THE IMPACT OF THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE ARCTIC REGION ON NORWEGIAN SECURITY POLICIES

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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B.S., Oregon State University, 1972

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This study is an analysis of the security issues in the North Cape region of northern Norway, including the Svalbard Islands and the continental shelf areas of the Barents Sea. It examines the geostrategic significance of the region, the Soviet force structure in the Kola peninsula and the Norwegian defense forces in the Arctic region. The paper then details the current political and economic issues between Norway and the Soviet Union that impact on security in the Arctic. Finally, it examines the Soviet goals and objectives in the North Cape area, and assesses the Norwegian defense and NATO reinforcement plans designed to counter Soviet aggression in the Arctic region. The study concludes that despite the force reductions in central Europe by both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the strategic issues in the region will keep tensions between Norway and the Soviet Union high in the coming decade. The author postulates that the Soviets will be seeking a co-tenancy agreement with Norwegians for control of the continental shelf area between the North Cape and the Svalbard Islands. Finally, recommendations are made for the upgrade of NATO response capabilities in the Arctic region.

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ABSTRACT

THE IMPACT OF THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE ARCTIC REGION ON NORWEGIAN SECURITY POLICIES: An analysis of Soviet political and military pressures in the Arctic region on the Norwegian government and the effect that they will have on Norway's defense policies and posture in the 1990's, by Major Carl E. Johnson, USA, 139 pages.

This study is an analysis of the security issues in the North Cape region of northern Norway, including the Svalbard Islands and the continental shelf areas of the Barents Sea. It examines the geostrategic significance of the region, the Soviet force structure in the Kola peninsula and the Norwegian defense forces in the Arctic region. The paper then details the current political and economic issues between Norway and the Soviet Union that impact on security in the Arctic. Finally, it examines the Soviet goals and objectives in the North Cape area, and assesses the Norwegian defense policies and NATO reinforcement plans designed to counter Soviet aggression in the Arctic region.

The three major research questions address the Soviet view of the threat in the Barents Sea region, the Norwegian reaction to the Soviet threat to the North Cape, and the current status of the NATO capability to respond to a crisis situation in the region. The paper will also examine some of the impacts that Gorbachev's new political policies are having on the region.

The study concludes that despite the force reductions in central Europe by both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the strategic importance of the Barents Sea region, for both security and economic reasons, will keep tensions between Norway and the Soviet Union high in the coming decade. The author postulates that the Soviets will be seeking a co-tenancy agreement with the Norwegians for control of the continental shelf area between the North Cape and the Svalbard Islands. Finally, recommendations are made for the upgrade of NATO response capabilities in the Arctic region.

THE IMPACT OF THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE ARCTIC REGION ON NORWEGIAN SECURITY POLICIES

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This paper postulates that the geostrategic significance of the Arctic region has increased to the point where it can no longer be considered a flank to NATO's defense in central Europe. The extent of the Soviet force build-up in the region, the scope of Soviet political, economic and national security goals, and the present low level of a rapid NATO response capability create, in the author's view, a potential for precipitous Soviet military actions north of the Arctic Circle.1 These actions, which could take place during periods of increased tensions short of general war, include the military occupation of the Svalbard Islands and the North Cape region of Norway and could involve the seizure of airfields and support facilities in those areas.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the following research questions:

- What is the Soviet view of the threat in the Arctic region?
- What is the Norwegian reaction the Soviet threat in the Arctic region?
- What is the NATO response to the Soviet threat in the Arctic region?

The analysis and conclusions drawn in chapter ten are based on the research developed to answer the following subordinate questions which are examined in greater detail in the body of the paper:

- What is the geography of the region to be examined?
- What is the Soviet Force Structure in the Arctic?
- What are the Norwegian defense structures and forces in the Arctic region?
- What political issues impact on security in the Arctic?
- What economic issues impact on security in the Arctic?
- What are the Soviet goals and objectives in the Arctic?
- What are the Norwegian defense policies and NATO reinforcement plans to counter Soviet aggression in the Arctic region?

The paper will also examine, in chapter eight, some of the impacts that Gorbachev's new political initiatives are having on security policies in the region.

The paper is organized into ten chapters. The following paragraphs present a brief synopsis of each chapter.

Chapter One is an overview of the paper. The chapter begins by presenting an outline of each of the ten chapters. It then provides a summary of why the Arctic region is important to the political and military leaders of both NATO and the Soviet Union. It details the research questions and subordinate questions presented in the paper and finishes with a summary of the conclusions drawn in Chapter Ten.

Chapter Two is an outline of the research methodology utilized for this paper. Subject matter is divided into three broad categories; Soviet defense posture, Norwegian defense posture and current political and economic issues facing the two countries. It details the research base, lists the assumptions made by the author and defines key terms used throughout the paper.

Chapter Three examines the geography of the Arctic region. It addresses the geostrategic significance of the region from the political, economic and security points of view, and touches on the historical background. The chapter also looks at the military strategic significance of the region for the Soviets; security of the Kola Peninsula and the SSBN fleet, deployment of the Northern Fleet, and the Norwegian common border with the Soviet Union. It concludes with the author's opinion that political, security and economic factors that make the region strategically important for the Soviets. These factors include the nuclear weapons issue, oil and mineral rights on the continental shelf in the Barents Sea and the long-held goal of isolating Norway from NATO.

Chapter Four discusses the current posture of Soviet forces in the Arctic region. For purposes of this paper, the Soviet Arctic Ocean Theater of Military Action (TVD) has been combined with the Northwestern TVD as a single area of reference. The paper lists the current air, naval and land forces stationed in the Arctic region and assesses their capabilities for offensive operations. The chapter finishes with a look at the growth in major Soviet naval exercises in the Northern Atlantic and Arctic region seas. The information in this chapter clearly shows that the Soviets have sufficient combat power in the Arctic region to secure limited objectives in the Arctic Front that are key to both offensive and defensive operations in a short period of time.

Chapter Five examines the Norwegian defensive strategy and force structure in the Arctic region. The defense of Norway is based on two basic factors; the size and geographical location of the country, and the security policies of the Norwegian government that are based in large part on a balance of deterrence and reassurance in regard to the Soviet Union. It concludes that Norway does not have sufficient assets to defend itself from a Soviet attack, and depends on NATO reinforcements to provide the force necessary for deterrence.

Chapter Six examines the political issues that relate to security in the Arctic region. It begins with a look at the two key concepts that are the foundation for Norwegian defense policies; the Nordic Balance and Deterrence and Reassurance. In brief, the Nordic Balance is a political balance that ties any changes is Soviet defense policies, in regard to the Nordic region, to Norwegian counter-actions in its defense posture and relation to NATO. The Norwegian government seeks to walk the line between having enough force to deter a Soviet attack, and a low enough defense posture to reassure the air, naval and land forces stationed in the Arctic region and Soviets that there would be no threat to Soviet security from Norwegian territory. The issue of a Nordic Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (NNWFZ) and its impacts on the region and on Norway is discussed. The chapter concludes that the nature of the Soviet threat in the Arctic Front and the ability of Norway

and NATO to react to that threat need to be reexamined to determine if the perceived deterrence factors are valid for the 1990s.

Chapter Seven discusses the economic issues that relate to security in the Arctic region. These economic factors will be discussed, but not researched in depth. They include the debates as to the sovereignty of the continental shelf region between the North Cape and the Svalbard Islands and the boundary disputes between Norway and the Soviet Union over areas in the Barents Sea, the 'Gray Zone' issue. The oil and mineral deposits in the region have a major imapact on these issues. The chapter concludes with two major points. First, the current Soviet drive for economic development will require substantial energy resources, and more importantly, sources of hard cash. The available location of these resources is the continental shelf region in the Barents Sea. Second, the threat to security of the Soviet Forces in the Arctic Front imposed by international development of this area is too large to be acceptable to Soviet military planners. The Soviets will seek some form of co-tenancy with the Norwegians if possible; if not, a limited military option cannot be ruled out.

Chapter Eight focuses on the Soviet political, economic and security goals and objectives in the Arctic Front as they relate to security in the region. The author concludes that:

political goals include the continued neutrality of Finland and Sweden, persistent efforts to move Norway away from NATO and support for a nuclear weapons-free zone; economic goals include access to the oil and mineral wealth of the continental shelf region in the north while denying that access to others; and security goals include defense of the homeland, defense of the SSBN fleet and defense of the Kola Peninsula military complex.

Chapter Nine looks at Norwegian defense policies and NATO reinforcements to counter Soviet aggression in the Arctic region. It covers the requirement for security of NATO sea lines of communication (SLOCS), the required reinforcements to defend Norway, and those forces now allocated in NATO contingency plans. Important to note, there are currently no NATO forces dedicated to Norway; all NATO units identified as reinforcements have a number of contingency missions which may have a higher priority in wartime situations. The author concludes that there are a number of negative factors in NATO plans to reinforce Norway, including the possibility that the Norwegian request for assistance may be delayed because of a desire not to provoke the Soviets, the time required for any NATO force to prepare for combat and deploy to Norway, and the increased possibility of Soviet interception of those reinforcements due to the expansion of their air and naval capabilities in the region.

Chapter Ten is the conclusion of the paper. It reviews the Soviet perception of the threat to their forces in the Arctic region, which are the military facilities and airfields in the North Cape and the Svalbards and the destabilizing factors of economic development in the Barents Sea. The Norwegian reaction to the Soviet threat is then examined, and the conclusion drawn that there should be adjustments made to the Norwegian defense posture and policies if a valid deterrence to Soviet offensive actions in the Arctic Front is to be maintained. Finally, the conclusion is made that NATO must dedicate sufficient forces to the defense of Norway to deter any Soviet aggression in the Arctic region.

The next portion of the paper will summarize the importance of the Arctic region to both NATO and Soviet political and military leaders. Norwegian defense policies are based on the concept of a balance between sufficient defense forces, combined with NATO reinforcements, to provide a valid deterrent to a Soviet attack versus a low-level offensive capability and posture to reassure the Soviets that no attack would originate from Norway.2 It is the author's position that while this basic strategy has worked for Norway for the last forty years, current changes in NATO and Warsaw Pact force structures in Europe and the increasing strategic importance of the Arctic Front for Soviet planners have weakened its viability for the 1990s. There is a strong

concern that the Soviet military presence in the region has resulted in a paralysis in the Norwegian government's ability to make a rapid decision to request NATO assistance in a crisis situation.3

As the conventional force structures of NATO and the Warsaw Pact are reduced, the capabilities of NATO to provide sufficient forces to reinforce Norway in the event of a Soviet attack will also diminish. Current Norwegian defense strategy basically cedes the North Cape region to the Soviets in the event of an attack, with main defensive lines set up further south. The concept is to delay until NATO reinforcements arrive.4 This military deterrent factor is dependent on how it is perceived by the Soviets, and it is the author's opinion that the Soviet perception of that deterrence may be reduced significantly in the next decade.

High ranking leaders in both the East and West have recognized the importance of the Nordic region. In 1990, Lothar Ruehl, a State Secretary in the West German Ministry of Defense, wrote:

> "...the Kola base complex is the most massive strategic forces concentration for the second-strike capability of the Soviet Union...Soviet strategy since the 1950s has tried to keep U.S. and other NATO naval forces with carrier-based attack aircraft as far as possible from the Kola pensinula."5

In an estimate on the Soviet military threat to the Northern Flank, the US Defense Intelligence Agency reported in 1984:

> "The importance of the Northwestern Theater of Military Operations to the USSR results from the presence

of the Northern Fleet and long range aviation units, and the potential threat posed to this force from Norway and the Norwegian Sea."6

Johan Holst, the current Norwegian Defense Minister, wrote in 1982 that:

> "Norway occupies the key strategic position in Northern Europe due to developments in military technology, the constellation of the major powers, and to their military deployments. The country is inextricably linked to the broad patterns which define the course and state of East-West relations."7

General Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley, former CINCNORTH, analyzed the importance of Northern Norway in this way in 1982:

> "Norwegian airfields at Bardufoss, Andoya and Bodo are within range of all transiting vessels. (of the Northern Fleet) These bases are of the highest strategic importance."8

And C.G. Jacobsen, a Soviet specialist, wrote in 1972:

> "...with the emergence of the Murmansk Base Complex as the indisputably most vital single strategic nerve center in the USSR, priority has been focused squarely on the strategic imperatives of Svalbard and the Kola exit."9

In the author's opinion, two main factors are influencing an increase in the strategic importance of the Arctic Front at the same time as tensions are being reduced in Central Europe. First, as the Soviets reduce their conventional forces, their national security posture is increasingly tied to the threat of nuclear retaliation. The smaller the Soviet force structure, the more important are the strategic missiles of the Northern Fleet's SSBNs, which provide them with second-strike capailities, and the more concerned they become about their security. Johan Holst, the Norwegian Defense Minister

noted in 1982 that the impact of super-power strategic forces:

> "Norway's strategic position is heavily influenced by the deployment, configuration and operation of strategic forces by the major powers. It is by no means a new situation. The combination of nuclear weapons and strategic bombers converted the northern areas into strategic avenues of approach and forward defense zones." 10

Second, the Soviecs are struggling to improve the efficiency of their economy at a time when their oil reserves, their primary source of hard currency, are dwindling at a rapid rate. As Gorbachev's economic revitalization plans advance, the oil and gas deposits in the Barents Sea region will become progressively more critical to economic security.

Ongoing developments in the area threaten to transform the Arctic Front into a region with a high potential for confrontation between Norway and the USSR, disrupting the equilibrium of the Nordic region and pressuring the Norwegian government to reevaluate security policies. These developments include:

- The size and capabilities of Soviet forces in the region
- Reduction of convential forces in Central Europe
- The growing strategic importance of the Barents Sea region to the Soviet Union for both security and reasons

Lothar Ruehl, State Secretary in the West German Ministry of Defense, wrote in 1990 that:

> (An attack on the North Cape of Norway) "...could be exercised by the USSR as a limited offensive aimed at securing a forward position in northern Europe and the

> Norwegian Sea during an international conflict short of general war...(This) contingency has been considered a distinct possibility...as a seperately viable and valuable offensive option of Soviet strategy in an international crisis as much as in war."11

Edward Warner III, writing in a paper for the U.S. Airforce and the Rand Corporation in 1989, observed that:

> "In light of the improvements in Soviet power projection potential and the virtual certainty that instability will continue to characterize the international political scene...the potential for the use of military power as a means to protect and advance Soviet interests cannot be ruled out."12

Marian K. Leighton, an expert on Soviet affairs at Columbia University, wrote in 1979 that the Soviets would like to obtain in the North Atlantic and in the Arctic a chain of islands and territories that, when taken together, would form a forward defensive zone for their northern frontiers, a secure bastion for their SSBN force and control of the significant oil and mineral resources of the region.13 With the development of long-range submarine launched ballistic missiles, the Soviets are now positioning their strategic submarine force in defended 'bastions' close to their coast and within range of land-based air cover.14

The means to accomplish these goals are concentrated in the Kola region. The formation of the Northwestern TVD for command and control of forces in the Arctic region, the growth of the Northern Fleet and the increasing political and military pressures that the Soviets are exerting on the Nordic countries, all give evidence to the Soviet interests and

objectives in the region. Curt Gasteyger, Director for Strategic and International Studies at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, wrote in 1990:

> "If the Soviets do come to perceive it to be in their interest to horizontally escalate a conflict into the Northwestern TSMA (TVD), an initial offensive early in a conflict would undoubtedly focus on northern Norway."15

And Captain William Sullivan, former Director of Strategic Studies at the US Naval War College, wrote in 1978:

> "Because of the concentration of strategic nuclear and conventional forces on the Kola Peninsula the Nordic area will remain at the forefront of Soviet concerns. Soviet efforts to intimidate the Nordic States into distancing themselves from the US policy objectives are certain to continue, and Moscow may employ more heavy-handed methods than it did in the late 1970's. This type of activity will probably galvanize the Nordic peoples' support for strengthening national defense capabilities, but it will also feed desires to reassure the Soviets that Scandinavia will not be used as a base from which to launch an attack against the USSR."16

At the same time, NATO capabilities to respond to the Soviet threat in the North are being called into question. Nils Orvik, a Norwegian expert writing for the Harvard University Center for International Affairs stated in 1978:

> "Most of the NATO thinking is concentrated on the contingency of a massive Soviet attack on the Central Front. Very likely this danger is less real than that of Soviet pressures in peripheral areas where Soviet power can be demonstrated at much smaller risk."17

Since that time, NATO reinforcement capabilities were reduced when the Canadian brigade originally designated to deploy to Norway had its mission changed to support West Germany.

The growth of Soviet forces in the Arctic has been rapid. (See Table 1) The missions and capabilities of these forces have been structured to support the goals of expansion in the north. In the author's opinion, Soviet efforts to intimidate the Nordic countries, both militarily and politically, have increased with the goal of distancing them from US and NATO policy objectives, and forcing a confrontation of the sort that can be used as justification for their first expansionist move in this region.

Having outlined the purpose of this paper in chapter one, the next chapter will describe the research methdology and structure utilized for the thesis.

MAP #1 - GEOGRAPHIC AREA ENCOMPASSED BY THIS STUDY: Norway's North Cape, the Svalbard Islands, the Kola peninsula and surrounding seas.



SOURCE: John Erickson, "The Northern Theater", Strategic Review, Summer 1976, page 53.

Table 1: GROWTH OF THE NORTHERN FLEET - 1968 to 1988

	1968	1975	1982	1988
Nuclear Ballistic-Missle Submarines (SSBN)	14	38	45	39
Nuclear Guided-Missle Submariness (SSGN)	18	28	29	28
Nuclear Submarines (SSN)	10	26	39	49
Aircraft Carriers (CV)	0	0	1	2
Guided-Missle Cruisers (CG)	3	7	11	11
Light Cruisers (CL)	2	3	2	0
Guided-Missle Destroyers (DDG)	6	9	11	13
Destroyers (DD)	18	13	5	5

Source: Nordic Security, Erling Bjol, Adelphi Papers No. 181 International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, The Carlton Berry Co.Ltd., 1983

The Military Balance - 1988-1989, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, The Eastern Press, 1988

ENDNOTES

1 The author will use the term 'security' when addressing issues of 'national security' for Norway and the Soviet Union, for the remainder of this paper.

2 John Lund, Don't Rock the Boat: Reinforcing Norway in Crisis and War, (1989): 24.

3 Edward L. Warner III, The Defense Policy of the Soviet Union, (1989): 22.

4 Lund, Don't Rock the Boat, (1989): 29.

5 Lothar Ruehl, "NATO Strategy and the Neutrals", in Richard E. Bissell and Curt Gasteyger ed., The Missing Link: West European Neutrals and Regional Security, (1990): 129.

6 "The Soviet Military Threat to the Northern Flank", Intelligence Quarterly nr 19, vol 3, (1984): 14.

7 Johan J. Holst, "Norwegian Security Policy for the 1980's", NUPI Rapport nr 76, (1982): 1, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Current Norwegian Defense Minister.

8 General Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley, "The Influence of the Northern Flank Upon the Mastery of the Seas", Naval War College Review, vol 35, nr 3, seq 29, (1982): 8. Former CINCNORTH.

9 C.G. Jacobsen, Soviet Strategic Initiatives, (1979): 74.

10 Holst, "Norwegian Security Policy", (1982): 3.

11 Lothar Ruehl, "NATO Strategy and the Neutrals", in Richard E. Bissell and Curt Gasteyger, ed., The Missing Link: West European Neutrals and Regional Security, (1990): 127.

12 Warner, The Defense Policy of the Soviet Union, (1989): xi.

13 Marian K. Leighton, "The Soviet Threat to NATO's Northern Flank", AGENDA, paper nr 10, (1979): 84, National Strategy Information Center. Soviet political affairs expert.

14 George Lindsey, Strategic Stability in the Arctic, (1989): 52.

15 Curt Gasteyger, "The Neutrals, the Soviet Union, and the West", in Richard E. Bissell and Curt Gasteyger, ed., The Missing Link: West European Neutrals and Regional Security, (1990): 153.

16 William K. Sullivan, Soviet Strategy and NATO's Northern Flank, (1978): 23, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. Former Director for Strategic Studies for the US Naval War College.

17 Nils Orvik, Europe's Northern Cap and the Soviet Union, (1963): 5, Harvard University Center for International Affairs. Director of the Queen's Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, Kingston, Canada.

CHAPTER TWO

METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE

Chapter Two is an outline of the research methodology utilized for this paper. It lists the major research areas and the assumptions made by the author, defines some key terms used throughout the paper, and delineates the scope of the paper.

The paper is based on ideas that were presented by Colonel Gerald W. McLaughlin at the A011 MMAS lecture on 2 October 1989. Research focused on evaluating three major subject categories; Soviet military goals and objectives in the Arctic region, current Norwegian Defense policies in relation to the Soviet Union, and the NATO commitment to Norway's defense.

The initial research effort was divided into the areas listed below:

- Geography of the Arctic region
- Soviet Forces in the Arctic region
- Norwegian defense structure and forces in the Arctic region
- Political issues impacting on security in the Arctic region
- Economic issues impacting on security in the Arctic region
- Soviet goals and objectives in the Arctic region
- Norwegian defense policies and NATO reinforcements to counter Soviet aggression in the Arctic region

As this basic research was completed, assessments were conducted of current Soviet military capabilities, current Norwegian defense capabilities and current NATO capabilities

to reinforce Norway in the event of a crisis. These assessments then led to the evaluation process for the three subject categories mentioned in paragraph one.

This study will provide military and political scholars with an analysis of Soviet military capabilities in the Arctic Front and the adequacy of the Norwegian political and security policies in response to the Soviet threat to the Northern region of Europe. It will address the trends and restraints in relations between Norway and the Soviet Union and Norway and NATO. It includes a review of the expanding strategic importance of the area to the Soviet Union, Norway and NATO, and discusses some of the international economic issues of the region. By understanding the considerable pressure, both military and political, that Norway will be under from the Soviet Union, it may be possible to predict future political decisions that will affect NATO interests.

A. ASSUMPTIONS:

1. An accurate picture of Soviet and Norwegian military goals and objectives can be obtained from unclassified sources.

2. The rapidly changing political situation in Central Europe will have little impact on the Soviet strategic forces based in the Northwestern Theater of Military Action.

3. The breakup of Warsaw Pact military solidarity in Central Europe will not significantly affect the current East-West balance for the next five years.

4. Finland and Sweden will retain their neutrality throughout the current period of political change in Europe.

5. The changing political situation in Europe will not cause Norway to withdraw from the NATO Alliance.

6. With the rapid changes in the military balance in Europe, NATO will continue to view the Arctic region as one of continued strategic importance to the defense of Europe.

7. A strategic arms treaty will not be ratified in the near future.

B. DEFINITIONS:

ASW: Anti-Submarine Warfare.

Arctic Front: (See Map #1) The Kola Peninsula of the Soviet Union, the northern half of the Scandinavian Peninsula, The Arctic Ocean, the Barents, Greenland, Norwegian and North Seas and the islands north of the Arctic Circle, including the Svalbard Islands.

CFE: Conventional forces Europe agreements.

CINC: Commander in Chief.

CINCNORTH: CINC for all NATO forces in the Allied Forces Northern European theater of operations.

GIUK Gap: (See Map #1) The seas surrounding Iceland that restrict naval passage from the North Atlantic to the Central Atlantic Ocean region.

INF TREATY: Intermediate-range nuclear missile treaty.

LOC: Line of Communication. The logistic support link that ties forward areas of military operations to the strategic base areas that provide supplies and support.

MD: Military District. Soviet military territorial organizational structure.

MEB: Marine Expeditionary Brigade. US Marine organization designed to be self-supporting for a short period of time, assigned a number of contingency missions.

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Alliance of Western countries for the purpose of defending member states.

NNWFZ: Nordic Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. Concept to prohibit nuclear weapons from all Scandinavian countries.

SACLANT: Commander for all NATO forces in the Atlantic Ocean region, including land, air and naval units.

SAM: Surface to Air Missle.

SLOC: Sea Line of Communication. LOCs that must pass through or over extended areas of water.

SPETSNAZ: Soviet Special Operation Forces.

SSBN: A nuclear submarine that is armed with ballistic nuclear missile systems capable of hitting targets in the United States.

START: Strategic arms-reduction talks.

TVD: Soviet term for a Theater of Military Action. The TVD addressed in this work will be the Northwestern TVD, which extends north from Leningrad to the Kola Peninsula. (See Map #2)

C. DELINEATIONS:

The study is confined to the impact that the Soviet military presence in the Arctic Ocean region is having on Norwegian defense issues. The paper will concentrate on the North Cape region, the greatest threat to NATO interests in Norway due to the proximity of the Northern Fleet. A similar study could be made of the Baltic region which would include Sweden, Denmark, Finland, East and West Germany and Poland. The next chapter will present a geographic overview of the region discussed in this paper to provide readers with a clear understanding of the areas in question.

CHAPTER THREE

GEOGRAPHY OF THE ARCTIC REGION

This chapter presents an examination of the geography of the Arctic region that relates to the security concerns of the Soviet Union and Norway. Also examined are the political, economic and military significance of the Barents Sea and North Cape region and how they relate to security issues.

The geostrategic significance of the Arctic region is growing steadily for both the Soviets and the nations of NATO. For the Soviets, it encompasses a priority position in all three of the major foreign policy fields; security, political and economic. Militarily, the region is of vital importance in three general areas: defense of the homeland, projection of power and maintenance of its position as a regional power.1 Politically, the Soviets are working to prevent the Nordic states from combining to present a common front against the USSR, attempting to weaken their ties with NATO, establishing a Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NNWFZ) and, in the long run, looking toward expanding the Soviet sphere of influence to include the Nordic region. Economically, the Soviets are seeking to gain control of the extensive oil and mineral resources and fishing zones in the Barents Sea. For NATO, the significance is two-fold: preservation of the security and independence of the Nordic states and maintaining the military

capabilities necessary to contain the ever-expanding force within the Kola Peninsula complex.2

For the purpose of this paper, the geographical limits for the Arctic Front will be the Soviet Kola peninsula and the northern half of the Scandinavian peninsula. It encompasses the surrounding seas, including the Barents, Greenland and the Norwegian seas. It also includes the major islands north of the Arctic Circle, especially the Svalbard Archaepelago, Bear Island and Jan Meyer Island.

NATO planners and commanders continue to think of the arctic region as a flank, the "Northern Flank", to what has been expected to be the main East-West confrontation in central Europe.3 Defensive plans and priorities have been shaped around this concept; NATO military capabilities in the north are extremely limited as a result. Under the current NATO structure, command and control of Norway and the Baltic and North Seas in time of war would be exercised by the Commander in Chief, North, (CINCNORTH) and command and control of the Barents, Greenland and Norwegian Seas by the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT). (See Table #2) In addition to areas in the Arctic Front, however, CINCNORTH is responsible for Denmark and northern Germany, and SACLANT is responsible for maintaining security of the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) for the entire Atlantic region. Both have duties that, based on current priorities, tie them into

preparing for hostilities in Central Europe. Neither one has the assets required to deal with Soviet offensive operations in the Arctic Front in a timely manner, and there appears to be a tendency in NATO planning to downplay the possibility of a Soviet move in the north in a crisis situation leading up to hostilities.4

Historically, the strategic importance of the Arctic Front was first brought home to the Russians during the Allied occupation of the area around Arkhangel'sk (1918-1919) during the revolution and civil war. Although never supported fully enough to be a serious threat to the Soviets, it provided an early indication of the defensive requirements that would be needed to secure the northern region. Until World War II, however, the Soviet military concentrated their ground force preparations in the Central Europe region and their naval deployments in the west to the Baltic and Black Seas. The buildup of the Northern Fleet did not begin until the early 1960s. The German domination of the Arctic region from 1941 to 1944 gave the Soviets an illustrative lesson on the consequences of having the area controlled by a hostile power.5 German naval and air forces based in Norway continually threatened the vital Allied convoy routes to the Kola Peninsula region, and German control of the Danish Straits prevented any significant naval activity by any of the Allied naval forces within the Baltic. In addition to the

strategic importance of the northern region, the Soviets learned of the tremendous significance of SLOCs for guaranteeing the operations of both armies and fronts; the strategic character of open sea lanes.6 As stated by Molotov in 1944:

> "The Dardenelles...here we are locked in ... Oserund ... here we are locked in. Only in the north is there an opening, but the war has shown that the supply line to Northern Russia can be cut or interfered with. This shall not be permitted in the future."7

Today this 'supply line' is the deployment route for Northern Fleet vessels to the Atlantic. For a variety of reasons, however, the Soviet post-war period of expansion did not extend to the Scandinavian area. It was not until the 1960's that the expansion of Soviet military power began in the Kola Peninsula.

The strategic importance of the North Cape region of the Arctic Front results from the presence of the Soviet Northern Fleet, which includes sixty percent of the Soviet SSBN force and long range aviation units, together with the requirement to be able to safely deploy these forces, and the need to defend them from threats posed by the proximity of Norway and the NATO forces that patrol the Norwegian Sea.

Former US Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, called the Kola peninsula, "the most valuable piece of real-estate on earth."8 It contains over forty airfields, sixteen of which have all weather capability, all of the bases, supply depots,

maintenance and support facilities for the Northern Fleet, and is home for two Motorized Rifle Divisions. But the most important aspect of the Kola is that it offers the only ice-free exit to the Atlantic for naval vessels that is not blocked by a NATO-controlled choke point. The military complexes have been built in the Kola because of the strategic significance of the geography, the lie of the land and sea.9 Soviet naval and air forces need operating room, and the Barents, Greenland and Norwegian seas provide it. The development of long-range, sub-launched nuclear missiles make penetration of the Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap into the Atlantic by nuclear-armed submarines unnecessary. The range of these missiles allows the Soviets to deploy their forces anywhere in the Arctic Front and still range targets in the United States. While not a factor in submarine operations, the ice-free passage between Norway and the Svalbard Archaepelago allows for year-round deployment of surface vessels. The passage is three hundred nautical miles (NM) wide in summer, and is reduced to one hundred fifty NM in the winter.10 Soviet air forces have access to both the Atlantic and, via the Arctic, the North American land mass. In addition to the strategic threat that these forces present, they also give the Soviets a better counter to the NATO sea-based nuclear threat, permit the interdiction of Allied forces moving to Europe and the disruption of the SLOCs and permit

them to prevent or impede the reinforcement of Norway. At the same time, they could deny NATO any reconnaissance bases in the region, prevent NATO anti-submarine activities and defend the Kola bases from attack.11

Norway is the only NATO country that has a common border with the Soviet Union in the European Arctic region. It extends for approximately one hundred fifty miles south from the Barents Sea, and is generally marked by the Pasvik River, which freezes during the winter. There is one point where the border diverges and both sides of the river are in Soviet territory; a Soviet / Norwegian dam was built here that the Soviets insured could support the weight of armored vehicles, providing them with an unopposed site for crossing the river.12 The Norwegians have a five hundred-man Frontier Battalion deployed in the area, with its headquarters at Kirkenes. There is only one north-south road in northern Norway that runs generally along the coast and is interrupted at two points by ferries. The only rail line ends at the town of Bodo. The three main airfields in the north are at Bardufuss. Andoja and Bodo, the first two of which could support air attacks of Soviet vessels transiting the North Cape region. At varying times all of these bases have been described in Warsaw Pact propaganda as threatening to the Soviet Union.13 In addition to the threat to naval vessels, aircraft staging from these bases could attack ports and facilities in the Kola.

The airfields in Northern Norway are vital to NATO. World War II proved conclusively that forces occupying the Norwegian coast pose a constant threat to Allied shipping operations in the Atlantic. Soviet occupation of Norway would allow for land-based air cover for their naval forces north of the GIUK Gap, permit naval-air to operate more effectively in the Atlantic and permit interdiction of Allied naval forces and shipping at greater ranges.14 Denial of the area to NATO would severely restrict reconnaissance activities in the Barents Sea and make reinforcement of Norway a much more risky operation. The bases in Northern Norway must be secured or destroyed to prevent utilization by Soviet forces.

The Svalbard archipelago lies approximately four hundred eighty miles north of Norway's North Cape, and extends to a point just ten miles south of the North Pole. It is approximately the size of Switzerland, has no native population, and currently houses approximately twelve hundred Norwegians and twenty-six hundred Soviets. The islands sit on the northern edge of the maritime route to and from the Soviet North Fleet bases, and are especially important during the winter months when the ice-edge greatly restricts this passageway. The islands have belonged to Norway since 1920, when the Svalbard Treaty was signed by most European nations, including the US and the USSR. Norway claims the entire continental shelf between Svalbard and Norway, a claim that is disputed by the Soviets.15

The political factors affecting security in the Arctic region will be addressed next. NATO's northern flank is held by Norway, but the security of the region is tied into the wider context of Soviet policy toward the Scandinavian peninsula as a whole. Michael MccGwire wrote in 1987 that Moscow views the Nordic area primarily in terms of an East-West conflict, and appears to give higher priority to military concerns over cordial relations with Norway and Sweden.16 Johan Holst, the Norwegian Defense Minister, stated in 1982 that the political objectives of the Soviets in the region are:

- Get Norway to cut back on commitments to NATO
- Promote anti-NATO sentiment in Norway
- Push for a Nordic Nuclear-Free Weapons Zone (NNWFZ)17

The bottom line of these objectives is to neutralize Norway. What the Soviets are hoping to accomplish is to create an atmosphere within the general population and the leadership of Norway that in effect paralyzes the government. If they can build the perception that the best way to prevent either nuclear or conventional attacks on Norway is to mollify the Soviets, they will have gained the ability to influence Norwegian defense policies in their favor and have reduced the effectiveness of Norway's links to NATO.

In the north, the Soviets are seeking a greater Soviet presence in the Norwegian Sea that will, in the long-term, significantly lessen NATO's capability to rapidly reinforce Norway. They are using political influence to minimize the

presence of NATO units, so that in periods of tension they would have the capability to control the straits and the airspace in the region. In 1981, Trond Gilberg stated that the primary Soviet political objective toward Sweden was the maintenance of its traditional neutrality:

> "Sweden's consistent support for detente, arms limitation and disarmament...are also positive traits in Soviet eyes and hence clearly to be encouraged."[18]

In Norway, the Soviets try to limit the cooperation with other NATO countries, and in that line, insure that the Norwegian government does not change its base and ban policy that restricts the presence of both nuclear weapons and any regularly based NATO military units on Norwegian territory. In addition, they are pushing for a Soviet-Norwegian agreement regarding the control and use of the Svalbard archipelago.

In the author's opinion, the Soviets are expanding their political influence in the Arctic region with the intention of gaining a degree of influence over Norway that could lead to an acceptance of co-tenancy for sovereignty of the continental shelf region of the Barents Sea. Soviet sensitivity to the events in Norway and Sweden testify to the growing importance of the area in their long-range goals.

The main economic factors in the geography of the Arctic Front region is the development of the Norwegian and Soviet oil fields in the Norwegian and Barents Seas. Not only do these fields represent important sources of income, but as a consequence, also require the positioning and maintenance of

assets to protect them. Other factors are the fishing zones in the Barents Sea and the mineral resources located on the continental shelf between Norway and Svalbard Island.

Sixty-three percent of Soviet hard currency earnings come from oil and gas exports. Slumping Soviet oil output, down 1/2 percent in 1984 and three percent in 1985, coupled with the huge fall in world oil prices in the mid-80s, has dramatically cut the Soviet ability to pay for the planned economic revitalization.19 As the money crunch gets tighter, the economic importance of the oil and mineral deposits in the region grows.

The next chapter will discuss the current structure of Soviet forces in the Arctic. It will detail the importance of the Northern Fleet and address Soviet exercise activities.

ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER FOUR

SOVIET FORCES IN THE ARCTIC REGION

This chapter details the current structure of Soviet forces in the Arctic region. It assesses the Soviet capabilities for offensive actions in the region and lists the major exercises that have been conducted in the North Atlantic and Arctic Oceans.

Soviet security goals and objectives in the Arctic region as addressed in a majority of the literature surveyed for this paper cover a wide spectrum. The author believes that most can be summed up in five major categories; to ensure that the Northern region is not a threat to the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact, to assure secure Warsaw Pact maritime lines of communication and frontiers, to provide adequate territory for a defense in depth, to ensure that the region remains free from nuclear weapons, and to provide security for the Soviet nuclear deterrence force, the SSBNs of the Northern Fleet. These are long-term goals, set in the context of global Soviet security posture. Chapter eight contains a detailed examination of Soviet goals and objectives in the Arctic region.

The Soviet military build-up in the Kola Peninsula far exceeds the requirements for a strictly defensive role; the base complex now houses strategic forces capable of and

committed to operating far beyond the Soviet periphery. In 1976, John Erickson of Edinburgh University, an expert on the Soviet military affairs, wrote that the defense build up reflects Soviet policies of forward deployment and can be seen to fall in line with three historical phases of Soviet expansion:

- Defense against a threat
- Emplacement of major strategic offensive and/or retaliatory capabilities within a Theater
- Evolution of a strategic entity 1

The global political and military objectives planned by the Soviet leaders are implemented through the Theaters of Action, or TVDs. Within a TVD, military operations involve dedicated air, ground and naval forces grouped into Fronts. There are two theaters in the Arctic region, the Arctic Ocean TVD and the Northwestern TVD. This paper will consider these two theaters as a combined sea and land theater of operations called the Northwestern TVD.

The Northwestern TVD, responsible for operations in the Arctic, will most likely have only one Front, with the objectives of securing the Baltic and the North Cape regions, and the islands in the Arctic Ocean. As a Theater, it will have its own specific, centralized command structure to coordinate operations, with unique missions and plans.2 The concept of Soviet deployment within the TVD is a result of experiences learned from World War II. The missions of the Front would be to deny NATO use of Norwegian facilities,

prevent the reinforcement of Norway and prevent an attack on the Soviet homeland. The bases in the region provide for anti-submarine operations, intelligence gathering and surveillance, intercept of Allied air and naval patrols and, important to this paper, the exertion of military pressure on the Scandinavian countries.3 It is the author's opinion that given the current forces and trends, the Soviets may feel compelled to make a limited military move against Northern Norway in the next eight to ten years.

The naval forces located in the Arctic region are part of Soviet Northern Fleet. The headquarters of the Northern Fleet and the major base for it surface vessels are located in Severomorsk. The submarine bases are located in the Motovseij Gulf and the repair base at Rosta. The major shipyard is Severodvinsk. The tasks of the fleet include defense of the homeland, control of the Barents and Norwegian Seas, the prevention of NATO reinforcements from reaching Norway, and amphibious operations against Norway and the Svalbard Islands.4 The area of operation of the Northern Fleet encompasses the seas north of Iceland, with occasional missions into the central portions of the Atlantic. The GIUK Gap, covering access routes to and from the Atlantic, is considered the forward defense zone.5 Amphibious exercises are regularly carried out against defended coastal areas on the Kola Peninsula; the 1985 exercise included vessels from the Baltic Fleet.6

The Northern Fleet is the largest of the four Soviet fleets. It is comprised of approximately 600 ships and submarines, including seventy-one major combatants, two aircraft carriers of the Kiev class, one hundred fifty-eight submarines, over half of which are nuclear powered, and approximately three hundred fifty-five naval aircraft. In addition there is a Naval Infantry Regiment that could be deployed on major surface vessels, and a Naval Infantry Brigade at Penchenga. Naval aircraft include eighty helicopters, fifty-five anti-submarine aircraft, seventy-five maritime reconnaissance aircraft and sixty long-range strike aircraft.7 Soviet Delta and Typhoon class submarines carry missiles capable of reaching the United States, and normally deploy to the Greenland and northern Norwegian Seas. The protection of these submarines plays a key role in Soviet planning.8

Although not as spectacular as the build-up of naval and air forces, the ground forces deployed in the northern TVD are vastly superior to the Norwegian forces in the frontier region. There are currently two motorized rifle divisions stationed in the Kola Peninsula opposite the Norwegian frontier. Both of the divisions are category one, and both have been designated as 'mobile divisions' due to a high percentage of vehicles that have cross-snow capabilities.9 There are an additional nine motorized rifle divisions, one airborne division and an air assault brigade in the Leningrad

MD, for a total of over seventy thousand troops, thirteen hundred tanks and thirty-six hundred armored personnel carriers. The two divisions in the Kola are supported by a SCUD surface-to-surface missle brigade. In addition, there are the six thousand Naval Infantry troops previously mentioned and approximately fifteen hundred KGB border guards deployed on the Norwegian border.10

The growth of Soviet forces in the Northern TVD has moved past the first phase build-up described by Erickson, defense against threat, and well into the second phase, forces available for offensive operations. The classical indexes of direct military power projection are all present; naval, amphibious, airborne and airlift.11 The Soviet view of the threat to the security of the region falls into three main categories; NATO forces operating in the Atlantic, the air bases in Northern Norway and the Norwegian and NATO conventional forces deployed in Norway. Marian Leighton, a Soviet expert at Columbia University, wrote in 1979 that she believed that the Kola Peninsula had become a crucial factor in the east-west balance of power:

> "all the available (data) suggests that the Russians intend to amass such overwhelming regional strength that the northern European countries' will to resist Soviet intimidation will be paralyzed. Should such intimidation fail - or in the event of a sudden deterioration of the international situation - the Soviet forces would be able to occupy adjacent areas as buffer zones for further offensive or defensive operations."12

As quoted in the introduction, a number of Soviet experts

writing in the last year support this position. Soviet naval and air forces deployed in the Kola provide them with the capability to seize and hold appreciable amounts of territory in the North Cape area. The force projection capabilities are sufficient to support a rapid, limited, offensive in Northern Norway on short notice.

Soviet air and air defense forces are considered next. There are forty airfields located on the Kola Peninsula, sixteen of which are capable of supporting all-weather operations. In addition to the naval aircraft belonging to the North Fleet, the Soviet Air Force deploys approximately four hundred fifty aircraft in the Leningrad Military District (MD). Of these, some one hundred all-weather fighter aircraft, MiG-23s and MiG-25s, operate from bases on the Kola Peninsula. In addition to these aircraft, the Leningrad MD could provide the Front with additional reconnaissance and ground assault aircraft.13

Air defense is coordinated by the Arkhangel'sk Air Defense District, which is divided into three air defense zones. Early warning and ground control intercept coverage at medium and high altitudes is complete and overlapping. Airborne early warning aircraft extend this coverage out over the Barents Sea. Due to line-of-sight restrictions, coverage at low altitudes is severely reduced. There are approximately eighty radar sites in the area, with the major concentrations in the strategically sensitive areas such as

Murmansk and Severomorsk. Surface-to-Air Missle (SAM) defense is provided by a combination of SA-2, SA-3 and SA-5 systems.14

The final area addressed in this chapter is Soviet exercise activity in the Arctic region. The missions of the Northwestern TVD are unique within the Soviet force structure, and the forces based there have been tailored to support the specifically developed plans and orders set up to accomplish those missions. It has been designed with the capability to seize and secure the territories that surround the North Atlantic, with the most likely target for the near future being the islands that determine the sovereignty of the continental shelf in the Barents Sea.

In the 1950's, Soviet exercises took place in the fleet operational areas near the Soviet coasts in the Barents and Baltic seas. Any moves into the Norwegian Sea were basically to intercept and confront NATO vessels. From 1956 on, operational areas were extended to the west in response to NATO carrier operations north of the GIUK Gap.15 Beginning in 1963, naval exercises began to fall into a Spring/Fall pattern, with exits from the Arctic and Barents Seas and deeper incursions into the Norwegian Sea. The first attempt by the Soviets to coordinate a large scale sea exercise appears to have been the SEVER Exercise of 1968. Operations were conducted in the North Atlantic, North Sea, Norwegian Sea and Barents Sea by units from both the Northern Fleet and

Baltic Fleet. Submarines, surface vessels, aircraft and amphibious vessels were involved.16

In 1970, the OKEAN-70 exercise involved all four fleet areas. In the Northern Fleet area of operations, a Task Force of surface vessels and at least thirty submarines participated, and over four hundred sorties by shore-based naval aircraft were flown. The units focused their operations on a notional enemy strike force that was deploying into the Norwegian Sea. During both phases one and two, amphibious landings were conducted on the Penchenga Peninsula near Norway.17

Worldwide maneuvers were conducted in 1975 during the OKEAN-75 exercise. Eight major Task Forces deployed in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans, the Mediterranean and the Sea of Japan. Seventy naval units deployed to the North Atlantic and one hundred to the North Sea and Baltic Sea to set up submarine barriers in the GIUK Gap and off of Norway. Again, amphibious exercises were conducted in the Barents and Baltic Seas.18

In 1981, the ZAPAD-81 exercise took place in the Baltic Sea, with ground, air and naval units participating. Over one hundred thousand troops and eighty ships from all four of the Soviet fleets participated in an operation that was the first real test of command and control of an inter-service operation.19 The exercise included a coastal assault phase that consisted of naval infantry conducting low-level

airborne drops, frogmen clearing mines and barriers and landings by a five thousand-man Naval Infantry unit; all operations that would come into play in an attack on the North Cape.[20] R.D.M. Furlong, a Norwegian Defense expert, wrote in International Defense Review in 1979:

> "Senior NATO commanders and intelligence officers in the Baltic...are concerned that the Warsaw Pact has doubled its amphibious lift capabilities in the Baltic since 1972, and that the increase in regular Pact patrols and large-scale naval, air , amphibious and airborne assault exercises since 1975 leaves them with only marginal warning time for a genuine attack."[21]

These same concerns also apply to the Soviet Northern Fleet. With Soviet exercises being conducted just kilometers from their borders, the warning time for an attack on the North Cape could be very short indeed.

In the Northern Fleet area, amphibious operations are generally carried out on the Penchenga Peninsula, only ten kilometers from the Norwegian border. Penchenga is the home of two motorized rifle regiments, and seems a likely jumping-off point for a direct frontal land assault on Finnmark and for amphibious assaults further along the coast.

Soviet exercises in the Northern Fleet area continue to expand in nature and scope. Scenarios include anti-carrier operations, the intercept of reinforcements to the region, ASW operations, and, to an increasing degree, amphibious landings. These exercises reinforce the contention that the Soviets now regard the GIUK Gap as their forward defensive area.[22]

This chapter looked at the current status of Soviet forces in the Arctic region. The next chapter will describe the Norwegian defense structure and forces.

MAP # 2 - LENINGRAD MILITARY DISTRICT: The Soviet units capable of force projection in the Arctic region are stationed in the LMD, with the majority located on the Kola Peninsula.



SOURCE: DOD Map 800089 (541360) 3-84.

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CHAPTER FIVE

NORWEGIAN DEFENSE STRUCTURE AND FORCES

This chapter examines the Norwegian defense structure and forces in the Arctic region. It begins with a short overview of the region, and then examines the defense policies based on the concept of deterrence and reassurance. It then details the current status of Norway's armed forces, and concludes with a discussion on the requirement for support by NATO reinforcements.

Norway is no longer merely the northern part of Europe in terms of military strategy, but is a strategic focal point in the global sense, especially in relation to the two super-powers. This is a result of the strategic nature of the Soviet SSBNs of the Northern Fleet and the corresponding United States military strategies to counter that threat.

In the author's opinion, the defense of Norway involves two main factors; geographical considerations and the government's international policies. Geographically, Norway is one of the largest countries in Europe, but it has one of the smallest populations. It sits astride the main Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) in the North Atlantic and the Baltic, and has an extremely long coastline. (See map #3) The three northern counties, Finnmark, Troms and Nordland, comprise approximately 40% of the Norwegian territory, but contain only 12% of the population.1 Of significant

importance is the proximity of the region to the Soviet Union and the military bases on the Kola Peninsula. Clive Archer, of the Aberdeen Center for Defense Studies, wrote in 1984 that Norway operates in an international environment in which:

- The Soviet Northern Fleet has extended operations in the North Atlantic out to the GIUK Gap
- Norway is a member of NATO, but with self-imposed restrictions that hinder rapid security assistance efforts
- Significant economic and political disagreements with the Soviets exist in the Barents Sea region2

As stated by former Norwegian Defense Minister, Anders Sjaastad, in 1984, "We have always based our defense upon two pillars: our own efforts and allied reinforcements."3 Norway's standing military is small; they rely on mobilization of local defense forces and reserves, and reinforcements from NATO. Norwegian Defense expert Edward Hooton listed the Norwegian military objectives in 1984 as:

- Contribute to the prevention of war
- Secure peace in the Scandinavian region
- Insure freedom of action to defend Norwegian interests and rights
- Provide support to United Nations peacekeeping operations
- Control and inspect the activities within the continental shelf and economic zone regions
- Assist the civilian community 4

Key to Norwegian defense policies are the concepts of deterrence and reassurance regarding the Soviet Union, and the Base and Ban Policies established by the government. In January of 1949, the Soviets sent a note to the Norwegian government asking whether Norway was establishing or

coordinating for the establishment of foreign air or naval bases on Norwegian territory as a result of their decision to join NATO.5 The Norwegian government responded that they would never allow their territory to be used for aggressive purposes and that they would not agree to the establishment of any bases as long as Norway was not attacked or exposed to threat of attack. Robert K. German wrote in "International Security" in 1982:

> "The Norwegian note...setting forth base policy demonstrated what has remained a constant element of Norwegian policy - the combination of insurance plus reassurance: insurance...through membership in NATO, reassurance for the USSR through refraining from provocative actions."6

In 1957, Norwegian Prime Minister Gerbardsen expanded the base policy. At a NATO summit meeting in December of that year he stated that Norwa had "...no plans to allow stores of nuclear weapons to be established on Norwegian territory, or to install launching bases for medium range missiles."7 As amplified by the Norwegian Defense Minister in 1980, the policy prohibits the storage or deployment of nuclear weapons, the training of Norwegian forces in the use of nuclear weapons, or the acquisition of either the delivery systems or communication systems used with nuclear weapons.8 The bottom line, as the Norwegians see it, is to ensure that any nuclear weapon used against the Soviet Union could not possibly have come from Norwegian territory. In 1982, Johan Holst, the Norwegian Defense Minister, listed some other

limitations imposed by Norway to reassure the Soviets as:

- No military exercises in the Finnmark region (effectively implementing an 800 kilometer buffer zone on the Norway/Soviet border)
- No aircraft activity in Norwegian airspace east of the twenty-four (24) degree meridian
- No naval activity in Norwegian waters east of the twenty-four degree meridian
- Norwegian control of all NATO early warning aircraft in the northern latitudes
- Limited West German participation in NATO exercises 9

By restricting any activity that might be viewed as provocative by the Soviets, the Norwegian government hopes to stabilize the security situation in the northern region.

A negative factor in these unilateral Norwegian measures in the author's opinion is that the Soviets have come to view them as the status quo; any deviation or perceived change in these policies elicits immediate Soviet response in the form of diplomatic pressure and propaganda. The measures have obviously not limited Soviet buildups of conventional and strategic forces in the region, and have severely limited the amount and timeliness of an Allied response in a crisis situation.

In 1989, the Norwegian Defense Forces consisted of about 366,500 personnel:

- Standing Force - 13,500
- Conscripts (1 year) - 28,000
- Reservists - 235,000
- Home Guard - 90,000 10

There are approximately 37,000 troops on active duty, 18,000

in the Army, 10,000 in the Air Force and 9,000 in the Navy. Norway's concept of the initial stages of any conflict is that the ruggedness of the terrain and the delaying tactics of the active duty units will give them time to mobilize their reservists. This key concept can be called into question along two lines. The first is that the one time that the system was tested, the German invasion in 1940, it failed totally. Even with the arrival of Allied forces in three days, the Germans, with a smaller sized force, were able to gain control of the country in only 65 days because the mobilization effort did not work. There is currently no evidence in the nature of tests or exercises to indicate that a present-day call-up would be any more effective. Additionally, Soviet forces available for an attack surpass those of Germany in 1940.11 The second problem is that the plan is based on the tenet that any Soviet advance would come as a full-scale attack against the entire country. It does not address the possibility that the Soviets might make a limited incursion into the Finnmark region with the sole intention of acquiring the North Cape as an additional buffer or deployment zone in a time of crisis.12

In 1980, Johan Holst, the Norwegian Defense Minister, listed the functions of the Norwegian active duty forces as:

- The direct defense to canalize, delay, attrit and destroy

- The reinforcement of key areas via mobilization and strategic movement of forces.
- The defense of key areas, such as securing pre-stockage sites and NATO reinforcement bases.
- The coastal defense of major ports.13

Norway concentrates its forces in the central and southern regions of the country, with Finnmark utilized as a trip wire to any Soviet advance. The only forces deployed in the North Cape area are a 450-man Frontier battalion at Voranger and a 1,000 man battalion at Porsanger.14 The only other major force in the northern region is a 5,000-man brigade deployed in the vicinity of Troms. The headquarters for northern defense forces is considerably further south, at Bodo. In effect, Norway's strategic defense policy cedes the North Cape to the Soviets. Short of an actual military attack, Soviet intimidation may result in success due to a failure by the Norwegian government to react in time to permit NATO reinforcements to arrive.

There are five Air Force bases and four Naval bases in northern Norway, but the country's air and naval forces are limited in size and capabilities. Norway has two squadrons of F-16 fighter aircraft and one squadron of maritime surveillance aircraft in the northern region, based at Ankdoya, Bodo and Bardufoss. The main Naval base in the north is at Olavsvern, in the vicinity of Troms. The two major fjords in the area are protected by fifteen forts, which have been upgraded with new 120mm guns.15 The Naval

strategy is designed around the defense of the major fjords and coastal regions.

In the author's opinion, the key facilities that would be main objectives for any attack are the ports of Trondheim and Narvik and the airbase at Bardufoss. From these bases, Norway and NATO conduct intelligence monitoring and surveillance of the Soviet forces in the Kola in peace-time, and would conduct interdiction missions against Soviet forces deploying into the North Atlantic during war-time.

Military support from NATO is a key part of Norway's defense. As stated earlier in a comment by Norway's Defense Minister, the country's defense is based in part upon allied reinforcements. He goes on to say:

> "What has changed over the past few years is that we have made the timely arrival of those reinforcements more credible with pre-stocking arrangements...(and) improved reception facilities at some of our airfields."16

In January of 1981, a memorandum of understanding between the United States and Norway was signed that set up a plan to establish pre-stocking sites in Norway for troops deploying from the US. Under the plan the United States will earmark a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) for reinforcement of Norway within the NATO chain of command. The MEB would consist of approximately 10,000 troops, with artillery and air defense support and about seventy-five helicopters. Equipment stocked in Norway includes artillery, bridging equipment, motor transport, and ammunition, fuel and food

supplies. In a separate agreement with the British, the Norwegians are pre-stocking over-the-snow vehicles for the Royal Marines.17 Robert German, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, stated in 1982 that Norway's policy regarding NATO reinforcement includes:

- Making bases available for Allied forces
- Upgrading reception and maintenance facilities
- Maintaining and guarding pre-stocked equipment
- Participating in NATO exercises which practice reinforcing procedures 18

First the Norwegian government must reach a decision to request Allied reinforcements. If the strategic military situation was such that there were no competing demands for NATO reaction forces, Bjol lists the sequence of events as:

- 6-8 days: The Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force, a brigade size force, arrives
- 8-10 days: The US Marine MEB arrives
- 10 days: The UK 3rd Commando Brigade arrives 19

The total of these forces, if all were uncommitted, would be less than two divisions, and they would not be available for deployment until approximately two weeks after the request was initiated. The arrival of any of these forces would depend on the Allies maintaining control of the sea and air LOCs to Norway. It is important to remember that all of these units have a number of contingency missions throughout Central Europe. The capability to provide support to Norway would depend on the international strategic situation; the NATO commander would have to prioritize requirements.20

Norway is currently negotiating with NATO for a force that would replace the Canadian brigade that was originally dedicated to the reinforcement of Norway, and is now scheduled for deployment in West Germany. This new unit would be called the NATO Composite Force, and would be dedicated to Norwegian defense. The force would consist of one Canadian infantry battalion with supporting artillery, one US artillery battalion, one West German artillery battalion and a Norwegian transportation helicopter squadron. The final resolution of this issue is probably several years away.21

A key point to consider is that it is entirely possible that the Norwegian government might not ever come to a decision to call for NATO support. With the limited forces stationed in the North Cape area, the Soviet units concentrated in the Kola could conceivably occupy the area without major fighting, and without any plans for further operations other than to secure the airbases and ports in the region. What would the response be to such a move if the Norwegians decided to deal with the matter diplomatically and refused to call for reinforcements? If NATO wants to ensure that the North Cape stays within the Allied sphere of influence, it must have a clear understanding of Norwegian defense policies and objectives.

MAP # 3 - NORWEGIAN MILITARY BASES: Those air, land, and naval bases in the northern region that impact on the military balance of power in the Arctic region.



SOURCE: Edward Hocton, "Norway: Country Portrait", NATO's Sixteen Nations, Dec 84-Jan 85, pg 64.

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CHAPTER SIX

POLITICAL ISSUES IMPACTING ON SECURITY IN THE ARCTIC

The two previous chapters examined the current structure of Soviet and Norwegian defense forces in the Arctic region. This chapter discusses the political issues that relate to security in the Arctic region and examines in detail the concept of a 'Nordic Balance'. It also looks at the possibility of establishing a Nordic Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (NNWFZ) in the region.

Norway's current defense policies are built around the framework of two key concepts, Nordic Balance and Deterrence versus Reassurance in regard to the Soviet Union. Many Scandinavians believe that Soviet interests in the region are primarily political, military defensive, and peripheral to the Central European region. As a result, their security policies have been basically defensive in nature.1

The concept of a Nordic Balance is not one of power so much as a political equilibrium in the Scandinavian region. The idea was developed and used by Norway and Denmark; it is not acknowledged by the Soviets, although they reference it when it is to their advantage. Basically the concept is that Finland remains neutral, but with a special relationship with the USSR based on the 1948 Mutual Defense Treaty; Sweden maintains no alliances during peace me, but has sufficient strength to deter attack; Norway and Denmark are part of

NATO, but maintain a number of self-imposed restrictions that reassure the Soviets.2 The balance is maintained because any change by one side of the political equilibrium would result in a compensatory change by the other side.

To counter the Soviet threat, Norway has relied on the 'Nordic Balance', which Marian Leighton described in 1979 as:

> "A vague concept of Scandinavian unity, as portrayed in the nation of a Nordic Balance, has often been cited as a deterrent to Sovietization of the region. The image is one of a scale, with neutral Sweden holding the balance between pro-western Norway, Denmark and Iceland on the one side and Finland, whose foreign policy operates under Soviet sufferance, on the other." 3

The theory basically involves a combination of deterrence and reassurance by both sides. An example of the adjusting mechanism would be if Soviet pressure on Finland intensified, the NATO presence in Norway would increase. Pressure on one side leads to a counter-acting reaction by the other side. Deterrence on the NATO side consists of the maintenance of conventional forces in Norway and Denmark, US forces in Iceland and NATO nuclear and reinforcement guarantees.

The concept of a Nordic Balance was first introduced in 1961 when Khruschev issued a call for the Finnish Prime Minister to come to Moscow for immediate consultations regarding the 1948 treaty due to the rising tensions in Central Europe. The Foreign Minister of Norway responded by saying that if the USSR changed Finland's neutral status, the Norwegian government would have to reconsider its base and

ban policy (discussed below) Because of this threat the Soviets withdrew their request to Finland's Prime Minister.4

The second of the major policy frameworks is Deterrence and Reassurance. Johan Holst, the current Norwegian Defense Minister, described the concept as follows in 1982:

> "In relation to the Soviet Union, the posture reflects a trade-off between considerations of deterrence and reassurance. 'Deterrence' resides primarily in making credible the proposition that an attack on Norway will be met with effective and determined resistance, and the fight for control of any part of Norway will not be confined to a fight with Norway. 'Reassurance' is made up of a series of unilateral confidence-building measures designed to communicate peaceful intentions and avoid challenging vital Soviet security interests during peacetime.5

These measures, maintained by all Norwegian governments since 1949, include the following major points:

- No foreign troops permanently stationed on Norwegian territory during peacetime
- No nuclear weapons deployed or stored in Norway
- No Allied exercises in the North Cape region
- No Allied air or naval activity operating from Norwegian bases east of twenty-four degrees longitude 6

In addition, Norway notifies Moscow of all major military exercises on Norwegian soil, and invites Soviet observers to all of these operations. NATO reconnaissance activities in the Barents Sea region are also restricted to Norwegian military forces only.7 In 1982, Kurt Frydenlund, Norway's former Foreign Minister expressed the concept as:

> "We belong to NATO, but during the formulation of our defense policy we have taken as much account of the Soviet Union as can be reasonably expected of a country's government. Our base policy, our nuclear policy and severe restrictions on military maneuvers all constitute

> what, in Helsinki terminology, we call confidence-inspiring measures. And they're unilateral Norwegian measures."8

A major problem that results from these policies of self-restraint is that although they are self-imposed, the Soviets tend to view them as established agreements. Any Norwegian action that the Soviets interpret as a change of these measures results in an immediate out-cry in both political and public channels, contending that Norway is violating principles agreed to by both parties. These posturings put added pressure on the Norwegian government in terms of international and internal opinions as defense policies are debated and developed.9

The concept is not one of a military or power balance, but of a political equilibrium. Writing in 1980, John Hattendorf, professor of strategy at the US Naval War College, wrote that the theory depends on four factors:

- Super-power relationships that dominate Europe
- The credibility of NATOs presence in Norway during times of crisis
- The stability of the individual Scandinavian states and their foreign policies
- The strength and credibility of Swedish defense 10

Finland does not like the idea of reciprocity for obvious reasons, and it is rarely mentioned in Swedish foreign or defense policies. The only time the Soviets bring it up is when they claim that it has been violated.11

These two basic concepts, Nordic Balance and Reassurance and Deterrence, have shaped Norwegian defense and foreign

policies, especially those concerning the USSR, for forty years. There are a number of factors coming into play that may cause a significant change in the way both the Soviets and the Norwegians look at the political and military balances in the North Cape region that, in the author's opinion, may cause a re-evaluation of these frameworks. They include:

- Strategic Issues:
  * SSBN deployment and operation areas
  * North Fleet SLOCs to/from the Kola bases
  * Force imbalance in the North Cape region-
- Tactical Issues:
  * Technological advances, including cruise missles, increased range of aircraft, improved ASW and surveillance capabilities * Lack of well defined boundaries in the Barents Sea
  * Rapid NATO reinforcement capabilities
- Economic Issues:
  * Exploration and exploitation of natural, mineral, oil and gas resources **12**

When Norwegian and NATO defense policies were established in the 1950's, NATO was in a position to maintain overall control of both the seas and airspace in the Northern Scandinavian region. The Norwegian basing and nuclear policies were acceptable risks at the time. There is a significantly different situation developing for the 1990's, with a massive ground force imbalance, and the buildup of the naval strength in the northern region. The Northern Fleet regularly deploys for joint maneuvers and exercises in the Barents and Norwegian Seas, and has now gained the potential to establish a strong presence in most of the North Atlantic Ocean north of the GIUK Gap.**13** Soviet naval forces can

quickly be positioned between Norway and the rest of NATO, cutting the reinforcement and resupply routes to both Central Europe and the United States. Norway must conduct a careful re-evaluation of its defense policies to ensure that they can provide adequate security for both Norway and NATO in the next decade.

The concept of a Nordic Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (NNWFZ) was first proposed in 1958 in response to the first generation of medium-range missles deployed in Europe. It has received varying degrees of support over the years, mostly from the socialist parties of the Scandinavian countries, but has never been able to gain a regional consensus. The Soviets have been strong proponents of the idea, for obvious reasons, and have continued to present various proposals over the years in an attempt to gain support.14

The first proposal was presented in 1958 by Soviet Premier Bulganin in separate letters to the Norwegian and Danish governments. The Norwegians saw it as an attempt to break up NATO and demanded that any agreement include Soviet territory in the Nordic region, with no response.15 In 1963, Finnish President Kekkonen re-introduced the proposal. It was again turned down by the Nordic countries, who replied that the only nuclear weapons in the region were in the USSR. During a 1978 speech, Kekkonen addressed the problem of cruise-missiles, declaring that there should be official

agreements concerning the overflight of Scandinavian territory.16

In 1980, the left-wing of Norway's ruling Social Democrat party called for the ratification of an NNWFZ, and got the idea adopted as a party platform. There was substantial popular support for the proposal at the time, fifteen percent signed a petition, but the plan never became official government policy.17

There are a number of reasons why people support the concept of a Nordic Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone. In 1988, defense expert Richard Bitzinger summarized them as follows:

- To improve international security
- As a buffer between the USSR and NATO
- As an impetus to arms control negotiations
- To strengthen the non-proliferation treaty
- As a confidence building measure for the Soviets
- To lower the possibility of nuclear weapons being used on Scandinavian soil 18

An NNWFZ is supported to save the world from nuclear destruction, and if not the world, at least Scandinavia. Controversies over enhanced radiation warheads and intermediate-range missle modernization and deployment led to a surge in popularity for the concept from 1980-1983, but the recent missle reductions and lessening of tensions in Central Europe have stalled NNWFZ activities.19

Bitzinger beleives that the negative impacts of an NNWFZ are that it would:

- Lower the credibility of NATO's nuclear deterrence
- Reduce NATO's flexibility of response

- Degrade the perception of the strength of the NATO alliance
- Prevent the deployment of nuclear powered ships to Norway
- Increase the isolation of Norway 20

An NNWFZ could weaken Norway's links to NATO, and it would not address the problem of Soviet nuclear weapons in the Northwestern TVD.21 The Soviets advise the Scandinavian countries that the best way to insure not being drawn into a nuclear war is to turn the current unilateral bans maintained by those countries into a binding treaty. Meanwhile, the Soviets themselves continue their build-up of nuclear and conventional forces in the Kola Peninsula.22

The United States had serious reservations concerning an NNWFZ from the beginning. In 1974, the US State Department issued the following statement:

> "The United States has studied proposals for nuclear-free zones in Europe, including the Nordic region. We have not yet found that such proposals are a realistic or effective means of improving security - or cohesion - of our NATO alliance. Most important, any move which called into question NATO's deterrent could make war - including nuclear war - more, rather than less likely."23

The United States opposes an NNWFZ because it would complicate arms control negotiations, have a negative impact on the NATO alliance, restrict the flexibility of a response in a crisis situation, and because Soviet weapons are never included in the proposals. The criteria for support of any nuclear-free zone as listed by the State Department are:

- The initiative must be taken by the states in the region concerned
- It must include all states within that region

- It should not interfere with existing security arrangements
- There must be adequate provisions for verification [24]

Based on the current lessening of tensions in Europe, including the INF treaty, the reduction in force size by both the Soviets and the United States and the current disarmament initiatives, the author believes that the perception of the risk of nuclear war in Europe is low enough that support for a nuclear weapons-free zone will diminish.

This chapter reviewed the political issues between Norway and the Soviet Union that impact on security in the Arctic. The next chapter will examine the impact that economic issues in the region have on security.

MAP # 4 - THE NORWEGIAN ARCTIC: The continental shelf region of the Barents Sea impacting on security and economic issues between Norway and the Soviet Union.



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CHAPTER SEVEN

ECONOMIC ISSUES THAT IMPACT ON SECURITY IN THE ARCTIC

The previous chapter examined the impacts that the political issues between Norway and the Soviet Union have on security in the Arctic. This chapter will look at the economic issues that need to be resolved between the two countries in regards to security in the region. It begins with a quick review of the International Law of the Sea Conference and how it effects the Barents Sea region. It then examines the Svalbard and Gray Zone disputes in terms of security in the continental shelf area off of the North Cape.

There are two major economic disputes between Norway and the Soviets. These issues affect both countries' national economic development and the security interests. These disputes center on the proprietorship of the continental shelf regions between the Svalbard Islands and the North Cape and Kola Peninsula regions. To fully understand these issues, it is necessary to take a quick look at the United Nations Law of the Sea Conferences.

With the exception of the Antarctic region, there are no universally accepted agreements concerning the territorial, fishing and exploitation rights of the world's coastal and ocean regions. The United Nations has sponsored a number of international conferences to address these important issues, including:

- Baselines from which boundaries are to be measured
- Status of islands (critical for sovereignty issues)
- Rights of passage for waterways
- Resource rights in economic and fishing zones
- Resource rights in continental shelf regions 1

In 1958, the first International Law of the Sea Conference established national maritime limits of three to four miles. In 1960, the second conference extended this to twelve miles, which in effect made any passageway less than twenty-four miles wide an "interior waterway". In addition, this conference established the right of 'innocent passage', a twelve mile fishing exclusion zone, and the sovereign right of any nation to explore and exploit continental shelf regions out to a depth of two hundred meters.2 In 1977, most nations agreed to extend the territorial rights of maritime countries out to two hundred miles, although Great Britain and West Germany did not sign the agreement

There is a definite link between these economic factors and the security concerns of the Norway and the USSR. Transportation issues affect both the transit of military and commercial shipping. Resource development supplies strategic materials as well as support to the economy. The Soviets make a strong effort to tie these economic issues to their military concerns to strengthen their bargaining positions with the Norwegians concerning the boundary disputes in the Barents Sea region.3

The continental shelf region, including the Svalbard Islands off of Norway's North Cape, are critical for economic

as well as security reasons. The closest of the Svalbard Islands is approximately four hundred miles north of Norway in the Barents Sea, and the archipelago extends to within ten degrees of the North Pole. (See map 4) Despite this northern latitude, the waters south of the islands remain ice-free year-round; it is this passage that permits access to and from the Soviet naval bases in the Kola Peninsula. In addition to this strategic location on the flank of the Soviet's Northern Fleet deployment route, the continental shelf area surrounding the Svalbards promises to be rich in gas and oil reserves. Thus, for both security and economic reasons, the islands are important to both the Soviets and the Norwegians.

In accordance with the 1920 Treaty of Spitsbergen, which was signed by most European countries, the USSR and the US, Norway owns and administers the islands. Signatory nations have the right to commercially exploit mineral and natural resources, but only the Soviets have taken advantage of these opportunities to mine coal on the island. The treaty states that the islands must remain demilitarized, and to date this has been the case.[4]

There are approximately one thousand Norwegians living on the islands in the towns of Longyearbyen and Svea, and two thousand Soviets in the towns of Barentsburg and Pyramiden. A Norwegian governor in Longyearbyen maintains authority in principle, but the Soviets flout the regulations on a regular

basis. A key strategic point on the islands is the modern airfield built near Longyearbyen that is two thousand meters long. It handles approximately one hundred twenty-five flights a year, and in the last ten years has had only fourteen flights cancelled due to weather. The airfield is operational for approximately three hundred and fifty days per year, and is capable of supporting a fighter squadron.5

The Svalbards have been a major element of tension between the Soviets and Norwegians since the end of World War II. In 1944, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov demanded that the 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty be annulled or revised. Pointing to the strategic importance of naval access to the Soviet naval base in Murmansk, he stated that Norwegian sovereignty of the islands was unacceptable and that there should be joint control of the region.6 In 1987, Michael MccGwire of the Brooking's Institute wrote the Soviet interest in the Svalbards has increased since 1944 for a number of reasons:

- Security of sea lanes
- Staging of aircraft
- Staging of naval surface/subsurface vessels
- Early Warning operations
- Intelligence and Reconnaissance activities
- Oil and gas reserves
- Denial of all the above to NATO 7

In 1976, Norway declared that the 1920 treaty did not apply to the continental shelf region that extends between Svalbard and the North Cape. (See map # 4) They imposed a two hundred mile economic zone off both areas that overlap, effectively covering the entire sea floor region between the

cape and the islands. The Soviets have strongly opposed this interpretation of international law, and continue to apply strong pressure on the Norwegian government in regard to both this issue and the international boundary issue, the Gray Zone issue addressed below. In 1985, Nils Morten Udgaard, a previous Norwegian Secretary of State, replied to these pressures:

> "...the Soviet Union and some other East-European countries have directly opposed the Norwegian view. They maintain that all of the limitations of the treaty also apply to the continental shelf in this area. The concept that the Svalbard Treaty does not apply to any part of the shelf beyond the territorial sea is regarded by the Norwegian government as the view most compatible with a firm and regulated administration of future resource development in the area and thus with the maintenance of low tension in this area.8

Of great concern to the Soviets is the potential for oil exploration in the region. Any such operations could seriously degrade security operations for all of the Soviet forces, land, sea and air, in the Kola peninsula. At the present time, the oil fields off Norway's west coast provide sufficient product to meet the industry demands. The Norwegian government has put a unilateral ban on foreign drilling operations north of the sixty-two degree parallel, but initiated fifteen exploratory wells in the area in 1984. According to Marian Leighton of the National Strategy Information Center, the Soviets continue to apply pressure regarding these issues, and a resolution will have to be agreed to in the near future.9

The current Soviet goal, in the opinion of the author, is to reach an agreement with Norway that acknowledges the principle that Norway and the USSR are in a unique position in regard to the administration of the region and that the two countries should work in cooperation to regulate the development of the mineral and natural resources. Kirsten Amundsen, writing for the Berkeley Institute of International Studies in 1961, listed these Soviet violations in the Svalbards utilized to pressure the Norwegian government:

- Systematic violations of the laws and regulations
- Unlicensed and unannounced aircraft flights
- Unregistered scientific expeditions
- Construction of military-like installations
- Installation of a long-range radar system 10

All point to a continued Soviet posturing to force Norway to agree to dual control on the islands, and some could be taken as possible precursors to future military operations. There are no security forces of the islands, and the major installations could be taken over easily. The bottom line: the Svalbards are even more important to the Soviets for economic reasons today then in 1944. The Svalbard problem will remain high on the list of issues that will affect Soviet-Norwegian relations through the 1990's.

In addition to the disagreements over economic issues in regard to the Svalbard Islands, the Norwegians must also contend with a long-standing dispute with the Soviets concerning the delineation line for the continental shelf region between the two countries. Based on Article 6 of the

first Law of the Sea Conference, Norway claims a boundary that follows a median line between the point where the two countries meet on the North Cape, equi-distant between the two countries. (See Map #5) The Soviets, because of "a special justification for security purposes", insist on a sector line, one drawn straight north from the point where the countries meet. In addition to providing additional space for reasons of security, this line gives the Soviets an additional fifty-eight thousand square miles in the Barents sea for mineral exploitation and fishing.11

The area that is between these two lines is claimed by both countries, and is referred to as the Gray Zone. The major significance of this zone is its proximity to the home waters of the Northern Fleet. The Soviets fear that exploitation of either the oil or fisheries in the region by western countries could provide NATO with excellent observation and surveillance platforms. NATO could utilize the airbase on the Svalbards and the oil platforms of NATO nations to mount both overt and covert collection operations. The Soviets are applying strong pressure on the Norwegian government to limit oil exploration in the Barents Sea region to Soviet and Norwegian companies only.12

This chapter looked at the economic issues that impact on security in the Arctic region. The next chapter will examine the Soviet goals and objectives in the Arctic, and some of the mechanisms they use to advance those goals.

MAP # 5 - THE GRAY ZONE: The continental shelf region, rich in mineral and oil resources, claimed by both Norway and the Soviet Union.



SOURCE: Frank Brenchley, "Norway and Her Soviet Neighbour", Conflict Studies, no 134, 1982.

ENDNOTES

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5 Geoffrey Till, Britain and NATO's Northern Flank, (1988): 175.

6 Robert K. German, "Norway and the Bear: Soviet Coercive Diplomacy", International Security, vol 7, nr 2, (1982): 57.

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8 Brenchley, (1982): 6.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

SOVIET GOALS AND OBJECTIVES IN THE ARCTIC

The previous two chapters looked at the political and economic issues between Norway and the Soviet Union that impact on security concerns in the Arctic region. This chapter will build on those issues by examining the Soviet goals and objectives in the Arctic. It begins with a review of Gorbachev's security policies, and then ties those policies to the disputes in the Barents Sea area. It then details the security objectives of the Northwestern TVD and looks at the possibility of Soviet offensive actions in the region.

Soviet national interests and policy objectives in Scandinavia are extensions of their overall global policies and goals. Objectives in the Arctic region can be broken down into three categories; political, economic and security. Writing in 1988, Stephen Meyer listed the following points as the doctrinal framework upon which Gorbachev states that he is building his security policies:

- War prevention is the fundamental component of Soviet military doctrine
- No war, including nuclear war, can be considered a continuation of politics
- Political means of enhancing society are better than military means
- Security is mutual - Soviet security cannot be enhanced by increasing insecurity in other states
- Reasonable sufficiency should be the basis for future development of combat capabilities of armed forces
- Soviet military strategy is based on defensive (non-provocative) defense, not on offensive capabilities and operations 1

These concepts are obviously an attempt to put the Soviet Union in the best light during the current period of military reduction in Europe and to accomplish a little reassurance of their own. Norwegian and NATO defense planners must continue to evaluate and react to the actual threat in Northern Europe, and that threat remains high. It must also be remembered that not all of the Soviet leadership supports this doctrine, and that any change in the Soviet political structure could result in defense policies less restrictive in nature. Marian K. Leighton wrote in 1979 that the Soviets look to "achieve maximum politico-strategic gains at minimum risk" by the seeking to "manipulate political, economic and psychological currents in Northern Europe to their advantage."2 This view is supported by a majority of authors writing more recently. This paper addresses the three objective categories separately, but it should be understood that they are strongly linked to each other in Soviet plans, policies and actions.

Writing in 1982, Johan Holst, Norway's Secretary of Defense, stated:

> "The primary interest of the Soviet Union in the Northern waters is likely to be protection of missile-carrying submarine launching zones and transit routes. Another primary concern is probably protection against the Norwegian Sea being used for carrier based strikes against the USSR, and the penetration and destruction of anti-submarine warfare barriers in the (GIUK) gap and off Northern Norway. Consequently, Soviet naval planners are likely to aim for the establishment of sea control north of the (GIUK) gap in order to prevent NATO naval incursion into the area."3

Political goals in the Arctic region center on maintaining the neutrality of Finland and Sweden and prying Norway away from the NATO Alliance. In Norway, they fall into four basic lines of attack; exploitation of the theme that money spent on defense is wasted money that should go toward social programs, propaganda attacks against any plan or policy that enhances the Allied capability to resist an attack on Norway, pressure concerning the Nordic Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone and continued disagreement over international boundaries.4

Economic goals in the Arctic region center on the large mineral and oil deposits in the Barents Sea. The current Soviet drive for economic development comes at a time when oil production in their existing fields is falling rapidly. An article in the Washington Post examining the impact of this slump on Gorbachev's revitalization plans quotes him as saying that the failure of the Tyumen oil fields to meet targets for three years in a row "creates difficulties for the national economy."5 In addition to internal fuel requirements, oil exports constitute sixty-three percent of the Soviet's hard currency earnings.6 If existing oil fields cannot support economic requirements, the Soviets will have to develop new ones, and to date, the most likely place to exploit is the continental shelf region of the Barents Sea.

Soviet security goals and objectives in the Arctic region as addressed in a majority of the literature surveyed for

this paper cover a wide spectrum. The author believes that most can be summed up in five major categories; to ensure that the Northern region is not a threat to the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact, to assure secure Warsaw Pact maritime lines of communication and frontiers, to provide adequate territory for a defense in depth, to ensure that the region remains free from nuclear weapons, and to provide security for the Soviet nuclear deterrence force, the SSBNs of the Northern Fleet. These are long-term goals, set in the context of global Soviet security posture.

Kurt Frydenlund, the previous Norwegian Foreign Minister, looked at the Soviet policies this in 1985:

> "What is certain, however, is that the Soviet Union determines its relations to Norway from a long-term perspective, and that this long-term approach is dominated by security considerations. We have to take into account that their objective is to get Norway out of NATO."7

Michael MccGwire, a senior fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies program, wrote in 1987 that the current set of security objectives evolved in the 1967-1968 time-frame. They stemmed from a Soviet conclusion that an escalation of a war to a nuclear confrontation was not inevitable.

> "The Soviets could adopt the objective of avoiding nuclear war, which as a bottom line, meant a restructuring of the forces in the Warsaw Pact to minimize the threat of war in Europe, and so reduce the threat of an escalation to intercontinental exchange.8

According to MccGwire, the Soviet long-term objectives from

1975 to 1987 were to avoid the nuclear devastation of the Soviet Union by hampering NATO's flexibility to resort to nuclear employment in any way possible, and to weaken the capitalist system to the point that the Soviets could control Western Europe, and deny the United States access to Eurasia. Military objectives are moving away from a confrontational nature to one closer resembling a defensive posture.

William Kintner, a member of the American Security Council Foundation, agreed with MccGwire, writing in 1989 that the "...Soviet interests in Western Europe have changed from direct occupation to promotion of passivity, structural fragmentation, and accommodation with Soviet power."9 As the Warsaw Pact military capability declines, political and psychological pressure on European governments to cut back on their own defense programs will increase proportionately.

As stated previously in this paper, it is the author's opinion that the lowering of tensions in Central Europe does not necessarily mean a reduction in the North. In fact, military, political and economic factors are increasing the probability of confrontation between Norway and the Soviet Union in the North Cape region. Writing in 1984, Tomas Ries and Johnny Skorve of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs stated:

> "Portions of the Nordic States do constitute important Soviet military targets in wartime. To support the Arctic strategic interests, and particularly to protect the SSBN assets, the USSR would have to engage in secondary operational missions in the North Atlantic and

> adjacent areas. To support these operations the Soviet armed forces would have to operate on the frontal level against key areas in Norway, probably through Sweden and Finland. Such operations could either be denial-oriented, involving... destruction operations, or use-oriented, involving the actual operations of key areas."10

There is a consensus in the majority of the material that the author reviewed that the Soviets view the Nordic region primarily in the context of the military strategy that they would employ in a general war; control of the North Atlantic, including the Barents and Norwegian Seas. Norway, especially northern Norway, would not be much more than a base from which to exert control of the seas. In a crisis situation, the Soviets would want to occupy the North Cape to provide bases for air cover to naval operations. By occupying the northern Norwegian airbases, Soviet aircraft could interdict naval movements in the Norwegian and North Seas, severely restricting Allied naval operations in the North Atlantic. It would substantially increase the risk of sending NATO reinforcements to Norway to assist in defensive operations. And finally, securing the North Cape region would give the Soviets the ability to close down oil production in the Norwegian sea, to launch simultaneous attacks on the Danish straits from the east and west, and to interdict NATO SLOCs to the U.S. at greater distances from Europe.

A prerequisite for an attack on Norway would be the occupation of the Svalbard Islands to deny that base to NATO for reconnaissance activities and to reduce the warning time

that NATO would have of any Soviet air or naval operations originating from the Kola Peninsula. In 1987, MccGwire described the military objectives of any Soviet attack on Norway as having two phases.

> "During Phase (One) the Soviets would be content with securing a limited number of footholds such as Svalbard, Bjornoya, and perhaps Jan Mayen islands... Meanwhile, the Soviets would concentrate on neutralizing the shore facilities and land-based systems that support NATO operations in the Norwegian Sea."11

He goes on to say that due to the principles of concentration and economy of force, they would not seek to control the Norwegian Sea during Phase One, but would attempt to deny such control to NATO until ready to move into the offense. Any operations against the Scandinavian mainland would not take place until after NATO had been defeated in Central Europe, at which point domestic resistance might lead to a call for negotiations instead of conflict.12

In the author's view, some of rationale for conducting preemptive operations in the Barents Sea area are:

- Obtain access to surveillance bases
- Extend the range of anti-carrier aircraft
- Intercept reinforcements
- Prevent raids on Soviet facilities in Kola
- Expand security and support of the SSBN fleet

Basically, occupation of the islands in the Barents Sea and North Atlantic and of the Finnmark province of Norway would allow the Soviets to expand their naval defensive perimeter to a point just north of the GIUK Gap.

Soviet Admiral Gorshkov stated that "Soviet sea power... has now become the optimum means to defeat the imperialist enemy...".13 The Soviets know that NATO would attempt to gain control of the Norwegian Sea in the event of hostilities to counter the threat of the Northern Fleet and to provide the bases for attacks on the Soviet Union. To counter this, the author believes that the initial Soviet objectives in the North in a crisis situation, of either military or economic making, will be to prevent this by seizing the Norwegian facilities on the Svalbard Islands.

Immediately following World War II, the Soviet concept of maritime operations was defensive in nature. The critical factor of US naval power during the Cuban missle crisis forced them to reassess this doctrine and realize the potential of force projection provided by naval forces. According to General Sir Walter Walker, a former NATO commander of the northern sector, the Soviet Navy today has the capability to maintain force presence missions in the Mediterranean and in the Indian Ocean, to conduct periodic visits to third-world countries, to operate continuous submarine patrols in both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and to achieve naval superiority in the Barents and Norwegian seas.14 In 1986, Helmut Meyer-Abich of the West Germany Navy stated:

> "Nowhere in the Alliance is the imbalance of standing forces between the Warsaw Pact and NATO greater than in

> Northern Europe... While there is room for debate about Soviet intentions, there can be no doubt whatsoever about the power of the Soviet military machine. They can apply that strength wherever they choose, whenever they choose, and probably without warning."15

What would the Soviets do in the Arctic Front if they perceived a strategic threat to the Kola Complex; disperse the forces based there or advance their defensive line to include the North Cape region? As the possibility of oil exploration on Norway's northern continental shelf becomes more likely, what will be the reaction to the accompanying threat of multi-national drilling operations just several hundred miles from the Kola, right in the middle of the deployment routes for the Northern Fleet? The Soviets will have to reevaluate their policies in this region, and it is likely that this evaluation will likely result in increased pressure on the Norwegians to insure Soviet security interests in the North.

NATO currently has the most advantageous geo-strategic position in the Arctic Front. To deploy, Northern Fleet vessels and naval aircraft must pass through the Barents Sea, around the North Cape, through the Norwegian Sea and then on to the GIUK Gap. Throughout this deployment, Soviet forces would be threatened by aircraft based in Norway. Forces based on the Kola Peninsula and the SLOCs necessary to maintain the deployment of those forces are too vulnerable to NATO units operating from the North Cape. It would become a matter of geographical necessity in times of crisis for the

Soviets to insure that Northern Norway could not be utilized by the Allies for military purposes, even taking into consideration the current unilateral constraints made by Norway.16 Control of this area provides operational leverage over land forces in Southern Norway, the arrival of reinforcements and the deployment of NATO naval forces in the North Atlantic. Control could be accomplished in two ways; physical occupation of the North Cape by Soviet forces or denial of use to NATO by destroying the bases in the area. Captain William Sullivan, US Navy, wrote in 1978 that a limited Soviet advance to seize the region would accomplish the following objectives:

- Provide the Soviets with access to airfields and naval bases up to 1,000 miles closer to the Atlantic while increasing the range for NATO attacks on the Kola Peninsula
- Permit earlier interception of NATO reinforcements
- Permit earlier interception of NATO carrier groups
- Allows for the expansion of the Kola military complex
- Increases Soviet intelligence collection capabilities at the same time as reducing NATO capabilities
- Expands the possibilities for amphibious operations
- Provides greater protection for surface and submarine forces operating in the Barents Sea
- Increases the warning and reaction time for all Soviet defensive systems in the North 17

Seizure of the North Cape region and the associated military bases would be a necessary first step toward providing the Soviets with control of the Norwegian Sea. Johan Holst addressed the possibility of preemptive strikes in wartime or crisis situations in 1982:

> "The structure of the Soviet defense posture in the north does exercise some inhibition on the freedom of action.

> The concentration of important naval central war forces in a narrow coastal strip constitutes an obvious element of vulnerability to counter-force strikes, a condition which is likely to temper incentives to use military force for limited gains in the area. However, those very constraints could constitute incentives for extending control over adjacent territory in the initial phases of major war."18

Captain William K. Sullivan, US Navy, Director of the Navy Forces and Systems Studies, wrote in 1984 that a Soviet attack would most likely include amphibious operations to secure port and naval facilities, airborne landings to secure the airfields and a ground assault across the border into Finnmark to link up and consolidate on the objectives. Any Soviet operation would most likely extend to at least Bardufoss, providing the Soviets with four airfields and the naval base at Tromso. Any such force projection operation would include the occupation of the Svalbard Islands, further enhancing the anti-submarine (ASW) defense of the Barents Sea.19 Surprise would be critical, and the operation would be disguised as exercise activity. Political posturing and propaganda activities would be intense, with the Soviets utilizing every means possible to intimidate the Norwegians into a non-military response. In 1884, Captain Sullivan listed some of the rationale for such overt use of force:

- To assure that the North Cape region is not used for operations that threaten Soviet security interests
- To assure "secure" and extended Warsaw Pact maritime frontiers along their northern border
- To provide adequate territory along the Soviet Northwestern frontier for greater "defense in depth"
- To assure a "nuclear-free zone" in the North 20

Such an operation could result from an incident or direct confrontation deliberately provoked by the Soviets that caused some significant breach of security interests or political stability. It might come about through unresolvable negotiations over either the Svalbard or Gray Zone issues discussed earlier in the paper, or more likely, as a result of the exploration and exploitation of the oil deposits in the Barents Sea. The Soviets have demonstrated in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Afghanistan that when there is a perceived threat to their national security interests, when the projected gains outweigh the risks and where the response by the West is assessed to be ineffective, they are willing to forcefully project State policies.

There is a perception in NATO that an isolated Soviet attack in the North would be irrational, undoing fifty years of political maneuvering for what would seem to some as marginal gains. Taken individually, the risks might seem great, but when looked as a whole, perhaps the seizure might not be so irrational after all. Lothar Ruehl, State Secretary for the West German Ministry of Defense wrote in 1990:

> "The pre-emptive attack options in the north represent the destabilizing tendency in the East-West balance of military forces...on the northern flank of NATO and the northwestern flank of the USSR."21

A successful, low-level offensive operation would lead to increasing distrust of the NATO ability to assist in the

defense and the promotion of deterrence for the security of Europe. Nowhere is the force ratio more in their favor, or NATO reinforcements so far away. A limited envelopment, with guarantees for the safety of Sweden, Denmark and of Southern Norway, with compensation to the Norwegian government, coupled with threats of additional attacks if there was a military response, could well paralyze both Scandinavian and NATO decision makers for long enough to permit a successful operation. As stated by Captain R.J. Biggs of the US Navy in 1985:

> "Spearheaded by amphibious forces, protected by sea control forces, and supported by several hundred shore-based aircraft, the Soviet Union has a modern, versatile air-ground-sea capability for the seizure of Northern areas essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign in the Atlantic. Therefore, the Soviet Union has not only pushed its defensive zones outward, it has also built up forces to project power ashore within the expanded defensive zones."**22**

Soviet amphibious and airborne forces are well-groomed for the mission of eliminating the one definite advantage NATO now has in the Arctic Front - the superior geographical position of the North Cape. The Soviets have accomplished the mission once, in 1944 against 53,000 German troops; it seems unlikely that the current NATO defensive posture could prevent them from doing it again if they decided to go in.

This chapter detailed the Soviet goals and objectives in the Arctic region. The next chapter will look at how Norway and NATO respond to this Soviet challenge.

ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER NINE

NORWEGIAN DEFENSE POLICIES AND NATO REINFORCEMENTS

The last chapter looked at the Soviet goals and objectives in the Arctic region. This chapter will address the Norwegian defense policies and the NATO reinforcements designated to support Norway if the Soviets were ever to attack. In addition to reviewing Norwegian and NATO capabilities, it details some problems faced in planning for the defense of Norway and reviews allied exercise activity.

One of the major tenets to fighting a protracted conflict is the importance of securing the lines of communication. Sea lines of communication (SLOCs) are particularly important in regards to conflict in the Arctic region. SLOCs must be secured right from the beginning of any confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact to ensure the arrival of reinforcements vital to the defense of Norway and to resupply northern flank military operations.1 NATO's goal in the North Atlantic and Arctic Oceans is to control the sea and airspace surrounding Norway, to secure both sea and air lines of communication, to neutralize the Soviet military forces stationed in the Kola Peninsula and to prevent the deployment of the Soviet's Northern Fleet south of the GIUK Gap.2

Vice Admiral Henry C. Mustin, Commander of the NATO Atlantic Striking Fleet, listed these goals in 1988:

> "NATO's maritime objectives in the Norwegian Sea are to repel a Warsaw Pact amphibious assault on North

> Norway, to support the defense of Norway against land threats, to prevent Soviet use of facilities in Norway, and to contain the Soviet Northern Fleet or destroy it at sea."3

NATO'S commitment to defend Norway can only be met if the Norwegian government makes an early decision to request Allied reinforcements, and then only if the response is rapid and large enough to be effective.

Sverre Jervell and Kare Nuyblom, Norwegian security experts writing for the Center for International Affairs in 1986, characterized the NATO maritime strategy as follows:

- Based on deterrence
- Deploy/employ naval forces in support of overall NATO strategy
- Defend as far forward as possible (dces not preclude offensive operations)
- Protect the territory of member nations
- Maintain sea lines of communication 4

Each of these points plays a part in the defense of the Northern Flank of NATO, and Norway is the keystone that the strategies are based on. This is apparent in most of the literature dealing with defense in the region. General Sir Walter Walker, a former CINCNORTH, put it this way in 1979:

> "If our Northern Flank should be turned, America's access to Europe would be exposed and thus her ability to aid us would be curtailed. NATO's Northern Flank is an area whose importance is growing...its defense is vital to the survival of the West as a whole."5

And Admiral Steinhaus of the German Navy said in 1981:

> "The Northern Flank is the left wing of the defensive front in Europe; a breakdown on this front would shatter the capability of forward defense in the Central region."6

As addressed in the previous chapter, Soviet control of the Norwegian North Cape region, they have increased capabilities for operational leverage over southern Norway, the Danish straits and over naval operations in the North Atlantic.

Because of the significant imbalance of forces between Norway and the Soviet's Northwestern TVD, Norway bases its defensive policies on the assumption that NATO will be able to rapidly provide significant reinforcements in crisis situations. The defense of Norway, especially the North Cape region, was characterized by John Berg as in 1980 as:

> "...a race for time, contingent on whether the attacker can reach the vital strategic targets and end the game before Norwegian and Allied reinforcements can appear on the scene 'en force'"7

Soviet forces available for operations against Norway include Amphibious, Airborne, SPETSNAZ, and Naval Infantry forces, as well as the two division deployed in the Kola, and the naval and air forces of the Northwestern TVD. To counter this potential, NATO has allocated forces and equipment to reinforce Norway, although the actual employment of these units will depend on the overall European security status. These forces were detailed in the chapter on Norwegian defense, but are listed here for reference:

- Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force. By air from Seckenheim West Germany. Numerous contingency commitments throughout Europe
- United Kingdom Royal Marine Commando Brigade
- United States Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Equipment pre-stocked in Norway) 8

The Allies conduct a number of regularly scheduled exercises to practice and validate reinforcement operations. The Norwegian Northern Brigade conducts two exercises annually, one in autumn and the other in winter. They involve approximately ten thousand troops, and the Canadian Brigade Group usually sends a company of soldiers to each. Every other year, the ACE Mobile Force conducts an exercise in the Arctic Express series. About fifteen thousand troops from the UK, US, Canada and Italy attend, along with supporting air and naval units. Every four years, SACLANT conducts a major fleet exercise off of the Norwegian coast. Norway announces maneuvers of ten thousand troops and over, and invites Warsaw Pact observers to all exercises as part of their reassurance policy regarding the Soviets.9

NATO is faced with significant problems in providing the forces necessary to defend Norway, and in transporting those forces to Norway in sufficient time. In 1978, Captain William Sullivan, USN, former director of the Navy Forces and Systems Studies, listed the following problems that face NATO in regards to reinforcing Norway:

- Lack of regional cooperation among NATO members concerning political goals and financial responsibilities
- Inadequate NATO forces designated
- The mechanism for mobilization and utilization of NATO forces is clumsy and slow
- No immediate confrontation with US forces
- No regionally based nuclear forces
- Short Soviet LOCs, long NATO LOCs 10

In the author's opinion, the effective reinforcement will be impaired by three major obstacles; the probability that any Norwegian request for assistance will be delayed to the last possible moment in keeping with reassurance policies; the delays resulting from the organization and deployment of designated forces; and the increased risks of Soviet interception of those reinforcements by sea or air forces of the Northwestern TVD.

These problems have led to an increased risk on the Northern Flank, risk that until now senior leaders in Norway and NATO have been willing to accept. However, the perception that NATO could not adequately respond to an attack in the North Cape area may result in a shift by Norway and Denmark toward a more neutral policy. In the authors opinion, the current status of NATO's ability to react quickly in defense of Norway calls into question the NATO guarantee to protect the sovereignty of all member nations. The factors listed below, which were developed by the author, increase the potential for Soviet limited operation in the Barents Sea region to secure the Svalbard Islands and the North Cape of Norway:

- Reduction of conventional forces in Central Europe has enhanced the role of the Soviet SSBN fleet in regards to the defense of the USSR. The security of that deterrent force will continue to grow as INF and force reduction measures take effect in Central Europe. That security depends on the control of the access and egress routes to the Kola naval bases, and the Svalbards and North Cape are key to that control.

- The continental shelf issues of the Barents Sea tie closely into both the security and economic policy considerations for the Soviets. First, they can not reasonably permit uncontrolled access by NATO member countries to the oil, gas and fishing resources of the region. Oil wells and fishing fleets in the Barents Sea would effectively prevent them from adequately securing their forces from either reconnaissance or attack. Second, with oil production dropping in the existing Soviet oil fields, they are going to require additional energy sources to fuel their new economic development plans.

For these two basic reasons, the Svalbard and Gray Zone issues will be high on the Soviet political priority lists. The author believes that the Soviet Union wants as a minimum a Norwegian guarantee of co-tenancy over the continental shelf region of the Barents Sea. This, in conjunction with continued Norwegian self-imposed security restriction policies, would provide them with an acceptable level of security for their forces in the Kola and access to the resources of the area.

This chapter looked at the Norwegian and NATO defense policies formed to counter Soviet agression in the Arctic region. The next chapter will detail the conclusions of this paper.

TABLE # 2 - COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR NATO FORCES IN NORTHERN EUROPE:



Notes:
1 - CINCNORTH always a British four-star general
2 - BALTAP covers Denmark and Northern Germany (North of Elbe)
3 - A national (Norwegian) command during peacetime; during war, comes under the operational control of CINCNORTH.

SOURCE: USCGSC AFNORTH resource packet distributed by the Department for Joint Operations (DJCO) in 1989.

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CHAPTER TEN

CONCLUSION

The previous chapters of this paper have detailed the material necessary to examine the research questions posed in chapter one. This chapter will conclude by listing the Soviet perception of the threat in the Arctic region, detailing the Norwegian reaction to the Soviet threat in the North Cape region and recommending changes for Norway and NATO to consider to help ensure that allied deterrence in the Arctic region will remain viable through the 1990's.

Twenty years ago, Norway was on the periphery of the force buildup in Central Europe, a low-tension portion of the continent with a low priority in the overall NATO planning process. The sweeping changes brought about by the strategic and economic issues discussed in this paper have led to the political balance of the Arctic region being dominated by the bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and Norway, a super-power versus a small state. Soviet security concerns in the North have the potential to raise the tensions between these two countries to higher levels in the coming decade, and it is unlikely, in the author's view, that the Norwegian government can respond successfully to the challenges ahead without both a toughening in the defense posture portrayed to the Soviets and an increased level of commitment of support from the NATO alliance.

Norwegian defense experts Sverre Jervell and Kare Nyblom, wrote in 1986 that the Soviet perception of NATO threats to the security of the Arctic Front could be divided into three categories:

- NATO strike forces, including strategic aircraft and missles, and aircraft carrier groups operating in the North Atlantic
- Bases and facilities in Norway that support these strike forces and provide early warning, surveillance and communication capabilities
- Conventional forces deployed in Norway and the NATO units scheduled as reinforcements 1

They go on to say that in a crisis situation, the Soviets would have to neutralize all of these assets to ensure the security of the Kola Base Complex and the Northern Fleet. It would be extremely difficult to accomplish this by air attack alone; repairs could be made in a fairly short period. For this reason it is likely that any offensive operation would be preceded by occupation of the North Cape by Soviet troops. General Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley, former CINC of Allied Forces in Northern Europe, agreed with this assessment, and listed a major Soviet concern in 1981:

> "Even if the (Northern) Fleet was by design abroad to fight from the outbreak of hostilities, its ability to maneuver in the North Atlantic and adjacent...seas, its reliance on a safe line of communication to Murmansk would be uncertain at best."2

In the event of war, Northern Norway and the Svalbard Islands would be prime military targets for offensive operations. Soviet control of the airfields in the region would provide

air cover for naval operations and to deny use of those facilities to NATO.

It is the author's view that while the Soviets would be unlikely to risk the military and political consequences of overt military operations to secure bases in the Arctic region under the current circumstances, there is a possibility that it could happen within the next ten years. As the security threat in the Kola grows due to the exploitation of the oil and gas resources in the Barents Sea, and as the Soviet requirements for energy and hard currency earnings grows, the possibility of limited Soviet offensive operations in the Arctic Front grows. Trond Gilberg, professor of Soviet studies at Pennsylvania State University, stated in 1981: "...Soviet policies are likely to be marked by greater...willingness to force favorable policy changes in the Nordic states."3 Joel Sokolsly, a political professor at Harvard, wrote in 1981: "...the Northern Flank is NATO's most vulnerable area. It is an area likely to witness increasing Soviet activity."4 And repeating Lothar Ruehl's comments from his work in 1990:

> (An attack on the North Cape of Norway from the Kola) "could be exercised by the USSR as a limited offensive aimed at securing a forward position in northern Europe and the Norwegian Sea during an international conflict short of general war... (This) contingency has been considered a distinct possibility..."5

The situation in the Arctic Front is volatile, and requires a reassessment by Norway and NATO of the existing policies and

plans for the security of northern Norway. If the first thing that the Soviets are going to do in a crisis situation is to invade Norwegian territory, are the current preparations adequate to provide a deterrent? In the author's opinion they are not, and some solutions will be addressed below.

An effective deterrence against Soviet aggression in the Arctic Front is dependent on the political resolve and the military capabilities of Norway and of NATO as perceived in Moscow. As discussed earlier in this paper, the defense of Norway is dependent on the commitment of NATO reinforcements as rapidly as possible in crisis situations; Norway could not defend alone against a Soviet invasion. In 1979, Francis West, former Director of Strategic Research at the US Naval War College, wrote that there were three scenarios that could require a NATO response to Soviet threats in the Arctic region:

- A conventional war in Europe
- An attack on Norway alone
- A Soviet threat to use force in Norway 6

In the case of an all-out war in Central Europe, it is likely that the units scheduled to reinforce Norway would be utilized for one of their other contingency missions in the central region. These units are not dedicated to Norway, and the force ratio in West Germany would most likely dictate their use there. In this situation, deterrence in the north would be based on the NATO nuclear response capability, and

the naval and air forces of STRIKFORLANT and STANAVFORLANT. It is unlikely that Norway could resist a Soviet attack for a significant length of time on their own.

In the case of a limited attack on Norway, all of the NATO units scheduled for employment in Norway would likely be deployed. Additionally, depending on the international situation, it is probable that additional air and naval assets would be made available to the CINCNORTH Commander. The key factor in this scenario is the time it would take for the Norwegian government react. If a request for military assistance was delayed for too long, forces could not reach Norway in time to be effectively employed.7

The third scenario, in the opinion of the author, is the most likely; an event that could occur within the next ten years. In this case, any NATO response would rest solely on the shoulders of the Norwegian government. Any response other than a strong demonstration of intent to involve NATO forces quickly would likely be perceived as a sign of weakness by the Soviets. Soviet threats to use force would not be made unless the military was fully prepared to back them up, and a failure by Norway to immediately request NATO assistance could precipitate Soviet actions.

In all three scenarios, the most important factor would be to deploy Alliance forces to Norway as rapidly as possible to allow them sufficient time to organize a defense. Joel

Sokolsky, a political affairs professor at Harvard University wrote in 1981:

> "The need to reinforce the Norwegian Front would arise, therefore, in advance of the outbreak of hostilities. An early and safe arrival of outside forces would serve to present the Soviets with the prospect of wider conflict."8

Based on this viewpoint, it is the author's opinion that the forces to Norway prior to hostilities:

- A trip-wire of international units that would expand the conflict beyond the Arctic Front
- A less likely chance for deploying units to be intercepted enroute to Norway
- Additional time for deploying units to organize and set up effective defensive positions
- A clear political message to the Soviets that they could not separate Norway from the NATO Alliance

As brought out in the chapter on the political issues, the Norwegian government policy is to weigh the deterrence advantages provided by NATO reinforcements against the factor of assuring the Soviets that Norway would not initiate hostile actions from Norwegian territory. The debate over when and if to request reinforcements could result in significant delays in appeals for NATO assistance. An example of this hesitancy to provoke the Soviets occurred in June 1968. The Soviets conducted a five day exercise consisting of fifty thousand troops and supporting tanks and artillery within two kilometers of the Norwegian border. Tank main guns were pointed in the direction of Norway, and airborne units were dropped in the area. Despite this provocative show of force on their border, the Norwegian

government did not initiate any procedures to request NATO support, and, in fact, appealed to the media to spike the story in the Norwegian papers.9 Incidents like this raise serious doubts that the current government policies concerning responses to Soviet threats would permit them to react in sufficient time to a real military threat. This in turn brings into question the credibility of Norwegian deterrence in the Arctic Front.

No Norwegian government can afford to be too provocative toward the Soviet Union, but, in the author's opinion, they also cannot afford to go too far in their attempts to appease the Soviets without the risk of compromising their long-term security interests. Knut Frydenlund, prior Secretary for Foreign Affairs stated in 1985: "The constant efforts to mediate the underlying conflicts between East and West must shape our long-term policy toward the Soviet Union."10 The current Secretary of State Nils Udgaard stated in 1988: "...Norway can be expected to continue a policy of seeking practical solutions to questions raised by the geographical concerns of the Soviet Union in the North."11 If these are the official positions of the Norwegian government, it seems to this author that they have carried the reassurance portion of their policies too far, to a point where they are degrading the credibility of the deterrence element of the formula.

The bottom line for the NATO deterrence policy in the Arctic Front is that any attack on Norway would be perceived as a threat to the security of all of the Alliance members. In the author's opinion, to be credible, the policy must meet two criteria. First, there must be sufficient forces available to reinforce the region in the event of a crisis, forces that are dedicated to the defense of Norway and capable of deploying in a timely manner. Second, the Soviets must have a clear perception that both Norway and NATO will be willing to request and utilize those forces without regard to Soviet responses. If these criteria are not met, then the deterrent nature of the NATO alliance is called into question and the potential for pre-emptive Soviet operations in the Arctic Front in times of political and economic crisis increases significantly.

The second criteria, a willingness to risk Soviet displeasure by requesting NATO assistance, falls on the shoulders of the Norwegian government as discussed above. The first criteria, the availability of a credible deterrent force in a timely manner, is the responsibility of NATO, a responsibility that, in the author's opinion, has not received the priority that the threat warrants. As discussed in the chapter on NATO reinforcements, there are currently no units identified within the NATO force structure that are dedicated to deploy to Norway in wartime situations. Negotiations for one battalion task force with supporting

artillery battalions is under way, but this force would have minimal impact on the defensive situation even if it is finally approved.

In the author's opinion, two main factors are influencing an increase in the strategic importance of the Arctic Front at the same time as tensions are being reduced in Central Europe. First, as the Soviets reduce their conventional forces, their national security posture is increasingly tied to the threat of nuclear retaliation. The smaller the Soviet force structure, the more important are the missles of the Northern Fleets SSBNs and the more concerned they become about their security. Second, the Soviets are struggling to improve the efficiency of their economy at a time when their oil reserves, their primary source of hard currency, are dwindling. As Gorbachev's economic revitalization plans advance, the oil and gas deposits in the Barents Sea region will become progressively more critical to economic security.

As the strategic value of the Arctic Front increases for the Soviets, the risks involved in assuring the security of that region by occupying the surrounding coasts might become acceptable to the political decision makers. As the risks in the area increase for the West, NATO needs to reevaluate their military commitment to ensure that there is sufficient deterrence against such a Soviet occupation. In the author's opinion, the following suggestions concerning NATO security

policies in the Arctic region should be studied by both Norwegian and NATO defense planners:

- Streamline the decision mechanism for requesting and deploying forces
- Affirm the willingness of the Norwegian government to request NATO assistance in any crisis situation
- Consider the permanent stationing of a small NATO force in northern Norway
- Create a dedicated NATO force of sufficient size to provide a viable defense in Norway
- Increase the number of air units that reinforce Norway
- Conduct large-scale, multi-national exercises in Norway on a more regular basis
- Establish a permanent NATO naval presence in the Norwegian Sea
- Consider increasing the number of Norwegian troops assigned to the Finnmark region
- Increase the amount of pre-positioned material in Norway
- Consider invoking the Svalbard Treaty as a means to increase the presence of US interests in the area

At present neither the Soviet Union or the United States has opted for a defensive strategy that entails the out-right control of the North Atlantic Ocean region; both sides hold to a policy of command denial. As the value of the Arctic region increases for the Soviets and as their security concerns rise in conjunction with this increase in value, these policies may change. If they do, the first offensive move by the Soviets would likely be the occupation of Norway's North Cape and Svalbard Islands.

To provide the degree of military deterrence necessary to prevent such a Soviet offensive action, Norway and NATO must upgrade their defensive posture in the Arctic region. This upgrade should include a relaxation of current Norwegian

unilateral decisions regarding NATO unit deployments and the designation of dedicated NATO units to reinforce Norway during crisis periods.

ENDNOTES

1 Sverre Jervell and Kare Nyblom, The Military Buildup in the High North, (1986): 30, Harvard University Center for International Affairs.

2 General Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley, "Defense in the Higher Latitudes", NATO's Sixteen Nations, vol 26, nr 2, (1981): 19.

3 Gilberg, Osborn, Taylor and Fairlamb, "The Soviet Union and Northern Europe", Problems of Communism, nr 2,(1981): 24.

4 Joel Sokolsky, "Soviet Naval Aviation and the Northern Flank: Its Military and Political Implications", Naval War College Review, vol 34, nr 1, (1981): 35.

5 Lothar Ruehl, "NATO Strategy and the Neutrals", in Richard Bissell and Curt Gasteyger, ed., The Missing Link: West European Neutrals and Regional Security, (1990): 127.

6 F.J. West Jr., "US Naval Forces and the Northern Flank of NATO", Naval War College Review, vol 32, nr 4, (1979): 15.

7 Sokolsky, (1981): 36.

8 Kirsten Amundsen, "Norway NATO and the Forgotten Soviet Challenge", Policy Papers in International Affairs, (1981): 36, Institute of International Studies.

9 Walter Goldstein, Clash in the North - Polar Summitry and NATO's Northern Flank, (1988): 29.

10 Ibid.: 159.

11 Ibid.: 154

APPENDIX A

LITERATURE REVIEW

Archer, Clive, Deterrence and Reassurance in Northern Europe, Aberdeen, Centre for Defensive Studies, 1983.

A series of articles presented at the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) in Stockholm, 1984. The articles are broken into four sections. The first addresses security configurations in the Nordic Region. The security in the region is based on the policies of the Scandinavian countries characterized by the term 'Nordic Balance'. It explains the elements of deterrence of potential attackers and reassurance of adversaries, and addresses the concerns of countries over the nuclear policies of NATO. Early proposals for NNWFZ is the topic covered by the second section. The third deals with the 1983 proposals from the various parties throughout Scandinavia and what changes have occurred in political responses. The final section covers a comparison of the proposals questioning if they can produce a viable nuclear-free zone and would such a zone enhance Scandinavian security. This section concludes that the establishment of a NNWFZ separate from a European-wide nuclear weapons agreement would upset the balance between deterrence and reassurance and is therefore not in the interest of the Scandinavian countries.

Archer, Clive and Scrivener, David, ed., Northern Waters, Security and Resource Issues, Ottawa, Barnes and Noble Books, 1986.

This is a compilation of articles from the Northern Waters Study Group, an organization established by the Scottish Branch of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Its purpose is to examine the interrelationships of security, resources and jurisdictional issues in the sea area stretching from Canada to Norway and the Barents Sea. The first article deals with the Law of the Sea Convention, which sets the international legal parameters for ocean areas, and how this convention might affect the legal status of the northern seas and oceans. The second article lists the resources of the area and the current proposals for sharing and exploiting them. The third article goes into detail on the transportation of these resources through the region and describes specific shipping requirements. Naval strategies of the Warsaw Pact and NATO is the topic of the fourth article while the fifth discusses the impact of new military technology and evaluates the rate at which hostilities or conflict could develop. The sixth covers the potential for conflict and how it might be controlled by political means. It also evaluates the chances for peaceful coexistence. The remaining eight articles provide country profiles that outline the interests, security postures and the resource exploitation positions of the concerned nations.

Bitzinger, Richard A., Competing Security Doctrines and a Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone, Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, 1988.

Primarily concerned with the historic background of the Nordic NNWFZ, this article presents the Scandinavian and Superpower positions on NNWFZ in a country-by-country analysis. It discusses the relation between NNWFZ and security issues and the increase in strategic importance of the Kola peninsula. The conclusion is that the progress on the establishment of a NNWFZ has been minimal. The point is made that the process of working together toward NNWFZ strengthens ties between the Scandinavian countries.

Bjol, Erling, Nordic Security, London, Carlton Berry Co.LTD, 1983.

This geographic overview includes a section on Soviet post-war policy detailing the status of Finland and the historical background that led to the term Finlandization. It discusses in detail security policies and postures of Finland, Sweden and Norway with less detail on Greenland and Iceland. Also discussed is the growing impact of Soviet build-up on the Kola peninsula. It spends even more time on the developing situation in Denmark, including an historical background and the perceptions and attitudes of the Danish population. Concluding with a discussion of Soviet political pressure and

the outlook for the future, the author sees the Norwegian coast as an important strategic area in the coming years.

Chapman, Keith, North Sea Oil and Gas, North Pomfret, David and Charles, Inc., 1976.

Three of the chapters of this book relate to the economic issues of my topic. In Chapter One, the author discusses the economic, political and legal environments of the North Sea oil fields from an historical aspect. He relates the impact that the North Sea oil fields have on the oil production in the Middle East and Libya, and discusses how the International Law of the Sea applies to the situation. In Chapter Three, he expands on the international issues and discusses the agreements between the nations that claim parts of the North Sea resources. In the final chapter, Chapter Six, he details the utilization of the oil resources and the strategies of the major oil companies.

Cole, Paul M. and Hart, Douglas M., Northern Europe: Security Issues for the 1990's, Boulder, Westview Press, 1986.

This is a series of articles that cover a reassessment of the security environment in Northern Europe, emphasizing the growing strategic importance of the Nordic area and the build-up of the Kola peninsula. The first introduces the key issues in the Nordic region, including the Finnish peninsula,

Baltic exits, Norwegian coast and a quick overview of the security policies of each of the Scandinavian countries. Swedish defense/political policies in relation to the Soviet Union are the subject of the second article. It discusses Sweden's Armed neutrality and the impact of the Soviet build-up. Vulnerabilities of the Swedish defense structure are also listed. The third details the rapid growth of the Soviet northern fleet and the security problems this causes in NATO, and specifically Great Britain. The author concludes that the large degree of risk posed by the Soviet fleet has not been properly addressed by NATO planners. West Germany's contributions to the defense of Northern Europe is the topic of the fourth article. It presents the strategic importance of Scandinavia to the Defense of NATO and gives an overview of NATO's organization and assets for the defense of the region. The author concludes that for NATO to continue as an effective deterrent to war, the Nordic countries must demonstrate support for the organization. The next article is about both security and energy issues in Norway. It details the oil and gas resources in the region and the legal issues that have been raised about their exploitation. The authors discuss possible Soviet military operations in the region and the appropriate NATO responses that should be planned for. The sixth article covers the emerging deep strike technologies, the new long-range precision weapons

systems being developed, and the impact they will have on the Nordic region. It discusses the utilization of these weapons by both Warsaw Pact and NATO, and concludes that Norwegian defenses are vulnerable to Warsaw Pact attack, while NATO assets in the region are scarce. The final article presents the build-up of Soviet forces in the region, discusses the submarine incidents and addresses political issues.

Critchley, Julian, The North Atlantic and the Soviet Union in the 1980's, Hong Kong, Macmillan Press, 1982.

The author looks at the probable security relationships between the Soviet Union and NATO in the 1980's. He begins with an overview of the political and military developments of the Soviet Union and NATO, including strategies, strengths and policies, and concludes with a detailed look at Great Britain's defense problems. Chapters Nine and Ten, which cover the prospects of Soviet force projection and the use of propaganda as policy, will be especially helpful in this research.

DeLeon, Peter, Emerging Security Considerations for NATO's Northern Flank, Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, 1984.

The main concept of this paper is that the increasing importance of the Nordic region is strictly due to external forces and events, that there have been no significant

changes within the region that have contributed to the growing attention the region is experiencing. These external conditions include the expansion of strategic forces in the Kola, the potential for conflict in the central region in Europe, the continued US-Soviet hostilities, the conventional and protracted warfare doctrines of both sides and the INF controversy. The author concludes that the renewed emphasis on the northern flank is not likely to abate significantly, and that the US must pay greater attention to the political and military aspects of the region.

Goldstein, Walter, ed., Clash in the North, London, Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1988.

A collection of articles that focuses on the confrontation of the Warsaw Pact and Nato security alliances in Northern Europe. Two common themes of the collection are stressed in the various papers; that the US and the Soviet Union are the dominant actors in a European scenario, and that the current easing of tensions in Central Europe tend to focus increased attention on the Northern Flank. The articles present both historical and projected views of political and military relations, both between the two major alliances and within the NATO alliance. They detail some of the security issues in the north, address the military balance, and the book concludes with an analysis of how to judge the Soviet threat to the region.

Hagard, John, Nordic Security, New York, Westview Press, 1987.

The author details the individual security policies of Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland, and then addresses some of the common interests and collaborations. He provides an historical look at the trends and challenges faced by the region between 1962 and 1987 and lists some of the reasons for the increasing strategic importance of the north. He looks at the political moves toward an NNWFZ and concludes that there will be additional pressures and threats to the stability of the region.

Hansen, Lynn M., Soviet Navy SPETSNAZ Operations on the Northern Flank: Implications for the Defense of Western Europe, College Station, Texas A&M University System, 1984.

A detailed examination of the numerous Soviet submarine incidents in Sweden and Norway in the 1980-1983 time frame. The author starts with a brief review of the incidents, and lists the organization of SPETSNAZ forces and capabilities of the mini-submarines. She presents reviews of the sequence of events for the major incidents, and then speculates as to the reasons for the incursions. She concludes that the activities were coordinated at the highest military and governmental levels in an attempt to prevent the western alliance from exercising a first strike nuclear option.

Jervell, Sverre, and Nyblom, Kare, ed., The Military Buildup in the High North, Lanham, University Press of America, 1986.

The basic theme of this collection of articles is that common security challenges confront the five nations in northern Europe that require to some degree a joint response. Problems continue to escalate with the buildup of Soviet forces in Kola and the enhanced strategic importance of the northern Atlantic and Barents Sea. The first article looks at US strategy in the region and the coalition approach of NATO. The second assesses the Soviet naval expansion of the Northern Fleet and details the current force structure. The third paper delineates the US naval response to this buildup. The author lists two vital factors he feels could lead to a confrontation; Soviet considerations for the defense of the SSBN fleet and the perception that whoever is on the offense has the advantage. The fourth article looks at the Soviet motives for the force buildup in the north and lists some of the handicaps that they would operate under if war broke out. Other papers include a review of the Swedish efforts to maintain the Nordic Balance, the political pressures on Norway and the security perspectives of Finland and Denmark.

Kintner, William R., Soviet Global Strategy, Fairfax, Hero Books, 1987.

A presentation of Soviet strategy and how their growing

military strength has permitted them to project their power throughout the world. It traces the development of long term strategy, and details their efforts to expand their influence world-wide. The author concludes with a discussion on the strategic options available to the Soviets for the 1990s.

Leitenberg, Milton, Soviet Submarine Operations in Swedish Waters 1980-1986, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1987.

A review of the political dilemma in Sweden caused by the Soviet submarine incidents. The author compares the public statements of the Swedish politicians with the actual rules of engagement that severely hampered naval operations, and concludes the government would likely have done almost anything to avoid a confrontation with the Soviet Union. The book starts with a compilation of similar activities world-wide and then goes into a full presentation of evidence for the incidents in Sweden year by year from 1980-1986. Next, the author analyzes the Swedish response to the submarine operations and the Soviet reaction to those responses. He looks at the motives behind the incursions, which reached a level of 40-60 each year. He concludes that the Swedish government's policy of restraint and the failure to provide the information that proved Soviet implication was a detriment to the international community.

Lindahl, Ingemar, The Soviet Union and the Nordic Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone Proposal, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1988.

An analysis of the reasons the Soviet Union has been consistently pushing the NNWFZ proposal for over twenty-five years even though there are no nuclear weapons in any of the Scandinavian countries. The author begins with a look at the Scandinavian culture and public opinion on nuclear issues. He then looks at the security issues in the region, including the Nordic Balance and the Soviet view of Nordic neutrality. Next is a discussion of the numerous NNWFZ proposals, including the Unden and Kekkonen plans, with emphasis on the Soviet initiatives and political pressures. The author concludes that the objective of the proposals is to totally eliminate the risk of nuclear war, but that the sheer number and increasing technological upgrades of the weapon systems makes this impossible.

Mottola, Kari, ed., The Arctic Challenge, Boulder, West View Press, 1988.

A selection of articles from scholars of the five Nordic countries that discuss the impact that the Super Power confrontation in the Arctic region is having on the security interests of the Scandinavian countries. The editors attempt to portray that the Nordic nations have to work together to

solve the security and economic issues that will arise as the significance of the Arctic increases. The articles include examinations of the defense policies and priorities in the region, the implications of the Soviet force buildup, strategic and economic significance of the area and several looks at the de-nuclearization issues.

Orvik, Nils, ed., Scandinavian Security: Challenge and Response, Kingston, Queens University, 1978.

Four papers that detail the security issues facing Finland, Denmark and Norway. Special attention is paid to the Soviet interests in the area. The final article will be the most useful to this study. It discusses the Norwegian security and economic issues in the Barents Sea area. The author concludes with a warning that the Norwegians cannot wish away the defense risks that have developed and that more is required in the way of defense spending.

Ries, Thomas, and Skorve, Johnny, Investigating Kola, A Study of Military Bases Using Satellite Photography, New York, Brassey's Defense Publishers, 1987.

A visual display of the Soviet military complex on the Kola Peninsula. The book begins with an overview of the military command structure and force organization in the Kola region. The authors discuss the mission, operational boundaries and

the impact that they have on defense in the north. They examine the rationales for deploying these forces so far to the north, which revolve mainly around the strategic missions of the air and naval units. The authors state that their report was not intended to draw conclusions, but to provide the information necessary for conducting analysis of the Soviet interests in the region. The imagery presented is too small in scale to determine any interesting features, but the book does have valuable organizational data.

Terry, James G., A-10 Operation and the Battle for North Norway, Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, 1988.

A look at the possibility of supporting Northern Norway with Alaskan based A-10s in time of war. The Norwegian non-basing policy makes it difficult for Allied air forces to provide support to the northern regions. The author suggests that one way to provide CAS support is to utilize the A-10 wing stationed at Eielson AFB in Alaska, that trains for similar missions in the same weather and terrain conditions. He concludes that this is a viable option that should receive consideration.

Till, Geoffrey, ed., Britain and NATOs Northern Flank, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1988.

An overview of the security issues in the northern flank region, including US and Soviet policies in the area, and a

look at British concerns. Defense issues are broken into land and sea operations, and it concludes with a look at some of the options available to Great Britain.

Ulstein, Egil, Nordic Security, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971.

A review of the Nordic Balance established between 1945 and 1970. The author discusses Soviet interests and the prospects for change in the area. The article may provide some data of historical significance.

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