


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SOCIETAL VALUES AND THEIR EFFECT UPON THE MILITARY

BY

COLONEL JAMES J. BAHR

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It is hard to imagine that in a democratic society there would not be a linkage between military values and societal values. Yet historians can easily point out that in America this linkage has not always existed, and when it did exist it was transparent. The evidence collected in this study project suggests that the association between the U.S. military and American society was very distant in the late 1900s. However, by the 1950s the values of these two communities had converged. That convergence still exists today.

During the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, this convergence was visible and surfaced for all to evaluate and judge. So controversial was the linkage that it even brought into question the very professionalism of the military. This paper explores the issues of linkage and professionalism. It will show that the military value system is one that is tied to the social fabric of American society. (S)

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SOCIETAL VALUES AND THEIR EFFECT UPON THE MILITARY

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Colonel James J. Bahr, MP

Colonel Ernest H. Dinkel
Project Adviser

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SOCIETAL VALUES AND THEIR EFFECT UPON THE MILITARY

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

One of the most controversial periods in American history has been the years of the Vietnam Conflict. At no other time has this nation and its military struggled so strongly with its conscience in an attempt to explain the social trauma that occurred during the late 1960s and the early 1970s. Affectionately, this period has been called the Age of Aquarius. It was a time of drastic social awareness and unrest. Daily the news media graphically covered race riots, student demonstrations, civil disobedience and rebellious youth violating traditional American values. The military, a bastion of conservative values, was plagued with incidents of fragging, high absent without leave (AWOL) and desertion rates, and rampant drug use among its service members. Reports of military atrocities such as the massacre at My Lai filled the headlines and aroused public distrust of its Army leadership.

It was a time when both the military and the civilian communities were questioning the nation's right of involvement,

both socially and morally, in the Vietnam Conflict. Prior to this period, the U.S. Military had prided itself on having high ideals of honor, discipline, and obedience. Soldiers were usually motivated by their belief in country, their own self esteem, and the public's respect for them. All this seemed to be changing. Blind obedience and duty to country were being challenged both inside and outside the military. Military leadership seemed unable to cope or deal with the problem. Even the officer corps began to question not only the military's involvement in Vietnam, but the senior military leadership's handling of the conflict.

The novel, Soldier by Tony Herbert, is a typical example of dissent. Herbert (an officer during the Vietnam Conflict) believes that "the major leadership problem in Vietnam was the generals, and the rest of the senior officer corps - the colonels, the lieutenant colonels and the majors."¹ Some junior officers even formed their own organization to speak out against the war.

Many of the senior military leaders, General Westmoreland in particular, were quick to blame the military's dilemma on the news media, politicians and even America's changing societal values. Like so many events in time, history moved on before a judgement could be made. Watergate, the OPEC oil crisis, the Iranian hostage situation and global terrorism quickly occupied America's attention. From 1975 until 1980 Americans ignored the trauma of the Age of Aquarius and the unresolved questions that

surround it.

Today, there is a growing need on the part of the public to focus its attention once again on those years. A generation of Americans have grown up with a void in their historical appreciation. Hollywood has taken the lead in trying to satisfy this void with such movies as Platoon, Full Metal Jacket, Hamburger Hill, Good Morning Vietnam and Born On The Fourth Of July. Television too, with Tour of Duty and China Beach, has attempted to shed a measure of insight into this troubled period. As many of these titles suggest, much of the attention is focused on the military. Even writers who wrote in the 1970s are again being read with a renewed interest. Much of the renewed attention centers around identifying the problems of the times and how Americans both inside and outside the military dealt with them. Little unfortunately, seems to be generated on the causes of the problems.

One topic that does surface but is often given little attention, is the question of how much effect changing American societal values has had upon the professionalism of the U.S. Army. During the 70s, this question was raised both inside the military as well as outside. Many advocated the thought that the social pressures of the late 60s were the cause of the Army of the 70s.

Some even argued that the U.S. Army is a profession that lacks a code of ethics and therefore created its own problems during the 70s. The triad of Duty, Honor, and Country is an

expression without meaning. The phrase is only a symbiotic relationship to an abstract moral code of professional ideals, ideals that change from person to person. They point out for example, there is no formal code which defines what honor should mean to a soldier. The definition for it as well as duty and country really depend upon an individual's own definition; a definition which is often formed by previous training and experiences.

This debate concerning the definition of military values is further aggravated by the question concerning the relationship between military values and societal values. Three theories are often used to address this question. They are the convergence, divergence, and cautious limited linkage theories.

The convergence theory presumes a total joining of military and civilian values system. The divergence theory stresses professional isolation between the military and society. The third theory is a combination of the first two: that is a commitment within each society to common values while maintaining separateness and uniqueness.

This paper will attempt to answer three of these issues. First, is the military a profession, one that has a code of ethics? Second, what relationship exists between societal values and military values? Lastly, was there a change in America's military value system during the 1960s and 1970s?

ENDNOTES

1. Anthony B. Herbert, Soldier, p. 240.

CHAPTER II
DUTY, HONOR, AND COUNTRY

THE MILITARY AS A PROFESSION.

The first topic that must be addressed deals with the military as a profession and the existence of a professional code of ethics.

A number of writers have addressed the issue of the military as a profession. One of the most noted is Samuel Huntington. In his book, The Soldier and the State, he identifies three important characteristics that distinguish a profession from other endeavors. Those three characteristics are expertise, "corporateness", and responsibility.

Huntington argues that these three characteristics are mutually supportive. To become a professional an individual begins by first obtaining expertise in an area. To gain the expertise, one must have acquired special training and skills. Once that expertise is acquired the second characteristic, "corporateness" develops. "Corporateness" is the sharing of the expert's acquired skills with other experts in the same field which in turn establishes a set of standards for maintaining these skills. The third characteristic, responsibility, is developed as a result of the corporation (experts) dealing with society. Responsibility and "corporateness", once combined, result in the development of a value code or ethos. The

formation of this ethos completes the establishment of a profession.

Huntington goes on to argue that the military fits this description and is a profession with a strong professional code. He describes what he views as the model military code or ethos. His military ethic includes a commitment to the state, subordination of the individual to the group, loyalty, obedience, civilian control, alienation from political activity, and a pessimistic view of a static and weak human nature. He labels this ethic as "conservative realism".

He goes on to state that the US Army has developed a similar outlook or code of professionalism. Huntington writes that the U.S. military professionalism he observes developed as a result of:

the isolation, rejection, and reduction of the armed services after the Civil War. Historians mark this as the low point of American military history...the very isolation and rejection which reduced the size of the services and hampered technological advance made these same years the most fertile, creative, and formative in the history of the American armed forces. Sacrificing power and influence, withdrawing into its own hard shell, the officer corps was able to and permitted to develop a distinctive military character. The American military profession, its institutions and its ideals, is fundamentally a product of those years.¹

Another historian, General Sir John Hackett, writes in his book, The Profession of Arms, that such virtues as courage, loyalty, and fortitude are common in everyone but that within the military they take on special meaning. They become a moral

code of ethics that governs all soldiers. He too holds that military service because of this code of ethics is a profession and not just an endeavor.

Malham M. Wakins also argues that:

there are two main discernible ties between moral virtue and the military profession: First, some important virtues (loyalty, obedience, courage, selflessness, integrity) are crucial to carrying out the military function and not merely 'nice to have' as they might be in some other endeavors; second, the profession itself can be noble because its ultimate purpose in a morally sound nation must involve one of mankind's highest values.²

Numerous other authors including Morris Janowitz, Samuel C. Sarkesian, and Russell F. Weigley argue that there exists a relationship between competence of military leadership and moral values. They all seem to argue that when an officer swears his oath of service, he accepts a concept of honor which is intertwined with a professional code of ethics that includes obedience, loyalty, integrity, and selflessness.

It is evident from these writings that historians and society considers the military a profession, one that has a code of ethics. The U.S. Army itself stresses that all soldiers must adhere to a code of ethics. U.S. Army Field Manual 22-103 best sums up what the Army believes. "A firm ethical base is the cornerstone of the Army. Ethics set the standard and the framework for correct professional action."³

MILITARY ETHICS/VALUES.

There are many excellent historical works dealing with the development of America's military ethic. The most noted authors are Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz, and C. Robert Kemble. Their classic works on military professionalism have been widely accepted as accurate descriptions as well as historical perceptions, of the role of military officers in American society.⁴ (Huntington's very concept of "professionalism" has become one of the major theoretical themes of the scholarly literature on military professionalism.)

These military historians believe that the military professionalism of the U.S. Army was born immediately after the Civil War and matured in the isolation of the frontier posts during the second half of the 19th century. It is during this time in history that the military and the nation moved in opposite directions. American society, liberal from its birth, became more liberal during this period of time. This heightened liberalism saw no need for a large standing military force. The military, rejected for the most part by a growing commercially oriented society, found itself assigned to the lonely outposts of the Indian territories, a duty that detached it from the mainstream of American life. As a result, the military became self-dependent and inclined toward conservatism. "By the turn of the century, when other professions, such as law and the ministry, had thoroughly adjusted to the liberal climate, the military was alone in its uncompromising conservatism."⁵ This

resulted in the military's developing a belief in the values of subordination, loyalty, duty, hierarchy, discipline, and obedience. Since survival in war depended upon unity, especially on the harsh, sparsely populated frontier, the military felt that the group was supreme over the individual.

This independent attitude (divergence theory) was further reinforced during the first half of the Twentieth Century when America attempted to practice isolationism and did not heed warnings being given by many in the military who saw the growing winds of war in Europe. The military was believed to be out-of-step with the times. Even after successfully fighting World War I, the military realized that the nation had no need for it and that it was not interested in spending monies on keeping it modern and professional. Huntington best describes the atmosphere:

After 1918 the military made every effort to continue the wartime identification with American society and to expand the neo-Hamiltonian link with the American community. . .(by 1920) it was only slowly that the officers were disabused of this illusion. By the end of the decade, however, it had become impossible for them to maintain their identification with the community . . . Rejected again, there was nothing for the military to do but retreat back to their prewar isolation and find interest and satisfaction in mundane duties of their profession.⁶

To sum up, military historians believe that the divergence theory best explains the formation of the American military value system and professional code of ethics that existed between the Civil War and World War II. Huntington states it

best, "American military professionalism. its institutions and its ideals, is fundamentally a product of those years, [1870-1900]. The isolation of the military was a prerequisite to professionalization, and peace was a prerequisite to isolation." 7

With this historical viewpoint on how American military professionalism developed, one then is lead to the question as to what elements affect this military value system. If a monastic existence developed this system, then does an exposure to the general society change it? Is there a cause and effect relationship? These questions will be addressed in the following chapters.

ENDNOTES

1. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 229.
2. Malham M. Wakin, War Morality and the Military Profession, p. 5.
3. U.S. Department of the Army. FM 22-103, Washington D.C., p. 18.
4. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, Cambridge, Belknap Press, 1957.
Charles R. Kemble, The Image of the Army Officer in America, Westport, Greenwood Press, 1933.
Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait, Glencoe, Free Press, 1960.
5. Huntington, p. 257
6. Ibid, pp. 282-288.
7. Ibid, p. 229.

CHAPTER III
PROFESSIONALISM AS VIEWED BY THE MILITARY

THE 1970 USAWC STUDY.


In 1970 the Chief of Staff of the Army, General William C. Westmoreland, directed the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) to conduct a study of military professionalism. This was the first major study conducted to determine what were the real causative factors affecting the military in the 1960s. That study has become over the years, one of the most quoted studies used by military historians and sociologists. In effect, it has become a legend in explaining the problems that plagued the U.S. Army during the years of the Vietnam Conflict.

Statistical data and earlier studies suggested that a climate existed in the officer corps that was "sufficiently out of step with the time honored aspirations and the traditional ethics of the professional soldier."¹ The 1970 USAWC study therefore, focused on the value system of the Army officer during the Vietnam Conflict years. Approximately 415 officers attending military schooling at Forts Benning, Eustis, Knox, Sill, and Leavenworth were interviewed and asked to fill out questionnaires that explored ethics, morality, and professional competence.

A conceptual model based upon the convergence theory, was

developed to help analyze the responses received to questionnaires given to the 415 officers (figure 1).

CONCEPTUAL MODEL, STUDY OF PROFESSIONALISM



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, STUDY ON PROFESSIONALISM, p. 6.

Figure 1

This model depicts several causative influences that shape the value system of an individual. One of those is the effect of "Socialization and Society." The study's authors recognize that such forces as family, school, church, and peers set an early imprint on a person's value system and that those same influences continue to affect an individual throughout their life. The model also illustrates that the individual's value system is influenced by professional indoctrination. This model

suggests that any changes to an individual's value system in later years would occur as a direct result of the relationship between the influences of socialization and professional indoctrination. This would be in effect, a proportional cause and effect relationship.

However, the findings of the USAWC study state:

there was no significant evidence that contemporary sociological pressures. . .which are ever present. . .were primary causes of the differences between ideal and actual professional climate in the Army; the problems are for the most part internally generated; they will not vanish automatically as the War in Vietnam winds down and the size of the Army decreases.¹

The study group repeated its observation later in the report by stating:

There is no direct evidence that external fiscal, political, sociological, or managerial influences are the primary causative factors of this less than optimum climate. Neither does the public attitude to the Vietnam War, or the rapid expansion of the Army, or the current anti-military syndrome stand out as a significant reason for deviations from the level of professional behavior the Army acknowledges as its attainable ideal.³

The study group did recognize that the military is "not immune from the intrusion of parts of the changing value system of society."⁴ The study's authors however, felt that the "transitory ingredients of societal change such as the anti-war, anti-establishment movements, did not appear to be primary causative factors to such a degree that they were truly

consequential in their assessment of the professional climate."5

The study group found that the Army's environment at the time was one that rewarded relatively insignificant, short term indicators of success. This finding was based upon a belief among the officer corps that officers both junior and senior were self-oriented, success-motivated and marginally skilled, which tended to discourage (an atmosphere or environment of) long term qualities of moral and ethical strength.

The surveyed officers believed that the contemporary military profession had the following problems:

1. Inadequate communication between junior and senior officers.
2. Selfish, promotion-oriented behavior.
3. Technical or managerial incompetence.
4. Distorted or dishonest reporting of status, statistics and officer efficiency.
5. Disloyalty to subordinates.
6. Senior officers setting poor standards of ethical and professional behavior.

To combat this environment, 31 recommendations were made. These 31 recommendations were collectively grouped into ten major areas. They are:

1. Disseminate to the officer corps the pertinent findings of this study.

2. Promote an atmosphere conducive to honest communication between junior and senior officers.
3. Outline standards for counseling of subordinates.
4. Provide continuing motivation for the competent and facilitate elimination of the substandard performer.
5. Enforce adherence to standards, with senior officers setting the example.
6. Focus on the development of measurable expertise.
7. Revise certain officer assignments priorities and policies, to include policy regarding the duration and essentiality of command tours.
8. Revise the officer evaluation system.
9. Revise the concept of officer career patterns.
10. Revise promotion policies.6

FOLLOW ON STUDIES.

The USAWC conducted follow-on studies in 1979, 1980 and 1985 to determine if the 1970 study might not have been aberrant or parochial. None of these studies were released for general publication. Each study, however, contains observations which shed some insight into any study of causative factors influencing professionalism in the military. The table below, taken from the 1985 study, shows a comparison of answers to 14 identical questions asked in the 1970, 1979 and 1985 studies concerning professional behavior and climate problems.

Table U: Top Problem Index Items, 1970-1985

BEHAVIOR	MEAN DIFFERENCE			IMPORTANCE			PROBLEM INDEX		
	1984	1979	1970	1984	1979	1970	1984	1979	1970
COMPLETING EFF RPTs	3.10	3.20	3.20	2.50	2.40	2.40	7.75	7.68	7.68
LOOK OUT FOR SUBs	2.90	2.70	2.80	2.60	2.60	2.30	7.54	7.02	6.44
BEING LOYAL TO SUBs	2.80	2.70	2.90	2.60	2.60	2.40	7.28	7.02	6.96
SETTING GOOD EXAMPLE	2.90	2.60	2.90	2.60	2.50	2.30	7.54	6.60	6.67
SET STDs OF MORAL BEHAVIOR	2.50	2.70	2.60	2.50	2.40	2.20	6.25	6.48	5.72
KEEP SUPs & SUBs INFORMED	2.60	2.70	2.70	2.40	2.40	2.20	6.24	6.48	5.94
DEV SKILLS FOR ASSIGNMENT	2.50	2.60	2.40	2.50	2.40	2.10	6.25	6.24	5.04
TAKING RESPONSIBILITY	2.60	2.50	2.70	2.30	2.40	2.20	5.98	6.00	5.94
GIVE ALL OUT EFFORT	2.50	2.60	2.50	2.30	2.30	2.10	5.75	5.98	5.25
KEEP ABREAST OF DEVEL	2.80	2.70	2.60	2.10	2.20	2.00	5.88	5.94	5.20
BEING LOYAL TO SUPs	2.50	2.40	2.50	2.30	2.30	2.10	5.75	5.52	5.25
MEETING COMMITMENTS	2.30	2.40	2.30	2.40	2.30	2.00	5.52	5.52	4.60
ATTENDING TO DUTIES	2.20	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.30	2.20	5.28	5.29	5.28
COMPLYING WITH ORDERS	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.20	2.00	5.06	4.84	4.60

The table's data illustrates amazing consistency in responses. Despite concerted efforts by the Army, the perception that nonprofessional behavior persists appears in all three studies. This suggests either that things have not gotten better in the military or that there is some causative factor

still impacting on the officers' perceptions of professionalism.

The authors of the 1985 USAWC professionalism study, in an attempt to answer why there appeared to be this consistency in the responses, reviewed both their study findings and the 1970 study findings. One observation is especially applicable to this paper. Unlike the authors of the 1970 study, the 1985 study group believed that societal climate has a direct effect upon military professionalism. They believe that the 1970 authors should have looked at the societal climate of the 1960s for several important reasons:

First, [the 1970] study respondents state the most influential factors on their military ethics are their own values and beliefs. These predispositions are the end products of their preentry socialization process and do reflect the effects of societal institutions such as family, school, peers, the workplace, and political and economic climate. Secondly, the military profession is cognizant of and subject to external societal influences, as evidenced in the 1973 study by LTC Moellering, [8] and internally through the accession process which brings thousands of young men and women, officers and enlisted, with their divergent attitudes and values into the Army every year. The conclusion that societal trends influence the Army is thus inescapable. Finally, describing the social climate of the 1970s leads to important conclusions and inferences concerning the state of Army professionalism in the 1970s and 1980s and provides some insights on future professional climate.⁹

The 1985 study group believed "external fiscal, political, and sociological influences have placed sufficient stresses on the military climate to warrant attention."¹⁰

The 1985 study group continued with this theme by examining

the societal climate of the 1970s in an attempt to understand its effects upon professionalism. They conclude:

First, the societal values of the 1970s impacted upon the Army officers involved in the 1970 Army Professionalism Study. Secondly, and central to this entire study effort, the 1970s generation are the captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels of today who were socialized in a very socially and economically turbulent time in our history and who are the respondents in the 1985 Army Professionalism Study.¹¹

Therefore, to expect to see a shift in the results from the various surveys is optimistic. No single surveyed group will be able to measure their values in congruence with that of a supposed "ideal" set. Each generation will have a different "ideal" value set from that of another generation. As a result each will see their held values falling short of the "ideal" set in the same proportion. In other words, there is no way to measure differences between generations without a written established definition of what it is one is trying to measure.

In analyzing societal effects, the 1985 study group tried to define social values in terms of family, work, education, authority, religion, patriotism, law, morals and obligations. For the first time, an Army study recognized that "the essential point is that the military services are not something different from and apart from American society, but are an integral part of the fabric of that society."¹² What unfortunately they did not do, was to define what the "ideal" standard was for these

values so that follow-on studies could measure changes from them.

There was one problem that concerned both the 1970 and 1985 respondents. The problem of careerism was prevalent in both studies. The 1970 study found that careerism existed because of self serving reasons. The 1985 study found that careerism was being perpetuated by both the individual and the service. Both studies felt that this problem had a significant effect on professionalism.

One thing did stand out between the two studies. The respondents in the 1985 study believed that the professional climate of the Army in the 80s has improved from that of 1970 Army.

ENDNOTES

1. U.S. Army War College, Study on Professionalism, Carlisle Barracks, 1970, p. V.

2. Ibid, p. 30.

3. Ibid, pp. 28-28.

4. Ibid, p. 27.

5. Ibid, p. 27.

6. Ibid, pp. 38-45.

7. Table U deals with answers to questions 15 through 84 of the questionnaire. Specifically, the Table lists the fourteen (14) officer professional behaviors considered to be most problematic on the basis of ratings given them by respondents during each study year. The "Mean Difference" column reflects the average differences between ideal and actual behavior perceived by respondents on a scale from one to five. The "Importance" column lists how important to the Army respondents felt the item of behavior was on a scale from one to three. The "Problem Index" is simply the product obtained by multiplying Mean Difference and Importance ratings. By incorporating data on the quality of officer behavior on any particular item (i.e. the Mean Difference between ideal and actual behavior), and data on the importance of that particular behavior, the Problem Index gives a measure of how much corrective action that particular behavior may require in comparison to other behavioral items.

US Army War College, Army Professional Study, 1985, unpublished, dated 1 June 1984/6 June 1985, p. 26.

8. LTC John Moellering, in a study titled "Civil Military Relations," published in 1973, sought to predict whether the army officer corps would move in a divergent or convergent direction with reference to civilian society in the post Vietnam era.

9. USAWC Army Professional Study, 1985.

10. Ibid, p. 107.

11. Ibid, p. 111.

12. Stephen E. Ambrose and James A. Barber, Jr, The Military and American Society, New York, Free Press, 1973, p. 310.

CHAPTER IV

The Change Begins

Many military sociologists and historians reinforce the 1985 USAWC study group's observation. C. Robert Kemble states, "if there is a single historical lesson to be drawn, it should be that any so-called traditional American view of the military profession is a home made myth."¹ To him, a soldier's image is as many-faceted as the society he comes from. The values that a soldier has at the time are those values that are reflected in the surrounding current contemporary life style. Every age, Kemble states, has several factions that shape the stereotype of the military careerist. He believes that such factors as the state of the art of warfare, along with the military-social situation of the times determines the fundamental styles of soldiery.

Kemble believes that one can "pick any point in the nation's past and there find a full spectrum of military images."² Each person builds their own image based upon their familiarity with history. The problem Americans have is that most of the images they envision are contradictory and usually false when compared to the real image. Time tends to build romantic, ideal images.

Kemble like Huntington, also views the military profession as having obtained its professional ethos during the last half

of the 19th Century and the first two decades of the 20th Century. But, Kemble believes that professionalism is different today because of the difference in societies and the roles molded for the military.

To many historians, the American military has had cyclic periods during which it pulls back into a monastic posture and there reinforces its perception of its professional ethos. From the end of the Civil War until the end of World War II, there have been several cyclic periods in which the military, because of a relaxation in military involvement in domestic or international affairs, has had time to step away from its involvement with society. During each of these periods, the Army has had a chance to reflect on its professional image and the values associated with that image. These monastic periods have afforded the Army an opportunity to amend any deviations it identifies and then to reindulcate its membership with the amended ethos. These monastic or cyclic periods normally occurred after American involvement in a war. The traditional desire for isolationism set the foundation for this climate.

An example of the military's reaction to one of those monastic periods in time is provided by this 1947 passage, written by a 38-year-old Air Force colonel, who served during the 1930s. It serves as an epitaph for the officer corps of that era:

Ground and air officers alike stubbornly carried out their duties among a people hoping and trying to believe that all officers were as useless as their saber chains. It was a weird, almost furtive existence. . . In such an atmosphere of unreality,

officers sometimes felt a little ghostly and bewildered, and turned to the affectation of imported uniforms and mannerisms, the imitation of the well-to-do and horse culture.³

Like other monastic times, the officer corps of the 30s withdrew from society and took the opportunity to cultivate its own image, an image that took on high ethical standards and a life of social grace. Such periods clearly helped the Army to maintain its traditional monastic existence. This enabled the Army not only to withdraw from the effects of society, but to erase any effects it had upon the service. Accompanying these periods were drastic reductions for manpower. This measure limited the number of individuals in the Army to a small, often elite group usually holding the same conservative outlook on values.

One of the serious problems facing the study of professional values is in trying to define what those values mean at any one time. The USAWC '85 study suggests that the meaning of a value not only may change in practice but in definition. Many military historians agree. Sam C. Sakesian states that the elusiveness of professional boundaries and the imprecise definitions and measures of substantive professional matters such as honor, ethics, and morals invite intuitiveness and subjectivity in the study of professionalism. But that should not let this deter one in defining values. He further states:

fundamental concern in the study of professionalism is societal values and the extent to which these influence the military professional value system and the degree of congruence between the two systems. A military system in a democratic society cannot exist

long without some reference to civilian values. Equally important, the values of society - whether technical skills, professional ethics and proper political perspectives - must have some visible and worthwhile connection with these same values in the military.⁴

So even if the military was able to withdraw into itself and modify its ethos, by virtue of future exposure to society the ethos was going to again be modified or changed.

Up until 1947, for most Americans, military conflicts were periods for reaffirmation of basic Americanism and for pride in the soldier's role in defense. Whenever the military was called upon to serve the nation, it found that its values mirrored many of those held by the majority of the public. However, after World War II, Americans entered a period of new warfare, the cold war. This is recognized by many historians as a turning point for military professionalism.

The cold war called upon the military to intermingle its talents with those of the civilian world. From this period on, there would be no monastic periods for the military to fall back and reflectively garnish its professional ethos. The boundaries between civilian and military roles became increasingly diffused. Military activities were now integrated with the economic, diplomatic, and psychological instruments of statecraft. This integration more than any other force would cause the ethical values of both communities to interact with one another. Huntington refers to this as the beginning of the disequilibrium between American civil-military relations.⁵

This diffusion was not readily noticeable until the second year of the Korean War. During the years between World War II and the Korean War, America was governed by leaders who were raised when warfare constituted a heroic epic that was used for the destruction of tyranny. These leaders used this lingering outlook and combined it with the enormous American (Atomic bomb) military capability after World War II to create a period of confidence in American diplomacy. However, the Korean War signaled an enormous inescapable change. "The objective of military operations ceased to be solely the destruction of the enemy forces in order to remove their capacity to resist; instead, the employment of force was closely controlled to convey a diplomatic message."⁶

America's policy of deterrence could no longer control every situation. Now more than ever, the military element of power became enmeshed with the political element. The nation was caught up in the realities of power politics in the nuclear age. Victory and defeat became frustratingly obscure and remote concepts. The very definition of many values changed drastically. Simultaneously, international tensions precluded major military reductions. Anti-Soviet sentiment was to become anti-communist furor.

Within the government, "civilian leaders became preoccupied with questions of potential violence internationally and nationally; as a result they further incorporated military leaders into the highest planning levels of foreign and even

domestic policy."⁷ The creation of such agencies as the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the National Security Council further intermixed large populations of military and civilian personnel. Now, civilian participation grew swiftly in what traditionally had been the province of the military establishment.⁸

This changing relationship with the civilian world and the frustration of not having conclusively won the Korean War created a serious challenge to military morale and professionalism. Huntington best describes the events of that time:

(There) appeared a fairly wide spread concern in civilian as well as military circles for the declining prestige of the military career and the shaky morale of the officer corps. The Womble Committee Report in 1953 and the persistent warnings of Hanson Baldwin and others called public attention to the plight of the military, the press generally reacting favorably to the military pleas, and even Congress manifesting a sympathetic interest. While this shift in intellectual environment did not reverse the tendencies in the opposite direction, it did enable a number of measures to be taken in 1953-1955 towards restoring the integrity of the officer corps and the attractiveness of the military career. Congress improved retirement benefits, liberalized promotion opportunities, and increased military pay. Within the services, more emphasis was placed upon developing combat leaders instead of technical specialists.⁹

Unlike World War II, the Korean post war adjustment did not allow the military their traditional monastic interlude. The now-integrated civil-military bureaucratic organizations demanded that the military develop within its ranks new

technical, analytical, and managerial skills of high order. Even if Congress intended to place more emphasis upon training its military leaders for combat, future events were to still press the military for more technical skills and technical attitudes.

In 1961, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara introduced sweeping changes to the military. He not only completed the unification of the services as directed by the 1958 Amended Unification Act, but he introduced corporateness to the services. Richard Gabriel and Paul Savage believe that:

(McNamara) was the ideal corporate man, and during his tenure as Secretary of Defense the Army moved closer to modern business corporation in concept, tone, language, and style. Further, the individual military officer became identified with the corporate executive to the point where the functions of command were perceived as identical to the functions of department management. More and more of its officers were sent to graduate school to take advanced degrees, almost all receiving degrees in business management or administration. 'Systems Analysis' became the new Army 'buzz word', and officers suddenly became concerned with something called 'career management'. The traditional aspects of the 'military way' collapsed under the impact of new administrative skills, staff reorganizations, and computer models of decision making . . . the Army and its officer corps not only adopted the technology of the business world, but began to absorb its language, its style, and, eventually its ethics.¹⁰

As early as 1960, Morris Janowitz noted the change occurring to the military. He saw the tasks of military leadership taking on three identifiable characterizations: the direct combat role, the organizational and administrative role, and the role of specialized military technologist. In these new

roles the military professional easily loses sight of the traditional roles and functions of the military profession. Management becomes the central contribution to the operation of the military, not heroic leadership as in the past. As a result, the military professional begins to inculcate the values of the civilians he works with instead of the traditional military virtues. Janowitz refers to this as the "civilianization of the military."¹¹

America's involvement in the Vietnam Conflict finally brought this convergence of civil-military identities to a confrontation point. "The fundamental weakness revealed in Vietnam was our strength: Management and technology."¹² "America's managerial fetish had 'civilianized' the military. General Westmoreland was the chief bureaucratic supervisor who reported to the bureaucratic Joint Chiefs of Staff who in turn reported to Secretary McNamara who wrote the book on bureaucracy in the Defense Department."¹³

The military values of the past seemed to be gone. By evolution, the new values of the military professional and the culture they embodied now became characteristic of the upwardly mobile civilian middle class. The military professional, who under McNamara was forced to obtain most of his formal education from a civilian society, now reflected the values of that society. Since education and culture are inseparably linked, it was inevitable that they would affect the military value

system. "The young American professionals learned that the bureaucracies want from them what they want for themselves. The bureaucracies hire people sufficiently self-interested to focus on technique, not goals; on self-advancement, not group loyalty; on the career, not tradition; on their own futures, not politics, not policy."¹⁴

This changing professionalism within the military was not to surface until the Vietnam Conflict. For unlike the Korean War, whose senior officers had been trained by the veterans of World War II, themselves the product of the traditional military establishment of the 1930s, the Vietnam Conflict officers, both senior and junior, had spent most of their careers in the cold war era and reflected the values of the existing military bureaucracy.¹⁵ These cold war era values, did not reflect the same value structure has held before the cold war. The stage was now set for a reflection of the times and societal values.

ENDNOTES

1. Charles R. Kemble, The Image of the Army Officer, p. 197.
2. Ibid, p. 196.
3. Edward M. Coffman and Peter F. Herryly, "The American Regular Army Officer Corps Between The World Wars," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 4, Fall 1977, p. 71.
4. Sam C. Sarkesian, "An Empirical Reassessment of Military Professionalism," Military Review, Vol. LVII, August 1977, p. 7.
5. Huntington, p. 464.
6. Robert G. Gard, Jr, "The Military and American Society," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 49, July 1971, p. 700
7. Bruce M. Russett and Alfred Stepan, Military Force and American Society, p. 6.
8. Gard, p. 700.
9. Huntington, pp. 460-461.
10. Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, Crisis In Command, p. 19.
11. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait, Chapter 2.
12. Loren Baritz, Backfire, p. 327.
13. Ibid, p. 326.
14. Ibid, p. 334.
15. Edwin A. Deagle Jr., "Contemporary Professionalism and Future Military Leadership," The Annals, pp. 162-170.

CHAPTER V
The Change Revealed

THE CLIMATE

After 7 years of inconclusive results (1966-1973), the Vietnam Conflict appeared to have no external purpose to a vast majority of Americans. Americans were not defending national goals, not resisting an evil enemy, not defending motherhood and apple pie. Adding to this image was the news media's daily coverage of the horrors of the war. This was not war as the American people fondly remembered; their good wars, especially the Big One, did not invade their homes every night.

In the beginning of the Vietnam Conflict, it was not like this. The generation of the 1960s had been "brought up on war news and wartime propaganda through a steady stream, of war novels, war movies, comic strips and television programs with war or military settings. To many Americans, military training, expeditionary service, and warfare were merely extensions of the entertainment and games of childhood."¹ This mind set was fueled by the many World War II veterans who romanticized and exaggerated their own military experiences and loyalties and often asserted that their military service and sacrifice should be repeated by the younger generation.

Lloyd B. Lewis, in The Tainted War, believes three agencies

influenced the generation of Americans who were born after World War II. They were:

1. The media (movies, comic books). This agency initiated young males into the mysteries of making war.
2. The family. This agency gave basic orientation to the reality of the world. As noted earlier, WW II veterans legitimated the military and warfare.
3. The military. This agency fashioned images of glory and virtue.²

In the early 1960s, all three of these agencies were consistent with one another and became mutually legitimating. Through these three agencies World War II became the paradigm of modern war. In addition, Americans by 1960 had accepted the cold war as a global struggle against a clearly identifiable evil, communism. This had a socializing influence on all Americans. War again took on a meaningful human activity in pursuit of a specific end. Communism became the defined equivalence of evil. Americans also saw themselves as welcome liberators of enslaved civilian populations. Warfare was believed to be fair play and heroic.

Lloyd B. Lewis refers to this heroic outlook as the "John Wayne Wet Dream Syndrome". Movies built a notion of immortality for heroes. John Wayne became the embodiment of the American Warrior, the spirit of war itself. In his movies he acted aggressively without regard to personal safety and left an image that death for heroes is inconceivable.³

It is with this value foundation that the Americans entered the Vietnam Conflict. After the first six years of the conflict, Americans made a cognitive transition in their beliefs. It became clear that the war was not being conducted in terms of glory-myths. America began to retreat from its earlier values as the reality of the war is brought home by returning veterans and by the youth of America who must fight the war. They have come to realize that warfare has no purpose except to destroy.

The Vietnam Conflict created considerable doubts among the citizenry about the military and its values. This skepticism, coupled with the enormous war cost which were detracting from President Johnson's illusion of a Great Society, caused anger and aggravated the social unrest in the crowded urban centers. The military now found its new recruits and even the officers being drawn from a social setting that is experiencing an almost unprecedented criticism of the military and conducting often violent, anti-war movements. All of this was occurring at a time when youth movements were supporting civil rights issues, anti-authoritarianism and counter culture attitudes. Everywhere people were struggling with traditional American values in hopes of finding a purpose in the turmoil of the decade.

By 1970, the Army too was plagued with many of the social problems being felt in society. Race riots, high incidents of AWOL and desertions, and rampant drug use became the outlets for expressions of dissatisfaction by enlisted soldiers towards the

military and in particular, toward the Vietnam Conflict. The growth of the youth culture and the changing social and political systems in American society were having their influence on the military.

A new generation of officers, attuned to the new demands and expectations of society, had entered the military profession. They brought with them new experiences and a sensitivity to societal tensions, a sensitivity that was lacking in more senior officers.⁴ These new officer attitudes, according to writers such as Llyold B. Lewis, Loren Baritz, William D. Henderson, and LTC Peter Petersen, clashed with a senior Army bureaucratic officer corps that appeared to be self-serving and disoriented on values.⁵ It became a corps that emphasized techniques and means not goals and purposes.

The Vietnam strategy of attrition implemented by General Westmoreland, seems to typify senior leadership of the conflict. Body counts became tactical objectives. Terrain fiercely fought for was abandoned only to be later fought for again and again in an attempt to destroy the enemy. This created a new moral independence for both junior officers and the soldiers alike.

The rapid turnover of commanders, usually every six months, supported the image of "ticket punching" (doing the job for advancement purposes). One year combat tours suggested a less-than-committed attitude of trying to bring the conflict to a quick, conclusive end. The 1970 USAWC study clearly

acknowledges careerism in the military as a problem. But it failed to recognize where careerism came from and failed to trace its development through the military's exposure to civilianization of the officer corps during the previous 15 to 20 years.

William L. Hauser believes that the U.S. Army since World War II has been unable to isolate itself from society sufficiently to maintain its authoritarian discipline or to prevent the intrusion of such social ills as racial discord and drug abuse.⁶ The problems experienced by the U.S. Army in the early 70s reflected that intrusion. The gap in value appreciation between junior officers and senior officers was demonstrated in the handling of the discipline problems within the enlisted ranks. "In the officer corps it is difficult to maintain the tradition of honor and integrity in the face of widespread belief that military service is evil and immoral. Nor is it easy to create an atmosphere conducive to discipline when the legitimacy of the institution itself is in question."⁷

Perhaps Max Lerner's essay on careerism, "The Shame of the Professions" best shows that there is a direct relationship of careerism with professionalism. Lerner concludes that the military of the 1960s and 1970s had accepted the general public's impersonalism ethics of the "bottom line."⁸

Philip M. Fammer's essay, "Conflicting Loyalties and the American Military Ethic," points out that during his time in the

service he knew many officers who clung to high ethics of integrity and moral courage, but that they were rare in numbers.⁹ Two officers at the time who appear to fit Flammer's image of the "rare breed" were LTC John Paul Vann and COL David Hackworth. Both became outspoken critics of the military and its lack of professionalism and ethical behavior. They became legendary figures for their professional ethic. Hackworth's book, About Face: The Odyssey of An American Warrior, faults the Army for its handling of the Vietnam Conflict. Another outspoken critic is Edward King a retired Army Lieutenant Colonel. His book, The Death of An Army: A Pre Mortem, reinforces many of Vann and Hackworth's charges.

Yet, even these outspoken critics who appeared to follow some forgotten ethic may lack the true moral character that they charge as being absent from the Army. In his 26 June 89, Army Times article, Harry S. Summers reveals the true professional records of Hackworth and Vann. Vann it appears, left the service just ahead of statutory rape charges being preferred against him. Hackworth, Summers writes, had more to his:

moral stand than met the eye. Investigation revealed that this once strict disciplinarian had turned his compound at Cao Lanh into a cesspool of corruption. To avoid even more negative publicity, the Army did not follow through on criminal charges that could have led to Hackworth's court martial and imprisonment, and Hackworth was allowed to retire from active service.¹⁰

It appears even the heroes of the times had personal values that were out of line with those of past generations.

THE CAUSES OF THE CHANGE

The changing of the military's role during the cold war years is not the only change that has affected the military's relationship to that of society. In the past, the military installations where most soldiers worked and lived provided separation from civilian societies. They became societies within societies. They had their own theaters, stores, housing areas, etc. However, the larger military forces of the cold war era broadened the Army's exposure to the civilian world. The magnitude of the Army took it out of those self-contained spheres of influence. The effects of that exposure incorporated many social value changes.

First, the lack of sufficient military housing required that a vast majority of officers reside in civilian communities. The increased number of married enlisted soldiers also caused more of them to live in civilian communities. This then and now, dilutes some of the values that could be maintained relatively easily within an isolated military community. Many Army offices and headquarters have leased facilities off Army installations further adding to the community exposure.

Second, this exposure allowed officers and enlisted members to associate closely with civilians who are financially more successful in less demanding occupations, thereby raising military expectations for similar treatment.

Third, an increasing number of military assignments are not related directly to combat functions, removing the sustaining motivation of the military mystique.

Fourth, enlisted members who have been raised with the luxuries of the "me generation" are not interested in the poverty and spartan life style of the old Army. The open-bay barracks of World War II have given way to individual rooms. Mess halls have become dining facilities. Off duty soldiers are now free to leave their installations without regard to pass requirements or permission. Duty days and the work week resemble civilian work schedules. Weekends are usually duty-free times for most soldiers.

Lastly, the very composition of the Army contributes to the effect civilian values have upon it. Its members come randomly from across the range of a pluralistic society causing a pluralism in attitude within its ranks. "The Army, albeit a professional service, is heavily leavened with men who are temporary soldiers. These temporary soldiers have their roots in American civil society not in the service."11

Even military leadership is for the most part temporary. ROTC officers have and will continue to provide the majority of the officers needed to fill positions at the junior grade level. Their active duty service obligations generally run between two to six years. Their background generally reflects the academic and social values of their civilian colleges; not the parochialism of a service academy. "Even the regular

officer cannot escape the impact and pressure of the American civil life style. He is returned periodically to a civilian environment where his perceptions of the basic American anti-military ethic will be reinforced. Better than 75 percent of all West Point graduates who stay on active duty receive advanced degrees at civilian universities."¹²

When viewed in total, all of these factors clearly illustrate how closely tied the military has become to civilian society. The monastic periods that allowed the Army to cleanse itself disappeared after World War II and since then, the Army has drawn closer to society and the values it holds.

Supporting this tie is the Army's attempt to recruit young soldiers. Advertisements such as "Be all you can be", paint a glamorous picture of the Army as a career rather than a profession, an attitude noted in the 1970 USAWC study and again cited in the 1985 study. William B. Skelton lists it as a fact of life:

Important to the self-image of the military profession is the view that the military service is a 'calling' rather than merely an occupation. Young men are supposedly drawn to a military career by strong positive forces - family tradition of military leadership, dreams of martial glory, patriotic devotion - rather than by such mundane considerations as money and security.¹³

His research, however, has found that most individuals selected the military for more prosaic reasons. They came for either a lucrative career or a protected one. In most cases a protected one.

This fact has not escaped the U.S. Army. The participants in both the 1970 and 1985 USAWC studies list careerism as a major disruption to military professionalism. The participants went on to state that the current system promotes "ticket punching," rewards trivial accomplishments instead of technical competence, and has a climate supportive of doing short term projects for success. In short, individuals are placing selfish behavior ahead of the good of the service.

Many historians further argue that the Army is and has always been, a bureaucratic environment. As such it is preoccupied with the specialization of functions. The result is that bureaucratic imperatives, in turn, demand technical, analytical and managerial skills which, in turn, reflect the prevailing societal values of the time. Since 1947, the pressures of the cold war have forced the military to move more from its traditional institutional format to that of an occupational model. This move has enhanced its bureaucratic nature.

The corporate image the Army has developed and the management style it operates under is an emergent structure consistent with the changes in American society. It has been a long term transformation, one that historians and social commentators believe is a direct result of a convergence of values needed by the military and civilian societies to exist in today's multidimensional world. This new world which had its birth in the 50s is drastically effected by the mass media, the

lethality of modern weapon systems, developing nations in the Third World, and the shifting alliances because of those nations. It is a world that no longer affords nations a time to retreat into isolationism. It calls upon and demands commitments from all.

The U.S. military like the world, has seen many changes since 1950. Gone are the periods in which the military could withdraw and evaluate its professional values and ethics. Like America, the military can no longer resort to isolationism. Both have an active role as guardian of the free world.

As a result of this change in identity, the U.S. military has found its values converging with those of American society. As illustrated, this convergence has occurred in many ways. The expanded role of civilization of the military has had an effect. The increased size of the cold war military has forced it to abandon its isolated installations and integrate with surrounding civilian societies. The increased need for technical skills and sophisticated weapon systems has integrated civilian and corporate values with the values of the military.

The new social awareness of Americans as a result of Vietnam, has probably had the most impact. The military has become closer to America's conscience. It no longer is placed out-of-sight and out-of-mind. It has become a tool of social activity. One only needs to focus on its use as a tool in America's war on drugs.

Lastly, the very nature of global enterprise has built

"corporateness" into every American undertaking. The expense of maintaining a modern military force calls for management and the skills that go with administering to large budgets and global commitments.

ENDNOTES

1. General David M. Shoup, "The New American Militarism", in The Military and American Society, ed. by Martin B. Hickman, p. 7.
2. Lloyd B. Lewis, The Tainted War, Chap. 2.
3. Ibid, Chap. 2.
4. Sam C. Sarkesian, The Professional Army Officer In A Changing Society, p. 213.
5. Lloyd B. Lewis, The Tainted War; Loren Baritz, Backfire; Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, Crisis In Command.
6. William L. Hauser, America's Army In Crisis: A Study in Civil Military Relations, p. 88.
7. James A. Barber, Jr., The Military and American Society, p. 309.
8. Malham M. Wakin, War, Morality and the Military Profession, p. 134.
9. Ibid, p. 168.
10. Harry Summers, "Vietnam Legacy: A New, Ugly Kind of Hero", Army Times, 26 June 1989, p. 25.
11. Major James S. Dickey, "A Personal Statement", in Military Force and American Society, ed. by Bruce M. Russett and Alfred Stepan, p. 31.
12. Ibid, p. 31.
13. William B. Skelton, "The Army Officer As Organization Man", in Soldiers and Civilians, ed. by Garry D. Ryan and Timothy K. Nerriger, p. 62.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Since America's founding, the nation has struggled with the question, what is the role of its military? The founding fathers were fearful that a standing military force might assume a traditional European role, one that influences politics. This same attitude was shared by many Americans. To prevent this from happening, they built America's military posture around the citizen-soldier concept, the militia.

Until the Civil War, most military units were social organizations with their officers being elected to position. The very small standing force that did exist was used primarily to build fortifications and conduct topographic studies.

The Civil War and the Indian Wars altered America's attitude toward the role of its military. Still not wanting a strong standing military force, most Americans recognized that a small professional military force was needed to deal with external threats. Thus was born the Army of the frontier.

Accepting the idea for the need to have a small standing military did not necessarily signal a change in attitude toward accepting its members. As a result, individuals who choose the military as a profession found it to be a monastic life, a life shunned by normal civilian society.

During the last half of the 19th century and the first half

of the 20th century in its isolated world, the military developed its own set of standards and values in order to govern itself and to provide meaning for its existence. Generically this ethos came to be known as Duty, Honor, and Country.

During both World War I and II American patriotism helped to burnish the image of this military ethos. The birth of the cold war however, again brought a new American attitude relative to its military. America became the champion and guardian of the free world. With that new national role, the U.S. military became a key and integral part of the U.S. elements of power. As such, it lost its monastic existence and found itself being drawn closer to American society. This new association started a slow erosion of the military ethos that had been built at the turn of the century.

At first, the breadth of change in the ethos was not apparent. It was not until the Vietnam Conflict, with its inglorious conduct and public outcry, that the military noticed that it had adopted many of American societal attitudes. By then, both America and its military identified massive changes occurring to their traditional values, such as the disintegration of the family, the adoption of a morality based on fashion and status, and above all, the collapse of delayed gratification.

Within the military, an orientation resulting from these changes became known as careerism. Several studies conducted by the military, most noted of which is the USAWC 1970 study,

revealed that the officer corps was concerned over these changes which were to be labeled as careerism.

Many historians have tried to identify what caused these changes in the military. Some as noted, blame the cold war, others Vietnam, and yet others blame the expanded role civilians have taken in traditional military matters, most noted being Robert McNamara. No doubt the real cause is a combination of all three.

What remains to be answered is how far this change has occurred. Both Morris Janowitz and Charles Moskos predict that the military will continue to change away from its 19th Century image. Moskos argues that the US military is moving from a profession to an occupation, while Janowitz strongly contends that the military is nearing but has not yet reached its convergence with civilian professionalism.¹ In either case, it is apparent that military historians and sociologists believe that today's military professional is continuing to change, and one of the causative factors for that change continues to be the growing civil-military relationship.

Not everyone finds this association bad. Many firmly believe it reinforces our founding fathers' desires. America's Army is a citizen force and as such reflects the values of its society. What better way to ensure this reflection than to continue to encourage the military to associate with society. So strong is the belief that the military is an institution with strong interrelationship with the rest of American society, that

the 19th National Archives Conference selected as its theme "The United States Army Vis-A-Vis American Society".² At the conference historians, sociologists, and other academic professionals as well as Army officers, archivists and other government officials discussed the relationship of the Army and its effects on the mores of the wider American society, and in turn the influences of that society. The participants of the conference strongly believe that both society and the military have direct affect upon one another.

The flavor of that conference was captured by the editors of Soldiers and Civilians. The opening article of this book is written by General Andrew J. Goodpaster. It best sums up the conference and this paper. "Americans would not tolerate a military force that did not emanate from and reflect the breadth of American society and the ideals that animated it. . .In American society, the military establishment is expected to mirror the attitudes of the society it serves."³ Without a doubt, America's Army over the years, has reflected the needs and values of the American people. Societal values have always been and will continue to be, the foundation for the value system the Army uses in maintaining its professional code of ethics.

ENDNOTES

1. Morris Janowitz, "From Institutional to Occupational," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 4, Fall 1977, pp.51-53.

2. The 17 essays included in Soldiers and Civilians, are a product of the 19th Conference of the National Archives held in 1986. The essays are essentially as they were presented at the conference. They explore four major themes: 1) Roots of American Military Policy and Institutions; 2) The People of the Army: The Military Social World; 3) The U.S. Army's Impact on Local Communities: Some Explored and Unexplored Pathways; 4) The U.S. Army as Agent of Social Change and as Instrument of Social Control.

3. Andrew J. Goodpaster, "Westpoint, The Army, And Society: American institutions in Constellation," in Soldiers and Civilians, ed. by Garry D. Ryan and Timoth K. Nenniger, p. 5.

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