and NATO policy.

I want to express my grateful appreciation to Lieutenant General Bradley C. Hosmer, President, National Defense University, Dr. John E. Endicott, Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies, and William B. Taylor, Jr., Director, Mobilization Concepts Development Center, for their support during the conference. I would also like to acknowledge the participation at the conference of General William A. Knowlton, USA (Ret.), Dr. Robert E. Hunter, CSIS, Colonel Knud L. Christensen, Danish Defense Intelligence Service, and Lieutenant Colonel Jan Erik Karlsen, Norwegian Army.

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Special thanks are due to Dr. Jack H. Nunn, Acting Director, and Colonel Andrew L. Austin, Deputy Director, Mobilization Concepts Development Center, for assistance in making the conference a success; to Commander William C. Moncrief and Ms. Shirley Higgren of the Information Resources Division; and to Dr. Frederick T.
Kiley, Director, Lieutenant Colonel Jennings R. Mace, Mr. George C. Maerz, and my editor, Dr. Deva Alves, of the Research Directorate, and Dr. William McCarron—all of whom provided indispensable assistance in preparing this volume in its final form.

Neither this volume nor the individual articles in it should be construed to reflect the official position of the National Defense University, the Institute for National Strategic Studies, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense. I alone am responsible for any errors of fact or judgment.

JEFFREY SIMON
WASHINGTON, D.C.
NATO–WARSAW PACT
FORCE MOBILIZATION
An Overview of NATO–Warsaw Pact Mobilization Issues

In December 1987 President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev signed an agreement to rid the European theater of intermediate nuclear forces (INF); the United States would remove its Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in return for Soviet removal of SS–20s, SS–4/5s, and SS–12/22s. More than just reducing nuclear weapons in the European theater, this agreement may ultimately prove historic because of the effect that it may have on the two post-World War II alliances; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) created in 1949 and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) or Warsaw Pact dating from 1955.

Not only have both alliances been challenged, they likely will be increasingly challenged from a number of quarters. Ever since Reykjavik, European NATO has remained shaken; some Europeans are questioning US guarantees. After NATO's painful dual-track decision in 1979, and ultimate political success in deploying INF in December 1983, some Europeans who question the US nuclear guarantee have
begun to search for "new" security arrangements both within and outside the NATO structure.

INF has also had repercussions on the Warsaw Pact. Soviet stubbornness in INF negotiations between 1979 and their walkout when NATO began deployment in 1983, created tremendous strains in Eastern Europe. Tensions became publicly evident when the Soviets pressured their allies to permit Soviet deployment of SS-12/22 missiles as "countermeasures" to NATO's INF deployment during 1983-1984. In sum, ever since the Soviets started SS-20 deployments in 1977, INF has been a central issue for NATO and the Warsaw Pact; undoubtedly, the recent "double zero" agreement profoundly affects both alliances.

During the next decade both alliances will face a number of challenges: the economic burden of maintaining and modernizing conventional military forces in the face of increasing scarcity of manpower and materiel; the need to maintain, if not expand (or reduce through arms control), conventional forces in a European theater with fewer nuclear weapons; and the problems of force readiness, mobilization, reinforcement, and demographics. Both alliances are affected by these problems, though often asymmetrically.

The purpose of NATO-Warsaw Pact Force Mobilization is to describe these differing trends and developments and to evaluate their impact on both NATO and the Warsaw Pact with the aim of suggesting various options to improve US and NATO security. The book is divided in four parts (Mobilization and Reinforcement Problems; Developments in the Front-Line States; Problems of Communication and Transportation; and Problems on the Flanks). Each part addresses, independently, a critical issue and/or problem challenging the two alliances.

PART I. MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCEMENT PROBLEMS

Part I focuses on the general problems that the United States and the USSR have in alerting, mobilizing, and reinforcing their forward-deployed European theater forces, from the continental United States (CONUS) and the western military districts, respectively. In the opening Chapter, I discuss a number of trends that have become apparent in both alliances. First, I argue that economic constraints, evident since 1978, will continue to become more pronounced over the next decade. US and USSR domestic economic problems and
constraints undoubtedly will have repercussions on each superpower's political relations with their respective allies. Though demographics present a problem for both alliances, NATO's Central Region, at least until the year 2010, will be more adversely affected, experiencing greater constraints on manpower than the Warsaw Pact.

Unfavorable demographics are increasingly significant for NATO because NATO must rely more and more upon conventional forces to maintain a credible deterrent and war-fighting capability. Since 1960, however, NATO has actually decreased its active forces in the Central Region, relying increasingly on reservists, while the Warsaw Pact has increased its active forces. As a result, NATO depends more upon mobilization of reservists to augment its force structure. NATO must effectively employ what little time it has to alert, mobilize, and deploy its forces in crisis. Unfortunately, NATO's procedures for alerting, mobilizing, and "chopping" forces to NATO commanders have shown little development since the alliance began in 1949; mobilization and logistics still remain national responsibilities. As a result, NATO's alerting procedures depend heavily on placing military decisions before the accompanying political realities.

In contrast to NATO, a 1979/1980 Soviet Statute circumvents East European political authorities, alters the Warsaw Pact's alerting procedures, and permits the "chopping" of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) forces to Soviet Western and Southwestern TVD commanders. As a result, the USSR and the Warsaw Pact have improved their capability to engage in offensive operations, if they so choose. In sum, asymmetrical active/reserve force developments and alerting procedures to ready and mobilize forces in NATO and the Warsaw Pact create significant credibility problems for both sides. On the one hand, they stretch the credibility of the Warsaw Pact's defensive military doctrine and, on the other hand, NATO's ability to defend itself against attack.

In Chapter 2 John Yurechko discusses Soviet problems for reinforcing their forward-deployed forces in the European theater. These consist of their nineteen divisions in the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG), five in the Central Group of Forces (CGF), four in the Southern Group of Forces (SGF) and two in the Northern Group (NGF). Soviet reinforcements must transit across Poland (and perhaps Hungary) from the six western military districts and the three military districts comprising the central strategic reserve.
Analyzing the Russian and Soviet historical manpower mobilization experiences—during the Crimean War, the Russo-Japanese War, World War I, World War II, and the post-World War II experiences in Hungary 1956, Berlin 1961, Czechoslovakia 1968, the Middle East 1973, Afghanistan 1979, and Poland 1980-1981—Yurechko concludes that, since 1945, the Soviets have improved their capability to mobilize portions of their forces on short notice in response to crisis situations. He also outlines Soviet general mobilization mechanisms; in particular, focusing at the level of the six western military districts and the three central strategic reserve districts.

Yurechko notes that the Soviets plan to generate over 96 divisions from these nine military districts (including the 18 divisions from the strategic reserve) in 60 days, and that between 1981-1987, Soviet reserve forces have actually increased by over 17 divisions (12 divisions in the western military districts, and 5 in the central strategic reserve). Yurechko also adds that the 1979-1980 Statute altering the Warsaw Pact’s alerting procedures and the creation of Western and Southwestern TVD command structures, made public in 1984, allows the Soviets to coordinate and control the timing of mobilization and reinforcement of western military district second strategic echelon forces with Soviet-Warsaw Pact first strategic echelon Combined Armed Forces (CAF) in the forward areas.

The Soviets, though, also have problems. According to Yurechko, the Soviets believe that they will have to mobilize and deploy western military district manpower while under attack from NATO deep-strikes (the Follow On Forces Attack), and their prepositioned equipment for 12 mobilization base divisions will be exposed to attack. Hence, the USSR’s struggle for strategic deployment will be different than in the past. Because a future war may be won or lost because of deployment, Soviet mobilization and deployment plans stress secrecy, mobility, maneuverability, and flexibility. In sum, the Soviets recognize that their mobilization and reinforcement effort will be as critical to success or failure as the performance of their front-line forces!

In Chapter 3 Karl Lowe discusses planning problems in mobilizing US manpower and reinforcing Europe. After describing how the United States has mobilized reservists in the twentieth century (during World War I, World War II, the Korean War, the Berlin crisis in 1961, and the Vietnam conflict), Lowe concludes that increasing dependence upon reservists and awareness of the political sensitivities
manpower mobilization entails has made the United States increasingly sophisticated in managing the mobilization process.

Despite developing sophisticated mechanisms for improving mobilization, the US rapid reinforcement plan (RRP) for Europe requires too much time. In addition to political deliberations to enhance readiness of forces, time is required to mobilize reserves, to augment strategic mobility assets (civii air and sea-lift resources), and, despite POMCUS, to move large amounts of materiel to Europe. Hence, until existing specified shortfalls are met, Lowe claims that the United States cannot meet its initial reinforcement objective of 10 divisions in 10 days.

Concerns about the US implementation of the RRP and stance on INF have led many Europeans to question the credibility of the United States generally—and its nuclear guarantee specifically—particularly in light of Soviet improvements in strategic and conventional force balances and changed perspectives on extended conventional operations. Hence, on both sides of the Atlantic fresh attention is being devoted to the question of the conventional defense of Europe.

Karl Lowe considers how to better convert NATO’s untapped potential into improved military capability. He suggests force alterations in the following NATO regions: the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Italy, and Thrace. In the FRG, amending the Treaty of Paris to permit the integration of its 12 mechanized home defense brigades into the Bundeswehr would provide four new heavy divisions to cover the forward areas until reinforcements could arrive. This would result in strengthening all three German Corps sectors. In the North German Plain it would free the UK reinforcement infantry brigade to strengthen the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR). In the center, if German III Corps were reassigned to NORTHAG, the vulnerable Belgian Corps would be strengthened. In Bavaria, German II Corps would be strengthened; and if the First French Army integrated into CENTAG, supported by Canada’s bilingual reinforcement division, and US II Corps, Warsaw Pact penetrations through Austria into southern Germany could be blocked.

In Italy, Lowe suggests that US and Portuguese reinforcements are not really necessary to handle the Alpine approaches, particularly if France and Germany block a Pact thrust through Austria. In Turkish Thrace, he suggests making Greece and Turkey (who are manpower intensive, but economically poor) more self-sufficient,
through a NATO funding scheme to subsidize their procurement of selected weapons and ammunition. This would free US reinforcements now earmarked for Thrace to be employed elsewhere.

Recognizing that obstacles to these ideas exist, Lowe argues that the net effect of these considerations is to lessen European dependence on early US ground forces reinforcement. In addition, by modifying the RRP, forward area defense could be strengthened and a more rational and realistic sequencing of US reinforcements could occur. The net effect would be an improved NATO deterrent and defense.

In Chapter 4 Michael Deane describes the Soviet perception of US reinforcement of NATO and speculates how the Soviets might attempt to frustrate its successful execution. According to Deane, Soviet military doctrine began to change after 1962; no longer did the Soviets perceive war as a single, decisive nuclear exchange, but as a phased conflict. Since war would be longer and US mobilization and reinforcement would be necessary, the Soviet’s planned to target CONUS departure and European reception points during the initial nuclear strike and to conduct anti-Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) operations against surviving forces. The Soviets apparently believed that these operations would undermine the US ability to reinforce Europe with enough ground forces to affect the outcome of the war.

Their perceptions may have altered slightly, but not fundamentally, when the US Reforger and Crested Cap reinforcement exercises commenced in 1969 and 1970. The Soviets, though, began to show some concern about US reinforcement capabilities after the NATO Autumn Forge exercise in 1975; after Autumn Forge 1978 (Reforger-10) they became more seriously concerned. According to Deane, the Soviets consider Autumn Forge-81 as the basic US plan to reinforce Europe. Soviet literature discusses US/NATO SLOC defense techniques and how to defeat the United States in the mid-Atlantic. In sum, though the Soviets perceive the US reinforcement of Europe to be more credible than formerly and plan to tackle it as a military problem, they also plan to deal with first threats first—notably to attack US predeployed forces, weapons, and equipment.

Peter Wilson in Chapter 5 amplifies issues raised by Karl Lowe and Michael Deane. Wilson argues that the economic crunch that faces both the Warsaw Pact and NATO will be significant. On the
OVERVIEW OF MOBILIZATION ISSUES

On one hand, it appears that the Soviets would like a near-term pause in the competition in military readiness to focus on the tasks of revitalizing the Soviet economy and developing trans-century weapons systems. On the other hand, NATO planners face similar choices: to choose between improving the near-term mobilization and reinforcement potential of NATO forces or long-term investment plans. In particular, any US efforts to improve reinforcement capabilities will face fiscal constraints through the mid-1990s.

Wilson discusses the implications of French and Spanish participation in NATO; both allies provide SACEUR with operational depth to conduct reinforcement and theater operations. Although French military activities are very important to NATO’s forward defense, Spain’s potential significance is to receive reinforcements, thus allowing US ships to traverse the Atlantic’s “southern” route to avoid Soviet submarine and aircraft attacks. In addition, the Iberian road net has been upgraded, providing alternate lines of communication (LOC) to France’s multilane highways to the front.

Adding to Karl Lowe’s concerns about US RRP shortfalls, Wilson, recognizing economic constraints, provides some US reinforcement options, especially trade-offs between the heaviness and transportability of forces. In order to improve US reinforcement timelines, Wilson provides a strategy that marries the attractive attributes of motorized rifle divisions (Marine mechanized brigades with organic tracked-vehicle mobility and firepower) with the US Marine Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS) concept of prepositioning at sea with fast sealift ships. Although motorized high-technology units married to prepositioning and sealift concepts do not provide the solution to NATO’s reinforcement dilemma, they do provide useful, financially feasible, second- and third-echelon force options that could improve US reinforcement time-lines.

PART II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FRONT-LINE STATES

Part II focuses on the general problems faced by the Warsaw Pact’s front-line states and NATO’s core. While each alliance maintains the largest concentration of its first echelon military manpower and equipment in the forward areas, there are significant, often asymmetrical economic, societal, demographic, and political pressures for change.
In Chapter 6 Douglas Macgregor portrays the GDR as the Warsaw Pact's model war mobilization state. Although East Germany's National People's Army (NVA) is one of the smallest in the Pact with six divisions comprising 125,000 ground troops (77,000 conscripts and 48,000 regulars), it remains the best equipped and trained of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) forces. Since the NVA has been earmarked to the First Strategic Echelon since 1965, all its units are Category I; its six divisions are operationally and logistically configured for deployment within the GSFG's two fronts; and its tactical units and rear services structure matches the Soviet Army's. More importantly, the NVA lacks an artillery division, intelligence, transport, and logistical formations—making the NVA structurally dependent on Soviet support.

According to Macgregor, during the decade of the 1970s the GDR defense budget increased by approximately 75 percent, leading to rapid progress in the mechanization and modernization of East German forces—significant infusions of T-62 and T-72 tanks, heavy folding bridges and engineer equipment, Mi-24 HIND helicopters, and MiG-23 fighters. Qualitative armaments improvements were necessary to support increased training and exercise activities between NVA and GSFG units. By the mid-1970s, as larger war stocks were being prepositioned in the GDR, civil defense and mobilization were increasingly subordinated to the NVA's control. In addition, the GDR's 50,000-man border force, under the ministry of state security, became increasingly integrated under the ministry of defense and coordinated with GSFG. Combined NVA-GSFG exercises suggest that these units were being trained to attack across the inter-German border from the march column without assembling prior to deployment.

The GDR's expanding military potential is based on a cadre system. A nucleus of professionals trains draftees who spend 18 months on active duty, and then 3 months per year undergoing refresher training until they have completed 24 months (Category I reservists are 20-35 years of age; Category II from 36 to 50). Thus, the GDR expects to supplement its six NVA active ground force divisions with four mobilization divisions. While reservists constitute 65 percent of the GDR's total force of 619,000 troops, when other armed organs are added during full mobilization, the total swells to 1,272,000 men. Added to this rather impressive force in East Germany is the GSFG,
OVERVIEW OF MOBILIZATION ISSUES

with a total strength of 420,000 (380,000 ground troops and 40,000 air force).

Soviet command and control of NVA forces predates the Statute system described by Colonel Kuklinski for other NSWP forces. The status of forces agreement which regulates the GSFG in the GDR allows the GSFG free reign regarding the number, location, and movement of Soviet forces and implicitly grants the GSFG Commander the authority to declare a state of emergency in response to internal or external conditions. Macgregor notes that the NVA’s structural dependence upon the Soviet armed forces not only makes independent NVA army operations impossible, but also the three NVA divisions in Military District (MD) V and the three in MD III could be operationally commanded by the GSFG commander. In addition, NVA naval forces have been incorporated into the Baltic Fleet since exercise Sevér in 1968. Air force units are not only extremely dependent upon Soviet support for repairs, supplies, and fuel, but will operate under Soviet direction as well.

In sum, the GDR is the Soviets’ model Warsaw Pact ally. One estimate, probably overly optimistic, suggests that the NVA could mobilize and deploy its four reserve divisions within 48 hours. In addition the militarization of the civil sector during the 1970s has been significant. The real question, though, is whether the GDR can sustain its current military contribution in the years ahead. Not only has its population declined in recent decades, but demographics suggest future steep declines in the 18-year old male cohort. In addition to bringing women into active service, the GDR’s long-term demographic prospects suggest that the NVA cannot maintain its existing strength levels in the 1990s.

In Chapter 7 Christopher Jones discusses developments in Czechoslovakia since the Soviet invasion. The catalyst for changes in relations between the Czechoslovak People’s Army (CSPA) and the Central Group of Forces (CGF) was the year 1968. CSPA restructuring occurred in the context of severe demoralization—the purging of the officer corps, mass resignations, and efforts to recruit new officers, while a Soviet shadow staff was placed at all levels of CSPA command. During the 1970s, the Soviets resolved the problem of demoralization by converting the CSPA into a national training and reserve system that supplied elite units to the Soviet-dominated coalition. On the internal front, the CSPA became a reserve and logistical system to support the elite 20,000-man National Security
Corps (Ministry of Interior) and the mass 120,000-man People's Militia.

The CSPA has four Category I divisions (one tank and three mechanized rifle), which are the most likely candidates for integration with the CGF's five ground divisions. In the early 1970s, combined exercises involving regiments and sub-units of the two allied forces occurred with increasing frequency. One consequence of bilateral and multilateral exercises was the CSPA's de facto surrender of independent operational capabilities.

Jones argues that during the next decade, the CSPA will continue to train and equip 4 to 5 of its 10 ground forces divisions to integrate increasingly with the 5 division CGF on the model of the NVA ground forces with the GSFG in East Germany. Although the ultimate goal in Czechoslovakia may be to link the CGF and CSPA units on a 1:1 ratio, at present it is no better than 2:1, and in the early 1970s the ratio was worse, on the order of 5:1.

The remaining five to six (of the present 10) ground divisions will serve as training units, reserve units, and logistical back-ups. The People's Militia, reorganized along CSPA lines in the early 1970s, will handle internal security. The CSPA and CGF have primary responsibility for the southern flank of the Central Front—to march into Bavaria to take on US and West German troops.

Jones argues that the Brezhnev-Husak era has left Czechoslovakia a number of troubling legacies. First, it remains difficult to replenish the CSPA officer corps. Second, the economy is steadily deteriorating, resulting in depleted CSPA inventories. Third, dissident and anti-nuclear movements continue to fester. Therefore, because Gorbachev and Milos Jakes can ill afford an intensified European arms race, they are pursuing a vigorous arms control policy to relieve the pressure.

Gorbachev's arms control policies are consistent with Czech interests. The CSPA's larger, but lower-quality forces can be bargained away, even on an asymmetrical basis, against smaller numbers of higher quality NATO forces. In fact, Jones argues that such a trade could enhance the relative offensive capabilities of the CGF-CSPA coalition force facing West Germany. At the same time, the interlocking structures of the CGF, CSPA, National Security Corps, and People's Militia preserve an effective internal control apparatus.
In Chapter 8 Phillip Karber and John Milam discuss developments in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). During World War II, the German Wehrkreis (military district) system (based upon a "mobilization in waves" concept) created over 300 infantry divisions between 1934 and 1944. Each Wehrkreis raised division-level formations by conducting recruitment, conscription, and post-mobilization training.

Today the Bundeswehr is the cornerstone for defending Western Europe. From its humble beginnings in 1955, the Bundeswehr now contributes 50 percent of NATO's combat ready land forces, 30 percent of its aircraft, and 70 to 100 percent of the naval aviation deployed in the Baltic Sea. By law, the Bundesheer (Army) is restricted to 12 divisions with a manpower cap of 350,000; a further 150,000 men are authorized for the Air Force and Navy. The Territorial Army, created in the 1970s, is based on the concept that paramilitary formations who provide rear-area defense are the best source of logistic support. They also permit the FRG to create the maximum combat elements within its 500,000/12 division cap.

In addition to the Territorial Army, new manpower pools were also created during the 1970s. These are the ready reserves and active unit fillers, which yield trained personnel to bring active peacetime units to full combat proficiency. The mobilization system, which allows the Bundesheer to increase from 300,000 in peacetime to 1,000,000 in wartime, is based upon conscription of 15 months service (18 months in 1989) and resembles the World War II Wehrkreis system.

The 12-brigade Territorial Army, which relies even more than the Bundesheer on reserves to fill out its wartime requirements, has undergone comprehensive equipment modernization. Six combined arms brigades have been organized to deal with the Warsaw Pact's increased capability to penetrate NATO's rear combat zones. Increasingly, several "heavy" home defense brigades have been assigned forward defense missions of their own, while some light equipment holding brigades provide rear defense functions. In addition to providing area and point security in NATO's operational depth, the Territorial Army plays a critical role in establishing and maintaining civil-military liaison.

According to Karber and Milam, the FRG's armed forces today are better manned, equipped, and prepared to carry out their peace
and wartime missions than at any time in the past. The mobilization system is efficient and reliable; Bundesheer personnel are well-trained and highly motivated, and their equipment ranks among the best in the world. Problems, however, lurk on the horizon. First, Germany is experiencing declining birth rates which are causing personnel shortfalls which will be increasingly felt in the civil and military sectors. A second problem has emerged from the recently completed modernization process; reservists are finding it more difficult to man new technologically advanced systems. The third concern is that recent five-year economic growth projections, which suggest a decline from 3 to 1.5 percent growth rates, will adversely affect the Bundesheer’s ability to field new equipment and improve infrastructure support. In addition to these domestic problems, external factors will likely impact the most over the next decade. INF and future arms control agreements might significantly impact on conventional forces. Despite these challenges, the FRG has been a notable NATO success and will likely continue thus in the future.

In Chapter 9 Diego Ruiz Palmer describes the evolution of France’s traditional mission from being NATO’s “heartland” between 1949 and 1966, through its withdrawal from NATO’s “integrated” military structure (the Defense Planning Committee, the Nuclear Planning Group, and the Military Committee), to the present when France participates in numerous NATO committees (dealing with Air Defense, Logistics, Civil Emergency Planning, Armaments, etc.) possibly contributing more conventional ground forces than at any time in NATO’s history.

Although French participation in multilateral training activities with allies has been deliberately low profile since 1966, it has expanded over the years. For example, its role has increased in SACLANT’s series of Maritime exercises (Teamwork/Ocean Safari/Northern Wedding) and in joint training with the Bundeswehr at virtually every level from battalion to corps. 20,000 French troops participated in 1987 Kecker Spatz/Moineau Hardi.

Under the Fifth Republic, the concept of the “short war” has driven mobilization planning. The two principal instruments for instilling a defense consciousness have been universal, compulsory military service and a mass mobilization-based territorial defense organization. The army’s active component is almost exclusively oriented towards performing wartime missions outside France, while the home defense forces are dependent upon mobilization of 115,000
men (from 273,000 reservists). With increasing cooperation with NATO, French support of protracted conventional combat concepts has occurred.

All French males between 18 and 50 are subject for military duty for 12 (some volunteer for 24) months conscription and then service as reservists (subject to 1 month recall for refresher training until age 35). Today, the French Army has 280,000 men (183,000 or 65 percent conscripts); it expands by an additional 273,000 men upon mobilization. An engagement in Central Europe would involve the three corps of the 1 (FR) Army and the Force d’Action Rapide (FAR)—200,000 men, 1,200 tanks, and 400 artillery pieces. In most conceivable scenarios, French conventional forces, as demonstrated by FAR in Kecker Spatz in Germany, would be available as a NATO operational reserve.

Alone in Western Europe, France maintains a versatile defense posture: a strategic nuclear triad, "prestrategic" nuclear and conventional forces configured for coalition war in Europe, out-of-area activities, and home defense. The size and quality of French conventional forces, though, may be at odds with her common defense responsibilities in Central Europe. While Kecker Spatz was an encouraging sign of French willingness to participate in European defense, it revealed French inadequacies in a high-intensity conflict. The issue of whether or not to move French forces forward into Germany in peacetime may arise if the United States decides to withdraw some troops from Europe.

The greatest challenge facing France will be to preserve the existing national defense policy consensus while adjusting France's defense posture to an evolving strategic environment. Such a policy will require resource constraints, less reliance on nuclear weapons, and an expanding role within the Alliance. Since it appears that France is more congenial to overall Alliance interests, a follow-on step would be to make French territory available to the Alliance, particularly US reinforcements during crisis or war. In sum, though much more could be achieved, France is another NATO success story.

In Chapter 10 David Isby discusses Britain's historical mobilization experiences. During World War I and World War II British mobilization stressed the rapid deployment of regular forces to the continent, with the Territorial Army dealing with the home front. It
took Britain two years to complete national mobilization with enormous US assistance. In contrast, post-World War II conflicts have been handled without mobilization of non-regular troops. Although manpower was raised through two-year conscription between 1949-1960, de-colonization, the emergence of the superpowers, and atomic weapons contributed to a change in British force structure; now Britain focuses primarily on Europe and NATO defense with all-volunteer forces.

Mobilization during the recent Falklands conflict demonstrated that modern "post-industrial" mobilization stresses the ability to "surge" not only production but procedures (notably in the development and procurement of systems) often using a wide range of civil-sector assets. The Falklands, though, was a limited mobilization, allowing for a concentration of resources that would not be possible in a general conflict. Britain's historical efforts to buy required items abroad may not be applicable, nor will "surging" domestic industry because of the decline in the heavy industrial base. In addition, ammunition and spare parts are likely to be consumed at very high rates in modern conflict and the UK's ability to use overseas resources is further constrained by NATO's lack of standardization.

Britain's total regular forces comprise 327,000. The 163,000 man British Army depends very much on reserves to complement its fighting power. The Reserve and the Territorial Army total about 218,000; the 158,000 reserve personnel are "fillers" (there are no "army reserve" units as on the American model). Instead Britain has a distinct Territorial Army of some 78,000 (that augments to 120,000), which is fully integrated into the Army structure, and will provide over 30 percent of the British Army Of the Rhine (BAOR)'s mobilized strength and much of the home defense force. British planning is geared to the short, sharp conflict. If a war lasted more than a month, a general mobilization would have to be improvised.

All unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral British military operations since 1945 have been performed successfully. Within NATO Britain plays a central role in many commands, including CINCCHAN. In AFCENT, the I (UK) Corps will be part of NORTHAG; British forces committed to Norway and Denmark come under AFNORTH command; and forces on Cyprus would be available to AFSSOUTH. British forces would, however, come under NATO command only on mobilization; in peacetime only British forces committed to AMF are subordinate to NATO command. In 1980
Operation Crusader and 1984 Operation Lionheart Britain tested mobilization and reinforcement of 10,000 regulars and 20,000 Territorials and Reserves by air and sea to Germany in 48 hours. This quickness counteracts the slower movement of the I (NL) and I and II (FE) Corps.

Numerous politically significant and expensive procurement programs will require funding, and procurement choices will affect Britain's mobilization capabilities. Almost all categories of follow-on equipment will cost more than the weapons being replaced. Greater cost trends are apparent in operations and maintenance, too. The already reduced regular force structure limits future reductions to offset these higher costs. Because most savings from transferring functions to reserves or the civil sector have already occurred, future cuts will likely mandate cuts in NATO commitments. The latest "marginal" commitment to be reexamined is deploying ground forces to Denmark; prioritization will be a British (not NATO) decision. Although Trident represents a considerable share of scarce procurement funds, Isby sees Britain's commitment to NATO's Central Front remaining as Britain's highest general purpose force priority, at the expense of Britain's Atlantic commitment. Britain has made NATO the key to its defense policy; it has not developed major bilateral defense agreements comparable to France and Germany. In addition, as INF are removed from Europe, Britain's (and France's) nuclear forces will likely take on added importance.

PART III. PROBLEMS OF COMMUNICATION AND TRANSPORTATION

Part III focuses on the general problems that both the United States and USSR have in transporting reinforcements from the continental United States and the western military districts to the forward areas. Not only does each have asymmetrical problems in distance, time, and terrain (air, sea, and ground) for transit of reinforcements, but also reception problems vary.

Soviet reinforcements must transit Poland and, depending on the nature of the conflict, Hungary, to reinforce the forward area; and both allies represent extremes. Poland has the largest military force (aside from the USSR) in the Warsaw Pact, a rich martial tradition, and sits astride a geo-strategically significant Soviet axis. Hungary has the smallest army, a less than exemplary martial tradition, and resides in a less significant strategic location.
Once US (and UK) reinforcements transit the Atlantic, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg (BENELUX) provide major sea and aerial ports for troop and materiel debarkation to reinforce and resupply the forward areas in Germany. In addition to providing naval mine sweeping and air defense support, BENELUX also commits manpower to NORTHAG in the form of I BE Corps and I NL Corps.

In Chapter 11 Les Griggs discusses the special problems that Poland presents to the USSR. Despite very unfavorable odds, the modern Polish Army generally has performed well. It had its origins in World War I, when Polish legions were formed, expanding to almost two million men. After the creation of the modern Polish state at the end of World War I, its first armed conflict was with the USSR, during which the 1,300,000 Poles acquitted themselves well. Poland's next military action was against the German onslaught on 1 September 1939. Although the general mobilization was chaotic, being called only 24 hours before the German attack, the Poles managed to field 840,000 troops (70 percent of their planning force) and to perform heroically against overwhelming odds.

Lessons learned from this tragic experience formed the basis of the Polish People's Army (PPA). Today the PPA remains large; it consists of 402,000 regulars with a very high percentage of conscripts (62.5 percent) who serve a two-year term of service. There are also 501,000 reserves (of which 415,000 belong to ground forces). The major problem with the PPA's 15 divisions is that while its equipment holdings are large (3,500 tanks and 675 combat aircraft), they remain mostly obsolescent despite efforts to modernize them. In addition, Poland maintains large paramilitary forces (14-65,000 Internal Defense Troops, 18-30,000 Frontier Defense Troops, 60-100,000 Citizens' Militia, 25-30,000 Motorized Reserves of the Citizens' Militia, and 100-300,000 Voluntary Militia Reserve).

The PPA has been tested in one international action, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and a number of domestic activities. Although the Polish General Staff positively evaluated the PPA's 1968 performance, the action demoralized the PPA's officer corps.

The PPA has also played a role in various domestic crises—in 1956, 1970, 1976, and 1980-81. During June 1956, PPA units refused to fire on rioting Poznan workers. Later in the year, the PPA backed Gomulka, who threatened to resist the Soviets if they
intervened in Poland militarily. During the December 1970 Baltic Coast riots, the PPA participated extensively in putting down the insurrection. Coming in the wake of the Czech intervention, PPA officer corps morale dropped precipitously. Perhaps for these reasons, during the June 1976 riots Jaruzelski refused to commit the PPA. In marked contrast, though, during the entire 1980-81 Solidarity period, PPA planning of a possible military intervention and the implementation of martial law was prominent.

In a potential Warsaw Pact military operation 90 percent of the PPA would fall under the control of the Soviet Western TVD commander. Poland's key role, though, remains its strategic location, providing lines of communication for Soviet second echelon forces in transit from the western military districts to the forward area. Noting that 168 Soviet divisions moved across Poland during World War II, Griggs argues that Poland's national territory and transportation system can support Soviet deployments if adequate preparations are made in advance. He argues that the Soviets likely will employ Soviet forces from the western military districts to secure transit of Soviet forces across Poland, and speculates that the Soviet GF will establish and protect the Western TVD headquarters and protect any Soviet weapons of mass destruction on Polish soil.

Griggs concludes that Poland's struggle to modernize the PPA has been uneven and glacially slow. Despite Soviet pressures, economic conditions result in continual delays in the upgrading of equipment. In fact, Polish leaders may face the prospect of having to scale back or restructure their military commitments. The PPA, though, remains vital to Warsaw Pact operational planning; if conflict broke out today, the PPA would play an offensive role. The effect of continued erosion, though, has clearly undermined the PPA's ability to operate in a protracted war and will likely undermine its future capability.

In Chapter 12 Ivan Volgyes and Zoltan Barany evaluate Hungary's historical military performance as dismal. As part of the Habsburg Empire, and not yet independent, its one true mobilization experience during World War I was fouled up. After independence under Bela Kun in 1919, and again during World War II, Hungarian mobilization proved less than exemplary.

In the post-war era, under communist rule, the Hungarian Army did not fundamentally improve. It was not a very impressive threat
against Yugoslavia in 1950. During the 1956 revolution many troops sided first with the rebels, then failed to resist when the Russians invaded Hungary. Finally, the HPA participated in the invasion of Czechoslovakia, an unpopular action. In sum, the HPA’s historical performance has been less than impressive.

In assessing the HPA’s structure today, the authors note that though it is the smallest NSWP army, it has the second largest professional officers corps because the party fundamentally distrusts the HPA. The HPA’s six divisions have no Category 1 units and are poorly equipped. Aside from a few T-72s, vertical-lift aircraft, and modernization of SAMs, the HPA’s inventory remains generally inferior. Military service is only 18 months, the second shortest (after Romania) among NSWP armies; readiness and training are undermined by the need to perform domestic economic tasks. Even though the 83,000-man army is the one service that must significantly augment by 135,000 through mobilization; and the authors question its effectiveness.

The Soviets’ four-division Southern Group of Forces (SGF) possess Category 1 forces, more aircraft than the HPA, and are located around major HPA bases and population centers. The SGF clearly has the mission to maintain control over Hungary in the event of a domestic crisis and to control Hungary’s logistics and air defense. Soviet domination over the HPA remains the same as in the past, only Soviet supervision is not as intrusive.

From the Soviet perspective, Hungary’s strategic role is less important than the northern tier. But in a Southwestern TVD offensive, the HPA might drive to the south toward Yugoslavia; in a Western TVD operation, the HPA would provide logistic and limited combat support in a “Danubian front.” While the HPA’s ability to participate in offensive operations is clearly limited by mediocre training, personnel, equipment, and questionable reliability, Hungary is important as a staging area. Hungarian weakness could cause problems for the Soviet Union since Hungary is “the soft underbelly” of the WTO.

In Chapter 13 Robert Ulin notes that the twentieth century has been hard on Belgium. Germany has invaded the country twice, its economy has gone from one of the best to worst in Western Europe, and the Fleming-Walloon language dispute threatens to tear the state apart. These experiences and trends reflect negatively on Belgium’s
defense posture: though Belgium’s total active forces have declined from 148,495 in 1953 to 90,800 in 1987, conscripts comprise a very low (31) percent of that force. With the eventual stand-down of the NIKE air defense missiles due to lack of funds, another 2,000 troops may be eliminated from the active force structure. The Belgian defense minister has indicated that Belgium may, in the future, have to do “one or two (NATO) tasks less.”

As Belgium’s active component has declined, there has been a corresponding increase in the reserve force structure. In 1987, for example, the 67,500-man army augments to 424,233, the 18,800-man Air Force to 61,649, and the 4,500-man Navy to 16,524—a total of 502,406. Unfortunately, the reserves are poorly trained and most units are poorly equipped. Of the 30,000 conscripts annually rotating through the Belgian Armed Forces (serving active duty tours varying from 10 to 15 months), most perform menial tasks and view military service as a waste of time. Following active service, a reservist can expect recall for a maximum of only 24 days during the remainder of his 8-15 year obligation. In sum, meaningful field training exercises are seldom held. This could present a critical problem for the I BE Corps sector and for US reinforcement, because most Belgian manpower for operating the LOC comes from Forces of the Interior who must be mobilized when called to duty. In addition, Ulin notes that not only do the reserves receive cast-off equipment, but that if the 411,606 reservists were called to duty in an emergency today, there would not be enough equipment to go around.

The active structure also has its problems in junior officer shortages and outdated equipment. For instance, one disturbing trend is the lack of junior officers in front-line units, while there is no shortage of officers on the staff in Brussels. Outdated equipment is widespread. Even the highly motivated, superbly trained Para-Commandos are supplied with World War II M2A1 105mm Howitzers and Korean War vintage radios. Rather than replace the 1960s vintage Leopard I tanks, the Belgians have been compelled to modernize them. In addition, though the Air Force has recently ordered 44 additional F-16s (at a cost of $980 million) that the defense ministry did not want, the decision was made merely to maintain jobs since they will be assembled in Belgium. Ulin argues that political-economic considerations create maldistribution of defense expenditures that contributes to Belgium’s structural disarmament.
Despite some long-term negative demographic, economic-political, and military trends, Belgium recently achieved important progress in bilateral host nation support (HNS) agreements, and in the development of a "mobilization by objectives" system which provides greater flexibility in the transition from peace to war. In addition, they adopted three major priorities. They recognize the need to improve the defense of LOC including air defense of the ports; the organization and equipment of the reserves; and the ability of the Gendarmes to protect LOC and provide rear area security.

In Chapter 14 Peter Volten notes that though the Dutch were willing to mobilize their forces historically (in 1870, 1914, and 1939) shortfalls and poor planning were evident. The experience of the May 1940 capitulation and 1940-1945 occupation led to an end of the Dutch armed neutrality policy. Since signing the Treaty of Brussels on 17 March 1948, the Netherlands has been tightly wedded to NATO. Since then, they have publicly supported the Korean War, Berlin crisis, peace-keeping efforts in Lebanon, and recent Persian Gulf minesweeping activities.

Volten also notes that the Netherlands shares some of the same problems that exist in Belgium. Demographic trends will impact upon military manpower; slowing economic growth signifies declining defense expenditures. Not only do Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost campaigns make it more difficult to generate public support for defense expenditures, but, when coupled with the high cost of follow-on weapons systems, the Netherlands also faces the problem of structural disarmament. In addition to these domestic problems is the difficulty in timing the arrival of US reinforcements in Europe to prevent Soviet successes. This, Volten argues, coupled with the lack of Western European operational manpower reserves, is the most critical Western defense shortfall that the Dutch can help to solve.

All three Dutch services (Army, Navy, and Air Force) fulfill their principal missions in NATO's defense. The Navy contributes to protecting SLOCs with a special emphasis on anti-submarine warfare. The Air Force mission (with eight squadrons of 162 operationally assigned F-16s of a total of 213 by 1991) remains close air support, although Dutch aircraft also play a role in air defense (with 12 squadrons of Hawk guided missiles). The Army's 1 NL Corps, which has the mission of defending a NORTHAG corps sector in the North German Plain, depends heavily upon conscripts (70 percent of the 34,000 peacetime force); in fact, more so than any other NATO member.
This aspect of Dutch mobilization—the contribution of conscripts to the almost threefold increase of combat power in wartime—is a system called Rechtstreeks Instromend Mobilisabel (RIM or Direct Intake “‘Mobilizable’”). The system provides a model for NATO to emulate. Under the system, troops train as units during their 14-16 month active duty and remain available in the 16 to 20 months after active duty completion, while equipment, identical to that used during active duty, is stored in depots. The system’s advantage is that for every active-duty battalion, a trained reserve battalion is maintained at 20-35 percent of the cost of an active-duty battalion. In addition, a so-called short leave (SL) system allows soldiers to go home after active duty, but they are subject to recall at any time during the next four to six months, substituting for the company still undergoing training, to bring their companies up to strength. Under this system, two active companies in peacetime can be augmented to six trained companies (one SL and three RIM) in wartime, thus tripling the peacetime strength. Upon full mobilization, which takes a few days, the I NL Corps will grow from 34,000 to 89,000 men.

According to Volten, the Dutch mobilization system offers distinct advantages compared to other NATO states and should be examined, in light of US reinforcement shortfalls and NATO’s core problem—lack of operational reserves. For example, if the United States picked up the Dutch Air Force or Naval mission, the Netherlands could concentrate on augmenting its ground forces. In effect, it could create a second NL Corps as operational reserves for NORTHAG, thereby reducing pressure on III US Corps strategic reserves. Though Volten’s suggestion may appear drastic, his point—that if countries within NATO (and services within countries) begin to cooperate more closely, NATO would discover and utilize an untapped reservoir of improvements—is worth pondering.

PART IV. PROBLEMS ON THE FLANKS

Part IV focuses on the general problems that the flanks present to both the United States and USSR. The Soviet Southwestern TVD Commander’s ability to project forces in the Southern flank toward Italy and/or Thrace through Bulgaria and Romania has eroded in recent years. In the same vein, NATO’s ability to reinforce and defend Norway and Denmark in the Northern flank has also eroded. These mutual, but asymmetrical vulnerabilities present opportunities and challenges to each alliance.
In Chapter 15 Daniel Nelson describes Bulgaria's military historical experience as being singularly uninspiring. Traditionally the Bulgarian army has had little esprit de corps or officer leadership. Virtually nothing in modern history suggests the Bulgarian People's Army (BPA) can operate independently and successfully against an adversary. In addition, in 1965 an unsuccessful political-military conspiracy arose within the BPA contributing to lack of trust between the Bulgarian Communist Party and BPA. As a result, the BPA has one of the smallest professional officer corps of Pact armies. In a protracted war, the BPA's lack of élan and combat experience may be telling factors in its ability to employ forces effectively.

Bulgarian military preparedness shows some major gaps—the most glaring one is that three of the eight BPA motorized rifle divisions are manned at only 30 percent. The limited size and modernization of the army and air force (and almost non-existent navy) suggest that an offensive role for the BPA is very unlikely. In fact, if the principal Soviet advance in the Southwestern TVD is through Hungary (Danubian front), a likely role for the BPA is to sit tight to secure Yugoslav and Greek non-interference.

NATO planners are most concerned with a general Warsaw Pact offensive where 24 Hungarian, Romanian, and Bulgarian divisions reinforce an equal or greater number of Soviet divisions in the Southwestern TVD. One offensive thrust in this unlikely worst-case scenario might occur through Hungary, Slovenia, and Croatia into Austria and Northern Italy. Other fronts might seek to secure the Bosphorus and Dardenelles, while other forces would move through Thrace and Macedonia to seize Greece. While Bulgaria might have the capacity to initiate an offensive operation, it would not mobilize nor begin preparations for hostilities unless ordered by the Soviet Stavka.

In addition to economic (aged inventories of armor and transport) and social (ethnic minority) obstacles to mobilization, military obstacles also exist. Of the BPA's eight motorized rifle divisions, three are Category III (manned and equipped at 30 percent) and two divisions and some armored formations are Category II (50-75 percent manned and equipped). Hence, at most only about half the BPA is capable of rapid involvement. A BPA effort to capture European Turkey and the northern Aegean coast would be fraught with uncertainty. If a rapid BPA mobilization were necessary, it would take several days to fill out the Category II divisions with 10-15,000
reservists, and would take weeks to fill out the Category III divisions with at least 25,000 reservists. The readying and testing of aged equipment would then necessitate further delays. During this period, NATO aircraft could disrupt troop formations, depots, staging areas, and transportation links. In sum, the Bulgarian build-up would be impeded and as combat time extended, the Turkish military (with a regular army of 500,000 and over 800,000 reserves) would gain favor.

Two indicators of Bulgaria's strongly integrated role are its defense spending, which at 7.0-8.0 percent of GNP, is the highest in Eastern Europe and its military manpower, which at 20 active-duty personnel per 1,000 population (versus 16-17 in the USSR) remains disproportionately high. Though no Soviet Group of Forces resides in Bulgaria, a Soviet presence persists with Soviet instructors in Bulgarian military schools, and technicians and personnel attached directly to BPA units. In sum, while the Soviets may be satisfied with Bulgaria's commitment of resources to its military effort, the BPA's understrength divisions and disproportion of conscripts to total manpower, limit its ability to support a full mobilization.

In Chapter 16 George Price refers to the Romanian People's Army (RPA) as merely tokens in the Warsaw Pact. In the 20 years since the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia—which Romania did not participate in, but felt threatened by—Nicolae Ceausescu has implemented a military policy that emphasizes the primacy of territorial defense on the Yugoslav model and he has restructured Romanian armed forces to resist invasion. Hence, although Romania gives the minimal support to the Warsaw Pact, the RPA is severely limited in its ability to engage in Soviet-style military operations.

Mobilization and force employment are geared to conduct military operations solely within Romania's boundaries. While the transition to territorial defense has reduced the need for expensive mechanized forces, it has burdened Romania's infrastructure to meet basic needs. In 1965 Romania produced 25 percent of its military materiel; today the bulk is produced domestically. The RPA's mission, centered around its elite mountain troops, is to resist invasion and delay enemy occupation to buy time for the 900,000-man Patriotic Guards to mobilize and engage in resistance based on an "all-peoples' defense" concept.
Romania keeps its participation in the Warsaw Pact to the absolute minimum. Romanian forces did not participate in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, and they do not participate in combined field exercises. Since the 1978 Political Consultative Committee meeting, Ceausescu has publicly resisted Soviet calls to increase defense expenditures; in fact, Romania has decreased its expenditures. Romanian law prohibits the use of Romanian forces outside Romanian territory, and Romania is the one Pact member that refused to adhere to the 1979/1980 Warsaw Pact wartime Statute which provides for "chopping" forces to the Soviet TVD commander. Romanian officers do not train nor are they educated in Soviet schools. These actions demonstrate Ceausescu's commitment to keeping participation in the Warsaw Pact to the absolute minimum, and make the incorporation of Romanian forces into a Southwestern TVD very difficult.

The 150,000-man (mostly conscript) Romanian Army has 10 (2 tank and 8 motorized rifle) divisions and three brigades of elite mountain troops. The army's size has gradually decreased from 200,000 in 1966, while the militia or Patriotic Guards have increased from 50,000 in 1968 to 900,000 in 1986. In addition, the Youth Homeland Defense Force provides manpower with some military training. In sum, the Romanian military mobilization process is designed to activate territorial defense units, not to provide replacement units for divisions depleted in offensive operations.

While the Soviets clearly have problems on their Southern flank, NATO has similar problems defending the Northern flank. In Chapter 17 Christian Thune discusses Denmark's defense problems. Since joining NATO in 1949, Denmark has endeavored to keep Alliance and defense commitments at a low level both politically and economically. Denmark's quasi-neutralism was revealed in 1953 in its peacetime prohibitions against permitting Allied forces to be stationed in Denmark, and in the 1960 refusal to permit nuclear warheads on its soil. Despite early Danish reservations, serious political divisions did not occur until the 1980s, when the issues of INF, Co-located Operation Bases for US fighters, and increased defense expenditures erupted.

The three pillars of Danish defense planning include allied (US and British) reinforcements, Bundeswehr defense of Schleswig-Holstein, and Denmark's own force structure. The 17,000-man Danish army has a Standing Force of 8,500 regulars, which can be
augmented by 4,500 in a matter of hours to form a Covering Force. Only 24 hours are required for mobilizing the 72,000-man Army, and an additional 36 hours to achieve full combat readiness of its five-mechanized brigades and one 5,000-man regimental combat team. The Jutland division's 20,000-man three mechanized brigades operate jointly with the Bundeswehr in Schleswig-Holstein. The rest of the army forces protect reception areas for allied reinforcements. In addition Denmark's Home Guard musters an additional 70,000 men.

The Danish navy maintains a relatively high alert in peacetime thanks to its professional core. In wartime its mission is to mine the straits and beaches at likely invasion approaches and to undertake multiple tasks in the Baltic. The mostly professional Danish air force has 64 F-16s for interceptor and ground attack missions and 32 DRAKENS for maritime strike and reconnaissance missions.

The basic problem with the mobilization force is that declining numbers of conscripts have resulted in the need to extend the period of reserve obligation to keep the wartime army force at 72,000 men. As reservists get older, their combat capability becomes a serious question. The 1984 defense settlement raised the annual intake of army conscripts to "freshen" the mobilization force. Over the years, Denmark has shortened the period of active duty for conscripts from 18 months to 9 months at present. As selective drafting developed, a more adequate wage system was developed. Today Denmark's military includes some of the most expensive soldiers in the world. Although Danish defense expenditures are indexed to guard against inflation, given the higher cost of military personnel, the amount of funds available for new equipment and supplies has been lower than in many other NATO countries.

The prospects for Danish defense are not bright. Despite more active Soviet-Warsaw Pact exercises and operations in the western Baltic, Denmark is unwilling and/or unable to respond. First, the existing coalition government must cooperate with smaller parties who are against increases in defense expenditures; hence, a zero solution with continued indexation is likely and needed modernization programs are unlikely. In response to NATO pressures to increase expenditures, strong undercurrents are developing for finding closer West European defense cooperation outside the Alliance.

In Chapter 18 Tonne Huitfeldt discusses the defense of Norway and NATO's northern flank. Norway remained neutral during World
War I, but the German surprise attack and occupation on 9 April 1940 led to a change in Norway's defense view. The lessons of World War II were, first, that Norway did not permit sufficient delegation of authority to local commanders (Norway only mobilized 50,000 men of 119,000 available) and, second, that it had not prepared and trained with allies in advance.

Norway gave defense a higher priority after World War II. The defense structure in the 1950s and 1960s combined mobilization forces based on general conscription with the allied preference for maintaining standing forces in exposed areas. After MC 14/3 and the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, NATO put more emphasis in flank contingencies and Norway focused on rapid reinforcement of North Norway (which is sparsely populated but near the Kola peninsula) using national and allied reinforcements.

Mobilization plays an important role in Norway's force structure, particularly in the army. At present Norway requires 12 months service, divided into basic training, specialist training, and service with standing units. This is followed by four training periods of 21 days and two of 12 days, until the age of 44, in mobilization units. The total peacetime strength of 35,100 (including 22,800 conscripts and 11,000 civilians) can be augmented to about 380,000 (9.4 percent of the population) in 36 hours—probably the highest mobilization percentage of any NATO country. For example, the army expands from 10,000 to 142,000 at M + 36, and the Home Guard will have 80,000 personnel.

Recent tests confirm that Norway's mobilization forces (which are all, including the Home Guard, dedicated to the Alliance in war) are effective: 60 hours after the mobilization order was broadcast on the radio, one infantry battalion from South Norway was ready in its GDP position in North Norway. A precondition for Norway's receiving allied (notably US, UK, and Canadian) reinforcements is transfer of Norwegian command to allied command in advance. Norway's role in NATO is important in providing surveillance and warning, contributions to crisis management, forward defense, and host nation support of allied reinforcement.

The long-term prospects for Norway's force structure depend on economics and demographics. During 1984-1988, Norway allocated a 3-3.5 percent yearly increase to the defense budget. A Chief of Defense Staff study, though, argues that if this does not increase to
the 6-7.0 percent range, Norway will not be able to maintain and modernize its current combat forces. In addition, Norway's current birth rate will make it difficult to maintain the present level of standing forces by the late 1990s. Since Norway depends for its security on NATO support and reinforcement because of its large area, small population, and exposed location, it strongly supports the Alliance. Any uncertainties regarding future NATO relations are primarily connected with developments within the Alliance (notably the trends toward Western European Union cooperation), and not to changes in Norway.

The contributions discussed above have focused primarily on the following issues as they are developing in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact: economic trends and military modernization and defense budgets, demographic trends and military manpower, societal attitudes and political policies. While these developments will continue to provide challenges that will test the US and USSR and both alliances, some developments also provide the United States and NATO with numerous opportunities for pursuing policies that may contribute to our benefit. In "Maintaining the Balance" I examine some of these in detail. I attempt to outline developing USSR-Warsaw Pact vulnerabilities and the major US-NATO vulnerabilities and strengths that need to be addressed and improved in order to enhance US-NATO security. The result is a set of policy recommendations for consideration by academics and policymakers alike to chart a course through the increasingly turbulent waters that will confront us as we move into the 21st century.

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PART I
MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCEMENT PROBLEMS

1 NATO AND WARSAW PACT INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
Jeffrey Simon

2 SOVIET REINFORCEMENT AND MOBILIZATION ISSUES
John J. Yurechko

3 US MOBILIZATION FOR REINFORCING WESTERN EUROPE
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4 THE SOVIET PERCEPTION OF US REINFORCEMENT OF NATO
Michael J. Deane

5 FUTURE US REINFORCEMENT OPTIONS
Peter A. Wilson
1 NATO and Warsaw Pact
Institutional Developments

This chapter will begin with a number of observations regarding the ability of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact to cope with the global trends and developments. First, both alliances have exhibited a declining share of the world's population and gross world product over the 25 years since their creation. These trends likely will continue. In addition, how the United States and the USSR deal with their own problems—efforts at domestic economic reform, conservation policies, new burden-sharing requirements/arrangements within each alliance—could result in declining prestige and influence for the respective leaders in NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Second, in addition to increasing economic constraints on the United States and the USSR, as well as their coalition allies, demographic trends are likely to create added pressures on both alliances. There will be difficulties in reallocating manpower resources into the civilian sector, and altering active/reserve force mixes for conventional force reductions. These economic constraints and demographic pressures, coupled with the generational changes that have occurred within the alliances since World War II, will have a continued impact...
upon political policies between superpowers and on allies and relations within the alliances.

Third, while it is impossible to predict the ultimate outcome of these issues on both alliances, it is likely that these trends will contribute to further stresses within the alliances and create greater challenges for the superpowers, potentially altering their relationship within each coalition.

In sum, we may be entering the period which history might ultimately judge as the beginning of the end of the post-World War II world order. While both superpowers likely are going to enjoy less influence and prestige in that “new” world order, national security successes will most likely depend on who loses the least influence, not on who acquires the most.

THE SHIFTING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

Since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) on 4 April 1949 and the Warsaw Treaty on 14 May 1955, a slow, but nevertheless steady, general trend has evolved. The rather “tight” bipolar world of the post-World War II era has yielded to a much looser bipolar world.1

Table 1.1, which outlines the relative economic standing (in 1985 constant US dollars) of the Warsaw Pact and NATO in 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1985, suggests that the relationship of both alliances to the global economy has altered rather significantly.2 In 1960, for example, the world’s Gross National Product (GNP) equaled 5.33 trillion dollars, while the world population equaled 3.06 billion. The Warsaw Pact and NATO economic and population shares were 1.18 and 2.74 trillion US dollars and 311.0 and 422.9 million population respectively in 1960—comprising some 24 percent of the world population and 73.5 percent of the world GNP in 1960.

Table 1.1 indicates the change occurring by 1985. Despite each alliance’s overall increase in population and GNP, in absolute terms each suffered a net decline. For example, in 1985 while the population of the Warsaw Pact (386.4 million) and NATO (515.6 million) had increased to 902.0 million (up from 733.9 million in 1960)—the world’s population meanwhile had increased from 3.06 to 4.89 billion between 1960 and 1985—both alliances’ share of world population decreased from 24 percent to 18.4 percent. Similarly, in 1985 while the combined GNP of the Warsaw Pact (2.73 trillion) and

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NATO (6.09 trillion) had increased to 8.82 trillion (up 3.92 trillion from 1960)—the world's GNP had significantly increased to 14.0 from 5.33 trillion—both alliances decreased their share of world GNP from 73.5 percent to 63.0 percent.\(^3\)

Put simply, in very gross economic terms, NATO and the Warsaw Pact represent a shrinking part of the pie. As this trend continues, both alliances are likely to search for economic and political relationships with the broader world community. Concerns, policies, and activities occurring outside the sphere are likely to play an increasingly important role in both Warsaw Pact and NATO deliberations.

While the relationship of both alliances to the world has shown relative decline, Table 1.1 also indicates another trend. Over the past 25 years, economic conditions have improved apace.\(^4\) In the Warsaw Pact per capita income went from $3,808 in 1960 to $6,755 in 1980, and to $7,061 in 1985. Similarly, in NATO per capita income went from $6,490 in 1960, to $11,172 in 1980, to $11,810 in 1985.

In 1960 when the Warsaw Pact’s and NATO’s per capita income was $3,808 and $6,490 respectively, Warsaw Pact per capita income represented 58.7 percent of NATO’s per capita income. Warsaw Pact per capita income was 60.3 percent of NATO’s in 1970; 60.5 percent in 1980; and 59.8 percent in 1985. While improvements in per capita income have been evident in both alliances over the past 25 years, relative per capita income between the two alliances has remained the same.

While this situation bodes neither ill nor well for NATO, it poses an ideological problem for the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. One only has to recall Nikita Khrushchev’s rhetoric at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in October 1961, when the CPSU (then First) Secretary claimed that the USSR would achieve the advanced stage of communism in 20 years (1981), or his threats at the United Nations boasting to the West that “We will bury you.” Khrushchev’s statements reflected an optimism about the Soviet political and economic system (and the Warsaw Pact) vis-à-vis the United States (and NATO) that, only 25 years later, has all but dissipated. Khrushchev’s rhetoric and threats aside, the data in table 1.1 suggest that in reality there has been no real change in the relative share of each alliance over the past 25 years.

Gorbachev’s program of glasnost and perestroika (restructuring) is an explicit recognition of that failure. In turn, the degree to which
his policies rejuvenate Soviet domestic political and economic stagnation will impact on Soviet relations with Warsaw Pact allies and ultimately on NATO and the United States. Similarly, the political ability of the United States to resolve its economic problems (its new debtor status, increasing deficits, and balance of payments) will impact on its relationship with European NATO allies, and ultimately on the USSR and the Warsaw Pact.5

DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AND MANPOWER POLICIES

As noted above, both NATO and the Warsaw Pact are experiencing a decreasing share of world GNP. To the degree that this economic pressure either continues or increases over time, both alliances likely will initiate economic reforms and conservation policies which are likely to affect both alliances’ future modernization and military manpower programs.

We may compare and contrast the alliances’ responses over the past 25 years to the above-noted economic problems and population trends. Both alliances, for example, have tried to increase defense expenditures in real terms over the past decade. After NATO agreed to 3 percent annual real increments’ increases in defense expenditures in May 1978, the Soviets pushed for a similar Warsaw Pact defense expenditure increase at the 22-23 November 1978 Political Consultative Committee (PCC) session. Since the added burdens created by these superpower demands were great, some members of both alliances failed to meet the new requirements.

In the Warsaw Pact, Romania explicitly refused to comply and publicly threatened to reduce defense expenditures; Poland and Hungary indicated reluctance.6 Despite Soviet pressures, Romania did, in fact, reduce expenditures,7 and Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia also did not meet their commitments.8 In NATO, Belgium, Denmark and, since 1982, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) have not achieved the agreed to increases.9

The effects of economic constraints are increasingly evident in the inability of some allies to modernize their inventories of military equipment. Within NATO, for example, Belgium decided not to spend $700 million to modernize its aging Nike Hercules Air Defense system with Patriot or its Leopard 1 main battle tanks with Leopard-2s;10 likewise, within the Warsaw Pact, Poland, and Czechoslovakia have failed to modernize their 1950s vintage T-54/55 main battle tanks with T-64/72 models or to maintain artillery holdings adequate
to Soviet norms. Similarly, the Air Defense systems of both Poland and Czechoslovakia are predominantly equipped with aging SA2 and SA3 missile systems.\textsuperscript{11}

Although both alliances have made similar efforts—with varying degrees of success—to increase defense expenditures, they have consciously pursued different military manpower policies. Table 1.2, which compares NATO\textsuperscript{*} and Warsaw Pact active and reserve\textsuperscript{**} manpower strengths over the past 25 years, highlights the different manpower policies of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

One generalization suggested by the data in table 1.2, is that Warsaw Pact active force levels (with the sole exception of Romania) have increased over the past 25 years while NATO active force levels (with the exception of the FRG) have decreased. Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact active strength rose 18.4 percent from 1960 to 1985. Most notably, East Germany (GDR) increased its active force structure by 74 percent (from 100,000 to 174,000) between 1960 and 1985; Hungary, 31.7 percent; Poland, 25 percent; and Bulgaria, 23 percent. At the same time, European NATO active strength fell 27.3 percent. In particular, France's active force declined 52.8 percent (from 1,009,000 to 476,600); Denmark, 31 percent; the United Kingdom, 28 percent; and the Netherlands, by 25.4 percent.\textsuperscript{12} The NATO exception, though, is significant. The FRG's Bundeswehr increased from 330,000 to 478,000 (or 44.8 percent).

Another generalization suggested by table 1.2 is that Warsaw Pact reserve forces (with the significant exceptions of increases of 31.1 percent in the GDR and 12.5 percent in Romania) generally decreased between 1980 and 1985, while NATO's reservists (with the exception of Norway) generally increased. The data shows that in the Warsaw Pact, Czechoslovakia registered the largest decline of 20 percent, followed by Bulgaria with 18.8 percent, and Poland with

\textsuperscript{*} NATO, for purposes of this analysis, encompasses NATO's core and France plus Denmark and Norway in the Northern flank.

\textsuperscript{**} Countries' reserve systems vary greatly. The figures given may include reservists with recent training, active territorial militia and forces available for later mobilization. The figures exclude paramilitary forces. For specifics, see The Military Balance, 1985-86, London: IISS, pp. 172-173.
17.2 percent. Within NATO, the increases were most notable in Belgium with 54.5 percent and France with 14.9 percent. In sum, East Europe overall registered a slight decline (3.2 percent) in reserve forces between 1980 and 1985 while European NATO registered a slightly larger increase (6.4 percent) during the same period.

One final generalization that emerges from table 1.2 is that the Warsaw Pact generally has been willing and/or able to commit a larger percent of its population to active and reserve military manpower than NATO. Generally, the difference has been on the order of magnitude of two to one. In other words, in 1980 while Warsaw Pact military strength represented 3.1 percent of available population, in NATO it was 1.5 percent. In 1985 it was 3.2 percent to 1.6 percent. This apparent difference in NATO-Warsaw Pact ability to commit population to military manpower might become increasingly important in any future conventional force negotiations.

Significant strategic implications, though, are buried in the different NATO and Warsaw Pact manpower policies outlined in table 1.2. The Warsaw Pact increasingly relies on active forces in contrast to NATO's increasing reliance upon reserve forces. Because reserve forces require time for mobilization, NATO has a problem. First, NATO forces must make sure that a warning is both politically credible and adequate; they then must have enough time to respond, that is, to reinforce and to mobilize reservists. Second, because mobilization of reserves causes societal and economic problems, NATO governments must judge political versus military sensitivity. NATO's institutional procedures for warning and alerts, which will be examined below, are becoming not only increasingly time-sensitive, but also critical to NATO's capability to survive attack.

Before examining the institutional developments and procedures for alerting and mobilizing forces within NATO and the Warsaw Pact, we shall examine both alliances' demographic patterns. Table 1.3, which compares the 18-22 year old male cohorts in NATO and the Warsaw Pact over the next quarter century, highlights demographic differences developing between the alliances. These trends do not bode well for NATO's conventional forces, particularly in light of the prospects for significant reductions in European intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and short-range (SRINF) nuclear forces.

One generalization suggested by the data in table 1.3 is that between 1987 and 2000, the 18-22 year old male cohort (which
### 1.2—Relative Manpower Standing of the Warsaw Pact and NATO

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## Institutional Developments

### Table: Military Strength as a Percentage of 1980 Population

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Source: Calculated from Raw Data prepared by the US Bureau of the Census for the World Population 1986 Project (May 1987)
*NATO = NATO's Core (plus France) and Northern Flank.
provides the primary pool of military conscripts) will, with the sole exception of East Germany, increase in the Warsaw Pact; the same pool will decrease rather significantly in NATO. Essentially, the data indicate that in the year 2000, the 18-22 year old male cohort will increase by 490,000 (12 percent) for East Europe and by 1,725,000 (16.5 percent) for the USSR. European NATO, in contrast, will have decreased by 2,370,000 (27.5 percent), and the US by 321,000 (3.3 percent).

Thus, over the next 15 years, NATO will find it increasingly difficult to maintain existing active force levels, while the Warsaw Pact will find it easier. Although this trend will begin to reverse in 2000, the question is how these demographic pressures will affect alliance policy between now and the year 2000. The demographic trend will be particularly painful for NATO, which, we noted earlier, has historically demonstrated less ability to commit manpower to military strength. Hence, NATO likely will find it increasingly difficult to counter this trend politically.

In summary, I believe that manpower developments within NATO and the Warsaw Pact over the past 25 years have put NATO in a more vulnerable position. While the Warsaw Pact has increased its active force structure, NATO has decreased its active forces, thereby increasing its reliance upon mobilization of reservists for meeting its force goals. Demographic trends to the year 2000 suggest that the pressures already partly responsible for the change in the active/reserve force mix in NATO will get much stronger, while the opposite change in the Warsaw Pact continues. Finally, these trends place increasing demands and requirements on NATO's warning and alerting procedures.

**ALERTING MECHANISMS AND PROCEDURES**

NATO's alerting mechanisms and procedures are distinctly different from those of the Warsaw Pact. In almost 40 years of development, NATO structures have not developed any supranational authority. A NATO axiom is that military mobilization (and logistics) is a national responsibility. Hence, each NATO country decides independently when to alert and mobilize its national forces committed to the defense of NATO.

Since sovereignty remains the essential ingredient of NATO's military alerts, effective civil structures are vital to NATO's success. The North Atlantic Council (NAC), established by Article 9 of the
Treaty, is the principal body of NATO. When specific defense issues (as opposed to general political-military consultation) must be discussed, the Council meets in session as the Defense Planning Committee (DPC), composed only of the member nations participating in NATO's integrated command. This procedure became necessary after France withdrew from the integrated defense structure in 1966 yet continued to participate in political affairs as a signatory of NATO.

The DPC deals with defense matters and, for all practical purposes, has the same authority as the NAC. For this reason, we will refer to NATO's highest political structure as the NAC/DPC, which provides a unique forum for confidential, constant, and timely intergovernmental consultation and has been called a "standing committee of governments, or a 'diplomatic workshop.'" Each national government retains decision-making authority. However, the NAC/DPC, permanently housed at Evere (Brussels), meets at least once a week at ambassadorial level (Permanent Representatives) and twice a year in ministerial sessions when foreign and defense ministers represent their nations.

The Military Committee (MC), composed of the Chiefs-of-Staff of the member countries taking part in the NATO integrated military structure, is the senior military authority in the alliance. Although it also meets twice per year at the Chiefs-of-Staff level, the MC meets each week with national military representatives appointed by their Chiefs-of-Staff. The MC advises the NAC/DPC on military matters and gives guidance to the major NATO commanders (MNCs) such as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), and Commander-in-Chief, Channel (CINCHAN).

During a crisis, though, as one source notes, "the position of the MC as an independent body reporting directly to the NAC/DPC ensures that a situation which relates a clear military risk for NATO will be brought to the NAC/DPC for resolution." During a developing crisis, therefore, requests for increasing the readiness of (and/or "chopping") NATO's military forces can be made by national governments. MNCs (most likely the SACEUR, operating from NATO military headquarters at Casteau near Mons), or the MC. Since decisions as to whether or not to reply to a perceived threat do not reside in the NAC/DPC, but always in the national capitals, time becomes a precious commodity in the NATO alerting process. In addition, the time factor has become particularly critical to NATO
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

over the past 25 years because its military forces, as noted above, have become predominantly reservist, thus requiring mobilization. For these and other reasons, NATO requires a permanent International Staff (IS) and International Military Staff (IMS) headquartered at Evère (Brussels) which periodically exercises this decision-making process (in the WINTEX-CIMEX series, for example).

The Warsaw Pact's political and military planning process is very different from NATO's. The Warsaw Pact does not have an equivalent political headquarters with permanent representatives of ambassadorial rank in residence. It does, though, have a military headquarters, situated on Leningradsky Prospekt in Moscow, where Warsaw Pact Commander-in-Chief (CinC) Kulikov resides. This organization appears to perform military functions similar to those carried out at NATO's military headquarters at Casteau, Belgium.

Although the Soviets want to refine and improve the Warsaw Pact's political coordination capabilities over the years, they have not yet created a permanent political headquarters, in part because such a political agency is not necessary to alert and mobilize forces (as it is in NATO). Before addressing the question of alerting procedures within the Warsaw Pact, though, we shall briefly review the Pact's political development.

Political Development. When the Pact was created in 1955, the Political Consultative Committee (PCC), comprised of ministers of defense, foreign affairs, and party secretaries, was designated the highest political authority. During the first decade of the Pact's existence, the PCC remained embryonic in nature: it always convened in Moscow, met sporadically (6 times in 10 years), avoided addressing critical issues (such as Hungary in 1956 and Berlin in 1961), and served more as a forum for enunciating Soviet policy rather than an arena for political discussion and resolution.

Shortly after Leonid Brezhnev came to power, the CPSU General Secretary in September 1965 began to stress "the need to set up within the framework of the Treaty a permanent and prompt mechanism for considering pressing problems." This initiative finally resulted in the first major political reform within the Warsaw Pact. The Budapest PCC session in March 1969, in addition to creating a permanent staff and reconstituting the Combined Command, put a
Military Committee (MC) "in charge of matters of combat and mobilization readiness of the Combined Armed Forces," created a Committee of Defense Ministers (CDM), a Technical Committee (TC), and a Military Scientific-Technical Council (MSTC). The Bucharest PCC session, in November 1976, further refined the 1969 institutional reform. Although the PCC approved forming a Foreign Ministers' Committee (FMC) and a Joint Secretariat of the PCC "with a view [according to the communique] to continually improve the mechanism of political collaboration," differences amongst allies continued.

We may summarize the Brezhnev era by saying that although Warsaw Pact political organs began to emerge, they still remained less developed than those of NATO. Under Brezhnev, PCC sessions, formerly convened in Moscow, began to rotate among East European capitals. In addition, sessions were predictably convened every other year. Immediately after the 1969 and 1976 reforms, the CDM and FMC followed similar periodic rotation patterns.

The absence of a permanent Warsaw Pact political headquarters becomes glaringly evident whenever the Soviets have to deal with a crisis or issue that necessitates meetings outside the normal Pact institutional rotation patterns. Such was the case when "emergency" sessions were hastily convened in Dresden, Moscow, Cierna, and Bratislava in an attempt to resolve the crisis in Czechoslovakia during 1968; in Moscow on 9 June 1967 during the Middle East War; on 5 December 1980 during the Polish crisis; and 28 June 1983 for the INF "countermeasures."

Although Warsaw Pact political institutions atrophied during Brezhnev's declining years and during the brief Andropov and Chernenko periods of "disarray," during which the 1982 Prague PCC and 1985 Sofia PCC were postponed, they have evidenced nothing less than a renaissance ever since Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in March 1985. In the past three years, the MC and CDM have continued their normal annual and biannual patterns, and the PCC has convened annually while the FMC has met twice a year rather than once. During the 28-29 May 1987 East Berlin PCC, participants agreed on "new" Pact mechanisms to further policy coordination. According to the communique, the PCC "agreed to set up a multilateral group of representatives of Warsaw Pact member-states for current reciprocal information [and also] to set up a special commission of the Warsaw Pact member-states on disarmament questions."
Although it is premature to speculate either on how this multilateral group will be structured or how effective it will be in coordinating Pact policy, it is clear that Gorbachev wants to involve the Warsaw Pact institutions (specifically the PCC and FMC) in all arms control discussions and initiatives. It is clear, though, that the Pact structure differs from NATO structures because it will not be used for alerting Warsaw Pact forces.

Throughout the 1970s the Soviets used the peacetime administrative and command organs of the Warsaw Pact as a mechanism for modernizing the Pact’s Combined Armed Forces (CAF) and laying the groundwork for a wartime command structure. Though both conditions were necessary, they were not sufficient to transform the Warsaw Pact into an effective military alliance, capable of operating as an extension of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Since at least 1981, the Soviets have advocated conducting combat at a theater of military operations (TVD) level rather than at the front. From the Soviet perspective, since their Western and Southwestern TVDs include the Warsaw Pact’s Combined Armed Forces, new requirements would be necessary to ensure the availability of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces. It is now without doubt that the Soviets have been attempting to subordinate Warsaw Pact CAF elements within the Soviet command structure since the late 1970s, as the following evidence shows:

- From 1971 to January 1977, the Soviet Chief of the General Staff was equal in rank to the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, who also served as Warsaw Pact CinC (Yakubovskiy until 1976, Kulikov thereafter). When N. V. Ogarkov became a Marshal of the Soviet Union (in January 1977), he outranked all others (including Kulikov) on the General Staff.

- Immediately following the November 1978 Moscow PCC session, Nicolae Ceausescu publicly suggested that the Warsaw Pact states not only had agreed upon certain arrangements regarding the military command structure of the CAF (control by the Soviets), but that Romania abstained from the new arrangement:

> ...we have certainly assumed obligations within the Warsaw Pact ... which we respect.... The Warsaw Pact clearly states that each country will participate in conformity with its capability and with the provisions and decisions which will be adopted by each state individually. We have not surrendered and we will never surrender to anyone the right to involve the Romanian Army in a military action
except to the parliament, the people, the party bodies and the Romanian state bodies.  

• Recent writings by Warsaw Pact chief of staff Gribkov also suggest that he embraces the TVD command concept and perceives the need for a Supreme High Commander. In September 1979, shortly after Ceausescu had voiced his objections about Soviet efforts to change the Pact’s command system, Gribkov stated the case for a coalitional high command with substantial wartime authority:

Under contemporary conditions the significance of the centralization of the control of coalition groupings sharply increased... and conduct of large-scale operations by coalition troop groupings entails also the need for the creation of uniform command agencies both to the scale of the military coalition as a whole and on the most important axes. The experience of the past testifies that such organs must be capable of... directly commanding the activities of operational formations.  

• A recent interview, granted by Colonel Ryszard Jerzy Kuklinski, formerly of the Polish People’s Army General Staff, confirms that the Soviets have, indeed, altered the wartime command and control structure of the Warsaw Pact. In 1979/1980 Poland signed a top secret document, “Statute of the Combined Armed Forces and Organs Commanding Them in Times of War,” which meant, in effect, that Poland now was “recognizing the Highest Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the USSR as the sole command of the Warsaw Pact forces in the event of war.” According to Kuklinski:

in these situations [crisis and war] the control of Poland’s defense and the command of her armed forces passes completely..... The indivisible command will be the Highest Command-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, while its sole working organ will be the Soviet General Staff.

The Soviet command will give their orders and instructions directly to the Polish armies subordinate to them, bypassing the national command. In practice, this means that the USSR has the unrestricted right to dispose of the Polish People’s Army without any prior consultations with the Polish People’s Republic’s leadership.... Even Party-political work will be coordinated not by the CC PUWP [Polish United Workers' Party], but by the Soviet political department attached to the Command-in-Chief of the Western War Operations Theater.  

• Another indication that the Soviets had renovated the Pact’s command structure came in 1982 with the death of Leonid Brezhnev.
In his eulogy to the CPSU General Secretary, East German defense minister Heinz Hoffmann revealed that Brezhnev, among his other positions, held the title "Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact." 

- More recent evidence indicates that the Soviets have taken additional steps for creating their military command structure and that this command structure will control Warsaw Pact CAF elements. In the obituary for defense minister Ustinov, several prominent names—former Chief of the Soviet General Staff N.V. Ogarkov, I.A. Gerasimov, and Yuri Maksimov—were listed with the commander of the Far Eastern TVD, I.M. Tret’ yak, but placed below the Deputy Defense Minister level. Thus, it appears that the TVD level is new in the command structure in 1984, with Ogarkov acting as Western TVD CinC and I.A. Gerasimov as Southwestern TVD CinC.

In sum, the creation of the high commands in the Western and Southwestern TVDs is an important step in enhancing the Pact's ability to transition to wartime operations. Additionally, the adoption of the so-called "Statute," which apparently provides the Soviets with a mechanism to "chop" non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) forces to Soviet control, is another important step. In effect, the creation of new TVD commands plus changes in procedures to alert (or "chop") NSWP forces indicate two Pact directions: first, they define the subordination of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces to the Soviet Supreme High Command in Moscow; second, they satisfy the Soviet requirement that the war be focussed on a single, unified objective, with the coalitional armies fighting as a single, unified force. If the Soviet Union can successfully implement these objectives, NATO's warning and alerting procedures will be burdened and challenged. In fact the Warsaw Pact's "defensive" doctrine increasingly must be called into question.

**DEFENSIVE MILITARY DOCTRINES**

Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact profess to be "defensive" military alliances. The NATO Treaty, comprised of a Preamble and fourteen Articles, was signed on 4 April 1949. Article 5, which represents the core of the treaty, states that: 

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or
collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such an action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

The Warsaw Pact Treaty consists of a Preamble, which affirms the signatories' beliefs in the "purposes and principles of respect for the independence and sovereignty of states, and of non-interference in their internal affairs...", and eleven articles. The core of the Pact's treaty is similar to NATO's Article 5:

Article 3 - Establishes joint consultation among parties when a threat of armed attack against any party occurs and provides for organizing a joint defense against such threats.

Article 4 - If an "attack in Europe" against one of the parties occurs, each signatory shall render the state attacked immediate assistance by all means it may consider necessary, including the use of armed force.

To this day, the military doctrine of both alliances remains "defensive." In the case of the Warsaw Pact, the 29 May 1987 PCC session issued a document entitled "The Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact Member States," which states that:

the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact is exclusively defensive in character.... the participants will never, and under no circumstances, commence military actions against any other state or alliance, if they have not themselves been subjected to attack.

The Soviet definition of "defensive," though, becomes critical. In marked contrast to NATO, the Soviets have either employed or threatened to employ military force in the European theater to "defend" their interests on numerous occasions (unilaterally in Hungary in 1956; threatening to terminate the West's access to Berlin in 1961; multilaterally with Warsaw Pact CAF forces in Czechoslovakia in 1968; and in pressuring Poland during 1980-1981).

This greater Soviet willingness and apparent need often to resort to military force frequently to maintain order explain, in part, why the Soviet/Warsaw Pact has increased its active conventional forces since 1960. Aside from the Soviet/Warsaw Pact's defensive military doctrine and "need" to maintain active conventional forces in Eastern Europe, the Soviets do have at their disposal more of the necessary instruments to go on the offensive, if they feel it necessary. At the very least their recent actions are not synchronized or consistent with their doctrine and they stretch the doctrine's credibility.
Like the Warsaw Pact, NATO is finding its defensive doctrine increasingly called into question—though for very different reasons. NATO's actions (notably its decrease in active forces and increased reliance upon reserve forces over the past 25 years, plus an alerting procedure requiring time to develop consensus at political headquarters) are consistent with a defensive military doctrine. However, the credibility of NATO's military deterrent is still a basic question. The credibility of NATO's (MC 14/3) Flexible Response Doctrine and ability to defend itself, especially in light of an impending agreement on INF and SRINF, is becoming increasingly questionable. NATO's doctrine, in other words, is increasingly out of touch with what it can do credibly. Added to this problem, and in marked contrast to the Warsaw Pact, is the fact that as NATO proceeds towards the year 2000, it will meet increasing demographic difficulty in maintaining existing military manpower levels, let alone increasing them to bolster its conventional force deterrent.

FUTURE TRENDS

What do these trends in the Pact and NATO indicate? I have suggested that only now in 1987, over 40 years after the conclusion of World War II, are we witnessing the transformation of the world order that was erected between 1945-1949. United States national security policy must accommodate and successfully operate in a more fluid global environment, where "out-of-area" activities, with their inherent dangers for miscalculation, will increasingly attract superpower attention. On the other hand, as both superpowers continue to encounter increasing constraints, the relative success of their domestic political and economic initiatives and reforms will determine ultimately who is to lose the least, thereby affecting US-Soviet relations, and relations between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Although the US and USSR have pursued similar policies since at least 1978 to get their respective alliances to spend more on defense, different manpower policies have evolved between the alliances. First, while NATO decreased its active force structure by 27 percent between 1960-1985, the Warsaw Pact increased its active force posture by 18 percent. The Warsaw Pact has demonstrated that it is either more willing and/or able than NATO to commit its population to military manpower; the ratio consistently remaining at 2:1. Second, as noted, NATO's historical inability to commit its population to military manpower will become increasingly more problematic
due to unfavorable demographic trends. Through the year 2000, while the 18-22 year old male cohort will increase by 12 percent in the Warsaw Pact, it will decrease by 27.5 percent in NATO. Both active force and demographic disparities will place increasing asymmetrical pressures on NATO vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact, and likely will play a role in the upcoming Soviet campaign for conventional arms reductions.

An asymmetry also has been developing between the alliances in their ability to alert and mobilize military forces. As we have seen, NATO relies increasingly upon reserve forces, which place two additional burdens upon the NATO alliance. First, NATO must have a warning apparatus providing adequate time to mobilize the reserves. Second, reliance upon reserves raises NATO’s political costs of implementing manpower mobilization measures because of the resulting economic and social dislocations. This makes these mobilization decisions more painful and therefore more difficult to implement. The likely end result of these burdens is to place the latest possible time for military decision before the earliest possible time for political decision.

Further asymmetry stems from the late 1970s when the Soviets developed a mechanism that makes it easier to employ non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces as an extension of the Soviet Armed Forces. In addition, the creation in the early 1980s of high commands in the Western and Southwestern TVDs represented another important step in enhancing the Pact’s ability to transition to wartime operations.

As a result of these long-term military developments, the “defensive” doctrine of both alliances, though for different reasons, have become less credible. The Warsaw Pact’s “defensive” doctrine has lost credibility because the Soviet Union, which often has resorted to employing its military to restore “order” in Eastern Europe, has developed the necessary instruments to go on the offensive when the Soviets feel it necessary.

In contrast, NATO’s “defensive” Flexible Response doctrine has become less credible over the past 25 years because of the changes in NATO’s active/reserve force structure and its cumbersome alerting procedures. In addition, through the year 2000, NATO’s Flexible Response doctrine will be asymmetrically burdened due to unfavorable demographic trends coupled with NATO’s historical unwillingness to commit population to military manpower.
In other words, in the face of an impending INF agreement which will reduce nuclear weapons in Europe, NATO's conventional forces will become increasingly important to maintain the credibility of its deterrent. But, unfortunately, NATO will meet increasing difficulty in even maintaining existing conventional force levels while the Warsaw Pact, in contrast, will find doing so increasingly easy. In addition, the recent "renaissance" of Warsaw Pact institutions under Gorbachev (notably the PCC and FMC, as well as the "new" mechanisms announced in 1987) for coordinating arms control policies, suggest that NATO is in for a campaign that might make the Warsaw Pact's ill-fated 1979-1983 INF campaign against NATO seem amateurish.
Endnotes


2. For information and an explanation on how these economic data were compiled and derived, see notes to Table 8, Central Intelligence Agency, Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1986 (Washington, DC: September 1986), p. 35.

3. This comparative figure, though, probably understates the wealth of the Western Alliance through foreign investments, etc.

4. One must keep in mind that we are speaking in macroeconomic terms about overall alliance trends. It must be noted here that some specific members within each alliance have exhibited either decline, economic stagnation, or very slow growth between 1960 and 1985. Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria are examples within the Warsaw Pact. The Netherlands and Belgium are examples within NATO. See, Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1986, op. cit., Table 8, pp. 34-35.

5. For an excellent discussion of this problem and how to manage it, see Paul Kennedy, "The (Relative) Decline of America," The Atlantic Monthly (August 1987), pp. 29-38.


8. One recent study concludes that: "The GDR appeared to have responded to Soviet pressure to increase military expenditures in response to the NATO 1978 three percent decision. The other three countries [Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia] reported a marked deceleration in the rate of increase in military spending after that year." See, Keith Crane, Military Spending In Eastern Europe, The RAND Corporation, R-3444-USDP, May 1987, p. 64.

10. According to Belgian Minister of Defense Xavier-Francois de Donnea, "This helps us to save about 25 to 30 billion Belgian francs, for the acquisition of the system, and approximately 1.5 to 2 billion Belgian francs in operating the system." In "Rationalizing the Defence Effort of Belgium," NATO's Sixteen Nations, July 1987, p. 49. Also, see Mark M. Nelson, "Cash-Strapped NATO Members Grapple With Waste," The Wall Street Journal, 6 August 1987, p. 20.


12. It should be noted, though, that these figures do not necessarily tell the whole story. In the early 1960s France had many men under arms to fight in Algeria; the United Kingdom and the Netherlands had outside commitments. While these active forces could have helped in a global war, the French could probably have done less than the others.

13. The Soviets, though, will experience some pain. The quantitative advantage of the Soviet Union and East Europe 18-22 year old male cohort in 2000 clouds a qualitative problem that is significant. Most of the increase in the Soviet Union will be in Asian minorities (notably Muslims). In Eastern Europe, Poland, which has the largest non-Soviet contribution, may cause the Soviet Union concern about reliability. Hence, the Soviets' apparent quantitative edge through the year 2000 carries inherent qualitative problems for the maintenance of reliable and capable active forces.

14. France withdrew from NATO's integrated military command structure in 1966, at which time it was decided to move the NAC from Paris to Brussels and the DPC decided to move the Military Committee from Washington to Brussels. France remained a member of NATO and participates in the NAC. On 14 August 1974 Greece withdrew from the integrated military command of NATO; its forces were reintegrated on 20 October 1980. On 30 May 1982 Spain became the sixteenth member of NATO. It participates in the NAC, but does not yet participate in NATO's integrated military structure. See, NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Information Service, April 1986), pp. 85-86, 92, 97, and 101.


20. "To increase the effectiveness and combat value of the NATO armed forces and to further cooperation amongst the different nationalities, international exercises are organized periodically by the [MNCs] in conjunction with member governments. They fall into two main categories: those in which no forces take part, which are called Command Post Exercises (CPX); and Live Exercises in which actual forces participate.

The aims of the CPXs are to familiarize commanders and staff officers with wartime problems; to test and evaluate plans and executive bodies; to study tactical and other questions; and to test communications facilities. The object of a CPX is to define, examine and solve military defense problems." See, ibid., pp. 111-112.

21. According to a Soviet evaluation of NATO's command-staff exercise WINTEX-87: "The participants...rehearse their operations in international crisis conditions over an extensive range of territory from Washington to Ankara and throughout Western Europe....This rehearsal envisages taking 'key decisions' in conditions as close to possible to those experienced in a crisis...including those relating to the interaction of the bloc's military and civilian organs for combat operations against the Warsaw Pact countries. Orders are to be issued for calling up reservists, industry is to be geared to meet military needs, the government of each country is to be invested with 'emergency powers,' and 'committees for the transition to wartime conditions' are being formed." See, V. Vavrilov, "Provocative Games," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 5 March 1987, p. 3. *FBIS,DR,SU* (12 March 1987), pp. CC4-5.


25. For a good discussion of the 1969 reform, see: Christopher D. Jones, "Agencies of the Alliance: Multilateral In Form, Bilateral In Content," in Simon & Gilberg, op. cit., especially pp. 135-146; and Checinski, pp. 18-23.


29. These developments are discussed more completely in my *Warsaw Pact Forces*, Chapters 5-7.
30. In a July 1981 Kommunist article, the then Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal Ogarkov, wrote that: "Earlier methods of employing obyedineniye (operational formations) and soyedineniye (tactical formations) no longer correspond to the new conditions of modern warfare ... (accordingly) the basic operation in a future war is not the front, but the larger-scale form of military operation—in a theater of military operations." Cited in: John G. Hines and Phillip A. Peterson, "The Warsaw Pact Strategic Offensive: The OMG In Context," International Defense Review (October 1983), p. 1391. See also the important interview with Ogarkov in Krasnaya Zvezda, 9 May 1984, pp. 2-3, where the then Chief of the General Staff noted: "There is a simultaneous process of honing and improving the system of operational combat...; the procedure for mobilizing and provisioning them [troops and fleets]." FBIS,DR,SU (9 May 1984), p. R20.

31. One source suggests that the establishment of separate and independent TVD commands relegates the Warsaw Pact CinC to duties similar to that of a Soviet Military District Commander; one who is concerned solely with training, logistics, mobilization and other matters not directly related to control of forces. Operational control is vested, instead, in the TVD commanders encompassing the Warsaw Pact area of concern. See, Michael J. Deane, Ilana Kass and Andrew G. Porth, "The Soviet Command Structure in Transformation," Strategic Review (Spring 1984), pp. 64-65.


34. There have been efforts on the part of the Polish government to discredit Kuklinski as a source. See, for example, Jerzy Urban's 17 June 1986 press conference. Urban notes, "There is a system for direct contacts at the highest level within the Warsaw Pact. This system operates without the need for colonels to act as go-betweens." (Warsaw) Rzeczpospolita, 23 June 1986, pp. 4,5. JPRS-EER-86-103 (17 July 1986), p. 73.


36. Ibid., pp. 53-54.


40. Kuklinski confirmed what Ceaucescu articulated in his speech at RCP headquarters following the 1978 Moscow PCC session—that Romania does indeed refuse to participate in this system. See, Kuklinski, op. cit., pp. 52-53.


43. Ibid.


45. One is reminded here of Strobe Talbott’s comment that “there is nothing as offensive as a Russian on the defensive.”

46. In addition, before the creation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955, there was the Berlin crisis in 1948.

47. Each of these cases is more fully discussed in my Warsaw Pact Forces, op. cit., pp. 13-19; 42-56; and 163-176.


49. Flexible Response doctrine (MC 14/3) is “based upon a flexible and balanced range of responses, conventional and nuclear, to all levels of aggression or threats of aggression.” The North Atlantic Treaty: Facts and Figures, pp. 52-53. Unfortunately, ever since NATO adopted MC 14/3, it has failed to field the nonnuclear forces most experts thought would be necessary to avoid the early use of nuclear weapons.

In the early 1980s NATO’s nuclear reliance became an issue even among official opinion. Four former US officials—McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, and Gerard C. Smith—in the Spring 1982 issue of Foreign Affairs advocated that NATO consider renouncing the option of being the first to use nuclear weapons in a potential NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation. A counter critique to this proposal was issued by four Germans—Karl Kaiser, George Leber, Alois Mertes, and Franz-Josef Schulze—in the Summer 1982 issue of Foreign Affairs.

In addition, General Bernard Rogers expressed his own concern about shortcomings in NATO’s current force posture, arguing for “greater flexibility” for Flexible Response. Rogers argued that NATO could move to a posture of “no early first use,” first by taking advantage of emerging technologies to improve nonnuclear defenses and, second, by increasing defense expenditures by 4 percent in real terms over the next decade. See, General Bernard W. Rogers, “Greater Flexibility For NATO’s Flexible Response,” Strategic Review (Spring 1983), pp. 11-19.
2 Soviet Reinforcement and Mobilization Issues

The modern Soviet state faces the same basic problems that its tsarist predecessor faced. The military geography of Russia, its large land mass, its seemingly inexhaustible wealth of human and natural resources, while providing an impressive military potential, have burdened the country's strategic planners with a persistent handicap. Although Russia's great store of manpower and economic assets has defeated many enemies, and although its vast territory has absorbed frequent invasions, frustrating the ambitions of some of the greatest military leaders in human history, its own generals and marshals have been virtual slaves to the same fundamental security question for centuries: how do we bring our numerous resources to bear in war and how do we use geography to our own advantage?

Confronted with these same questions, the current leaders of the Soviet armed forces must resolve them in a manner that strengthens the military might of the nation. They face a task that Russian soldiers like D. A. Miliutin, V. A. Sukhomlinov, L. Trotsky, M. N. Tukhachevskiy, and G. K. Zhukov wrestled with from the 19th century through the Great Patriotic War. Their efforts have focused on
developing a more effective means for mobilizing Russia's resources in a rapid manner in order to fight and win a war. Since the emergence of mass armies, the role of the mobilization process has become more and more important. The relationship between strategic deployment, reserves, reinforcements, and in the current era, readiness, is growing more complex. The presence of nuclear weapons with strategic means of delivery has further complicated the process of force mobilization and employment.

Today, the units in the Western military districts of the Soviet Union are a key factor when comparing the military strength of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union's ability to alert, mobilize, and deploy these forces will, to a major degree, influence the course and outcome of a future war in Europe. With the commitment of the fronts formed from the Western military districts, the Soviet armed forces at the beginning of war would strive to reach their immediate strategic objectives in the theater and thus lay the groundwork for successfully concluding the war.

This chapter addresses the issue of the Western military district forces in reinforcing the Soviet armies in Europe during a future NATO-Warsaw Pact war. It examines the historical roots of the Russian approach to the process of mobilization and reinforcement, and reviews Soviet military doctrine concerning mobilization. It describes the Soviet mobilization system, the forces in the Western military districts, and their probable role in a future war. Finally, it outlines the evolving nature and character of the mobilization process, as seen through Soviet eyes, to show how some current trends in modern warfare impact on matters of reinforcement, readiness, reserves, and deployment.

The problems facing the Soviet forces today, as during the past 130 years, center on the questions of what is the most efficient way of reinforcing the forward-deployed units in Eastern Europe to secure a victory. Those units, while at a high state of readiness, do not represent the fully mobilized combat power of the USSR. As in past wars, Soviet military leaders must count on all Russia's resources to be mobilized and brought to bear during a future conflict. In the simplest terms, mobilization must deal with fundamental issues of space and time, of distance to, and of speed in reaching the front. The margin between victory and defeat will rest on successfully achieving those mobilization goals.
HISTORICAL FACTORS IN THE EVOLUTION OF MOBILIZATION

The Crimean War and the Miliutin Reforms. Russia's defeat in the Crimean War (1853-56) influenced the current mobilization system of the Soviet Union. In that conflict the Russian army suffered a series of humiliating defeats at the hands of Great Britain, France, Turkey, and Sardinia. Russia's territory was invaded; the country's largest port on the Black Sea besieged and captured; and the Baltic coast blockaded. Over 250,000 men died in combat or from cholera. In the peace settlement which followed, Russia had to accept the neutralization of the Black Sea and to cede southern Bessarabia to Turkey.

The Crimean War revealed serious deficiencies in the Russian military establishment. The armed forces could neither prevent an invasion of the homeland, nor bring enough trained forces to bear to defeat the invaders on Russian soil, even though the Russian army had a shorter line of communications than its enemies. The allied invasion force fielded technologically superior weaponry and supplied its forces on foreign soil much better than the Russian army did in their own homeland. Two factors contributed to Russian defeat: inadequate rail service and an unprepared army. The Russian railroad system was woefully unprepared for the war. Because rail service from Moscow did not extend into the Crimean peninsula, reinforcements and supplies had to move overland from assembly points at Kharkov, where the rail line terminated, over 400 kilometers north of the Perekop isthmus. From there, another 200 kilometers remained to the main battlefields at Sevastopol. Furthermore, the army was forced to maintain a large force along the Austrian border, and reinforcements sent to the Crimea were often home guard units with little or no training. The army lacked any additional reserves and no formal system existed for mobilizing more forces. As a result, the Russians were outnumbered and outgunned on the battlefield, and suffered defeat after defeat.

The loss of the Crimean War and the abolition of serfdom in 1861 led to a series of reforms in the army. Carried out by Minister of War D. A. Miliutin, the reforms reduced the overall size of the army and created, in addition, a trained reserve of 553,000 men by 1870. From 1862 to 1864, Miliutin renovated the local military administrative system, and established 15 military districts and a new
training program based on several new military academies. In 1874 Russia instituted a law of universal military obligation which raised the number of reserves to over 750,000 men, and provided the army with more modern weapons.

By the mid 1870s the peacetime army numbered 760,000, and the military districts had the task of generating new forces in wartime to expand the overall size of the army. A newly engineered mobilization schedule proved particularly effective in marshalling forces for the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, which ended in a Russian victory. In sum, the Miliutin reforms produced a mass army which could mobilize over one million men in times of war.

The Russo-Japanese War. Although the Miliutin reforms of the 1860s and 1870s corrected some of the army's serious shortcomings, systemic weaknesses continued to undermine its effectiveness. While the new mobilization system performed fairly well in the Russo-Turkish War, technological backwardness continued to result in inadequate armament and supply. Furthermore, lack of talent among military leaders, particularly in the area of operations, contributed to a weak and unreliable command structure.¹

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 manifested these deficiencies, and mobilization capabilities quickly became a key feature of the war. War in the Far East found the Russian armed forces totally unprepared. Of the 1.1 million-man regular army, only 98,000 were troops deployed in the Far East. To make matters worse, this force was “scattered over the vast territory from Chita to Vladivostok and from Blagoveshchensk, to Port Arthur.”² Such deployment predetermined Russian strategy for the initial period of the war. Army General S.P. Ivanov in his 1974 book, The Initial Period of War, describes the Russian command as being hindered by the need to mobilize and deploy forces to the Far East—a process requiring up to six months time:

The plan of the Russian command was quite clearly formulated by the commander in chief of the Manchurian Army, Kuropatkin, in a report to the tsar…. In Kuropatkin's opinion, the Russian army could begin decisive offensive operations to expel the Japanese from Manchuria and Korea and to land assault forces in Japan not sooner than 6 months after the declaration of mobilization. To gain time and to ensure the concentration and deployment of its ground forces, the Russian command directed the Pacific Squadron to win supremacy in the Yellow Sea at the start of the war and to impede the landing of Japanese assault forces on the coast of the Asian continent.³
As in the Crimean War, the limitations of the railroad system hindered troop deployment. Although a rail line did extend all the way through Manchuria to the battle areas around Port Arthur and Mukden, it was not strategically sufficient. The Trans-Siberian line could only handle three pairs of troop trains per day, and all of the main reinforcements arriving from western and central Russia faced additional delays at the 15-45 mile wide gap at Lake Baikal. Here, the rail line was incomplete and forces had to transfer to ferries or march across the frozen waters in the winter months. In fact, a troop train from European Russia required up to six weeks to make the transit.\(^4\) Even units in the Far Eastern region were of little help because some garrisons were up to 600 kilometers from the nearest rail line.\(^5\) Of the 1.2 million men deployed to Manchuria during the war, a majority arrived in 1905, a full year after the war had begun and after the important Russian defeats at the Yalu, Wafangkou, Liaoyang, and in the siege of Port Arthur.\(^6\)

The defeat to Japan cost Russia the highly valuable Port Arthur and the Liaotung peninsula. Once again the poor performance of the Russian army and the mobilization system spurred a reform movement. This occurred first under Minister of War A.F. Rediger (1905-08) and then under V.A. Sukhomlinov (1909-12). The reforms revamped the mobilization and reserve system and created “concealed cadres” or a reserve corps which, when mobilized, would field 35 divisions.\(^7\) The overall peacetime deployment of the Army changed: troops from the western military districts were restationed in the central military districts to make strategic deployment easier.\(^8\) In addition, Russia introduced a territorial system of recruitment that established special corps, division, and regimental recruitment areas. This system provided for the calling up of troops in a specific region or military district, if necessary, and enhanced the state’s ability to mobilize for specific contingencies, such as using the armed forces to suppress rebellions.\(^9\) These provisions for mobilization played a crucial role in the events which led to the outbreak of World War I.

**World War I.** The cataclysmic events of the summer of 1914 demonstrated the inherently political nature of the mobilization process and exposed its delicate inflexibilities once set in motion. Russia was drawn into the war by the dynamic relationship between the mechanics of its own mobilization system and the objectives of its foreign policy. The primary feature of that relationship was the Franco-Russian alliance of 1894, in which both parties agreed to aid
each other in case of war with Germany. The provisions of the alliance guaranteed that the political decision to support one's ally and the military decision to mobilize and initiate hostilities would be formally intertwined.

The actual events that unfolded in the crisis of 1914, however, did not fully accommodate the contingencies of the Franco-Russian alliance (nor, for that matter, of the opposing Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy). When Austria-Hungary ordered what was, in effect, a partial mobilization of her forces against Serbia, after the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914, and followed that with a formal declaration of war on 28 July, the Russians and their French allies were thrown into a quandary. Although Austria was not "attacking" Russia as the alliance provisions stipulated, the Austrian mobilization, even though incomplete and directed against Serbia, threatened to catch the Russian army unprepared for future war contingencies which might involve not only Austria, but Germany as well.

This complication caused Russian leaders to consider a partial mobilization of the Russian army, involving only the forces in the Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan military districts (those units which would be used against Austria alone). No mobilization would occur in the military districts of Warsaw, Vilna, and St. Petersburg so as not to aggavate Germany and lead to a widening of the conflict.

As historical writings reveal, the proposal for a partial mobilization discussed at the Russian Council of Ministers held on 24-25 July 1914 was not a novel concept. Russian military leaders had debated such a possibility during the negotiations surrounding the Franco-Russian alliance in 1894, but the Minister of War, General Vannovsky, and the Chief of the Russian General Staff, General Obruchev, argued that such an undertaking was impossible. During the Balkan crisis of 1912-13, the idea of a partial mobilization was raised again, this time by War Minister Sukhomlinov, who believed that the greatly improved Russian army and strategic railway system could carry out such a demanding process. Sukhomlinov proposed conducting a partial mobilization of the army by mustering the Kiev military district, and undertaking a partial mobilization of the Warsaw military district itself. The Tsar's prime minister opposed this scheme and, instead, decided to initiate certain "premobilization"
measures by extending for six months the service term of those conscripts scheduled for discharge.\textsuperscript{15}

In 1914 Sukhomlinov's idea fell on more receptive ears. Foreign Minister Sazanov embraced the idea of a partial mobilization as a means to dodge the diplomatic miasma caused by Austria's unilateral mobilization against Germany. But military planners in the Russian General Staff openly questioned the efficacy of Sukhomlinov's offer in light of Russia's war plans. General Dobrorolsky, Chief of the Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff, pointed out that a partial mobilization was out of the question: "A partial mobilization of our forces would have had exactly the opposite consequences of those which we reckoned upon. From a strategic point of view the partial mobilization was simply folly."\textsuperscript{16} The General argued that by mobilizing the Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan military districts, only 13 army corps could be provided for operations against Austria whereas the war plan called for additional forces to come from the Warsaw military district, which were supposed to protect the right flank of the Southern Army Group. In addition, some of the forces in the Moscow and Kazan districts were designated as reserves for the Warsaw district, and apparently no plans existed for their deployment elsewhere.\textsuperscript{17}

Whether a partial mobilization would have been technically feasible remains the question of ongoing historical debate.\textsuperscript{18} Some Soviet works completely ignore the issue. Sukhomlinov's proposal fell victim to rapidly unfolding events and pressure from France on Russia to fulfill the terms of the alliance agreement. At one point the Tsar agreed to sign two separate mobilization orders, one for a partial muster and one for a general call-up, while some other steps had been taken to lay the groundwork for a general mobilization. The Tsar resisted, however, and ordered a partial mobilization late on 29 July, which led to a general mobilization in Austria and the final march into war. Less than a day later, Russia began a general mobilization; Germany then mobilized and declared war on 1 August.\textsuperscript{19}

The complications surrounding Russia's mobilization decision in 1914 reflect key relationships among the military process of mobilizing the western military districts, the entangling requirements which connect those districts with each other and with the strategic reserve military districts such as Moscow, and their jumbled interplay during a war crisis in Europe. Russia's political commitment to France continued to influence the mobilization process even after the Tsar's
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decision had been made; what had been a flirtation with a partial mobilization now became an obsession in the opposite extreme. Russia turned from attempting to sidestep the commitments of the 1894 alliance, to a partial mobilization, then to trying to meet those obligations through an accelerated mobilization.

Soviet military writers emphasize that the difficulty in meeting the 800,000-man deployment scheme stipulated by the 1894 alliance directly caused Russia's early defeats in the war. Ivanov points out, for example, that the treaty commitment forced the Russian General Staff to revise its war plans for the initial period of war. Instead of conducting a strategic defensive operation designed to buy time to permit a full mobilization of her forces, Russia instead launched simultaneous offensives against both Austria and Germany to draw off German forces from the French front. However, Russia simply could not put enough forces into the field in time to achieve this objective.

Instead of bringing all of its forces to bear in one concentrated mass, the Russian command committed them piecemeal. The attempt at an accelerated mobilization resulted only in sequential mobilization, in which the forces of the border military districts were committed by the sixth day of mobilization, followed by those of the interior regions by the 8th, and finally by those of the strategic center by the 21st. While more efficient than in the Russo-Japanese War, the process did not fully meet the rigorous requirements of the war plan's offensive. Hence, at the start of hostilities Russia had ready approximately 2 million out of a 5.3 million-man mobilization base; of these, only 500,000 actually deployed against Austria and little more than 600,000 against Germany. The 1894 alliance agreement had specified that Russia would deploy 700,000-800,000 against Germany alone. Although the Russians achieved a dramatic victory in Galicia against the even less efficient Austrians, in East Prussia, German planning and boldness proved more than a match. The Tsarist army, which still outnumbered the Germans more than two-to-one, suffered a staggering defeat at Tannenberg from which it never recovered.

The mobilization experience of 1914 had a profound effect on military planners. The rush to mobilize placed extreme constraints both on politicians and strategists and indicated a growing need for greater flexibility. The events of these first months also revealed that the mobilization rate was necessarily accelerating; thus, full-scale
operations could begin earlier than heretofore thought possible. Ivanov summarizes these trends as follows:

At the same time, World War I confirmed and strengthened the trends that had appeared in the wars of the nineteenth century: first, the trend toward starting military operation in the interval between the declaration of war and the commitment of the main forces to battle; and, second, the tendency for the initial clash of the main forces to occur earlier in the war.

For the first time, one could also see the distinct tendency of the belligerents to put into effect, even before declaring war, certain preparatory measures that in the nineteenth century were usually carried out after the declaration of war. This trend was brought about by the identical desire of the belligerents to preempt their enemies in carrying out a number of political and military activities that would supposedly provide the key to victory to the side accomplishing them first.

The consequences of these trends still reverberate today. Armies devote considerable energies towards improving the readiness of their peacetime forces through measures which previously were associated with the traditional mobilization process. At the same time, strategists began to examine planning alternatives to preempt an enemy's mobilization and to achieve a lightning victory before an opponent could bring his full force to bear. These developments dramatically influenced the Soviet mobilization during World War II.

World War II. Soviet mobilization and war plans remained focused on the potential threat in the European theater. Despite the rapid mechanization of military forces in the interwar years, Soviet strategy for dealing with a potential invasion of western Russia remained remarkably similar to their defensive war plan for the First World War, when Tsarist strategists planned to conduct a holding action, or "covering battle," along the deployment line from Vilna through Belostok, Brest, Rovno, and Kamenets-Podolskiy. Fortresses along this line were to anchor the defense until the newly mobilized army moved forward and launched its counteroffensive.

The last Soviet war plan before the German invasion in 1941, like its Tsarist predecessor, mixed both mobilization and operational planning. Produced by the Soviet General Staff in April-May 1941, and entitled "State frontier defense plan 1941," the plan provided for the initial defense of the Soviet frontier while mobilization would be carried out. Similar to the 1914 defense plan, the defense concept anticipated the use of covering forces deployed in peacetime and fortified areas in the border military districts to provide a barrier against
invasion. Second echelon forces, now more highly mobile than in World War I, would then mobilize within two weeks of the war's outbreak and close on the battle, isolate and destroy any breakthroughs, and begin a counter-offensive to drive the invader out of Soviet territory on to its own soil.26

Once again the western military districts influenced the evolution and structure of this plan. In early January 1941, the top Soviet field commanders and the General Staff conducted a war game to evaluate the effectiveness of the forces in those districts; a major conference then reviewed the results of the game for Stalin. Zhukov, soon to be appointed Chief of the General Staff, took issue with the location of fortified zones in the western military districts, arguing that:

In my view fortified zones in Byelorussia are being built too close to the frontier, and have an extremely disadvantageous operational configuration, particularly in the area of the Belostok bulge. This will enable enemy forces to strike from the Brest and Suwalki area at the rear of our Belostok group. Furthermore, due to inadequate depth the fortified zones cannot expect to hold out for long as they are completely vulnerable to artillery fire. I hold that the fortified zones should be built farther from the border.27

In essence, Zhukov proposed that the principal defensive line be moved away from the border (as had been urged in the pre-World War I war plan when proponents decided that the Polish "bulge" would not be defended) to provide a more effective covering line for mobilizing reserves. Zhukov's proposal, however, was rejected in favor of a more forward defense.

Another aspect of the mobilization and operational planning before the war centered on the issue of the likely German axis of advance. Stalin, according to Zhukov, believed that Hitler would first seek the economic wealth of the Ukraine and the Donets coal basin and that the principal axis of advance would be in the southwestern sector through the Kiev Special Military District. Consequently, he assigned to this region a large reserve force which could be mobilized if war occurred; he ignored the Western Special Military District (Byelorussia), where the main thrust of the German attack in fact did initially occur.28

The frontier districts—the Baltic Western and Kiev Special Military Districts, and the Odessa Military District—were directed to revise their separate operational and mobilization plans, though with
some oversight: "the General Staff, Zhukov notes that "the last version of the mobilization plan, concerning organization and logistics, was approved in February 1941 and designated as MP-41. It was handed down to the districts with instructions to correct the preceding mobilization plans accordingly by May 1, 1941." The "State frontier defense plan 1941" offered only very general directions for the districts, with no specific operational orders other than

(i) to prevent ground and aerial intrusion by hostile forces upon Soviet territory;
(ii) to conduct a stubborn defense in the fortified districts to cover the mobilization, concentration and deployment of Red Army troops.  

Zhukov notes that the 1940 plan, finalized early the next year, did have broader provisions for addressing what would occur in the event of war. These were:

All armed forces are to be alerted;
Troop mobilization is to be carried out immediately on a nationwide scale;
Troops are to be built up to wartime strength under the mobilization plan;
All mobilized troops are to be concentrated and deployed along the western frontier in accordance with the plans of the frontier military districts and the Military High Command.

All these steps, and additional measures outlining instructions for a counter-offensive onto enemy territory, would "be implemented only by a special government decision," which was, in fact, granted "and partially at that, only in the early morning of June 22, 1941."

Although the success of the German surprise attack and the belated reaction of the Soviet command meant that mobilization formally began after the hostilities started, in fact certain premobilization measures were underway in the western military districts and the strategic reserve districts in anticipation of the possible outbreak of war. These measures included refresher training for 755,000 reservists called up into the Army and Navy. Significantly, 38,500 men moved to the fortified regions of the four border military districts. Zhukov notes that in May and June "under the guise of mobile training camps" two infantry armies of reduced strength moved into the Ukraine and another two into Byelorussia, accompanied by a General Staff directive on May 13 ordering the armies of the interior military
districts to shift westwards. A few weeks later the General Staff instructed frontier military district commanders "immediately to start preparing command, and stationing Front commands not later than June 26..."  

Although the Soviet armed forces had increased from 1,513,000 men in early 1938 to 4,207,000 men by early 1941, the mobilization status of these forces was significantly attenuated. Ivanov points out that "on 1 June 1941, not one of the 170 divisions and 2 brigades in the five border districts was up to full strength. Some 144 divisions had 8,000 (of 14,483) men each, 19 had from 600 to 5,000 and the 7 cavalry divisions averaged 6,000 men each." Ivanov adds:

The forced retreat of our units from the border caused undoubted damage to the mobilization deployment of our forces. The retreat greatly complicated the conduct of mobilization in the border districts; mobilization was virtually stopped in areas directly adjacent to the border.

To be sure, other factors contributed to the worsening of the Soviet situation; a shortage of ammunition, an insufficient number of signal units and communications gear, and lack of transportation equipment.

The magnitude of the 22 June 1941 disaster cannot be overstated. The border military districts' defenses collapsed; thousands of troops were killed, wounded, or taken prisoner. The Soviet air force, still on the ground, was decimated. German spearheads ripped through the prepared defense line; Russian forces being mobilized in what were to be relatively secure rear areas, found themselves in the thick of battle. As the military districts attempted to convert their forces to armies and fronts, they discovered that the two weeks which General Staff planners needed to complete the mobilization process were now a pipedream.

The Germans occupied many key mobilization centers in the frontier districts making it impossible for some personnel to report to their units. Martial law was declared in the western districts and a mobilization decree issued on June 22 covering all citizens eligible for military service (born between 1905 and 1918). The following day the State Defense Committee (GKO), the "extraordinary body set up under Stalin's chairmanship" to manage the overall war effort, introduced a plan for producing ammunition. The GKO then developed a mobilization plan for the entire economy. The Communist Party Central Committee also set up a mobilization plan designed
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to put more party members into front line service. The military itself launched a crash effort to organize new units and redeploy forces from the interior military districts and from the Far East to the west; by 1 December 1941, they generated 291 divisions and 94 brigades. Universal, compulsory military training affecting almost 10 million people was enacted on 1 October.40

Extreme duress characterized the Soviet mobilization experience in World War II. The expected two-week grace period never materialized; the opening battle of the campaign proved to be decisive, not just a covering battle. Eventually, rear-echelon Soviet defenses extracted a heavy toll on the German armies, and the vast distances and demands of weather provided the Soviets with sufficient time to bring their reserves and newly mobilized forces into play. But the shock of the German surprise attack and its effect on the country's ability to mobilize its resources exerts an influence on current strategic thinking.

Post-World War II. Since World War II, the Soviets have implemented premobilization and mobilization measures during several crisis situations. Some involved the forces of the western military districts; and in a number of instances these forces actually deployed outside of the districts in direct support of operational maneuvers designed to crush revolts in East Europe.

During the Polish and Hungarian crises in 1956, Soviet units were alerted and moved to apply pressure; and in the case of Hungary they suppressed a rebellion. In addition, Soviet units in Silesia and East Germany moved towards the major Polish cities in anticipation of potential unrest in Poland. During the Hungarian revolt, the Carpathian military district covertly mobilized to prepare for the invasion; in fact, the Soviets deployed 15 tank and motorized rifle divisions in that operation from 1 to 4 November.41

During the 1961 Berlin crisis Khrushchev warned that a Western mobilization would evoke a Soviet mobilization; he even backed this threat with military exercises conducted by GSFG. He also took the step which the Tsar had used during the 1912 Balkan crisis of temporarily retaining in service those conscripts eligible for release. After observing their Soviet counterparts, East Germany and Czechoslovakia took similar steps.42

Premobilization measures also occurred during the Cuban missile crisis. The Ministry of Defense published an order on the front

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page of Pravda (24 October 1962) which postponed the release of conscripts, cancelled all leaves, and announced an alert of the armed forces.43

Perhaps the largest force mobilized by the Soviets in the postwar period was used against Czechoslovakia in 1968. This force included an airborne division from Byelorussia and a Soviet army from the Carpathian military district. Other Soviet units from the Baltic and Byelorussian military districts, from Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) and from Southern Group of Forces (SGF) also participated.44

In 1973, a number of Soviet units in Poland and East Germany were placed on alert in response to the Middle East crisis; a division of airborne troops stationed in Russia prepared for airlift and moved its command staff to Syrian military headquarters outside of Damascus. Air transport units also readied.45

Mobilization of the Afghan invasion force in 1979 involved primarily the Central Asian military district; some 10,000 airborne troops of the 105th airborne guards division also deployed.46 The 40th Army presence in Afghanistan has increased from the initial invasion force of approximately 70,000 men to 116,000, including security units from both the Ministry of Interior (MVD) and the Committee of State Security (KGB). After more than eight years, the Soviets remain involved in combat in Afghanistan.

This brief post-World War II survey shows that the Soviets have markedly improved their ability to mobilize portions of their armed forces on short notice in response to crisis situations. In contrast to the poor showing in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, where Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces experienced supply shortages, the 1979 Afghan invasion was carried out in a relatively efficient manner.47 During the 1980-81 Polish crisis some reserves in the Western military districts efficiently mobilized for possible use against Poland.48 In fact, current Soviet writings on the characteristics of a mobilization for a future world war reflect these historical lessons.

A LEXICON OF SOVIET MOBILIZATION CONCEPTS

General Mobilization. As we have seen, historical events have influenced the Soviet mobilization process and are reflected in the range of current definitions on the nature of mobilization. Soviet military writers continue to differentiate between general (or total)
and partial, and overt and covert mobilization—categories of mobilization which cover the entire scope of potential activity involving the western military districts during a war.

A general or total mobilization (mobilizatsiya obshchaya) covers the transition of all of the armed forces, civil defense, the national economy, and government to a wartime "posture" ("polozheniye"). Classic examples are the 1914 and 1941 mobilizations. In the case of the armed forces, a general mobilization entails a complete buildup of all of the services to their prescribed wartime organization and strength. This process includes "alerting and gathering of reservists," providing units with personnel, rations and provisions, fuels, combat and transportation equipment, bringing various naval (and merchant) vessels into commission, and preparing for force deployment.

A general mobilization declaration would profoundly affect the civil defense establishment. Martial law could be applied to all, or just part of the country; because of their location near key border areas, martial law ("voyennoye polozheniye") would probably occur in the Western military districts, just as it did in June 1941. Under martial law, the military district commander assumes extraordinary authority and can impose additional obligations and restrictions on the entire district population. During a war threat or crisis, certain preparatory civil defense measures would be undertaken, such as: preparing shelters to receive civilians; establishing stocks of protective gear, food, water and medical supplies; and identifying alternate sources of electrical power and gas supply. At the national level, the Deputy Minister of Defense of Civil Defense, currently General V.I. Govorov, supervises the nationwide effort; at the military district level, the deputy commander for civil defense supervises the district’s civil defense mobilization effort. In extreme cases where the threat of a nuclear exchange is great, the deputy manages the evacuation of urban areas and the relocation of the district’s population to safe zones.

In the USSR, mobilizing the national economy and implementing civil defense measures are interrelated activities. The military district, in addition to calling military personnel through the military commissariat system, is responsible for "securing the survivability and stability of the country’s economic mechanism." During World War II the Soviets relocated entire industries to safe zones in the Ural
mountains. Also economic mobilization for war encompasses a fundamental change in the production plan for the entire country. Industries "gear up for war production" and marked increases would occur in the manufacture of military goods at the expense of consumer goods. Such mobilization would also affect the consignment of raw materials, transportation assets, and research and development priorities. Special wartime communications would be activated to provide for the centralized control of the wartime economy.

General mobilization also affects the government and how it exercises its control. During World War II, the overall control of the war effort was centralized in the State Defense Committee ("Gosudarstvennyi Komitet Oborony" or GKO) headed by Stalin. Formed one week after the outbreak of war, and designated as the highest organ of state power, the GKO concentrated primarily on issues of military economy and military production. In a future war, the Soviet Defense Council, currently chaired by General Secretary Gorbachev, probably would assume these same responsibilities. A Supreme High Command ("Verkhovnoye Glavnokomandovaniye" or VGK) would be created to control the actual conduct of the war itself. This element is comprised of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the Minister of Defense and his deputies (which include the Chief of the General Staff, the First Deputy Minister for Warsaw Pact Affairs, the First Deputy Minister without portfolio, the Chief of the Main Political Administration, the five service chiefs, and the other deputy defense ministers). Similar wartime command and control arrangements would be implemented throughout the government and Communist Party bureaucracy, from the national level down through the republics, krais, and oblasts. The military district would become a key administrative unit under the wartime scheme; the district commander and his staff would act as a local GKO/VGK under the direct control of national level authorities.

The presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet formally declares general mobilization. The titular head of state, Chairman of the Presidium (currently Andrei Gromyko), signs the mobilization decree. Specific measures of the national mobilization process would be based on resolutions of the Council of Ministers, regarding the economy, and of the Minister of Defense, regarding the armed forces themselves. These procedures apply not only to the initial stage of the mobilization process, during which the economy is transformed into a wartime production mode and the armed forces assume the
wartime strength, but also throughout the entire course of the war. Hence, general mobilization is not a one-time event, but rather a state of affairs, of operations, that is achieved and maintained until the conflict is resolved.

**Partial Mobilization.** In spite of the difficulties encountered in 1914 with partial mobilization ("mobilizatsiya chastichnaya"), the Soviet Union frequently has used this measure to cope with geographically limited crises. Partial (or local) mobilizations occurred during the Far Eastern crisis in 1938, when Soviet and Japanese troops fought a pitched battle at Khalkin-Gol; during the September 1939 Polish crisis, when Soviet troops from the Byelorussian and Kiev military districts occupied eastern Poland; during the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, when the Leningrad and Baltic military district forces, reinforced by a large reserve force, conducted an invasion of Finland; and again in June 1940 when Byelorussian and Baltic military district forces occupied Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and Kiev and Odessa military district forces occupied Bessarabia and northern Bukovina in Romania. In the postwar period there have been partial mobilizations in Hungary and Poland in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Mideast crisis/war of 1973, the Afghan invasion of 1979, and the Polish crisis of 1980-1981.

The concept of a partial mobilization traditionally has been linked with a military response to a local war or a geographically limited crisis. For example, the 1964 *Dictionary of Basic Military Terms* defines a partial mobilization as:

> used in those cases when, in order to fulfill the missions assigned to the armed forces, it will suffice to mobilize one or several military districts (or fleets, flotillas), or even individual major field forces, formations, and organizations that form part of them. As a rule, partial mobilization is carried out when there is a local war (or the threat of one), observing that under present-day conditions a local war may become a general one, as aggression started by the imperialists in any region whatever may grow into a world-wide nuclear war.  

Sokolovskiy, in the 1968 edition of *Military Strategy*, uses the term "special mobilization" to cover a contingency that "in the past included simultaneously or consecutively only the territories of certain military districts in the immediate vicinity of the probable theater of military operations." More recent definitions clarify that a partial mobilization involves placing only a portion of "a country's armed forces, economy and government institutions ... on a war footing."
Perhaps the most important feature of partial mobilization is the capability to mobilize individual military districts or, if necessary, specific forces within one or more military districts. Though the ability of the Soviet armed forces to carry out partial mobilization is verified by the historical record, the exact nature of their mobilization flexibility is not fully clear. In theory, partial mobilization allows for a vast range of contingencies which entail detailed planning and resource expenditure. It is doubtful that all such contingencies could be covered; so the General Staff probably uses a basic mobilization plan which covers the activities a unit ordered to mobilize must undertake. Obviously, ad hoc planning would still be necessary to accommodate the specific requirements of any one scenario (i.e., allocating transport, air and rail assets, shifting POL reserves, actually mobilizing and deploying units to cope with the existing crisis situation).

A partial mobilization would be unlikely during a world crisis which portends war in Europe. In such a case, the Soviets would be under extreme pressure to either match or exceed any NATO preparations and would probably reinforce all key units in the western military districts. One could envision some scenarios where Soviet leaders might prefer to avoid a general mobilization for political reasons, and that a mobilization order in response to a European crisis might exclude the Far Eastern military district (at least initially) and the Central Asian military district. A less likely case might be the exemption of the Leningrad military district, if such a militarily risky move might prove politically beneficial on that flank. The most likely case of a partial mobilization would involve all of European Russia; the entire USSR would likely be placed on a war footing but with Far Eastern units avoiding full mobilization so as not to provoke a Chinese reaction. Naval units, air and air defense and coastal defense units in the Far East might be partially mobilized to deal with the potential threat from US forces in the Pacific.65

In the western military districts, a partial mobilization might occur at the early stages of a crisis if the Soviets considered it necessary to demonstrate resolve, match a similar move by NATO, or take advantage of an opportunity to apply military pressure. The Soviets appear to view such a move with caution because of the loss of any chance of surprise and the inherent risks of escalation. Also such a move would be disruptive of the need to implement an orderly general mobilization because it would leave some forces at an unprepared state while other units are gearing up for full hostilities.
Overt and Covert Mobilization. Currently, the United States and the USSR possess the capability to completely devastate each others' territories by employing strategic nuclear weapons. As a result, the factor of surprise remains a critical consideration in all planning, particularly mobilization planning. To achieve surprise in the mobilization and deployment of the forces in the western military districts, a "covert" or "concealed" mobilization must occur.6

Since the end of World War II Soviet writings have openly argued that a covert mobilization, in spite of the advanced state of military intelligence technology, can be achieved. Sokolovskiy states that:

Concealed mobilization is possible even under present-day conditions, but it will be realized somewhat differently than previously...

However, it must be borne in mind that with present-day means of strategic reconnaissance, widespread mobilization measures, even though concealed, cannot go unnoticed. Therefore, all the leading countries of coalitions strive to keep their armed forces in a maximum state of readiness.6

Hence, the relationship between unit readiness and the covert mobilization process is paramount. Changing a unit's level of readiness, which is not the same as mobilizing a new unit or of filling a skeleton unit with call-ups, offers a greater degree of subtlety—particularly at lower levels of readiness, where increases in a unit's status might not be as easily detectable or, more likely, as easily categorized as a full-fledged move towards total mobilization. This vague signature is especially important in a partial mobilization, where the absence of large-scale changes throughout the armed forces and the nation would lead to sufficient ambiguities to cloud intent.

Sokolovskiy confirms "the concealed method" possibility when he notes it "was sometimes used for special, that is, partial, mobilizations which consisted of mobilizing only certain units under the guise of different types of checks, training groups, maneuvers, etc."68 More recent sources, including the 1986 Military Encyclopedia Dictionary, note that mobilization "can be carried out openly or secretly."69

Soviet theorists cite considerable historical precedent for covert mobilization. Marshal Ogarkov in a 1983 article on mobilization argued that a short, covert mobilization phase occurred prior to the outbreak of World War I.70 Major General V. Zemskov notes that all the European powers carried out a secret mobilization in 1914 before the actual declaration of mobilization.71 Official histories of World War II credit the Germans with successful covert mobilizations prior
to the 1939 Polish campaign and the 1940 campaign in the West. They admit that the covert mobilization conducted prior to the German invasion of Soviet Russia in 1941 was also somewhat successful, even though Soviet intelligence detected these preparations. General A.M. Mayorov claims that even though the Germans achieved a high degree of strategic surprise, the Soviet command had initiated some covert mobilization activities in the Western military districts prior to the German attack.

Soviet historical analyses use a specific taxonomy in describing the evolution of the mobilization process during the crisis leading to war. Zemskov’s 1969 *Military Thought* article, “Wars of the Modern Era,” categorizes various phases of the “threatening period” (“Ugrozhayemyy period”) of a crisis which leads to war. Zemskov argues that a “general threatening period” first occurs when international relations begin to deteriorate and a war becomes quite likely; then follows an “immediate threatening period,” when actual preparations for war are conducted. He further subdivides the “immediate threatening period” into two stages, marked first by covert mobilization, then by a briefer period of open mobilization. Zemskov specifies the phases for World Wars I and II, and states:

Such a division of the threatening period is also possible in modern conditions. During the concealed stage, direct preparation for military operations is carried out secretly. The open stage takes a small portion of time, when the aggressor completes preparation for war and his preparations are discovered, the international situation becomes heated to the limit, and war becomes inevitable. Usually this stage is of the utmost brevity. In any case, the enemy evidently will conceal to the end his preparation in order not to lose the advantages of surprise. It is, therefore, a task of primary importance to determine the beginning of the threatening period, so as to take the necessary countermeasures.

Zemskov concludes that a crisis leading to a world war will inevitably exhibit some mobilization characteristics, even if they are of a covert nature, or in the open in the culminating moments of the threatening period at the brink of war.

Can such a covert mobilization be successfully implemented in the western military districts in the advent of a future crisis which might lead to war in Europe? These territories, along with the deployment areas in Eastern Europe, would be the most closely watched in a burgeoning world crisis. Intelligence assets will concentrate on detecting any signs of a mobilization of those forces. An additional
complicating factor for military leaders could be the reticence of political leaders to commit early to any form of mobilization, out of concern over events escalating out of control.

Current Soviet writing stresses the need for more flexible planning to cope with a range of variants for the outbreak of war. M.A. Gareyev stresses the importance of mobilization preparations during the threatening period. He argues that it is extremely difficult to predict beforehand if a particular crisis will lead to war (and hence require a mobilization); he compares the situation to the "demand of a fire chief that his team arrive at the fire an hour before it starts."76

In sum, covert and overt mobilization processes in the Western military districts are greatly constrained. If the mobilization decision is made late in the crisis, one might then expect a relatively short covert mobilization phase, quickly followed by the outbreak of war and the simultaneous commencement of a wide-scale overt mobilization, carried out under attack. Most Soviet theorists accept this scenario of the overall mobilization period in a future war.

THE MECHANISMS OF MOBILIZATION

Although the complex theories of mobilization and their related terminology appear as a science on paper, they depend on the human factor for their execution. People fight wars, and it is no simple matter to gather vast numbers of people together to fight. Mobilization is the first real step in transforming a mass of civilians into a coherent, effective fighting force.

The 1967 Law on Universal Military Service stipulates requirements for military service.77 Soviet mobilization rests on a system of universal military service for all males, making the armed forces a conscript force. With the exception of a few women, there are no volunteers. All men between the ages of 19 and 22 must serve unless exempted. After a two- to three-year tour of active duty, an enlisted man moves to the reserves and remains eligible for callup until age 50; officers serve longer.

The male population provides a vast pool of Soviet reservists. The active duty armed forces are a training ground for these reservists, with a corps of professional officers and enlisted noncommissioned officers providing continuity through the constant training of inductees. Hence, most ready reservists are those personnel who have just completed their active duty; as these personnel grow older, the
relevance of their active duty training wanes. Although reservists receive refresher training throughout their lives, the majority (when called up to temporary active duty) conduct non-military activities such as crop harvesting, construction work, etc. However, officers receive more professional military training and are directly involved in actual military activities.

At the top of the mobilization structure is the Defense Council, the modern equivalent of the World War II GKO, headed by the General Secretary of the CP. Responsible for the overall management of the war effort, it supervises the implementation of the mobilization plan through its primary action office, the General Staff. The Organization and Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff prepares the national mobilization plan in accordance with the deployment requirements established by the Main Operations Directorate's war plan. The Organization and Mobilization Directorate also keeps account of the manpower figures for the armed forces as well as the stockpiles of supplies, unit equipment, and mobilization transportation requirements.

The Commander-in-Chief of each of the 16 military districts acts as the primary local agent for the General Staff on mobilization matters. Each commander must develop his own district mobilization plan in accordance with the overall national plan. This planning process is carried out by the military district's Organization and Mobilization Directorate, which must not only organize the district's military effort, but also must coordinate with civilian elements. The district mobilization plan covers the formation of military units and the appropriation and conversion of civilian resources to support the war effort. For units already in garrison within the district, the garrison commander acts as the senior officer in charge of garrison mobilization for wartime operations.

At the local level, the principal agent responsible for mobilization is the military commissariat, or voyenkomat. The 4,200 voyenkomats, which are serviced by some 22,000 military personnel and over 75,000 support personnel, perform primary mobilization activity—namely, gathering personnel for service in the armed forces. Each voyenkomat is directly subordinate to the district commander and works closely with the General Staff. Voyenkomats exist at all levels of the state administration—in commissar republics, kray and oblasts, national districts, and autonomous oblasts. Cities also have their own voyenkomat; and large cities, such as Moscow,
are further subdivided into separate offices. The *oblast voyenkomat* is the primary mobilization administrative authority within the military district. In addition to maintaining files on personnel and preparing and implementing a training plan for those personnel once they are called up, the *voyenkomats* also keep a register of all civilian vehicles designated for use during war. These vehicles are organized into transport units, called *autokolona*, and provide a large pool from available, operating vehicles. Drivers must keep these designated vehicles up to specified standards.

When the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet declares mobilization, the Minister of Defense issues a mobilization order directing reservists to report for duty and to retain individuals currently in the armed forces until further notice. This order would set off a large movement of personnel; civil defense measures would be initiated and martial law declared at least in those regions closest to the probable theater of action. Training would commence. According to some figures, the Soviet Union would be able to mobilize 9 to 11 million men within two days of the order; a quarter to a third of these would report within the first 24 hours. Though this seems impressive, most men will require additional training and outfitting, and many units will not be ready for battle for two to eight weeks.

Mobilization procedures pertain primarily to the ground forces, not to the other services. Since the Strategic Rocket Forces remain at a high state of readiness and are fully manned, the impact of the mobilization would be relatively small. Air defense forces might go to a higher alert status, but they too are not dependent on a mass influx of reservists to carry out their mission. Since front-line air force units remain at full strength, mobilization would cover primarily the conversion of Aeroflot aircraft to military service and the training of additional pilots and support crews. The Navy would activate mothballed ships and accelerate repair and servicing of active vessels.

The Soviet mobilization effort remains one of the greatest successes of the Great Patriotic War. The Soviets fielded 291 divisions and 94 brigades in the six-month period following the German attack and moved extensive stores and entire industries out of danger. This entire procedure was carried out while the Soviet Union was under attack. In a future war, the military districts will be faced with no less a task.
WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICT AND CENTRAL STRATEGIC RESERVES: FORCES AND COMMAND AND CONTROL

The actual forces currently arrayed in the six western military districts (Leningrad, Baltic, Byelorussian, Carpathian, Kiev, and Odessa) from European Russia are extensive. The Soviets know, too, that force calculations for a war in Europe must also include the three military districts of the Central Strategic Reserve (Moscow, Urals, and Volga). These nine military districts constitute the primary mobilization base for reinforcements to the forward-deployed Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. The six districts in European Russia would provide the immediate reserve forces for the strategic military operation in the European theater. The military districts in the Southern TVD are not included in the European theater calculations. Although they do comprise a force that could be used against eastern Turkey, a NATO member, they would not be called upon to provide reinforcements for the western theater except in extreme circumstances. Though Southern TVD forces do force NATO (that is, Turkey) to maintain forces in this region, the role of these forces is not directly connected with this particular study.89

Table 2.1, which portrays the ground forces in the European theater, indicates that in approximately 60 days the above nine districts could generate over 96 divisions (including the 18 divisions from the strategic reserve) through mobilization. Some 2,300 tactical aircraft (including 215 from the Moscow military district) are available, plus added aircraft from the air defense forces. The air armies at Legnica, Vinnitsa, Moscow, and Smolensk offer an additional reserve force for either theater or strategic operations. The three principal naval forces possess over 200 submarines, over 200 main combatants, some 500 minor combatants, 59 amphibious ships and an array of auxiliaries. One might also include the KGB border guard and MVD security units for rear area defense.

Table 2.2, which portrays European theater ground forces between 1981-1987, indicates that reserve forces have increased since 1981. In the Western military districts alone, available force increased by over 12 divisions (including 2 tank, 7 motorized rifle, and 2 artillery divisions, and an assortment of smaller airborne/air assault units of brigade size or less). The central strategic reserve also
### 2.1—GROUND FORCES IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER, 1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Western Military Districts</th>
<th>Central Strategic Reserve</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leningrad</td>
<td>Baltic</td>
<td>Byelorussianian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD Headquarters</td>
<td>Leningrad</td>
<td>Kaliningrad</td>
<td>Minsk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank divisions</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorized Rifle divisions</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airborne divisions</td>
<td>1+</td>
<td>2+</td>
<td>0+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery divisions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11+</td>
<td>13+</td>
<td>15+</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

YURECHKO

has expanded by 5 motorized rifle divisions. Although available manpower figures are ambiguous (due to changes in counting techniques and limited data), manpower appears to have increased in both the overall number of active duty personnel and in the number of recently trained reservists (see table 1.2, Chapter 1 above). Since no specific manpower figures are available for the western military districts or the central strategic reserves, the growth in the number of units is probably best accounted for by the creation of new cadre level divisions (that is, divisions which have a small number of personnel to maintain the equipment base until a mobilization provides additional active duty manpower).

Western military district forces, except for Leningrad, would be under the control of a TVD commander-in-chief (CINC). The Western TVD CINC, in addition to controlling Soviet and East European forces in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, commands the second-echelon fronts generated by the Baltic, Byelorussian, and Carpathian military districts. Similarly, the Southwestern TVD CINC controls Soviet, Romanian, and Bulgarian units and the Kiev and Odessa fronts. Even after the generation and forward deployment of the second echelon fronts, the parent military districts continue activities under the purview of the TVD CINC and maintains responsibility for the overall defense. The MD commander in the affected five districts continues to conduct mobilization activities, including industry and agriculture to support the war effort.

The creation of the TVD high command structure and the evolution of the theater of war as a key organizational unit for the conduct of the war has significantly changed the Soviet approach to mobilizing for war in Europe. Historically, the USSR has had to contend with mobilizing only its own forces within its own boundaries, a process which rests on the military districts. With the formation of the Warsaw Pact and the continued presence of Soviet forces in forward-deployed positions in East Europe, the old approach to mobilization became outdated. While the basic mission of the military district forces remains reinforcing the front, the relationship between reinforcing units and the forward deployed units has changed. First, reinforcing units must move further to reach the front itself; second, they must leave Soviet territory to accomplish that mission; and third, they must operate within the context of a coalition, or multinational effort. All these factors (described by Karl Lowe in Chapter 3) also affect the US reinforcement of Europe.
### 2.2—European Theater Ground Force Divisions, 1981-1987

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<tbody>
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<td><strong>Tank</strong></td>
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<td>23</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Motorized Rifle</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Western</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>37</td>
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<tr>
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<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Airborne</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Western</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4+</td>
<td>5+</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Artillery</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td>71</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>95+</td>
<td>97+</td>
<td>17+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The TVD CINC, though a Soviet marshal, is commander of a multinational force. His area of responsibility covers several states and his armies are composed of various nationalities. Consequently, the mobilization of the western military districts cannot be viewed as isolated from the mobilization of East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. In fact, recent evidence confirms that Soviet planning includes transnational mobilization. Colonel Ryszard J. Kuklinski, who served on the Polish General Staff, revealed that a special agreement entitled the "Statute on the Combined Armed Forces (of the Warsaw Pact) and Organs Commanding Them in Times of War" had been signed between the USSR and the non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact. That statute provides for the creation of the TVD high-command structure and confirms his control over all of the forces in his area "in the case of a threat or of war." In the Polish case, Kuklinski points out, this means that "in case of a threat, or war, up to 90 percent of the Polish Army will directly under the orders of Soviet commands." According to Kuklinski, the other Warsaw Pact states, with the exception of Romania, also participate in the system.

This Combined Statute clearly touches on mobilization contingencies since it operates at times of threat as well as war. In effect, the mobilization decision has become an alliance decision; but unlike the World War I case, the Soviets have retained ultimate control over the alliance choice. If a general mobilization of the western military districts is ordered, then the Soviets can, through their own General Staff and the TVD high commands, order the general mobilization of the armies of their alliance partners, with the possible exception of Romania.

The full integration of the forces of Belorussia, Carpathia, and the Baltic military district—and of Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary under a single theater command—reflect their continued importance in the Soviet calculation of the correlation of forces in the European theater. The basic mission of the forces in the western military districts remains the reinforcement of the forward-deployed elements. Their ability to carry out that mission is part of the planning dynamic which juxtaposes NATO's reinforcement schedule with that of the Warsaw Pact.

THE STRUGGLE TO MOBILIZE AND DEPLOY

According to the Soviet view, the beginning of a future war features efforts to mobilize and deploy the total of the warring
coalitions' forces simultaneously, with full-scale combat operations conducted by the forces assembled in peacetime and during the pre-war crisis. The struggle to concentrate and commit second-echelon forces and strategic reserves will become a critical battle, too. Each side will attempt to disrupt the mobilization plans of the other, with the aim not only to deprive the opponent of timely reinforcements, but also to upset efforts to convert the national economy to a wartime footing. Consequently, the struggle to mobilize economic and manpower resources and to deploy them to the theaters of war will be quite unlike that of previous wars.

The traditional concept of force mobilization, according to the Soviets, is no longer viable. Contrary to previous wars, where mobilization could be conducted with some degree of immunity and with relatively long periods of pre-combat activity, a future war will begin with full-scale simultaneous operations on the ground, air, sea, and outer space. Hence, the timing of the decision to mobilize will influence the course of the early stage of the war. The probable absence of a formal declaration of war will complicate the decision to begin mobilization. A decision to mobilize too early during a crisis could exacerbate tensions to such a degree that a possible peaceful settlement would become infeasible. In sum, as noted by Jeffrey Simon in Chapter 1, the mobilization decision is one that political leaders in both alliances will be reluctant to make and military leaders will be anxious to initiate.

If the pre-war crisis were relatively short, exploding suddenly out of long-standing grievances and international tension, political and military leaders would be further pressured. This situation would mean that the time available to convert the armed forces and the national economy to a wartime footing would be extremely brief, marked by rapidly unfolding events of a critically important and sometimes inchoate political and military nature. This type of evolving "threatening period," will become more ambiguous if both sides mask their true intentions and camouflage and conceal their military preparations in order to achieve surprise. Consequently, the Soviets have concluded that many activities (which in previous wars were carried out during the "threatening period") may begin only after the outbreak of hostilities in a future war.

Lieutenant General A.I. Yevseyev admits that in the 1930s the Soviets misunderstood the evolution of the role and character of the mobilization process and the "threatening period." Consequently,
the Soviets did not organize their forces prior to the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War. Yevseyev notes that, "It was assumed that the main forces would go into action after border engagements and after the strategic deployment of the armed forces of the parties had been completed."97 Because the war began with extensive German operations deep in Soviet territory, the Soviets had to carry out the mobilization, concentration, and deployment of their second-echelon and strategic reserves while the first echelon was already in battle. Hence, the Red Army had to fight a fully mobilized German army, with only part of its forces ready and without the concentration and full deployment that their war plans required. Consequently, as Major General V. Matsulenko points out, the Nazis "seize(d) the initiative and attack(ed) the troops in the border military districts piecemeal as these were moved up from the interior."98

Mobilization, according to the current Soviet view, has acquired operational dimensions which until now were not evident. These operational dimensions result from the changing character and likely initiation of modern war. Modern states can no longer count on an extended period to prepare their armed forces for combat; indeed, they must prepare (especially their strategic nuclear forces) to transition to wartime operations in a very short period.

This requirement places severe demands on the mobilization system and on forces which are already deployed in peacetime. Soviet leaders openly admit that "not a single state, no matter how powerful it may be economically, is in a position to maintain in peacetime such massive armed forces as it requires for the attainment of the goals of war."99 Consequently, both NATO and the Warsaw Pact have developed elaborate readiness systems and mobilization timetables for gearing up their peacetime armed forces and their reserves.100 The Soviet readiness system is designed to incrementally increase the preparedness of units already deployed in peacetime and the mobilization timetables aim to compress the amount of time required to marshal the coalition’s military assets.

Although ideally both sides might hope to raise their level of military readiness before hostilities begin, they must also prepare to enact plans under combat conditions. The readiness system effectively covers those forces which are already partially mobilized for war and in a combat-ready state. Although in the past, such units constituted a covering force which would conduct a small-scale battle along the frontier until the main forces could be committed, the
Soviets do not believe that this situation will occur in a future war. Instead, mobilization will be carried out simultaneously with the commitment of the pre-mobilized forces into battle.

In Europe, pre-mobilized first-echelon forces—the 19 divisions of the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG), the 2 divisions of the Northern Group of Forces (NGF), the 5 divisions of the Central Group of Forces (CGF), and the 4 divisions of the Southern Group of Forces (SGF), along with the pre-mobilized units of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states—would conduct full-scale offensive and defensive operations in the European theater. Consequently, their mission goes well beyond simply fighting a "covering battle"; the full commitment of these first-echelon forces and nuclear forces "make it possible, as never before, to achieve results at the beginning of a war which can have a crucial effect upon the course and even the outcome of a war." Not only will the Warsaw Pact and the NATO mobilization systems come under attack during the initial conflict, but also their large prepositioned stocks of military materiel for divisions scheduled to be mobilized will be vulnerable. For example, the United States has several POMCUS (pre-positioning of materiel configured to unit sets) sites in Europe for Army divisions and numerous nondivisional support units. Similarly, the Soviets have 12 mobilization base divisions of unmanned equipment that will be used by mobilized personnel. From the very beginning of the war, these sites, as well as key rail, port, and road facilities will be targeted by air, missile, and, if necessary, special purpose forces.

Although the Soviets believe their forces will be under constant attack throughout the mobilization process (with key support and transportation facilities being degraded from D-day onwards), they also believe they must prevent the reinforcement of Europe to prohibit any deterioration in the overall correlation of forces. Consequently, their NATO targets will be the FRG and the United States. The Soviets expect upwards of two million reservists to be called up in the FRG. Also, as noted by Michael Deane in Chapter 4, the United States plans to rapidly reinforce Europe with six divisions (90,000 personnel) and about 60 air squadrons in a 10-day period. These forces will be further supplemented by three Marine Amphibious Brigades (MABs) and some additional Canadian and British forces. Other NATO members, as well as France and perhaps
Spain, would also respond to the crisis or war with similar reinforcement and mobilization programs. If hostilities commence before reinforcement is concluded, US and other NATO mobilization and reinforcement units will face concerted attacks.

Soviet military lexicons note that deployment covers not only the mobilization and assembly of forces, but also their organizational transition from a peacetime to a wartime structure. The "occupation of areas in a sector of impending action" covers the actual movement forward of second-echelon forces and of strategic reserves from the rear areas into the theaters of military operations and the combat zone.  

Recently, NATO has discussed a strategy for countering the Pact's large manpower reserves by using sophisticated conventional weaponry to conduct intensive attrition and interdiction campaigns against these forces. Known as the "Follow On Forces Attack" (FOFA), deep strikes would be launched against Pact forces assembling and deploying to the rear of the main battleline. These strikes would employ both exotic weaponry, stand-off air attacks, and traditional air and missile attacks.

An important effect of the FOFA strategy, recognized by NATO and Warsaw Pact military planners, is that the battle zone would be extended over a larger area than has traditionally been the case. Hence the traditional Soviet distinction between "front" and "rear" disappears, and events occurring deep in the territory of one coalition will have a major impact on the course of the war along the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).

The struggle for strategic deployment by both sides will be significantly different than in the past and will play a central role in the evolution of the initial period of the war. In the early 1960s, the Soviets expected concentrated nuclear missile strikes against their reserve forces. For example, Major General Kh. Dzhelaukov pointed out that "the problems of combating strategic reserves is not new" adding that modern weapons made it "completely logical that combat with enemy reserves will take place not only within the formal boundaries of a given TVD, but also far beyond its borders, on the ocean and in the air." Dzhelaukov also recognized that attacks against reserve forces could ensure a relatively rapid victory in the early stage of a future war.
More current Soviet writings emphasize the importance of winning the battle of deployment. Hence, the Soviets concentrate on three key properties: secrecy, mobility and maneuverability, and flexibility. The Soviets believe that secrecy and surprise will play a major role not only prior to the outbreak of war, but also in its initiation and throughout its entire course. During the initial period, they will attempt to camouflage and conceal the mobilization and forward deployment of troops, yet maintain a centralized control.  

Dispersal of various elements of the armed forces, including mobile strategic missiles, submarine and surface naval craft, and some ground units will, the Soviets believe, enhance secrecy and achieve surprise. By scattering these forces over a wider geographic area during the first hours of war, the Soviets believe the enemy’s targeting planning will become more difficult and less accurate.  

Dispersal operations and the demands of achieving effective cover and deception require that forces are sufficiently mobile and maneuverable to respond quickly to new deployment orders. The Soviets point out that in the initial period of war, they must achieve three objectives: first, a high degree of camouflage regarding the deployment of second-echelon forces and reserves. Second, a rapid and unexpected concentration of forces to pursue its immediate strategic aims is essential. Soviet objectives here come from the lessons of history. The lack of such mobility, according to Matsulenko, contributed to the Red Army’s severe defeats during the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. Forces were committed in a piecemeal fashion and not deployed in depth and, as a consequence, they were cut off and surrounded. Third, flexibility means that the strategic command must not be so rigid as to forget that the enemy, too, is making plans based on his own specific objectives. Gareyev, for instance, argues that the Soviets’ present system of strategic deployment “should be more flexible and provide the organized deployment of the troops (forces) under any conditions when the imperialist aggressors initiate a war.”  

The overall dynamic between action at the front and the mobilization and deployment of second-echelon forces and strategic reserves is becoming increasingly complex. While each side will attempt to prevent the forces of the other from achieving unity and forward advance, each will also simultaneously seek to use first-echelon forces to create favorable circumstances for subsequent operations by those very reserves which are under attack. Consequently,
the attack on enemy reserve forces will require an independent operation that is inextricably connected with the war at the front. The battle to win air supremacy, to seize the initiative and gain ground will effect the war in the rear as much as the war along the front line. The degree to which either side is able to mount systematic, rather than sporadic attacks on enemy reserves will be a measure of effectiveness in the forward area. Because the Soviets anticipate much destruction surrounding the struggle to mobilize and deploy during the initial period of war, they stress a rapid, almost cataclysmic shift in the correlation of forces, and hence in the fortunes of war.14

Furthermore, this battle will go beyond strictly military targets into the larger national economy. Although Soviet strategy and doctrine leave open the possibility that the conflict might be relatively short, they also accept the possibility of a long, protracted war. Hence, their mobilization activities encompass more than just the marshalling of numerous military personnel and their equipment; plans also include, as MSU Ogarkov noted in 1985, the conversion of the entire industrial and agricultural base to wartime production programs supporting the military effort.15

Converting the economy to a wartime mode of operation entails major changes in production planning, organization, and priorities—a staggering enterprise, overall. All such planning, according to Ogarkov, will have to be accomplished quickly to minimize disruptions and to accelerate the transition to a wartime economy. In Always in Readiness to Defend the Homeland, Ogarkov emphasizes that, "The question of prompt and expeditious shifting of the Armed Forces and the entire national economy to a war footing and their mobilization deployment in a short period of time is much more critical today."16

Anticipating a protracted conflict, Ogarkov argues for making the detailed peacetime preparations needed to convert the economy rapidly during the initial period of war. In essence, he recommends that the economy be closely integrated with the military even in peacetime, so it could be gradually or rapidly mobilized through preplanned readiness measures. "In the interests of increasing the nation's defense capability," Ogarkov urges that "coordination between mobilization deployment of the Armed Forces and the national economy as a whole is required today as never before, especially in utilization of manpower resources, transportation,
This enormous effort requires meticulous arrangements to cover the evacuation and relocation of large numbers of the population away from high-risk urban areas, the protection of key leadership and management personnel, and the dispersal of industry to exurban areas where they could operate in semi-autonomous fashion. Also the state must stockpile large amounts of war materiel reserves.

In addition to altering the vast economic arm of the war effort, the Soviets plan to control their armed forces and the nation as a whole through a specially designed wartime command structure. The transition to a pre-arranged wartime command system must be achieved quickly during the very first moments of the war, or immediately prior to its outbreak. On the military side, the theater of military operations high commands (first revealed in 1984) represent a major step towards enhancing the Soviet ability to achieve this goal. These high commands serve as the Supreme High Command's (VGK) executors; they control the fronts and other forces whose mission will be to secure the immediate strategic objectives during the initial period of war. On the civil side, the Soviets will employ a national-level organ similar to the World War II State Defense Committee (GKO) to manage the overall war effort—the Defense Council, which is chaired by the General Secretary of the CPSU. Other Party and government control agencies would assume special wartime responsibilities only to simplify the management of the wartime economy.

This "higher concentration of leadership," as Ogarkov calls it, depends on the demands of the national mobilization process, and the anticipated devastation of the rear area. The Soviets believe that their country will have no "peaceful" areas and that the long logistical tail of the armed forces will suffer attack. Consequently, local and regional leaders will have to operate like military commanders in a combat zone. Civil defense will acquire special responsibilities that go beyond the traditional role of protecting the populace. Military district commands will need to coordinate military district operations, assist in repairing severe logistical disruptions, and defend the rear against air, missile, and special purpose forces. Also critical will be the battle to maintain coherent communications and transportation.

The vast scope of mobilization and deployment processes and their importance to both the short and long-term progress of the war
make them the essential characteristic of the initial period of war. The Soviets clearly recognize this fact and have taken steps to ensure they will be able to carry out their basic plans for preparing and committing their manpower and materiel reserves to the war effort. The success of mobilization and deployment remains integrally related to the overall progress of the operations carried out in the various theaters of war. In sum, the Soviets recognize that the mobilization effort will be a critical struggle and will require the same intensive commitment as that of the front-line forces themselves.

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Endnotes


2. GSE, Volume 2, p. 500.


7. GSE, Volume 5, p. 278.

8. SVE, Volume 2, p. 263.

9. Ibid.


15. Ibid., p. 70.

16. Ibid., p. 72.

17. Ibid., pp. 72-73.


20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

24. Ibid., p. 29.
26. Erickson, pp. 80-81, p. 132.
27. Zhukov, p. 223.
28. Ibid., p. 250.
29. Ibid.
30. Erickson, p. 80.
32. Ibid., and Erickson, p. 132.
33. GSE, Volume 4, p. 335.
34. Zhukov, p. 259.
35. Ibid., p. 261.
36. Ivanov, p. 179.
37. Ibid.
40. GSE, Ibid., p. 337; Grechko, Ibid.
48. Simon, p. 156.
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50. Ibid.

51. VES, p. 451. Martial law was declared in most of the western regions of the USSR after the German invasion of 1941. See, GSE, Volume 4, p. 336.


61. GSE, Volume 4, p. 336.


65. The Chinese would tend to look at these as less threatening.


68. Ibid.


70. SVE, Volume 7, pp. 39-40; 549-555.


72. Zhukov (1985), pp. 267-279. Stalin's reaction to reports on German preparations was, according to Zhukov, "You can't believe everything intelligence says." (p. 26).


75. Ibid., p. 45.
77. The law was published in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, 13 October 1967.
78. Scott and Scott (1979), pp. 303-306.
84. Ibid., p. 239.
85. Ibid., pp. 322-326.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid., pp. 325-326.
91. Hines and Petersen, pp. 281-289.
93. Ibid., p. 54.
94. Ibid., pp. 53-56.
96. See Zemskov in Douglass and Hoeber (1982).
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107. Ibid.


117. Ibid.

118. Sokolovskiy (1975), p. 28, notes, "Strategy must supply to the economy accurate data on the requirements of at least the first year of the war."


The question of how the United States might mobilize in a crisis is key to the issue of how well the nation can carry out its NATO reinforcing role. This chapter focuses first on how and under what circumstances the United States might mobilize and then addresses the implications of US mobilization for reinforcing Europe. Finally, I offer some considerations concerning ways for NATO to redistribute responsibilities which could enhance conventional deterrence and improve NATO's chances for success if war comes.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The United States has mobilized reserve component forces for an international crisis five times in this century. During World War I, freshly mobilized troops were organized into units, given a brief period of individual training in the United States, and shipped off to France to complete their training under French and British tutelage. The Army, which, since the Spanish-American War, had had few
units larger than a regiment was ill-prepared to suddenly grow to a force of over 4 million men, organized into brigades, divisions, corps, and eventually field armies. Of the 54 divisions formed between 1917 and 1918, 41 went to France. Because of the expanded army’s generally poor state of training, many divisions had to be converted into replacement training depots rather than take part in combat.¹

The conditions under which the United States mobilized for World War II were quite different from its experience of 1917-1918. When it became apparent that the United States might become involved in another war, Congress, wishing to avoid a repeat of the hasty force expansion of 1917, authorized a limited mobilization in the Spring of 1940, over a year before the United States was attacked.² The National Guard was fully federalized, the Army was expanded from its peacetime strength of 6 divisions to 37, and US industry began its ramp-up to meet the demands of not only our own growing forces but of the British Empire as well. By 1945, 12 million Americans were under arms and the national economy was on a full war footing, complete with rationing of selected commodities and the collecting of scrap material for the war effort.

For the war in Korea, President Truman mobilized eight National Guard divisions, expanded all the Services by mobilizing thousands of individual reservists and units, and restored the draft. All of the Services had been reduced to skeleton form after World War II and were in poor shape to fight a war. While all of the reserves were not required for the emergency, it was impossible to carry on a war without calling some reserves to active duty.³ Korea was the United States’ first use of a partial mobilization to fight a war. But, because the United States did not call all reservists to active service, many observers viewed the Korean callup as politically motivated and unfair since some states were given a disproportionate share of the task.

During the Berlin crisis of 1961, President Kennedy became the first President to use mobilization measures as a political signal to show resolve. Kennedy mobilized 68,000 reservists, including two Army divisions, to show the USSR that he had the will and the mandate to do whatever was necessary to maintain US rights in Berlin.⁴ The President also reinforced US air and ground forces in Germany to underscore his determination.
For the war in Southeast Asia, President Johnson reluctantly and belatedly resorted to partial mobilization to strengthen the over-committed armed forces, but purposely kept the callup small to minimize its political impact. He federalized two Army brigades, but few of the mobilized units were ever deployed to Vietnam, although many of their members deployed as individual replacements. Because the Vietnam war had an adverse impact on morale and retention in the active Services, it became clear that the nation should never again attempt to fight a war without mobilizing reservists on a large scale. Mobilization not only expands the pool of trained manpower available, but also increases the size of the rotation base in the United States and more equitably spreads the burden of fighting among the society at large.

MOBILIZATION TODAY

Since the mid-1970s the US armed forces have all come to depend on the reserve components for both crisis response and war. Since over 60 percent of the Army's support forces are in the reserve components, the Army is the most dependent of all the Services on its reserve structure. Hence, it is no longer feasible for the country to deploy major forces to combat without first mobilizing reserve component units and selected individual reservists. Even in an operation as small as Grenada, selected specialties had to be called up on a voluntary basis because the active forces did not possess the necessary skills. Similarly, the continuing use of reserve component units in Central America reflects the nation's dependence on its reserve components.

Because of our dependency on the reserves and because of the sensitive political issues mobilization entails, the United States has become increasingly more sophisticated in managing the mobilization process. The key to US mobilization is flexibility in execution. Reserves are called up in increments, depending on the demands of each situation. Varied authority levels exist for personnel callup.

At the lowest end of the spectrum, Service Department Secretaries may call reservists on a voluntary basis to fill skills absent or in short supply in the active force as was done in the Grenada operation. They may also call selected reservists or entire units to active service for up to 15 days. In a major crisis, the Secretaries could initiate mobilization by bringing the mobilization base into readiness ahead of a Presidential callup.
Without declaring a National Emergency, the President may call up to 200,000 reservists to active service for up to 90 days. This authority is similar in scale and purpose to the 1961 Berlin callup and the forces so activated could be used either in a regional war not involving direct hostilities with another major power or in an early stage of a major international crisis. In a crisis, such a callup could signal political resolve and could increase readiness to hedge against the possibility of war.

If an adversary is detected mobilizing and reinforcing or preparing to reinforce a crisis area or if hostilities begin with little warning, the President could expand the armed forces without waiting for the outcome of Congressional debate. In such cases, the President can declare a state of national emergency, allowing him to call up to one million reservists to active service for up to 24 months.

If war is imminent or has begun, the Congress may declare a state of national emergency, permitting the callup of all ready reserves, the standby reserve, the retired reserve, and restoration of the draft. Not counting inductees, about 4 million personnel are currently in a reserve status; they could be added to the standing armed forces, and could be required to serve for the emergency's duration plus six months under Congressional authority. Industrial mobilization, although not specified in the same terms as the mobilization of manpower, could be initiated and sustained by budget authorizations or supplementals in response to the crisis.

**TIME IMPLICATIONS OF MOBILIZATION**

One can only speculate what course of action a President may choose in a future crisis since circumstances always differ. The President and Congress have broad latitude for expanding the armed forces as the crisis may warrant.

To bring reservists to active duty nominally takes only 48 hours from decision to notification and another 48 hours to arrival at a designated mobilization station. In addition, post-mobilization training is normally needed before a reserve unit is ready to deploy to a war zone. The Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard are exceptions which must be ready to deploy within 48 hours of notification. While some reserve units having missions related to peacetime civilian skills (such as medical or transportation functions) may require only a short orientation period of training, many of the larger reserve formations could require up to 8 weeks of additional training before they
approach combat readiness. Among the assets in most critical demand in a crisis are the aerial port and military air and sealift resources that are missing from the active structure in numbers sufficient to support a major US overseas deployment.

**AUGMENTATION OF STRATEGIC MOBILITY ASSETS**

In addition to calling up reservists, the nation's civil air and sealift resources must be marshalled and brought under military direction to support deployment. Although some assets can be called up by the US Transportation Command's Commander-in-Chief, a major augmentation of military airlift requires action by the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary may declare an Airlift Emergency, calling 171 commercial passenger and cargo planes into service to support deployments within 24 hours of notification. During a State of National Emergency, he can call on an additional 268 civil aircraft on 48 hours' notice.11

The above are only those aircraft covered by existing agreements as part of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). Hundreds of commercial passenger and cargo aircraft which could be made available through contractual or requisition action after a declaration of national emergency are not included. Also available are cargo and passenger aircraft designated by NATO countries and the Republic of Korea (ROK) to assist the United States in deploying its forces in a crisis or war.

Sealift resources are mobilized from a variety of sources and although planning is constrained to specific categories of ships, contractual arrangements with other nations' shipping lines could potentially expand total availability in a crisis. Currently NATO has identified over 400 dry cargo and passenger ships which could support US deployments. Unfortunately, the roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships, so critical to moving heavy tracked and wheeled vehicles, are severely limited in number, constricting the flow of heavy equipment overseas unless other shipping means can be found.

The availability of ships in all categories is subject to many variables such as their location and condition at the time they are called into service and the availability of crews to put mothballed or idle ships back into operation. With the steady decline of experienced merchant seamen throughout the Western world, deficiencies could prove difficult to overcome on short notice. The transit time to marshalling points on the US Gulf and Atlantic coasts could be as
long as three to four weeks for ships nearing ports in the western Pacific with cargoes on board at the time of notification. Since an increasing share of America's trade is with Asian countries, the number of ships in that category could be significant.

**MOVEMENT OF MATERIEL**

Another factor governing the pace of reinforcement is the massive volume of materiel which must be delivered to Europe to equip, support, and sustain reinforcing units. Although all Services have materiel (including vehicles, weapons, ordnance, and supplies) in storage facilities in Europe to reduce early strategic mobility requirements, millions of tons of equipment and supplies must still accompany any reinforcements. Even the prepositioned equipment (POMCUS) stocks for reinforcing heavy divisions remain incomplete and some divisional equipment such as helicopters and selected low-density vehicles will always have to accompany deploying units from the United States. This situation places a high premium on the early availability of shipping in a crisis.

**REINFORCEMENT REALITIES**

The foregoing discussion shows that mechanisms for mobilization are flexible and well-defined in US law and that precedents exist from earlier crises for incremental mobilizing and reinforcing overseas theaters. Factors limiting such mobilization and reinforcement include the timeliness and speed of political deliberations and decisions, which Jeffrey Simon, in Chapter 1, claims to be asymmetrically unfavorable to NATO. Planning must also take into account the time required to mobilize transportation resources, to make strategic air and sealift available, and to actually deploy the required volume of materiel.

Although the United States has made considerable progress to facilitate rapid reinforcement, some of the less predictable hurdles cited above could still impede timely deployment. Even without any of the above impediments, the United States cannot meet its initial reinforcement objective of 10 divisions in 10 days until the remaining shortfalls in storage facilities, selected materiel stocks, and strategic mobility assets are resolved.12

Critics on both sides of the Atlantic have long been skeptical about a major reinforcement of Europe with conventional US ground forces during a NATO-Warsaw Pact crisis. Europeans question
whether the United States can support SACEUR's Rapid Reinforcement Plan (RRP) and recognize that US forces may arrive late. Although reinforcing air squadrons could arrive quickly, reinforcing ground units may not meet the criteria outlined in SACEUR's planning. Despite considerable effort and cost, there remain significant shortfalls in US deployment capabilities.

Some US and NATO planners are concerned that some European countries, designated by SACEUR to be reinforced, will vacillate on critical decisions to raise alert levels, mobilize, and reinforce for fear of "provoking" an aroused USSR in a crisis. There are legitimate reasons for skepticism on both sides of the Atlantic, but there are also strengths in the alliance which remain untapped and could remedy the problem or at least mitigate its consequences. A greater effort by some European countries and an acceleration of the US reinforcement pace could significantly improve the picture.

CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Concerns about the RRP stem from the growing perception in some academic circles and in the public domain that the era of nuclear deterrence may have passed its high water mark. Unlike the US nuclear superiority prevailing throughout the first quarter century of NATO's existence, the USSR has now matched, and in some areas exceeded, US nuclear capabilities. Today, most experts in nuclear deterrence agree that there is no way either side can assure itself that escalation can be controlled if the nuclear "Pandora's Box" is opened at any level of intensity.

That disquieting realization has led many Europeans to embrace Charles de Gaulle's view that NATO cannot rely on the United States to employ nuclear weapons in Europe's defense when the cost might be the destruction of America's cities. The recent agreement to eliminate intermediate nuclear forces (INF) probably adds fuel to that perception even though that idea originated among Europeans well before INF was deployed. Americans, recognizing that no winners are likely to emerge from a nuclear war, have intensified the search for ways to raise the nuclear threshold by making conventional defenses more robust. Regardless of the logic of such efforts, they add to Europe's fears that without a credible US nuclear umbrella, the continent could once again become a battleground.
THE MILITARY BALANCE IN EUROPE

A quick look at the conventional military balance in Europe shows that without reinforcement from North America, a successful defense of the continent is currently questionable. Despite NATO's higher defense spending levels, the Warsaw Pact has NATO outnumbered in nearly every functional area of conventional capability except manpower. The technological edge which once mitigated NATO's numerical disadvantage has also eroded significantly over the past two decades. Approximate manpower parity offers small consolation because NATO's forces are not organized or deployed to maximize their most efficient use.

When coupled with numerical superiority in tanks, artillery, planes, and divisions, the Warsaw Pact's more efficient structure makes its prospects for a quick conventional victory seem uncomfortably high. The Warsaw Pact could throw as many as 232 divisions against NATO, supported by over 6,500 combat aircraft. NATO could respond with a maximum of only 136 division equivalents and 5,500 aircraft once all reinforcements are in place and if France and Spain integrate their forces into the alliance.1 Of the above forces, 31 division equivalents and 1,800 aircraft must come from North America and would require roughly three months to complete deployment, casting doubt on some of NATO's current defense concepts.

General Rogers certainly must have had such concerns in mind during the recent furor over INF negotiations.15 Concern over conventional force asymmetries was emphasized repeatedly during his tenure with announcements stressing the need for early nuclear release authority if NATO were attacked. Through such statements General Rogers made it abundantly clear that NATO has little confidence in its ability to conduct a successful conventional defense, leaving him no option but to reinforce Soviet fears of possible nuclear retaliation.

SOVIET PERSPECTIVES

Soviet perspectives on nuclear war have also undergone a period of transition. Destruction of the homeland by America's nuclear arsenal has always been a major Soviet concern and has long served as a genuine constraint on Soviet foreign policy options. Although the strategic nuclear capabilities gap has since narrowed and closed, the Soviets recognize that there is no such thing as a purely tactical nuclear option.
In the early 1970s, renewed Soviet interest in World War II "mobile group" concepts reflected the demand for a conventional capability aimed at paralyzing NATO's decision-making apparatus and destroying the major segment of its nuclear delivery capacity to reduce the likelihood of escalation. Force structure changes such as the Operational Maneuver Group (OMG) and doctrinal emphasis on airborne and airmobile operations deep in NATO's rear areas soon followed to transform theory into capability. Those capabilities heightened Western concerns about the RRP, with good reason, as Michael Deane notes in Chapter 4, and retrenched reliance on the nuclear umbrella, despite its declining credibility in NATO's own capitals.

COPING WITH REALITY

Regardless of public proclamations aimed at sowing doubt in the minds of our adversaries, strategists on both sides of the Atlantic are realists. Hence, the conventional defense of Western Europe is receiving refreshing attention. Recently, as noted by Phillip Karber and Diego Ruiz Palmer, in Chapters 8 and 9, France and Germany conducted the largest combined maneuvers in their history and have agreed to form a combined unit. Canada and the Netherlands, as noted by Peter Volten, in Chapter 14, are examining ways to strengthen their conventional ground forces. As noted by David Isby, in Chapter 10, Britain has reorganized its forces in Germany and strengthened territorial forces earmarked for the continent's reinforcement; and, as Christian Thune shows, in Chapter 17, Denmark is questioning its current defense planning.

The question for NATO is not how to make the world safe for conventional war, but how to pose a credible conventional deterrent to dissuade the USSR from taking advantage of its conventional preponderance to make a lightning grab for Europe's heartland in a crisis.

THE MACRO VIEW

Viewed from the perspective of potential capabilities, NATO certainly has the resources to outstrip the Soviet bloc in military competition. With a combined population of 662 million people and a combined annual economic output of 6.5 trillion dollars, NATO potentially dwarfs the Warsaw Pact's population of 398 million and its combined economic output of 2.5 trillion. Hence, Western
Europe on its own could match or even outstrip the Warsaw Pact's defense capacity if it felt compelled to redirect its economy and populace to a semi-mobilized status like that of its eastern neighbors.

However unlikely such a situation may be, the Soviets recognize that while NATO may be politically diverse, its European countries, as noted in Chapter 1, have nearly 9 million trained military personnel, 3.3 million of whom are in active status at any time. That force is more than the Germans had when they invaded Russia in 1941 and there are more tanks in Western Europe than Germany had throughout World War II. If better organized and integrated, NATO's European armies could pose a powerful conventional deterrent, even without force increases or early reinforcements from North America. In short, the potential exists, but it remains insufficiently tapped.

**MUSINGS ABOUT NATO'S POTENTIAL**

Although the Treaty of Paris limits the German Army to 12 divisions, there are strong reasons to amend the treaty or waive that particular provision. How much stronger might NATO be if West Germany integrated its 12 mechanized home defense brigades into NATO? That would add four more heavy divisions to the Bundeswehr to cover the forward areas until other allied forces could be brought to bear. The figure (3.1) Proposed German Army Structure shows the likely distribution of German forces under such a concept.

In Schleswig-Holstein, an additional German division would become available to ease the current command and control burden of the mammoth 6th Division and would strengthen defenses near the vital corridor between Hamburg and Lubeck. To guard the North German Plain, German I Corps would also gain a new division to cover the dangerous Braunschweig-Hannover corridor.

Formation of a second German division in Schleswig-Holstein could free a UK infantry brigade, now earmarked to reinforce the sector, to form the nucleus of another infantry division for the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) in northern Germany. That would ease both the logistical and command and control burden of the British Army while also strengthening the vulnerable approaches across the North German Plain, as shown in figure 3.2, UK Corps Sector. Britain has sufficient separate infantry brigades to form at least two more divisions while still retaining a large home defense capability.

The use of an added UK infantry division in the Harz Mountains
US MOBILIZATION FOR REINFORCING EUROPE

LEGEND

▲ Active brigade station
▲ Home defense brigade station
★ New division headquarters
13 Division designation

3.1—PROPOSED GERMAN ARMY STRUCTURE
By adding another infantry division here, two armored divisions can be concentrated on the more dangerous approaches to the north.
south of Hannover would make considerable sense since these units could reach the continent quickly to cover the southern half of the BAOR’s sector. The area is heavily forested and poor tank country, but it is ideal for an infantry-heavy force. Such tactics would free the UK’s three armored divisions to concentrate on the more open corridors in the northern portion of the BAOR’s sector and to provide a mobile corps reserve to hedge against a possible Warsaw Pact penetration of an adjacent sector.

There is also a case to be made for the creation of a Dutch infantry division from existing separate brigades (101st, 302nd, and 304th) and a Belgian/Luxembourg infantry division formed with existing separate battalions. The addition of a Dutch infantry division to cover the heavily populated area between Luneburg and Hamburg, as 3.3 Netherlands Corps Sector shows, would free the Dutch mechanized divisions to thicken the more open approaches near Uelsen. A Belgian/Luxembourg infantry division would be more appropriate than a heavy division to cover the heavily forested hills west of Gottingen (see 3.4 Belgian Corps Sector) allowing one of the heavy divisions to serve as a corps reserve behind the more dangerous Einbeck “bowl.”

If French III Corps were committed to form a mobile reserve for the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG), the German division now designated for the task could be released for forward defense missions. Such redeployment would significantly strengthen the defenses of northern Germany, particularly in front of the Ruhr industrial complex so vital to sustaining Germany’s war effort. Would not the Germans, doctrinally committed to the forward defense of their homeland, be best suited to defend along the border while the French backed them up on the avenues of approach leading to France?

In the center of the country, German III Corps could be reassigned from CENTAG to NORTHAG to strengthen the sectors adjoining the vulnerable Belgian corps. German III Corps would gain a new division and would also receive the armored division which is now NORTHAG’s reserve as a dedicated corps asset. In Bavaria, German II Corps would also gain a division, enabling it to better cover its currently overextended sector.

Would it not also make sense for the First French Army to
3.3—NETHERLANDS CORPS SECTOR
3.4—Belgian Corps Sector

Insertion of an infantry division into the hilly, forested area here, a mechanized division can be released to serve as corps reserve.
assume responsibility for a sector in southern Germany? Part of the
First Army (II Corps) is stationed in Germany already and could cer-
tainly get into position sooner than the United States could deploy
additional forces across the Atlantic. If the French assumed respon-
sibility for the Cheb and Highway 14 approaches (as in 3.5 Proposed
French Sector), US VII Corps could concentrate on the Coburg,
Meiningen, and Hof corridors, making a successful defense of that
area more likely. It also would narrow the sector of German II Corps,
allowing it to more adequately cover the dangerous Danube corridor.

It is unquestionably in France’s interest to keep the battle for
Europe well forward of its own homeland and it would be in Ger-
many’s interest to provide host nation support if needed to extend the
reach of the French Army’s supply lines. In short, both countries
would be better off with a forward defense concept which did not
depend on the early arrival of US forces from over 4,000 miles away.

With First French Army integrated into NATO’s Central Army
Group (CENTAG), the French Force d’Action Rapide (FAR) could
form a mobile reserve for blocking penetrations in southern Ger-
many. If the Warsaw Pact violated Austrian neutrality, such a force,
with its mountain, airborne, airmobile, and armored capabilities
would be ideal for sealing CENTAG’s vulnerable right flank.

The division now being formed by Canada could augment the
French First Army. With its bilingual composition, the Canadian
division would serve as a natural link between the US VII Corps and
the French First Army. The German airborne division, now dispersed
among the three German corps, could be reunited as a tactical entity
to serve with the French FAR as a combined reserve for CENTAG
with an on-order AFCENT reserve mission. This level of integration
would seem to make more sense than the symbolic Franco-German
brigade now being considered.

Is it really necessary for the United States to reinforce northern
Italy? Or have US forces simply been spread around as glue to stiffen
all parts of NATO? It would seem that the Italian Army, 790,000
strong on mobilization, could handle the Alpine approaches, par-
ticularly if France and Germany cooperate in blocking a Warsaw Pact
thrust through Austria.22

Italy’s III and IV Corps are ideally positioned and structured for
combat in the Alps, including the approaches through Austria if nec-
essary (see 3.6 Alpine Approaches), and would serve as a suitable
US MOBILIZATION FOR REINFORCING EUROPE

3.5—PROPOSED FRENCH SECTOR

LEGEND

○ French First Army Division Stations

--- Proposed boundaries

→ Avenues of approach
3.6—ALPINE APPROACHES
complement to the French force described above. This situation would still leave Italy’s strongest corps (V Corps), reinforced by brigades from southern Italy, to secure the approaches from Yugoslavia.

Is it really necessary for the United States to provide ground reinforcements for the defense of Greek and Turkish Thrace? The real problem in both countries’ military establishments is neither manpower nor force structure. Turkey has the second largest standing army in NATO and both Turkey and Greece have sufficient forces to defend their territory. What they lack is adequate quantities of ammunition and replacements for badly outdated equipment. It would seem to make sense to strengthen the defensive capabilities of both armies by supplying them with TOW and MILAN antitank weapons, antitank mines, engineer barrier material, and ground air defense weapons at prices they can afford. None of that equipment is very useful for offensive combat and would do neither country much good on Cyprus or in the Aegean, but it is exactly what they need to stop a Warsaw Pact attack. Since Turkey and Greece are among the alliance’s poorest members, it would appear appropriate to create a NATO funding scheme to subsidize their procurement of selected weapons and ammunition.

An arrangement making Greek and Turkish forces more self-sufficient would free the US army and marine forces now earmarked for the contingency for employment elsewhere. This is particularly important for the army since there is insufficient combat support and combat service support structure to sustain deployments to multiple regions of Allied Command Europe. Dissipation of those key assets, particularly in the early phases of deployment, could place all US forces at greater risk of defeat. With Bulgaria as the primary threat, even if augmented by the Soviet Odessa Military District, NATO should have at least as good a chance of success in the southern region, even without external ground reinforcements, as in the more demanding central region.

The net effect of the above considerations is to lessen Europe’s dependence on early reinforcement by US ground forces. The keys to realizing such a scheme are: Germany’s willingness to integrate its mechanized home defense brigades into the forward defense of its homelands; the willingness of Britain, Holland, and Belgium to form additional infantry divisions from existing structure; France’s willingness to return to full integration of its forces in NATO; and the willingness of other NATO countries to assist Greece and Turkey
with funding levels adequate to allow them to provide for their own defense. While obstacles to all these ideas exist, the benefit to NATO may far outweigh the potential costs. The impact of taking such modest but potentially powerful steps is to raise the nuclear threshold.

PRESSURES FOR CHANGE

The view from the United States is that Europe must do more to provide for its own conventional defense, raising the specter of US troop withdrawals mandated by an increasingly impatient Congress if the picture does not change. After supporting the highest peacetime level of military spending in US history, Congress is frustrated over the apparent impossibility of reaching current reinforcement goals and views with disdain the unwillingness of some European countries, much closer to the threat, to meet defense goals set by common agreement. The interest sparked by Zbigniew Brzezinski’s proposal for a 100,000-man reduction in US forces in Europe indicates where Congressional frustrations could lead, particularly in the wake of a US Presidential election campaign in which defense spending is certain to be an issue. The above defense concept could satisfy both US and European concerns at relatively low cost.

A more important reason for reducing Europe’s dependence on early US ground reinforcements is that most wargaming simulations of the conventional defense of Europe show that NATO is unlikely to succeed for more than a few weeks without having to resort to nuclear weapons. Although wargames are not reliable predictors of battle or campaign outcomes, the consistency of their findings, regardless of the model employed, should give the alliance some concern. If NATO is to retain its viability, it must find new solutions to its current dilemma or the trust of its people and the will of its member governments to continue supporting NATO will inevitably erode.

REINFORCEMENT ALTERNATIVES

The United States can deploy its air reinforcements quickly and could accelerate its delivery of air power if some heavy ground forces were not needed so early. Accelerated air deployments could alter the overall air correlation of forces even before the onset of war, confronting the Soviets with the difficult decision of whether or not to launch an attack in the face of potential NATO superiority in the crucial initial air battle. If European countries take up some of the slack in ground reinforcements, US ground forces would have enough time
to reach the continent as operational reserves, adding depth and flexibility to NATO’s land defenses.

Another advantage of a better integrated European ground defense concept would be to enable the United States to send some of its lighter and more readily deployable forces to the central region’s northern flank where there may currently be too few forces to stop a determined attacker. For example, the figure (3.7) Proposed AFCENT Dispositions, indicates that if the US XVIII Airborne Corps and II Marine Amphibious Force (II MAF) were deployed early to Denmark, the entire strategic equation could change in central Europe. The Soviets would have to reassess the cost of trying to take the Danish islands since the forces they now have available for the task would become inadequate. The Soviets would be forced to either buy more forces or divert resources from the more demanding fight in the central region.

If that caused the Soviets to cancel an attack on Denmark, not only the Danes but all of their neighbors would be better off. The air corridor into northern Germany and the Benelux ports would remain secure as would the air approaches to the United Kingdom. Southern Norway would also remain secure, enabling the Norwegians to concentrate on the vital approaches through Norwegian Finmark in the north. An added benefit of the concept is that the US airborne, air-mobile, and Marine forces, less useful in the central region, would be postured on terrain ideal for a highly mobile, infantry-heavy force.

The Soviets, recognizing the forced entry potential of the above NATO forces, might also become concerned about the exposed northern coasts of East Germany and Poland, causing them to divert resources from the central region to secure their own northern flank. Thus, the mere presence of additional forces in Denmark would serve as a powerful drain on the Soviet Western TVD without ever firing a shot. In fact, if the force were large enough and augmented by US carrier-based air power from the North Sea or southern Norway, such a force might dissuade the Soviets from attacking at all because they would radically change the correlation of forces in the region and confront the Warsaw Pact with a problem for which its force structure is ill-suited.

With a corps-sized (French) reserve in NORTAG at the onset of hostilities, the time sensitivity of US heavy reinforcements for northern Germany would be significantly reduced. That would permit
3.7—PROPOSED AFCENT DISTRIBUTIONS
US III Corps, reconfigured with four heavy divisions and an armored cavalry regiment, to serve as a powerful reserve for Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT). The enlarged corps could be earmarked to either augment French III Corps as an expanded NORTHAG reserve or to reconstitute NORTHAG's reserve on commitment of the French corps. Proposed reconfiguration of III Corps as above includes the three heavy divisions now earmarked for the mission, all deploying to prepositioned equipment in northern Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium. It adds to that force another division which has no prepositioned equipment in Europe but which would deploy by SL-7 fast sealift shipping. It also shifts an armored cavalry regiment to the corps from assets now earmarked for CENTAG to enhance its flexibility and initially take the place of a later deploying reserve component roundout brigade for one of the divisions.

To the south, US I Corps with two divisions and a separate armored brigade, could have a similar, albeit less powerful, role in CENTAG, augmenting the French FAR or replacing it as CENTAG's reserve on commitment. That would leave two US heavy divisions and a light division to reinforce US V and VII Corps or to strengthen I Corps, as determined by the situation. Such a scheme also hedges against the possibility that some of the earmarked US forces may already be committed in another theater at the time a crisis breaks out in Europe. Since NATO’s European nations cannot be expected to fight in significant strength outside Europe, but must have an assured supply of oil to stay in a war if it comes, they must be prepared to compensate for a possible diversion of some US forces to other theaters.

SEQUENCING OF REINFORCEMENTS

As indicated earlier, the first priority for US reinforcement of Europe is, and would remain under any foreseeable conditions, air power. It should be emphasized that this should include naval aviation, positioned to either supplement or complement the allied air effort ashore.

If the above concepts became reality, the second priority, most likely sandwiched among the early deploying air squadrons, would necessarily be the ground air defense battalions needed to improve NATO's margin of safety, protecting key airfields, arrival ports, C3 facilities, and prepositioned equipment sites.

That combination would provide the greatest measure of security for arriving ground forces when they are at their most vulnerable
state. Concurrent with early US deployments, UK, Belgian, Canadian, Dutch, and French reinforcements would move into Germany to bring the earliest required ground defense forces into place.

The next priority would be deployment of US II MAF and XVIII Airborne Corps to Denmark, and US, UK, and Netherlands Marine reinforcement of northern Norway. That would protect the Atlantic seaways and Channel ports and would thicken forward defenses everywhere along NATO's eastern borders. It would also confront the Warsaw Pact with problems for which they have no reliable solutions. Concurrent with that deployment would be the movement of two US heavy divisions to POMCUS in Germany to reinforce the US V and VII Corps, giving the forward defenses the necessary strength to succeed.

It is important to note that both Norway and Denmark prohibit stationing of foreign forces in their countries in peacetime, presenting NATO planners with a delicate problem of providing for the common defense without coming into conflict with Danish and Norwegian laws. Because the Soviets must currently move against those countries before they can mobilize and implement their layered defenses, it is imperative that the decision to reinforce be made promptly. In a crisis, that could be done as a training exercise to avoid conflict with national laws, and could be carried out before the Warsaw Pact is ready to attack.

With the above forces in place, US I and III Corps and I MAF can be deployed to add depth to NATO's reserve capacity. Finally, US reserve component ground forces should be fed into deployed corps as the situation may warrant.

PRE-HOSTILITIES REINFORCEMENT

How much of the above reinforcement sequence should be accomplished before the onset of hostilities? It is unlikely that NATO could accomplish all of its required reinforcement before the Warsaw Pact became too nervous about its prospects for success and either defused the crisis or decided to go to war before any chance of a quick victory evaporated. The Rapid Reinforcement Plan (RRP) as currently structured may be an insufficient planning framework for crisis response. What is needed is a measured, flexible planning tool which does not envision the completion of most reinforcement, less deployment of most US reserve components, in a 30-day period before a Warsaw Pact attack.
One way to make the RRP a more viable crisis response tool, would be to structure it in clearly identifiable increments, each of which would key deployments to a specific set of NATO security objectives. One could imagine that in its initial stage, the RRP would call for on-going exercises in and around Europe to be extended, for selected prepositioned stocks of equipment to be issued or dispersed as a precautionary measure, and that national contingents earmarked for early deployment be alerted and prepared for deployment at their home stations. The objective of this early stage is to show resolve at minimum cost and to complement on-going diplomacy with increased military readiness.

This would be a minimum readiness enhancement consistent with a need for maintaining calm while diplomacy seeks an end to the crisis short of war. It is imperative that this period not be open-ended and that NATO serve a démarche at its outset containing specific prohibitions against further Warsaw Pact reinforcement of the forward areas. If the démarche's provisions are not met by the Warsaw Pact within a prescribed time frame, the clear signal will have been sent to NATO that the stakes are being consciously raised and that countermeasures are required.

If the crisis intensifies, NATO must make a determined effort to prevent the Warsaw Pact from gaining the necessary military advantage to permit a successful attack on Western Europe. At this juncture the forward defense line must be established and backed with immediate reserves. This requires at least partial mobilization by all allies and includes the most rapid deployment feasible of air and naval power from the United States and Canada. Because the latter forces are relatively easy to move and have high impact on the correlation of forces, they represent the ideal deterrent augmentation, allowing for recall at any time the Warsaw Pact acts to defuse the crisis.

As a hedge against an early Warsaw Pact offensive, early-deploying ground forces earmarked to deploy by amphibious shipping, maritime prepositioning ships (MPS), fast sealift (SL-7), and commercial shipping could be moved to waters off the United Kingdom or the continent to narrow the time window of vulnerability in transit. This would avoid some of the political complications inherent in reinforcing NATO during a crisis, but also would place combat-ready ground combat power near the critical areas for insertion in a timely manner.
If the above measures and the accompanying diplomatic interactions with the USSR prove unsuccessful in causing the Soviets to defuse the crisis, then there is no choice remaining but to carry out the RRP's full provisions as fast as feasible, recognizing that the Warsaw Pact may attack before reinforcement can be completed but placing enough combat power into the key areas to prevent a precipitous loss of key territory.

THE PROSPECTS

Recent changes in East-West political perspectives resulting in military measures intended to reduce the possibility of war in Europe are having profound effects on military thought throughout NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It is time to use those changes in a positive way which will give NATO a genuine measure of deterrence from its investment in conventional forces. Failure to do so only invites increased reliance on a nuclear threat which has grown less credible and which could backfire and lead to either a nuclear war or NATO's defeat in a conventional conflict. The means exist to change that picture and there are signs at hand indicating a willingness among Europeans and North Americans alike to explore and adopt solutions which will keep deterrence viable well into the next century.

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Endnotes

1. United States Army in the World War, Organization of the American Expeditionary Force (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1948), pp. 94-96.


7. Title 10, U.S. Code, 672 (b).

8. Title 10, U.S. Code, 673 (b).

9. Title 10, U.S. Code, 673 (a), (c).

10. Title 10, U.S. Code, 672 (a).


15. General Bernard Rogers, op. cit.


20. Ibid., p. 305.

21. Ibid., pp. 28; 207-208.


The Soviet Perception of US Reinforcement of NATO

The Soviet perception of US reinforcement of NATO is a typically analytic multi-level assessment, which examines reinforcement from three perspectives: military doctrine, military strategy, and military-technical capabilities. Within each tier, the assessment has two basic characteristics. It is dynamic, reflecting the changing nature of war and war-fighting methods in Europe; it is interactive, balancing US/NATO objectives, plans, and capabilities with Soviet/Warsaw Pact goals, approaches, and counteraction potential.

This chapter surveys the evolution and current state of Soviet views relating to US reinforcement on each of the three pertinent levels, taking into account their dynamic and interactive characteristics.

THE MILITARY-DOCTRINAL PERSPECTIVE

The Soviet notion of military doctrine is closely aligned with the US idea of national security and the more general political aspects of US national security strategy. By Soviet definition, a military
doctrine is an official and integrated "system of views" concerning the: essence, goals, and nature of a possible future war; preparation of the country and the armed forces for war; and methods for waging war. On the doctrinal level, therefore, several issues are central to understanding the Soviet view of US reinforcement:

- the nature (nuclear versus conventional) of a war, including its European component
- the strategic goals (total versus limited) of the belligerents in this war
- the type and degree of war preparations (mobilization of reserves versus forces-in-being) necessary for the war
- the specific features of the war (the duration of the war, the phases of the war, the impact of speed and surprise, the level of mobility and firepower, the manpower-firepower trade-off, etc.)

From the Soviet perspective, the 1960-61 timeframe witnessed a fundamental change in both US and Soviet military doctrines, but in opposite directions. Within these two years, the United States was striving to shift away from the intercontinental orientation of its massive retaliation doctrine, which assumed that any war directly involving the two superpowers had to be a general nuclear war. In its place, the new flexible response doctrine sought a European orientation that would exclude the continental United States (CONUS) from direct nuclear attack and would limit the US-Soviet conflict to a "total" war in Europe.

Conversely, Soviet military doctrine was seeking to shift from a European to an intercontinental orientation. Prior to 1960, the doctrine had focused on war in Europe, involving extended campaigns by conventional and theater nuclear forces. Now, under Khrushchev's "new military doctrine," the Soviets began to flirt with their own version of massive retaliation. In this regard, the Soviet Union and the United States would wage a short war, which would begin with and essentially be decided by a nuclear exchange. In seeking to mask their war preparations and thereby inflict a surprise nuclear strike, the Soviets would leave little opportunity for either side to mobilize and redeploy major ground force units during the pre-war threat period lest such movements clearly warn of impending action. Mobilization would be impossible; both sides would
have few reinforcements available to influence the course and outcome of the conflict and would have to rely on pre-deployed forces-in-being. Thus, Khrushchev, who asserted that the enemy would be defeated by Soviet firepower "on the very first day of the war," was aware of, but little perturbed by US reinforcement plans.8

From 1962 onward, however, Soviet military doctrine took an increasingly more complex view of a future war. Now, war was perceived not as a single, decisive nuclear exchange, but as a phased conflict. The initial period of war would still likely entail massive nuclear strikes, which would largely—but not absolutely—determine the course and outcome of the war. Under these conditions, massive ground force offensives would play a significant role in the second and third phases. Indeed, the Soviets officially acknowledged that such offensives would be essential to the attainment of final victory.9

Yet, Soviet military leaders disputed ideas about the duration of the war and the readiness state of the ground forces and their effectiveness if the war's outcome was still in doubt. On the one hand, some argued that, given the massive initial strikes, the conflict would be relatively short, lasting only a few days. Given this view, only the forces deployed at the start of the war, waging an immediate and rapid offensive, would significantly impact the war's outcome. For this group, US forces already in Europe, not US reinforcement from CONUS, were the major problem.

On the other hand, Soviets who envisioned a relatively longer conflict of several weeks stressed that no state had the economic capability to maintain a peacetime force sufficient for wartime requirements.10 Consequently, both sides would have to depend heavily on forces mobilized during the threat period and, even more, after war's initiation.11 For this group, then, a US reinforcement from CONUS was a more perplexing, though surmountable, problem necessitating Soviet targeting of CONUS departure points and European reception points during the initial nuclear strike and by anti-Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) operations against surviving forces. In addition to actual destruction, the Soviets were convinced that strategic strikes on CONUS would fundamentally "paralyze" the US societal and military will to fight. Fear of such destruction, indeed, was the primary impetus for the shift from massive retaliation to flexible response in the first place. In sum, CONUS targeting and anti-SLOC operations would probably draw out, if not totally deter, a US
reinforcement of Europe beyond the point where the reinforcement could affect the war's outcome.

In the Soviet perception, therefore, US reinforcement really did not become a major problem, even in theory, until the mid-1960s. Only then did Soviet military planners begin to entertain the prospect of a prolonged conventional initial phase, with subsequent escalation to nuclear use in the second phase. Soviet doctrine now had to consider the potential trade-offs of prolonged conventional fighting. The Soviet/Warsaw Pact side would enjoy certain advantages in predeployed forces because of their larger armies and in reinforcement speed because of their geographic location. On the negative side, however, Soviets realized the United States' potential—absent a direct attack on CONUS—to mobilize and redeploy its forces to Europe in a steadily increasing flow. Here US precedents were not lost on the Soviets, when it came to evaluating the longer-term US reinforcement capability.

Yet, they cited two factors to suggest that a conventional initial phase probably would not last long enough for the US reinforcement to take place. First, if either side were to attain significant advantage through conventional victories, the losing side would then resort to nuclear weapons to stave off total defeat. Second, when the attacking side mounted a serious threat to the defending side's nuclear arsenal through deep air strikes, airborne assaults, or even ground force advances, the defender would face a tremendous use-or-lose pressure. As a consequence, at least one major theoretician estimated that use of nuclear weapons would begin by the fourth or fifth day of the conflict.

Despite NATO declarations, the NATO flexible response doctrine adopted in 1967 was not viewed as fundamentally changing the situation. Beginning in August 1966, the Mansfield Amendment reflected Congressional sentiments for a unilateral reduction of US troops in Europe. In this context, flexible response made it look as if the United States and the European allies had worked out a quasi-division of labor that would permit further US disengagement from a land conflict in Europe. Under flexible response, the United States would provide the nuclear umbrella and air power, while the Europeans would furnish the bulk of the ground force units. Moreover, several factors seemed to imply a shorter, not longer, conventional phase: French reluctance to support NATO, West German insistence on a "forward border" defense, as well as major improvements in
As a whole, these factors suggested to the Soviets that NATO would have to use its nuclear weapons early in any war to offset its relative and absolute decline in conventional capabilities.

These perceived trends may have been slightly tempered, but were not fundamentally changed in 1969 and 1970 by US reinforcement exercises, especially Reforger and Crested Cap. Intended to offset the reduction of European-based US forces and to test US rapid reinforcement and dual-basing capabilities, the exercises were not major successes in Soviet eyes. First, the 1970 Reforger exercise transferred only 12,000 men from CONUS to Europe. Since this deployment amounted to only one-third of the 1968 withdrawal, the Soviets hardly viewed Reforger as reestablishing an equivalent capability. Second, once in Europe, the reinforcements faced several major hurdles. As one Soviet commentary pointed out:

The troops, brought from the US, used the tank equipment and armaments, which were in American depots in West Germany. It is considered that such use of troops and combat equipment, although it is more economical, does not void, however, a number of shortcomings. For example, according to on-site reports of an AP correspondent, American officers declared: "With 'dual-basing,' several weeks are required to prepare military equipment for use by the troops."18

In the Soviet assessment, the naval component of the US NATO exercises fared no better. Describing the Northern Wedding exercise, for example, the Soviet reviewers noted that the exercise had "revealed serious shortcomings" in NATO war preparations. Specifically, the writers cited "poor maneuverability, the unpreparedness of [transport] ships to operate in convoys, and a lack of coordination."19

In the Soviet interpretation, developments over the next several years seemed to confirm their early assessment of NATO's flexible response doctrine. Although they were fully aware of the US programs to improve airlift and sealift capabilities,20 the Soviets thought the United States was distracted along other lines because of Nixon's new realistic deterrence doctrine. First, because of the operational costs of the Vietnam War, the Nixon Administration began to invest heavily in new weapon systems, especially strategic systems, in an attempt to regain strategic nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. Second, because of the domestic anti-military backlash within the United States that led to draft elimination and drastic reductions in
military manpower, the United States had to intensify its efforts to establish a division of labor within NATO.21 The Soviets concluded that the overall thrust under the "Nixon doctrine" was to reduce direct US troop participation in any conflict.22 Third, the United States was aiming toward an oceanic posture, which would not only draw away Soviet targeting in wartime, but also permit a continued global presence that had less risk of involving the United States in another ground conflict.23 At the same time, Soviets observed growing anti-Americanist movements abroad, especially in Western Europe. Given these factors, the Soviet tendency was to perceive the "one" in Nixon's "one-and-a-half" wars concept as more theater nuclear-oriented and the strategic mobility concept as more relevant to the conventional "half" in a non-European environment.

Thus, not until the mid-1970s does one begin to see hints of genuine Soviet concern for the US reinforcement problem. The first cause was the US adoption of the "Schlesinger" or "limited nuclear" targeting option for a "limited strategic war."24 In the Soviet view, limited nuclear war implied a US trend toward a modernized version of massive retaliation. In common with the earlier doctrine and in contrast to flexible response, it reopened the prospect of a US strategic attack on the Soviet homeland as an essential part of US war-fighting plans—a possibility that the Soviets had regarded as a low probability because of Soviet parity and assured destruction capabilities. Moreover, within this limited nuclear war, the main target would be a restricted number of Soviet nuclear assets and troop groupings. In light of MacNamara's "city avoidance" theory, counterforce targeting was itself not a new danger; the new threat was the increased likelihood that it would be executed, and executed early in the confrontation.

By extension, a limited strategic war implied that the United States might seriously consider and prepare for an extended intercontinental nuclear conflict. Thus, if the Soviet Union should accept the US "rules of the game," a US reinforcement of NATO could indeed play a major role in determining war outcome. For this reason, some Soviet analysts assessed the US concept of strategic mobility and the "one" in the "one-and-a-half wars" concept in a slightly new light when they reviewed NATO Autumn Forge exercises after 1975. To this group, the fact that NATO exercises were conducted "as a unified planned operation instead of exercises by individual units" fostered an impression that the Europeans were ready to undertake a new
level of commitment to an effective NATO and that the United States was preparing to become directly involved in a European war on all levels. Confirmation of the presumed shift could be found in the 1976 US Army Field Manual FM–100–5, which changed the focus from operating outside of Europe to employing general purpose forces “primarily in developed theaters of war against a well-armed opponent.”

However, the larger Soviet military community appears to have remained unimpressed, at least until Autumn Forge–78. As in former years, reviews of the exercise maintained that Autumn Forge–78 matched a general overall plan beginning with NATO war mobilization, initiation of “war” with a conventional phase, the transfer of 13,000 troops from US territory under the Reforger–10 exercise, and, finally, escalation to a nuclear phase. Yet, the reviews went on to note that Autumn Forge–78 included several “firsts”: the transfer of units over and above the usual dual-based units, the flight of CONUS-based B–52s directly to West German firing ranges, and the use of Marine troops in the Baltic. While noting that the exercise had provoked some “angry protests” from the FRG’s “sober-minded forces,” the Soviet analysis sounded the somber forecast that Autumn Forge–79 would likely exceed the 1978 version in scale. Most interestingly, the 1978 Soviet review—in contrast to the assessments of prior years—did not mention any “shortcomings” in Autumn Forge–78 in general or Reforger–10 in particular.

Even with this somber forecast, Autumn Forge–79 unfolded in acutely more ominous circumstances than the reviews of Autumn Forge–78 had projected. Two factors were responsible: first, the unwillingness of the US Senate to ratify the SALT II Treaty, which would consolidate US-Soviet parity and, presumably, strategic nuclear deterrence of the United States; and, second, the NATO “dual track” decision to deploy Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe to offset Soviet SS–20 deployments and, presumably, reestablish theater nuclear deterrence of the Soviet Union. As seen from the Kremlin, therefore, improvements in US reinforcement capabilities were now inherently linked to events and force developments across the military spectrum. Even if one can dismiss as propaganda the Soviet assertions that the three events amounted to proof of US intentions to unleash a preventive war, one must accept that in Soviet eyes these events were not coincidental. As a whole, they reflected a new US doctrinal mind-set, which might
eventually serve, as the Soviets vehemently charged when the PD–59 or "Carter doctrine" was announced in August 1980, as the underpinnings for a war-fighting and war-winning doctrine—something that Moscow had seen as its own monopoly.

On the other hand, the immediate implications were far from clear. Indeed, the 1979 to 1981 timeframe is one of the most confusing, if not the most confusing, period of Soviet perceptions related to US doctrine and intentions. At least, four Soviet interpretations of the timespan can be identified, each with a different starting point:

- Focusing on the US strategic modernization program, one school of thought saw US doctrine as seeking "the most advantageous conditions for employing the entire US nuclear potential." "
- Focusing on the new INF decisions, a second school argued that US doctrine now rested on using theater nuclear weapons "at the very beginning of the military conflict." "
- Focusing on US conventional modernization programs and reinforcement plans, a third school emphasized that US doctrine aimed at a conventional war in Europe, but only if it could "gain victory in the first operations with those groupings, which were created in peacetime." "
- Also focusing on US conventional modernization programs, but assessing the expertise of Autumn Forge–79 rather than general reinforcement plans, a fourth school concluded that the US doctrinal objective was "to conduct successful combat operations for a comparatively long time without resorting to use of nuclear weapons." 

With the advent of the "direct confrontation" doctrine under the Reagan Administration, Soviet leaders and analysts appear to have come to a compromise solution, namely, that the United States is preparing for all variants of war. Thus, this Soviet interpretation of the Reagan doctrine:

The task has been set of preparing the US Armed Forces to conduct any war (nuclear and conventional, short and extended, limited and total, local and general, two-sided and coalitional) and to participate in any of the possible conflicts.

Having arrived at this perception of an all-embracing US doctrine, the Soviets distinguish between its near-term and long-term
implications for US military strategy—to which we now turn our attention.

THE MILITARY-STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

By Soviet definition, a military strategy concerns the theoretical and practical aspects of preparing the country and the armed forces for war, planning and waging strategic operations, and the war as a whole. Consequently, the Soviet concept is somewhat broader than the traditional American notion, which tends to focus more narrowly on preparing the armed forces alone. Yet, the difference is more than semantic, for it leaves the Soviet analyst with a built-in bias against the realism of any US strategy. In other words, while public propaganda requires the Soviet commentator to espouse a worst-case assessment, a lingering and inherent doubt exists that, because of its constricted purview, the United States could put its strategy into practice. To distinguish between this public posturing and the actual Soviet perception is a subjective art to be sure, but it is the goal and objective of the following comments to help clarify this distinction.

Specifically, this section surveys one element of the overall US strategy, namely, what the Soviets define as a strategic operation for the US reinforcement of NATO. In the Soviet lexicon, a strategic operation combines the operations, strikes, and combat activities of various military services according to a unified plan with a coordinated goal, set of missions, location, and timing. Thus, we must address how the Soviets perceive and assess the following:

- the US goal—in transfers from CONUS to Europe.
- the US command structure—how the reinforcement will be directed and coordinated.
- the US plan—how the reinforcement will be executed.
- the service missions—which services are involved in reinforcement and what their tasks and capabilities are.
- the timing of the reinforcement—what the scheduling objectives and sequence of operations are.
- US reinforcement exercises—in what way and how effectively the United States is preparing its armed forces for the reinforcement.
The Reinforcement Goal. Over the past eight years, the Soviets have identified three different US aggregate targets for reinforcing NATO. In 1980, citing 1977 NATO plans, one author observed that the US objective was 1.5 million men, 12 million tons of cargo, and 100 million tons of fuel to be transferred from CONUS immediately prior to a war's start. A 1982 author agreed on the figures for men and supplies, but drastically cut the fuel requirement stating that the initial transfer would amount to only 12 million tons of fuel and lubricants. A subsequent author (1985) modified all three figures, positing targets of one million men, 10 million tons of cargo, and 17 million tons of fuel and lubricants. Clearly, by 1985, the Soviets envisioned a downward trend with considerable across-the-board reductions in all categories.

Still, only the first author cited an identifiable Western source for his data, making it difficult to determine the reason for the Soviet changes. Presumably, given standard Soviet methodology, such changes are derived from official or unofficial Western writing.

Perhaps even more interesting are the probable implications a Soviet analyst would draw from the negative trend. Since the 1980 author described reinforcement as occurring "immediately prior" to the beginning of war, he obviously found the 1977/80 targets to be realistic based on US lift capabilities at the time. If so, the later Soviet reductions may have come from their interpreting an increased sensibleness on the US part, with little or no practical implications for US and Soviet strategy. Conversely, if the Soviets viewed the decline in the context of a US trade-off between predeployment and reinforcement or as an indicator of a change in US strategy aimed at war initiation with increased reliance on forces-in-being, the trend would be significantly more crucial to Soviet strategy and counter operations. In either of these cases, the result would be a shortened threat period and an accompanying decrease in targetable nodes valuable not only for war fighting, but also war deterrence.

Within the overall US reinforcement goal, the Soviets underscore several US sub-goals. The Soviet source lists such sub-goals chronologically, implying no particular assessed priority:

- an air lift within 10 days of three dual-based divisions or one complete division and 40 air squadrons (The author projected 5-6 dual-based divisions and 60 air squadrons as a "future" objective.)
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- a combined air and sea-lift, which will increase US ground forces in the Central European TVD by a factor of 2.5 within two weeks\textsuperscript{43}
- an airlift of 10 divisions and 1,000 aircraft within 10 days\textsuperscript{44}
- a lift of six dual-based divisions within 10 days\textsuperscript{45}

Soviet sources also provide a few indicators that pertain to the theoretical feasibility of these US goals and sub-goals. These indicators include:

- 6-8 days to deliver 12 thousand men and 1,500 tons of cargo by 10-12 C-5A and 130 C-141 trips during Reforger exercises of early 1980s\textsuperscript{46}
- 1,000 sealifts per month\textsuperscript{47}
- 18 days to sealift cargo and 6 days to airlift troops for "70 subunits" during the 1982 Carbine Fortress exercise\textsuperscript{48}

Although some oblique references are made to the US difficulties in landing at targeted airports and unimproved airstrips, the potential problems with US sealift are more explicitly addressed in several other Soviet writings. First, one article, citing Vice Admiral Lyons and the experience of Ocean Safari–83, points out that the United States expects to lose up to 50 percent of NATO merchant fleet during the first 30 days of the war\textsuperscript{49} because the United States has a 250-ship or 50 percent shortfall in the number of escorts required for convoy defense. Second, another source notes that US sealift carriers are ill-equipped to off-load at unprepared or partially destroyed sites.\textsuperscript{50}

The US Command Structure. Soviet treatments of the Military Airlift Command (MAC) and the Military Sealift Command (MSC) are merely descriptive in nature, with no direct or implied assessment.\textsuperscript{52} This lack of commentary apparently suggests that the Soviets find both the MAC and the MSC able to meet the basic requirements of strategy in terms of centralization in C\textsuperscript{2} and flexibility in operation.

The US Reinforcement Plan. The Soviets seem to consider Autumn Forge–81 (see 4.1) as the basic outline of the US plan to reinforce Europe in wartime. As described in the Soviet literature, the reinforcement consists of four distinct phases: first, the initial rapid airlift of US troops; second, the sealift of materiel; third, the off-loading in Europe; and fourth, the transfer to the combat zone.
4.1—THE REGIONS FOR CONDUCTING THE BASIC EXERCISES OF AUTUMN FORGE-81
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In a relative sense, a significant textual difference exists between the Soviet treatment of the airlift and the sealift phases. Discussions of the airlift plan are sketchy in detail and propagandistic in tone, whereas discussions of the sealift plan are broader in detail and almost exclusively factual in content. Moreover, while many articles describe US transport aircraft, very few describe the airlift plan—even with a propagandistic tone—a fact which boldly contrasts the more numerous articles on the sealift plan.

Indeed, in my research for this chapter, the most comprehensive treatment of US airlift found in Soviet literature was a historical survey of earlier total war conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, rather than current European reinforcement planning. (See 4.2 and 4.3.)

The reasons for this disparity (vis-à-vis sealift and local war experiences) is not explained or even implied in Soviet writings. At most, the literature shows that the Soviets acknowledge a fundamental role being attributed to and a significant share of resources being dedicated to the US airlift potential. Thus, one might conclude that the absence of an in-depth treatment reflects Soviet opinion that the airlift is a fairly straightforward problem which does not require extensive coverage: the Soviets would attack the airports in CONUS and Europe as called for in their targeting strategy and then hope for the best since the Soviet Armed Forces possess little capability to affect the airlift in transit.

On the other hand, the lack of discussion possibly reflects an alternative perception. It may suggest that the United States has the appropriate C² structure and aircraft to mount the appropriate airlift, but not the capability to execute it if the conflict begins with little or no threat period and is short in duration because of a swift Soviet advance—both of which are included in current Soviet doctrine and strategy.

Yet, a third and perhaps more viable explanation—given the extensive Soviet coverage to US sealift plans—is that sealift of materiel for a prolonged conflict in Europe, not airlift of troops, is the true essence of the US reinforcement plan for Europe. Such an argument seems reasonable since Soviet assessments of US airlift capabilities are more often made in the context of a transfer of the Rapid Deployment Force to non-European TVDs. In addition, Soviet writings have increasingly stressed the Reagan Administration's attempts—through its FOFA and Airland Battle concepts—to begin and wage the initial
4.2—THE FUNDAMENTAL SCHEME FOR LOGISTICS ORGANIZATION IN THE 1950–1953 KOREAN WAR

4.3—THE FUNDAMENTAL SCHEME FOR LOGISTICS SUPPORT OF TROOPS USING AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS DURING THE US WAR IN VIETNAM
phase of the war with prior-deployed forces. If this is the accurate Soviet perception, it reflects the often stated assessment that the Reagan Administration is seeking to fight a short war, but is also preparing for a long conventional conflict in the second and third phases of the war.

The more extensive and detailed Soviet examination of US sealift during Ocean Venture–81 and Ocean Safari–83 (illustrated in 4.4 through 4.6) as well as fuel transport within Europe (illustrated in 4.7) is probably neither accidental nor service bureaucratic. Rather, it expresses the traditional Soviet perception and fear that a prolonged war will allow the United States to use its tremendous, but slow to mobilize, industrial capability to attain Western victory.

US Reinforcement Exercise. Within the context of the preceding remarks, it is not surprising that Soviet examinations of US reinforcement exercises concentrate heavily on US convoy defense techniques. Using Ocean Safari–83 (see figures 4.5 and 4.6), the Soviets see the United States employing two types of convoy defense: the defended zone in the CONUS and European near-coastal areas; and the mobile zone on the high seas. For example, one fairly standard depiction notes:

The "mobile zone of superiority" method assumes the attainment of total sea control and air superiority within a mobile zone of up to 500-600 miles in diameter and 25 km in altitude. As foreign military specialists note, it will be used for escorting especially important sea and oceanic convoys, primarily from the United States to Europe....

The "defended zone of sea lines of communications" method assumes the waging of systematic combat operations by permanent groupings of naval forces and other military services. This goal is the destruction or exclusion of opponent forces from the zone and the creation and maintenance of a favorable operational regime within the zone.

A major Soviet assessment of Ocean Safari–83 (from which figures 4.5 and 4.6 are taken) points out that in the case examined "practically no 'opponent' aircraft" came within missile launch range of the convoy. As a consequence, the Soviet author judged that combining the techniques could provide "sufficiently effective" SLOC defense with minimum losses.

Unfortunately, several significant gaps occur in the Soviet analysis of US/NATO SLOC defenses. First, the portion of Ocean
4.4—FORCES DEPLOYMENTS IN THE EXERCISE
OCEAN VENTURE—81
4.5—CONVOY DEFENSE BY THE METHOD OF “MOBILE ZONE OF SUPREMACY” IN THE JOINT NATO NAVY EXERCISE OCEAN SAFARI-83
4.6—CONVOY DEFENSE BY THE METHOD OF "DEFENDED ZONE OF NAVAL LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS" IN THE JOINT NATO NAVAL EXERCISE OCEAN SAFARI-83
4.7—THE ORGANIZATION OF LOGISTICS
WITHIN THE TVD
Safari-83 reviewed above apparently presumed a conventional situation and only an enemy aircraft threat. The Soviet authors make no attempt to assess the same techniques in a more complex weapons' environment. Second, the reviewed portion assumes a combined zonal defense of convoys already at sea. The Soviets make no effort to judge their effectiveness individually, such as the mobile defense in the mid-Atlantic where protection against enemy attack would be less effective. Third, the location of the operation was the furthest from the Warsaw Pact, but it was also the furthest from the Central Europe TVD. Hence, the scenario is indeed planted in the US/NATO favor, providing only for a "best case" result. Therefore, Ocean Safari-83 would seem only to maximize Soviet incentives to advance rapidly within the Central TVD, focus their attack further out from the European coast, and use their longer-range nuclear systems.

**THE SOVIET VIEW OF THE PRIMARY DANGER**

Soviet writing clearly shows they understand that reinforcement of Europe from CONUS is becoming an increasingly central factor in US/NATO doctrine and strategy and, consequently, Soviet/Warsaw Pact doctrine and strategy. And, in a relative sense, this situation may be more true with respect to the sealift of materiel than the airlift of troops.

While the prospect of improved US/NATO preparations for a long war unquestionably disturbs the Soviets, there are few signs they consider such preparations decisive in either Western or Eastern calculations. Given the Soviet penchant for dealing with first threats first, they undoubtedly still believe that US predeployed forces, weapons, and equipment are the primary danger. Moreover, the INF accord may only serve to intensify this perception by requiring removal of long-range and highly destructive US systems and further pushing the Soviets toward a swift conventional conflict, that is, in the direction that the Soviets would most prefer to go.

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Endnotes

1. At the outset, the reader should be aware that several important aspects of the issue must fall beyond the scope of this short review. Most noteworthy in this respect, no attempt has been made either to present Western concepts, plans, actions, and/or capabilities objectively or to judge the "correctness" of Soviet corresponding interpretations. From this, two points follow. First, all statements about the West should be viewed as Soviet views and interpretations. This allows the author to avoid the constant repetition of such phrases as "the Soviets allege . . ." or "the Soviets assess . . ." one or another viewpoint when speaking about the West. Second, Soviet interpretations may be correct or incorrect from a Western perspective, but they are treated as Soviet views. A Western net assessment or objective assessment is simply not possible.


4. In the Soviet scheme of things, massive retaliation—like flexible response, realistic deterrence, etc.—contains elements of both doctrine and strategy, even though Western terminology prefers to call it a strategy. Since the Soviet approach is used in this essay, the "doctrinal" elements will be examined in this section and the "strategy" elements will be assessed in the following section.

5. Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovskiy, ed., Voyennaya strategiya (3rd ed.), (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1968), p. 68. A page later (pp. 69-70), Sokolovskiy adds that the massive retaliation doctrine entailed a corresponding US deemphasis on the development and use of conventional armed forces, especially the ground forces. Because of this, US and NATO doctrines were forced to rule out a limited conflict against the Soviet Union in Europe.


8. The general outlines of Khrushchev's "new military doctrine" were first presented publicly in N.S. Khrushchev, "Disarmament Is the Path to the Strengthening of Peace and Securing Friendship Among Peoples," O vneshny politike Sovetskogo Soyuza, 1960 god (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1961), pp. 33-40 and 47-51. The seriousness of Khrushchev's views were underscored by attendant proposals to cut Soviet armed forces' manpower by 1.2 million men, along with a discontinuation of Air Force bombers and a sharp reduction in Navy surface ships.
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13. In this context, Soviet literature frequently referred to the fact that the West Germans were particularly adamant about not losing territory to a Warsaw Pact offensive. Thus, early in a Soviet advance, the FRG would pressure for a nuclear usage.


15. Ibid., p. 175.

16. To ward off the full impact of the Mansfield Amendment, the Administration announced in May 1967, that is, seven months before NATO’s adoption of flexible response, that 35,000 troops and several fighter squadrons would be withdrawn from Europe on a dual-basing plan during early 1968. At the same time, leading US officials were warning that further cuts could be made in the near future.

17. In 1967, in addition to the restoration of the Ground Forces CINC post and the reinstitution of a universal military service obligation, the Soviets conducted the large-scale conventional exercise Dnepr.


27. Noteworthy in this respect is that the seventh volume of Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya, which went to typesetting in February 1979 and to printing in September 1979, did not even include an entry on “strategic mobility.” Conversely, the single-volume 1983 (p. 710) and 1986 (p. 710) editions of Voyennyy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar’ include an identical entry, which starts: Strategic mobility (foreign) is the capability of armed forces to rapidly transfer formations and units into transoceanic TVDs or from one TVD to another for reinforcing existing or creating new troop groupings.


30. To be sure, this was based on a long-term potential prospect, not a near-term actual threat, for the United States could not develop such a capability until at least the mid-1980s. See G.A. Trofimenko, “Washington’s Strategic Fluctuations,” SSHA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya, No. 12 (December 1980), p. 58.


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55. At the same time, it is occasionally noted that, in view of US/NATO shortfalls in escort ships, the United States also intends to send individual unprotected transport ships.

56. Galkin, “Convoy Defense in the Atlantic,” pp. 60-61. See also Captain First Rank V. Khomenskiy, “Combat Training of NATO Navies in 1984,” Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye, No. 6 (June 1985), p. 65, which specifies that the 500-600 mile area of the mobile zone will be offset to provide protection 300-400 miles ahead and 150-200 miles behind the center of the convoy.

5 Future US Reinforcement Options

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) faces numerous major challenges during the 1990s in a "double zero" environment. A substantial reduction in NATO's theater nuclear posture presumes that the Alliance can improve its non-nuclear deterrent and direct defense posture. Critical to any nonnuclear enhancement program are significant improvements for reinforcing and mobilizing NATO's member states—especially the United States. Unfortunately, NATO's economic environment during the 1990s will not favor a major increase in nonnuclear capabilities. Besides fiscal problems, NATO investment plans for nonnuclear forces will compete with the "strategic" force posture accounts, especially in the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Thus, any nonnuclear upgrades, requiring increased defense spending from NATO's chief members, will likely be unrealized. Any planner will have to design options with these severe constraints in mind.

Interestingly enough, NATO's main potential opponent, the Warsaw Pact, also faces similar political and economic challenges which will constrain their military spending. This chapter highlights
some US options to improve its nonnuclear capability, despite a wide range of external factors which will compel some hard choices.

THE REINFORCEMENT DILEMMA

NATO planners understand that the geographic dispersal of the Alliance presents some unique problems. NATO’s nonnuclear deterrent and war-fighting potential depend upon deploying a vast quantity of personnel and equipment from the United States across the Atlantic Ocean during a severe crisis. Currently, the rapid reinforcement plan (RRP) envisions moving the equivalent of six “heavy” divisions and 60 theater aircraft squadrons to Central Europe in a 10-day period. This plan requires a timely decision to begin a massive airlift of personnel to marry up with the equivalent of six heavy, division-prepositioned equipment sets (the POMCUS Program). Unfortunately, this reinforcement program is hostage to a US political decision, which, as Jeffrey Simon notes in Chapter 1, is very likely to be ambiguous—particularly during a tense period.

Even if the Warsaw Pact, particularly the Soviet Union, does not conduct a sophisticated pre-war deception program, the core question facing US political leaders is: Is the crisis one of connected but uncontrolled events of escalation (the 1914 analogy), or is it the product of a conscious Soviet decision to initiate a European war (the 1938 Munich analogy)? Thus, mobilization plans must deal with this central uncertainty concerning timely political decisions to initiate action. A major task of the mobilization and reinforcement planner will be to design steps which can be taken during a crisis to reduce the “closure rate” of major force elements. As Karl Lowe argues in Chapter 3, such steps must be “flexible” enough so as not to frighten the political leadership into inaction.

BOUNDARY CONDITIONS FOR DEFENSE PLANNING

Before examining a number of mid-1990s mobilization and reinforcement options, I will describe the boundary conditions which will have a profound effect on plans for upgrading the US nonnuclear potential.

Economic/Fiscal. Grand strategy, without reference to economics, is so much elegant hot air. A central constraint on the defense planner will be the economic performance of the United States and its European allies. The United States faces a protracted period of fiscal austerity in defense spending. After a historically
remarkable defense spending buildup (which averaged 7 percent per annum in real terms), the Reagan Administration's defense program reached a plateau in FY 1985. Since that time, political concern over the rising domestic and foreign indebtedness has led to declining defense spending. The October 1987 stock market crash dramatized the fragile nature of the five-year period of growth and general prosperity in the United States. Irrespective of the precise cause of the market collapse, the political consequences within the United States will be quite significant.

A decline in economic competitiveness, accompanied by a rise in "structural indebtedness," will force the United States to constrain defense investment until the mid- to late-1990s. To put it simply, a national view is emerging which spans most of the political spectrum. Namely, a core element of US "national security" will be measures to reinvigorate the US economic engine. Uncertain questions arise: what measures will the United States take to modify the tax structure and/or direct national resources by Federal spending to encourage an increased productivity for the US economy?

Clearly, this scenario was not the one planned by the Reagan Administration following the recession of 1981/1982. At that time, the Administration hoped that a series of major tax cuts, accompanied by constraints on domestic spending, would lead to a burst in US economic productivity. By 1985, the results were quite disappointing because overall productivity rates remained unchanged from the unsatisfactory decade of the 1970s.

Furthermore, Congress and the Administration were politically unprepared to constrain the "uncontrollable" portions of the budgets such as Social Security and Medicare. These budgets continued to rise—although not with the velocity of the defense budget. By the late 1980s, the politically "untouchable" portion of the budget has risen to approximately 65 percent of total Federal expenditures, and the Federal Government ran on a series of substantial deficits, much being financed by a massive influx of foreign capital. That economic circumstance has proved not sustainable; the most dramatic signal of likely future economic distress being the October market crash.

US economic troubles suggest many scenarios for the defense planner. Under the most favorable circumstance, defense spending will be frozen in current dollar terms for the rest of the decade. During this period, the United States will very likely experience a
moderate recession which, in turn, will accelerate transfer payments to compensate for a return of rising unemployment. Assuming the recession is modest and the United States and its allies have taken moderately sensible measures on trade and budgetary policy, one could forecast a plateau in defense spending during the first half of the 1990s.

However, a more pessimistic forecast is plausible. The Reagan Administration and Congress could fail to act in a psychologically and economically correct fashion to the current market crisis. For example, the United States Government might overreact with too rapid tax increases as a quick fix to a fiscal crisis and/or the Federal Reserve, fearing a revival of inflation and a weakened dollar, could maintain a restrictive monetary policy. Furthermore, the Administration, weakened politically by the economic crisis, might not resist highly protective trade legislation which the Democratic-dominated Congress could pass during 1988, a Presidential election year. The stage would then be set for a very serious recession which could rapidly take on global dimensions exacerbated by a trade war between the major countries of NATO. Aside from the political damage to the Alliance’s collective commitment to a common defense posture, the deteriorating economic conditions would likely trigger further defense spending cuts.

On the other hand, defense spending might plateau, if not rise. The latter might occur in dramatic fashion since there will be a powerful short-term argument in favor of a “counter cyclical” spending measure to re-energize the Alliance members’ economies. Naturally, this measure would further escalate the fiscal crisis since tax increases would not match dollar expenditures. Recovery from such a deep recession might be very slow, with real growth rates for most NATO members remaining in the 1 to 2 percent range. Following recovery, the United States would likely resume cutting its defense spending to deal with deficits which could balloon well beyond the $200 billion per annum mark by the early 1990s. Thus, US defense during the early to mid-1990s might maintain a steady downward drop, perhaps approximately 3 to 4 percent per annum well into the 1990s. Such a downward decline would not be unusual since the United States followed this course after its military disengagement from South Vietnam in 1973.3

Whatever the case, overall economic and fiscal factors will severely constrain US nonnuclear defense planning throughout most
of the 1990s. Only a dramatically increased sense of threat perception would shift the US national consensus back in favor of a renewed defense buildup. Yet, the Soviet Union, in both objective and subjective terms, may well appear far less worrisome to NATO’s political leaders through this time period.

_The ‘Threat’ and Its Perception._ Increasingly, the Soviet political leadership has placed a high priority on reinvigorating its own stagnant economy. Since the mid-1970s, the Soviet economy has shown downward growth. This phenomenon was aggravated during the late Brezhnev period when the economy was “primativized” with a massive diversion of resources into the agriculture, energy, and extractive sectors at the expense of capital investment in the civilian industrial base. Only the military industrial sector benefited from a continuing increase in capital investment.

After a protracted transition period involving the short tenures of Andropov and Chernenko, the new regime of Mikhail Gorbachev consolidated political power by the winter of 1986-1987. In fact, the Gorbachev regime has embarked on a series of rather ambitious (by Soviet standards) economic “reform” programs. The Soviets have made a major increase in capital investment in the manufacturing sector. Simultaneously, the regime has launched a campaign of labor and cadre discipline, symbolized by the anti-alcohol program. Furthermore, the regime has promised better consumer products to reward those who perform and break away from the Soviet version of the “iron rice bowl.”

Simultaneously, the Gorbachev regime launched a dynamic political/diplomatic campaign, a “peace offensive,” designed to undermine political support in NATO for a sustained military program. This campaign is currently capped by the recently negotiated “double zero” theater nuclear forces agreement with the United States. While this treaty contains significant Soviet military concessions, it has the larger and longer term objective of undermining West European political support for continuing the forward deployment of nuclear weapons in Central Europe. Further, we should not be surprised if the Soviets press ahead with a variety of European nonnuclear disarmament proposals.

From the perspective of Soviet and East European leaderships, agreements which result in a substantial drawdown of the US forward presence in Central Europe will look very attractive. No doubt
Eastern leaders hope that such agreements will lead to substantial cutbacks in many West European states and the United States. In sum, the Gorbachev regime might be willing to pay a fairly high price—in the form of asymmetric reductions of their forward deployed Soviet Army in Eastern Europe—if such a policy leads to a substantial "defanging" of the NATO threat.

In addition, Gorbachev has called for a very dramatic reversal of Soviet economic performance. Although it is beyond the scope of this essay to explore the full implications of the Soviet reform program, we should be skeptical. From a NATO military planner's perspective, the early 1990s will reflect considerable uncertainty. The success or failure of the Gorbachev reform program will have a serious effect on how the Warsaw Pact evolves as a potential military challenge. If the current program leads to disappointment or outright failure, then two scenarios suggest themselves. The first is a sharper turn toward a more radical form of a neo-New Economic Policy (NEP) in which the Soviet leadership would consider more substantial cutbacks in military spending.5 Following the current Chinese approach, they might cut near-term military spending while investing in a modernizing of its military-industrial base. If so, Western Europe could negotiate a major drawdown of the Soviet Army in Central Europe.

A second, and more worrisome scenario, is that the Gorbachev reforms could lead to multiple economic and political shocks within the Soviet Empire. Partially marketized, the command economies of the Soviet Union and East Europe could move into a period of explosive inflation. The policy of "glasnost" could be exploited by European nationalists and Soviet regionalists. If so, the reforms will not provide a dramatic boost in overall economic performance, and the stage would be set for return of a neo-Stalinist faction to "save the revolution." The model for this crisis is the events that unfolded in Poland after the rise of Solidarity in 1980. A "coup" against the Gorbachev regime could be led by elements of the Party fundamentalist wing, security services, and selected elements of the military, particularly should Gorbachev alienate them. In addition, Gorbachev could conceivably slash military budgets and force postures in a fashion similar to that of Khrushchev; he might even accept withdrawal from Afghanistan. The latter Vietnam-type defeat might leave a very bitter taste in the mouths of many in the elite military units who supported a failed Party-directed policy in Afghanistan.
From a NATO planner's perspective, the neo-Stalinist regime would be very worrisome since it would likely endorse a "race against time" military spending posture. Thus, NATO would likely face a mid-1990s surge in Soviet military spending when Western Europe and the United States had focused their national security priorities toward lower spending and investment levels. In addition, the NATO planner, trying to craft a viable Alliance-wide nonnuclear upgrade program, would have to ascertain the appropriate threat horizon.

**The Threat Horizon.** Put crudely, threat horizon in defense planning means whether near- or far-term threats should receive greater priority. Some advocate near-term force posture maintenance and capital investment in contemporary weapon systems while opponents focus on the next generation of weapon technologies. This debate will become more acute during the next decade, particularly when both NATO and the Warsaw Pact must make near-term cuts to deal with underlying economic problems. In turn, technological developments hold out the prospect of trans-century weapons which could revolutionize warfare by the year 2010.

As noted by John Yurechko in Chapter 2, these systems include developments in long-range strike weapons that blur the distinction between strategic and theater warfare; in fact, Soviet planners already anticipate such developments. SDI-related technologies will probably lead to a variety of space offensive and defensive weapons. Space combat during theater warfare may become quite plausible since theater forces will depend increasingly on space-based systems to provide targeting, navigation, and communications data. For example, navigation satellites, such as the GPS and GLONASS, will provide critical mid-course and terminal guidance updates for long-range manned and unmanned nonnuclear strike systems. Further innovations include a new generation of combat vehicles which have low visibility attributes of great military significance. SDI-type technologies will likely yield first- and second-generation directed energy weapons. A likely near-term use for directed energy weapons on the battlefield will be systems designed to defeat a wide range of direct fire and wide-area surveillance systems. Finally, both sides expect to exploit robotized factories to produce the next generation of guided weapons and combat vehicles.

Apparently, the Soviet leadership appreciates this trend and desires a pause in the near-term competition for military readiness.
This pause would facilitate a major shift of resources to re-energize the Soviet economy so that it can better compete in developing and producing trans-century weapons systems. In turn, NATO planners face a similar set of choices. Investments which focus on improving the near-term mobilization and reinforcement potential of NATO forces may lead to cutbacks in far-term investment plans. If the record is any guide, it is likely that NATO will cut back on near-term readiness accounts since they have less "sex appeal" than continued investment in a wide range of advanced weapon systems and technologies. More specifically, the United States military faces the following programmatic choices which will become more acute due to the recent worldwide collapse of the securities markets.

The United States Navy

- Should the United States Navy press ahead with the construction of two CVNs, even at the expense of other surface ship and tactical aircraft programs?
- How should further investment in the sealift program be funded? Should the United States Navy warship program be constrained to further fund the sealift and amphibious lift account?
- Should current aircraft upgrade programs such as the A-6F and F-14D be sacrificed to pay for developing of the ATA, "stealth" theater bomber, and the ATF?
- What are the modernization priorities of the United States Marine Corps? Should the MV-22 or AV-8B programs be sacrificed to preserve the landing craft air cushion (LCAC) and ground force modernization programs?
- In the face of Soviet submarine developments, what is the priority of the United States Navy's submarine and ASW programs?

The United States Air Force

- Should the United States Air Force sacrifice its F-16 and F-15 modernization programs to pay for the ATA and ATF? What is the priority of nonnuclear munition procurement, a program which has suffered from technological and budgetary stretch-outs?
- What is the priority of the C-17? Should any of the advanced tactical fighter and/or theater surveillance programs be
stretched out to pay for a robust strategic/theater airlift program?

- What priority should be placed on developing survivable theater surveillance systems (e.g., ASARS and JSTARS)?

The United States Army

- Should current helicopter programs be sacrificed to pay for development of the LHX?
- What priority should be placed in developing a next generation of armored fighting vehicles?
- What priority should be placed on developing survivable battlefield and theater surveillance systems?
- What priority should be placed on battlefield and theater active defense systems (Patriot upgrades and/or follow-ons) designed to deal with advanced nonnuclear theater ballistic and cruise missiles?
- What priority should be placed on modernizing the battlefield and theater communications and control systems?

The above list is far from complete. All four Services will have to set priorities between capital investment and current requirements to fund operations, maintenance, and above all, training. The Services have tended to sacrifice these accounts during low-budget times. Clearly, those accounts associated with the unglamorous issues of improved mobilization and rapid reinforcement will likely get lesser priority unless the threat to the Alliance is "clear and present."

Aside from the issues associated with nonnuclear force posture priorities is the larger national security question of the balance between general purpose force and "strategic" force investment.

Although the US "strategic" force budget represents less than 15 percent of the total defense budget, it dominates those accounts associated with trans-century weapon technology. The most significant element is the SDI program. SDI's fate will profoundly effect where the United States places advanced weapon R&D resources for the next decade. With constrained defense budgets, a positive decision to press ahead with a late nineties deployment option will place all other defense spending accounts, both theater and strategic, under severe stress. Even if SDI research does not evolve into an actual deployment program, significant trade-offs between strategic nuclear
force and general force programs will have to be made. Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter, several major nuclear weapon and C'1 programs must be scrutinized, especially if NATO wants to upgrade its nonnuclear deterrent and war-fighting potential. NATO should ask the following questions:

- Is the deployment of the mobile SICM justified in light of the Trident II, MX, and manned bomber programs?
- What should be the size and velocity of the ATB program? Is the ATB a competitor within the USAF for the theater strike mission of the ATA?
- What should the strategic C'1 investment strategy be during the 1990s following the very high investment levels of the 1980s?
- Should advanced strategic air defense R&D or deployment programs receive significant funding?
- What should investment strategy be in space-based systems in light of very likely upgrades in the Soviet Union's space combat potential?
- What should be the scale, velocity, and objectives of the SDI program?

At present, all options are open to debate; planners will have to examine these dilemmas, keeping in mind possible changes due to arms control agreements.

**Arms Control.** Clearly, many in NATO hold out the hope that substantial arms control progress may solve some of the current security dilemmas. The Gorbachev regime has begun and will continue to conduct a very vigorous program of diplomacy designed to contain, if not reduce the "threat" to the Soviet Union. Beyond the "double zero" agreement, the NATO planner faces considerable uncertainty about the role that arms control may play.

The fate of the SDI program will be tied to the outcome of negotiations on strategic offensive weapons (START) and any linkage to a modification of the ABM Treaty. As Gorbachev showed in the fall of 1987, over the timing of a third summit, the Soviets are determined to constrain any future US option to develop and deploy SDIO technology. They are also opposed to early deployment of the advanced BMD which includes a space weapon element. The Soviet military
seems more concerned about space combat, not missile defense potential of the SDI program.⁷

Since the space arena will evolve into an increasingly significant combat theater by 2000, the Soviets desire to prevent an evolving US space weapon program while maintaining their own vigorous R&D program. From the NATO planner's perspective, if a future US administration agrees to significant constraints on SDI-type deployment options as part of a major strategic offensive force reduction package, then the budgetary tension caused by strategic programs will lessen.

On the other hand, if the strategic negotiations remain stalled, either the United States or the Soviet Union might choose to press ahead with a strategic defense/space combat deployment. Clearly, a "breakout" by either would greatly effect their respective defense budgets.

Given current and future economic realities, it is unlikely that either superpower would employ a "breakout" option unless powerfully provoked. For example, if a resurgence of a neo-Stalinist and militaristic regime occurs within the Soviet Union, such a regime might feel sufficiently threatened by the evolving military potential of NATO and the Chinese to press ahead with a major deployment of BMD and space combat means.

Aside from the US-USSR nuclear weapon negotiations, the CDE forum for European arms control and disarmament might evolve into something quite significant. Both the United States and the Soviet Union could have powerful parallel motives for reducing their respective forward deployment in Central Europe. As suggested, the Gorbachev regime might consider withdrawing a significant portion, say one or two combined arms/tank divisions of their armies in the GDR if the US undertakes a significant drawdown in the Federal Republic of Germany. In turn, the national consensus during a post-Reagan Administration could strongly favor a drawdown of approximately 50 percent of the US forward deployed in Central Europe. This drawdown could occur in a relatively benign scenario as part of a European arms agreement, or as part of a negative scenario in which the United States is primarily motivated by nationalistic economic and security concerns. Certainly, the simmering geo-strategic debate within the US national security community, as symbolized by the
commentary of Kissinger and Brzezinski, suggests a growing argument within the United States favoring some degree of US withdrawal from Central Europe.\(^8\)

**The US Geo-Strategic Debate.** Within the US national security community debate continues between the “European firster”/continentalists and the advocates of a maritime/global strategy.\(^9\) With tightening budgets, this geo-strategic debate has and will become a surrogate for an intense inter- and intra-service argument about force posture and funding priorities. In summary, the European-first strategy calls for a continuation of heavy expenditures in the following classes of forces even at the expense of other programs:

- Heavy US Army divisions and technology
- Air-Land Battle Weapon/Sensors optimized for Europe
- High performance USAF tactical aviation
- Prepositioning
- Enhanced airlift
- Enhanced sealift
- Naval forces optimized to protect the SLOC and ALOC (less for carrier forces and more for ASW assets).

In turn, the Maritime/Global strategy favors the following force elements:

- Light US Army units
- Modernized US Marine Corps and amphibious lift
- Long-range USAF tactical aviation
- Long-range theater surveillance systems
- Aircraft carriers and surface support ships
- Enhanced theater airlift (C-17)
- Enhanced sealift
- Maritime prepositioning.

Both strategic alternatives call for a substantial investment in strategic mobility. A challenge for the US defense planner is to design force elements which can satisfy both geo-strategic requirements. Aside from realigning US force postures, the West European contribution to any plan to upgrade NATO’s nonnuclear potential will
remain the important question. This is the final and most significant variable in any NATO attempt to enhance its nonnuclear deterrent and war-fighting posture.

**The European Swing Players.** While the roles of the FRG and the United Kingdom (UK) are critical to any NATO plan for the “stalwart” defense of Central Europe, the roles of France and Spain have become major variables. Both provide NATO with operational depth for conducting reinforcement and theater operations. Furthermore, both provide an important increment of NATO’s second operational echelon. From an American observer’s perspective of the international environment, the positive shift in France’s defense policy vis-à-vis the Atlantic Alliance is good news. As Diego Ruiz Palmer notes in Chapter 9, French policy has clearly evolved away from the rigid nuclear-dominated nationalism of deGaulle. Although far from perfect from a military operational point of view, the recent joint French-German exercise involving the French Force d’Action Rapide (FAR) points to a major political-military reengagement by France.

Practical measures to integrate the French military back into the NATO command structure have occurred. First, the United States bought the French-designed RITA cellular mobile corps/division radio system. By the early 1990s, US ground forces in Europe and the United States will have a communication system compatible with the French Army. Second, the French and UK decision to buy the E-3 Century AEW aircraft, is another concrete move towards interoperability. Hopefully, the next step will be integrating French air units into the NATO air defense system. One suspects that the Soviet High Command is far more impressed by these French Government decisions than any political declaration calling for greater West European political-military unity.¹⁰

Of great consequence to deterring any Soviet act of aggression in Central Europe is French willingness to place ground forces in the “front line” during the opening day of any future European conflict. As in the case of the forward presence from US and UK field armies, the Soviet political leadership faces the difficult uncertainty of making pre-war calculations as to when the French might employ nuclear weapons either in Europe or against the Soviet Union.

Although of less geostrategic consequence, the role of Spain is important in any NATO effort to upgrade its nonnuclear potential.
Spain's contributions to NATO's flexible response posture should be explored fully. While the current negotiations between the United States and Spain over US peacetime base posture has reached a less than happy outcome, the situation is not all that gloomy. The United States showed some wisdom at the eleventh hour and moved off of its rigid position on maintaining the forward deployment of the F-16 Wing at Torrejon.

Of greater long-term significance is the availability of Spanish airfields and ports as entry points for American reinforcements which, as noted by Karl Lowe in Chapter 3, would likely arrive after European hostilities begin. In fact, the Iberian Peninsula becomes a very useful entry point during a European war because landing and off-loading facilities are well out of range of Soviet long-range non-nuclear attack systems. Furthermore, ships will likely cross the Atlantic via the "southern" route along the Tropic of Cancer to avoid the Soviet submarine and aircraft attacks referred to by Michael Deane in Chapter 4. The road net on the Iberian Peninsula is undergoing a major upgrade with the continued construction of interstate class roadways. These "autocoutes" are now connected to the improved French multilane highway system with lines of communication through both sides of the Pyrénées.11

Although the concept appears unusual the idea that Spain's forces could contribute to the defense of Central Europe has met. By the mid-1990s, Spain will have restructured and modernized its army. NATO planners could consider moving a corps-sized force of three Spanish armor heavy divisions to a NATO second or third operational-echelon reserve position. Such a tactic becomes feasible if France commits early to the forward defense of NATO. Naturally, the plausibility of this concept will depend upon Spain's internal political environment, which presents a very mixed picture for the NATO planner at this time.

The roles of France and Spain will become increasingly significant during the 1990s as the European security environment undergoes a likely major evolution. Whether that evolution is favorable or unfavorable to the United States will be critically dependent on these relatively "new" players to a more integrated NATO. Without the active participation of France and Spain, the concept of a "stalwart" nonnuclear deterrent and defense posture for NATO has little practical meaning.
NATO planners must consider these major variables and/or boundary conditions in designing future US mobilization and reinforcement options.

**SOME US REINFORCEMENT OPTIONS**

A central challenge for US ground forces is to deploy units which are strategically mobile with meaningful combat power. In the Central European battlefield environment, this situation has led the US Army to design super heavy divisions which weigh out in the 80,000-ton range. Each heavy division has a combat support slice which weighs approximately 50,000 tons.\(^1\)

Given the practical limits of airlift to move units, the US Army has relied heavily upon the concept of prepositioning. Currently, the six division sets of the POMCUS program are being filled out with equipment. Through a combination of airlifting personnel and pre-positioned equipment, the US Army hopes to have a 10-plus division heavy force deployed in the field within 10 days after a mobilization and reinforcement decision. Simultaneously, the USAF hopes to move 60 squadrons of tactical fighter and support aircraft to co-located operating bases (COBs) throughout the European theater.

Political and economic forces may make this core reinforcement concept more problematic, however, since critical forward deployed forces may be withdrawn from Central Europe by the mid-1990s. Even if a significant withdrawal of US forces does not occur, there is a persuasive need, for the reasons noted by Karl Lowe and Michael Deane in Chapters 3 and 4, to increase the strategic mobility and combat power of the US ground units. To meet this challenge, the US Army and the US Marine Corps have taken radically divergent paths. The former has chosen to create a number of ultra-light divisions optimized for their air transportability, while the latter has moved toward heavier units while relying upon sea-based prepositioning.\(^2\)

An examination of these alternative service responses to the strategic mobility challenge may suggest some hybrid solutions which permit forces to rapidly reinforce the European theater while maintaining credible combat power. In addition, new weapon technologies could provide high firepower without the massive logistic tail of classic heavy armor units. Whatever the future reinforcement option, planners must keep in mind changing political climates and the budget costs to all the participants.
HOW LIGHT SHOULD LIGHT BE?

Following the political military crisis in Southwest Asia during 1979-1980, the US Army began to consider the extraordinary task of moving large combat units transoceanic distances in just a few weeks. The first response during 1981 was to develop a light high-firepower division, the 9th High Technology Test Bed, which evolved into the 9th Motorized Division, equipped with light-wheeled fighting vehicles. The philosophy was to deploy a division which had more tactical mobility and anti-tank firepower than a standard “straight-legged” infantry division. This division was designed to be transported transoceanic distances (12,000 kilometers) with approximately 1,400 C-141B sorties, compared with the 1,500 C-141B and 100 C-5 sorties needed to transport a standard infantry division. From a theater mobility perspective, the 9th division is less demanding than the infantry division since it contains no heavy tanks and other heavy support equipment. Finally, lighter vehicles mean that C-130s can carry all force elements of the motorized units within theater.1

Starting in 1983 Army thinking focused on creating more strategically mobile divisions. Because the Army viewed the 9th as too demanding on limited airlift assets available during a major crisis, they created the Light Infantry Division. Under this concept, the standard infantry division sacrifices much of its organic firepower and mobility so that the entire division can be airlifted with approximately 500 C-141B sorties. In fact, four active and one reserve divisions have converted to this ultralight posture. From a NATO planner’s perspective, too much may have been given up!

The Marine Corps moved in the opposite direction. Faced with confronting Third World armies equipped and trained along the Soviet model of armor, artillery, and air defense, the Corps made a conceptual break from its purely amphibious orientation. They developed and deployed the Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS). From the manpower and equipment base of their active three heavy-infantry-type divisions, the US Marine Corps created three mechanized/armored task forces. Their heavy equipment is now forward-deployed in MPS squadrons, one each in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans. Current plans call for airlifting personnel to marry up with the equipment which has been offloaded near relevant airfields and for deploying all personnel using approximately 250 C-141B sorties. Comparison of the TO&Es of the 9th Motorized Division, the
US REINFORCEMENT OPTIONS

5.1—MOTORIZED/LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION/MPS BRIGADE COMPARISON CIRCA 1990*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>9TH INFANTRY</th>
<th>7TH INFANTRY</th>
<th>7TH MAB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maneuver Units</td>
<td>5 CAB (Heavy)</td>
<td>9 Infantry Battalion</td>
<td>3 Infantry Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 CAB (Light)</td>
<td>1 Tank Battalion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 LAB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>53 M-60A-1 or M-1A1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Vehicles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>109 AAV-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>54 155mm Howzr</td>
<td>8 155mm Howzr</td>
<td>6 203mm SP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 105mm Howzr</td>
<td>54 105mm</td>
<td>30 155mm Howzr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 MLRS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar</td>
<td>54 120mm</td>
<td>36 81mm</td>
<td>24 81mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>54 60mm</td>
<td>24 60mm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy ATGM</td>
<td>330 TOW</td>
<td>36 TOW</td>
<td>88 TOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HMMWV</td>
<td>HMMWV/LAV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light ATGM</td>
<td>150 Dragon</td>
<td>72 Dragon</td>
<td>96 Dragon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>42 AH-1S</td>
<td>29 AH-1S</td>
<td>24 AH-1T/W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOW</td>
<td>TOW</td>
<td>Hellfire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30 UH–60</td>
<td>36 UH–60</td>
<td>48 CH–46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8 CH–53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Using WEI/WUV methodology of measuring combat power, the three combined arms units have the following weighted unit values: 9th ID = 19,000, 7th ID = 8,000, and 7th MAB = 16,000.

7th Light Infantry Division, and 7th MPS Brigade in table 5.1 is instructive.15

As this comparison reveals, the US Marine Corps MPS concept provides very powerful leverage for a heavy expeditionary force. Furthermore, Table 5.1 understates the leverage of the MPS concept since the ship provide 30 days of consumables for the ground forces as well as a Marine tactical aviation attack group consisting of approximately 48 tactical fighter aircraft. Once deployed in a theater of operation, both the motorized and Marine-mechanized units are self-deployable with organic vehicles, while the light division will have only sufficient wheeled vehicles to lift a single battalion. Helicopter lift assets are available to move another battalion.

Army proponents of the light division concept respond that the comparison is unfair and a Corps “plug” of assets will provide additional organic mobility and firepower if required. The current
European Army structure makes this concept questionable since forward-deployed forces have had their combat service support units stripped to the bone. US forces, as Phillip Karber, Robert Ulin, and Peter Volten note in Chapters 8, 13, and 14, are now heavily dependent upon Host Nation Support (HNS) units to provide critical rear logistics during the early phase of any mobilization. In fact, the Army has consciously reduced its division combat support and Service support slices to less than half of the active combat divisions. As noted by Karl Lowe in Chapter 3, US reserve units can be called up to make up for the shortfall.\textsuperscript{16}

This situation suggests that any light units rapidly airlifted during the first two weeks of reinforcement will either have to rely upon HNS or commandeer civilian vehicles from the European economy. In essence, the light division is likely to have limited use during the early phases of NATO mobilization because these units lack the firepower and the mobility to help in a major European conflict.

However, light mobile forces could play a very useful role in NATO’s reinforcement potential. Aside from the 9th Motorized Division, the British and French can deploy motorized and/or light-wheeled armored forces. In the case of the United Kingdom, as David Isby notes in Chapter 10, reserve infantry brigades designed to reinforce the BAOR are now equipped with a wheeled, armored personnel carrier, the Saxon. This vehicle allows the infantry to self-deploy across the channel to the European road net. In a similar fashion, the bulk of the French FAR, as noted by Diego Ruiz Palmer in Chapter 9, is equipped with wheeled units which could self-deploy over the ever-expanding, multi-lane road net of Central Europe. In turn, the US Army could reconsider its decision to abandon the motorized/light armor division concept.\textsuperscript{17}

\textbf{MOTORIZED DIVISIONS AND ARMY PREPOSITIONED SHIPS (APS)}

Why not take the attractive attributes of the motorized division and marry them to the concept of prepositioning at sea and the use of fast sealift? In summary, motorized units have a number of attractive features compared with their heavy armored/mechanized counterparts.

- Motorized units have a rapid self-deployment capability to airfields and/or ports. Track-laying vehicles require the use of
rail and/or wheeled transporters in order to move to embarkation points. Wheeled vehicles are ideally suited for the rapid loading and off-loading from modern high-speed roll-on roll-off (RoRo) ships.

- In the European theater, motorized units will exploit the upgraded road net through the Iberian peninsula and France. Off-loading can take place in a safer part of the European theater.

- Motorized units can use tactical airlift efficiently. For example, a C-17 will be able to carry 8 to 10 light-armored vehicles versus a single MBT.

- The operation and maintenance costs of a wheeled-fighting vehicle is a fraction of the cost of a track-laying vehicle. Training and logistics are simpler since the chassis of the light-fighting vehicle can be similar to the logistics vehicles.

Furthermore, numerous advances in modern weapon technology should enhance the combat power of light-motorized units. Some of those near-term advances include the following:

- **Anti-armor.** Several interesting developments are at hand, including the fiber-optic guided missile (FOG-M) and the hyper-velocity missile (HVM). The former is an optically guided missile which will provide the next generation ATGM with an over-the-hilltop attack capability. Mounted on light vehicles, the FOG-M may bring about some of the anti-tank "revolution" touted for the wireguided ATGM 20 years ago. Furthermore, the Army is pressing the FOG-M into service as an anti-helicopter weapon. The HVM is a direct-fire laser beam riding kinetic energy kill missile. Currently, there are active joint Service programs underway to develop air- and ground-launched variants. Mounted on light-armor vehicles, the HVM may solve the fundamental incompatibility between high-velocity tank guns and light vehicles. If successful, the HVM might provide a zero recoil kinetic energy-kill weapon and obviate the need to develop a modern tank destroyer, the Army’s off-again, on-again armored gun system (AGS).

- **Anti-Air Defense.** Motorized units will benefit from the successful development and deployment of the forward area air defense system (FAADS) developed for rear-area units,
including a light SAM (Stinger) mounted on a HMMWV. Such weapons will provide invaluable rear-area defenses against "desant" operations, a concept usefully demonstrated by the Afghan guerrillas, Chadian Army, and South African Army.

- **Light-Weight Fire Support.** FOG-M technology is potentially quite useful in developing a family of guided multiple rocket and mortar systems. A FOG-M guided bomb could be developed for the 120mm mortar planned for near-term procurement. Another possibility is a guided variant of the MLRS rocket mounted on a light-weight wheeled launcher.

Aside from the limited list of combat weapons, rapid advances have occurred in light-combat engineering equipment. Finally, both the US Marine Corps and the French Army have made widespread deployment of numerous modern diesel-power wheeled combat vehicles. The Army would do well to reconsider its dropping of the light-armed vehicle (LAV) program. Either it, or a variant of the next generation medium-truck chassis, could be bought in large numbers as a wheeled armored personnel carrier. Another possibility is a stretched and armored variant of the HMMWV as an APC.

Implicit in the Army's rationale for the ultra-light concept is the need to deploy a division as a complete unit over transoceanic distances. The Army has not fully evaluated trade-offs between the deployment of smaller and heavier brigade-size units and the lighter full division. Thus, a compromise may be possible between the requirement for strategic mobility and the need for combat power. Within a future light division, additional organic mobility and firepower assets would allow airlift of a motorized high-firepower brigade, using the same amount of lift as the division. The concept of a brigade task force is not alien to the Army since the armored cavalry regiment (ACR) is a combined arms-armored brigade with organic helicopter support.

The Army could modify the light-infantry division in the following fashion:

- Provide sufficient APCs of a LAV-type vehicle to lift a three-battalion brigade (approximately 70 LAV and 20 HMMWV per battalion).
- Add a motorized anti-tank battalion equipped with LAV-type vehicles. Variants would be armed with a turret system.
equipped with 25mm cannon and TOW-II launcher and/or HVM pods (approximately 70 LAV and 20 HMMWV).

- Replace 105mm artillery battalion with a high-firepower battalion equipped with LAV-type vehicles armed with 120mm mortars and FOG-M launchers (approximately 70 LAV and 20 HMMWV).

- Create a high-firepower battalion with 24 light-weight/wheeled variants of the MLRS.

- Create a target acquisition battalion equipped with Pioneer type RPVs.

- Modernize light anti-aircraft battalion with HMMWV armed with FAAD weapons (Stinger, HVM, and FOG-M).

Depending upon the scenario, the brigade could deploy as a task force, or the entire division could deploy as a straightlegged unit which would require approximately the same airlift requirements. Currently, a C-141B can carry two LAV-type vehicles, and a C-5B can carry ten. Assuming that only the C-141B is available, a motorized task force would require approximately 175 sorties to lift the maneuver battalions. An additional 325 sorties would be used to airlift the two firepower battalions, the target acquisition battalion, air defense units, and associated logistic support. For many Third World contingencies, a case can be made that the deterrent and/or coercive effect of the motorized brigade will be greater than the larger straightlegged division.

An upgraded variant of the 9th Motorized Infantry Division is plausible, representing an expanded mix of the units found in the high-firepower brigade. More radical concepts are possible, including the marriage of motorized and airmobile units.

During the mid-1970s, the Army experimented with the "Tricap" concept—a marriage of two heavy brigades with one airmobile assault brigade. For a variety of budgetary, operational, and doctrinal reasons, this concept did not transform the Europe-oriented heavy forces. On the other hand, the Army did decide to create the air cavalry/attack brigade concept which is now a part of the Heavy Division 86 structure.

A further evolution of the Tricap concept is possible. One could conduct a series of operational experiments with a reequipped brigade of the 9th Division. This brigade could be enhanced with one or more
battalions of the Apache attack helicopter. When available, the Army could add a battalion of UH-60s and/or MV-22s. These battalions could provide the lift for rapidly moving the brigade's critical logistics or for a specialized cavalry/reconnaissance battalion.

The primary mission of this brigade would be to provide a Corps commander with a very mobile reserve force. In essence, it would act as a more mobile variant of the ACR. Planners should set up a series of exercises to see whether such a unit can conduct deep maneuvers to support heavy-unit offensive operations. Specifically, the Army should explore some of the concepts advocated by the late Richard Simpkin. Even if the concept proves unsatisfactory, the exercises could provide very useful insights for designing and organizing Corps forces designed to fight the "rear battle" against Warsaw Pact airmobile, OMG-type, and Spetsnaz units. Organic integration of motorized and airmobile units may prove either inefficient and/or impractical. In the final analysis, the most useful result might be the combined arms doctrine developed for use between separate motorized divisions and airmobile brigades.

The Middle East, in particular the Arab side of the Persian Gulf, should offer the most appropriate terrain and circumstance for combined motorized/airmobile operations. One potential benefit of the lower logistics demands of motorized units is their ability to operate over considerable distances while relying primarily on airmobile logistics and fire support. The Chadians have clearly demonstrated the military utility of the light diesel truck in desert warfare.

For the European contingency, motorized divisions could be used as second- and third-echelon forces. Certainly they would be very useful in rear areas as an anti-desant force. With their own organic mobility and firepower, they would be capable of exploiting the dense road net of Central Europe. They would continue to be of value as traditional infantry forces when units fight in a dismounted fashion in urban and forest regions.

Aside from the current 9th Infantry Division, the Army could reconsider whether it needs five light infantry divisions. One obvious source for additional motorized units is the five National Guard straight-legged infantry divisions whose role and mission appears irrelevant to any plausible NATO contingency. To be attractive, the National Guard units must be transportable. The answer lies in the MPS concept of the US Marine Corps.
Currently, the US Navy has greatly expanded its Rapid Reinforcement Fleet (RRF) of sealift ships, including a number of modern RoRo ships. The Army could organize a number of Army Prepositioning Ship (APS) squadrons filled with motorized equipment sets. During peacetime, a division equivalent might base itself in a forward position such as the Azores; another could deploy along the East Coast. If tensions rise, the ships would sail to a position off the European coast to dramatically reduce the closure rate of the division. In a fashion similar to the Marine concept, personnel could fly to an airfield near the debarkation port. Another variant is to “marry up” the vehicle drivers with their equipment before the ships sail. This situation might allow for motor marching fighting and logistics vehicles to a more distant airfield in the relevant European theater of operation.

Planners could devise a similar strategy for the moving element of the III Corps heavy divisions which will rely upon the SL-7 high-speed RoRo ships. Deploying the SL-7 with their mechanized equipment sets during a crisis would permit one or more sailings back to CONUS and return before the start of hostilities. Overall, an additional investment in high-speed RoRo ships of the SL-7 class appears a much more attractive concept than any investment in the exotic Surface Effect Ship (SES). Some commentators suggest that this technology is the answer to the strategic lift dilemma. This author remains very skeptical, given the very high cost of developing a 5,000- to 10,000-ton vessel which will have a cruise speed of 100 knots. Pre-deploying 25+ knot 40,000- to 50,000-ton class RoRo ships appears to have far greater logistic and crisis mobilization leverage.

Aside from European contingencies, the motorized division/APS concept would be very valuable in supporting most USCENTCOM contingencies. In fact, the motorized division appears a much more relevant ground unit for most USCENTCOM contingencies which involve the defense of the Arab side of the Persian Gulf. The old argument in favor of the ultra-light divisions defending a “thin blue line” in the Zagros Mountains of Iran appears increasingly irrelevant in light of the transformed security environment of the Persian Gulf. For the foreseeable future, Iran is unlikely to receive direct US military assistance against Soviet aggression.

Motorized high-technology units, married to prepositioning and sealift concepts, are far from a panacea to the ongoing dilemma of NATO’s deterrent and defense requirements of the 1990s. On the other hand, there are some useful options that the United States could
carry out within the likely economic and political realities of the next
decade. If the OECD cracks up economically in the near future, then
these concepts and others may well seem clever but irrelevant sugges-
tions to enhance NATO's security.

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Endnotes

1. For a more complete discussion of these issues, see Richard Cohen and Peter A. Wilson, "Superpowers in Decline? Economic Performance and National Security," *Comparative Strategy* (Spring 1988).
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
15. Lewis and Wilson, op. cit., p. 17, and Wilson, op. cit., p. 54.
16. Communication with author from Jack A. Stockfish who identified a cost model developed by Richard J. Wright of the National Defense University. Fort McNair, Washington, DC.
17. For an excellent description of the FAR's organization, see Gerard Turbe, "France's Rapid Deployment Forces" *International Defense Review*, No. 8 (1987), pp. 1023-1026. For a discussion of the recent evolution of French national security policy, also see Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, "Between the Rhine and the Elbe: France


19. The Surface Effect Ship (SES) has been a highly touted answer to the strategic sealift problem for nearly 20 years. A very ambitious US Navy program to develop a 5,000-ton SES frigate floundered on technical and budgetary problems during the late 1970s. The SES represents a high-risk technology which may not provide sufficient performance improvements over displacement-hulled vessels to warrant a multi-billion dollar/ten-year development program. If forward deployed during a crisis, displacement-hulled prepositioning ships should have very short closure rates with transportation efficiencies considerably greater than an SES-type vehicle. After a decade-long delay, the US Marine Corps is finally deploying the heavy-lift Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC). This vehicle appears to represent a true revolution in amphibious warfare capability. LCAC hovercraft will be very useful in providing high-speed, ship-to-shore logistics support, especially if peacetime off-loading facilities have been damaged by air/missile attacks and/or blocked by mines.
PART II
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FRONT-LINE STATES

6 THE GDR: A MODEL MOBILIZATION
   Douglas A. Macgregor

7 THE CZECHOSLOVAK ARMED FORCES
   Christopher D. Jones

8 THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
   Phillip A. Karber and John H. Milam

9 FRANCE
   Diego A. Ruiz Palmer

10 THE UNITED KINGDOM
    David C. Isby
6 The GDR: A Model Mobilization

Given East Germany's geographic position, it was probably inevitable that the German Democratic Republic (GDR) would become the bulwark of the Soviet military alliance system in Central-East Europe. In general strategic terms, the GDR's position in the Soviet bloc today is analogous to that of Prussia in post-Napoleonic Europe. Just as Tsarist Russia relied on Prussia to help preserve Russian hegemony over Poland and to act as a Russian bridgehead against the West, the Soviet Union currently counts on a politically and economically stable GDR to insulate its volatile European periphery from potentially destabilizing Western influences and to project Soviet power and influence westward.

Therefore, it's hardly surprising that today's East German forces are the best led, equipped, and trained of the Pact's non-Soviet forces or that East German troops are kept in a state of continuous alert which "even Soviet troops, with the exception of the airborne forces, do not achieve." Moreover, thanks to a robust economy which the GDR's allies can only envy, East German defense spending for military modernization has continued at a rate second only to the Soviet Union. Buttressed by a program of societal militarization
and the most efficient suppression of internal political opposition and free speech in the Soviet-bloc, the GDR military state seems capable of coping with any form of internal unrest.4

The GDR’s emergence as the Warsaw Pact’s military linchpin has helped to sharpen the debate about the future of Eastern Europe. In many ways, the organizational evolution of East German and Soviet forces in the GDR and the constant upgrading of their equipment have made the GDR the center of the debate over the changing contribution of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact’s (NSWP) armed forces to the regional Soviet military effort. The question is whether the GDR’s growing military potential will compel Western analysts to look seriously at how armed forces allied with the Soviet Union may be structured to mobilize their national military power and how this capability may influence the outcome of a future regional crisis.

An examination of the GDR’s contribution to the Soviet military effort is long overdue. Few postwar observers appreciate that East Germany’s new communist leadership inherited the remnants of a political system that was among the first in Europe to establish a standing army and to reorganize the modern state’s administration to give it centralization, uniformity, and a class of officials devoted to these pursuits.5 In fact, for 25 years, Western scholars ignored the GDR because they thought it was a transitory phenomenon that would “simply disappear from the European scene when the two halves of the former German empire were reunited.”6

This chapter will examine East Germany’s capability to mobilize its military power by attempting to answer the following questions: First, what are the key features of the mobilization base? Second, what is the probable wartime structure of command and control for these elements? Third, will the GDR’s current capability to mobilize diverse social, economic, and political entities under centralized party-military control improve or decay for the remainder of this century?

The central premise of this essay is that the East German Communist Party, the Socialist Unity Party (SED), regards the Soviet-East German military alliance as vital to the maintenance of the GDR’s political order and to the attainment of future East German foreign and domestic policy objectives.7 In addition, because the Soviets will continue to rely on the GDR, my analysis suggests that the GDR will remain a stable base for military mobilization in the years ahead.
MILITARY POTENTIAL

In the GDR, where authority was never afraid to act and seldom met resistance, wholesale adoption of Soviet political institutions and control mechanisms not only guaranteed solid Soviet political control, but also revived the Prussian-German tradition of a powerful authoritarian state. When German national character and political culture are added to the SED’s acute sense of depending on Soviet military backing, it seems inevitable that the goal of the GDR state—like its model the Soviet state—would be the “continual development of its own power.”

Although the East German peacetime armed forces are among the smallest in the Warsaw Pact, the GDR state can dispense considerable military power. The phrase “NVA and Border Forces” encompasses the GDR’s ground, naval, and air forces. Since 1965 the NVA has belonged to the First Strategic echelon of the Warsaw Pact—that group of forces earmarked for immediate operations if an armed confrontation with NATO occurs. As a result, all units are category I formations and even when troops get leave, unit strength seldom falls below 75 percent. Relentless modernization efforts and constant growth in defense spending (see table 1.1 on GNP and table 1.2 on Defense Expenditures in Chapter 1) have produced the highest density of tanks and armored vehicles in the non-Soviet ground forces of the Warsaw Pact: 285 tanks and 250 armored vehicles per 10,000 men. The first table (6.1) outlines current strength figures and organization for the NVA and Border Forces.

In addition to the formal groupings of armed forces, the GDR state, as noted in the table (6.2), also fields several reserve, elite, and paramilitary formations that could play important military roles in a conflict.

Under SED leadership and Soviet supervision in the 1960s, the NVA’s organization was modeled on the Soviet military district organization, main political administration, tactical structure, and security system. In East Germany, peacetime military administration of the NVA’s six divisions split between two military districts. District III, with headquarters in Leipzig, became responsible for the daily equipping and training of three divisions, and District V, with headquarters in Neubrandenburg, became responsible for three divisions.

Following the Soviet model, the six-division force organized itself into five combat arms: motorized rifle units, armored forces, air...
6.1—ARMED FORCES OF THE GDR

NVA ground troops 125,000 men (77,000 conscripts, 48,000 regulars) organized administratively into two armies of three divisions each. These include:

- 2 tank divisions and 4 motorize rifle divisions
- Several Regiments of Ministry of Defense
  Special Troops including:
  - 2 SAM missile brigades
  - 2 AAA regiments
  - 4 Artillery Brigades
  - 2 Antitank Battalions
  - 2 Airborne Battalions
- 4 Reserve divisions with 1,500 tanks and 1,700 armored vehicles
- Ground Formations are equipped with:
  - Between 3,000 and 4,000 T55/T72 Tanks Armored Vehicles, 3,500 BMPs/BTR60s/BTR70s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Border Forces</th>
<th>48,000 men</th>
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<td>10 Frontier Brigades and 2 independent regiments</td>
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<tr>
<th>NVA Air Forces</th>
<th>42,000 men</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>800 aircraft including 460 front line aircraft and 90 helicopters</td>
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<tr>
<th>NVA Naval Forces</th>
<th>16,000 men</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>light surface craft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>no submarines</td>
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defense, rocket, and artillery forces. In the 1970s, the East German Army expanded to include two airborne infantry battalions as well. Generally, the East German Army uses Soviet equipment, although they acquired some Czechoslovak weapons in the early 1960s.

Since the NVA’s development was primarily designed to compensate for reductions in the size and strength of Soviet forces in the GDR, the NVA’s six divisions were operationally and logistically configured to deploy within the GSFG’s two Soviet fronts. Hence, the structure of the NVA’s tactical units and rear services was and is identical to the Soviet Army’s. More importantly, the NVA still lacks an artillery division, plus intelligence, transport, and logistical formations which have been historically present in Soviet fronts since the end of World War II. Structured dependence on Soviet support has also persisted in the GDR’s small defense industries. Although the
6.2—GDR Reserve and Paramilitary Formations

Ministry of State Security
- Regiment (Berlin)
  - 7,000 men
  - 6 Motorized Rifle Bns.
  - 1 Artillery Bn.

People’s Police
- 12,000 men
- 21 Paramilitary Alert Units (battalions)

Militia (Workers’ Combat Groups)
- 500,000 men (5,000 regulars)
- 15,000 combat groups organized into:
  - 130 heavy formations (motorized, anti-tank and artillery capable)
  - 250 general formations (light infantry)

Militia (Workers’ Combat Groups)
- 15,000 combat groups organized into:
  - 130 heavy formations (motorized, anti-tank and artillery capable)
  - 250 general formations (light infantry)

Society for Support and German equivalent of DOSAAF youth aged 16-18
Technology (GST)
- 150,000 75 percent active
- 15,000 units, trained under NVA supervision with small arms.


GDR produces its own small arms, ammunition, spare parts, communications gear, optical instruments, wheeled vehicles, and clothing, virtually all heavy weapons and aircraft still come from the Soviet Union.

The transformation of the NVA from an ill-equipped native augmentation to the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany into a vital element in the modern armed forces of the Warsaw Pact is quite striking. Profound changes in Soviet military thought concerning the high probability of sudden conventional war, as well as shifts in the strategic nuclear balance, have greatly influenced East German force development.

Between 1969 and 1977, the 73.5 percent increase in the GDR’s defense budget confirmed that détente and peaceful coexistence had not persuaded anyone in East Berlin to reduce or simply stabilize the GDR’s defense expenditures. In fact, East German defense spending grew at a much faster rate from 1970 to 1975 than between 1965-1970. Moreover, the high annual percentage rates of growth in nonpersonnel costs in the GDR during the early 1970s indicated rapid progress in mechanizing and modernizing the East German armed forces. Even though the GSFG’s and the NVA’s nominal order of battle did not change substantially after 1969, newer T-62 (and later, T-72) tanks and artillery, heavy folding bridges and
engineer equipment, Mi-24 helicopters, and MIG-23 fighters entered the inventory. Although East German ground strength in the NVA and border troops grew only slightly until 1979, the personnel strengths of the NVA air and naval forces did rise after newer equipment was introduced.19

These qualitative improvements in armaments supported East German participation in a new wave of exercises involving command elements, staffs, and troops of the GSFG and the NVA. This improvement followed the 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and continued through the 1970s.20 To some extent, the GDR's military environment after the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet interest in gaining international recognition for existing European borders was due to its geographical location. However, the prominent East German role in the Warsaw Pact's largest combined exercises confirmed the strong East German military commitment to Soviet regional strategy. In the words of one analyst, these exercises were designed to merge the NVA and the GSFG into "a homogenous and functional combat machine."21

East German emphasis on military mobilization and preparation for offensive operations against the West involved (as noted by John Yurechko in Chapter 2) prepositioning larger war stocks and (as noted by Les Griggs in Chapter 11) constructing logistical pipelines across Poland to supply points in the GDR. In the 1970s, the GDR's well-organized administrative infrastructure began to provide a substantial Soviet advantage in their quest for high readiness combat power on the ground in a forward deployed posture. By the mid-1970s, over 1,200,000 Soviet and East German men-at-arms were deployed over territory smaller that the state of Ohio. This distribution meant 11 soldiers and armed security forces per square kilometer of East German territory.22 To improve the East German capability to mobilize all military-industrial assets for NVA-GSFG use, the SED increasingly subordinated the mission of civil defense and mobilization to the NVA's control.23

At the Ninth SED Party Congress, on 22 May 1976, the civil defense forces were officially included among the armed organs of the GDR state and for the first time placed under NVA command rather than under the Ministry of State Security.24 This process included the former garrison Air Defense Battalions (roughly 15,000 men), special reconnaissance forces, and armament enterprises and facilities. This shift of control doubtlessly occurred because of similar
measures being implemented in the Soviet Union. This point notwithstanding, the impact on the GDR state’s military mobilization capability has been significant.

Ten years earlier, training in the Worker’s Combat Groups suggested an essentially tertiary role for these units as home defense forces. However, new equipment and closer integration with the NVA and the GSFG during large-scale Pact exercises indicate a more prominent role for the roughly 15,000 combat groups across the country. During the 1970 and 1980 exercises “Comrades-in-Arms,” East German civil defense forces, in cooperation with mobilized workers’ combat groups, functioned under NVA command to practice plans for civil defense mobilization. According to official statements, these exercises enhanced “combat, operational and mobilizational readiness and cooperation between the armed forces as well as with party and state organs.” Thus, today’s East German workers’ combat groups constitute an instrument which other Warsaw Pact states cannot match. Most combat groups appear capable of acting as reserve units for the NVA if war occurs and are sufficiently well-equipped with artillery and armored vehicles to conduct “limited, independent combat operations.”

Subordination of defense-related activities in the civil sector to NVA control complements similar developments in the armament, training, and control of the GDR’s 50,000 man border forces. Although the border forces were assigned to the command and control of the GDR’s ministry of state security, the infusion of modern combat equipment and the restructuring of the model of the NVA’s motorized rifle formations suggest that the GDR ministry of defense plans to integrate the border forces into the NVA if a conflict starts. According to former NVA and border force officers now living in the West, NVA-GSFG war planning, with the approval of the Soviet high command, began assigning the border forces to seize bridges, strategic road crossings, and installations suited for telephone points on West German territory along the 1,734 kilometer border between the two German states. In addition, border units must also protect important areas from NATO breakthrough attacks into GDR territory.

This mission significantly expanded the cooperation of the border forces in the GDR’s zone of military security with the GSFG. Of the 32 major installations erected along the inter-German border as part of the East German zonal complex for air space surveillance
and early warning, the majority remain under GSFG control, particularly in electronic disruption and deception measures.\textsuperscript{32} This forward movement of Soviet-controlled installations and the inclusion of the border forces in war planning have important implications for how the Soviets would initiate hostilities with the West.

The plan to turn the GDR into the advance fortress and logistical turntable for the Soviet Central European Front seems to support NVA-GSFG deployment by exercise/maneuver along the lines witnessed in the 1973 Israeli-Egyptian war. In the field, NVA-GSFG training has concentrated on the difficulties associated with traversing West German rivers and mounting movements to contact directly from military installations in the GDR.\textsuperscript{33} The result is that Soviet and East German divisions are being trained to attack across the inter-German border from the march column without assembling prior to deployment. Though the problems of military interoperability still leave open to debate just what the NVA would do in a war, Soviet evaluation suggests that the East Germans have been fully admitted to the offensive designs by the Soviet High Command.\textsuperscript{34}

The GDR's expanding military potential results from a cadre system with a nucleus of trained professionals engaged in training draftees for 18 months. These conscripts represent roughly 55 percent to 60 percent of the total serving soldiers, sailors, and airmen.\textsuperscript{35} East German reports suggest that most arrive for duty in a high state of physical readiness.\textsuperscript{36} Much of the remaining professional cadre will undoubtedly serve during wartime mobilization as cadre for the NVA's four additional reserve divisions and supporting units. In fact, this situation was probably the case with two of the NVA's reserve divisions during the 1980-1981 Polish crisis.\textsuperscript{37}

Although the GDR's armed forces are among the Warsaw Pact's smallest, peacetime figures are misleading if we include the state's military mobilization potential. NVA reserves total 400,000, with 330,000 men in the ground forces; the reserve soldiers thus constitute 65 percent of the East German Army's total force of 619,000 troops.\textsuperscript{38} When more of the state's organs are added, the total force under arms during full mobilization swells to a massive 1,272,000. As Phillip Karber and John Milam note in Chapter 8, in the German Federal Republic—whose population numbers four times the GDR—a similar state of mobilization produces only 1,045,000 men.\textsuperscript{39}
In the GDR, all reservists must spend 3 months refresher training per year until they have accumulated 24 months. An additional 250,000 men have a reserve commitment up to age 50. Reservists are designated category I or II: Category I reservists range from 20 to 35 and category II from 36 to 50.

According to NVA regulations, within four days of discharge from the NVA, the former soldier immediately joins the reserves and must report to one of the 218 military Wehrkreiskommando headquarters (excluding East Berlin). He then becomes part of a reserve collective consisting of 10 to 100 members—though collectives of less than 50 members normally are consolidated for training purposes with larger organizations. Current West German estimates indicate the existence of 7,000 reserve organizations nation-wide, with NVA units supporting the reserves with equipment and instructors. In addition to the 24 months' refresher training, the NVA also conducts "reservist exercises" lasting up to eight days and designed to develop the speed, readiness, and clandestine character of the NVA's reserve mobilization system.

At the top of the reserve mobilization structure are 14 military district commanders, responsible for training and preparing reservists for duty in the NVA. These commanders resemble the Soviet military commissariats in that they enforce measures pertaining to troop mobilization, developing and expanding human and economic resources, and supervising premilitary training of the GDR's youth.

Throughout the GDR citizen's life, the military absorbs much of his time and energy. According to the GDR's Military Service Law, all state organs—especially schools, colleges, factories, and mass social organizations—must prepare the GDR citizen for eventual service in the NVA. The chief result of the SED's policy of treating the GDR's labor force as part of the force structure is an unparalleled level of civil-military integration.

In contrast to the war mobilization system of the Third Reich (where Hitler's whims and battles of rapacious and short-sighted interest groups made a mockery of the visions of technocrats and ambitious businessmen), the SED's Soviet political and economic structures and practices have placed the GDR's human and industrial resources at the ready disposal of the national leadership. In the GDR, the SED and state structures, the NVA, the armed internal security organs, and reserve components are all thoroughly
integrated. One fact shows how these various state agencies are linked together: Peoples Police Officers in the Ernst 'Juaelmann Central Commission for Militia and the Ernst Schneller Militia School are responsible for guaranteeing the readiness of the Arbeiterkampfgruppen (worker's combat groups) and for conducting civil defense exercises.\textsuperscript{46} At the same time, district party functionaries help in selecting combat group members for promotion and advanced training, and ensure that recruiting goals for all militia and civil defense formations are met through local factory party organizations.\textsuperscript{47} Moreover, annual training requirements and military instruction guidelines for the workers' combat groups and all civil defense-related training come from the Civil Defense Main Administration of the Ministry of National Defense under the direction of an NVA Lieutenant General, Fritz Peter.\textsuperscript{48}

The same principal of interlocking mass civil and military organizations extends to the GDR's industrial sector where NVA officers proliferate in the Ministries of Foreign Trade, Construction and Transportation, the State Planning Commission, and the General State Procuracy. In addition, a military officer is the state secretary of the Main Administration of the Council of Ministers.\textsuperscript{49}

However impressive the GDR's military potential may be, we must add the enormous quantity of Soviet military personnel and equipment permanently stationed on German soil. If a large Army is to operate on a massive scale from the territory of a third party, it must have a very broad infrastructure—air and land bases, prepositioned supplies and weapons, the means of reinforcement—plus an army capable of securing this infrastructure. With a total strength of 420,000 men (about 380,000 ground troops and 40,000 men in the air forces) the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) constitutes such a force.\textsuperscript{50} Additionally, structural changes during the 1970s have increased the combat power of what has been an impressive ground force since the end of World War II. Modifications include expanding and adding new artillery regiments, airmobile assault groups, independent tank regiments at army level, and five new combat helicopter regiments.\textsuperscript{51}

**COMMAND, CONTROL, AND INTEGRATION**

Since the founding of the Warsaw Pact, the SED has forcefully promoted the NVA's integration with Soviet forces on the assumption that close cooperation in security affairs would prevent the Soviets
from reopening the German question or embarking on foreign policies which could destabilize the GDR's social order. The most profound expression of this integration is the GDR's revised constitution of 7 October 1974 which dictates that the GDR is "allied with the Soviet Union irrevocably and forever." In 1977, SED 1st Secretary Erich Honecker alluded to the military concomitant of the GDR's political relationship with the Soviet state:

Cooperation between the staffs, divisions and units of both armies has achieved a qualitatively new stage especially in recent years. More and more directly does it affect the improvement of combat strength and readiness in the National People's Army. Our collaboration in the Alert System, common training bases, help in the mastering of new weapons and equipment, the fruitful exchange of experiences and performance comparisons have become everyday reality.

Honecker's pronouncement is significant because it directly foreshadows developments that Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski claims are the basis for Marshal Ogarkov's current efforts to tighten Soviet control over the entire region's capacity for mobilizing its military resources under Soviet command and control.

From the Soviet standpoint, any suggestion that the NVA be given an independent military capability in the postwar period would have evoked a visceral response. Because of these feelings and that command and control has traditionally received considerable attention from the Soviet armed forces, it is not surprising that command and control of the NVA was carefully designed to deny the GDR an independent military capability.

The status of forces agreement regulating the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) in the GDR does not accord the SED any decision-making power concerning the number, location, and movement of Soviet forces on East German territory. More significantly, it implicitly grants Soviets the authority to impose a state of emergency on the GDR in response to internal or external conditions. During the Warsaw Conference in May 1955, when the SED hoped to gain permission for East German rearmament, the Polish and Czechoslovak delegations demanded several treaties that would guarantee their post-war borders before agreeing to the formal creation of an East German military establishment. Only after the SED's recognition of new GDR territorial limits and Soviet reassurances to the Polish and Czechoslovak party leaderships that new East German forces would
be permanently subordinated to Soviet control, were the paramilitary police forces formally redesignated the National People's Army (NVA) in January 1956.58

Following the SED's tendency to equate incorporating the NVA into the Warsaw Pact's Combined Armed Forces with the internal consolidation of the GDR state, the SED established early in the development of Soviet-East German military cooperation "smooth cooperation by commanders, staffs and troops with those of the Soviet Army as a preeminent political and military duty." Even when divergent opinion between the SED and the CPSU directly occurs in domestic or foreign policy, disagreement has never produced irreconcilable conflicts in the given fundamental convictions of the two party leaderships concerning security matters.60

The early practice of restricting local NVA party control continues to show in the NVA's operational structure of command and control. In addition to the NVA's permanent assignment to the Warsaw Pact Combined Command and the manifold presence of Soviet officers in the GDR's Ministry of Defense planning staffs, the activities of the NVA main staff are primarily limited to supply and procurement, recruitment, training, communications, intelligence dissemination, civil defense, and planning. A G-3 operations cell is notably absent from the five principal subdivisions of the NVA staff. Furthermore, the NVA Minister of Defense supervises the training and logistical support of all field forces directly from his headquarters in Berlin. The two army headquarters appear to exercise limited administrative control. As already mentioned, the structural dependence on the Soviet armed forces makes independent NVA operations impossible. This situation suggests that the GSFG commander could operationally command three divisions of Military District V and that he or the NGSF commander could command the three divisions of Military District III. Although it is still unclear where the NVA's four reserve divisions might deploy, the deployment pattern of two NVA divisions as component parts of two Soviet Tank Armies during the Warsaw Pact's 1968 Czechoslovakia intervention and the practice of the integrating German divisions into Soviet armies during combined exercises both suggest the high probability of a similar command arrangement for them as well.62

The wholesale incorporating of NVA naval forces into the Red Banner fleet during the worldwide Warsaw Pact exercise "Sever" in July 1968 makes it seem that NVA naval forces will operate as
component parts of larger Soviet formations. Because of their close-
ness to GSFG air formations and extreme dependence on Soviet sup-
port for repair parts, supplies, and fuel, NVA air forces will probably
operate under Soviet military direction as well. The GSFG and the
NVA air forces share at least 27 large and 13 medium-sized air fields
in the GDR. In fact, NVA and GSFG personnel man virtually all air
controller cells with Soviet officers exerting ultimate command
authority. In addition to the existing air fields, the NVA controls
many standby airfields and has devised plans to use part of the
national motorwork for landing strips as well. In summary, Soviet
control of NVA forces should a conflict with NATO occur is equally
dependent on military integration and on the operational subordina-
tion of the NVA to the combined staff of the Warsaw Pact's Com-
bined Armed Forces.

Apparently, the SED has realized the aim of developing Soviet-
East German military cooperation. At the alliance level, East German
participation in combined GSFG field exercises allows the command
and staff elements of both forces to focus on the main tactical mili-
tary tasks they can accomplish. On unit-to-unit levels, the coopera-
tive plans which the GDR Ministry of National Defense and the
Group of Soviet Forces in Germany develop seem to figure most
prominently. In 1972, the SED Central Committee announced plans
to extend the uniformity of equipment and tactical battle drill to troop
leading techniques and political training in order to reinforce Soviet-
East German military interdependence. Former Minister of Defense
Heinz Hoffmann reiterated these plans to the NVA rank and file:

Relations among the brothers-in-arms must include all units and for-
formations. The soldiers and noncommissioned officers should have
more opportunity for direct meetings with the brothers-in-arms—
including shop talk, athletic competition and cultural recreation.

Given the close proximity of all East German military installa-
tions to Soviet Army posts, organizing these programs does not pre-
sent a major problem. East German unit commanders have
traditionally socialized regularly with the GSFG in the formative
stages of the NVA's development. Also, frequent and regular contact
in the 1970s have enabled the Soviets to train on what amounts in
some East German units to be a weekly or monthly basis. From the
SED's perspective, these areas of Soviet and East German political
and military cooperation are designed to ease the "progressive
integration" of East German forces with the Soviet-dominated Com-
bined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact.
To ease Soviet and East German cooperation, the NVA has directed major attention to training and educating East German officer cadres in the Soviet Union. The GDR reportedly sends more officers for schooling in the Soviet Union than any other Warsaw Pact country. By 1975, 1,000 NVA officers had reportedly graduated from several Soviet military institutions, including Frunze and Voroshilov General Staff College. In a speech celebrating the 30th anniversary of the National People's Army, GDR Deputy Defense Minister Horst Bruenner alluded to the important role which the graduates of Soviet military academies play in the NVA:

Today's Army has a highly qualified officers corps. Seventy-three percent are university graduates and 25 percent college graduates. The 2,400 graduates from Soviet military academies and 170 Generals, Admirals and officers who studied at the Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces helped greatly to ensure that the findings of Soviet military science were applied broadly and creatively.

While consolidating the NVA's functional military ties with the GSFG formed in combined tactical training, the NVA's leadership is apparently projecting a military image which mirrors the SED's political attitudes. The NVA's political organs continue to exhort East Germany's officer corps to strive for "the standards set by the Soviet Army" and to "educate the troops, train them and lead them in battle in accordance with this yardstick."

FUTURE PROSPECTS: CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES

Prussia was once characterized as an army with a state. Since practically all males in the GDR are in the reserve or on active military duty in the NVA (or one of the other military organizations under the overall direction of the Ministry of Defense) the same may be said of the GDR. How rapidly and efficiently the GDR could mobilize its manpower, however, is a question with no definitive answer. One estimate suggests that the NVA could mobilize and deploy its four reserve divisions within 48 hours. Of course, such an assessment may be overly optimistic, but evidence suggests that militarizing the civil sector and planning for mobilization are matters of state policy. What is less clear is whether the GDR can sustain its current military contribution to the regional Soviet military effort in the 1990s.
Since the GDR's founding in 1956, its population has experienced a steady decline. Prior to 1950, more than 18,000,000 Germans lived in the former Soviet zone of occupation; in 1984 it fell to 16,660,000 inhabitants. While much of this decline is due to continued legal and illegal migration to the West, most of the decrease is due to a declining birthrate. In 1985, live births fell to 227,436 births, compared with 298,867 live births in 1964. To revive the East German population's fecundity, the regime has provided numerous incentives to encourage both families and single women to have children. While results of these efforts are difficult to forecast, the GDR's capacity to man its armed forces at current levels and to sustain its reserve of military manpower will be constrained in the 1990s.

The demographic data in Table 1.3 above illustrate an unavoidable manpower dilemma confronting the GDR in the decade ahead. With virtually the entire male population already serving in the GDR's armed forces at one time or another, a decline in the 18-year-old males represents a serious threat to the GDR's military effort. Since more than 80 percent of the nation's militarily eligible males must serve each year in the NVA, manipulating age cohorts to compensate for reduced eligible men produces marginal results at best. However, NVA main staff spokesmen indicate that new laws will mandate increased terms for career soldiers. Free German Youth (FDJ) functionaries and authorities from the NVA military commands have already intensified their efforts to convince GDR youth to voluntarily extend their military service, or to pursue military careers. One incentive to serve longer than the prescribed 18 months is their high probability of being called to serve additional periods because of demographic circumstances if they do not "volunteer." Most young people in the GDR understandably regard service later in life as professionally disadvantageous.

An equally plausible solution that cannot be dismissed is to selectively draft and employ women in all non-male activities. D. T. Yazov, Soviet Minister of Defense, recently endorsed such a consideration:

Women may serve as officers, for example, at computer centers, in radiotechnical flight support units, in legal or medical establishments, in the Signal Troops, in the editing and publishing system, and other positions. Women officers have performed well in office work, in military psychology and sociology, and in many other fields.
If the past is any guide, the NVA will move quickly to embrace his remarks.

Nevertheless, what cannot be changed is the growing number of male reserves who will be 35 and over. Despite the SED's emphasis on youth in the NVA's mobile combat formations, fewer young men are available to serve in combat roles. Such a situation cannot help but moderately degrade the NVA's offensive striking power, since war is not an old man's game. In sum, the GDR state faces a serious challenge to its future military potential which it will have difficulty meeting no matter what measures it adopts.

These comments notwithstanding—in contrast to the other Warsaw Pact allies—the East German military-political elite does not have to fear outright political opposition to its rule, but rather a continuing assault on the GDR state's credibility ("ideological softening-up" as it is referred to in the NVA).80

In Prussia, opposition to the existing political order never came from the dynasty or the peasants, but from a small minority of intellectuals and students.81 Internally, the SED has had to contend with an increasingly unruly peace movement from students and handfuls of professional people who have generally resisted the government's attempts at cooption.82 Still, this situation has been hardly more than a minor irritant. This is not to say that the GDR has not produced its own political opposition,83 nor that the NVA's military leadership is unaware that Western influence will possibly continue to have a potentially destabilizing effect on their conscript forces.84 However, they understand that the more important gap between economic promise and performance has not precipitated internal revolt, and the peace movement will not do so either.85 Today, everyone in the GDR, including the state bureaucracy, knows that the new socialist society has not, in fact, come about, and assurances that communism will yet be built generally evoke disinterest among Germans in the East.86

Western analysts should not forget that the key factor in Prussia's nineteenth-century avoidance of revolution and internal disorder was that the educated classes identified with the state because the state had become their raison d'être. Such appears to be the case today with East Germany's military elite. Consequently, they are not likely to become a source of nationalist opposition to Soviet domination. The demonstrated desire of the Soviet and East German military
and political elite to retain stringent control over the GDR state and armed forces and the reemerging Prussian tradition of military participation in government\textsuperscript{87} probably precludes such a development.

That the SED regime has worked tirelessly to tie military class interests to the Soviet-sponsored system's survival suggests that East German military elites would be reluctant to sacrifice their fringe benefits, upward social mobility, and prestige for the uncertainty of a different social system.\textsuperscript{88} This convergence of military conservatism and bureaucratic elitism seems to reinforce the rule of preserving rather than changing the GDR's social order. While this situation does not exclude the possibility that a Soviet withdrawal from the GDR might merge East Germany as readily with West Germany (as Prussia was joined with the rest of Germany in 1871), it does suggest that the East German military establishment will submit to Soviet command in a conflict.\textsuperscript{89}

This recognition is especially important for students of international affairs who are understandably interested in anticipating crises that could lead to a confrontation between the two superpowers in Central Europe. One such study, called *Inadvertent War in Europe: Crises Simulation*, conducted at Stanford University in 1984 revolved around a hypothetical US-Soviet crisis in which an NVA division revolts and deposes its commander.\textsuperscript{90} If this analysis is correct, the GDR is the last place where this event is likely to occur. A pattern of institutionalized cooperation and regular joint planning with the Soviet military establishment makes this possibility remote. Rather, the high state of training and readiness characterizing the NVA's forward-deployed ground combat formations make them ideal candidates for employment within the framework of Ogarkov's integrated Theater of Strategic Operations (TVA) forces. More than perhaps any other non-Soviet formation in the Warsaw Pact, NVA divisions can rapidly mobilize and launch offensive operations under overall Soviet command and control.\textsuperscript{91}

In summary, the military factor has become, and will continue to be, the critical element in East German domestic and foreign policy. Although military requirements do not hold primacy over all other policy considerations, military requirements do affect the GDR state's regional and domestic security interests.\textsuperscript{92} In this context, the GDR is the one Warsaw Pact state capable of maintaining a stable economy while enduring the costs of continuous military modernization. The GDR's remarkable stability may be the reason
why the SED's reluctance to embrace the spirit of Gorbachev's reforms has not provoked the CPSU to pressure the SED into adopting the new Soviet approach to internal affairs. In fact, Gorbachev may well understand that as long as the GDR remains economically and politically stable, the Soviet position cannot be challenged and the Warsaw Pact conventional military threat to Western Europe remains credible.

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Endnotes


30. Claus-Einar Langen, "GDR Border Troops Superior to those of FRG," Frankfurter Allgemeine, 4 September 1975, p. 3.
31. The line of demarcation extends from Hof into the Mecklenburg Bay opposite West Germany.
41. Woller, op. cit., p. 27.
42. "Details of Reservist Duties," op. cit., p. 22.
55. See Ryszard Kuklinski's interview "War Against the Nation Seen from the Inside" in *Kultura*, No. 4/475, 1987 (Paris), pp. 42-44.
60. Bernard von Plate, "Maneuvering Room and Interests in GDR Foreign Policy," *JPRS-EER-86-106*, 21 July 1986, pp. 73-75.


71. T. Forster, op. cit., p. 81.


77. Miskiewicz, op. cit., p. 4.


This chapter offers analysis and evidence to support the following conclusions about what role the Czechoslovak People’s Army (CSPA) will play in the Warsaw Pact during the rest of this century:

First, the CSPA will continue to train and equip 4 to 5 of its 10 ground forces divisions to make them compatible with those maintained by the Central Group of Forces (CGF), the Soviet five-division garrison in Czechoslovakia. If reductions of the five-division CGF are negotiated, the elite CSPA ground forces divisions will also be reduced. The CSPA’s elite divisions will gradually be integrated with the CGF, following the model of the East German ground forces with the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG). The CSPA-CGF coalition will eventually integrate with the designated Combined Armed Forces (CAF) of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO).

The CAF consists of Soviet forces stationed in Eastern Europe and designated elite units of the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) forces of the three northern tier states—plus Hungary. Since the early 1970s, elite CSPA units and corresponding units of the CGF have participated in joint training and joint exercises. In turn, these forces
have also set up exercise capabilities with Soviet and NSWP forces in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary.\(^2\)

The ultimate Czechoslovak goal may be to link the CGF and elite CSPA units on a 1:1 ratio, although the present ratio is probably no better than 2:1. However, in the early 1970s, the ratio was far worse, probably on the order of 5:1 or 4:1. Problems of recruitment, officer shortages, equipment costs, and political reliability may well prevent the CGF from ever achieving a 1:1 pairing, even though this ratio remains the goal. Pairing takes place on the division level, but the Soviets are likely to seek pairing at the smaller unit level, depending on specific capabilities and functions. Czechoslovak officers, trained in the Russian language in both Czechoslovak and Soviet military academies, must use a Russian-language command-and-control system. These officers, already in command positions, will provide the critical links between Soviet commanders and Czechoslovak personnel.\(^3\) Since the early 1970s, the Main Political Administration (MPA) of the CSPA has drawn up and implemented annual bilateral plans for political education with the MPA of the CGF.\(^4\) These programs prepare Pact personnel to handle the political and psychological difficulties of coalition warfare. Since the early 1970s, joint exercises, often under the command of Czechoslovak officers, have sought to prove the effectiveness of such bilateral formations and larger multilateral formations.

The 1:1 pairing (or perhaps 2:1 pairing) attempts to solve two closely related problems: political reliability and unified command-and-control. The pairing system attempts to solve the political reliability problem by reducing the scope of decisions available to Czechoslovak officers because of their relatively low-level integration into a Soviet-controlled coalition force. This pairing also preserves Command and Control on a future battlefield by requiring the best possible interchange between Soviet and NSWP units so that WTO forces can quickly regroup during battle.

Ultimately, the elite Czechoslovak units assigned to the CAF will participate in a coalition that is multi-national, but not multilateral. The functions of the Czechoslovak Defense Ministry will chiefly be to train and supply the Czechoslovak units assigned to the CAF, which fall under the command of Soviet officers who are directly subordinate to the Soviet general staff rather than to any WTO agency.
Second, the tactical air force and air defense troops of the CSPA will continue to receive equipment a generation or two behind that of corresponding Soviet forces based in Czechoslovakia and Central Europe. Czechoslovak personnel in these two service branches will continue to be closely integrated with their Soviet counterparts and will make net contributions to WTO capabilities.

Third, the remaining 5 to 6 (of the present 10) ground forces divisions will serve as training units, reserve units, logistical backups, and political socialization schools which provide manpower and materiel to the external and internal fronts falling under the Czechoslovak Defense Ministry. The external front consists of elite units paired with the CGF. The internal front has border troops (11,000) and the national security corps (number unknown), both under the operational command of the Ministry of the Interior but also linked to the Defense Ministry. The largest single force on the internal front is the People's Militia (120,000), ultimately subordinate to the party but operationally linked to the Ministry of Defense (MOD). The CSPA's remaining five to six divisions will probably decrease in size if NATO and the WTO negotiate mutual troop cuts.

Fourth, the People's Militia (PM) has assumed primary responsibility for internal security. The PM is formally subordinate to the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CSCP), whose first secretary is ex officio PM Commander. However, the PM has close organizational ties to the MOD, the Federal Interior Ministry, and the Republic Interior Ministries for Slovakia and the Czech lands. Likewise, the PM has direct links to large economic enterprises and state institutions. The PM Chief of Staff is the operational head who also commands separate staffs for Slovakia, Moravia, and Bohemia. In the early 1970s the PM was restructured on the organizational model of the CSPA's 148,000 ground forces and expanded to at least 120,000 personnel, if not more. Most of the PM personnel serve part-time or as reservists; only party members are eligible and most receive their military training in the CSPA. The PM occasionally participates in WTO combined exercises. The Vyskov Ground Forces Higher Military School of the CSPA trains officers for both the ground forces and the PM. By law and by doctrine, the PM can request aid from the CSPA and the CGF. Its mission, however, is to buffer these forces from the demoralizing effects of conducting internal security actions in peacetime and to free these forces during wartime for use on the external front.
The objectives of Czechoslovak military policy on the external front is to increase the Soviet-Czechoslovak threat to Bavaria and Austria while also providing heightened security on the internal front during both peace and war. This emerging posture is a qualitative and quantitative improvement of Czechoslovak conventional capabilities compared to the 1955 to 1968 period and the years immediately following 1968, when the CSPA experienced a severe decline in morale and a depleted officer corps. The resources devoted to improving Czechoslovak conventional capabilities in the next 12 years will be well worth the cost to the Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders if the WTO can obtain arms control initiatives that place lower limits on NATO's nuclear and conventional capabilities.

ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS AND CZECHOSLOVAK SECURITY

Besides its direct military contributions to the WTO's external and internal fronts in Czechoslovakia, the Husak/Jakes regime will continue to support USSR/WTO nuclear weapons proposals which enhance Soviet security in Europe and reduce the likelihood of a nuclear war on the Czechoslovak front. To date, the USSR/WTO have put forward five nuclear weapons proposals, most of which will remain on the European security agenda well into the 1990s:

Maximum possible denuclearization of the Soviet-American confrontation in Europe. The most important item on this agenda is the "double-zero" solution for eliminating 572 US intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and the corresponding elimination of the larger Soviet INF deployments. This first "zero," which covers weapons in the 1,000-5,000 km range, has little bearing on Czechoslovakia directly.

The second zero, though, covers weapons in the 500-1,000 km range which could directly expose Czechoslovakia to a nuclear war. This category includes Soviet 500 km-range SS-23 missiles based in East Germany and 1,000 km SS-12/22 missiles based in Czechoslovakia and the USSR. In return for eliminating such systems, the Soviets have obtained elimination of West Germany's 72 Pershing IAs that carry American-controlled nuclear warheads. While the German Pershing IAs could not hit Soviet soil, some were likely aimed at Czechoslovak targets. Hence, the zero option for 500-1,000 km INF will benefit Czechoslovakia.
Another important effect of "double zero" is a symbolic reduction of the American nuclear guarantee to West Germany as expressed in NATO MC 14/3, the Flexible Response Doctrine outlining the possible use of US nuclear weapons to halt a successful Soviet/WTO conventional attack against the FRG. Such an attack would almost certainly involve CGF and CSPA units and thus provoke NATO air attacks against CGF bases and the Czechoslovak transportation network. Hence, Prague wants to reduce the likelihood of nuclear weapons being used against targets in Czechoslovakia.

Even before Gorbachev came to power in 1985, some Soviet military officers surmised that the Soviet-nuclear threat to West Germany was counterproductive in both military and political terms; the Soviets—and their allies—would be substantially better off mounting a primarily conventional threat.⁷ During the 1960s some Czechoslovak officers also apparently concluded that a nuclear war in central Europe would be immensely counter-productive.⁸ In 1983, Husak publicly indicated his misgivings about Soviet SS–22s on Czechoslovak soil, although he did support the deployments.⁹

Czechoslovakia also stands to benefit in another way. Other NATO states may symbolically decouple from the FRG during a Soviet-German war. If such a war were allowed to run its course, it might not involve either a Soviet conventional or nuclear attack on the rest of NATO. The Soviets could encourage this view not only by eliminating the INF capable of striking non-German NATO states, but by configuring a conventional threat limited to portions of the FRG east of the Rhine. If non-German territory acquired quasi-sanctuary status in the West—even if NATO armies were fighting in Germany—perhaps Czechoslovak territory might gain a similar quasi-sanctuary status, even if CSPA units were in Bavaria.

Maximum possible separation of Soviet-French and Soviet-British nuclear confrontations from a conventional war in Central Europe. Czechoslovakia would benefit from further effort to prevent the use of nuclear weapons in a European war. To date, Soviet efforts to stop the planned deployments of greatly expanded French and British forces have completely failed. By 2000 the French may well be able to extend a credible nuclear guarantee to the West Germans against Pact use of either conventional or nuclear forces.¹⁰ Soviet spokesmen have already emphatically denounced the joint Franco-German brigade (equipped with conventional weapons) and former
President Giscard d'Estaing's statement that France should make a nuclear guarantee to the Germans against any form of Soviet aggression.\(^1\)

Gorbachev has repeatedly called for the cancellation of West European research on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and its likely focus on Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile Defense (ATBM). Although the Soviet-American INF agreement may help deflect a European R&D effort on ATBM,\(^2\) Czechoslovakia supports the Gorbachev approach to SDI and ATBM because it contributes to European denuclearization.

Another nuclear arms control proposal, already associated with the neutral and non-aligned group in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), is creating a 150-kilometer nuclear-free belt on either side of the FRG border; this area includes Czechoslovak territory. In the FRG, such a belt would constitute a conventional reprisal zone where the WTO could counter any West German effort (during a bloc crisis in East Germany or East Europe) to reunify the two Germanies by political means. Again, Czechoslovakia would benefit from establishing a nuclear sanctuary zone in the Sudetenland.

Related proposals for eliminating mass destruction chemical weapons would also benefit the densely populated front-line countries, such as Czechoslovakia.

All nuclear and/or chemical arms control proposals mentioned above—plus additional, Soviet-backed proposals (such as the denuclearization of the Balkans and northern Europe west of the USSR) would benefit the Soviet Union. Collectively, these proposals imply a decoupling of a general NATO-WTO war and global US-USSR war from a Soviet/WTO conventional assault on the FRG. This development would simultaneously strengthen the USSR's military position in Central Europe while promoting better East-West political and economic relations. The Czechoslovak regime would also benefit militarily and politically if these proposals were adopted. Such proposals would reduce the likelihood of using nuclear weapons in or near Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and West Germany; and would decouple the FRG from its allies if a WTO conventional assault occurred to prevent reunification of the two Germanies. German reunification would constitute a severe blow to the political survival of Czechoslovakia and the allied regimes in neighboring states.
CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS AND CZECHOSLOVAK SECURITY

The Husak/Jakes regime stands to benefit not only from arms control proposals which encourage a denuclearized Central Europe, but also from WTO conventional arms control proposals to reduce the capability of either alliance to change the European status quo. The thrust of proposals already put forward are:

First, a 1:1 ratio between the Bundeswehr and the three Soviet force groups stationed in the northern tier states. This ratio has clearly emerged as the Soviets' negotiating objective in the Mutual and Balance Force Reduction Talks.13

Second, the Soviet/WTO proposal to reduce by the mid-1990s both NATO and WTO force levels by 500,000 on each side. Although talks are scheduled to begin on this question, the Soviets have yet to specify the terms of such a reduction, other than identifying the geographical region as extending "from the Atlantic to the Urals" and calling for a preliminary reduction of 150,000 troops on each side. Extrapolating from existing MBFR proposals, the WTO might propose: a 1:1 ratio between the Bundeswehr and the GSFG/NGF/CGF; a 1:1 ratio between, on the one side, East European national forces in the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the SFG in Hungary; and, on the other side, all non-German NATO troops in Germany plus Danish and Benelux national forces; and a 1:1 ratio between Soviet western military district forces against French and British troops and whatever additional NATO forces are necessary to match the Soviet totals.

Even if these hypotheses are incorrect, the general Soviet goal of reducing NATO troops by 500,000 would substantially cut NATO's combat capability in Germany and weaken, at least symbolically, NATO's commitment to defend the FRG. Although such reductions would also severely reduce the WTO's capability to attack Western Europe, the Pact would still be capable of attacking the FRG. If troop reductions occurred in the CGF, then building-up the CSPA to a 1:1 pairing with the CGF would be much easier.

Such a formula for "equal security" in Central Europe would prove highly advantageous to Czechoslovakia. It would reduce CSPA dollar contributions to Czechoslovakia. It would reduce CSPA dollar contributions to the WTO and, hence, boost the Czech economy. It would reinforce the political status quo by continuing the Soviet capability to intervene and defend local regimes and to keep
the two Germanies apart. In addition, NATO’s capability to project power into Soviet-East European crises would be reduced.

**CONFIDENCE-BUILDING PROPOSALS AND CZECHOSLOVAK SECURITY**

The Czech leadership also supports the confidence-building measures already advanced by the USSR/WTO. The most important are:

- A NATO-WTO non-aggression treaty pledging no first-use of either nuclear or conventional weapons.
- Mutual inspection of troop movements based on requests from the opposing alliance. The 1983 Prague PCC proposal suggests the Pact is prepared to offer NATO assurances against surprise attack if NATO will tolerate troop movements necessary to allow Soviet/WTO interventions in Eastern Europe. Such interventions have been justified on the basis of the United Nations Charter (Article 51), which the Soviets read as permitting actions for self-defense, including collective self-defense against internal threats.
- NATO-WTO military doctrine consultations. Such meetings would presumably combine *explications de texte* and arms control proposals. The USSR/WTO will suggest that NATO allies rule out NATO power projection capabilities into the GDR and Czechoslovakia (such as Follow-On Forces Attack), and that NATO interpret WTO doctrine to mean that the Warsaw Pact will not attack Western Europe, but will take reprisals if the FRG attempts to undermine the GDR.
- A wide-range of proposed confidence-building measures: such as reducing the size of alliance military exercises, exchanging observers for scheduled military exercises, permitting mutual inspection by military officers from opposing forces, and expanding trade, cultural, and scientific-technical contacts.

**COMMON SECURITY INTERESTS OF HUSAK/JAKES AND GORBACHEV**

The Czech regime will continue to endorse such proposals, as announced either by the USSR, the WTO’s PCC, or by individual East European states. Husak’s unflagging loyalty to Soviet initiatives—from originally deploying SS–22s in Czechoslovakia to possibly eliminating these missiles—indicates not so much Soviet coercive power as a perceived common security interest.
Husak has adjusted to Gorbachev's dramatic initiatives on INF, just as he adjusted to Brezhnev's FRG initiatives in the early 1970s. Brezhnev's and Gorbachev's objectives were virtually identical: to weaken US ties to West Germany so that a Soviet USSR-FRG conflict would not automatically escalate to a Soviet-American nuclear war; and to make the status quo in Central Europe the most attractive of the possible FRG options. Despite numerous differences dividing Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders since 1955, they continue to share an interest in enhancing Czechoslovakia's external security and internal stability. Only in 1968 did an independent conception of Czechoslovakia's security interests emerge—a conception Gustav Husak roundly denounced. Husak, Jakes, and Gorbachev continue to share four objectives:

First, to preserve an unfettered Soviet capability to intervene militarily in Czechoslovakia against any revival of a "Dubcek" faction of the CSCP or any manifestation of non-communist opposition such as Solidarity in Poland. To achieve this objective, the Soviets must continue to maintain the CGF as the preeminent military power in Czechoslovakia; to ensure that the Czechoslovak Defense Ministry remains unable to organize defense of Czech territory by national means; and to enhance capabilities of the People's Militia.

Second, to preserve the Pact's capability to wage a devastating assault on West Germany. Such an assault is necessary to preempt a West German political response to a crisis in the GDR. As stated previously, reunification of Germany would be extremely destabilizing to all Warsaw Pact governments, especially Czechoslovakia. To achieve this objective, CSPA and CGF units are paired into a combat-ready, well-equipped, politically reliable force. Prague and Moscow would denuclearize the Central Region so that Czechoslovakia would not suffer from NATO use of nuclear weapons under the Flexible Response doctrine. They also want to reduce non-German NATO forces in the FRG in exchange for NSWP troop reductions. In Czechoslovakia, the five to six divisions not assigned to the WTO's CAF would be reduced, and so would not affect the Pact's capability against West Germany.

Third, to preempt NATO's capability to project military power into either a Soviet-East European crisis or a Soviet-West German crisis over events in the GDR. Since NATO's introduction of more precision-guided munitions, together with Air-Land Battle concepts, entailing such power-projection capabilities, the WTO has proposed troop reductions of about 500,000 on both sides.
Fourth, to preserve the USSR/WTO capability to militarily support pro-Soviet regimes throughout Eastern Europe. This capability depends on the WTO's role to preempt independent national defense capabilities, such as those that Yugoslavia, Albania, and Romania now have. Since the Husak/Jakes regime has a profound stake in preserving alliance-wide capabilities of intervention, they support the WTO's basic agencies and programs, even during periods of East-West military détente.17

With the exception of 1968, Czech and Soviet leaders have shared all four objectives since 1955, though WTO policies have gone through several abrupt shifts. The evolution of Soviet/Czechoslovak/WTO policies fall into six distinct periods since 1955.

1955-1961: THE FIRST PERIOD

During this period the Soviets faced three intractable problems in Europe: first, Soviet-East European relations suffered recurring crises in Hungary, Poland, East Germany (mass defections through Berlin to the West), Albania, and Romania, and outside the bloc—notably Yugoslavia and China. Second, Soviet policy failed to resolve the post-war border issues of both German states. Third, the United States committed its nuclear superiority in both intercontinental and theater weapons to NATO. Even though Prague was the most stable and continuous supporter of Soviet policy in the WTO, Soviet policy reversed most military programs pursued by Czechoslovakia before 1955. These policies had produced a very large but poorly equipped and poorly led infantry force.

First, the Czechs had their military personnel reduced considerably. Although a precise figure is not available, a 1985 joint Soviet-Czechoslovak study on USSR-CSSR military relations, Na vekhnye vremena (For Eternity), claims that from 1955 to 1961 the WTO reduced total military manpower by 3,796,500, with the USSR accounting for 1,200,000 and NSWP for 2,596,500.18 Condoleezza Rice estimates that in the early 1950s, Czechoslovakia, with a population of less than 15 million, managed to field about 1,500,000 personnel in various military and security services, 250,000 in the regular armed forces, 100,000 in border troops, 200,000 in the People's Militia, about 1,000,000 in active reserve units for the military and police, plus large, but unspecified, numbers in security police and paramilitary youth organizations.19
Second, the Czech military was de-Sovietized and renationalized when Soviet advisors were removed from regimental-level units and above, thus eliminating Soviet-style shaved heads for inductees, and restoring traditional Czechoslovak uniforms, insignia, and other military routines.20

Third, qualitative improvements were made in Czechoslovak military equipment. The 1985 edition of For Eternity reports that in 1954 the CSPA had the equivalent of 18 horsepower for every soldier, but that by 1962 this had risen to 42. In 1953 only 3 percent of the entire officer corps had a higher education; by 1961 this figure had risen to 14.6 percent.21 In addition, the same source reports there were “important steps” toward the “standardization” of Czechoslovak materiel and introduction of “new military technology and equipment.”22 This source mentions only aviation units, a claim substantiated by an emigré air force colonel.23

Condoleeza Rice argues these developments helped professionalize the CSPA, following purges of the pre-war officer corps after the 1948 coup and of alleged Titoists in the 1949-53 period. She adds that Czechoslovakia was able to recruit loyal but poorly-educated replacements for the purged professionals.24 The 1955-61 period, though, saw an effort to avoid the backlashes that similar policies had produced in Poland and Hungary. Improvements in manpower policy and materiel were not connected to any bloc-wide policy; they were ad hoc improvements on previous policies, but lacked any coherent focus.

One policy not reversed was devoting large shares of industrial resources to producing military equipment not only for the CSPA, but for other bloc armies and Soviet Third World clients. In fact, some analyses of Czechoslovak economic difficulties since the mid-1960s claim these problems have their origin in the post-1948 orientation of Czechoslovak industry to military production and related heavy industries.25

1961-1968: A CZECHOSLOVAK FRONT IN THE WARSAW PACT?

In 1961 the Soviets initiated a comprehensive program to meet severe problems on its internal and external fronts. On the internal front, Albania defected from the WTO; both Romania and Poland were moving in the same direction. The GDR witnessed an exodus of its citizens through Berlin to the Federal Republic, which was
emerging as the economic and military giant of the West European community. WTO Commander, Marshal A. A. Grechko, started a program to address not only these problems, but also to evaluate how the United States was committing its long-range and theater nuclear weapons to NATO.

For Czechoslovakia, Marshal Grechko’s program meant several things:

- The CSPA could enter a nuclear conflict with NATO. The CSPA was thoroughly subordinated to Soviet command and incorporated into an emerging WTO order of battle. The CSPA would mount a large-scale conventional threat to Bavaria and Austria and offer itself as a target for American nuclear weapons.

- Soviet troops could regularly re-enter Czechoslovakia as part of WTO exercises. According to some sources, Moscow attempted to establish a permanent Soviet garrison there.26

- Combined exercises, under Soviet command, would orient the Czechoslovak defense ministry toward offensive actions outside national territory. Czechoslovakia forfeited a defensive capability against the USSR.

The 1985 edition of For Eternity also notes that the CSPA was to operate with “the use of nuclear missile weapons as well as with the conduct of military actions by conventional means of armed struggle.”27 To achieve this dual objective, Czechoslovakia had to increase the quality and quantity of aircraft in its air force; establish anti-aircraft missile troops in the PVO (anti-aircraft troops); and to extensively reorganize its ground forces. In the ground forces, existing infantry and mechanized divisions were dissolved and then replaced by motorized rifle divisions, based on the Soviet model. Tank divisions upgraded to meet Soviet standards. In addition, the CSPA corps organization was abolished and replaced with Soviet-style “Superformation” (Ob’edinienie) or army groups. The Czechs added airborne troop units and reoriented their logistics to permit the influx of more modern Soviet weapons in all service branches. Furthermore, the CSPA systematically developed capabilities for joint actions with the Soviet army through a system of combined exercises.28

Finally, Czechoslovakia exerted considerable efforts to recruit and train a capable officer corps. However, the “success” of such
efforts showed up in mid-1960s public opinion polls that indicated that ranked military officers below sewage workers in perceived status! Of the 28 professions listed in the survey, the military profession ranked 25th.29

I have argued elsewhere that the trend toward combined WTO exercises in the 1960s re-established an assured Soviet-Czechoslovak capability for unopposed military intervention.30 For example, in the 1966 Vltava maneuvers, the Soviets worked out the logistical problems for intervention and developed liaison with Czech local and national agencies which preempted organized Czechoslovak resistance. In addition, such Czechoslovak orientation toward conducting external operations under Soviet control further deprived the Czechs of national control of the CSPA. Hence, in mid-1968, Czechoslovak troops practiced marching with, not against, Soviet and other Pact troops during maneuvers in Czechoslovakia.

Several Western observers,31 supported by emigré testimony,32 conclude that in the 1961-1968 period the Soviets wanted the CSPA to assume primary responsibility for the southern flank of the Central Front and to march into Bavaria to take on US and West German troops. The analysis here rejects this interpretation and argues instead that the Soviets were upgrading the CSPA in order to integrate them with Soviet forces on a bilateral basis. The following observations support this conclusion:

In the 1920s and 1930s, and in 1942-43, Soviet ground forces consisted of entire non-Russian divisions that were mainly training units. Ultimately, the Soviets created a multi-national personnel Soviet army by dispersing ethnic units in large multi-national formations. This Soviet model is an example for training and deploying Warsaw Pact multinational personnel: that is, peacetime training in national units and wartime deployments in multi-national formations.

From the beginning, the Soviets trained and deployed the East German People’s Army as a technically capable but politically suspect ethnic force, whose units were to be integrated into the larger Soviet force, based in East Germany.33

In the 1960s the Soviets evidently tried to place a Soviet garrison in Czechoslovakia, perhaps to maintain a Soviet nuclear arsenal in the country.34

Soviet policy demonstrated extreme distrust of independent East European military forces under national control, as in Yugoslavia,
Albania, and Romania. These armies presented problems of reliability and availability.  

If Michael McCGwire is correct that Soviets began planning in 1965-66 for a NATO-WTO war without the use of nuclear weapons, then a quasi-independent conventional mission for the CPSA against the best forces of the US and West Germany clearly was a dubious gamble.

I. I. Yakubovskiy's appointment as WTO Commander in 1967, following Marshal Grechko's elevation to Defense Minister, coincides with the Soviet reorientation toward more frequent low-level combined bilateral exercises, which mixed Soviet and East European troops, and occasional massive multilateral exercises. This system, along with setting up the Central Group of Forces in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, drew the CSPA into a new form of coalition warfare.

JANUARY-AUGUST, 1968: PRAGUE SPRING

In 1968 Czechoslovak officers publicly complained that they had no role in formulating or implementing the CSPA's mission. Furthermore, they rejected existing CSPA policy for external and internal fronts in favor of a policy of Czech national control over the CSPA.

After the Czechoslovak Central Committee adopted its "Action Program" in mid-April 1968, Colonel Vojtech Mencel, the rector of the Gottwald Academy, Lieutenant Colonel Borivoj Svarc, a department head at the Academy, and several faculty members critiqued Czechoslovakia's national defense system. In a signed document, they complained of the "20-year long distorted development of our army [and a military strategy] devoid of rational criteria." According to a Czechoslovak officer who analyzed this document for Gustav Husak, Colonel Mencel's memorandum sought to prove that Czechoslovak military policy was "dictated by outside interests, the interests and requirements of the Warsaw alliance. So these policies were supposed to be dictated by the interests of the Soviet Union."

By the end of April, the officers of the Gottwald Academy had produced a 100-page document entitled "On the Action Program of the Czechoslovak People's Army," which proposed five possible Czechoslovak military strategies. The Army could: continue to act within the framework of the Warsaw Pact, but propose its bilateral or unilateral abolition; safeguard the security of the state within the framework of its territory or of neutral policies; initiate proposals for
disarmament measures; create conditions that will ensure security in Europe using collective security organization; and plan contingencies for self-defense.\(^4\)

In early May, the Gottwald Academy drafted a shorter document, the "Gottwald Memorandum," that reduced the five options to three: reconsider the existing coalition principle (the alliance with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact) in the coming 10 to 15 years; contemplate coordinated defense in Central Europe without relying upon the military potential of the USSR (some kind of collective security organization without a class determination); pursue neutrality and rely on one's own means of defense.\(^4\)

The third option, that of proclaiming Czechoslovakia's neutrality and relying on "one's own means of defense," is similar to Romania's defense system. The second option suggested a collective security organization made up of two possible sets of allies: either a group of Communist and non-Communist central European states, or a group of states constituting "a military analog to the Little Entente 'in a socialist form.'" (The Little Entente of the 1930s comprised Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia.) The first option, specifically called for reconsidering Czechoslovakia's membership in the Warsaw Treaty Organization. In fact, one post-invasion commentator concluded that the Gottwald Memorandum advocated Czechoslovakia's de facto withdrawal from the WTO.\(^4\)

Colonel Mencl sent copies of the Gottwald Memorandum to the first secretary of the party, the president of the republic, the chairman of the council of ministers, the foreign minister, and other high-ranking officials.\(^4\) Within a week, Yakubovskiy was in Prague to seek assurances of loyalty; and within six weeks, Soviet, Hungarian, and Polish troops were maneuvering in Czechoslovakia.\(^4\) On 2 July, shortly after completion of the June WTO maneuvers in Czechoslovakia and shortly before the final round of delegate elections to the Extraordinary 14th Congress of the Czechoslovak Party, Lidova Armada, the Czechoslovak army newspaper, published the Gottwald Memorandum. According to one post-invasion critic, the publication constituted "the program of the rightists in the army.... The rightists intended to force this program through the 14th Congress of the party."\(^4\)

In mid-July, Lieutenant General Vaclav Prchlik, newly promoted from chief of the Czechoslovak Main Political Administration
to head of the Central Committee department, in charge of the state's military and security agencies, publicly advocated reformulating Czechoslovakia's military doctrine. According to one Husak-era commentator, Prchlik relied on support from the Gottwald Academy. At a 15 July press conference, Prchlik presented a critique of Czechoslovakia's military and security policies remarkably similar to that of the Gottwald Memorandum. Prchlik then outlined the "necessary conditions for working out a Czechoslovak military doctrine."

Prchlik proposed that the forthcoming Party Congress should adopt a resolution requiring the revision of Czechoslovakia's military doctrine. He also proposed that the new doctrine be developed by the new Central Committee and by the new National Assembly due to be elected in late 1968. Further, he urged that these two bodies establish a State Defense Council to implement the new doctrine.

Prchlik also wanted to improve the Warsaw Pact's command structure by "strengthening the role of the Political Consultative Committee," thereby giving each member state "genuine equality." Although Prchlik did not suggest that his plans for reformulating Czechoslovak military doctrine would depend on organizational changes within the WTO, Krasnaya Zvezda later charged that he discussed organizational changes in order to show a false loyalty to the Warsaw Pact. Although Dubcek responded to Soviet criticisms by abolishing Prchlik's Central Committee department, he reinstated Prchlik as chief of the Czechoslovak Main Political Administration. There is no evidence that Dubcek ever seriously considered the Gottwald Memorandum proposals or General Prchlik's press conference; in fact, on the night of the Warsaw Pact invasion, he ordered the CSPA to remain in barracks.

General Prchlik also complained that Czechoslovakia's internal security forces were not oriented to external enemy subversion, but only "toward watching internal political problems"—meaning that they were watching Novotny's opposition within the party.

Underlying all these critiques were two observations: a markedly different analysis of the West German threat; and questioning of the basic justification for the Warsaw Treaty of 1955 and the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of 1963. One post-1968 analysis notes that the Gottwald Memorandum implied reconciliation with Western Europe:

the orientation...}
the other socialist countries. It is expressly stated in one of the sections of the memorandum that 'practical measures which are feasible in this situation aim at the conclusion of international agreements with potential adversaries.' And, in another section, possible agreements between Czechoslovakia and the German Federal Republic are also expressly mentioned.57

CHARTERS OF SOVIET-CZECHOSLOVAK MILITARY COOPERATION

The 1968 developments in Czechoslovakia served as a catalyst for reorganizing East European bloc structures: the WTO, CMEA, academies of sciences, and cultural ministries. The so-called Prague Spring, like earlier crises in Eastern Europe, provoked the Soviets to design a reform program to correct past errors. In addition, the Soviets redefined relations with the Federal Republic of Germany and subsequently redefined FRG relations with East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia in the early 1970s. The Czech attempt to redefine West German relations in 1968 may have speeded up Soviet efforts. Yet another catalyst was the Soviet achievement of strategic parity, which the United States began to recognize in 1968 by starting preliminary discussions on strategic arms control negotiations. NATO's adoption of Flexible Response recognized the implications of strategic parity.

The Gottwald Memorandum and General Prchlik's press conference prompted the specific organizational changes of the WTO between 1969-1975. The major changes included:

- Establishing the Council of Defense Ministers as nominally the highest body for policy planning.
- Creating the Military Council as the agency responsible for planning all training and exercise programs.
- Creating the Technical Committee and Military-Scientific Committee to coordinate adoption of new weaponry and R&D.
- Creating the Council of Foreign Ministers and its secretariat to coordinate European security policy. Aside from giving greater symbolic recognition to the NSWP, the changes enlarged the Staff and reorganized the Combined Command. Both agencies presided over a smaller, but higher-quality Combined Armed Forces of designated Soviet and NSWP forces.58
The reforms eliminated any remaining possibility for national control over national armed forces and eliminated distinct national missions. Establishing the CGF in Czechoslovakia meant that the CSPA’s elite units would merge into a force that was binational without being bilateral. The Soviet-Czechoslovak force’s mission was threefold: to assure Husak’s security against internal challenges; to preserve the inner-German border; and to confront NATO in either a Soviet-East European conflict or Soviet-FRG conflict.

The Warsaw Pact reforms were by far the most successful bloc reforms of the early 1970s. These reforms were more successful than the economic agencies enlisted in the CMEA’s 1971 Complex Program for Long-Term Integration, or the academic bodies in the 1971 Multi-Lateral Agreement of the Academies of Sciences, or the loose structure of annual summit meetings of socialist culture ministries.

The impetus for integration in the WTO’s Combined Armed Forces was not a desire to create a multi-national coalition, but rather a desire to pre-empt the independent national military capabilities that Czechoslovak officers proposed in 1968. Brezhnev’s program for expanding economic, political, cultural, and scientific ties among the FRG, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland also necessitated further integration. The Soviets evidently concluded that expansion of inner-German contacts was tolerable provided there was an offsetting expansion of intra-bloc contacts.

The Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of 1970 is important because it correlates with the Soviet-West German treaty of 1970 and diametrically opposes the relationship charted by the Soviet-Romanian treaty of 1970. The Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty defined the long-term significance of the 1968 treaty (whereby the CGF was set up in Czechoslovakia) and it set the agenda for the program adopted at the 1971 Czechoslovak Party Congress. It also became the basis for Prague’s 1973 treaty with the FRG and for its signature of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act.

For Eternity (1985) identifies three factors behind the treaty: a common interest of the ruling regimes in the USSR and Czechoslovakia to preserve the inner-German status quo; restriction of NATO’s power projection capabilities by nuclear or conventional means; and preservation of Soviet intervention capabilities resulting from a more integrated WTO. The 1970 Treaty contains a series of articles which specifically focus on these three objectives and how they enhance WTO conventional capabilities.
On Policy Toward the FRG. Article 9 pledges both states to "ensure the inviolability of the borders of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty of 1955 and to take all necessary steps to prevent aggression on the part of any forces of militarism and revanchism and to rebuff the aggressor." Article 6 reinforces this pledge by specifically condemning the 1938 Munich agreement that awarded the Sudetenland to Germany. Article 10 promises immediate military aid in the event of an attack on either party.

Commitments to Restrain NATO. Articles 7 and 8 pledge both signatories to reduce military confrontation levels with NATO and at the same time to maintain the military power necessary to rebuff "encroachments by the aggressive forces of imperialism and reaction."

Commitments to WTO Intervention Capabilities. Article 5 refers to the key concept used to justify the Soviet intervention of 1968—the 1968 Bratislava Declaration's pledge to joint defense of the gains of socialism. The 1970 Treaty requires both states to "take the necessary steps to defend the socialist gains of the peoples." Articles 1-4 spell out not only the military, but also the economic, scientific, technological, cultural, media, party organ, and state agency requirements.

Shortly before signing the 1970 Treaty, Husak publicly lectured CSPA officers that "Our army must develop in the very closest cooperation with the Soviet army, both within the framework of the Warsaw Pact and with the Soviet soldiers temporarily stationed on our territory." Afterward, the 1971 14th Party Congress pledged to carry out the letter and spirit of the 1970 Treaty. A Soviet text on the WTO concludes: "The resolution of the [14th] Congress emphasizes that [guaranteeing Czechoslovakia's defense] could take place only in the framework of joint efforts in full correspondence with the interests of all the member states of the Warsaw Pact and in unbreakable union and friendship with the Soviet Union.

The 1970 Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty and the 1971 Party Program commit Prague to collaborate closely with the CGF and to develop a conventional military capability to deal with NATO, the FRG, and internal opposition in Czechoslovakia.

THE CZECHOSLOVAK PEOPLE'S ARMY AND THE CENTRAL GROUP OF FORCES

The practical goal of these three interrelated objectives is to integrate the CGF with selected elite units of the CSPA; to restructure the
CSPA so it can achieve its requirements on the external and internal fronts; to overhaul the Czechoslovak internal security forces so as to relieve the CSPA and the CGF of direct responsibility on the internal front; and to thoroughly paramilitarize Czechoslovak society.

The restructuring of Soviet-Czechoslovak military relations occurred during severe demoralization of the CSPA, including mass resignations of disaffected officers, a purge of politically suspect officers, and Ministry of Defense efforts to recruit qualified candidates to enroll in officer training programs. All these developments testified to a massive vote of no confidence in the CSPA by Czech society. The Soviets added their own vote of no confidence by creating a so-called "shadow staff" which took over the daily management of the CSPA and placed its own representatives in all key CSPA commands in the early 1970s.69

For analysts who regard the CSPA's WTO mission to fight as a distinct national force, the 1968 disruptions severely compromised its credibility as an ally of the Soviet Army.70 Dale Herspring and Ivan Volgyes bluntly make the case, "The Czechoslovak army must be regarded as unreliable under almost any circumstances."71 Their conclusion is persuasive as long as the CSPA remains a distinct national force. However, integrating CSPA elite units into a coalition with the CGF poses a different question regarding the reliability of Czechoslovak personnel.

Richard Martin noted that, in the 1980s, with the exception of some selected units, the overall level of modernization in the CSPA appeared to be declining.72 Martin suggests that financial constraints may account for the outdated equipment "of most Czech units."73 Keith Crane, though, analyzes East European military spending, and notes that Czechoslovakia has slightly increased military spending (as a percentage of national income) in the 1980s, even though the prosperous GDR has overtaken the CSSR and now devotes the highest percentage to military spending.74 Crane sees Czechoslovakia either increasing relative military spending or decreasing its contribution to the WTO. Thus, if Czechoslovakia concentrates its military spending on selected elite units of the ground forces and air forces integrated into a Soviet coalition force, the Jakes regime might simultaneously resolve the problems of modernization, economics, and reliability identified by Martin, Crane, and Herspring.
BUILDING A COMBAT COALITION

The CGF comprises two air and five ground forces divisions—two of which are in Bohemia, two in Moravia, and one in Slovakia. Their disposition suggests the CGF's internal role. Since 9 of the 10 CSPA ground forces divisions plus the Czechoslovak airborne regiment are co-located with the CGF, combined training and exercise programs between garrisons are possible. According to *The Military Balance 1986-87*, Czechoslovakia has four Category I divisions: one tank and three mechanized rifle. These divisions are the most likely candidates for integration.

In 1970 *Krasnaya Zvezda* began to report on combined exercises involving units (regiments) and sub-units of the two allied forces. The Soviet army newspaper stated, “Frequently the subunits of the two friendly armies act in common combat actions, constituting a monolithic striking force.” In the 1970 “Taran” exercise involving the CSPA and CGF in western Czechoslovakia, Vasil Valo, a Czech officer, commanded the allied force while CSSR party and state leadership looked on. A 1974 Soviet volume on the WTO reported that “units and formations” of the two armies “systematically” conducted regular combined exercises.

Bilateral exercises prepare CSPA units to function as components of multilateral Pact exercises in which neither the Czechoslovak nor other NSWP forces perform distinct national missions. *Krasnaya Zvezda* reported that in the 1969 “Oder-Neisse” exercises in Poland, CSPA and Soviet mechanized rifle units, plus Polish tank units, carried out important actions. It also reported on joint actions conducted by a CSPA tank unit and GDR mechanized unit. Also, in the same exercise, the Czechoslovak airborne regiment took part in an action involving Soviet air transport craft and Polish fighter planes. Czechoslovak units played similar roles in the 100,000-man “Brotherhood-in-Arms-70” exercises in East Germany.

Czechoslovakia hosted the “Shield-72” maneuvers, involving participants from the CSSR, USSR, Hungary, Poland, and East Germany. The 1975 edition of *For Eternity* described this exercise as one in which Polish and Czechoslovak forces fought “shoulder to shoulder” while receiving support from Soviet mechanized units. When the “enemy” brought up reinforcements, Soviet tank, artillery, and air forces went into action, annihilating the enemy.
One consequence of such bilateral and multilateral exercises in the 1970s may have been the CSPA's *de facto* surrender of independent operational capabilities. Jeffrey Simon has argued that from the late 1970s through the 1980s WTO exercise patterns reveal the continued integration of multinational groupings into Warsaw Pact plans, rather than the ability to act as distinct national groupings pursuing distinct national missions.  

In 1978 *Rude Pravo* reported a further step in integration—the exchange of whole units (regiments?) between the CSPA and CGF for training purposes:

In the recent summer period a new form was added to the existing ones: the mutual exchange of whole units between the motorized riflemen and other formations of the fraternal armies.

For many days these units fulfilled all tasks set by the combat and political training plans, as part of the formation [division?] which they joined....

The new form has fully proven itself. We and the Soviet comrades get to know each other thoroughly and draw closer to each other in fulfilling the most difficult tasks of the training program.

In 1979 *Rude Pravo* again reported on such exchanges. Major General M. Goglev, CGF political administration chief, provided further details about joint training programs in 1980:

According to a previously-agreed upon plan, Soviet friends will be visited by, say, a company or battery of Czechoslovak soldiers and our equivalent sub-unit is sent to them.

The hosts and guests together participate in tactical training, fire training, operations of combat vehicles, defense from mass destruction weapons, physical training, and other disciplines.

General Goglev noted the feelings of political solidarity produced by such training. He drew similar conclusions about combined troop and command-staff exercises, but did not reveal the levels of interaction and integration. Lieutenant Colonel V.I. Arkhipov, one of Goglev's subordinates, though, has provided more information about the sub-units in both combined training and exercises. Arkhipov notes that "in joint actions, in conditions maximally close to those of combat.... tactical interaction of units and sub-units is improved and perfected; there is also an exchange of experience in the control of troops and in the organization of party political work in various types of combat actions."
This pattern of interaction appears well-established in the Czechoslovak air force. For all intents and purposes, CSPA and Soviet CCF air forces act as a single unified command in tracking planes and in executing missions.\textsuperscript{91}

WTO sources report integration of CSPA and CGF low-level sub-units, even in the larger WTO exercises. For example, during the 26,000-troop "Friendship-79" exercise in Czechoslovakia,\textsuperscript{92} Soviet journalists drew the parallel between integrating multinational personnel in the Soviet army to integrating Czechoslovak personnel into the WTO. This report, noting that a Soviet artillery battery included Czech military personnel, observed that: "The subunits of the fraternal armies efficiently and skillfully carried out their tasks, and skillfully interacted."\textsuperscript{93} This article also noted that when a Soviet tank battalion was suddenly attacked on its flank, a CSPA artillery battery quickly took up a position that allowed it to halt the enemy. In addition, \textit{Krasnaya Zvezda} noted that the sub-units had trained together.\textsuperscript{94}

In the 25,000-man "Friendship-82" exercise in Czechoslovakia, \textit{Krasnaya Zvezda} reported that Soviet and Czechoslovak helicopter crews conducted a joint action with Soviet and Czechoslovak tank and mechanized forces of unspecified size and that "interaction was evident at all stages of the exercises. When a difficult situation befell one of the participating detachments, Soviet and Hungarian subunits paralyzed the actions of the enemy and a Czechoslovak tank battalion ... broke away from the rear to secure a vantage point."\textsuperscript{95}

The 60,000-man "Shield-84" exercises in Czechoslovakia also strongly suggested that the CSPA no longer trains or conducts exercises geared to independent actions (even if the Czechoslovak Defense Minister, Martin Dzur, was in nominal command). For example, in one action, a Czechoslovak mechanized unit, pinned down by the enemy, was rescued by a coalition force from five WTO states.\textsuperscript{96}

\textit{For Eternity} (1985) claims that CSPA-CGF combined exercises involve not just ground forces, but other combat arms and support services, specifically the PVO (anti-aircraft), Air Force, and "types of troops" (such as engineering, and signals) and "joint rear services exercises."\textsuperscript{97} The text concludes that "... questions of tactical, operational, and strategic interaction are worked out in joint troop, naval, and special troop and command-staff exercises."\textsuperscript{98}
SOVIET PENETRATION OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK ARMY

The most visible device for ensuring the political reliability of the Czechoslovak People's Army is the elaborate system of activities between CGF and CSPA political officers. In the post-invasion period, Czechoslovak political officers used the Soviet armed forces' political work as the model for the Czechoslovak MPA.99 One of the first steps in reconstructing political training was to close the Gottwald Academy in early July 1969 and to establish a new military-political faculty at the Zapotocky Military Academy in Brno. In 1974, a new Gottwald Military-Political Academy opened in Brno.

During early 1970, each CSPA officer had to give an account of his activities during 1968-69.100 As a result, in December 1970, the Central Committee reported that "a significant number of party members in military units were ejected from the Czechoslovak Communist Party and many of them had to retire from military service."101 One Soviet source notes that in 1970 the Czechoslovak Defense Ministry established special one-year officer schools to train personnel to replenish the officer corps which had been "purged of alien elements," and that in 1971, the curriculum was expanded to two years.102 The new chief of the Czechoslovak Main Political Administration, Lieutenant General Vaclav Horachek, reported in a 1972 interview that CSPA personnel had just embarked upon a three-year study program devoted to the theoretical legacy of V.I. Lenin.103 Horachek, without mentioning the Gottwald Memorandum by name, also noted that conceptions identical to those of Gottwald Memorandum had found broad support in the armed forces; he added that these ideas resulted in the "deformation of the concept of the probable enemy."104

To prevent the recurrence of 'deforming the concept of the probable enemy,' Soviet CGF political officers began to assist the Czechoslovak MPA in their political work. One Krasnaya Zvezda article in 1970 noted that: "We devote great attention to the political and internationalist training of your army...such work proceeds with the aid and participation of our Soviet comrades, Communists and Komsomol members."105 In 1974, Colonel Jan Khmelik, editor of the Obrana Lida, reported:

Our army has the possibility to draw directly upon the rich experience of the Soviet armed forces through direct cooperation with commanders, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations in the Central Group of Soviet Forces....
We make good use of such possibilities on the basis of a joint plan of the Main Political Administration of the Czechoslovak People's Army and the Political Administration of the Central Force Group. In 1975, Horacek gratefully acknowledged the "great aid" provided by CGF political officers.

A Soviet-Czechoslovak study published jointly in 1975 noted that during combined political exercises the fraternal soldiers engaged in a wide variety of activities, including visits to industrial enterprises, historical museums, and population centers. This study also highlighted that the Czech MPA maintains regular ties not only with CGF political officers, but also with the central administrations of the Soviet MPA, Soviet military districts, departments of Soviet formations (divisions or larger groupings), and with Soviet military-education institutions.

In a 1974 study, General Epishev observed that the "moral-political situation" of the Czechoslovak armed forces had "recently improved." By 1977, Colonel Khmelik reported that party membership among Czechoslovak officers stood at "almost 75 percent... We are striving first of all to form in soldiers a socialist conviction and patriotic and international feelings."

These activities appear to have intensified in the late 1970s in conjunction with Soviet and Czechoslovak troop exercises. Jiri Hecko reports that during 1976-78 about 55 percent of the political education groups for soldiers and NCOs now had specially trained political instructors; of which over 98 percent had completed at least a secondary education and 81 percent were members or candidate members of the party.

In 1980 the CGF's chief political officer, Major General M. Goglev, reported on the CGF's broad range of political activities. One program, stressing regular contacts with civilian enterprises, institutions, and local party and state officials, involved joint visits to monuments to Soviet-Czechoslovak military cooperation, to CGF museums and educational displays, and Soviet music concerts and sports events.

A detailed chronological review of the CGF's activities since its 1968 beginning suggests that bilateral political activities are synchronized, at least in terms of ideological content, with multilateral WTO political activities during combined exercises and with unilateral political activities in the CSPA. CSPA unilateral military
exercises now seem to be only small-scale training maneuvers which prepare CSPA personnel for the larger-scale bilateral and multilateral CAF exercises. In sum, the available evidence suggests that the political education programs of the Czechoslovak military no longer focus on large-scale independent CSPA missions. Instead, political education focuses on CSPA participation in bilateral and multilateral military actions. Though such actions generate command and control problems, the evidence indicates that the CSPA and CGF have developed a political program that fosters interaction between Czechoslovak and Soviet units.

**THE INTERNAL FRONT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1969-1984**

During the pre-Gorbachev period, the Soviets restructured a demoralized CSPA by converting them into a national training and reserve system for supplying elite units to a Soviet-Czechoslovak coalition force. This force's cohesion and reliability depends principally on the quality of Soviet personnel and equipment, the effectiveness of bilateral integration, and the morale and training of CSPA elite forces. On the internal front, the CSPA assumed a reserve and logistical role to support the elite National Security Corps, under the Ministry of the Interior. In addition, the People's Militia now consists of full-time staff, closely linked to the CSPA, and a large body of volunteers drawn from the party membership.

This system insulated the CSPA from the potential strains of independent missions on either the external or internal front. It also established buffers to prevent direct confrontation between the CGF and Czechoslovak society, as occurred during the 1968-69 crisis when the CSPA buckled to such pressure. The CSPA's effective integration into the post-1968 internal security system was necessary for its effective integration into the external security system.

**The National Security Corps.** In the early and mid-1970s, the Husak regime improved the capabilities of the National Security Corps (exact size unknown, but probably less than 20,000) by linking it more closely with regular military and paramilitary organs. In 1973 the government established a National Security College,\textsuperscript{115} which dissident sources report now has a Ph.D. program in interrogation.\textsuperscript{116} The 1974 law on the National Security Corps (SNB) provides for an interchange of SNB troops with all other uniformed detachments in Czechoslovakia. On the one hand, the law permits SNB troops to take on the functions of the Ministry of Interior Troops (civil police)
assigned to the Federal Interior Ministry and to the republic interior ministries of Slovakia and the Czech lands. On the other hand, the reverse is also possible: the Federal Ministry of the Interior can mobilize other armed forces to carry out SNB functions.\textsuperscript{117}

These linkages guarantee CSPA liaison to the CGF. Interior Minister Jaromir Obzina in a 1975 statement specifically identified the principal threat to state security as an alliance of reformers within the communist party and social groups outside the party—in other words, a revival of the Dubcek-style coalition of 1968. Obzina, though, noted with satisfaction, that the SNB had purged its ranks of those who had sided with the Dubcek leadership.\textsuperscript{118} In 1976 a decree mandated closer SNB ties to two other agencies—the Public Security Corps (police) and the Auxiliary Public Security Corps.\textsuperscript{119}

When the Polish crisis began in 1980, the Husak regime had in place a comprehensive internal security system that linked the CGF, the CSPA, the SNB, the People’s Militia (discussed below), the Public Security Corps, the Auxiliary Public Security Corps, and the People’s Control Commission. In 1982, in an obvious reference to Poland, Minister Obzina noted with evident pride: “... the National Security Corps and our army have contributed to the defeat of the rightist and antisocialist forces by stopping them from establishing an integrated enemy platform to fight against socialism on the basis of either the old positions or a new program.”\textsuperscript{120}

**The People’s Militia.** In 1948 the People’s Militia, drawing upon personnel and equipment from the CSPA, seized power in the name of the Communist Party.\textsuperscript{121} By 1968 the People’s Militia had deteriorated into an organization whose chief political effort consisted in writing public letters to the Soviet Union appealing for help.\textsuperscript{122} The 1971 Party Program called for revitalizing of the People’s Militia as the party’s armed instrument in the struggle against revisionism, and by 1972 it had grown to some 120,000, almost the size of the CSPA ground forces.\textsuperscript{123}

A new 1974 statute established the People’s Militia as a dual force available for duty on the internal or external fronts. By decree of the Minister of the Interior, the People’s Militia could assume the same powers as the SNB, or in wartime, the Minister of Defense could incorporate it into the CSPA. In both cases, it remained under the ultimate control of the Presidium of the Central Committee, as did both the Interior and Defense Ministries.\textsuperscript{124} In essence, the
People's Militia is an auxiliary force serving as both conduit and buffer between the local agencies of internal control and the ultimate guarantor of stability, the CGF. According to Miroslav Novak, the Militia's Chief of Staff, its "basic task is the defense of socialism against all internal and external enemies." \(^1\)

In 1974 the People's Militia was reorganized along lines similar to the CSPA. \(^2\) In addition, the Vyskov Ground Forces Higher Military School of the CSPA began to train People's Militia officers and to develop liaison capabilities with them. \(^3\)

In 1981 the People's Militia concluded a formal agreement with the Ministry of the Interior, which called for coordinating its work with the SNB and the Border Troops. The 1981 agreement also provided for direct links with the Czech and Slovak republic interior ministries, plus local government agencies in both republics. \(^4\)

The General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party is the People's Militia commander, but operational responsibilities are entrusted to the Chief of Staff. Below the National Staff are regional staffs (Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia), and local units organized in factories, enterprises, and state institutions. Only party members and its youth branch are eligible for membership. Most members receive basic military training in the CSPA, although some receive it in various internal security forces. The People's Militia conducts two-year training cycles for its members, organizes labor brigades for special economic tasks, and provides occasional aid to local authorities in civil defense and natural disasters.

In 1984 a Central Committee department head described the People's Militia as "an historically new form of consolidating the victory of the socialist revolution. . . . The twin tasks of the members of the People's Militia have been and remain taking an active part in building socialist society while at the same time preparing to defend it." \(^5\)

During the Husak era, the People's Militia restored its unique 1948 role. Perhaps, too, the Czechoslovak Militia represents the harbinger of similar paramilitary party organizations in the rest of the Warsaw Pact. Miroslav Novak, the Chief of Staff of the People's Militia, noted in 1976:

> At the present time, in almost all socialist countries, in addition to the army and security components, organizations along the 'militia' principle are being formed.

\(^1\) Miroslav Novak, Chief of Staff of the People's Militia.
\(^2\) In 1974, the People's Militia was reorganized along lines similar to the CSPA.
\(^3\) The Vyskov Ground Forces Higher Military School of the CSPA began to train People's Militia officers.
\(^4\) In 1981, the People's Militia concluded a formal agreement with the Ministry of the Interior.
\(^5\) A Central Committee department head described the People's Militia.
These, even though they use different methods, take part in safeguarding public order and the defense of their territory.

In all these organizations, one should note the incorporation of the maintenance of internal order in the state with its defense. 130

The Paramilitary Education of Czechoslovak Society. To support the organizations linking the internal and external fronts, the Husak regime employs an extensive paramilitary education system. The practical effect is to educate the populace about the coercive forces that can be brought to bear on internal opposition. Svazarm, a youth sports organization modeled on the Soviet DOSAAF, is the principal agency for paramilitary education. Svazarm undertakes numerous sport and paramilitary activities that are highly visible to the general public. 131

The two key charters of this program were written in 1972 and 1973. In 1972 the Central Committee resolved to create a unified national system for paramilitary training and education, and in 1973 the Federal Assembly passed a law for conducting military training at every level of the national educational system. 132 The goal of paramilitary training is to overcome "the relics of the non-Marxist liberal and non-class approach toward the fulfillment of the tasks of defending the socialist fatherland, and the entire socialist camp as well." 133 But for all these heroic bureaucratic measures, a paramilitary education official complained in 1984, "Paramilitary education still has not taken the desired place in the overall process of the management and political-organizational activity of agencies and organizations." 134

THE LEGACY OF THE BREZHNEV-HUSAK ERA

In 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev became CPSU General Secretary and in Czechoslovakia Milan Vaclavik succeeded Martin Dzur as defense minister. As former commander of the Western Military District of Czechoslovakia in the late 1970s, Vaclavik had frequent occasion to work closely with the former Soviet Commander of the CGR (1979-1981), D. M. Yazov, who became the Soviet Defense Minister in 1987. Evidently Gorbachev encouraged the partial retirement of Gustav Husak, who in late 1987 surrendered his party post to Milos Jakes, one of the party members who had welcomed the Soviet intervention of 1968. These personnel changes symbolized the end of the Brezhnev era.
A special April 1984 issue of the party theoretical journal, *Nova Mysl*, summarized Czechoslovak security policy for the Brezhnev-Husak era. The issue stressed that: The CSPA, State Security Corps, Border Troops, Public Security Corps, People's Militia, Civil Defense Forces, Svazarm and paramilitary training programs must anticipate action on both external and internal fronts; alliance and close ties with the Soviet Union and its corresponding military detachments must be achieved. The evidence presented above suggests that the policies of the Husak-Brezhnev era succeeded in linking the paramilitary and regular military forces of Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Central Group of Forces. However, the security policies of the Husak-Brezhnev era also encountered some major setbacks.

The most obvious failure of the period is the CSPA's inability to recruit adequate numbers of qualified officers. The available evidence suggests that the officer corps has yet to replenish itself from the two waves that swept 19,000 officers out of the military in the post-1968 period—those who resigned in protest over the Soviet intervention and those who were purged as politically unreliable.

An internal Czechoslovak survey of junior officers during 1973-79 indicated that they frequently complain about their lack of status in Czechoslovakian society, low respect from troops, condescending attitudes of superiors, and the lack of worthwhile military work. Frequent campaigns to recruit more officers further suggest serious morale problems and shortages in the officer corps. The officer shortage persists despite financial incentives and much-advertised improvements in the educational and living facilities of military high schools and officer-candidate schools. The regime has even set up special officer-training programs for high school dropouts.

Another troubling legacy of the Brezhnev-Husak period is Czechoslovakia's steadily deteriorating economy. In the early 1980s, Czechoslovakia, which formerly matched the GDR, was spending 4.5 percent of Utilized National Income (UNI) on defense, compared to 6.5 percent in the GDR. Czechoslovakia's current second-place standing in UNI defense support conceals the fact that Prague's annual rate of increase lags behind the GDR, Hungary, and even Poland. The problem of CSPA modernization is also acute. In 1985 Richard Martin argued that, except for some select units, the CSPA lacks the tanks, artillery, and air defense systems necessary for first-echelon combat against US and FRG forces.
A third problem is the fusion of the dissident and anti-nuclear movements which developed out of the Charter 77 movement. Though Charter 77 was principally concerned with civil rights in Czechoslovakia, it protested the Soviet emplacement of SS-22 missiles in Czechoslovakia as “countermeasures” to American INF deployment. Anti-nuclear protests evolved from the World Assembly for Peace and Life Against Nuclear War, convened in Prague by the Czechoslovak government in June 1983. Officially banned from the meeting, Charter 77 members met with various West European peace movement representatives and began to circulate petitions against missile deployments. Anti-nuclear protests continued at Charles University in the spring of 1984.

In May and July of 1984 Charter 77 sent open letters to the British Anti-Nuclear movement (END) and to the Third International Peace Conference held in Perugia, Italy. Both letters summarized the Czech dissident position. The source of the security problem in Europe was the political division of Europe; the ultimate solution was to withdraw all Soviet and American forces from Europe; West European peace groups were guilty of condemning NATO policies without condemning WTO policies; and the prerequisite for peace in a divided Europe is to make the Soviet bloc states more democratic. In other words, tension between the two blocs will endure as long as tension exists between the peoples of Eastern Europe and their regimes.

PROSPECTS FOR CZECHOSLOVAK SECURITY POLICY

Gorbachev and the new Czechoslovak leaders, Milos Jakes (1987) and Milan Vaclavik (1985), found that the Brezhnev-Husak security policies led to an intensified European arms race that the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia could ill-afford. To restructure the terms of the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation, Gorbachev has sought to eliminate all missile systems with ranges greater than 500 km, including those in the CSSR; halt planned British and French nuclear force increases; establish a 150 km zone free of nuclear weapons on each side of the FRG border (including Czechoslovakia); negotiate reductions of conventional forces by 500,000 in each alliance; and ban chemical weapons in the European theater.

These policies coincide with the principal elements of previous Czechoslovak security policy that seek to integrate Soviet and elite Czechoslovak units into a reliable conventional force and to rely on
the People's Militia and SNB for internal security, backed up by reserve forces of the CSPA and CGF. If Gorbachev achieves his arms control objectives, Czechoslovakia can focus on fielding a small, but well-equipped Czechoslovak force. The larger, but lower-quality CSPA forces can be bargained away, even on an asymmetrical basis, against smaller numbers of higher quality NATO forces. Such a trade would preserve or possibly even enhance the relative offensive capabilities of the CGF-CSPA coalition force facing West Germany.

At the same time, the interlocking structures of the CGF, CSPA, SNB, and People's Militia would preserve an effective internal control apparatus, flanked by Soviet garrisons in the GDR, Poland, Hungary, and USSR. Conceivably, Gorbachev, Jakes, and Vaclavik, in looking back upon the security policies of the Brezhnev-Husak era, will refrain from consigning these policies to the "era of stagnation."

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Endnotes

2. Ibid., and the following article in the same journal covering the period from 1971-78 in Historie a Vojenstvi, No. 6 (1985), pp. 119-136.
4. Ibid., pp. 344-349.
15. Ibid.
17. The following formula frequently appears in Soviet texts on the WTO. This formula justifies the WTO as necessary in light of the imperialist/revanchist threat to socialism: A.I. Gribkov, Nadezhnyi shcit mira i sotsializma (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), pp. 99-101.
20. Ibid., p. 76.
22. Ibid., p. 343.
28. Ibid.
32. Jan Tesar, former scholar at Prague’s Military Historical Institute, in 16 November 1982 interview with Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone.
34. See Hodic, “Military-Political Views . . . . ,” pp. 18-19; Jan Tesar interview with Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone.
39. Ibid.

41. Quoted in *RFE*, Czechoslovak Press Survey No. 2257, p. 3.

42. J. Hechko, "Scientific Hypothesis," p. 292: "In one of the sections of the memorandum the position of Czechoslovakia in the Warsaw Pact was characterized as the position of a victim of processes on which we were not able to exercise influence. The authors of the memorandum put forward arguments against the participation of Czechoslovakia in the Warsaw Pact."

43. Matous, "The So-Called 'Memorandum,'" p. 7.

44. See *Soviet Influence*, Ch. 5 for a discussion of these and other matters related to Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968.


46. According to Matous, "The So-Called Memorandum," p. 10, Prchlik relied upon officers of the Gottwald Academy, in particular a Colonel Blizek, for drawing up unspecified documents and for preparing Prchlik's speeches. It is likely that one of the speeches Matous had in mind is Lieutenant General Prchlik's press conference of 15 July; it is also likely that the documents to which Prchlik referred in his press conference were the documents which Matous accused Col. Blizek of drafting.

47. See *Soviet Influence*, Ch. 7, for a further discussion of Prchlik's press conference.


49. Ibid., pp. 216-217.

50. Ibid., p. 217.

51. See the editorial of July 23 in Remington, *Winter in Prague*, pp 220-223. In this editorial *Krasnaya Zvezda* declared: "First General Prchlik assured his audience at the press conference that 'Czechoslovakia supports efforts aimed at a further strengthening and improving of the Warsaw Pact.' But he immediately followed this with arguments whose meaning belies this."


54. Ibid.


57. Matous, "The So-Called Memorandum," p. 5.

59. For a discussion of the impact of these two treaties on the WTO see Remington, *The Warsaw Pact*, chs. 6, 7.


62. See Ibid., pp. 233-34.

63. Ibid., p. 233.

64. Ibid.


67. The party program reads in part: “The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic will contribute to the utmost to the constant strengthening of the Warsaw Treaty Organization… We will do everything in order that the new Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the CSSR and USSR will become fruitful and will provide the point of departure for the further development of cooperation in all areas.” In XIV S’ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Chekhoslovakii (Moscow: Politizdat, 1971), p. 251.


69. See Johnson et al, *East European Military Establishments*, p. 120.

70. See Rice, *The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army*, pp. 196, 245.


80. Ibid.
86. See Rude Pravo October 9, 1979 in FBIS, Eastern Europe, 10 October 1979, p. D 5.
88. Ibid., p. 58.
90. Ibid., p. 88.
98. Ibid., p. 319.
100. Ibid., p. 24.


104. Ibid., pp. 38-39.


109. Ibid.


113. Goglev, "'V dukhe ...','" passim. See also *Rude Pravo's* account of these activities in *Rude Pravo* 9 October 1979 in *FBIS*, Eastern Europe: Czechoslovakia, 10 October 1979, p. D-5.

114. See Vladislav Rybecky et al., "Tricet let prislushnost CSSR a CSLA k Var- saski smlouve, 1955-1985" in the following issues of *Historie a Vojenstvi*: No. 5, 1985, pp. 133-143; No. 6, 1985, pp. 119-136; No. 1, 1986, pp. 146-158. These issues cover the period from 1969 to 1985. For joint WTO MPA planning activities, Soviet-Czechoslovak MPA planning sessions and purely Czechoslovak MPA planning sessions, the entries are so extensive that it is impossible to list all these sessions without reproducing a substantial portion of a lengthy, annotated chronology. In the context of statements cited above and below about coordination of Soviet-Czechoslovak military-political education, the frequency of these planning sessions suggest the coordination of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral political activities.


133. Sagac, "In the Interests of the Defense of the Fatherland."

135. For a similar but more differentiated reading of this issue see Vladimir Kusin's, *RFE Situation Report: Czechoslovakia*, No. 10, 5 June 1985, pp. 9-12.
140. Ibid., p. 65.
The history of the Bundeswehr is unique among the national military components of NATO in both origins and substance. In sharp contrast to its European neighbors, the sovereign right of West Germany to have and maintain a credible military capability has been seriously inhibited as a result of its role in World War II. The reluctance of the Allied powers to permit Germany's military establishment to rebuild has resulted in many significant limitations to its rearmament program. One must evaluate the overall characteristics and qualities of the Bundeswehr within the context of these externally imposed limitations and in light of Germany's periodically adverse domestic conditions.

The record of the last 32 years, however, indicates the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has overcome numerous obstacles by creating and maintaining a professional military force that has become a critical component of NATO's deterrent to Warsaw Pact aggression and political coercion. Perhaps more significant in some ways has been the Federal Republic's acceptance as a full and equal member of NATO and the European community by the very
countries that the Third Reich had so grievously injured. The objective of the following discussion is to describe and explain the historical process which has culminated in today's Bundesheer (Army). A central theme of this chapter is the role of mobilization as the critical variable in the West German force generation system.

In 1987, the Bundeswehr is the cornerstone of Western Europe's defense. From its humble beginnings in 1955 the West German armed forces now contributes 50 percent of NATO's combat ready land forces, 30 percent of its combat aircraft, and from 70 to 100 percent of the naval aviation deployed in the Baltic Sea. Because the Bundesheer (Army) is the most important component of West Germany's contribution to NATO and is far more relevant in mobilizing reserve personnel and combat formations, the Luftwaffe (Air Force) and Navy are not treated in the ensuing analysis. This opinion does not deny the value of their contribution to NATO's force structure. We will, however, focus the discussion around three areas: section one describes the Bundeswehr's evolution from World War II to the present; the second provides an overview of the modern West German Bundesheer force generation process; the final section offers a brief prognosis of the Bundeswehr's ability to cope with future challenges.

MOBILIZATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE BUNDESHEER

Manpower Mobilization in World War II. Historians of World War II have stressed the phenomenal capacity of the Germans to sustain industrial output throughout the conflict, despite prodigious efforts by British and American strategic air forces to destroy Nazi Germany's military-industrial complex. An achievement of equal import to the German war effort, which has received much less attention, is the Wehrkreis (military district) system that so ably provided the manpower to create, maintain, and refit the divisions of the Wehrmacht. The Wehrkreis system created over 300 infantry divisions between 1934 and 1944. In 1944 alone, during the bleakest period before the beginning of the end, more than 54 divisions were created.

Each Wehrkreis raised division-level formations by conducting complete mobilization activities (recruiting, conscription, and post-mobilization training). Each Wehrkreis also provided replacement personnel for the division it had raised, to compensate for combat
casualties. A key facet of the *Wehrkreis* was its "mobilization in waves" system, which provided a constant stream of manpower tailored to meet tactical and strategic needs. For example, while the system generated at least six waves in 1939 (80-plus divisions) and 1940 (57-plus divisions), only two waves occurred in 1941 (13 divisions).

Perhaps the most important factor in the overwhelming success of this mobilization system was its careful organization at the local level. As such, the personnel manning each *Wehrkreis* were intimately familiar with local conditions and could better ensure the efficiency of call-up practices. As a component of the "Replacement Army," the *Wehrkreis* did not have substantive operational responsibilities. Instead, each *Wehrkreis* provided essential combat service support functions to enable field army formations to concentrate on their combat missions. Re-establishment of a *Wehrkreis*-like system in the Federal Republic would have to wait roughly 25 years until the *Bundeswehr* was into the third of its "Heerstruktur," a time when new strategic and tactical concepts necessitated the creation of a robust and rapid manpower mobilization capability.

**Heerstruktur I (1955-1957).** The creation of the *Bundeswehr* in 1955 occurred primarily because of the US and European allied reaction to the perceived threat to international stability and security posed by the Soviet Union and its East European allies. It was a tacit admission that German rearmament, although at a very modest level by World War II standards, was necessary to offset mounting allied force structure inadequacies and meet expanding operational needs. However, as Karl Lowe notes in Chapter 3, the size of the *Bundesheer* was restricted to 12 divisions with a manpower cap at about 350,000; a further 150,000 men were authorized for the Air Force and Navy.

Despite the many specific German proposals concerning force structure issues and operational concepts, the substantive decisions resulting in *Heerstruktur I* essentially came from the United States. For example, the Germans proposed to create 12 panzer divisions to be deployed in forward areas and integrated with other NATO forces. They intended these divisions both for combat in a tactical nuclear environment and to provide armor-heavy forces for maneuver and counterattack. The personnel to man both combat and combat support units (combat service support would be supplied primarily by the United States) would at first come from the many World War II veterans who had not yet been absorbed into the civilian economy.
What actually happened was quite different. Not only did it prove impractical to form all 12 divisions simultaneously due to manpower, materiel, and logistics shortfalls, but the United States rejected the all-armor concept because it did "not coincide with the overall requirements of NATO." Finally, because the United States requested it, the West Germans adopted a more balanced force structure, consisting of 6 infantry (Jaeger) divisions, 4 armor (Panzer), 1 mountain, and 1 airborne division. Of the 12 divisions envisioned, they actually established only 7 (3 infantry, 2 armor, 1 mountain, and 1 airborne) under Heerstruktur I. In fact, between 1955-1957 Germany only activated 5 divisions, finally activating the 3rd and 5th Panzer Divisions in 1958. As 8.1 notes, they built their infantry and armor division on three combat commands, each comprising 4 maneuver battalions (3 motorized infantry and 1 armored for the infantry division versus 2 motorized infantry and 2 armored for the panzer division). Each division had one artillery regiment with 1 medium and 3 light artillery battalions. Anti-aircraft, reconnaissance, and engineer battalions carried out other combat support functions.

Early projections of the available manpower volunteering to serve in the Bundesheer proved overly optimistic. Consequently, the Germans began a draft in December 1956 to compensate for personnel shortfalls. At the same time that the regular army was being formed, the United States agreed in principle to a Territorial Army (TA) because the German field army basically lacked the logistic infrastructure to field and sustain a 12-division force in the high-intensity combat environment likely to occur in Central Europe. While the Territorial Army would not actually be formed until the early 1970s, Germany agreed upon one critical assumption: that indigenous paramilitary formations who could provide rear-area defense were the best source of logistic support. Indeed, the creation of significant combat service support elements within the 12 division/500,000 man limits imposed on the FRG by NATO would have drastically reduced the direct combat power of the field army by shifting substantial numbers of men out of maneuver units.

Heerstruktur II (1958-1967). From 1958 to 1963 the FRG restructured the Bundesheer to meet a different set of operational and tactical imperatives defined by NATO's new nuclear strategy (articulated in MC 14/2). In short, MC 14/2 stipulated that any Warsaw Pact nuclear or conventional attack would encounter either a tactical nuclear response or escalation to the strategic nuclear level. To
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

JAEGER DIVISION

PANZER DIVISION

8.1—HEERSTRUKTUR I
execute this strategy, NATO estimated that the Central Region would require 30 divisions, each equipped with tactical nuclear weapons. Each division projected to conduct operations on the nuclear battlefield also had to be restructured to function in a post-nuclear strike environment. For the Bundesheer, this situation required organizational and equipment modifications on a grand scale, essentially resulting in shaping the field army. As 8.2 notes, the FRG reorganized maneuver divisions around a brigade structure (3 panzer grenadier or panzer brigades per division). Panzer grenadier brigades had 4 maneuver battalions (2 panzer grenadier, 1 panzer, 1 motorized infantry), plus an artillery battalion of towed howitzers. The panzer brigade comprised 3 maneuver battalions (2 panzer, 1 panzer grenadier) and an artillery battalion of self-propelled howitzers. Each brigade also had a mixed combat service support battalion to provide improved self-sufficiency and operational independence. New reconnaissance, communications, engineer, and tactical nuclear artillery and rocket gear modified division-level combat and combat service support assets.

Even though the combat effectiveness of maneuver divisions increased dramatically because of Heerstruktur II, corresponding improvements in the mobilization system did not keep pace. For example, over this 10-year period the Bundeswehr reached its authorized 12-division size (7 panzer grenadier, 3 panzer, 1 mountain, and 1 airborne division). Also, a large manpower pool of reservists served as non-career soldiers who passed in and out of the army. Over the same period, many post-war baby-boomers swelled the ranks of potential conscripts providing an overabundance of personnel for service in active and mobilization units. However, the reserve system remained organizationally underdeveloped as did contingency planning for efficiently mobilizing and employing combat reservists. The potential for catastrophic damage in a tactical nuclear war ( strategic from the German perspective) placed a premium on effectively employing existing forces, rather than relying on an external mobilization more appropriate to prolonged campaigns.

One interesting change in Bundeswehr manpower policy occurred during this period: an extension of the tour of duty for conscripts from 12 to 18 months as one response to the 1961 Berlin crisis. Again, this situation demonstrated how the Germans preferred peacetime readiness instead of the less expensive, and more socially acceptable alternative of maintaining numerous reserve formations.
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

PANZERGRENADIER DIVISION

PANZER DIVISION

8.2—HEERSTRUKTUR II
Given the international climate of the time and the immediacy of the Soviet threat as the West Germans perceived it, the parliament easily ratified the measure. This modification to Bundesheer manpower practices, coupled with an efficient mobilization system, could have had profound implications on the armed forces' ability to generate combat power across the threat spectrum.

**Heerstruktur III (1967-1980).** The Bundeswehr finally matured with the advent of Heerstruktur III in 1967. Like Heerstruktur II, Heerstruktur III responded to new strategic imperatives, now defined by the operational concepts in MC 14/3. Since MC 14/2 was acknowledged to be politically untenable and militarily flawed from its inception in 1957, NATO promulgated MC 14/3 ("Flexible Response") to redress the perceived shortcomings of MC 14/2. However, disagreements over nuclear weapons prevented NATO from modifying its declared military strategy to better counter Soviet capabilities—or even provide for a conventional response to Soviet aggression—without resorting to either a theater or strategic nuclear defense.

For purposes of this study, the critical dimension of "Flexible Response" was an enhanced requirement to mount a defense as far forward as possible. While the Germans would not ignore the threat of a Central European conventional campaign escalating to global nuclear war, the Bundesheer had to begin improving its capability either to deter or conventionally defeat the Warsaw Pact. To do so, the Germans converted two panzer grenadier divisions to Jaeger divisions. Since these divisions had no further need for their armor for tactical and topographical reasons, they created a tank regiment for each corps which would act as a mobile reserve. The remaining divisions underwent various modifications, resulting from force structure experiments.

The one element that showed continuity between this reorganization and previous Heerstrukturen was a shift in manpower use and mobilization concepts to give operational meaning to "Flexible Response" and forward defense. These included:

- Creation of a Territorial Army (TA) to support and supplement the combat missions of the Bundesheer,
- Effective organization of manpower pools to provide fillers for understrength active units, to man cadred combat support units, and to provide replacement battalions to compensate for combat attrition.
8.3—NATO RELIANCE ON WEST GERMAN MOBILIZATION

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These reforms reduced the number of personnel committed to support missions in the active forces, with the nascent Territorial Army compensating for the resulting shortfall. Personnel formerly in support units shifted to combat units, resulting in an overall increase of 10,000 men. At the same time, the historical limitations placed on *Bundesheer* force structure and active unit manpower were accomplished, in part, by establishing new peace-authorized strength levels for corps level units at 50 percent, division level units at 75 percent, and brigades and other tactical formations at 95 percent. The new mobilization system and corresponding manpower pools compensated for the reduced peace authorized strength, a luxury affordable in extended conventional campaign scenarios.

Among the new manpower pools, the ready reserves, active unit fillers, and Territorial Army personnel categories stand out. The first two categories yielded trained personnel for bringing active peacetime units up to full combat proficiency. The Territorial Army, employing less capable reserve personnel in rear-area missions, freed up active personnel to implement forward defense (see 8.3). At the same time, this mobilization system allowed the *Bundesheer* to remain within its peacetime limits for active forces; it would, however, increase by slightly more than 300,000 to 1,000,000 men in its transition to a wartime footing.

*Heerstruktur IV (1981-Present).* By the mid-1970s changing circumstances in East-West military affairs required replacing *Heerstruktur III.* The major increase in both quantity and quality of Warsaw Pact conventional and tactical nuclear capabilities made it necessary to: first, increase the emphasis on implementing "Flexible
Response” within a conventional environment, especially in terms of deterring or defeating rapidly increasing Warsaw Pact armored formations; second, employ in-place high readiness tactical units as far forward as possible to take advantage of terrain features favoring the defense; third, meet new requirements to improve combat mobility and flexibility by reducing the size and increasing the number of maneuver battalions being equipped with new generations of improved weapons systems; and fourth, provide integrated rear area support services across AFCENT Corps boundaries to free up allied assets that could otherwise be committed to forward defense missions.

Figure 8.4 shows the Heerstruktur IV reform emphasis took place at the brigade and battalion levels, in both the field and territorial armies. The active maneuver brigades increased from 33 to 36 (including 3 additional panzer brigades plus 4 additional panzer grenadier brigades created by converting 3 Jaeger and 1 mountain brigade). An additional maneuver battalion was created within each brigade by chopping one company from each battalion during mobilization. While the number of systems (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, etc.) increased marginally (see Figure 8.5), Germany created a new tactical unit to provide a combined arms reserve. Hence, the number of forward deployed units increased; the previously 2 forward and 1 back now became 3 forward and 1 back. Given the increased lethality and target acquisition characteristics of the new weapon systems entering service, the reform dramatically improved German forward defense capabilities.

The figures 8.4 and 8.5 also illustrate that the Territorial Army reforms were even more dramatic and far reaching. Not only were the Home Defense Commands, Heimatschutzkommandos (HSKs), completely reorganized and upgunned, but 6 additional territorial brigades were authorized, along with 15 home defense regiments (HSRs), 150 companies, and 300 Platoons. The figure 8.6 demonstrates that the new Home Defense Brigade, Heimatschutzbrigade (HSB), comprises 2 panzer battalions (1 manned at cadre level in peacetime), 1 panzer grenadier battalion, a Jaeger battalion, and a towed artillery battalion. The six additional Heimatschutzbrigades are equipment holding units (EHUs) in peacetime. Each consists of 2 infantry battalions, 1 panzer battalion, and 1 towed artillery battalion. Finally, each of the 15 home defense regiments (HSRs) comprises 3 infantry battalions and 1 mortar company.
### Force Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Structure</th>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>Divisions</th>
<th>TA BDE/RGMT</th>
<th>36 Brigades</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Land Jut</td>
<td>MTN &amp; ABN 2</td>
<td>HSR 15</td>
<td>ABN 3</td>
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<td>I</td>
<td></td>
<td>PZ 6</td>
<td>EHU 6</td>
<td>PZGR 16</td>
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<td>II</td>
<td></td>
<td>PZGR 4</td>
<td>HSK 6</td>
<td>PZ 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### Manpower Active vs Reserve

- **ABN**: Airborne
- **EHU**: Equipment Holding Unit
- **HSR**: Home Defense Regiment
- **HSK**: Home Defense Command
- **MTN**: Mountain
- **PZ**: Panzer
- **PZGR**: Panzer Grenadier
- **TA**: Territorial Army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Active</th>
<th>Reserve</th>
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<td>Land Jut</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>MTN &amp; ABN 2</td>
<td>45%</td>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PZ 6</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>55%</td>
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<td>90%</td>
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**8.4—Average Active Versus Reserve Personnel Components of War Authorized Strength**
<table>
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<tr>
<th>MANPOWER</th>
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<th>RESERVE</th>
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<td>PZ GREN DIVISION</td>
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<td>21000</td>
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<td>IFVS</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>110</td>
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<td>ATGMS</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANTITANK GUNS</td>
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8.5—HEERSTRUKTUR IV UNIT MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT HOLDINGS
HOME DEFENSE BRIGADE

EQUIPMENT HOLDING UNIT

HOME DEFENSE REGIMENT

8.6—HEERSTRUKTUR IV
FORCE GENERATION AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS

Mobilization Procedures. Implementation of a comprehensive and efficient mobilization system greatly improved Bundesheer and Territorial Army operational effectiveness. Between 1955 and 1980, army planners primarily focused on overcoming the artificial cap placed on Bundeswehr force structure in the aftermath of World War II. German forces were also being fully integrated in NATO's conventional and nuclear defensive strategy. Integration was promoted not only because of NATO-Warsaw Pact competition, but because the Germans had developed sensitive and artful policies in their quest to rearm. For example, during its first 15 years, the Bundesheer concentrated its efforts on contributing to NATO military requirements as defined by its new allies. The result was a small, well-trained force, but one incapable of mounting large-scale sustained actions by itself. During the last 15 years, the Bundesheer has gradually assumed further responsibilities, often compensating for reductions in the in-place forces of its NATO allies. Moreover, evolving military burden-sharing concepts (themselves the product of changing intra- and inter-alliance relationships) began to suggest, and ultimately define, how the Federal Republic would provide a broad range of host nation support services throughout the rear combat zone. By fulfilling this requirement, the West Germans were able to increase their peacetime and wartime force structures while reducing less efficient allied expenditures to provide similar combat service support.

The mechanism that made this possible was a mobilization system that in many ways resembles the Wehrkreis system of World War II. While the actual notification and call-up procedures are not novel, the design of peacetime manning levels in the various echelons and units types, coupled with the respective manpower pools configured to bring them up to wartime strength, provide for rapid and reliable force generation.

Mobilized Manpower in the Bundesheer. The distribution of peacetime personnel throughout the operational and tactical echelons of the Bundesheer clearly indicate the German commitment to forward defense. As figure 8.4 notes, at the lowest echelon, the maneuver battalions, scheduled to occupy positions in the forward areas, have the highest peace-authorized strength (95 percent of wartime actual strength and associated unit readiness). At the next level, the brigades are manned at a lower level (80-90 percent), with most of
the shortfall occurring in brigade level combat support and combat service support elements. Division level assets are manned at between 45 percent and 55 percent of wartime actual strength. Combat, combat support, and combat service support units organic at the corps level range from cadre status to full wartime authorized strength.

On mobilization each echelon has unique operational requirements performed by reserve personnel from a particular manpower pool who possess specific capabilities. For example, to assure that forward defense missions are conducted on a tactical level, the Bundesheer has created a stand-by readiness pool to replace the new inductees (constituting 20-25 percent of total manpower) contained in all battalions at the beginning of each quarterly induction cycle. As noted in 8.7, Heerstruktur IV further accommodates this phenomenon by creating a composite combined arms battalion from each of the training companies in the respective battalions. Since inductees at the beginning of the training cycle are not fit for high intensity combat, they are replaced with stand-by ready reservists who then form battalion level reserves.

The brigade is the basic maneuver unit for German force employment. Because the brigade conducts tactical engagements independently (reinforced by task organized support elements from division level), the brigade must be capable of sustaining itself in a high intensity environment for three to five days. Consequently, brigades possess limited logistic assets, beyond those organic to maneuver battalions that carry their own combat loads. The vast majority of combat and combat service support is provided by division-level assets. Because each division's maneuver brigades are self-sufficient for short periods of time, reserve manpower elements, including the replacement battalion, are concentrated primarily in the combat service support units. Reconnaissance, artillery, and air defense assets are maintained at a higher degree of readiness in order to assist, support, or reinforce their organic maneuver brigade and battalion.

**Mobilized Manpower in the Territorial Army.** The Territorial Army relies on reserve manpower to fill out its wartime manpower requirements to a far greater extent than the Bundesheer. In fact, one of the Territorial Army's primary missions is to mobilize and train replacement battalions to compensate for combat losses. In addition to its critical mission of providing logistic support to field army units that cannot independently sustain extended high intensity combat, the
8.7—Heerstruktur IV Peace to War Transition: Formation of Composite Reserve Battalion
Territorial Army has increased responsibilities in implementing NATO's forward defense.

As originally configured, the combat arm of the Territorial Army comprised home defense commands (light brigades), regiments, companies, and platoons, which were to be employed in rear areas (see figure 8.8) to provide point and area defense for high value targets. However, increasing Warsaw Pact capabilities to penetrate into NATO's rear combat zones—either through air assault or operational maneuver groups (OMGs)—posed a new threat to NATO's interior lines of communications that the Territorial Army's light forces were ill-equipped to counter. At the same time, the field army was undergoing the most comprehensive equipment modernization program in its history.

Weapon systems, previously beyond the means of the Territorial Army, became available as systems were replaced in the field army often on a one-for-one basis. The end result was the formation of the six combined arms brigades, requiring a higher level of military skill from their troops to carry out their wartime missions. Accordingly, the peace authorized strength of these units was set at much higher levels, in turn necessitating more competent and ready reservists. Ultimately, in recognition of their combat potential and peacetime readiness, several "heavy" home defense brigades were assigned forward defense missions of their own.

The Territorial Army's remaining combat functions are rear area defensive operations. The cadred light equipment holding brigades (EHUs) are structured to provide area defense against Warsaw Pact aggressors at the battalion level and below. While the EHU's missions are not as demanding or as combat-intensive as those of the Heerstruktur Brigades (HSBs), they have certain tactical advantages that also pertain to the home defense regiments, companies, and platoons that might prove decisive. Local citizens form the main reserve manpower pool which brings these units up to wartime actual strength. While the EHUs receive less peacetime training than the HSBs, they fight in familiar terrain—around their own towns and villages, an intangible edge and motivation to defeat the enemy.

In addition to providing area and point security in NATO's operational depth, the Territorial Army also plays a critical role in establishing and maintaining civilian-military liaison. By virtue of their reserve status and being local citizens, the Territorial Army has
8.8—HEERSTRUKTUR IV: WEST GERMAN ARMY UNIT PEACETIME LOCATIONS
proven very effective in arranging for civilian community logistic support to meet military requirements. Given the essential role Host Nation Support agreements play in providing for the common defense of West Germany, and the overwhelming role that mobilized elements of the civil sector play in providing a range of host nation support services, the timely and effective communication between military and civil counterparts is vital.

Strengths and Weaknesses of the Force Generation System. The armed forces of the Federal Republic are today better manned, equipped, and prepared to carry out their peace and wartime missions than at any time in their past. The mobilization system is efficient and reliable; the men and women of the Bundesheer are motivated, well-trained, and well led—the beneficiaries of the most far-reaching force structure modernization and expansion program since the 1950s. Their equipment ranks among the world's best and will remain so for the foreseeable future. What, then, are the shortcomings of the Federal Republic's force posture? Are these shortcomings inherent in the force generation process or have they resulted from the external factors that limited the Bundeswehr's combat potential during its formative years? Although the answers to both these questions would properly fill a volume, we will briefly discuss three areas of concern:

First, as noted in table 1.3, Germany is experiencing declining birth rates which are causing personnel shortfalls that adversely affect the Bundesheer's peacetime readiness. Although quick fixes have been devised and implemented, they do not alter the fact that the Federal Government's population is declining. In the long term, this problem will affect West German civil and military sectors. The predicted population decline jeopardizes: the FRG's ability to quickly generate the many replacement troops needed for high intensity combat operations; the capacity to maintain adequate reserve pools with sufficient training to operate complex weapons systems and perform intricate battlefield maneuvers; the required balance between military duty and private enterprise.

A second problem has emerged from the recently completed modernization program. The ability of reservists to effectively operate new or upgraded weapons systems requires more time and effort as new technologies are introduced on a recurring basis. For example, the bulk of reserve manpower were trained on equipment no longer in service with their parent units. The only way to keep this
problem from escalating (especially as reliance on older soldiers grows, due to the manpower shortfalls) is to increase peacetime training to ensure familiarity with weapon systems. However, such a solution is very demanding, time consuming, and prohibitively expensive. Although this problem may never affect standby reservists, it may affect the immediate replacement units that are so critical in the first few weeks of war.

The final area of concern is by no means the least troublesome. The Federal Republic of Germany depends on a strong and viable economy to supply its military posture. Unlike the United States, however, most West German expenditures go to materiel acquisition and maintenance accounts as opposed to defraying manpower costs. (True, lower manpower costs is a side benefit of having a national draft since Germany does not rely on a much more expensive, all-volunteer army.) However, recent five-year economic projections suggest West Germany’s economic growth will be only half the previous predictions. This decline—from 3 percent of GNP to a 1-1.5 percent—will have a major impact on the Bundesheer’s ability to field new equipment, to improve infrastructure support, and to attract the high-caliber soldier needed for the future.

**PROGNOSIS FOR THE FUTURE**

Of the factors that will influence the Bundesheer through the next decade, those having the greatest impact will undoubtedly originate outside the Federal Republic. Despite West Germany’s resurgence as the premier European power in the Central Region, the consequences of World War II still loom. Because of the political sensitivities that continue to persist about West Germany’s role in the defense of Western Europe, the NATO alliance will continue to exert decisive influence on Germany’s future force structure, planning, and operational concepts. Aside from the political dimension of the challenge to plot a course for the Bundeswehr in the 1990s, a number of practical military considerations exist:

- The effect of nuclear arms reductions on conventional force requirements;
- The need to better integrate NATO concepts of operations across Corps’ boundaries;
- The requirement to redress NATO’s poor brigade-level deployment, especially in the face of increasing Warsaw Pact short warning attack capabilities;
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

• Forward defense requirements in the event of allied troop withdrawals or other reductions in NATO in-place combat potential and readiness;
• Dramatic increases in Host Nation Support contributions to encourage continued multi-national participation in forward defense; and,
• Implementation of terrain preparation measures to improve defensive capabilities against short and medium mobilization scenarios.

This is but a partial list of the military exigencies facing West Germany. Consequently, while the details of the specific forces that will shape the Bundeswehr's future are important, the most significant factor is the Federal Government's demonstrated willingness and capacity to work within the system to achieve its objectives. For more than 30 years the FRG has successfully met every significant challenge on the way to its goal of becoming an effective deterrent to Warsaw Pact aggression. There is every reason to believe that this record will continue in the future.

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Sources

STORICAL BACKGROUND BUNDESWEHR EVOLUTION


FORCE GENERATION

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY


THE GERMAN TERRITORIAL ARMY


OPERATIONAL ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES


LOGISTIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND SUPPORT

2. Germany's Contributions to Western Defense (New York: German Information Center, 1984).


CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUTURE


BUNDESWEHR DIVISIONAL HISTORIES


In September 1986, in his first major speech on defense policy since becoming head of government, Prime Minister Jacques Chirac described for the *Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale* in Paris a hypothetical conflict in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact: a "... battle of mutual delays and reinforcements in which France, the Alliance's only reserve in depth, furthermore protected by its own nuclear forces, can play a key role." For some observers, Chirac's statement implied, in an admittedly ambiguous way, that, in a contingency, the French would make their territory available to the Allies for the unloading and deploying of reinforcements or as a logistical rear base—two roles which France had assumed before its withdrawal from the Alliance's integrated military structure in 1966. In September 1987, the French Army's new *Force d'Action Rapide* (FAR) staged with the *Bundeswehr* in Bavaria the exercise *Kecker Spatz/Moineau Hardi* ("Bold Sparrow") which featured the largest contingent of French troops to participate in a field training exercise in Germany and the first operational deployment of the FAR across the Rhine.

The missions which have been traditionally associated with France's role in the common defense are assignments as logistical "heartland" and as reservoir of conventional reinforcements.
few people realize is that these two functions have virtually never co-existed. While France’s principal contribution to the Alliance until 1966 was her territory—the bulk of French conventional forces having been deployed overseas through the 1950s and early 1960s being, therefore, unavailable to NATO in Europe—her main contribution since then has been the growing pool of conventional ground forces which might one day fight in Central Europe alongside the Allies. The French planned initially a single corps in Germany, expanding to two corps in the mid-1970s; it would reach three corps in the early 1980s and four corps by the mid-1980s with the establishment of the FAR. In fact, a review of French force levels today reveals that France might contribute more conventional ground forces—in terms of men, main battle tanks, and field artillery pieces—to the common defense in Central Europe than at any other time in NATO’s 39-year history.

Considering the Alliance’s renewed emphasis on conventional defense, the role of France in NATO mobilization raises several questions: first, what is France’s present mobilization potential and how has it evolved over time? second, how are the three key missions of the French Armed Forces—protection of the homeland, defense of Western Europe, and “out-of-area” security—reconciled in French mobilization planning? and, third, based on the experience of exercises and actual “out-of-area” operations, how would the French force-generation process function in hypothetical contingencies in Central Europe and overseas?

MOBILIZATION IN CONTEMPORARY FRENCH MILITARY HISTORY

Ever since the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, successive republican regimes in France have maintained a relatively large standing army which has relied substantially on universal military service. In 1913, the Army Chief of Staff, General Joffre, expected that once the law introducing a three-year military service was put in effect (it had been reduced to two years in 1905), the army would expand to 710,000 men in 46 divisions. The restoration of a two-year military service obligation in 1935 (reversing a 1928 decision to shorten its length to a year) enabled the French Army to essentially double its annual intake of able-bodied draftees. Today, France has either the third or fourth largest army in NATO after the United States and Turkey, depending on whether personnel of the German Territorial
Army are added to the manpower of the Bundeswehr's Field Army or not. From a total peacetime strength of 280,000 men, 183,000 French men, or 65 percent, are conscripts.

Prior to both world wars, the French Army had planned on mass mobilization (levée en masse) to expand its peacetime force structure and to counter-balance Germany's demographic advantage and larger force generation potential. However, reserve forces were not recognized as full partners with the active army. In the years preceding World War I, the low regard that the French Army's conservative officer corps had for the reserves, and the democratic concept of the "nation in arms" which they embodied, was reflected most prominently in the hostility of the French Army's senior leadership to a 1911 proposal by General Michel, Joffre's predecessor as Chief of Staff. Appearing before the Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre he urged creating a reserve regiment for every active regiment upon mobilization. Both regiments would then form a demi-brigade. This proposal was intended to support a new defense strategy for countering a German thrust across western Belgium (the famed "Schlieffen Plan") by shifting the center of gravity of the French Army's deployment away from Lorraine towards northern France. As one source notes, "Michel's plan required 1,300,000 men. The French army had only 500,000 on active duty. Michel wanted the difference to be made up by the reserves and to integrate the reserves into the active army." General Michel's colleagues ridiculed the proposal; the Minister of War rejected it; and Joffre replaced Michel as Généralissime. Although opposition to the plan among the Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre reflected disbelief in Michel's contention that the Germans would strike at France through Belgium (rather than through the more heavily defended area extending from Verdun to Belfort), the opposition primarily reflected hostility towards reservists and the concept of the "citizen in uniform" inherited from the French Revolution and championed by the French Left's Jean Jaurès. The French officer corps' contempt for the reserves eventually blinded the French General Staff to reliable intelligence information that the German Army planned to employ reserves in front-line assignments. Indeed, blank acceptance of the evidence that the even more conservative German officer corps would rely on mobilizing reserves in a contingency would have compelled the French officer corps to reluctantly do the same. General Joffre strongly advocated extending the term of military service to three years as a way of expanding the army's
peacetime establishment, thereby reducing dependence in a crisis on mobilized reservists of questionable military effectiveness. The result of this choice, formalized in August 1913 with passage of the three-year military service law, was to transform the French Army into a large training organization with detrimental effects on operational readiness.

Between the two world wars, the French Army faced a manpower predicament similar to the one prior to the Great War, except that France’s demographic situation relative to Germany’s was even more adverse than in 191...nder these circumstances, reliance on reserves had become man...ory, and the French General Staff developed mobilization plans accordingly. Once general mobilization was declared, each standing infantry division was scheduled to become the nucleus of two reserve divisions designated “series A and B,” thereby tripling the army’s pool of infantry troops. The original division would retain one-third of its officers, two-thirds of its non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and approximately 55 percent of its enlisted personnel. The “series A” divisions would be manned by 23 percent active officers and 17 percent active NCO’s, but only 2 percent of its enlisted personnel would be active. “Series B” divisions would be completely manned by reservists, except for three officer slots.\textsuperscript{10} The readiness and combat proficiency of “series A and B” divisions was anticipated to be low because reservists who had been inducted between 1928 and 1935 had only served for a year, which was considered inadequate for proper training.\textsuperscript{11} Concurrently, the Secrétariat Général du Conseil Supérieur de la Défense Nationale outlined some preliminary emergency measures for mobilizing industry and for protecting the civilian population in case of war.

In 1937, Général Georges, commander-in-chief of the North-eastern Front opposite Germany and Belgium, estimated that the defense of France’s borders from the North Sea to the Mediterranean would require approximately 88 divisions, including 2 cavalry divisions, 3 light mechanized divisions (divisions légères mécaniques) and 2 to 3 armored divisions (divisions cuirassées de réserve). When war broke out in September 1939, the French Army order of battle comprised 84 infantry divisions, 2 light mechanized divisions and 3 cavalry divisions. However, the equipment of light mechanized divisions and motorized infantry divisions had lagged well behind plans due to French industry’s inability to meet the army’s demand.\textsuperscript{12}
Not until early 1940 were the first two armored divisions formed. General reserves included 40 independent tank battalions, 7 of which were stationed outside metropolitan France. These tank battalions were a considerable armored force which, conceivably, could have reversed the Battle of France had they been consolidated into additional armored divisions rather than distributed across the battlefront to support the infantry.

In considering the role which mobilization may have played in the defeat of the French Army in May 1940, the one element which certainly affected French force-generation capabilities prior to World War II was a 50 percent decline in male population. (Whereas in 1914 France had 1,250,000 men between the ages of 20-25, in 1940 she had only 600,000 in that vital age group.) The cohorts of young males reaching the age of 20 between 1935 and 1940 could not simultaneously meet both the French Army’s mobilization requirement and the growing labor demands of French industry. Anticipating a serious manpower shortfall in the initial stages of a war, the French Army had been compelled to rely increasingly on North African and colonial troops to supplement the metropolitan forces.

These precautionary measures notwithstanding, in September 1939, general mobilization brought several key war industries to a virtual standstill because skilled technicians were drafted. “The Bourges arsenal, for example, was so deprived that it was reduced temporarily to delivering only 10 percent of its monthly quota of shells. At the Renault works, the number of workers fell abruptly from 30,000 to 8,000 and several plants producing the planes that France was to need more desperately than anything else were actually forced to close down.”

Unlike World War I, however, the German blitzkrieg and France’s unexpectedly rapid collapse prevented the May 1940 campaign from developing into a contest of human and material resources.

THE ROLE OF FRANCE IN NATO MOBILIZATION, 1949-1966

French Territory as an Alliance “Heartland.” Because of her geographical position at the heart of Western Europe and because what would later become the Federal Republic of Germany was still in the late 1940s occupied Germany, France rapidly became the operational and logistical hub of Western defense efforts on the continent in the post-war era. When the five signatory nations to the Brussels
Treaty established the Western Union Defense Organization (WUDO) in September 1948, the Chairman of the WUDO Commanders-in-Chief Committee, Field Marshal Montgomery, set up his headquarters in Fontainebleau, and WUDO began funding a common infrastructure program for constructing airfields, pipelines, and communications sites predominantly on French territory.16

With NATO’s establishment in 1949, the role of France in the common defense became even more pivotal, less in terms of her contribution to fulfilling the Alliance’s conventional force goals, than because of her situation as the Alliance’s “heartland.” In 1951, the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General Eisenhower, moved with his skeleton staff into a barrack complex at Rocquencourt, near Versailles. This soon became Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). In 1952, the North Atlantic Council, the Alliance’s senior decisionmaking body, and the NATO International Staff, settled in Paris. With the transfer of defense planning responsibilities from WUDO to NATO, Fontainebleau became, in 1953, the headquarters of Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT).

Since NATO and the United States had originally agreed that the same American general officer appointed SACEUR would be “dual-hatted” as US Commander-in-Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR), in 1954 Headquarters, United States European Command moved from Frankfurt to the Camp des Loges, near SHAPE, to promote command interface between the two staffs (see 9.1). Meanwhile, the US Army Europe had established its “Communications Zone, Europe” headquarters in Orléans to operate its line of communication (LOC) through France. Logistical supplies arrived at the seaports of debarkation on France’s Atlantic coast, were sent to Orléans, then by rail and road either on a northern route through Fontainebleau, Verdun, and Metz, or a southern route through Toul and Nancy prior to merging again across the French-German border in the Palatinate.17 A US-owned, French-operated pipeline was also built, extending from the port of Saint-Nazaire to Metz where it was connected to the NATO Central European Pipeline System (CEPS).

The US Air Forces Europe (USAFE) was granted use of nine airfields in France, but General de Gaulle’s veto over storing US tactical nuclear weapons on French territory forced SACEUR in 1959 to relocate all USAFE nuclear-capable fighter-bomber squadrons deployed on French soil to airbases in West Germany and Britain, thereby considerably reducing the value of the French airfields to
9.1—NATO, US, AND CANADIAN FACILITIES IN FRANCE UNTIL 1967
NATO. The importance of continued access to French airfields, however, was demonstrated during the 1961 "Berlin Wall" crisis. Four USAFE "stand-by" bases in eastern France were activated to support the emergency deployment of several CONUS-based Tactical Air Command and Air National Guard squadrons. While the US Naval Forces Europe had their principal shore facilities located in Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, Villefranche-sur-Mer, on the French Riviera, was the home port of the Sixth Fleet's flagship until France's withdrawal from NATO in 1966.

Compared with the US military presence in France, Canada's force was considerably smaller. The Royal Canadian Air Force had its European headquarters in Metz, from which it operated two airbases in France (Marville and Grostenquin) and two in the FRG (Zweibrucken and Baden Soellingen).

**French Contribution to NATO Force Goals.** On paper, France's intended contribution to Alliance military strength (as defined in the early days of NATO) was impressive. Plans called for establishing some 25 divisions by 1958, 14 of which would be high-readiness units assigned or earmarked to the SACEUR. The 14 divisions would comprise 3 armored, 3 mechanized (*divisions mécaniques rapides*) and 8 motorized divisions, and, except for 2 motorized divisions garrisoned in North Africa, all would be deployed in France and the Federal Republic of Germany. The remaining 11 divisions, based predominantly in North Africa, were projected to be oversize infantry brigades tasked with a territorial defense mission under national command. Finally, 12 reserve divisions would round out the projected French Army force structure. A rapid mechanized division and a motorized infantry division were eventually raised as the prototypes of a new generation of combat units specially configured for the Central European theater. The *division mécanique rapide* was the outgrowth of an experimental combined-arms brigade, code-named *Javelot*, while the motorized infantry division was patterned after the US Army "Pentomic" infantry division. However, despite the US Mutual Defense Assistance Program, of which France was a large recipient, a want of equipment effectively ended this ambitious French plan.\(^8\)

The French military presence in West Germany steadily dwindled as a result of successive troop withdrawals to quell the rebellion in Algeria.\(^9\) By 1965, the French forces in Germany (*Forces Françaises en Allemagne*) essentially consisted of: the
Second French Corps, headquartered in Freiburg and assigned to NATO's Central Army Group (CENTAG), with only two "Type 1959" divisions, one armored, one infantry, each with three brigades; three Honest John rocket battalions; and two Hawk surface-to-air missile battalions. Supplementing the ground forces, the First Tactical Air Corps (CATAF), assigned to NATO's Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force (FOURATAF), operated seven wings of fighter, fighter-bomber, and reconnaissance aircraft and two air defense brigades with Nike Hercules SAMs. Two of the wings, equipped with nuclear-capable F-100s—as well as the two Nike brigades—were forward-deployed in southern Germany, the balance being based across the Rhine in eastern France.20

In a contingency, the Second French Corps, together with the Second German Corps of the Bundeswehr headquartered in Ulm, would have been "chopped" to the operational control of the First French Army in Baden-Baden which reported to CENTAG. When NATO adopted a "forward defense" posture in the FRG on September 1, 1963, the II (GE) Corps was tasked to defend Bavaria north of the Danube up to the boundary with the neighboring Seventh US Corps, while the II (FR) Corps was responsible for the southern part of Bavaria up to the border with Austria. (Ironically, that area south of the Danube is the same one which the II (GE) Corps tasked the Force d'Action Rapide to defend during the Kecker Spatz/Moineau Hardi field training exercise in September 1987.) A First French Corps and a Second CATAC were established in 1964 to command the forces repatriated to France from Algeria—essentially two understrength mechanized divisions and a few disparate squadrons—but these forces went, not to SACEUR, but to a French national commander, the Commander-in-Chief of the Metropolitan-Mediterranean Theater.

In 1960, the North Atlantic Council had approved the concept of a NATO Europe Integrated Air Defense (NATINAD) system, and the following year, SACEUR received peacetime operational command over allied air defense forces across Western Europe. France resisted the concept of pre-delegating to a "foreign" commander an "open-fire" authority and refused to integrate her air defense forces into NATINAD, except for those fighter interceptor squadrons and SAM batteries stationed in northeastern France and southern Germany and already assigned to FOURATAF as part of France's force commitment to NATO. But even in this case. France restricted SACEUR's
authority to the phases (detection, tracking, interception) preceding the actual engagement order which the French Government reserved for itself. To underscore their "non-integrated" status within the Alliance, the interceptor squadrons of the French Air Force's Air Defense Command (CAFD) were re-equipped exclusively with domestically produced aircraft, such as the Ouragan, Mystère, Super Mystère, and Vautour series of fighters.

Hence, in the early 1960s, the three French services had been essentially split into two bodies of forces: those forces integrated into NATO (the Second French Corps in West Germany, the First Tactical Air Command in eastern France, and the Navy's Atlantic squadron) and those retained exclusively under national command (the First French Corps, the Second Tactical Air Command, the Air Defense Command, the overseas intervention forces, and the Mediterranean squadron). After De Gaulle's return to power in 1958, the French forces assumed a somewhat aberrant status. NATO witnessed the withdrawal from NATO integration of the Atlantic squadron in 1964; establishment of a single national Tactical Air Command (FATAC) to control both CATACs in 1965; and, ultimately, the end of France's participation in the integrated military structure of the Alliance in 1966.

Disassociation From Integration. From an operational and logistical standpoint, France's position in the Alliance was critical to the defense of Central Europe. True, when NATO adopted a forward defense posture in the FRG in 1963 (necessitating a relocation forward of the Rear Combat Zone), West Germany assumed an increasingly important role in the defense of Central Europe, somewhat at the expense of France. Still, a relatively widespread perception existed among the French military, (later reflected in De Gaulle's vehement criticism of the NATO integrated military structure as an instrument of subordination to "foreign interests") that French representation at the higher levels of Alliance command did not match the French contribution to the common defense. Specifically, the French felt the Anglo-American partnership was too dominant. Although France enjoyed, together with the United Kingdom and the United States, a prominent position atop the allied military hierarchy (they were the only three NATO nations represented in the Washington-based "Standing Group"), France was very much a junior partner, especially when it came to effective operational control of allied forces during wartime.
Of the three Major NATO Commanders (MNC), the two Supreme Commander positions (SACEUR and SACLANT) were in the hands of the United States; so, too, were the all-important positions of Chief of Staff, SHAPE, and Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH). Even less acceptable to the French was what they perceived as British over-representation. Indeed, British officers held the remaining MNC position, that of Allied Commander-in-Chief, Channel (CINCHAN), the positions of Deputy SACEUR and Deputy SACLANT, as well as the positions of Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Northern Europe (CINCNORTH) and Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Mediterranean (CINCAFMED). By comparison, France had only one key position: Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe (CINCENT) in Fontainebleau. Even worse, the two French admirals, in Brest and Toulon, were subordinate to two British admirals. The Commander, Biscay Atlantic sub-area (COMBISCLANT) reported to the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Atlantic area (CINCEASTLANT) in Plymouth, while the Commandant, secteur Méditerranée Occidentale (COMEDOC) reported to CINCAFMED in Malta. Not surprisingly, the first French military forces withdrawn from NATO integration when De Gaulle assumed power in 1958 were the French Navy Mediterranean and Atlantic fleets, in 1959 and 1964, respectively.

THE ENDURING ALLIED CONNECTION

Despite France’s assumption of an autonomous defense posture within the Alliance, her military withdrawal from NATO was only partial. She has remained a signatory member of the Alliance and has her own ambassador on the North Atlantic Council. French participation in the Alliance’s other senior civilian and military bodies depends on whether these bodies are concerned with the “integrated” aspects of allied planning or not. Hence, France is not represented on the Defense Planning Committee, the Nuclear Planning Group, and the Military Committee, but does participate in the activities of the NATO Air Defense Committee, the Committee for European Airspace Coordination, the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee, the Senior NATO Logisticians Conference, the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency, and the Conference of National Armaments Directors. In the field of NATO crisis-management, France’s involvement reflects the same pattern of participation à la carte. Although, since 1979, France has joined in the NATOWIDE
communications system for political consultation, she does not participate in the NATO alert system, and she has declined, so far, to take part in NATO’s series of periodic crisis-management exercises (HILEX and WINTEX/CIMEX).

France’s withdrawal from the Alliance’s integrated military structure has not affected her participation in non-NATO multilateral bodies such as the FINABEL Coordination Committee, which promotes interoperability among the armies of the seven member nations of the Western European Union (France, FRG, Italy, the United Kingdom and the Benelux), and the Live Oak Group, a trilateral (France, UK, USA) contingency planning staff responsible for the allied defense of Berlin.

Since De Gaulle evicted US, Canadian, and NATO forces and headquarters from France in 1967, only a handful of allied facilities still operate on French territory today. These are the three NATO agencies—the Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development, the NATO Hawk Production and Logistics Organization, and the Central Europe Pipeline System Operating Agency—all located in the vicinity of Paris; and the components of two major NATO infrastructure projects completed in the 1950s. These are the Central European Pipeline System and the Allied Command Europe High Command (“ACE High”) tropospheric back-scatter communications system, operated by French military personnel on behalf of CINCENT. France has allowed the Federal Republic of Germany, unlike Canada and the United States, to maintain ammunition storage sites and other logistical installations which the Bundeswehr was operating on French territory after signing a bilateral agreement on logistical cooperation on October 24, 1960.

The French military took over many of the facilities vacated by the departing allied forces. The French Air Force retained Toul and Evreux airfields as main operating bases. The airfields at Phalsbourg and Etain were transferred to the French Army for its Light Aviation Corps (Aviation Légère de l’Armée de Terre) and today these airfields house two combat helicopter regiments of the Force d’Action Rapide. Bases at Chaumont, Chateauroux, and Laon converted to a French Army casern or training facility for armored forces. Finally, the two US airfields at Chambly and Dreux and the two Canadian airfields at Marville and Grostenquin transferred to civilian use. Little remains today, therefore, of the aircraft beddown structure available to NATO in 1967. Such a situation effectively precludes allied use of
these same airfields in an emergency, were France to grant the Allies access to her territory. There are signs, however, that France might be reconsidering, for its own purposes, the value of those former airfields. The French Air Force in 1987 repossessed Marville, and the FAR used Grostenquin as a marshalling area for their armored troops during exercise Kecker Spatz/Moineau Hardi. In March 1988, on the occasion of Airex-Datex 88 (the French Air Force’s annual, large-scale exercise) Chambley was reactivated as a dispersal operating base for Jaguar fighter-bombers normally stationed at Bô Jeaux in southwestern France.23

Since 1967, allied military aircraft have routinely used French airspace for NATO-related training and transit flights and, under bilateral agreements, Belgian, British, Dutch, and German troops enjoy regular access to French Army major training areas. The Belgian Air Force conducts its live-firing practice camps at the range near Solenzara air base in Corsica, and the French Air Force and USAFE jointly operate a multi-national aircrew electronic warfare tactics facility, the Polygone, across part of France and West Germany.24

Although French involvement in multilateral training activities with the Allies has been deliberately low profile since France’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military structure, the frequency and scope of French participation has gradually expanded over the years with the easing of French domestic political opposition to greater military cooperation with NATO forces. During the NATO Ocean Safari 83 maritime exercise, US Navy attack aircraft operating from a carrier cruising in the Bay of Biscay for the first time refueled in-flight in French airspace while on a mission to a bombing range in West Germany.25 For the NATO Central Enterprise 84 air defense exercise, allied combat aircraft flew missions into France for the first time in a non-French exercise.26

French participation in allied training activities (whether nationally or NATO-sponsored), and, conversely, allied participation in French exercises are conducted on the basis of reciprocity: for instance, allied navies take part in the Suroit maritime exercise conducted by the French commander-in-chief, Atlantic (CECLANT), and the French Navy participates in the Team Work/Northern Wedding/Ocean Safari series of maritime exercises sponsored by SACLANT. Naval and air exercises are predominantly multinational in format, whereas army field training exercises have been conducted
to date almost exclusively on a bilateral basis, primarily with the Federal Republic of Germany, Spain, and the United States (see table 9.2). Joint training activities are particularly intensive with the Bundeswehr, involving unit partnerships at virtually every level from battalion to corps, sub-unit exchanges (companies and platoons), as well as combined exercises—reflecting the special security relationship which has developed between the two countries since the late 1950s. Starting in 1963, after conclusion of the Franco-German treaty of cooperation, the 9th German and 11th French airborne divisions have staged an annual joint exercise, nicknamed Colibri ("Hummingbird"), in France and West Germany alternately. Every two years, the German and French navies conduct a bilateral mine-warfare exercise, nicknamed Jaguar, in the Baltic Sea. Since 1978, German Army units have participated in the Second French Corps’ annual divisional-size field training exercise in the FRG.

Following the decisions reached between French President François Mitterrand and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl at the 40th Franco-German summit meeting in Bonn in October 1982 relative to reactivating the defense clauses of the 1963 "Treaty of the Elysée," combined exercises have increased substantially in size and scope. In 1984, when Mitterrand and Kohl attended a joint commemorative ceremony in Verdun, a German Army brigade was allowed to exercise for the first time on French territory outside a major training area. In 1985, the Second French Corps and the Second German Corps staged a joint field training exercise, appropriately named Alliance, at the Muensingen MTA in Baden Wuerttemberg, the first genuinely bilateral exercise ever between major units of the First French Army and the West German Field Army.27

In 1986 an entire French armored division participated in the Fraentischer Schild field training exercise with the Third German Corps, a major departure from past practice. Until then, French participation in the Bundeswehr’s fall maneuvers had been sporadic and deliberately low-key, involving a company or battery-size unit, lest a larger French military presence imply closer ties to NATO. Kecker Spatz/Moineau Hardi preserved the appearance that the French were independent of the Alliance’s integrated military structure: the exercise was not included in the Allied Command Europe Autumn Forge 87 exercise series, and none of the senior NATO military leadership (Generals Altenburg, Galvin, and Chalupa, respectively Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, SACEUR, and CINCENT)
9.2—REGULARLY SCHEDULED NATO/NATIONAL EXERCISES WITH FRENCH PARTICIPATION

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<td>“Datex” (FR)</td>
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<td>“Phiblex” (FR/US)</td>
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<td>Competitions:</td>
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<td>“Boeselger Cup” (GE)</td>
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Sources: Various U.S. and foreign military journals, including the French magazines Armées d’Aujourd’hui, Terre, Air, Mer (TAM), Air Actualités, and Air et Cosmos, the British magazine Armed Forces, the West German magazines Soldat und Technik, Heer, and Luftwaffe, and the Austrian magazine Österreichische Militärirtiche Zeitschrift. The “Naval Review” issues of the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings were particularly informative on maritime exercises.
were invited to attend. Nonetheless, the scale of French participation (20,000 men) clearly indicated that Franco-German defense cooperation had overtaken past political inhibitions regarding the role of France in the common defense.

MOBILIZATION CONCEPTS

Under the Fifth Republic, the concept of the "short war" (a decisive and relatively brief engagement of French conventional forces, with or without employing tactical nuclear weapons, leading either to war termination or subsequent nuclear escalation) has driven mobilization planning. French emphasis on conventional operations of relatively short duration, resulting in a military requirement for only limited mobilization, has often conflicted with the politics of mustering a civilian population intellectually demobilized by nuclear deterrence, to rise and defend their own nation. The two principal instruments for instilling "defense consciousness" have been universal, compulsory military service and a mass mobilization-based territorial defense organization, known as the Défense Opérationnelle du Territoire (DOT). As a consequence, the army’s active component is almost exclusively oriented towards performing wartime missions outside France, either in Central Europe or overseas, while the reserve component is primarily concerned with home defense.

As French military policy has gradually evolved toward greater conventional cooperation with NATO, contingency planning and exercise scenarios have increasingly emphasized French support of protracted conventional combat without the French necessarily subscribing to NATO’s more ambitious sustained combat goals. This evolution is particularly apparent in the French Army’s procuring a heavier, substantially more capable main battle tank, the AMX Leclerc, and high firepower delivery field artillery systems, such as the 155mm AMX-30 AU-F1 self-propelled howitzer and the 227mm Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS). In addition, the French Air Force Airex exercise series—designed to evaluate its capability to generate sorties in simulated wartime conditions and over a protracted time period—illustrates increased French commitment to sustained operations.

The French body politic, however, has consistently resisted conventional sustained warfare measures whose adoption would imply that the French accept "conventional deterrence" or a de facto "no first nuclear use" posture for France. In addition, France has set
objective limits to the resources they could allocate to conventional force generation given other defense priorities (nuclear forces, maritime forces, etc.). Any plan involving a massive expansion of French conventional forces through mobilization (such as the one proposed by former West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt) would require a dramatic change to the present European security environment. However, large-scale, unilateral US troop withdrawals from the Federal Republic of Germany could conceivably trigger new French interest in the Schmidt idea.

**THE MOBILIZATION SYSTEM**

*Peacetime Organization.* Responsibility for crisis management and civil emergency planning rests with the Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale (SGDN), an independent agency subordinate to the Prime Minister. Specifically, the SGDN must develop policy guidance for national mobilization during tension or war, including government-wide crisis management procedures and civil emergency planning measures. Also, the SGDN must coordinate their implementation among the various ministries, such as defense, foreign affairs, interior, transportation, industry. To that end, a senior civil servant represents the SGDN in every relevant ministry (*Haut fonctionnaire de défense*). In 1982 and again in 1986, the SGDN directed a government-wide crisis management exercise, nicknamed *Gymont*, to evaluate how well crisis management procedures, including continuity of government measures, actually work.

In crisis management, the responsibilities of the armed forces joint staff (*Etat-Major des Armées*) are wide-ranging, extending from setting up alert measures to planning military mobilization. For purposes of peacetime administration, wartime mobilization, and home defense, a territorial chain of command exists inside each service which parallels the operational chain of command.

Within metropolitan France (including Corsica), the Army is structured into six military regions (with headquarters in Paris, Lille, Rennes, Bordeaux, Lyons, and Metz), the Air Force into four air regions (Metz, Paris, Bordeaux, and Aix-en-Provence), and the Navy into three maritime regions (Cherbourg, Brest, and Toulon). The Army's six military regions further subdivide into 22 "Territorial Military Divisions" (2 to 5 per region). In addition, there are three specialized territorial commands: the Navy's *commandement de la défense du Finistère* in Brittany, protecting the SSBN base at the Ile
Longue near Brest; the Air Force's district air Albion surrounding the IRBM field on the plateau d'Albion in southeastern France; and the Army's zone de franchissement du Rhin (encompassing the Rhine river's length along the border between France and Germany) which, in wartime, would have to secure river crossing operations. Where appropriate, territorial and operational responsibilities have been consolidated into a single, "dual-hatted" commanding officer. For example: the commander of the 2nd Military Region in Lille also commands the III (FR) Corps; the commander of the 1st Air Region in Metz, the FATAc, and the admiral serving as "prefect" of the 3rd Maritime Region in Toulon is also French commander-in-chief, Mediterranean (CECMED).

Of all the army components requiring wartime augmentation, home defense forces are the most dependent on mobilizing the reserves (115,000 men from a total of 273,000 army reservists). Initially conceived as internal security forces tasked to fight insurgency situations, the home defense forces soon became an integral part of France's nuclear deterrent posture in the early 1960s (due to their status being formalized by two Government decrees in February 1962 and October 1967, relative to the organization of the Défense Opérationnelle du Territoire (DOT) in times of tension and war). A special category of army ground forces, the Forces du Territoire, was established to protect France's nuclear forces and facilities against enemy infiltration and sabotage. Concurrently, the air force and the navy are responsible for defending France's airspace and coastlines as part of the Défense Aérienne du Territoire (DAT) and the Défense Maritime du Territoire (DMT), respectively.

If the DOT is activated during tension or war, the six military regions would become "defense sectors" (zones de défense) entrusted with the protection of all sensitive military and civilian installations located within their area of responsibility. Under the present mobilization plan, each zone de défense would have a mobile home-defense brigade (two each in the 5th and 6th military regions) available, and each "territorial military division" a relatively more static combined-arms regiment, in addition to the considerable resources the Gendarmerie contributes to the DOT mission. There are also six reserve border defense infantry regiments.

Reserve duty. All French male citizens between 18 and 50 years old are subject to military duty, initially for 12 months as conscripts, and, thereafter, as reservists. Between the ages of 18 and 22 years
old, but on the average at the age of 19, draftable males within a yearly class serve active duty military service in two-month increments (six call-ups a year). To ease conscription and expedite the mobilization process in an emergency, draftees are assigned, whenever possible, to a unit garrisoned close to their home. For instance, some 39 percent of the conscripts assigned to the French forces in West Germany come from the 6th Military Region (eastern France, including Alsace, Lorraine, and Champagne), 23 percent from the 1st Military Region (Paris and its surrounding region), but only 1 percent from the 3rd Military Region (Normandy and Brittany).

To accommodate the growing manpower requirements of France’s multiple “out-of-area” commitments (in southern Lebanon, Chad, and elsewhere), since 1983 draftees have the option of serving for an additional 12 months beyond the regular 12-month military service duty in exchange for higher pay and a chance to serve either in technically demanding positions or with units temporarily deployed overseas, notably those belonging to the elite Force d’Action Rapide. In 1983, 6,125 conscripts chose this opportunity of serving as “long-term volunteers” (volontaires pour le service long). By 1986, the number had grown to 30,408, or approximately 16 percent of the total conscript population for that year.

Following release from the 12-month active military service, former conscripts join the reserves: until the age of 35 years as part of the “Military Service reserve” contingent, thereafter, until age 50, as members of the “Defense Service reserve” component. During the first four years in the “Military Service reserve” force, former conscripts have a “stand-by” status (disponibilité), subject to immediate recall upon mobilization. Until age 35, they can be recalled to active duty for refresher training, each recall not to exceed a month for a total allowable training time of six months. In peacetime, reserve officers and non-commissioned officers are assigned to either an active unit as wartime “augmentees,” or to a local training establishment: Centres d’entraînement prémilitaire et des réserves (Army); Centres d’instruction des réserves de la Marine (Navy); and Centres Air de perfectionnement et d’instruction pour les réserves (Air Force).

If mobilized, Army reservists assigned to reserve units would process through 55 mobilization centers (centres mobilisateurs) scattered throughout France within a 96-hour period. They would be issued uniforms, individual arms, vehicles, and communication
equipment. Reserve personnel assigned to active units as wartime augmentees would rejoin their garrison directly.

The Status of Reserves. The peacetime manpower strength of the French Army is approximately 280,000 men, including personnel deployed overseas, of which 183,000 are one-year conscripts. The peacetime establishments of the 1 (FR) Army and the FAR are 170,000 and 47,000 men respectively, with the balance of manpower strength belonging to the territorial and overseas forces, administrative services, and training facilities. Upon mobilization, the French Army would expand by an additional 273,000 men from a total available reserve pool estimated at 3,226,000 men. Reserves would then represent—as a percentage of the wartime authorized manpower strength—26 percent of the FAR, 34 percent of the 1 (FR) Army, and 75 percent of the home defense (DOT) forces.

The peacetime French Air Force consists of 96,000 men, 35,400 of which are conscripts. In wartime, the Air Force would expand by 78 percent by adding 75,700 reserve personnel from a pool of 118,000 men. Some 60 percent of the mobilized reservists would be assigned to protect sensitive installations (airfields, early-warning radar stations, communications sites, ammunition storage facilities). The Navy's peacetime establishment is approximately 66,000 men, including naval aviation, of which over 17,500 men are draftees. Upon mobilization, the Navy would expand by 33,000 additional men from an available pool of 176,000 reserve personnel. Forty-five percent of the reserve increment would assume security duties to defend naval facilities; 22 percent would join the fleet.

MOBILIZATION FOR DEFENSE OF THE CENTRAL FRONT

Evolution of the Force Posture. Since the end of World War II, the French Army has undergone four major reorganizations: in 1959, 1967, 1977, and 1983. The 1959 reorganization helped to convert French divisions, still structured at the time along the lines of a US Army V-E Day division, to the “LANDCENT” model being introduced into other Center Region NATO armies. “LANDCENT” divisions were to be standardized—each composed of three brigades (either two armored and one mechanized, or, conversely, one armored and two mechanized), a reconnaissance battalion, and a divisional field artillery group equipped with nuclear-capable, self-propelled howitzers and unguided rockets—and be able to fight on a nuclear battlefield in accordance with NATO’s 1957 MC-14/2, “Sword and Shield” strategic concept.
Following France’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military structure in 1966, the French ground forces underwent a major reorganization to prepare them to fight with domestically developed tactical nuclear weapons, including the Pluton weapon-system expected to be delivered in the early 1970s. The two divisions stationed in France and two forward-deployed in West Germany converted to the “Type 1967” structure, and a fifth division was created. In 1969, the First French Army established a new headquarters in Strasbourg, designated the French Army’s senior field command. Its mission was to plan the engagement of the First and Second French Corps along France’s northeastern borders and their “approaches” and coordinate their commitment to battle with the operations of the Tactical Air Command, the FATAF, as part of a so-called “independent deterrence maneuver.” The latter centered on using tactical nuclear forces in a massive, single-salvo strike against an advancing enemy which would seek to break through NATO forces first.

When Valéry Giscard d’Estaing became president in 1974, the process of converting the French Army from a disparate, half-“integrated,” half-“colonial” force into a coherent battle corps, equipped with tactical nuclear weapons under national command, had been essentially completed. The 1 (FR) Army comprised five “Type 1967” mechanized divisions, two in the FRG, three in France, each structured into two mechanized brigades and one motorized brigade (see table 9.3). Their modernization was well underway, but significantly behind schedule due to budget priorities going to strategic and tactical nuclear forces. Of the ten mechanized brigades, eight were of the standard type with one armored battalion and two mechanized infantry battalions. The remaining two brigades had been upgraded, each consisting of two armored battalions and one mechanized battalion. Two of the five motorized brigades had begun converting to the mechanized type, and, at the rate of one brigade a year, all five were expected to have converted by 1980. Also in 1974, the first of six Pluton surface-to-surface missile regiments, three per corps, had become operational (eventually, only five regiments were fielded, two each with the First and Second Corps, and one with the Third Corps created in 1979).

Given the emphasis on a short, decisive engagement at the borders and their “approaches” implied in the “independent deterrence maneuver,” the French Army’s 1967 force structure relied on mobilization predominantly to raise the First French Army’s
9.3—EVOLUTION OF FRENCH ARMY UNIT STRUCTURE, 1966-1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Type 1967</th>
<th>Type 1977</th>
<th>Type 1984</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967 Reorganization</td>
<td>&quot;Mechanized Brigade&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Armored Division&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Armored Division&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 (medium tank) armored battalion (AMX-30)</td>
<td>2 (medium tank) armored battalions (AMX-30)</td>
<td>2 or 3 (medium tank) battalions (AMX-30)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 mechanized infantry battalions (AMX-13)</td>
<td>2 mechanized infantry battalions (AMX-10P)</td>
<td>2 mechanized infantry battalions (AMX-10P)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 field artillery battalion (AMX-13F3 155mm SP)</td>
<td>1 field artillery battalion (AMX-13F3 155mm SP)</td>
<td>1 motorized infantry battalion (VAB)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Motorized Brigade&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Infantry Division&quot;</td>
<td>Same as &quot;Type 1977&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 (light tank) armored battalion (AMX-13)</td>
<td>1 armored cavalry battalion (AMX-10RC)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 motorized infantry battalions (truck)</td>
<td>3 motorized infantry battalions (VAB)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 field artillery battalion (AMX-13 105mm SP)</td>
<td>1 field artillery battalion (155mm towed)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

peacetime manpower strength to authorized wartime strength and to expand the home defense forces from a cadre of approximately 25 active infantry and armored car battalions to near a hundred in wartime. The French did not consider establishing divisional-size reserve units upon mobilization to augment the active force structure.

In 1977, the French Army initiated yet another major force reorganization. To promote versatility, the brigade concept was suppressed as an intermediary level of command, and the 20 brigades inherited from the 1967 reorganization consolidated into 15 small "divisions," in effect becoming overstrength brigades (as in table 9.4). Of the 15 divisions, 8 were armored and approximated US Army armored brigades in strength. Four divisions, stationed in eastern France, were subordinated to the First Corps, which, as part of the reorganization, moved its headquarters from Nancy to Metz. The Second Corps took command of the three divisions in West Germany, and the single remaining armored division was eventually attached to the new Third Corps. The other seven divisions became a general reserve. Furthermore, the distinction introduced in the early 1960s between "maneuver," "intervention," and "territorial" forces was abolished, underscoring the concept that the new divisions should be capable of performing missions in Europe as well as overseas. In reality, the restructured 9th Marine Division and the 11th Airborne Division continued to bear the brunt of France's "out-of-area" commitments.

More intriguing was the 1979 decision to establish a Third French Corps headquartered near Paris and independent from the First French Army. Its creation seemed to correspond with President Giscard d'Estaing's wish to have forces versatile enough to participate in theaters other than Central Europe and to meet threats to France from other directions. Indeed, the new III (FR) Corps staged several command post and field training exercises across France, sometimes at considerable distances from its headquarters in Saint-Germain-en-Laye. In retrospect, the creation of a Third Corps as a planning headquarters for European contingencies outside Central Europe appears to have been the last in a three-step master plan, involving the three services. It was inspired by growing French concern in the mid-1970s over the deteriorating international situation in and around the Mediterranean basin (strife in the western Sahara, the civil war in Lebanon, and the Cyprus crisis). Earlier steps had featured the permanent homeporting of the navy's two aircraft carriers, the Foch and the Clemenceau, and their escorts at Toulon, and the
### 9.4—EvoluTion of the French Army Order of Battle, 1966-1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1967 Reorganization</th>
<th>1977 Reorganization</th>
<th>1983 Reorganization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 French Army, Strasbourg, Fr.</strong></td>
<td><strong>1 French Army, Strasbourg, Fr.</strong></td>
<td><strong>1 French Army, Strasbourg, Fr.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 French Corps, Nancy, Fr.</td>
<td>1 French Corps, Metz, Fr.</td>
<td>1 French Corps, Metz, Fr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 4 Mechanized Division, Verdun, Fr.</td>
<td>- 4 Armored Division, Nancy, Fr.</td>
<td>- 1 Armored Division, Trier, FRG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 10 Mechanized Brigade</td>
<td>- 6 Armored Division, Strasbourg, Fr.</td>
<td>- 7 Armored Division, Besançon, Fr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 15 Mechanized Brigade</td>
<td>- 7 Armored Division, Besançon, Fr.</td>
<td>-12 Light Armored Division, Saumur, Fr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 16 Mechanized Brigade</td>
<td>-10 Armored Division, Chalons s/Marne, Fr.</td>
<td>-14 Light Armored Division, Montpellier, Fr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 7 Mechanized Div., Mulhouse, Fr.</td>
<td><strong>II French Corps, Baden-Baden, FRG</strong></td>
<td><strong>II French Corps, Baden-Baden, FRG</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 6 Mechanized Brigade</td>
<td>- 1 Armored Division, Trier, FRG</td>
<td>- 3 Armored Division, Freiburg, FRG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 7 Mechanized Brigade</td>
<td>- 3 Armored Division, Freiburg, FRG</td>
<td>- 5 Armored Division, Landau, FRG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 8 Mechanized Division, Compiegne, Fr.</td>
<td>- 5 Armored Division, Landau, FRG</td>
<td>-15 Infantry Division, Limoges, Fr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Mechanized Brigade</td>
<td><strong>III French Corps, St. Germain-en-Laye, Fr.</strong></td>
<td><strong>III French Corps, Lille, Fr.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Mechanized Brigade</td>
<td>- 2 Armored Division, Versailles, Fr.</td>
<td>- 2 Armored Division, Versailles, Fr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Mechanized Brigade</td>
<td>- 8 Infantry Division, Amiens, Fr.</td>
<td>- 8 Infantry Division, Amiens, Fr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II French Corps, Baden-Baden, FRG</strong></td>
<td>- 10 Armored Division, Chalons s/Marne, Fr.</td>
<td>-10 Armored Division, Chalons s/Marne, Fr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Mechanized Division, Trier, FRG</td>
<td><strong>Strategic Reserve</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rapid Action Force (FAR) Maisons-Laffitte, Fr.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Mechanized Brigade</td>
<td>- 8 Infantry Division, Amiens, Fr.</td>
<td>- 4 Airmobile Division, Nancy, Fr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Mechanized Brigade</td>
<td>- 9 Marine Division, St. Malo, Fr.</td>
<td>- 6 Light Armored Division, Nimes, Fr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Motorized Brigade</td>
<td>-11 Airborne Division, Toulouse, Fr.</td>
<td>- 9 Marine Division, Nantes, Fr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 3 Mechanized Division, Freiburg, FRG</td>
<td>-12 Infantry Division, Rouen, Fr.</td>
<td>-11 Airborne Division, Toulouse, Fr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Mechanized Brigade</td>
<td>-14 Infantry Division, Lyon, Fr.</td>
<td>-27 Alpine Division, Grenoble, Fr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Mechanized Brigade</td>
<td>-15 Infantry Division, Limoges, Fr.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Mechanized Brigade</td>
<td>-27 Alpine Division, Grenoble, Fr.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic Reserve</strong></td>
<td>-31 Brigade (Motorized), Aubagne, Fr.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-11 Airborne Division, Pau, Fr.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Marine Brigade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Parachute Brigade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Parachute Brigade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Alpine Brigade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Alpine Brigade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

staging by the air force of exercise Volt-Air in 1975, involving emergency redeployment of 185 combat aircraft from their home bases in eastern France to airfields in southwestern France.38

The 1977 reorganization also profoundly affected the role of the reserves. The concept of "derivation," introduced into the French Army in 1977, provided 10 active divisions and four training establishments of cadre personnel for activating 14 reserve infantry divisions upon mobilization. This concept resembles the mobilization system in place in the late 1930s which allowed the French Army, at least on paper, to essentially triple its infantry strength. Like its pre-World War II predecessor, the 1977 mobilization plan failed to achieve its goal. Although several of the reserve divisions were eventually activated for basic training and small-unit combined-arms exercises, the plan proved overly ambitious for the resources available to the French Army.39 In any event, most reserve divisions were equipped with obsolescent or second-hand materiel (such as AML Panhard armored cars and 155mm towed howitzers), weapons unsuitable for the Central European battlefield.

Coming as it did on the heels of the previous army reorganization, the 1983 reorganization was not universally welcome and led to the resignation of two four-star general officers, including the army chief of staff. While it preserved the basic divisional structure introduced in 1977—from which the brigade as an intermediary level of command was absent—the new reorganization introduced the following changes:

- A further reduction of the French Army's active manpower, bringing it below the 300,000-men threshold. As a result, one company or battery in every combat and combat support battalion had to assume an inactive, cadre status in peacetime.

- The transformation of the eight "Type 1977" armored divisions into six, larger "Type 1984" armored divisions, each with a strength comparable to approximately one half of a US armored division.

- The formal subordination of the previously independent III (FR) Corps to the 1 (FR) Army, and its relocation from near Paris to northern France, in case France had to confront a Soviet breakthrough in the exposed Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) area.
The creation of a five division-strong Rapid Action Force to perform power-projection operations or act as a rapid deployment mobile reserve in Central Europe.

The restoration of the Défense Opérationnelle du Territoire and the replacement of the 14 reserve infantry divisions established by the 1977 mobilization plan by eight home-defense brigades and 22 combined arms regiments maintained on cadre status in peacetime.

The projected consolidation of all Army tactical nuclear weapons into a single "nuclear division," once the extended range Hades surface-to-surface missile starts replacing the Pluton in 1991. This decision will free the First French Army from its nuclear strike mission and permit a more flexible use of French ground forces in a conventional role.

In the wake of this latest reorganization, the First Army comprises 10 divisions, subordinated to the three corps. The First Corps consists of the 1st and 7th armored divisions and the 12th and 14th light armored divisions. The 1st Armored Division is stationed in West Germany while the remaining three are scattered throughout France. The Second Corps has the 3rd and 5th armored divisions deployed in West Germany and the 15th Infantry Division garrisoned in central France. The Third Corps comprises the 2nd and 10th armored divisions and the 8th Infantry Division, all three located in northern France. The FAR includes the 4th Airmobile, 6th Armored Cavalry, 9th Marine, 11th Airborne and 27th Alpine divisions (see figure 9.5).

At its peak, a French engagement in Central Europe involving the three corps of the 1 (FR) Army and the FAR would total approximately 200,000 men, 1,200 main battle tanks, several thousand other armored fighting vehicles, and 400 artillery pieces. This potential force approximately equals the strength of a Soviet field army.

Concept of Operations. The principal mission of French conventional forces in a hypothetical Central European contingency would be to defeat—with or without the use of tactical ("prestrategic") nuclear weapons—enemy penetrations into West Germany which threaten French territory. The French would perform operational-scale counter-attacks against Warsaw Pact second-echelon armies and operational maneuver groups (OMG). Accordingly, the First Army is configured to support the Second Corps, forward deployed in West
9.5—PRESENT FRENCH ARMY PEACETIME DEPLOYMENT

Germany, in an easterly direction (toward Bavaria), and the Third Corps, stationed in northern France, in a northerly direction (toward the Ruhr) to meet potential threats along two likely paths of approach into France. In effect, the First Corps, stationed in eastern France, has a "swing" role and could reinforce either of the other two corps. If two corps were committed together along the same axis, one would act as an arresting force and the other as a counter-attack force.

The Force d'Action Rapide may act as the forward echelon of the First French Army until the latter relieves it. Former Défense Minister Paul Quiles defined the relationship between these two units as follows: "The FAR can be engaged in support of the 1st Army, or independently from it. It can be employed on the flank of the 1st Army, in front or behind it, under its command or without any link with it, in a different theater, at a different time, before, after or during its engagement." The FAR can be tailored to a specific crisis or conflict situation by combining elements of its five component divisions. For contingency planning, the FAR divisions have been configured into an "emergency echelon" (the 4th Airmobile and 11th Airborne Divisions operating in tandem) and a heavier "air-mechanized echelon" (the helicopter division operating in concert with one or both of the FAR's light armored divisions, the 6th Armored Cavalry Division, and the 9th Marine Division).

The remaining division, the 27th Alpine Division, can reinforce either of the two echelons, providing an infantry reserve well outfitted with antitank weapons. However, an engagement of the FAR in Central Europe is unlikely to involve more than three and one half divisions at once. This force size approximates the force size involved in Kecker Spatz and in Fartel 85, an earlier exercise in southeastern France which constituted the first large-scale field test of the Rapid Action Force's ability to intervene in the European theater.

In most conceivable scenarios, French conventional forces would become available to act as a NATO operational reserve. NATO and French military authorities have agreed upon procedures which would enable French ground forces to counterattack under the operational control of CENTAG (while retained under French operational command). As the Kecker Spatz exercise showed, procedures for employing the FAR in Central Europe would not differ substantially from those applicable to the First French Army. Although the FAR was established as a major command, separate from and co-
equal with the First French Army, during *Kecker Spatz* it was temporarily placed under the operational command of the 1 (FR) Army and the operational control of the II (GE) Corps.\(^{43}\)

From an operational standpoint, *Kecker Spatz* was a rare event. For the first time ever, a large body of French Army troops deployed to West Germany and participated in a field training exercise (until *Kecker Spatz*, large-scale French Army FTXs had been held only on French soil). The deployment of FAR units across France into the FRG essentially replicated, in simulated wartime conditions, the elaborate sequence of movements which the France-based First French Army units (the Third Corps and the bulk of the First Corps) would have to undertake during tension or war. These movements would be the initial movement from peacetime garrison locations to a marshalling area (*zone de déploiement initial*) in eastern France; and the subsequent movement to a staging area (*zone de déploiement avancé*) in the FRG (see figure 9.6).\(^{44}\) The mobilization and movement of the 1 (FR) Army would take a relatively long time because the French depend on reservists to bring many of its units to wartime authorized strength and because most of its forces are deep inside France and would have to move considerable distances to potential engagement areas. The French have estimated, for instance, that moving a French corps with 15,000 vehicles a distance of 200 kilometers would require six itineraries over a two-day period.\(^{45}\) By comparison, *Kecker Spatz* involved the movement of 6,000 vehicles over a distance of 1,000 kilometers over two days.

In line with this increased French emphasis on force-projection into Central Europe, in March 1988, for the first time, a unit of the First French Army (that is, not belonging to the FAR) stationed in France, the 15th Infantry Division of the Second French Corps, redeployed temporarily to the Federal Republic of Germany to conduct its annual field training exercise code-named *Jourdan 88*.\(^{46}\) Among the various missions being considered for the Franco-German joint brigade proposed by Chancellor Kohl in June 1987 one would involve the brigade facilitating the movement of units of the First French Army stationed in France into West Germany; currently, this mission falls to the home defense brigades of the West German Territorial Army in the Rear Combat Zone on behalf of other allied reinforcing land forces (Belgian, British, etc.).\(^{47}\)

*Kecker Spatz* also featured the German Territorial Southern Command (GTSC), tasked with providing logistical support (POL,
9.6—FAR SEQUENCE OF MOVEMENTS FOR
FTX KECKER SPATZ/MOINEAU HARDI
Milan, and HOT antitank guided missiles) to the FAR once it was deployed on German territory. Logistic support in the French Army is centralized at the corps level, where all logistical functions (resupply, maintenance, and casualty evacuation) are consolidated into a logistics brigade. At the level of the 1 (FR) Army is a logistics command, the 1er Commandement de Logistique Opérationnelle (1 COMLOG), responsible for planning the logistical support of a French engagement in Central Europe.

Procedures for providing logistical support to a French Army engagement in Central Europe several times the magnitude of the contingent involved in Kecker Spatz have been set forth in bilateral agreements concluded in 1978 and 1980 between the French and West German ministries of defense. These procedures are tested every two years, at the level of the 1 (FR) Army, during the Vega command post exercise. In addition to the 1 COMLOG and the French railways administration (SNCF), the Vega exercises regularly include the participation of the GTSC and the Bundesbahn.

Procedures for activating the West German LOC across France in a contingency have been tested every two years since 1964 during a bilateral Franco-German ammunition transshipment exercise, codenamed Forte. Forte 86, for example, featured the unloading of Germany-bound supplies from three US-chartered Boeing 707 cargo aircraft and a merchant ship, and their movement across France by air, rail, and road. In 1987, for the first time the Vega and Forte exercises were scheduled together, to test how well the West German and French logistical infrastructures and rail and road networks could simultaneously support, under duress, a French Army engagement in Central Europe and the movement of German Army supplies across France. To what extent, however, this peacetime bilateral logistical cooperation implies an automatic commitment by the French government to activate the West German LOC during tension or war is uncertain.

French bilateral logistical cooperation with the United Kingdom has been at once more sporadic and less elaborate than with the FRG. In 1973, a small British Army contingent exceptionally participated in the Forte 73 ammunition transshipment exercise alongside French and West German units. In 1976, the French and British ministries of defense reportedly concluded a bilateral LOC agreement, whose contents remain classified, which would allow British reinforcements bound for Germany to transit through France. At a summit meeting in
January 1988, the British and French defense ministers agreed to stage joint exercises to test the transit arrangements. An initial command post exercise, to be held in 1988, will be followed by a field exercise at some later date involving the actual movement of British troops and supplies through French ports and airfields.52

The staging of Kecker Spatz in southern Germany almost simultaneously with NORTHAG's exercise Certain Strike in northern Germany was another particularly significant operational aspect of the exercise. In both instances, forces created to be specifically employed as "counter-offensive," operational-scale reserves (the Third US Corps in the case of Certain Strike) were able, for the first time, to exercise that intended role in West Germany. While the deployment of 20,000 French Army troops across the Rhine hardly compares with the deployment of 35,000 G.I.'s across the Atlantic, in terms of the comparative magnitude, complexity, and political scope of the two operations (REFORGER 87 was the largest ever exercise in this series), Kecker Spatz provided a reasonably accurate representation of France's ability to rapidly project within the European theater a relatively large body of forces at some 1,000 kilometers from home bases.

MOBILIZATION FOR "OUT-OF-AREA" SECURITY

Following reorganization of the French armed forces after France's withdrawal from North Africa in 1962, a joint services task force, the Force Interarmées d'Intervention (FII), was established to perform overseas power-projection operations, primarily in Africa where France had concluded bilateral defense and military assistance agreements with several of her former colonies.53

The FII was structured as an ad hoc contingency force which could be tailored to meet a particular crisis or conflict by combining elements from its three components. It included a land component, the Force Terrestre d'Intervention (FTI), consisting of the 11th Airborne Division stationed in Southwestern France with two parachute brigades, and the separate 9th Marine Brigade based in Brittany; a naval component, the Force Amphibie d'Intervention (FAI), homeported in Lorient and primarily responsible for moving the 9th Marine Brigade by sea; and an air component, the Composante Air de la Force d'Intervention (CAFI), centered on the Second Tactical Air Command of the French Air Force's Tactical Air Force (see 9.7). The 2nd CATAC was designed essentially as a planning staff which,

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joint</strong></td>
<td><strong>Force Interarmées d'Intervention</strong></td>
<td><strong>Forces d'Actions Extérieures</strong></td>
<td><strong>Force d'Action Rapide</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td><strong>Force Terrestre d'Intervention</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11th Airborne Division, Pau</td>
<td>11th Airborne Division, Toulouse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9th Marine Brigade, Saint-Malo</td>
<td>9th Marine Division, Saint-Malo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign Legion Operational Group (GOLE), Corte (Corsica)</td>
<td>31st Brigade (Motorized), Aubagne</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong></td>
<td><strong>Composante Air de la Force d'Intervention</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2nd CATAC, Nancy-Ochey</td>
<td>2nd CATAC, Nancy-Ochey</td>
<td>11th Fighter Wing, Orange-Caritat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>92nd Bomber Wing, Bordeaux-Merignac</td>
<td>5th Fighter Wing, Orange-Caritat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11th Fighter Wing, Toul-Rosières</td>
<td>11th Fighter Wing, Toul-Rosières and Bordeaux-Merignac</td>
<td>33rd Reconnaissance Wing, Strasbourg-Entzheim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
<td><strong>Force Amphibie d'Intervention</strong></td>
<td>Contingency task forces</td>
<td>Contingency task forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Maritime Patrol Squadrons, Lann-Bihoué and Nimes-Garons</td>
<td>Maritime Patrol Squadrons, Lann-Bihoué and Nimes-Garons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹Prior to the establishment of the FAR in 1983 as a major command of the French Army, French overseas power-projection forces were generically designated *Forces d'Assistance Rapide*.

in a contingency, could call up assets belonging to the various operational commands of the French Air Force: Vautour IIB light bombers of the Strategic Air Command (FAS), F-100 fighter-bombers of the Tactical Air Command (FATAC), and Nord 2501 Noratlas transport aircraft of the Military Air Transport Command (COTAM).

The FII's two key missions were to reinforce, as needed, French military contingents permanently deployed in French overseas dependencies (DOM-TOM) and former colonies; and to perform power-projection operations in those areas where no French military forces were prepositioned. To prepare for its mission, the FII regularly carried out small-scale rapid deployment exercises involving the movement by air and sea of paratroops and marines and a subsequent field training exercise with indigenous African forces in Senegal, Togo, Gabon, and the Ivory Coast. The first such Franco-African exercise took place in Senegal in 1965. These in-country exercises were complemented by larger, combined maneuvers of the FII code-named Sterne off France’s Mediterranean and Atlantic coasts. To further improve the French Government’s ability to rapidly insert forces into a friendly African nation, in 1967 the French Army introduced the “Guépard alert” concept into the 11th Airborne Division whereby selected battalions of the division assume a 24-hour rapid deployment readiness status on a rotational basis.

Aside from a few low-key interventions, limited in time and scope, France’s main overseas power-projection operation in Africa in the 1960s occurred in the Chad civil war between 1968 and 1972, only the first of many such operations in that war-torn country. By comparison with the 1960s, the 1970s witnessed a considerably more active French military role in African security, partly as a result of a more overt Soviet (and Soviet surrogate) military challenge and partly because of increasing regional political instability. Between 1977 and 1980, France conducted the following “out-of-area” operations: Lamentin in Mauritania against the Polisario rebel movement supported by Algeria; Bonite into Zaïre to assist General Mobutu’s regime against an invasion of the Shaba province by Katangan insurgents who had infiltrated from neighboring Angola; Tacaud in Chad to support General Malloum’s Forces Armées Nationales Tchadiennes (FANT) against foe Hissene Habre; and Barracuda to restore constitutional legitimacy in what had become the “Central African Empire” under the rule of self-proclaimed “Emperor” Bokassa I.
Circumstances since the mid-1960s had changed, however. To compensate for the loss of key military bases across Africa (such as the seaports of Bizerte in Tunisia, Mers el-Kebir in Algeria, Diego Suarez in Madagascar, and the N'Djamena airfield in Chad), France had to rely increasingly on home-based intervention forces, a development which revealed some very glaring shortfalls in her airlift and sealift capabilities. French forces also had to operate in African countries where a French military presence had been non-existent, such as Zaire and Mauritania.

Despite the adverse pressure exerted on France's capabilities and resources, the expanded size and scope of French military operations in Africa during the 1970s gave the French armed forces a beneficial opportunity to develop an elaborate, yet relatively flexible, overseas power projection capability which today bears no resemblance to the comparatively rustic and obsolescent capabilities of the FII. Compared with the earlier years, the French Navy's role in overseas operations has become more visible and important because the French decided to maintain a permanent maritime presence in the Indian Ocean (the Forces Maritimes de l'Océan Indien) and in 1975 transferred the aircraft carriers Foch and Clemenceau and their escorts from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean. However, improvements have been even more noticeable in the areas of ground and air forces, and in command and control.

Starting with the 1977 reorganization of the French Army, the trend has been to involve an increasingly large number of units in overseas deployments and operations, including motorized infantry and Alpine troops which until then had exclusively European missions. The French expanded their procedure of "rotating" company-size combat units (compagnies tournantes) from their home garrisons to overseas locations on temporary duty to familiarize units stationed in metropolitan France with the peculiarities of combat operations in sub-tropical areas. In the early 1980s, the larger pool of available troops enabled the French Army to meet virtually simultaneously the requirements of the UNIFIL in southern Lebanon, the MNF in Beirut, the MFO in the Sinai, the Chad contingency, and its other regular force commitments in Africa, the Pacific, and the West Indies.

To confront an increasingly lethal threat in the Third World (main battle tanks, ATGM-equipped armored fighting vehicles, and helicopter gunships), the French Army also established "heavier"
units. In 1981 France created the 31st Brigade on the French Mediterranean coast, equipped with AMX-10 RC wheeled light tanks and VAB wheeled armored personnel carriers; they earmarked for major overseas contingencies selected battalions of the First French Army which operate tracked vehicles (two AMX-30 armored battalions and one Roland air defense artillery battalion have been so designated). For the first time ever, a company of AMX-30 main battle tanks deployed by sea to Africa during the 1982 N'Diambour III exercise in Senegal. In addition, the French have deployed overseas exceptionally sophisticated means which were not intended for extra-European missions, such as French Army Improved Hawk surface-to-air missiles to Chad and French Air Force Crotale point air defense SAMs to Chad and French Guiana over the past year.

The French Air Force has also expanded considerably the range of capabilities available for overseas power-projection. In the 1960s, close-air-support assets consisted only of A-1 Skyraider piston-engine fighters forward-deployed in Africa and a few jet aircraft which either had the range to deploy from France (Vautour IIB) or could be refueled in-flight (F-100) by France's indigenous fleet of US built C-135F tankers. Today, in contrast, France can deploy Mirage F-1C interceptors, Jaguar A fighter-bombers, and Mirage F-1CR photographic reconnaissance aircraft over long distances using in-flight refueling (French combat pilots have periodically practiced long-haul flights from France across the Mediterranean to Djibouti and across the Atlantic to Nellis AFB, Nevada).

Selected squadrons based at airfields in southern France have received specific "out-of-area" roles in the Mediterranean and Africa in addition to their primary European mission. Based on lessons learned over Mauritania and Chad, the French Air Force has developed the concept of integrated, so-called Rapace "air cells," combining into a single formation Mirages F-1C and CR, Jaguars, Transall cargo aircraft, C-135F tankers, and French Navy Atlantic long-range maritime patrol aircraft, the latter serving either as a forward air controller (FAC) aircraft or as an airborne command post.

French airlift capabilities—a long-time Achilles' heel—have also been upgraded. In the late 1960s, DC-8F long-range aircraft replaced older Breguet 262 heavy cargo aircraft and the C-160 Transall transport began substituting the obsolescent Noratlases. In the 1970s, new Transalls, with an in-flight refueling capability as well as an ability to operate as tankers themselves, were delivered and all
Noratlases were ultimately retired from service. The additional Transallcs not only expanded the French Air Force’s airlift capacity, but also helped relieve the small, over-committed fleet of 11 C-135F tankers. These tankers originally purchased from the United States for in-flight refueling of the Mirage IVA nuclear bombers, were increasingly called upon to refuel other combat aircraft as the number of Mirage F-I and Jaguars with an in-flight refueling capability grew.

Airlift capabilities in the French Air Force inventory still do not meet requirements. At one time, the French Air Force reportedly considered purchasing second-hand C-141 Starlifter transports from the United States, but the US Air Force could ill-afford to spare even a dozen Starlifters. Instead, in the fall of 1987, France decided to purchase a dozen C-130 Hercules to boost long-range, heavy capacity airlift capabilities. France has also relied on the two French airlines, Air France and UTA, to complement its military airlift assets and, on occasion, has asked the United States for assistance which was gladly granted (Military Airlift Command C-141 and C-5 aircraft, respectively, airlifted French paratroopers to Zaire in 1977 and Improved Hawk batteries to Chad in 1966).

Still, the establishment of FAR in 1983 has added a new dimension to French power-projection capabilities by consolidating under a single command units with diverse but complementary capabilities and a long experience in overseas operations. However, if operations Manta and Epervier in Chad are indicative, the French have apparently shied away from giving the Commander of the FAR (COMFAR) exclusive responsibility for overseas power-projection operations. Instead, in Chad the French have relied on the more traditional approach of appointing a lower ranking general officer, with the generic title of ‘Commander of the French Elements’ (COM-ELEF), who reports directly to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces in Paris. COMFAR has seemingly incurred the more demanding task of planning both a FAR engagement in Central Europe alongside the Allies and a large-scale, rapid deployment operation in the western Mediterranean.

In place of the Sterne joint services exercises of the old Force Interarmées d’Intervention, the FAR conducts, in alternate years, a major power-projection exercise on France’s Atlantic (Korrigan) and Mediterranean (Farfadet) coasts, involving elements of the various FAR divisions. In recent years, an increasingly more important part
of French overseas intervention capabilities has been use of rotary-wing aircraft, belonging to the French Army Light Aviation Corps (ALAT), from naval platforms such as an aircraft carrier reconfigured to a helicopter carrier. In December 1982, 10 Puma medium transport helicopters of the ALAT, which had deployed to Senegal for the *N'Diambour III* exercise on board the aircraft carrier *Foch*, returned to France on their own, covering a distance of some 3,500 kilometers in four days.\(^6\) For *Farfadet 85*, held in June 1985, 40 Gazelle and 23 Puma helicopters flew from their home base at Phalsbourg in eastern France to the carrier *Foch*, cruising off the French Mediterranean coast. Then they flew in support of an amphibious assault by the FAR’s 6th Armored Cavalry Division.\(^6\) In April 1987, 40 Gazelle and 20 Puma helicopters participated in exercise DAMTAM 87, involving a sequence of flights from their home bases at Phalsbourg, Etain, and Pau (near the Pyrénées) to the aircraft carrier *Clémenceau* in the Mediterranean and back to their garrisons; the helicopters flew some 2,000 kilometers during 4 days.\(^6\) This emerging seaborne airborne capability could well be a critical element in western Mediterranean contingencies requiring a rapid reaction, such as a hypothetical French deployment to Tunisia to counter an external threat from a neighboring country.

To match a progressive upgrade in combat and logistical capabilities, the French Armed Forces have also improved their C^3_I means for managing extra-European crises and conducting power-projection operations. French forces based overseas are linked to the Armed Forces Operations Center (*Centre Opérationnel des Armées*) in Paris through the Navy-operated Joint Worldwide Communications Organization (*Organisation Mondiale Interarmées des Transmissions*), a network of nine high-frequency ground stations around the world. OMIT is complemented by the Syracuse satellite communications system which links the COA with four French overseas garrisons via the Telecom 1B satellite.\(^6\) In a contingency, the COMFAR or the local COMELEF would communicate with the COA from a remote overseas location using Syracuse satellite links and TGP long-haul radio links (both the Syracuse and TGP ground stations are air-transportable by Transall as the *Comoe 84* exercise in the Ivory Coast proved).

Current French “out-of-area” deployments in Chad, the Arabian Sea, and elsewhere clearly show that France, unlike other Alliance
partners which are extremely cautious about using military forces outside Europe as an instrument of foreign policy, does not share such inhibitions.

PROSPECTS

Alone in Western Europe, France maintains a versatile defense posture: a strategic nuclear triad of bombers, silo-based and submarine-launched intermediate-range ballistic missiles; ground-based, airborne, and seaborne non-strategic ("prestrategic") nuclear forces; and conventional forces configured for coalition warfare in Central Europe, "out-of-area" operations, and home defense. The French defense posture is, in a sense, a microcosm of the defense posture of the United States, and can be summed up in the words, "A grandes ambitions, grands moyens."

De Gaulle saw France's assumption of a "global," national defense posture as a logical consequence of, and a necessary prerequisite for developing an independent nuclear deterrent. By the mid-1970s, France had introduced the Redoutable SSBN into operational service, fielded the Pluton, and received official acknowledgment from the Allies of her contribution (and the United Kingdom's) to Alliance deterrence at the spring 1974 ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Ottawa. Hence, the French requirement to assert independence from NATO gradually lost much of its validity and legitimacy. Few in NATO seriously anticipate that France will rejoin the integrated military structure as it exists today, yet everyone firmly expects she will play an increasingly important role in the defense of Western Europe.

How to reconcile France's world power ambitions with her necessarily limited resources and her European destiny is the greatest challenge confronting French defense planning for the foreseeable future. Already, the size and quality of French conventional forces are at odds with common defense responsibilities in Central Europe which France might have to assume in the future, particularly as her security partnership with the Federal Republic of Germany expands. While exercise Kecker Spatz/Moineau Hardi was another encouraging sign of France's new readiness to shoulder her fair share of the common defense burden, it also revealed some weaknesses in the French Army's ability to fight in a high-intensity conflict environment. In this regard, the French have given priority to the AMX Leclerc main battle tank, the MLRS fire-support system, and the
Orchidée airborne battlefield surveillance system in their Army procurement plans. Decision-makers in Paris are committed to correcting the most glaring French deficiencies in a continuing effort to improve Franco-German defense cooperation.

French participation in the exercises *Fraenkischer Schild* and *Kecker Spatz* in September 1986 and 1987, respectively, within a relative short distance from the FRG’s eastern borders, apparently implies a greater French willingness to engage the First French Army and the FAR in a genuine “forward defense” role. At this time, however, it is doubtful that France is either politically ready or militarily prepared to make a formal commitment to NATO’s “layered cake” deployment involving the peacetime stationing of French troops in Bavaria opposite Austria and Czechoslovakia. Given that the nominal combat strength of a West German or a US corps is approximately twice that of a French corps, France would have to restation a disproportionately large segment of the First French Army (two out of three corps) to occupy and defend a vacant allied corps sector. Furthermore, the accompanying increase in manpower levels (predominantly conscripts) in the FRG to 100,000 men (bringing the French Army’s presence on West German soil, expressed as a percentage of the French Army’s total manpower strength, close to the Belgian and British ratios) could well represent an insurmountable political obstacle (see table 9.8).65

Nor is it obvious that West Germany’s best interest includes requesting French ground forces to redeploy forward from their present garrisons in Baden Wuerttemberg and the Rhineland-Palatinate. In considering the wisdom of such a request, Bonn must weigh the political requirement for involving French ground forces early on against the competing military requirement for preserving the First French Army’s conventional combat potential intact in the rear combat zone in case hostilities require a counter-attack. Ironically, the issue of whether or not French forces ought to be moved forward may not be settled in Paris and Bonn, but in Washington—particularly if untimely proposals for US Army troop withdrawals from Europe become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Deciding what France’s future “out-of-area” presence and power-projection capabilities should be is a no less thorny problem than determining how France should contribute to the security of her closest neighbor and ally. With approximately 34,000 men deployed overseas (Africa, Near-East, Indian Ocean, South Pacific, and West
9.8—COMPARATIVE CORPS STRENGTHS AND FORCE LEVELS

COMPARATIVE NOMINAL STRENGTHS OF A FRENCH, WEST GERMAN, AND US CORPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FR Corps</th>
<th>GE Corps</th>
<th>US Corps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main battle tanks</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field artillery tubes (155mm)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field artillery tubes (203mm)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The German Leopard II and US M-1A1 tanks are significantly more capable than the French AMX-30B2 tank.

ALLIED LAND FORCES STATIONED IN THE FRG AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ARMY STRENGTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Army Strength</th>
<th>Army Levels in the FRG</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>67,500</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>22,500</td>
<td>4,400</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>279,900</td>
<td>48,000</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>68,000</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>158,700</td>
<td>56,200</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>774,100</td>
<td>204,700</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Indies), half of them belonging to the army, France’s “out-of-area” military presence and power-projection operations represent a serious drain on the Ministry of Defense’s resources.66

For the Alliance, France’s “out-of-area” forces have been an important component of Western security outside Europe, even though Paris has consistently resisted formal multinational arrangements. Such arrangements would limit France’s freedom of action, imply a NATO role beyond the North Atlantic Treaty area, or associate French policies with those of the United States in the eyes of non-aligned nations. It is not altogether clear, therefore, that the Alliance should welcome reductions in France’s “out-of-area” military presence and power-projection capabilities. Reduced French presence might shift even further the burden of defending Western security interests outside the NATO area to the United States, even though such reduction would help France meet her other defense missions. A partial solution may be for other European members of the Alliance to assume a greater “out-of-area” role, combining economic assistance and military presence. In this regard, West European participation in mine-clearing operations in the Red Sea and, more recently,
the dispatch of warships by the United Kingdom, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands to the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea—and West Germany’s subsequent decision to deploy three vessels to the Mediterranean—represent hopeful signs.

France has received accolades for its national security resolve from as unlikely a supporter of her autonomous stance within the Alliance as the NATO secretary-general, even though Joseph Luns and Lord Carrington have cautioned that other allied nations should not emulate France’s policies vis-à-vis NATO. The greatest challenge facing the French body politic in the foreseeable future will be the preservation of the existing national consensus on the Fifth Republic’s defense policy while adjusting France’s defense posture to an evolving strategic environment. In all likelihood such an environment will be characterized by resource constraints, less reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence and defense, and an expanding West European role in Alliance and “out-of-area” security.

President Mitterrand has already indicated a willingness to reconsider the role of French prestrategic nuclear weapons in the context of the Franco-German security partnership. In December 1987, Prime Minister Chirac expressly excluded any French option of non-belligerency in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict by emphatically declaring that if West Germany were attacked, “France’s engagement would be immediate and without reservations.” Mitterrand and Chirac’s statements have potentially far-reaching implications for France’s long-term arms procurement plans and defense planning in ways more congenial to overall Alliance interests. In this context, a follow-on step in France’s resolve to fortify NATO mobilization would be making French territory once again available to the Alliance, particularly to help expedite the US reinforcement process during tension or war. Chirac’s sibylline statement of September 1986 deserves, in this regard, closer scrutiny.
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Endnotes


5. This finding does not contradict Phillip A. Karber's statement that "The entire French Army, including all the metropolitan mechanized divisions, does not equal the firepower of one US corps," Armed Forces Journal International (June 1987), p. 134.


15. Ibid., p. 127.


22. For maps of the CEPS and ACE "High" networks in France, see David S. Yost, op. cit., pp. 70 and 74, respectively.


30. For a more extensive treatment of the DOT, see Alain Bizard, "La Défense opérationnelle du Territoire (DOT)," *Pouvoirs*, No. 38 (1986), pp. 87-97; and "La Défense Opérationnelle du Territoire," *Armées d'Aujourd'hui*, No. 105 (November 1985), pp. 29-44.


35. Figures on reserve manpower strength were extracted from a special issue of the magazine *Armées d'Aujourd'hui* devoted to the reserves. See "Les Armées et les réserves," *Armées d'Aujourd'hui*, No. 121 (June 1987), pp. 23-45.


64. For information on the OMIT worldwide communications system, see Capitaine de corvette Jean-Christophe Collonier, "Organisation Mondiale Interarmées des Transmissions," Armées d'Aujourd'hui, No. 123 (September 1987), pp. 52-53.


70. In 1986, a Luftwaffe tactical reconnaissance wing equipped with RF-4F Phantom aircraft was temporarily relocated for a period of nine weeks to the French Air Force airfield at Colmar, in Alsace, while the runways at its home base in West Germany were being renovated. In 1987, the Colmar air base hosted Ample Gain 87/1, a NATO aircraft cross servicing exercise involving aircraft from nine countries, the first such exercise ever to take place at a French airfield. At a time when NATO may be investigating alternate basing options in Central Europe to the present beddown structure in West Germany, these two unprecedented events, although isolated at Colmar, could be a forerunner of a greater French willingness to allow allied aircraft to stage missions from airfields in France in wartime. See "La Luftwaffe s'installe en France," Le Monde, 25 April 1986; and "Ample Gain Meet 87/1," Air Actualités (July-August 1987), pp. 48-49.
The United Kingdom

We are but warriors for the working day,
W. Shakespeare, Henry V,
Act IV, Scene 3, line 109

Shakespeare often summarizes best. In one line, set on the field of Agincourt, he contrasts not only the appearance of the bedraggled British Army with their glimmering French opponents but their differing make-up as well. The French are nobles and men at arms, bred to battle, along with Genoese mercenaries, while Shakespeare depicts King Henry's British troops as immature, traitorous, crooked, quarrelsome, and ethnically divided. The British men at arms are hardly professional soldiers (Henry V stands as evidence) and their infantry are not veteran mercenaries but yeomen mobilized from their farms in England, Wales, and Ireland. Shakespeare's description fits not only Henry V's army, but George III's and George V's, as well as their twentieth-century successors. These British armies were "but warriors for the working day," usually amateurs at war—including, often, those who spent a career in uniform—yet, as at Agincourt, they carried the day and the victory. If the splendid empires of Henry V or the Georges did not endure, the failings were not due to their fighting men. British mobilization, then and now, is an issue that has shaped the world and how we, as English-speakers, view it. Even today, it is more than just men and
weapons; their effective mobilization and use are crucial to success in war.

HISTORICAL MOBILIZATION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

In 1914, just as it was in the Crimean and the Boer Wars, mobilization meant gathering up the British regular army and sending them overseas. British mobilization in 1914 emphasized deploying regular forces to the Continent rather than the full political and economic mobilization that the challenge of total war would eventually require. Post-Boer War reforms had led to a small but efficient British Army with Continental force projection capabilities. World War I's British Expeditionary Force (BEF) represented the first British peacetime continental commitment (although one based in Great Britain) since the seventeenth century. The regular divisions earmarked for the BEF received help from Territorial Force divisions (the reformed and reorganized Volunteers of the nineteenth century) for home and imperial defense. The Royal Navy remained Britain's bulwark, and in 1914 its ships were fully manned and in their mobilization stations even before war was ever declared.

In August, 1914 the limited British mobilization system proved capable of rapid response. The Navy was ready. The BEF strengthened by recalled reservists, left its barracks for Southampton and the battlefields of 1914 more quickly and efficiently than the second BEF, that of 1939, was to do. In 1914, the BEF reached its assembly areas in Northern France with only one fatality: a general who died of a heart attack in a troop train.

The Territorials, though crippled by limited and outdated equipment and a lack of formation-level training, mobilized successfully in 1914. They were not a mobilization base for a large, national army on the continental model, but were intended to release regular troops for BEF service. Still, Territorial battalions saw action before the decisive battles of early World War I ended. In 1914, Britain had a limited trained manpower pool available compared to the conscripted millions of European armies and the many volunteers who had flocked to join lengthy training before entering combat. In fact, ad hoc arrangements expanded the Territorials and provided 30 new "Kitchener's Army" divisions.

In Britain, as throughout Europe, the war eventually led to industrial, social, and military mobilization, fundamentally changing
all facets of life. Mobilization, however, was slow. Until 1916, while the Royal Navy controlled the seas, neither British industry nor the British Army amounted to more than a junior partner of the French. Only with the Battle of the Somme and a resolved “shell crisis” in 1916 did Britain consider herself mobilized. In fact, the heavy losses on the Western Front led the British to adopt conscription for the first time in their history.

After the War, Britain rejected proposals for configuring the army to allow for re-mobilizing large forces for sustained combat in Europe. Instead, the Army shrank to pre-war proportions and structure. Financial cuts forced disbanding and combining fighting regiments. The Territorial Force was actually disbanded for some time. In the decades that followed, mobilization was not a priority issue in British military thinking, although all services considered reserve forces and options. Particularly noteworthy were the Royal Air Force’s Auxiliary Air Force squadrons, reserve forces using first-line aircraft that contributed so much to its wartime combat strength.

Munich in 1939 meant a new mobilization, minus the cheering crowds of August 1914. Despite this crisis, full mobilization, as in World War I, took almost two years. In the end, the degree of British national mobilization was among the most complete ever seen, although US aid made much of this possible.

Post-1945 Britain has witnessed no shortage of military action, including, to name just a few:

1945–48—Palestine—anti-terrorist campaign
1948–61—Malaya—Communist insurgency
1950–53—Korea—Communist invasion (UN operation)
1952–56—Kenya—Mau-Mau uprising
1955–58—Cyprus—counter-insurgency campaign
1956—Suez
1962–66—Borneo—Indonesian confrontation
1963 to present—Cyprus—UN peacekeeping operation
1964–67—South Yemen—insurgency
1969–76—Oman—Dhofar operations
1969 to present—Northern Ireland
1976 to present—Belize—vigilance on Guatemalan border
1982—Falklands War

In addition, since the end of World War II, nearly five times as many incidents of a “minor” nature occurred as formerly that have required the presence of British troops, ships, or aircraft.
Post-1945 British conflicts and commitments outside of Europe have been handled—as they had been before 1939—without mobilization of non-regular service elements. Manpower came from the traditional British regulars and from peacetime conscription ("National Service") which lasted from 1949 to 1960, the last conscript mustering out in 1963. During this period two-year conscripts constituted about half the Army and a lesser percentage of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force.

For example, Britain contributed its regular-force units: the Commonwealth Division to UN operations in Korea, beginning with the 27th Brigade from Hong Kong in August of 1950, followed by the 29th Brigade—as well as a strong Royal Navy contribution (plus RAF transport and patrol aircraft). In Britain the Korean War spurred the largest post-war defense build-up and paved the way for the relatively threadbare post-1945 force structure to become a viable military force once more.

Three factors have contributed to a change in British force structure: decolonization, the emergence of the superpowers, and atomic weapons. Britain exploded its first nuclear weapon in 1952, and subsequently, during the late fifties and early sixties, British reliance on nuclear strategy, added to dwindling overseas garrisons, lowered Army resources and strength. In the decade following Suez and the 1957 defense review, the Army declined from 77 infantry battalions to 56; from 30 armored regiments to 19; and from 69 artillery regiments to 20. The Navy, its wartime ships now obsolete, suffered even more dramatic reductions. The RAF, in part because it had the nuclear deterrent role, fared better in the opening defense cuts, but its tactical forces were reduced as procurement and operating costs increased and research and development programs failed to produce results. In fact, RAF Germany lost 50 percent of its tactical aircraft following the 1957 White Paper.

Even before completing the "retreat from east of Suez," in the early 1970s, the British military focused attention primarily on Europe and the NATO defense commitment. Fortunately, enough flexibility remained in the British system of mobilization to cope with unforeseen events such as sending a Royal Navy task force and two brigades of troops across thousands of miles of ocean and sustaining their operations so they could liberate the Falklands from a numerically superior enemy.
CURRENT LESSONS FROM HISTORICAL MOBILIZATION

Lessons from historical mobilizations provide limited value in the modern world. The industries and attitudes of August 1914 are long gone. In both World Wars Britain enjoyed an extended mobilization period. However, today's threats—high, medium, or low intensity—are unlikely to be so accommodating. Therefore, historical mobilizations yield no precise overall blue-print for future action. In fact, a future British mobilization for war will probably resemble a greatly expanded Falklands mobilization.

The Falklands mobilization's lessons certainly apply to a potential future limited conflict. The mobilization was more extensive than any since 1945 because of the long distances, anticipated conventional opposition, and British economy measures since the 1950s which had pushed functions of the active force structure into the civil sector or the military training base. Two examples of this force conversion are: the rapid acquisition and conversion of the STUFT (Ships Taken Up From Trade) fleet and the formation of operational squadrons from Fleet Air Arm training units.

The ability to draw on the full range of national resources during mobilization is especially important for medium powers such as Britain. Britain cannot deploy large peacetime forces, especially when hardware, operating, and personnel costs are far higher than those of previous decades. The British insistence on hard and intense training (a force multiplier seen as a justification for small, professional forces) means that operations and maintenance funding considerations will be more significant to the British than to some of their allies.

Despite the pervasive impact of the "British disease" and enduring root-and-branch economic problems, Britain remains—along with its Western and Northern European NATO allies—a relatively prosperous country with a strong economy and society. The challenge is to convert this non-military strength to military power. Today, the Soviet Union, its economy much less efficient than that of Western Europe, is actually much more efficient in turning its overall national strength into military power. Edward Luttwak estimates the Soviets are five times more efficient, assuming Soviet battlefield parity with opponents whose combined economy is at least five times as large.

The Soviet system cannot, obviously, be implemented in the West. Mobilization provides much of the Soviet weight in terms of
the theatre balance in Europe—a balance that has become more significant with the December 1987 double zero arms control agreement. Today, no Western European nation is going to devote a percentage of GNP comparable to that of the Soviet Union to defense. A NATO goal, especially since the emergence of (MC 14/3) flexible response strategy, is to find a more efficient way to yield military power from the resources invested. If NATO is ever to close some of the conventional forces gap between East and West, it must look to mobilization assets. Britain is among NATO’s most effective users of mobilization as a way to create military power, shown by the Falklands and the experience of a decade of exercises.

Yet there are limits to what mobilization assets can be expected to accomplish. Territorial Army (TA) units include skilled infantry battalions such as the 1st Battalion, Wessex Volunteers, and the Territorial battalions of the Parachute Regiment. These are good troops, and in specific skills competition may even surpass their regular force counterparts, yet they are not as flexible as the regular battalions.\(^3\) The successful use of STUFT in the Falklands does not mean that the days of the Armada (when merchantmen and men o’ war could be used interchangeably) have returned—even with pre-designed bolt-on modular weapons and sensor packages (which the British still lack). Even the RAF Reliant, using the more sophisticated ARAPAHO helicopter system, has encountered problems.\(^4\) The use of mobilization assets—not just reserve forces, but those found throughout the economy—is certainly cost-effective; hence, countries such as the Soviet Union and Israel rely heavily on them. But it is not realistic to count on them as being as efficient as the British regular force structure, with its strong emphasis on training and the quality of individual components.

The resources that Britain needs to mobilize for a future conflict go beyond forces, transport, and industry. If one accepts the postulate that a short, sharp war is what will probably occur, the indicators of national power are in the process of changing. In traditional terms, a nation’s strength depends on the number of divisions or warships; if economic indicators are examined, steel production, currency reserves, access to raw materials (especially energy) are what count.

However, if a war is likely to be short and sharp (an assumption that certainly merits question), the non-quantifiable factors take on additional importance. Sheer number of warships, for example, will mean less if their electronic warfare suites are not adequate in modern
conditions. In a short war, the economic indicators will also mean less.

In a future conflict, significant numbers of new main battle tanks, frigates, or fighter planes are unlikely to be produced quickly. What can and must be done quickly, however, is to modify and adapt existing assets (both military and civilian) to a changing situation: writing new software for a missile's fire control computer to allow it to deal with an emerging threat or modifying merchant ships to operate in combat zones (both examples from the Falklands War). Such adaptation does not require a large manufacturing base, but rather an ability to keep up in the thrust and parry of conflict using technology that, to a large extent, remains new and untried.

A crucial element in this type of modern “post-industrial” mobilization is the ability to “surge” not only production but procedures. Democracies such as Britain and the United States have organized their defense establishments for smooth peacetime running, minimizing internal conflict rather than maximizing efficiency. They are not really configured for wartime and quick, responsive action. While the British succeeded in the Falklands, the inertia of peacetime and bureaucratic modes of action are difficult to overcome—short of a complete wartime mobilization.¹⁵

One vital area where peacetime procedures can be modified is in the development and procurement of systems. The slow peacetime pace of British research, development, and procurement simply are unacceptable when mobilization becomes immediate. In the Falklands War, in a matter of weeks the British rapidly developed and deployed a number of systems that would have taken years under normal conditions. While some improvisations (such as STUFT) came from pre-war planning, others were reactions to the circumstances of the war. These included the developing and deploying of an Airborne Early Warning version of the Sea King helicopter and improved electronic warfare equipment for Lynx helicopters.¹⁶ It included retrofitting different types of aircraft for mid-air refueling and for carrying a wider range of munitions, and up-arming ships.

In a free market economy, a wide range of civil-sector assets can also play a critical role in mobilization. The civil communications system can supplement military needs. Car washes can become NBC decontamination stations. In fact, twentieth-century British mobilizations have all included effective use of scarce assets from the civil
sector. For example, in 1914, a number of double-decker London motor busses were rushed, with their drivers, to the Continent during the final, decisive stages of the First Battle of Ypres to provide the personnel transport that the BEF lacked. The contemporary equivalent may include the civil helicopter fleet that supports the North Sea oil fields, just as the STUFT were the post-industrial equivalent of the armed merchant cruisers and troop transport liners of 1914.

However, the effective use of civil sector mobilization assets requires planning and encouragement long before mobilization. Thus, prior to 1914, the Army had established a reserve of motor vehicles, allowing an annual payment for mobilizable trucks as well as a bounty for trucks constructed to military specifications. This lower-cost alternative, in the absence of defense funding, allowed large-scale motorization of the regular force structure, including much of the Army's available motor transport in 1914. Today's helicopters, like the trucks of 1914, are high-technology items required for effective mobility. While potentially mobilizable, civilian helicopters, airliners, and crews—like their US Civil Reserve Air Fleet counterparts—each have limited capabilities and training, but they could still provide a much needed supplement.

World War II mobilization was not limited to transportation or industrial mobilization. The British COMINT and cryptanalysis efforts which yielded such significant results came largely from the mobilization of civil-sector assets. While today's compressed time-frames and increased level of professionalism make such repetition unlikely, the history of the successful use of civil-sector assets points the way to future mobilizations, in large part of necessity.

Mobilization plans will likely be improvised or modified ad hoc, even if not quite on the scale of 1914. For example, personnel mobilization for the Falklands, with the exception of a few specialists, did not include Territorial or Reserve individuals or sub-units. Rather, as with almost all British out-of-area actions since 1945, the government did not recall reservists to bring battalions up to strength. Instead, because only a limited force was needed, shortfalls came from volunteers among serving personnel (which invariably well exceed need) from depots, or other units, training staffs, and soldiers extra-regimentally employed. During the Falklands, many reservists with mobilization orders reported after hearing news reports, some coming from overseas at personal expense, but they did not go into
uniform. Similarly, Territorial sub-units that were part of deploying regular units did not go to the Falklands (such as 289 Commando Battery Royal Artillery (V), part of 29 Commando Regiment Royal Artillery in Third Commando Brigade). Out-of-area commitments will, in the future as in the past, likely be the sole concern of the regular force structure. In a general mobilization, of course, all such limits are likely to vanish. For example, Territorial forces were quickly sent overseas in both World Wars and would immediately deploy to Germany in a future mobilization.

In combat there have always been too few British infantry—not only in the World Wars, but also during extensive peacetime commitments. At the height of the commitment to Northern Ireland, Royal Armoured Corps, Royal Artillery, and Royal Corps of Transport units served as infantry. Artillery units were frequently employed as infantry in post-1945 out-of-area conflicts, although these responses were due more to tactical requirements than force structure constraints. Historical experience suggests that large-scale manpower shortages would likely follow in the wake of any future mobilization. British reserve forces in all services tend to consist largely of specialists needed to support the full force structure when it is mobilized, rather than a surplus of combat arms units. Britain lacks a dedicated mobilization force structure set up in peacetime to re-raise the large armies of the World Wars.

Changes in the British force structure have created new requirements for mobilization. Keeping all major systems fully equipped and capable has become more costly. British Army major weapons systems are largely kept in the regular force structure. Unlike the United States, Belgium, or the Netherlands, Britain has no reserve tank or mechanized infantry battalions and relatively little artillery.

The cost of major systems has forced Britain to keep up numbers at times, at the expense of the capability of each unit and to rely on mobilization to add capability. One recent illustration was the 1987 deployment of Royal Navy (RN) ships to the Persian Gulf where mine countermeasure vessels were equipped with ESM equipment, chaff launchers, SATCOM systems, and additional guns (even though RN stockpiles are unlikely to have enough of these systems to outfit all such vessels in the event of mobilization). Limited mobilizations, of course, permit concentrated resources that would not be possible in a general conflict. Thus, 3rd Commando Brigade’s air
defense troops with Javelin surface-to-air missiles enhanced the air
defense capability of RN ships in the Persian Gulf; however, using
these assets in this way in a general conflict would be impossible,
due to competing requirements.

Historically, Britain has had to supplement its own output with
overseas buys during mobilizations. The Japanese Arisaka rifles
bought to train Kitchener’s Army and the US Lockheed Hudson
patrol aircraft bought after Munich have modern precedents in the
Shrike and Harpoon missiles of the Falklands War, supplied from US
stocks to meet urgent operational needs. While none of this hardware
was a decisive factor, Britain knows it cannot depend on the avail-
ability of foreign arms. In a future general mobilization, it is unlikely
that other nations, including the United States, will have anything to
provide to the British, although unfamiliar sources would certainly be
exploited.

Britain’s capability to “surge” production in any future mobil-
ization will be limited because Britain now lacks as extensive a tradi-
tional base of heavy industries as it once had. Additionally, modern
weapons are less able to be “surged” than their 1940s predecessors,
primarily a function of the technology involved. A “postindustrial”
mobilization will have to write software, tweak black boxes, and
modify and employ existing civilian resources to compensate for
reduced surge production of major end-items.

Yet such high technology compensation for industrial limitation
can go only so far. Two very important items in a “post-industrial”
mobilization are spare parts and munitions. Both are likely to be con-
sumed at a high rate in a future general conflict. However, NATO is
generally expected to suffer substantial shortfalls in stockpiles of
spares and munitions. Their increasing complexity and cost, plus
NATO funding constraints, means not only that less money is avail-
able, but that unit costs are increasing. For these reasons, Britain can-
not sustain a prolonged conflict. Some surge production is possible,
but unless Britain can expand existing facilities, or even train new
workers for additional shifts, bottlenecks may limit production
increases. However, because industrial production increasingly
depends on robots rather than task-specific tooling, it may be easier
to adapt an automated factory to munitions production, especially if
the appropriate software has already been written and the required
raw materials are accessible.
British ability to effectively use overseas sources where they need it most—munitions and spare parts—may suffer from the often-discussed shortfalls in NATO standardization. This situation mandates investing in munitions and spares, particularly in areas where the domestic production base cannot deliver and sustain effective surge production. If British mobilization remains committed to a short-war scenario with in-place forces, technical adaptation, innovation or the use of civil sector resources, it will probably not overcome lack of munitions and spares.

Because surge production is unlikely to provide all the answers to the shortfalls between pre-war resources and mobilization needs, research must provide quick fixes to a vast range of problems. Britain devotes a higher percentage of its defense spending to research and development than any major European NATO member—a factor that might increase "post-industrial" general mobilization effectiveness for Britain, more than in other European NATO nations. British defense research and development remains extensive, despite cuts throughout the 1960s and 1970s and is a key element in contemporary mobilization. Many of the Falklands era improvisations were possible because industry cooperated, and Britain remains strong in high-technology areas where mobilization can still yield a significant short-term pay-off.

THE BRITISH RESERVE SYSTEM

The British Army is the service most heavily dependent on reserves to complement its fighting power. The reserve components of the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy (excluding the Royal Marines) are more limited in scope. For example, the British lack counterparts to the US Air National Guard fighter squadrons and Naval Reserve frigates and destroyers; although the RAF does maintain a few types of aircraft as attrition reserves and has recently added Royal Auxiliary Air Force airfield defense units.

The Royal Navy has maintained, in recent years, a Standby Squadron of ships available for operations but without crews, and with their systems maintained by preservation or operation. During the Falklands, the bulk of the Standby Squadron was recalled to service, manned by crews taken from shore and training establishments. Many of these ships, of course, lacked full capability because modern on-board systems were absent. This situation illustrates the tension between trying to maintain effective individual units and trying to
keep enough units for a viable force structure. Many ships have passed through the Standby Squadron on their way to being scrapped or sold abroad. The decision to prolong the lives of newer British surface escort ships to 26 years from the previous 18 means that assets will be on active service and no longer part of the Standby Squadron.

The British Army’s two reserve systems—the Reserve and the Territorial Army—total about 218,000 personnel. The Reserve (158,800 strong) is broken down into the Regular Reserve, Regular Army Reserve of Officers, Long-Term Reserve, and Army Pensioners. All have served in the regular Army at one time, and are subject to mobilization. The personnel are chiefly “fillers”, used to make up shortfalls in Army manning. There are no “army reserve” units on the US model; instead, Britain has a separate and distinct Territorial Army, a difference which reflects the historical origins of the two forces. Reserves receive minimal training after they leave the Army, though they may volunteer for courses. Reservists have “hip pocket orders” and know their mobilization assignments. They are liable to a yearly reporting exercise which has yielded about 93 percent attendance annually. Once mobilized, reservists in uniform would then report to centers within their District, and be sent on as battle casualty replacements or war establishment reinforcements. Operation Crusader in 1980 and Operation Lionheart in 1984 tested this movement forward of reservists to BAOR.

The Territorial Army (TA) of some 77,900 personnel will be increased to 86,000 by 1990. As late as 1965 the TA still boasted ten divisions and four separate brigades. Soon afterwards, defense cuts, declining manpower, and changed perceptions of the nature of war led to strength erosion and a name change to the TAVR or Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve in 1967. For the next decade, with its brigade and divisional headquarters disbanded, the TAVR was simply a collection of poorly equipped battalions, most with an ill-defined home-defense role. The TAVR was not a viable reserve force and did not significantly contribute to Britain’s war-fighting capability in Europe.

In 1979, the title Territorial Army was restored as part of an overall revival of a relatively economical part of the British force structure. Despite years of defense cuts, Britain wanted to preserve as high a proportion of “teeth to tail” in the active force structure as possible. The solution was to cut the regular service support force structure—which would only be required on mobilization—and to
recreate these assets, as part of the Territorial Army, making them less costly. In the 1980s, the revitalized Territorials assumed greater combat roles. In war, the TA will provide over 30 percent of the mobilized strength of BAOR and much of the home defense force. In the home defense mission, they will be augmented by the Home Service Force (HSF), formed in the 1980s and tasked with local defense.

The TA is fully integrated into the Army structure. Its Territorial battalions serve beside regular units in some UK-based brigades, with the units of the 2nd Division being a particularly good example. In addition, many TA units deploy to Germany annually to participate in joint maneuvers with BAOR. In the mid-1980s, the TA consisted of:

- 41 Infantry Battalions (21 Type “A”, 15 Type “B”, 3 Parachute, 2 Security),
- two SAS Regiments (these lack the counter-terrorist mission of the regular regiment and emphasize traditional special operations missions and so are considered by their members as the ‘real’ SAS),
- two Armoured Reconnaissance Regiments (armored cars),
- three Light Reconnaissance Regiments (Land Rovers),
- two artillery Field Regiments and one Battery (105mm gun),
- four Air Defence Regiments (Blowpipe SAM),
- three Observation Post Batteries,
- six Engineer Regiments (and several squadrons),
- the Honourable Artillery Company, (whose roles include target acquisition).

Since the late 1970s, Territorial units have been equipped along the same lines as their regular counterparts. However, in reality, these weapons and equipment are, at best, supplied on a reduced scale. Even BAOR-committed Territorial battalions, for example, have only six Milans.

TA members are volunteer part-time soldiers (the regular cadre of each battalion is small) who train for a minimum of one two-week period annually plus at least 12 additional days during the year. Unlike their US counterparts, recruits are not required to undergo full-time service for initial training. While this system means that the
overall entry-level training is less than in a comparable US unit, the TA can attract a high quality of recruit. Quite often, however, TA units (or at least their staffs) meet one evening each week and one weekend per month in addition to the annual two-week camp.31

The Territorials do not act as a mobilization base for a national army under conditions of general war, but they do meet these immediate missions: BAOR reinforcement, rear area security, and limited defense of the UK. The order of battle does not include cadre formation headquarters or training base formations.

Along with the limited munitions and spare parts stockpiles, such organization reflects overall British policy in an era of limited resources, geared to a short, sharp conflict. Even in the warm afternoon of Pax Britannica, the British have seldom maintained a peacetime force structure geared to a large-scale conflict.32 Should a future European war last more than a month or two, Britain may again have to improvise a general mobilization.

**FORCE STRUCTURE**

The traditional three British independent service ministries (Admiralty, War, and Air) became subordinate to a joint Ministry of Defense in 1963, with only the Secretary of State for Defense having cabinet rank. In the twentieth century, like the United States and unlike many continental countries, no single service has determined national policy or even defense policy. As in the United States, interservice rivalry in Britain makes "jointness" difficult and causes services to compete with each other for resource allocation.33 Such a situation only makes inter-allied cooperation, reasoning, and burden-sharing more difficult, and the entire thing makes NATO defense spending less efficient. British policy decisions continue to be driven by service-specific needs, rather than overall alliance force structure.

Under the Secretary of State for Defense is an assistant, the Minister of State for Defense, and the three Under-Secretaries for each of the individual services. The Chief of Defense Staff is the highest ranking military officer who, along with the Chiefs of Staff of the three services, forms the Chiefs of Staff Committee. All these bodies join together for major defense policy matters in the Defense Council.34

The Army General Staff is subordinate to the Central Defense Staff (of the Chief of Defense Staff) for operational matters.
Subordinate to the General Staff are the various commands of the British Army. The primary peacetime mission of the United Kingdom Land Forces (UKLF) is to recruit and train. The UKLF also includes the regular and Territorial brigades stationed in Ulster or earmarked to reinforce Europe. On mobilization, UKLF would command the UK Field Army, formed from home defense brigades. The British Army of the Rhine includes I (UK) Corps and British forces in Berlin. The other major commands located outside of the UK are: Hong Kong, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Belize, and the Falkland Islands.

British force structure has evolved slowly since 1945. In the 1950s, British Army thinking for conventional war centered on World War II equipment, operations, and tactics because of limited defense funding and because out-of-area commitments absorbed so much of its time and material and intellectual resources. The RN suffered from similar limitations, resulting in ships and aircraft which lagged behind emerging technology. The RAF fared better, not only because of its nuclear role but also because airpower seemed emphatic in a future general conflict.

The problems for the British Army force structure, both active and reserve, became acute when its weapons and tactics became obsolete in the late 1950s. While British cohesion and professionalism at the unit level remain unmatched in NATO—even during the era of National Service—British tactical evolution often lagged behind its allies. The Army slowly moved toward mechanized infantry in BAOR, with 1961 seeing the first battalion completely equipped with Saracen-wheeled APCs.

Under National Service, there was less need for weaponry to substitute for manpower. The four-division (three armor, one infantry), post-Korea BAOR was reduced after 1957. Into the mid-1960s Britain’s three divisions in Germany had only two armored brigades between them, and a total of four infantry brigades (not including the attached Canadian infantry brigade). By the late 1960s, however, tracked APCs were standard, and brigades adopted a “square” organization with two tank and two mechanized battalions each. In addition, Britain’s 3rd Division was “airportable.” Consisting of three infantry brigades of three battalions each, it was primarily oriented towards out-of-area missions, substituting for increasingly expensive and politically unrewarding overseas garrisons. Also active in the UK were the three battalions each of the 16th Parachute Brigade and the 44th (Territorial) Parachute brigade.
The British Army has reorganized numerous times in recent years. Despite Britain's persistent efforts to reconcile decreasing resources with an increasing threat, no apparent benefit has emerged. In 1976, Britain announced a new Army structure with an alleged 25 percent increase in combat power for BAOR—accomplished with no addition to personnel strengths! BAOR's three divisions were to again become four, each with two armoured regiments and three mechanized battalions (instead of the four and four previously). Internally, the brigade structure was cut out, and provision made for forming two ad hoc task forces within each division.

By December 1976, the 2nd Division had changed to the new structure. In 1977, the 3rd Division disbanded (the reduced out-of-area commitment had supposedly reduced the need for rapid reinforcement, so it was no longer designated as "airportable") and was reformed and restructured by January 1978 as the 3rd Armored Division in Germany. Field forces, larger than a brigade but smaller than a division, were merged with several infantry battalions supported by light artillery and armored car-equipped reconnaissance regiments.

Flaws in the new structure soon became apparent. The drain of 3,000 BAOR troops to Ulster caused some armored and mechanized battalions to reduce their fourth squadrons or companies to cadre status. Hence, the brigade echelon of command was restored in January 1981.

The next reorganization, announced in 1981 and completed in 1983, had the BAOR revert to three divisions. The 1st and 4th Divisions would have three triangular brigades each, and the 3rd Division two (being reinforced in war from UKLF). In late 1983, the 3rd Division's 6th Armored Brigade became 6th Airmobile Brigade for a test period. The 2nd Armored Division was disbanded and reformed in Britain as the 2nd Infantry Division with one regular and two TA brigades—its BAOR assets going to other units. An airborne capability returned in the form of 5th Airborne Brigade.

In 1987, the British Army focused on maximizing the strength of British forces in Germany. However, RAF Germany, while still a large commitment, does not equal the RAF assets allocated to air defense of Great Britain and the Atlantic battle. In addition to reinforcing Germany, UK-based brigades (organized from the former field forces in the early 1980s) had new commitments: AFNORTH,
airborne, out-of-area, and home defense. The home defense Territorial brigades retained their varying establishments due to missions and geographic considerations.

While the RAF turned away from reserve forces after 1957, the British Army’s use of Territorial and other non-regular units is at the forefront of NATO. The TA provides 30 percent of the Army’s mobilized strength at a cost of 4.5 percent of the 1985 Army budget (1.4 percent of the total defense budget); in 1985 the annual cost of a regular soldier committed to home defense was 12,000 pounds, a Territorial, 2,500 pounds, an HSF soldier, 575 pounds.

Territorial units have taken over much of the service support role for BAOR, as well as contributing much of the Lines of Communications area commitment. This situation followed the 1985 decision which sought to shift 4,000 men from support to combat positions. However, this emphasis on pushing much of the force committed to service support into either the reserves or civil sector means that BAOR could only fight a few days without mobilization taking place.

The Territorials are not the only force compensating for the rundown of the regular force structure. The defense reviews of the 1970s led Britain to replace military strategic mobility assets with mobilized civilian assets. For example, the RN’s aging commando carriers and the RAF’s Belfast, Britania, Beverly, Argosy, and Comet transports left service, generally coinciding with the run-down of the Army’s out-of-area commitments. Comparable equipment did not replace these mobility assets. Rather, the British decided to use civilian ships and aircraft, thus transferring a mission not to the reserves, but to the civil sector. Other mobility assets were fit into the training base, such as the pre-1982 use of the two amphibious warfare ships Fearless and Intrepid.

In addition, Britain has sought to optimize resources by contracting out support elements. Dockyards were a prime target of such policy. The 1985 estimates switched at least 800 jobs to contractors, particularly in transport, catering, depots, communications, and medical care. The Royal Military College of Science, Shrivenham, has become a civilian university. The target-towing and air-sea rescue duties of the RAF Marine Branch now belong largely to contractors, and proposals have surfaced to privatize RAF airborne search and rescue functions.
In addition to these policies, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Britain has tried to increase combat potential while minimizing cost in a number of ways. One way has been to give training forces an operational capability (for example, fitting many RAF Hawk trainers—including the Red Arrows flight demonstration team—with air-to-air gunsights and wiring them for all-aspect AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles and having them exercise in the air defense role with interceptors from 11 Group). Another approach has been to use operational units for training, rather than having dedicated training assets in the force structure. Examples include: the use of operationally equipped Royal Navy ships rather than dedicated training ships and use of a standard infantry battalion rather than a specialized demonstration unit at the School of Infantry, Warminster.

The increased emphasis on supplementing the small (and expensive) regular force structure can also be viewed as part of Britain’s remaining out-of-area commitments. Use of local armed forces dates to the earliest days of the Empire. Today, because of reduced regular forces overseas, local defense forces in Hong Kong, Gibraltar, and the Falklands constitute a significant percentage of the overseas commitment and have, like the Territorials, become a significant part of the force structure.

Part-time forces have also taken over much of the burden in Northern Ireland. The Ulster Defense Regiment has become a key element for peace-keeping in Ulster, with more troops on the ground than the active force. Ulster-based TA battalions are trained in a conventional role and avoid aid to the Civil Power tasks.

FORCE UTILIZATION

In this century, except for the brief gap between the withdrawal from Aden and the start of Ulster, the British military has always been in action somewhere. No action has involved a British NATO commitment, but some British military actions—although none involving actual combat—have aided other NATO members such as the Royal Navy’s commitment to the two “Cod Wars” with Iceland, and the 1964 and 1974 Cyprus crises. The British garrison at Gibraltar protects against action by Britain’s NATO ally, Spain, and was reinforced after the Falklands’ invasion.

All the British military operations since 1945 were either unilateral, (as in the Falklands); multilateral, because of Commonwealth or regional defense agreements (such as, for example, the support,
together with Australia and New Zealand, of Malaysia when it confronted Indonesia; or bilateral (such as agreements or commitments for the continued post-independence British presence in Belize).

Ulster has weighed heavily on the British Army since 1969. Other domestic British military commitments include operating vital services during disastrous strikes and industrial disputes which have characterized post-1945 British life. While no battle honors have been awarded for longshoreman's strikes, garbageman's strikes, and fireman's strikes—to name but a few domestic encounters—the Army performed admirably, although at considerable cost to its operating funds and training time.

In purely military terms, British armed forces have performed their tasks successfully. In contrast to all other nations involved outside Europe, there have been no military defeats in post-1945 British history. In addition, Britain has suffered no major political defeats except Suez in 1956 and even this event does not match the scale of defeats such as the United States in Southeast Asia, the French in Algeria, or the Portuguese in Africa. In fact, the British withdrawal from Empire may not have been well handled overall, but it took place with a minimum of military and political cost.

THE ROLE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE

Britain plays a central role in many NATO commands, including one of NATO's major commands, Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN), commanded by a British admiral (CINCHAN). While RN and RAF forces would operate under his command in wartime, other British forces would fall under SACLANT. While SACEUR's responsibility does not include the United Kingdom, he would control British forces in wartime through the major NATO commands: AFCENT, AFNORTH, and, possibly, AF SOUTH, plus the United Kingdom Air Command Region and the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF), which both contain substantial British contributions.

In AFCENT, the I (UK) Corps will be part of NORTHAG, whose commander is a British general. NORTHAG's air counterpart, 2 ATAF, also has a British commander and a heavy British contribution. This command reports to Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AAFCE), which is directly subordinate to AFCENT. These forces are all committed to NATO in peacetime, though the Berlin garrison is not. British forces committed to Norway and Denmark would come
under AFNORTH command. Although Britain no longer has large-scale forces committed to AFSOUTH, the forces on Cyprus, plus RAF and RN elements in the area, would be available if war breaks out.

British forces would come under NATO command only on mobilization, and, as noted in Chapter 1, the British government would have to transfer command or control of such forces. In peacetime, only the British forces committed to the AMF (which are based in the UK, and administered by UKLF) and those forces on quick reaction alert are subordinate to NATO command. In wartime, however, all British forces—except those needed for home defense and the defense of British overseas commitments—will likely fall under NATO command. Thus, Britain's commitment to NATO will be basically identical with any future national war effort.

Britain provides host nation support not only to many NATO training facilities, but also to many US military installations, representing all three services. The most important are bases for 3rd Air Force, in addition to other British airfields used by US air units in wartime.

FORCES DEPLOYMENT AND INTERACTION

British Army Of the Rhine (BAOR). V-E Day left the British occupying northwest Germany, with a force whose Army component by 1946 had shrunk to two divisions (the 2nd Infantry and the 7th Armored). RAF Germany suffered similar reductions. Two further BAOR divisions, the 11th Armored and the 6th Armored, were formed in the wake of Korea, in 1950 and 1952 respectively. Over the next two decades the strength of BAOR fluctuated from a high of about 77,000 to its present total of 55,000.

In 1987, on mobilization, BAOR will reach about 120,000 personnel, including individual reservists (to fill personnel shortfalls and take up various logistics functions), plus UK-based units of the regular army and the Territorial Army. The 19th Infantry Brigade, based in Britain, will "round out" 3rd Armoured Division. British Corps rear area security will come from the 2nd Infantry Division, while un-brigaded TA battalions will perform rear area security for the divisions. The TA parachute battalions will probably be the nucleus of an airportable reserve. A part of BAOR, but not I British Corps, are three infantry battalions and one tank squadron (with no artillery complement) of the Berlin Brigade.
In late 1980, the largest British test mobilization since World War II, Operation Crusader, took place, followed in 1984 by the even larger Operation Lionheart.45 Both exercises included the transport of 10,000 regulars and 20,000 Territorials and Reserves by air and sea to Germany for an exercise with BAOR. Because some heavy equipment stocks were held in Germany, sea transport of vehicles were kept to a minimum.

The exercises were both well-planned and successful, with most units arriving in the battle area within 48 hours. For example, during Operation Crusader, the sea landed echelon included 15,000 troops with equipment in 40 transport vessels (60 sailings) which left ports throughout south and west England and arrived safely at Ostend and Zeebrugge (see, Chapter 13 “Belgium: The Strategic Hub”). The air-landed echelon included 15,000 troops (10,000 by commercial air; 5,000 by RAF transports), leaving from civil and RAF airfields throughout Britain and arriving at Frankfurt, RAF Gutersloh, and Brussels. Additionally, 49 trains (27 transport, 17 stores, 4 ammunition, one ambulance) successfully supported this operation.46

The mobilization and reinforcement of BAOR is certainly a frequently-exercised and well thought-out procedure. In addition to CPXs and staff exercises, the British feel they must hold large-scale exercises such as Crusader and Lionheart, despite their expense. In fact, the British have planned another such exercise in 1988 which they hope will surpass preceding ones, although funding cuts may greatly reduce its scope. Such British investment in effectively mobilizing and reinforcing BAOR will likely yield positive results in a future conflict—unless extensive enemy action blocks it. NATO should feel assured that such well-exercised large-scale redeployments such as the US Reforger and Crested Cap series will favorably affect the theatre balance in Europe. Such quick British movement may well counteract the slower movement of, for example I (Netherlands-NL), I (French-FR) and III (FR) Corps in case of mobilization.

Other NATO Commitments. From 1945 until the mid-1960s, the Army’s intense out-of-area commitments mandated a larger Army presence overseas than at home.47 In the mid-1980s, 30 percent of the Army was based in Germany with another 10 percent in out-of-area commitments, while nearly 60 percent remain in Britain and Ulster.

The 1st Infantry Brigade, under UKLF command in peacetime, is tasked to deploy, on mobilization, to AFNORTH command, which
means Jutland or Schleswig-Holstein. Britain's contribution to the Allied Mobile Force (Land) is one infantry battalion, one reconnaissance squadron, one field battery (105mm light guns), one artillery regiment HQ (which serves as AMF artillery HQ), one artillery survey and troop locator, one independent field engineering troop, and one air flight (Gazelle helicopters). In addition, the RAF provides a squadron of Jaguars and a squadron of Harriers, as well as a flight of Puma helicopters. For AMF South contingencies, the infantry battalion is deleted.

UKLF also commands an out-of-area projection force (5th Airborne Brigade), which fought in the Falklands as 5th Infantry Brigade. As presently constituted, the brigade has a parachute assault capability, including artillery, and can rapidly intervene in non-European settings or serve as a home defense reserve reaction force. This force, however, may be released to NATO command.

Ulster. The Army's pre-1969, Ulster-based force of three battalions (trained for conventional combat rather than internal security) rose by 1970-71 to an average of 13 battalions, organized into three brigades: 39th in Belfast, 8th in Londonderry, and 3rd along the Irish Republic border. The Army's strength peaked at over 21,000 men in 1972. Over the past decade, the Army has kept between 13,000 and 15,000 regular troops in Ulster, some serving for three-year resident tours while others serve four-month roulement tours. In 1987, the regular force presence was reduced to six resident and two roulement battalions, plus two battalions on "emergency" short deployments. The reduced troop level has eliminated the 3rd Brigade.

Throughout the history of the commitment, but especially in the early 1970s, the Ulster situation has upset normal unit training and rotation, and kept heavy weapons' personnel, as well as armor and artillery crewmen, away from their primary functions. This situation has hurt the readiness of BAOR at the peak commitment times because up to seven battalions might be absent from Germany for duty in Ulster. Still, these forces can return to Central Europe within 72 hours.

New tactics and equipment were developed to deal with the Ulster situation. The British have placed more emphasis on patrolling and short-range marksmanship. That the situation in Ulster has improved, even if it shows no signs of ultimate resolution, is in large part due to the British Army's adaptation to this most difficult form of military operations.
Security forces in Northern Ireland include the Ulster Defense Regiment (UDR) of locally raised men and women. The nine-battalion UDR is about 7,500 strong, of which 2,200 are full-time personnel, with the remaining 5,300 being part-time active security forces.\(^4\)

**Out-of-Area Commitments.** At the two Sovereign Base Areas on Cyprus, the Army normally deploys one-and-a-half infantry battalions and a reconnaissance squadron; it also contributes half an infantry battalion and a reconnaissance squadron to the United Nations Force. Resident RAF presence now is limited to helicopters, the days of the Cyprus-based Vulcan bomber force being long gone.\(^4\)

One battalion is at Gibraltar on a two-year posting, during which it must periodically rotate its companies home to Britain for training. Up to seven Territorial companies per year visit Gibraltar to fill in for absent regular troops. A locally raised unit, The Gibraltar Regiment, has a rifle company and a composite artillery battery with 105mm light guns, Blowpipe SAMs, and two Exocet coast defense missile-launching platforms—similar to those that damaged H.M.S. **Glamorgan** in the Falklands. There is no permanent RAF operational element.

Hong Kong's Army garrison consists of one British and four Gurkha infantry battalions and supporting troops, supplemented by RAF helicopters and a RN inshore protection squadron. Aside from border patrol and internal security training, the Hong Kong garrison detaches companies to Brunei and elsewhere for six weeks' annual jungle training. One Gurkha battalion is normally deployed in Brunei on a two-year tour.

Belize-based forces consist of a reinforced infantry battalion, divided into two battle groups, with supporting light artillery and reconnaissance units. RAF support includes Harrier fighter-bombers. The six-month tours emphasize practical jungle training.

In the Falklands, Britain maintains a naval presence and an RAF commitment, including Phantom interceptors and helicopters. An infantry company on short tour is stationed at RAF Mount Pleasant, in a large all-weather barracks complex known as "The Death Star". A small local militia company, the Falkland Islands' Defense Force, has been re-equipped since the war and contributes to the security effort.
THE NATIONAL FORCE STRUCTURE:
LONG-RANGE PROSPECTS

By 1987, it appeared likely that, overall, NATO could not sustain the growth level in defense spending that prevailed in the early 1980s. This same situation will likely prevail in Britain. Numerous politically significant and expensive procurement programs will require funding in the near future, especially the Trident-SLBM armed submarines of the V-boat force. Other research and development programs, especially the European Fighter Aircraft, will also absorb funds during the next decade. A broad spectrum of 1960s-vintage weapons systems, ranging from Leander-class frigates and amphibious warfare ships to the Army's Chieftain tanks and Abbot self-propelled howitzers, will have to be replaced. British choices in procurement policy will directly influence its mobilization capabilities.

Almost all categories of follow-on equipment will cost more than the weapons being replaced. This expenditure, combined with dramatic increases in operations and maintenance (gone are the days of cheap fuel and conscript troops), is the most obvious reason for the reductions in British force structure in the past 30 years. Unfortunately, the trends towards greater costs in procurement, operations, and maintenance continue. The already-reduced size of the regular force structure makes it difficult to balance increased equipment costs by continued reducing of the force structure in terms of units and major systems.

The British will continue to see mobilization assets as valuable supplements for (not replacements to) the regular force structure. Replacing regular British forces with mobilization assets could undercut the thorough training that skilled British planners and operators need. The Royal Navy officers who used the STUFT so well at San Carlos in the Falklands had learned their skills exercising with Fearless and Intrepid, the Royal Navy amphibious warfare ships. If the capability for amphibious lift was purely mobilization-only, it would have been very difficult for the Navy to develop these skills. It is easier to teach and improvise at a tactical level than at an operational one. Operational planning, execution skills, and procedures must come before mobilization.

Because most of the savings anticipated by transferring functions to reserve forces or the civil sector have already been realized, future
cuts will likely mandate cuts in major NATO commitments, with the political damage that will entail. Right now it is difficult to envision how further disbanding could take place without further pruning numerous commitments and forces. A still smaller force structure would further reduce any economies of scale in major system procurement, increasing per-unit cost in a vicious circle.

Recent force structure reductions have tended to focus on politically vulnerable “fringe” units and capabilities, such as the Navy’s dedicated minecraft support ship (to pay off) or the Army’s Infantry Demonstration Battalion at Warminster (disbanded). Not only are these elements limited in number and the savings correspondingly small, but such cuts may be counterproductive.

The latest “marginal” commitment to be reexamined is deploying ground forces to AFNORTH command for use in Denmark or possibly Schleswig-Holstein in case of NATO mobilization. Reducing commitments is certainly one obvious solution to the problem of reconciling increasing threats, increasing costs, and inadequate resources. Discontent with the Danish level of defense spending, no doubt, is also a factor. However, Canada’s unilateral decision to end their commitment of a Canada-based brigade group and two all-weather fighter-bomber squadrons to Norway may discourage unilateral British moves affecting AFNORTH for the next few years. In the case of the British forces committed to Denmark, as with the Canadian forces previously committed to Norway, Britain must weigh the advantage of having these forces available on the central front against the political impact of this change and, since there is no proposal that the combat elements of these forces be disbanded, the savings will be limited.

Whatever the British decide, it is unlikely that the rest of the defense establishment will escape cuts. While efficiency in British defense spending has increased—especially in procurement—this measure alone is unlikely to prevent the resources squeeze. Prioritization will be primarily a British decision, not an alliance one.

The most important single commitment is likely to remain the nuclear one. The Atlee government decided to deploy and maintain an independent British nuclear force. A decade later, following the 1956 Suez Crisis, even the powerful conventional forces that Britain deployed left the nation vulnerable to nuclear threats. The nuclear force was a key issue in the 1987 election, and deployment of the
V-Boats and their Trident missiles will apparently remain a priority of the third Thatcher government. This issue continues to be a contentious one, with the Labour party manifesto embracing unilateral nuclear disarmament. However, for the present, Trident looks as if it will remain an ongoing program. While Trident represents a considerable percentage of scarce procurement money, it will not exert a corresponding burden on operations and maintenance funding.

If a resources shortfall occurs due to a failure to increase defense spending, the commitment to the central front is likely to remain the highest priority for general purpose forces. The commitment will likely continue to absorb much of the Army and a large percentage of the Royal Air Force, based in Britain as well as Germany; about one-third of total British defense spending comes from the central front commitment.

The chief competition to the central front commitment for resources devoted to general purpose forces is the Atlantic commitment, which absorbs most of the Royal Navy and a significant part of the Royal Air Force. The Atlantic commitment has been the loser in resource competition through the 1980s. The biggest potential "loss" was the 1981 Defence Estimate's proposal for substantially reducing the Royal Navy surface warships. While the Royal Navy and its supporters strongly attacked these "Nott cuts" in Parliament, media, and industry, it took the Falklands War to reverse this approach and make more resources available.

By 1987, with the Falklands memories fading and resources again running short, the Royal Navy may well receive cuts similar to those proposed in 1981, although it is unlikely the Navy will accept a two-carrier force (although only two carrier air groups’ worth of Sea Harriers are in the Fleet Air Arm). It is equally unlikely that the amphibious warfare capability will slip away (as proposed in 1981). The Navy will retain destroyers and frigates by prolonging the planned life-cycle of more modern types such as Type 22 and 23 frigates and Type 42 Batch 2 and 3 destroyers from 18 to 26 years. Such retention might degrade individual capability, however, given the RN’s perennial problems in manning older warships and modernizing older systems.

Still, the consensus of opinion is that, in the late 1980s, the Atlantic commitment will bear the brunt of most of the resources shortfall. Atlantic shortfalls seem likely, too, because the threat to the
central front has grown faster than the threat to the Atlantic. The alliance-wide consequences of retrenching the central front commitment are also more severe than those associated with reducing the Atlantic commitment. In the late 1980s Britain has regained its leadership role in Europe through political stability and direction rather than economic performance; therefore, cuts in the central front commitment would probably imperil Britain's relations with its Continental allies.

The home defense commitment is unlikely to be cut, in large part because it has been ignored for so long. Much of the air defense investment is shared with the Atlantic commitment, including deploying the Boeing E-3A AWACS Sentry and Tornado F-3 forces. On the ground, the organization of the Home Service Force attempts to tap an unused resource at low cost to carry out a needed task.

The out-of-area commitment has often been seen as a place to look for savings. While certainly peripheral, the relatively small-size of the British forces involved limits savings and runs the risk of so reducing strengths overseas so that enemy aggression becomes more likely. For example, when the British announced withdrawal of H.M.S. Endurance from the South Atlantic in 1981, Argentina interpreted it as a lack of concern over the Falklands — although the actual British motivation was to save on a marginal commitment. The reduction of the Falklands garrison army component to a company-sized force in 1987, along with the withdrawal of the Army's Rapier SAMs, certainly puts a new burden both on the defending RAF Phantoms and the British rapid reinforcement capability. In addition, the new airfield means that the Falklands cannot be liberated as before if again conquered. The turn-over of Hong Kong to China may free not only RN warships but also permit Gurkha battalions (cheaper to maintain than British battalions) to assume more of the out-of-area commitments, although China is reluctant to see a run-down of the Hong Kong commitment before the turn-over.

THE ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIP

The relationship of Britain to NATO is not a fundamental problem. Britain probably has less trouble reconciling its alliance and national requirements than any other major NATO nation except Germany; in fact, an estimated 95 percent of British defense spending
goes to NATO tasks. Britain's and NATO's goals could draw apart, however, especially if a possible future government seeks unilateral nuclear disarmament. British and NATO goals could also diverge as a reaction to policy changes by major alliance partners, especially the United States. In 1987, Britain has not developed major bilateral defense agreements with other European NATO members comparable to that between France and Germany; in fact, Anglo-German cooperation focuses on host nation support rather than broader cooperation.

Shortage of funds must not choke off British innovation. The British have pointed the way for NATO in numerous areas. On the battlefield, Britain urged the "Bagnall concept" to help increase the operational reserves available to NORTHAG; they also took steps to provide a conventional answer when Soviet deep operations posed a threat. Finally, the British use of reserve forces and the mobilization of civil assets provide models for NATO to follow.

The British nuclear force will take on additional importance as the US theatre nuclear missiles withdraw from Europe. Along with its French counterpart, British presence will assure the Soviets that, if they come over the wire, they are putting everything at risk, not just their forces in the field. The main threat to the British nuclear force is not the changing alliance or geopolitical situation, but the shifting of domestic political views.

Britain's commitment to collective security is likely to remain strong; unilateral aspects and the out-of-area commitments will have secondary importance. Still Britain, like France, is willing to project power outside of NATO, as the Gulf crisis in 1987 proved. If NATO nations can help defend their interests out-of-area, Britain will likely be the catalyst. In fact, those very British naval deployments to the Gulf in the summer of 1987 led other NATO countries to contribute their own forces. Leadership, by example, is still a British hallmark within the Alliance, even if the commitment itself is not, strictly speaking, a NATO one.

Britain, historically wary of peacetime alliances, has made NATO the key to its defense policy. The British military—Army, Royal Navy, Royal Air Force—have a significance and commitment that far exceeds their limited numbers in the Alliance.
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Endnotes


14. The significance of the RN experience with ARAPAHO is not its particular technical strength or weakness, but to underline that mobilization assets are a supplement rather than a substitute for active force components. See, Desmond Wettern, “Argus: Will The Royal Navy Set A Trend?”, *Defense & Foreign Affairs* (October 1986), pp. 22-25.


22. Ibid.


25. Isby & Kamps, op. cit.

26. Ibid.


29. Isby & Kamps, p. 301.


31. Isby & Kamps, pp. 300-301.


37. This and following section comes from: Isby & Kamps, pp. 239-244.


65. On the air defense commitment, see, Sir David Evans, "United Kingdom Air Forces (UKAIR)," *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, Special No. 2 (1979), pp. 18-22.


68. Asteris, op. cit., p. 36.

PART III
PROBLEMS OF COMMUNICATION
AND TRANSPORTATION

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11 The Polish People’s Army

I swear to guard steadfastly freedom, independence and the borders of the Polish People’s Republic against imperialism’s thirst for conquest; to stand unyieldingly on guard for peace within the fraternal alliance with the Soviet Army and other allied armies.*

The Polish People’s Army (PPA) (Ludowe Wojsko Polskie) is, after the Soviet army, the second largest in the Warsaw Pact, and in the early 1980s ranked behind only West Germany, France, and the United Kingdom in Europe.¹ Despite its most apparent limitations (older-generation equipment and reduced training time in recent years) and lingering questions of reliability, the 15-division force remains disciplined and capable.²

HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS

The modern Polish Army had its actual beginnings in the early days of World War I, when Pilsudski’s riflemen merged with other Polish paramilitary groups “of the same persuasion” and formed the Polish Legions. Two years later, nearly two million Poles were serving in the war.³

*Polish Military Oath (1986), emphasis added.
In the aftermath of that war, the newly created Polish state had only 20 battalions of infantry, a few cavalry squadrons, and a couple of artillery batteries. The Polish armed forces, however, expanded rapidly. By mid-January 1919 some 147,000 men were under arms; by April the figure had risen to 200,000; and six months later, one million. Shortly thereafter, at the height of the nation’s armed conflict with the USSR, the Polish armed forces numbered around 1,300,000, including some 300,000 volunteers.4

Throughout the interwar period, compulsory male conscription remained the norm in Poland. In fact, the peacetime military establishment rose from 266,000 in 1923 to 350,000 (30 infantry divisions and 10 cavalry brigades) in 1935.

In the months preceding the German invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939, Polish strategists were convinced that Germany would initially fight a defensive holding action in the west against England and France, and would throw its main effort against Poland. Accordingly they designed the Polish operational war plan to ensure that Poland could withstand the German onslaught until French and English forces entered into battle. The Poles envisioned a strategic defense of the country’s major economic regions with a twofold objective: to inflict as many casualties as possible on the invaders; to prohibit a rout of the Polish army before the start of combat operations in the west. They expected the Polish forces would have to yield 110-240 kilometers to the enemy during Poland’s defensive holding action. Polish planners estimated that the army could hold out no longer than 30 days; however, they felt that this period would suffice for England and France to mobilize and enter the fray.5

Poland’s mobilization plans in 1939 were based on the belief that war would begin just like it did in World War I: with the classical stages of mobilization, concentration of forces, deployment, and, finally, the opening of military operations. Given such a scenario, the Poles felt they could detect enemy preparations and take the necessary countermeasures before the enemy offensive. Polish plans called for mobilization in two ways: by an open (universal) declaration, and by alert (concealed mobilization) via use of special call-up cards to reservists. The Poles planned to fully mobilize 30 regular infantry divisions, 9 reserve divisions, 5 infantry brigades, 11 cavalry brigades, and 2 armored brigades—all as part of the so-called “line troops.” In addition, they would employ home guard formations and so-called “march battalions” to replenish the line troops.6
To support the ground forces, the Poles planned to field some 15 fighter aircraft squadrons, 9 bomber squadrons, 7 reconnaissance squadrons, plus support and liaison units of the Polish air forces; and to mobilize and deploy a division of destroyers, a division of submarines, a division of minelayers and a group of coastal patrol craft in the Polish Navy. Finally, they planned to defend the coast with a mixed coastal defense force, consisting of a marine brigade, maritime national defense brigade, artillery, and other support units. The total size of the Polish forces after mobilization would be approximately 1.5 million men.7

When German-Polish relations worsened in March 1939, the Poles initiated a partial mobilization by fleshing out four infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade. In late August, the Poles belatedly ordered mobilization deployment for most regular units; on 31 August, only hours before the full-scale German invasion, they announced a general mobilization. As of 1 September, the Poles had managed to field some 840,000 troops (about 70 percent of the planned number), with some 400 aircraft and 220 light tanks.8

During the final frantic hours before the war began, the Polish military command faced what has kindly been termed an "exceptionally difficult situation."9 Amid full-scale mobilization and under crushing time constraints, forces had to be concentrated, deployed, and placed in assembly areas and defensive positions. The entire process became even more difficult because the Poles had to move many units across almost the entire country, meaning that 500-800 kilometer rail transport movements had to be hastily organized and launched.10 In the end, although roughly 70 percent of the Polish forces managed to reach their designated defensive areas, most of them entered combat from march formation (or worse), and were soundly defeated.11

Poland's military problems intensified after the invasion when communications throughout the country were severed and roads became hopelessly clogged with refugees. In addition, Polish forces found themselves facing superior German weapons and equipment. The combat throughout the brief conflict was bitter: in approximately four weeks of fighting, Polish forces lost some 60,000 killed, and 140,000 wounded. However, the Poles gave a good account of themselves, inflicting over 50,000 casualties on the Wehrmacht.12

Many important military lessons emerge from a study of the ill-fated 1939 Polish mobilization efforts:
The importance of accurate, up-to-date intelligence and warning data.

The necessity for widespread, redundant, and survivable command, control, and communications systems.

The need for modern weapons and equipment.

The magnitude of problems that develop in moving people and equipment within the country, and the crucial vulnerability of road and rail lines of communication, especially to enemy air strikes and large numbers of refugees.

Today, nearly 50 years after learning these lessons, Polish and Soviet planners continue to face many of the same issues.

The collapse of Poland in 1939 only served to shift the major focus of the Poles' military war effort. Polish forces fought valiantly and fiercely in every major World War II campaign against the Germans and Italians, while the Poles at home continued the struggle. In all, some six million Poles perished in the war: approximately 642,000 (10.7 percent) as a result of military operations and around 5,358,000 (89.3 percent) as a result of executions or "pacifications." 13

Today's Polish People's Army (PPA) likes to trace its lineage to the Kosciuszko Infantry Division, founded in 1943 in the USSR. Under the command of General Zygmunt Berling, this force emerged in March 1944 with the "First Polish Army" designator.14 At that point, just a few months before the Normandy invasion, some 195,000 Poles were fighting under British command; and only 78,000 under Soviet sponsorship. By the spring of 1945, as the Soviets liberated Poland's eastern provinces, these numbers changed dramatically; 228,000 under British command; and 400,000 under Soviet leadership.15

When the Soviet-backed Polish government was set up in Lublin in July 1944, one of its first acts was to order the merger of The People's Army (Armia Ludowa-AL) (the small, communist-led underground military arm in occupied Poland) with the Polish First Army, commanded by General Berling. This newly formed Polish Army also included conscripts from the liberated areas, a few members of the non-communist underground Home Army (Armia Krajowa-AK), some soldiers from Polish units on the western front, and large numbers of liberated Polish prisoners from German camps.16
The conclusion of World War II left this mixed 400,000-man PPA completely under direct Soviet command and control. As the newly constituted Polish communist regime came to power and sought to consolidate national control, government leaders set about restructuring the country’s military and paramilitary forces along Soviet lines. In 1945, they organized military districts and formed the Internal Security Corps, Border Troops, and Navy. By late 1947, the new Soviet-style military establishment was essentially in place. By 1949, after the first wide-scale demobilizations, veterans of Berling’s First Army made up over 63 percent of the officer corps; about 29 percent were former members of the pre-war Polish Army; some eight percent were Red Army “advisors”; and only 0.5 percent were from the non-communist groups that had fought the Germans during the war.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, as more weapons and equipment became available from the USSR, the Poles began organizing infantry units into armored and mechanized forces. By 1952–1953, the PPA comprised armored and mechanized corps and Soviet-style breakthrough artillery divisions, and a branch of so-called ‘Anti-aircraft Defense Troops’ which would later evolve into the ‘National Air Defense Forces.’ In addition, with United States operations in Korea fresh in their minds, the Poles created an anti-landing corps to protect the Baltic coast from amphibious attack.

During the years immediately following World War II, the PPA experienced strict political indoctrination and systematic purges. According to one report, 14 Polish generals and 200 colonels were purged; the official reason given was that they were anti-Semitic. However, the underlying reason was that the officers were anti-Soviet.

In reality, from 1945 until 1956 the Polish armed forces remained directly subordinate to Moscow, with Soviet officers filling most key posts. Between November 1949 and 1956, Soviet Marshal Rokossovsky, an ethnic Pole, served as Polish Minister of National Defense and Commander-in-Chief of Poland’s armed forces. During the same period, Soviet officers also served as Chief of the Polish General Staff, Commander of the Ground Forces, heads of all branches of services, and commanders of all military districts.

The creation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 had little immediate impact on the situation in Poland; however, the wave of unrest which
swept through Eastern Europe in 1956 brought significant changes, forcing the large force of seconded Red Army officers back to the USSR. In June 1956, Polish troops refused direct orders to fire on workers rioting in Poznán. Poland's internal security troops finally put down the riots, with scores of casualties inflicted on the workers. With key elements of the Polish armed forces ready to fight Soviet invaders, the Polish leadership (Gomulka) was able to achieve a new degree of internal autonomy for the government. Direct Soviet influence was reduced, although the Soviets continued to train Polish general officers in the USSR, to supply Soviet-designed weapons and military equipment to the Poles, and to include Poland in Soviet military defense plans.

THE POLISH PEOPLE'S ARMY TODAY

Poland's 1952 constitution established—and the amended 1976 constitution reaffirmed—the obligation of every citizen to defend the nation against an external threat. Beyond this basic obligation, the November 1967 "Law on the General Requirement to Defend the People's Republic of Poland" defined the statute requiring every citizen to defend the socialist achievements of Poland against the dangers emanating from the internal enemies of the socialist system, as well as natural disasters.

According to the 1967 law, all Polish citizens, age and health permitting, must fulfill general defense requirements. The obligatory options under the 1967 law were: military service, service in civil defense units, service in militarized spheres (that is, state administration, economic affairs), participation in self-defense of the people, or provision of services for national defense.

By Polish law, all able-bodied men between the ages of 18 and 50 (cadets and officers to age 60), as well as able-bodied women between 18 and 40 years of age (cadets and officers to age 50) must serve. Legal exemptions exist for disease, women caring for a child under eight years old, or women caring for a child over eight (under certain circumstances). Basic military service (with a unit), conscript training, military training for students, military training for reservists, and active service upon declaration of a direct danger to national security, during mobilization or in wartime, are deemed acceptable military service according to Polish law.

Reflecting the mood of the times, a 1979 amendment to the 1967 conscription law tightened deferments, provided for early
release of "good performers," and clarified and expanded options for substitute military service. Subsequently, in November 1983, another amendment provided for assigning conscripts to military formations which are not part of the armed forces—youth labor battalions in civil defense detachments; labor battalions for political unreliables. It also made choice recruits eligible for service in the "elite" militarized units, such as the motorized militia.\textsuperscript{26}

While the basic term of military service in Poland is 24 months, certain missile units, special communications elements or naval service with seagoing forces require 36 months. The basic term of service may be served uninterrupted, or in several time installments within three years. Thereafter, soldiers become reservists, which may require either an obligation to participate in military exercises or to improve military knowledge by self-study. The total annual time each reservist spends on military exercises must not exceed 90 days; or 180, if so decreed by the government.\textsuperscript{27}

Within Poland's approximately 39 million people, there are some eight million men (and nearly as many women) between the ages of 18 and 45, with about 50 percent of these in the 18 to 30 range.\textsuperscript{28} Of the more than 250,000 men who reach military age each year,\textsuperscript{29} approximately 100,000 Poles complete active military service and enter the reserve pool, thus creating a sizeable reservoir of trained manpower.

The Polish peacetime armed forces currently consist of some 402,000 regular troops, including Internal Defense forces. Approximately 251,000 (62.5 percent) of the force are conscripts. The reserves number 501,000, of which 415,000 belong to the ground forces, 55,000 to the navy, and 31,000 to the air forces.\textsuperscript{30}

The ground forces number approximately 295,000 troops (including 65,500 Internal Defense personnel), of which 215,000 (nearly 73 percent) are conscripts serving a mandatory two-year term of service. The ground forces are organized into three military districts (wartime armies), with the principal maneuver elements being five combat-ready armored divisions, eight mechanized divisions (three combat-ready; five in various stages of lower readiness), one brigade-size airborne division, and one sea-landing (or amphibious assault) division of approximate brigade size. These ground force combat elements are complemented by: four artillery brigades, one separate artillery regiment, three separate antitank regiments, an
SA-4 surface-to-air missile brigade, eight air defense regiments (SA-6 or SA-8), and four SCUD surface-to-surface missile brigades.\textsuperscript{31}

Ground forces equipment remains largely obsolescent, despite protracted modernization efforts. The 3,500-3,600 Polish tank fleet is large; in 1985, Poland possessed more tanks than Great Britain, France, and Italy combined.\textsuperscript{32} Almost all of the Polish tanks, however, are aged T-54/55s of dubious survivability on the modern-day European battlefield. In addition, the Polish armada of armored fighting vehicles and personnel carriers consists of older SKOT/TOPAS/FUG/FRDM vehicles, with only about 20 percent of the inventory being “newer” BMPs.\textsuperscript{33}

The story is much the same in other segments of the ground forces. The mainstays of the tube artillery are the older-vintage 122mm M-1938 howitzer and D-30 gun-howitzer, plus the 152mm ML-20 gun-howitzer and D-1 howitzer, with a number of relic 122mm-M-31/37 and 130mm M-46 guns scattered throughout the force. Further, the number of artillery pieces in Polish units currently appears inadequate to meet Soviet battle norms.\textsuperscript{34}

Divisional air defense systems represent another critical problem for the Poles. The ancient 57mm S-60 antiaircraft gun and the far less numerous ZSU-23-4 23mm self-propelled antiaircraft system are inadequate to challenge newer generations of NATO aircraft.\textsuperscript{35} Further, the Poles’ tactical surface-to-air missiles are of older vintage and also appear to be in relatively short supply.

The Polish national air defense force currently contains some 48,000 personnel, with 300 SA-2/SA-3 fire units organized into 10 regiments deployed throughout the country.\textsuperscript{36} This force is well-maintained but antiquated, and clearly cries out for modernization, especially in view of its peacetime status as a component of the combined Warsaw Pact air defense structure. Little progress, however, is discernible to date.

Poland’s air forces number approximately 88,000 personnel, (30,000 conscripts). The force has some 675 combat aircraft: 240 ground attack; 400 interceptors; 35 reconnaissance. About half of the ground-attack aircraft are MiG-17s, with the remainder divided equally among Su-7 variants, Su-20s and Su-22s. The 400 interceptors are mainly MiG-21s, with the three reconnaissance squadrons made up principally of the recce variant of the MiG-21. Poland’s military air transport fleet is composed of aging An-2, An-12,
An-26 and Il–14 aircraft. The PPA's helicopter force is relatively small: 100 Mi–2s, 12 Mi–4s, 25 Mi–8s (some armed), and 12 Mi–

The 19,000-man Polish Navy is roughly 33 percent three-year conscripts. The navy operates about 90 coastal and seagoing warships, and some 40 auxiliaries and service craft. Poland's lone Kotlin-class destroyer, Warszawa, was decommissioned in January 1986. The Poles launched one 1,100-ton Kaszub-class frigate in 1985; three more are being built at the Polish shipyard of Gdynia. In June 1986, the Polish Navy became the first NSWP fleet to acquire the most advanced Soviet diesel-electric torpedo attack submarine, a 3,000-ton Kilo—with at least three more expected to be transferred. Two obsolescent ex-Soviet Whiskey-class diesel boats also remain in the Polish inventory, but new Kilos will eventually replace them.

Poland's missile- and torpedo-armed combat patrol craft are predominantly old, but the Soviets have transferred three newer missile corvettes to the Polish, and up to five more may follow. Twelve 1960s-vintage Osa-class missile craft are still in service, as are four of the Polish-built Wisla-class torpedo boats. Poland's fleet of some 40 amphibious lift craft is large, but aging. When augmented with newer “Roll-on/Roll-off” ships, manned by civilians, this fleet will be capable of delivering major elements of the Gdansk-based 7th Sea Landing Division for assault operations on the northern flank of NATO's Central Region.

Polish antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities now are vested primarily in eight older 150-ton patrol boats and a dozen or so Mi–8 helicopters. Soviet-built Mi–14 helicopters began entering the Polish inventory in 1986; large numbers of these aircraft will greatly upgrade the Navy's ASW capabilities. The Polish naval mine warfare component consists of some 23 older vintage ocean minesweepers and ten inshore minesweepers built in the 1950s. At least five modern, plastic-hulled coastal minesweepers have been commissioned, and more may be under construction.

The naval aviation arm is composed of some 2,300 personnel, 44 combat aircraft (Mig–17; Il–28), and approximately 35 helicopters (Mi–2/Mi–4/Mi–8,—not counting the newly acquired Mi–14s). Finally, Poland also has a 4,100-man coastal defense force, consisting of several battalions, armed with SSC–2b antiship missiles and coastal gun batteries.
PARAMILITARY FORCES

Poland maintains sizeable paramilitary forces which play important roles in the nation’s defense plans. The Internal Defense Troops (Wojska Obrony Wewnętrznej: WOW) are integral to the national territorial defense system. The WOW includes general-type military units, as well as specialized elements for bridging, communications, chemical defense, etc. Since 1965, the WOW forces have been subordinate in peacetime to the Ministry of National Defense. Size estimates of the WOW forces vary widely, from a low of 14,000 to a high of around 65,000.

Poland’s Frontier Guard Troops (Wojska Ochrony Pogranicza: WOP), numbering some 18,000-30,000, are organized into brigades, and man frontier posts and outposts. The Frontier Guard Troops also operate a seagoing force of 11 large naval coastal craft and 14 small craft. In peacetime, the WOP forces are subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs; but in wartime, their subordination shifts to the Ministry of National Defense.

The uniformed Polish Citizens’ Militia (Milicja Obywatelska: MO) is the national police force. “Mister Mili” is omnipresent throughout the country and, from a former military attaché’s perspective, Western estimates of their strength (60,000 to 100,000) seem low.

The so-called Motorized Reserves of the Citizens’ Militia (Zmotoryzowane Odwody Milicji Obywatelskiej: ZOMO), infamous worldwide since 1981, serve as the “elite” riot police. The size of the ZOMO force is not precisely known, but most estimates place their numbers between 25,000 and 30,000.

Another element which must be reckoned with in a mobilized Poland is the Voluntary Militia Reserve (Ochotnicza Reserwa Milicji Obywatelskiej: ORM0). This force numbered around 100,000 in 1947, grew to 300,000 in 1967, but probably stands much less than 300,000 today.

The peacetime PPA is a large force, and its garrisons generally are well-positioned to facilitate rapid deployment; however, from the outset, the force’s battlefield success will clearly depend upon rapid, large-scale mobilization. Conscripts and reservists must arrive in units quickly and must be expeditiously integrated into the force. Polish planners recognize this necessity and undoubtedly count on widespread mobilization to flesh out all branches of service. Air,
naval, and national air defense units rely upon mobilization in varying degrees; the ground forces are in large measure at its mercy. Within almost any plausible wartime scenario, the PPA force structure will experience severe strains in meeting wartime norms and goals.

**THE POLISH PEOPLE’S ARMY IN ACTION**

*International Activities.* Except for representational contingents in international peacekeeping activities, Poland’s military operations abroad since World War II have been limited to participating in the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. In August of that year, Polish units joined the Soviet, Hungarian, East German, and Bulgarian forces in a military campaign designed to “protect and defend” socialist Czechoslovakia. The two-division Polish contingent was commanded by the chief of staff of the Silesian Military District, Lieutenant General Florian Siwicki.

Shortly after the Pact incursion into Czechoslovakia ended, the Polish Minister of National Defense (General Jaruzelski) sponsored a symposium to analyze the operation. Nearly the entire Polish leadership of the defense ministry, as well as the commanders and staffs of the branches of the armed forces and the military districts, plus the Polish commanders of the units participating in the invasion attended this gathering at the Polish General Staff in Warsaw. The “main authors” of the invasion plan, representatives of the Soviet High Command, were also present.

At the symposium, Polish units which took part in the operation drew high praise. Even though the Polish forces had been unable to encircle Czechoslovak garrisons as swiftly as Soviet units (a political given), the Poles more than made up for any sluggishness by exerting strong, persuasive influence on Czechoslovak commanders to support the reinstitution of “socialist order” in the country. Polish units also were highly commended for managing to accomplish all objectives, while avoiding significant Polish or Czechoslovak human or material losses.

Although the official “post mortems” glowed, the Polish participation in the invasion had a deep, lasting negative impact throughout the Polish armed forces, where participation was widely considered an “unforgiveable mistake” of Poland’s political and military leadership.

*Domestic Activities.* Poland’s internal security forces handled—with no direct PPA help—the communist power consolidation in the
three years immediately following World War II. Still, the Polish People’s Army has been fairly active during various post-World War II domestic crises. In the Poznán riots of June 1956, PPA units were committed, but they reportedly refused to fire on the rioting workers. Later that same year, as Polish unrest again came to a head, PPA elements stood with Gomulka and threatened to resist the Soviets in case of armed intervention. Faced with the prospect of widespread bloodshed, Nikita Khrushchev backed down. These events remain ingrained in the Polish memory, and Poles often discuss them in private conversations as being in sharp contrast to the military’s performance in 1980-1981.

In the December 1970 riots along the Baltic coast, PPA units helped suppress rioters. Some sources have characterized such PPA involvement as reluctant and limited. Strong evidence, however, now exists that PPA participation was much more extensive than originally believed. One authoritative source noted recently that the PPA engaged in over 100 actions during these riots, and that the military employed over 61,000 troops, 1,700 tanks, 1,750 transport aircraft, plus a “significant number” of helicopters and even “tens” of naval craft.

Some 44 rioters were killed and an additional 1,165 wounded during the December 1970 unrest. Gomulka gave the order to fire on the rioters; the order passed to the army via the Minister of National Defense, General Jaruzelski. The only limitation he imposed on the military commanders was the instruction to direct fire at the rioters “after warning shots into the air, after a repeated warning and warning shots into the ground.” Only then could shots be fired in extremis at particularly aggressive opponents, aiming at the legs.

The resulting casualties and the apparent ease with which Polish authorities used the armed forces against their own society left yet another indelible impression on the PPA, especially throughout the officer corps. Use of the PPA’s regular conscript troops instead of (available) elite security forces was never fully explained, but it had serious consequences, causing immense resentment in the officer corps, followed by a spectacular drop in officer recruitment. Further, it raised the “specter of mutiny.”

Apparently the PPA was not involved to any degree in the localized June 1976 food price riots, centered in Warsaw and Lodz. During this brief period of unrest the Minister of National Defense, General Jaruzelski, mindful of the 1970 crisis, reportedly vowed that “Polish soldiers will not fire on Polish workers.”
In sharp contrast to earlier crises, the August 1980 major upheaval in postwar Poland had its origins in economic crisis and under completely new political circumstances. The PPA played a prominent role in the events of 1980-1981. The idea of introducing martial law in Poland apparently surfaced within the country’s leadership during the peak period of strikes in August 1980. Approximately two months later, Minister of Defense Jaruzelski ordered the Polish General Staff to prepare martial law plans. Accordingly, an initial plan was ready in November, some 13 months before implementation in December 1981.

The Chief of the Polish General Staff, Florian Siwicki, directed martial law planning from start to finish. Planning at the Polish General Staff was limited to a handful of senior officers (colonels and generals), aided by selected representatives from the office of the National Defense Committee, Ministry of Internal Affairs, propaganda organ of the Party Central Committee, and the Main Political Administration of the PPA. Later, other key civilian agencies (communications; energy; transportation; internal trade and services) were included.

The martial law plan provided for a “partial mobilization,” including the callup of some 250,000 reservists, militarization of segments of the economy, and the mobilization of as many as one million people for civil defense. Polish General Staff planners, recalling the painful lessons of history (especially the bloody 1970 experiences), envisioned that the PPA would not directly confront striking workers. They saw the primary mission of the PPA as the “maintenance of internal order in cities”—a diplomatic term for “terrorizing society in large urban areas.” Militarized forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were to handle the actual suppression of strikes, while the PPA guarded some key government buildings and transferred arms and equipment (weapons, ammunition, armored vehicles and helicopters) to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

As Poland’s domestic turmoil continued in late 1980, the USSR and selected Warsaw Pact allies prepared to intervene. The invasion plan, which was shown to the Polish leaders, would have sent 18 divisions (Soviet, Czechoslovak, and East German) into Poland, with sea blockade of Poland’s seacoast by Soviet Baltic Fleet and East German naval units. After reviewing this intervention plan, General Jaruzelski argued successfully for including Polish units to handle “secondary tasks.” Accordingly, four Polish divisions were written into the plan: the fifth and eleventh armored divisions were to operate...
with Czechoslovak forces, while the fourth and twelfth mechanized divisions would work with East German units.\footnote{For a variety of reasons, including a strong message sent by the United States government to the USSR, the Soviets deferred the December 1980 invasion. Concurrently, the martial law plans gained momentum. In February 1981, the Poles held a “war game” to test and coordinate these plans. Although no Soviets were yet formally involved in the General Staff development of the martial law plans, Soviets likely advised the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs during planning phases. In any case, even as the martial law planning moved forward in the early months of 1981, the threat of Soviet/Warsaw Pact military intervention loomed again, under the thin veil of “Soyuz–81” exercises. By April, however, the Soviet leaders once more had backed off, in the face of United States pressure and the Politburo’s apparent concern over Polish reaction/resistance to any military action.\footnote{Soviet concern and uncertainty about how the Polish populace and PPA might react to a Warsaw Pact invasion were undoubtedly well-founded. Already anti-Soviet, a large percentage of Polish society at the time was pro-Solidarity, and many PPA conscripts, as well as an “overwhelming majority” of the officer corps, shared Solidarity’s ideas.\footnote{When martial law finally was implemented in December 1981, the plan went relatively smoothly. Within a few days the Polish authorities seemed to have the situation well under control and the military moved into the dominant position in the nation, “trying to fill the vacuum left by the near disappearance of the party as a viable and credible actor.”\footnote{Since that time, the military junta has clearly been groping toward a goal of “normalcy,” attempting to carve out a viable niche in foreign affairs while coping (largely unsuccessfully) with the near disintegration of the Party and economic catastrophe. “Order reigns in Warsaw” . . . at least for now.}}}}

**THE PPA’S ROLE IN WARSAW PACT MILITARY OPERATIONS**

Soviet strategy for a conflict in central Europe depends on a swift and decisive campaign to collapse NATO before reinforcements can cross the Atlantic, to prevent a NATO decision to use nuclear weapons prior to Warsaw Pact occupation of large chunks of NATO territory, and to destroy a significant portion of NATO’s nuclear arsenal via conventional attacks.\footnote{Soviet strategy for a conflict in central Europe depends on a swift and decisive campaign to collapse NATO before reinforcements can cross the Atlantic, to prevent a NATO decision to use nuclear weapons prior to Warsaw Pact occupation of large chunks of NATO territory, and to destroy a significant portion of NATO’s nuclear arsenal via conventional attacks.}
Within the Warsaw Pact concept of "coalition warfare," Polish forces clearly will play a major role in the envisioned theater strategic offensive. As already noted by Jeffrey Simon in Chapter 1, according to the 1979/80 Warsaw Pact Wartime Statute of the Combined Armed Forces and their Command Organs, control of Poland’s national defense and the PPA passes to the Unified Supreme High Command during war or threat of war. The chain of command in such a case will be via the Soviet General Staff down through the commander of the Western Theater of Military Operations (Teatr Voyennyykh Deystviy: TVD) to the operational forces.72

The Polish "External Front," consisting of all of Poland’s operational ground and air forces, will become directly subordinate to the Western TVD commander, a Soviet marshal. Polish naval forces, including land bases, will come under the command of the Combined Baltic Fleet commander, a Soviet admiral. The Polish national air defense forces will continue in their peacetime role as part of the Soviet-commanded multinational air defense system. In sum, according to Kuklinski, up to 90 percent of the Polish armed forces will fall under Soviet command and control in wartime. Practically the only regular troops left at the disposal of the Polish national leadership will be logistics units, engineer-technical units protecting or facilitating the transit of Soviet troops through Polish territory, and units earmarked to train replacements for war losses.73

In such a scenario, the "Internal Front," comprising the support elements remaining on Polish territory, will face formidable tasks. As noted by John Yurechko in Chapter 2, we can assume that the Soviets will deploy across Poland most of their 90 or so motorized rifle, tank, airborne and artillery divisions garrisoned in peacetime in the western and central European USSR.74 In all, during the days immediately preceding D-Day and immediately thereafter, it is likely that at least two Soviet fronts plus a large part of the "immediate strategic reserve forces" of the Western TVD will be moving across Polish territory.75 Concurrently, additional elements of Poland’s operational forces will be mobilizing and moving to the combat zone to support the TVD offensive. Even if all goes as planned, the mobilization and movement of so many Soviet and Polish forces will be difficult.

Such heavy deployments across Poland are not without precedent. As Michael Sadykiewicz has pointed out, in the final months of World War II, 168 Soviet infantry and cavalry divisions moved westward across Poland. In toto, during that period, four Soviet fronts, 23
combined-arms armies, five tank armies, five air armies and 21 tank and mechanized corps—plus a total of three million troops, 6,500 tanks, 42,000 artillery pieces and 7,500 aircraft—moved across Poland.76

On the one hand, Poland's national territory and transportation systems can apparently handle such initial deployments, especially if adequate prewar preparations are made. On the other hand, the resources remaining at the disposal of Poland's Internal Front seem insufficient to support Polish operational forces, facilitate the transit of Soviet elements across Poland, and maintain internal order. Soviet doctrine dictates that much of the required support for moving Soviet forces across Poland would be the ultimate responsibility of the Western TVD commander; therefore his staff would plan and coordinate the necessary air defense and bridging support. In sum, the Soviet commander of the TVD is likely to do whatever is necessary to ensure the safe, timely movement of forces to the combat area, to include drawing upon Polish national resources.

In all likelihood, the reluctance of Soviet planners to rely exclusively upon Polish elements to secure the transit of second- or third-echelon Soviet forces across Poland predates the 1980–1981 crisis. In my view, the Soviets have maintained long-standing alternative contingency plans for deploying additional air defense, engineer, and internal security support forces from the USSR into Poland to support transit operations. Events of 1980–1981 undoubtedly have served to heighten Soviet apprehension and to force Soviet General Staff officers to search for other alternatives to the Polish Internal Front as the guarantor of Soviet cross-country troop transit.

I do not believe, however, that Soviet forces currently stationed in Poland will play a major role in such alternative plans because of sheer numerical inferiority. The Soviet Northern Group of Forces (NGF), with headquarters in southwestern Poland, consists of only two Soviet combat divisions, which appear to be fully manned and equipped with “first-line” equipment, along with contingents of Soviet air forces and support elements. The total number of Soviet NGF military personnel is estimated at between 25,000 and 35,000. The NGF’s tanks number approximately 700, while its military aircraft number 400. From time to time, NGF ground force elements join Polish divisional maneuver units in combined training exercises designed to enhance interoperability, facilitate the incorporation of individual components of the PPA into Soviet coalition formations,
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and demonstrate fraternal military cooperation between the two armies.78

The NGF's wartime role has been the source of widespread, heated debate. Some Western analysts have suggested that NGF ... is presumably ready to increase its strength in a matter of 48 hours to create a second-echelon front of the Western TVD, having 8 Soviet divisions and 5 Polish divisions from the Silesian Military District; in total, 3 tank armies ar... 1 air army, plus front-level support units.79 While such a role for NGF is a possibility, though an ambitious one, I believe the NGF forces in wartime either would establish and protect the core of the Western TVD headquarters, or perhaps would provide security for weapons of mass destruction which might be sited on Polish territory.

THE FUTURE OF THE ARMED FORCES

The Poles have been struggling for years to modernize their armed forces; however, refinements in equipment, doctrine, and organization have been uneven and glacially slow. For example, in the ground forces, the newer T-72 tank has been slowly seeping into the inventory, with the total number probably hovering around 100. Additionally, only very small quantities of self-propelled artillery and newer armored vehicles are appearing in the Polish divisions. Modernization efforts in the air forces, air defense, and the navy seem similarly paced.

Apparently, the Poles are trying to proceed with efforts to modernize their forces, even at the expense of the nation's civilian economy. Because of Warsaw Pact commitments and/or bilateral pressures from the USSR, Jaruzelski and his colleagues appear willing to accept the consequences which continued force modernization efforts have in many sectors of the economy. Even so, economic problems will undoubtedly continue to stymie extensive modernization over the near term. I believe that the Poles will have to continue to accept delays in force upgrades while seeking more creative approaches to maintaining credible force capabilities into the 1990s. Indeed, if current economic difficulties continue, Polish leaders may be forced to seriously examine scaling down and restructuring the armed forces and/or seeking relief from alliance commitments. I do not believe, however, that this decision point has yet been reached.

I believe that the Polish People's Army today, positioned astride the key strategic axis in central Europe, remains a vital component of
Warsaw Pact operational war plans. In my view, the PPA retains the key offensive role assigned to it in the 1960s and 1970s and, if a Warsaw Pact-NATO armed conflict broke out today, Poland’s operational forces would deploy expeditiously and fight along the Baltic coastal axis as part of the Western TVD’s strategic offensive.

Still, the PPA’s combat capabilities have eroded since the troubled period leading up to the imposition of martial law in December 1981. A prolonged period of martial law has taken a heavy toll: leadership has been absent in many key military positions, training programs have suffered, and equipment maintenance and modernization efforts have lagged. Not surprisingly, ideological commitment and small-unit cohesion also reportedly have dropped significantly.

Even taking these serious problems into account, I remain convinced that the PPA will fight as part of the Warsaw Pact’s Combined Armed Forces against NATO. In reality, the Poles may have little choice because of the provisions of the 1979/80 wartime statute and the Soviet-dominated system of interlocking controls firmly implanted in the Warsaw Pact’s organizational structure. Under such circumstances, Polish forces may find themselves mobilizing and moving to battle in a very short time. Of course, the question of how well or how long the PPA will fight remains open, and can only be answered in actual combat. If the Warsaw Pact offensive goes according to plan, the Poles probably will press ahead. On the other hand, if the offensive bogs down and NATO launches a successful counterattack, the reliability and staying power of the PPA will come into serious question.

The bottom line is that the PPA today appears incapable of fighting a protracted war against NATO. The force does not seem to have the combat support infrastructure or the fundamental, viable economic base to sustain operations beyond 25-30 days.

As for the Polish Internal Front, I am convinced its resources currently are not sufficient to support Polish and Soviet operational forces. Perhaps these resources have never been adequate, but today, in the large wake created by the wartime statute, the TVD approach to war, and the events surrounding martial law, the Internal Front’s capabilities are even more degraded.

True, the Polish armed forces remain disciplined and committed to Warsaw Pact operational plans. However, their capabilities have been eroding throughout the 1980s, especially relative to their Soviet
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This erosion is reaching near landslide proportion as the USSR presses ahead with upgrading and modernizing Soviet forces. The gap in force capabilities between Polish and Soviet forces continues to widen, and unless Polish leaders manage to arrest the downward trends in the PPA, crippling problems await the force in the early 1990s.

Endnotes


6. Ibid., p. 113.

7. Ibid., p. 114.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., p. 125.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., p. 126.


15. Ibid.


21. Ibid., p. 300.
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22. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
27. Mrosik, op. cit., p. 84.
31. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
42. Vego, op. cit., p. 49.
44. Sanford, op. cit., p. 74.
47. Vego, op. cit., p. 49.
48. Ibid. 166; Sanford, op. cit., p. 76; Sadykiewicz, op. cit., p. 14.
53. Ibid.
55. Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev, op. cit., p. 49.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
64. Ibid., pp. 18-19.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid., p. 22.
67. Ibid., pp. 24-25; 28; 33-34; 39-41.
68. Ibid., p. 41.
70. Anonymous, 1831.
73. Ibid., pp. 53-54.
74. Sadykiewicz, op. cit., p. 57.
75. Ibid., p. 5.
76. Ibid., p. 57.
78. Rakowska-Harmstone, Jones, and Sylvain, op. cit., p. iii.
12 Hungarian Mobilization and Force Structure

Motto for the Hungarian army:

Recruitment: three lads were called to arms. One of them said: Gentlemen, I cannot fight. The other said: I'd rather even be a cabby; What could the third do? He crawled on his belly, wiggled on his knees, froze in freezing weather, marched, and finally came home, in order to be shot, here, at home.

Gabriella Pecsi, “Magyar Sanzon” (Hungarian Song)

The myth concerning the Hungarian military seems to be all pervasive: fierce Magyar horsemen tenderizing their meat under well-worn saddle-blankets while laying siege to Paris; fearless Kuruc volunteers beating hapless Habsburgs to submission; desperate Hussars facing hopeless odds, leading a charge against Russian armies whose ranks stretch all the way to Siberia; or heroic youngsters hurling Molotov cocktails against Soviet Army tanks on the burning streets of Budapest. The myth is all powerful and all comforting; it is the myth of the victorious Hungarian military fighting and winning against incredible odds. Against such a myth facts have little to offer by way of comfort, but it is the facts of
performance in real life that determine events, rather than the myths created ex post facto.

The reality of military performance in Hungarian history is not nearly as rosy as the myth. For the facts of the case indicate a truly sorry record of military performance, if performance is measured by victories: very much like their northern brethren, the Poles, the Hungarians have, indeed, attended nearly all of the wars of the last 500 years, but won none. While the heroism of Hungarian soldiers in battles has been undoubtedly proven, the cruelty of historical experience has thwarted their ability to win wars.

It is against this background that our analysis of the Hungarian armed forces must begin. Discarding the myth, what emerges is a picture of the Hungarian armed forces as military formations that have secured some victories but, when the chips were down, were unable either to guarantee the nation’s survival or maintain its territorial and political integrity. Shrunken from an army of imperial size, today’s Hungarian army is merely that of a small power, relegated to missions of secondary importance. Completely subservient to the Soviet Army, whose soldiers are still stationed on Hungarian soil, the contemporary Hungarian People’s Army (HPA) functions mostly as an official guarantor of the rulers’ survival and as a provider of support tasks for the larger missions of the Soviet Army.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a net assessment of the Hungarian armed forces. Part I examines the mobilization experiences of the HPA, the impact of this historical background upon the present, and upon the expected future. Part II discusses the “recent” use of the HPA to help fulfill the alliance obligations it has had to assume as a result of its membership in the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). Part III analyzes the changes in the HPA’s force structure and in the process and extent of modernization. Part IV deals with the relationship between the HPA and the Soviet Army and concentrates on the integration of the Hungarian army with the WTO alliance system. Finally, the conclusion renders a prognosis of the HPA’s future as part of the WTO.

MOBILIZATION: PRECEDENTS, EXPERIENCES, PROBLEMS

Historical experiences of mobilization are of little or no instructional value in the case of the Hungarian army, for this army has
existed as a separate entity less than 70 years. The Army of Hungary came into existence only in 1918, after the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy. Consequently, its experiences in World War I, and specifically in the mobilization that preceded it, can only be analyzed as a part of the functioning armies of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and one must repeat that within that context Hungary had no separate army.

As a part of the Monarchy, however, the territorial and imperial units' experience in call-up was rather dismal. The mobilization in July 1914, the only true mobilization in the history of modern Hungary, occurred along very well-organized lines. Every male, living within the military districts designated for purposes of organizing the call-up, knew full well where he was supposed to go in the case of mobilization; they employed intensive poster-campaigns in the cities and “drummed-out-the-news” in the villages. Despite the extensive campaign, however, mobilization, in general, turned out to be a rather chaotic operation. It was not uncommon for the mobilized masses to arrive at the collection points only to find out that the designated barracks were no longer there, or that there were not enough beds, let alone guns, available for the recruits. In light of such extensive problems, the “enthusiasm” of Schweik's “On to Prague!” sounds rather hollow.

During the remaining years of the Great War, mobilization and call-up procedures became more routinized and better organized; yet there is no doubt that they never became perfect from the military perspective. Absenteeism from recruitment was common, especially in areas that were far from administrative centers, and during the latter years of the war the phenomenon of absent without leave (AWOL) was routine even in urban units. As enthusiasm waned by 1918, the mobilization procedures—specifically the call-up of the successive age-cohorts—although routinized, were subject to sloppy and inefficient administration on the one hand, and rampant corruption (including successful attempts at ignoring call-up orders) on the other. Lost wars are not conducive to efficient mobilization efforts.

The end of World War I, the chaos, the stupidity of the Allied leaders, and the insatiable territorial hunger of the Allied successor states contributed greatly to the declaration and establishment of the Hungarian Soviet Republic. When that entity was attacked en masse by the forces of the newly organized Czecho-Slovak, Romanian, and Yugo-Slav armies in July 1919, the Hungarian Communists ordered a
The initial successes of the army under Aurel Stromfeld in Slovakia, in fact, brought additional recruits to the army, but Béla Kun’s refusal to advance further, as well as the Allied advice and assistance to Romania and Czechoslovakia, doomed the effort. Suffice it to say, that even with the tremendously aggravated nationalism on Kun’s side, the 1919 experiments in mobilization did not yield “total success” in arming the population.

However, mobilization during World War II was a totally different case. To begin with, no general mobilization took place in Hungary until very late in the game. At the beginning of the war, on 10 July 1941, Hungary succumbed to German pressure and sent a division of Hungarian soldiers via Znamenka to join the aggression of the Wehrmacht. This “quick” or mobile division was made up of a brigade of horse-mounted, a brigade of motorized, and a brigade of bicycle-mounted(!) troops; not one single armored carrier, or tank accompanied this unit. Furthermore, the equipment of the army sent to fight the war in the USSR, both in 1941 and during the subsequent years, was unimaginably atrocious and practically useless for warfare. For instance, a large stock of the rifles issued were Mannlicher, manufactured in 1896! Be that as it may, the division’s transshipment to the USSR did not involve any element of mobilization, or general call-up; it was sent to Russia from the general “stock” of the army proper.

Subsequent pressures on Hungary to send additional troops to the Soviet Union during the summer and fall of 1941 did result in shipping the Second Hungarian Army to the USSR in October. Undermanned, ill-equipped (with arsenals and clothing that were totally unsuited for the severe Russian winter), and already exhausted in battle, the Second Army perished en masse at the Don. Yet, despite this horrendous sacrifice, we should note that the use and sacrifice of the Second Army did not induce Hungary’s leaders to resort to special call-up or mobilization procedures; the regular army continued to operate on the basis of calling up only the relevant age-cohorts for service.

A mobilization order was issued on 18 or 19 March 1944, as news of the impending German occupation of Hungary spread. The order came from General Lajos Dálnoki Veress, the commander of the Transylvanian Army, but it was localized and restricted to Transylvania; in fact, it was countermanded on 20 March 1944, as soon as the Germans were able to exert their control over the Hungarian
army. Ironically, the cost of issuing the mobilization order was deducted later from the monthly pay of General Dálnoki Veress!

General mobilization, in the strict sense of the word, began only during July 1944 when Prime Minister Dőme Sztojay ordered "general mobilization" of men who were not already "in regular service." In typical Hungarian fashion, many tried to circumvent or evade the order by going into hiding, securing "military" excuses or "medical certificates" proving physical unsuitability for service. Although, since the regular induction of the reserves continued unabated throughout the war, no mass-confusion occurred as in 1914; still, there was little or no significant increase in military strength as a result of mobilization.

The mass call-up, or total mobilization that took place under Ferenc Szálasi's murderous Fascist reign, between 19 October 1944 and Hungary's liberation and subsequent occupation by the Soviet Army in 1945, deserves to be mentioned for its notable failures. Although every able male under 65 years of age had to report for military service, most people tried to go AWOL, or into hiding, and only a small minority volunteered anew to fight misguided and hopelessly for the survival of "historic" Hungary, or, alternatively, "for the protection of the Aryan race." Even though the Arrow Cross thugs were empowered to shoot deserters without trial, Hungary's last mass mobilization took place when mass desertion was already the order of the day.

Interestingly and sadly, the one "success" in mobilization that Hungary registered took place among those Jews and "semi-Jews" who were called up for forced labor service between 1938 and 1945. Because of the difficulties of hiding and of evading the order, Jewish males when "mobilized," indeed, went to do their service, on the road that most often resulted in their deaths. The mobilization of Jewish males was clearly successful, however, because of a political culture that tacitly accepted that it was "just" for these men to work in the interest of "historic Hungary," on the one hand, and the unavoidability of labor service for them, on the other. It would have been highly desirable for Hungary's ethical provenance if the experiences of previous mobilization failures could have been repeated in 1945.

Short of the total mobilization or mass call-to-arms for the entire male population, the regular mobilization system currently employed
in the HPA is, generally, similar to that used by other WTO armies. It is a two-tier system based on the initial call-up of some 145,000 active reservists and around 700,000 inactive reservists. The call-up for the active reservists for training purposes is supposed to take place at least once every five years, but special reserve mobilization exercises are also based on one- or two-year cycles as well. For regular reserve duty, the post office sends mobilization notices for all reservists not in command position, usually two weeks in advance; on occasion, some reservists get their orders via telegrams. However, for soldiers and NCOs this method is supposed to be used only for slow, predictable service requirements, rather than fast-breaking national emergencies. Officers holding command positions usually receive orders either by telephone or by telegram; in turn, they then supervise the mobilization of their units. The mobilization of the reserve officers in command usually precedes the general mobilization of reservists by one to seven days, but we have noted concurrent mobilization experiences as well.

Emergency, or “non-regularized,” mobilization—specifically for the first-echelon reserve units that are directly subordinated to and are quasi members of the Soviet army—employs the “snowball” or “bell” method used elsewhere in the WTO. Accordingly, each individual, from the unit-command downward, is supposed to notify one or two other members of the unit. Occasionally postal notification may occur, but, in general, pyramid alert is the primary means of all emergency-mobilization practices. Although we do not have exact figures about the success ratios of these mobilization practices, the available evidence suggests that “snowball” mobilization is not particularly effective. In one such call-up in the early 1980s, less than 50 percent of an inactive reserve unit in the provincial city of Pécs showed up.

In all instances, the mobilization, or call-up, is handled administratively at the reserve military headquarters (Hadkiegé-szitó Parancsnokság or “Kieg”), and is organized on a territorial basis in each military district. The “Kieg,” in turn, reports to a special department within the Ministry of National Defense on the administrative level, and to the commanding general in charge of the Reserves on the force level. Both officials, in turn, report directly to their designated Soviet Army counterparts.

All active military installations maintain meeting points for mobilization purposes. Equipment and weaponry are “supposed to
be" kept in combat-ready condition for active reserves. The evidence, however, reveals that the procedures for mobilizing active reservists are cumbersome, and performance in these exercises are frequently dismal. Conservatively, at least 30 percent of the active reserves mobilized either do not get their call-up notices in time (or not at all), or, for various reasons, are excused from their reserve duties. The failures of HPA mobilization showed up during the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968. According to a high-level officer who participated in the exercise, the partial mobilization of reserve units intending to replace the approximately 20,000 Hungarian troops deployed briefly in Czechoslovakia, was "disastrous." For some reason, the NCO ranks were especially depleted.

The mobilization of inactive reserves is even more problematic. There are 5, 10, and 20-year cycles for call-up of inactive reserves (men generally between 35 and 55 years of age). Historically, the call-up procedures for these individuals have been sporadic and highly questionable as far as the success rate is concerned. While all men on active and inactive reserve duty are supposed to keep their "military booklets" (Katonakönyv or Katonai Igazolvány) up-to-date and register any and all address and workplace changes with the military district's registration division, inactive reservist participation in exercises has been unsatisfactory.

The Hungarian reserve mobilization system has some further peculiarities. While active reservists are supposed to be called up in the same manner as active status Workers' Guards units, generally the latter have a higher rate of participation. This higher rate occurs because the units of the Workers' Guards are mostly connected to a common workplace, while reserve units collect men separated by place and occupation. Another anomaly of the call-up system lies in the problems caused by the service regulations for the officers' personal weapons. In Eastern Europe all officers above the rank of lieutenant, directors of large enterprises, academic institutes, or ministry departments, as well as cadres on the first and second echelons of the nomenklatura, maintain a "personal weapon." This regulation is to ensure that the regime's potential defenders will be able to assist it in crisis. Both the experiences of 1956 and the reality that the regime can only count on the monopoly of weapons for the ultimate defense of the system, compel the leadership to trust this "elite." These personal weapons, that are supposed to be kept at the workplace for the penultimate defense of the system, are rarely maintained properly.
Although there is no published account available to shed light on the successful fulfillment of these regulations, in 1984, a captain in the army reserves laughed at the question of "proper maintenance" by presenting his weapon kept in the bottom "safe" drawer of his office desk. His pistol had rust caked on both the barrel and the trigger.

The reserve officers' summer training program is about the only part of the mobilization system, in general, that seems to work on an acceptable level. Special activities occur annually for the officers of the active reserves: they usually spend one-to-four weeks each summer on some form of reserve activity, ranging from lecture series to target-shooting competitions held especially for members of the reserves. For example, there are lectures on "contemporary economic questions," as well as discussions among reservists concerning the tasks of military institutions, or the work of reserve military headquarters (hadkiegeszito paransnoksagt), and the Hungarian Defense Association (Magyar Honvedelmi Szovetseg or MHSZ).110

Obviously, a large percentage of the reserve officers' summer training program is spent with "book-work" rather than physical activities in cooperation with regular military field units. In short, the call-up and reserve systems seem to function on a barely acceptable level, to fulfill the nation's military obligations. Then again, we may say the same things about the military operations of the HPA in general, and, thus, we should not be surprised that the reserve mobilization is no exception to the minimal level of performance.

SUCCESSES AND PROBLEMS IN PERFORMANCE OF THE HPA

The Hungarian People's Army has exercised three different roles during Hungarian Communist rule: an external threat, a domestic guarantor, and an external repressive force. The performance of the HPA on each of these levels seems to have varied, making blanket generalizations impossible. Instead, we must analyze the HPA's performance on each of these levels, separately.

The Hungarian army was first used as an active threat against Yugoslavia.11 Although originally permitted only 65,000 men under the provisions of the Paris Peace Treaty, under Muscovite control the ranks of the army increased to more than 250,000 by the summer of 1950.12 The purpose of such an increase was not primarily domestic, but to prepare for a general war against recalcitrant Yugoslavia at Stalin's personal behest. While the military prowess of the army...
during this period cannot be evaluated positively, far more soldiers in Hungary were under unified military command than ever before during the state's supposedly "peacetime" activities.

As far as the army's use in the control of domestic violence is concerned, the experiences of the Hungarian army are markedly different. Since much has been written about the army's role during the 1956 revolt, let us briefly recall the salient points of the HPA's activities. During the first day of the 1956 revolt, the Budapest garrisons, and especially the rank and file soldiers, were generally unreliable from the perspective of the regime. Soldiers often gave up their weapons to the rebels and participated in the fighting proper, especially in the battles against the secret police (AVH) troops. There were some major skirmishes between Hungarian and Soviet units: in Budapest, especially around the Killián Barracks; and outside of Budapest, specifically near Cegléd, between the Soviet Second Guards Mechanized Division and the local Hungarian troops. In these confrontations, the individual Hungarian units proved able to put up a good fight against the contingents of the Soviet Army.13

The participation of the HPA in opposing the second Soviet Army invasion that began in full force on 4 November 1956 is more problematical. Though many individual acts of courage occurred in the fighting against overwhelming odds, the army, as an army, did not participate in the fighting. There was, of course, an understandable reason for this "reluctance" to fight; Prime Minister Imre Nagy, who clearly had feared the unnecessary and futile shedding of blood, failed to order the Hungarian Army to engage the invaders in battle.14

Consequently, the Hungarian armed forces fought or failed to fight either as individuals or as members of poorly armed small units at the discretion of their commanding officers. In the provinces the vast majority of the units stayed inactive; some 30 percent of the soldiers simply "melted away." Although the soldiers and most NCOs stationed in Budapest garrisons generally sided with the revolt, organized field-resistance rarely happened; the battle of Nagykovacsi was a much misunderstood rear-guard action of a few desperate men under General Béla Király's command. While nearly all of the field-and general-grade officers remained loyal to the Soviets, the regime could not use the army as its ultimate guarantor; instead of Hungarian weapons and soldiers, Soviet equipment and men had to be used to secure communism once again in Hungary.
Finally, the Hungarian army was also used in the 1968 occupation of Czechoslovakia. On 21 August 1968, approximately 20,000 Hungarian soldiers were deployed in Slovakia to assist the Soviet Army, and the fellow “fraternal” troops from East Germany, Poland, and Bulgaria, to quash Czechoslovakia’s aspirations to create “socialism with a human face.” Clearly, the Hungarian elite did not wish to take part in the invasion; Prime Minister Jeno Fock even stated it was not up to János Kádár and his elite to make that decision. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the HPA did participate in that invasion, and that the political officers working with some of the invading units justified the attack on Czechoslovakia based on nationalistic hyperbole. In any case, Hungary’s participation in that invasion, despite its being undertaken to comply with WTO and Soviet Army High Command mandates, remains one of the more shameful aspects of national military performance during the long centuries of Hungarian history.

Let us now briefly explore one additional and highly hypothetical element in the external control activities of the HPA: the case of a potential conflict with Ceausescu’s Romania or Husak’s Czechoslovakia. While the 1968 invasion by Hungary was a Pact-mandated affair, the cultural genocide practiced by Romania, and, to a lesser extent, the mistreatment practiced by Czechoslovakia toward its Magyar minorities, could conceivably lead a domestically beleaguered Hungarian Communist leadership to play on the ever rising nationalism among Hungarians to conduct some external offensive operations against these states. While such a scenario is unlikely—mercifully due to the size and equipment deficiencies of the HPA and to the lack of any such will on János Kádár’s part—the HPA’s participation in such invasions could occur as a result of national rather than alliance considerations. Under such circumstances, while HPA’s participation would likely be enthusiastic, we must realize that technically such invasions would be doomed. Acts of heroism, based on warped values notwithstanding, would never overcome the superior manpower strength available to both Romania and Czechoslovakia to combat such incursions. At any rate, such HPA activities are inconceivable, unless approved in advance and supported by the Soviet Army; if this were the case, however, Hungary’s role, once again, would be subordinated to Soviet Army requirements.
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE HPA:
PAST AND PRESENT

Since the belligerent days of the late 1940s and early 1950s, the manpower of the HPA has continued to diminish from the all-time high of 250,000. Although, as noted in table 12.1, some negligible change frequently occurs in the year-to-year manpower pool of the HPA, the size of its personnel for the last 20 years has remained at approximately 105,000 men, rendering it the smallest armed force of the WTO. A noticeable tendency of the 1970s, though, was the growth in the HPA's professional component. As noted in table 12.1 (comparing the manpower of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact armies in 1986) the 44.7 percent proportion of professional cadre (i.e., 47,000 to 58,000 draftees) in the HPA is very high. Among the non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact (NSWP) only the GDR exceeds the HPA in this regard. Distrust of Hungarian conscripts, who represent the population at large, is probably a main, though certainly not the only, reason for the higher than average cadre-conscription ratio of the Hungarian army.

We should also mention that the military policies of the Hungarian regime are, by no means, exclusively responsible for the relatively small size of the HPA; it is also due to two consequences of the general social malaise so evident in Hungary. First, Hungary has had to face severe demographic problems in recent years. The size of the population, stagnating for a decade, has actually been diminishing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Armed Forces (1,000s)</th>
<th>Professional (1,000s)</th>
<th>Conscription (1,000s)</th>
<th>% of Professional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>148.5</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>201.0</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>118.0</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>179.0</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>105.0</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>44.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>402.0</td>
<td>151.0</td>
<td>251.0</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>189.7</td>
<td>81.2</td>
<td>108.5</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>204.0</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>120.7</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, there are simply no more Hungarian youths available for the army, a problem aggravated by the fact that generally 10-15 percent of the conscripts cannot do military service because of medical problems. Second, the HPA has had difficulties in attracting quality people into the ranks of its professional cadres, a situation that has had a negative impact on the recruiting of NCO and officer candidates. In addition, only a very small number of draftees choose to remain in the HPA after fulfilling their compulsory military obligation.

The regular HPA is composed of roughly 80 percent (or 83,000) army, 19 percent air force and 1 percent Danube Flotilla. The army has 33,000 (40 percent) professional cadre and 50,000 (60 percent) conscripts. The Hungarian air force has 22,000 soldiers, of whom 14,000 (63 percent) are professionals. The “naval element” of the HPA consists of the 700-strong Danube Flotilla. These regular forces are supported by the approximately 145,000 reserves, 135,000 of whom are commissioned to the army, with the remaining 10,000 to the air force.

The Hungarian army consists of one Category 2 tank division and five motorized rifle divisions, two at Category 2 and three at Category 3. Except for some air force/air defense units, the HPA does not maintain any permanent Category 1 forces. The army is supplemented by one artillery brigade, one surface-to-surface missile brigade, one anti-aircraft artillery brigade, four SAM regiments, and one airborne battalion (which may also be used for anti-terrorist support activities).

Military obligations for Hungarian men between the ages of 18 and 55 are in effect. Paralleling the HPA’s decrease in size over the last 30 years is the decrease in the period of mandatory military service. In the 1950s, this period was three years; since 1982 it has dwindled to 18 months, the second shortest compulsory armed service in the WTO. Before enrolling at a university, students must serve one year, followed by 6 months after graduation. Hungarian military service involves women only in specific employment categories between the ages of 18 and 45. Women graduates of universities, especially those with degrees in law, economics, and medicine who decide to join the military, receive commission as officers.

The effective training time of conscripts is seriously hampered by the economic contribution the HPA must render to the national
In a practice originating in the post-war reconstruction effort, Hungarian soldiers, like other soldiers in WTO, spend a significant proportion (25-33 percent) of their compulsory military service working on various construction projects, or in agriculture, or in sectors that have chronic shortages of manpower. Undeniably, this practice benefits the Hungarian economy; nevertheless, it has negative implications for general military training and combat readiness.

We should also mention that the Hungarian paramilitary, the Border Guards and Workers' Guards, are supervised by the Ministry of Interior. This force of 16,000 is composed of 11,000 (69 percent) conscripts and 5,000 (31 percent) professionals; all officers are trained in one of Hungary's three military colleges. The nearly 10 percent lower professional participation in the Border Guards versus the army cannot be explained on the basis of the available information. Since 1957, the regime has also maintained a 60,000 strong Workers' Guards (also trained and supervised by the Ministries of Interior and Defense) whose members are volunteers.

The HPA's arsenal has remained decidedly mediocre. The probable primary reason for the relative inferiority of the army's equipment—which is superior only to that of Romania—is that the Soviet leaders have never entrusted the HPA with first rate weaponry. Even in the late 1940s, when large quantities of Soviet military hardware were shipped to Hungary to prepare for the envisioned showdown with Yugoslavia, the Hungarian army did not receive the top-of-the-line equipment; rather, it received only weaponry that enabled it to play a subservient role in armed conflicts.

Consistent with the modest growth of the HPA's personnel in the last decade has been the small increase of the HPA's equipment inventory. The Hungarian army now possesses 60 T-72, 1,200 T-54/-55 tanks, and approximately 2,000 mechanized infantry combat vehicles. Some positive changes, though, have occurred in air defense and artillery units; the 50 percent growth in recoilless launchers is especially noteworthy. Also Hungarian missile inventories have improved. Between 1979 and 1985 the HPA acquired 30 SA-4, 40 SA-6, and 200 SA-7 surface-to-air missiles. As a result, it now possesses a total of 490 SAMs. A similar modest increase is also noticeable in the air force.

While the number of fixed-wing aircraft has remained essentially at around 135, in recent years the helicopter inventory has increased from 59 to 75 units—a 27 percent increase. In spite of these equipment alterations, the HPA's arsenal remains generally inferior. Moreover, in 1987
Hungarian Prime Minister Károly Grosz, claiming financial exigencies, failed to pay the cost of importing an additional squadron of Soviet aircraft (probably MiG-27s).

Finally, we must mention the Hungarian military expenditure issue. In table 12.2, which outlines Hungarian defense budgets between 1971-1986, it appears that Hungarian defense spending in the 1970s was basically stagnant at a level that was acceptable for the country's expanding economy; however, since the late 1970s defense allocations have increased dramatically. The Soviet demand, voiced during the 1978 meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the WTO, that all members increase military outlays by an annual 3 percent, is the probable reason for this growth. We should add, though, that there is no consensus regarding the size of the Hungarian defense budgets among experts. However, according to *The Military Balance*, Hungary's defense budget has increased from Ft.20.2o billion in 1982 to Ft.37.228 billion in 1985—an absolute increase of 83.7 percent, or of 27.9 percent annually. Even considering the significant rate of inflation, approximating 8-10 percent annually, Hungarian military spending increases have been exorbitant.

**THE HPA AND THE WARSAW PACT**

The Southern Group of Soviet Forces (SGSF) has been stationed in Hungary since 1945. Today it consists of at least two armored and two motorized rifle divisions (between 45,000-60,000 soldiers), stationed in northwestern Hungary, around Lake Balaton, and in the vicinity of many provincial cities. The First Soviet Air Army Corps, with its approximately 300 aircraft, is more than twice the size of the entire Hungarian air force; Soviet units are located near the northeastern city of Debrecen and at Tokol, near Budapest.

The readiness of the Soviet Army units (more than half are Category I troops) and the location of Soviet bases in Hungary reveal a great deal: aside from the Soviet missile, air-control, and air force bases, the Soviet ground troops are all located either near major HPA bases, or at the choke points of the country. Consequently, it is likely these units have, as a primary mission, control over the potentially hostile population centers in case of a domestic crisis. A secondary task is to maintain the Soviet domination of Hungary's logistics and air defense; and, as elsewhere in the WTO, the Hungarian and the Soviet air defense units are under the command of the PVO Strany. Notably, all air defense forces are located in a technically ideal air
control environment where the exercise total control over both Hungarian air space and air communications, as well as over similar activities in the entire Carpathian basin.

During 40 years of Soviet occupation, the HPA has been totally subordinate to the Soviet Army save for the few days of the 1956 Revolution. The modes of Soviet domination, however, have changed—although certainly not significantly enough to alter the basic rules of relationship between the two armies. In the 1940s and 1950s, Soviet "advisers" penetrated and supervised not only the Hungarian military high command, the service academies, and the armament industry, but also regular units down to the company level. During the last 30 years, however, Soviet supervision of the HPA has become somewhat less intrusive, and more sophisticated.

Today, the Soviet Army exercises some control over the Hungarian military institutions of higher learning (and the education of the HPA's top leaders in Soviet academies) and total operational control over the units which would be part of the Soviet fighting force in wartime. The Soviet leaders also maintain a firm grip on Hungarian participation in the WTO. However, the Soviets appear to have lost interest in the importance of the WTO as an institution, and consequently have tolerated some emerging Hungarian dissent regarding
Soviet demands of stepped up Hungarian military expenditure. The ultimate source of Soviet domination, however, remains the continued deployment of Soviet Army troops in Hungary. In short, in peacetime both on a day-to-day level and on a permanent basis, the Soviets totally supervise the Hungarian military. In the meantime, its “parallel” units have become practically units of the Soviet Army.

Hungarian political leaders have continuously defended the stationing of Soviet troops in Hungarian territory; nevertheless, its permanence has been glossed over. Although a vastly unpopular policy, the regime sees no room for maneuver. Moreover, it is quite uncertain that Hungarian Communist leaders have ever been truly willing to discuss the withdrawal of Soviet Army units from Hungary even if they would have had the external permission to do so; ultimately, these troops are the final guarantors of the Hungarian communist elite’s own survival.

Hungary has been a member of the Warsaw Pact since its inception. In fact, there is some truth to the assertion that the WTO was created to justify the stationing of Soviet troops in Hungary proper. As a member of the southern tier of the WTO, Hungary’s strategic role is less important than those of northern tier NSWP states. Traditionally, Soviet leaders have demonstrated more concern about north-central European than south-central European defenses or offensive postures in the region. The size and quality of military personnel and the arsenals of the two tiers support such a WTO strategy.

As far as Hungary’s WTO function in an offensive scenario is concerned, the HPA’s drive to the south would encounter a fierce Yugoslav army defending the Ljubljana gap; however, huge Soviet reinforcements would quickly overwhelm the defenders. In essence, both possible defensive and offensive scenarios indicate that the bulk of the fighting would take place in the northern theater. Hence, the HPA’s wartime role probably would be limited to logistic and combat support. During a major conflict with NATO, elements of the Southern Group of Soviet Forces (SGSF) would likely form a “Danube Front” for flank cover in southwesternly operations. Consequently, the HPA’s role as a component of the SGSF, at best, would be restricted in both offensive and defensive scenarios involving the Warsaw Pact.

Throughout the 32-year existence of the Warsaw Pact Hungary has been an obedient, if not always content, member of the WTO.
Hungary participates in all of the administrative bodies of the alliance, as well as in the combined exercises of the WTO. The HPA is essentially well-integrated into the Warsaw Pact and remarkably well subordinated to the Soviet Army. The best Hungarian officers are often educated in the Soviet Union; contacts between Hungarian and Soviet Army officers appear to be close on a professional, if not always on a personal basis. However, several implicit disagreements have somewhat blemished Soviet-Hungarian military ties: the invasion of Czechoslovakia by WTO forces; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; and Soviet demands for stepped-up Hungarian military spending. Nevertheless, the relationship between the HPA and the Warsaw Pact remains free of major contentions, and the relationship with the Soviet Army is one of total HPA military subordination to Soviet needs.

Indicative of Soviet efforts to ensure that Hungarian troops remain reliable are the lessons learned from the combined Warsaw Pact exercises. While some Western analysts have long believed that NSWP armies will fight as "distinct national entities," it seems clear today that selected NSWP units are already treated as a part of the Soviet Army and that in any conflict they would be "sandwiched" between Soviet troops. Evidently, the presence of Soviet forces in such a scenario would discourage NSWP forces from defecting. Moreover, if we are to believe in Colonel Kuklinski's analysis, Warsaw Pact protocols make national decisionmaking regarding military alerts in Hungary and elsewhere in the Warsaw Pact simply irrelevant.

The WTO did not stage major combined exercises until October 1961; however, Hungary has actively participated in WTO exercises since 1962. While Hungarian participation has been less intensive than that of the northern tier armies, the HPA has been the most frequent participant among the armies of the southern tier. Reasons for such frequent participation by Hungary are Romania's 1967 decision not to take part in large WTO exercises and Bulgaria's geographical isolation. The greater Hungarian integration with northern tier forces is also a consequence of its geographical location. Obviously, the Bulgarian army finds it difficult to participate in northern tier exercises because of logistical difficulties, especially since Romania has consistently refused to allow the transit of foreign troops on its territory.
Official accounts regarding the performance of Hungarian units are, of course, extremely favorable. It is, therefore, almost impossible to decipher from media releases the actual performance of the troops involved. Only frequently recurring themes, such as the proficiency of Hungarian troops in pontoon-bridge building, or the general competence of the HPA’s engineering and artillery units, rear services, and anti-aircraft components can be considered somewhat reliable. We should add, however, that even the actual performance of Hungarian troops in WTO combined exercises would be a poor indicator of the HPA’s achievements as a whole. Although we can cite no published evidence to support this hypothesis, it appears that, at least from the Hungarian army, only the best trained and equipped units take part in the combined exercises.

Bordering on two neutral states on the west and south, and on three socialist states on the north and east, Hungary, at the same time, appears to be both relatively insignificant and crucially important. On the one hand, besides Hungary’s geographical location (surrounded by mountain ranges on the edges of the Carpathian basin), the HPA’s less than first rate training and personnel, mediocre equipment, and questionable reliability make the country a relatively safe staging area in an offensive scenario. On the other hand, the picture would dramatically change should we envision a defensive role. In this instance, Hungary would become “the soft underbelly of the alliance,” precisely because of its weaknesses.

IS THE FUTURE TRULY OURS, COMRADES?

Some years ago a bleak little book, The Future Is Ours, Comrades, appeared in the United States. The text expressed pessimism about the West’s ability to counter the “Soviet” or “Communist” menace, partially predicated on the Soviet Union’s success as the “overlord” in Eastern Europe and, hence, within the WTO alliance system. While we are still pessimistic about the West’s ability to adequately defend itself in indirect confrontations with the Soviets (and are highly skeptical about a true national will in the United States to do so), we must recognize that the WTO alliance system has not been a total and unadorned blessing for Moscow, either.

The problems of the WTO, especially Hungary, partially stem from Hungary’s inability to “adequately” contribute to alliance needs. In spite of the tremendous numerical rise in Hungary’s military expenditures between 1979-1986, Hungary’s defense
contributions are not "adequate" according to the relevant Soviet authorities. Some of these increases have contributed arsenal growth, especially in SAMs, and logistic equipment. The arsenal growth that has occurred in other areas, however, is likely the result of direct Soviet Army help—for example, the 30 new T-72s received since 1982.

An inadequate defense budget is one reason Hungary is a questionable member of the WTO. Another more menacing reason is the strong, and growing, anti-Russian sentiment among the Magyar population. Fuelled by unfortunate events (such as the 1986 murder of a cab-driver by two drunk Russian officers), and the presence of the Soviet Army with a full complement of nearly 80,000 men in Hungary, many Hungarians resent the Soviets. True, the anti-Russian sentiments are far from uniform; in fact, public opinion surveys show many Hungarians do regard the Russians as people quite positively. Still, the reality is that the Russians are an occupation force in Hungary; and this is visible to anyone travelling in Hungary today. The anti-Soviet sentiment, coupled with a very negative evaluation of the other "fraternal" allies, is not likely to disappear soon. In fact it may well continue to increase in extent and intensity.

While these developments spell some trouble for the Soviets, Hungary's status within the WTO is not likely to change nor endanger either the WTO or Soviet interests. For example, the 1979/1980 WTO statutes render Hungarian national decisionmaking in military matters irrelevant in wartime, and the Soviet Army is still an overwhelming force in Hungary, guaranteeing that a 1956 uprising will not occur again. Thus, in a sense, the Soviet Army, by "law" and by its very presence, has assumed the role of the domestic guarantor of the Communist regime, generally reserved elsewhere in the region for the local, national military. For this reason, Hungary's current malaise and crisis are viewed with much concern in Moscow; the current Soviet elite under Gorbachev clearly wishes to avoid having to use military force to restore domestic order in Hungary. Whether Gorbachev and company will have the luxury of choice in this matter, however, is open to speculation.
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Endnotes

1. Extensive information for World War I mobilization may be gleaned from the following sources: József főherceg emlékiratai (Budapest: 1923-1928), 6 vols; A világháború 1914-1918-ban különös tekintettel Magyarország és a magyar csapatok szereplésére (Budapest: 1928), 10 vols., especially v. 1; Ferenc Julier, 1914-1918: A világháború magyar szemmel (Budapest: 1932); Jozsef Galántai, A Magyarország az első világháboruban (Budapest: Zrínyi, 1974); Österreich-Ungarn in letzte Krieg (Wien: 1932-38); Conrad von Hötendorf, Meiner Dienstzeit (Wien, 1925) 4 vols., esp. v. 2.

2. The description in Jaroslav Hasek’s Osudy dobreho vojaka Svejka (Prague: A. Synek, 1926) seems to be rather an exception in the sense of organization; the author’s fine sense of irony is especially notable here.

3. For the experiments in successes in mobilization the daily issues of the July, 1919 Vörös Ujság are the most instructive sources to consult.

4. For general information on the beginnings of the war see Sándor Toth, “A Horthy hadsereg helyzete a háborubalépés előestjén,” Haditörténési Szemle 6 (1961); Dr. János Csima, Adalékok a Horthy hadsereg szervezetének és háborus tévékenységének tanulmányozásához (Budapest: HMKL, 1961); Gyula Kádár, A Ludovikától Sopronkőhidáig (Budapest: Magvető, 1978); Magyarország és a második világháború (Budapest: Kossuth, 1966); A Wilhelmstrasse és Magyarország (Budapest: Kossuth, 1968); Magyarország és a második világháború (Budapest: Kossuth, 1961); Andras Simonffy, Komparseg katonái (Budapest: Magvető, 1981); István Nemeskürty, Requiem egy hadnferségért (Budapest: Magvető, 1967).

5. Magyarország és a második világháború, pp. 373-374.


7. For documentation of these pressures see A Wilhelmstrasse ..., pp. 621, 623, 625, ff.


19. In Romania mandatory military service is only 16 months.

20. For a more detailed discussion of the Hungarian paramilitary forces see Volgyes, The Political Reliability ..., pp. 73-74.


22. See, for instance, the different view of Keith Crane in his Military Spending in Eastern Europe (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1987).


25. Volgyes and Barany, “The Hungarian People’s Army.”


Belgium came into being when it won its independence from The Netherlands in 1830 and the Great Powers guaranteed the country’s neutrality. This served to separate The Netherlands, the States of the German Confederation, and France. In effect, Belgium became a buffer state which suited most of her European neighbors weary of the many conflicts which characterized the period.

Belgium was born as a state encompassing two nations, the French-speaking Walloons in the south and the Flemish-(Dutch) speaking Flemings in the north. For the first 68 years of statehood, French was the only official language even though the French-speaking population was, and continues to be, in the minority. In fact, language continues to be the fundamental problem dividing this small but important European country. So vexing is the language problem that it has at times caused governments to fall (as recently as October 1987) and, more recently, it has hampered military budgets and long-term procurement actions essential to military modernization. Indeed, Belgium has become the new Sick Man of Europe, seemingly unable or unwilling to meet its NATO force goals despite an ever increasing
Warsaw Pact threat, particularly when conventional force modernization has taken on greater significance following the US-Soviet agreement to scrap medium and intermediate range missiles in Europe.

Neutrality served Belgium well until World War I when the German armies swept through Belgium in a great arc, thereby outflanking French defenses and hoping to defeat France in a few short weeks. Following the terrible stalemate of that war and with the ensuing destruction of many Belgian cities, Belgium renounced her neutrality and joined the League of Nations; however, she soon lost heart and returned once again to a state of neutrality in 1936. A mere three years later Hitler invaded Poland, and Europe was once again at war. The following year "unfortunate Belgium" was the victim of another assault on its neutrality. At war's end Belgium became a charter member of the United Nations and NATO, and today Brussels, the capital of Belgium, can boast of being the military, economic, and political "capital of Europe" with NATO, the EEC, and the seat of the European Parliament.

Strategically, Belgium, situated at the northwest corner of Europe, lies within 160 kilometers of London, Paris, the Ruhr Valley, and most of Holland. She is an important member of NATO with superb transportation links: ports, road, rail, air, and canals. Antwerp, the second largest port in Europe, and fifth in the world, boasts of having the fastest "turn-around" of any port in the world. Ghent and Zeebrugge are the second and third largest ports in Belgium. These ports will play an important role in reinforcing and resupplying (RE/RE) NATO in times of war. Additionally, Belgium has the densest railway network in the world, and, next to The Netherlands, has the best highway and inland waterway in the world.

In addition, its 12 years of compulsory education and 98 percent literacy rate, coupled with a generous provision for higher education, makes the Belgian workforce perhaps the best educated in Europe.

Because of its strategic position, foreign invaders have trampled Belgium since the beginning of recorded history. This chapter will examine how Belgium mobilized its forces to meet the German invaders in the two great wars of the twentieth century. Then we will assess the current structure for mobilization and see how it has changed.
WORLD WAR I

Belgium first used conscription in 1868 following a move by the French to annex Belgian territory. The term of service has changed over the years, but conscription has remained.

In March 1913, when Europe was once again in turmoil, the government adopted “generalized personal military service,” calling for 30,000 draftees annually for 9 or 10 months. Exemptions were only allowed for physical disabilities. As practiced, conscription provided for drafting from the lower classes of society, granting of numerous exemptions to university students, and the ability for the wealthy to pay substitutes to serve in their places. These practices led to an almost complete lack of reserve officers and NCOs; those who did exist were either former regulars honorably discharged, those who had resigned for personal reasons, or old warrant officers who received a commission when they retired.

For a neutral country, the moment at which one begins mobilization is crucial. If Belgium mobilized too late, the entire country could be overrun before a defense was ready, and if she mobilized too soon, her neighbors might view it as a provocative act which could provide the pretext for invasion. Historically, Belgium has had to choose the time for mobilization carefully. Confronted in July 1914 with the growing danger of war, King Albert acted as follows: on 29 July, one day after the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia, the Army was put on what was called pied de paix renforcé or “reinforced peace footing,” a condition similar to partial mobilization. Three classes, or annual contingents of conscripts from the previous three years, were called back to active duty. The purpose of pied de paix renforcé was to maintain the appearance that Belgium was not actually mobilizing.

Mass mobilization was decreed on 31 July after the news that the Russians and Austrians were marshalling their forces—a sure sign that war was imminent. From 1 August onwards, 11 classes were put under arms and sent to their positions. Because the French and
Germans had only begun their mobilization on 1 August, the Belgian Army, thanks to the speedy decision of its political authorities, had won precious time, and despite the absence of a transportation plan, the armed forces were able to carry out their mobilization and concentration in time to meet the German invasion of 4 August.\(^3\)

Although Belgian forces mobilized to meet the German invasion, many problems associated with organizing and preparing for war were evident. The Belgian General Staff had not come into being until 1910, and they planned chiefly to defend their neutrality. However, by August 1914, they had not yet reached agreement on how best to defend. Three schools of thought existed. The first advocated an offensive orientation with forces on the frontier on threat of war; a second group favored a defensive orientation with forces concentrated in the interior to protect the vital core; and the third called for a forward defense initially, then falling back and protecting the lines of communications to Antwerp. When the war broke out, no solution had been agreed upon; as a result, railroad schedules had not been prepared to move the troops and equipment to their positions.\(^4\)

In 1913, when a reluctant Parliament finally agreed to vote more money for defense, Belgium placed an order for heavy artillery to be used to cover the gaps between the fortresses. But when the war started, the heavy artillery had not yet been delivered. The guns had been ordered from the German firm Krupp which, not surprisingly, had held up their delivery. Despite these shortcomings, the Belgian defenders acquitted themselves very well. The Germans had expected an easy time against these “chocolate soldiers” but were surprised by their tenacity and spirit. Reports of valiant Belgian bayonet charges and mass German casualties were widespread. The Germans had so much difficulty reducing the fortresses of Liège that they brought up their heavy siege guns (305mm and 420mm mortars, the largest weighing 98 tons) and employed Zeppelins to drop aerial bombs on the city of Liège as a terror tactic. This tactic foreshadowed twentieth-century air warfare.\(^5\)

German forces occupied Brussels 18 days after the war began, but the Belgians, accompanied by their allies, held out in a narrow strip of land in the northwest corner of the country until the Armistice was signed in 1918.
THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE WARS

In accordance with the Treaty of Versailles of 1920, Belgian neutrality was rescinded. Belgium became one of the first signatories of the League of Nations and in 1920 signed the French-Belgian Military Cooperation Accord to ensure that Germany adhered to the terms of the Versailles Treaty. Belgian troops took part in the retaliation occupation of Frankfurt in 1920 and the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, when Germany threatened to default on her reparation payments. When the Locarno Mutual Security Pact was signed in 1925, which included Germany, most of the provisions of the Franco-Belgian Accord had become obsolete. In May 1926, public opinion forced the military to reduce its budget and the term of service for conscripts. Two years later a Royal decree reduced the Belgian officer corps by hundreds of officers. The result was a steady quantitative and qualitative decline of the Army. In 1936, when the French failed to act following Hitler’s remilitarization of the Rhineland, Flemish leaders bitterly denounced the Accord which they said made the Belgian Army a “tool of the Godless French.” Shortly thereafter, the King renounced the Accord and proclaimed Belgium’s return to neutrality.

During the Munich crisis in September 1938, when Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia, the Belgian government once again declared pied de paix renforcé (reinforce a partial mobilization. They activated five to seven classes of reservists, amounting to 300,000 men and representing 16 divisions. However, the crisis soon ended and by October the soldiers were sent home. So precipitous was this action that soldiers abandoned their equipment in the cantonment areas, leaving the officers and NCOs to collect all the materiel. This mobilization also demonstrated that plans for commandeering civilian trucks, cars, and bicycles were also inefficient. Serious training deficiencies showed up as well; for example, motorized cavalry divisions of reservists, who had been trained as horsemen, were the cause of many traffic accidents.

WORLD WAR II

The lessons learned from the 1938 partial mobilization were not forgotten. The General Staff took note of the errors and substantially expanded the existing two-phased mobilization system (reinforced peace footing and mass mobilization) to a more flexible system consisting of five main phases. As the European situation further deteriorated, Belgium mobilized in accordance with this new plan.
PHASE A: (25 August 1939) Put active units on war footing as the tension between Germany, Poland, France, and England was increasing.

PHASE B: (28 August 1939) Recalled reserve units of the fortification garrisons four days before the German invasion of Poland.

PHASE C: (1 September 1939) Mobilized all first-line divisions the day Poland was invaded.

PHASE D: (11 September-7 November 1939) Extended Phase C by gradually adding six divisions of the second reserve. Recalled logistics and support units.

PHASE E: (10 May 1940) Declared general mobilization. All men 16-45 years sent to training camps in southern France. Also road, rail, and buildings units activated.

The following type units were also activated:
—GTA (*Garde Teritoriale Antiaéerienne*) which were part-time antiaircraft units.
—GVC (*Gardes Voies & Communications*) which were independent companies for the safety of the LOC, including two light regiments made up of Gendarmerie to perform antiparatrooper duties (Rear Area Security).8

In addition to military mobilization, a form of civil mobilization occurred as well. Certain public office-holders, physicians, firemen, and local police who were no longer draftable, were mobilized in place to assist the local population. This effort was a complete failure because the fear of German atrocities (similar to those that had occurred in August 1914) led many public servants to join the flood of refugees.

Under the authority of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MEA), national resources were mobilized to support the war effort under a program called *Service de Mobilisation de la Nation*. Together, the MOD and MEA coordinated the conscription of food supplies, vehicles, industrial facilities; made provisions for transferring armament industries to France, including the engineers and workers; and assumed responsibility for making defense purchases abroad.
Although great strides had been made between the wars to make mobilization more orderly, many serious deficiencies still remained in three major areas: structural, tactical, and political.

On the structural level, regional recruiting, lack of officers and NCOs, and lack of adequate logistics infrastructure caused many problems. Belgium’s 600,000-man mobilization caused a near collapse of economic activity. (Recall that mobilization occurred over an 8½-month period). At various times from the start of “Phase A,” coal miners were sent back to their jobs, as were teachers and some public servants. Farmers were sent home for the harvest. Since reservists were recruited regionally, this selective “demobilization” created severe problems. By sending home miners and mining engineers, two Infantry divisions recruited from Hainaut Province in Walloonia were depleted. Mining engineers sent back to their jobs left the Engineer Corps with a gap of some 40 percent of its reserve officers. Since school teachers were either reserve officers or NCOs, many second-line divisions were left with a skeleton cadre. While the Flemish-speaking divisions badly resented the coal miners being released, since all were French speaking, the departure of Flemish farmers during harvest time provoked ill feeling in the French-speaking units.9

Tactically, Belgium was not prepared when the war began on 10 May 1940, since a new line of defense had not yet been completed and Belgium had not adequately coordinated with neighbors to the south. As a consequence, “strategy had to be improvised from day to day.”10 Three elements of military policy emerged: first, a full frontier defense was not deemed possible; second, the Albert Canal was to be the first line of defense; and third, a new line of fortifications was to be built extending from Antwerp to Namur. Belgian forces were to hold the enemy at the Albert Canal as long as possible and trade space for time by falling back to the new line of fortifications. By then, theory had it, the allies would join Belgian forces to halt the enemy and repulse the invader.11 While King Leopold had realized the necessity for a dynamic defense in depth supported by tanks, the Socialist Party objected, saying that tanks were offensive weapons which had no place in a neutral country.12

On the political level, Belgian military policy between the wars vacillated between strength and weakness. Military service, at 14 months in 1923, was cut back to 10 months, and the size of the Army was reduced “in the spirit of Locarno” in 1926. When Hitler
remilitarized the Rhineland, service was increased to 17 months. Just two weeks before the attack on Belgium, the government became deadlocked over proposals on linguistic reform. When the Liberals refused to accept the education budget, Prime Minister Pierlot submitted the resignation of his government to the King who refused, noting "This is not the time to provoke a ministerial crisis on internal and domestic matters." On 10 May, Germany attacked.

For all the apparent failings during this period, Belgium was perhaps the best prepared of the wartime allies at the onset of war with Germany. In September 1939, 24 percent of Belgium’s total budget went to defense. With a population of only 8 million, Belgium had about 600,000 men under arms, over half that number between 20 and 40 years of age. The order for General Mobilization brought that number to 900,000. Compare this figure to 237,000 soldiers for the British Expeditionary Force and only 185,000 men in the Regular Army of the United States. The American statesman, Henry Stimson, pointed out that, in early 1940, the US Army was "nowhere near as well trained as the Belgian Army."

THE POST-WAR PERIOD

For all of the planning and the resources that Belgium expended to ensure its neutrality, King Leopold III surrendered his Army after only 18 days. Four years of German occupation followed; the subsequent counter thrust of the Allied Armies in the fall of 1944—highlighted by the 43-day Battle of the Bulge—caused the destruction of many picturesque villages in the Ardennes. At war’s end, Belgium had had enough of neutrality.

Consequently, Belgium took a leading role in forming both collective and regional security organizations: she was a founding member of the United Nations in 1945, the Western European Union established by the Treaty of Brussels in 1948, and NATO in 1949. Today, Belgium hosts NATO Headquarters located in Brussels and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) near the French border in Casteau. Both headquarters were established in Belgium in 1967 following the withdrawal of French forces from NATO’s integrated military structure.

As a believer in collective security, Belgium answered the call of the United Nations Security Council to send forces to Korea in 1951. Belgium, along with Luxembourg, formed a battalion of volunteers which fought under the flag of the United Nations Forces during the war.
Since the end of the Korean war, all Belgian military operations outside the nation's territory have occurred in Zaire, the former Belgian Congo. On three separate occasions (1960, 1964, and 1978), Para-Commandos, an elite ranger-type unit, went to save the lives and property of Belgian and European settlers who had remained in Zaire following independence. During the 1978 intervention, the Belgians were joined by French paratroopers to assist the Zairean Army recapture the important mining city of Kolwezi following an attack by Angolan rebels.\textsuperscript{17}

**EVOLUTION OF FORCE STRUCTURE**

As noted in the following table (13.1), since the turn of the century, Belgian Armed Forces have generally increased—except in 1935—to a peak in 1953. From that point they began to decline until the early 1980s when they recorded a slight increase.

**13.1—BELGIAN FORCE STRUCTURE, 1902-1987**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Regular</th>
<th>Reserves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>137,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>137,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>77,398</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>65,717</td>
<td>547,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>91,212</td>
<td>533,821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>117,250</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>148,495</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>108,362</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>103,533</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>87,000</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>93,500</td>
<td>141,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>90,800</td>
<td>411,606</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Compulsory service has an extensive role in the force structure of the Belgian Armed Forces. Currently, conscripts constitute nearly one-third of the total force, whereas in 1924, they were nearly 70 percent. At the onset of each of the two great wars, conscripts increased dramatically. In 1914, conscripts comprised 82 percent of the force—in 1940, 92 percent. Table 13.2 outlines conscript evolution within the Armed Forces.

On the eve of World War I, the Belgian Army had two major commands: a Field Army consisting of 117,000 soldiers, and the Fortress Army with 90,000 men. The fortress troops were to defend from the forts surrounding Antwerp, Liège, and Namur.
### 13.2—BELGIAN CONSCRIPTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Force</th>
<th>Conscripts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>% of Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>13,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>33,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>207,000</td>
<td>170,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>77,398</td>
<td>53,410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>91,212</td>
<td>53,476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>625,000</td>
<td>580,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>148,495</td>
<td>87,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>108,362</td>
<td>36,936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>93,500</td>
<td>31,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>90,800</td>
<td>29,510</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By 1940, the structure had changed. Though there was no Fortress Army per se, a few specialized regiments manned the forts around the fortress cities. The Field Army consisted of some 375,000 out of a total force of 625,000. With the exception of two cavalry divisions and one brigade, the Army was not motorized and had only a few tanks. The Air Force had 10,554 airmen and 184 airplanes, most of which were obsolete. The Navy was much smaller since Belgium had only a 40-mile coastline to protect.

After the Second World War, Belgium incorporated major changes: they created armored units and established the 1st Belgian Corps with duty station in West Germany, where it remains to this day. The Air Force now constitutes nearly a quarter of the peacetime strength of the Armed Forces and has the latest fighter aircraft, including the F-16. The Navy is a highly specialized force of minesweepers and frigates and has some 4,500 sailors in its force.

As outlined in the table 13.3 the Belgian Armed Forces are currently organized along traditional military lines with an Army, Air Force, and Navy. The Army is divided between the 1st Belgian Corps, much of which is forward-based in Germany, and the Forces of the Interior, headquartered near Brussels. The Air Force consists of Tactical, Transport, Air Defense, and Reconnaissance formations; the Navy has frigates and minesweepers which support missions of convoy escort and mine clearing operations in the English Channel and North Sea.
BELGIUM: THE STRATEGIC HUB

13.3—TOTAL ARMED FORCES, 1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACTIVE</td>
<td>67,500</td>
<td>18,800</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>90,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESERVE</td>
<td>356,733</td>
<td>42,849</td>
<td>12,024</td>
<td>*411,606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>424,233</td>
<td>61,649</td>
<td>16,524</td>
<td>502,406</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*About 145,000 personnel have been on active duty within the past 5 years.
Source: See endnote 20. Belgium has a separate Medical Service which is operationally autonomous but depends upon the Army for logistic support. Current strength, which is included in the above figures for the Army is 5,200 plus a reserve force of 46,922.

BELGIAN CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM

At the age of 16 each male citizen must register for national service. Call-up normally occurs when the individual reaches 19 years of age. The earliest age for call-up is 17, but that can only happen in case of war. National service can be delayed to age 32 for certain categories of students: for example, a physician specializing after graduation. At present, roughly 35 percent of the total Belgian population of young men actually serve, but this figure will undoubtedly increase since exemptions are becoming more difficult to obtain. One can receive an exemption if two family members are serving as conscripts, or if one is head of household (widowers with a child, sole source of support for parents or grandparents, and so on), or for medical reasons. Alternative service is available to conscientious objectors (numbering some 1,400 per year) with the approval of the Minister of Interior. Two options exist for alternative service: 18 months in the Civil Defense field, or 24 months for service performed in the socio-cultural field.

Presently, non-citizens residing in Belgium have no service obligation. Resident alien status includes children of aliens born in Belgium who take the citizenship of their parents. As noted in Chapter 1, table 1.3, the pool of service-eligible young men will probably decrease by 25 percent by 1995 due to a low birth rate. The Belgian government is studying the impact of this shortage and may opt for future increases of females in the Armed Forces (an unpopular option). Although women can volunteer for service, they are not drafted, nor do they incur a reserve obligation. The current service obligation for conscripts varies: for serving in Germany, 10 months; in Belgium, 12 months; as reserve officers, 13 months; and with the Para-Commandos, 15 months. Total service obligation is 8-15 years, depending on military specialty.

An interesting feature of conscript service is that the "normal" conscript cannot be sent abroad during his tour without special
legislation being enacted during a crisis or emergency. Soldiers must volunteer to serve in Germany; so too, Para-Commandos volunteer in advance for service abroad. In September 1987, when Belgium sent two minesweepers and a support ship to assist her allies to help keep the Persian Gulf clear, the 50 conscripts assigned to these ships willingly volunteered to go abroad. In fact, there were more volunteers than necessary for that deployment.

THE RESERVE FORCE

Two categories of civilians are considered mobilizable, those recalled to active duty and those called to active duty. The first group comprises draftees who are discharged after their active duty tour and retired military personnel to age 56. Individuals are “recallable” from 8 to 15 years after discharge, depending on their schooling and specialty. The civilians who have never been drafted form the second category. Called the recruiting reserve, they include 17-year-olds who are awaiting the draft and civilians who were exempted from active service (mainly students on a deferment and conscientious objectors). Reservists receive classifications in one of four groups:

1. Complements: recently released conscripts earmarked for assignment to their former units.
2. Recalled Reservists: trained individuals assigned to reserve units.
3. Reinforcing Chain: trained individuals not assigned to reserve units but who can serve as individual replacements.
4. Recruiting Reserve: others not previously trained and capable of being mobilized.

The Belgian reserve force differs from the US Reserve or National Guard structure, because unit training occurs infrequently and individual refresher training is non-existent. A reserve unit—for instance an artillery battalion—will have a commander or executive officer and an operations officer as active officers and some other officers and NCOs who are also on active duty (about 15 percent of the unit). They are generally staff officers on a high-level staff or school faculty, etc. The officers (active and reserve) meet at random throughout the year, plan for the coming recall exercise, attend seminars, and participate in an occasional Command Post Exercise (at times with active units). Figure 13.4 portrays the “career” of the typical reservist.
ACTIVE DUTY TRAINING CYCLE

TOTAL SERVICE OBLIGATION

NOTES: Typical for enlisted force (notional)

Conscripts who volunteer to become Para-Commandos receive conscript pay for 12 months and regular pay for the remaining 3 months.

In 1987, conscripts received BF125 per day ($3.00) or about $96.00 per month, while volunteers were paid BF22,000 per month ($564.00)

Air Force and Navy do not have a similar structure since they have no reserve units. Their reservists reinforce existing units. There is no possibility of retirement compensation. Therefore, reserve officers and NCOs are motivated by patriotism or a sense of duty rather than a monetary reward. They must complete training courses and seminars and meet specific qualifications for promotions which, for both active and reserve forces, are much slower than the US system.

13.4—TYPICAL "CAREER" OF BELGIAN RESERVIST
Every 3 or 4 years they have an exercise with their troops who are recalled for various periods (Territorial Companies, 8 days; Brigades, 15 days; Corps and Corps Troops, 12 days). During this period, they go through limited refresher training; however, meaningful field training exercises occur infrequently. The following table (13.5) outlines a typical reserve Brigade training schedule. According to law, the enlisted reservist can only be recalled to active duty, short of national emergency or war, for a maximum of 24 days within his 8 to 15 years of reserve service. For NCOs this figure increases to 40 days. Since no such restrictions are placed on reserve officers, they meet more frequently but only receive compensation for the authorized recall with troops not to exceed 30 days per year. As one might expect, the higher skilled jobs within the active component go to career personnel whereas the conscripts inherit menial tasks. This situation inevitably leads to morale problems among conscripts who see military service as a waste of their time.

Another feature of the reserve structure is what one might call “rounding out” a unit. For instance, one particular active artillery battalion has a peacetime strength of 300 men, but a wartime strength

### 13.5—RESERVE BRIGADE TRAINING EXERCISE

**Pre-recall (about one week)**
- Movement of material to training area
- Instruction of reserve NCOs
- Reconnaissance of training/exercise areas
- Preparation for reception of enlisted reservists

**First Week**
- Welcome/reception of personnel
- Formation of units
- Parade
- Technical and tactical instruction
  — Live firing exercises, small arms, artillery,* etc.
- On Saturday—family day

**Second Week**
- Two day FTX
  — Critiqued and evaluated by active units
- Maintenance of equipment
- Turn-in of equipment

*Artillery in reserves are the M109A2 or M109A3 SP (155mm) howitzers. The M109A2 are new and the M109A3 are newly modernized with a new cannon. Observation of a recent reserve exercise revealed that each battery had 400 rounds of ammo for training which included the following missions: Registration, HE, Smoke, Time, Illumination, Bn TOT, and emergency missions. Troops were motivated and their training days were long and hard.
of 560 men. The additional personnel come from the *Complément* (that is, the most recently released conscripts). Under this system, the *Complément* compensates for the annual influx of untrained conscripts.

**MOBILIZATION BY OBJECTIVES**

The five-phased system used prior to World War II was more flexible than the two-phased approach used in World War I; however, it did not yield the high degree of flexibility required in the modern transition from peace to war. The new system was designed to meet the rhythm of events by allowing selective mobilization to meet the needs of a particular moment; it allows the Belgian authorities to mobilize by objectives in a controlled, deliberate manner. The idea is to separate mobilization operations for different missions assigned to the Belgian forces in the NATO structure. The rhythm or pace of mobilization is, for the most part, linked with the NATO declaration of alert measures. For each mission, successive mobilization objectives have been determined. Manning the Lines of Communication (LOC), for example, may be accomplished *outside* of the NATO sequence of alerts. The United States, France, and the UK have completed comprehensive bilateral Host Nation Support (HNS) agreements to support their respective LOC through Belgium. The US-HNS agreements are discussed below.

This new system enables either a progressive and measured transition to wartime posture or a more rapid mobilization (if necessary) and greatly improves the more rigid and less accommodating phased-approach.

**MOBILIZATION SEQUENCE OF EVENTS**

When the Minister of Defense (MOD) or the government orders the Chief of the Defense Staff (CHOD) to mobilize forces, the government specifies which categories of reservists may be recalled. Each reservist possesses a notice of assignment which is overstamped with a number and all active personnel have a Codeword which is stamped on their military identification.

The typical sequence of events for activating the reserves follows:

- The operations section of the Joint Staff transmits the specific order to the headquarters of the Gendarmerie (State Police) stating the categorie(s) of personnel to be recalled.
Gendarmerie Headquarters retransmits this order to the 52 subordinate districts where all the recall orders are stored by category for the reservists who reside in these respective districts.

Recall orders are then handcarried to each of the villages within the district for distribution.

Simultaneously, the radios and televisions broadcast recall of both active and reserve personnel using the Codewords and numbers.

For example: If the Codeword “Geronimo” is transmitted, all personnel with this word stamped on their ID card report to their assigned unit, mobilization station, or pick-up point.

During the execution phase, the Compléments for Belgium join their assigned active unit where their weapons and unit equipment are physically stored. The Compléments for Germany report to a pick-up point, then are transported by buses or trains to their assigned garrison in Germany. Individual Recalled Reservists assigned to a reserve unit report to a mobilization center where their equipment is stored; and the Recalled Reservists belonging to the Reinforcing Chain report to an assigned army depot.

THE ROLE OF THE GENDARMES

The Gendarmerie, one of the branches of the Armed Forces, reports to the Minister of Defense who controls its administration and organization. Its primary mission is to maintain law and order, and as such, it functions more properly as a state police organization. During peacetime the line of authority for operational control also extends from the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Interior. Therefore, the Gendarmerie works for separate ministries and has specific responsibilities to each.

During wartime, the Gendarmerie, working with the Ministries of Defense and Interior, participates in the territorial defense of the state. A primary mission of the Gendarmerie is to cooperate with the Armed Forces to assist in mobilizing the nation for war. Key tasks include protection of mobilization facilities and depots, traffic control, and security of the mobilization transportation network. As already noted, the Gendarmerie headquarters transmits mobilization orders to its 52 subordinate district headquarters. Since each reservist must register with his local commune (village), these mobilization orders, which contain instructions on where the individual must
One of the major formations of the Gendarmes is *La Légion Mobile* which constitutes the national reserve for the Commander of the Gendarmerie, a Lieutenant General. The Mobile Legion consists of a Special Intervention Squadron and two Squadrons of Cavalry which can be placed under the operational control of one of the Gendarme Territorial Commanders. Armament for these mobile forces includes 60mm mortars, light and heavy machineguns, and portable anti-tank weapons. Their vehicles include jeeps, cargo trucks, armored cars, water cannons, and transporters for horses and cavalry equipment. As one might expect, these men, arms, and vehicles provide wartime rear-area security missions which support the Army Province Commanders.

On numerous occasions, the Army has been called upon to provide soldiers to reinforce the Gendarmes during domestic crises and violence. For example, in winter, 1985-86, a local terrorist group calling itself the Communist Combat Cells (CCC) targeted NATO pipelines, US support facilities, and American company facilities in Brussels. At the same time, murderers, dubbed by the press as the "Brabant Killers" (so named after the province in which they operated) were at large, and engaged in wanton killings. To protect vulnerable facilities and augment the Gendarmes, army Para-Commandos and some non-NATO committed units stationed in Belgium were placed under operational control of the Gendarmerie who, in this instance, reported to the Minister of Interior. On a rotational basis, Army units have also provided roving platoon-strength patrols for perimeter security of the Brussels International Airport and Belgian nuclear power facilities.

The current strength of the Gendarmes is 631 officers, 1,205 senior NCOs, 2,363 elite NCOs, and 10,738 junior NCOs, corporals, and privates, or a total active force of 14,937. At any given time approximately 1,000 candidates are undergoing training. In addition a reserve manpower pool, comprising about 4,000 individuals who have performed their conscript service in the Army, are assigned to the Gendarmes for rear-area security missions during wartime. As of March 1987, 400 draftees per year will serve their obligation with the Gendarmes, thereby adding an annual trained contingent to their reserve force.²³
THE MOBILIZATION BASE

Within the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MEA) is Le Bureau des Plans Civils de Défense (BPCD), the Office of Civil Defense Plans, headed by a retired Major General and composed of both retired military and civilian personnel. Their mission is to prepare in peacetime the plans to ensure Belgium's survival during crisis and war. To carry out these responsibilities, civil servants in various other ministries coordinate with the BPCD to discuss their progress and particular problem areas. Civil Defense plans include both individual and collective survival measures. Individual concerns are primarily food, clothing, and energy; collective levels pertain to national economy, such as ensuring that the factories are properly manned. Plans have been formulated on three general levels: peacetime events which can have grave consequences for the economy of the state, including natural catastrophe or a major nuclear incident/accident; crisis events which include escalating international tensions leading to a state of war; and actual hostilities. Belgium recognizes that such plans must match NATO alert measures and the treaties which they have signed with their European Community partners.

According to Belgian law, the MEA can interdict, regulate, and control the economic activities of the state. To anticipate needs, several ministerial decrees have been prepared for a number of contingencies. Called "arrêtés dormants" (dormant laws/decrees), they will be submitted to the government when needed. To anticipate certain crises/events, the MEA has prepared food and fuel rationing stamps if these are needed. Belgium constantly updates these and other measures to ensure they coincide with the NATO alert measures and their own needs.

Since the peacetime structure of the MEA does not meet its wartime responsibilities, many of the purely peacetime responsibilities are dropped, and the manpower is redistributed to augment those offices which coordinate wartime matters. The crisis structure of the MEA includes: a Central Bureau For Industrial Distribution (to coordinate metallurgical products, non-ferrous metals, chemical products, ammunition, paper, textile material, wood, tobacco, leather, construction material, and food products); a Central Bureau For Distribution Of Energy (to coordinate petroleum, coal, electricity, and natural gas); and a Distribution Service (to coordinate the rationing of food and fuel).
Another concern is how the factories and businesses function to contribute to the overall well-being of the state and how labor performs essential tasks. Personnel with critical skills and essential managers may be exempt from military service but would be mobilized in place. This situation presents a difficult problem to factory managers who must decide that certain personnel are essential and others are not, a task that is not yet complete.

The requisitioning of vehicles to support the war effort is another matter falling within the responsibility of the Ministries of Transportation (MOT) and of Defense. The Forces of the Interior (HQs FI) submits its vehicle requirements to the MOD. MOD coordinates with MOT to determine the classes of vehicles necessary. Once every six months, commercial vehicles must be taken to one of the Controle Technique (CT) vehicle inspection stations. Data from these inspections are fed into a computer maintained by the MOT. Vehicle requirements from HQs FI are then compared with the data in the MOT computer, and requisition orders are sent to the commercial enterprise that owns the vehicle, with copies to the local Gendarmerie. When these vehicles are needed, owners must deliver them to the requisitioning station, a Controle Technique station. The CT thoroughly inspects the vehicles and issues government receipts to the owner. The vehicles are then turned over to the military authorities who form transportation companies manned by reservists who operate and maintain the vehicles.²⁴

WARTIME HOST NATION SUPPORT (WHNS)

The Lines of Communication (LOC) to the European Theater of Operations for NATO flow through Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Belgium, with its sea and aerial ports of debarkation, is critical to the reinforcement and resupply (RE/RE) of American forces transiting the LOC, and, to a lesser extent, British forces. Coordination of this LOC began in the early 1970s and continues to this day.²⁵ To speed up coordination and implementation of the numerous Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS) agreements, the United States European Command has established a US-European Command Logistics Coordination Cell (ULCC) in several NATO capitals. In Brussels, the ULCC is colocated with the Office of Defense Cooperation, attached to the American Embassy.

The ULCC's mission is to develop joint US-BE host nation support plans, coordinate the activation of the US LOC, and coordinate
wartime host nation support. During exercises and in wartime, this cell collocates with the Belgian Joint Military Staff to coordinate the implementation of the various LOC plans.

Critical to our discussion of mobilization is the fact that most of the manpower associated with operating the LOC comes from mobilizable forces which would come under the Forces of the Interior when called to duty. When one considers that Belgium has numerous staging and marshalling areas for US forces, then the role of mobilizable forces takes on an even greater significance.

To coordinate the activities associated with the creation of these LOC plans, a Joint Planning Commission (13.6) has been established. This commission meets at least once a year and its subordinate Steering Committee meets annually as well. Thus, coordination meetings occur at least every six months.

Since logistics is a national responsibility, the United States has agreed to bilateral agreements to ensure that the appropriate level of RE/RE is available during times of tension and war. Because the United States may want to begin reinforcing key forces in Europe (short of implementing specific NATO alert measures), various LOC agreements can be activated bilaterally. Therefore, NATO doesn’t have to act; the issue is more an act of political will by both the United States and Belgium.

As one might expect, much progress has been made in this area since the early 1970s. Each WINTEX and REFORGER exercise proves existing plans, yet uncovers new problems for resolution. The important thing is that many issues are relatively complex and take time to resolve. When one realizes that numerous US units will be staying in Belgium to operate the LOC in wartime along with their Belgian counterparts, and that they both must coordinate the transportation, sleeping accommodations, and operating facilities—and that many of these requirements continually change—then the magnitude of the problem is understandable.

The US-Belgian Joint Support Plan (1982)—the keystone document for Wartime HNS—includes functional and operational support areas (supply, transportation and services). To provide the necessary security to the LOC and the national territory, the Commanding General of the Forces of the Interior commands the nine province regiments which are variously equipped to meet the needs of their
respective provinces. Additionally, there are two regiments which constitute the national reserve, all of which are largely composed of reservists.  

THE PROBLEM OF STRUCTURAL DISARMAMENT

In the late 1940s and 1950s, the United States granted economic aid and military materiel to several western European states. The military equipment, provided under the Military Assistance Program (MAP), included tanks, artillery, trucks, airplanes, ships, air defense missiles and launchers, ammunition, and signal equipment. In short, the United States provided the wherewithal for the western European states to rebuild their armies without having the economic burden of paying for all this expensive equipment. Belgium received over one billion dollars of this aid, and today the Belgian Military still maintains approximately $141 million (original acquisition value) of this property. As one might imagine, much of this property is obsolete, and each year several items are returned to US control for redistribution, sale, or destruction.

Some MAP property is still in the active force structure, but most is in reserve depots because spare parts are no longer available. Also, since this equipment is quite old, failure rates are high. In
short, reserve forces equipped with World War II vintage equipment are not very capable nor, in the final analysis, militarily useful.

Replacing this MAP property has been an expensive proposition, but it has become necessary to ensure that the military can remain a viable fighting force. However, the cost of acquiring modern and effective military equipment has skyrocketed since the immediate post-war period, and some states, when confronted with the cost of modernization, look for a cheap solution, which sometimes translates to a marginally effective weapons system; or, they simply refuse, for economic reasons, to replace aging systems, as is the case in Belgium.

A good example is the now-antiquated NIKE air defense missile system. This system, still in service with other NATO countries, is gradually being replaced by the PATRIOT air defense missile system. The cost of replacement, for Belgium alone, is approximately $700 million in initial acquisition costs, but Belgium refuses to buy the system. Instead, Belgium will stand-down the NIKE system and go out of the high altitude air defense business. This is structural disarmament?27

A number of factors have come together to create a “critical mass” for many smaller western European states. First, is the ever increasing costs of modern weapon systems. Second, is the high social welfare costs coupled with high unemployment as their economies have begun to level off (or decline) after the post-war boom. Last, and perhaps the most difficult for NATO, is the Gorbachev “Peace Offensive” and his policy of glasnost which, seemingly, has begun to erode the western defense consensus. All these factors come at a time when the INF Treaty has become effective and NATO is calling for conventional force modernization—not a cheap alternative, as the PATRIOT example demonstrates. Needed are intelligence means which can “see deep” and weapons systems which can strike deep; both call for the latest and most sophisticated technologies. Without a “clear and present danger,” how do NATO nations convince their publics that they must spend billions to modernize their conventional forces?

The foregoing brief excursion concerning structural disarmament and the eroding defense consensus helps to explain why Belgium has failed to adequately modernize its forces and will relinquish one of its NATO missions.
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

The twentieth century has been extremely hard on Belgium. She has been twice violated by Germany in devastating wars; her economy has gone from one of the best to one of the worst in Western Europe; and the age-old language dispute between the Flemings and the Walloons continually threatens internal order.

Because of her position on the European continent, Belgium was unable to retain her neutrality. Instead, she embraced regional and collective security organizations which have served her, along with her Allies, in keeping the peace in Europe for the past 43 years. One would think that Belgium, above all, would recognize the value of maintaining a strong defensive posture. There are, however, disturbing trends. Belgium's active force has declined since 1953, and, with the eventual stand-down of the NIKE air defense missiles, another 2,000 manpower spaces may fall by the wayside. Also, the Belgian defense minister has hinted that further personnel cuts may be in the offing when he indicated that Belgium may have to do "one or two (NATO) tasks less." Cutting active duty manpower has become an effective way to reduce defense expenditures since for Belgium, 48 percent of the defense budget goes to personnel costs.

As the active component has declined, the reserve force structure has increased, but the reserves are poorly trained and most units are poorly equipped. About 30,000 conscripts a year rotate through the Belgian Armed Forces; many perform menial tasks, and most believe it's a waste of time. Following their active service, they can expect to be recalled for a maximum of 24 days for the remainder of their 8-15 year obligation, during which time they will fire a rifle or crew-served weapon and attend some training. Reserve units seldom train together to hone their tactical skills and develop the unit cohesion and esprit so essential to success on the battlefield. As in most other countries, the reserves receive the cast-off equipment, and it will be impossible to adequately supply individual equipment to the 411,606 Belgian reservists if they were all called to duty in an emergency.

The active structure has its problems as well. Outdated equipment and junior officer shortages are the most notable. Elite Para-Commandos, though superbly trained and highly motivated, have Korean War vintage radios and their artillery battery uses the M2A1 105mm howitzers supplied through the US Military Assistance
Program at the end of World War II. They are just now beginning to realize that spare parts are not available for these weapons—many are no longer serviceable. In the late 1960s, the Belgians bought 334 Leopard I tanks from Germany and rather than replace them in order to acquire a more capable and survivable tank, they have been compelled to modernize them—a program which is not expected to be completed until the late 1990s. At a time when the Soviets are fielding modern main battle tanks with reactive armor and 125mm cannons, the Belgians will face them with a far less capable tank using a 105mm cannon. A certain irony accompanies this situation since the Belgian Government recently ordered 44 additional F-16 aircraft at a cost in excess of $980 million “that the Defense Ministry didn’t want and for the sake of jobs, insisted they be assembled in Belgium at a huge extra cost.” Those funds could have gone a long way towards modernizing the ground forces.

On the plus side of the ledger, the artillery modernization program is proceeding apace, but the Belgians could have gotten much more for their money if they had not insisted on offsetting economic compensation from the suppliers which inevitably drives up the cost. Likewise, the fabrication—in-country, under license from FMC, of the 1039 M113 APCs and Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles (AIFV)—has doubled their cost. In short, political-economic considerations have made it nearly impossible for the Ministry of Defense to carry out sensible modernization programs within the confines of a constrained budget. Meanwhile, Belgium is severely criticized for accomplishing only 38 percent of her key NATO Force Goals compared to 70 percent for her European partners.

Another disturbing factor is fewer junior officers in front-line Belgian units. One artillery battalion had lieutenants commanding batteries because there was only one Captain in the entire battalion and he was the operations officer. Even though the Belgian military recognizes this problem, it will likely take two or three years to correct the grade imbalance. Conversely, there is no shortage of officers on the staff in Brussels. The shortage of defense money directly translates to fewer funds for training, which affects readiness. The following table (13.7) notes the annual training requirement for NATO and Belgian plans for 1985.
13.7—ANNUAL TRAINING PLAN FOR 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NATO Requirement</th>
<th>Foreseen for 1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
<td>60 days</td>
<td>22 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
<td>240 flying hours</td>
<td>145 flying hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td>110 days for ½ the fleet</td>
<td>73 days for ½ the fleet</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Minister of Defense recently announced that funds were available to increase the number of Army field training days to 26, Air Force flying hours to 165, and Navy steaming days to 80. However, these newly announced training figures fall far short of the minimum number required to attain and maintain combat readiness.

There is good news as well. The newly arrived at “mobilization by objectives” is a welcome change to the phased approach and should provide the respective commanders more flexibility as they transition from peace to war. The system for mobilization within the Army is very well organized and highly effective in keeping track of reserve personnel and reorganizing units, maintaining equipment, and managing periodic recalls. Reserve force modernization is improving with increased firepower (M109A2/A3, MILAN), new jeeps and, for the units of the 1st BE Corps, the RITA communications system, known in the US Army as MSE. Civil Defense planning is making great strides, and wartime host nation support plans are comprehensive and under constant revision as Belgium applies the various lessons learned from exercises. The service staffs know exactly what they need to do to adequately modernize their respective forces but they lack the economic resources to accomplish their force goals and modernization plans. The Minister of Defense, a reserve officer keenly aware of the shortcomings in the reserves, has three major priorities: first, to improve the quality of the defense of the Lines of Communication (including Air Defense of the ports); second, to improve the organization and equipment of the reserves; and third, to improve the ability of the Gendarmes to protect the LOC and provide rear area security. To accomplish these goals and adequately modernize the Armed Forces, the Belgians will need more than money. It will take an act of political will by a reluctant parliament which has been riding far too long on the coattails of the Alliance.
ROBERT R. ULIN is a Colonel in the US Army, currently Military Assistant to the Deputy Chairman of the NATO Military Committee in Brussels. He wrote this chapter before his current assignment, when he was the Chief, Army Affairs, Office of Defense Cooperation, American Embassy, Brussels. Colonel Ulin has an extensive background in NATO, having served as a liaison officer to CENTAG from the 56th Brigade (Pershing), and as a staff officer/strategist at SHAPE for three years. He served four years on the faculty of the Command and General Staff College, teaching National Security Policy. Colonel Ulin is on his sixth overseas tour, including two tours in Vietnam, having served nearly 12 years in Europe. Colonel Ulin is an OCS graduate with Master’s degrees in History from the University of Kansas and International Relations from Boston University. He is a 1986 graduate of the US Army War College.
Endnotes


5. Tuchman, pp. 102, 105, 106.


15. Ibid., pp. 75, 103-104.


19. L’effort militaire belge avant 1940 (Everè: Centre de Documentation Historique des Forces Armées (Travaux de Section), No. XV, 10, undated).


25. UNITED STATES-BELGIUM LOC AGREEMENTS are as follows:
   A. BASIC AGREEMENT OF JULY 1971
   B. GENERAL TECHNICAL AGREEMENT OF JUNE 1973
   C. TECHNICAL AGREEMENT FOR PROCUREMENT OF POWER & PUBLIC UTILITIES (2 July 1975)
   D. TECHNICAL AGREEMENT FOR LOCAL CIVILIAN LABOR (2 July 1975)
   E. TECHNICAL AGREEMENT FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS (2 July 1975)
   F. TECHNICAL AGREEMENT FOR CONSTRUCTION (2 July 1975)
   G. TECHNICAL AGREEMENT FOR INSTALLATIONS (2 July 1975)
   H. TECHNICAL AGREEMENT FOR INLAND AND SURFACE TRANSPORTATION (2 July 1975)
   I. TECHNICAL AGREEMENT RELATIVE TO THE ACQUISITION OF SUPPLIES AND SERVICES (6 February 1978)
   J. TECHNICAL AGREEMENT FOR A US ALOC IN BELGIUM (19 March 1981)
   K. ADMINISTRATIVE & FINANCIAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN BELGIAN FORCES AND USEUCOM (12 May 1981)
   L. ACTIVATION OF BELGIAN LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS & ALLIED FORCES (31 October 1979)
   M. US/BE JOINT SUPPORT PLAN (November 1982)


29. Ibid., p. 2.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.


34. Ibid.
14 The Dutch Contribution to NATO

Shortly after the summit in Reykjavik, the usually compliant Margaret Thatcher, in a London speech, pointed out to Washington that there are more aspects to Western European security than ballistic missiles alone. She was specifically referring to the conventional superiority of the Soviet Union. President Reagan's marked reticence on NATO's principle of collective security and risk-sharing was serious enough to elicit her sharp criticism. Since then, we have seen how the INF agreement was reached or rather driven by primarily domestic, political considerations of the White House and to some extent of the Kremlin as well. In addition, we have witnessed the European allies' confusion over the second zero option, confusion that was to continue for some time because of the division within Bonn's coalition government. However, governments ostensibly applauded the summit on which shone the double-zero agreement, and the hope and gratitude of public opinion.

THE PROBLEM

However pivotal and exciting the nuclear issues are, military security in Europe has become increasingly dependent on the
conventional balance. The United States' nuclear superiority may have been sufficient to provide a credible nuclear guarantee, but strategic parity between the superpowers, formally reaffirmed by SALT-1, fundamentally changed the military balance in Europe. "First use" is an incredible problem; "early first use" has become incredible. Because of the Soviet Union's longtime conventional superiority, the decision to use nuclear weapons is forced upon NATO. Making such a decision has become more difficult and will be time consuming. Therefore, not surprisingly, the military strategy of the Soviet Union, since the mid-1970s focuses on conducting conventional warfare and limiting a conflict with the West to conventional weapons. Clearly, the need for conventional parity has become more urgent than in the past when conditions for the West were more favorable.

A robust conventional balance, not necessarily parity, would undermine the significance of Soviet nuclear superiority in Europe, not merely in numerical terms but primarily as a political-psychological lever. The double-zero solution could indeed bolster Soviet and Western European perceptions that numeric superiority in Europe can be exploited for nuclear "blackmail" provided the Warsaw Pact can achieve early conventional successes. However, if NATO possessed an adequate conventional deterrence which could force the Soviet Union to go nuclear in its offensive, then the decision of first use, with all the associated risks, would again be left with the political leadership in Moscow.

The need for strengthening conventional defense in Western Europe is not only based on nuclear considerations, but also on socio-political, military-operational, and geo-strategic aspects. Due to the geo-strategic differences between the United States and Western European countries, the European allies must assume much of the burden of conventional defense. This is especially true for ground forces, whose reinforcement from North America, as noted by Karl Lowe in Chapter 3, is time-consuming. The West European effort represents an important contribution to the joint deterrence and defense. The United States has continuously insisted the West Europeans increase their defense efforts, particularly in arresting a ground offensive, so that American reinforcements can move into the theater and assume their defense positions. Many people in the United States speak disparagingly about the West European defense effort. In fact, an incorrect image of "defense on the cheap" appears to be virtually ineradicable, regardless of the real West European contribution.
Undoubtedly, the pressure of such opinion on the West European allies will increase, not decrease, in the next few years.

Thus, the US Congress will probably continue its appeals to the Europeans. The freeze on defense expenditures, established by the US Congress in May 1985, indicates that US budgetary constraints now also extend to defense. This situation will have repercussions for the conventional general purpose forces of the United States. Furthermore, a movement is afoot in the United States toward a national defense organization with a more global mission. The strengthening of the navy, the creation of the Rapid Deployment Force, and the expansion of the US Marine Corps indicate that the present Administration supports such a movement. Further developments in this direction could result in an increasingly strong US insistence on task specialization for both sides of the Atlantic. Consider the position of Senator Nunn. Even though he has not resubmitted his amendments of 1984 (in which he urged the Europeans to take certain steps at the risk of American troop reductions) he has explicitly reserved his option to do so in the future.

This potential political change in the US position regarding Western Europe is not yet acute, but it is becoming more and more manifest. Such signals likely mean that in the future the United States will insist on a rational distribution of conventional tasks for the collective defense of Europe.

The requirement to improve the conventional defense of Western Europe coincides with some disturbing trends. As already noted in table 1.3, a serious impediment to force increases is the demographic situation in several Western European countries. For example, if the current draft is maintained in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), military manpower will decrease by 150,000 men in the 1990s. Moreover, modest economic growth, as Robert Ulin notes in Chapter 13, will make it very difficult for governments to maintain increased defense budgets. As a matter of fact, a number of allies have already announced a real decrease for the next few years.

The financial resources will be unavailable for manpower increases, not to mention the intractable problem of how much required weapons systems will cost. Finally, governments may face an increasingly difficult task to persuade their people of the need to improve the Western defense capability. It remains to be seen what Gorbachev really wants in the field of conventional arms control, but
we should expect he will cast the cards of détente and arms control. The recent experience with the double-zero agreement has shown that, at least at present, NATO is ill-prepared for his diplomatic offensives, because the Gorbachev position is so radically different from the rigid and predictable approach of the Brezhnev era.

While recognizing these political and financial restraints, NATO participants must determine which specific components of the conventional defense merit emphasis. Shortfalls in the conventional defense occur in each of the military missions, identified in SACEUR's Conceptual Military Framework or in NATO's study on Conventional Defense Improvements. But they are not equally important. The relative weight of each shortfall must be assessed against the military developments in the Warsaw Pact and the military strategy of the Soviet Union. The unavoidable conclusion may well be that the highest priority in NATO's Central Region is to prevent a break-through of the forward defense line. Under no condition should Soviet maneuver units be permitted to conduct raids behind the forward line (which John Yurechko in Chapter 2 notes they are planning to do) because these raids will disrupt rear area defense during the initial phase of the conflict.

Both the operational doctrine of the Soviet Union and modern technology have immensely reduced the time needed to react and to gain time in an unfolding conflict. NATO is not dealing with tactical battles where it may be advantageous to trade space for time to be better prepared for the defense and counterattack. On the strategic or Soviet operational level, there is little or no time to trade. Operational and strategic success in defense will critically depend on NATO ability to frustrate the attacker's tempo right from the start. Today, the factor of time has assumed a far greater importance in Clausewitz' notion of the "culminating point" beyond which "the scale turns and the reaction follows with a force that is usually much stronger than that of the original attack". The defender must face his opponent with that culminating point very, very, rapidly.

In practice, such planning means that the Soviet air offensive must be stemmed from the start. Maintaining a favorable air balance is also essential during the ground offensive. As for the ground forces, the combat units in place must have sufficient strength as covering force, and be reinforced to every possible extent, to prevent Soviet tactical successes. At the same time, this tactical shield should
allow the mobilization of reserves. If breakthroughs cannot be pre-
vented at each axis of attack (a likely event), then the capability of
the operational reserves would become decisive.

In fact, the strategy of the Soviet Union, which relies on the for-
ward positioning of an important part of its forces, and technology
that promises decisive encounters in the first phase of a conflict,
force NATO to forward line, air balance, and operational rear area
protection priorities. After this first phase, a secondary priority is to
ensure that the reinforcements from the Soviet Union cannot be
deployed into battle before the strategic reserves from North America
have taken their defense positions. As noted by Michael Deane in
Chapter 4, those reserves are important, but given the time factor, it
is a secondary concern.

To be sure, nobody can predict the sequence of actions as a war
unfolds. Yet, insofar as the "grammar" of our analysis of proba-
.bilities corresponds with the "logic of war," the present lack of op-
erational reserves is a most critical shortfall for the Western defense.
Air power is available and, moreover, the Soviet General Staff highly
respects it. American aircraft that are not deployed in Europe nor
assigned to NATO could be made available on relatively short notice.
However, the situation for the ground forces is very different. The
demand of manpower far exceeds that of the air force, and the proc-
ess of deploying the operational reserves takes much longer—
provided that those forces are available at all.

The ways the forces are formed in peacetime and mobilized in
times of crisis have a direct bearing upon these questions. Costs
depend on the ratio between active and mobilizable units; the number
of combat units in wartime is the result of the army formation system;
and timely availability depends on a mobilization system that takes
into account the effects of demographic trends.

I will address these questions for the Dutch armed forces with
respect to both its current organization and possible, future develop-
ments. A brief review of the past will illuminate some experiences
and lessons which have left their marks on Dutch security policy and
the defense organization.

FROM ARMED NEUTRALITY TO COLLECTIVE DEFENSE

During the "Golden Age" of the 17th century, the Republic of
the United Provinces could afford a huge navy and, if necessary, hire
an impressive army. During the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713), the Republic was still able to raise an army of 100,000 men, but the decline of the commercial and maritime great power was already underway, and the Dutch could no longer wage a continental struggle for power. During the 18th century Holland’s preference for aloofness as regards power struggles on the continent continued.

Except for King William I (1813-1839) who considered the role of the united northern and southern Netherlands as more than one of a sous-Allié in the Concert of Vienna, the Dutch have tended to abstain from continental politics and to distrust great power politics. Financial restraints went hand in hand with nonbelligerent principles. The period before the Prussian wars of the 1860s saw decreasing defense budgets and a general lack of interest in defense matters. Belgium, the Dutch surmised, was a buffer against the traditional French threat, and the wars in Italy and the Crimea did not disturb the Dutch.

Bismarck’s use of military power and growing Dutch vulnerability stemming from mass armies and those armies’ mobility changed this sense of security. The Franco-German war in 1870 directly threatened Dutch security and marked a new era in the parliamentary debate about organization of the Dutch army. Despite long-time concerns for a renewed concept of national defense, only ideas like those of parliamentarian and former officer, Stieltjes, were implemented.

In fact, the mobilization of 1870 revealed serious shortcomings. Although the army command managed to mobilize the forces within one week, shortfalls were alarming. The maximum strength was about 60,000 men, 2,000 of whom were officers and 17,000 Schutterij, the local armed citizen corps. This number was unimpressive compared to the armies of the other European powers. Moreover, regulars and NCOs were insufficient in number and their competence often reflected the low pay and still lower public esteem for their job. The army’s poor reputation made it difficult to attract able and qualified professionals. Thus, the soldiers were unmotivated and belonged to the lowest social strata. Loopholes in Dutch law allowed wealthier citizens to find and buy substitutes, thus creating an army of illiterates and outcasts. For many of them the system of substitution offered the only way of making a living.
After the Franco-German war the Dutch took about 30 years to implement proposed reforms concerning: the abolition of the substitution system; the issue of having the legal duty either to be trained for militia-units or to serve in the ranks of the standing army; and, in particular, the question of how the Dutch army should reorganize given the new challenges of the vastly superior, strategic strength of the German forces and their unprecedented operational mobility.

However, in 1870 the Netherlands was not drawn into a war and the policy of armed neutrality had proven itself as the correct course, or so it seemed to many. "Fortress Holland" would be conquered by superior forces like the German or French, but the complex of rivers and inundation lines behind a reasonably strong field army was, or rather should be, a serious deterrent to any invader. The defensive strategy posed no threat to anyone and could provide security against an aggressor who needed his forces elsewhere. Thus, in 1914 the rather strong Dutch army demanded a considerable contingent of the German forces to be diverted from the offensive against the French. The Dutch would never have won a campaign against the Germans, but they could have weakened the Germans' main offensive thrust.

However, there was no coalition with France or Belgium. On the contrary, armed neutrality, which was a sensible means, had turned into a goal in itself. Military power is a useful means in combination with diplomatic efforts to keep a balance of power, but, in this case, diplomacy was completely absent. Strict neutrality was the key word for the diplomats. The Netherlands should not enter into an alliance in peacetime because that would, according to Queen Wilhelmina (1898-1948), be "extremely dangerous."

This approach was also bolstered by a late nineteenth-century belief that peace and prosperity were the result of international efforts and cooperation, not of national competition and conflict. The Netherlands should, in this vision, be an example for the international community. The Peace Conferences at The Hague in 1899 and 1907 are illustrations of this utopian mood, which was, by the way, not exclusively Dutch.

At the same time, defense experts in parliament, mostly former military, delved into the problems of the army after the mobilization debacle of 1870. Despite the prevailing liberal conscience, mediocre ministers, and short-lived cabinets, important reforms did take place, though slowly. In 1898, the Dutch finally agreed to personal
conscription and a threefold numerical increase. The reforms lengthened the initial term of service and raised the yearly intake. In fact, the Army Acts of 1912 and 1913 raised the yearly intake from 17,500 to 23,000 and made it possible for more males to gain initial training. In 1914, three groups comprised the wartime organization: the army conscripts (20-26 years old), the Landweer (27-32 years old), and the Landstorm (previously the local Schutterijen, up to 40 years old). The mobilization of 1914 brought approximately 200,000 men under arms within three days, conscripts and Landweer. These forces were relieved after some time by the Landstorm. In other words, during the period 1914-1918, more than 200,000 were on active service, while another 220,000 were mobilizable. Still, in 1914, the Netherlands stayed out of the war; the policy of armed neutrality had “proven” itself once more. Whether or not the army was a decisive factor, since Von Moltke had political and economic reasons for respecting neutrality as well, the swift mobilization of a large army, the prepared fortifications, and the timely organization of headquarters and combat units had improved significantly since 1870 and had a deterrent value.

In 1939, the mobilization of 250,000 men took only five days. The army counted four corps (eight divisions), three brigades, and one light division. In May 1940, this force was defeated within five days. Armed neutrality did not—could not—work against Hitler, but the awareness of the Nazi threat came too late. The lack of a sound defense strategy (above all an allied strategy) underlay the rapid defeat of Holland and the Western front. The Western European nations had failed to incorporate changes in warfare and in operational thinking, and their defenses were not prepared to meet the powerful thrusts of the highly maneuverable German forces.

The increased Defense Funds, appropriated since 1935 could not redress the effects of the defense cuts that had taken place since 1920. The rearmament program was only in part implemented in 1940. The amendment of 1938 to raise the yearly draft from 19,500 to 32,000, of whom 1,000 were sent to the Navy, had no significant impact on the mobilizable force in the two years preceding the war. In any case, the number of the mobilization force was not the main problem; instead it was the state and system of army formation. The Dutch peacetime army was, in fact, a “loosely organized aggregate of ‘training units,’” a hodgepodge of numerous small training schools. As a result, the army was unable to hold large-scale
exercises and, even if mobilized, the wartime army would have to be entirely reformed.” In addition, regular cadres were insufficient and had low proficiency. The number of regular officers dropped from 2,076 in 1920 to 1,320 in 1933, and the pool of reservist cadre was cut in half.

The army formation system was simply unsuited to field-trained combat units who could operate as a team. In fact, this problem of combat strength was not only neglected at the lower levels of the army, but in 1939-40 throughout the command chain. At the very top, the commander of the field army and the Chief of the General Staff were equals in peacetime and the commander-in-chief (CinC) would only be appointed in wartime. Disagreements about strategically deploying the field army merely added confusion about the division of responsibilities. As a result, after the 28 August 1939 mobilization, the Chief of the General Staff and the newly appointed CinC, General Reijnders, resigned as a result of differing opinions with Minister of Defense Dijxhoorn. General Winkelman, retired since 1934, was recalled to active duty and inserted as CinC on 30 January 1940.

The May 1940 experience and the 1940-1945 occupation ended the policy of armed Dutch neutrality. Immediately following the war, the Dutch were still not clear what policy they should pursue to guarantee their security. Some set their hopes on the United Nations, others on the creation of a United States of Europe. Still others preferred an alliance between European countries. This was the view of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Van Kleffens, who favored an arrangement between Britain, France, and Benelux. “A radically new policy goal was taken on 17 March 1948 with the signing of the Treaty of Brussels, marking the end of neutrality and non-alignment, and tied the Netherlands politically for the first time in more than 100 years to its neighbours, a policy which has been maintained right up to the present day.”

FORCE MOBILIZATION TODAY

All three Dutch services (Navy, Army, and Air Force) fulfill their principal missions in NATO’s organization of collective defense. The Navy helps to protect the lines of communications to Western Europe, with a special emphasis on anti-submarine warfare. In the current plan the Navy will have 22 frigates, 6 submarines, 2 combat support ships, 13 maritime patrol aircraft, 30 helicopters, and
a mine counter-force equipped with minehunters and minesweepers. The Marine Corps participates in the forward-positioned, allied forces in Norway.

The Army's main mission is the defense of the Dutch Corps sector in the North German Plain. The First Netherlands Corps, I (NL) Corps, covers an area of 100 x 170 km and consists of 10 brigades, 6 of which are active in peacetime. Its 16 peacetime armor and armored infantry maneuver battalions will grow to 23 after mobilization. The increased urbanization, especially in the forward area of the Dutch sector, calls for infantry units, plus two partly mechanized battalions. The territorial mission to secure the territory of the Netherlands and the lines of communications is fulfilled by two infantry brigades, four security battalions, four engineer battalions and some specialist companies, and 11 Provincial Military Commands which, in all, count 49 infantry security companies and 143 platoons of volunteers of the National Reserve.

The main mission of the Air Force is close air support, although Dutch aircraft also play a role in air defense and the nuclear strike mission of allied forces. The current plan envisions eight fighter squadrons by 1991, with 162 operationally assigned F-16 aircraft in a total inventory of 213. At present, the four planned Patriot guided-missile squadrons in the Federal Republic are replacing the Nike-Hercules units. Air defense also includes 12 squadrons equipped with Hawk guided missiles.

However, the system of force mobilization of the three services differs significantly. The bulk of the mobilizable Dutch reserves consists of army men and, as a result, the army formation in peacetime is heavily conscript-oriented, even more so than in the other member states. In peacetime, about 70 percent of the 34,000 men Army Corps consists of conscripts. The Navy, on the other hand, has no more than 8 percent in the ranks of a force of about 17,000, while approximately 20 percent of the Air Forces' 17,500 men are draftees.

Besides the differing ratios between regulars and conscripts both in peace and wartime, the use of conscripts in the army is also very distinct from that in the other services. Whereas the conscripts in the Navy and the Air Force are mainly trained to fulfill supporting and security duties, the Dutch system of army formation aims at using conscripts chiefly in combat units. Specialized missions and the highly technical character of the Navy and Air Force prevent extensive use of conscripts for combat duty. Hence, the need for reservists
is limited—to several thousand for the Navy, and 6,000 (in a pool of 30,000) for the Air Force. At the same time, the Marine Corps doubles its strength up to 6,000 men. To be sure, the Army does fill its combat support and combat service support units with conscripts, but only if they recall older, retrained reservists. The following figure (14.1) outlines a unique feature of the army formation system, compared with the other armies in the alliance—the contribution of conscripts to the almost threefold increase of combat power in wartime.

Thus, the army formation is the most interesting feature of the Dutch system of force mobilization and, as I will argue, both the most promising and opportune contribution of the Netherlands to the defense of the alliance. The Netherlands can make efficient use of its army conscripts because of a system called Rechtstreeks Instromend Mobilisabel (RIM) which means "Direct Intake Mobilizable." Under the concept, troops train as units during their active duty and remain available as a recall team in the 16 to 20 months after they complete active duty. Their equipment, held in depots in unit sets, is identical to the equipment they have used on active duty.

The regulars attached to the RIM-units are assigned other duties which permit them to rejoin their unit at a moment’s notice during a crisis. The advantage offered by such a system is that for every active-duty battalion, a trained reserve battalion is maintained at only 20-35 percent of the cost of an active-duty battalion. However, the recall period for a RIM-unit must occur within approximately 20 months because of declining proficiency and vacancies in the team.

The so-called short leave (SL) arrangement for active units outlined in 14.2 offers another advantage. After their 14-16 month active duty, companies go on leave. They go home, but they are formally still serving. They can be recalled at any time during the next four to six months to bring their battalions up to strength by substituting for the company still undergoing training. An active-duty battalion thus consists of two active companies and a training company which is immediately replaced by the recently departed company, using the equipment in-place. Under this system, two active companies in peacetime can be brought up to six trained companies in wartime (one SL company and three RIM companies), thus tripling the peacetime strength of these combat units.
14.1 THE FIRST ARMY CORPS IN 1993
Maneuver and Fire Support Units of Battalion Strength
After the 14-16 months of RIM status, personnel of the senior company go either to the reserve pool or get a new assignment in a RIM unit. In the first case, conscripts may join territorial defense, but all conscripts will have three weeks refresher training for their new, or renewed duty. Newly formed mobilizable units are maintained six years, during which vacancies are filled individually. Depending on his rank, a conscript is liable to mobilization until the age of 35, 40, or 45.

The mobilization takes place in three stages, each involving some 50,000 men and taking place within 24, 36, and 48 hours, respectively. The conscripts on SL are not counted as part of the mobilization. They are formally on active duty, and the Minister of Defense can recall them without consent of the council of ministers, although a cabinet decision is required for mobilization proper. Full mobilization of the ground forces will take at least a few days. The I (NL) Corps will grow to 89,000 men, whereas National Territorial Command will increase from 9,000 to 44,000 men.

**COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES**

The Dutch mobilization system offers some important advantages compared with the other NATO member states. For example, the wartime regulars of the Belgium Corps comprise 40 percent versus 16 percent in I (NL) Corps. For the total strength of the ground forces in wartime these figures are about 30 percent and 10-15 percent. Also, the Netherlands makes more intensive use of conscript manpower in peacetime (with an intake of 46,000 per year versus 10,000 in Belgium) and has a larger mobilizable component, a large proportion of whom have combat duties. In the FRG conscripts constitute some 57 percent of the peacetime strength of the I (GE) Corps, while its mobilizable component amounts to no more than 30 percent. This presents a very different picture from the comparable figures of 70 percent and 55 percent for the I (NL) Corps.

To be sure, the system of army formation, however effective it may be, is not without problems. Some problems can be solved by improving the system, within the present army budget. Others may require more resources if the Dutch are to maintain or strengthen their present combat power. If the Dutch defense budget remains level, the next question becomes a difficult and extremely sensitive problem: at whose expense, the Navy, or the Air Force? These services also have problems maintaining their combat power; and the "Iron Law" of the
14.2 SHORT LEAVE AND RIM SYSTEMS
THE DUTCH CONTRIBUTION TO NATO

fixed distribution of defense money, as well as tradition and employment, are insurmountable obstacles for adjustments of missions.

Yet, if a national or, even better, an alliance-wide approach is taken and the interests of individual services are set aside, the conclusion is inevitable: the Netherlands will concentrate on its ground forces. National considerations suggest that effective use of army conscripts yields a comparative advantage compared to the Navy and Air Force. Augmenting the strength of ground forces would require considerably less in personnel costs than expanding the other services. Alliance-wide considerations would not only include the comparative advantages of the Dutch system regarding personnel costs and combat effectiveness, but would also take into account operational needs and possible demographic shifts, especially if the Federal Republic and the United States reduce their forces.

From an operational point of view, cooperation between the United States and the Netherlands would benefit the alliance by greatly shortening the reaction time in the NORTHAG area. The Dutch could augment their army contribution and indeed help to solve the problem of the core. As noted by Karl Lowe in Chapter 3, NORTHAG badly needs operational reserves, which the Netherlands can provide. With Dutch additions, NORTHAG would depend less on the strategic reserves, which the III (US) Corps currently provides. Reaction time for the air force or naval missions—which the United States could take over in exchange—would not pose a serious problem for the armed forces of a superpower. Only in the unlikely event of a surprise attack would the American ships and aircraft not be in their defense sectors. In any event, naval and air units would more likely be ready for action much sooner than III (US) Corps.

Demographic developments are another compelling argument for alliance cooperation. The Netherlands, contrary to the FRG, is in the fortunate position of possessing a surplus of conscripts. In 1986, almost 50 percent of all available conscripts fit for military service actually served (47,000 out of 89,000). The Army intake is approximately 30,000 per year; the Navy and Air Force require no more than 6,500. Although the Dutch birth rate has declined in the early 1980s, more than 60,000 conscripts will still be fit for service in the year 2000. Assuming that the present 25-30 percent are disqualified for physical and other reasons, the Army still can count on an additional 20,000 fit men available for active duty per year.
THE KEY TO THE CORE PROBLEM: DUTCH OPERATIONAL RESERVES

The present structure of I (NL) Corps is three armored brigades, six armored infantry brigades, and one infantry brigade—two of whose four battalions are mechanized. One can reasonably argue that there presently exists a certain shortage of light, mobile mechanized brigades able to deploy in cultivated, built-up areas. Heavy units such as armored brigades, while necessary for the counteroffensive, are less suitable for operations in such areas. In addition, mechanized troops, equipped with long-range wheeled vehicles, light tanks, and helicopters, can more swiftly counter airborne landings and surprise breakthroughs by relatively small enemy forces. Because I (NL) Corps is equipped with a large number of tanks (913 Leopard I and II) and armored infantry vehicles (1490 YPR plus 144 M113), further procurements of a successor for the 718 wheeled YP 408 could consist of less expensive equipment for additional mechanized units.

Let us assume that the Netherlands would be willing to create a second army corps. Given the army formation system, the two corps would be identical, one fully active, the other having RIM status. The two army corps could comprise the following units: 2 corps staffs; 6 division staffs; 16 brigades (4 armored, 8 armored infantry and 4 mechanized) combat support, logistic, and signal units.

In that case, a number of new units would have to be formed, and some shifts in equipment (armor) from the first-existing to the second corps would be necessary. The new units would be 1 armored brigade, two armored infantry brigades, three mechanized brigades (incorporating the two existing mechanized battalions), five field artillery battalions and one MLRS battalion, six to eight light anti-aircraft artillery battalions, two engineer battalions, three special engineer units, two reconnaissance battalions, and two signal battalions.

The extra personnel required for the active-duty and mobilizable army corps would be 2,400 and 17,850 conscripts, and for the staffs and training units 5,200 regulars and 2,500 conscripts, totalling 7,600 and 20,350 respectively. However, some changes in the company replacement system and extra use of the short leave system could save about 3,500 conscript training places, so that 18,500 additional conscripts would suffice.

While this option may be far too drastic a measure and require unacceptable cuts in the Navy and the Air Forces, the Netherlands
THE DUTCH CONTRIBUTION TO NATO 443

could coordinate with the FRG or Belgium and contribute to a joint provision of operational reserves for NORTHAG. The Netherlands could then, for instance, contribute two divisions composed of one armored brigade, three armored infantry brigades, and two mechanized brigades. This option would cut the extra requirements of Dutch manpower by approximately one-third.

Other less drastic measures are also possible, but the point is that close cooperation between countries—not merely between services—opens a practically untapped reservoir of improvements for NATO. In effect, one gets more value for the same money. For example, cooperation between military staffs would produce substantial savings by making hundreds of posts redundant. Though one cannot precisely predict what savings would result from joint staffs, by the same token, operational advantages might accrue from developing common concepts and acquisition strategies, say by the German and Dutch Armies. Such economy of scale would mean considerably lower procurement and personnel costs, even though these items would not be apparent until later.

In short, many ways exist to implement one or another model of division of labor and mission specialization in the Alliance. The member states must work together to find solutions. To be sure, the distribution of roles is a very sensitive issue, but individual countries, especially the smaller ones, are no longer capable of solving all their defense problems separately. Force mobilization is a crucial factor and, in the light of the trends mentioned before, a growing concern. The Netherlands cannot solve the problem, but it can significantly help to strengthen the core of the defense of Western Europe, if, and only if, one or two allies are ready to cooperate and all the governments involved seek to overcome the fierce opposition to redistributing their respective defense budgets.

PRESENT AND FUTURE COMBAT POWER

The Dutch historical experiences of force mobilization still have relevance today. First, public willingness to mobilize and to defend the country in times of crises were evident in 1870, 1914, and 1939, and there is no reason to believe that this Dutch attitude has changed. Postwar events such as the Korean War, the Berlin crisis, the UN peace-keeping efforts in Lebanon and, most recently, in the Persian Gulf have seen Dutch participation, with full domestic support. In the latter case, 65 percent of the public favored sending Dutch ships,
even before the government decided or even debated the issue in parliament.

Second, in sharp contrast to the past, the necessity of the Western alliance is an axiom of Dutch foreign policy and a deep-rooted belief of the people. Support for membership in NATO always carries 75-80 percent of public opinion. Although widespread opposition to nuclear weapons exists, 70 percent of the Dutch favor NATO membership—even among the socialist electorate, with their very strong anti-nuclear sentiments. Calls for "Europeanizing" East-West security matters are heard and, possibly, such calls will increase in the future, but the dominant perception is for collective defense and the "natural" relationship between Western Europe and the United States. Dutch willingness to participate in adapting the structure of NATO to present and future needs is a far cry from past allegations about the end of the Alliance.

Third, history shows the capriciousness of the public mood about paying for defense in peacetime. This mood is a more common phenomenon, but nonetheless one evident in 1840-1870 and the interwar period. Whether the liberal conscience, internationalism, or an economic crisis prevailed, the Dutch defense budget has always proven a vulnerable target. Under present political and economic circumstances, a solid, financial basis may be difficult to maintain. The Dutch government will have to live with the domestic effects of how Dutch people feel about the arms control negotiations between East and West, while socio-economic demands for defense cuts are likely to continue for the foreseeable future. The primitive "Cold War" image of the Soviet threat has disappeared. As a result, government(s) will be under increasing scrutiny to show that defense money is being spent efficiently. This situation may press NATO governments to a more beneficial closer cooperation; it may also increase mobilizable components of the armed forces, which is not bad once the limits of force mobilization are recognized.

Such a concern leads to a fourth observation: force comparisons too often focus on quantity. In 1914 and 1939 the number of mobilizable men was not the major weakness; nor is it today. In addition, the quantity of modern equipment in the Dutch armed forces today is satisfactory and should not be compared with the situation in May 1940. Even though the "Structural Disarmament of NATO," as Senator Nunn has phrased it and as noted by Robert Ulin in Chapter 13 is, for Belgium, a real danger in view of equipment costs, for the Netherlands, the situation is not alarming—at least not yet!
In times of financial restraint the services continue to cling to the quantity and even more emphatically to the quality of equipment as visible proof of combat power, while ignoring other aspects. In 1870 and 1940, equipment was lacking both in quantity and quality. Other weaknesses, equally important, were the lack of organization, proficiency, regular cadre, and cohesiveness of units; in short, the aspects of combat power that are invisible in peacetime. Weaknesses can be hidden in many ways: in the form of munition shortages, impressive aircraft carriers at the expense of submarines or minesweepers, and cutting the training hours of a pilot.

A force mobilization system is also an invisible capability and therefore very vulnerable. The Dutch must not blind themselves to the invisible aspects of weapons and manpower. To maintain an effective system, the Dutch should: first, organize a RIM unit and its active-duty unit so they are identical both in personnel and equipment; second, continue to give conscripts the same duties as their active service people and keep conscripts as members of the same team; third, keep equipment the same and ready for use; and finally, make sure the length of the RIM period is related to active duty duration.

Currently, the armed forces of the Netherlands are in good shape. The Dutch cannot afford to allow present and future financial restraints to undermine the quality of the system. In sum, regular cadre must be available, active duty training and exercises must be sufficient, and the RIM unit must be kept as a team.

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Endnotes


5. See my ‘‘The Dutch Army, Past and Present,’’ in Steven L. Canby, ed., *NATO’s Manpower and Reserves*, forthcoming.


7. This section is based on an example of task specialization and division of labor among the United States, Belgium, and the Netherlands in my *Voor hetzelfde Geld meer Defensie (More Value for Defense Money)*, Clingendael Cahier, no. 5, The Hague, March 1987. (Presently being translated).

8. The additional personnel for one active and one mobilizable (RIM) army corps would be distributed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Regulars</th>
<th>Conscripts</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 mechanized brigades</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>9,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 tank battalions</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 field artillery battalions</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 light anti-aircraft artillery battalions</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 engineer battalions</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 reconnaissance battalions</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 signals battalions</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 depot and maintenance battalion</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,418</strong></td>
<td><strong>17,850</strong></td>
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Additional staff and training units personnel:

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Regulars</th>
<th>Conscripts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partly active staffs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. second army corps</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. 3 divisions</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. other active staff elements</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. instructors</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. logistics support (national)</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. other sectors (NTC etc.)</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,200</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,525</strong></td>
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PART IV
PROBLEMS ON THE FLANKS

15 THE BULGARIAN PEOPLE'S ARMY
   Daniel N. Nelson

16 THE ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES
   George W. Price

17 DANISH DEFENSE PROBLEMS
   Christian Thune

18 FORCE MOBILIZATION IN NORWAY
   Tonne Huitfeldt
Among observers of Eastern Europe, Bulgaria is most often characterized as a loyal and obedient Soviet ally that has undertaken disproportionately large military efforts. An accompanying understanding is that Bulgarian defense expenditures and manpower levels were high not because of "legitimate defense needs," but because of "Soviet strategic interests." 

But what capability does Bulgaria have to mobilize its armed forces—to assemble, prepare, and commit to combat the forces it now has? More importantly, how assured can a Warsaw Pact commander be that the armed forces of Bulgaria will employ their available manpower and weaponry in the best way? This chapter explores the relationship between the capabilities of the Bulgarian military "on paper" with what is likely to hinder its mobilization in practice. Mobilization potential is a country's ability to efficiently extract manpower and material resources from its society and economy, only part of which is military.

In principle, mobilization potential could be unlimited, if a nation's leadership's ability can invoke a nation-state's entire military
capability. In ideal circumstances, all available forces could be called up to face imminent hostilities; all orders would be understood; all equipment would work; all plans would go into effect without delay; and all men would obey. Of course, even the most fortuitous deployment of available forces can never ensure success. Rather, I am suggesting that mobilization is a continuum, the ideal extreme being a condition where no problems exist and all Bulgarian military power is directly applied against an adversary.

However, military planners must consider impediments to mobilization; they must seek to minimize them and make contingency arrangements. Though full mobilization potential is impossible, the key questions for Bulgaria are: how will mobilization potential be compromised? What factors will affect most its ability to comply with its Warsaw Pact obligations?

A systematic assessment of Bulgaria’s mobilization potential must focus on a variety of factors that would affect that process: the nature and duration of hostilities, systemic integration, domestic socioeconomic and political conditions, and military preparedness. These factors, together with Bulgaria’s military tradition and history, comprise the following discussion.

BULGARIA’S MILITARY TRADITION AND HISTORY

Medieval Bulgarian history includes two periods: the First Kingdom (679-1018) and the Second Kingdom (1186-1396), both of which show early military prowess. In the First Kingdom, Bulgarian armies defeated neighboring Slavs and threatened to destroy the Byzantine Empire. Much of the Balkans was under the Bulgarian control after the Bulgars had defeated the Byzantine Emperor in 811 and laid siege to Constantinople. However, Byzantine Emperor Basil II’s victory over the Bulgarians in 1014, brought to a close this flirtation with empire, despite a short revival near the end of the twelfth Century.

After enduring almost two centuries of Byzantine domination, the Bulgarians rebelled in the 1180s, eventually achieving independence in 1207. During the Second Kingdom, military conquest once again expanded Bulgaria west to the Adriatic, and south to the Aegean. Macedonia, Albania, Thrace, and other areas became part of this greater Bulgaria.

During the next century, succession struggles, and incursions by Mongols, Tartars, Hungarians, and Serbians weakened severely
Bulgarian unity and ability to resist. The Ottoman Turks swept through Bulgaria in the 1370s and 1380s, and the last Bulgarian resistance ended in 1396. For the next 500 years the Ottomans did not permit any indigenous military force and repressed Bulgarian culture and nationalism. Bulgarian youth were forced into the Ottoman armies, used in the Turkish conquests of the Balkan Peninsula, and forced to invade Hungary. During such impressment into the Ottoman army the Bulgarian army lost its own identity.

Slowly, Bulgarian military skills revived in the periodic uprisings and banditry directed against the Turks. However, not until Bulgarian nationalism revived, partly due to the writings of Father Paisii in the 1760s, did uprisings and armed attacks coalesce native Bulgars into a broad movement to overthrow Ottoman rule. During the nineteenth century, hopes for complete Bulgarian independence interwove with hoped-for Russian liberation—hopes raised by the Russo-Turkish wars of 1806-1812 and 1827-1829. Spurred by Pan-Slavism, and a deteriorating Ottoman Empire (as Serbs, Moldavians, and Walachians achieved independence in the mid-nineteenth century), Bulgarian intellectuals hoped to rid themselves of the Ottomans.

Bulgaria had no well-organized guerrilla resistance or underground. As a result, the Turks brutally suppressed a widespread Bulgarian uprising in early 1876. Russian intervention against the Turks the following year finally led to an Ottoman evacuation from Bulgaria. However, Western powers refused to accept the March 1878 Treaty of San Stefano ("strongly Pan-Slav" in flavor) because it created a large Bulgarian state that incorporated much of Macedonia, implying Russian domination of the region from the Adriatic to the Black Sea. By late 1878, Britain and Austria-Hungary forced the treaty's provisions to be altered, resulting in the Treaty of Berlin, which returned Macedonia to the Turks and granted them control over southern Bulgaria.

Even in the 1880s, Bulgaria's military had not emerged as an independent entity. Russian officers commanded the Bulgarian army and intervened at will in Prince Alexander's government. Finally in the 1890s, the Russians helped create a Bulgarian army. Given Bulgaria's strong irredentism (focusing on territories such as Macedonia, Dobrudja, and Thrace), the new army had numerous adversaries: Serbs, Greeks, Romanians, and, of course, the Ottomans. Although the small Balkan states had many internal conflicts, their common interest in pushing the Ottomans out of the Balkans eventually led to
a Serbian, Montenegrin, Greek, and Bulgarian alliance that attacked the Turks in the fall of 1912. The Bulgarian army assumed the largest combat role and a quick victory was obtained over Ottoman forces.8

Although the First Balkan War ended in May 1913, the Bulgarian army was soon at war again: this time against all its previous allies, plus Romanian and Ottoman forces. Sofia initiated this Second Balkan War believing it could quickly defeat Greece and Serbia. The array of opponents, however, quickly overwhelmed the Bulgarians. The resultant Treaty of Bucharest, in August 1913, created an independent Albania, an enlarged Serbia (including much of Macedonia south of the capital of Skopje), and an extension of Greece into Macedonia. Bulgaria’s earlier gains were thus reduced: Macedonia being distributed among other states and Dobrudja going to Romania. Clearly, as Jelavich points out, the Balkan Wars were an “extreme setback” to Bulgarian nationalism. Militarily, however, the Bulgarian army had demonstrated its willingness and its ability to engage in offensive campaigns against its neighbors.

In 1914-15, Bulgaria leaned towards the Central Powers, and in September 1915 Sofia signed an agreement stipulating the territory it would gain for joining the German/Austro-Hungarian/Ottoman war effort. In October, the Bulgarian army attacked Serbia and participated in the dismemberment of the nation. Bulgaria’s other actions during the war, particularly against Allied forces near Thessaloniki and against Romanians in Dobrudja, were costly: Bulgarian army losses from 1912 to 1918 were 160,000 dead and 300,000 wounded from a population of 5 million.9 As a defeated Central Power, Bulgaria lost Western Thrace to Greece and four important border areas to Serbia. It also absorbed large war debts amounting to almost a quarter of the country’s national wealth, and had its military and police forces confined to 33,000.10

In the closing days of World War I, the Bulgarian army began to disintegrate and the Radomir Rebellion threatened the government before it was put down in the fall of 1918. During the next several years, the Agrarian Union government of Stamboliski gained a modicum of stability despite rising Internal Macedonia Resistance Organization (IMRO) terrorism and huge economic problems. Then, in June 1923, ex-army and reserve officers from the so-called Military League initiated a coup. Following another decade of turbulent domestic politics, the Military League launched a second military coup in May 1934, paving the way for the royal dictatorship of Boris
III. After Boris turned on the League in a series of "sweeping purges," the army became "compliant" and its principal combat role was directed against the IMRO camps in southeast Bulgaria and in maintaining Bulgaria's tense border posts.13

When World War II began, Bulgaria declared its neutrality, but pro-German sentiments were strong. Although Boris formally entered the Tripartite Pact on 1 March 1941, most historians agree that Bulgaria never became a "fascist state," and few German troops deployed there. Bulgarian troops, unlike Romanian, did not fight in the Soviet Union. Instead, most Bulgarian army fighting was, once again, in Yugoslavia, Greek Macedonia, and in western Thrace. The repressive Bulgarian occupation of Thrace precipitated a Greek revolt in September 1941 that was brutally suppressed; the Bulgarians killed 10,000 Greeks and subsequently deported many thousands more.14 In fact, both the Bulgarian Fifth Army serving in Yugoslav Macedonia, and a Bulgarian corps occupying the southern part of Serbia often encountered Yugoslav Partisans.

Anti-German partisan activity did occur in Bulgaria, but on a much lower scale compared to neighboring Yugoslavia or Albania. (A nucleus of Bulgarian Partisans would eventually emerge as important in the post-war Bulgarian army, and then reappear in the mid-1960s in an abortive plot.) The sudden death of Boris in August 1943, however, occurred when the tide of war was beginning to turn, and left a weakened government. By the summer of 1944, Bulgarian representatives tried to accelerate negotiations with the Allies to secure a negotiated settlement which would deny the Soviets an excuse to invade. In a surprise move, however, the USSR declared war on Bulgaria on 5 September 1944 and rushed troops into the country.16 Since the Germans had disarmed and captured most of the command elements of the Bulgarian forces in Yugoslavia, Soviet plans to use the Bulgarians in their drive against the Germans in the Balkans were impeded.17 However, by late October, numerous Bulgarian divisions, with their command reorganized under Marshal Tolbukhin's Red Army 3rd Ukrainian Front, began an offensive north through Serbia. Hence, by January 1945, at least 100,000 Bulgarian troops joined the Red Army in the drive through Hungary, and several divisions entered Austria. These final six months of combat against the Germans cost Bulgaria perhaps 30,000 dead.18

Subsequent concern for the political reliability of the Bulgarian army led the Soviets and Bulgarian communists to place political
commissars as "deputy commanders at the army and divisional levels." Even though the communists purged some one thousand German sympathizers among the officer corps in 1944, the command structure remained largely intact.

By 1946, however, the Soviet and Bulgarian communists insisted on political subservience and recognized the army's past involvement in politics. In July 1946, at least 2,000 "reactionary officers" were dismissed; many were accused of war crimes and were imprisoned or executed. One notable partisan leader, General Slavcho Trunski, simply disappeared, only to reappear a decade later. By mid-1946, then, the Bulgarian People's Army (BPA) had come into being. In September 1946, Georgi Damianov (who had lived in the USSR since 1923, graduated from the Frunze Military Academy, and was a high ranking officer in the Soviet Red Army) became Bulgarian Minister of Defense. (Damianov, it should be added, was one of several hundred Bulgarian communist exiles serving in the Red Army officer corps.) Yet, the new army's creation did not mean that the Communist Party could regard it as wholly loyal.

The foregoing brief comments about Bulgaria's military history underscore the fact that, traditionally, the Bulgarian army has had little esprit de corps or officer leadership. The First Balkan War against the Ottomans was the only large-scale, lengthy, and successful campaign for Bulgarian forces in the twentieth century. The Second Balkan conflict and World War II led to a downward trend in Bulgarian military performance.

In addition, since World War II, the Bulgarian People's Army has provided no new glory in which to bask. Indeed, wartime partisans were probably at the core of a military-political conspiracy in early 1965; at least five (of nine) principal conspirators brought to trial had had military careers. Members of this core group were imprisoned, while many others, suspected of being sympathetic, were transferred. If, as reports suggest, "subservience" to the USSR and a desire for an independent foreign policy were issues in the plot, then almost 20 years after the purges, the Bulgarian People's Army retained divisive thoughts and intentions.

Virtually nothing in modern Bulgarian military history suggests its forces can operate independently and successfully against an adversary. Current Bulgarian efforts to bolster esprit through incessant reference to the few months of anti-Nazi combat in the
"Great Patriotic War," say more about how history can be inflated and abused than about actual experiences. This lack of a positive twentieth-century military tradition, and the absence of recent combat experience, continues to diminish the BPA's ability to "build the psychological competence of its military forces." 25

True, an absence of tradition and experience—plus a questionable military psychology—may not impede mobilization at the outset of a conflict. Nonetheless, if Bulgaria enters a prolonged war, the lack of élan and combat experience among commanders may be telling factors in Bulgaria's ability to employ its available forces effectively.

THE NATURE OF HOSTILITIES

Efforts to analyze Bulgaria's mobilization potential must assess the effect of different scenarios: the alternative and hypothetical chains of events or situations that may lead to hostilities in Central or Southeastern Europe. The location of likely combat roles (and thus the probable adversaries), will certainly affect how rapidly and effectively the Bulgarian army is brought up to full strength by reserve call-up and by turning over certain roles to paramilitary and militia formations; munitions, fuels, and other material are distributed from depots, and specific orders are sent out and acknowledged. As I will discuss later, the military preparedness of Bulgaria shows some major gaps—the most glaring one is that three of eight Bulgarian motorized rifle divisions are manned at only 30 percent. 26 Were the Bulgarian army ordered into combat, what geographic focus would maximize its rapid and efficient mobilization? Obviously, fighting on Bulgarian soil, to defend against Turkish, Greek, or Yugoslav invasion, would accelerate preparations and heighten commitment not only in the military, but in the civilian population as well.

However, the limited size and modernization of Bulgarian land and air forces (and the almost non-existent navy), suggest that an offensive role for the BPA and for Bulgarian mobilization is very unlikely. As Christopher Jones has argued, the Warsaw Pact's emasculation of national army commands and the creation of very large internal security forces make it very unlikely that Bulgaria could mobilize for a general offensive against NATO. The most likely scenario for calling up reserve, paramilitary, and militia manpower would be a threat to Bulgaria itself from internal rebellion, or an anticipated intervention (led by the USSR) against another Pact member, such as Romania.
Further, a second probable mobilization scenario would likely be as a non-combatant during NATO-Warsaw Pact combat in Central and Northern Europe—perhaps involving other fronts in the USSR's Southwestern Theater of Military Operations (TVD), but not in the Balkans. In this case, the Bulgarian forces would most likely sit tight—the product of Soviet decisions, perhaps welcomed in Sofia. As Ivan Volgyes and Zoltan Barany note in Chapter 12, the principal Soviet advance in the Southwestern TVD may well be through Hungary—that is, a Danubian front. If so, efforts to secure Yugoslav and Greek non-interference would take priority over a ground attack launched from Bulgaria. In fact, the Soviets have made efforts to decouple Greece from NATO during the 1980s,27 and the Bulgarians have endeavored to normalize relations with Turkey and Greece.28 One can certainly see advantages for the Soviets in securing Greek non-involvement during an offensive elsewhere in Europe. During such a waiting period, Soviet forces could arrive in Bulgaria, and Bulgaria's mobilization could take place, without the stress associated with short warning.

Therefore, the only likely scenario for Bulgaria assembling, preparing, and committing its armed forces would be in the event the Soviets began a conventional attack on NATO. As part of the socialist community of nations, Bulgaria could, on a far larger scale than its symbolic participation in the 1968 Czechoslovak invasion, mobilize to intervene elsewhere (Romania?), or to end major domestic upheaval (a prolonged wave of Turkish nationalist violence?).

Yet, Bulgarian mobilization might precede or accompany an external offensive, principally to preclude a front in the Balkans, Aegean, and Bosphorus, which would imply danger to Soviet control in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In an offensive mode following a Soviet-initiated conventional attack on NATO, Bulgarian forces operating outside their own borders would confront "traditional enemies" in all directions: those with long-standing irredentist issues such as Macedonia and Thrace, and those with ethnic tensions, such as the Turks. Although the Bulgarian army might not make a successful attack, Bulgarians would engage in offensive operations against their neighbors to regain territories the Bulgarians perceive as theirs.

The location and purpose of military operations, however, cannot be considered alone. In World War II, the Bulgarian army was
not particularly effective as an occupation force in Macedonia, and the Germans easily disarmed Bulgaria prior to the Nazi retreat. Only after the Soviets insisted on their reorganization did the Bulgarians lend "unenthusiastic but disciplined" help against the Germans through Yugoslavia, Hungary, and into Austria. Bulgaria, though, had limited, and quite recognizable war aims—to regain the ancient "greater Bulgaria" borders consistent with the First and Second Kingdoms. Beyond these goals—which involved Macedonia (from the Aegean north to the Sar Mountains), western Thrace, and southern Dobrudja—Bulgarians were indifferent. Indeed, even Nazi Germany could not force Bulgaria to participate in out-of-area ventures further south in the Greek peninsula, or in the invasion of the USSR.

Also, Bulgaria certainly recognizes the imminent danger of two- or three-front combat (reminiscent of the Second Balkan War in 1913). If the Bulgarian army attempted to seize European Turkey and Western Thrace, they would need several divisions in reserve because Yugoslav Macedonia offers irredentist claims to Bulgaria. In any case, Soviet forces have far greater access to Yugoslavia through Hungary (with its open border to the USSR) than by forging a Macedonian front. Also, since the BPA cannot conduct operations simultaneously in Yugoslav Macedonia and in Thrace or European Turkey, Soviets are apt to prefer one Bulgarian front close to ports and airfields for supplies and troop landings.

NATO planners are most concerned with a general Warsaw Pact offensive where a total of 24 Hungarian, Romanian, and Bulgarian divisions reinforce an equal or greater number of Soviet divisions in the USSR's Southwestern TVD to "support [an] advance in the Western Theater and [to] establish dominance in NATO's Southern Region." One principal thrust in this unlikely worst-case scenario might occur through Hungary, Slovenia, and Croatia into Austria and Northern Italy. Other fronts would seek to secure the Bosporus and Dardanelles, while other forces would move through Thrace and Macedonia south to seize the Greek peninsula. In such a multi-front theater, the Soviet high command might assign the Bulgarians a limited offensive role, yet retain the understrength Bulgarian divisions on M-Day for either reserve or occupation duty once they have been fully manned.

The BPA would initially have to move into these territories in the first days of a European-wide offensive and hold their gains (with Soviet air, naval, and modest ground assistance) until full Soviet
forces arrived, after moving across the Black Sea and through Romania, until Bulgarian reinforcements had been mobilized. In a typical assignment, then, Bulgarian war aim would be traditional and of short duration.

Such external, offensive operations encountering organized resistance would not, in and of themselves, affect Bulgaria’s mobilization potential if the campaign were short, and historical Aegean and Bosporus objectives were attained without reversals. Since Greek and Turkish deployments are not principally designed to defend against Bulgarian attack, five Bulgarian motorized rifle divisions and several tank regiments could attack and could reach these goals, given substantial Soviet naval and air support. In addition, as field exercise Shield-82 revealed, a BPA rifle division with Soviet naval infantry would attempt an amphibious assault against the south NATO flank from the Aegean. Even though Bulgarian forces would not be alone, they would likely assume the principal ground role. Currently, Romania would probably not allow its forces to leave the country, nor allow the Soviets to transit its territory.

Defending Bulgaria through large-scale mobilization and engaging in Soviet-initiated offensive operations nearby are both unlikely combat scenarios for this country. Either circumstance would encounter hostility from Bulgaria’s military personnel and populace. Even if Bulgaria’s mobilization potential were minimal at the outset of offensive operations, given likely opponents and the Soviet level of participation, one must look to how prolonged combat and socioeconomic upheaval would disrupt Bulgaria.

**Duration of Hostilities.** Bulgaria has the capacity to initiate an offensive operation but probably not the ability to sustain it. “All things being equal,” as I have written elsewhere, “the longer militaries of Eastern Europe are required to perform, the more one should doubt the full application of their available forces.” My point is that extended conflict will sap a nations’ resources: its existing military manpower and equipment, its munitions and fuels, its food and material reserves, its industrial plant and civic morale.

Warfare in the late twentieth century can be so rapid that mobilization will no longer permit the prolonged social and economic preparation we once knew. In the Central Region, with the Pact’s massive concentrations of armor, tactical air power, and the potential of a surprise attack, American and West European commanders must
assess how badly they will be outnumbered and outgunned at various points from the beginning. The actual time-line is now measured in days rather than weeks, since both sides fully expect manpower and material attrition will be very high.

Southern flank mobilization dynamics are unlikely to match the rapidity of the Central Region because the participants lack a technologically sophisticated military and a substantial air-lift capability for rapid deployments. Greece and Turkey face logistical difficulties in redeploying forces to respond to a concerted Bulgarian-Soviet attack towards the Aegean and the Bosphorus. Immediate European Turkish forces include at least two infantry divisions and an armored brigade (none likely to be at 100 percent strength), while Greek forces from Thessaloniki eastward include several infantry divisions (one at its full complement), an armored battalion, and scattered field artillery battalions. Although both countries have larger armies than Bulgaria, Turkey deploys its large army against not only the Soviets and Greeks, but the Kurds and Syrians as well. Ironically, Greece positions most of its forces against Turkey.\(^3\)

The 15-plus Soviet divisions that are fully manned and immediately available in Hungary and the Odessa, Kiev, North Caucasus, and Trans-Caucasus military districts provide minimal flexibility in the Southwestern TVD for standing-start offensives. Category II divisions, at 50-75 percent strength, might be manned in several days, but would not be operational for several weeks. Thus, if the Soviet offensive sought to secure surprise in the Southwestern TVD and to push towards Northern Italy and through Austria from Hungary, then the Soviets would probably not commit ground and air resources to the Balkans. Within the first week of hostilities, Soviet ground support for Bulgaria would certainly be minimal. Only if NATO sought the Aegean and Bosphorus would the Soviet naval infantry brigade (stationed with the Black Sea Fleet) be immediately reinforced by the airlift and sealift of a Red Army motorized rifle division from M-Day through M+7.

NATO-Warsaw Pact hostilities in a Bulgarian front would lack the same "time-line" as elsewhere in Europe. A Soviet attack in the Central Region (without accompanying action in the Southwestern TVD) would obviously heighten the readiness of Turkish, Greek, Italian, American, and other NATO forces in the area. If so, any efforts to begin a surprise offensive would go to Bulgarian forces,
reinforced only by such Soviet naval infantry or motorized rifle divisions as could be either prepositioned or airlifted directly from Soviet soil.

Such a balance would not ensure success. Indeed, even if initial BPA successes did occur due to surprise and numerical superiority, Bulgaria's position would depend heavily on Soviet involvement to: secure the Aegean; block any Turkish reinforcements from crossing the Bosporus; and interdict Greek forces who might move past Thessaloniki to relieve Thrace. Bulgarian forces would likely be immersed in a costly and extended conventional battle. For Bulgaria, this situation represents a negative prospect.

Category III divisions and other units—often described as cadre units of officers and noncommissioned officers—average about 30 percent of Bulgaria's assigned manpower and equipment density. Almost 40 percent of the BPA's manpower is deployed in such organizations, including three of the BPA's eight motorized rifle divisions; while two others, and at least some of the armored formations, are probably Category II (50-75 percent manned and equipped). Certainly, only about half the BPA is capable of rapid commitment to combat. In sum, without substantial Soviet involvement, a Bulgarian effort to capture and hold European Turkey and the northern coast of the Aegean would be fraught with uncertainty, particularly if the combat continued indefinitely.

If the USSR were to open several fronts within the Southwestern TVD—attacking Turkey, invading Yugoslavia through Hungary, and using the Bulgarian front to aim for the Bosporus and the Aegean coast—they would have to rely heavily on the BPA. Throughout the Southwestern TVD (as opposed to the Central Region and Baltic covered by the Western TVD), Warsaw Pact forces are much more evenly "balanced" between Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact. If a Bulgarian front emerged in the Southwestern TVD, Bulgaria would have to absorb most of the initial ground fighting. However, the Soviet involvement necessary to ensure the Bulgarian army reached its goals and maintained them would stretch Soviet resources.

The extent of Soviet involvement will affect Bulgarian mobilization. Given the BPA's very limited size, mobilization would commence only hours or—at most—a day or two before a WTO surprise offensive would begin. Perhaps two Category II divisions and other brigade/battalion-sized units would be filled out with 10-15,000
reservists in several days, but the principal call-up of Bulgaria’s 150,000 army reserves (at least 25,000 of whom would be needed to fill out existing Category III motorized rifle divisions) would take weeks. The readying and testing of equipment and vehicles for cadre divisions and the making of critical repairs would necessitate further delays.

During such a mobilization period, NATO aircraft could disrupt troop formations, depots, staging areas, and transportation links. In other words, a Bulgarian build-up would be impeded. If such NATO attacks on rear areas diminished Bulgarian reinforcement rates, then the Soviets would have to pull more resources from neighboring fronts in the Southwestern TVD.

As combat times extended, the much larger Turkish military (with a regular army in excess of 500,000 and over 800,000 reserves) would gain favor. Even if we assume that only 25 percent of the Turkish forces would defend Turkish land west of the Bosporus, the Bulgarian-Soviet position would become difficult, despite compensating factors such as shorter distances for Bulgarian-Soviet logistics. Still, if the Bulgarian front included an attack against Greece, or if the Greeks joined in a NATO counter-offensive, or if NATO aircraft deep strikes hampered mobilization of Category III divisions, the Bulgarian-Soviet position would be more tenuous.

SYSTEMIC INTEGRATION

The Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) denote the “system” for integrating Soviet allies in Eastern Europe. Through the Warsaw Pact, the USSR has tried to ensure an imposing military barrier that prevents Western threats to the “socialist community” and one that prevents Pact nations from “breaking out” of that community. The first of these goals has meant developing the Combined Armed Forces (CAF) such that—although the CAF structure itself would be set aside in crisis—raw capabilities implicitly threaten NATO. To achieve the second goal, the Soviets have sought to deny national armies in Eastern Europe the capacity to operate independently under national authority. Yet, the Warsaw Pact itself has no military command structure or mobilization system. It has, instead, merely agreements to pursue cooperation and to plan joint maneuvers. As Jeffrey Simon notes in Chapter 1, according to Ryszard Kuklinski, mobilization orders and wartime command would come from the Soviet Union in all theaters and fronts.
How responsive would individual WTO members be to a Soviet command to start limited mobilization to bring Category II divisions up to full strength in a few days? Could these divisions then launch an immediate “standing start” offensive against neighboring states while facing a full-scale national mobilization? For Bulgaria, the answer is simple because Bulgaria has been thoroughly integrated into the Warsaw Pact and unquestionably accepts fighting alongside the Soviets. Unlike Romania, no discussion appears in print about any preparation to fight a war independently of the Warsaw Pact. Unlike the Czechoslovak Army there are no open challenges to the preeminence of Soviet interests (such as those Vaclav Prchlik aired publicly in July 1968). Quite simply, Bulgaria would not mobilize unless ordered by the Stavka, issued through the Soviet General Staff. Since Bulgarian command, control, communications and intelligence operations are tied into Soviet systems, Bulgaria would not begin preparations for hostilities without Soviet approval.

Two indicators of Bulgaria’s strongly integrated role are its defense spending which, as a proportion of GNP (converted to dollars), has remained the highest in Eastern Europe, and its military manpower, which remains disproportionately high. In sum, Bulgaria’s strict adherence in providing military resources consistently exceeds that of any other Warsaw Pact member. In addition, Bulgarian ground and air forces and their staffs consistently rate among the most mobile in the Pact. While Soviet divisions located in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany obviously “require” frequent joint training, such a situation does not explain Bulgaria’s greater than expected participation in maneuvers elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

A permanent Soviet troop presence would add to Bulgaria’s integration. Even though no Soviet divisions have been based in Bulgaria since 1947, a Soviet presence persists. For example, Soviet officers teach in Bulgarian military schools and institutes (Georgi Benkovski Military Air Force School, Nikola Vaptsarov Higher Military Navy School, Georgi Dimitrov Higher Artillery School, and so on); Soviet technicians (“Radiotechnical Troops”) man early-warning radar installations, communications facilities, and intelligence gathering posts; and Soviet personnel are attached directly to Bulgarian units as observers. In addition, Soviet Black Sea Fleet military aircraft and warships constantly use Bulgarian facilities, and several huge ferries have been built to carry Soviet troops and equipment across the Black
Sea for rapid redeployment, thus avoiding the problem of Romanian transit.

Beyond a physical presence, Defense Minister Dobri Dzhurov, effusive on many occasions regarding Soviet-Bulgarian links, often quotes Georgi Dimitrov: “Our Army must be like the Soviet [army]. We must have the same tasks, organization, arms, and military science. We must have full understanding and a common language on all issues.”43 For decades Todor Zhivkov has employed similar language; he has reiterated that, “We are of the opinion that our army is part of the Soviet armed forces.”44 In fact, a Bulgarian general is typically identified as a “hero of the USSR and of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria” (in that order!).45

Bulgarian officers receive extensive training and education in the USSR.46 Any top command position requires graduation from one of the principal military academies in the USSR—the Voroshilov Academy for those high-ranking cadre (colonels and generals) who will fill posts in Bulgaria’s general staff. Indeed, a joint Bulgarian-Soviet study on these close educational linkages between Soviet and Bulgarian officers notes that mid-level academies such as the Frunze Military Academy and the Lenin Military-Political Academy educate BPA captains and majors.47 Other academies specialize in armor, communications, and other fields. Undoubtedly most, if not all, of the BPA’s officers will be trained in the USSR before their promotion into command positions.

Economic ties ensure alliance integration, and Bulgaria largely depends on the USSR and other East European WTO members. In 1985, for example, over 75 percent of Bulgaria’s exports and imports were with the Warsaw Pact, and over 57 percent with the USSR alone.48 In energy supplies, Bulgaria is the least self-sufficient Pact member: imported Soviet natural gas and crude oil account for more than 70 percent of all its energy needs. In fact, Bulgaria continues to have the smallest indigenous primary energy production in all of East Europe.49

The Bulgarians recognize their economic dependence, particularly as it affects their mobilization. Narodna Armiya articles elaborate on Bulgaria’s “coalition military economy,” implying that Bulgaria has no “military economy” of its own. These articles suggest “a peculiar structure and development of the international division of labor in the sector of the material backing of war, and for a
dynamic and highly organized structure connected with the preparation for and the waging of a coalition war." In Bulgarian discussions, the "full coordination [and] intensified processes of economic and military-economic integration [with the] entire socialist community and, above all, [with the] Soviet Union" are encouraged; the establishment of complexes "that duplicate each other and guarantee economic security in the case of war" are applauded.

All things considered, Bulgaria depends highly on the Soviet-led alliance system and this situation is unlikely to change. Bulgaria cannot make an autonomous decision to mobilize, and certainly could not engage in any substantial or extended external offensive without Soviet help. The Soviets would supply: command, control, communications and intelligence; air power, both to interdict an adversary's reinforcements and to ensure dominance over the battlefield; naval deployments to secure adjacent waters, such as the Aegean; and ground forces, at least in the form of naval infantry and light infantry divisions that can deploy immediately by air or sea-lift.

DOMESTIC SOCIOECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Bulgaria's potential to mobilize its available forces also stems from varied uncertainties concerning its economy and society. If the hypothetical Bulgarian front described earlier were inaugurated from a standing start, and were it to reach the Bosporus and Aegean within a few days, Bulgaria's socioeconomic constraints would not have time to surface. Casualties would be concealed, munitions and materials would not be exhausted, and most of the called-up reserves would not yet be involved in combat. The arrival of Soviet troops, first by air and sea, would not evoke mass apprehension or revulsion as it might in Poland, or other member states.

Further, Bulgaria, unlike several other Soviet allies (notably Czechoslovakia), has enjoyed rising living standards relative to the USSR since the end of World War II. Bulgaria's change in just a few decades from a peasant, agricultural economy to one based on industry and trade has been dramatic. According to Thad Alton, Bulgaria exhibited East Europe's fastest rising Net Material Product (NMP) per capita between 1965-81 and the highest increase in NMP per capita distributed domestically as personal consumption. Predictably, therefore, Bulgarian workers, despite evident dissatisfaction about automatization and concerns about pay and working conditions,
have not challenged the authorities; Bulgaria has no record of serious work stoppages or other disturbances at major enterprises. In sum, the Bulgarian workforce would likely accept the heavy demands that mobilization would impose upon them.

True enough, Bulgaria does have social and economic obstacles to smooth and rapid mobilization. A principal difficulty, particularly if the BPA moved towards the Bosporus, would be the 800,000 ethnic Turks and 100,000 Bulgarian Moslems (Pomaks), whose proportion of Bulgaria's population is increasing. Indeed, the Turkish minority in Bulgaria (constituting 8 to 10 percent of Bulgaria's 9,100,000 population) is an increasing problem for Todor Zhivkov's regime. As a result, the Zhivkov regime began to proclaim, in the 1980s, the existence of a "single socialist nation" (without ethnic identity other than "Bulgarian") and forcibly shut down Turkish-language publications, banned Turkish-language broadcasts, required Bulgarian surnames, and made Bulgarian language and culture preeminent in all primary and secondary education.

During 1984-1985, numerous violent incidents (train and train station bombings, for example) occurred and were, indirectly, acknowledged by Bulgarian authorities. Other violent encounters between Turkish/Moslem protesters and security police or militia units may have cost many more lives, with Turkish authorities claiming that 1,000 people had died. The Bulgarian hard-line position toward minorities surfaced in Stanko Todorov's warning that Turks could emigrate "to other areas of Bulgaria" where they might find peace and quiet.

Within the military itself, Turk and Pomak conscripts receive disproportionate representation in Bulgarian construction units. Although these minorities will probably not compromise the BPA's combat capabilities in a limited-duration offensive, their low morale and performance could become critical during extended conflicts.

Since the principal region of Turkish population adjoins European Turkey, however, any ground offensive into that area would necessarily be supplied through such border okrugs (along the main road, European highway 5N). The supply routes might be: from the Bulgarian Second Army HQ at Plovdiv through Haskovo to the border town of Svilengrad or on the smaller highways from Sliven, HQ of the BPA's Third Army, south through Jambol to the Turkish border. A rail line, from Plovdiv via either Haskovo or Dimitrovgrad
to the Turkish border, was completed in the early 1970s. Like the main highway, it follows the Marica River valley from Hamranli to the border—a distance of about 40 kilometers. However, NATO attacks could cripple both highway and rail traffic. Soviet forces landing at Burgas, after the 550-kilometer ferry trip from Odessa, would probably deploy along the road from the seaport to Malko Tarnovo. In all cases, infantry and armor would pass through 60 to 100 kms of countryside inhabited mostly by Turks. Turkish sabotage and/or organized guerrilla activity in border okrugs seem likely if hostilities were to continue.

Numerous heavy trucks cross from Turkey and Greece through Sofia and from Western Europe to Turkey and the Middle East. Bulgaria, in fact, has much more motor vehicle freight than either Hungary or Romania. The few principal roads are in good repair and would support rapid movement of manpower and materiel. However, these well-maintained routes are few in number, meaning that NATO air or Turkish national attacks could easily slow or interrupt logistics.

The Bulgarians might also attempt an accompanying Bulgarian offensive into Thrace and Greece: Macedonia. If so, the BPA First Army headquartered in Sofia might use European Highway #2 (through Blagoevgrad towards Thessaloniki, Drama, and Kavalla) as a principal route of attack. Such a drive, confronting higher elevations and more difficult terrain would necessarily be confined to principal existing highways. Again, route #2 and a railway, which wind along the Struma River valley, would also be choice targets for NATO air strikes.

In addition, this hypothetical Bulgarian front would begin with very limited Soviet ground assistance. The BPA, with resources drawn from the civilian sector, would have to provide its own transport and logistical support. Because Bulgarian military air transport capabilities are very small, the BPA cannot transport logistics for a standing start offensive and/or accompanying mobilization. In metric tons/km or total metric tons, Bulgaria has far less rail capacity than Romania or Hungary and, in the mid-1980s, had far fewer locomotives or freight cars. Consequently, most manpower and materiel would have to move along one of several highway routes. Even if the necessary trucks and armored personnel carriers were available for Bulgarian divisions to engage the enemy, serious questions arise about whether there are enough reserves to assemble and equip reserve forces.
Although data are unavailable on military truck transport, 20 percent of the BPA's tank inventory in 1986 consisted of 40-year-old T-34s, while 80 percent of armored fighting vehicles are 1950s' designs. Even if all the BPA's tanks and vehicles are used—an unlikely prospect—filling out Category II and Category III divisions would exhaust all armored vehicles. In sum, the army's movements, especially among Category III and reserve divisions, would soon depend on limited trucks and buses from the civilian sector, which would affect negatively the wider socioeconomic mobilization. Bulgaria's diminished ability to assemble and move manpower or material would only worsen as hostilities continued, particularly if NATO air strikes interdict highways and railroads. In effect, with an army structured and equipped for armored and motorized rifle combat, a Bulgarian offensive would soon confront the limits of its own transportation system—a problem that the Soviets could not relieve in the first days of combat.

Finally, Bulgarian industry has little indigenous capacity to produce major weapons (tanks, mechanized artillery, aircraft, or helicopters). Unlike the Northern Tier countries, or even Romania, Bulgaria does not help produce the Warsaw Pact's major weapons (unless one considers retrofitting older T-54/55 tanks with range-finders and engines). Bulgaria produces standard conventional munitions and ammunition, small arms, and light vehicles. However, Bulgarian lack of heavy industry necessitates Soviet deliveries to replenish her tank and aircraft losses.

**Domestic Political Conditions.** Bulgaria's capacity to mobilize military, social, and economic resources during hostilities will depend on her elite-society relations. In Bulgaria, mass disaffection does not threaten the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) or the Zhivkov regime. Data collected from Bulgaria in the last 25 years indicate only a few isolated incidents in the 1963-67 period, and several cases of Turkish nationalist violence during the 1980s. Although these events caused a flurry of security police activity and a heightened army presence in Turkish districts and transportation centers in the mid-1980s, no concern for the regime's stability has been visible.

Likewise, elections to Bulgaria's state organs (local people's councils and national assembly) show large and steady turnouts for the last four decades, with assembly leaders continuing to implement the BCP's program. Mass organizations, including trade unions,
continue to command almost universal membership; the 9th Bulgarian trade union congress in April, 1982—despite repression in Poland against Solidarity—took place without any visible dissent among its almost 3,000 delegates. In addition, attitudinal surveys of Bulgarian workers reveal that a high level of "political and ideological disinterest" exists among skilled and unskilled workers in Bulgaria. In sum, we can confidently say that the BCP's mass political control is not now an issue and is unlikely to become one in the early days of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict.

However, the Bulgarian Communist Party has had reason to wonder about its political control of the BPA. In Bulgarian history, the army has never been firmly under civilian control; rebellions in the closing days of World War I and coups in 1923 and 1934 demonstrate the army's proclivity for intervention in politics. From late 1944 through the end of World War II, the Bulgarian army fought Germans, monitored closely by Bulgarian communist political commissars (many of whom had served in the Soviet army) and "assisted" by Red Army training officers, and (in Hungary and Austria) bracketed by Soviet divisions.

This lack of trust between Party and Army continued in the 1950s and 1960s, as a spirit of nationalism remained among high ranking officers. A number of the BPA's top officers, who had first met as partisans in World War II, probably plotted a coup in 1961. More substantiated reports, however, indicate a widespread conspiracy to oust Zhivkov in 1965; Major General Tsviatko Anev, commander of the small Sofia garrison, conspired with Central Committee member Todorov-Gorunia and others to seize power. Among the other ringleaders were two active-duty major generals, Micho Michev and Lyuben Dinov. Although the BCP discovered the plot and arrested and imprisoned the conspirators, internal dissent continued for several years. For example, in April 1968, the Vratsa district party organ reported that the 1965 conspirators had been active there, and that their influence was still felt. Some analysts speculate about the effect of irredentism and nationalism on the military, and some issues (such as Macedonia and greater Bulgarian autonomy from Moscow's influence) are still present among military officers.

The BCP seeks, of course, the unconditional loyalty of Bulgarian officers and troops to its rule and to the existing regime. At times the Party has used Macedonian irredentism to link the BCP, the
army, and the nation. The Party still fears, however, that such emotional sentiments may form the ideological nucleus for groups to challenge its authority, as in 1964-1965.

Evidence of BCP concern for the political "health" of the BPA has been constant. Thirty years ago, the commander of the Second Bulgarian Army (HQ in Plovdiv), General Velichko Georgiev, warned of lapses in the political education of the army, and reiterated commanders' obligations to instill "the Party line in the army." More recently, just before the 12th BCP Congress, Defense Minister Dobri Dzhurov published a series of articles under the general title, "Party Leadership Is the Foundation of the Army's Cohesion and Power." Attention to the Party's central role was also evident in a December 1984 Narodna Armiya editorial. The editorial criticized party work in the Army, stating clearly that party leadership in the BPA is wanting; the editorial went on to advocate "improving the style of leading organs [and] better application of advanced science and technology in leadership and training of troops."

Even so, the political education of Bulgarian officers is thorough, particularly at the highest levels, where, as we have seen, study in the Soviet Union is a necessity. Party membership among officers, according to Dobri Dzhurov, had reached 85 percent in the late 1970s.

Consequently, if there is a hindrance to Bulgaria's mobilization of manpower or material for a limited offensive against NATO, it lies within the military itself, rather than the wider population. Still, internal dissension is likely only in protracted hostilities where objectives are not reached or become costly to maintain.

MILITARY PREPAREDNESS

What kind of hostilities does the Bulgarian military prepare for? The principal roles of Warsaw Pact armies are focused within—towards their own societies or intervention elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Because the USSR does not have clear numerical superiorsities in the Southwest," the prospect of an offensive launched from Bulgaria is not high—even in the case of a Soviet-initiated attack against NATO in Central and Northern Europe. Were a Bulgarian front created, however, the soldiers would not be as well trained as those in Central Europe, nor would they fight with weapons of the same technological sophistication.
Precisely because this front would be one of lower technology and proficiency, small increments in military preparedness will mean more (particularly when there is little prior mobilization). By the standards of NATO's front-line forces, the Bulgarian military remains unprepared, poorly armed, and of limited proficiency. Still, the BPA would not be fighting the Bundeswehr or the British Army of the Rhine. Instead, the BPA would at most have localized offensive responsibilities. In sum, Bulgaria maintains basic "minimal level" preparedness for such a role.

Bulgaria has 150 T-72 tanks (the principal main battle tank (MBT) in Soviet Category I forces) and is unlikely to receive any T-80s in the near future. The T-72s account for less than 8 percent of the total MBT force, while over 20 percent of the tank inventory consists of T-34s, a 40-year-old design. The density of BPA armor does not match other Warsaw Pact armies either; the BPA probably fields 120-130 tanks per 10,000 soldiers, whereas the GDR and Poland have over twice that armor density. Likewise, the BPA's armored personnel carriers are dated BTR-50 or BTR-60 models, and infantry fighting vehicles are BMP-1 models, which lack antitank guided missiles. Although the Bulgarian Air Force received 60 very capable MiG-23 Floggers during the mid-1980s, 115 aged MiG-21s still remain in the active inventory.

Although Bulgaria's relatively old equipment weakens the BPA's offensive capability against NATO, Bulgaria's military hardware is similar to that fielded by Turkey or Greece, whose M-47 and M-48 tank forces are no more capable than the T-54/55 in Bulgaria's inventory. It is also doubtful that the Turkish or Greek air force, equipped with F-104 Lockheed "Starfighters," F-4Es, and the 30-year-old F-100 "Super Sabres" would be superior to Bulgaria's.

The amount, sophistication, and density of Bulgarian military equipment are not imposing; however, Bulgaria's potential opponents do not have superior technology or firepower per unit. Turkey does have far more equipment, but little of it is new. In addition, in European Turkey 50 percent of Turkish divisions are understrength. Though Greek army divisions are more fully manned, they lack substantial strength and advanced equipment in Thrace and Greek Macedonia.

To what degree has Bulgaria amassed manpower and material resources? Can we infer anything from such data about the nation's
readiness for war? Expenditure and manpower data confirm Bulgaria's very considerable effort to extract manpower and material for its armed forces. Military expenditures are 7.0-8.0 percent of GNP, and 17.2-22.4 percent of central government expenditures over the 1972-1984 period. Bulgaria's efforts to generate manpower over a long period are second only to the Soviet Union within the Warsaw Pact. Furthermore, Bulgarian manpower levels, measured per 1,000 population, have been higher than the Soviet Union; Bulgaria maintains 20 active-duty personnel per 1,000 people versus 16-17 in the USSR.

Qualitative assessments of Bulgaria's manpower, including active duty and reserve, paramilitary, and militia, must be largely judgmental. Because much of the BPA's manpower is in understrength or cadre divisions in all three of its army commands, its proficiency is questionable, particularly when reserves are mobilized to fill vacancies. Conscripts provide a smaller proportion of total military manpower (including paramilitary and militia) than in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, but a larger proportion than in the GDR and Poland. The presence of conscripts versus career cadre and part-time paramilitary or militia formations create what Rakowska-Harmstone calls the "ratio of distrust;" this distrust is more substantial in Bulgaria than in the GDR and Poland where a more professional core is available to expand the military during mobilization.

Relative to its size and wealth, Bulgaria has committed large amounts of resources to its military effort. Aside from the disproportion of conscripts to total manpower and the relative understrength of its active divisions, Bulgaria is closer to being mobilized already than other Warsaw Pact members. However, Bulgaria has only a small reservoir of resources to draw on if full mobilization were required, particularly in support of its transportation system.

Thus, military preparedness is a factor that cuts both ways in Bulgarian mobilization. The Bulgarian Communist Party has, quite dutifully, followed the Soviet lead and has consistently devoted resources to the BPA. However, should war be imminent or a standing-start offensive necessary, mobilization would not expand Bulgaria's capabilities to the same degree as other Warsaw Pact members because Bulgaria simply cannot squeeze more out of its society and economy. Further, the inherent Bulgarian "ratio of distrust" may slow or impede the flow of manpower and materiel into the BPA during mobilization.
OVERVIEW OF BULGARIAN MOBILIZATION

A Bulgarian mobilization, coextensive with the BPA's offensive operations against a NATO member, will most likely not take place. Nevertheless, most assessments start with such an improbable scenario since it is most germane to Western concerns and NATO military planners.

Were the unlikely to happen, and a Bulgarian front were to open in the Balkans, Bulgaria's own negative military tradition and lack of combat experience would predominate. The Party's lingering doubts about the BPA's loyalty and the Army's doubts about the BCP's concern for Bulgarian national interests, reinforce this negative environment.

Irredentism focused on western Thrace and Macedonia and long-standing animosity toward the Turks would aid mobilization in conjunction with a Bulgarian front within the Southwestern TVD. Thus, the BPA would be in combat with opponents that are neither well-prepared nor positioned, although if hostilities continued, Turkey and Greece could far outweigh Bulgarian resources. Soviet participation in a standing-start offensive would be constrained. Hence, duration would greatly offset the outcome of combat. Put simply, the Bulgarian front would have to succeed quickly, largely using BPA ground forces. However, ground success will depend on ample commitment of Soviet air, naval, and ground forces. But in the Southwestern TVD, the Soviets would have little flexibility if they attacked from Hungary into Italy and Austria. In this case, Bulgarian force mobilization would depend on an extremely rapid call-up of reserves to fill out understrength divisions because Soviet ground support would likely be modest.

Bulgaria's integration into the Warsaw Pact is complete, and mobilization upon Soviet command seems assured. However, Bulgarian dependence on command, control, and communications underscores the need for Soviet participation in any Bulgarian front. Doubts will persist about BPA capabilities, when and if they are operating without Soviet guidance.

Although domestic socioeconomic conditions show advances in output and living standards and a relatively compliant workforce, the large Turkish minority presents a clear danger in any war. The routes and terrain of likely attack against Turkey and Greece would create inviting targets for ethnic Turks. In addition, the BPA's lack of modern vehicles raises questions about the army's logistics in mobilization during hostilities.
As we have seen, political conditions for force mobilization in Bulgaria pose no problem within Bulgarian society, but would be troublesome within the military. Concern for the political loyalty of the BPA stems from its traditional lack of commitment to the Bulgarian Communist Party. Once again, however, quick and decisive engagements may not allow such disloyalties to surface.

Finally, military preparedness in Bulgaria presents a diverse picture. Under Todor Zhivkov, Bulgaria has devoted enormous resources over a long period to the military. Despite such output, however, there is very little depth to Bulgaria’s military potential. The BPA’s manpower and equipment are not modern, and mobilization of socioeconomic resources does not alter the situation. Again, if Bulgaria is to achieve objectives in any offensive, it must do so with speed and precision, qualities not easily achieved by the Bulgarian People’s Army.

Should the Soviets order Bulgaria to assemble, prepare, and commit to combat its military in an offensive against its Balkan neighbors, the venture will be fraught with uncertainty. Irredentist sentiments, profound dependence on the USSR, a relatively compliant population, and substantial commitment of resources to defense would enable Bulgarian leaders to begin mobilization. Yet, Bulgaria’s Turkish minority, lack of indigenous military industry, ongoing record of political disloyalty within the BPA, and lack of depth in manpower and materiel resources would hamper mobilization. Given such conditions, Bulgarian and Soviet military planners are far from optimistic about Bulgaria’s role in an all-out war.

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Endnotes


3. Ibid., p. 5.


6. Wolff, p. 84.


8. Ibid., p. 98.

9. Ibid., p. 121.

10. Ibid., pp. 126, 166.


12. Ibid.


15. Ibid., Chapter 16.

16. Ibid., pp. 174-194, 204-216.

17. Oren, p. 85.

18. Miller, p. 218; and Oren, p. 87.


22. See, for example, the detailed discussion in Jaworsky, pp. 4-6.


29. Miller, p. 218.


41. Cason, p. 145.

42. Clawson, pp. 257-258.
44. Paul Lenvai, Der Rote Balkan (Frankfurt, 1968), p. 263.
45. For example, see Narodna Armiya, 27 May 1985, when officers attending graduation ceremonies at the G. Benkoski Higher Military Air Force School were listed.
49. Ibid., p. 130.
51. Ibid.
53. See, for example, the comparative statistics on the composition of GNPs in Eastern Europe over time in: Thad P. Alton, “East European GNPs: Origins of Product, Final Uses, Rates of Growth and International Comparisons,” in East European Economies: Slow Growth in the 1980s, p. 89.
54. Ibid., pp. 115-116.
58. Ibid., 8 December 1985.
61. Ibid., pp. 212-213.
62. Ibid., p. 221.
67. Welsh, p. 492.


70. Costello, pp. 136-137.

71. Brown, p. 177.

72. For a detailed account of the entire conspiracy, see: Costello, p. 149; Brown, pp. 173-187.


77. Jones, pp. 219-225.


80. Cason, pp. 145 and 150; and author's estimates.


82. Cason, p. 145.


84. Ibid., footnote p. 79.


86. Ibid., p. 67.

The events of August 1968 began an important transition in postwar Romanian military doctrine and the political-military role that Bucharest has chosen to play within the Warsaw Pact. Throughout that year the Romanian leadership, headed by Nicolae Ceausescu, watched with morbid fascination the Warsaw Pact's preparations for invading Czechoslovakia. Romania did not participate in the invasion and criticized the action as an unjustified interference in the internal affairs of a socialist state. Because of the Warsaw Pact occupation of Czechoslovakia, Ceausescu feared the Soviets would mount a similar operation against his regime. Three days after the Czechoslovak invasion he held a popular rally in Bucharest to demonstrate the Romanian people's support for his regime and their willingness to resist forcefully any intended Soviet invasion. He called on the masses to join the Patriotic Guards and, as rumors of a possible Soviet military invasion spread throughout the country, thousands joined the Guard, visibly demonstrating their willingness to resist such an action.

In the 20 years that have passed since the Czechoslovakian invasion, Ceausescu has continued to implement a military policy that
emphasizes the primacy of defenses and he has restructured Romanian military forces to resist invasion. This transformation in both doctrine and force structure severely limits the use of Romanian forces for Soviet-style military operations, but minimally supports the obligations Romania has made and continues to make to the Warsaw Pact. Such actions match Romania's foreign policy which attempts to assert, to the degree possible, an independent position while giving the minimum necessary support for its Warsaw Pact allies.

Since assuming power, Ceausescu's changes have resulted in a significant restructuring of Romania's military forces that contrasts sharply with their role in both World War I and World War II. A brief review of those historical experiences will serve as departure point for a detailed examination of Romania's intentions in preparing and actually mobilizing current military forces.

MOBILIZATION IN BOTH WORLD WARS

World War I. Romania's participation in World War I came late and followed a series of lengthy political approaches to the Entente seeking to maximize Romania's postwar territorial gains. Romanian negotiations sought to regain Transylvania from the Austro-Hungarian Empire and to reincorporate it into Romania. By the time Prime Minister Bratianu finished haggling over the details with Britain and France, Romania's chance for decisive military action together with Russia had passed. Nonetheless, on 27 August 1917 Romania declared war on the Axis and began military operations.

In the two years preceding the declaration of war, Bucharest conducted a major mobilization effort. The Romanian army grew from 250,000 to 500,000 men—comprising basically peasant conscripts, organized into 23 infantry divisions and 2 cavalry divisions—that represented a sturdy fighting force.¹ In 1915, a War Ministry General Board started to increase military production and to purchase equipment from Italy, Britain, and France. The Board sought to produce 30 percent of the ammunition needed from domestic sources and to import the remainder. In addition, Romania took steps to improve fortifications in the Bucharest area and along the defensive line from Focsani-Namoloasa-Galati.² Despite these efforts, Romanian forces were poorly equipped when war was declared; they had no automatic rifles, no gas equipment, no large mortars, and few machine guns.³ Of even greater concern was the quality of the Romanian officer corps. The leadership was largely a group of pompous Beau Brummers. According to historian C. R. M. Cruttwell, "Eyewitnesses
state that all through the campaign crowds of officers were strolling around Bucharest with painted faces, soliciting prostitutes or one and another.14 The poor quality of leadership manifested itself when outnumbered but combat-tested Germans demonstrated their advantage in the short campaign that followed.

The Romanian military did not decide on a campaign plan until after war was declared. Romania's 1916 boundaries suggested a defensive campaign along the Transylvanian Alps, with an offensive action in the South to regain Dobrudja. Instead, Bratianu insisted that regaining Transylvania was foremost; he surmised this action would have the beneficial side effect of generating popular support for the war effort. Consequently, two armies marched north into Transylvania and one remained in the South opposite Bulgaria, where a combined German, Bulgarian, and Turkish force under General Mackensen struck after crossing the Danube in September 1917. As a result, the Romanian military command had to move reserves to bolster the southern line, and further Romanian advances into Transylvania stalled before advancing German forces under General Falkenhayn. Falkenhayn's forces seized the Vulkan Pass, crossed into the Danubian Plain in late November, and raced Mackensen's to Bucharest which was occupied by 5 December. Romanian forces retreated to the East and finally established a defensive line together with the Russians along the Sereth, which held until the end of the war.5 Unfortunately, during this brief campaign, Romania lost 310,000 troops, either as casualties or as prisoners of war.

What Romania failed to gain through military action came in the peace settlement. The collapse of the Western front in August 1918 and actions around Salonika led Mackensen to seek Romanian support in exchange for Transylvania. With the armistice, the German forces withdrew and Romanian military forces quickly moved into Transylvania. As a result of Foreign Minister Titelescu's actions at the Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Trianon, Romania was ceded the territory of Transylvania.

World War II. Romania's political victory became a major grievance for Hungary during the interwar years and led to a reversal through the Vienna Diktat in 1940, when Transylvania was awarded to the pro-Nazi Horthy regime in Budapest. Shortly thereafter, the Iron Guard leader Ion Antonescu implemented a pro-Nazi regime and Romania entered World War II as a German ally. Romanian participation had two phases. During the first phase, Romania supported
the German operations by sending forces with Army Group South into the Ukraine and on to Stalingrad; during the second phase, Romanians overthrew the Antonescu regime, committed Romanian forces to support the Allied cause, and operated with Soviet forces moving across southeastern Europe.

During the 1930s Romania’s King Carol had enacted a military modernization program designed to overcome the leadership and equipment shortfalls that had plagued the army during World War I. Alliance with the Entente as well as traditional ties to France led Romania to adopt French training regimens and equipment, and most officers spoke French as a second language. By 1939 the army consisted of a force of roughly 400,000 men organized into 1 Guard and 21 regular divisions. Of these forces, one was an elite Mountain Rifle division modeled on the Chasseurs Alpins. Romania’s force constituted the largest of the satellite armies to support German operations, but they were lightly armed, with few artillery pieces, and even these were short-range.6

Following the defeat of France in 1940, Romania suffered major territorial losses. The Soviet Union gained Bessarabia and Bukovina, Bulgaria obtained the southern Dobruja, and Hungary gained the northern half of Transylvania. Antonescu sought to redress these actions by allying with the Germans and providing Romanian military support to German operations. He committed the Third Army, consisting of Romania’s best forces, to support Operation Barbarossa. This army, which included the elite Mountain Rifles, acquitted itself well in the advance on Odessa and participated in the siege of Sevastopol.

A reconstituted Third Army was assigned the northern front at Stalingrad in October 1942 while a Romanian corps protected the southern flank, with the 4th Panzer Army in the center. Both Romanian forces were shattered in the Soviet counter-offensive and forced to withdraw. By 1943 the Germans consigned the remnants of the Romanian army to duties in the rear, while major units returned to Romania for refitting and restructuring. By May 1944 Romanian forces, reconstituted as the 3rd and 4th Armies, were in position to defend Bessarabia though it was clear that the German cause was lost. King Michael forced Antonescu to resign and began maneuvering to join the Allies in the defeat of Germany. In all, the Romanian campaign into the Soviet Union cost 350,000 casualties with no territory regained.
Internally, the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) established a united front with prewar peasant and socialist parties, forced King Michael’s abdication on 23 August 1944, and led Romania to enter the war on the side of the Allies. Romanian forces then fought with Soviet units, pushing German forces from Bucharest and then mounting an offensive campaign into Transylvania.

German military forces, consisting of slightly over 625,000 men arrayed along the front and in the interior—particularly around Bucharest and in the area of the Ploesti oil fields—faced Romanian forces of about 450,000 men organized into about 29 divisions. Initial Romanian efforts focused on regaining the capital and securing the oil fields. By 27 August 1944 Romanian forces secured the capital; and by 31 August, Soviet and Romanian units recaptured the Ploesti oil fields, forcing German units to retreat across the Carpathians. As a result of these operations, about six German divisions (or 61,000 troops) were no longer combat effective. As the 25 August 1944 edition of the New York Times noted, “control over the Romanian territory is of utmost importance…. The latter is not only a shield to her southern flank, but it also provides her with oil, the most indispensable of all war materials.”

Starting in early October, Soviet and Romanian forces began operation Debrecen aimed at moving north through Transylvania. Over 260,000 Romanian troops participated in this operation which freed Transylvania by 25 October 1944. Romanian troops continued to advance with Soviet units through Hungary and into Czechoslovakia. The 2nd and 3rd Mountain Divisions were particularly active in these campaigns. Overall, 32 Romanian divisions participated in Slovakian operations which led to the occupation of Budapest. By the end of the war on 12 May 1945 approximately 540,000 Romanian troops had been committed to operations outside of Romanian territory. By the end of hostilities, Romania had suffered 170,000 casualties in operations against the Wehrmacht and its allies in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

As a result of these military operations and with strong Soviet political support during postwar negotiations, Romania regained much of the territory she had lost at the beginning of the war. The end of World War II was similar to the situation following World War I: Romania’s gains resulted more from the political realities of Allied military power (particularly Soviet) than from her own capabilities or military actions.
MOBILIZATION LESSONS FROM THE TWO WORLD WARS

Outside forces and influences dictated Romania's military actions in both World Wars more than internal priorities or pretensions. Romania attempted to maintain or regain territory annexed by larger powers or by her neighbors supported by larger rivals. Romania's wartime military forces were modeled on her European neighbors, particularly France; the French trained, equipped, and provided mobilization and operational doctrine in World War I and prior to World War II. The German occupation in 1940 introduced German training methods and integrated Romanian forces into German operations in 1941.

In neither war did Romania's armed forces markedly contribute to the attainment of Romania's national goals. In World War I, Romania's military forces, although quantitatively superior, could not defeat a more skillfully led and better equipped German force. In World War II, Romania's forces participated well as an integral part of the German offensive in the South and, following the political realignment in 1944, marched into Transylvania to regain territory lost to Hungary in 1940. Yet none of these military confrontations helped Romania regain lost territory. Rather, opportunistic political actions led Romania to align with the victorious coalition in each war and assured partial restoration of lost Romanian territory. Because of World War II settlements, Romania regained (with the exception of Bessarabia which remains in Soviet hands) most of the territory inhabited by ethnic Romanians and which various Romanian governments claimed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Consequently, Romania now sees herself as a status quo power in the Balkans with little interest in or expectation of regaining additional territories through military means. Instead, the military's prime task is to reinforce existing state boundaries and to prevent any erosion of national territory.

As a result, the Romanian armed forces have significantly restructured from the World War I and II models. Instead of numerous divisions, equipped and trained to operate with Alliance partners, Romania has turned to a much more modest force aimed at securing the defense of the homeland. Romania's defensive posture has largely emerged under Nicolae Ceausescu's leadership and has had a major impact on the structure and capabilities of Romania's military forces.
EVOlUTION IN ROMANIAN FORCES SINCE 1968

Since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Romania has significantly revised the doctrine that governs mobilization, training, and operations of its armed forces. Romanian forces have followed the trend of a territorial defense concept tailored on the Yugoslav model; and they have turned to Chinese (and perhaps North Korean) models, in terms of self-sufficiency. Major General Ilie Ceausescu has outlined the basic tenets of Romania’s defense concept:

It can be said that the fight of the whole people in defense of its homeland has always been an objective necessity for this country, that it sprang from the Romanian people’s determination to defend itself, to defeat the invaders and all those who attempted to violate the fundamental interests of the homeland, the right of all the inhabitants of the Carpatho-Danubian-Pontic area to a free life and development.  

The changes in Romania’s doctrine have been justified and elaborated in an extensive set of historical examples dating back to the Geto-Dacians of the fourth century BC. An examination of these themes reveals a consistent trend that provides a contemporary rationale: Romanians stress the primacy of defensive operations to preserve the territorial integrity of their nation. Romanian historians want to show not the success of pre-Romanian military history as much as the continuity of doctrinal requirements for contemporary Romanian military requirements. Major General Ilie Ceausescu explicitly notes the continuity between ancient and recent experiences:

At the same time over the centuries, the Dacians handed down to their successors—the Romanian people—the matchless art of destroying with small means an enemy which was superior in point of numbers and equipment, of winning great victories over any invader. The victories scored by the Romanian armies throughout the Middle Ages against some enemies possessing incomparably more numerous forces are revealing in this respect. In certain aspects, those victories recall the memorable successes of the Geto-Dacians, until the 2nd century, against various invaders.  

The importance of this tenet dominates current military thinking as well. Former Minister of Defense Ion Coman recently noted:

The actual materialization of the requirement of the doctrine concerning the preparation of the population creates a united whole of forces, under a single national leadership, capable of fulfilling the sacred duty towards the homeland, towards its destinies—the defense of independence and sovereignty, the thwarting of any external attack at any moment, throughout the territory by all means and with force.
Contemporary Romanian historical examples hark back to the first century BC to Burebista, a Geto-Dacian ruler, to demonstrate the success and primacy of a second key factor in current Romanian military thought: the requirement for all the citizens to rally to the defense of the nation. According to General Ceausescu:

Burebista’s military strategy was based on the defense of the territory inhabited by the Dacians by all forms, methods, and means of fighting at any cost and sacrifice. In order to attain this goal, the great leader envisioned mobilizing the entire population, and enlisting everyone capable of causing damage to the aggressor. The rational use of the advantages offered by the vast and variegated territory and the bravery and courage of all the citizens were a constant aim of Burebista’s military strategy. 

Likewise, popular participation occurred both in successful and unsuccessful revolutions against the Ottomans and Hapsburgs during the nineteenth century. Tudor Vladimirescu’s abortive 1821 revolt remains an early example of Romania’s efforts to gain popular participation in military actions. Similarly, Romanian participation in the revolts throughout Europe that occurred in 1848 indicate an early recognition by Romanian leaders of how important universal participation in defense of the homeland actually is:

The proclamation of the 1848 revolutionaries in Moldavia envisaged the setting up of a civic guard in “all the towns of the country.” “The Romanian nation,” stipulated the National Petition of Blaj “demands the arming of the people, or a national guard for the defense of the country inside and outside it”; Article 11 of the Proclamation-Constitution of Islaz stipulated that the Romanian people “decree that the national guard should be established, in which every Romanian should become a soldier, and every Romanian should be a guardian of public happiness, a guarantor of public liberties.”

Ilie Ceausescu emphasizes the contribution of the national guard forces during World War I, both after war was declared in 1916 and in the actions in 1918 which led up to the invasion of Transylvania. However, these historical evaluations, which seek to use past experience to justify a territorial defense doctrine, depart considerably from actual experience. Romania’s military forces in both World Wars were modeled on European standards and fit the patterns of Bucharest’s major allies. Significant deviation from this pattern has taken place only in the past 20 years. Ilie Ceausescu justifies this shift in the following terms:
After long debates by the military specialists with regard to "the armed nation doctrine," the Enciclopedia Romaniei (The Encyclopedia of Romania) drew the conclusion that: "After the great experience of the war, the idea of an army which had as its main element an active army was replaced by the conception of an army consisting of all the forces of the nation." Today we have the integral conception of the armed nations corroborated by the fact that the modern wars demand the throwing into action of all the forces and means which a country has at its disposal. Thus, in the future, the army for the war will be in no way different from the nation, because it will be nothing else than the nation mobilized in its entirety. It will consist of two parts: the military organization of the nation and the organization of the army itself.19

The current demographic situation in Romania also favors adopting a people's defense. Former Minister of Defense Coman notes that, "as far as Romania is concerned, if we view the demographic potential from the standpoint of raising to arms the entire population, the result is that a part of the total population, several times bigger than the limited availabilities of the regular army, can be drawn into direct armed struggle."20

A third feature of current military doctrine affecting mobilization and force employment is the Romanian leadership’s decision to conduct military operations solely within the boundaries of Romania. Codified in the 1972 Law Concerning the Organization of the National Defense, Romania is strictly prohibited from participating in military operations outside national boundaries.21 Many contemporary studies use historic examples to demonstrate the validity of this concept; some look back to the Geto-Dacian period,22 others to the defensive operations of Stephen the Great in 1475,23 and to Romania’s actions in World War I.24

The importance of fighting on known territory also reflects recent discussions of the territorial defense concept. Unable to trade large amounts of national territory, as certain countries did in World War II, Romania concluded:

that solutions should be found to prevent the aggressor from exercising full control over the zones in which he penetrated, from establishing absolute occupation as in the classical wars . . . [to strengthen] the resistance movement, in structured forms which would deny the aggressor sway over the territory in which he had penetrated.25

Economic potential also determines the ability of a nation to meet its military requirements. Although the current Romanian
regime places a very high premium on self-sufficiency, historically they have not been very successful. In preparing for World War I, the Romanian government required additional military materiel. While the Entente had promised 300 tons per day of additional support, deliveries never kept pace with the promised support. During the interwar years King Carol sought to redress Romanian shortfalls by procuring equipment from France, particularly artillery; however, Romania’s requirements easily exceeded the Treasury’s ability to support needed weapons. During World War II, Nazi Germany’s need for Romanian oil and foodstuffs played a key role in Romania’s fortunes.

Under Ceausescu, Romania has sought to improve her economic ability to provide the necessary materiel for its armed forces to meet the nation’s defensive requirements. While the transition to a territorial defense has decreased the need for expensive mechanized forces, it has further burdened Romania’s domestic infrastructure to meet basic needs. According to Romanian statistics, 25 percent of Romania’s military materiel was produced domestically in 1965; this rose to 48 percent by 1970; and by 1980 domestic industry produced the bulk of armaments and military materiel. In addition, an important side effect is the use of the military to support the domestic economy, including work on development projects (such as the Danube Black Sea Canals) and help in harvest efforts. Such programs, while justified by leaders in terms of strengthening the nation’s economic potential, have one disadvantage. Diverting military forces from training requirements decreases their effectiveness.

The five components discussed above determine the structure and mobilization potential for present Romanian forces. The result is a relatively small, permanent armed force of 10 divisions, supported in wartime by a mobilized citizenry based on a territorial defense doctrine of resistance and organized in the Patriotic Guards.

Clearly, the Romanian Army’s primary requirement is to resist invasion and delay enemy occupation as long as possible—in essence, to buy time for the Patriotic Guards to mobilize and to establish themselves as resistance forces. The elite mountain troops are the centerpiece of these forces, and contemporary historical analysts note the role these forces played in World War I and World War II. Former Defense Minister Coman stressed their important role:

in the great attention paid to the cultivation of the knowledge to organize and carry through actions in mountainous terrain, at tactical
and strategic levels, a knowledge which is a priority demand for the specialized troops, the mountain guards, but should also be possessed ... if location requires it, by the Patriotic Guards.\textsuperscript{30}

Romania's shift in emphasis from armed forces designed to support offensive operations to one geared for territorial defense has increased the role of the Patriotic Guards, currently numbering some 900,000 troops. Established by Party Resolution in November 1956, the Patriotic Guards' functions were originally limited, consisting principally of providing support in heavy industrial areas.\textsuperscript{31} The 1972 Defense Law explicitly notes the growing responsibilities of all citizens. Article 2 specifically states:

The defense of the fatherland, of national sovereignty and independence, of its unity and territorial integrity, in the case of an armed aggression or of any other actions directed against the revolutionary conquests of the working people in the Socialist Republic of Romania, is a sacred duty of each Romanian citizen man or woman, regardless of nationality.\textsuperscript{32}

Also Articles 101 through 114 delineate the Patriotic Guards' growing responsibilities to defend the nation as: "representing a considerable force with a great fighting potential for defending the revolutionary gains of the people, the homeland's independence and sovereignty."\textsuperscript{33} Nicolae Ceausescu also has stressed that "the Patriotic Guards have permanently raised their level of training, and during tactical exercises in which they took part they proved to have a good combat training, political maturity, etc."\textsuperscript{34}

**ROLE WITHIN THE WARSAW PACT**

Romania keeps its participation in Warsaw Pact military actions to an absolute minimum. For example, Romanian forces do not take part in major Warsaw Pact field exercises. Also, Romania did not take part in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia; in fact, the invasion only accelerated Romania's defensive orientation. Since the November 1978 meeting of the Political Consultative Committee, Nicolae Ceausescu has publicly resisted Soviet calls for increased Warsaw Pact defense expenditures; he has consistently advocated eliminating both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Nonetheless, geopolitical realities force Romania to remain a member of the Warsaw Pact. To reconcile continued participation in the Pact with their emerging defense concepts, Romanians have adopted a very narrow interpretation of the Warsaw Treaty.
Romanian military officers continue to insist that they meet the full requirements for membership and reaffirmed this stand at the Twelfth Party Congress. However, Romania's objections frustrated Soviet efforts to expand the scope of the Warsaw Pact on its renewal in 1985. As a result, the Soviets let the renewal pass with minimal efforts to adapt the Treaty.

Article 4 of the Warsaw Treaty—the collective defense article—is the operative clause for Romanians:

In case of an armed attack in Europe on one or more of the Parties to the Treaty, in the exercise of its right to individual or collective self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations Organization, [the Parties] shall immediately, either individually or in agreement with other Parties to the Treaty, come to the assistance of the state or states attacked with all such means as it deems necessary, including armed force. The Parties to the Treaty shall immediately consult concerning the necessary measures to be taken by them jointly in order to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Measures taken on the basis of this article shall be reported to the Security Council in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations Organization. These measures shall be discontinued immediately [once] the Security Council adopts the necessary measures to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Romania's stress on this portion of the Treaty supports Bucharest's current emphasis on solely defensive operations. Romanian law prohibits using Romanian military forces outside her national borders. Ceausescu remains concerned that the Soviets might use the Warsaw Pact to intimidate Romania or even invade as was the case in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in 1981. Ion Coman makes these points strongly:

The principles underlying the alliances in which socialist Romania participates today exclude the preponderance of force as well as the inequality and inequity among the participants. ... The military assistance is asked for by the subject or the subjects which have suffered an armed aggression; it is not and cannot be imposed by the other partners; the extent and the ways of rendering help are established by common agreement among the interested States without any interference that would endanger national sovereignty.

The extent of Romanian commitment to this principle shows up dramatically in Bucharest's refusal to adhere to the "Statute of the United Armed Forces and Organs commanding them in times of War," signed by the Polish People's Republic in 1979/80 and
presumably by other members of the Warsaw Pact as well. This highly secret document legally ceded Polish command of her armed forces to the "Unique Highest Command in Chief" (in fact the Soviet High Command and its staff, the Soviet General Staff).37 However, according to Ryszard Kuklinski, the Romanians have not signed this document:

Romania has established in its constitution, without any ambiguities and insinuations, that the armed forces of the Romanian Socialist Republic are to be under national command both in times of peace and war, and the Romanian leadership has never diverged from this constitutional right. In spite of much pressure exercised on it within the framework of the Warsaw Pact, Romania has never signed any bi- or multilateral agreement which would have violated that right. In that way, the Socialist Republic of Romania, even though it is a member of the Warsaw Pact and has the same geopolitical conditions as Poland, has remained the exclusive disposer of its armed forces and its defensive potential.38

These actions demonstrate Ceausescu's firm commitment to keep Romania's participation in the Warsaw Pact to the absolute minimum.

In addition, Romania further demonstrates its independence through its widely publicized military exchanges with non-communist national forces. These exchanges include socialist and Third World nations, many of whom are courted in an effort to expand potentially lucrative military sales. Since the mid-1970s, Romania has expanded its contacts with NATO military leaders: from traditional allies such as France and Great Britain to mutual visits by senior US and Romanian military officials to Bucharest and Washington. While largely devoid of substantive results, these public actions are visible evidence of Romania's stated policy of taking advantage of the best worldwide advice to support its military requirements. Contacts have extended to ship visits to Constanta by the French, British, and the US navies; they have included exchanges of delegations and student visits to military schools and colleges in the West and the Third World.

ROMANIAN FORCES ABROAD

Because the Romanian constitution specifically prohibits the stationing of Romanian forces outside her national territory, none are currently assigned to other nations in the Warsaw Pact. In fact, the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) consciously limits the contact that Romanian officers have with other Warsaw Pact officers. In addition
to Romania's limited participation in Warsaw Pact field exercises since the early 1960s, the RCP has eliminated training/education in Soviet schools for the Romanian military. Unlike other Pact nations who routinely send their officers to the Voroshilov or Frunze Military Academies in Moscow for advanced training and General Staff orientation, the Romanians conduct military education entirely in national institutions, the highest of which is the General Military Academy in Bucharest. In 1970 Romania established the Center for the Study and Research of Military History and Theory to improve the regime's ability to support development of nationally based military education. Finally, Viata Militara, the organ of the Higher Political Council, frequently publishes articles on Romania's unique views on national defense.

In 1964 Nicolae Ceausescu reorganized the political control functions of the Romanian military. Because he had headed the Main Political Administration in the 1950s, he was certainly well aware to what extent the Soviets used these organs to both influence and vet senior Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact military officers. Ceausescu created a Higher Political Council, headed by LTG Gomiou until spring 1983 when he was replaced by the President's brother, Ilie Ceausescu.

No foreign forces have been stationed on Romanian territory since Soviet Army forces withdrew in 1958. Unlike East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, Soviet Groups of Forces are not stationed within Romania and she has successfully resisted all efforts to introduce such forces. Ceausescu knows well the impact such forces can have on domestic political developments.

**IMPACT OF FORCE STRUCTURE ON MOBILIZATION**

The Romanian Army is currently organized in 10 divisions: 2 tank and 8 motorized rifle divisions. In addition, Romania has three brigades of elite mountain troops. The total Army consists of 150,000 troops, the bulk of whom are conscripts. The Air Force is the second largest force with 32,000 men supporting 18 squadrons (6 fighter and 12 interceptor) and an air defense division. The Navy is the smallest force with only 7,500 men. It maintains several small craft for riverine type operations on the Danube; the major units are limited to three frigates, three escorts, and six aging OSA missile patrol boats. Romania's total force thus amounts to 189,500 personnel.
In addition, Romania maintains 900,000 Patriotic Guards, with an estimated 12,000 full-time support staff. A third category, the Youth Homeland Defense, consists of members of sports clubs and similar organizations which provide rudimentary skills—estimated at 650,000. Thus, Romania's total personnel strength available to support "all the peoples' defense" numbers 1.5 million; with the regular military, this means roughly 8 percent of the Romanian population, or 1 in every 12 citizens, is committed to national defense.40

The table (16.1) shows that the size of Romania's regular army has gradually decreased since 1966 when the army consisted of 13 divisions (200,000 men), to the current 10-division force (150,000). The Navy has remained consistent in size, while the Air Force's modest growth in personnel strength has come from increases in air defense forces. Overall, the manpower in the regular forces has dropped by roughly 37,000 during Ceausescu's tenure, a decrease of roughly 15 percent in the past 25 years.

In marked contrast, as figure 16.2 portrays, a dramatic growth has taken place in the size of the militia or Patriotic Guards. Prior to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, these forces were estimated at about 50,000. Following that action, the Patriotic Guards grew to an estimated 500,000 in 1971, and then to 900,000 in 1986—an 18-fold increase. According to the First Secretary, the Patriotic Guards, supported by a full-time staff of roughly 12,000, also participate fully in military training and exercise activities. In addition, the 650,000 Youth Homeland Defense Force provides manpower, with some degree of military training. However, the military effectiveness of these forces, and of the Patriotic Guards, appears uncertain because of the lack of extensive training and modern weapons. All these changes represent a RCP commitment to shift from prior military force structures compatible with Warsaw Pact allies to a force structure which emphasizes defensive operations and homeland defense.

The "all the peoples' defense" concept calls for the regular military units, particularly the mountain troops, to halt an invasion by conducting holding operations against superior enemy forces, while providing the Patriotic Guards time to mobilize. The Guards would then initiate harassing attacks on enemy lines of communication or attack isolated enemy military units which could be engaged at an advantage. Clearly, the numerous personnel who support the Patriotic
16.1—ROMANIAN MILITARY FORCES, 1966 TO 1986

1966

TOTAL: 256,000

REGULAR FORCES 76.7%
PATRIOTIC GUARDS 23.3%

1986

TOTAL: 1,748,000

REGULAR FORCES 11.4%
PATRIOTIC GUARDS 51.5%
YOUTH DEFENSE 37.2%


16.2—CHANGES IN ROMANIAN FORCE STRUCTURE, 1966 AND 1986
Guards demonstrates Romania's commitment to these types of operations. Their ability to execute these difficult operations effectively, though, remains to be tested militarily.

This defense concept is a major departure from Romania's force structure, mobilization, and employment patterns of the two World Wars. In both cases, Romanian forces structured their divisions to be consistent with both their allies and adversaries. Indeed, in World War II Romanian forces fought with Axis forces through the battle of Stalingrad and, following the 23 August 1944 coup, joined forces with the Red Army to march to Budapest.

The incorporation of Romanian forces into current Warsaw Pact operations in the Southwestern Theater of Military Operations would be very difficult. Although the two tank divisions and eight motorized rifle divisions are nominally organized to support combined operations, Romanian equipment, such as T-55 and T-34 tanks and similarly aging armored personnel carriers, would seriously degrade the Romanian units' offensive capabilities. The Romanian Navy possesses only a limited coastal defense capability, based upon an eclectic collection of domestic, Soviet, and Chinese-produced equipment. The Air Force, with its MIG-15/21 aircraft and a few MIG-23s, is probably the force most tightly integrated into Pact operations. The Romanian Air Force does participate in air defense exercises with its Warsaw Pact allies and serves as part of the air defense belt protecting the Soviet Union from air attack.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WARSAW PACT

The consequences of the RCP's emphasis on an "all the people's defense" are profound for Romania's role in the Warsaw Pact. This doctrine, while extensively grounded in Romanian analysis of historical experience, does not correspond with Soviet efforts to increasingly integrate non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces to support Soviet combined arms operations in the military theaters of operations opposite NATO. Even though Romania's active forces are organized to support such operations, their lack of training and modern equipment would make their value doubtful. Furthermore, the Romanian military mobilization process is designed to activate territorial defense units in the Patriotic Guards, not to provide replacement units for divisions depleted in offensive operations. This Romanian defensive posture means the Soviets cannot rely on Romanian forces to support extended combined arms operations in the Southwestern Theater of Military Operations.
Just as significant as incompatibilities in force structure and training is Romania's refusal to cede control of her national forces to the Warsaw Pact High Command (the Soviet High Command) in times of war or crisis. Romania's refusal to sign the United Armed Forces and Organs' Statute is a dramatic departure from the other Warsaw Pact states. The lack of contact between Soviet General Staff officers and their Romanian counterparts in training, education, or other activities further limits the use of Romanian forces for Soviet-style operations. Indeed, the Romanian situation reflects its own concern about a possible Soviet/Warsaw Pact invasion of Romanian territory or the posturing of such forces for political pressure.

Despite these limitations on the Romanian forces' ability to contribute to Warsaw Pact offensive operations, Bucharest does remain a Pact member, even if its participation has been minimal. In fact, the RCP carefully maintains minimal participation levels which apparently represent an acceptable, if not optimum, level of support in Moscow's eyes. Soviet willingness to accept this situation results principally from Romania's geostrategic position. Romania does not border any non-communist state and is positioned in a theater of military operations which is unlikely to be central to a NATO/Warsaw Pact war—an advantage clearly not enjoyed by either East Germany or Poland. Furthermore, the Romanian Air Force, probably the most significant force from the Soviet perspective, remains sufficiently integrated into the Pact air defense system. The Romanian Air Force can warn of a NATO air or cruise missile attack, and potentially reduce these forces as they pass over Romanian territory. The "peoples' defense" concept could even benefit Moscow should NATO forces seek to cross Romania. If Romanian defense forces were employed against invading NATO armies, NATO, dependent on very lengthy lines of communication, might be quite vulnerable.

In summary, the defense policies adopted by the RCP over the past 25 years have lessened Romania's contribution to the Warsaw Pact both politically and militarily. However, Romania's level of participation remains sufficient to meet Moscow's minimum requirements relating to defense of Soviet territory. Given Romania's geopolitical circumstances in an area of lesser strategic concern to Moscow, Bucharest should be able to maintain—but not greatly extend—the current delicate balance between Soviet pressures for greater military and political commitment to Pact objectives with her ongoing wish to minimize Soviet influence. While Nicolae
Ceausescu's efforts have enjoyed some success, the continuation of these efforts will likely depend less on Romania's military fortunes than on the character of his successor. In fact, failing economic and domestic policies appear to be raising prospects for a change of political leadership. While Moscow's ability to influence this change would not appear to be great, a more pro-Moscow First Secretary could reverse Ceausescu's 25-year effort to make Romania's military primarily forces for territorial defense. Still, even if a pro-Soviet leader appeared, Romania's current domestic difficulties would likely prohibit restructuring of her armed forces. Romania's doctrine, training, and equipment will undoubtedly continue to reflect her goals of self-defense rather than shift to offensive operations with her Warsaw Pact allies.

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Endnotes


8. Ibid., p. 112.


11. Ibid., p. 569.

12. Abbott and Thomas, p. 25. The Soviet view of the importance of the Romanian contributions in these campaigns is much more modest. In fact, the value of these forces is considerably downplayed, although the importance of the defection from the Axis side is duly noted. For a good discussion from the Soviet viewpoint see, G. Zhukov, *The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov* (New York: Delacorte Press 1971), pp. 521-549.


19. Ibid., p. 115.


22. Ceausescu, p. 46.
24. Ibid., p. 175.
25. Ibid., pp. 166-169.
27. Ceausescu, et al., p. 53.
28. Coman, p. 140.
32. Law 14/2 in JPRS 58017, p. 33.
33. Ibid., p. 74.
34. Coman, p. 245.
38. Ibid., p. 43.
40. Ibid.
At regular intervals, the Gallup Institute polls the Danes on their attitudes towards NATO membership and over the years a fairly solid majority favors membership. Nevertheless, during the last decade NATO allies have criticized Denmark for its unwillingness to share the burdens of the Alliance. One factor commonly cited is the comparatively very low percentage of GNP that Denmark allocates to its defense budget.

Such low defense expenditures result from recurring defense "settlements" among Danish political parties, which normally freeze defense expenditures near existing levels. These settlements reflect the political fact that defense expenditures are not highly politicized and that the majority of Danes do not support any growth in defense budgets. For example, in a recent poll 64 percent declared themselves against any growth in defense expenditures.

This contrast between Danish attitudes towards Alliance membership on the one hand and defense expenditures on the other, is rooted in the general background of Denmark's membership. The lessons of the German occupation during World War II and the onset
of the Cold War caused most Danes to realize it would be very
difficult for a small country with limited resources to muster credible
defense capabilities—capabilities that would make Denmark's neu-
trality respected if another major conflict erupted in Europe. Before
joining NATO in 1949, Denmark turned characteristically and ener-
getically toward a Scandinavian solution for its alliance needs.\(^4\) This
abortive attempt reflected Danish skepticism and that of the major
political party, the Social Democrats, towards superpower rivalry and
weaponry. Accordingly, since 1949 Danish security policies have
endeavored to keep Alliance and defense commitments at a low level
in both political and economic terms and to persist in explori\(\_\)ng how
Denmark might structure its security arrangements in a Nordic or
United Nations context.\(^5\)

Denmark's semi-alignment or quasi-neutralism reveals itself in
several decisions on defense matters.\(^6\) Denmark's membership in the
Alliance shows two fundamental, major reservations: the 1953 deci-
sion not to accept Allied forces permanently stationed on Danish ter-
ritory in peacetime,\(^7\) and the 1957 decision not to allow nuclear
warheads on Danish soil in peacetime. Despite these reservations,
serious political division about defense issues did not take place till
the early 1980s.\(^8\)

THE POLITICIZATION OF SECURITY AND DEFENSE ISSUES

Three different elements of this politicization are important.
First, the INF issue gave momentum to the anti-nuclear protest move-
ment, based partly on the fears of a nuclear holocaust and on a wide-
spread Danish mistrust of US strategic and global policies. The
immediate result was the growing enthusiasm among Danish Social
Democrats and leftist parties for a Nordic nuclear-free zone; conse-
quently, they often expressed consternation about possible Allied
infringements of the Danish ban on nuclear weapons in its territory
during peacetime.\(^9\)

Second, the issue of allied reinforcements came sharply into
focus during a Danish debate about the implications of the Rapid
Reinforcement Program and the program of US fighter reinforce-
ments (Co-located Operation Bases). The debate focused on the pre-
positioning of heavy US military equipment—a step which critics
saw as diminishing Danish independence and freedom to maneuver in
a crisis.\(^10\)

Third, the 1978 NATO decision, initially supported by Den-
mark, to require an annual three percent growth in members' defense
budgets set off a heated controversy in Denmark which heavily influenced the political debate over the 1982 defense settlement.\textsuperscript{11}

**THE THREE FOUNDATIONS OF DANISH DEFENSE**

Since the late 1970s, Allied reinforcements have played a significant role in Danish defense planning. The 1984 defense settlement stated that "the strength, composition, and endurance of the defense must be seen in close connection with the demands for secure reception of, sufficient logistical support for, and efficient cooperation with those possible reinforcements which are the consequence of SACEUR's reinforcement plan for Europe."\textsuperscript{12}

Apart from the Allied Mobile Force (AMF), considered mostly an instrument of crisis management, the major reinforcement possibilities for Denmark are: five US and three British fighter/fighter-bomber squadrons and a British infantry brigade of 13,000 men allocated to Denmark. Of the forces allocated to the Northern Region as a whole, some aircraft and 25,000 US marines could reinforce Denmark.\textsuperscript{13}

Despite these impressive figures, Denmark has no real assurance that the political and military conditions for reinforcements will be present, especially when SACEUR sets army priorities if war breaks out. Further, reinforcements from NATO will carry only limited heavy equipment.

Accordingly, the integration of Danish and West German planning and resources in the joint command for the Baltic Approaches (BALTAP) may well constitute a much more effective military guarantee for Denmark than mere Allied reinforcements.\textsuperscript{14} Remarkably enough, this situation does not arise at all in the Danish public debate, which instead seems to concentrate on the availability and problems of allied reinforcements and to neglect the formidable presence of the *Bundeswehr* in the Schleswig-Holstein area.\textsuperscript{15} In wartime, the West German forces number 175,000 men; this force equals the Danish wartime force including the Home Guard. In addition, the West German navy delivers 70 percent of BALTAP naval presence and 100 percent of the naval aircraft. The West German Air Force stationed in the area matches the total Danish airforce.

Allied reinforcements and cooperation with the *Bundeswehr* thus constitute two foundations for Denmark's defense. The third foundation, of course, is the composition and force levels of Denmark's own national defense.
The Army. The Danish army’s Standing Force consists of 4,000 regulars organized as cadre units for five mechanized brigades and one regimental combat team. Together with conscripts who have finished their six months of basic training, these units make up the core of the army’s combat force. The conscripts form the cadres for six additional regimental combat teams and eight battalions. During the first stage of a mobilization, in a matter of hours the Standing Force could be reinforced by the so-called augmentation force, comprised of 9,000 recently discharged conscripts who would fill out the mechanized brigades plus some additional companies of armored infantry. Known as the Covering Force, the reinforced Standing Force’s first main task would be to ensure the safety of complete Danish manpower mobilization and of the reception facilities for expected allied reinforcements.

Only 24 hours are required for fully mobilizing the 72,000-man Danish army; an additional 36 hours are necessary for the mobilized units to achieve full combat readiness. While this rapid time schedule can be justified on the basis of Denmark’s excellent communications, full combat readiness may be slowed down by the comparatively high age of the reservists.

After full mobilization, the Standing Force will have received another 9,000 men by adding supplementary personnel, companies and more battalions to the mechanized brigades. An additional 40,500 troops will fill out the Field Army’s brigades, combat groups, etc. Another 18,000 reserves are organized in so-called local defense forces, consisting, among other units, of eight infantry and three artillery battalions. Finally, Denmark’s army Home Guard musters approximately 70,000 men, organized in 540 companies and assigned local defense duties. Home Guard members keep their weapons and equipment at home and thus can be ready almost on one hour’s notice. Furthermore, the average age of the Home Guard is steadily being lowered, thus increasing its maneuverability and effectiveness. The number of Home Guard members with military training either as conscripts and/or as professionals is also increasing. However, this situation poses a planning problem because many Home Guard members will also be called up as reserves during mobilization, thus depleting their Home Guard companies.
After mobilization, the three mechanized brigades in Jutland will constitute the Jutland division which, in joint operation with the Bundeswehr, will take up positions in Schleswig-Holstein. The Jutland division has a strength of 20,000 men, with 200 tanks, 230 guns and mortars, and 425 anti-tank weapons. The rest of the army forces in Jutland (a regimental combat team and 13 battalions) will act as a mobile force to protect the reception areas and facilities for allied reinforcements. While the regimental combat team consists of 5,000 men, 47 tanks, 150 APCs, 58 guns and mortars, and 78 anti-tank weapons, the local defense brigades have 6,000 men, 68 guns and mortars, and 80 anti-tank weapons.

The forces on Zealand and the other major Danish islands consist of two mechanized brigades, five regimental combat teams, and nine battalions of the Field Army supported by one battalion and nine companies of local defense forces.

The standards of Danish army equipment varies considerably. While mechanized brigades of the Jutland division have 120 Leopard I tanks, the brigades in Zealand must do with 90 modernized Centurions. The mechanized infantry deploy in 650 M-113 APCs, supported by 68 M-106s with mortars.

The Navy. Even in peacetime, the Danish navy maintains a relatively high alert level in order to survey and contain Warsaw Pact naval activity in the area. Accordingly, Danish navy personnel are mainly professionals and have only a small percentage of conscripts. However, one result of the most recent defense settlement was to replace heavy navy units with lighter ones. The heavy units—the two frigates of the Peder Skram-class—were taken from active service and mothballed. If this trend toward lighter units continues, the peacetime navy will become even more professional and the wartime navy more dependent on reserves.

The navy has three frigates. Additional forces are 5 seagoing fishery protection vessels with Lynx helicopters; 5 coastal submarines; 16 fast attack craft; 6 minelayers; 3 minesweepers; and 22 patrol craft for surveillance. The navy's land force mans two coastal forts armed with 155 mm guns. While the present defense settlement sets up a modernization program for the weapons systems of the newer frigates and the submarines, a major innovation, evident in the building program, calls for 16 multi-purpose craft, the so-called Standard Flex.
In wartime the navy's highest priority is to mine the straits and
the beaches at the likely invasion approaches. In addition, the navy
has multiple tasks in the Baltic. Success, though, depends on suffi-
cient warning time to deploy naval units and on maintaining effective
cooperation with West Germany's navy and naval aircraft. Under
these circumstances—even though the Danish navy is shrinking—it is
believed it will be able to inflict considerable damage on its
opponents.

The Air Force. The Danish air force has 57 F-16s deployed in
d four squadrons for interceptor and fighter ground attack missions. It
also has 32 DRAKENs deployed in two squadrons: primary mission
fighter ground attack, secondary reconnaissance. In addition, the air
force controls eight air defense units, each with six I-HAWK
launchers, six anti-aircraft batteries with 40 mm guns, and six early
warning squadrons, of which one is placed on the Faroe Islands.

Danish air force personnel are almost fully professional, and
pilot training is of very high quality. However, during recent years
the air force has regularly lost some experienced pilots who prefer the
higher wages of the civilian airlines. Since air force policy does not
grant reserve status to former pilots who become civilian pilots, the
number of surplus pilots in the squadrons has been reduced.

THE MOBILIZATION FORCE

Several problems connected with the mobilization force still
exist. First, the reserve obligation has been gradually extended as a
result of the declining numbers of conscripts available. Hence, to
keep the wartime army forces at 72,000 men, Denmark must keep the
reserves in the mobilization force for a longer period. To what degree
these reserves, some of which are in the 30-40 year age-group, are
still credible reinforcements for combat units remains a serious ques-
tion.

Military arguments emphasize the need to strengthen the con-
script element in the armed forces—over an extended period of
time—to keep up the conscript level and to achieve the necessary
"freshening" of the mobilization force. Another aspect, of course, is
Denmark's maintaining a credible form of national service to foster
positive relations between its civilian and military population.

From a military point of view, a most welcome element of the
1984 defense settlement was to raise the number of army conscripts
to 6,800 by the end of 1987, with projected increases to 7,200 for 1988, and to 8,700 for 1989. However, if the coming defense settlement for 1988-1991 is based on a zero growth in budgets, then the price for more conscripts will have to be cuts in planned materiel investments.19

NATIONAL SERVICE IN DENMARK

When Denmark entered NATO in 1949, it readily accepted NATO's suggestions to establish a national service of 18 months and a standing force based on conscripts. Service was divided into two periods: 6 months for recruitment and training and 12 months' service in the standing force. During this early period practically all physically fit Danish males were drafted into the national service. The mobilization force was rapidly built up and was effectively renewed with fresh young cohorts. In addition, Denmark had one of the most cost-effective arrangements in NATO. Denmark demonstrated that given the right circumstances, a mobilization force is an inexpensive and rewarding investment.

However, Denmark did not keep the 18 months national service period for very long. Since 1954, a series of reductions in length of service and of recalls ensued. Instead, the military leadership focused its attention on trying to secure, at one and the same time, an adequate standing force and a relevant mobilization force. Finally in 1973, when the period of national service was reduced from 12 to 9 months, Denmark recognized that it was no longer possible to man a standing force comprised mainly of conscripts. The solution was to create a standing force comprised of professionals, supplemented with conscripts.

During the 1960s shrinking military budgets prevented the drafting of all eligible youth from the large year-groups of the World War II period. Accordingly, as selective drafting was introduced, national service became less and less universal. As with any system of selective drafting, considerable discontent spread among young Danes. As a result, Denmark introduced an adequate wage system for the conscripts which promised the equivalent of the minimum wage for a Danish worker. Thus, discontent disappeared and the conscript military steadily gave way to growing numbers of volunteer conscripts. By 1986 volunteers comprised 75 percent of the conscripts. Hopefully, there is an acceptable degree of identity between those who volunteer and those who are actually fit, in a broad sense, for military service.
Denmark's military includes some of the most expensive soldiers in the world, and any decision to expand the mobilization force will, therefore, mean a corresponding reduction in the quantity and quality of equipment.

**THE PROBLEMS OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES**

The level of Danish defense expenditures depends on a defense budget indexed to prices and wages. Such indexing constitutes a guard against inflation.\(^{20}\) Thus, Denmark's budgetary "straitjacket" of recurring defense settlements is offset by insuring that this budget is not the target of periodic cuts in public expenditures.

However, given the higher cost of the wages of military personnel, the percentage of the Danish defense budget available for investing in new equipment has, for several years, been significantly lower than in other NATO countries.\(^{21}\) Though the effect of this cutback is somewhat softened by well-established Danish expertise in maintenance and modernization programs, more immediate problems are the need to replace the Centurion tanks and the 155 mm howitzers, and to restock ammunition supplies. In addition, within a few years, Denmark will have to replace the DRAKEN aircraft.\(^{22}\) Prospects for the necessary increases in defense budgets, however, are slight.\(^{23}\) Accordingly, the problems of equipment modernization will grow at an increasing scale and Danish defense will pay the price of being behind the "technological inflation" curve. Lack of new equipment will become increasingly apparent during the coming years and will reinforce the political problems for Danish defense.\(^{24}\)

**HAS DANISH DEFENSE FALLEN BETWEEN TWO STOOLS?**

From the above description of the structure of present-day Danish defense forces, we see that the navy and the air force are predominantly professional with a relatively small number of conscripts. In contrast, the army has a more balanced relationship between professionals and conscripts. While the Standing Force is almost totally professional, the army's wartime strength can only be achieved through mobilizing large numbers of reserves. In principle, army reservists should be able to immediately take up their positions in their units.

However, during the past 10 years, the army's peacetime preparedness has steadily eroded. According to some military experts, the manning of the brigades has been reduced to such a low level that
their credibility as an emergency force is threatened. Accordingly, the implication for the army is that the operational Standing Force has been more or less abandoned in favor of a training structure whose main purpose is to produce wartime units.

Thus, we might well ask if the present Danish defense system is effective, or, to put the issue more provocatively: Has Denmark fallen between two stools by settling for a system with a small professional standing force and a large peacetime mobilization force (trained many years ago)?

During the past two to three years, the Danish defense debate has increasingly focused on this problem. Opposing viewpoints can be traced to differing perceptions of the military threat towards Denmark. 

A professional standing force (and perhaps even a more augmented one) should be the Danish priority if the major threat is perceived to be a Soviet surprise attack to secure control of the Danish straits and/or of the Jutland peninsula. From this worst-case scenario follows the strategy to make Danish defense forces capable of fending off an attack, without the need for a general mobilization. At the same time, high priority must go to securing sufficient Allied reinforcements. In sum, the argument is that only a well-stocked and professionally manned standing force will give the Danish army a sufficient degree of deterrence. In addition, if a high-level crisis preceded a Soviet attack, Denmark’s capacity for effective crisis-management depends heavily on the credibility of its standing force. Its deterrence capability, as Jeffrey Simon notes in Chapter 1, will be correspondingly reduced by the external and internal political effects of a wide-scale call-up or even partial mobilization.

The proponents of this argument emphasize Denmark’s need to consider a worst-case scenario. This preparation is based on Warsaw Pact capabilities for rapid offensive military actions against Denmark: the Pact build up of highly effective amphibious forces combined with aggressive maneuver patterns of aircraft and naval vessels would drastically reduce the warning time for Danish forces.

Another perception of the Soviet threat, though, is one where Denmark would likely get involved only after a major all-out Soviet attack on the Central Region. The implication of this scenario is that, given the scale of such an attack, the warning time (including escalation of the crisis) would be considerably longer. Hence, the
endurance capacity of Denmark’s defense forces would have to exceed that of the Standing Force, and even the Covering Force. Consequently, proponents of this scenario argue that credible Danish defense necessitates a much larger wartime mobilization force, even if the cost of such a mobilization reduces the professional element in the Standing Force. 29

During the last decade the Danish defense debate has tended to favor the former perception of the Soviet threat, rather than the latter. The traumatic effects of the German 9 April 1940 surprise attack on Denmark still remains prominent in the minds of political parties and voters.

This “Never Again a 9 April” sentiment underlies Danish membership in NATO and influences fundamental priorities in Danish defense planning. Within the defense establishment, it reflects the military’s natural tendency to plan for the worst possible case and the traditional interest of the air force and the navy in a high level of preparedness. 30 The escalating demands on today’s soldiers in respect to technological expertise increases such a trend. 31 On the other hand, during the 1980s, the unions, which organize Denmark’s professional soldiers, have become a very influential pressure group, especially in relation to the Social Democrats. 32

CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Danish defense planning demonstrates the need for timely decisions during a crisis period. Quite apart from the overriding importance of deciding to mobilize reservists, the Danes must decide when to mine Danish waters, and when to deploy forces early, especially the Jutland division into Schleswig-Holstein, and when to receive Allied reinforcements.

During the last decade the Danish defense establishment has paid considerable attention to problems of crisis management. 33 Warning is critical to crisis management, and, among other things, depends on deviations from the “normal pattern of activity.” Danish defense planners have become increasingly worried about the Warsaw Pact’s growing maritime and air surveillance in the Western part of the Baltic. The number of Warsaw Pact units performing navigational training in Danish waters has also increased significantly, including frequent circumnavigation of the Zealand group of islands. Pact amphibious exercises have gradually advanced westwards towards the beaches of the German Democratic Republic and naval
exercises usually now include major Pact units operating in the waters west of the island of Rugen. Furthermore, naval exercises, even if on a rather small scale, are now conducted in the Kattegat, the Skagerak, and the North Sea.

This more aggressive pattern, especially combined with the submarine incidents in Swedish coastal waters, naturally causes some apprehension in Danish military circles. One interpretation could be that the pattern is less indicative of a new risk of a Warsaw Pact surprise attack than of the possible risk of strong political pressure by military demonstration.

THE INSTITUTION OF DEFENSE SETTLEMENTS

Since 1960 Danish defense budgets have come from a continuous, if often fragile, coalition between three parties—the Social Democrats, the Conservatives, and the Liberals—which together decided in 1949 to join the NATO Alliance. Cooperation between the three parties (at times, even including a fourth, Radical Party) reveals itself in concluding so-called defense settlements which cover several fiscal years.\(^3\)\(^4\)

A central mechanism making such agreement possible is the process of indexing the defense budget, thus effectively removing the defense budget from the annual confrontations over the Finance Bill. These defense settlements have contributed to the depoliticizing of defense politics, and thus removed the issue of defense budgets from disputes over other aspects of security politics at discussion times.

The negative aspect of such defense settlements is that it focuses attention on defense inputs—on budgets and length of conscription, rather than on outputs, such as force strength figures and organization. In addition, Danish settlements have tended to be incremental as regards any changes in the budgetary status quo. As a result, the political defense debate often fails to focus on essential questions, such as the nature of the military threat against Denmark, the role of the Alliance, and the resulting functional priorities and tasks required of Danish defense forces.\(^3\)\(^5\)

THE COMING DEFENSE SETTLEMENT OF 1988

In March 1987, the Danish Chief of Defense presented a book to the Danish public, entitled The Role of Defense.\(^3\)\(^6\) The Danish Defense Command’s conclusions concerning the possibilities for the
Danish defense to fulfill its objectives were gloomy. The Chief of Defense notes that the defense forces' structure and endurance have become weakened; he emphasizes personnel problems, predicting a reduced capacity to train and organize the planned wartime force.

This book, of course, is timed to influence the ongoing political debate over the coming defense settlement for 1988 onwards. Viewed in this light, the book's influence is only slight, and every indication is that the Social Democrats will present the non-socialist government parties with a "take-it-or-leave-it" approach to a zero-growth defense settlement.

This position implies that the situation surrounding the negotiations on the settlement in 1984, which were concluded during considerable disputes over the INF issue, will likely repeat itself. The Social Democrats negotiated from a position of strength among the government parties and were able to put their traditional imprint on the 1984 settlement—especially in regard to the zero solution for the defense budgets and to the ceiling of their indexation. Moreover, the 1984 political discussions ventured into the issue of military priorities. The Social Democrats argued that the day of large surface vessels—like the two Danish frigates—and of submarines had passed; they also succeeded in phasing out the two frigates as part of the defense settlement.

Negotiations toward a new defense settlement have been difficult for several reasons: The present Danish minority government is a coalition of the Conservatives, Liberals, and two small partners—the Center Democrats and the Christian Peoples' Party. By tradition, the coalition parties favor NATO membership and call for stronger defense allotments from the Danish defense command and from NATO. However, the coalition government commands only 77 out of the 179 seats in the Folketing (parliament). As a result, it has had to base its economic and social policies on cooperation with the small Radical Liberal Party. But this party has firmly opposed the present government's nuclear weapons policies and its defense expenditures in general.

Therefore, in Danish politics, if the government coalition cannot compromise with the Social Democrats on defense settlement, it must face a majority in the Folketing. The Danish government cannot evade this political reality; in the bargaining process, the Social
Democrats will likely end up with a settlement very close to a zero solution with continuing indexation.

Because the Danish economy is in such dire straits, the government parties, as well as the Social Democrats, all seem to agree that any expanded public expenditure would be hazardous. Accordingly, higher defense budgets will only be established at the expense of budget cuts in social welfare programs, an alternative the Social Democrats strongly oppose. Hence, the government parties, including Social Democrats, do not feel they can increase the defense budget, especially not during ostensible detente between the United States and USSR.38

Furthermore, in late 1986 the Social Democrats published a discussion paper on defense, obviously intended to serve as the party platform in the impending negotiations for a new defense settlement. This controversial paper reflected both the Social Democrats' critical attitude toward planning for forward defense in the Baltic and even in the Schleswig-Holstein area, and also the Social Democrats' growing enthusiasm for a non-offensive defense.39 In sum, this enthusiasm implies an overall disaffection with the modernization programs which some government parties and the defense establishment advocate.

FUTURE TRENDS

The Danish foreign minister reacted to the November 1987 INF agreement by calling for a strengthening of Western European conventional defenses and by reaffirming his government's policy to raise the defense budget in the coming defense settlement. Little indication exists, however, that recent INF developments will cause the Danish Social Democrats and the parties to the left to bolster Denmark's contribution to Western Europe's conventional defense.

At the same time, one can observe Danish politicians across the spectrum becoming increasingly enthusiastic about closer Western European cooperation in defense.40 The moment of truth could be at hand for Danish politicians. They just might realize that the price for joining a defense cooperation dominated by the French, the West Germans, and the British (whether it be in the shape of a "militarized" European Political Community or the "revitalized" Western European Union) may well be an increased defense budget. Such increases could far exceed the price demanded by NATO and the Americans.
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Endnotes


2. In an address in 1986 the US ambassador to Denmark, Terence Todman, said: “Another Danish attitude which provides little comfort to its NATO allies is the apparent unwillingness to carry a fair share of the defense burden ... nearly all its allies spend more, as a percentage of GNP, to maintain their NATO commitment than Denmark does ... One must wonder whether Denmark would feel as secure as it does if its allies had spent as small a portion of their wealth on defense in recent years as has Denmark.” *The Effect of Danish Attitudes on NATO and the US*, address by Terence A. Todman, US Ambassador to Denmark, to the Strategic Study Group of the Danish Foreign Policy Society, Copenhagen, US Embassy, n.d.

When the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Uffe Elleman Jensen, visited Washington in July 1987, he was told by members of the two Foreign Relations Committees of Congress that Denmark’s contribution to NATO’s defense was “conspicuously low,” see *Jyllandsposten*, 17 July 1987.


15. In 1984 the Danish government asked a committee of senior civil servants to produce a white paper on Danish security problems. The hope of the government was that this paper could form the basis for a reestablishment of the traditional security policy consensus between the government parties and the Social Democrats. The government probably failed in this ambition in as far as the so-called “Dyvig Report” (named after the chairman of the committee, the permanent undersecretary of the ministry for foreign affairs, Peter Dyvig) is still being considered in a parliamentary committee in the Folketing. However, it is significant that in the Dyvig report only 10 pages are devoted to the discussion of the concrete problems of Danish defense planning and priorities. These 10 pages devote a single paragraph to BALTAP and the rest of the discussion centers on the issue of reinforcements. See Denmark’s Security Policy Situation in the 1980s (Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1984), (The Dyvig Report).


20. See the response of the Danish defense minister, Poul Sogaard, to the two letters which the US minister of defense, Harold Brown, sent him in April 1980. In the face of Harold Brown's critique of Danish defense expenditures, Poul Sogaard emphasized indexation, the internationally high level of Danish development aid, which seen in a broader perspective also contributed to Western security, and finally his government's general wish to further détente and refrain from fueling the arm's race. For the texts of these letters see Christian Thune, ed., Dansk Udenrigspolitis Arkog 1980 (Copenhagen: Dansk Udenrigspolitis Institut 1981), pp. 261-265.


23. Senior members of the defense establishment have during 1987 used the media for repeated warnings as to what they perceive as the dismal fate of the credibility of Danish defense if the needs for replacement of obsolete material is not met.


26. For a general outline of the threat picture, see Warsaw Pact Aggression Possibilities Against Denmark (Copenhagen: Danish Defense Intelligence Service, 1983), p. 15.

27. Hagen, Militært Tidsskrift, op. cit.

28. The defense spokesman of the Social Democrats, Mr. Knud Damgaard, stated in an interview in December 1986 that "the primary task for a defense force is crisis management and in this context, the standing force, i.e. the force which can be applied without mobilization, is of decisive importance," see INFORMATION, 24
December 1986. In the Social Democratic party proposal for the modernization of Danish defense, mobilization is termed "an alarming escalation," see Socialdemokratiets forslag til modernisering af forsvar, Copenhagen, May 1987.


30. For an interesting analysis of the diverging perspectives of the three services, see Michael M. Clemmensen, Vaernskulturne og forsvars-politikken (Arhus: Forlaget Politica, 1986), p. 75.

31. See Lt.Colonel J.B. Crentzien, "Illusioner eller effekt" in Militaert Tidsskrift.

32. See Michael M. Clemmensen in Weekendavisen (September 1987).


35. This characterization can be illustrated by the lengthy debate on expenditures for defense in the Folketing on 17 March 1987, see Forsryk til Folketingets forhandlinger (Copenhagen: Schultz Forlag, 1987), spalte 8947-9015.


38. It is significant that during the campaign preceding the general election in September 1987 defense was not an issue at all.

39. The Social Democratic paper describes non-defensive defense as "a non-threatening defensive defense structure, which by its composition demonstrates peaceful, non-offensive intentions, and which at the same time is able—in cooperation with other nations—to inflict such losses on an aggressor in and from its own area of sovereignty that an aggression cannot be assumed on beforehand to lead to a successful result for the aggressor," Here cited from the translation of Nikolaj Petersen in Denmark and NATO 1949-1987, p. 41. See also Karsten Ole Knudsen & Peter Michael Nielsen, "Denmark: The recent Danish Defense Agreement and Attitudes to Non-Offensive Defense," in Non-Offensive Defense, no. 1 (Copenhagen: August 1985), pp. 6-10.

Even before Norway became united as one kingdom, a main task was to protect it, primarily against the Danish king. Hakon Adelsteinsfostre (circa 920-960) made a law for a country-wide defense (the so-called "leidang") against attack from the sea. The coastal districts from northernmost Norway in Halogaland to the estuary of the Gota River (in what is now Sweden), and as far inland as the salmon went up river, was divided into about 300 "skipreder." The people in each "skipred" had to provide a long ship with from 20 to 25 "sesser" for two oarsmen with one oar each. For immediate defense the King could call-up full "leidang," but if he had to keep the men under arms for more than three months, he had to get the people’s consent. For raids across the sea, the king could only call up half "leidang" (probably one of the earliest examples of European arms control.)

Frequent attacks from outside invaders required Norwegian innovation. In old Norway, the "leidang" was the most important state institution under the king’s authority and it became very important for maintaining the Norse state over the next 400 years. In addition to the "leidang," the king also had his "hird," as well as
the warriors which his officials had to maintain. The old system of
general call-up (“folkeoppbud”) was maintained, and according to
the saga, the call-to-arms raced from the southernmost cairn to the
northernmost “tinglag” in Hålogaland in seven days. This alarm
meant that both free men and slaves had to meet within five nights at
designated places and remain under arms until five nights after the
enemy had been driven away. Another way to warn about an enemy
attack was to send a war arrow or a (“budstikke”) from neighbor to
neighbor. The arrow was burnt in one end, and provided with a
willow or piece of rope in the other end as a sign of the punishment
for those who did not follow the call to arms.

After this medieval saga period, conditions in Norway and the
neighboring countries became more stable, and occasions for taking
out the “leidang” became less frequent. In 1429 for the last time a
large Norwegian fleet went to sea and suffered a decisive defeat from
German pirates. Even before this the “leidang”-duty had been
replaced by a tax, the origin of ordinary state income in Norway. The
requirement for defense—more in line with the general demands of
the time and providing a better land defense against Sweden, can be
found in Magnus Lagaboter’s law of the land from the 1270s. This
law put greater emphasis on the “hird” and the warriors in order to
provide effective army formations with a nucleus of armored horse-
men. However, conditions did not favor knights in Norway, and the
“hird” disappeared towards the time of the Kalmar union of the
three Nordic states in 1397. Soon afterward, there was neither a fleet
nor an army left to protect Norway. As a result, the Danish King
Christian III was able to capture the crown of Norway with only a
few small mercenary units.

The disbanding of an organized defense structure was one reason
for the sometimes arbitrary behavior of the Hanseatic tradesmen in
Norway and also why the country eventually fell under Danish domi-
nation. A prominent Norwegian historian has concluded that, “From
a state point of view, the military dissolution was undoubtedly a main
cause in the decline of the old Norse state.”

Wars and Union With Sweden. Wars with Sweden in 1563-
1570 and 1611-1613 convinced the king that Norway could no longer
remain defenseless. Because of the long border with Sweden, King
Christian IV in 1628 established a conscripted Norwegian army,
based upon the so-called “legd” system Norse defense structure
comprised conscripted forces (the “legd” army, primarily drawn
from the farmer population), a small number of regular soldiers, and
fortresses and citizen militia in the towns. The Baltic Sea was the pri-
mary area of naval operations; the maritime defense rested chiefly
with the joint Danish-Norwegian fleet based in Copenhagen.

Between 1600 and 1700 wars among Denmark, Norway, and
Sweden were mainly about sovereignty in the Nordic area in general,
but they also concerned vital Norwegian interests. A superior Sweden
would naturally constitute a greater threat against Norway's national
existence, than Denmark's. In the 1643-45 war, the new Norwegian
army had its baptism of fire and, in spite of many shortcomings,
managed to keep the country free from the enemy. Although the Nor-
wegians gained confidence in their own strength, in subsequent con-
flicts Norway lost its former possessions in Bohuslan, Jämtland, and
Härjedalen in Sweden.

In 1807 Napoleon and the Russian Tsar joined forces and made
plans to block England's trade with the European mainland. Follow-
ing a British surprise naval attack on Copenhagen (resulting in the
conquest of the joint Danish-Norwegian fleet), the Danish-Norwegian
authorities sided with Napoleon. This led to war with England, and
then with Sweden in 1808. The Napoleonic wars gave strong evi-
dence of the will and the ability of the Norwegian peoples' common
effort in time of danger.

**Full Independence, 1905.** By the 1814 Treaty of Kiel, Denmark
ceded Norway to Sweden. When the news reached Norway, the
Danish governor immediately ordered full mobilization. During the
cold winter, units marched on foot or on skis from all parts of the
eastern region to their billeting areas where they joined the soldiers
from western and southern Norway who had been on border guard
since the autumn of 1813. The Swedes wanted to seize Norway
immediately, but their politicians and generals respected the Nor-
wegian forces. Recalling their defeats in 1808, the Swedes also feared
a popular uprising and guerrilla warfare in the Norwegian mountains
(similar to the Spanish campaign against Napoleon after 1808).
Because Swedish King Carl Johan considered his reserve army too
weak to attack Norway, the Norwegian constitutional assembly at
Eidsvold could complete its work. Norway's independence was again
endangered when Carl Johan returned to Sweden wanting to make
himself master in Norway. Negotiations failed when the governor of
Norway refused the Swedish demand to occupy the two fortresses of
Fredriksten and Fredrikstad. The Norwegian army faced east with
about 26,000 men, while the Swedish army of 45,000 men came from the south, closely supported by a superior navy. A union with Sweden could not be avoided, and when the fortress in Fredrikstad fell the governor took steps to make peace.

A Norwegian condition for union with Sweden was that Norway would maintain its own national defense. However, the Norwegian economy was in poor shape, and drastic reductions in the military resulted. Subsequently, however, Norway realized it could protect itself against Swedish infringements. Hence, between 1895-1905 Norway initiated a significant rearmament program for its army and navy to prepare for dissolving the union with Sweden. Military preparations included increased exercises and maritime readiness in the Oslo fjord and enforced construction of the border fortresses. Army basic training was prolonged indefinitely; the fortresses' garrisons were increased and also covering forces enhanced. The Norwegians established guard posts along the border and prepared to blow up bridges on major roads leading from the east.

During final negotiations in Karlstad, a critical situation arose when the Swedes concentrated forces close to the border and to the Oslo fjord. Norway increased its readiness: several army units prolonged their exercises and other formations mobilized. In the eastern districts near the border about 18,000 men were under arms and about 4,000 men were deployed in Trondelag along the approaches from the east. The navy was fully mobilized with about 50 ships.

When the decisive phase was reached in the negotiations, the military forces contributed toward achieving the political aims. Despite the Norwegian unilateral decision on 7 June 1905 to dissolve the union, no armed conflict developed because Swedish public opinion did not favor upholding the union by military force. Thus, Norway achieved full independence without an armed conflict, but only because of the military power supporting the Norwegian political demands. Afterwards, the Norwegian prime minister stated, "If the Government had not fully trusted the will of the Norwegian people to defend their rights, it would never have gone to this step."

The Neutral Ally, 1914-1918. Norway maintained its neutrality through World War I (1914-18) because plans for protecting that neutrality were implemented without delay when the war broke out. The navy, which included 4 armored artillery ships, 2 monitors, 4 submarines, nearly 50 torpedo and gunboats, 7 minelayers and a number of...
auxiliaries, went on full wartime status. The coastal defenses had a somewhat reduced mobilization strength, and the army provided covering forces.

The European powers respected Norway's neutrality as long as Norway showed a reasonable capability to deny either side the use of Norwegian territory in violation of international law. At the end of the war, the Norwegian prime minister stated, "Our experience shows that had not the defense of neutrality been in order, then Norway would now have been involved in the war, and been the theater for the war among the warfighting major powers."

**Surprise Attack and Occupation, 1940.** In 1939 the strategic importance of Norway's geographic location was much the same as during World War I. However, plans for defense measures assumed only that Norway's neutrality could be randomly violated, and not deliberately breached or attacked. When World War II broke out, naval and coastal artillery mobilization had to take place in steps because of a shortage of trained personnel and the poor state of the equipment.

The mobilization, put into effect to protect Norwegian neutrality, included the navy with 2 armored artillery ships, 7 destroyers, 17 torpedo boats, 9 submarines, 10 minelayers, and 8 minesweepers as well as some patrol vessels. Of the 60 ships, more than 40 dated from the 1874-1918 period, and only 5 were considered modern in 1939. In addition, the coastal fortresses were only partly manned, and the minefields were not laid as in World War I. The army mobilized four infantry battalions and some smaller units in South Norway. The anti-aircraft artillery mobilized fully, and with later additions, the total strength in South Norway reached about 7,000 men. In North Norway the defenses were strengthened to about 7,000 men after the Soviet attack on Finland; some 3,000 troops were deployed in the east opposite Finland and the Soviet Union.

Although both sides declared they would respect Norwegian neutrality as long as it was maintained effectively, British and German aircraft and naval ships frequently violated Norwegian neutrality. Norwegian protests failed to prevent the increasing activity and deliberate violations of its territorial waters. The Germans, interested in obtaining bases for submarines and for air attacks against Great Britain and in blockading iron ore shipments from Sweden, launched a surprise attack on both Denmark and Norway on 9 April 1940.
Even the Germans themselves considered the attack on Norway a risky enterprise, and the German assumption of low Norwegian military readiness was a precondition for launching the surprise attack. As it turned out, Norwegian forces, in spite of many deficiencies, held out until allied forces came to their aid. The Norwegian and allied forces’ successful operations in North Norway, including the recapture of Narvik, buoyed Norwegian self-respect and also meant much to the subsequent resistance against the German occupation. After the allied expeditionary forces withdrew from Norway because of the German attack on the Low Countries and France in May 1940, Norwegian forces in North Norway had to capitulate. However, the Norwegian government, with army and navy elements, continued the war from Great Britain.

An important lesson learned from World War II was that the Norwegian armed forces did not have the political and military resolve to deter and, if necessary defend against a deliberate attack on Norwegian territory. When the attack eventually took place, the responsible politicians failed to give clear and deliberate orders to resist the aggression. Instead of full mobilization, Norway mobilized only about 50,000 men from a total of 119,000 men available. Considerable confusion ensued in the initial phase after the attack. The lack of orders and of sufficient delegation of authority to local commanders and military officers hampered the efficient use of the military assets available. Finally, another important lesson was that Norway’s allies had to prepare and train in advance in order to arrive in time and become effective. Consequently, the restructuring of Norwegian foreign and defense policy after the war has made use of the bitter lessons of 1940.

THE ROLE OF FORCE MOBILIZATION TODAY

Background. After World War II, Norway gave defense a higher priority. From 1946 to 1949 defense expenditures increased three to four times in fixed prices compared with the three last years before the war. At the end of the 1930s initial military service had been extended from 72 to 84 days. In the reconstruction period after World War II, Norway introduced 9 to 12 months military service, and large numbers of volunteers joined the recently established Home Guard. The lessons of 9 April 1940 played an important part. A public opinion poll in 1946 showed that 69 percent of the population wished Norway to build up a strong defense; today this percentage has increased to 83 percent.
Initially, there was a discussion about the general principles to follow in reconstruction of the armed forces and about the length and requirement for training of mobilization forces. The military chiefs wanted to establish an immediate broad basis of mobilization forces to be trained as units, thus giving all new conscripts a relatively short period of initial military service. However, the defense minister, who headed the underground military organization in Norway during the war, believed that the lessons of the 1940 campaign called for longer and more professional military training. He wanted the new intakes of conscripts to receive longer and more thorough military training, and the older available intakes to have shorter refresher training, and then be used in the Home Guard and local defense units. The Norwegian parliament approved this approach.

After 1947 Norway contributed a brigade to the British occupation zone in Germany. This move led to more effective training and also a more rapid build-up of the mobilization cadres in Norway. The Defense Commission of 1946, which produced its recommendations in 1949 (just in time to include Norway’s entry into the Atlantic Alliance in its deliberations), outlined many concepts that have since become the basis for structuring Norway’s defense forces.

The North Korean attack in June 1950 resulted in the integrated military organization of NATO, including the U.S.-Canadian Mutual Defense Assistance Program which had a significant impact on the build-up of the Norwegian defense forces. In the spring of 1950, the Norwegian defense minister tried to establish an allied covering force in Schleswig-Holstein, comprising British, Danish, and Norwegian brigade components. However, this plan failed, and after the new Allied Command Europe was set up on 1 April 1951, new requirements were created for Norway’s defense efforts. The defense posture for the Alliance, agreed at the ministerial meeting in Lisbon in 1952, recommended the establishment of two standing brigades in Norway: one in North Norway and one in South Norway.

The Norwegian defense structure of the 1950s and 1960s consequently combined the traditional Norwegian system of mobilization forces based on general conscription with the allied preference for maintaining standing forces in areas which were considered exposed. Standing forces would provide the immediate reaction and defense in case of a surprise attack, making it possible to mobilize the full potential of the country. Mobilization forces were to provide the bulk of the defense capacity, making a sustained defense of Norway’s
strategically most important areas possible. Taking into account the huge size of Norway’s territory, a large, adequately trained and equipped mobilization force was absolutely essential.

With the introduction of NATO’s new strategic concept in MC 14/3 and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, NATO put more emphasis on dealing with a variety of contingencies on the flanks. Increased attention to deterrence—and, if need be, the countering of a conventional attack against strategically important areas in North Norway—also led Norway to emphasize rapid reinforcement of North Norway using national and allied reinforcements.

This development emphasized the interdependence of North and South Norway. First, North Norway, located next to the Soviet Union and the large base complex on the Kola peninsula, has a very low population density (only 10 percent of Norway’s total population). Thus, North Norway depends upon standing forces and reinforcements from national and allied forces. Second, South Norway is protected by the allied forward defense in Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark, and by the strong Swedish defense which aims to prevent any of the parties in a conflict from using its territory. With the Swedish defense as “back cover” it is possible for Norway to concentrate more of its limited forces to deter an attack on the most exposed part of the country in the North.

The Mobilization System. Obviously, mobilization plays an important role in Norway’s force structure, particularly in the army, the coastal artillery in the navy, and the anti-aircraft artillery in the air force. Service obligation presently requires 12 months initial military service, divided into basic military training, specialist training for occupational jobs, and service with standing units. The Norwegian military must then serve in mobilization units until the age of 44. During this time, each soldier may have to complete up to four refresher training periods of 21 days with field units and two refresher training periods of 12 days with local defense units.

The mobilization system is highly decentralized. After initial military service, each man is assigned to his mobilization unit. Arms, ammunition, and equipment are stored in company-level mobilization depots, located centrally in areas where personnel actually live. Furthermore, arms, equipment, and military vehicles are marked for each subunit and individual soldier. Officers and NCOs, plus members of the Home Guard, have their personal weapons, ammunition, uniforms, and equipment at home. Officers and key personnel are
specially trained in the procedures for rapid issue of equipment and the activating of mobilization units.

Experience from exercises and special mobilization tests show that the following mobilization times are realistic:

1. Call-up (by radio and pre-posted mail), travel to mobilization depot, issue of individual and unit equipment and military vehicles at company level... 6-12 hours

2. Forming up, establishing command and control, ready to move at battalion level... 12-24 hours

3. Ready to move at brigade level... 36 hours

The Home Guard units are organized in sections and platoons which can be mobilized in two to six hours to protect and help mobilize the field units and local defense forces. In addition, they will prevent or delay an enemy advance through their own and neighboring areas and take part in local defense throughout the different phases of operations.

The peacetime strength of the total Norwegian military forces is 35,100 men, including 22,800 conscripts, and about 11,000 civilians. However, it is more meaningful to consider the forces that Norway can generate by mobilization and the time factors involved.

As the table (18.1) indicates the total strength of the armed forces (excluding civil defense and security forces) can be increased from about 34,500 (plus about 11,000 civilians) in peacetime to about 380,000 within 36 hours. In sum, the peacetime strength of Norway's armed forces can be increased elevenfold. In effect, 9.4 percent of the population can be mobilized in military units which have been trained and equipped for their specific tasks—probably the highest mobilization percentage of any NATO country!

Recent tests confirm that mobilization forces are effective: 60 hours after the mobilization order was broadcast on the radio, one infantry battalion from South Norway was ready in its GDP-position in North Norway after having received all equipment, tested fire and corrected sights on all personal weapons, traveled 90 km by road, 1,000 km by air, and 120 km by road again; and taken over heavy equipment and vehicles which were pre-positioned in North Norway.

The difference in cost between mobilization and standing forces is also significant. Regarding capital costs, mobilization forces do not
need peacetime camps. These forces are designated to defend Norway's territory and function inside the total defense concept. All available resources (military as well as civilian) are put at the disposal of the defense effort; common-user vehicles and engineering equipment are pre-requisitioned for the mobilization units. This coordination reduces the equipment costs of the mobilization forces significantly. As regards personnel, the regular cadre averages about 10 percent of the war establishment of officers and NCOs. Mobilization battalion training costs amount to about 10 percent compared to those for a standing battalion. Within current defense budget levels, Norway can maintain a significantly greater level of combat forces by means of the mobilization system than would otherwise be possible.

The Norwegian system of general conscription and national service for all able men makes it possible to maintain both standing and mobilization forces with a high degree of utilization of the available personnel and training. Each conscript is in fact used "twice": first, at the age of 18-19 for basic training and service with standing units during the initial military service; second, in a corresponding job and unit in the mobilization forces up until the age of 44.

**FORCE STRUCTURE**

*Size and Composition.* The current defense program for 1984-88 provides the basis for the size and composition of the force structure.

**18.1—NORWEGIAN FORCE GENERATION**

*Peacetime and D-day Forces*

Headquarters, logistical units and personnel undergoing basic training ........................................ 17,900

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>3,900</td>
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</table>

Standing Forces ........................................ 16,600

<table>
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<th>Service</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>5,600</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*Mobilization Forces, M+36 Hours* ................................ 284,000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Number</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>27,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Guard</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Trained Reserve For Mobilization Units ................. 60,000

(All Services) .................................. 378,500 (Total)
While major changes—which have taken place over time—are explained in comments following each of the services, a long-term prognosis, to the year 2000, comes later in the chapter.

**Army**

13 brigades:
- 1 standing brigade type 90, armor reinforced
- 2 mobilization brigades type 90, armor reinforced
- 10 mobilization brigades type 78
- 1 standing battalion group, type 90 standard
- 2 standing infantry battalions, 1 of standard 90
- 6 mobilization infantry battalions, 78 standard
- 3-4 separate field artillery battalions
- 22 local defense battalions
- higher headquarters and logistical support

The more important changes have been the gradual increase of standing units in the army and the greater concentration of standing forces toward North Norway. The standing brigade in South Norway was never fully manned and has subsequently been further reduced. Consequently, only small standing units of the army serve in South Norway. Also, the number of mobilization brigades has been increased to 12, thanks to the new Brigade V in the Bergen area. Considerable modernization is occurring in both standing and mobilization units. However, budgetary constraints are causing differences in the level of fire power, mobility, and armor protection in the various types of brigades.

**Navy**

74 combatants:
- 5 frigates, *Oslo*-class*
- 2 corvettes, *Sleipner*-class*
- 13 submarines, *Kobben*-class*
- 19 gun boats, *Storm*-class*
- 6 missile-torpedo boats, *Snogg*-class
- 14 missile-torpedo boats, *Hauk*-class
- 2 minelayers, *Vidar*-class
- 1 mine maintenance ship, *KNM Borgen* *
- 9 minesweepers, *Sauda*-class*
- 1 mine countermeasure ship, *KNM Tana* *
- 1 prototype MCM ship
1 depot ship, KNM Horten
5 LST, Reinoysund-class
2 LST, Kvalsund-class*
35 coastal artillery forts, torpedo batteries and controlled
minefields, including 3 new 120 mm coastal artillery forts
coastal radar stations
headquarters and logistical support

The 1960 Fleet Plan significantly increased the number of com-
bat ships. As a result, a need now exists to extensively modernize
and replace ships procured either before or under the 1960 plan (those
indicated with an asterisk above). Norway has decided to build six
new ULA-class submarines, to modernize six Kobben-class sub-
marines, and to build 10 new minesweepers. Modernization of the
coastal artillery with 120mm rapid firing turret guns has taken place
at one fort in Trøndelag and in two North Norway forts.

**Air Force**

4 squadrons air defense fighters, 67 F-16
1 squadron fighter-bomber, 16 F-5
1 squadron maritime patrol aircraft, 7 P-3Bs (including 2 for
cost guard duties)
1 squadron transport aircraft, 6 C-130
2 helicopter squadrons, 28 UH-1B
1 squadron rescue helicopters, 10 Sea King
1 squadron coast guard helicopters, 6 Sea Lynx
3 Falcon ECM aircraft, 4 DH-6 liaison aircraft
1 Nike battalion, with 2 standing and 2 mobilization anti-air-
craft missile batteries
4 anti-aircraft battalions, each with 1 standing 40mm battery at
airfields
30 anti-aircraft batteries, 40 mm and 20 mm on mobilization status
control and warning system, air stations, logistical support

The number of combat aircraft and fighter squadrons were
reduced as a result of converting to F-5s in the 1960s and to F-16s in
the 1980s. At the height of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program
in the late 1950s the air force had six squadrons and more than 200
F-84Gs, and later, 192 F-86Ks. However, the new generations of
aircraft are considerably more effective in maneuverability, combat
range, and weapons load. Currently, Norway has programs to buy 14
new 412 SP helicopters to replace UH-1Bs, and to buy 4 new P-3C
Orions to replace 5 of the present P-3Bs. The introduction of six Norwegian Adapted Hawk (NOAH) anti-aircraft missile batteries will be completed in 1988 (on four airfields in North Norway and two in Trøndelag). Replacement of the Nike batteries at the end of their useful lifespan is still an open issue. The control and warning system is being modernized and provided with silo-protected radars.

**Home Guard**

Total peacetime strength: About 90,000
Mobilization strength: 80,000

- 18 Home Guard districts
- 512 Home Guard areas

**Naval Home Guard:**
- 12 motor torpedo boats
- 390 armed Home Guard cutters

**Air Force Home Guard:**
- 2 anti-aircraft batteries, 40 mm-20 mm
- 3 anti-aircraft battalions, 40 mm-20 mm

Over time, the size and organization of the Home Guard has stabilized at the present level. Original large volunteer recruitment has largely given way to allocated conscripts who have completed their initial military service in the Army. While this situation has increased the standard of training, the Home Guard has also received modern antitank weapons and better equipment.

**Relationship of Active to Reserve Forces.** Except for an overall increase in both components the relationship of active to mobilization forces in the total force structure has not significantly changed since the start of the military build-up in the early 1950s. Furthermore, the increased Soviet threat and the implementation of NATO’s strategic concepts of forward defense and flexible response have led Norway to concentrate its standing forces in the north, resulting in increased reliance on mobilization forces in the south.

**Relationship of Volunteers to Conscripts.** The peacetime force structure includes the following main categories of personnel:

- Officers and NCOs .................................. 12,087
- Civilians ........................................... 11,480
- Conscripts ......................................... 23,000
- Regular soldiers (volunteers) ................. 1,178
The number of regular soldiers (with three-year contracts) remains very low, due mainly to a conscript system based on mandatory military service for all able men. Norway finds it necessary to professionally train NCOs and officers, particularly the junior ranks, for more highly specialized tasks, because the initial period of military training is short. Finally, in the permanent establishments, civilian employees perform many of the common and professional tasks. Defense civilians are bound by their contractual obligations to remain in their jobs, and, if necessary, to move with their units in case of mobilization and war.

This force composition, as regards personnel categories, is also designed to operate within Norway itself, and is based on the Norwegian concept of total defense. Thus, both civilian and military resources are integrated to provide maximum contribution to the common defense effort.

**USE IN MILITARY OPERATIONS**

**Out-of-Area Operations.** The Norwegian conscription laws state that only the so-called “line” year-classes (conscripts in the age-group between 19 and 35), may be used outside Norwegian borders. This constraint is probably a left-over from the old “leidang” system where the king could only call-up half of the force for excursions outside the country. The Norwegian parliament also used this regulation in the conscription laws when Norway was in a union with Sweden to prevent Norwegian units being taken out of the country and put under Swedish command. For this reason, Norwegian politicians sought to reduce the size of the “line” forces and instead to increase the “land storm” forces composed of older conscript classes.

In more recent times, Norwegian forces participated in World War II outside the country—particularly the navy and the merchant fleet, which participated in most of the theaters of operations even though Norway was not formally at war with Italy and Japan. After the war, Norway took part in the allied occupation of Germany with a brigade in the British zone. In 1951, the brigade came under allied command with the establishment of Allied Command Europe, until it was withdrawn in 1952.

Norway also sent a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital to Korea in 1951-1954, under United Nations auspices. In 1956-1967, Norway participated in the Danish-Norwegian Battalion and with a Light
Field Hospital in United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt. A Norwegian anti-aircraft battalion took part in the United Nations force in the Congo during 1960-1964, and Norway has participated in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon with an infantry battalion and a maintenance company since 1978. Norway also maintains a UN on-call force (consisting of an infantry battalion, a medical detachment, a transport aircraft, helicopter detachment, and a naval harbor command) which can be put at the disposal of the United Nations on very short notice for peacekeeping operations.

Consequently, no formal or legal obstacles currently exist for using Norwegian field forces in military operations external to Norway (although such operations have not been undertaken since the Norwegian brigade withdrawal from Germany in 1952); Norway has simply preferred to employ its forces to defend its own extensive territory. Recently, when the question arose of committing Norwegian reinforcements to Denmark to replace the British if they were to withdraw their UK Mobile Force, Norway argued that its brigades are tailored to the special terrain and climate in Norway and not well-suited for operations in Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark. In any case, commitment of Norwegian field forces outside Norwegian territory would likely raise the same political concerns as were voiced when the Norwegian brigade was sent to Germany in 1947-1952. Families of the conscripts feared that the Norwegian force could be cut off and that it would be difficult to bring it back home in case of a conflict. Obviously, one limitation of the Norwegian conscript system is the inherent political and psychological constraint against using conscripts outside the national territory.

Norwegian naval forces participate regularly in NATO’s multinational Standing Naval Force in the Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), established in 1967 to show the NATO flag and to demonstrate allied cohesion. However, Norwegian authorities have been concerned that STANAVFORLANT operate only within the NATO area of responsibility and that Norway should participate in the force mainly when STANAVFORLANT is operating in the western Atlantic, the area of primary interest to Norway. However, Norway’s political attitude (as well as that of other smaller NATO members), may be softening towards out-of-area operations following developments in the Persian Gulf. In the 10 June 1987 communiqué from the Bonn summit, all member nations recognized it may be necessary to engage in out-of-area operations to safeguard vital Western interests; they noted that
such operations should primarily be undertaken by those nations having the necessary means. Also, all signatories agreed that prior consultations are essential, and that out-of-area deployments by one or more members might make it necessary for the others to take a greater share of the defense in their own area.

**Restoration of Domestic Tranquility.** Norwegian forces do not have a task to assist the civilian authorities in maintaining law and order. However, on occasion, military forces have been used to restore domestic tranquility. A notorious case (often referred to by Norway’s political left) was the Center Government’s 1931 decision to use a company of the King’s guard and four naval ships to restore law and order during a large demonstration against Norsk Hydro A/S. The ensuing “Menstad battle” led to severe criticism of Norway’s military, and regulations have since been passed concerning military assistance to the police. One example of this was at the time of a major civil disobedience against construction of a hydro-electric power plant in the Alta river in the late 1970s; when the Minister of Defense refused to even loan a military camp and to provide police military rescue helicopters for back-up. Thus, it is very unlikely the military will ever be used in restoring domestic tranquility in Norway again.

In this connection, it is also worth mentioning that Norwegian practice since the end of the last century has been to store vital weapons’ components separately at the mobilization depots. In the event of civil unrest, authorities feared workers would break in and arm themselves. However, in 1936 divisional commanders were delegated authority to decide whether or not to continue this practice. In 1940, at the outbreak of war and during the rapid mobilization, some weapons were not complete when issued. This situation has a parallel at the present time. Because of many thefts of weapons and ammunition from the mobilization depots, small arms and other attractive items are today stored separately, under special lock at the depots. Even if it is youth gangs, not political groups who commit most of the weapon thefts today, Norwegians still must weigh storing by component parts against the need of complete weapons during mobilization.

**Role of Norwegian Forces in the Alliance.** Norwegian forces play a political and military role within the Alliance. First, all Norwegian military forces, including the Home Guard, are dedicated to the Alliance and will come under allied command in case of war. For
instance, a precondition for Norway's receiving allied reinforcements is transfer of Norwegian command to the allied chain of command in advance.

Regarding the overall political role of the military forces, it is clear that a country in Norway's geographical location has need of its own military forces in order to give the national authorities the options to decide for themselves the destiny of the country and the development of its society. Without a military capability of protecting and defending itself, Norway would become a pawn in the game between greater powers. The national authorities would be faced with two equally unacceptable choices: either to allow foreign troops on its territory in advance, or to risk a competition to get there first in case of a conflict.

In Norway's case, the national forces provide the conditions for this political freedom of choice. In so doing, the military must be able to perform numerous functions which are important nationally as well as to NATO:

(1) **Surveillance and Warning.** The geographical location, particularly of North Norway, makes it possible to provide NATO with important surveillance and warning of Soviet air and naval activities (as a basis for indications of attack and long-range strategic intelligence).

(2) **Contribution to Crisis Management.** Norway's forces contribute significantly to effective crisis management. They can respond to ambiguous as well as unambiguous warning; they can deescalate the situation if possible; and, they can provide adequate readiness if a crisis should worsen.

(3) **Forward Defense.** The primary task of the national forces is to meet an attack on any part of the national territory, and to repel, contain, or defeat it. Apart from the need to maintain national integrity, Norway cannot expect Alliance assistance if Norway itself does not fight to protect its own territory. Similarly, there is little chance other NATO members will stand by their collective commitments to Norway unless it is clear that Norway itself fulfills its obligations in defense and in providing host nation support and protection for allied reinforcements.

Furthermore, by defending and keeping the airfields operational, Norway clearly provides important bases to support vital NATO operations for keeping control of the Norwegian Sea and the Atlantic.
lines of communication. Also, Norway provides important support for the forward defense of Schleswig-Holstein, Denmark, and the Baltic exits.

(4) Host Nation Support of Allied Reinforcements. Because of Norway's exposed geographical location and its policy of not accepting permanent stationing of allied troops in peacetime, Norway has had to plan for adequate allied reinforcements in times of crisis or war. Increased Soviet maritime and air capabilities in the sea areas dividing Norway from its allies have made it even more necessary to introduce allied reinforcements rapidly, and with less dependence on sea transport, by prepositioning equipment and supplies and by effective host nation support.

To reinforce Norway, a range of options have been developed. The dedication of allied aircraft squadrons are most important because the Norwegian air forces will not be able to maintain an adequate air situation for long. Support for allied air reinforcements depends upon prepositioning weapons, fuel, and stores to reduce the requirements for airlift; and provision of essential operating facilities as well as hardened shelters for protection. Norway must provide these conditions, aided by NATO's commonly funded infrastructure program. Norway must also provide adequate command and control facilities to employ the allied reinforcements effectively.

The allied ground reinforcements signal NATO's commitment to defending the area and augmenting the national forces. Timely introduction of allied ground reinforcements depends to a great degree on prepositioning of heavy equipment and supplies. At the receiving end, Norway's responsibility is to provide host nation support: transport for onward movement; common-user items of equipment; and logistical and medical support in accordance with a memorandum of understanding with the sender nation. Host nation support is essential to reduce the reinforcers' need to provide self-support themselves, which would only increase the administrative "tail." Well-prepared and effective host nation support is also important to give the reinforcing nations adequate confidence that their commitments will receive full support.

In short, the Norwegian defense effort aims to: deter any "fait accompli" type of attack in the North by maintaining an adequate forward defense, by forces which have specific orders to resist any armed attack; and to maintain the credibility of NATO's commitment in case any part of the real estate of any Alliance member is
subject to aggression. If a limited attack on the strategically important parts of the North occurs, Norway has made elaborate plans and preparations which threaten the aggressor with a drawn-out conflict and the danger of escalation. The ability to deter a large-scale attack on Norway in a major European war depends on NATO's overall ability to counter aggression and by the capability to confront an adversary with a Norwegian defense effort which would raise the enemy's threshold of required forces to such a degree that the enemy would have to divert its resources away from the decisive areas in the Central Region.

Foreign Troops and Norway's Base Policy. When Norway entered NATO in 1949, it refused to allow stationing of allied forces on Norwegian territory—as long as Norway had not been attacked or been threatened by attack. Norway made this reservation in view of the fact that it has a common border with the Soviet Union on the Kola peninsula, and as part of Norway's deliberate policy to demonstrate its purely defensive intentions.

Thus, Norway's basing policy combines deterrence and reassurance into one composite security posture. Toward the Soviet Union, the posture reflects tradeoffs between deterrence and reassurance. Deterrence aims primarily at making credible the proposition that an attack on Norway will not be confined to Norway only. Reassurance comprises a number of unilateral, confidence-building measures designed to communicate peaceful intentions and to avoid challenging vital Soviet security interests during peacetime. Norway's refusal to permit the peacetime stationing of foreign troops, the policy of not stockpiling or deploying nuclear weapons, and constraints on certain peacetime allied activities in Norway constitute the main elements of reassurance.

The basing policy is self-imposed in the sense it does not depend on agreements with other states; it is conditional because it applies only as long as Norway is not attacked or threatened with attack. The absence of foreign troops on Norwegian soil in peacetime, though, creates an increased need to reinforce Norway earlier and more rapidly than might otherwise be necessary. Norway must prepare in peacetime to receive allied reinforcements; allied exercises must be carried out regularly to demonstrate and make credible the plans for reinforcing Norway in crisis or war.
THE FORCE STRUCTURE IN THE LONG TERM

The long-term prospects for the force structure depend greatly on the economic levels that political authorities will determine. During the 1984-1988 planning period, Norway allocated a 3.0-3.5 percent yearly increase of the defense budget. However, a 1985 study, carried out by the Chief of Defense, indicates that if defense expenditures do not increase by 6-7 percent from now to year 2000, Norway will not be able to maintain and modernize its current military combat forces. In fact, if the present 3.0-3.5 percent economic levels stand up, Norway will have to rely increasingly on allied support by year 2000 and to accept the fact that greater parts of the country will be left with only local defense. This may mean maintaining a deterrence and defense priority in north Norway and accepting a defense reduction in the south. Granting 3 percent economic growth, Norway’s force structure in year 2000 will be as follows:

- Norway may only be able to update seven brigades (and limited divisional troops and supporting troops dedicated to the highest priority operational areas) to a satisfactory standard. The remaining six brigades will have significantly reduced combat power.

- Norway’s navy will maintain a relatively acceptable capacity in the areas given priority for anti-invasion defense in the form of submarines, mine and torpedo batteries (MTBs); coastal artillery; and a limited capacity for escort and mine-countermeasures. The coastal artillery and the number of naval ships outside priority areas will be reduced significantly.

- Norway’s combat aircraft would fall to 70-75, considered the absolute minimum necessary to receive allied air reinforcements. Air defense may be improved in priority areas, but Norway will be unable to provide anti-aircraft missile defenses for airfields in South Norway. The control and warning system will provide minimum geographical cover and have reasonable survivability.

- The Home Guard’s structure will remain at present strength, with reductions in modernized equipment.

A decrease in population in exposed areas in Finnmark and the rest of North Norway may make it more difficult for Norway to
Mobilization in Norway

Maintain current mobilization forces in these areas. Thus, increasing numbers of personnel from South Norway will have to go to mobilization units in North Norway and for reinforcements to North Norway.

FUTURE RELATIONS WITH THE ALLIANCE

Norway depends for its security on NATO support and reinforcement because of its exposed location, large area, and small population. Norway’s location is on the northern outskirts of Europe along the great circle—the shortest distance between the two superpowers. Because of its geographic location and military resources available for deterrence and defense in the North, Norway must maintain the Atlantic dimension of the Alliance. Clearly, neither a European nor a Nordic security arrangement would be adequate, without active United States participation.

Norway strongly supports NATO According to recent opinion polls, fully 63 percent of those surveyed believe NATO contributes to Norway’s immediate security (7 percent believe NATO increases the danger of attack; 10 percent that it makes no difference; and 20 percent don’t know). However, different opinions exist over NATO’s strategy and the role of nuclear weapons. It is unlikely, though, that these differing views will create any problems for Norway’s relations with the Alliance, or for the continued large majority of Norwegians favoring NATO membership.

Uncertainties regarding future NATO relations are primarily connected with the developments within the Alliance. Further strengthening of the European pillar through the Western European Union or the European communities could be unfavorable for Norway, particularly if it resulted in less interest and commitment from the North American Alliance members. Also, NATO cohesion and common defense could fragment because of American withdrawal. Whether this comes about as a result of United States unhappiness about the European unwillingness to carry their share of the burden, or in order to coerce the European members to a greater effort, the result would most likely be the same—increased fragmentation and possible realignment of European policies to the new realities. Norway believes that the United States, with its leadership and commitments, holds the Alliance together; and also that a cohesive NATO alliance serves the best interest of American security and self-defense.
In sum, developments, which are difficult and hard to predict, will influence NATO, particularly in the eyes of its smaller members. Being by nature an optimist, however, I firmly believe that NATO will continue to serve the common security of its 16 member-nations—Norway among them—for many more years to come.

**MOBILIZATION, A DUTY AND A RIGHT**

Norway's national defense capacity has had a decisive effect on its nationhood and on the ability of national authorities to form Norwegian society. In the early periods, Norwegian national defense protected the country from sea attack by Denmark and England and overland invasion from Sweden, thereby making it possible for Norwegians to determine their foreign policy and to form and develop their own society. Continuous civil war in twelfth-century Norway between different pretenders to the throne, plus the Black Plague in 1349 caused deterioration of the national defense, making it possible for outside powers to seize control over Norway, using minimum military forces.

By the early nineteenth century, Norway's national defense made it possible for the political authorities to call a constitutional assembly and give this assembly time to draft an entirely new constitution at Eidsvold in 1814. In 1905, the National Defense made it possible for the Norwegian Storting to disband unilaterally the union with Sweden without armed conflict resulting. During World War I, Norway provided a credible enough deterrent to deny the warfighting parties the use of Norwegian territory; consequently, Norway managed to remain neutral. During World War II, the national defense lacked this capability; the Germans made a surprise attack on Norway on 9 April 1940 to seize air and naval bases and prevent the blockade of Swedish iron ore destined for Germany.

Throughout Norwegian history, mobilization forces have played a vital role in its force structure, particularly in generating the forces needed to support the political authorities. Norwegian failures were not caused by the mobilization system, but rather by the political authorities either not providing adequate training and equipment for the mobilizable forces, or simply not giving the necessary orders.

Finally, I must mention that general military service in Norway is very closely linked to the principle that the nation's defense is not only a duty for all citizens, but also an important right written into the Norwegian Constitution of 1814. Even if it had been possible to
provide adequate defense of Norway’s large territory by voluntary recruitment, Norway views the task of defense as the responsibility of all her citizens. For these reasons, Norway’s defense is based not on a regular army, but on a citizenry willing to fully mobilize.

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Sources
6. Terje H. Holm, "'1940-igjen?'" *Forsvarmuseets smaskrifter, No. 4 (1987).*
Maintaining the Balance

As indicated in *NATO-Warsaw Pact Force Mobilization*, both superpowers and their NATO and Warsaw Pact allies appear to be at an historic crossroads. In addition, it appears that Soviet and American perceptions of that crossroads differ. In a recent interview in a Yugoslav journal, Warsaw Pact commander-in-chief (CinC) Viktor Kulikov outlined his view of the current NATO-Warsaw Pact balance:

There is no advantage on the part of the Warsaw Pact over NATO. The West is trying to create a myth about the Soviet military threat. ... For this reason they misrepresent the real correlation of forces. They do not take into consideration the two sides' human resources, do not include the Armed Forces of France and Spain in this relation, and do not fully include into that correlation of forces either the information on the US Armed Forces, or data on the armies under national commands. They also do not take into consideration the US and NATO reserve formations, and the stocks of armament and military equipment.¹

Whether or not one fully agrees with Kulikov's assessment, on face it does suggest those areas that the Warsaw Pact CinC perceives to be NATO strengths and, reading between the lines, what he perceives to be potential Warsaw Pact vulnerabilities.
WARSAW PACT STRENGTHS/NATO VULNERABILITIES

As Part I illustrates, two significant problems or NATO vulnerabilities have evolved since 1960. First, compared to NATO, Soviet (Warsaw Pact) strengths exist in the form of an active force structure that has actually increased in size and alerting procedures (created by top secret Statute in 1979/80) that facilitate the "chopping" of NSWP forces to the recently created Soviet Western and Southwestern TVD Commands. In contrast, NATO since 1960 has relied increasingly upon reserve forces which require mobilization when alerted, thus adding great burdens to the Alliance—in terms of increasing the time necessary to mobilize military manpower and in the resulting severe societal dislocations that mobilization entails. In other words, warning indicators must be more credible to NATO's national decision-makers; any ambiguity will further burden the I&W system and slow the decision-making process for mobilizing manpower. In effect, the earliest possible time for NATO's political decision may be after the latest possible time for military decision. This remains a significant NATO vulnerability!

Second, the creation of the Western (and Southwestern) TVD commands in the early 1980s to command, control, and coordinate the mobilization, training, and movement of Soviet second strategic echelon forces in the Soviet western military districts with the Soviet Groups of Forces and NSWP armies in the forward areas also represents a significant improvement in Soviet reinforcement capability.

US reinforcement problems of terrain, distance, and time appear more difficult to surmount than the USSR's reinforcement problems. If deterrence fails, and if NATO is successful in mobilizing its manpower in a timely fashion, the US reinforcement of Europe, which requires trans-Atlantic air- and sea-lift, is more difficult to achieve than the resolution of the Soviet reinforcement problem. As noted in the book, at present the 10-divisions-in-10-days goal remains only a goal, and an unfulfilled one at that.

In sum, Soviet improvements in alerting and command procedures in conjunction with a less complicated reinforcement problem remain Soviet (Warsaw Pact) strengths and NATO vulnerabilities.

NATO STRENGTHS/WARSAW PACT VULNERABILITIES

First, as Part II illustrates, NATO's core—the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), France, and the United Kingdom (UK)—appears
to have a much greater resilience than the Warsaw Pact's front-line states—the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Czechoslovakia.

NATO's core states are all success stories. Over the past 30 years, the FRG has created the Bundeswehr and the Territorial Army which have developed into an impressive, first-rate military as far as manpower, morale, and modernized equipment are concerned. France not only has maintained a well-balanced, impressive military structure; but ever since 1966, when it left NATO's integrated military command, it has significantly evolved into a major participant in NATO defense. In addition to its strategic and theater nuclear weapons, which are likely to become more important in a post-INF world (exemplified in the 1986 "pre-strategic" measures agreement with the FRG), France's conventional forces and strategic depth have assumed an increasingly important role in NATO defense (exemplified by the 1987 bilateral French-German Kecker Spatz exercise and by the recent French-UK bilateral agreement providing reception and transit for BAOR reinforcements). Britain, like France, is a balanced military power; possessing strategic and theater nuclear weapons, as well as an all-volunteer conventional force that remains committed to, and capable of reinforcing NATO's defenses. In sum, NATO's core provides substantial military power (total active forces of more than 1,250,000 men), and recent political-military developments offer encouraging signs regarding their commitment to NATO defense.

The Warsaw Pact's front-line states provide a marked contrast to NATO's core. Though the GDR is a model ally, with probably the best quality military manpower and equipment in the Warsaw Pact, and a total active force that has significantly increased from 100,000 to 174,000 since 1960, it still remains relatively small. While Czechoslovakia has also increased its total active forces from 185,000 to 203,000, significant problems remain evident in the CSPA. Since the 1968 invasion, when the CSPA reached its nadir, although the officer corps has improved, morale problems remain, still frustrating recruitment. As a result of Czechoslovakia's increasing economic constraints, disparities in force modernization between CSPA and Soviet CGF units have become apparent. In effect, at least half of the CSPA's ten divisions remain militarily "hollow," providing potential Soviet bargaining-chips in future conventional arms control reductions talks. In sum, though political-military improvements have
been evident in the GDR and Czechoslovakia in recent years, one gets the feeling that these states are "stretched" to their maximum. There are few in the West (and likely many in the East, including Kulikov), who would trade the economic potential or military capability of any NATO core ally for both Warsaw Pact front-line states.

Second, NATO still represents enormous untapped economic potential which remains essentially unchanneled into military goods and services. Part of NATO's economic power is untapped because of the general unwillingness of democratic polities to pay for defense; part is due to national military acquisition programs (that result from inter-service rivalries or from domestic requirements such as the need to create jobs within the economy). The net effect of national procurement programs which supersede alliance defense priorities is to contribute to a less rational allocation of increasingly scarce economic resources and to create "structural disarmament" within the Alliance. But while NATO's structural disarmament remains soluble (at least theoretically), the Warsaw Pact's structural disarmament appears insoluble.

The inability of the USSR's East European allies to modernize their military forces and to prevent their equipment from falling at least one and sometimes two generations behind the Soviets' inventories is a problem that appears to remain insoluble under the existing economic order. In effect, Gorbachev's perestroika program to restructure the Soviet economy and to encourage the East Europeans to follow suit is an admission of this failure.

Third, as Part III illustrates, NATO's ability to receive reinforcements and transfer them to the front line in West Germany appears to have perceptibly improved compared to the Soviet's second strategic echelon forces' transit and reception in East Germany. The Netherlands and Belgium provide well-developed, modernized, and redundant sea and airport facilities for reception and road and rail lines of communication (LOC) for transport of reinforcements to the forward areas. NATO's 1977-1978 Long-Term Defense Program and numerous allied bilateral and multilateral Host Nation Support (HNS) agreements for facilitating reception and transport and for providing logistical support for reinforcements have proliferated and significantly improved in recent years. Additionally, to the degree that Dutch and Belgian reception areas become vulnerable to Soviet attack, France and Spain (as Kulikov recognizes) provide strategic
depth and well-developed transport infrastructure alternatives for the Alliance that were neither politically nor physically feasible two decades ago.

In marked contrast, Soviet second strategic echelon reinforcements from the western military districts simply do not share the reception and transport improvements and alternatives enjoyed by NATO. Though reinforcement by aircraft provides a Soviet alternative unavailable 20 years ago, it remains limited. In a Western TVD offensive, massive movement of men and materiel across Poland’s (and in the case of a Danubian front, Hungary’s) very limited road and rail system provides few alternatives and creates significant vulnerabilities, particularly to NATO’s Follow-On-Forces Attack (FOFA) doctrine and accurate, deep-strike weapons. Former Soviet Chief of the General Staff, N. V. Ogarkov has expressed this concern as follows:

... rapid changes in the development of conventional means of destruction and the emergence in the developed countries of automatic reconnaissance-and-strike complexes, long-range high-accuracy terminally guided combat systems, unmanned flying machines, and qualitatively new electronic control systems... make it possible to immediately extend active combat operations not just to the border regions, but to the whole country’s territory, which was not possible in past wars.2

CinC Kulikov, discussing the implications of NATO’s “smart weapons” and FOFA doctrine on the Warsaw Pact, notes that the concept of “deep echeloned strike ... is based on new weapons systems, the so-called ‘smart weapons’ ... intended for attacks on targets deep in the territory of the Warsaw Pact countries: on commands, airfields, communications, missile bases, and concentrations of armed forces ... and implies preventive operations on the part of the common Western offense strategy.”3

In sum, NATO’s active pursuit and development of FOFA and “deep strike” capabilities is a significant deterrent in that it does target a Soviet perceived Warsaw Pact vulnerability. In addition, and just as important, it has the effect of “re-balancing” the US reinforcement vulnerability to Soviet anti-SLOC activities in the North Atlantic.

NATO/WARSAW PACT VULNERABILITIES

As Part IV illustrates, the Soviet Southwestern TVD Commander and the Warsaw Pact have problems in projecting forces
south toward Italy and Thrace, while the US and NATO have new problems defending the increasingly vulnerable Denmark and the Northern flank of Norway.

First, the US and NATO must continue to focus political and economic attention on Romania and Bulgaria on the southern flank. Over the past two decades, Romania, which has been a significant problem for the Soviet Union, has been the object of close political and economic attention from the US and West European NATO. While US and NATO policy has been generally successful, Romania's repressive internal policies have caused strains recently, particularly with the United States. In effect, US policy must focus on Romania beyond Ceausescu. It is in NATO's interest that Romania remains a "token" ally (and not become a full-fledged member) in the Warsaw Pact.

Bulgaria, which has been generally regarded as the most loyal Soviet ally, also offers opportunities for the United States and NATO. Bulgaria's apparent unwillingness and inability, due to low readiness and lack of modernized weapons systems, to project military force beyond its borders provides NATO with a margin of safety. In addition, recent political developments among Balkan states, which transcend traditional alliance boundaries, are encouraging and offer opportunities for the United States and NATO. In sum, recent developments in Romania and Bulgaria suggest continued erosion for the Soviets in the Southwestern TVD and offer opportunities for NATO.

Second, NATO faces similar problems on its northern flank; in Schleswig-Holstein, Jutland, and BALTAP for Denmark and in North Norway. Re-evaluation of the evolving Soviet-Warsaw Pact threat in this region in conjunction with recent changes in Canadian reinforcement commitments and continued pressures on Danish and Norwegian economic and manpower capabilities must be balanced against the need to maintain a credible NATO deterrent and defense in the North.

**US-NATO POLICY SUGGESTIONS**

- **US-NATO alerting and crisis-management procedures need to be improved.** It is necessary to improve the decision-making process because time is such a scarce commodity for NATO. There are many ways to tackle this problem varying from improving the indicators and warning systems at allied
national levels and at the multilateral level. While it is unlikely that NATO will ever develop a Warsaw Pact-like Statute to “chop” allied forces to SACEUR, NATO might improve its crisis-management capability by examining alternate peacetime control over selected allied forces, beyond the present Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), Allied Mobile Force (AMF), and AWACS. Time is a particularly important commodity for the Alliance, because NATO’s military structure has evolved largely into reserve forces that require mobilization upon alert. National decisions to mobilize forces will be difficult to make due to national perceptions resulting from historical experiences that equate mobilization with war, to the societal dislocation that will result from mobilization of manpower and civil resources, and to fears that an opponent will misinterpret the meaning of mobilization.

- **US Atlantic Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) vulnerabilities can be improved** from a number of perspectives:

  First, existing US air- and sea-lift times might be improved by re-examining pre-positioning concepts and reevaluating the mix between the heaviness and the fire-power of units that need to be transported.

  Second, increasing US SLOC vulnerability to Soviet interdiction since the mid-1970s suggests the need to reexamine likely European reception ports and transport to the forward areas. While a southern route to French and Spanish ports might require more time for reinforcements to transit the Atlantic, this must be balanced against the likelihood that more reinforcements will eventually arrive. Not only have French and Spanish roads been improved, facilitating the physical movement of troops to the forward areas, but recent improvements in French and Spanish participation in NATO suggest the political feasibility of this concept.

  Third, US/NATO can also focus on improving its ability to frustrate and slow down the Soviet second strategic echelon movement to the forward areas. It is evident that both Ogarkov and Kulikov are concerned about the Soviet-Warsaw Pact vulnerability to concepts such as Airland Battle 2000 and Follow-On-Forces Attack, the so-called “Rogers Plan.”
• **Rationalization of NATO national commitments and manpower allocations needs to be improved.** NATO must reevaluate the realities of US reinforcement arrival times and plan NATO alternatives to meet the anticipated arrival times of Warsaw Pact forces by balancing NATO's time-window of vulnerability against the potential availability of West European reserve manpower. This general problem can be improved from a number of perspectives:

  First, national ground force commitments to Central Region defense might be re-examined with an eye to providing US reinforcements more time to arrive in Europe. As the authors have suggested, reserve manpower possibilities do exist in the Netherlands, Belgium, the FRG, and France.

  Second, US (and perhaps UK) reinforcement commitments to AFSOUTH might be reevaluated in light of the evolution of the threat from the Southwestern TVD and changing requirements for strengthening the Central Region's defense.

  In sum, rationalization of NATO's manpower commitments is necessary in light of the evolution of the threat, the time necessary for US reinforcements to arrive in Europe, and the potential availability of reserve ground forces already in theater.

• **Rationalization of NATO economic and defense planning needs to be improved** through more effective multilateral cooperation and planning that transcends narrow national inter-service rivalries and/or political-economic requirements. Since 1977-1978 when the Long-Term Defense Program was authorized and developed, NATO has come a long way to coordinate logistics support, and to improve NATO’s capability in air and sea defense, reserve mobilization, electronic and nuclear warfare, communications and control, readiness, and reinforcement. It is now time to more effectively coordinate national military procurement plans with NATO's defense requirements.

**PROSPECTS**

It appears that both post-World War II alliances are indeed at an historic crossroads. On the one hand, the economic opportunities and options available to Soviet and East European political and military
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leaders appear quite limited; most of what can be extracted from these states has already been converted to military capability. Compared to NATO, time is working against the Warsaw Pact. While Gorbachev recognizes the challenge, it is questionable whether the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact are actually capable of responding successfully; only time will tell.

On the other hand, more economic and political options are available to US and European NATO political and military leaders. The problem for the Alliance, though, is how to convert all the untapped potential of NATO’s democratic polities into military capability. It is NATO’s untapped potential that Ogarkov and Kulikov perceive and lament; and the ability to convert NATO’s untapped potential into military capability remains in the hands of NATO’s leadership. To the degree that NATO’s political and military leadership is able to rationalize peacetime economic/defense planning and national mission/reinforcement commitments, deterrence will be enhanced. In other words, at the present historic crossroads, NATO’s political and military leadership remains more in control of the future than Soviet and Warsaw Pact leaders. It remains to be seen whether NATO’s leadership is up to the challenge.
Endnotes

1. Interview with Marshal Viktor Kulikov by Miroslav Lazanski, (Zagreb) *DANAS*, no. 269, 14 April 1987, pp. 47-51 in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Soviet Union* (21 April 1987), p. AA8


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