The Validity of "Soviet Military Power"

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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This study provides a brief review of the role of the Department of Defense publication, 'Soviet Military Power', and a detailed analysis of Tom Gervasi's book, 'Soviet Military Power *The Pentagon's Propaganda Document, Annotated and Corrected'.

A comparative analysis is made of Gervasi's statements with his own stated references and other reliable sources to demonstrate the validity of the information in 'Soviet Military Power'. Gervasi makes three fundamental errors in his analysis. First he incorrectly perceives that 'Soviet Military Power' is attempting to prove an overall Soviet superiority over U.S. military strength. Secondly, the many numbers and facts in 'Soviet Military Power' disputed by Gervasi can largely be corroborated by the very sources Gervasi endorses. Thirdly, his accusations of deception in 'Soviet Military Power' are often illogical or trivial. Additionally, he makes numerous comments that editorialize about related subjects but do not directly contradict information in 'Soviet Military Power'.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

The Validity of Soviet Military Power: An analysis of the role of the public information aspect of the Department of Defense as it specifically pertains to the publication of Soviet Military Power and a critique of that publication by author Tom Gervasi.

This study provides a brief review of the role of the Department of Defense publication Soviet Military Power and a detailed analysis of Tom Gervasi's book, Soviet Military Power *The Pentagon's Propaganda Document, Annotated and Corrected. Gervasi reprinted the entire text of Soviet Military Power with the inclusion of more than 700 annotations in the margins. In his book, Gervasi charged that the Defense Department lied and distorted the truth about the true nature and extent of Soviet military strength.

A comparative analysis is made of Gervasi's statements with his own stated references and other reliable sources to demonstrate the validity of the information in Soviet Military Power. Gervasi makes three basic errors in his analysis. First he incorrectly perceives that Soviet Military Power is attempting to prove an overall Soviet superiority over U.S. military strength. Secondly, the many numbers and facts in Soviet Military Power disputed by Gervasi can largely be corroborated by the very sources Gervasi endorses. Thirdly, his accusations of deception in Soviet Military Power are often illogical or trivial. Additionally, he makes numerous comments that editorialize about related subjects but do not directly contradict information in Soviet Military Power.

This study concludes with the recommendation that the Department of Defense continue to publish information for the general public regarding the threat to our security from Soviet or other sources. This study also encourages that books such as Gervasi's be adequately refuted.

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Research Question

What is the role of the Department of Defense (DOD) in providing information to the general public as it specifically relates to the DOD publication, Soviet Military Power, and Tom Gervasi's book, Soviet Military Power *The Pentagon's Propaganda Document, Annotated and Corrected? Is Gervasi's book a valid criticism of Soviet Military Power? Are his sources reliable? Does he correctly identify errors and distortions in the report? Is he correct that the report is "misleading and wrong"? Did he make an "honest and complete comparison" of Soviet and Western military capabilities?

Background.

Since 1981, the Department of Defense has published an annual report entitled, Soviet Military Power. This publication is an unclassified report produced for public distribution. It's stated purpose is "to report on the USSR's military developments. It is designed to assist informed citizens in free nations everywhere to make the choices required to provide for the defense and security necessary to safeguard freedom."[1] It provides a comprehensive statement of the current military capabilities

of the Soviet Union. It thus furnishes the general public with information about the nature and extent of Soviet military capabilities. Information such as this can assist American citizens to make intelligent decisions regarding their support of U.S. defense policy.

The publication of Soviet Military Power has produced some controversy. After its initial publication in 1981, the "New York Times" criticized it for containing "no new information, no conclusion," and "no systematic comparison with American forces".[2] In October 1987, author Tom Gervasi published a book containing the entire text of the 1987 edition with numerous annotations and comments. Gervasi titled his book, Soviet Military Power *The Pentagon's Propaganda Document, Annotated and Corrected. He had previously published a trilogy entitled, The Arsenal of Democracy, and another book, The Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy, expressing a similar theme that Soviet military strength was overstated.

Mr. Gervasi is a former counterintelligence officer assigned to the Army Security Agency. He currently is the director of the Center for Military Research and Analysis in New York City. He is a journalist who has written for Harper's, The Columbia Journalism Review, Science Digest, and others. Booklist referred to him as "a distinguished defense journalist".[3] In contrast, Parameters stated the following:

"Mr. Gervasi is not well-known outside of the hard-core left nor is he much of a scholar, at least insofar as being a scholar implies performing careful and unbiased research".[4]

Gervasi's publisher has billed him as "America's leading expert on defense and the military" who "page by page, rebuts, refutes, and rejects the often outrageous claims and outright lies" contained in Soviet Military Power.

Gervasi claims the DOD report contains numerous "lies" and "exaggerations" which he corrects in his annotations. He further attempts to "identify the hidden assumptions used to create incomplete and misleading comparisons of military power". In Gervasi's words,

"The actual facts are not in dispute; the administration cannot really deny them. It can only avoid mentioning them, misrepresent them, or, as it does frequently in this book, simply lie."[5]

Gervasi's charges are very serious. He makes the following indictment in his introduction:

"At no time in our history, though, have the lies been so numerous and the warnings so urgent as during the past seven years of the Reagan administration's tenure."[6]

Gervasi goes on to charge that the publication of Soviet Military Power is a key tool used to deceive the public as part of "an intensive propaganda battle". Again in Gervasi's words:

"News conferences, press briefings, and addresses by major administration officials were only a few of the platforms used to disseminate the lies. But the most effective tool was a new device

> of the Reagan administration's own invention, the publication of Soviet Military Power, which refined the techniques of selective emphasis and omission to focus almost exclusively on the Soviet military threat to the West without giving any but the most insignificant details of the much larger military threat the West continues to pose to the Soviet Union."[7]

Gervasi initially makes his charges specific to the Reagan administration. He notes the publication of Soviet Military Power began after President Reagan assumed office, and accuses the DOD under his administration of deliberately falsifying and distorting information to promote a particular political agenda. Later in his book, however, he refers to the "unbroken record of 40 years of official misrepresentations of the balance of power, from the bomber gap to the missile gap".[8]

Gervasi's charges are often very specific. Gervasi makes the following observations about the summary of Soviet Military Power:

> "In this summary of what appear to be the major 'findings' in this year's edition of Soviet Military Power, familiar patterns emerge. Soviet levels of arms production and military spending are exaggerated. Existing weapons are given improved capabilities that more nearly match our own. Modifications of existing systems are described as 'follow-on' systems to make them seem like new ones, or are simply given new names. Systems not yet deployed are said to be. The imminent deployment of many new systems is promised, when it may not occur for some years, if at all. These misrepresentations are designed not only to 'enhance' the Soviet threat but also to suggest a Soviet initiative where we have already taken one or plan to take one."[9]

Purpose of Thesis

This paper examines the purpose for the publication of Soviet Military Power as a public information document. An analysis is made of Gervasi's criticisms of Soviet Military Power to determine which, if any, of his claims are valid. His statements are categorized and compared with other sources, especially with those he referred to in his preface. This study makes recommendations regarding the publication of public information documents such as Soviet Military Power.

This study does not propose or favor censorship of publications critical of official government documents. The role of responsible criticism and dissent is vital to the health of a democracy. It is appropriate that every aspect of our national defense posture be subjected to the widest scrutiny and inquiry.

Assumptions.

(1) There are reliable sources that can be used to verify or disprove Gervasi's assertions.

(2) Gervasi's claims are not considered invalid because his book is undocumented. His assertions are evaluated on the basis of other corroborative sources and, in some cases, the logic of his own reasoning.

(3) Publications such as Gervasi's can have an impact on the national defense policies of the U.S.

(4) Citizens must have an accurate assessment of Soviet military capabilities to make informed opinions regarding our national defense.

Limitations.

(1) Gervasi does not document any of his information with footnotes or end notes. He makes reference to several publications in his introduction but lists no bibliography. This failure to document information makes it difficult to determine his source of information in many cases.

(2) Soviet Military Power is also undocumented. The DOD has substantial intelligence assets and publishes its document as an authoritative source of information. Although Soviet Military Power is unclassified, some of the sources from which it obtained data may be classified.

Delimitations.

(1) The length of this proposed study does not permit an examination of every comment made by Gervasi.

(2) This study uses only unclassified information.

(3) This study does not critique Mr. Gervasi's credentials as a defense analyst, but rather will examine the specific charges he makes.

(4) This study does not make a comprehensive comparison of U.S. and Soviet military strength. It discusses issues raised by Mr. Gervasi.

Significance of the Study.

There is a substantial debate in the United States over the correct type and amount of military strength needed to defend against the perceived Soviet threat. The Gervasi book represents a point of view that, if correct, would require a major change in both the level and the type of components of the U.S. armed forces.

This study is focused on a particular government publication and a book that is critical of that publication. There is however a larger issue at stake than the accuracy of a single government publication. This study takes on greater significance when it is viewed against the larger question of the extent of DOD influence on public opinion.

In a representative democracy such as ours, public opinion strongly affects defense policies. Decisions are not made solely by government officials who study the national security situation and implement appropriate programs. Policies are ultimately made by elected officials who are aware of popular attitudes. Political considerations can override all other factors when defense policies are determined.

The information available to scholars, opinion leaders, the press and others will have a genuine impact on programs and policies that are eventually adopted. Publications such as Soviet Military Power can therefore become very important as they provide information to the

public in a usable and understandable format. However, if Gervasi is largely correct in his assessment, it would seriously question the ability of the DOD to publish unbiased evaluations of security threats that would be meaningful and helpful to the public.

The importance of this study remains unaffected by the changes in international politics that have occurred during the past year. This paper does not argue for or against any particular weapons system or program. This study supports the need for accurate sources of information which can assist the public in making intelligent decisions.

Because the Gervasi book represents a view shared by many in the free world, and because he makes such specific charges against an official DOD publication, this study is needed to properly evaluate his claims.

END NOTES

CHAPTER ONE

[1]Department of Defense Soviet Military Power 1987. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1982. p. 5.

[2]Gervasi, Tom Soviet Military Power *The Pentagon's Propaganda Document, Annotated and Corrected. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1987, p. V.

[3]"A Review of Soviet Military Power *The Pentagon's Propaganda Document, Annotated and Corrected" Booklist, May 1, 1988, p. 1463.

[4]Altfeld, Michael F. "A Review of Soviet Military Power *The Pentagon's Propaganda Document, Annotated and Corrected" Parameters, June 1989, p. 94.

[5]Gervasi p. VI.

[6]Gervasi p. V.

[7]Gervasi p. V.

[8]Gervasi p. 126

[9]Gervasi p. 5.

CHAPTER TWO

Review of Literature

There is a substantial amount of information available regarding Soviet military capabilities. Sources of information include the U.S. government, foreign governments, independent research institutes, and studies by individual authors.

a. U.S. Department of Defense: Information from DOD sources ought to verify the information in Soviet Military Power since they are produced by the same agency although not necessarily by the same individuals within that agency. Gervasi states however that he uses several DOD sources that contradict the statements in Soviet Military Power. DOD sources specifically mentioned by Gervasi as his references include the Military Posture statements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and sworn testimony from chiefs of the military services and Defense Department officials before the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of Congress.[1] Other DOD sources of information include the Force Structure Summary produced by the Defense Intelligence Agency, and numerous Department periodicals. Several military professional journals are published by the different branches of the U.S. armed forces. The December

1989 issue of Military Review provides a recent analysis of changes in the Soviet military.

b. U.S. Government Agencies Outside the DOD: Gervasi lists one of his key sources as the annual reports to Congress from the Central Intelligence Agency. Other sources include studies by the Library of Congress and various reports from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

c. Sources From Other Governments: Gervasi lists sources from the "governments of other NATO nations (especially Canada and West Germany)" but does not specify what documents he used from those governments.[7] Both Japan and the United Kingdom publish their own annual assessments of Soviet military capabilities.

d. Non-Government Institutions: Each of the following was referred to by Gervasi as sources he used.

(1) The International Institute for Strategic Studies in London England. This institute draws its membership from over 80 nations and is not the advocate of any particular interest. It considers itself an international center for research and information to study the growing complexity of security issues in a nuclear age. It publishes a bi-monthly journal, numerous monographs, and two annual reports: 1. Strategic Survey provides information and analysis of significant international security events

and trends. 2. The Military Balance provides an assessment of the military strength of over 140 nations.

(2) The Center for Defense Information in Washington, D.C. provides a variety of publications relating to defense issues.

(3) The Union of Concerned Scientists. This organization includes some scientists that have worked on defense projects, but it has frequently been critical of U.S. national defense policy.

(4) The Federation of American Scientists publishes a wide variety of materials some of which relates to military and defense issues.

(5) The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in Stockholm, Sweden. This institute is financed by the Swedish government and describes itself as "an independent institute for research into problems of peace and conflict, with particular attention to problems of disarmament and arms regulation."[3]

(6) Various military references published by Jane's Publishing Company of London. These volumes are highly regarded, authoritative references on ships, aircraft, military equipment and weapons.

(e) Individual Authors: Two books referred to by Gervasi are Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army by David Isby, and Soviet Military Aircraft by Bill Sweetman. David Isby is an attorney who has written a number of books on the

Soviet army. Some of his works have been published by Jane's Publishing Company. Bill Sweetman has written several books on military aircraft.

(f) There are many other potential references that were not mentioned by Gervasi.

(1) Pergamon-Brassey is an international firm that publishes numerous books by defense analysts.

(2) NATO provides various reports on Warsaw Pact and NATO capabilities.

(3) The U.S. Naval Institute at Annapolis, MD publishes a monthly periodical, Proceedings, and numerous books dealing with ships and seapower.

(4) The United States Strategic Institute in Washington, D.C. prints periodicals and other publications that focus on the strategic capabilities of the Soviet Union and the U.S.

(5) Various military associations publish materials that deal specifically with their particular branch of warfare.

(6) The Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. has strong ties to American defense industries and draws its participants from industry, government, universities and the press. Its publications focus on strategic issues for the United States and the Soviet Union.

(7) The National Strategy Information Center, Inc. in New York City publishes studies from a wide range of political perspectives but is avowedly opposed to pacifism and isolationism.

(8) The World Defense Almanac, published by Military Technology magazine in West Germany, provides an overview of data about the military capabilities of every nation.

(9) The Brookings Institution, in Washington, D.C. publishes a series entitled, "Studies In Defense Policy". It is a prestigious institution devoted to non-partisan research and education.

(10) The Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual (SAFRA) is published annually by the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies of Dalhousie University and Academic International Press. This publication provides statistical information, a review of recent Soviet military developments, and articles that provide insight into various aspects of the Soviet military. It also contains a large bibliography of publications relating to the Soviet military.

(11) A number of authors have written about various aspects of Soviet military capabilities and the threat they constitute to the security of the free world. Inside the Soviet Army, written by a Soviet defector under the pen name of Victor Suvorov, provides an insider's view of the structure of the Soviet Army. He reveals their emphasis on

the swift exploitation of success and simplicity in the design of equipment. Soviet Strategy by Gerald Segal and John Baylis provides insight into the diversity of Soviet military planning, and the dichotomy of opinion that exists within their decision making process. The Soviet View of U.S. Strategic Doctrine by Jonathan S. Lockwood identifies Soviet perceptions and assessments of the U.S. military. Soviet Global Strategy by William Kintner gives a detailed account of the implementation of Soviet strategy throughout the world. The Soviet Estimate by John Prados provides insight into the evaluation process of the Soviet military in the absence of direct information from the Soviets. The Soviet First Strike Threat by Jack H. Nunn, and numerous other related works examine different aspects of Soviet military capabilities and strategies.

Beginning in 1982, The Soviet Union began publishing a series in response to Soviet Military Power entitled, Whence The Threat To Peace. This document argued that military developments and expansion in the U.S., coupled with an aggressive U.S. foreign policy constitute the major threat to peace. It portrayed the Soviet military as a defensive force constantly responding to U.S. military initiatives. It offered no new information about Soviet weapons systems. Until the last two years, there was an almost complete lack of literature from authoritative Soviet sources concerning their own military forces.

Book Reviews

Several periodicals have reviewed Mr. Gervasi's books. An examination of these reviews reveals widely divergent views regarding Mr. Gervasi's research methodology and overall credibility.

The first book in his Arsenal of Democracy series enumerated U.S. military strength and arms exports. Arsenal of Democracy II, published in 1981, strongly opposed the defense budget increases proposed by President Reagan. Gervasi stated that the "shift in national priorities will benefit private industry more than it benefits the national security," and that "our security can be maintained at a fraction of the costs now planned."[4]

The London Sunday Times noted that "one of the most important results of Gervasi's research is that it indicates that the conventional monitors of the world's arsenals only give us part of the picture." Harvard economist John Kenneth Galbraith referred to Gervasi's book as "informed, useful and excellent." Mr. Gervasi's Arsenal of Democracy III and The Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy both stressed that U. S. defense spending was excessive and that Soviet military capabilities were exaggerated.

Reviewers held divergent views regarding Gervasi's latest book, Soviet Military power *The Pentagon's Propaganda Document, Annotated and Corrected. Michael Harrington, a former chairman of the Socialist Party,

endorsed Gervasi's criticism of Soviet Military Power by stating, "What better witness against the Pentagon than the Pentagon. This book is a deadly serious double whammy."

Andrew Cockburn, author of The Threat, said "We are lucky to have Tom Gervasi to tell us the truth."[5] In his book, The Threat, Mr. Cockburn argued that due to poor training, equipment, and morale, the Soviet military was incapable of seriously threatening the West.

Booklist calls Gervasi's book "a useful contribution to current affairs and military collections". But it states that his study is flawed because he "makes the most favorable assumptions about American weapons and the least favorable about Soviet ones."[6]

The Times Literary Supplement contended that Soviet Military Power is "simplistic, disingenuous, and seriously misleading" but that Gervasi weakened his point by his "hyperbole, crudity and frivolity." It complained that the figures

> "from the International Institute of Strategic Studies, which fall mid-way between the Pentagon and Gervasi extremes are seemingly discounted because Gervasi dismisses the Institute as 'a strong administration supporter'."[7]

National Review referred to Gervasi as "one of Moscow's favorite defense commentators." It listed several examples of errors by Gervasi and notes that Soviet Defense Minister Yazov has recently confirmed some of the facts listed in Soviet Military Power that were disputed by Mr. Gervasi.[8]

Parameters was critical of both of Mr. Gervasi's recent books:

> "The bias inherent in this publication is just as extreme as it was in The Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy, and the tone is, if anything, even more shrill and vindictive than in that earlier work. . . in sum, [this] is a hatchet-job and not a very good one."[9]

Other reviews of The Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy also produced widely divergent viewpoints. The Library Journal endorsed the volume:

> "Gervasi provides evidence that President Reagan's claims have no basis in fact. Instead, he asserts that U.S. superiority has never been challenged. This book is for all those who wish to discuss seriously the growth of military hardware and the enormous cost the U. S. taxpayer bears to sustain it. Highly recommended."[10]

The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, in a review by David R. Jones of the Russian Research Center of Nova Scotia, is also generally positive about The Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy:

> "Gervasi uses his professional abilities to analyze the accuracy of Soviet missiles, the strategic nuclear balance, the comparative strength of ground forces in Europe, the 'tank balance,' and similar subjects. His arguments on these issues, backed by the massive section of appendices, are sound, convincing, and an excellent antidote to the distortions so often permeating official and unofficial publications. . . [This] book should make an important contribution to the debates on the future security of the United States and the future of Western civilization."[11]

On the negative side the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists noted that the "suggestion of a conspiracy theory, which sometimes

pervades Gervasi's analysis of the selling of the arms race, is unpalatable".[12]

Choice was especially critical of Gervasi's philosophical bias:

> "Gervasi's book will help little in addressing the substantive issues of the U.S.-Soviet military balance. In tone and structure it is fundamentally ideological, appealing to those nonspecialists who share the author's persuasion."[13]

A review by Dr. Jacob Kipp of the Soviet Army Studies Office, in Air University Review, noted that Gervasi could find no place for "honest conflict" of "Western assessments in lieu of Soviet data." Dr. Kipp further observed:

> "While Soviet military supremacy is a myth, Soviet military power is not. To understand its significance within the context of the ongoing political and ideological competition between the United States and the Soviet Union requires a certain hardheaded realism regarding the severe limitations affecting the utility of military power in the nuclear era. Gervasi's book does not provide the context for such an assessment."[14]

END NOTES

CHAPTER TWO

[1]Gervasi, Tom Soviet Military Power *The Pentagon's Propaganda Document, Annotated and Corrected. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1987. p. VI.

[2]Gervasi p. VI.

[3]Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Offensive Missiles. Stockholm, Sweden: 1974. p. 2.

[4]Gervasi, Tom Arsenal of Democracy II. New York, NY: Grove Press, Inc., 1981, back cover.

[5]Gervasi back cover.

[6]"A Review of Soviet Military Power *The Pentagon's Propaganda Document, Annotated and Corrected" Booklist May 1, 1988, p. 1463.

[7]Clark, Ian "A review of Soviet Military Power *The Pentagon's Propaganda Document, Annotated and Corrected" Times Literary Supplement, April 29, 1988, p. 478.

[8]Oberg, James E. "A Review of Soviet Military Power *The Pentagon's Propaganda Document, Annotated and Corrected" National Review, August 18, 1989, p. 52.

[9]Altfeld, Michael F. "A Review of Soviet Military Power *The Pentagon's Propaganda Document, Annotated and Corrected" Parameters, June 1989, p. 94.

[10]Finnegan, Richard B. "A Review of The Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy" Library Journal, June 1, 1986, p. 114.

[11]Jones, David R. "A Review of The Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy" Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, June 1987, p. 51.

[12]Ibid.

[13]Trout, B. T. "A Review of The Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy" Choice, November 1986, p. 548.

[14]Kipp, Jacob W. "A Review of The Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy" Air University Review, January-March 1987, pp. 93-94.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Gervasi makes 733 specific annotations of Soviet Military Power, excluding those annotations that merely refer the reader to a comment on another page. Many of the comments are repeated. The first step in analyzing Gervasi's charges is to divide his comments into five categories:

1. Numerical differences: There are 137 different numbers in Soviet Military Power that Gervasi states are incorrect. Gervasi has annotated each of these with his "corrected" number.

2. Factual differences that are not numerical: There are 59 different narrative statements in Soviet Military Power that Gervasi annotates as being in error.

3. Omissions of information: There are 69 times when Gervasi states that important information was omitted that, if included, would have shown Soviet military capabilities to be less than indicated by Soviet Military Power.

4. Lack of Comparison with U.S./NATO forces: There are 164 times when Gervasi annotates with information on comparable U.S. or NATO military strength.

5. Other comments that do not fit any of the four other categories: There are 268 of these narrative comments.

None of these directly contradict any information in Soviet Military Power. Some of these statements claim that information was misleading, while others make editorial comments about related subjects.

The second step in analyzing Gervasi's comments will be to compare disputed facts with various other sources. A comparison will be made among Gervasi's statements, Soviet Military Power's statements, and other sources. This study has in part adopted Gervasi's own method of comparing statements in Soviet Military Power with those of other military analysts. He has given us an excellent list of references: CIA reports, "Military Posture" reports by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testimony by Defense Department officials, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, various works produced by Jane's Publishing Company, and authors David Isby and Bill Sweetman.

Numerous tables have been provided in the appendices to provide comparative information. Emphasis has been made to those references specifically named by Gervasi as forming the basis for his study. Sources cited by Gervasi ought to validate his claims. He repeatedly claims that Soviet military strength was exaggerated while U.S. military strength was understated. These comparisons have been analyzed and patterns are noted. By focusing on those sources Gervasi used, it can be determined if he has a valid claim for charging that Soviet Military Power is misleading

and deceptive. By making comparisons with other reliable sources we can observe if Soviet Military Power is providing information significantly different from other defense analysts.

The third step is to review the annotations in the three categories (omissions, lack of comparisons, other comments) that do not generally contradict information in Soviet Military Power. Selections from each type have been reviewed to determine if his comments are consistent and relevant to his overall thesis.

The fourth step in analyzing Gervasi's data has been to draw conclusions based on the information drawn from the previous steps. Four factors have been utilized to help draw conclusions. First of all, Gervasi challenged some of the predictions made by Soviet Military Power regarding emerging weapons systems. These predictions have been reviewed in the light of additional information received during the past two years.

A second factor is the danger of circular reasoning. Many institutes and authors that deal with these subjects draw information from each other and from the Defense Department. There exists the possibility that this research of various groups will render information that all came from the same source. In this case, however, the fallacy of circular reasoning can be avoided. Gervasi has effectively endorsed a number of reliable sources in his book. By

comparing his comments with the sources he utilized, we can determine if Soviet Military Power is at variance with the reliable sources he references. Additionally, the various analyst mentioned are probably too experienced on military matters to be deceived on a large scale. Jane's volumes question DOD statements occasionally, as do others, although none has charged that Soviet Military Power is a massive attempt at deceptive propaganda.

A third factor used in drawing conclusions is the fact that some of the discrepancies may be attributed to the use of different criteria when assessing a particular weapon system. While Soviet Military Power gives many details, it does not cover individual weapons systems in depth. For example, it lists the speed of a Soviet T-64 tank as 80 kilometers per hour. Gervasi states its speed is only 60 kilometers per hour (kph).[1] Neither source states the conditions necessary for a T-64 tank to attain a particular speed. Interestingly, author David Isby states in Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army that the speed of a Soviet T-64 tank is 70 kph.[2] None of these sources states whether they are referring to maximum speed, normal cruising speed, travel on paved roads, unimproved roads, in mud, on hilly terrain or other variables that could affect the speed of a tank.

In a similar example, Soviet Military Power states the weight of a T-54/55 tank as 36 metric tons (MT).

Gervasi claims the correct weight is 30 MT.[3] Neither specifies whether the figure refers to empty weight or weight when fully loaded with men, fuel and munitions.

Likewise, aircraft ranges depend upon variables such as altitude, speed, weapons load and other factors. For example, the A-6 Intruder aircraft has a maximum ferry range at optimum altitude and speed of 4700 kilometers. That same aircraft flying at operational speed and altitude with maximum weapons load has a combat radius of only 1870 kilometers.[4] Data criteria must be carefully checked to ensure consistency. Variable factors such as these can be used to explain some numerical differences that exist among the various references.

A fourth factor is that the Soviet Union has historically released very little information regarding their own weapons capabilities. One observer reported that the Soviet military leadership was so secretive during disarmament negotiations, that Soviet diplomats "drew most of their information about their own forces from Western publications and not from the Soviet military authorities."[5] It was not until 1986 that the Soviets admitted possessing chemical weapons although the U.S. was aware of them for many years.[6] Occasionally Western intelligence and defense analysts must hypothesize based upon incomplete information about Soviet military

capabilities. This can easily lead to some honest differences of opinion.

END NOTES

CHAPTER THREE

[1]Gervasi, Tom Soviet Military Power *The Pentagon's Propaganda Document, Annotated and Corrected. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1988, p. 73.

[2]Isby, David Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army. London, U.K.: Jane's Publishing Company, 1988. p. 139.

[3]Gervasi p. 73.

[4]International Institute for Strategic Studies The Military Balance 1987-1988. Oxford, U.K.: Nuffield Press, 1987, p. 209.

[5]Whyte, Stuart "Military Glasnost and Force Comparisons" International Defense Review, May, 1989, p. 559.

[6]Ibid, p. 559

CHAPTER FOUR

THE PURPOSE AND CONTROVERSY OF "SOVIET MILITARY POWER"

The purpose of Soviet Military Power has been to inform the public concerning the military capabilities of the Soviet Union and the potential threat those capabilities pose to the security of the United States. Soviet Military Power has the potential to influence public opinion since all information has by nature the ability to influence others. Soviet Military Power advocates "an adequate defense program" to defend "our vital interest against Soviet aggression",[1] rather than a specific defense agenda. There are no recommendations for readers to support any specific weapons system for the U.S.

It supplies evidence for those who want to support a strong national defense, and therein lies the major controversy behind the document. Individuals and groups hostile to increased U.S. military defense for various motivations are most likely to be critical of the information in Soviet Military Power.

The publication of Soviet Military Power began because the Department of Defense wanted to provide a source of information to the public that accurately portrayed the power of the Soviet military. During the 1970's, there was increasing concern about the balance of military power

between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The growing military strength of the Soviet Union was threatening the stability, peace, and security of the free world. The overwhelming nuclear superiority the U.S. enjoyed in the 1950's and early 1960's had vanished. The Soviets in the 1970's had more nuclear missiles and vastly more megatons of explosives on their missiles. The U.S. held the advantage in the number of warheads and in missile accuracy, but the gap was narrowing. The SALT Treaty of 1972 permitted the Soviets to possess more missiles than the U.S. The U.S. believed it could maintain its superiority in warheads because it was more advanced in Multiple Independently-targeted Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) technology. The Soviets subsequently developed the capability to place MIRV's on their missiles.[2]

On July 1, 1970, several members of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel submitted a report to the President where they expressed increasing concern with the "convergence of a number of trends".[3] Their report indicated a shift in the balance of strategic military power against the United States. They concluded that

> "if these observable trends continue the United States will become a second-rate power incapable of assuring the future security and freedom of its people."[4]

Soviet leaders believed that a favorable shift in the balance of power was necessary to implement their strategic goals. Pravda editorialized in 1974 that the

"successful implementation of the Peace Program is conditioned by the existing balance of world forces and continued orderly changes in this balance in favor of socialism.[5]

Kenneth Adelman, a former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, observed that the U.S. was not keeping pace with Soviet military expansion:

"While the Soviet Union marched ahead in its strategic capabilities, the United States dawdled. Our defense spending, by the mid-1970's, had for seven years been in real decline. In 1981, the United States had an open production line in only one leg (sea-based missiles) of the strategic triad, whereas the Soviet Union had open and active production lines in all three.

Furthermore, they have not only constructed the permitted ABM defensive system around Moscow but also have taken some steps toward fashioning a nationwide ABM capacity. They are engaged in vigorous research in such SDI areas as lasers and neutral particle beams."[6]

In conventional forces, the U.S. went through a major reduction in the post-Vietnam era. Meanwhile, the Soviets continued a steady build up of their conventional forces. The Soviet Navy greatly expanded its capabilities. By 1980, the Chief of Naval Operations complained about having "to meet a three-ocean requirement with a one-and-a-half ocean Navy."[7]

While estimating Soviet defense spending has been difficult and sometimes controversial, CIA specialist, William T. Lee estimated that the share

"absorbed by the defense sector of the Soviet Gross National Product had grown from some 12-13 per cent in 1970 to perhaps as much as 18 per cent in 1980."[8]

During the same period U.S. defense expenditures declined from 7.5 to 4.6 per cent of its G.N.P.[9]

While many in the West argued tha Soviets were merely increasing their defensive posture a_ ast the perceived threat from the NATO nations, the National Strategy Information Center warned in 1981 about the offensive nature of Soviet doctrine and military capability. They observed that it would be "virtually impossible" for a "Soviet defensive military posture to coexist with the ambitious political goals" of the Soviet Union.[10]

It was against this background that the first edition of Soviet Military Power was published in September, 1981. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger noted in the preface of that edition that the "greatest defense forces in the world are those of free people in free nations well informed as to the challenge they face."

The original document was based on a summary of briefings provided to NATO Ministers of Defense.[11] The 1983 edition of Soviet Military Power began the inclusion of some comparative information of U.S. and NATO capabilities. In the 1987 edition, the final chapter was devoted to the U.S. response to Soviet military strength. This comparative analysis was greatly expanded to nearly half the document in the 1988 edition.

Contention surrounding the publication of Soviet Military Power has come from two possible motivations. Some

believed the Soviets were merely concerned about defending their homeland and were not interested in an expansionist foreign policy. Secondly, there some who feared any increase in defense priorities would come at the expense of other domestic programs. Sir John Slessor once wrote,

> "It is customary in the democratic countries to deplore expenditures on armaments as conflicting with the requirements of the social services."[12]

Gervasi appears to be motivated by both of these factors. Throughout his book, Gervasi supports the idea that the Soviets are primarily defensive in their foreign policy. In his words, the Soviets are "building only to meet the level of the Western threat, but not to project additional military power abroad."[13] In this, his views happen to coincide with the Soviet leadership that the "threat to peace comes from the U.S. war machine."[14]

Gervasi is very specific about defense budgets draining funds from other programs, and advocates reducing the U.S. military budget by "more than 60%."[15] He is critical of former President Reagan's "unprecedented peacetime program of $1.6 trillion in military spending in only tive years" when "many more urgent needs go unattended."[16] He also states that U.S. defense policy is unrelated to the actual Soviet threat, but rather is the result of the influence of the "military-industrial complex" seeking more contracts.[17]

END NOTES

CHAPTER FOUR

[1]Department of Defense Soviet Military Power 1987. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987, p. 159.

[2]Collins, John M. U.S.-Soviet Military Balance 1980-1985 McLean, VA: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1985, p. 4.

[3]National Strategy Information Center The Military Unbalance. New York, NY: 1971, p. V.

[4]Ibid. p. V.

[5]Pravda, November 20, 1974.

[5]Adelman, Kenneth L. "Arms Control With and Without Agreements" Foreign Affairs, Winter 1984, p. 85.

[7]Committee On Armed Services, House of Representatives, Hearings of Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1981, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, testifying as Chief of Naval Operation. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980. p. 540

[8]Lee, William T. Soviet Defense Expenditures. Washington, D.C.: United States Strategic Institute, 1981, p. 11.

[9]Lee p. 5.

[10]Dziak, John J. Soviet Perceptions of Military Power: The Interaction of Theory and Practice. New York, NY: National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1981, p. VIII.

[11]Department of Defense Soviet Military Power 1981. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981, p. 5.

[12]Kaufman, William W. Defense in the 1980's. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1981. p. 50.

[13]Gervasi, Tom Soviet Military Power *The Pentagon's Propaganda Document, Annotated and Corrected. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1987, p. 143.

[14]Whence The Threat To Peace. Moscow, U.S.S.R.: Military Publishing House, 1987, p. 3.

[15]Gervasi p. 145.

[16]Gervasi pp. V-VI.

[17]Gervasi p. 145.

CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION

Gervasi makes three fundamental errors in his book. First of all, he misinterprets the purpose of Soviet Military Power. He often argues against claims that Soviet Military Power does not make. Secondly, other references on Soviet military strength, including the references that Gervasi said were "especially helpful" to him in compiling his book, do not generally corroborate Gervasi's "corrections" of the facts published in Soviet Military Power. Thirdly, Gervasi's charges of deception are not valid. He is frequently illogical or trivial in his statements concerning propaganda. His statements charging deliberate misrepresentation by the authors of Soviet Military Power are not credible. Additionally, he detracts from his thesis by making so many comments that merely editorialize about related subjects and do not support his case that Soviet Military Power contains lies and propaganda. Although there is some overlap in these areas, each will be examined in detail, along with many of his editorial comments.

PART ONE- Misinterpretation

Gervasi's fundamental error is his perception that Soviet Military Power is attempting to verify an overall

Soviet military superiority over the U.S. Gervasi is not alone in his perception. He quotes the "New York Times" which editorialized that the 1981 edition of Soviet Military Power supported the impression that "the Soviet Union had achieved military superiority over the United States".[1] Stuart Whyte, in an article for the International Defense Review, subsequently observed that publication of Soviet Military Power over the years was focused on demonstrating that the forces of the Soviet Union "were superior" to those of the U.S.[2]

Since Gervasi perceives that Soviet Military Power is an attempt to prove the military superiority of the Soviet Union, he argues that Soviet Military Power is deceptive by excluding details that would demonstrate a greater capability of the U.S. military. His logic follows that any attempt to demonstrate superiority of one thing over another requires that the capabilities of both be fairly examined.

It is incorrect to assume that Soviet Military Power is an attempt to prove Soviet military superiority. One of the most frequent complaints made by Gervasi is that Soviet Military Power does not adequately show a comparison of U.S. military power with the Soviets. There are 164 annotations made by Gervasi which provide information about a comparable U.S. or NATO capability in his book. In fact, his annotations that add additional information regarding

U.S. capabilities are mostly correct. But in these comments, Gervasi adds to rather than contradicts information in Soviet Military Power.

Gervasi misinterprets the purpose of Soviet Military Power which is to describe the military power of the Soviet Union, but not to prove its superiority over the U.S. In fact, Soviet Military Power never states that the Soviets have military superiority over the U.S. Soviet Military Power even refers to the U.S. "technological lead"[3] and gives several examples of "growing" NATO strength which will hinder the Soviets from attaining "victory by rapid offensive operations".[4] It clearly portrays the Soviet Union as a strong military power, but not necessarily superior to the U.S.

Although Soviet Military Power does not claim to be a comprehensive comparative analysis between U.S. and Soviet forces, the final chapter, entitled "The US Response", briefly discusses U.S. military capabilities. It also refers the reader to two additional publications which discuss U.S. military strength in detail. Gervasi responds to this reference by commenting that "the authors get themselves off the hook by referring the reader to other publications."[5]

Many of the comments in Soviet Military Power expound on the strength of the U.S. armed forces:

The "Soviets remain an average of 10 years behind the West in civil/industrial technology applications."[6]

"All our naval improvements bolster deterrence by showing our adversary that he cannot control the sea."[7]

"Our antiair warfare capabilities have also grown considerably."[8]

"Our antisubmarine warfare forces have grown in number, and we have extended their range."[9]

"We have greatly improved our tactical aviation capabilities."[10]

"We continue to exploit our technological advantages by adding to our target acquisition, surveillance, and warning capabilities."[11]

"Since 1980, we have expanded our airlift capability by 35 percent, giving us the means to move troops and equipment by air that is unmatched by any country."[12]

Gervasi could have charged that Soviet Military Power's references to growing U.S. military strength since 1980 were included to portray the successful defense build-up during the Reagan administration. But it is inaccurate to suggest that Soviet Military Power portrays the Soviet Union as militarily superior to the U. S., or that it attempts to downplay U.S. military strength.

Gervasi's annotations that discuss comparable U.S. military capabilities do not provide evidence the authors of Soviet Military Power were avoiding pertinent facts. They can be attributed to a lack of detail about U.S./Soviet force comparisons rather than a deliberate attempt to create a distortion that the Soviets have more power than the U.S.

The real question becomes whether or not Soviet Military Power exaggerated Soviet military capabilities. There are 69 times where Gervasi annotates Soviet Military Power with a statement claiming some information was omitted which would have indicated a weaker Soviet military capability. These comments are likewise related to Gervasi's perception that the purpose of Soviet Military Power is to demonstrate Soviet superiority. By omitting details that would portray a weaker Soviet military capability, Gervasi accuses Soviet Military Power of avoiding pertinent information. Again, Gervasi misinterprets the purpose of Soviet Military Power. In these 69 instances Gervasi generally adds information rather than contradicts information in Soviet Military Power.

Frequently, his attempts to portray a weaker Soviet military capability do not stand under scrutiny of objective analysis:

Diesel Submarines

On page 82, Soviet Military Power refers to Soviet production of submarines with the comment, "Of these, almost all are nuclear powered." Gervasi annotates that the "Soviets continue to build diesel submarines" but "only in small numbers". In this case Gervasi confirms rather than contradicts Soviet Military Power. Gervasi also states that such diesel submarines could only be used "in territorial waters" and that building diesel submarines constitutes "a

continuing commitment to defense of the homeland."[13] Gervasi ignores the fact that diesel submarines from the north fleet frequently deploy to the Mediterranean Sea and are not used solely for coastal defense.[14]

Civil Defense

On page 52, Soviet Military Power contains the following statement:

> "Industrial and other economic facilities are equipped with blast shelters for the work force, and detailed procedures have been developed for the relocation of selected production facilities. By planning for the survival of the essential work force, the Soviets hope to reconstitute vital production programs using those industrial components that could be redirected or salvaged after an attack."[15]

Gervasi annotates this statement with the following:

> "There is little such protection. According to the CIA, 'the Soviets would suffer over one hundred million casualties in a nuclear exchange,' and the bulk of the general population, far from having access to blast shelters or other facilities,'must rely on evacuation from urban areas for its protection.' So much for the 'massive' Soviet civil defense program."[16]

Gervasi makes an erroneous comparison between the survival of "the essential work force" and the "bulk of the general population" in this example. The Soviets successfully relocated and reconstituted some of their industry during World War II.

Some of Gervasi's comments that indicate a weaker Soviet military capability are not corroborated by other defense analysts:

T-72 Tank Automatic Loader

Gervasi comments that the T-72 main battle tank has serious loading problems:

> "The automatic loader on the T-72 gives its gun a theoretical rate of fire of six rounds per minute. Several serious injuries, however, have been suffered by Soviet crewmen attempting to use the loading system, whose power rammer tends to load the gunner's arm into the gun breach. Consequently, Soviet crews have not used the automatic loader since 1979. The gun must be so loaded, and would be so loaded in combat. This reduces its rate of fire to a maximum of two rounds per minute."[17]

David Isby states that such problems have been reported on the T-64 tanks and that

> "It is not known whether the T-72B and later models have ever suffered from these problems, or whether they are confined to the T-64-style autoloader."[18]

Some of Gervasi's comments in this category are correct but insignificant criticisms:

Artillery

On page 73, Soviet Military Power displays a picture with the following caption: "Self-propelled 122-mm howitzers fire to a maximum range of 15 kilometers." Gervasi's response is "These howitzers are not nuclear-capable."[19] Gervasi is correct, but Soviet Military Power does not suggest that those weapons are nuclear capable. There are many other weapons systems that are not nuclear capable as well, but Gervasi does not annotate them.

PART TWO- Corrections of Disputed Facts Lack Credibility

Overall, a comparison of the numerical discrepancies between Soviet Military Power, Gervasi, and other sources does not give credibility to Gervasi's argument that Soviet Military Power "lied" about facts which are "not in dispute" in an attempt to make the Soviets look more powerful than they actually are. A review of these comparisons in the appendices of this study reveals the similarity of statements in Soviet Military Power with those of other respected analysts. In some instances, the facts are clearly in dispute among the various analysts. Differences that exist can be explained by a lack of Soviet data, honest differences of opinion that result when estimating Soviet capabilities, and the many variables that can affect a particular weapons system.

As Soviet Military Power evolved, revisions were made in some of the estimates of Soviet weapons systems. In the 1981 edition, the unrefueled combat radius for the Backfire was listed as 5500 Km., for the Badger, 2900 Km., and for the Blinder 3100 Km. The 1987 edition listed those numbers as 4000 Km., 3100 Km., and 2900 Km. respectively. Thus the estimated range of the Backfire was reduced by more than one-fourth. This reflects the difficulty in determining such figures, honest differences of opinion, and revisions made due to updated information.

The percentage of gross national product that the Soviets spend on their military is an excellent example of a figure that is very difficult to determine. William Lee and others have written extensively on this subject. Soviet Military Power places the figure at 15-17%.[20] The International Institute for Strategic Studies states it is 12-17%.[21] The United Kingdom, in its annual report on Soviet capabilities states it is 15%.[22] World Military And Social Expenditures 1987-88, a publication critical of high levels of defense spending, estimates the Soviets spend 11-12% of their GNP on their military.[23] Unlike other major industrial nations, the Soviet Union has not provided details on its military budget, or even to describe what expenditures are covered. Gervasi states the correct figure is 6%. He also notes that "reinterpretation is fundamental to propaganda," and that higher figures used by others is the result of "reinterpretations of CIA data."[24] Gervasi has isolated himself from other analysts with his exceptionally low figure, and with his accusation that those who state a higher figure have incorrectly "reinterpreted" data.

In five specific cases out of 108 listed in Appendix A, the sources Gervasi said he used clearly matched his numbers and contradicted those found in Soviet Military Power. But even in these few cases, it must be remembered that the Department of Defense has extensive intelligence

capabilities and may have the more accurate information. Some of their information is classified and unavailable to others. In many instances, the sources Gervasi used were in disagreement on an exact figure.

Gervasi did correctly identify two contradictions found in Soviet Military Power. On page 78, the Soviet Fencer aircraft is listed as having a range of 1300 km., while on the following page the range is given as 1500 km. Since aircraft ranges are heavily dependent upon variables such as altitude, and airspeed, it is possible for both ranges to be correct depending upon conditions. However Soviet Military Power fails to explain the difference in ranges given.

Another subtle contradiction is in reference to the new Soviet Hokum helicopter. On page 80, Soviet Military Power state that the Hokum "may" have air-to-air combat capability, while on page 145 it states that it "will give the Soviets a significant rotary-wing, air-to-air combat capability." While these contradictions are relatively minor, they emphasize that documents such as Soviet Military Power will always be subject to close scrutiny.

The difference between Gervasi's and Soviet Military Power's numbers in some of those cases which corroborate his numbers is fairly small:

Artillery

For example, Soviet Military Power states the maximum range of the 2S5 and the M-1976 Soviet artillery as 28,500 meters. Gervasi and author David Isby state it as 27,000 meters.[25] In a more detailed explanation, Jane's Armour and Artillery 1985-1986 lists the ranges as between 27,000 and 37,000 depending upon ammunition type.[26]

Some of Gervasi's corrections are corroborated only in part:

Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles

There are two SLBM numbers where Jane's is in agreement with Gervasi. Soviet Military Power identifies the range of a U.S. Poseidon SLBM C-3 as 4000 kilometers (km), and states that it has 10 MIRV's. Gervasi states the range is 4600 and the MIRV's are 14. Jane's agrees with Gervasi by placing the range at 4630 km. and the MIRV's at 14.[27] An explanation may lie with a report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). They note that the Poseidon has 10 MIRVs, but that they can potentially be equipped with a maximum of 14.[28]

At times, Gervasi used the number from among his references that was most as variance with the number in Soviet Military Power:

SS-11

On page 30, Soviet Military Power lists the range of the Soviet SS-11 mod 1 as 11,000 kilometers. An

examination of three different references used by Gervasi reveals three different figures for this range. The International Institute for Strategic Studies identifies the range as 9600 kilometers, Bill Sweetman as 10,000 kilometers and Jane's Weapons Systems 1987-88 as 10,500 kilometers. Without any explanation, Gervasi uses the smallest of the three figures: 9600. In seven other examples of ICBM ranges disputed by Gervasi, the figures of the IISS matched those in Soviet Military Power.

In other examples, Gervasi confused items which were being compared:

Self-Propelled Guns

On page 63, Soviet Military Power captions a picture of a 203 mm self-propelled gun, with a "range of 30 kilometers". Gervasi annotates, "Wrong. 18 km." Gervasi has evidently confused the BM-4M howitzer with the SO-203 (2S7) gun. Both are 203 mm weapons but the BM-4M has a maximum range of 18 km. while the 2S7 has a maximum range of 30 km.

Soviet Armored Vehicles

By using a bar chart, Soviet Military Power places the number of Soviet armored vehicles at 78,000.[29] On the following page the number of Soviet armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles (APC/IFV) is given as 59,000. Gervasi calls the 59,00 figure "close to true". He elaborates,

"How careless, then, to exaggerate that figure so much in the bar charts on the preceding page. One of the major hazards of lying has always been the difficulty of being consistent."[30]

Gervasi is confusing armored vehicles with APC/IFVs. The Soviets have several different types of armored vehicles other than APC/IFVs such as the air defense ZSU vehicles, reconnaissance vehicles and others. John Collins of the Library of Congress placed the number of Soviet armored vehicles at 79,900.[31]

In other cases, Gervasi's information may simply be dated:

Soviet Armed Forces Personnel Strength

"Soviet Armed Forces personnel strength currently exceeds 5.8 million," states Soviet Military Power. Gervasi says that figure is "wrong", and claims they have "3,700,000 active uniformed military personnel." The International Institute of Strategic Studies(IISS) identifies Soviet armed forces personnel strength in 1987 at 5.796 million including 570,000 KGB/MVD personnel.[32] In 1981, IISS listed Soviet armed forces personnel strength as 3.673 million excluding 560,000 KGB/MVD personnel.[33]

Soviet Army Divisions

Gervasi puts the number of Soviet army divisions at 185 as compared with the 211 stated by Soviet Military Power. John Collins lists the number of Soviet divisions in 1980 as 185, increasing to 199 by 1984.[34] The International Institute for Strategic Studies listed 187

Soviet Army divisions in 1981,[35] increasing to 209 in 1987.[36]

Disputed Non-Numerical Facts

Among the non-numerical facts in Soviet Military Power that Gervasi disputes, the Soviet Military Power statements are backed up by Gervasi's own sources in the vast majority of cases:

Submarine-Launched Missiles

Soviet Military Power illustrates the Soviet SS-N-8 mod 2 and SS-N-18 mod 2 missiles. Gervasi says that

> "No evidence exists that either the SS-N-8 Mod II or the SS-N-18 Mod II is currently deployed, or ever has been deployed. The ranges shown for these mythical missiles are also way out of line for liquid-fueled rockets of this size."[37]

Jane's Fighting Ships 1986-1987 however confirms that both missiles are in the Soviet inventory with ranges the same as listed in Soviet Military Power.[38]

Firepower of the T-80 Tank

Soviet Military Power states that the T-80 tank has "more firepower" than the T-72. Gervasi annotates "Wrong. All T-72s, including the "T-80" variant, have the same 125mm main gun." But unlike the T-72, some T-80 tanks have the AT-8 Songster mounted on them. The AT-8 is an ATGM (anti-tank guided missile) that can penetrate 650mm of rolled hardened armor.[39]

Strategic Bomber Force

One of Gervasi's repeated assertions is that the Soviets do not have a strategic bomber force. On page 58, Gervasi states that "we are the only ones with a strategic bomber force." Yet on page 36, Gervasi states that Soviet bombers of "intercontinental range" can currently carry as many as 264 nuclear weapons. On page 37, Gervasi refers to the "165 Bear and Bison bombers which make up the Soviet intercontinental strike force". The Soviets claimed to have 160 "heavy bombers" in 1987.[40]

Identity of Soviet Defense Minister

Gervasi's criticism of the correct identity of the Soviet Minister of Defense is especially interesting. Soviet Military Power was published in April 1987 while Gervasi's book was published in January 1988. Soviet Military Power identifies the Soviet Minister of Defense as Sergey Sokolov. Gervasi annotates this statement with "Wrong. General Dimitri Yazov is Minister of Defense." On the following page, Gervasi relates the story of the West German pilot who flew from Helsinki, Finland in a light civilian aircraft, and landed it at Red Square in Moscow on May 28, 1987. Gervasi then states that Soviet Defense Minister Sokolov was replaced by General Yazov after the incident. Thus on one page Gervasi says that Soviet Military Power incorrectly names the Soviet Defense Minister, and on the following page he notes that the Soviet

Defense Minister was replaced during the interval between publication of Soviet Military Power and Gervasi's book.[41]

Mobile Missiles

In nine different places, Gervasi states that the Soviets do not have a mobile missile.[42] On page 23, Soviet Military Power refers to the Soviet SS-25 as a mobile ICBM. Gervasi responds, "Remember, we have only the administration's word that the SS-25 is 'mobile'." The Military Balance 1987-1988, published in autumn 1987, refers to the SS-25 as a "single-warhead mobile ICBM."[43] Thus on nine occasions, Gervasi denies what one of his own sources confirms.

Predictions

Some of the disputed data can be viewed in the light of more recent information. One of the points of contention concerned the new Soviet aircraft carrier. Soviet Military Power illustrated the new carrier and noted in the caption that it was under construction "with sea trials anticipated in 1989."[44] Gervasi stated that the carrier "probably will not enter service until the mid-1990's--somewhat later than the caption here suggests."[45] If Gervasi understands "entering service" to mean an operationally active carrier, he confuses the issue by comparing sea trials with "entering service". If he understands "entering service" to mean sea trials then he has been proved wrong in his prediction. World Defense

Almanac reported that the new carrier began sea trials in 1989[46], as predicted by Soviet Military Power in 1987.

Both Gervasi and the DOD may have misjudged the role for the new Soviet Hokum helicopter. Gervasi predicted that the Hokum would primarily be an attack helicopter against ground targets,[47] while Soviet Military Power predicted an air combat role.[48] The Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual also referred to the Hokum as an "aerial combat helicopter".[49] The February 1990 issue of Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review reports that a "naval role now seems more likely" for the Hokum.[50]

PART THREE-Deception

Gervasi repeatedly uses the words "deception" and "propaganda" in his annotations of Soviet Military Power. He states that the primary principle of propaganda is emphasis and that the second principle is repetition.[51] He charges that both principles of propaganda are used extensively in Soviet Military Power to create a deliberate deception. Gervasi often takes statements and illustrations which are completely accurate facts about Soviet military capabilities, and charges they are deceptive because they were not compared with Western military capabilities.

Illustrations

He makes reference to several illustrations as being deceptive. Soviet Military Power displays a silhouette map

of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations annotated with locations of Soviet air, naval, missile, and ground forces. Gervasi states that neighboring "land masses have been removed from this map to give the false impression" that they "do not create choke points which bottle up the Soviet Fleets as they do." This statement is typical of many comments he makes throughout the book. He is correct that the Soviet navy is restricted somewhat by the choke points he describes. But he has no basis for suggesting Soviet Military Power was deliberately attempting to create a false impression that the choke points do not exist because it used a silhouette map of the U.S.S.R.

On page 59, Gervasi criticizes another illustration as being deceptive:

> "Here is yet another small deception. To create the quick impression that the Soviets have more interceptor aircraft than we do, the authors have shown every possible type of aircraft the Soviets might use for air defense, while showing only those U.S. aircraft specifically assigned to our Aerospace Defense Command."

Yet despite this statement, a few sentences later Gervasi states that

> "The Soviets have more aircraft assigned to the defense of their territory than we have to ours, although some Soviet aircraft like the MIG-29 are available only in small numbers."

Gervasi repeatedly uses illustrations in Soviet Military Power that show several types of Soviet weapons alongside a smaller number of types of U.S. weapons as evidence that Soviet Military Power is seeking to portray

that there are more Soviet versus U.S. total weapons. It is wrong to assume that more types of a weapon means more total weapons.

For example, Soviet Military Power lists a single U.S. submarine with 10 classes of Soviet submarines on a chart that lists the capabilities of each class of submarines. Gervasi incorrectly claims that the chart misrepresents the relative balance of submarine power of each nation by only depicting one of four U.S. submarine classes in the chart. Soviet Military Power states that the single U.S. class is "shown for comparison purposes."[52] The purpose of the chart is to portray the capabilities of Soviet submarines, not to make a comparison of the number of submarines possessed by the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

In another example, a chart in Soviet Military Power titled "Surface Ship Comparisons" lists 6 Soviet and 6 U.S. ships side by side showing the relative size and weight of each. Gervasi says Soviet Military Power's authors "have chosen only those Soviet ships with the highest tonnage, and have found smaller U.S. ships to place next to them." In the chart, Soviet Military Power compares the Soviet Udaloy class guided missile destroyer with the U.S. Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyer.

Gervasi suggests that the U.S. Spruance class destroyer ought to be compared with the Udaloy. It is uncertain why he suggests that comparison since both the

Udaloy and the Arleigh Burke have guided missiles and the Spruance does not. It is even more interesting since, according to Gervasi's own figure, the Spruance class weight is 7800 metric tons compared to the Arleigh Burke class weight of 8300 M.T. and the Udaloy class weight of 8000 M.T. Soviet Military Power thus compares the smaller Udaloy with the larger Arleigh Burke class. Gervasi complains that Soviet Military Power inappropriately found smaller U.S. ships to compare with larger Soviet ships, while simultaneously suggesting that Soviet Military Power should have compared the Spruance class destroyer instead of the larger Arleigh Burke class destroyer with the Udaloy. Furthermore, the differences between the Burke, Spruance and the Udaloy are relatively small. In three of the six comparisons of surface ships in this chart, the U.S. ship has the larger weight.[53]

HELICOPTERS

Some comments by Gervasi seem trivial. On page 79, Soviet Military Power pictures Soviet and U.S. helicopters in profile annotated by speed, radius, and troop lift capability. Gervasi states that placing "the helicopters compared here in profile helps to conceal the higher lift capacity of our wider-bodied aircraft." Even if Gervasi's figures on troop lift capability are accepted, the two helicopters with the largest troop lift capability are the Soviet Mi-26/HALO and the Mi-6/HOOK.

Reverse Deception?

In four instances, Gervasi used figures that showed that either the Soviets had greater, or the U.S. had less capability than that indicated by Soviet Military Power. Gervasi states that there are 31 Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe, rather than the 30 indicated by Soviet Military Power. Gervasi gives the Soviet Mi-8/Hip helicopter more than double the troop lift capacity than is indicated by Soviet Military Power.[54]

In another instance, Soviet Military Power gives the maximum range of a U.S. Peacekeeper missile as 300 kilometers more than Gervasi.[55] It also states that NATO could place 900 more tanks in combat than Gervasi's figures indicate.[56] It does not seem logical that the authors of Soviet Military Power would have understated Soviet power and exaggerated U.S. power in these instances if they were attempting to deliberately distort the truth in the opposite direction.

In many of Gervasi's charges of deception, he argues against statements that Soviet Military Power did not make:

Extremely-Low-Frequency (ELF) Communications

On page 24, Soviet Military Power states that "Supported by an extremely-low-frequency communication system, the DELTA IV could be almost as responsive as an ICBM for destroying time-critical targets." Gervasi's comment is that "We have an ELF system. Therefore we must

say they have one for all their ballistic missile submarines."[57] Gervasi's comment is inaccurate since Soviet Military Power did not state or imply that all Soviet ballistic missile submarines have an ELF.

Tanker Aircraft

Again on page 35, Soviet Military Power states that "Moreover, some 530 tanker, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare aircraft are in the air armies and Soviet Naval Aviation." Gervasi refutes this by stating that "This statement creates the impression that most of these aircraft are tankers, when they are not."[58] Why does Gervasi believe that such a statement creates that impression? Soviet Military Power states there are a total of 530 aircraft from three different categories, and not that "most" of those 530 are tankers.

PART FOUR-EDITORIAL COMMENTS

Frequently, Gervasi makes editorial comments that relate to the subjects in Soviet Military Power. They vary from advocating a joint U.S./Soviet manned mission to Mars to comments on the effect of defense spending on economic growth.

Gervasi's Agenda

Gervasi betrays his case that Soviet Military Power is propaganda by frequently demonstrat.. that his opposition to Soviet Military Power is motivated by his

pursuit of his own agenda. In a review of Gervasi's earlier book, The Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy, Choice magazine noted that

> "Inaccuracies about both the process of defense budget making and the structure of the military balance are sufficient to demonstrate that his objective is advocacy, not clarity."[59]

For example, Gervasi suggests that the Strategic Defense Initiative will not work and that 26 billion dollars "would be much better spent on domestic social needs."[60]

Sarcasm

Some of the criticisms made by Gervasi are sarcastic or irrelevant comments that have no bearing on the issue. For instance, Soviet Military Power states that "The Soviet leadership, however, recognizes the devastating consequences of a general nuclear war". Gervasi's comment to that statement is "We should be grateful that someone does".[61] In Chapter V, Soviet Military Power states "The Far Eastern Theater of Military Operations (FETVD) ranks second in importance only to the Western TVD." Gervasi's comment to this is "Of course. That is where we have more Communists on our side than the Soviets have on their side."[62]

Irrelevant Comments

A number of Gervasi's comments do not respond directly to the statements in Soviet Military Power. On page 2, he annotates a chart showing the warhead mix of Soviet Intercontinental Attack Forces with the following statement:

> "Every time we have taken any major new step in the arms race, we have always claimed that the Soviets took it first."

Such a statement does not appear in Soviet Military Power. In fact, Soviet Military Power acknowledges that the U.S. has a "technological lead".[63]

On page 38 of Soviet Military Power, the ranges of U.S. cruise missiles are listed next to the ranges of Soviet cruise missiles. Gervasi annotates that

> "It is standard practice for the propagandist to represent the opponent's weapons as having the greater range, though our weapons were deployed five years before theirs."[64]

The fact that U.S. missiles were deployed "five years before theirs" does not necessarily mean that U.S. missiles have greater ranges.

On page 142, Soviet Military Power illustrates a Nicaraguan harbor with Soviet and Cuban merchant vessels. Gervasi states that the U.S. "mined" this particular harbor. Such a statement by Gervasi does not contradict anything Soviet Military Power stated.

Soviet Sources Of Information

As previously noted, some of Gervasi's opinions are similar to the official Soviet view as published in Whence The Threat To Peace. But Gervasi often argues that the Soviets have less strength than they acknowledge. Gervasi states that since the U.S. has "deployed large range cruise missiles, they are struggling to deploy them too." The

Soviet acknowledge in Whence The Threat To Peace that they have 53 bombers with cruise missiles.

Gervasi calls the Soviet Union a "second-rate military power".[65] The Soviets believe that "an approximate military-strategic equilibrium exists worldwide as a deterrent to the aggressive plans of the imperialist."[66]

Soviet Military Power stated that "the Soviet Union now has about ten thousand deployed intercontinental strategic nuclear weapons." Gervasi put the figure at 8360.[57] However, in the February 8, 1988 issue of Pravda, Soviet Defense Minister Yazov stated the total charges on Soviet strategic carriers as "approximately 10,000." Yazov also stated that the Warsaw Pact had approximately 20,000 more tanks than NATO. Gervasi had placed the difference at only 6 thousand.[68]

END NOTES

CHAPTER FIVE

[1]Gervasi, Tom Soviet Military Power *The Pentagon's Propaganda Document, Annotated and Corrected. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1988, p. V.

[2]Whyte, Stuart "Military Glasnost and Force Comparisons" International Defense Review, May, 1989, p. 559.

[3]Department of Defense Soviet Military Power 1987. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987, p. 1.

[4]Department of Defense Soviet Military Power 1987. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987, p. 63.

[5]Gervasi p. 145.

[6]Department of Defense Soviet Military Power 1987 Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987, p. 112.

[7]Department of Defense Soviet Military Power 1987. p. 149.

[8]Department of Defense Soviet Military Power 1987. p. 150.

[9]Department of Defense Soviet Military Power 1987. p. 150.

[10]Department of Defense Soviet Military Power 1987. p. 150.

[11]Department of Defense Soviet Military Power 1987. p. 150.

[12]Department of Defense Soviet Military Power 1987. p. 150.

[13]Gervasi p. 82.

[14]Polmer, Norman Guide to the Soviet Navy 3rd Edition. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1983, p. 102.

[15]Department of Defense p. 52.

[16]Gervasi p. 52.

[17]Gervasi p. 107.

[18]Isby, David Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army. London, U.K.: Jane's Publishing Company, 1988, p. 252.

[19]Gervasi p. 73.

[20]Department of Defense Soviet Military Power 1987. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987, p. 10.

[21]International Institute for Strategic Studies The Military Balance 1987-1988. Oxford, U.K.: Nuffield Press, 1987, p. 215.

[22]Secretary of State for Defence Statement on the Defence Estimates 1988. London, U.K.: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1987, p. 68.

[23]Sivard, Ruth Leger World Military And Social Expenditures 1987-88. Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1987, p. 55.

[24]Gervasi p. 10.

[25]Isby p. 267.

[26]Jane's Armour and Artillery 1985-1986. London, U.K.: Jane's Publishing Company, 1985, pp. 473, 595.

[27]Jane's Fighting Ships, 1986-1987. London, U.K.: Jane's Publishing Company, 1986, p. 818.

[28]International Institute for Strategic Studies The Military Balance 1987-1988. Oxford, U.K.: Nuffield Press, 1987, p. 202.

[29]Department of Defense Soviet Military Power 1987. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987, p. 71.

[30]Gervasi p. 72.

[31]Collins, John M. U.S.-Soviet Military Balance 1980-1985. McLean, VA: Pergamon-Brasseys International Defense Publishers, 1985, p. 204.

[32]International Institute for Strategic Studies The Military Balance 1987-1988. Oxford, U.K.: Nuffield Press, 1987.

[33]International Institute for Strategic Studies The Military Balance 1981-1982. Colchester, U.K.: Spottiswoode Ballantyne Ltd., 1981, p. 10.

[34]Collins, John M. U.S.-Soviet Military Balance 1980-1985. McLean, VA: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1985, p. 118.

[35]International Institute for Strategic Studies The Military Balance 1980-1981. Colchester, U.K.: Spottiswoode Ballantyne Ltd., 1981, p. 11.

[36]International Institute for Strategic Studies The Military Balance 1987-1988. Oxford, U.K.: Nuffield Press, 1987, p. 34.

[37]Gervasi p. 33.

[38]Jane's Fighting Ships, 1986-1987. London, U.K.: Jane's Publishing Company, 1986, p. 181.

[39]Isby p. 215

[40]Whence The Threat To Peace. Moscow, U.S.S.R.: Military Publishing House, 1987, p. 160.

[41]Gervasi pp. 11-12.

[42]Gervasi pp. 8, 23, 27, 30 (two references to mobile missiles), 31 (two references to mobile missiles), 52, 120.

[43]International Institute for Strategic Studies The Military Balance 1987-1988. Oxford, U.K.: Nuffield Press, 1987, p. 27.

[44]Department of Defense Soviet Military Power 1987. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987, p. 20.

[45]Gervasi p. 20.

[46]World Defense Almanac January 1990, p. 130.

[47]Gervasi p. 144.

[48]Department of Defense Soviet Military Power 1987. p. 145.

[49]Jones, David R. Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual 1984-1985. Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1986, p. 26.

[50]Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review. London, U.K.: Jane's Publishing Company, February 1990, p. 82.

[51]Gervasi p. 17.

[52]Department of Defense Soviet Military Power 1987. p. 81.

[53]Department of Defense Soviet Military Power 1987. p. 83.

[54]Gervasi p. 79.

[55]Gervasi p. 30.

[56]Gervasi p. 93.

[57]Gervasi p. 24

[58]Gervasi p. 35

[59]Trout, B.T. "A Review of The Myth of Soviet Military Power" Choice, November 1986, p. 548.

[60]Gervasi p. 44.

[61]Gervasi p. 25.

[62]Gervasi p. 102

[63]Department of Defense Soviet Military Power 1987. p. 1.

[64]Gervasi p. 38.

[65]Gervasi p.145.

[66]Whence The Threat To Peace Moscow, U.S.S.R.: Military Publishing House, 1987, p. 95.

[67]Gervasi p. 23.

[68]Gervasi p. 93.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS

Gervasi states that the actual facts are "not in dispute". He charges that the authors of Soviet Military Power have avoided mentioning the facts, lied, or misrepresented the truth. When Gervasi's "annotations" and "corrections" have been thoroughly compared to reliable sources, his assertions lack credibility. This study has compared his comments to many other sources, including many of his own references. He has been given credit for those instances when he had a valid point, but his basic accusations against Soviet Military Power are not valid.

His claim that Soviet Military Power avoids mentioning the true facts is based on a false perception that its purpose is to prove Soviet military superiority. While a good case can be made for the usefulness of a comparison of U.S./Soviet capabilities, the absence of such a comparison in a document describing Soviet military strength does not constitute deception.

His claim that Soviet Military Power lied about facts which are not in dispute cannot be verified by an examination of reliable reports of other defense analysts. The origin of some of his statements is uncertain. In many cases he apparently quoted a figure from among several

possible references that was most at variance with Soviet Military Power. He then concluded that Soviet Military Power was wrong without any further justification. In many cases numerical discrepancies can be explained due to the many variable factors that can affect a system. Some of his figures were out of date. Some of the differences in data from among western defense analysts are due to honest differences of opinion resulting from the lack of information from Soviet sources.

Gervasi's claim that Soviet Military Power misrepresented information is equally lacking. His statement that helicopters should be pictured from a frontal instead of a profile view seems trivial. His suggestion that destroyers with guided missiles should be compared to destroyers without them is illogical.

Limitations of "Soviet Military Power"

Although Soviet Military Power provides a realistic assessment of Soviet military capabilities, it has some limitations and weaknesses. Through the 1987 edition, the document lacked a thorough comparison with U.S. military capabilities. An extensive comparison was made beginning with the 1988 edition. As a public information document rather than a technical journal, it did not always define the criteria used to determine some of its numerical values. It did not explain that some of its statistics were estimates, due to a lack of corroborative information from

the Soviet Union. It contained two minor contradictions of facts.

On the whole, Soviet Military Power provided material that concurred with the information provided by other military analysts. As one reviewer observed about his earlier book, Gervasi's assertion of a conspiracy to deliberately distort the truth is "unpalatable."[1]

Response of the DOD

The public has a right to expect government agencies to provide information on important issues. The proper response of the DOD is to fulfill its role in this area.

A French writer observed recently that democracy

> "tends to ignore, even deny, threats to its existence because it loathes doing what is needed to counter them. It awakens only when the danger becomes deadly, imminent, evident. By then, either there is too little time left for it to save itself, or the price of survival has become increasingly high."[2]

Sir John Slessor reminds us that there "is a tendency to forget that the most important social service a government can do for its people is to keep them alive and free."[3]

Constraints on DOD

The DOD should be restricted in its informational activities by the following:

1. The DOD should ensure that it remains informational rather than taking on an advocacy role. Lobbyist and pressure groups may use DOD information, but

DOD should be careful to not engage in overt political lobbying with such documents. While some critics will charge that all such informational activities are by nature laden with political overtones, such charges should not cause the DOD to reduce its informational efforts. In this case the DOD performs like any other government agency: the Environmental Protection Agency issues reports on air pollution, the Consumer Product Safety Commission issues reports on hazardous products, and other agencies perform similar functions.

2. No attempt to prevent publication of hostile studies should be attempted unless important classified information has been compromised. Legal action or other attempts to prevent publication of reports that are derogatory of Defense documents would likely fail due to first amendment rights. Such efforts would also probably backfire with negative public reaction.

Recommendations

1. Publication of Soviet Military Power should continue. It should not be discontinued due to a perceived lessening threat from the Soviet Union. By reducing their forces in Europe, the Soviets may be seeking to manage the "Western perception of the conventional threat in order to keep low both the level of new systems and the will to consider deploying them." Simultaneously, they could be going "forward in those areas that contribute to the overall

strength of the Soviet economy and to the restructuring of Soviet defense industries to account for newly emerging technologies."[4]

Furthermore, the Soviet Union is not reducing its military capabilities in all areas. Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review noted recently that "it can be safely said that the Soviet Navy retains considerable potential, and that this potential is showing no signs of decreasing.[5] A recent Rand Corporation study noted that the Soviet intercontinental bomber force "is in the process of a dramatic expansion."[6] The same study observed that the Soviets have also significantly improved their ability to project military power:

> "The more dramatic improvements in Soviet force projection have occurred with regard to their ability to move military forces over long distances, well beyond the Soviet frontier. This improvement has involved the acquisition of new, long-range air and sea transport, as well as the development of an embryonic overseas basing infrastructure and the accumulation of greatly increased experience in undertaking such operations."[7]

Additionally, the current Soviet force structure permits them in some cases to make reductions while retaining a military advantage. In a comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact capabilities, one observer noted that "the Warsaw Pact could cut large numbers of older tanks as part of a conventional arms control agreement and still retain a more effective force than NATO."[8] Changes in the Soviet

Union and the Warsaw Pact nations require a continued realistic evaluation regarding their military capabilities.

2. Public information books should be expanded to include a more comprehensive compilation of threats to our national security. Information regarding non-Soviet security threats could become increasingly important. The Panama situation of December 1989 or the current situation in the Persian Gulf are examples where DOD information could be useful in helping the public make informed opinions.

In addition to the Soviet Union, threats from terrorism, piracy, or conflicts in foreign nations with the potential to disrupt an ally could be examined.

3. Studies should be made and disseminated which refute the errors of books such as Gervasi's. While every small pamphlet or letter to the editor may not warrant a response, certainly significant books such as Gervasi's can be correctly refuted.

If such information is not provided, the U.S. will suffer the consequences of misinformed public pressure on policies of critical national security importance.

END NOTES

CHAPTER SIX

[1]Jones, David R. "A Review of The Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy" Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, June 1987, p. 51.

[2]Revel, Jean-Francois How Democracies Perish. New York, NY: Doubleday, 1984, pp.3-4.

[3]Kaufman, William W. Defense in the 1980's. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1981, pp. 50-51.

[4]Kipp, Jacob W. "Soviet Military Doctrine and Conventional Arms Control" Military Review, December, 1988, pp. 13-14.

[5]Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, February 1990, p. 83.

[6]Warner, Edward L. The Defense Policy of the Soviet Union. Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, August 1989, p. 83.

[7]Warner p. 94.

[8]Vogt, William J. "Beyond the Bean Count, Quality/Quantity Assessment of Conventional Forces" International Defense Review, March, 1989, p. 275.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

Table of Disputed Facts Between Soviet Military Power and Mr. Gervasi Compared With Other Sources

Note: The first entry in each item is from Soviet Military Power, and the second entry is from Mr. Gervasi, followed by other entries which are specifically identified.

Abbreviations:

SMP: Soviet Military Power 1987, Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1987.

Gervasi: Gervasi, Tom Soviet Military Power *The Pentagon's Propaganda Document, Annotated and Corrected. New York, NY: Vintage Press, 1987.

BAS: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Collins: Collins, John M. U.S.-Soviet Military Balance 1980-1985. McLean, VA: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1985.

IDR: International Defense Review

IISS: International Institute for Strategic Studies The Military Balance 1987-1988. Oxford, U.K.: Nuffield Press, 1987.

Isby: Isby, David Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army. London, U.K.: Jane's Publishing Company, 1988.

Jane's: various publications by Jane's Publishing Company specified in end notes, London, U.K.

JCS: Joint Chiefs of Staff Military Posture Statement 1988, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987.

Kintner: Kintner, William R. Soviet Global Strategy. Fairfax, VA Hero Books, 1987.

Mayers: Mayers, Teena Karsa Understanding Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control. McLean, VA: Pergamon-Brassey's International Publishers, Inc. 1986.

Nitze: Nitze, Paul H. The Soviet Threat. Montpelier, VT: Capital City Press, 1978.

Rand: Warner, Edward L. The Defense Policy of the Soviet Union. Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, August 1989.

Sivard: Sivard, Ruth Leger World Military And Social Expenditures 1987-88. Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1987.

Sweetman: Sweetman, Bill and Gunston, Bill Soviet Air Power. London, U.K.: Salamander Books Ltd., 1978.

U.K.: Secretary of State for Defence, Statement on the Defence Estimates 1988 London, U.K.: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1987.

World Defense Almanac: published annually by Military Technology

DISPUTED NUMERICAL FACTS

Chapter One

PAGE 9:
Number of Aircraft in U.S.S.R. Naval Aviation
1756/1315 IISS[1]: 1869 total aircraft (1319 combat)
Jane's[2]: 1600

PAGE 10:
U.S.S.R. share of GNP devoted to military:
15-17%/ 6% IISS[3]: 12-17% Sivard[4]: 11-12%
U.K.[5]:15%

PAGE 17:
Number of Soviet Army Divisions:
211/ 185 IISS[6]: 209

Chapter Two

PAGE 23:
Number of Soviet deployed intercontinental strategic nuclear weapons:
10,000/ 8360 Mayers[7]: 9490 BAS[8]: 10,025

PAGE 29:
Soviet ICBM Launcher and Reentry Vehicle (RV) Deployment:
6400/ 5400 Mayers[9]: 6395 Collins[10]: 6420

PAGE 30:
ICBM Missile Ranges in Kilometers:

U.S.S.R.		IISS[11]	Sweetman[12]	Jane's[13]
SS-11 mod 1	11000/ 9600	9600	10000	10000
SS-11 mod 2	13000/ 9000	13000		13000
SS-11 mod 3	10600/ 8800	10600	10000	10600
SS-13 mod 2	9400/ 8000	9400		9400
SS-17 mod 3	10000/ 8800	10000	10000	10000
SS-18 mod 4	11000/ 8800	11000	10500	11000
SS-19 mod 3	10000/ 8000	10000	9000	10000
SS-25	10500/ 9000	10500		10000
U.S.				
TITAN II	12000/ 15000		15000	12000
MINUTEMAN II	12500/ 12900	11300	11250	12500
MINUTEMAN III	11000+/ 12900	12900	13000	11000
PEACEKEEPER	11000+/ 10700	11000		8000

PAGE 32:
Number Of SLBM Launcher and Reentry Vehicle (RV) Deployment:

U.S. 5900/6464 Mayers[14]: 5632

U.S.S.R. 3100/2672 Mayers[15]: 2495

PAGE 33:
Nuclear Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles
Ranges in Kilometers:

U.S.S.R.		IISS[16]	Collins[17]	Jane's[18]
SS-N-8 MOD I	7800/ 5500	7800	8880	7800
SS-N-18 MOD I	6500/ 3100	6500		6500
SS-N-20	8300/ 7400	8300	8325	8300
SS-N-23	8300/ 7400	8300		8300
U.S.				
POSEIDON C-3	4000/ 4600	4000		4630
MIRVs	10/ 14	10*		10-14
TRIDENT C-4	7400/ 7800	7400		7000

*maximum of 14

PAGE 36:
Bomber Aircraft Unrefueled Combat Radius:

U.S.S.R.		IISS[19]	Sweetman[20]	Collins[21]	Jane's[22]
Tu-95 Bear	300/ 6270	5690	6275	8286	8285
Backfire	4000/ 2890	4430	2870	2735	2735
Blackjack	7300/ ?			5470	7300
M-type Bison	5600/ 4860	5100	5500	5631	5600
U.S.					
FB-111	1480/ 3780	1750			

Note: The range of an aircraft can vary dramatically depending
on conditions such as altitude, temperature, and payload.

PAGE 38:
Ranges of Long-Range Cruise Missiles (KM):

U.S.S.R.		IISS[23]	Jane's
SS-NX-21	3000/ 1200	3000	3000[24]
AS-15	3000/ 1200	1800	3000[25]
U.S.			
ALCM	2500/ 3900	2400	2500[26]
Tomahawk GLCM	2500/ 3900	2500	2500[27]
Tomahawk SLCM	2500/ 3900	2500	2500[28]

PAGE 41:
Range of Longer Range Intermediate-Range Nuclear Missiles in Km.:

U.S.S.R.		IISS[29]
SS-4	2000/ 1930	2000
SS-20	5000/ 3900	5000
NATO		
Pershing II	1800/ 2000	1800
GLCM	2500/ 3900	2500

Page 42:
Range of U.S.S.R. Shorter Range Missiles in Km.:

		IISS[30]	IDR[31]	Jane's[32]
FROG-7	70/55	70		70
SS-1 SCUD B	300/ 160-270	300	300	280
SS-23	500/ 350	500		500

CHAPTER THREE

PAGE 59:
Air Defense Interceptor Aircraft:
(Ranges in KM, speed in MACH)

U.S.S.R.		Collins[33]	Jane's[34]
MiG-25 Foxbat E range	1450/ 740	1480	1450
Su-15 Flagon E/F range	1000/ 650	1017	725
Tu-128 Fiddler B range	1500/ 1300	1249	1500
MiG-23 Flogger B/G range	1150/ 930	1295	1300
max speed (MACH)	2.3/ 2.2	2.3	2.025
MiG-31 Foxhound range	2100/ 1650	1480	2100
YaK-28 Firebar max speed (MACH)	1.8/ 1.13	1.8	1.88
MiG-29 Fulcrum armament (AAMs)	6/ 4	6	6
U.S.			
F-106A Delta Dart max speed (MACH)	2.0/ 2.3	2.0	
F-15A Eagle max speed (MACH)	2.5/ 2.54	2.5	
F-15C Eagle max speed (MACH)	2.5/ 2.54	2.5	2.5+[35]
combat radius	1770/ 2700	1572	
F-16 Falcon Max Speed (MACH)	2.0/ 2.12	2.2	2.0+[35]

PAGE 60:
Number of Soviet MiG-29 Fulcrums Deployed:
300/ 30 Jane's[37]: 300+ (as of mid 1987)

CHAPTER FOUR
Page 71:
Number of U.S.S.R. Armored Vehicles:
78,000/ 56,000 Collins[38]: 79,900
PAGE 72:
Range of Selected Artillery in meters:

USSR		Isby[39]	Jane's[40]*
2S5	28,500/ 27,000	27,000	27,000-37,000
M 1976	28,500/ 27,000	27,000	27,000-37,000
2S7	30,000/ 18,000	30,000	30,000
U.S.			
M109A2/A3	18,100/ 30,000		14,650-24,000
M110A2	22,900/ 35,000		21,300-29,100
M198	18,100/ 34,000		18,150-30,000

*Dependent upon ammunition type

PAGE 73:
Main Battle Tanks:
USSR

T-54/55		Isby[41]*
weight	36MT/ 30MT	36MT
muzzle velocity	1500/ 1400	1415
T-62		
muzzle velocity	1600/ 780	1615: HVAPFSDS 780: 780: OF-11 FRAG-HE
T-64		
speed km/h	80/ 60	70
muzzle velocity	1750/ 1600	850-1680
T-72		
muzzle velocity	1750/ 1600	850-1680
T-80		
speed	90/ 60	70
muzzle velocity	1750/ 1600	850-1680

*Muzzle velocity is dependent upon ammunition type.

PAGE 78:
Tactical Aircraft:

		Collins[42]	Jane's[43]
U.S.S.R.			
Su-24 Fencer			
combat radius	1300/ 1100	1850	1300
MiG-23 Flogger B/G/K			
max speed MACH	2.3/ 2.2	2.3	2.025
combat radius	1150/ 930	1295	1300
MiG-27 Flogger D/J			
max speed MACH	1.7/ 1.6		1.7
Su-17 Fitter			
max speed MACH	2.1/ 1.8	2.0	2.09
combat radius	550/ 480	740	685*
MiG-25 Foxbat B/D			
combat radius	900/ 740	800	900
MiG-21 Fishbed L	750/ 500	925	740
Tactical Aircraft U.S.:			
F-111			
combat radius	1100/ 3000	1378	
armament KG	4000/ 10000	6600	
F-15E			
max speed MACH	2.5/ 2.54		2.5+
F-16A/C			
max speed MACH	2.0/ 2.12		2.0+

*with 2,000 KG of stores

PAGE 79:
Combat and Support Helicopters

U.S.S.R.:		Jane's[44]
Mi-24/HIND		
max speed KM/H	320/ 295	310
U.S.:		
AH-IT/Sea Cobra		
speed KM/H	260/ 290	277
AH-IS/Huey Cobra		
speed KM/H	260/ 290	227
radius KM	230/ 288	253
UH-1 Iroquois		
radius	200/ 330	255
troop lift	9/ 15	11-14
CH-53E/Super Sea Stallion		
speed KM/H	280/ 320	315
troop lift	35/ 55	55
UH-60A/Black Hawk		
speed KM/H	260/ 320	296
radius KM	300/ 335	300
CH-47D/Chinook		
speed KM/H	260/ 300	278
troop lift	33/ 44	44

PAGE 84:
Range of Soviet SS-N-19 Cruise Missile in km.:
550/ 460 Jane's[45]: 550

PAGE 89:
Number of Soviet Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) reconnaissance and decontamination vehicles:
30,000/ Fewer than 10,000
U.K.[46]: "the Soviet Union has over 30,000 specialized vehicles and over 70,000 personnel in the armed forces specially equipped and trained for operations in a contaminated environment.

Chapter Five

PAGE 97:
Soviet Armed Forces Personnel Strength:
5.8 Million/ 3.7 Million IISS[47]: 5.796 million (includes 570,000 KGB, MVD)

Number in the Soviet Armed Forces Reserve System:
55 Million/ 27 Million IISS[48]: 55 Million

PAGE 98:
Military Transport Aircraft:

		Sweetman[49]	Jane's[50]
U.S.S.R.			
An-22/Cock			
maximum payload MT	80/ 45	80	80
range KM	4200/ 4000	5000	5000
number in inventory	55/ 50		55
Il-76/Candid			
maximum payload MT	40/ 35	40	40
range KM	4600/ 3250	5000	5000
number in inventory	340/ 310		340
U.S.			
C-5B/Galaxy			
range KM	4200/ 5600		5526

Chapter Six

PAGE 107:
Soviet Tank Production:
3000/ 950 Collins[51]: 3000

Horsepower produced by Soviet T-80 tank:
1000/ 780 Isby[52]: 900-980

Page 121:
Tank Production 1977-1986 in U.S.S.R.
24,400/ 9,370 U.K.[53]: 24,400

Disputed Facts: Non-Numerical

Preface

SMP: The SS-25 is the USSR's "fifth-generation" ICBM.

Gervasi: SS-25 is a conversion of the SS-13.

IISS[54]: The SS-25 is "a mobile missile"

U.K.[55]: "The Soviet Union deployed 100 of its mobile ICBM's, the SS-25" in 1987.

PAGE 11:

SMP: S.M. Sokolov is the Soviet Minister of Defense.

Gervasi: Dimitri Yazov is Soviet Minister of Defense.

According to Gervasi General Yazov replaced Sokolov after publication of Soviet Military Power[56].

PAGE 20:

SMP: Sea trials are anticipated for the new Soviet aircraft carrier in 1989.

Gervasi: The new carrier will "probably not enter service until the mid-1990's"

World Defense Almanac[57]: Sea trials began in 1989.

CHAPTER TWO

PAGE 25:

SMP: The Backfire is listed as a "Nuclear Forces Bomber"

Gervasi: The U.S. State Department has declared that the Backfire is "neither equipped nor deployed as a strategic bomber."

Sweetman[58]: "The bombers are estimated to have the technical capability to reach some or all of Continental United States (CONUS), depending on various operational factors."

Note: Not all bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons have ranges long enough to be inter-continental strategic bombers.

PAGE 27:

SMP: The Soviets are deploying a mobile SS-25 ICBM.

Gervasi: A Soviet mobile ICBM "doesn't exist and it never may."

IISS[59]: The Soviet Union continues to deploy "new SS-25 single warhead mobile ICBM missiles."

U.K.[60]: The Soviet Union is probably ahead of the West in "the development of mobile ground-based long-range ballistic missiles."

PAGE 31:

SMP: The SS-X-24 missile is "well along in its flight-test program."

Gervasi: "The SS-X-24 has just begun its flight test program."

IISS[61]: The SSx-24 is a "mobile ICBM with 10 warheads" It is "now in production and reports suggest deliveries have begun." (1987)

U.K.[62]: The SS-X-24 "is close to initial deployment." (1987)

PAGE 33:

SMP: A chart shows the capability of Soviet SS-N-8 Mod II and SS-N-18 Mod II missiles.

Gervasi: "No evidence exist that either the SS-N-8 Mod II or the SS-N-18 Mod II is currently deployed."

Jane's Fighting Ships identifies both missiles as part of the Soviet inventory. The SS-N-8 mod II has a range of 4800 nautical miles; the SS-N-8 mod II, 4300 nautical miles.[63]

PAGE 37:

SMP: The Soviets have started deploying the MIDAS, an aerial-refueling tanker version of the CANDID transport aircraft."

Gervasi: "Not yet."

JCS[64]: The deployment of the Soviet MIDAS tanker aircraft for theater support increases the effectiveness of Soviet combat aircraft.

IISS[65]: The Midas tanker is "being introduced" as of autumn 1987.

PAGE 39:

SMP: The U.S. neither has, nor plans to adopt "a first-strike policy."

Gervasi: The U.S. officially adopted the policy of "striking the first blow" on September 19, 1945 in a top secret Joint Chiefs of Staff directive 1496/3."

JCS[66]: "The fundamental objective of U.S. nuclear forces is to remove all incentives for direct attack against the United States and its allies by promising a devastating retaliation to any attacker."

U.K.[67]: NATO has committed "itself never to be the first to use force."

PAGE 40:

SMP: The SS-20 ICBM allows it to "operate under both on and off road conditions."

Gervasi: The SS-20 must "be launched from carefully prepared positions, and none of these is going to be right on the road."

Mayers[68]: The SS-20 is a "mobile ABM system".

IISS[69]: The SS-20 is "mobile".

Page 41:

SMP: "The Soviets stockpile refire missiles."

Gervasi: This statement is "not likely to be true."

U.K.[70]: It is not easy to identify "the number of spare (reload) missiles available."

Page 42:

SMP: The USSR has significant numerical advantage in INF aircraft.

Gervasi: NATO has numerical advantage.

U.K.[71]: Among long range INF aircraft the Warsaw Pact has 350 Badger, Blinder, and Backfire aircraft. NATO has 144 F-111 aircraft. Among short range aircraft the Warsaw Pact has 200 Fitter, Fishbed, Flogger, Fencer, and Fulcrum aircraft. NATO has 1500 F-4, F-16, F-104, and Tornado aircraft.

CHAPTER THREE

PAGE 45:

SMP: "The Soviets already have ground-based lasers that can damage satellites".

Gervasi: It was only a "gas fire" from the Soviet Union that damaged one of our satellites rather than a laser.

Mayers[72]: The "US concluded in 1975 there were gas fires caused by breaks along natural gas lines that affected U.S. satellites."

Kintner[73]: "In 1986, high powered Soviet ground-to-space microwaves temporarily disabled a U.S. satellite."

Jane's[74]: "The Soviet Union already has two ground-based lasers that have a 'limited capability' to attack U.S. satellites."

PAGE 46:

SMP: The Soviets have a "civil defense" program.

Gervasi: "The Soviets have no civil defense."

JCS[75]: The Soviet civil defense is a "strong program."

Nitze[76]: "The Soviet Union is building a large number of blast shelters in cities and near major industrial establishments. These shelter are intended to give protection to that essential fraction of the urban industrial population that the Soviet Union does not plan to evacuate in time of crisis. Soviet plans call for the remainder of the urban industrial population to be dispersed relatively evenly over a wide area and to be sheltered against fallout to a degree that would leave only a small percentage of them vulnerable to an American retaliatory attack, even one designed to maximize fallout."

SMP: The Soviets have violated the ABM Treaty with their phased-array radar at Krasnoyarsk.

Gervasi: Krasnoyarsk "cannot be used effectively for ballistic missile early warning and tracking."

The Union of Concerned Scientists[77]: "the Krasnoyarsk radar, is clearly a violation" of the ABM Treaty. It will "recognize, and to some unknown extent monitor and characterize an attack by U.S. SLBMs."

Page 50:

SMP: Soviets deployed their first ASAT about 1965.

Gervasi: about 1968

Jane's[78]: "Since 1971 the USSR has had the ability to attack satellites in near earth orbit with a ground-based orbital interceptor."

SMP: Soviets may be preparing an ABM system.

Gervasi: No such defense is possible.

U.K.[79]: The Soviet Union is constructing "a large anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defence radar, as part of the world's only operational ABM system."

SMP: USSR laser program is considerably larger than the U.S.

Gervasi: It is not considerably larger.

Jane's[80]: "The high energy laser program in the USSR, which dates from the mid-1960's is reported to be much larger than that of the U.S.A."

U.K.[81]: The Warsaw Pact is "roughly equal" to the West in directed energy (lasers).

PAGE 53:

SMP: USSR can use Radar Ocean Reconnaissance satellite to target naval vessels. The U.S. has no such capability.

Gervasi: The U.S. has that capability.

Jane's[82]: "The USA has no equivalent counterparts (as yet) to the satellites used by the Soviet Union for ocean surveillance, the electronic ocean reconnaissance satellite (EORSAT), or the nuclear-powered radar ocean reconnaissance satellite (RORSAT). Their function is to detect, locate, and target US and allied naval forces for Soviet anti-ship weapons."

PAGE 58:

SMP: MiG-31 Foxhound has lookdown/shootdown capability.

Gervasi: "They don't have it (lookdown/shootdown capability) now and it will be quite some time before they do."

JCS[83]: The Foxhound is a lookdown/shootdown capable aircraft.

Jane's[84]: The MiG-31 Foxhound is said to provide "true lookdown/shootdown and multiple target engagement capability for the first time in a Soviet interceptor."

PAGE 60:

SMP: Soviet Union has begun deploying Flanker aircraft.

Gervasi: Not until the end of 1987.

IISS[85]: a "slower deployment" of Flanker aircraft has been observed.

U.K.[86]: The "replacement of older fighters with Fulcrum and Flanker has continued."

Jane's[87]: The total number of Flankers "had probably increased to at least 50 operational aircraft by mid-1987."

PAGE 61:

SMP: The Mainstay AWACS is a "substantial" improvement over the Tu-126 Moss.

Gervasi: It is a "slight" improvement.

JCS[88]: The Soviet's "forward air defense capabilities will be significantly improved with deployment of Mainstay."

U.K.[89]: Soviet air defence capabilities have been "improved markedly" by the combination of Flanker and Foxhound fighters with the Mainstay AWACS "which extends Soviet air defence boundaries especially against low flying targets."

PAGE 63:

SMP: The Soviets have superior numbers.

Gervasi: The U.S. is superior.

JCS[90]: "As a result of a larger peacetime military force, greater equipment and manpower reserves, and the ability to mobilize rapidly, the Soviet Union has forces with a quantitative advantage over those of the United States."

U.K.[91]: "It is sometimes argued that Warsaw Pact numerical superiorities can be discounted because they are offset by NATO's technological lead. Certainly the West still has a lead in many areas; but it is being eroded by the continuing deployment of new Soviet weapons with improved flexibility and performance. And, although the West is often ahead in the race to develop new technologies, the Soviet glazed often quicker to apply and deploy them, as has been demonstrated by the introduction of explosive reactive armour for tanks, an idea first developed in the West but now widely applied by the Soviet Union."

PAGE 66:

SMP: The T-80 is the Soviet's newest tank.

Gervasi: There is no T-80 tank. It is only a slight modification of the T-72.

Isby[92]: The T-62 was replaced "by the T-64 and then by the T-80. The T-55 was itself replaced at the low end of the mix by the T-72".

U.K.[93]: "Deliveries have continued of new equipment such as the T-80 tank."

PAGE 73:

SMP: Reactive armor on tanks threatens to fundamentally shift the conventional balance.

Gervasi: It threatens nothing of the kind.

Isby[94]: Reactive armor on Soviet tanks "may represent an attempt to reduce the protection gap that exists between the T-64/72/80 and the best NATO tanks. The improvements in main battle tank protection seen since the 1970's have greatly reduced the tank killing efficiency of the HEAT warhead."

U.K.[95]: "Reactive armor" is one of the Soviet "technological advances" that has continued to reduce the superiority of NATO equipment.

SMP: The T-80 can fire an anti-tank guided missile through the main gun.

Gervasi: Any missile which gets through the gun barrel of this is "headed in the wrong direction."

Jane's[95]: The AT-8 Songster has "laser or radio command guidance" and is "launched from the 125mm gun installed in the T-64B and T-80 Main Battle Tanks."

PAGE 91:

SMP: BINARY chemicals are safe to handle.

Gervasi: They are not as "safe" as advertised.

Mayers[97]: "Because its two components are non-toxic until they are combined, binary gas can be stored and handled more easily than other toxic gases."

SMP: France does not participate in the NATO integrated structure.

Gervasi: France has 50,000 troops in West Germany.

U.K.[98]: Although France does not participate in NATO's military structure, it stations 50,000 troops in the Federal Republic (of Germany) under the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty of 1954.

CHAPTER FIVE

PAGE 95:

SMP: Soviet forces are equipped and trained for the offensive.

Gervasi: There is no difference between offensive and defensive training or equipment.

U.K.[99]: Soviet operational art "has its roots in a long-standing tradition of defending the homeland by taking the offensive." Soviet "offensive capability continues to be reflected in the operational art and structure of Warsaw Pact forces today."

SMP: Soviets maintain a high degree of readiness.

Gervasi: Not a high degree of readiness.

U.K.[100]: For 1988 "under the terms of the Stockholm Document, the Warsaw Pact declared 22 exercises involving 13,000 or more soldiers, compared with NATO's 12. "Many divisions are already at very high levels of readiness or capable of being mobilized within a few days." There are "57 Warsaw Pact divisions in the Central Front most of them at high levels of readiness." There are 65 more divisions in Eastern Europe, "many of which could be brought into action immediately or within a short time."

SMP: Soviets are capable of missile reloading operations.

Gervasi: "not likely"

U.K.[101]: The Soviets have "spare (or reload) missiles."

Jane's[102]: "Above-ground test launches of the modified Galosh ABM missile at the Sary Shagan Missile Test Range have demonstrated a reload/refire time of "much less than a day". It is believed that each silo has the capability of one refire." The "SS-19 is deployed in canister launch containers which are loaded into the silos to facilitate reload and refire capability in the same way as SS-17 and SS-18 ICBMs."

CHAPTER SIX

PAGE 107:

SMP: The T-80 tank has more firepower than the T-72

Gervasi: All T-72 and T-80 have same gun.

Isby[103]: "There are probably two T-80 versions, both with the 125mm gun but one also being able to use the AT-8 Songster. Alternatively, all T-80s may be able to use Songster."

U.K.[104]: The T-80 has "improved mobility, firepower and armored protection."

SMP: Soviet military costs during 1977-1986 exceeded those of the U.S.

Gervasi: U.S. spent 600 billion dollars more.

JCS[105]: "For the 1976-1985 period, the estimated cumulative dollar cost of Soviet investment for strategic forces was almost 2.5 times that of comparable US outlays, and the Soviet investment or general purposes forces was ten percent higher."

PAGE 110:

SMP: Soviets had a breakout of anthrax due to biological warfare experiments.

Gervasi: This is a belabored effort to revive an accusation we first made in 1980.

Isby[106]: "Soviet biological warfare efforts were illuminated by an accident at Sverdlovsk in 1979, when what appeared to be an airborne strain of Anthrax-N was inadvertently released, causing casualties."

Page 112:

SMP: USSR has built a high energy laser device to 10 Megawatt level.

Gervasi: Not even a 5 MW level exists.

Jane's[107]: Regarding laser weapons technology, a rocket-driven magneto-hydrodynamic (MHD) generator that can produce 15 MW of short-term electric power "has been developed" by the Soviet Union.

U.K.[108]: The Soviet Union is probably ahead of the West in "some areas of high energy physics."

SMP: Soviets have a significant lead over the West in chemical explosives.

Gervasi: The West has more powerful anti-tank missiles.

JCS[109]: The USSR continues to maintain the world's most significant capability to employ chemical weapons.

U.K.[110]. "The Soviet Union commands the world's largest, most comprehensive and advanced capability for chemical and toxic agent warfare (CW). This ranges from the research, production, and storage of lethal agents and chemical weapons to the protective systems required for their use."

PAGE 143:

SMP: Soviet policy activities remain buttressed by the use of military power.

Gervasi: The Soviets are only meeting the Western threat.

U.K.[111]: Warnings are made of "the intimidating power of Soviet superiority in conventional and chemical forces, which could be used in attempts to impose Soviet will."

Rand[112]: "Between June 1944 and June 1979, Soviet military units were used as a policy instrument to influence other international actors on 190 occasions. Among these incidents, 158 involved the deliberate manipulation of Soviet forces as a means to coerce other."

CHAPTER EIGHT

PAGE 147:

SMP: The SS-20 missile increases the threat to friends and allies.

Gervasi: The SS-20 reduced the megatonnage of the Soviet missile aimed at Europe.

U.K.[113]: "In the late 70's, NATO faced an increasing disadvantage in theater nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union was rapidly deploying new and capable systems--particularly the SS-20 missile, which could hit all Western Europe from sites deep in the Soviet Union."

SMP: The D-5 missile on the Trident submarines will strengthen deterrence.

Gervasi: The D-5 is dangerously destabilizing.

U.K.[114]: The Trident provides "the necessary updating" of a strategic deterrent capability.

APPENDIX B

Examples of References Corroborating Gervasi's Statements

Note: The first entry in each item is from Soviet Military Power 1987, and the second entry is from Mr. Gervasi, followed by other entries which are specifically identified.

T-54/55 muzzle velocity: 1500/ 1400 Isby[115]: 1415

CH-53/Super Sea Stallion speed: 280/ 320 Jane's[116]: 315

CH-53E/Super Sea Stallion troop lift: 35/ 55 Jane's[117]: 55

CH-47D/Chinook troop lift: 33/ 44 Jane's[118]: 44

U.S. C-5B/Galaxy range in Km.: 4200/ 5600 Jane's[119]: 5526

END NOTES

APPENDIX

[1]International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) The Military Balance 1987-1988. Oxford, U.K.: Nuffield Press, 1987, p. 38-39.

[2]Jane's Fighting Ships 1987-88. London, U.K.: Jane's Publishing Company, 1987, p. 533.

[3]IISS p. 215.

[4]Sivard, Ruth Leger World Military And Social Expenditures 1987-88. Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1987, p. 55.

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[7]Mayers, Teena Karsa Understanding Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control. McLean, VA: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1986, p. 63.

[8]Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, May 1987, p. 57.

[9]Mayers p. 63.

[10]Collins, John M. U.S.-Soviet Military Balance 1980-1985. McLean, VA: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1985, p. 289.

[11]IISS p. 205.

[12]Sweetman, Bill and Gunston, Bill Soviet Air Power. London, U.K.: Salamander Books Ltd., 1978, p. 32.

[13]Jane's Weapon's Systems 1987-1988. London, U.K.: Jane's Publishing Company, 1987, pp. 7-10, 24-26.

[14]Mayers p. 86.

[15]Mayers p. 86.

[16]IISS p. 206.

[17]Collins p. 178.

[18]Jane's Weapons Systems 1985-1986. pp. 14-15, 26-29.

[19]IISS p. 207.

[20]Sweetman pp. 165, 171, 155.

[21]Collins p. 181.

[22]Jane's All The World's Aircraft 1987-1988. London, U.K.: Jane's Publishing Company, 1987, pp. 87-88.

[23]IISS p. 216.

[24]Jane's Weapons Systems 1987-1988 p. 16.

[25]Jane's All The World's Aircraft 1987-1988 p. 883.

[26]Jane's All The World's Aircraft 1987-1988 p. 883.

[27]Jane's Weapons Systems 1987-1988 p. 1018.

[28]Jane's Weapons Systems 1987-1988 p. 1018.

[29]IISS pp. 202, 205.

[30]IISS pp. 206-207.

[31]International Defense Review November 1988, p. 1427.

[32]Jane's Weapons Systems 1987-1988 pp. 122-123.

[33]Collins p. 187.

[34]Jane's All The World's Aircraft 1987-1988 pp. 260, 275, 285, 258, 263, 285, 261.

[35]Jane's All The World's Aircraft 1987-1988 p. 457.

[36]Jane's All The World's Aircraft 1987-1988 p. 424.

[37]Jane's All The World's Aircraft 1987-1988 p. 261.

[38]Collins p. 204.

[39]Isby, David Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army. London, U.K.: Jane's Publishing Company, 1988, p.

[40]Jane's Armour and Artillery 1985-86. London, U.K.: Jane's Publishing Company, 1985, pp.473, 595, 488-489.

[41]Isby pp. 124, 130, 139.

[42]Collins p. 221, 187.

[43]Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1987-1988 pp. 276, 258, 274, 260, 256, 457, 424, 258, 269.

[44]Jane's All The World's Aircraft 1987-1988 pp.269, 368, 370, 365, 513, 512, 515, 398, 397.

[45]Jane's Weapons Systems 1987-88 p. 485.

[46]Secretary of State for Defence, p. 6.

[47]IISS p. 33.

[48]IISS p. 33.

[49]Sweetman, Bill and Gunston, Bill Soviet Air Power. London, U.K.: Salamander Books Ltd., 1978, pp. 110, 115.

[50]Jane's All The World's Aircraft 1987-1988 pp. 236, 243, 247, 450.

[51]Collins p. 48.

[52]Isby p. 147.

[53]Secretary of State for Defence p. 62.

[54]IISS p. 34.

[55]Secretary of State for Defence p. 65.

[56]Gervasi, Tom Soviet Military Power *The Pentagon's Propaganda Document, Annotated and Corrected. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1987, pp. 11-12.

[57]World Defense Almanac January 1990, p. 130.

[58]Sweetman p. 171.

[59]IISS p. 27.

[60]Secretary of State for Defence p. 57.

[61]IISS pp. 27, 37.

[62]Secretary of State for Defence p. 65.

[63]Jane's Fighting Ships 1987-88 p. 181.

[64]Joint Chiefs of Staff p. 54.

[65]IISS p. 34.

[66]Joint Chiefs of Staff p. 2.

[67]Secretary of State for Defence p. 58.

[68]Mayers p. 94.

[69]IISS p. 34.

[70]Secretary of State for Defence p. 56.

[71]Secretary of State for Defence p. 3.

[72]Mayers p. 93.

[73]Kintner, William R. Soviet Global Strategy. Fairfax, VA: Hero Books, 1987.

[74]Jane's Weapons Systems 1987-1988 p. 18.

[75]Joint Chiefs of Staff p. 45.

[76]Nitze, Paul H. The Soviet Threat. Montpelier, VT: Capital City Press, 1978, p. 10.

[77]Krass, Allan and Girrier, Catherine Dispropportionate Response. Cambridge, MA: Union of Concerned Scientists, 1987, p. 37, 66.

[78]Jane's Weapons Systems 1987-1988 p. 19.

[79]Secretary of State for Defence p. 65.

[80]Jane's Weapons Systems 1987-1988 p. 18.

[81]Secretary of State for Defence p. 57.

[82]Jane's Weapons Systems 1987-1988 p. 19.

[83]Joint Chiefs of Staff p. 43.

[84]Jane's All The World's Aircraft 1987-1988 p. 262.

[85]IISS p. 28.

[86]Secretary of State for Defence p. 60.

[87]Jane's All The World's Aircraft 1987-1988 p. 278.

[88]Joint Chiefs of Staff p. 43.

[89]Secretary of State for Defence p. 60.

[90]Joint Chiefs of Staff p. 10.

[91]Secretary of State for Defence p. 56.

[92]Isby p. 114.

[93]Secretary of State for Defence p. 60.

[94]Isby p. 150-151.

[95]Secretary of State for Defence p. 60.

[96]Jane's Weapons Systems 1987-1988 p. 146.

[97]Mayers p. 112.

[98]Secretary of State for Defence p. 17.

[99]Secretary of State for Defence p. 5.

[100]Secretary of State for Defence p. 57-58.

[101]Secretary of State for Defence p. 56.

[102]Jane's Weapons Systems 1987-1988 p. 8, 17.

[103]Isby p. 147.

[104]Secretary of State for Defence p. 60.

[105]Joint Chiefs of Staff p. 7.

[106]Isby p. 299.

[107]Jane's Weapons Systems 1987-1988 p. 18.

[108]Secretary of State for Defence p. 57.

[109]Joint Chiefs of Staff p. 65.

[110]Secretary of State for Defence p. 69.

[111]Secretary of State for Defence p. 2.

[112]Warner, Edward L. The Defense Policy of the Soviet Union. Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, August 1989, p. 100.

[113]Secretary of State for Defence p.8.

[114]Secretary of State for Defence p. 4.

[115]Isby p. 124.

[116]Jane's All The World's Aircraft 1987-1988 p. 513.

[117]Jane's All The World's Aircraft 1987-1988 p. 512.

[118]Jane's All The World's Aircraft 1987-1988 p. 397.

[119]Jane's All The World's Aircraft 1987-1988 p. 450.

GLOSSARY

ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE (ABM) SYSTEM- A group of radars and missiles capable of destroying incoming offensive ballistic missiles.

AWACS- Airborne warning and control system. An aircraft with a radar able to identify hostile targets used as an airborne command post.

BINARY CHEMICAL WEAPONS- Toxic gases made by mixing two relatively harmless chemicals, enabling them to be stored and handled more easily than other chemical weapons.

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE- The use of and defense against bacteria, viruses, toxic agents derived from dead microorganisms, and plant growth regulators to produce casualties among humans, animals or plants.

CHEMICAL WARFARE- The use of and defense against asphyxiating, poisonous, and corrosive gases, flames, aerosols, liquids, sprays and smoke to produce casualties among humans and animals and/or damage to plants and material.

COLD LAUNCH- A technique that ejects ballistic missiles from silos or submarines using a power plant that is separated from the delivery vehicle. Projectiles are then ignited when they are clear of the launcher.

CRUISE MISSILES- A guided missile propelled by a jet engine with either a nuclear or conventional warhead. They may be launched form aircraft, submarines, surface ships, or land based platforms.

ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES (ECM)- A form of electronic warfare that prevents or degrades enemy uses of the electromagnetic spectrum.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW)- Acts of war in the electromagnetic spectrum that affect things such as communication equipment, radar, and navigation aids.

FIRST STRIKE- An initial attack with nuclear weapons that disables an enemy from making an effective counter-attack.

INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE (ICBM)- A ballistic missile launched from a land based platform usually with a range of over 3,000 nautical miles.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE (IRBM)- A ballistic missile with a range of approximately 1,500 to 3,000 nautical miles.

LOOKDOWN/SHOOTDOWN- An aircraft equipped with a radar which can distinguish moving objects below it from background "clutter".

MEDIUM-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE (MRBM)- A ballistic missile with a range of approximately 600 to 1,500 nautical miles.

MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY-TARGETED REENTRY VEHICLES (MIRV)- Two or more warheads on a single missile capable of being delivered to separate targets.

REENTRY VEHICLE- That part of a ballistic missile designed to reenter the earth's atmosphere during the final stage of its trajectory.

SHORT-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE (SRBM)- A ballistic missile with a range of less than 600 nautical miles.

STRATEGIC BOMBERS- Bombers capable of damaging another nation's war-fighting capacity as distinguished from theater or tactical aircraft. Also known as "heavy bombers".

SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE (SLBM)- A ballistic missile launched from a submarine as distinguished from a land launched ICBM.

TRIAD- The U.S. strategic force which consists of manned bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine launched ballistic missiles.

WARHEAD- The part of a missile that contains explosives whether conventional or nuclear.

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