

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

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AFIT/GLM/LSR/90S-31

THE SECURITY FACTORS INVOLVED IN SPAIN'S ENTRY INTO NATO

THESIS

Juan Gabriel Lobo Sanchez, Major, SAF

AFIT/GLM/LSR/90S-31



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

AFIT/GLM/LSR/90S-31

THE SECURITY FACTORS INVOLVED IN SPAIN'S ENTRY INTO NATO

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty of the School of Systems
and Logistics of the Air Force Institute of Technology
Air University
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science in Logistics Management

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Major, Spanish Air Force

September 1990

Preface

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the bilateral agreements with the United States have been subjects of significant importance in Spain. Spain's recent entry into NATO was the latest of a series of events which culminated a profound social and political transformation. The political environment has been the framework in which most studies over Spanish adhesion to NATO have been developed. This research effort joins aspects of international relationships, the Atlantic Alliance, and Spanish sovereignty and focusses on security aspects of the Spanish integration into NATO. The viewpoints presented in this study are not intended to reflect the point of view of any of the agencies, organizations, or governments referred to in the study.

A number of individuals helped me in this research, mainly my thesis advisor, Dr. David Kirk Vaughan, whose corrections were comparable to the efforts needed for completing this study.

Juan Gabriel Lobo Sanchez

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Abstract

The focus of this research effort was to determine if Spain's entry into NATO gave Spain substantial improvement in security terms which served as justification of a defensive alliance from a strictly military perspective. First, a qualitative, in-depth literature review was conducted regarding the Spanish integration process into NATO and the U.S.-Spanish agreements. Then, to contrast critical viewpoints, the information sources were divided into three groups: Spanish, U.S., and NATO sources. The information was analyzed addressing those aspects closest related to Spain's security. The historical events since 1936 and the political process since 1975 served as the framework for a discussion of military issues in recent Spanish history. Finally, analysis of the information gathered led to the conclusion that the justification for Spain's entry into NATO has not adequately addressed her most pressing defense issues.

THE SECURITY FACTORS INVOLVED IN SPAIN'S ENTRY INTO NATO

I. Introduction

The enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) twenty four years after its creation was an event without precedent in the history of both NATO and Warsaw Pact (53:13-85; 81:3-18). Spain, ranked eleventh among the industrialized countries in 1982 (26:9), applied to join NATO in December 1981 and became a formal member in May of the following year (83:409). The incorporation of a new country into the Western block could have introduced a factor of disequilibrium in the ever-tense East-West relationships; however, the special characteristics of Spain prior to her integration did not result in instability.

Problem Statement

Spain's entry into NATO has been a complicated process characterized by long duration and two different Spanish approaches to the Alliance (74:29-30). These two approaches have generated many analyses, mainly focused on the political reasons for and consequences of the Spanish integration. In spite of NATO's being primarily a military alliance (51:7-10,77-82), there is little information which looks at the Spanish incorporation process from a joint

political and military perspective. The importance of defense issues within the political decision is only marginally covered.

Justification

Spain became a signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty on May of 1982 and is, therefore, the last country to have entered the North Atlantic Alliance (53:355). On that date, a long negotiating process was initiated which, as of September of 1990, has yet to be concluded. Currently both sides are developing technical aspects of what might be considered the final stage of the Spanish integration, the Coordination Agreements (54:186). Such agreements will establish the framework for the participation of Spain in Alliance endeavors (29:26). Spain's role in NATO has been the subject of concern because of complicated negotiations, characterized by differing approaches of two Spanish governments responsible for negotiations during the last seven years (76:11-20).

In December of 1981, Spain applied to join NATO as a full participating member and in May of the following year the fifteen allied nations ratified Spain's entry into the organization (83:409).

The political coalition Union de Centro Democrático UCD (Union of the Democratic Center), at that time controlling Spanish policy, was not reelected in the legislative

elections of October of 1982, and the Partido Socialista Obrero Español PSOE (Spanish Socialist Worker's Party) won the general elections (83:409). This party made two formal commitments during its platform for the general elections: it would freeze the process of integration into the NATO military structure and it would submit the question of Spain's membership to a popular referendum (64:6).

In March of 1986, the referendum was approved. According to its terms, Spanish membership within the organization was affected by three clauses:

1. The participation of Spain in the Atlantic Alliance would not include its participation in the integrated military structure.

2. The 1979 prohibition against installing, storing, or introducing nuclear arms on Spanish territory would be continued (83:409).

3. A progressive reduction of the military presence of the U.S. forces in Spain would be initiated (Spain and the United States have maintained bilateral agreements since 1953) (8:187).

The referendum kept Spain within NATO but modified her initial full integration status, adopting one less participative (83:140). As a consequence, Spanish armed forces are not integrated into NATO's command structure and carry out their missions under Spanish command (41:14). The operational control of Spanish units assisting Alliance

endeavors may be transferred to NATO commands, but that decision must have been previously agreed upon by the Spanish and Allied Commanders (78). Those and other technical aspects are being currently developed as a final stage of the integration process (29:26).

The third clause of the March 1986 referendum addressed the military presence of the United States on Spanish soil. Since 1953, the United States and Spain have maintained a bilateral friendship, defense, and cooperation agreement, renewed every five years. Under the agreement, the United States has had access to four main bases plus a number of smaller facilities, especially military communications installations (48). In 1987, the agreement period expired; during the renegotiating discussion the United States and Spain agreed, after almost two years of negotiations, to the withdrawal of the U.S. units stationed at Torrejon Air Force Base, near Madrid, according to the last referendum clause (31:14).

From 1981, when Spain applied to join NATO, to 1988, when the last bilateral agreement was signed, different analyses and assessments of the occurrences were made by experts of countries involved in one or other way in the process. A comprehensive synthesis of the information with regard to the issue, confronting the three main agencies--the United States, other NATO countries, and Spain--has not

been made. Furthermore, the military factor is not consistently included in these analyses.

The need for a compilation of this information into a single document, including military aspects and their consequences, justifies this study.

Literature Search

The information sources through which the literature search was conducted were divided into three main groups: Spanish sources, U.S. sources, and NATO sources.

(1) Spanish information sources can be divided into two areas: the integration into Nato and the U.S.-Spanish agreements. The outlook of the Spanish authors reflects the wide political spectrum of the Spanish society. Analyses from highly critical to absolutely favorable were found connected to the participation in NATO, whereas political analyses of bilateral accords were almost always critical in nature.

(2) U.S. sources, including Congressional records, legislation, periodicals, and books provided information necessary to furnish a contrasting and balanced study. Unlike Spanish sources, U.S. analyses of the two areas, NATO and mutual agreements, are blurred and hardly differentiated. The U.S. experts link both topics into a broader one, western security.

(3) NATO sources apart from the U.S. sources were searched as the third information area. The limited information related to the U.S.-Spanish agreements primarily focussed on the overall NATO issue. However, reports discussing Spanish integration and its consequences were more abundant and provided insight into military aspects.

Objective

This study provides a synthesis of information compiled from the three main sources, addressing the different perspectives that each part gives of the controversial topic. In addition, this study analyzes the military component of the Spanish integration within the political framework in order to assess Spain's entry into NATO from a security perspective.

Limitations

All sources searched for this study reflect the opinions of experts, which differ widely. Thus the subjective, rather than factual, nature of the information contained in analyses, books, and reports represents the main limitation of this thesis. Such a limitation could be partially overcome only by means of contrasting the different perspectives of the same topic.

Another limitation regarding the military issues is that the Coordination Agreements between Major NATO Commanders and Spain are yet to be concluded. In addition,

most of their content is of a classified nature that precludes their discussion in this study.

Finally, the issue of the economic costs and benefits of Spanish adhesion to NATO is beyond the scope of this study. Neglect of this issue could also be viewed as a limitation; however, research on economic issues would support the conclusions of this thesis. Because NATO is primarily a military organization, the security factor, with regard to the Spanish integration, should outweigh other considerations.

Definition of Terms

Integrated Military Structure. It is the basic command structure of NATO forces. The countries which belong to this structure permanently assign specific units under international commands. France, Iceland, and Spain do not participate in the integrated military structure of NATO. Greece withdrew temporarily due to political disagreements with Turkey (41:14).

Coordination Agreements. These were developed as a consequence of the General Guidance which tailored the "Spanish model" of integration into NATO. The agreements are currently under development between the Spanish authorities and Major NATO Commanders (MNC) (54:186-187).

Marshall Plan. The Secretary of State of the United States in 1947, General George C. Marshall, initiated the

idea of a Program for European Recovery to foster the economic development in Europe after the Second World War (50:69).

Military Assistance Program (MAP). This U.S. program provides for the training and equipping of the forces friendly countries on a nonreimbursable (Grant) basis. It is not intended to support forces engaged in combat operations (12:b15).

Foreign Military Sales (FMS). It forms part of U.S. security assistance authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and by the Arms Export Control Act. It differs from MAP in that governments provide reimbursement for defense articles and services transferred (12:b10).

Rapid Reinforcement Plan (RRP). RRPs are the plans established to deploy U.S. troops in reinforcing the European theatre in crisis time before the outbreak of hostilities (82:34).

Forces Assigned to NATO. Under this term fall those units that each NATO nation dedicates permanently and solely to NATO missions. Only countries integrated into NATO's command structure have assigned forces (53:67).

Research Questions

The overall question of NATO military benefits to Spain which this research attempts to answer is this: Did Spain's security require military alliance?

In the course of answering this primary research question, other subsidiary but connected questions will be addressed. These questions are:

(1) How does Spain's entry into NATO interface with the U.S.-Spanish agreements?

(2) What has been the effect of Spanish membership in NATO on the U.S.-Spanish relationships?

(3) What effect has the military alliance had on Spain's security?

(4) Is there any area within NATO strategy in which the Spanish incorporation can modify former NATO considerations?

Plan of Presentation

Chapter I: Introduction. This chapter states the problem and justification of the thesis, provides a brief review of the Spanish integrating process, defines terms, outlines the objective, and analyzes the limitations of research questions to be answered.

Chapter II: Background. This chapter provides the reader with a brief insight into the recent political history of Spain, from the outset of 1936 Spanish civil war to 1988. It also relates Spanish recent history to main international events worldwide, describes Western political attitudes regarding Spain during the 1939-1982 period, and summarizes current Spanish public opinion. The chapter ends

with a summary of the main aspects affecting Spanish policy in the period 1939-1982.

Chapter III: The U.S.-Spanish Agreements. This chapter covers the accords between the United States and Spain since 1953 when the first of the modern agreements, the Pact of Madrid, was signed. It focuses on those aspects closely related to Spanish integration into the Atlantic Alliance.

Chapter IV: The Military Factor. This chapter briefly describes NATO and its purpose; the Spanish armed forces, their capabilities, limitations; and their possible roles within the Alliance. Finally, it analyzes the Spanish military contribution to NATO forces.

Chapter V: Security Aspects. This chapter analyzes Spanish foreign policy and its relation to national security. It discusses Spanish threats and examines these threats in light of the U.S.-Spanish bilateral agreements and NATO.

Chapter VI: Conclusions and Recommendations. This chapter answers the main and subsidiary research questions, presents conclusions drawn from the information in the preceding chapters, and includes recommendations for further study.

II. Background

An analysis of the process of Spanish integration into NATO would not be wholly understandable without a brief review of the recent political events in the history of Spain. The purpose of this chapter is to provide the background information needed to understand the reasons for the Spanish attitude with regard to the Atlantic Alliance.

Spain 1936-1982

The Civil War 1936-1939. On 18 July of 1936 military forces commanded by General Francisco Franco acted against the civilian government, which was unable to control a paralyzing political upheaval and social chaos (57:3). The country divided into two parties, Nationalists and Republicans, who waged a fratricidal conflict lasting three years (64:41-51).

Franco, in October 1936, was named by a junta of Nationalist generals as Generalissimo and Caudillo of the Army and as chief of state of the Nationalist government, positions he maintained until his death in 1975 (15:15-18,1).

Germany, under a National socialist--Nazi--government, and Italy, under Fascism, supported the Nationalist party with troops, weapons and supplies while Russia supported Republicans (85:11). The remaining European democracies and

the United States agreed to a non-intervention policy (57:183). This policy indirectly helped the Nationalists because it denied to Republicans their main sources of potential support. General Franco returned the favor to Western democracies, remaining neutral in Word War II (37:263). The hostilities came to an end in April 1939 with the victory of the Nationalists five months before World War II started (21:123).

World War II. At the outset of the world conflict, Spain, with a devastated economy and with well trained but badly equipped armed forces, remained neutral, although it contributed personnel to organize one army division--the Blue Division--in supporting German forces on the Russian front (37:45).

Spain perceived the world war as three different conflicts. The first was between Russia and Germany in which the anti-communist views of its government, and consequently of the Spanish public opinion, made it pro-German (37:266). The second was between Germany and the Western countries, and in this conflict Spain remained neutral. Finally, a distant third war existed between the United States and Japan in the Pacific, in which Spain also adopted a neutral position (80:147).

The neutrality towards the Western war meant indirect but effective support to the Allied cause because such

neutrality prevented Germany from crossing the Pyrenees Mountains to establish bases within the Iberian peninsula and to control the entrance to and the exit from the Mediterranean Sea (21:167-168). By 1944, Spanish neutrality was encouraged by the Allies with the embargo on petroleum products, and in the following year the Second World War came to an end on all its fronts (37:45).

Post-World War II Period. On June 26 of 1945, seven weeks after the capitulation of the German forces and six weeks before the Hiroshima bomb, fifty nations signed the United Nations Charter in San Francisco. Spain, among other countries, was not represented (79:73).

With the victory of Allied forces in Europe and in the Pacific, an international ostracism period started for the Spanish government (79:109). By the Potsdam declaration of 1945, the Soviet, U.S., and U.K. representatives

> would not favor any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish government, which, having been founded with the support of the Axis powers, does not, in view of its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership. (37:270)

Thus, Spain was branded as unfit to associate with the other members of the United Nations and was denied membership in the world organization. The Iberic country was punished for its ties to the Axis powers during the

world war and for the dictatorial character of Franco's regime (37:269).

On December 2 of 1946, the General Assembly of the United Nations voted, in Resolution 39, to exclude Spain from any organizations associated with or sponsored by the United Nations. Furthermore, the same Resolution 39 recommended that all ambassadors and other representatives be withdrawn from embassies and consulates in Madrid (80:146). Only Portugal, Argentina, and the Dominican Republic--in that time under dictatorial governments as well --along with the Holy See, ignored the recommendation of the United Nations (76:58).

In contrast to these political attempts to force changes in Spanish regime toward a more democratic and less repressive political attitude, the primary foreign policy aim of the authoritarian government headed by General Franco was the achievement of international recognition and consequent economic support (64:4).

The economic situation in Spain was not less alarming than in the rest of Europe. In spite of the aid received by most Western European countries from the United States to relieve war consequences, the mechanism of the European economy remained seriously damaged and Western Europe was generally on the brink of economic and political collapse

(50:56; 30:56). On March 12, 1947, President Truman stated in the U.S. Congress that the U.S.

> must help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national entity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. (46:36)

This statement, which became known as the Truman Doctrine, was specifically tailored for the situation in Greece and Turkey, which were increasingly feeling communist pressure (75:63,167). It served, however, as the foundation of the Marshall Plan. Three months after Truman's statement, Secretary of State General George C. Marshall initiated the idea of a Program for European Recovery during a speech at Harvard University (46:41). He proposed that the United States come to the aid of European nations and suggested that a number, if not all, of the European countries agree on common requirements and design a program of economic recovery (50:69). General Marshall added that this plan was "directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos" (55:112).

The Marshall Plan, which in the following years contributed largely to European economic recovery (46:42), was even open to Russia and its satellite countries, although it was not accepted, but not to Spain (50:69-71). Eventually, Britain, France, and The Federal Republic of

Germany benefited by more than half of the Marshall Plan's total amount of aid (68:50).

On March 4 of 1948, representatives of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom signed a mutual assistance treaty, the Brussels Treaty, as a response to Soviet expansion, which, from 1940 to 1948 had annexed 182,400 square miles and 24 million inhabitants and aligned satellite countries of 92 million of inhabitants and 393,547 square miles in Europe (53:17). The Cold War had begun (55:40).

The Brussels Treaty was followed in June 1948 by the Berlin blockade, which triggered the organizing process of the Western defense. First, it set up the Western Union Defense Organization (later Western European Union (WEU)), and finally culminated with the North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington, on April 4 of 1949, by representatives of twelve countries, the signatories of the Brussels Treaty and Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, and the United States (30:56).

In spite of sharing the same threat, Spain was not invited to join the defensive alliance of the two groups either in 1951, when Greece and Turkey joined NATO, or in 1955, when the Federal Republic of Germany entered the organization and changed from defeated and invaded to allied and host country (53:30,33). Even the mediation of the

Truman administration could not c nvince other NATO members to accept Spain into the alliance; Franco's dictatorship was still the burden (6:133-137).

In late 1950, the United Nations lifted its recommended sanctions against Spain and her government and diplomatic relationships between this country and most nations were resumed (76:58). In February of 1951, the ambassador of the United States presented his credentials to Franco (79:109).

Two years later, in September of 1953, the United States and Spain signed the Madrid Pact, containing three agreements: a defense agreement, an economic assistance agreement, and a mutual defense agreement (27:10). The history of the U.S.-Spanish accords is discussed in the following chapter.

In 1955, three important events occurred: the admission of Spain into the United Nations Organization, the integration of the Federal Republic of Germany into NATO, and the signing of the Warsaw Pact by the Soviet Union and its European satellites (81:49; 79:79).

In 1958, Spain joined the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and thus entered into the modern post-war financial and trade structures (44:12). However, the political ostracism that Spain suffered since 1945 did not allow her to participate in the following political and

economic movements, which propelled the European economic development:

(1) The Treaty of Rome, signed by the Benelux countries, France, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany. It was entered into force in 1958 and established the European Economic Community (EEC), one of the most influential event in Europe of the second half of twenty century (71:146-155).

(2) The European Free Trade Association (EFTA), established by Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom during the Stockholm Convention of 1959 (19:28-40).

(3) The Convention for the Establishment of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in place of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) set up in 1948 to channel Marshall Plan aid. This organization was formed by eighteen European countries; the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan joined in 1960 (30:57).

The end of the post-World War period, as this study is concerned, can be considered in November 1975, when General Franco died and Spain began a transition to democracy. From 1977 to 1981, the two governments of the political coalition Union of the Democratic Center (UCD) introduced the

structural and institutional modifications necessary for the establishment of a democratic system (45:32-46).

UCD applied to join the European Community and fulfilled part of its electoral platform for the general elections of 1979. The application to join NATO was made as full member after a parliamentary debate in 1981 (76:62). In the following year, the PSOE, a left wing party, won the general elections and delayed the integrating process until the referendum results of 1986 (64:6).

Spanish Public Opinion

All historical experiences described in this chapter served as a partial framework to model Spanish public opinion, because the events of Spanish history from 1936 to 1975 influence in a special way Spanish opinion about Western countries and their foreign policies. In fact, however, these events can be seen as an extension of the earlier period when Spain, after losing all her colonies in Asia and America by the end of last century, began an increased divergence from the mainstream of world events (64:3). Thus, isolation, chosen or imposed, has been the main characteristic of the environment in which Spaniards built up opinions about Western democracies (76:1; 64:2).

During the Franco years, the period that starts this study, the nationalist sentiment present in Spaniards was

emphasized as a natural response to isolationist policies (76:163). Later, in spite of experiencing similar anticommunist feelings, Western democracies united against the communist menace and declared Spain "the pariah of the West" (76:2). The acceptance of both a Portuguese dictatorship and a defeated Germany, and the lack of a favorable reaction after the signing of the U.S.-Spanish agreements, in which Spain not only shared those anticommunist feelings but risks as well, helped to build up a Spanish public opinion characterized by unanimous anti-western sentiments (76:2; 64:5). The passage of time diminished anti-western feelings as well as Spanish concerns over the Soviet threat, which started to look like something remote and unlikely. Traditionally, Spanish society has not considered the Soviets as a serious menace to Spanish interests, and consequently integration into NATO has not been seen as necessary (70:149-150).

The referendum held in 1986 to decide whether or not Spain should remain in the alliance evidenced the configuration and dichotomy of Spanish public opinion (76:2,39-40). Such dichotomous perception of Western attitudes and roles can be also extended to political parties and, therefore, to politics (76:2,39-40,169; 74:7).

Summary

The position of Spain within the international sphere has been one of almost total isolation since 1945. The chief reason for that isolation was the lack of acceptance of General Franco's regime by Western democracies.

The Soviet expansion, the cold war, and the signing of bilateral agreements with the United States helped to improve relations between Spain and most Western countries, but in any case these developments enabled Spain to participate in European recovery and in development of European political and economic organizations.

Franco's death, the abandonment of his regime, and the re-establishment of democracy allowed Spain to be integrated into the Council of Europe, the European Economic Community (EEC), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the Western European Union (WEU), among the most important organizations.

Spanish public opinion has been influenced by unique political history, unlike that experienced by any other NATO country. The ambiguity of some foreign policies regarding Spanish interests led Spaniards to look at NATO issues from a different perspective, resulting in divided public and political opinion.

III. The U.S.-Spanish Agreements

The bilateral U.S.-Spanish agreements have a close relationship to Spain's entry into the Atlantic Alliance and to defensive Spanish matters due to defense and mutual defense accords and to U.S. membership into NATO. During Franco's regime, from 1953 to 1982, the agreements were used by Madrid and Washington as a bridge between Spain and the remaining NATO allies to satisfy the Spanish interest in integration into NATO and into other European organizations.

The Madrid Pact

In June 1950, the outbreak of the Korean war had a far-reaching effect on the evolution of Spanish relationships with the Western nations in general and with the United States particularly (37:274). The United Nations Security Council denounced communist North Korea leaders for their aggression and requested all members go to the assistance of the South Korean Republic (25:155-156). This new demonstration of the communist expansionism was the motivating force that encouraged the United Nations in late 1950 to lift Resolution 39 recommending diplomatic sanctions against Spain (27:9). As a result, a normalization process in international relations began. However, Spain did not

enter the United Nations until 1955, two years after signing the Pact of Madrid with U.S. (27:10).

Within this normalization process, the United States officially resumed its diplomatic relations with Spain when the U.S. ambassador Stanton Griffis presented his credentials to Franco in Madrid in February of 1951 (79:109). However, the appointment of ambassadors was not the first contact between the U.S. and Spanish governments. Two years before, the U.S. Congress had approved a $62.5 million loan to Spain through the Export-Import Bank, but the Truman administration delayed the loan until the following administration, with Eisenhower as President, took office (37:275).

The United States pioneered a movement of moving closer to Franco's regime based on three arguments:

(1) The isolation policies directed to Spain had not produced the expected results. It was increasingly evident that Franco would remain at the Spanish helm (8:187; 80:147).

(2) The imperialism exhibited by international communism elicited a normalization of relations with Spain based on purely strategic reasons (47:494). "Fascist Franco of Spain took on a better odor as the cold war grew hotter" (5:812).

(3) The anti-communist feelings of the Spanish regime made the United States and Spain share the same Soviet threat (37:275).

In this changing environment, backed by the loan of $62.5 million and a grant of $125 million in foreign aid, the United States negotiated the first accord with Spain which resulted in the Pact of Madrid of 1953 (37:275). The pact was defined by U.S. administration as an Executive Agreement, which meant it did not have to be brought before the U.S. Senate for approval (76:59; 80:146).

Reasons for Wanting the Pact

U.S. Reasons. The strategic location of Spain has been a determining factor throughout her history (31:28). The establishment of bilateral agreements with the United States was also a decisive factor (8:187; 12:45). The Pyrenees Mountains delimit the Spanish-French boundaries and represented in 1953 one of the strongest natural defense lines of Europe (79:111). Coupled with the fact that Spain is surrounded on three sides by the sea, and on the fourth by the Portugal border, the Iberian Peninsula was seen by the U.S. strategists as a good secondary defense zone against a possible Soviet overrun in Western Europe (79:113; 12:49). Another strategic value of the Iberian Peninsula was as a secure storage area of bulk military equipment, to

provide support through Spain to both the Middle-East and the Mediterranean Basin. The use of Spanish ports to stockpile fuel for the U.S. Mediterranean fleet and the establishment of repair docks would strengthen the U.S. naval presence in the area (see Figure 1) (8:187; 36:45-46).

Finally, and as one of the most influential reasons, the location of Spain and the establishment of air bases on Spanish soil would allow U.S. bombers to carry out combat missions against the Soviet Union and return without stopping for refueling. Furthermore, the same kind of mission was denied to Soviet aircraft because they did not have the capability of flying the distance to Spain over friendly territory to strike U.S. units (36:46).

An additional political reason was argued to support the agreement; the formerly boycotted dictatorship was providing, in 1953, necessary stability in Spain to assure alternative bases to those established in Northern Africa in countries marked by unstable political situations (36:45-46).

Spanish Reasons. The main Spanish reason in favor of agreement with the United States was economic. The consequences of the Civil War were still evident in the Spanish economy (80:293). Spain, because it was excluded from Marshall Plan, needed the support provided by foreign



Figure 1. Southern Eruope, Northern Africa, and Middle East

capital to develop its damaged economical structure (6:69-71; 5:146). The defense agreement included within the accord allowed Spain an important modernization of its armed forces increasing considerably its defense capability (76:167). Another political reason is added by Spanish analysts: Franco searched for international recognition of his regime; the agreement with the United States could be the first step to drive an international acceptance (64:4). Nonetheless, the European allies in NATO continued to deny Spanish membership (76:60).

Provisions of the Madrid Pact

The Pact of Madrid was in force for ten years; it called for two five year extensions, unless either government decided to cancel the agreement. The Pact included three agreements: economic assistance, defense assistance, and mutual defense (48). The economic agreement was of extraordinary importance to Franco's regime because it allowed him to conduct a monetary stabilization plan to develop the Spanish economy (37:293-297; 44:13). Although no specific amount of assistance was mentioned in the accord text, during the ten years it was under the agreement, Spain received economic assistance of $1.3 billion in different forms (37:281).

The defense agreement allowed the United States to have access to four bases, three of which were used as Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases: Torrejon, Zaragoza, and Moron; and the other as naval base: Rota (see Figure 2). Pipelines between Rota and Zaragoza and a series of smaller facilities, mainly communications sites, were also permitted by the accords (37:281).

To Spain, the defense agreement meant U.S. economic and military aid of $26 million in fiscal year (FY) 1954 which was later increased to $350 million for the four year period 1953 to 1957 (37:281; 79:114). The mutual defense agreement was especially controversial from the Spanish perspective. As part of an Executive Agreement, the U.S. Congress and Senate were not bound by Madrid Pact provisions; the United States maintained the right to interpret the conditions under which the agreement could be invoked (76:59; 80:147-148; 79:167).

Extensions of the Madrid Pact

In 1963, the Pact of Madrid was renewed for a period of five years. Basically, the agreement kept the basic structure and content of 1953 pact. Much more significant was the renegotiation process when the first extension period expired in 1968. The withdrawal of U.S. units from North African bases (Morocco and Libya) strengthened U.S. need of Spanish bases (36:49).



Figure 2. Major Joint Installations in Spain

From Madrid's standpoint, the accident over Spanish territory of two U.S. aircraft carrying nuclear weapons coupled with the fact that the bases were put on alert during the Cuban and Middle East crises, although Spain was not directly involved, increased Spanish feeling that the risks were not proportional to benefits (74:6; 79:146-167). Madrid wanted to strengthen the U.S. commitment in defense of Spain while Washington preferred to maintain the vague terms with regard to mutual security and joint preparedness (8:188; 69:241). Another Spanish aim was to increase control over the uses to which the bases might be put; the U.S., in contrast, wished to have a free hand, leaving open the option of using the bases as staging areas for possible operations in the Middle East (36:45; 35:38-42). For two years the previous agreement had to be extended while negotiations for a new accord took place. Finally in 1970, both delegations reached an Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation of broader scope than the Pact of Madrid of 1953. Madrid could not reach the commitment degree sought with Washington but in addition to military and economic aspects, the new text also furnished cooperation and assistance in technology, urbanization, environment, oceanography, education, and agriculture (3). Washington was not assured a free hand because it was obligated to

consult with the Spanish government on questions beyond the agreement scope (8:190).

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1976

In November of 1975, General Franco died and the current king of Spain Juan Carlos I assumed the throne (39:151). The renegotiations for a new accord had begun in 1974 with different approaches from both parties. Washington wanted to extend the 1970 Agreement of Cooperation and Friendship for a five year period, while Madrid wanted an entirely new text (8:189; 80:165). The conflict between Greece and Turkey and the increasing power of communist parties in Portugal and Italy made U.S. reliance on these four NATO allies more doubtful, thus increasing U.S. interest in using the bases located in Spain (35:37). The Spanish bargaining position was again one of attaining a greater binding defense agreement and assistance in return for the United States' utilization of the defense installations (51:5).

The final text furnished two important modifications: the nuclear submarine squadron stationed at Rota base would initiate a phased withdrawal which should be completed by July 1979, and the United States forces would not store nuclear devices or their components on Spanish soil (35:38-40). The agreement was elevated to treaty rank and signed

on January 24, 1976. This accord was the sole bilateral agreement with rank of treaty (35:38).

The Last Two Agreements

The bilateral treaty reverted again in 1982 to an executive agreement and consisted of the basic accord on friendship, defense and cooperation with additional complementary agreements, annexes, and notes exchanged between the U.S. embassy in Madrid and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (80:163). It was signed just before Spain joined NATO (83:409). Yet, before the new accord could enter into force, the Spanish socialist party won the general elections and froze Spain's integration process into Nato (84:990). In 1987 the applicability of accord expired. The renegotiations were conducted, from the Spanish side, by a socialist government whose party had linked, in its political platform for general elections, the Spanish integration into NATO with a substantial reduction of the U.S. presence on Spanish territory (64:10-13).

After two years of tense negotiations, Madrid and Washington agreed to the withdrawal of the U.S. units at Torrejon air base (31:14). The final agreement was signed in December 1988 and was in force for a five year period (4). As a result of U.S. displeasure for withdrawing from Torrejon AFB, the U. S. Congress dropped FMS credits to

Spain from $105 million to zero, and a State Department message stated:

> the clearest message we could send, both to Spain and anyone else who may be watching, is that kicking us out of a base is not a sign of friendship and does have its consequences. (8:193)

Two years before, by virtue of popular referendum, Spain had been integrated into the Atlantic Alliance and one of the joint objectives of the U.S.-Spanish agreements had been finally reached (76:60).

Controversy in U.S.-Spanish Agreements

Controversy has been present in many instances during the thirty-seven years of relations between the United States and Spain since the first Pact of Madrid was signed. The influence of each country on international policy determines the importance and transcendency given by each country to its relationship with the other. For Spain, the impact of the bilateral accords in its domestic and foreign policy has been significant throughout its recent history. In contrast, from the U.S. standpoint, its relationship with Spain represents only a small part within the complex foreign policy of the United States. Nevertheless, there are aspects in the agreements which have been focus of controversy from U.S. political and public opinion perspectives.

Support to a Dictatorship. The support provided by the U.S. administration through the bilateral accords to Spanish regime, although currently irrelevant from the U.S. perspective, was in the 1949-1953 period a hotly debated issue in which strategic considerations overrode all other sentiments in U.S. public and political opinions (8:187; 65:93). In contrast, most Spanish sources currently relate it to the Spanish attitude toward U.S. foreign policy (80:148,375). The U.S. aid, although it helped to improve the Spanish economy and consequently to raise Spaniards' living standards, also sustained Franco's dictatorship which lasted twenty years more (76:126). The political parties, in that time in the exile, do not share the point of view of the U.S. administration that the agreements were formalized to facilitate the Spanish integration into the Western community. From their perspective, saving the military dictatorship was unforgivable conduct on the part of the United States (64:4-5; 8:187; 80:148; 32:6).

Agreements Benefits/Costs. The cost to the United States of a better strategic position with regard to communist threat was to rebuild the Spanish armed forces and economy, which was carried out by means of economical assistance (52:7-10). In monetary terms, Spain, in the 1950-1987 period and as a consequence of the agreements, received approximately $2.4 billion in foreign military

sales credits over a total of $6.3 billion that Spain spent in the U.S. through the Foreign Monetary Sales (FMS) program. In addition, in the period 1950-1989, $63 million under International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) were spent in courses for training personnel of the Spanish armed forces (20:5,19,37,89). In the 1950-1984 period, the assistance received by Spain under the Military Assistance Program (MAP), nonrepayable assistance, reached the amount of $689 million (20:63), that is, approximately 11% of total volume of FMS and IMET programs (20:iii; 61).

The Question of the Use of Bases in Spain. The question of the use of joint bases came up during the Middle-East crisis of 1967. The United States was not allowed to use any of the Spanish air bases of joint utilization to assist Israel, which was involved in a conflict with Arab countries (76:149). The 1953 Mutual Defense Assistance agreement specified in its first article:

> Both Governments will utilize this assistance exclusively for the promotion of international peace and security, in accordance with arrangements satisfactory to both Governments, and will not, without prior and mutual consent, devote such assistance to purposes other than those for which it was furnished. (48)

But the Cooperation for Defense chapter also specifies that

> The Government of Spain, subject to Spanish constitution provisions and legislation in force, will authorize the Government of the United States to use and maintain for military purpose certain facilities in

> Spanish military installations agreed upon by two Governments. (48)

The formation under the terms of 1970 agreement of a Joint Committee on Defense Matters was intended to assist in the resolution of possible disagreements. Basically, the purpose of the committee was

> to establish the necessary coordination between the two governments and to insure greater effectiveness of the reciprocal defense support granted by the two governments to each other. (3)

But although the reason for U.S.-Spanish disagreement at the political level is mainly a problem of interpretation of terminology, the issue is perceived by the U.S. public opinion as a clear refusal of U.S. rights in something that the United States is paying for (9). Another aspect that supports this controversy can be found in the difference of terminology employed in the agreement text and in the U.S. political documents. In spite of determining the agreements that the areas which "are prepared for joint utilization will remain under Spanish flag and command" (48), many official U.S. documents referred to bases in Spain as U.S. bases. Such wording conveys in U.S. public opinion an ownership sentiment which does not fit with imposed limitations (77; 24:9). The question of the use of bases produces a similar controversy within the NATO context related to Out of Area Operations (7:3-63). This aspect will be discussed in the following chapter of this study.

The Spanish perspective of the use of bases differs widely from that of U.S. sources. In no case does it share U.S. interpretations related to U.S. rights on base utilization granted by agreements; the agreement text, according to Spanish analysis, does not allow the United States to use bases for purposes regarding third countries without previous Spanish consent (48). On the other hand, the bases are described in Spanish documents either as joint bases or bases of joint utilization. Occasionally, a more general and ambiguous "U.S. presence on Spanish soil" is used to describe references to the bases (64:11). Only sources critical to presence of U.S. troops in Spain refer to joint bases as U.S. installations (70:149; 43:14).

Aside from semantic issues, the lack of support for U.S. actions in certain events related to the Middle East or North Africa is explained by most Spanish sources as a consequence of the traditional good relations of Spain with the Arab countries (17:13; 1:21). For example, Spain maintains with Saudi Arabia an economic commission at ministerial level, something it shares with only other four states: the United States, Great Britain, Japan, and West Germany (35:44). The lack of diplomatic relations with Israel (until 1988) and the influence of Arab lobby in Spain supported the executive decisions (80:146,376; 17:13).

The Mutual Defense Agreements

Within bilateral agreements, the mutual defense accords are significant to this study because, if satisfactory, they would question the need of an additional defensive alliance like NATO.

The fifth article of 1953 agreement specifies that in mutual assistance matters, "the Government of each country will take such action as may be mutually agreed upon to eliminate causes of international tension" (48). This vague statement is the only reference to mutual defense commitments. By and large, the wording is suitable to many interpretations with regard to bilateral defensive binding. Most U.S. and Spanish experts agree upon this lack of precise wording (76:59; 8:188), which is the procedure generally used in international agreements (61).

One of the Spanish objectives of the Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation of 1970 was to strengthen the U.S. commitment to Spanish security (69:241). The objective was not accomplished. In spite of both countries granting reciprocal defense support, article 31 stated that

> This support will be conditioned by the priorities and limitations created by the international commitments of the United States and the exigencies of the international situation. (3)

Neither the Executive Agreements nor further treaty bound the United States to defense of Spain. The sole

accord considered as a treaty after General Franco's death was sanctioned by U.S. Senate; it recognized that

> this Treaty does not expand the existing United States defense commitment in the North Atlantic Treaty area or create a mutual defense commitment between the United States and Spain. (3)

The text of the 1988 Agreement on Defense Cooperation, currently in force, does not include any reference to mutual defense matters in binding terms: "Both Parties shall promote their cooperation in the common defense and shall inform each other... of the actions... for the attainment of these objectives" (4).

Its terms do not allow twofold interpretations on the prickly question of use of bases. Spain grants the U.S. utilization of operational and support installations, but any use beyond the scope of the agreement would require the prior authorization of the Spanish government (4). On the date this accord was signed, Spain was already the sixteenth NATO member and the mutual defense matters took a different dimension because, by virtue of article six of Washington Treaty, "an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America" (53:265).

Summary

The U.S.-Spanish agreements have played an important role in the relationships between the two countries since

1953. By and large, the agreements allowed the United States to strengthen their strategic position and encircle the Soviet Union with a defensive belt. To Spain, the accords mainly provided economic and military assistance. The agreements derived from an almost exclusive military content toward a broader scope of cooperation between the two countries. The different perspectives in some specific aspects have negatively influenced public opinion in both countries.

The mutual defense agreement, which was originally a primary reason for a bilateral relationship, has never been an actual mutual defensive commitment. The 1988 agreement text, currently under force, does not include references to bilateral defense assistance.

IV. Military Aspects

Nato Overview

Over 628 million people rely on a multilateral collective security alliance, the Atlantic Alliance, or more properly, the North Atlantic Alliance (53:319). It is a disparate amalgam of national needs, interests, and capabilities that only a strong conviction of a continuous, believable, Soviet menace keeps joined. The Treaty of Washington, or the North Atlantic Treaty, established the Atlantic Alliance, which was signed in 1949 by twelve countries of both sides of Atlantic: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States (51:85). Further, Greece, Turkey, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Spain enlarged the member number to sixteen. The sixteen nations have signed the treaty, the essence of which can be summarized in the commitments to consult each other if the security of one of the parties is threatened and to consider an armed attack against one of the members as an attack against all of them (53:264-265). Article 9 of this treaty provides for the creation of a council and subsidiary bodies necessary to articulate the agreed-upon structure of alliance. The civilian and

military bodies make up the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (53:89).

Not all sixteen countries are members under the same conditions. Each country can enjoy its peculiar status as proof of sovereignty within the common pledge. Thus, Iceland has no armed forces and consequently is not part of the military organization. Norway and Denmark have a special arrangement to avoid permanent stationing of foreign troops or deploying nuclear weapons on their territories. Great Britain, Canada, Portugal, and the United States have the responsibility for planning the defense of their national territory outside NATO. France, Iceland, and Spain do not belong to the Alliance's integrated military command and do not assign units to NATO. The Federal Republic of Germany differs from other country members in that all its units are forces assigned to NATO, while the remaining countries, within integrated military structure, place a specific number of units at the disposal of the Alliance commands. Greece probably represents the most peculiar case within the alliance because she perceives her most serious threat posed not by the Warsaw Pact but by another NATO country, Turkey (76:146).

This flexibility and pragmatism in accepting a wide range of approaches and national peculiarities is reflected

in the patient attitude with regard to the hesitant Spanish integration (1:386).

Nato Strategy

As a response to NATO's threats, the organization has developed a singular strategy characterized by a clear and unequivocal defensive character (53:8-10; 13:8). The philosophy underlying such strategy is first, to deter enemy attack, and if deterrence fails, to counter military aggression jointly (10:57).

This strategy has taken different forms, varying according to perceived threat levels (56:50-54). In 1960s, supported by U.S. nuclear supremacy, "Massive Retaliation" was the keyword (11:8). Nevertheless, when Soviet successes in the nuclear weapons field eroded the Alliance's advantage and questioned deterrence validity, the strategy was changed in the sense that it still retained the possibility of a massive nuclear response but was extended to include the use of theatre nuclear weapons on the battlefield (13:18). This modified strategy is known as "Flexible Response" (11:8) and embraces a forward defense doctrine in which conventional forces play the main role (13:18).

Nato Military Structure

The complex Atlantic Alliance organization is headed by the North Atlantic Council, principal body of the Treaty.

It is chaired by a Secretary General and each nation member is represented by permanent ambassadorial rank representatives who act as spokespersons for their respective governments. To carry out Council functions, a large number of subsidiary civilian and military committees has been set up (53:90-91). One of these committees is the Military committee, the highest military authority, composed of the Chief of Staff of each member nation apart from France. The strategic area covered by the alliance is divided into three commands (European, Atlantic, and Channel) and a Regional Planning Group (Canada and the United States). Each one of these commands reports to the Military Committee and is responsible for other subordinate commands (53:102-106). The subordinate commands are, in their turn, responsible for more delimited areas and functions, that is, air or naval endeavors in a determined operations area (53:106-112).

The present command structure of NATO is sometimes criticized for being top heavy and too complicated, but it is the sole way to integrate complex defense interests and responsibilities of each nation (13:20).

Spain, due to her geographical location, and without modifications in current military structure, would be included in the following Nato commands and commanders:

1. Allied Command Europe (ACE). ACE headquarters is located in Mons, Belgium, and its commander is the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). Regional subordinate commands to ACE include the Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) and within it the Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe (NAVSOUTH) both in Naples, Italy. Part of the Spanish airspace is included in the United Kingdom NATO Air Forces (UKAIR) and part in the Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (AIRSOUTH) (66:17).

2. Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT). ACLANT's headquarters are located in Norfolk, Virginia. Regional subordinate commands of ACLANT include the Eastern Atlantic Command and Iberian Atlantic Command (IBERLANT) (See Figure 3.)

In addition to these commands and subcommands, there are a series of organizational bodies in which Spanish participation can be expected because, partially or totally, they match Spanish areas of national interest (53:106-110; 63:435-440). The Coordinations Agreements between Major NATO Commanders and Spanish authorities currently define Spanish participation within those areas of mutual interest and responsibility (54:186-187).



Figure 3. Spain and NATO Commands

Nato Armed Forces

To develop flexible response strategy, NATO requires both nuclear and conventional forces of its country members. Currently, only the United Kingdom, France, and the United States possess their own nuclear weapons (2:168). France and the United Kingdom do not assign such weapons to NATO, and at least in principle, they have the autonomy to decide their use. The United States, on the other hand, is the only NATO member that contributes nuclear weapons, but logically, U.S. authorities retain the ultimate decision as to their use in any possible European conflict (2:166). The remaining nations, Spain included, have no nuclear capability (2:168-170).

Where conventional forces are concerned, two facts should be pointed out. First, flexible response returned to conventional forces an important role that had been partially lost as a consequence of the massive retaliation doctrine (13:18; 38:27); and second, the Warsaw Pact currently enjoys a considerable superiority in quantitative terms (13:17).

Each NATO country defines its own national strategy as part of its sovereignty, and therefore roles and contingents of its armed forces also depend on national decisions. NATO provides guidance to secure a closer alignment among common military requirements and national force plans and

recommends or urges re-assessment of national defense if forces assigned to Alliance endeavors do not meet NATO standards (53:48). The Defense Planning Committee, composed of representatives of member nations, which participate in the integrated defense structure, deals with planning matters to implement NATO strategies (53:92). Spain is the only member which participates in the Defense Planning Committee and is not integrated into the NATO's military structure (29:27).

Out-of-Area Operations

The controversy in the joint bases issue, within the U.S.-Spanish bilateral agreements, is similar, within the NATO context, to the out-of-area operations (OOA) issue. According to the fifth article of the North Atlantic Treaty, Nato members will take actions, individually or joined, "to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area" (53:265). The following article of the treaty defines that North Atlantic area, which includes the national territory or national jurisdiction of any country member north of the Tropic of Cancer. The territories under jurisdiction referred to Algeria, at that time (1949) ruled by France (53:265-266).

The responsibility area to which Article five applied was revised on the accession of Greece and Turkey in 1951.

The accession Protocol, in its second article, included the new Mediterranean sea and land area of the two nations (53:267). The Protocol prepared on the accession of Spain did not introduce any modification, given that Spanish territory was included in treaty text (53:269).

The main problem OOA operations is the difficulty of balancing collective interest in North Atlantic security with the differing agreed-upon commitments in other parts of the world (7:3). Criticism to OOA operations is supported by a wide range of reasoning. Limited defense budgets in most countries do not allow them to devote defense expenditures to OOA operations. In contrast, some NATO countries have eventually participated in multi-national peace-keeping forces sponsored by United Nations (33:7). Another source of disagreement is posed by the interventionism character that seems to surround specific aspects of an expanded European security role beyond the Western Alliance (7:5; 33:8). This question was already present during the preliminary talks in Washington which led to the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. Some NATO experts consider geopolitical limits of Alliance the main cause of the failure to turn Atlantic Alliance into a broader political structure to manage global interests (7:6-7; 72:11).

Some international events like the unresolved Middle Eastern conflicts and the rise of state-sponsored international terrorism have contributed to sustaining the pro-OOA defenders' perspective. These events have also had the effect of decreasing NATO criticism of these OOA issues and emphasizing interdependence for overall NATO security (7:3; 2:27-28; 72:16). One exceptional example of this change was the multi-national mine sweeping operation in the Red Sea in 1984 (33:7).

The Spanish Armed Forces

Because Spain is not part of the integrated military structure, no Spanish unit is permanently assigned to NATO endeavors. Only in case of crisis would Spain's armed forces fulfill its Alliance obli· :ions in common defense. To analyze Spanish contributions to NATO from a military perspective it is necessary to define a criterion to assess globally the Spanish armed forces. In addition, one fact addressed by experts has to be recognized; the organization of NATO is asymmetrical in the sense that the United States is the only country whose influence is decisive. The remaining NATO countries together probably could not defend themselves against the Soviet Union (76:44).

Criterion. Most military experts agree that three factors define a modern, conventional armed force: size,

flexibility, and lethality (76:142; 13:58-59; 14:97,99). Notwithstanding, these three factors only provide overall guidance; it is not realistic to compare conventional forces among countries with enormous differences in capability, national interests, or outside threats. In the NATO/Warsaw Pact context, Spain can be included in a third and more numerous group of countries. The first group would be formed by two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The second group includes the United Kingdom and France, due to their nuclear capability. Finally, there is a third group, the group of countries with only conventional armed forces, in which the remaining nations of both blocks would be included (76:45). It is in this third country group that the Spanish armed forces should be analyzed according to the size, flexibility, and lethality criteria.

Analysis. Of three characteristics, the first one, size, is the least appropriate to define Spanish armed forces. NATO and Spanish experts agree in their opinions regarding oversized Spanish services (76:129; 64:7). Initially, the Spanish military looks impressive. In 1982, it ranked sixth in size among Nato countries, after the United States, Turkey, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy, and ahead of the United Kingdom (76:129). But the severe reduction program initiated by

Spanish government in 1982 confirmed the assessments made by experts of an oversized armed force (64:7).

The Spanish army accounts for three-fourths of Spain's total military manpower. The emphasis given in early times on territorial defense was the reason for such proportion. As a result, the Spanish army has absorbed the larger part of the Spanish defense budget, and the overall personnel costs of three services have represented a greater percentage of defense budget than in other NATO countries. Thus, in the period 1976-1978, 62% of Spanish expenditures was allocated to personnel costs, while expenditures in the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, France, and Italy were 43, 50, 35, and 34% respectively (74:19-23; 76:129-130).

Flexibility is an ambiguous term, given the difficulty of generalizing the same criterion to three different service capabilities. The air force is normally well suited to play diverse roles, because it is able to rapidly deploy across a wide spectrum of conflicts (13:58). The same rationale can be applied to remaining services or to forces formed of joint units. Proof of this statement is the creation in leading defense countries of forces which are characterized by a great flexibility, mobility, and operational effectiveness. The U.S. Centcom, France's Force D'action Rapide, and Nato's Naval On-call Force for the

Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED) or the ACE Mobile Force are current examples of this operational doctrine (53:140; 33:7).

Spain has presently underway the creation of a force of similar characteristics, the Fuerza Operativa Conjunta de Intervencion Rapida (FOCIR)(78; 67:37). However, due to the limited Spanish airlift capability, represented by two C-130 squadrons (12 aircraft) and five squadrons endowed with Spanish manufactured light transport aircraft (CASA 212), Spanish armed forces do not possess substantial power projection capability which is a basic premise of operational flexibility (74:22; 78; 1:385-386).

From the lethality perspective, the lack of nuclear weapons confers to any armed forces a restricted lethality. In the field of conventional forces, lethality can be represented by modern technology weaponry and high training levels (13:13; 10:52,57). In the modern weaponry aspect, NATO experts judge Spanish hardware as one generation behind that of the principal nations of the Alliance (74:20; 1:385). Despite modernization plans, the low percentage of Gross National Product GNP devoted to defense expenditure (2.4% in 1980-1984 period)(28:22), and the limited Research and Development basis, Spain could not bridge the qualitative and quantitative gap between it and other countries. According to NATO analysts, an appropriate index

of GNP distribution places the percentage devoted to defense at 3% GNP, and some experts estimate a 4% GNP as percentage necessary to produce and maintain national defense capability (11:15). The consequence of scarce resources for defense purposes incidentally drives Spanish armed forces toward lesser qualitative than quantitative hardware. That is, Spain like most nations, tends to use her systems and weapons to the maximum of their service life instead of updating them and reducing quantities. The Spanish navy is a good example: according to NATO estimations, navies require annually 30,000 tons of new shipping to avoid obsolescence. The current Spanish naval program provided only 42,000 tons of new construction over the 1982-1989 time period (34:20). In contrast to this negative perspective, the Spanish air force is considerably more modern, in terms of average age, than the general average of NATO Southern region countries, Italy, Greece, and Turkey (10:52); however, it is less endowed with aircraft than Italian and Turkish air forces (60:421,542,1046).

Regarding training, Spanish and NATO sources do not provide a sound assessment. NATO observers define the Spanish navy as most competent and the Spanish air force as most modern of the three services (74:22-23; 76:130), but the lack of stable cooperation with foreign counterparts adversely affects training comparisons (74:22). Most

defense experts agree that the Spanish army is the least professional of the three services, based on the conscript level of its units (1:386). However, all elite units like paratroops, Spanish Legion, mountain troops, and air-mobile units (FAMET) meet NATO standard requirements related to mission readiness and training (74:22; 78).

Spanish Armed Forces Roles in NATO

At the expense of what most expressly is provided for in the Coordination Agreements negotiations, the Spanish armed forces have five strategic missions which are integrated into NATO missions. The five tasks are:

1. To guarantee, in so far as possible, the security of the Spanish part of the Iberian peninsula.

2. To contribute to the strengthening of the defense of the western Mediterranean flank.

3. To anticipate in the task of keeping the Atlantic routes open, and, if necessary, guarantee the aeronaval passage between the United States and Spain in the event of conflict.

4. To monitor and control the two approaches to the Strait of Gibraltar.

5. To integrate the Spanish air-warning network into Air Command and Control System (ACCS) of NATO, which will significantly enhance its monitoring capacity.

6. To utilize Spanish territory as logistic support echelon (54:186).

It is evident to most NATO and Spanish observers that the participation of Spain in defense of the NATO Southern region, although it improves AFSOUTH structure, does not alleviate its dependency on U.S. units. In crisis time, the defense of Southern region must be assisted by U.S. reinforcement units (64:9; 22:58).

With regard to eastern Atlantic area ACLANT, and within it the subcommand IBERLANT, the geographical location of Spain's mainland and Canary Islands significantly improves NATO's strategic position (1:385; 73:76). Previous to Spain's entry, NATO could count on only one facility capable of supporting air operations south of the Tropic of Cancer, Porto Santo airfield in the Portuguese Madeira Islands (82:35). The incorporation of the Canary Islands strengthens NATO's control capability in the area and enlarges the number of airfields and ports to support NATO tasks in this part of the Atlantic (Figure 3)(34:20).

Finally, the importance of Spanish territory as a logistic support area from an overall perspective is another point on which analysts of both sides agree. Spain brings geographical depth to a crowded operational theatre, but the addition of Spanish territory did not compensate for France's absence in either the central European or

Mediterranean areas (1:385). The capability of dispersing assets over a wider area and the number of Spanish bases capable of supporting operations conducted by large U.S. aircraft, B-52 and C-5, are highly valuable assets (34:20; 73:76).

Spanish Status within NATO

France and Spain are not participants in NATO's integrated military structure, but the statuses of both countries, like their capabilities, are different. Thus, Spain, unlike France, in order to achieve necessary coordination in terms of planning, is present at the Defense Planning Committee and consequently participates in the planning cycle. Spanish units should meet NATO force standards based on readiness and training levels (80:182). Spain, in addition, takes part in logistical coordination, and in development of support and supplies structure. The role of Spanish assets within the Rapid Reinforcement Plan to Europe (RRP) will be developed by Coordination Agreements negotiations in the chapter of Host Nation Support yet to be concluded (64:11).

Although the degree of Spanish participation in the NATO structure is greater than that of France, some NATO commentators analyze Spanish status from a negative perspective based on the change of the initial integrating

approach and on the four following points: (1) lack of integration in the Nato command structure; (2) absence of Spanish units stationed abroad; (3) lack of nuclear weapons; and (4) reduction in presence of U.S. forces in Spain. These four points lead analysts to conclude that the Spanish position tends to achieve all of the military and economic advantages, but with none of the political disadvantages (49:65). In contrast, Spanish opinion agrees in regarding NATO command structure as a supra-national body whose objectives go beyond the limits of national concerns and in assessing the support provided by Spanish participation in other areas as mutual and advantageous to both parties (64:7-13).

Summary

The North Atlantic Treaty organization is a huge organization embracing sixteen different forms of national interests but one only common pledge, the defense against the Warsaw Pact threat. Even though the NATO role is perfectly defined and totally accepted within the NATO area, is not perceived by nation members with the same commitment level regarding OOA operations beyond the limits fixed by Washington Treaty and later amendments.

The incorporation of Spain as the sixteenth member, given her non-nuclear capability, did not suppose an

extraordinary reinforcement in terms of force, but did add considerable improvements in logistics matters in the Southern region. The Coordination Agreements between Major NATO Commanders and Spanish authorities are yet to be concluded; therefore, considerations of specific benefits from geographical and strategic perspectives are, at this point, difficult to determine precisely. A sounder assessment will occur as time passes.

V. Security Aspects

The security factor has to prevail over others with regard to domestic or multinational defense matters. International commitments that evolve from foreign policy are designed to surmount defense limitations and to complement national capabilities. NATO and bilateral agreements entail for Spain the main link between national security and foreign policy.

Spanish Foreign Policy

The Spanish transition from a long dictatorship period to a democracy can be considered as exemplar. The almost unanimous desire of Spanish society to transform the political system into a democratic process was the reason for a pacific transition period of minimal social cost (76:11). The need for a consensus policy resulted in the so-called Moncloa Pact in 1977, which signified that all major Spanish political parties agreed to both a common economic plan and a general policy to achieve an immediate stabilization of the economic and political system (64:6). But even though the domestic policy accomplished its main goal in a relatively short time period, Spanish foreign policy was not so easily determined and agreed upon and the

Spanish integration process into European political organizations lasted several years (76:11).

The consensus policy in domestic matters was also expanded to foreign policy in the continuing Spanish interest in participating in European Economic Community (EEC), more familiarly known as the Common Market (35:47). During the long and frustrating negotiation phase with the European Community which started in 1977, the NATO question was supposedly left in the background. However, it was tactically used by both parties as a bargaining issue (74:8-9). In 1980, due to French opposition to EEC enlargement, the Spanish government initiated a new political move which linked, for the first time, Spain's entry into NATO to the process of integration into the Common Market (74:9-10). The following two years witnessed political events which began with the Spanish application to join NATO. The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States and Spain expired and a new Executive Agreement was arranged, just after NATO ratification of Spanish membership. And finally, the Spanish Socialist Worker's Party (PSOE) won the general elections and a new appraisal process in foreign policy was conducted affecting the NATO issue and, to a lesser degree, the bilateral accords (64:5-6).

The PSOE is considered by most analysts as a moderate left wing party (74:11). But in its political platform

during the opposition period it claimed a neutral position regarding foreign policy (73:41). Neutrality or non-alignment was also practiced by the previous UCD governments until 1981 (64:12-13), when the government decided to join NATO and broke the agreed consensus phase in foreign policy with other national political forces (64:6; 80:160). The PSOE, without making any specific mention of leaving the Atlantic Alliance, had asserted that a measure of such importance should not be taken without consulting the public (76:64). In 1982, when the PSOE won the general elections, it found itself in a delicate position summarized in three points: (1) the moral commitment of non-alignment in any of defensive blocks, (2) the situation of Spain integrated into NATO, and (3) the commitment of calling for a referendum on NATO membership (76:13; 80:162). The timing of the NATO referendum was made implicitly conditional on the date of Spain's entry into the Common Market (74:12). In public opinion polls conducted at that time on NATO membership, there was a significant majority against Spanish participation, 54%; 19% were in favor of staying in; and 27% had no view. A dramatic political campaign was held to modify Spanish public opinion (76:34-40; 74:12). According to most political observers, participation in NATO was presented to the Spanish public as a global option of Spanish alignment with the rest of the west (64:6). The

referendum was approved in 1986, six months after Spain joined EEC, and kept her within the Atlantic Alliance but without participating in command military structure. The Spanish foreign policy during the transition period is branded by many domestic and foreign political commentators as ambiguous (64:13,22,46; 73:43).

Less ambiguous has been the Spanish foreign policy, however, with regard to Latin American and Arab countries. Spanish governments have emphasized, from the time of General Franco, the importance of good relations with these two groups of countries (35:3; 17:13). Nevertheless such political attitudes are not backed by other significant aspects of international relationships. The trade balance between Spain and Arab and Latin American countries on one hand, and between Spain and the EEC and the United States on the other hand, is clearly favorable to the latter group. Spanish exports to North African countries were even larger than to Latin America, the Federal Republic of Germany and France, countries which do not emphasize their relations with South America, and which have larger economic interests in that area than Spain (74:17-18).

The political interest in Latin America and Arab countries is not only based on historical reasons, as it is suggested by foreign analysts, but in addition to that, the increasing growth of Spanish economy finds in less

industrialized countries a better market for its products than in most industrialized countries' markets, which are saturated by domestic products (17:14; 62:61).

Spanish Security

It has been discussed in the second chapter that Spanish public opinion does not perceive the Soviet threat as the main threat to Spanish security. Such a perception is illustrated in Spanish public opinion polls on the NATO issue, in which 59% were against NATO participation prior to the political campaign supporting Spain's stay in the alliance. The same public opinion polls would have had a different result if conducted during the hottest time of the Cold War (76:43). The lack of Spanish participation in the long, shared European historical experience which constituted the basis for NATO establishment is seen as the main reason for Spanish perception of Soviet menace (76:2). By and large, Spain does not define her security problems in the terms used by other NATO countries. Spain is more concerned about a threat from the south, the Maghrib, than from the north, the direction of the Soviet menace (76:3,169). The rationale behind this strategic policy rests on two points:

(1) Ceuta and Melilla (See Figure 4). Spain rules these two enclaves on the north coast of Africa and has for



Figure 4. Spanish Enclaves in Northern Africa

over four hundred years. Morocco considers that the two cities, along with some other small islands along the coast also ruled by Spain, are part of the North African country, and consequently such disagreement creates instability in relations between the two countries (74:14-15). Despite the words of the Moroccan King Hassan II in his last official visit to Spain, "Spain and Morocco are condemned to understand each other," Ceuta and Melilla pose the sole most likely threat to Spanish security (62:36).

(2) The overall instability in most Maghrib countries. This point is also shared by other NATO members and by the United States (34:21; 73:49). The disappearance during the current century of the colonial system in the entire Mediterranean area yielded a wide spectrum of governments and philosophies, from dictatorial to genuinely representative, from assumedly Marxist or pro-East to capitalist or pro-West. The sometimes hostile relations among many of these countries coupled with impressive arms inventories and the increasing Soviet presence in the Mediterranean made the Southern NATO region, in general, and the Maghrib countries, in particular, focus of potential conflict (23:39-43; 58:49).

Spanish Security and International Commitments

Spanish security, as it has been already discussed in this study, is affected by the two different commitments Spain maintains with the United States and the Atlantic Alliance.

The Bilateral Agreements. The security issue between the United States and Spain is covered by the 1988 Agreement on Defense Cooperation in the following terms, which states that both governments

> shall promote their cooperation in the common defense and shall inform each other, as necessary, of the actions which they may be take for the attainment of these objectives and shall consult together on others which they may adopt, jointly or separately, to the same end. (4)

The text does not mention any commitment in mutual defense matters; there is explicit reference to mutual consultation, which means that the United States is not obliged to support Spanish position in a potential conflict with Morocco resulting from territorial disputes regarding the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. Furthermore, Morocco is a staunch U.S. ally, and U.S. political support for Spanish interests would be unlikely (74:15).

With regard to Maghrib instability, despite sharing similar perceptions, both governments do not share either the same threat level or the same approach to solving conflicts connected to North African nations. Thus, Spain,

like France and Portugal, denied the U.S. use of her territorial airspace in the strike mission against Libya in 1986 (8:192). The Spanish attitude is similar to those of other European NATO nations and very different from that of the United States. Despite the fully proven role of some Arab countries as supporters and sponsors of international terrorism, Western European countries, Spain included, do not apply the same determination as the U.S. in its foreign policies (59:7). Such policies are more influenced by economic and domestic than by security factors (18:55). Thus, even though the United Kingdom permitted the U.K. bases to be used during the air raid against Libya, it still maintains increasing exports with the African country (18:55-56).

The Atlantic Alliance. The fifth article of North Atlantic Treaty determines the responsibility area of the Atlantic Alliance. Such area leaves out of NATO concern the cities of Ceuta and Melilla, but by contrast, includes the Canary Islands which also, at least geographically, are a part of African continent (7:7-8). The same article also states that the common defense commitment is valid only inside the NATO responsibility area (53:265), which again leaves Spain out of defense support in a conflict related to Ceuta and Melilla. In any case, Spain did not try to expand the NATO area to include African enclaves under its

protection umbrella, something which the other Nato allies surely would have not accepted (1:385).

Regarding the Warsaw Pact threat, it is not logical to analyze the threat of the Eastern block to Spain's security, because the U.S. presence in Spanish soil, granted by bilateral agreements since 1953, deprives the topic of realistic discussion. The bilateral agreements, since 1953, committed the U.S. to the defense of Spanish territory. Thus, according to the 1953 accord, each government will "fulfill the military obligations which it has assumed in multilateral or bilateral agreements or treaties to which both Governments are parties" (48). Such wording has practically conferred to Spain the status of de facto member of the Atlantic Alliance, as most NATO analysts agree (1:385; 13:21; 34:19).

Spanish policy makers might have chosen not to align the country either with the United States, that is, by relinquishing the bilateral agreements, or with the Alliance, but most NATO and Spanish experts consider complete Spanish neutrality not viable based on economic and security reasons (74:34; 76:34).

Summary

The lack of exterior constraints marks the difference between Spain and the remaining NATO countries in security

matters. The process of incorporating Spain into the Atlantic Alliance was linked by Spanish governments to the overall process of recuperation of a Spanish political role within the mainstream of Western European countries. The potential sources of instability individually affecting Spainish security remain unaltered regardless of NATO integration and bilateral agreements.

VI. Conclusions and Recommendations

The viewpoints presented in this study are not intended to reflect the point of view of any of the agencies, organizations, or governments referred to in the study. The answers to the susidiary questions and overall research question represent the conclusions drawn from the documented data in the previous chapters. The overall research question is answered following the subsidiary research questions.

Subsidiary Question 1

How does Spain's entry into NATO interface with the U.S.-Spanish agreements?

Both topics are so intertwined that in many instances they are differentiated with difficulty. The bilateral accords, in addition to other more relevant objectives pursued by both parties, were used to ease Spanish integration into Western Europe defense plans. Paradoxically, by virtue of the Spanish government's initiative when such integration was finally achieved, the subsequent bilateral agreement resulted in a significant limitation in the sense of reducing substantially the number of U.S. units stationed on Spanish soil. The withdrawal of U.S. units from the Torrejon air base near Madrid resulted

in cutting U.S. assistance credits to Spain and consequently in worsening bilateral relations.

The Spanish political move, qualified as ambiguous by most sources external to Spain, was justified by Madrid's government, which claimed that Spain was not participating passively or indirectly in defending common interests, but upholding them as her own. Therefore, the manner in which Spain carries out NATO tasks or in which her territory is involved in NATO plans should be agreed to by Spanish and NATO authorities. The Spanish position within the Alliance demonstrates that an independent national defense policy can result in a mutually advantageous relationship in NATO's integrated military structure while remaining outside it.

The relatively new Spanish status within NATO will require greater technical cooperation between the three involved parties, NATO, the U.S., and Spain. The addition of Spanish objectives to the list of national and multinational objectives established some time ago will introduce variations in priority and will result in disagreements if these possible modifications are not foreseen, studied, and solved in advance.

Regarding the question of use of bases in Spain, the bilateral agreements were based initially on vague wording, suitable to varied interpretations, but have been modified to indicate a more precise content. Spanish attempts to

control U.S. participation that do not match Spanish interests related to base use are the justification for such wording. The traditional lack of Spanish support for specific aspects of the U.S. foreign policy is consistent with the NATO role of the out-of-area operations, and will continue without a satisfactory solution for all involved parties.

Subsidiary Question 2

What has been the effect of the Spanish membership in NATO on U.S. Spanish relationships?

This question cannot be completely answered by means of this study. The study primarily examines the background, process, and military consequences of the NATO enlargement process rather than other economic and political issues more suitable to providing a basis for general assessments over bilateral relations. All issues related to NATO, even though they are relevant, disclose only a part of relations between the two countries.

The only feasible approach to answer this subsidiary question can be related to the fact that Spanish membership into the Alliance was linked by Spanish authorities to the overall process of recovery of political role within the mainstream European countries. The European Economic Community is a significant institution which will play an

important role not only in economic but also in the political field. Any European organization, such as EEC, will emphasize European perspectives in contrast to those of the U.S. Spanish participation in European organizations will probably lead to a lesser weight being placed on U.S. influence on Spanish decisions. But this stance should not be understood as representing an antagonistic attitude towards the United States.

With regard to this subsidiary question, some aspects of this study lead to the conclusion that as closer relations develop between Spain and the other European countries, the influence of the U.S. in Spanish decisions will lessen.

Subsidiary Question 3

What effect has the military alliance on Spain's security?

In Chapter V the Spanish security aspects from Spanish perspective were discussed, including aspects in the common NATO defense framework. The summary of the fifth chapter addresses this subsidiary question in the sense that the previous individual constraints to Spanish security before integration into NATO remained unaltered after NATO enlargement. Part of Spanish territory claimed by Morocco falls beyond the Atlantic Alliance's responsibility area and

therefore any conflict evolving from territorial disputes out of the NATO area is not considered binding for Alliance defensive commitments.

The military alliance with NATO faces the largest threat to Spain's security, but not the most likely menace, one that could emerge from the South.

Subsidiary Question 4

Is there any area within NATO Strategy in which Spanish incorporation can influence former NATO consideration?

Chapter IV addressed the fact that in spite of the fact that France and the United Kingdom possess nuclear capability, only with difficulty could they defend themselves against the Soviet menace without support from the United States. The same statement can be expanded to include the remaining European countries after formal Spanish membership. Therefore, the defense of Europe relies almost exclusively on U.S. military capabilities.

On the other hand, the unanimous definition of de facto Spanish membership in Nato until 1982 meant that Spain contributed to the defense of Europe with her most valuable asset--her geo-strategic location. It is true that this contribution was not one of Spanish aims when the bilateral agreements were signed; however, the bases served and still serve the defense of Western Europe.

All this preamble aims at the fact that if Spain had become a full-fledged NATO member, her contribution in 1982 could not have added more to common defense. Moreover, only with difficulty could Spanish armed forces contribute in military terms something comparable to that represented by U.S. armed forces, whose presence in Spanish soil has been committed since 1953. Even though the modernization process underway in the Spanish armed forces was absolutely successful and the number, weaponry, and training of Spanish units were comparable to those of the main military powers, their capabilities are almost marginal compared to those of the U.S. Spain's contribution will be always in the conventional force area and, in comparative terms, modest.

The most immediate area of benefit to NATO is provided by Spanish territory not committed in bilateral accords. The Iberian peninsula now forms part of the NATO area, which enables better NATO control over the Gibraltar straits. The Canary Islands strengthen the existing Atlantic Alliance assets in the Iberlant area and improve NATO control capabilities. Even though Spanish territory improves NATO's position and the Spanish armed forces strengthen NATO conventional forces, it is hard to determine precisely what the strategic and military benefits are, and for reasons discussed above, the formal Spanish integration into the

Alliance did not introduce modifications into former NATO strategic matters.

The Overall Research Question

Did Spain's security require a military alliance?

The bases in Spain as a consequence of bilateral agreements form part of the U.S. defensive belt to deter the Soviet threat. The use of bases against such a potential threat in an European theatre, the actual purpose for the bases' establishment, has been always granted by U.S.-Spanish accords.

Two kinds of West-East conflicts seem to be most likely: (1) a conflict between the two superpowers exclusively, or (2) a conflict between the two blocks. In both cases, the bases in Spain would play a role in the hostilities, regardless of Spanish interests. This reasoning suggests that the most sensible Spanish option would be a position of nonalignment, that is, canceling commitments with the United States. But in such a case, expert analyses find Spanish neutrality unsafe and costly. If a position of political neutrality cannot be considered as viable solution, Spain has two options; either maintain bilateral agreements with the United States, but outside NATO, or participate formally in the Atlantic Alliance.

All that has been discussed so far has been the assumption that Spanish interests would not be involved in conflicts between the two blocks. If we considered a conflict in Europe in which Spain is aligned with the Atlantic Alliance, the fact of Spanish membership in NATO would be marginal, since joint bases in Spain are also NATO bases and consequently NATO defensive plans would include Spain as well. By and large, the consequences to Spain in both cases with or without Spanish membership in the Alliance would probably be similar.

On the other hand, from the standpoint of possible local conflict with Morocco due to territorial disputes, the clear position of NATO members with regard to out-of-area operations would leave Spain facing the conflict alone. Only in the unlikely case that the conflict extended and affected the Spanish mainland and archipelagos would NATO be obliged to support and defend, if requested, Spanish territory. Only in this situation would Spanish membership introduce a positive variation, from support and defense perspectives, if Spain were not in NATO. In all other hypotheses, there is little difference if Spain is or is not a NATO member.

Therefore, the answer to the overall study question is that there does not seem to be any substantial improvement in security terms posed by Spanish membership in NATO. If

bilateral agreements defend Spain against Soviet threat, and NATO's responsibility and commitments do not include individual Spanish concerns, Spain has not improved her security in joining NATO. However, decisions that governments make are based on an amalgam of strategic, economical, and even historical reasons. The recovery of the Spanish political role in Europe and the formalization of the Spanish status in the Atlantic Alliance are arguments for NATO membership which fall beyond security matters, and which have a fundamental weight in the light of the peculiar Spanish position in 1982. Spain did not need a military alliance, but, however, did need NATO.

Recommendations

Within NATO, collaboration and cooperation in Western armament development represent some relevant concerns of the Atlantic Alliance. The improvement of the national Research and Development basis by means of multinational cooperation is one of the main goals in most countries. A study of Spanish participation, from 1982 on, in collaborative programs from industrial and economic perspectives coupled with political and security aspects would provide the basis for a complete assessment of Spanish integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

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The focus of this research effort was to determine if Spain's entry into NATO gave Spain substantial improvement in security terms which served as justification of a defensive alliance from a strictly military perspective. First, a qualitative, in-depth literature review was conducted regarding the Spanish integration process into NATO and the U.S.-Spanish agreements. Then, to contrast critical viewpoints, the information sources were divided into three groups: Spanish, U.S., and NATO sources. The information was analyzed addressing those aspects closest related to Spain's security. The historical events since 1936 and the political process since 1975 served as the framework for a discussion of military issues in recent Spanish history. Finally, analysis of the information gathered led to the conclusion that the justification for Spain's entry into NATO has not adequately addressed her most pressing defense issues.

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