COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF UNITED FRONT

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by
ROLANDO C. GARCIA, LT.COL., PC
B.S., Philippine Military Academy, 1971
MM, Asian Institute of Management, 1984

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1990

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# The Communist Party of the Philippines: Theory and Practice of United Front

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**ABSTRACT:**
The thesis is a study and analysis of the united front activities of the Communist Party of the Philippines to include its evolution, theories, strategies, practices, and current state. The CPP organizations for united front work, both locally and internationally, are presented.

**SUBJECT TERMS:**
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES THEORY AND PRACTICE OF UNITED FRONT by Lt. Colonel Rolando C. Garcia
Philippine Constabulary, 166 pages

This study is an investigation and analysis of the united front (UF) theories and practices of the Communist Party of the Philippines as these impact on the Philippine insurgency. The research hypothesis is that united front building is as vital a component of the CPP strategy as is the armed struggle being waged by the insurgency movement.

This study profiles the nature and extent of united front work by the CPP; the ideological and practical bases of the strategy; the basic concepts and theories associated with it; the organizational and operational manifestation of such concepts and theories; and the current situation of CPP united front building. The study further examines the role united front building plays in the furtherance of the revolutionary struggle of the CPP/NPA/NDF that has become an increasingly formidable politico-military force that can present a credible challenge to the continued existence of a democratic Republic of the Philippines.

Among the conclusions that could be drawn from the study are: that united front work is a mature CPP strategy for insurgency that is based on sound doctrinal and practical foundations; that united front building is complementary to the armed strategy for insurgency; that the probability of CPP victory is greatly enhanced by its success at UF building; that CPP UF work involves an intricate web of overt and covert organizations all working for the furtherance of the CPP insurgency struggle; and that the spread and depth of CPP UF work has reached alarming proportions. The study further concludes that there is a need to reassess government response to this growing menace.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

| APPROVAL PAGE | ii |
| ABSTRACT | iii |
| ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS | iv |
| GLOSSARY | viii |

## CHAPTER

### I INTRODUCTION
- Introduction | 1
- Research Question | 4
- Background | 5
- Limitations and Delimitations | 11

### II REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
- Review of Literature | 14
- Research Methodology | 19

### III CPP THEORY OF UNITED FRONT
- Theoretical Basis of CPP United Front | 21
- Basic Concepts Related to UF | 22
- Class | 24
- UF Within One Class | 30
- UF Among Different Classes | 32
- Political Line | 37
- UF Against a Common Target | 41
- UF Around a Common Political Strategy | 42
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Related Concepts</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organizational Line</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UF From Below</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UF From Above</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independence and Initiative</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>UF IN EARLIER PHILIPPINE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UF Against Spanish Colonialism</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UF Against U.S. Colonialism</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UF Efforts of the PKP</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>CPP UNITED FRONT STRATEGY AND PRACTICE</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Formulation of Political Line</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CPP Policies in UF work</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NDF Twelve Point Program</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CPP Activities in UF Building</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peasant Organizing Work</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UF Work Among the Proletariat</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban Poor</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UF Work Among the Middle Forces</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The National United Front</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evolution of the NDF</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GLOSSARY

Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) - includes the four major branches of service of the Philippine military establishment namely the Army, Navy, Air Force and the Constabulary.

Barangay - the smallest unit or subdivision of society and government in the Philippines. It is basically a small village administered through an elected set of barangay officials. A barangay can be either rural or urban. It was formerly called a barrio.

Bureaucratic Capitalist - those whose economic interests are tied up with the control of governmental positions as sources of capital and economic gain. Also called crony capitalists to denote relationships with the ruling government elite.

Class - social and economic stratification of society where people are grouped according to the place they occupy in an existing system of production, their degree of ownership of the means, and their respective share in the fruits of production.

Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) - the active Marxist party in the Philippines. It was founded in 1968 by a splinter group of the then active Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas. The CPP adopts the Maoist philosophy and strategy of protracted war.

Comprador Bourgeoisie - those who own or control the primary means of industrial production whose wealth is derived from its exploitation of labor and profits from its control over the economic activity of a country.

Counterinsurgency (COIN) - the political, social, civic and military policies of a government designed to defeat an insurgency.

Insurgency - a struggle by an organized group to overthrow a duly constituted government and its systems through the conduct of a combination of political, organizational, and military activities.

Landlord class - composed of owners of vast tracts of land who do not engage in essential agricultural labor and instead, derive benefits from the land through the exploitation of tenants that work their land.
Middle Forces - those classes or individuals who adopt an ambivalent view of the CPP revolutionary struggle. The support of these uncommitted elements of society is vigorously solicited by the CPP as it views the support of and active participation in the struggle by these middle forces as critical in shifting the balance of political forces in favor of the CPP.

Motive Forces - those classes or individuals who are expected to support or actively participate in the CPP revolutionary struggle.

National Bourgeoisie - those local capitalists who use indigenous capital in business activities that range from small scale cottage industries and light manufacturing to intermediate industries that are highly dependent on imported raw materials.

National Democratic Front - the CPP sponsored united front organization that is being projected as a broad based coalition of all democratic and nationalist opposition forces in the Philippines.

National Democratic Revolution - the term used by the CPP to describe the revolutionary struggle it currently wages. To the CPP, this means the seizure of state power to assert national sovereignty over the imperialist influence of the U.S. and other countries, the fulfillment of the peasant's struggle for land ownership, and the upholding of the democratic rights of the masses against the oppressive rule of the economic and political elite.

National United Front (NUF) - the alliance among all the nationalist and democratic forces against the forces of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism.

New People's Army (NPA) - the military arm of the CPP.

Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) - the Soviet oriented communist party in the Philippines that spawned the CPP. While politically, organizationally and militarily inactive, the PKP continues to be recognized by the pro-USSR communist bloc as the representative communist party of the Philippines.

Peasants - those who own no land or small parcels of land and are engaged in agricultural labor. The CPP classifies the peasants into rich, middle and lower peasants. Such subdivision is based on ownership of land and other means of agrarian production.
Petty Bourgeoisie - the lowest stratum of the bourgeoisie composed of those engaged in small scale economic activity and characterized by its relative economic self-sufficiency accruing from ownership of small amounts of productive means, or the possession and practice of special training and skills. They compose the bulk of the bourgeoisie.

Proletariat - refers primarily to workers engaged in industrial production and other wage earners who do not own any of the means of production and must sell their labor power for economic gain.

Political line - in the context of the CPP struggle, refers to the party propaganda line that is propagated to unite the various classes of Philippine society to support or actively participate in the CPP struggle. The CPP political line is described as anti-feudal, anti-imperialist and anti-bureaucratic capitalist.

Rural Proletariat - those rural-based workers who, while not tenants, are engaged in agricultural production activities. Among these are migratory seasonal workers who are contracted to work the fields as the need for them arises. There are no tenancy relationships between these workers and the landowners. To the CPP, this sector of the proletariat is the most oppressed and economically exploited group of workers.

Target Forces - those classes or individuals who are expected to oppose the CPP revolutionary struggle. Prominent among these forces are the landlords, big bourgeoisie and bureaucratic capitalists.

Urban Poor - those low income urban-based elements of Philippine society who are mainly found in blighted urban communities. They do not have steady sources of income but may be employed in sporadic occupations and trades. Though neither peasants nor proletariat, the urban poor suffer from the same social, economic and political maladies that hound peasants and workers.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

In the late 1960's, young cadre from the militant student sector were recruited into the Partido Kommunista ng Pilipinas (PKP). The PKP was the active Philippine communist party that developed out of the agrarian reform and urban socialist movement of the 1920's and 30's. After almost forty years of struggle, the PKP and its military arm, the Hukbong Magpapalaya ng Bayan (HMB) or National Liberation Army, had not been able to gain any political power. Exposed mainly to doctrinal Marxist-Leninist ideas, these young cadre possessed no practical experience in the conduct of a revolutionary struggle. Thus, they began to look at the failure of the PKP on the basis of what they perceived to be basic PKP ideological, organizational, and political mistakes. They had also become increasingly dissatisfied and critical of the PKP leadership.

Meanwhile, a parallel development was occurring in the Central Luzon countryside. A group of HMB fighters led by Bernabe Buscayno, also known as Commander Dante, had also become dissatisfied with the corrupt and anti-people activities of the HMB. The HMB had by then degenerated into nothing more than an armed band engaged in criminal activities. Dante attributed this sad state of the HMB
to the greed and corruption of the HMB high command, particularly to that of HMB Supremo Faustino Del Mundo, a.k.a. Comdr Sumulong.\(^1\)

These twin developments resulted in the convergence of the aspirations of the more radical and progressive elements in both the PKP and the HMB. Contacts between these dissatisfied cadre and guerillas were initiated. Out of these initial contacts and subsequent informal meetings between these two groups came the realization that only in repudiating the PKP and establishing a new Marxist-Leninist party could an effectual people's democratic revolution be launched. It was also decided that, to wage the people's protracted war, a people's army had to be organized.\(^2\)

Thus, on 26 December 1968, a group of young PKP cadre led by Jose Ma. Sison, who assumed the *nom de guerre* Amado Guerrero, and HMB peasant fighters, led by Buscayno, met in a village in Capas, Tarlac. In meetings that lasted until 7 January 1969, these urban radicals and battle scarred HMB guerillas drew up the documents that declared the formal organization of the "re-established" Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).\(^3\)

Thus was born the CPP. Sison was designated CPP Party Chairman and Buscayno, Commander-in-Chief of the New People's Army that was to be formally organized on 28 March 1969. This was the birth of the insurgency that, after more than two decades, continues to pose a potent
threat to Philippine society. From this humble birth, the CPP/NPA has evolved into a formidable politico-military force that has become the most serious and increasingly credible threat to the continued existence of a free and democratic Philippines.

In *Rectify Errors And Rebuild the Party*, a basic CPP document drawn up and approved in the December 1968 founding congress of the CPP, the Party declared its three basic tasks to be: Party building; Armed struggle; and United Front building. The ideological basis of this is the Maoist dictum that says "...A well disciplined Party, armed with the theory of Marxism-Leninism, using the method of self criticism and linked with the masses of the people; an Army under the leadership of such a party; a United Front of all revolutionary classes and revolutionary groups under the leadership of such a party--these are the main weapons with which to defeat the enemy...". (4) This basic doctrine is represented organizationally by the CPP (party), the NPA (army) and National Democratic Front-NDF (united front).

This being the case, it would be reasonable to conclude that the Philippine government and all its instrumentalities, notably its Armed Forces, are aware of the threat posed by all the organs of the communist-led insurgency. However, the focus of government concern has always been the NPA and the armed struggle. The covert
organizational struggle being waged by the CPP through the NDF is given only cursory attention. This inattention could lead to a serious erroneous assessment of the Philippine insurgency situation.

The roles of the CPP and NPA in the communist insurgency in the Philippines are well studied subjects. They are the more visible organs of the struggle. They have been, and continue to be, the focus of attention. Perhaps this is so because of the higher state of development of these two organs and the high visibility and impact of their activities. For whatever reason, the CPP and NPA share the limelight within the insurgency scenario in the Philippines.

The development of the broad united front under the NDF was last to occur. It arose out of the necessity for mass popular support for the revolutionary struggle being waged by the CPP. It was not only ideologically necessary but, perhaps more importantly, operationally expedient for the CPP to develop a united front led and controlled by the Party.

Research Question

The CPP/NPA, being the more visible organs of the insurgency, have been the subjects of exhaustive studies. The wealth of knowledge on them is significant. On the other hand, the NDF remains largely unstudied and has not
received the attention it rightfully deserves. It is the intention of this thesis to help redress this potentially disastrous imbalance and clarify the crucial role of the united front activities of the CPP in its struggle to seize Philippine state power and effect the socialist transformation of Philippine society. Specifically, this thesis will seek to answer the primary question "What is the nature and extent of the united front activities of the Communist Party of the Philippines and its effects on the contemporary Philippine insurgency?".

In answering this primary question, it will be necessary to examine and establish the following:

1. CPP theory of united front
2. Role of the NDF in united front building
3. CPP/NDF united front strategies and practices
4. Current thrusts and situation of CPP/NDF united front work.

Background

The seriousness of the threat posed by the CPP on the security of the Philippines has been traditionally gauged according to the state of the armed struggle being waged by the NPA. The effectiveness of government counter insurgency (COIN) programs and strategies is determined mainly by the quantifiable aspects of the struggle such as insurgent kills/captures/surrenders, firearms gains and
losses, number of insurgent-related violent incidents and similar criteria. The insurgency is being assessed based on the criminogenic statistics it generates. It has been reduced to a simple law and order problem which could be solved by traditional pacification campaigns. The focus is on the symptoms rather than on the roots of the insurgency.

Figures released by official sources indicate a steady progress by government counterinsurgency programs. Indeed, campaigns conducted against the armed component of the insurgency project a workable COIN program. But the armed component, visible and important as it is, composes merely the proverbial tip of the insurgency iceberg. Set aside and overlooked is the web of covert organized mass, intricately linked in a complex organizational structure, that provides support not only to the armed struggle but to the political struggle as well. This is the unaddressed aspect of the Philippine insurgency.

The spread and depth of the insurgency cannot be gauged solely on the intensity of armed conflict. The insurgency must be viewed in the context of the broad spectrum of the politico-military conflict. It is necessary to view the insurgency on the basis of its ideological bases, its theories, and strategies. The organizational complexities and operating systems involved need to be understood. The insurgents’ visions and the alternative society they offer need to be determined and
examined. Only through such a scrutiny and understanding can an accurate assessment of the insurgency be made and a viable COIN program developed.

In its early years, the CPP focused its attention on party building and the armed struggle. As the depth and breath of party and army activities became more complex both socially and geographically, a broad united front, that could provide channels for party propaganda and cover for party cadre and underground organizations to reach and influence the various classes and sectors of society, become an operational necessity. The generation of popular mass support for the struggle made imperative a broad united front under the control of, and subject to, the machinations of the party.

Tasked to forge a broad alliance among the various progressive and nationalist groups was the National United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP and its operating organ the National Democratic Front (NDF). The CPP views the NDF as a powerful instrument in expanding the influence of the party and convincing the masses to unite, support, or actively participate in the revolutionary struggle being waged. (5)

More specifically, the CPP looks at the NDF as indispensable in laying down the groundwork for the national united front which will serve as the seed that will provide the initial organizational framework in
preparation for the post-revolution national coalition government. Hence, the CPP designed the NDF such that it will be able to forge political unity among the masses and, in the process, tilt the balance of political forces in its favor. The CPP also sees the NDF as a rich pool of highly politicized cadre that can be fielded within the existing government bureaucracy to pursue party programs and achieve party purposes. These cadre will eventually compose the core of government administrators in the post-revolutionary people’s democratic government. (6)

The importance of united front building can be further appreciated by considering its role in overcoming the perceived limitations usually pointed out as why a Marxist struggle cannot succeed in the Philippines. One explanation usually cited for the improbability of CPP success is that its ideology, Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse Tung Thought (MTT), is foreign and therefore unacceptable to the majority of Filipinos. Consequently, it is expected that the CPP would be unable to recruit as many members as it would like. Thus, the Communist Party will be unable to grow organizationally large enough to gain political power through peaceful means. Given these two factors of lack of popular acceptance of its ideology and small organizational strength, the CPP can only hope to impose its ideology on the Filipinos by seizing political power through armed struggle then force its ideology on the people. (7)
It might come as a surprise that the CPP would agree to the premises of such a view. The Party accepts that its ideology cannot yet be expected to find general acceptance among the Filipinos. However, this is not because it is foreign. It is because Marxism is the ideology of the proletariat and the majority of Filipinos belong to classes other than the proletariat. The Party also believes that Marxism is an advanced ideology that only the more class conscious proletariat adopt, along with those members of the other classes, such as peasants and bourgeoisie, who change their class standpoint and identify themselves with the proletariat. The CPP realizes that membership in the Party will remain relatively small because of the limited acceptability of its ideology. At the same time, the CPP believes that it can gain leadership over the majority of Filipinos and come to power with popular support. This is to be achieved through the employment of Party united front activities. (8)

Instead of directly propagating its ideology and seeking its acceptance by the majority of the population (something the CPP still considers to be impossible), the CPP propagates a political line that enjoys widespread acceptability among Filipinos. The Party calls this the national democratic political line. This is a political line that is projected as anti-feudalist, anti-imperialist, and anti-bureaucratic capitalist. This political line
evolved out of the CPP’s analysis of Philippine society and its application of Marxist theory to concrete Philippine situations. It does not demand the acceptance of Marxism for it to be acceptable. This is what the CPP seeks to propagate among the Filipinos and what it believes to be acceptable to them. This political line can best be described as one that seeks to unite the diverse classes within Philippine society. (9)

The second employment of united front is in organization. Party membership remains small because the CPP maintains the standard of accepting only those who adopt the Marxist ideology. Thus, the CPP can only hope to expand its organizational strength and influence by setting up or encouraging the setting up united front organizations influenced or controlled by the CPP. These organizations are united not on the basis of ideology, but on the basis of the national democratic political line. Such united front organizations then become the conduits through which the CPP can influence and mobilize the majority of the population. (10)

The CPP also wages the armed struggle along the lines of a united front. The New People’s Army (NPA) is incontestibly Party-led. However, it is not united on the basis of ideology. It is a united front organization that has drawn into its ranks not only communists, or the class conscious proletariat, but also members of other classes.
like the peasantry and petty bourgeoisie. In fact, most members of the NPA are peasants who are not communists at all. The political line that unites the members of the NPA is the CPP national democratic political line.\(^{(11)}\)

From these considerations, it would be impossible to accurately assess the true state of insurgency and its potential for success without taking united front building into account. Worse, there is danger of underestimating the insurgents' organizational and political influence. This could lead to a potentially disastrous false sense of national security.

Limitations and Delimitations

The availability of material treating the matter of united front activities of the CPP is very limited. Thus, most of the information upon which this paper is based were culled from CPP publications and official Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) reports that result from the analysis of captured CPP documents and computer diskettes and made available to the author. The identity of most of the sources are withheld due to security considerations but may be revealed with the clearance of AFP authorities.

Additionally, in preparing this thesis, I relied heavily on my knowledge on CPP united front activities. In my earlier stint as Chief, Operations Branch, Philippine Constabulary Intelligence Division, I was privy to certain
sensitive information regarding united front activities of the CPP. I also had the chance to have direct personal association with very high ranking CPP elements who, covertly or overtly, surrendered to the Philippine Constabulary and have since been reprojected back into the CPP to work in support of government COIN programs. The information derived from discussions and planning sessions with these erstwhile CPP cadre comprise the bulk of my knowledge of CPP united front activities.

Finally, should there be changes in the insurgency situation and/or government policy vis-a-vis the CPP that will render the premises of this thesis inapplicable, this thesis will be completed on the basis of the situation prevailing as of 1 June 1989.
NOTES

1. Revelations of Benjamin Bie @ Comdr Melody, an NPA guerilla who was part of the initial group of group of HMB fighters who joined Bernabe Buscayno @ Comdr Dante in affiliating with Sison in 1968. Bie subsequently surrendered to government forces in 1971 and helped in COIN operations in Central Luzon. He was later killed in an ambush staged by his former comrades.

2. Benjamin Bie @ Comdr Melody

3. Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party, Founding document of the CPP drafted and ratified during its Founding Congress in December 1968 p.1

4. ibid., sec. V, para A-10

5. Intelligence Service, Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP), The Re-established Communist Party of the Philippines (Quezon City: ISAFP,1986) p. 201

6. ibid., p. 211

7. Revelations of a former Central Committee member of the CPP who is presently active in AFP COIN operations directed against CPP united front work.

8. Former Central Committee member

9. Grasp the Principles of Revolutionary Mass Movements, a CPP publication of January 1978, p. 36

10. ibid., pp. 35-36

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Review of Literature

I will discuss the existing literature on the topic of this thesis in the context of the limitations imposed by the premises upon which this thesis is based and the nature of the topic itself.

My primary motivation in writing this thesis is the almost exclusive attention given by Philippine government authorities to the armed component of the CPP insurgency. Having been involved in my country's counterinsurgency effort for the most part of my nineteen-year career as an Officer of the Philippine Constabulary, I have become keenly aware of this disturbing development. The military hierarchy have become overly obsessed with the physical results of COIN operations. Conveniently set aside is the political component of the communist insurgency. Lacking the visibility and vibrance of the armed struggle, the political struggle became the concern of only a handful of Officers and men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Even the civilian leadership seem to be unaware, or worse, unmindful of the impact the political struggle has on the overall insurgency scenario. Thus, the political struggle became the neglected component of the struggle.
This being the case, very little had been written about the political aspect of the CPP insurgency. Most of the literature concerning the topic are those that have been written by AFP intelligence agencies. The materials written by these agencies are mainly reports on the analysis and interpretation of captured CPP documents.

The CPP itself is the main source of information. Party publications such as position papers, training and orientation manuals, memoranda and directives, intra-Party correspondence and reports comprise the bulk of literature treating the topic of this thesis. Hence, most of the information presented in this thesis come from primary, albeit uncirculated, CPP sources.

An additional limitation imposed on the research for literary sources for this thesis is the fact that most of these works are available only in the Philippines, and then again, are of limited access. Thus, I had to rely on whatever manuscripts I had been able to bring along when I came to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. This limitation is somewhat compensated by my first hand knowledge and understanding of united front acquired in my direct involvement in matters related to the thesis topic. Hence, I am confident that the information available to me is adequate for the purposes of this thesis and that I can maintain a balanced perspective in the discussion of the topic of this thesis.
Notwithstanding the background knowledge I possess on the topic of this thesis, I consulted various sources if only to ensure a balanced presentation of the topic. To further enhance my understanding of communist theory of united front as applied in a revolutionary scenario, I read certain books I thought would treat the concept of united front with more than just a passing interest. My research only reinforced my belief that the concept of united front is indeed a largely unstudied subject.

Authors of books on insurgency almost uniformly focus on the whys and wherefores of revolution. Their exposition on the operating systems of an insurgency is almost always focused on the armed component of the insurgent movement. At other times, the focus is on the dramatis personae of the revolution. Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Ho and other revolutionary leaders become the subject of innumerable analyses. It is as if the fate of revolutions are wholly dependent on such leaders, whose exploits are, more often than not, romanticized to great extents. The deeds of those who bring about, and exploit, situations that make revolutions credible options are ignored. Thus, the information I gathered on the thesis topic had to come mostly from CPP generated materials and the interpretation of such by military intelligence.

Of the various materials I had access to, the CPP founding documents entitled "Rectify Errors and Rebuild the
Party" had been the most beneficial to my research. It is the basic document that lays down the ideological and political foundation of the CPP revolutionary struggle. In this document, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) rigorously criticizes the ideological, political, military, and organizational errors of its precursor, the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP). This document is perhaps the most effective instrument with which the CPP ideological and political line could be grasped. The document is illustrative of how a meticulously scientific assessment of the past can be a tool in building a firm revolutionary Party and a strong revolutionary movement.

CPP theory and practice of united front is treated in great detail in the documents "Grasp the Principles of the Revolutionary Mass Movement" and "Basic Course for Middle Forces". These documents are virtual handbooks of CPP united front work. They are "must" readings for anybody who is seriously interested in the study CPP united front activities. Other CPP documents and publications on united front merely amplify the concepts and theories found in these two documents.

The breadth and depth of current CPP united front work is well established by the documents listed in Annex "G" of Chapter VII of this thesis. These documents were recovered in numerous raids by Philippine Constabulary (PC) intelligence operatives on clandestine CPP safehouses. In
addition to these documents, large numbers of computer
diskettes containing meticulous details of CPP activities
were also recovered. These documents and diskettes provide
great amounts of information on the united front activities
of the CPP.

Of the materials generated by various intelligence
agencies of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, those
published by the Production Branch of the Philippine
Constabulary Intelligence Division (C2 Prod Br) provide the
most information. Special Reports and Intelligence papers
produced by this agency result mainly from analysis of CPP
documents and are generally current and unopinionated. As
such, they tend to be more factual than the rest and thus,
can be regarded as primary sources.

Among the materials generated by C2 Prod Br, the
Special Report: United Front Activities of the CPP provides
the most comprehensive analysis of the nature and extent of
CPP united front work. This report is the product of an
exhaustive study of captured CPP documents and diskettes
which were painstakingly deciphered and interpreted by C2
intelligence analysts. This report is a veritable gold
mine in so far as information on the united front work of
the CPP and NDF is concerned. Another C2 publication that
was of great value in the research for this thesis is the
report entitled CPP/NPA/NDF International Relations and
Linkages.
Research Methodology

The research methodology used in the preparation of this thesis consisted essentially of reading and document research. As previously stated, the limitations imposed by the nature of the thesis topic compelled me to rely mainly on literature generated by both the CCP and the AFP. These materials adequately provided me the necessary information I needed to write this thesis.

In the determination of materials to be consulted, recency was a major factor considered. The insurgency situation in the Philippines is a dynamic activity. The political situation that impact on the insurgency is also constantly changing. So is the Philippine government’s counterinsurgency program. Hence, the research materials consulted were generally of current vintage.

The research on CPP activities was facilitated by my access to classified information. Though not included in the thesis, classified information provided the main base of my background knowledge on the research topic and took on a major significance in the formation of my research agenda. Additionally, my access to classified information afforded me the chance to verify information gathered from other secondary sources. Such facility in the verification on the factuality of information gathered significantly eased the burden of research and more importantly, greatly enhances the credibility of this thesis.

-19-
Previous personal exposure to CPP united front work also helped a great deal in the conduct of the research. My direct association with former CPP personalities, with whom I had numerous discussions, gave me the proper insight on the CPP program of united front. As a result of these discussions, information that otherwise would have been unavailable from open sources became available to me. The information gathered during these sessions provided me the background knowledge that guided me in my search for additional research materials. The notes I kept on these meetings proved very useful during my research.

Finally, in order to maintain the currency and veracity of the information I was gathering during the research, communication with the concerned intelligence agencies in the Philippines was initiated and maintained. Consultations with these agencies through correspondence was done regularly. Late breaking developments in the Philippine political environment, and the impact these had on the insurgency situation, were continuously relayed to me. Thus, the information I was getting was relatively up to date, and more importantly, accurate.
CHAPTER III
CPP THEORY OF UNITED FRONT

Theoretical Basis of CPP United Front

The theoretical basis of CPP United Front (UF) work lies on the Party's assertions in Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party, a basic CPP document drawn up and ratified during its founding Congress on 26 December 1968. In this document, the Party states that:

...the national united front is a component part of the political line of the CPP. The highest task of the people's revolution is the seizure of state power and the consolidation of the people's democratic power as the transitional stage towards socialism. The CPP stands firmly, wielding and utilizing both weapons of armed struggle and national united front against the enemy. Through the national united front, the party extends widely its political influence and gains the widest support of the masses and other progressive classes and strata as it establishes the independent strength of the leading class, the proletariat, through a national war or revolution supported mainly by the peasantry... (1)

The same document also emphasizes that the national united front should be based on the alliance of the working class and the peasantry under the leadership of the CPP and the proletariat. Despite this obvious bias in favor of the working class, the party recognizes the crucial role to be played by what they call the "middle forces". These middle forces, specifically the petty and middle bourgeoisie,
are to be given special concern. Thus, the CPP decrees that "...the party must respect the legitimate interests of all the middle forces, with concessions actually granted to them without undermining the interests of the people and the leadership of the proletariat...".(2)

Notwithstanding this realization of the importance of these middle forces in united front work, the Party was careful to stress, in adhering to its concept of united front, that the national united front shall be based on the alliance of the working class and the peasantry under the leadership of the party.(3) It is in this context that we shall proceed to examine the CPP theory and practice of united front.

Basic Concepts Related to United Front (UF)

The conventional understanding of united front is that of organizational relationships. Such relationships may be expressed in alliances between two or among various independent organizations. These organizations each have interests distinct from but not opposed to those of the others. Such organizations do not subordinate their respective interests to those of the rest, but they work in unison to achieve the collective objective. There is no primacy of one over the others. A good example of this would be the temporary, tactical alliance entered into by the CPP and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the
Muslim secessionist movement in Southern Philippines. The NPA and MNLF entered into such a relationship in Mindanao to diffuse government military operations over very wide areas. As a result of this alliance, NPA and MNLF forces conducted coordinated military action against government targets. This resulted in extreme difficulty for AFP forces to decisively address either of the two allied insurgent forces.

Another expression of organizational relationship would be a situation in which an organization such as the CPP, clandestinely initiates the formation of satellite organizations. These organizations are projected to be independent. In reality, these are merely organizational fronts of the CPP which the latter uses to achieve party objectives. These front organizations project themselves to be the legitimate leaders of various organizations whose interests can best be achieved in collective action. The primacy of the parent organization is clearly established within the alliance. Such a situation exists within the National Democratic Front (NDF). Party sponsored sectoral front organizations such as the League of Filipino Students (LFS) and Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) forged UF relationships with legitimate student/youth and labor organizations respectively. Projected to be independent organizations, the LFS and KMU succeeded in the formation of united front organizations in their respective sectors and in the
process, brought under their influence various labor and student/youth organizations and assumed a leading role in the militant student and labor movement.

Such conventional understanding of UF is not wrong in itself. However, such understanding is rather shallow and inadequate. While it is true that relationships as indicated above invariably take on an organizational shape and form, certain underlying relationships need to be considered in order to understand more adequately the visible organizational expressions of such seemingly diverse groups.

In the context of the contemporary CPP/NPA/NDF revolutionary struggle, what could be these underlying relationships? The most fundamental would be the concepts of class and political line.

Class

In the CPP milieu, the primary concept used for political analysis and political alliances is class. Other politically significant concepts may be added, but these are subordinated to the category of class. For example, the primary way of analyzing alliances in traditional Philippine politics is to look for kinship relationships. This is so because relationships within Filipino families are very strong and extended. Such relationships extend well beyond blood lines and the
immediate family. Ritual kinship ties, such as godfather-godson, are as strong as blood ties. Ethnic and regional factors are likewise taken into account. The CPP does not deny or ignore these relationships, but asserts that the most important underlying interest that people fight for in politics is their class interest.(5)

To the CPP, what then is class? Relatedly, what is class analysis? The traditional CPP definition of class states that "..classes are groups of people differing from each other by the place they occupy in a historically determined system of social production. It is primarily based on their ownership or non-ownership of the means of production such as land, machines and capital; their role in the social organization of production; and the dimension of their share of social wealth of which they dispose and their mode of acquiring it..".(6)

Generally, classes come in mutually opposing pairs such as landlord and tenant, capitalist and proletariat. The CPP emphasis is on the ownership or non-ownership of the means of production as the basis of class identification and analysis. This distinguishes it from the traditional non-Marxist view where the classes are determined mainly by the magnitude of their income, or in Marxist terms, their share of the fruits of production.(7)

There is some obvious correlation between these views on class and methods of class analysis. Those who
own the means of production tend to have greater incomes than those who do not own them. For example, landlords who own the land and other tools of production such as the carabao, water pumps, and other farm implements will have larger incomes than the tenants who use such implements to work the land. The same would be true with capitalists who own the machines and factories vis-à-vis the workers who operate the machines.

Generally, owners of the means of production do not directly participate in the working of such means. In some cases, such owners participate in the production process. Usually, they participate in managerial or supervisory capacities. Non-owners are usually the ones who are involved in the production process, primarily as manual workers or at best, overseers of other workers. This factor regarding the role of the person in the production process, while coming into play in the determination of one's class, is subordinated to the factor of ownership or non-ownership of the means of production in so far as the CPP is concerned. (8)

Based on these three factors - ownership of the means, place in the process, and share in the fruits of production - CPP class analysis meant grouping people according to all three. However, the major emphasis has been on the classification of the population according to their degree of ownership of the means of production.
CPP bases for the determination of class identity is not limited to the three factors mentioned above. The CPP includes a factor that is not anymore within the realm of the objective. This involves the fundamentally subjective factors of class consciousness and choice.

The CPP can analyze society and determine the class to which a certain group of people belongs. However, the Party knows that for political purposes, what it needs to determine and what can be useful for its struggle is the people's consciousness about their class interest and their choice of class interest. This is referred to by the CPP as the people's "class standpoint". The CPP also asserts that the interests of a certain class can be objectively determined apart from the class consciousness of individual members of that class. (9)

Hence, the CPP defined the class interest of the landlord class to be a desire to continue to own the land and to have tenants to work it even if certain elements of the class would believe otherwise. The Party assigned the peasants the class interest of wanting to own the land that they till. The CPP deliberately highlighted the dichotomy of the interests of the opposing classes. Such emphasis on conflicting interests justified the CPP reliance on the concept of ownership of the means of production as the primary basis for class analysis and main determinant of class identity. (10)
The CPP recognizes that a major conflict between the opposing classes, e.g. tenants vs. landlords, workers vs. capitalists, is over their respective share in the fruits of production. However, the Party concludes that such conflict is not as deep seated and irreconcilable as the conflict these classes have over the question of ownership of the land and the factories. (11)

Given their respective objective class interests, the next questions would be: How conscious are the people of a certain class about such objective interests and what interests do they consciously choose to defend and fight for? For example, a worker may fight militantly for higher wages and better working conditions. However, he may not even be aware of or want to adopt what the CPP has assigned to be his class interest. He may not want to own the factory altogether. Similarly, a landowner might realize the validity of the tenant’s desire to own the land that the latter tills. He may voluntarily transfer ownership of the land to his tenants, an act diametrically opposed to the CPP determined class interest of the landowner.

How does the CPP deal with such obvious aberrations of its conclusions about class and class interests? Quite simply, the Party injects a new set of factors into play. Cultural factors such as education, religion, ethnic origins, and even the role of mass media are made to account for deviations from the Party’s conclusions.
The CPP further theorizes that the spontaneous class consciousness of peasants and workers tend to be dominated by the interests of the ruling classes. This is so because landowner and capitalist ideas are the ones that are commonly propagated in the existing Philippine conditions. Such is the situation prior to the conduct of revolutionary education and organizing work among the workers and peasants.

However, the Party is confident that ultimately, the classes will become conscious of their interests and fight for them. When this happens, their consciousness will become congruent to their objective situation and attain what the CPP calls "true consciousness". The Party's role in bringing about such a situation is one justification for united front work. The earlier the classes attain true consciousness, the better it would be for the CPP. (12)

One last item is needed to round out this short discussion of the CPP perception of class. To the Party, the class to which a person belongs can be determined according to his class of origin, meaning the class of his parents from whom he first draws support. His class can also be established according to the class status he gains by virtue of personal property, job and income. He can also belong to the class whose interests he chooses to defend or fight for. Thus, it is possible to have a person whose class origin is landlord, whose class status is petty
bourgeoisie (small properties or professional living off his skills) but whose class standpoint is proletariat because he has joined the cause of the working class and fights for the interests of his adoptive class. The situation can also be the exact reverse of this. One may have the peasantry as his class of origin but through his own efforts, accumulates wealth and attains the status of the bourgeoisie and chooses to fight for the interests of his adoptive class. (13) Whatever the case, this CPP perception of class plays an important role in the Party’s united front work.

Given this clarification of the CPP’s perceptions of class, and applying them to existing Philippine conditions, two types of united front become possible. These are the UF within one class and UF among classes.

**United Front Within One Class**

CPP theory of united front is basically Marxist. Thus, we will examine an example of a worker’s united front. The CPP claims that Marxism is the ideology and the true consciousness of the working class. However, it also theorizes that the development of the consciousness of the proletariat as a class is very slow and uneven. Initially, most workers are under the influence of the ideology of the capitalist class for reasons cited earlier. Some will later develop critical consciousness about their situation
and become critical of the contemporary system where they think their interests, both individually and collectively, are not given due attention. The initial reaction of the workers to such a situation would be to try to rectify the situation through means that are acceptable within the present system. However, the workers perceive that the system tends to perpetuate the interests of the capitalists to the exclusion of their own interests. Based on such perception, the workers then seek an alternative system which they perceive will serve their interests better.

Convinced that the struggle would be futile, these workers then seek colleagues of the same persuasion to seek collective redress. At a certain point, these workers will become aware of an alternative system with a body politic that claims to represent the interests of the working class. This system is the socialist system being peddled by the CPP. In such a situation, the formation of some sort of an alliance with the Party that espouses such a system becomes desirable. In the context of existing Philippine conditions, this will mean establishing an alliance with the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), the CPP front organization tasked to spearhead the CPP united front work among the proletariat. The CPP would accept such united front relationships even if, in the analysis of the Party, the workers still possess a limited consciousness of their class interests. (14)
In the Philippine situation, the form of united front that was immediately applicable was that between the CPP and workers' organizations such as trade unions and union federations. However, it must be clarified that no matter how militant their struggle may be, the workers are considered by the CPP as not having attained true class consciousness so long as they stop short of wanting to change the system of ownership of the means of production. Otherwise, they are perceived as merely fighting for an increased share of the fruits of production within the existing capitalist system. The long term objective of the CPP is to bring about the true consciousness of the proletariat. When this is achieved, the proletariat shall have become the true vanguard of the revolutionary struggle.(15)

United Front Among Different Classes

The class which the proletariat, as represented by the CPP, primarily seeks to establish united front with is the peasantry. The peasant class comprises the majority of Filipinos. As would be true in most Third World countries, the proletariat comprises the minority of the population in the Philippines. Thus, it is expected that the proletariat would seek a united front with the majority class as this is both desirable and imperative if effective popular mass support is to be developed.
This united front with the peasantry does not refer to the process of recruiting members from the peasant class into the CPP or the NPA. This does not constitute a united front relationship. CPP membership means that the peasant needs to change his class standpoint and assume that of a proletariat. Hence, the peasant who becomes a CPP member does not anymore consider land ownership as his ultimate interest. Instead, he adopts the transformation of the existing social order into a socialist model as his ultimate interest.

As the CPP views it, the united front between the proletariat and the peasantry consists of the support and leadership the former provides to the latter in their struggle to change the current system of agriculture. To the CPP, the semi-feudal agricultural system existing in the Philippines is an anathema to its struggle for national democracy. Thus, all sectors that are sympathetic to this anti-feudal cause should be allied to pursue the collective struggle. These sectors need not adopt the CPP ideology to be acceptable to an anti-feudal united front that is CPP controlled and supported.(16)

Another form of UF between classes could be that between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. However, this needs immediate qualification. According to basic CPP theory, these classes are class enemies. Their respective class interests are irreconcilably in conflict. Indeed,
the class interest assigned by the CPP to these classes are diametrically opposed. How does the Party deal with such situations then?

The first qualification that has to be made is to state that the united front the proletariat seeks to establish with the bourgeoisie is limited to that with the two lower strata of the bourgeoisie class. The CPP had subdivided the bourgeoisie into three levels: the big, the middle, and the petty bourgeoisie. The primary basis of such a subdivision is the magnitude of ownership or control of the means of production. To the CPP, only a UF with the middle and petty bourgeoisie is possible. (17)

What does this united front consist of? It is one which is directed against the big bourgeoisie who own or control the majority of the means of production. Such ownership or control begets economic and political power. In the Philippine scenario, it is likewise a UF against foreign big bourgeoisie who continue to monopolize and/or control, key industries and other critical sectors of the economy. This represents the anti-imperialist element of the CPP political line of national democracy. The big bourgeoisie against whom the UF is directed can either be, in CPP terms, the "comprador bourgeoisie" meaning those whose class interest is tied up with imperialism, or the "bureaucrat capitalist" or those whose class interest is tied with the control of government offices as sources of
The latter is now commonly known as "crony capitalists", a term made popular during the Marcos era. It is used to refer to Presidential friends and relatives and government officials who controlled the economy of the Philippines. These crony capitalists, and a set of new ones, have staged a remarkable comeback during the Aquino administration.

Thus far, we have considered UF only from the starting point of the proletariat. However, it is also possible to consider UF's from other starting points. For instance, in a Third World country like the Philippines, the bourgeoisie, as a class, is a minority much like the proletariat. But the bourgeoisie can also establish UF within itself as a class or with other classes.

In fact, the big bourgeoisie conducts UF work within the entire bourgeoisie class in the Philippines. If we examine the class status and standing of the majority of those in government and other established institutions, we would find that they are predominantly of the petty and middle bourgeoisie. So long as they aspire to rise within the present system and dream of someday rising to the top themselves, they may be said to have the class standpoint of the bourgeoisie as a class. The big bourgeoisie, wielding great economic and political power, affects to a large degree the ability of these sub-classes to attain their objectives. This being the case, the middle and
petty bourgeoisie are forced into an informal UF with the big bourgeoisie. It is through the exercise of its economic and political power that the big bourgeoisie dominates the interests of the entire bourgeoisie class.

The bourgeoisie can also establish UF with the peasantry. Let us take the example of a landlord who, after selling his landholdings, shifts his capital totally to industry and services. Thus, he positions himself as supportive of the peasant's demand for landownership. He may even criticize the other landlords who do not follow his example. Having divested himself of all his agrarian interests, the erstwhile landlord can then support the peasant's anti-feudal demands. The problem arises when militancy among the peasants develops to the point where not only the agricultural system but the whole social system becomes the target of the peasants' struggle. When this happens, the even interests of former landlord who supported the anti-feudal struggle becomes threatened.

The CPP emphasis on class and class analysis as the basis of UF reveals its evidently Marxist view that the more fundamental change in a given society is social rather than political. However, to achieve such social change, there is need for political change. There must be a change in the class or coalition of classes that hold political power in a country. This brings forth a second basic concept that must be considered in this analysis of
CPP united front work. This concept encompasses both the aspects of political and social change. The CPP calls this concept the political line. (19)

**Political Line**

United Front can be looked at simply as one within or among class(es) and/or at local levels. However, the more workable vantage point from which united front should be analyzed is at the level of the nation-state. This is because, as stated earlier, political power and political change is involved in social change and, political power is primarily organized at the nation-state level. To our specific point of interest, united front is interesting to the Philippines in so far as it affects the contemporary system of political rule on the national level rather than on the local or regional levels. This view most fits the Philippine political environment.

Going back to the proletariat as the starting point, it was stated earlier that the CPP seeks to propagate not its ideology of Marxism but its political line of national democracy. Putting this in class terms, the CPP does not seek to fight only for the proletariat's class interest of effecting the socialist transformation of the Philippines. The CPP also seeks to fight for the interests of the various classes that constitute the majority of the Filipino people. (20)
Why would the CPP seek fighting for the interests of the classes other the class it claims to represent? One obvious explanation is political. In order to have the chance of achieving the class interest of the proletariat, the CPP needs to gain political power. To achieve this, whether by way of armed or parliamentary struggle, the CPP needs popular mass support. To generate such popular mass support, the CPP must fight for, or at least project that it is fighting for, the interests of the various classes that make up the majority of the population.

The second explanation is social. Although the proletariat's interest is constant, i.e. the socialist transformation of the Philippines, the CPP believes that it is unrealistic to talk of building a socialist society unless certain antecedent social changes happen. Foremost of these is the change from a dependent economy to a more independent one. Another is the abolition of the de facto feudalistic system of landownership. Thus, it can be said that the CPP united front line of national democracy is not a mere ploy. It is being propagated not only to gain the support of the other classes. It is a political line that seeks to bring about the antecedent social changes. To the CPP, the national democratic political line is a strategic line. It is something that the Party has to seriously fight for if it seeks to seize state power and effect the socialist transformation of the Philippines society.
The formulation of the CPP national democratic political line and its major components becomes our next point of interest. This political line is the result of CPP application of its Marxist ideology to the existing conditions of Philippine society. These two elements are essential. The same Marxist ideology, if applied to other countries or even to the Philippines at another stage of its history, e.g. when under Spanish colonial rule, will produce a different political line. Similarly, existing contemporary Philippine conditions, when examined from the standpoint of another, non-Marxist ideology would produce a dissimilar political line. Thus, the CPP believes that its political line, evolving from such a process, is the right line that seeks to unite and can unite the various classes that compose the majority of Filipinos.

The CPP views a political line to include several elements. It must be based on a factual analysis of the existing social systems, broken down into its various modes of production and ownership of such. Class analysis should lead to the accurate determination and identification of the target forces—those who are expected to resist or oppose social change, and the motive forces—those who are expected to push for social change. It must include and explain the basic strategy for change, particularly the form of political struggle. Finally, it must propose an alternative social system to supplant the existing system,
including the alternative forms of the political operating systems that will spearhead the implementation of the contemplated social changes. (21)

Because of the term "political line", there is a tendency to emphasize the political angle - the form of political struggle. Therefore, it becomes important to stress that the main elements of a political line are social. The political line is concerned not only with political change but with social change as well. Thus, it should embody the political and social interests and aspirations of the classes it seeks to unite if it is to be acceptable to them.

Although a political line can be expressed in the positive as in "national democracy", it achieves more impact when it is expressed in negative terms. Hence, the CPP expresses its political line as "anti-feudalism, anti-imperialism, and anti-bureaucrat capitalism". Such negative expression of the political line identifies in concrete terms the agenda for the revolutionary struggle. Thus, with the social and political aspects of the CPP national democratic political line stated in very clear terms, we can then determine the possible forms of united front under such line.
United Front Against a Common Target

The proletariat can unite with the peasantry in an anti-feudal UF against the landlord class. As earlier illustrated, even the bourgeoisie can be a party to an anti-feudal UF, especially after they have diverted themselves of their agrarian interests.

The proletariat can also enter into a united front with the peasantry and the lower strata of the bourgeoisie in an anti-imperialist UF. The unifying common target is imperialism, i.e. foreign capital domination or monopoly. Such a united front also targets the local "comprador" big bourgeoisie. The CPP defines the comprador bourgeoisie as those who profit from the colonial trade between the Philippines and imperialist countries such as the US and Japan. The comprador bourgeoisie derives its wealth from the exploitation of the Philippine's human, as well as, natural resources which it exports and in turn, generates more profits from his importation of foreign goods which it sells to Filipinos at oppressive prices. (14)

All the classes can also unite in a UF that may be called an anti-fascist UF. Such a UF is not as much a UF against the existing social system as it is against a system of political rule. Such was the case during the waning years of Marcos' rule when a broad spectrum of classes formed an informal anti-Marcos UF. This broad based UF began to develop after the assassination of Ninoy.
Aquino, the bitter political rival of Marcos. The various opposition forces, each with their own political agenda, were united mainly in wanting Marcos out of power. This UF struggle culminated in the People's Power revolution of 1986 that resulted in the exile of Marcos and the rise to power of the Aquinos.

In citing the above possible combination of classes around the unifying line of a common target, it is not meant that these classes can spontaneously unite and rally under the CPP national democratic line. The earlier explanations about objective class interests, choice and consciousness remain critical factors. What is being stressed is that the various classes, with due regard to educational and organizational work among them, can be made to unite against a common target notwithstanding the inherent conflicts among them. By extension therefore, the CPP can be able to unite the various classes along its national democratic line and lead them into the socialist transformation of Philippine society.

United Front Around a Common Political Strategy

For the CPP to be able to achieve social changes desired by the various classes it is able to unite within the UF, the Party needs to seize state political power. The form of struggle to wage to achieve this objective is the basis for a UF around a common political strategy.
A united front based on the social aspects of a political line is separable from one based on the line's political aspects. To illustrate, there can be agreement among the groups comprising a UF to wage a struggle against a common target but there could be disagreement on whether to pursue an armed or a parliamentary struggle. In our example of the anti-Marcos UF, the CPP advocated violent means to overthrow Marcos. The various political parties such as UNIDO and LABAN advocated peaceful means. This basic conflict on the strategy for change led to the boycott of the elections of 1986 by the CPP and its front organizations. Only when Marcos manipulated the results of the elections did the informal UF become solid again.

The situation cited above could also be reversed but still be true. There could be agreement among the UF members on the mode of struggle but not everyone may agree on what elements of the common target are to be resolved. The dichotomy among the varied and often conflicting interests of the classes represented in the UF gives rise to such situations.

To the CPP, these possibilities are subject to serious concern in so far as deciding what sectors of population are to be included in the UF and what political lines they are to be exposed to. It is more a matter of operational rather than ideological expediency to determine which classes can unite against a common target or around a
common strategy of struggle. Thus, the CPP strives to ensure the formation of a comprehensive united front, united against a common target and around a common strategy. This is a united front where all parties are united by the CPP political line and agree to wage a people's war where both the armed and parliamentary strategies for struggle are adopted to complement each other. (23)

Other Related Concepts

The concepts of class and political line were dwelt on to illustrate that united front is not merely a matter of organizational linkages and alliances. That is not to say however, that organization is unimportant. As cited earlier, class and political relations, sooner or later, take on an organizational expression. Furthermore, in the process of united front building and maintenance, one participant usually assumes the leadership of the UF. This is not withstanding the fact that each of the participants have their independent reasons for acting and wanting to be part of the united front. Finally, no matter how stable or comprehensive a united front is, the member organizations never give up their independence or initiative and do not restrict their political activities within the framework of the UF. Against this backdrop, let us examine how the CPP works around such realities of UF building.
Organizational Line

As our starting point, we find that class based organizations take various forms. The most primitive of these, in the political sense, would be the situation where a class does not have organizations of its own but is dispersed among different organizations formed and led by other classes. Presuming that organizations exist within a certain class, these are mainly in the form of economic, social, educational or cultural organizations. However, the organizational form most usually involved in united front building is the political organization which includes among its programs the conscious struggle for the interests of its members.

Two basic forms of political organization come to mind. The higher form would be the established political party which has the specific characteristic of seeking to contest political power. For this purpose, such political parties have to develop a political line and agenda that can draw the support of the other classes. In common political parlance, this is the party platform. Examples of these political organizations include the traditional Filipino political parties such as the Nationalista and Liberal parties; the emergent Laban which is the present ruling party, and the Partido ng Bayan (PnB) which is the CPP/NDF sponsored political party.
The lesser form would be the various non-political party organizations that do not directly contest political power. These merely engage in the application of group pressure on the government to further their respective interests. These groups usually actively campaign for or against the political parties vying for political power. In the Philippine scenario, these organizations are called sectoral or multi-sectoral organizations. Under these sectoral groupings would be the various labor unions and federations, the student/youth organizations, peasant groups, professional and business groups and others.

As stated previously, the CPP does not yet consider itself to be an organization large enough to contest political power within the established democratic systems in the Philippines. Lacking organizational strength, the CPP looks at these sectoral/multi-sectoral organizations as primary sources of mobilizable popular mass support. It views these organizations as multipliers of its political influence and strength. United front relationships with these organizations becomes very important in this aspect. Through the United front, the CPP expands its influence over larger and larger segments of the population and thus, may grow big enough to be a credible participant in the electoral process and vie for political power just as any legal political party would. This is the parliamentary aspect of the CPP struggle.
The united front can also help bring about the situation that makes the conduct of the armed struggle an acceptable and viable undertaking in the eyes of the population. This is achieved by way of orchestrated mass actions such as strikes, demonstrations, boycotts, civil disobedience and similar protest actions. Such actions are designed to create an aura of government ineffectiveness. Authorities are deliberately provoked to overly react to the situation thus, eliciting charges of oppression and tyranny. Under such conditions of government rule, the revolutionary struggle becomes a viable, acceptable and, desirable alternative to the existing system and the strategy of armed struggle becomes increasingly justifiable.

In forging UF relations, the CPP has two concepts of organization. One is for the CPP to initiate the formation of organizations that transcend class lines and then form a united front among such organizations with itself at the helm. An example of this concept would be the various front organizations such as the KMU and LFS which the CPP organized purportedly to fight for the interests of the class(es) and/or sectors that these organizations project to represent. These front organizations are then united in a united front that is supposed to be broad based. Within the Philippine insurgency scenario, this united front is the National Democratic Front.
The other concept of organization is for the CPP to develop UF relations with organizations that are initiated and led by other groups which are neither CPP influenced nor controlled. In this case, the CPP employs two (2) modes of approach: the UF from above and UF from below.

United Front From Below

This approach is used when the leadership of the organization with which the CPP seeks to establish UF relations is unwilling or not yet ready to enter into a UF with the CPP. In such a case, the Party or any of its front organizations establish relations with the members and/or lower leadership of the target organization. This is usually done through activities that lend support to the actions of the target organization. These could take the form of sympathy strikes, joint manning of picket lines, student solidarity movements and other supportive actions. These initial relationships are without formal or organizational links. From such initial contacts, Party cadre start encouraging the members of the target organization to persuade or coerce their leaders to agree to the forging of UF relations with the CPP or CPP front organizations. This does not preclude the possibility that a totally new relationship with the organization is established. This takes the form of an alliance that does not anymore involve the original target organization as a
body but only its members. A good example of this would be in the labor sector where the CPP, using UF from below methodology, was able to forge UF relations with a wide assortment of independent labor unions that belong to diverse labor federations. These federations do not have united front relationships among themselves and are even hostile to each other.

**United Front From Above**

In this approach, the CPP works on the leadership of the target organizations. It gains influence over the leadership through a variety of methods. One such method is the forging of solidarity ties with individual leaders of the target organization. Another method would be the case where the Party supports the campaign of prospective officials of the target organizations. In all of these methods, the central idea is to make the leadership of the target organization greatly indebted to the CPP or its front organizations. They then come under the influence or control of the CPP. Such relationships obviously include implied relationships among the rank and file and lower level leadership. These develop once the top leaders have established united front relationships with the CPP.

The organizational form of such united fronts can assume various modes. These can be simple coordinative relations among the organizations involved. A new alliance
or an umbrella organization may also evolve to collectively represent all parties to the UF. In the latter case, the individual organizations usually retain their identity and structure but also contribute in the composition of the new alliance's infrastructure.

Leadership

All united fronts involve multiple organizations. However, it does not follow that member organizations share equally in its leadership. One member usually assumes leadership, although his leadership is tempered by the fact that his is a united front leadership that has to provide direction to all the parties involved. There can be no certainty on who should lead since there is no permanence in the leadership structure. The CPP, however, strives to gain such leadership and in the process, gain primacy over the other member-organizations. In consonance with its emphasis on class and political line rather than on organizational line in the analysis of UF relationships, the CPP takes the view that leadership in a united front is not primarily organizational. It is neither formal nor dependent on the organizational strength of the represented organization. Leadership is determined primarily on the relative ability to formulate the correct political line that can unite the membership of the UF. The ability to handle the various forces the membership represent so that
they will be united in accepting and implementing such unifying political line becomes equally important. In CPP terms, this means the ability to handle the contradictions among members of the united front and maintain unity around the common political line.(24)

The above buttresses CPP claims that while it may not attain organizational superiority in terms of numbers, it can attain leadership of and control over united fronts with organizations very much bigger than itself. The CPP attributes this to its superior class consciousness and the correct political line it developed based on Marxist ideology applied to existing the Philippine situation.(25)

Independence and Initiative Within The United Front

The previous discussion implies that the interests of the various member-classes, to include their various organizational interests, are served by the united front political line, leadership and infrastructure. However, such interests are rarely served to the full satisfaction of the members. In reality, there remain some distinct individual organizational and class interests that are not addressed by the united front. This being the case, all members of a united front are expected to retain some degree of independence and initiative to engage in activities that do not involve the rest of the united front. However, such actions should not
go against the common united front program. In such cases, the rest of the united front may not actively participate in or support certain activities of a particular member organization. However, there exists an understanding that neither will they oppose such activities. The CPP accepts such arrangements provided that the results of such would be to the ultimate benefit of the Party. (25)

The foregoing discussion on CPP concepts relative to its united front work will facilitate our appreciation of the Party's united front strategies and practices. These shall be treated in greater detail in succeeding Chapters of this thesis.
NOTES

2. ibid., p.45
3. ibid., p.44
4. CPP, *Basic Course for Middle Forces*, chap.IV sec A para 1
5. ibid chap V sec A para 3
6. ibid chap IV sec A para 3
7. ibid. chap IV sec A para 2
8. ibid. chap IV sec A para 3
9. ibid. chap V sec A para 3
10. ibid. chap IV sec B para b.2,c.2
11. ibid. chap IV sec B para a-g
12. ibid. chap IV sec B para a-g
13. ibid. chap IV sec B
14. Conversations with a former CPP Central Committee (CPP CC) member presently active in AFP COIN operations directed against CPP united front activities. 1986
15. Former CPP CC member.
16. Former CPP CC member.
17. CPP, *Basic Course for Middle Forces*, chap IV sec B
18. ibid. chap IV sec B para b.1
19. CPP, *Grasp the Principles of Revolutionary Mass Movements*, chap III sec v
20. ibid., chap III sec iv
21 CPP, *Basic Course* ... chap IV sec D para 2-3
22. ibid., chap IV sec B para b.1
23. CPP, *Grasp the Principles...* chap III sec iv
25. ibid., pp. 8-17
26. CPP *Grasp the Principles...*, chap III sec iv
CHAPTER IV
UNITED FRONT IN EARLIER PHILIPPINE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS

Introduction

This Chapter is a review of the united front (UF) practices of earlier Philippine revolutionary movements. The review will be in accordance with the theories and concepts discussed in the preceding Chapter. The focus of the review is not the organizational details and methods employed by these movements in UF building. Instead, the focus will be the theoretical interpretation of such based on CPP theory. The purpose of this Chapter then, is to help the reader to better understand and appreciate CPP united front activities.

United Front Against Spanish Colonialism

Philippine colonial history is replete with examples of peasant revolts. These revolts resulted from the social transformation and abuse imposed on the country by Spanish civilian and Church authorities. This, coupled with the abuse suffered under the local elites and the resultant economic despair, triggered numerous rebellions. However, these revolts were sporadic and geographically isolated from each other. They were mainly localized revolts that were caused by local grievances and which targeted local
authorities. Subjected to humiliation, exploitative taxation, forced labor and abuse by both government and Church authorities, the peasants suffered from severe deprivation. They were a people chronically frustrated in their effort to achieve what they thought of as the normal satisfactions of life. (1)

The tendency toward these small pockets of revolt continued as Philippine society developed. These were conducted in isolation and there was no conscious move to consolidate such widespread local uprisings. Neither were there moves to merge these locally based rebellions with the evolving nationalist movements towards the latter part of the 1800's. Instead, these rebellions intensified and took on some characteristics of 19th century nationalism while maintaining some degree of uniqueness.

The uniqueness of these revolts came in the form of their religious orientation. The central line, i.e. what could be called the political line, flowed from religious thoughts and beliefs. Religion became the powerful bond in these uprisings. The growing ideals of nationalism and independence found expression in religious forms which the peasants easily understood and accepted. This religious orientation suggested a deeper cause for rebellion than just oppression and economic deprivation. These native revolts offered their followers something more than land reform and higher wages. They offered salvation and
independence not only of the peasant's physical self but more importantly, the peasant's inner self or soul. (2)

Such was the perception of the peasants. In CPP terms, the peasants interpreted their class interest in the form of religious beliefs and visions that offered a future democratic society where everyone was free and treated equally.

The twin developments of parochial rebellions and growing ideals of nationalism and independence ushered in the Philippine Revolution of 1896. This nationalist revolution was led by the Kataastaasang Kagalonggalangang Katipunan ng mga Anak Bayan—KKK (most high and respected society of the sons of the people). The KKK was a secret society that advocated independence from the Spanish colonizers. Andres Bonifacio, a clerk of lower class origins, founded the KKK in 1892. The historical significance of the Katipunan can be best summed up as its being "...the historic watershed that linked nationalism with peasant unrest, bringing together the peasant's aspirations for religious salvation and the proletarian yearnings for national independence...". (3)

The Katipunan, in contrast to the earlier peasant rebellions, espoused secular nationalist goals. Notions of independence, land reform, redistribution of wealth and others became the unifying causes. The Katipunan embraced the whole spectrum of Philippine geographical and societal
groupings. Thus, in the context of our discussions on united front, we can view the Philippine Revolution of 1896 as a struggle of the Filipino people in a broad united front against a common target-Spanish colonialism and toward a common objective-Philippine independence. It was a revolution that sought political change; a change in the system of government from a colony into a Republic. It was a revolution united along the common political line of national independence.

Applying the concepts discussed previously, the following interpretation of the Philippine Revolution of 1896 seeks to take into account the more complex social realities that underlay the seemingly simple political movement for Philippine independence. We will start with the analysis of the existing classes and their ideologies.

The majority of the Filipinos then, as now, were peasants. The peasant class was greatly influenced by the Christianization efforts of the Spanish Friars. The dominant ideology at the time was "milleniarism" or "religious messianism". This meant that the peasants interpreted their class interests in terms of religious beliefs and visions. While they shared nationalist sentiments that wanted a Philippines free from Spanish colonial rule, their interests went beyond that to include social goals that included rural land reform and social equality. (4)
The other extant class that played a major role, in fact the leading part, in these revolts is more accurately described as a coalition of classes. Called "Illustrados", this class of the educated elite was comprised of the landed gentry, professionals and business people whose consciousness and ideology followed liberal capitalist lines. They were greatly influenced by the ideals of the French revolution and the other bourgeois democratic revolutions of Europe. Although they were landlords or local bourgeoisie, their class interest could be linked with the peasants' class interest because the biggest landlords were not Filipinos but Spaniards, particularly the Friars. They therefore perceived that they could be benefitted greatly if the Spaniards were driven out. In line with their liberal bourgeoisie ideology, they also sought the establishment of a more democratic republic without the absolutist and oppressive features of Spanish colonial rule.

The Filipino proletariat was also already present as a class. Then, as now, they composed the minority of the population. Its class consciousness was not yet evident. In fact, it had no independent organizations. The first labor unions would not be organized until the 1900's.

Since there existed no specific organizational form of a political party, there was neither a written nor formal political line. However, elements of a political
line that could unite the different classes can be easily derived from the conditions under Spanish colonial rule. One such element was clearly independence from Spain, i.e. anti-colonialism. Another was partial anti-feudalism. It was partial because it was directed only against Spanish landlords and not against Filipino landlords. This was so because the Filipino landholdings were insignificant when compared to that of the Spaniards. A third element is more political in nature; what we now call civil liberties.

On the matter of strategy, two developments can be traced. The first is the development of reformism, i.e. lobbying with the Spanish government. Reformism was particularly true within the illustrados and was best exemplified by Dr. Jose Rizal, the Philippines' national hero, who espoused a non-violent form of struggle. The other strategy developed from the series of localized peasant revolts that were presented earlier. Both these developments would meet in the strategy advocated by Andres Bonifacio and the Katipunan which called for the conduct of an armed struggle against the national colonial government on the common issue of national independence.

Thus, it can be said that Bonifacio, in uniting the various classes in the struggle against the Spanish, was exercising not only leadership of his own class but a UF leadership. We must interpret the revolution of 1896 not merely as the revolt of the Katipunan but as the revolt of
all the formal and non-formal Filipino organizations which took part in and supported the struggle against Spain.

In contemporary CPP terms, the revolution of 1896 can be interpreted as a united front composed of Filipino peasants, landlords, proletariat and bourgeoisie, using a political line that was anti-colonial and anti-feudal with armed struggle as the strategy. The leading ideology was liberal capitalism. This ideology was dominant not only among the illustrados but among the proletariat as well. The peasants' ideology was milleniarism. These ideologies were united along a political line of national independence and a strategy of armed revolution in the struggle against Spanish colonialism. Thus, the revolution of 1896 was of a united front composed of classes with different ideologies but was united around a common political line and against a common target.

The political line was adequate for the purpose of uniting the different classes in an armed revolution against Spain. However, it was not comprehensive enough to include the alternative social and political systems. While it was clear about the political goal of driving away Spain and putting up a Filipino government, it was not clear about the form of that government. It was even less clear on the social alternatives. This led to subsequent peasant revolts against the emergent Filipino landlords, most of whom were active in the struggle against Spain.
There was another united front angle in the 1896 revolution against Spain. This was the international united front with the United States against Spain. This united front with the US was to cause more problems than expected by the Filipino illustrados who were the main UF participants. Representing a more advanced capitalist state than Spain, the US proved to be more ideologically, economically, and politically skilled to deal with succeeding Philippine insurrections. These insurrections ushered in the next development stage of united front in the Philippines.

**United Front Against US Colonialism**

The united front forged during the 1896 revolution was not without its problems. As the united front became more involved in a protracted struggle against Spain, the Katipunan became increasingly rent by internal disputes that revolved around the twin issues of leadership and direction. The principal parties were led by Bonifacio and Emilio Aguinaldo, a General of the revolutionary forces who was an illustrado town mayor under the Spanish colonial government. In a revolutionary council meeting in March 1897, Aguinaldo was elected and subsequently, designated President of the provisional revolutionary government. This paved the way for his consolidation of power within the revolutionary movement.
Subsequently, Bonifacio was arrested by forces loyal to Aguinaldo in an incident still clouded in dispute. The former was later executed on 10 May 1897. This development shows how deep the rifts were within the movement.

Thus, Aguinaldo became the undisputed leader of the 1896 revolution. Rebel fortunes were later to turn for the worse. This culminated in Aguinaldo's surrender to the Spanish authorities and his agreement to go on exile in Hong Kong in exchange for 800,000 pesos. While on exile in Hong Kong, Aguinaldo explored UF possibilities with the US, which by then had conflicts with Spain. He peddled himself to be the legitimate leader of the unfinished revolution in the Philippines. Aguinaldo then promised partisan support to the projected US involvement in the country in exchange for recognition of Philippine independence upon termination of Spanish-American hostilities. (5)

On 25 April 1898, the US declared war on Spain. In the decisive battle of Manila Bay on 1 May 1898, the US Fleet under Admiral Dewey defeated the Spanish Armada. The Battle of Manila Bay precipitated the occupation and colonization of the Philippines by the United States.

Aguinaldo returned to Manila together with the US occupational forces on 19 May 1898. On 12 June 1898, he proclaimed an independent Republic of the Philippines in ceremonies held in Kawit, Cavite. He declared himself the first President of the Republic. However, the US refused
to recognize neither the independence of the Philippines nor the Presidency of Aguinaldo. At the conclusion of the Spanish-American war, the Philippines was ceded to the US by Spain by virtue of the Treaty of Paris that took effect on 10 December 1898. This refusal of the US to recognize Philippine independence precipitated the second struggle for national independence that was to be suppressed only in 1903. Casualties resulting from this second struggle for independence are estimated to be 4,000 US, 16,000 Filipino troops and 200,000 civilians dead. (6)

With the entry of the US and its colonization of the Philippines, the premises of the united front during the 1896 revolution changed. The united front eventually broke up, not so much because of US superiority as much as it was because of conflicts within the UF itself.

Generally, the peasants continued to fight, both with the regular Filipino forces and later, with the guerilla forces that fought against American occupational forces. It can be safely assumed that these peasants were motivated by a combination of nationalism and their class interest that was carried over from the revolution of 1896.

As for the proletariat, it started to develop its consciousness. This was expressed in the formation of labor unions and similar organizations. The beginnings of a socialist consciousness began to emerge. However, all these were subordinated to the nationalist sentiments that
was now directed against American, rather than Spanish, colonialism. On the whole, the peasant and proletarian classes agreed on the bases for the struggle against the US colonizers.

The picture was the reverse within the illustrado class. It was among the illustrados that the conflicts became so pronounced and intensive that it led to the break up of the united front. A minority sector of the class, mainly the bigger landlords and bourgeoisie, soon accepted the reality of US rule. However, the majority continued to adhere to the political line of national independence. A further break within the majority sector occurred over the issue of strategy for the struggle. As was the case during the Spanish colonial period, the revolutionaries were divided between the issue of reformism versus armed strategy for the struggle. The former adopted a lobbyist position reminiscent of Rizal while the latter persisted on the conduct of a protracted war as Bonifacio did.

Applying CPP theories on class and class interest as discussed previously, the decline of illustrado opposition to US colonial rule can be interpreted as a logical consequence of their class interest. Comprised mainly of the educated elite, the illustrado class can be said to have the class interest of the landlord and the bourgeoisie classes. Economically and socially, these interests could be served and accommodated within the framework of American
colonial rule. In contrast to oppressive Spanish rule, the US colonial rule showed signs of liberalism. As early as July 1902, the US Congress passed the Philippine Organic Act that provided, among others, a Philippine Legislature composed of two houses, a Bill of Rights, and a disestablished Catholic Church. This single piece of legislation addressed the most basic of the causes which coalesced the various classes into a workable united front during the 1896 revolution.

Additionally, US authorities extended political accommodation to the illustrado class. Such accommodation included the promise of a gradual Filipinization of the colonial government and eventual Philippine independence. Thus, the illustrado class became convinced that the strategy of reformism was the more effective way to achieve the aims of the revolution.

Given this abdication of united front leadership by the illustrado class, at least over the original UF line of anti-colonialism and anti-feudalism, which class could then come forward and lead a new united front? Applying CPP theory, the class that could conceivably lead a new united front would be the proletariat. The CPP considers that the highest form of capitalism is imperialism. The CPP further considers the proletariat to have an ideology superior to that of the imperialists. Since the CPP theorizes that only the class that has an ideology superior to that of the
enemy can unite and lead the various classes in a united front struggle against that same enemy, then only the proletariat can effectively lead a new united front. (7)

The assumption of leadership by the proletariat is easier said than done. Before the proletariat could lead, it needs to attain a high level of class consciousness and organizational capability. This meant the elevation of its organizational expressions from the level of labor unions and similar organizations to the level of a political party. Assumption of leadership also meant the formulation of a political line that could unite the various classes the united front seeks to attract. In the context of the prevailing situation, as interpreted along CPP lines, the new political line should include the reinterpretation of the old nationalist line. The new line should not limit itself to the old issues of colonialism and feudalism that targeted foreign political rule but should now include the issues of foreign and domestic imperialism and bureaucrat capitalism. This meant that the emerging local elite who were proving to be oppressive were also to be targeted. This is in sharp contrast to the united front of 1896 where only the Spaniards were the targets of the struggle.

This abdication of united front leadership by the illustrados and the challenge to the proletariat to assume such leadership leads to the next stage of united front experience among earlier Filipino revolutionary movements.
United Front Efforts of the PKP

The Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) was founded on November 7, 1930. The event was hailed by its Marxist leaders as serving "to signify that the Filipino working class had advanced ideologically, politically, and organizationally and had started to seek leadership of the Philippine revolution." (8) The emergence of a working class party, committed to the application of Marxist-Leninist theory to the Philippine revolutionary scenario marks the beginning of a new revolutionary movement.

During the initial stages of its existence, the PKP was based in the urban areas in and around Manila where the mass of Filipino workers was concentrated. PKP forays on propaganda and organization were met with some degree of success. This initial PKP success was evidenced by the rapid expansion of PKP activities. However, these PKP activities were not left unnoticed. After only a short period, government forces began taking punitive actions against the PKP. Ironically, government punitive actions commenced on Labor Day, 1 May 1931. This resulted in the arrest and detention of PKP cadre, leaders, and members. Mass organizations under PKP leadership, to include those organizations that projected even remote support for the PKP became government targets. Government punitive actions culminated in the Philippine Supreme Court decision to declare the PKP and its support organizations illegal. (9)
Meanwhile, another organization was evolving in the countryside. In the period that the PKP was outlawed, a socialist movement based on a loose coalition of peasants and agricultural workers in Central Luzon began to form. Out of this movement emerged the Socialist Party of the Philippines (SPP). It was a socialist movement that sought the leadership of the struggle of the peasant and rural proletariat. The socialist party succeeded in expressing the class interests of both the peasants and the rural proletariat in the vital Central Luzon region. (10)

It was also at about this time that an illusitro coalition of landlords and bourgeoisie was pursuing a reformist strategy for national independence. It was a fairly large united front that included among its ranks not only landlords and big bourgeoisie but workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie as well. On the other hand, various other groups composed primarily of peasants and rural proletariat occasionally rose in independent local revolts similar to the peasant revolts during the Spanish colonial period. As was the case during the Spanish period, there was no conscious effort to unite these small sporadic and geographically widespread uprisings. Invariably, these local uprisings were neutralized through the conduct of a systematic and bloody pacification campaign by American occupation forces.
Such was the Philippine revolutionary scenario. There was no unity of effort, no coordination among the different movements. This state of affairs was harshly criticized by the re-established Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) some thirty five (35) years later. In *Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party*, the CPP took the PKP to task for not formulating a united front political line that could have integrated the class interests of the peasantry and the two lower strata of the bourgeoisie with the class interest of the proletariat. This PKP failure caused it to lose the opportunity of forging and leading a united front in a common struggle against US imperialism and colonialism. Perhaps the PKP could have eventually done so. However, it was early on declared illegal and dramatically crippled before it could become politically and organizationally more adept. Even the basic issue of strategy was not clearly established when the PKP was declared an illegal organization.

However, the rise of Fascism, represented by the Axis powers, brought forth the formulation of a political line that would hasten the formation of a broad based UF in the Philippines and propel the PKP to the leadership of such. It was an anti-fascist line that brought together the capitalist countries of the world and the Soviet Union in an international UF. This united front was in response to the threat resulting from the alliance among the Axis
powers. While international in origin, this popular front against the Axis powers found local application in the Philippines. (11)

In accordance with this anti-fascist popular front, the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines granted conditional pardon to the leaders and cadre of the PKP arrested in 1931-32. Upon their release, these PKP personalities sought a merger with the SPP. The merger was not merely a united front move. It was an effort to unite the two parties that espoused socialist ideas into a single Marxist party. The merged party assumed the name of the PKP. In compliance to the conditions of their pardon, PKP leaders included in the new PKP Constitution an explicit disavowal of armed struggle against the government. The PKP subsequently offered its help in anti-Japanese activities. (12) From 1938 to 1942, the merged PKP party leadership concentrated its efforts in reformist activities that centered on the defense of civil liberties. Urban work took precedence over rural work. Leading party cadre soon participated in elections held under the auspices of the Philippine Commonwealth. (13)

With the advent Japanese invasion and occupation, two elements of the anti-fascist political line fell into place. First, the principal target became clear - Japanese colonialism. Under the conditions of Japanese occupation the main form of struggle could only be an armed struggle.
For the PKP, this meant the formation of an armed organization to wage the anti-Japanese armed struggle. The PKP choice of a name for such an armed organization clearly reflected the PKP political line. The armed organization was called Hukbong Magpapalaya ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon or Hukbalahap (People's Liberation Army against the Japanese). The direct reference to the Japanese was designed to shroud the class struggle the PKP wanted to eventually wage. In addition to the regular squadrons of Hukbalahap fighters, the PKP also organized a rural-based support organization that was designated the Barrio Defense Unit Corps (BUDC). The primary duty of the BUDC was to support Hukbalahap units in the field.(14)

The PKP-Hukbalahap-BUDC was not the only Japanese resistance force. Various guerilla organizations resisted Japanese occupation forces. There was also the government in exile in the US. All of these were objectively part of a united front against the Japanese. At no time however, was a formal united front establishment attempted among the various anti-Japanese forces, not even among the guerilla organizations other than the Hukbalahap. This was despite the common pro-American and anti-Japanese feelings among them. The CPP further criticized the PKP for the latter's lack of vision especially towards the end of World War II. According to the CPP, the return of US forces meant the reimposition of US imperialist rule.
According to the CPP, the PKP should have initiated the formation of a united front that would have resisted renewed American imperialism. Anti-imperialist propaganda and political education among the masses should have been conducted to prepare the minds of the masses for the anti-US struggle. (15)

After the war, the PKP shifted its political line and adopted a new strategy for struggle. It decided to adopt the parliamentary form of struggle. Thereupon, the Hukbalahap was disbanded as an armed organization and transformed into the HukVets. The PKP peasant base was likewise organized into an overt and legal peasant united front organization. It was called the Pambansang Kaisahan ng Magbubukid (PKM) or National Peasants Union. In the urban areas, PKP controlled and influenced labor groups were organized into a labor alliance called the Congress of Labor Unions (CLO). The PKP also set up a political alliance with various anti-Japanese and collaborationist groups. These groups were comprised mainly of petty and national bourgeoisie that planned to participate in the projected elections. The resulting political group was called the Grand Alliance. (16)

This political party fielded candidates in the elections. However, winning party candidates were not allowed to assume the positions they won. As a result of this, and growing government repression against PKP legal
organizations, the PKP decided to drop the parliamentary form of struggle and resume the armed mode of struggle. This resulted in the reactivation of disbanded Hukbalahap units. The new armed organization was named the Hukbong Magpapalaya ng Bayan - HMB or HUKs - (National Liberation Army). The designation depicted the central PKP line of national liberation. In a parallel move, the PKP pulled out all cadre from its legal united front organizations and deployed them in the armed struggle.

The absence of organizational forms other than the PKP/HMB during the conduct of the armed struggle suggests that the PKP did not forge united front relationships in support of the struggle. Of course, there was UF between the proletariat and the peasantry, as represented by the PKP and HMB respectively. However, there was no evident participation of bourgeoisie organizations in the PKP movement. This could be the result of the governments' repressive policy against all forms of legal struggles perceived to be supportive of the PKP/HMB.

However, the CPP looks at this as the result of the PKP's incorrect understanding of the role of UF in the conduct of an armed struggle. The CPP accuses the PKP of looking at united front building as equivalent to parliamentary struggle. So, when the PKP resumed the armed struggle, it dropped UF building because it looked at it as a form of struggle inconsistent with its current armed
strategy. The PKP failed to see the potential for support
united front can generate for the armed struggle. (17)

The PKP decided to revert back to a parliamentary
form of struggle after its military defeat. Its social
programs and political line remained basically the same
i.e. anti-imperialist and anti-feudal. However, the PKP
was not able to develop effective organizations to conduct
united front work with the other classes and sectors of
Philippine society. Despite this shift in strategy, the
PKP remained an illegal organization and eventually
disintegrated organizationally.

The PKP struggle took an interesting twist in 1974
when it decided to enter into a political settlement with
the Philippine government. At about that time, the PKP
movement was in a state of almost total collapse. In
elaborate ceremonies held in Central Luzon, PKP leaders and
cadre surrendered en masse. The mass surrender was to
signify the PKP's formal renunciation of armed struggle as
a strategy for the movement. The PKP also declared its
support for government programs it considered progressive
thus, deserving of its support. In effect, the PKP entered
into a partial and limited UF with the government.

The PKP justified its relations with government by
labelling it an anti-feudal united front. Afterall, the
government was then in the process of implementing a
comprehensive land reform program. The PKP also called
its alliance with the government an anti-imperialist united front. The PKP rationale for was the governments’ more independent stand vis-a-vis the United States. This was true in both the political and economic sense.

Economically, the Philippines sought to sever the economic umbilical cord to the US by finding other markets for its traditional export products. Such products, mainly minerals, sugar and copra, were then being subjected to increasingly restrictive US quota requirements.

Politically, the Philippines was then starting to formulate a more independent foreign policy. This was manifested in a diplomatic offensive designed to open economic and diplomatic relations with eastern bloc countries.

The CPP criticized as unacceptable the rationale for the PKP alliance with the government. The CPP accused the PKP of abdicating the latter’s responsibility to lead the united front when it chose to support the Philippine government. Perhaps, the PKP had its own organizational interests in mind when it chose to come to terms with the government. The PKP had hoped that in entering into a political settlement with the government, it could regain its organizational strength. After all, part of the deal was the release of detained PKP leaders and cadre. With this core of leaders and cadre released and freed from government repression, the PKP could hope for renewed

-76-
organizational activities. This could conceivably result in the formation of organizations that are supportive of the PKP or at least, united front relationships with other organizations could be developed. This could then result in the expansion of PKP influence. Such a scenario was undoubtedly appealing to PKP leaders, considering the moribund state of the organization.

The CPP views the PKP move as a virtual capitulation to the state. The CPP looks at this as a betrayal of the revolutionary will of the people. It goes on to say that "...no genuine Marxist-Leninist party would ever consider surrendering to or seeking amnesty from the enemy. To do so would be to betray the fighting masses, promote capitulation and serve the enemy...". (18) After the events of 1974, the PKP ceased to exist as a viable and credible revolutionary movement. Following the PKP demise came the rise to revolutionary prominence of the breakaway group of young ideologues and peasant fighters who, only five short years before, decided to establish the Communist Party of the Philippines.
NOTES


3. ibid., p.10

4. ibid., p.11


6. Kessler, Rebellion and Repression p.10

7. CPP, Reactify Errors and Rebuild the Party, 1968

8. CPP, Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party, 1968 p.4

9. ibid., p.5

10. ibid., p.18

11. ibid., p.18

12. ibid., pp.20-21

13. ibid., p.19

14. ibid., p.22

15. ibid., p.8

16. ibid., p.42

17. ibid., p.23

18 ibid., p.22
CHAPTER V
CPP UNITED FRONT STRATEGY AND PRACTICE

Introduction

The CPP theory and practice of united front is clearly superior to that of the PKP or all the earlier revolutionary movements in the Philippines. At the very least, the proliferation of organizations influenced, led, and controlled by the CPP will support this conclusion. However, the effectiveness of the CPP united front work should not be judged on the basis of organizational indicators alone. Consistent with the emphasis of this thesis, perhaps the better measure of superiority would be the level of success the CPP has had in utilizing such UF organizations in advancing its revolutionary struggle. The purpose of this Chapter then is to discuss CPP strategies in united front building and help the reader appreciate how the Party had been able to mobilize a significant sector of Philippine society to support, if not actively participate in the revolutionary struggle the CPP is waging.

Formulation of the Political Line

The analysis of CPP UF work must start with a look at the political line formulated to serve the movement and determine to what extent this line had been propagated and accepted by the various classes it seeks to unite in the
collective struggle. As discussed earlier, what the CPP seeks to propagate is not its Marxist ideology but a political line that can unite the various forces that can collectively wage the revolutionary struggle. This is the result of the CPP’s realization that its Marxist ideology is, as yet, not acceptable to the majority of Philippine society. Hence, the Party formulated a political line it deems acceptable to the majority of Filipinos. With it, the CPP seeks to unite all the democratic and nationalist forces and mobilize them to support or actively engage in the revolution.

The CPP enjoyed at least two advantages over the PKP in the task of formulating a political line. First, the CPP had greater access to Marxist literature than the PKP, particularly to the works of Mao Tse-Tung. Mao’s writings give very explicit explanations of the concept of united front. Second, the CPP’s adoption of Mao’s works as its principal source of Marxist theory enabled it to apply such theory to the Philippine situation as close to reality as can be. Maoist theories, applied directly to Philippine situations with minimal adjustments, tend to fit reality. This is due to the similarity of pre-revolutionary Chinese social structures to those of the Philippines. This is particularly true among the peasants. Thus, the CPP was able to undertake a realistic class analysis of Philippine society along classic Maoist lines. As for the PKP, its
main source of Marxist theory was Soviet literature, and the emphasis therein was on the urban proletariat. This was far removed from existing Philippine conditions.

Another aspect of Maoist theory that helped the CPP formulate a political line more effectively than the PKP is that, unlike Russia, China was a former semi-colony. China suffered from Japanese occupation like the Philippines. Thus, Mao's writings against imperialism found immediate local application in the Philippines. His writings on the concept of a people's protracted war were also directly applicable to the Philippine scene.

Given these theoretical influences and assistance, the CPP formulated a political line that includes the following elements: (1)

1. The existing Philippine society is semi-colonial and semi-feudal. The modes of production in this social formation are imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism. (2)

2. The classes in Philippine society can be classified into two groups:

1) target forces or those who are expected to oppose the revolution e.g. imperialists, comprador big bourgeoisie, landlords, and bureaucratic capitalists.

2) motive forces or those who are expected to participate and/or support the revolution e.g. peasants, proletariat, petty and national bourgeoisie. (3)
3. The main strategy for the struggle would be an armed revolution conducted in a people's protracted war. (4)

4) The alternative government would be a people's democratic republic in a national democratic society. (5)

The CPP initially gave emphasis on organization or party building activities. Hand in hand with this was the building up of the NPA to conduct the armed struggle. Subsequently, the CPP engaged in united front work to popularize and propagate its political line of national democracy. The CPP places extreme importance to its task of united front building. Apart from the parliamentary and armed struggles, the CPP believes that a united front with all progressive classes and sectors of Philippine society is as important and powerful a tool in the conduct of the revolutionary struggle. The CPP expects to expand its influence over such groups and gather their support and cooperation in the conduct of the people's democratic revolution.

CPP Policies in United Front Work

CPP united front work is guided by a set of six (6) policies. (6) These generally flow from the basic concepts related to UF discussed in Chapter 3. These policies are:

1) The national united front must be under the leadership of the Party. This flows from Maoist theories regarding the conduct of a protracted struggle. (7)
means that the CPP exercises authority over the UF through the formation of party cells among secret and open mass organizations within the classes and sectors that compose the UF. These party cells and secret movements within the open mass organizations implement party plans through the control and manipulation of the activities of the latter.

2) The national united front must work for the advancement of the armed struggle. In contrast to the concept of the PKP that united front is in itself the form of struggle, the CPP views united front as supportive to the conduct of the armed struggle. The revolutionary UF is not limited to the development of the legal, parliamentary struggle. The united front must endeavor to work for the promotion of the armed struggle. This could be done through the formation of alliances with varied classes and sectors of society to expand CPP influence and muster support for the armed struggle being waged by the NPA. United front building can also involve the generation of moral and financial support to the NPA. (8)

3) The program of the national united front must coincide with and carry out the CPP's program for a national democratic revolution. In essence, this means the "...abolition of feudalism and the free distribution of land to the peasants; the nationalization of industries and business empires owned or controlled by foreigners and/or local big bourgeoisie; the confiscation of factories owned
by the state; the confiscation of properties owned by bureaucrat capitalists; the struggle for democratic rights as against that of fascism; and, the establishment of a united front or coalition government where the proletariat will play the leading role and participated in by all the democratic classes of society..."(9)

4) The national united front does not necessarily have to be of a definite organizational form. For the CPP, a united front does not have to be of a specific form for it to be effective. What is paramount is for the UF to be a strong alliance between the peasants and the proletariat which can be mobilized along the party political line. Nevertheless, when UF organizations become extensive and stable, they may assume definite organizational forms.(10)

5) The formation of the united front must be based on the strength of the revolutionary force. The CPP will only be ready to seek alliance with other forces if its own armed force is already strong. In seeking such alliances, the CPP places great weight on the relative power of its forces and the stability of its organization.

6) The independence and initiative of the party on ideological politics and organization within the united front must be maintained. The CPP will not tie itself completely with the UF. Neither will the united front be a hindrance to the conduct of party revolutionary activities, especially the advancement of the armed struggle and the
launching of legal and semi-legal mass actions. The CPP also insists on maintaining its independence and freedom of ideology in advancing its political lines and programs. It reserves the right to act outside the united front but, accedes to have its plans pass the other parties to the UF for perusal prior to implementation. (11)

The CPP makes it clear that it will maintain its own ideology. The Party will never set aside its theories and principles in favor of those of the united front. The CPP will not agree to the infiltration, assimilation or dissolution of its organization as a consequence of its merging with, or subordination to, a united front.

Notwithstanding these general policy guidelines, the CPP had been mature enough to adjust its united front work in reaction to changing trends in Philippine political, social and economic conditions. The CPP, from time to time, had to fine tune its united front program. Such adjustments started as early as November 1977 when the NDF Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) urged the formation of a national united front and reaffirmed the initial ten-point UF program. This initial program was promulgated in April 1973. In 1982, the CPP drafted a program that was never published. Then, on January 1 1985, the party issued a draft program that contained the NDF’s 12-point program. This manifests the Party’s flexibility in adapting to the changing conditions in the Philippines.
NDF Twelve Point Program

The twelve-point program acts as the controlling set of CPP objectives in so far as the conduct of united front work and organization of a nationwide UF is concerned. It prescribes the objectives of the entire united front effort and identifies the targets of such. The following is the twelve-point program of the CPP.(12)

1) Unite the Filipino people to overthrow the tyrannical rule of US imperialism and the local reactionaries.

2) Wage a people's war to win a total nationwide victory.

3) Establish a democratic coalition government and a people's democratic republic.

4) Integrate the revolutionary armed forces into a single national revolutionary army.

5) Uphold and promote the free exercise of the people's democratic rights.

6) Terminate all unequal relations with the US and all other foreign entities.

7) Complete the process of genuine land reform, raise rural production through cooperation and modernized agriculture.

8) Carry out national industrialization as the leading factor in economic development.

9) Guarantee the right to employment, raise the people's living standards and expand social services the soonest after establishing democratic state power.

10) Promote a patriotic, scientific and popular culture and ensure free public education.

11) Respect and foster the self-determination of the Moro and Cordillera people and all ethnic minorities.

12) Adopt and practice a revolutionary, independent and peace loving foreign policy.
The above cited 12-point program can be considered as the specific expression of the CPP political line. It explicitly states the CPP/NPA/NDF objectives in terms that are acceptable to various classes of Philippine society. The success of the Party’s UF program is heavily dependent on the acceptance of this CPP political platform by the classes and sectors of society the CPP hopes to unite in the collective struggle. These 12 policy statements have guided CPP UF efforts since 1985.

CPP Activities in United Front Building

CPP united front work consists primarily of three basic forms of activity designed to develop a legal and open mass movement that is supportive of the CPP struggle. These activities are propaganda, education and organizing work. This section discusses briefly such activities according to the CPP’s interpretation and the attendant features of each activity.

Propaganda encompasses all forms and methods the CPP uses to broadcast and popularize its political line and ideological stand. These include oral propaganda in the form of speeches, teach-ins, group discussions and word of mouth dissemination of CPP lines; audio-visual propaganda in the form of plays, rallies, mass actions and visual propaganda such as paintings, graffiti, drawings and many more. All of these are designed to heighten the
consciousness of the masses and mobilize them into action against anti-revolutionists. Propaganda work prepares the mind of the masses to unite with the progressive classes, i.e. the proletariat as represented by the CPP, and to participate in the various activities of and support the objectives and tasks of the revolution.

Education work essentially has the same objectives as propaganda. Both aim to raise the political consciousness of the masses for a more active and thorough involvement in revolutionary work. What makes education work different is that it is a more formal, concentrated and systematic study of the revolution by organized masses. CPP education work consists of two types of courses; the general and special mass courses. The former tackles comprehensively the CPP's interpretation of the history of the Philippines, the basic problems of its society and the fundamental principles and tasks of the CPP revolution. The latter clarifies the history, characteristics and revolutionary solutions to the principal problems of the class or sector being organized and mobilized. These special mass courses are focused on the classes or sectors of society where the CPP is to be engaged in organizing work. According to the CPP, education places the participation of the masses in the revolutionary struggle on a firm and strong theoretical footing that helps link the moves of all the motive forces and classes to those of the CPP.
Organizing work consists of the establishment of mass organizations that are united through the correct political line, i.e. the CPP national democratic line. CPP organizing work is guided by two basic principles. First, the Party must learn to rely on and trust the mass of the class or sector that it is organizing. This is premised on the CPP assertion that whenever the masses have completely understood and accepted the goals of the revolution, they will be more effective allies of the revolution. The other principle involves solid organizing work among the masses.

To the CPP, gaining influence over the masses is not enough; the masses must be solidly organized so that they will be strongly united and prepared for the revolutionary struggle. Solid organizing entails the formation of tightly-knit, highly-motivated, and well-led organizations. The CPP aims to make the masses the firm foundation of the revolution. This underscores the importance of solid organizing among the masses.

Organizing work is not limited to legal and open organizing. It also involves the formation of illegal, underground organizations. These Party-led underground organizations form the backbone of the revolutionary mass movement. CPP organizing work revolves around the so-called ND-UG-MO relationship. This is where CPP cadre (ND) belonging to CPP underground organizations (UG) discretely manipulate the activities of overt legal mass
organizations (MO) to conform with the Party’s programs and objectives.

Some examples of ND-UG-MO relationships include the Kabataang Makabayan-KM (UG) which effectively controls the League of Filipino Students-LFS (MO), the overt and legal student organization active in the militant student movement. In the Labor front, the Katipunan ng Samahang Manggagawa-KSM (UG) steers the activities of the Kilusan Mayo Uno-KMU(MO), the CPP sponsored labor united front organization. Several such covert organizations have been formed by the CPP to establish UF relationships with, and eventually gain control over, overt and legal sectoral mass organizations. (14)

CPP organizing work is delineated according to the target class or sector of society. We will now proceed to the discussion of the Party’s organizing work among what it identified as the motive forces or the forces that are expected to support the revolution. These forces include the peasants, the proletariat, the urban poor and, the petty and national bourgeoisie or the middle forces. (15)

**Peasant Organizing Work**

CPP organizing work among the peasants is guided by its political line of national democracy and its strategy of armed struggle. In line with these, the CPP first built the NPA as a united front organization for the armed
struggle. The united front character of the NPA is expressed organizationally in its composition. Most of the members of the NPA are peasants although there are always party members that represent the proletariat in each of the NPA formations. The NPA's united front character is expressed politically in its adoption of the national democratic political line as its program. The CPP highlights the anti-feudal element of the national democratic political line in its united front work among the peasants.

Other than conducting united front work through the NPA as a united front organization, the CPP also seeks a broader united front among the peasants in the form of an anti-feudal united front. The CPP and NPA started by propagating a modest land reform program. This program set out by targeting rent and loan interest reduction. This was designed to weaken the hold of the landlords on the tenants and heighten the conflict between these two classes. The ultimate objective of this program is the free transfer of land ownership to the peasants. Organizationally, this anti-feudal united front took the form of non-political peasant organizations such as cooperatives and similar organizations.

The CPP initially attempted to openly organize the peasants. This ill-fated attempt was manifested in the organization of the Pagkakaisa ng Magsasaka ng Pilipinas
or the Union of Filipino Farmers. The open and legal mode of organizing was abandoned when landlord reaction to (PMP) or Union of Filipino Farmers. The open and legal mode of organizing work was abandoned when landowner reaction to the activities of the PMP was so hostile and overbearing that the PMP became inutile. Perhaps more importantly, Party cadre immersed within the PMP were threatened with exposure. As a result of this experience, the CPP shied away from such aboveground organizing work. Various attempts at this form of organizing would later be made at local levels but these too were of limited success. Hence, CPP peasant organizing work remained mainly clandestine.

CPP organizing work was, and continues to be, based on the party analysis of the peasant class. Guided by Maoist doctrine and benefitting from the surveys conducted by various CPP/NPA units, the Party subdivided the peasant class into three substrata: the rich, middle and poor peasants. This stratification was based on the degree of land ownership. CPP cadre based their organizing work on such stratification to suit the particular target subclass. The system for peasant organizing work was codified in the CPP document "Revolutionary Guide to Land Reform." This document discusses issues pertaining to the agrarian situation in the Philippines and prescribes actions necessary to rectify the identified imbalances.
The document also indicates the proper propaganda lines and methods of exploiting agrarian issues.

In 1976, the CPP published "Our Urgent Tasks" (OUT). This document further systematized the CPP political and organizational line among peasants. Before the publication of "OUT", CPP UF work among the peasants emphasized the military support role of these organizations vis-a-vis the NPA. They were reduced to being mainly support organizations of the NPA with little political work of their own. The "OUT" and subsequent CPP documents rectified the situation. These documents emphasized the formation of a distinct revolutionary movement among the peasants. Though still linked to the NPA, the peasant movement was to have its own agenda for developing various forms of organizations to wage the anti-feudal political struggle. The united front organizational line became more realistic and utile when CPP cells began to be established within peasant organizations. These organizations became the core of militant rural mass movements that the party could mobilize in support of CPP/NPA activities.

At this point, it would be important to distinguish CPP united front work from recruitment activities among the peasants. Party building i.e. recruitment, among peasants does not consist only of the propagation of the political line. It seeks to make the prospective party
member adopt the Marxist ideology, thus changing his class interest and standpoint. In united front building, it is not necessary to make the peasant change his class interest, standpoint, or ideology. What UF seeks is for the peasant to interpret his class standpoint and interest in political terms along the CPP anti-feudal, anti-imperialist and anti-bureaucratic capitalist political line. As discussed earlier, the CPP does not expect the majority of the peasants to accept its Marxist ideology and join the CPP. However, the Party expects the peasants to accept the national democratic political line and thus, will support the struggle being waged by the CPP.

Putting it in another way, the CPP expects to exercise leadership and influence over the peasantry not directly through its ideology. The CPP achieves such influence and leadership through its propagation of the national democratic political line and its initiative in organizing the peasants into various organizations it can mobilize into its support. The relative success of the CPP in its united front work among peasants can be appreciated when we compare its reported organizational strength and the number of rural villages reportedly under its influence. Official government reports indicate that about 19% of the Philippines’ Barangays or villages are CPP controlled or influenced. Additionally, another 17%
are threatened by insurgent activity. These figures give a very clear indication how CPP united front work can expand the Party's limited ideological and organizational reach.

In its united front work among peasants, the CPP itself initiates, then leads, peasant organizations. There had been no significant instances where the Party had to deal with peasant organizations that have been initiated and/or led by non-party elements. In contrast to this situation, the CPP has had to cope with non-party led or initiated organizations in its united front work among the other motive classes. Ironically, such a situation was most pronounced in the CPP united front work among the class it projects to represent - the Proletariat.

UF Work Among The Proletariat

Being a latecomer, so to speak, on the labor scene, the CPP had to deal with various forms of organizations of workers when it set out to create a labor-based united front. The existing trade/labor unions and federations reflected various levels of worker consciousness and interests. The first job that had to be done then was to determine how the Party line could be presented to and accepted by this diverse collection of labor-based organizations. After this, an umbrella organization that
could be projected as representative of the collective interests of the group had to be organized. In both these tasks, the CPP had been very effective.

The CPP has always considered the working class to be the vanguard of the revolution. According to the Party, the proletariat is the most oppressed class, and as such, it can be easily motivated and induced into revolutionary action when properly organized, led, and directed. Also, the sheer numbers and high visibility of the mainly urban based workers gives the proletariat great potential for destabilization when mobilized. Thus, the CPP objective becomes the politicization and mobilization of the mass of workers to expand the revolutionary mass movement. The militant mass movement then helps bring about the proper revolutionary situation that can facilitate the CPP quest for state power. (20)

CPP united front work among the proletariat goes beyond the propagation of the national democratic political line. As a class, the workers are considered by the CPP to be receptive not only of the national democratic political line but also to the concepts of socialism and Marxism. Thus, in contrast to its united front work among the peasants, the CPP seeks not only united front relationships with the working class but outright membership in the CPP. However, given the weak socialist tradition among Filipino workers, and the
relative underdevelopment of the labor movement as a whole, the CPP had been very cautious in its party building efforts among the proletariat. It had concentrated more on the forging of united front relations with organizations within the labor sector and exerting influence over them.

The CPP had to start with a modest political line in its united front work among the proletariat. Initially, the Party promoted militant trade unionism and the use of strikes as the main expressions (in fact, weapons) of the worker’s struggle. The CPP limited itself to the exploitation of concrete issues that had a direct bearing on the workers. Issues like wages, working conditions, unfair labor practices and the like were exploited. These issues became the worker’s rallying points in their conduct of protest actions. Despite its desire to propagate socialist and Marxist thought among the proletariat, the CPP limited such actions to clandestine study groups/cells composed of advanced worker activists. These advanced elements from the worker’s ranks became the party cadre through whom the CPP effected the massive infiltration and politicization of the labor movement.

Rather than organizing its own labor unions, the CPP sought to infiltrate existing labor organizations such as unions and union federations. The CPP gains influence
and control over these target organizations through a highly developed modus operandi. This involves the infiltration of party cadre into the target organizations and the formation of front organizations that serve as legitimate covers for Party intentions. (21)

CPP infiltration of a target organization starts with the infiltration of party cadre who initially seek positions of influence within the organization like being the Secretary or Public Relations Officer. Eventually, these cadre seek leadership positions. In the process, the activities of said organization become controlled by party elements and are steered on a course in accordance with CPP designs.

On the other hand, CPP front organizations seek UF relations with existing labor organizations and eventually gain control over these target organizations. This is attributable to the better organizational and propaganda skills of the Party. The CPP had been so successful in this endeavor that it succeeded in forging a highly effective labor-based UF organization. In fact, the most mature and stable UF organization the CPP had been able to forge thus far is its labor UF. The Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) or May 1st Movement, the labor UF organized and controlled by the CPP, is today a most formidable force within the proletariat. The KMU's line of "tunay, palaban at makabayanang union" (genuine, militant and nationalist
trade unionism) found wide spread acceptance among the working class. This resulted in the KMU’s phenomenal rise to prominence.

The emergence of the KMU as the leading force within the labor sector becomes all the more impressive when one factor is taken into account. This is the fact that the relative stability of the KMU as a UF organization can be attributed largely to the participation of trade unions and union federations whose earlier growth happened independent of CPP relationships and influence. This clearly indicates the relative success of the CPP in infiltrating and gaining control and influence over targeted labor organizations.

It is safe to assume that recruitment into the CPP is certainly going on from among the members of the KMU. However, the overt leadership of this labor united front will continue to be non-CPP members. CPP elements will remain to shy away from the limelight of overt leadership in the KMU. This is so because of the need for these CPP elements to maintain their cover and maintain the image of the KMU as an independent labor movement. However, the KMU will continue to be under the influence and control of the CPP as exercised by party cadre deeply imbedded within the KMU organization. Thus, the KMU will remain to be a very potent instrument of the CPP in its development of a revolutionary mass movement.
Urban Poor

A new dimension of CPP organizing work is found among that sector of Philippine society that is neither proletariar nor peasant. This is the urban poor sector that shares the commonality of oppression and poverty with the peasants and workers. The CPP has identified it as a motive force that offers a potential for support for the struggle. However, the Party has yet to clearly define the class character and interest of this particular group that is composed mainly of slum dwellers and squatters. There is no question that some of these are workers. Some of them are, at least, semi-proletariat, i.e. not employed regularly but engaged in various sporadic and small time occupations. Like the workers, the urban poor is at varying stages of self-organizing although these tend to be in the form of informal, social based organizations.

In its effort to forge an urban poor based united front, the CPP formulated a political line that was suitable and acceptable to these urban poor communities. This UF line includes demands for urban land reform, employment opportunities, welfare provisions and other issues that are of general concern within these poor communities. As in the case of the UF line for workers, this is not quite the national democratic line. The CPP views this as a necessary aberration because it concludes that the urban poor sector is not yet receptive to the

-100-
abstract ideas of socialism and Marxism. Concrete ideas are deemed to be more utile in raising the political awareness of this sector of society. Again as in the labor sector, the political line of national democracy and its attendant concepts of socialism and Marxism is being propagated only among clandestine study groups composed of advanced urban poor activists. These activists comprise the manpower pool from which the Party will draw the cadre to effect the formation of urban poor UF organizations influenced and controlled by the CPP.

UF Work Among the Middle Forces

In relation to UF building, the CPP considers the petty and national bourgeoisie as the middle forces. These middle forces are those forces who are perceived by the CPP to be in the middle of the political and economic spectrum between the oppressed and exploited masses, i.e. read peasants and proletariat, and the oppressing and ruling classes. Due to this perception, the CPP views the middle forces as strategic allies whose support for or active participation in the revolutionary struggle shifts the critical balance of political forces in favor of the revolutionaries. Thus, the middle forces are critical elements in the CPP insurgency scenario.

The petty bourgeoisie includes the vast majority of the intelligentsia like teachers, student youth, low
income professionals, and minor private and government employes. Also among the petty bourgeoisie are small businessmen, craftsmen and other relatively well paid skilled workers. This group has generally fixed or limited incomes as they possess limited capital or depend on their special skills for a living. They are also oppressed by the forces of feudalism, imperialism and bureaucratic capitalism.

The national bourgeoisie includes businessmen that are involved mainly in small cottage and intermediate industries. Rich peasants and landowners who accept the policies of agrarian reform may also be considered as belonging to the national bourgeoisie. To a lesser extent, they are also oppressed by the same forces of feudalism, imperialism and bureaucrat capitalism. This shared characteristic among the peasants, proletariat, the petty and the national bourgeoisie makes them the forces that can unite under the CPP political line.

The CPP concludes that the middle forces can hasten the formation of a broad based alliance of the people that will become a powerful weapon of the revolution. Such an alliance is to be realized through the organization and mobilization of the middle forces to actively participate in the revolutionary mass movement. The struggle of the middle forces is then to be linked to the struggle of the of peasants and workers and the armed struggle. Because

-102-
of their numbers and influence, the middle forces have the potential of swaying public opinion in favor of, and generating mass support for, the revolution. (22)

The most common understanding of CPP UF work in the Filipino public's mind refers to the Party's UF work among the intelligentsia which is composed mainly of teachers, professionals and the student youth. This is rightly so considering that the intelligentsia has the greatest visibility among all the middle forces. Moreover, the intelligentsia's political consciousness and involvement is the most developed within Philippine society. Thus, the intelligentsia had been a primary object of CPP UF activities. It is among this class, and UF organizations of this class, that the CPP propagates and broadcasts its national democratic line on a nationwide scale.

The intelligentsia is numerically much smaller than either the peasantry or the proletariat. However, its political impact, especially in the open, legal struggle is significantly greater than that of both the peasants and proletariat. Because of this, the CPP considers the acceptance or rejection by this sector of the UF line very critical. The intelligentsia is the primary indicator of the balance of revolutionary forces in the CPP insurgency scenario. The position this sector takes vis-a-vis the struggle affects the balance between the target forces, or
forces opposed to the struggle, and the motive forces, or forces that support the struggle

The CPP and the PKP originally shared a common organization in their UF work among the intelligentsia. This was the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) or nationalist youth that was organized in 1964. The KM was an aboveground legal organization that drew into its ranks the mass of student activists and assumed the vanguard role in the militant student movement in the 1960s. When the CPP broke away from the PKP in 1968, KM cadre were split according to their ideological persuasion (pro-Moscow or pro-Peking). Most of the more politically active, organizationally astute, and ideologically pure cadre joined the CPP. The CPP was perceived to be the true representative of the Marxist-Leninist movement in the Philippines. Soon after the declaration of Martial Law in 1972, the KM was declared an illegal organization, its cadre went underground and thus, ceased to be an open UF organization. In 1983, the CPP reactivated the KM organizationally but this time, purely as a clandestine, underground organization.

As in the case of the proletariat and urban poor, UF work among the intelligentsia involves organizations other than those that are party-led or initiated. CPP UF work within this sector follows the pattern of proletariat organizing work. However, because of the character of
In this sector, particularly the student youth, the national democratic political line is being propagated among them, with some adjustments for laws against subversion and rebellion. This meant that the issue of armed struggle is not openly discussed. However, the rest of the elements of the political line is presented and in fact, offered as the unifying factors in the UF organizations. The armed struggle is discussed only among advanced activists and clandestine organizations like the KM.

In the case of the national bourgeoisie, the CPP looks at it as having a dual and inconsistent attitude towards the revolution. While also oppressed to some degree by the same forces that oppress the peasants and proletariat, the national bourgeoisie themselves oppress their own workers. They are likewise linked in varying ways and degrees with imperialism. As such, this subclass can only participate in the revolution at certain times and then, only to some limited extent. Nevertheless, they are targeted as a group because of their great potential in providing great material and pecuniary support to the revolution. (24)

CPP united front work among the members of the national bourgeoisie is as yet, less developed than party work among the previously cited classes. No definite or stable organizational form has yet evolved out of united front efforts within this particular segment of Philippine
society. Neither has this subclass developed its own stable organizations independent of influence of or direction by the CPP or other political parties. For the most part, CPP UF work within this stratum is conducted on a man-to-man basis with no definite organizational form envisioned. The rationale for this is the fact that the interests of the individual members of this stratum are mutually negating to the extent that a unifying line is hard to determine.

At this stage, the CPP appears seemingly content with establishing relations with national bourgeoisie organizations that are neither Party-led nor initiated. The CPP looks at these organizations primarily as sources of material support rather than popular mass support.(25)

The National United Front

With the foregoing discussion of CPP UF work in the classes perceived as potential members of the CPP united front, we can proceed to a brief discussion of the concept of a national united front. The CPP looks at the above cited classes as potential members of the united front because the Party believes that their respective interests are embodied in the CPP national democratic political line. As had been shown, UF is an essential part of the CPP struggle. The Party conducts such work among the classes separately and at various levels. However, these
various forms of united front work are supposed to culminate in the formation of a national united front (NUF). The CPP rationale for this is its own assessment that the basic forces of the revolution, i.e. the peasants and proletariat, are not by themselves capable of overthrowing the existing order. Thus, the CPP must engage in alliance building in order to tap all the motive forces to support or actively participate in the struggle and tip the balance of political forces in its favor.

To the CPP, the NUF is "national" in the political geographical and societal sense. It covers the entire nation and all the classes. In the political sense, it is "national" because the UF objectives of anti-feudalism, anti-imperialism and anti-bureaucratic capitalism are all shared by the classes that are to form the NUF. Such a national united front is to be formed on the basis of the comprehensive political line of national democracy. (26)

The organization of the NUF does not necessarily call for the immediate and formal assumption of the CPP to the primary political role. The Party is aware that other organizations are wary of communist intentions. Moves by the CPP to prematurely seize dominance or leadership would only be counterproductive. Thus, the CPP proposed a UF organization that aims to unite all the democratic and nationalist forces under its wings to wage the open, legal struggle. While a creation of the CPP, this united front
organization is being projected as the organizational expression of the common struggle of all democratic and nationalist forces. This organization is the National Democratic Front (NDF). (27)

This leads us to the next Chapter of this thesis where the NDF is discussed as the organizational expression of CPP united front work.
NOTES

2. CPP, *Basic Course for Middle Forces* chap.II sec.A
3. CPP, *Grasp the Principles of Revolutionary Mass Movements* chap.III sec.14
5. CPP, *Basic Course...*, chap. II sec. E
7. CPP, *Rectify Errors...*, p.44
8. ibid., p.43
9. ISAFP, *Re-established CPP* p.212
10. CPP, *Rectify Errors...*, p.43
11. ibid., p.44
12. From a captured CPP document. This 12-point program was given widespread publicity during the ceasefire/peace negotiations between the RP government and the NDF in 1987.
13. CPP, *Basic Course...*, chap. II sec.A para. 5.a,b,c
14. Various captured CPP documents indicate the extent of CPP organizing and infiltration work in these sectoral organizations. This matter will be treated in greater detail in the next Chapter of this paper.
15. This section is culled mostly from discussions with ex-CPP personalities during 1985-86 planning sessions for AFP COIN operations directed against CPP UF activities. Several Project Operations resulted from these planning sessions and were subsequently implemented.
16. CPP, *Basic Course...*, chap.IV sec.C
17. Captured CPP document. This CPP document sets forth the Party program for land reform. The CPP concept for land reform has the drastic reduction of land rent and elimination of usury as its minimum goal. The maximum goal is the free distribution of land to the landless. This
program is being implemented by the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Magbubukid-PKM (national alliance of farmers), a CPP underground mass organization.

18. This CPP document issued by the Party Central Committee on 25 June 1976 sets forth a set of 7 tasks the CPP needs to undertake to further advance the revolutionary struggle. It is really an explicit reiteration of Party Basks as set forth in the CPP founding document Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party.

19. Philippine Constabulary, 1988 Year-end Assessment of the National Peace and Order Situation, p. 25

20. CPP, Basic Course..., chap. IV sec. B para. d.2

21. CPP infiltration and organization of urban based groups follow a meticulous step-by-step methodology. The CPP calls this modus operandi the "urban module" of organizing work. This module starts with a "social investigation" of the target group/organization and culminates in the formation of a "party branch" composed of CPP members and candidate members recruited from the ranks of the target group.

22. CPP, Basic Course..., chap. V sec. 1,2

23. 1985-86 revelations of a very high ranking CPP cadre that was deeply involved in KM activities. This source is presently active in AFP counter organizing work among the middle forces.

24. CPP, Basic Course..., chap. IV sec. B para. b.2

25. Revelations of a former member of CPP Central Committee actively involved in current AFP operations directed against CPP UF activities.

26. CPP, Basic Course..., chap. V sec. 2

27. Revelations of ex-CPP CC member
CHAPTER VI
The National Democratic Front
CPP UF at Work

Introduction

The rationale for the national united front (NUF) is indicated in the CPP founding document Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party where the Party states that:

...the CPP must engage in a national united front in to tap all positive forces in the armed and legal fronts against the enemy. The national united front policy is pursued in order to expand the influence of the revolutionary armed forces, isolate the enemy and its die-hard elements and recruit the broad mass of the people to the side of the people's democratic revolution..."(1)

Guided by this vision, the CPP embarked on the development of a national united front (NUF).

The basic UF remains to be the strategic alliance of the peasants and proletariat. However, the CPP has consistently sought to draw into its NUF program various sectors and classes of Philippine society. This the CPP did through the formation of the National Democratic Front (NDF); and projecting it as a national united front alliance of all democratic and nationalist forces seeking the liberation of the Philippines from the forces of feudalism, imperialism and bureaucratic capitalism. The CPP has consistently pursued this concept of united front in its political and organizational struggle.
Thus, the focus of this Chapter will be the present state of CPP united front work, as well as the Party organs tasked to forge the NUF.

Evolution of the NDF (2)

The initial stage in the formation of the NDF was set during the Second Plenum of the CPP in mid-1971. The Central Committee (CC) of the CPP decided that a national united front had to be formed to advance the revolution. Thus, on 15 January 1972, the NDF Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) was set up with the end in view of unifying all revolutionary forces in the Philippines and paving the way for the formation of a provisional revolutionary coalition government. The proposal for a coalition government after the seizure of state power was the main lure to entice the other nationalist forces to support the NDF’s initial Ten Point program and join the projected national alliance. Herminigildo Garcia IV, a founding member of the CPP, was designated head of the PrepCom. Organizationally, the Prepcom was placed under the direct supervision and control of the Central Committee of the CPP.

The Prepcom 10-Point Program was adopted to define the basis for the working relationships between the CPP and the other political and sectoral groupings. The Program was revised in 1977 and 1978 to incorporate the political trends and developments obtaining at that time. Up to
these revisions, no formal name was adopted for the planned aboveground united front organization. It was very useful then to project the Prepcom, and its 10-Point Program, as the basis for united struggle. This provided a venue for the broad participation of the various classes and sectors in anti-government activities.

Concerted CPP efforts to fully develop its UF work began in 1979. It was at this time that the CPP realized the need to provide close supervision to the Party’s organizing work in the countryside. This realization came as the result of the rapid advance of the revolutionary armed struggle being waged by the NPA. This development created the need for greater support for NPA forces in the field. While the focus was the development of Party work in the countryside, the CPP did not abandon its objective to develop and strengthen the urban mass movement. In this regard, the CPP organized the Pambansang Komisyon sa Organisasyon-KomOrg (National Commission for Organization). The KomOrg was tasked to supervise the development of the urban mass movement through the formation of CPP sponsored sectoral front organizations and infiltration of existing non-party sectoral organizations.

The KomOrg, which was headed by CC member Isagani Serrano, provided organizational control and supervision over CPP units organized to supervise the development of militant mass movements within their respective sectors.
These CPP units included the following:

1. National Trade Union Bureau (NTUB)
2. National Youth and Students Bureau (NYSB)
3. National Middle Forces Department (NMFD)
4. National Peasants Department (NPD)
5. United Front Group 1 (UFG1)
6. United Front Group 2 (UFG2)

In 1981, the KomOrg was dissolved and in its stead, two (2) Party Commissions were organized: the National Commission for Mass Movement (NCMM) and National United Front Commission (NUFC). These commissions were organized to respond to the needs of the broadening united front arena as well as to develop further the increasing involvement of elements of the middle forces in the mass struggle. The NCMM was tasked to supervise and provide direction to the Party’s organizing work among the basic forces i.e. the peasants and proletariat. Under NCMM control came the NTUB, NYSB and NPD which took charge of organizing work in the labor, student /youth and peasant sectors respectively. On the other hand, the NUFC was tasked to supervise Party organizing work among the middle forces and organize the National Democratic Front (NDF).

These organizational changes brought to fore many controversial issues revolving around the orientation, nature, composition and leadership of the NUFC. These
issues caused significant intra-party conflicts. The principal parties in the conflicts were members of the ruling CC of the Party. Horacio "Boy" Morales, the designated NDF Chairman, contended that the NUFC was to be headed by no less than the Party Chairman, Rodolfo Salas. On the other hand, Ricardo Reyes, another CC and Politburo member, asserted that the NUFC was to be headed by the head of the NUFC Secretariat, Milagros Aguilar.(3)

Before these controversies were finally resolved, the NCMM and NUFC were dissolved. This was the result of another Party reorganization instituted after the arrest of several key Party cadre who were mostly regular and alternate members of the CC. The two Commissions were replaced by an ad hoc NCMM and a provisional NUFC. As a result of this, the organizational buildup of the NDF was suspended. CPP UF activities were then concentrated in organizing the middle forces and the formation of a so-called "broad legal alliance". A Broad Legal Alliance Committee (BLAC) was, thus, organized to oversee alliance building with other political forces. This gave birth to the Kongreso ng Mamamayang Pilipino (KOMPIL) or Filipino People's Congress which was projected as the umbrella organization of all nationalist political forces.

In mid-1984, the NUFC was reestablished and was given the tasks of reviving the organizational buildup of the NDF, middle forces organizing work and, legal alliance
The NCMM was likewise reorganized and given the designation **National Organizational Commission (NOC)**. Its task was the supervision over sectoral organizing work in the National Capital Region (NCR). A good number of NUFC cadre were subsequently transferred to the NOC to give impetus to organizing work among the middle forces in the Metro Manila area.

These reorganization moves brought forth their own share of controversies. One was over the issue of which Commission was to exercise supervision and control over multi-sectoral organizing work. The solution to this basic problem was the delineation of organizing work between the two functional Commission. The NOC became responsible for sectoral organizing through its sectoral bureaus such as the NTUB and NYSB. On the other hand, the NUFC became responsible for orchestrating multi-sectoral mass campaigns and advancing the National Democratic Front.

After this series of Party reorganizations, the CPP CC, in its 9th Plenum in 1985, resolved to strengthen the various Commissions by designating regular CC/Politburo members as head of these Commissions. A 5-man Standing Committee was organized to head the NUFC. The tasks of the NUFC were formally declared by the 9th Plenum to be:

1. NDF building
2. Organizing work among the Middle Forces
3. Legal alliance work
4. Nationwide multi-sectoral mass movements
5. International Solidarity work.

To prevent the recurrence of the conflicts over the leadership of the NUFC, the incumbent Chairman of the CPP, Benito Tiamzon, designated Ricardo Reyes as head of the NUFC. With these developments, the NUFC became fully operational starting mid-1987. The present organizational set-up of the NUFC, as shown in Annex "A", is discussed in a later section of this Chapter.

The NDF as the Organizational Expression of CPP UF Work

Theoretically, the NDF is supposed to be much bigger than the CPP organizationally. The CPP has always projected the NDF as the UF organization that unites all nationalist forces to wage the common struggle. The Party has consistently depicted itself to be a mere member of the NDF. However, the foregoing discussion on the evolution of CPP united front organs clearly shows the falsity of CPP claims as to the true status of the NDF. Contrary to Party claims, the NDF is in reality, the creation of the CPP and is merely a party organ operating under the NUFC. Nevertheless, this strategic deception engaged in by the CPP served Party interests extensively. This is proved by the apparent effectiveness of the Party in mobilizing a
broad mass of people in support to CPP campaigns. In the pursuit of its UF efforts, the NDF adopted as its strategy the ND-UG-MO relationship as discussed in the preceding Chapter. In the NDF setup, CPP sponsored underground organizations are projected as NDF members, as are the CPP itself and the NPA. However, it should be noted that these are paper organizations that exist merely to project that the NDF has a broad based membership. These organizations are actually a handful of CPP elements that provide direction to the activities of corresponding overt and legal sectoral organizations. Additionally, the NDF claims a membership composed of other political and revolutionary groups. This deception was designed to enable the NDF to make credible representations, both internally and abroad, as a movement of a broad mass of Filipinos fighting for national democracy.

As part of its program to establish a broad based national united front, the NDF initiated the concept of a "broad legal alliance". This was to be in the form of an alliance composed of the various sectors and individuals opposed to the so-called "US-Marcos" dictatorship. This united front concept found expression in the formation of the Nationalist Alliance for Justice, Freedom and Democracy (NAJFD) and the Coalition of Organizations for the Realization of Democracy (CORD). The NAJFD consolidated the politically active elements that came forward in the
course of the open mass struggle and played the lead role in pushing forward the militant mass movement. On the other hand, the CORD attempted to unite various democratic elements on the basis of a broad and militant democratic program through the promotion of cooperation among these political and sectoral groups that were opposed to Marcos.

The CPP also recognized the growing popularity of the so-called "independent political forces" (IPF) such as the social democrats and cause-oriented political groups. These political groups exhibited significant strength in influencing other sectors of society particularly the middle forces. The CPP, sensing the broad influence these IPF wield in the political arena, attempted to form a political coalition and projected it as the post-Marcos leadership alternative. Hence, the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-BAYAN (New Nationalist Alliance) was formed to bring together the various political forces opposed to Marcos. Fortunately, the non-CPP sponsored parties to the coalition got wind of CPP attempts to gain control Bayan. As a result, these groups walked out of the BAYAN founding Congress.

The NDF again tested its organizational strength when it advocated a boycott of the 1986 snap Presidential elections. The rationale for the move was the CPP assumption that the masses would see the elections for what it truly was: a sham designed to perpetuate Marcos' rule
and his US backers. By advocating the boycott, the CPP projected itself as siding with the true sentiments of the people. However, voter turnout for the elections was good despite the CPP campaign for a boycott. This indicated that the CPP/NDF did not yet enjoy the people’s popular support. Pitted against the mass mobilization initiatives of non-Marxist and traditional political oppositionists who advocated participation in the elections, CPP moves at mobilization fell short. Worst, the NDF, in shunning the democratic process of removing Marcos, became isolated from the people. The boycott campaign was acknowledged by the Party as a "major tactical blunder". (4)

Perhaps the greater blow to the NDF was the People Power Revolution of February 1986. Isolated from the people because of its boycott campaign, the NDF was not quick enough to react and take advantage of the massive outpouring of protest over Marcos’ attempt at manipulating the results of the election. Thus, when the civilian backed military uprising succeeded in ousting Marcos from power, the NDF was deemed a non-participant by the masses. However, this setback was to be temporary. The rise to power of Corazon C. Aquino ushered in a temporary political reconciliation. Aquino released all political prisoners to include Jose Ma. Sison, the founding Chairman of the CPP, and Bernabe Buscayno, the former CinC of the NPA and later, head the Partido ng Bayan - the CPP front political party.
The best thing that happened to the CPP/NPA/NDF was the unprecedented step taken by the fledgling Aquino government in agreeing to a ceasefire agreement and peace negotiations with the insurgents. This was tantamount to a de facto recognition of the CPP as a legitimate politico-military force by the upstart Aquino government. That the government should agree to the peace talks is the subject of debate even at the present time. Some quarters contend that the government did right in trying to seek a peaceful resolution of the conflict. After all, Aquino was riding the crest of her popularity and was, perhaps, capable of performing another miracle. On the other hand, there are those who see the whole matter as a glaring example of the sheer naivete of the Aquino government. Worse, there are those who ascribe the government’s decision to some of Aquino’s advisers who are perceived to be left-leaning.

It can be said that the CPP was forced into the peace negotiations. Rejection meant that the CPP was no longer open to peaceful means of resolving conflict. This would have further isolated it from the people. Surprised as it was of the sudden call for negotiations, the CPP went to the negotiating table with definite and clearly stated objectives. The CPP Central Committe stated that "the peace negotiations should be taken as a component of our overall strategy and tactics that will lead us to the next higher phase of our struggle". (5)
The CPP projected the NDF to represent it in the negotiations. By using the NDF, the Party maintained the flexibility of reneging on any agreement that may later prove disadvantageous to the struggle. The move also reinforced CPP claims that the NDF is the coalition of all revolutionary forces in the Philippines. The CPP sought to derive maximum propaganda benefit out of the negotiations. This was reflected in its decision to field Antonio Zumel and Saturnino Ocampo, both members of the NUFC Standing Committee, to represent the NDF. Both being former media persons, Zumel and Ocampo had great access to the news media and thus, could generate positive coverage (to the CPP/NPA/NDF) of the peace talks. Furthermore, the duo had access to Party cadre who had been deeply infiltrated into the legitimate media.

Thus, the NDF panel plunged into the negotiations intent on maximizing benefits and advantages. One of the immediate gains was the excellent media exposure given the NDF. The propaganda value of such exposure is difficult to estimate, but it is safe to say that it was extensive. Such exposure, coupled with the government’s cavalier treatment of the NDF panel, projected the NDF to be a credible coalition of revolutionary forces. The NDF and its supposed members were able to impress upon the public, locally and perhaps internationally, that they are a legitimate politico-military force that enjoyed popular -122-
mass support. This invariably bolstered the CPP/NPA/NDF bid to attain the status of a belligerent.

As an added benefit, the 60-day cease-fire period afforded the CPP/NPA/NDF time to consolidate its forces, intensify personnel and logistics buildup, and expand its influence both in rural and urban areas. Party cadre enjoyed freedom of movement. The NPA was not only able to mass its fragmented forces but was also able to bring them closer to, if not within, centers of population. Moreover, the respite gave the insurgents time to reevaluate their tactics, strategies, and policies.

On the other hand, the NDF became more concrete to the public. Because of the extensive media exposure, the NDF became open to public scrutiny and criticism. Many of its elements, affiliates and supporters were identified. The NDF also became susceptible to government political tirades. The government was also able to gauge the NDF's capability to mobilize its mass base. Moreover, groups, individuals, and organizations that are symphathetic to and supportive of the NDF were identified.

The failure of the Peace negotiations to bring about substantive improvements in the insurgency scenario can be attributed to several factors. For one, the parties to the talks had differing political agenda. The NDF proposed a coalition government which the Philippine government rightfully refused to consider. The NDF wanted the CPP
recognized as a legal political party. The government premised such recognition on the CPP's disarming the NPA and disavowing armed struggle as a means to achieve political power. These basic conflicts were left unresolved until the termination of the negotiations.

Notwithstanding the failure to extract significant concessions from the government, the CPP/NPA/NDF derived considerable benefit from the whole exercise. For one, it was able to recover from its isolation from the masses that resulted from its boycott of the 1986 elections and its non-participation in the People Power revolution. The exposure the NDF got also has definite significance in the long term. The NDF was able to project itself as a viable political alternative should conditions in the Philippines deteriorate to a point where the armed struggle becomes acceptable as the mode to bring about reforms.

The CPP/NPA/NDF embarked on another exercise to gain political power. This was when it decided to form a legal political party to participate in the general elections of 1988. The CPP organized the Partido ng Bayan-PnB (People's Party) which fielded candidates in the Senatorial and Congressional races. The PnB also fielded candidates in the Gubernatorial and Mayoral races in areas which the CPP considered itself to have significant influence, if not outright control. The results of this attempt was not all that encouraging to the Party. If there is any lesson to
be learned by the CPP from this electoral debacle, it is the stark reality that the CPP/NPA/NDF does not yet enjoy the popular mass support it would like to believe it has. This realization could lead to two things.

The frustration to achieve political power through peaceful means will make the CPP all the more convinced that only through the armed struggle can it hope to attain state power. This would mean an escalation of NPA military action. On the other hand, the failure at the polls should also convince the Party to exert greater effort at united front building since popular mass support is not yet a reality. This would mean greater political action by the NDF. That the Party will undertake both actions would not be unexpected. The question really is where the emphasis will be placed.

Party Organization for United Front Work

To further appreciate the importance the CPP places on united front, the Party organization for UF work needs to be presented. Thus, this section will be an exposition on the different CPP organs that are charged with the responsibility of forging the national united front. This section will likewise show, to the extent considerations for security will allow, the extent of CPP penetration of organizations active in the militant mass movement in the Philippines. The information presented here was culled
mostly from research and analysis of CPP documents and computer diskettes recovered by government security forces in a series of raids on CPP/NDF underground houses. The identities of personalities, excluding those whose involvement in the united front movement have been previously exposed, have been deliberately omitted to conform to security requirements. Nevertheless, the data presented is deemed appropriate for the purpose of this thesis. CPP documents from which the information included in this section were derived are listed in Annex "F".

As previously discussed, there are two (2) CPP Commissions charged with the responsibility of organizing work. These are the National Organizing Commission (NOC) and the National United Front Commission (NUFC). Both are so-called functional commissions of the CPP that are charged with specific duties and responsibilities as enumerated in a previous section of this Chapter. The NUFC, being the Party Commission in charge of UF building will be the focus of this section.

NUFC Organization and Disposition of Cadre

The NUFC is the CPP organ which orchestrates Party UF work. Its paramount objective is to formulate and implement programs of action that will attract elements of the middle forces and the independent political and sectoral groups to form the national united front (NUF).
Under the NUFC are various Staff Organs that provide administrative services to the Commission and Operating Units that are tasked to implement UF work within their respective areas. (Annex "A", Organizational Chart of NUFC)

The NUFC has a Standing Committee which is the central collective leadership of the Commission. Saturnino Ocampo headed the NUFC until his arrest on 27 July 1989. There is yet no definite identification of the present leader of the NUFC.

**NUFC Staff Organs:**

1. **Instructors Bureau (IB)**—tasked to conduct and supervise the political education of all members of the NUFC. It is presently working at the establishment of a regular Education Department of the NUFC that will take care of the education requirements of UF work. As part of its activities, the IB conducts education work among NUFC units concerning these units' respective sectoral orientation. There are presently three (3) full members of the CPP in the IB.

2. **Finance Staff (FS)**—responsible for managing NUFC funds, monitoring the financial activities of NUFC units and conducting tactical financial campaigns designed to generate funds to support NUFC activities. There are presently seven (7) full Party members in the FS.
3. **Self Defense Unit (SDU)**--responsible for the security of NUFC elements as well as counter-intelligence work. The SDU performs other tasks such as evaluation of NUFC cadre and investigation of cases arising out of such evaluation. It is also responsible for the organization of intelligence networks to support NUFC operations like information gathering on target personalities and internal security cases. Internal SDU operations center on the identification, isolation and neutralization of suspected government agents infiltrated into the CPP. This task of the SDU is of primary importance to the Party as it continues to purge its ranks of so-called deep penetration agents (DPA) of government security forces.

4. **Communications/Technical Staff (COMTECH)**--the staff responsible for communications/liaison work among NUFC units and other Party organs. The COMTECH is also tasked to provide encoding and decoding (cipher) services for intra-Party communications. The codes used by the Party are constantly being changed to enhance security and maintain compartmentation within the Party organization.

**NUFC Operating Units**

**Multi Sectoral Campaign and Alliance Department (MSCAD)**

As its name implies, the MSCAD is the NUFC unit that conducts alliance work with open, legal organizations and
other cause oriented groups that are multi-sectoral in nature. MSCAD cadre undertake covert united front alliance work under the cover of the following six (6) identified organizations, all of which are projected as legal organizations. (ANNEX "B" MASCAD Organization)

1. Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN)--this is the organization which the CPP projected as the coalition of political forces that were against Marcos. As stated earlier, the other non-Marxist groups that were lured into joining this coalition got wind of CPP intentions and walked away from the supposed founding Congress of Bayan. Nevertheless, the CPP maintained the coalition and continues to use it as the medium through which alliance work with nationalist political groups opposed to the so-called US-Aquino dictatorship are undertaken. There are presently twenty six (26) CPP members and eighteen (18) advanced activists supervising Party work in BAYAN.

2. National Alliance for Justice, Freedom and Democracy (NAJFD)--This organization serves as the political center of the anti-imperialist element of the CPP revolutionary struggle. It is also one of the primary sources of recruits from among the middle forces into the NDF. The NAJFD spearheads mass movements that espouse anti-imperialist and nationalist issues. There are three (3) full members of the CPP and fifteen (15) advanced activists presently active within the NAJFD.
3. Human Rights Committee (HRC)—Perhaps the most visible of the MSCAD units, the HRC spearheads the human rights movement (HRM) in the Philippines. As a movement, the HRM encompasses various organizations, including those initiated and led by the CPP, that are projected to espouse respect for human rights. The main social base of the movement are the petty and national bourgeoisie.

The HRM has defined "human rights" to mean the whole spectrum of human experience - whether it be social, political, economic or cultural experience. In relation to this broad definition, the HRM involves itself in an advocacy role by supporting the various groups and organizations that undertake human rights campaigns. It bases its position on human rights issues on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other basic documents on human rights. Within the context of such internationally accepted documents, the HRM seeks to find the proper mode of supporting the CPP revolutionary struggle. In relation to this, the HRM invokes the laws of war in denouncing the governments' alleged brutal policy of waging war against its own people.

In the furtherance of its basic task of generating people's support to the revolutionary struggle, the HRM conducts anti-militarization, anti-fascist, pro-justice and human rights promotion and education campaigns designed to heighten the people's disdain for government. These are
manifested in mass protest actions such as pickets and demonstrations. The issues are given maximum exposure through the mass media and the conduct of symposia and public fora. Lobby work in the Legislative assemblies is also being increasingly used to advance the movement. The overt organizations actively involved in the movement include the following:

a. **Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates** - The PAHRA serves as the main organizational expression of the HRC and acts as the spokesperson of the HRM on human rights issues.

b. **Task Force Detainees of the Philippines** - the TFDP is the legal institution established to document and manage political detainee affairs. It has a nationwide network of offices and is headed by a nun. The TFDP also has the basic task of campaigning for justice for revolutionary forces allegedly subjected to government repression.

c. **Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace** - the EMJP serves as the center for anti-militarization campaigns.

d. **Samahan ng mga Ex-detainees laban sa Detensiyon at para sa Amnestiya** (SELDÁ) or alliance of ex-detainees against detention and for amnesty - the SELDA is composed of former political detainees that are being projected by the CPP as the living testimony of government repression.
The SELDA is primarily tasked to carry out the campaign for justice by exploiting charges of alleged illegal arrests, detention and torture of political prisoners. It advocates the grant of amnesty to and indemnification of detainees and the prosecution of illegal arrestors and torturers.

e. Families of Victims of Involuntary Disappearance (FIND)

f. Mothers and Relatives Against Tyranny (MARTYR)

There are presently thirty six (36) Party members and thirty two (32) advanced activists that are involved in the human rights movement. These Party cadre are spread all over the above cited organizations and effectively control the activities of these organizations.

5. Ethnic Minorities (ETHMIN) - ETHMIN undertakes alliance work among the cultural minorities. There are presently thirteen (13) Party members and thirteen (13) advanced activists active in the ETHMIN.

6. Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection (CACP) - The CACP is primarily engaged in anti-imperialist and economic propaganda. Three (3) Party members and ten (10) advanced activists orchestrate the activities of this organization.

7. National Movement for Civil Liberties (NMCL) - The NMCL is a loose coalition of groups and individuals
who espouse civil liberties. It is presently composed of some sixty five (65) organizations who subscribe to a set of six (6) basic points of unity. These points of unity have basically anti-military and anti-imperialist themes. It opposes all forms of foreign intervention particularly that of the US. It is significant to note that out of the six (6) founding members of the NMCL, three (3) were CPP front organizations (BAYAN, VPD, PAHRA).

Middle Forces Department (MFD)

The Party's strategic task among the middle forces is to win them over to the side of the revolution in order to decisively shift the political balance of forces in favor of the revolutionary movement. Thus, the CPP gives emphasis on the arousing, organizing and mobilizing the middle forces for militant mass campaigns and in the process, generate popular support for the revolution. Party organizing and alliance work among the middle forces is the domain of the MFD and its different Bureaus which are responsible for politico-organizing work within their respective sectors. (Annex "C") These Bureaus are:

1. National Church Bureau (NChB) - the NChB is the Party organ that undertakes organizing and alliance work within the religious sector. By this sector is meant the entire institution of Christian Churches, both Catholic
and Protestant, in the Philippines. The emphasis in Church work is on the development of a political movement composed of church people that advocates the demands of the people for basic political, economic, and socio-civil rights as well as their struggle for national sovereignty and independence. The CPP also aims to develop an intra-church reform movement to wage an internal struggle for institutional and organizational reforms within the Church sector. The agenda for these internal reforms include rechannelling of resources and personnel in support of the revolution. The NChB is presently organized into operating units and staff organs much like the NUFC. A Standing Committee composed of four (4) CPP members oversees the day-to-day activities of the Bureau. There are eight (8) full CPP members and some three thousand (3,000) advanced activists presently deployed in the various Church related organizations that are under the influence or control of the NChb.

2. National Health Bureau (NHB) - Organizationally, the CPP organ in the health sector is referred to as the Provisionary National Health Bureau (PNHB). The PNHB orchestrates Party work among workers engaged in health services. To implement its program of revolutionary health work, the PNHB is staffed by 127 CPP members and 209 advanced activists. Additionally, an estimated 2,000 community-based health workers are reportedly active in
this program. The PNHB had also been able to organize several open, legal organizations that act as covers for Party work in this sector. All these open organizations are influenced or controlled through the Makabayan Samahang Pangkalusugan-MASAPA, the underground mass organization of the CPP for the health sector. These open organizations include: the Alliance of Health Workers-AHW which is a labor union type organization composed of some 4,000 workers employed in government and private hospitals spread nationwide; the Medical Action Group (MAG) which is an organization of Medical and Dental Doctors that provide services not only to insurgent elements but to the public as well; the Health Alliance for Democracy (HEAD) which is a militant alliance of medical professionals that espouse democratic and nationalist causes.

3. National Teachers Bureau (NTB) - The NTB is the CPP organ tasked to provide direction to Party efforts to develop the "rebolusyonaryong kilusang guro" or teachers revolutionary mass movement. This is a movement designed to arouse, organize, and mobilize school teachers to render support to or actively participate in the revolutionary struggle. The movement is also projected to represent the struggle of teachers for their legitimate political and economic rights. Additionally, the movement is tasked to carry out party propaganda to propagate the national democratic political line among the student youth.
To realize these objectives, the CPP organized the Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) as an open and legal organization. However, the ACT is controlled through the Katipunan ng mga Gurong Makabayan (KAGUMA) or Alliance of Nationalist Teachers, the CPP underground organization for the teachers sector.

4. National Scientist/Technologist Bureau (NSTB) - Party work within the scientific/technological sector is not limited to organizing the individuals, organizations and institutions involved in science and technology and drawing them into the revolutionary mass movement. An important component of Party work in this sector is the development of military works support for the armed struggle. This is in the form of technological assistance to NPA field units in the production of homemade materiel like improvised explosives and land mines. The production of such military materiel aims to compensate for the inferiority of NPA armaments vis-a-vis the AFP. Progress in this field is indicated by the increasing use of explosive devices and landmines by the NPA in both rural and urban terrorist operations. The organization engaged in research and production of military materiel is the Samahan ng mga Makabayan Siyentipiko-SMS or association of scientists.

Similarly, research on and production of herbal medicine and the propagation of acupuncture for use by NPA
field units is another important task of the NSTB. This task is undertaken by the *Progresibong Kilusang Medikal* or progressive medical movement. Research on the production of improvised equipment and materials for Party propaganda is another task of the NSTB. The *Progresibong Samahan ng mga Inhenyero’t Arkitekto* or progressive movement of engineers and architects, was organized to perform this task. Finally, the *Makabayan ng mga Nurses* or Nationalist Nurses Association and the *Makabayan ng Medical* or nationalist medical association were organized to provide medical training to members of the underground movement. These activities were all aimed at improving the self-reliant posture and operational capability of the insurgent operating forces.

5. **Media Group (MG)** - The preoccupation of this CPP organ is organizing and alliance work in the print and broadcast media. Its central task is to generate positive media exposure for the CPP/NPA/NDF. Through its influence over newsmedia, the CPP is able to use legitimate print and broadcast media organizations as channels for Party propaganda. At the same time, the MG is charged to cause the exploitation of sensitive anti-government issues that have mass appeal, particularly those involving the AFP. The MG had been able to organize the *People's Movement For Press Freedom* (PMPF), an alliance of thirty six (36) media groups engaged in a struggle against allegedly increased
media management by government and the emerging monopoly of media organizations by individuals identified as close to the Aquino administration. Additionally, the MG has successfully organized a labor alliance among twelve (12) affiliated unions composed of employees of various media organizations. Presently, twenty (20) Party members and twenty four (24) advanced activists are orchestrating the media efforts of the CPP.

6. Lawyer’s Group (LG) - The LG is tasked not only to conduct organizing and alliance work within the lawyer sector. It also recruits prospective Party members from among individuals active in the various militant mass organizations composed of lawyers. Attorneys from these organizations have consistently represented CPP elements charged with various violations of law.

Additionally, these associations of lawyers provide legal services to people who file suits against the military for alleged violations of human rights such as torture and illegal arrests and detention. Among the more prominent lawyer’s groups are the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity, Nationalism and Independence (MABINI); the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG); and, the Protestant for People’s Enlightenment and Liberation (PROFEL). There are presently ten (10) Party members organized into a party-group that orchestrate CPP efforts in this sector.
7. Businessmen Group (BG) - the primary concern of the BG is alliance work among the national bourgeoisie. We stated earlier that CPP organizing work in this sector is as yet, less developed than among the other sectoral groupings. However, the CPP had been able to organize an open legal organization of the national bourgeoisie which it calls the Economic Advisory Group. This organization is currently engaged in education and propaganda campaigns concerning anti-imperialist and economic issues. Aside from the EAG, the Party also organized the National Economic Protectionism Association (NEPA) which it tasked to engage in research, propaganda and cadre training on economic issues. A total of twelve (12) Party members are actively involved in these Party efforts.

National Democratic Front Secretariat

The NDF Secretariat orchestrates the activities of the NDF. It is staffed by thirty six (36) CPP members that are responsible for a wide variety of activities. Its organization as an NUFC unit is depicted in Annex "D". Among the more prominent operating arms are:

1. LIBERATION - the NDF publication through which united front policy statements of the CPP are published and the national democratic political line is propagated. It is also the medium for NDF propaganda and is widely circulated both locally and abroad.
2. **Media Liaison Group (MLG)** - as the name implies, the MLG conducts liaison work with the legitimate media for positive coverage of NDF activities and publication of NDF releases. This function is performed in conjunction with the **NDF Information Office** efforts to create, produce and circulate NDF information materials for intra-alliance and external use. These twin efforts of the NDF is geared towards achieving for the NDF the exposure it needs and to reinforce CPP claims that the NDF is a coalition of forces engaged in a broad based struggle.

3. **Moro Struggle Office (MSO)** - tasked to conduct liaison with the Muslim separatist movement in Southern Philippines. As mentioned in an earlier Chapter, the CPP entered into a temporary tactical alliance with the MNLF. However, the CPP wants to forge a more formal alliance, not only with the MNLF, but also with the various factions of the separatist movement. Thus, the Party continues to explore the possibilities of such an alliance.

4. **Task Forces (TFs)** - these TFs are ad hoc groups responsible for the conduct of special studies on matters that happen to be of special concern to the NDF at a particular point in time. Such matters normally include current political and economic issues which are to be exploited by the revolutionary mass movement. A TF is usually activated to prepare for important meetings such as Congresses of the NDF.
5. International Solidarity-Liaison (IS-IL) - The development of international support networks and linkages of the NDF is the major concern of the IS-IL. While this task is primarily the responsibility of the International Department (ID) of the CPP, the IS-IL complements the efforts of the ID in this regard. CPP international organizing and alliance work is discussed in more detail as a separate section of this Chapter.

Legal Political Parties (LPP)

The LPP (Annex "E") serves as the main CPP/NPA/NDF instrument in the furtherance of the parliamentary element of the revolutionary struggle. It is the medium through which the NDF is able to develop linkages with other political parties and groups. It is also through the LPP that the NDF is able to project its cadre to work within the existing government bureaucracy to gain hands-on experience in running the machinery of government. This is in preparation for the post revolution government that is envisioned to effect the socialist transformation of the Philippines. It was for these purposes that the Partido ng Bayan (PnB) was organized in August 1986. The PnB was projected as the organizational expression of the legal political struggle of the basic masses and middle forces. The PnB fielded candidates during the elections in 1988. However, the Pnb performed miserably in the elections.
This electoral failure highlighted several deficiencies in party organizing and alliance work. Thus, the PnB decided to step up organizational efforts to improve the political machinery of the party.

Meanwhile, CPP/NDF cadre, operating under PnB cover, are currently organizing or infiltrating the staff of certain Legislators and conducting party building efforts among them. The purpose of this undertaking is to utilize the Philippine Legislature as a venue for ventilating current political issues and propagating the CPP political line. In fact, decoded CPP diskettes reveal the CPP claim that it has succeeded in gaining control over the staff pool of the so-called "nationalist bloc" of Congress. This staff pool is engaged in research, preparation of speeches, drafting of proposed legislation, conducting seminars, and organizing work for the members of this bloc. This effort is referred to as "congress work" by the CPP. Relative to this congress work, seven (7) Party members are known to have been deployed to oversee this effort. Additionally, thirteen (13) other Party members are active within the Partido ng Bayan.

The above-cited NUFC units and their respective subordinate organs compose the CPP/NPA/NDF organizational structure for united front work. The spread and depth of their organizational and alliance building efforts underscore the importance of UF work in the CPP agenda for
the revolutionary struggle. However, these CPP organs are concerned mainly in local UF efforts. To round out this discussion and to further appreciate CPP UF work, a short presentation of CPP international UF efforts follows.

**CPP International United Front Efforts**

One vital component of the CPP/NPA/NDF struggle is the development of international linkages. In developing such linkages and forging relations with other proletarian parties abroad, the CPP is concerned mainly in seeking and acquiring moral and material support for its struggle. The CPP considers such international support important and indespensible, although it hastens to add that this support is merely supplemental and that the Party must always strive to be self reliant. The CPP also proclaims its adherence to the principles of integrity, equality, independence, and mutual cooperation and benefit in its relations with other communist and worker's parties.

The CPP takes into account three (3) major considerations in expanding its international relations. First, the organizations and parties the CPP is seeking relations with are willing to extend moral and financial support to the CPP. Second, these supporters do not dictate what stand the CPP must take on both Philippine and international issues. Finally, they must not have relations with pseudo-communist groups in the Philippines,
i.e. the PKP. Significantly, the CPP has had rapid advances in developing its international relations. CPP success in this regard is attributable mainly to its skillful utilization and projection of the NDF as the representative of a broad based coalition of nationalist opposition forces in the Philippines.

Party efforts to generate international support for its revolutionary struggle is the responsibility of the International Department (ID) which is presently staffed by one hundred forty (140) Party members and three hundred twenty (320) advanced activists. The ID is centrally controlled by a Standing Committee and has various staff and territorial organs. (see Annex "G") The CPP/NDF international support network is anchored on its overseas revolutionary work which is divided into three specific lines of work: Broad Solidarity Movement (BSM), Overseas Filipino Movement (OFM), and International Diplomatic Works (IDW). These are supervised by the territorial organs that has geographical jurisdiction over specific countries. These territorial organs are the US-Canada, Western Europe, Asia-Pacific, Eastern Europe, China, Latin America and Middle East Committees.

The objectives of the Broad Solidarity Movement (BSM) are the establishment and development of people's solidarity relations with overseas militant movements, non-governmental cause oriented organizations and
ecumenical bodies. This is in order to develop a broad solidarity movement supportive of the democratic struggles of the Filipino people. The BSM is also tasked to conduct overseas propaganda and lobby work aimed at exposing and opposing US intervention in the Philippines.

The direction of work in the Overseas Filipino Movement is to organize, arouse, and mobilize the greatest possible number of overseas Filipinos to support or actively participate in the revolutionary struggle. This is to be undertaken through a comprehensive propaganda and education work among Filipinos abroad, highlighting issues and problems affecting them and linking such to the national democratic movement. Additionally, the OFM looks at these Filipinos as sources of material support for the conduct of the struggle.

The principal arm of the OFM is the Commission of Filipino Migrant Workers (CFMW) which was registered as a foundation in Utrecht, Holland in 1980. The CFMW is the first organization set up to help in the political and organizing work among Filipino migrant workers. It currently has centers in Rome, London, Amsterdam, Hamburg, Rotterdam, Madrid, Barcelona, Paris, Stockholm, Athens, Hong Kong and several Middle East cities. Its general agenda calls for it to unite with and generate support from the struggle of Filipino migrant workers for a just and prosperous Philippines and equal rights and protection.

-145-
abroad. However, the main thrust is to develop awareness among these Filipinos about the political and social realities in the home country. The support generated from this activity come in various forms such as participation in NDF organized rallies, contributions in fund raising activities and donations of food and other materials. The amount of support generated is difficult to estimate but it is assumed to be a contributing factor in the movement.

NDF diplomatic work aims to develop relations not only with socialist but also with capitalist countries, with the end in view of attaining formal or informal recognition of the NDF as a credible political entity. The thrust among socialist states is to obtain support for the national democratic revolution being waged through the development of solidarity ties with the ruling proletarian parties of these states. As for the capitalist states, the NDF seeks to mobilize influential and progressive institutions and organizations to support the NDF through propaganda and lobbying work. The relative success of the NDF in this endeavor is manifested by the increasing attention given by foreign organizations and institutions on the state of affairs in the Philippines. Thus, despite the obvious absence of official support from foreign governments for the insurgency, the NDF has access to unofficial support channelled through non-governmental organizations. Perhaps the best example to illustrate
this claim is to cite the activities of the Netherlands Organization for International Development and Cooperation (NOVIB) relative to the Philippines.

The NOVIB is the best known Dutch non-governmental organization involved in development work in Third World countries. It is composed of some 47 organizations of varying political, religious and ideological persuasions.

In 1980, NOVIB secured an agreement from the Dutch government for the latter to provide yearly subsidies for the former's use in its developmental projects. Adequately funded by the Dutch government, NOVIB had since then been actively providing support to organizations undertaking legitimate developmental projects in Third World countries. Aside from these projects, NOVIB also started providing support to projects that were concerned with political and social issues such as human rights, disarmament, peace, social awakening, East-West relations, the role of women and other similar issues.

NOVIB was, and continue to be, particularly active in the Philippines. However, an analysis of NOVIB exposure in the Philippines reveals that in addition to support for legitimate developmental projects, it also provides support to the activities of identified CPP front organizations. There are numerous examples of such funding initiatives by NOVIB. Thus, it can be said that NOVIB, consciously or otherwise, is supporting the CPP insurgency. (6)
Indeed, the NDF has had significant inroads in the international scene. It has managed to draw considerable international attention to the causes it espouses through the conduct of unrelenting propaganda, information and organizational campaigns. It has succeeded in establishing ties with various cause-oriented organizations and funding institutions overseas that led to the formation of NDF solidarity and support networks abroad.

Thus, in addition to the national united front with which it hoped to advance its revolutionary struggle, the CPP has also managed to forge international united front relations with varied overseas groups, organizations and institutions. The effects of such united front relations on the Philippine insurgency situation will undoubtedly bear significant implications both in the short and long terms. Hence, CPP united front efforts merit greater attention than what it presently gets.
NOTES

1. CPP, Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party 1968
   Sec V para 39

2. HPC, Special Report: United Front Activities of the
   Communist Party of the Philippines 1988. This
   report resulted from the analysis of various
   CPP documents captured during a series of raids
   on CPP underground safehouses by Constabulary
   intelligence operatives in 1988. During these
   raids, several high ranking CPP cadre were also
   captured and their revelations on CPP/NPA/NDF
   matters form the main basis of this report.

3. ibid

4. The decision to boycott the elections became the
   subject of intense intra-party debate. A position
   paper written by a ranking Party cadre using the
   pseudonym Marty Villalobos elaborated upon the
   rationale for the CPP boycott and reveals the causes
   of the Party’s misjudgement of the sentiments of the
   people that caused the failure of the boycott
   campaign.

5. From a decoded CPP computer diskette recovered during
   the capture of several ranking CPP cadre on 29 March

6. A good reference on the activities of NOVID in the
   Philippines is the position paper The CPP
   International Network in Europe by Col Ismael Z.
   Villareal, PA (GSC). The information cited in this
   section are contained in subject position paper.
ANNEX "A" NATIONAL UNITED FRONT COMMISSION (NUFC) ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

NATIONAL UNITED FRONT COMMISSION (NUFC)

STANDING COMMITTEE

IB
FINANCE
COMTECH
SDU

MSCAD
PDC
NAJFD
HRC
NMCL
ETHMIN
CACP

MFD
NCHB
NHB
NTchB
NSTB
MEDIAGRP
LAW GRP
BUS GRP

NDF SEC'T
LIB
NDF IO
MLC
MSO
SE GRP
IS-IL GP
TF

LPP
COND GRP
VPD GRP
VPD
IPD
YVPD
PRRM
BUR

LEGEND: Please see next page
LEGEND to Acronyms in NUFC Organizational Structure

IB .......... Instructors Bureau
COMTECH ..... Communications/Technical Staff
SDU .......... Self Defense Unit
MSCAD ....... Multi Sectoral Campaign and Alliance Dept.
MFD .......... Middle Forces Department
NDF SEC'T... National democratic Front Secretariat
LPP .......... Legal Political Parties
PDC .......... Popular Democratic Coalition
HRC .......... Human Rights Committee
NMCL ......... National Movement for Civil Liberties
BLA .......... Broad Legal Alliance
ETHMIN ....... Ethnic Minorities
CACP .......... Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection
NCHB .......... National Churches Bureau
NHB .......... National Health Bureau
NTchB ......... National Teachers Bureau
NSTB .......... National Scientist and Technologist Bureau
MED GRP .... Media Group
LAW GRP .... Lawyers Group
BUS GRP .... Businessmens Group
LIB .......... Liberation
NDF IO ...... NDF Information Office
MLC .......... Media Liaison Committee
MSO .......... Moro Struggle Office
SE .......... Socio Economic Group
IS-IL GRP .. International Solidarity/Liaison Group
VPGP GRP .... Volunteers for Popular Democracy Group
VPD .......... Volunteers for Popular Democracy
IPD .......... Institute for Popular Democracy
YVPD ......... Youth Volunteers for Popular Democracy
PRRM ......... Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement
BUR .......... Bureaucracy
ANNEX "B" MULTI SECTORAL CAMPAIGN/ALLIANCE DEPARTMENT (MSCAD)
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

NATIONAL UNITED FRONT COMMISSION (NUFC)

MSCAD

BAYAN  HRC  NMCL  ETHMIN  CACP

NAJFD

LEGEND:
BAYAN ...... Bagong Alyansang Makabayan
NAJFD ...... Nationalist Alliance for Justice Freedom and Democracy
HRC ........ Human Rights Committee
NMCL ....... National Movement for Civil Liberties
ETHMIN ...... Ethnic Minorities
CACP ....... Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection
ANNEX "C" MIDDLE FORCES DEPARTMENT (MFD) ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

LEGEND:

NCHB ........ National Churches Bureau
NHB ........ National Health Bureau
NTchB ...... National Teachers Bureau
NSTB ...... National Scientist and Technological Bureau
MED GRP ... Media Group
LAW GRP ... Lawyer’s Group
BUS GRP ... Businessmen’s Group
ANNEX "D" NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT SECRETARIAT
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

NATIONAL UNITED FRONT COMMISSION (NUFC)

NDF SECRETARIAT

IS-IL       SEWS       RDS       COMTECH       NDF IO

LIBERATION       MSO       MLC       TFs

EDITORIAL

PRODUCTION       DISTRIBUTION

LEGEND:
IS-IL ......... International Solidarity/Liaison
MSO .......... Moro Struggle Office
SEWS ......... Socio Economic Work Staff
RDS ......... Research and Documentation Staff
ComTech .... Communications/Technical Staff
NDF-IO ....... NDF-Information Office
MLC ......... Media Liaison Committee
TFs ......... Task Forces
ANNEX "E" LEGAL POLITICAL PARTIES (LPP)
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

LEGEND:
VPD ........ Volunteers for Popular Democracy
IPD ........ Institute for Popular Democracy
YVPD ........ Youth Volunteers for Popular Democracy
PRRM ........ Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement
POPDEM ..... Popular Democracy
Annex "F" International Department (ID) Organizational Structure

INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT

STANDING COMMITTEE

STAFF ORGANS

NDF INTL OFF

HOME FRT BU

PROPCOM

COMTECH

FINCOM

TERRITORIAL ORGANS

US-CANADA

WEST EUROPE

ASIA-PACIFIC

EAST EUROPE

CHINA-PEKING

LATIN AMERICA

MIDDLE EAST
ANNEX "G"  CPP SOURCE DOCUMENTS

1. CPP POLITBURO, Deliberation on NUFC Report, 1988

2. NUFC, Rekord ng Pinagusapan, Pinalaking Pulong ng NUFC, (Record of deliberations, NUFC), 1987

3. POLITBURO, Taktika at mga Tungkulin ng Partido (Party Tasks and Tactics), 1988

4. MFD, Orventasvon na Gawain sa Sector na Aaham at Teknolohiya (Orientation on Tasks in the Science Technology Sector)

5. MFD, Ang Agham at Teknolohiya sa Lipunan ng Rebolusyonong Filipino (Science and Technology in the Filipino Revolutionary Society)

6. MFD, Panimulang Ulat ng MFD (MFD Initial Report), 1988

7. MFD, Strategic and Tactical Considerations in our Work Among the Middle Forces

8. HRC, Political Orientation of the Philippine Human Rights Movement Under the US-Aquino Regime

9. HRC, SELDA Orientation

10. HRC, Task Force Detainees Philippines Orientation

11. HRC, Mungkahin sa Kampanyang Anti-Militarization (Comments on the Anti-Militarization Campaign), 1987

12. MFD, Ang Taktika at Tungkulin ng Rebolusyonaryong Kilusang Guro (Tasks and Tactics of the Teacher’s Revolutionary Movement), 1988-1990

13. MFD, Health Sector Report, 1987

14. MFD, Comments on the Church Sector Orientation

15. NDF Secretariat, Tactical Plan on Socio-Economic Work

16. LPP, Report on LPP Activities, 1988

17. CPP, Ang Pangtatlong Taong Programa ng Partido (CPP Three (3) Year Plan), 1987-1989
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS

This thesis on the theory and practice of united front by the Communist Party of the Philippines sought to establish the crucial role united front plays in the CPP revolutionary struggle. Philippine government authorities continue to view the CPP insurgency mainly as a military problem. This view is not at all unexpected. Indeed, how can the government be expected to acknowledge that the CPP insurgency is more than a military problem? Is it not that the primary responsibility of government is to bring about a social order where the socio-political and economic conditions that breed insurgency do not exist? Thus, for government to admit that the insurgency problem is more socio-political than military is tantamount to a de facto acknowledgment of its failure to govern. Perhaps this explains the refusal of government to recognize the crucial role united front plays in the conduct of the revolutionary struggle.

The preceding exposition on united front efforts of the CPP clearly establishes the cruciality of such efforts in the overall insurgency scenario. United front building is not merely a doctrinal necessity for the CPP but, more importantly, is an operational necessity.
The CPP fully appreciates the potential united front offers in expanding the Party political and organizational strength and influence. Furthermore, united front has the potential for reversing the perceived improbability of CPP success that result from the non-acceptance of the Party ideology. United front can also mobilize a great mass of people in militant protest that exploit real or imagined socio-political and economic issues. Such mass movements help bring about the revolutionary situation that can make the insurgency a viable political alternative to supplant the existing system. Thus, united front enhances the chances of success of the CPP revolutionary struggle.

CPP theory and practice of united front is a well thought out undertaking with ideological and practical foundations. It results from a good analysis and appreciation of historical precedents and existing societal conditions. It is a comprehensive program with a clear view of its objectives.

The united front activities of the CPP involves an intricate web of underground and overt organizations orchestrated by Party organs in an elaborate scheme to entice various sectors of Philippine society to support or actively participate in the revolutionary struggle of the CPP. The vehicle used by the CPP in forging this broad revolutionary alliance among the mass of Filipinos is the National Democratic Front (NDF).
The NDF was deceptively projected by the CPP to be the catalyst of the alleged desire of the Filipino people to attain true national democracy. This unifying theme of national democracy is expressed by the CPP political line that is purportedly anti-feudal, anti-imperialist and anti-bureaucrat capitalist. This political line is an ingenious creation of the CPP. In contrast to the Marxist ideology of the CPP, this national democratic political line enjoys mass appeal. Hence, the CPP had been able to bring into its revolutionary fold a considerable mass of Filipinos who have been lured by the prospects of a better Philippines. Engaged in a very visible and militant mass movement, these organized masses give the NDF an aura of widespread popular support.

The militant mass movement orchestrated by Party cadre can conceivably create unfavorable social conditions that cause the government to increasingly lose credibility in the eyes of the populace. Protest actions such as strikes that can paralyze the economic machinery of the country could result in the government’s further isolation from the people. All these could create the bandwagon effect that could potentially sway the sympathy of the uncommitted elements of Philippine society into the CPP’s favor. Thus, the critical balance of socio-political forces will be in favor of the CPP/NPA/NDF, and this could hasten the seizure of state power by the CPP.
The benefits that the CPP derives from its united front effort go beyond the generation of popular support. Through the UF organizations, party elements are provided legitimate covers for their insidious activities. Armed elements of the NPA are harbored by organized peasants who provide not only material support to these guerillas, but intelligence and other military support functions as well. Additionally, organized urban masses also provide material support to the insurgency through various fund generation schemes. Hence, the generation of material and funding support for the struggle is served by UF efforts as well.

Such generation of popular and material support is not limited to the local scene. There had also been concerted CPP diplomatic initiatives abroad. These seek to gain international awareness and recognition for the NDF. Such recognition for the NDF necessarily means support for NDF programs. Thus, by projecting itself as espousing popular causes in a legitimate democratic struggle, the NDF deceives various foreign fund sources into providing support to NDF activities. Since these funds are used to finance activities supportive of the CPP struggle, these funds are being channelled to the insurgents' coffers. Hence, despite the absence of acknowledged support from foreign governmental and non-governmental institutions, the CPP can be said to be receiving significant material support from overseas.
The spread and depth of CPP infiltration of the various sectors of Philippine society has indeed grown to alarming proportions. Through its skillful utilization of united front concepts and strategies, the Party has been able to expand its socio-political influence far beyond its organizational strength. The CPP/NPA/NDF has become an increasingly credible politico-military force that can seriously challenge the existence of a free and democratic Philippines. Notwithstanding this already remarkable success, the CPP, through the NDF, is expected to pursue further its united front building activities to hasten the attainment of its ultimate objective of seizing state power and effecting the socialist transformation of Philippine society.

Toward this end, the CPP/NDF will continue to exploit real and/or imagined socio-political and economic issues that erode the credibility and legitimacy of the continued existence of the democratic systems in the Philippines. The NDF will remain behind its democratic facade if only to hide its true intentions. While deceit and subterfuge will remain the NDF's main weapons, its ultimate success will depend mainly on how well the Philippines can effectively rectify the socio-political and economic imbalances on which the insurgency plague thrives. This is the real challenge for the Philippines.
The realization of the central role united front plays in the CPP insurgency agenda should make government policy makers, both civil and military, see the whole spectrum of conflict the CPP insurgency represents. They should start treating the insurgency not merely as a military conflict between the AFP and NPA. The central conflict is between the democratic systems as represented by government and the alternative socialist systems being peddled by the CPP. What is at stake is the future of the Philippines' democratic systems and the people's democratic way of life and not the future of the ruling economic and political elite. In the final analysis, the people, not the government, will be the judge as to which system will better serve their aspirations for a better life. Thus, the government's socio-political and economic agenda should be geared towards a more pro-people orientation.
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-165-
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