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MUZZLING THE BEAR

GORBACHEV'S PROGRAM TO RESTRUCTURE THE SOVIET MILITARY

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MUZZLING THE BEAR

GORBACHEV'S PROGRAM TO RESTRUCTURE THE SOVIET MILITARY

→ At a special closed session of the Central Committee convened immediately after the official end of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956, Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalin and ushered in a new era in Soviet politics. The underlying motivations behind Khrushchev's landmark speech were no doubt varied and complex, but it is not difficult to discern that one of the fundamental goals was to set the stage for launching the Soviet Union on a radical program of social and economic reform.¹ Within a year, Khrushchev had managed to oust or weaken his main political rivals, and he moved forward briskly, outlining his ambitious objectives with bold aplomb. While praising the "spectacular achievements of the Soviet people" in "greatly overfulfilling" the 1956 goals of the sixth five year plan, he advocated a complete break with the Stalinist past and brazenly declared that the nation's primary mission was "catching up with and surpassing the most developed countries in per capita production".² (SDW) ←

Unfortunately for Khrushchev, his vision of the Soviet Union being able to "bury" the capitalist West in an economic landslide of socialist achievement was destined for failure. He was removed from office in October 1964 and the 18 year reign of Leonid Brezhnev commenced. Under Brezhnev, many of the reforms were reversed and the brash optimism of the Khrushchev era dissolved into the dull monotony of what is today

commonly referred to as "the period of stagnation."

Now there is a bold new reformer on the scene, one Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. For almost five years, he has been attempting to push the Soviet Union forward into modernity by implementing his radical three-pronged reform program of perestroika, glasnost and democratization. Through this process, he hopes to maintain the Soviet Union's great power status into the next century by radically transforming its political, economic and social structure. The focus of this thesis is on one aspect of that transformation- changes in the Soviet military under Gorbachev.

The topic at hand is extremely broad and diverse, and I have divided my analytical effort accordingly. Chapter one is devoted to studying the relationship between the Army, the Party and society. Chapter two examines the impact of "new thinking" on military doctrine and defense policy. Chapter three offers analysis of the effects of cutting the defense budget and implementing the "conversion" program. Chapter four aims at defining the evolving relationship between the Soviet armed forces and their Warsaw Pact counterparts. Chapter five explores the interrelationship between military reform and the overall reform process. Collectively, I feel that these chapters provide fairly comprehensive coverage of a widely discussed but often poorly understood topic, and I hope that my work provides useful insight for the reader.

CHAPTER ONE

THE ARMY, THE PARTY AND SOCIETY

THE PARTY AND THE MILITARY

A necessary precondition to an objective analysis of the effects of Gorbachev's military reform program is an examination of the historical, political and societal parameters within which the Soviet armed forces exist and operate. Without a firm grasp of the military's role in the internal Soviet political equation, and in particular, without a thorough understanding of the dynamics of its relationship with the Party, there is no basis for comparison to determine precisely what it is that is being changed at present, and to what extent it is being changed. Perhaps more importantly, it is impossible to gauge or predict the likely consequences of the reform process in the absence of such a conceptual framework.

Accordingly, my analytical effort in this chapter will proceed in three stages. First, I will endeavor to lay a solid empirical foundation which describes where the Soviet military is and how it got there by examining its historical roots and the evolution of its relations with the Party and society. Second, I will evaluate several theories which purport to explain the essence of the interface between the Party, the armed forces, and society. Finally, I will consider the changes wrought in this relationship during the Gorbachev era, and venture some tentative conclusions about the current state of affairs and the probable general direction of future developments.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Lenin's interpretation of Marxist theory regarding traditional military forces was expounded rather unequivocally as early as May 1905. In his speech to the Third Congress of the Russian Workers' Social-Democratic Party, he stated "War... offers an exceptional, convenient chance for the revolution to annihilate the military caste." Six months later, he reiterated this theme in an article in Novaya Zhizn, where he argued that "a standing army serves as a tool against the internal enemy rather than against an external one. Everywhere it turns into a tool of reaction... We must destroy this evil and annihilate the standing army completely."¹

Lenin's alternative, "the people in arms" remained a conceptual abstraction for more than a decade, until the dramatic events of February 1917 forced his hand. At first, he remained wedded to the idea of organizing a "people's militia" where volunteers would serve "one day every fortnight."² But by the end of March, he had disabused himself of this notion and the Bolsheviks became very active in implementing a two-pronged strategy aimed at seizing power. The first component involved undermining the combat effectiveness of the existing army by attempting to win converts and by encouraging desertion. The Bolsheviks found that the conditions were ripe for political agitation. After three years of largely unsuccessful active ground combat and the political upheaval induced by the overthrow of the tsarist regime, the morale and discipline of the Imperial Army was already in an advanced state of disintegration. Further, the decision of the Provisional Government to continue to prosecute the

war accelerated this process and made the Bolshevik platform of immediate peace appear highly attractive. It is difficult to determine with any degree of accuracy how effective the Bolshevik agitators were, but by October, the number of deserters had reached two million.³ The second prong involved the creation of a large number of voluntary armed detachments, which came to be known as Red Guards. It is a remarkable indicator of the incompetence and impotence of the Provisional Government that it failed to take action to halt the formation of a rival military organization over which it had no control.⁴ The Bolsheviks gradually increased the size and capability of this autonomous paramilitary force, and by October, there were over 20,000 Red Guards. Not surprisingly, they proved to be the primary instrument involved in executing the transfer of power.

Interestingly, even as Lenin was busy creating his own independent paramilitary force, he refused to discard his earlier theoretical catechism about the role of the army in a socialist state. In September 1917, he stated in his classic treatise, *State and Revolution* "the proletariat annihilates the bourgeoisie republican state machine and its standing army as well as the police and the civil service."⁵

It was evident that despite the key role played by the Red Guards in securing victory in the October revolution, at this time the concept of basing state defense on a territorial militia composed of armed workers retained a strong ideological appeal. After seizing power, the Bolsheviks displayed little interest in using the remnants of existing forces to form the core of a new military organization, and they failed to incorporate more than a handful of units into the new Red Army. Moreover, they issued

a series of decrees designed to radically reform military discipline. The formal hierarchical structure of rank and insignia was abolished, which simultaneously removed the traditional command and control structure and officially established the equal status of every servicemember as a "comrade." Soldiers' committees were established for the election of officers and the management of daily affairs.⁶

The Bolshevik perception that an entirely new military organization was required was clearly conveyed in the 15 January 1918 decree which created the Red Army of Workers and Peasants:

The old army served as an instrument of class warfare in the hands of the bourgeois for the repression of the class of the toilers by the bourgeois. With the transfer of power to the proletariat and the poor peasantry and the classes of the exploited toilers, the need has arisen to create a new army which the Soviet regime can rely on now in the present and which will serve in the near future as the basis for the replacement of the permanent army by the entire people in arms as well as a support for the imminent social revolution in Europe.⁷

Unfortunately for the Bolsheviks, it was not long before harsh reality intruded on their vision of building socialism. Peace negotiations with the Germans had begun in December 1917, but little progress was being made. This was primarily because the Soviet delegation, headed by Leon Trotsky, used the talks as a forum to deliver inflammatory political speeches, denouncing their counterparts as imperialists and urging the German workers to rise up and overthrow their capitalist oppressors. The Germans tolerated these antics because they were simultaneously negotiating a separate peace treaty with the Rada, a group of non-Communist Ukrainian nationalists. On 8 February 1918, this treaty was concluded, creating a de facto independent Ukrainian state. The following day, the Germans issued an ultimatum to the Soviets. The response was Trotsky's

famous dictum of "no war, no peace." The Soviet delegation withdrew, with the Bolshevik regime refusing to accept the armistice terms and refusing to do battle. However, the Germans were not nearly as perplexed by this move as Trotsky had hoped. They simply resumed the offensive, quickly advancing to threaten Petrograd, and forcing the Soviet government to relocate deeper in the interior, to Mosccw. But this brought only a temporary respite, as the German Army closed to a position "less than two weeks march" away from Moscow. At this point, the internal Bolshevik debate intensified sharply. Lenin, under threat of resignation, needed every ounce of personal power, prestige and persuasion that he could muster to convince his fellow Bolsheviks that they should protect the existing gains of socialism by accepting the armistice terms. He forcefully argued that they could not build socialism if they did not retain power. Lenin's argument carried the day, and on 3 March 1918 "the shameful peace" was signed, agreeing to the payment of massive war reparations, as well as the German occupation of the Baltic states, most of Byelorussia, and all of the Ukraine.⁸

The sobering experience of Brest-Litovsk sparked a vigorous internal debate among the Bolsheviks concerning the need to create a professional standing army organized along traditional lines to defend against the threat of external aggression. However, before they were able to resolve the issue, the press of subsequent events drove home the lesson that a real army was required to deal with internal threats as well. By June 1918, the military situation had deteriorated precipitously. British and French troops arrived in Murmansk, heralding a multi-power foreign intervention. The Civil War formally erupted, with vast tracts of Soviet

territory seceding from Bolshevik control and declaring independence under alternate governments. Meanwhile, the peasantry fiercely resisted the policy of coercive grain confiscation, resulting in "245 important anti-Soviet rebellions" in "20 regions of central Russia" in 1918 alone.⁹

The Bolsheviks realized that drastic action was required to ensure the regime's survival. In March, Trotsky was appointed head of the Supreme Military Council and People's Commissar of War. In April, the Central Committee issued a decree which abolished the principle of elections in the army and restored the traditional hierarchy according to rank. In May, compulsory military service was ordered for all males ages eighteen to forty. And in June, mandatory registration of former tsarist officers was introduced.

Trotsky was faced with the formidable task of building a large and effective fighting force essentially from scratch, and he had no time to waste. For manpower and leadership, his only available materials were the peasantry and the tsarist officer corps, two groups of rather questionable reliability from a Bolshevik perspective. Trotsky's solution was to instill iron discipline. After the fall of Kazan in July 1918, Trotsky immediately left for the front. Upon arrival, he ordered the commander and commissar of a regiment shot because they had retreated without orders. Later that same month, he directed the incarceration of any officers who refused to serve in the Red Army in the newly established concentration camps. In September, he authorized the arrest of family members as hostages to help officers decide their loyalties. Whether through

patriotism or intimidation, by the end of 1918, more than 22,000 former tsarist officers had volunteered or been mobilized into the Red Army.¹⁰

In addition to the implementation of strict discipline, a highly centralized system of political control was established. Party cells were formed within tactical units to bolster morale and a military commissar system of dual command was developed to further political indoctrination and to provide a counterweight against the very real possibility of wavering fidelity. This structure remains in effect today, although its substance has altered significantly. The constant struggle for authority between commander and commissar that characterized the Civil War has now subsided, largely because over the years the commissars have acquired technical competence. Now they are career military professionals first and foremost, rather than simply civilian political advisors with no technical expertise who have been forcibly grafted onto a unwilling and recalcitrant military.¹¹

By the end of 1918, in armament, equipment, organization and appearance, the new Red Army was a reasonable facsimile of the old Imperial Army which it had replaced. Moreover, it was not terribly different from the White armies which opposed it.¹² Naturally, this situation was ideological anathema to the Bolsheviks, who felt compelled to justify the adoption of successive traditional military structures and principles by declaring that they were categorically new concepts conceived by the historically unique dynamism of socialism.¹³

The belated adoption of proven principles of organization for modern

warfare enabled the fledgling Bolshevik regime to avoid defeat and survive the successive challenges posed by various White forces and peasant insurrections. Trotsky was not shy about taking credit for the surprising transformation, and his battlefield success seemed to lend an aura of credibility to his claims.¹⁴ However, the Red Army's decisive defeat outside Warsaw in August 1920 deflated Trotsky's martial reputation and offered his many opponents the opportunity to reopen the simmering debate on what kind of armed forces were appropriate for a socialist state.

By April 1921, the military situation had stabilized and Bolshevik power was secure. The last significant White forces- Wrangel's army in the Crimea- had been defeated in November 1920, and the withdrawal of British troops from Transcaucasia in February allowed the Red Army to reoccupy the area and reassert Communist rule from Moscow. In March, the Treaty of Riga was concluded with Poland, and the Kronstadt uprising was crushed. The peasant war was still in full swing, but these scattered rebellions did not pose a direct threat to the Bolshevik regime. They could be suppressed one at a time by the successive application of overwhelming military force, which is exactly the strategy which was adopted and carried out.

The mere existence of a traditional standing army represented a rather distasteful compromise for the Bolsheviks. Starting at the 10th Party Congress in March 1921 and continuing for several years thereafter, an intense political debate ensued concerning the fundamental nature of war, strategy, and the type of armed forces required to protect the state and foment socialist revolution abroad. Interestingly, it was Trotsky- the man who had recruited tsarist "military specialists" and relied on

bourgeois methods of waging war- who defended the idea of a militia army. His primary opponents were his Red Commanders, led by Mikhail Frunze, who advocated a "unified military doctrine" and the creation of a regular army capable of mass warfare and large scale offensive operations.¹⁵

Certainly Frunze and the Red Commanders lacked the political clout to win the ideological debate with Trotsky. Meanwhile, the faltering economy and Trotsky's inattention to military administration was resulting in the rapid disintegration of the Red Army. But the debate over military strategy was only one component of the overall power struggle for succession after Lenin's death. The alliance of Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Stalin against Trotsky weakened him politically and bolstered the Red Commanders' position. In January 1925, Trotsky was dismissed as Commissar of War, and replaced by Frunze. At the 14th Party Congress in April, Stalin was successful in winning acceptance of his concept of "socialism in one country." From a military standpoint, this event was of vital significance because the Stalinist corollary was the mobilization and preparation of the entire country for total war. This justified the creation of a large standing army trained and equipped to conduct large-scale offensive combined arms operations in a vast and climactic struggle between capitalism and socialism.¹⁶

During the early 1920s, the internal political debate over national security strategy resulted in military policy gridlock. The Red Army was neglected and it deteriorated badly. However, despite the rather mysterious death of Frunze in October 1925,¹⁷ by the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Red Army began to flourish. In the command economy,

military production received a high priority and the internal military debate over doctrine was exceptionally open and fruitful, successfully blending foreign (particularly German) concepts with Soviet military thought to create a large and relatively modern fighting force.

However, these halcyon days were numbered. During the succession struggle, Stalin aligned himself with the concept of building a strong military to protect the existing gains of socialism and to prepare the nation for future war. This stance on military readiness provided a sharp contrast with that of his main political opposition, Trotsky, who advocated a militia army and a continuing effort to foment socialist revolution abroad. This military aspect of the overall political and ideological struggle that took place in the years following Lenin's incapacitation and death is frequently overlooked as a significant contributing factor in Stalin's ultimate victory.¹⁸ But even after achieving political ascendancy in 1928, Stalin was not satisfied and continued to consolidate his power. By 1936, this process involved the physical elimination of any and all opposition, whether real or imagined. This included the military high command, and from 1936 to 1938, a series of purges were conducted which removed 3 out of 5 marshals, 15 out of 15 army commanders, 60 out of 67 corps commanders, more than 70% of divisional and regimental commanders, and over 60% of political commissars, as well as the Minister of Defense, Marshal Tukhachevski.¹⁹

Not surprisingly, the permanent removal of such a large portion of the officer corps had disastrous consequences in terms of military effectiveness. In the 1939-1940 Winter War with Finland, the Red Army was

thoroughly embarrassed. The Soviets enjoyed overwhelming superiority on the order of 6 to 1 in manpower, and even greater in tanks, airplanes and artillery pieces. The high command evidently envisioned a quick and easy campaign, as the operational time table only allotted 10 days to conclude the occupation. However, the skillful and determined nature of the Finnish resistance managed to stretch the campaign out to 12 weeks, and the Finns inflicted an estimated 22,500 Russian casualties while incurring only 2,500 of their own. Similarly, the initial performance of the Red Army in the weeks following the German invasion on 22 June 1941 was desultory and confused. Only now the opponent was a first class military power and the consequences of lack of preparation were grave. The Germans advanced across the steppes at an astounding rate, smashing Soviet formations and capturing vast numbers of men and equipment in huge pockets at the Pripyat marshs, Minsk, Smolensk and Kiev. By the end of November, German infantrymen from the 2nd Panzer Division had entered the outskirts of Moscow and were close enough to see the spires of the Kremlin in the distance.²⁰

Despite these early setbacks and the ultimate loss of 20 million soldiers and civilians, the nation survived the ordeal of the Great Patriotic War. The Soviet armed forces emerged from the conflict victorious, larger and more robust than ever, with greatly enhanced power and prestige both at home and abroad. The officer corps overcame the utter decimation that it had suffered on the eve of war, primarily because armed combat proved to be an excellent, if unforgiving, judge of talent. Battlefield prowess, and not political loyalty, propelled a number of extremely capable Soviet commanders such as Zhukov, Katukov, Rotmistrov and Rybalko to the top of the military hierarchy. Stalin took great pains

to distance himself from the catastrophic events of 1941-1942, concealing his culpability for the foreign and domestic policy blunders which precipitated them. Simultaneously, he launched a campaign to ensure that he was personally identified as the architect of the great victory, so that no military leader would be able to translate his personal popularity into political capital. This fear was particularly manifest in Stalin's relations towards Marshal Zhukov, who was denied the post of minister of defense until 1955, two years after Stalin's death. 21

In February 1946, Stalin moved to expand his claim of responsibility for the defeat of Nazi Germany. Not only did he take credit for managing the war effort, he argued that events had vindicated his world view, and that this justified his policies of intensive industrialization, collectivization and purging. Moreover, he maintained that the fundamental validity of these policies continued to provide an operative blueprint for the future. 22

This development had significant impact on the post-war structure of the Soviet armed forces. Even though the determination of military doctrine and strategy remained the private preserve of the general secretary, the military's institutional interests were served by this political justification for the maintenance of a huge standing army. In addition, 1946 was the launch year for an ambitious Soviet weapons production program. 23

After Stalin's death in March 1953, the high command moved to reassert its prerogatives in exercising control over the military-

technical sphere of Soviet strategy and doctrine. In particular, the general staff, called the "brain of the army" by its founder, Marshal Boris Shaposhnikov, had developed sufficient competence and expertise during the war years to manage the day-to-day functions and general direction of military activities without political interference. Perhaps more importantly, Stalin had failed to create any parallel civilian structure to manage military affairs, preferring to keep a tight personal hold on the reins of power instead. As a result, his demise left a power vacuum in this arena which was quickly and easily filled by the general staff.²⁴

But this relative freedom from strict political control was not a situation which the civilian leadership would permit to continue indefinitely. The Stalinist pattern of using the military to consolidate a personal power base and then turning on it later was repeated by Khrushchev. Marshal Zhukov's elevation to minister of defense in 1955 coincides with Khrushchev and Molotov's successful effort to oust Malenkov as premier. However, within two years, Zhukov had lost his post as well.

Ironically, it was the abortive coup attempt against Khrushchev in June 1957 that allowed him to finally escape the restrictive confines of coalition rule and achieve a significant degree of political ascendancy. He used the opportunity to ruthlessly dispatch his opponents to a somewhat more lenient fate than that of Stalin's victims- political oblivion. He also served notice that he envisaged a radical restructuring of the Soviet armed forces.

Khrushchev ardently believed that the advent of nuclear weapons had revolutionized the fundamental nature of war. In his view, the dominant role of nuclear weapons in a future conflict dramatically decreased the requirement for maintaining powerful theater conventional forces and rendered large surface naval combatants obsolete. He characterized military expenditures allocated to the sector of the defense economy producing conventional weapons as "wasteful and unproductive" and complained of the high cost of maintaining combat units abroad.²⁵ Starting in 1955 and continuing through 1961, he steadily reduced military end strength from approximately 5.7 million to approximately 3.3 million, deactivating 36 out of 175 divisions, including 16 externally deployed divisions.²⁶ Khrushchev engineered a dramatic shift in resource allocation, but not from the defense sector to the civilian sector. The monies saved from reductions in conventional weapons production were poured into ballistic missile research, development and production.²⁷ In December 1959, the Strategic Rocket Forces were created as a separate service, institutionalizing the substantial claim of nuclear forces on the Soviet defense budget. Khrushchev continued to propose further cuts in conventional end strength, but by 1962, his power base had eroded and he was unable to force implementation.²⁸

It is a commonly held view that a number of Khrushchev's policies, both foreign and domestic, were ill-conceived and injurious to Soviet interests in the long run. Particularly after the prolonged Berlin crisis in 1961, followed by the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, the repetitive failure of these policies had laid the foundation of a strong internal opposition, which certainly included the military. Khrushchev's polit-

ical opponents were able to successfully harness this dissatisfaction; first in stalling, altering, or reversing his policies, and finally in his removal.

Perhaps it is poetic justice that in 1955, it had been Khrushchev who skillfully used his personal contacts with senior military leaders and forcefully advocated increased emphasis on heavy industry and defense spending to outflank the consumer-oriented position of his rival, Malenkov. But in October 1964, it was Leonid Brezhnev who occupied the high ground of conservative and military support, and wielded it in a successful effort to oust Khrushchev.²⁹

In contrast to Khrushchev, whose brief flirtation with the military had been merely a marriage of convenience in the context of the struggle for succession, Brezhnev formed a lasting relationship with the Soviet armed forces. He embarked on a massive military build-up that continued unabated for almost two decades. The fact that Khrushchev's policies had been so thoroughly discredited ensured a constant flow of defense rubles and gave the defense establishment relatively free rein to determine its own agenda. In classic bureaucratic fashion, the general staff slowly but surely filled the void, exponentially increasing its power and extending its authority into all aspects of the military sphere. It gradually secured and solidified its primary role in the formulation of military thought and aggressively expanded the limits of its purview over the services and defense production industries.

However, this "golden age" for the Soviet armed forces was not

indicative of a permanent shift in Party-military relations. Rather, it was a replay of the previous periods of relative freedom under Stalin and Khrushchev when the new leader was preoccupied with consolidating his personal power base, and found the defense establishment to be a useful ally. In Brezhnev's case, the power consolidation process was glacially slow, and unlike his predecessors, he evidently did not feel any urgent need to cut the military down to size.

But nor did he countenance a military establishment that was not firmly under his control. Brezhnev still adhered to the Stalinist principle of staunchly defending the interests of the military as an institution, while simultaneously ensuring that no individual officer accumulated too much independence or power. He used the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia as a pretext for reshuffling the command hierarchy by promoting certain officers who had "admirably performed their socialist duty" over others who presumably had not. By the mid 1970s, the golden age was over. Slowing economic growth rates led Brezhnev to adopt a rather predatory approach to military interests, as he attempted to reorder the nation's budget priorities. In 1976, when Marshal Grechko died, he appointed a civilian with defense industry experience (also a loyal crony and friend), Dimitri Ustinov to the post of minister of defense, rather than the military heir-apparent, Marshal Kulikov. In 1977, Kulikov was replaced as chief of staff by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov and Brezhnev delivered his famous Tula speech, which clearly provided the theoretical justification for a decrease in defense spending. Again in 1980-1981, the uneven results achieved by various commands during the mobilization effort

in connection with the Polish crisis provided a pretext for the swift promotion of certain individuals at the expense of others.³⁰

Following Brezhnev's death in November 1982, there was considerable speculation in the foreign press that his successor, Yuri Andropov, would adopt a softer line on defense policy because of his alleged intellectual orientation and western tastes. But this was not the case. Andropov's approach to NATO's 1979 dual-track decision to deploy the Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) in Europe, and to East-West relations in general, was extremely hawkish. In November 1983, when actual NATO deployment commenced, the Soviets severed arms control negotiations in a dramatic walkout, and maintained this disingenuous moral stance even after it was publicly disclosed that Soviet SS-20 deployment had continued despite numerous declarations of a "unilateral moratorium" on further deployment. The following month, Andropov's bellicose handling of the Korean Air Lines incident brought US-USSR relations to their lowest point in twenty years by throwing gasoline on the already blazing fire of early Reagan cold war rhetoric and fueling continued strong Congressional support for the U.S. military build-up.³¹

The preceeding analysis suggests that there were internal institutional constraints involved in helping shape Andropov's policy options, as well the open and more easily recognizable foreign and domestic factors which influence the dynamic of superpower relations. In short, Andropov's lack of a consolidated power base may have left him with little room to maneuver. The traditional pattern of Soviet succession politics demonstrates a distinct tendency for a new leader to adopt a very

conservative stance on defense. Only when he feels that his position is unassailable will he venture to alter the basic direction of national security policy.

Yuri Andropov was dead within fourteen months of taking office, and Konstantin Chernenko's equally brief thirteen month tenure as general secretary did not provide him with much of an opportunity to consolidate his power base or to make any substantive changes in defense policy. Moreover, because of his declining health, he lacked the vitality to engage in such a struggle, leaving the field open for potential heirs-apparents such as Gregori Romanov and Mikhail Gorbachev to jostle for political position. During this brief interlude, the Soviet ship of state was for the most part rudderless, and in keeping with tradition, the institutional interests of the military were well served; partly through simple inertia and partly through gradual absorption of powers which were not being exercised by the civilian leadership.

A SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP

Soviet national security strategy is inherently a hybrid product. Its formulation and execution springs from the interaction between a variety of competing and often contradictory variables such as historical experience, ideology, geography, and leader personality within the context of the internal and external political, economic and social situation over time. Clearly there are compromises and tradeoffs involved in developing a coherent strategy, allocating sufficient resources to implement it, and staying with it until fruition. Proper prioritization and management of these diverse influences is the greatest challenge of any national leadership hierarchy, and the challenge is particularly acute in the Soviet Union today because Gorbachev is facing incipient crises simultaneously on several fronts.

Defining the relationship between civilian authority and the armed forces in this process is an inexact science at best. Traditionally, the development and execution of Soviet national security policy has been shrouded in secrecy and the evidence available to western analysts is often incomplete and contradictory. However, this does not mean that it is impossible to formulate a useful paradigm based on observable data and anecdotal evidence which conceptualizes the essence of the relationship and provides a basis for some general conclusions.

Early attempts at explaining the relationship between the Party and the military were simply subsumed under the basic tenets of totalitarian theory. The presence of an official ideology and a single mass party led

by one autocratically powerful individual holding a monopoly of control over all facets of the state implied a monolithic and undifferentiated decision-making process.³² This conceptualization proved inadequate when confronted with the severe internecine domestic power struggles that characterized the Khrushchev era and ultimately resulted in his downfall.

During the Brezhnev years, the armed forces steadily accumulated power, status and influence. This phenomenon lent credence to a new view- that of the military as an equal player in the Kremlin power equation. Proponents of this theory maintain that the Soviet power relationship dynamic is best described by a triangle, or troika. They contend that there are three primary forces active in the Soviet political arena- the Party, the Army and the KGB. In this theory, each of the three players has various advantages and disadvantages which may make it comparatively strong or weak in a given situation. When one of the three competing elements begins to gain ascendancy, the other two unite in a coalition prevent it. Therefore, this system of checks and balances always maintains a relatively stable, if distrustful, balance of power.³³

The problem with this theory is its portrayal of the military as an active and equal player in the Kremlin power equation. Historical experience has demonstrated that ultimate power resides solely within the Party, a prerogative it guards jealously. Traditionally, there has never been more than one military member of the Politburo, and frequently this modest degree of representation has been deemed one too many by the senior political leadership. The original ideological Bolshevik distrust of a professional standing army still runs deep. As we have seen, there have

been interludes when the civilian leadership has been preoccupied with the dynamics of an internal succession struggle, thereby allowing the military a modicum of freedom to set its own agenda. However, this freedom has never extended into the top echelons of political control, and the Party has always reasserted its dominance once a clear winner emerges from the succession struggle. Moreover, the Party has always retained final authority over national security issues and has freely exercised its right to fire and hire personnel within the defense establishment.

A more accurate way of visualizing the military is as a substantial, but largely passive actor in Soviet domestic politics. The military is a social institution as well as a war machine, and it is a worthwhile endeavor to attempt to identify and clarify the human perspective. Problems afflicting the military such as drug use, alcoholism, corruption, inefficiency and ethnic strife simply reflect the broader social malaise of Soviet society as a whole. Similarly, it is not difficult to identify the general outlines of the armed forces' basic institutional and bureaucratic interests. To the defense establishment, it is axiomatic that a robust external threat requires a large investment in manpower, material, and resources resulting in more jobs, better wages, enhanced status and increased power and influence.³⁴

Despite its predominantly passive role, it is difficult to overestimate the overall impact of the military in Soviet domestic politics. The basic principle of war and military considerations in general have been a major, if not decisive influence in the historical development of the USSR. Martial rhetoric and a military mentality have permeated Soviet

society and Soviet policy for decades. This phenomenon manifests itself in a variety of ways.³⁵ For instance, an obsessive penchant for secrecy. Road maps available to the public have been deliberately altered for decades. This subterfuge was admitted (and presumably halted) only this year. Similarly, high school history textbooks are so replete with misleading omissions, half-truths, and outright lies that last year's final examinations had to be cancelled, pending the publication of new textbooks.³⁶ Another example of society's military mentality is the cult of reverence for the victory over the Nazis in the Great Patriotic War. As late as December 1982 in Leningrad, I was able to watch a huge moveable neon display depict the story of the heroic actions of the people of Leningrad during the blockade years. The entire show lasted about 12 minutes, repeating itself continuously and occupying the entire side of a multi-story building.³⁷ Further, even under Gorbachev, the Soviet Union maintains the world's most extensive formalized paramilitary training program for the nation's youth. Children ages seven to eighteen are taught how to field strip and fire the Kalashnikov assault rifle, throw hand grenades, wear chemical protective equipment, build fortifications and execute basic military tactics.³⁸

It is evident that military considerations in the abstract are a potent force in the Soviet domestic political landscape. Although the military as an institution lacks the political clout to oust a general secretary or to set national security policy, it exerts considerable influence in ruling out certain policy options which it believes run counter to its interests. Traditionally, successful Soviet politicians have catered to these interests. Unwavering support of a strong defense

translates into a political promise that the nation will never again be caught off guard as it was on 22 June 1941, and that it will never again suffer the devastation of the war years. More recently, the promise has also come to mean that strategic parity with the United States, earned at such great cost and sacrifice, will be scrupulously maintained.

Likewise, concrete military considerations of a fiscal genre have come to play a key role in the domestic political equation. The sheer size and scope of the defense industrial complex makes it a major institutional force which must be factored into almost any national security decision. The defense industrial complex is easily the most efficient sector of the Soviet economy. It produces over 40% of the nation's durable consumer goods as well as military hardware and employs millions of workers. Moreover, military export sales account for a major portion of the country's hard currency income. They represent perhaps the only commodity sector where Soviet manufactured goods are competitive on the world market and provide the primary lever of influence in enhancing Soviet power and prestige throughout the third world.³⁹

In addition, there are purely military considerations based on an objective analysis of the threat posed by likely adversaries. The senior military leadership, and in particular the general staff, is entrusted with the task of conducting an impartial and dispassionate review of the state's security requirements and then rendering nonpartisan advice and expertise in fulfilling those requirements. The structure established to perform this mission is streamlined and highly centralized. The Party retains final decision authority, but in the interest of efficiency and

expediency (especially in regard to the ability to quickly convert from peacetime to wartime posture), it has intentionally left the nuts and bolts of option formation and implementation to the professional military. The Party broadly defines the general direction of policy and its goals, but allows the general staff to develop and execute the specific programs which will achieve those aims. This system leaves the political leadership highly dependent on the general staff for information and expertise, as there are no alternative civilian institutions capable of independent military analysis and option formation.

Various western analysts have created conceptual paradigms which attempt to describe this relationship. Stephen Meyer and Condoleezza Rice refer to it as a "loosely coupled" system, where the Party wields its power primarily through the judicious use of veto authority which can not be overridden.⁴⁰ Timothy Colton uses the allegory of a series of concentric circles- the military dominates the innermost circle of force structure, training and organization, but has less influence over the wider circles of production priorities and grand strategy.⁴¹ Still another approach is the decisional trajectory model of David Finley and Jan Triska. In this paradigm, all decisions move along two axes- a horizontal axis representing time and a vertical axis representing the level of authority. Mundane everyday decisions have a flat trajectory, as they can move laterally quickly towards implementation. In contrast, important decisions have a high arcing trajectory, moving faster vertically than horizontally until a sufficient level of authority is attained. The decision point represents the apex of the curve, where the proposal will either be approved for implementation or rejected.⁴²

I find each of these models to be largely valid, because all three tend to focus our attention where it should be- on the level of decision. The key discriminator in the Soviet national security decision-making hierarchy is the degree of authority required to approve a given program or policy for implementation. The structural framework represents a compromise between the political desire for control and the military requirement for efficiency. The Party must constantly monitor and evaluate the situation to determine what level of participation is appropriate. Clearly, too much oversight becomes interference and ties up the political leadership managing minutiae that is better left to career professionals. Conversely, the Party can not afford to abdicate its decision-making authority in matters vital to national security. Therefore, a balance must be maintained. The historical ebb and flow of party-military relations is largely a function of the degree of attention that the political leadership has paid to this balance at various times, and the manner in which individual general secretaries have chosen to define an appropriate balance at specific junctures during their tenure.

The key organization involved in maintaining a proper balance is the Defense Council. It is a small and secretive group within the Politburo which has ultimate decision-making authority over all matters of national security. Its origins can be traced back to Lenin's Civil War Council of Workers' and Peasants Defense, but its existence was not publicly acknowledged until 7 May 1976, when the announcement promoting Leonid Brezhnev to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union referred to him as chairman of the Council of Defense. The exact composition of the Defense Council is a closely guarded secret, but its membership is generally

thought to include only the general secretary and a small circle of intimate advisors.⁴³

Recently, new information was released which sheds additional light on the inner workings of the Defense Council. Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze revealed that the decision to invade Afghanistan was made exclusively by a small coterie of top officials: General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, KGB chief Yuri Andropov, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov, Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin and ideology chief Mikhail Suslov. Shevardnadze stated that "the decision, with such serious consequences for our country, was taken behind the backs of the Party and the people. The Soviet people were presented with a fait accompli."⁴⁴

From the preceeding discussion, it is apparent that the term "the Soviet military" encompasses several disparate but related components. First there is the abstract conceptual element, which caters to the psychology of the Soviet people- fear of invasion and fear of inferiority juxtaposed against pride in military strength and scientific and technological achievement. Then there is a concrete bureaucratic and institutional element of social and financial reality represented by a massive defense industrial establishment which dominates the resource allocation process, provides jobs, produces consumer goods, generates hard currency income and promotes Soviet interests abroad. Finally, there is a structural element of power and authority defined by the senior military leadership and the organizational context within which it operates. Obviously, all three of these components interact with Soviet society and

help shape the Party's attitudes and policies towards the armed forces. The relative influence of each element must be analyzed when evaluating the relationship between the Party, the military and society at any given point in time.

Having examined the historical record and some key determinative variables, at this point I think it is possible to draw some general conclusions about the fundamental nature of the military's relationship with both the Party and Soviet society. First, Soviet domestic politics remain highly attuned to military considerations. The citizenry has long considered the need for a strong defense to be axiomatic, and has willingly accepted a degree of personal inconvenience and hardship that would never be tolerated in the West. The incredibly painful memories of the death and devastation wrought by the struggle against Fascism are so indelibly seared into the collective national consciousness that the military establishment itself needn't lift a finger to wield decisive influence in a number of national security debates. However, under the critical glare of glasnost, the automatic nature of this support has been steadily eroding. At this point, it is almost impossible to determine how long the process will continue, and more importantly, what its ultimate impact will be.

Second, the militarization of society and the lack of a formalized succession mechanism have made the military an important ally in deciding internal Kremlin power struggles. Sometimes this involves senior officers actively throwing their support behind a particular candidate. But more often, the military is on the sidelines as rival candidates attempt to

outmaneuver one another. Historically, it has been extremely advantageous to grasp the mantle of staunchly defending the security of the motherland, while simultaneously skewering the opponent's credentials in this area. Just as an American presidential hopeful can not afford to be portrayed as "soft on defense," Soviet leaders must always ensure that they are not perceived as being "soft on capitalism."

Third, although the relative influence and freedom enjoyed by the military tends to wax and wane in accordance with the dynamics of the personal power equation within the Politburo, the Party has always been firmly in control. Through its power of appointment, the Party has asserted its dominance continuously, drawing a sharp line between military and political service that senior officers are rarely, if ever, allowed to cross. Moreover, the evidence suggests that in the end, Soviet uniformed commanders accept the principle of civilian preeminence, even when they vehemently disagree with the policies being pursued. Given the degree of status and prestige afforded the military by society, it is not uncommon for Soviet leaders to maintain a public affirmation of a solid alliance with the military hierarchy, whether or not one in fact exists. At times when the personal power equation within the Politburo is in flux, such a union is of distinct value; otherwise from a politician's viewpoint, it is usually best to keep the military in its place.

Fourth, the highly centralized decision-making structure is extremely leader dependent. When there is no clear leader, national security policy is often convoluted and confused, operating more out of inertia than intent. Further, a new leader's freedom of action can be

severely constrained by bureaucratic and institutional infighting until he consolidates his power base. However, once a single dominant leader has emerged, traditionally he has moved to personally take charge of defense matters. This usually means that significant changes in defense policy can be expected when a new general secretary is selected. The severity and pace of those changes is often dictated by the rate of his personal power consolidation. Once firmly established, the relative longevity of the average general secretary has both positive and negative aspects. On the one hand, political stability ensures a considerable degree of continuity in defense policy for long periods of time. But on the other hand, it causes problems when the leader becomes old and infirm. The lack of institutional checks and balances to challenge the authority of the general secretary and his Defense Council creates a streamlined decision-making structure capable of acting quickly in time of crisis, but affords no opportunity for broader consideration and debate, as in the case of the decision to invade Afghanistan.

Although there are undoubtedly additional germane variables which serve to shape and define the relationship between the Soviet military, the Party, and society, I feel that the elements which I have identified are adequate to form a sufficiently broad basis from which it is possible to draw general conclusions. Further, these conclusions provide us with a heuristic point of reference in attempting to determine what it is about the civil-military relationship that is changing and to what degree it is being changed. There is certainly a considerable amount of smoke and dust being generated, but the real issue is whether genuine structural change is being effected, and what overall impact this change will have.

THE GORBACHEV ERA

Beginning in October 1980 when he became a full member of the Politburo, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev had a ringside seat from which to observe the deepening stagnation of the Soviet economy and the inability of the Kremlin leadership to discard ineffective dogmatic formulas for dealing with it. Further, he witnessed a period of rapidly deteriorating relations with the United States and a militaristic foreign policy saddled with failure- the inability to prevent NATO deployment of INF, the embarrassing downing of a civilian airliner, and the quagmire of involvement in Afghanistan. Given his subsequent actions, it appears likely that Gorbachev assumed the position of general secretary in March 1985 with a set of preconceived notions about what had to be done, or at least the conviction that the use of military power had to be de-emphasized and the defense budget cut. Certainly, he wasted no time in moving to revise military doctrine,⁴⁵ which has provided the theoretical justification for his reforms. Problems arose almost immediately, however. Although dissatisfaction with the results of Brezhnev era policies had helped create a general consensus for change, there was very little consensus on what needed changing and how to go about changing it. Severe political infighting ensued; a predictable consequence of the Soviet succession process magnified by Gorbachev's impatience to simultaneously consolidate power and implement reform.⁴⁶ The outward manifestation of this phenomenon has been a slow but steady purge of the party and bureaucratic hierarchy unequalled by any leader since Stalin.⁴⁷ Gorbachev's problem with the military was the same, and so was his prescription. There were simply too many Brezhnev era marshals, generals and admirals that were

resistant to his ideas about restructuring the armed forces and trimming the defense budget; they would have to be replaced by officers more amenable to change. Over the next three years, a sizeable number of prominent military men would be "retired," including ten of sixteen deputy defense ministers.⁴⁸ The May 1987 Mathias Rust affair provided the catalyst to remove Gorbachev's primary nemesis, Defense Minister Sergei Sokolov. He was replaced by General of the Army Dmitri Yazov, a relatively unknown and obscure officer who had been commanding the Far Eastern military district. Yazov was promoted to Minister of Defense over several dozen more senior officers because of his support for perestroika and his pliability. Gorbachev has intentionally limited Yazov's power- to this day he remains only a candidate member of the Politburo. The new chief of staff, General of the Army Mikhail Moiseev (recently promoted from Colonel General), also vaulted over numerous more senior officers to land the job, making him beholden to the senior political leadership for his power and position. He appears to have been selected largely because of his demonstrated loyalty, rather than any particular evidence of personal distinction.⁴⁹ Of the old guard of senior officers, most are now either retired (Ogarkov, Kulikov, Petrov) or deceased (Gorshkov, Tolubko, Belikov). Of the four theater level commanders, there are now no holdovers remaining from the pre-Gorbachev era. The April 1989 purge of the Central Committee "retired" nine senior military officers and replaced none, leaving a total of only fifteen.⁵⁰

This approach to the problem of establishing firm control over the Soviet military is not unprecedented or even unusual. Under Stalin in the late 1930s and under Khrushchev in the late 1950s, the military exper-

experienced an extremely high turnover rate in senior leadership personnel. Under Brezhnev, personnel turbulence was minimized, but the level of military participation in the political process was carefully circumscribed. Uniformed representation in the Central Committee remained small (about 20) and relatively constant throughout his 18 year tenure.⁵¹ Gorbachev has cleaned house by removing a large number of personnel in the highest echelons of the military command and staff structure,⁵² and by reducing the political power and influence wielded by the officers who replaced them. But this has not bought him total acquiescence and obedience. Even if the new generation of military leaders agrees that restructuring is the answer to the various ills that afflict the Soviet Union and its armed forces, it balks at the foul-tasting medicine that Gorbachev prescribes. For instance, General of the Army Ivan Tretyak was appointed to replace Marshal Koldunov as commander-in-chief, air defense forces in the wake of the Mathias Rust affair. Yet Tretyak has been extremely outspoken in his opposition to a number of reforms. He has warned against being "lured by apparent benefits," and describes the unilateral force reductions carried out under Khrushchev as "a sorry experience."⁵³ Nor is Tretyak alone in airing his differences with the new military doctrine and with military restructuring in general. General of the Army Yazov has made it plain that "it is impossible to rout an aggressor with defense alone... after an attack has been repelled, the ground troops and naval forces must be able to conduct a decisive offensive."⁵⁴

The vast majority of military writings on perestroika reflect the view that restructuring in the armed forces should be focused on qual-

itative improvement through more efficient production, more sophisticated and effective weaponry, and enhanced morale, discipline and training. The emphasis is much more on improving performance than it is on reconfiguring or eliminating forces.⁵⁵ A case in point is the issue of asymmetrical reductions. Having admitted the need to make asymmetrical reductions, the Soviet high command has closed ranks behind the judgement that the majority of militarily significant asymmetries favor NATO.⁵⁶

In addition to his vigorous program of purging the ranks, Gorbachev has adopted another, heretofore unprecedented strategy for seizing control of the defense agenda: sanctioning public criticism of the armed forces. In the past, this criticism was largely muted because information about military affairs was carefully controlled and manipulated so that only items promoting a positive image of the armed forces were released. But now the military is being subjected to the unrelenting glare of close public scrutiny. This process has been extremely successful in undermining the political authority of senior officers, as they are now largely preoccupied with defending themselves and the services against increasingly strident attacks by an outraged populace. However, it is possible that this process has already been too successful in weakening the military. Having already overridden the institutional advice of his senior military leadership once on the issue of unilateral conventional force reductions,⁵⁷ Gorbachev seems reluctant to push too hard at this juncture. Even though the threat from the West is still the most frequently cited rationale for moving with caution, it is far more likely that domestic considerations have more bearing. The anti-military forces that have been unleashed through glasnost since May 1987 have already

seriously eroded the traditional status and prestige of the armed forces, and Gorbachev may feel that the process is starting to get out of hand. The media have become increasingly virulent in their attacks on the military, spot-lighting waste and inefficiency. The excessive secrecy of the past and the unquestioned top priority that military spending has enjoyed in the Soviet budget for decades have fueled the anger of a populace that feels that it has received precious little recompense for its sacrifices.⁵⁸ The visceral impact of incidents such as the needless drowning of 42 sailors on the nuclear submarine Komsomolets,⁵⁹ or reports of Soviet soldiers unleashing poison gas and using shovels to bludgeon women and children in Georgia⁶⁰ have served to heighten a profound sense of betrayal and frustration. When heaped on top of the open wound that has been ripped in the national psyche by Afghanistan,⁶¹ the result has been a severe crisis of confidence in the Soviet armed forces.

The original purpose of redefining the defense agenda was to provide Gorbachev with some leverage to prod the military into undertaking reform. However, that strategy appears to have backfired, at least for the moment. The media have proven insatiable in their quest for more information and new revelations. For instance, the official publication of data on the correlation of forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact (footnote 56) only served to whet their appetite for more.⁶² It remains to be seen whether or not the recent release of defense budget spending figures will satisfy the public.⁶³

Predictably, the military's reaction to this firestorm of criticism

has been defensive and negative. Patriotic men who have served their country faithfully for many years now feel that the armed forces are being unfairly blamed for a variety of social ills, ranging from the lack of consumer goods to inadequate wage and pension payments. They claim that they too have been victimized by years of unsound fiscal policy.⁶⁴

Recently, the high command and the senior political leadership decided to send a message to the media. An official communique was issued from the secretariat of the Central Committee proposing the assignment of "qualified military journalists" to the editorial staffs of the central press. The statement lauds Pravda, Izvestiya and Trud for "helping formulate correct impressions of the Army and Navy among the Soviet people" and sharply criticizes other publications such as Ogonyok for publishing "incompetent articles" filled with "unreliable information" and "reporting in a one-sided way."⁶⁵

It is likely that the very serious opposition in the new Supreme Soviet to the confirmation of General of the Army Yazov as Minister of Defense only a few days before provided the catalyst to convince the senior leadership that immediate action was required. Only a last minute procedural rule change and the personal intervention of Gorbachev prevented Yazov's rejection.⁶⁶ He was grilled at length on a number of defense issues, with several deputies accusing him of being too entrenched in the old way of thinking and demanding that he step down in favor of younger leadership. In the aftermath of the confirmation hearings, even the account printed in the official party newspaper was distinctly unflattering. Pravda noted "the aspirant for the post of Minister of Defense" was "unable to find the necessary answers to all the questions."

It characterized his demeanor as "excessively nervous" and "sometimes even impatient," speculating that "it is hard to guess how the voting might have gone if it had not been for a word in defense of the candidate from the chairman of the Defense Council."⁶⁷

The general feeling of the political leadership that the press has gotten out of control was recently underscored by Gorbachev himself. He fired Viktor Afanasyev, the editor of Pravda, demanded the resignation of Vladislav Starkov, editor of Argumenty i Fakty, and publicly rebuked a number of other journalists for "irresponsible" reporting. Gorbachev made it quite clear that he sees glasnost as a tool for supporting perestroika, and not as a moral and legal right guaranteeing freedom of expression. Right now he wants the press to soothe the populace, not agitate it, as the country moves through a period of crisis, and this includes backing off the military. As Andrei Sakharov noted, "Evidently he wasn't prepared for such a free press as this."⁶⁸

But a temporary retreat does not imply that Gorbachev has given up his goal of fundamentally restructuring the military and its role in Soviet politics. Both his rhetoric and his actions reveal that he believes that there is still much more work to be done.⁶⁹ In addition to his ongoing programs of personnel replacement and public criticism, Gorbachev has also initiated a process which is of far greater import for the future of the Soviet military- systemic institutional reform. In this regard, there are two broad developments which are of considerable interest and significance because of their potential to drastically alter the way that the Soviet Union conducts its affairs in matters of defense policy

formulation and execution.

The first is the inclusion of civilian defense specialists in the policy formation process. They have been enfranchised to question conventional wisdom and recommend new policy options in an advisory capacity that formerly fell strictly under the purview of military professionals. The general indictment of Brezhnev's defense policy is that he abdicated his authority to the military bureaucracy and became a prisoner of a vertically stratified system which offered him unimaginative and hidebound options inappropriate for today's world situation. Clearly, Gorbachev wants new ideas and at least for the time being, he seems to feel that expanding the pool of advisors is a valid approach to promote new thinking and generate alternative policy options.

It would be a mistake to overestimate the influence wielded by the civilian defense specialists, however. The military hierarchy still controls access to the vast amount of information that remains classified, and has not been displaced as the key player in formulating national security policy options. The General Staff still provides its input on security matters to Gorbachev and the Defense Council on a daily basis; the difference lies in the fact that now its recommendations must compete with those from the Academy of Sciences and its two primary analytic organizations, the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) and the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada (IUSAC). These competing centers of threat assessment serve to reduce the military's ability to completely dominate the process of national security policy option generation. But it is important to keep in mind that

Gorbachev recruited civilian expertise to provide him with innovative solutions to the country's problems, and that if they fail to provide them, he may decide to disenfranchise them just as quickly as he enfranchised them. Their status as independent loci of threat assessment and policy formation has not yet been institutionalized.

The second development is probably even more significant. In addition to canvassing the scientific and intellectual community for outside expertise in arms control and security matters, Gorbachev has also moved to create counter institutions. In the International Department of the Central Committee, a special arms control section has been created, headed by Lieutenant General Viktor Starodubov. Similarly, in the Foreign Ministry, a new Arms Control and Disarmament Directorate has been established, headed by Viktor Karpov.⁷⁰ These moves are designed to broaden the base of expertise in military affairs and reduce the degree of dependency on the General Staff for input in the policy option generation process.

But easily the most important new institution is the fledgling Committee on Defense and State Security in the Congress of People's Deputies. It represents an effort by the Supreme Soviet to establish legislative oversight over national security decisions. Theoretically, the committee will be empowered to review military spending plans, and to reject or redistribute funding for specific programs much in the way that the House and Senate Armed Services Committees exercise fiscal authority over the U.S. defense budget.

At this point, it is impossible to predict whether the committee will evolve into a genuine organ of legislative control exercising broad powers of discretionary fiscal authority, or if it will function as a front organization with no mandate other than to simply rubber stamp the policies and programs as dictated from above. At present, the 44-member committee is not really a fully independent entity. Although there are a few reform-minded mavericks, the bulk of the committee membership roster reads like a Who's Who of party, government, military and defense industry establishment figures who are more likely to represent the institutional interests of their respective bureaucracies than the interests of the electorate. Further, the committee chairman, Vladimir Lapygin, has announced that committee meetings will be closed to the public.⁷¹ These developments do not bode well for the emergence of the committee as a relevant force capable of influencing the national security agenda in the near term. But if the committee members are given a few years to establish an independent staff, develop defense expertise, and strengthen their ties to their local constituencies, it is conceivable that the committee may emerge as a bona fide player in the national security process. Edward Warner, who accompanied a delegation of American Congressmen who traveled to the Soviet Union in August to establish contact with the nascent organization, summed up the situation like this- "The Soviets themselves don't know what they'll do or what powers they'll have. Right now, it's really wide open."⁷²

The real challenge for western analysts is to distinguish between those changes which are attendant to the natural process of power consolidation and power maintenance by the general secretary, and those

changes which represent genuine reform with broader implications for the future. In Gorbachev's case, the indicators are mixed. Certainly the extensive purging of senior military personnel is nothing new; this is the classic response when the political leadership wants to rein in the military. The Gorbachev difference is that he did not wait to consolidate his power base before initiating other reforms. He began to radically revise military doctrine while he was still busy dispatching political opponents, a definite indicator that he felt a sense of urgency.⁷³

Subjecting the armed forces to criticism is not a novel approach either; both Stalin and Khrushchev attacked the armed forces with vigor. But Gorbachev has added an unprecedented new twist to this process. In the past, criticism of the military was carefully controlled and directed from above. Gorbachev has decentralized the process, unleashing the media and the public in his cause as well as the Party. As a result, a wide range of previously taboo topics have been addressed and a fair portion of the criticism has assumed a vituperative character that largely transcends the traditional boundaries of permissible criticism. The momentum of this process has fed a growing sense of loss of control that is being felt in the military, the Party, and across Soviet society as a whole.⁷⁴

Institutional reform is the third aspect of Gorbachev's program to redefine the civilian-military relationship. This element of his agenda is the most difficult to evaluate. He is definitely changing the rules of the game in defense decision making, but to what end? Is he simply dissatisfied with the status quo bequeathed him by his predecessors, or does he have in mind a grand scheme that he is trying to implement? Khrushchev was

the last general secretary who made a serious attempt at this sort of fundamental institutional reform. But he approached it in a haphazard manner and the results were desultory at best. Gorbachev's program also lacks consistency. This could be described as pragmatism, but it leaves him vulnerable if he is not successful. It is my belief that the true definition of a "hare-brained scheme" is a program which doesn't work; or even worse, a reform which makes things worse than they already are. The evidence suggests that Gorbachev is seeking greater efficiency in the national security decision making process- he realizes that the military can not be trusted as an honest broker if there are no competing independent centers of threat assessment to provide the political leadership with alternative policy options. But he does not appear to have a predilection for pluralism per se. In Gorbachev's view, pluralism is good medicine for what ails the military, but not for what ails the Party.⁷⁵

However, as we have seen, there are definite limits as to just how far Gorbachev is willing to go in terms of downgrading the military's role in Soviet public and political life. Gorbachev has articulated a vision of sorts about where he wants to go with Soviet national security policy,⁷⁶ but he has not revealed what he has in mind as the ultimate goal of institutional reform, perhaps suggesting that he himself is unsure. So far, he has demonstrated considerable skill in wielding the political tools at his disposal as general secretary to persuade the public to support his innovative defense policies and to prod the military into implementing them. But the process has entailed unintended side effects as well, and some of these may prove to be beyond his control. Whether the new institutions will provide some stability, or even acquire meaningful authority remains an open question.

It is clear that the final curtain has not yet come down on this show. The creation of counter institutions and their subsequent evolution into bona fide players in the Soviet national security policy formulation and execution process is obviously a long term proposition. Certainly we can not expect a fully pluralized democratic system to spring into being overnight. The seeds of a such a system have been sown, and they need time to develop. However, several decades of Soviet history argue that these seeds will never sprout. Moreover, Gorbachev's tendency has been to amass personal power as general secretary, president and chairman of the Defense Council; he does not appear inclined to voluntarily share his prerogatives with others. So far, the institutions which he has created derive their power at the expense of other existing organizations. As a result, Gorbachev emerges more powerful, not less. I must concur with Condoleezza Rice's assessment that it is too early in the game to declare that a fundamental shift in the nature of Soviet defense decision making has taken place.⁷⁷ At this point, I think it prudent to confine ourselves to saying that the potential for significant change is present, but its fruition is not assured.

So the key question remains. What is the fundamental nature of the relationship between the Party and the armed forces today? I believe that it is one of compromise and confluence of interest. As Stephen Meyer suggests, the reforms that we have seen so far are very closely related to Gorbachev's effort to wrest control of the defense agenda away from the entrenched parochial interests of the military hierarchy and to reassert personal and Party primacy in national security affairs.⁷⁸ But the process has proven more difficult than expected, and recently Gorbachev

himself hinted at the depth and intensity of his struggle with the military. Characterizing it as "very painful business," he implied that although the worst was behind him, the fight was still far from over. Failing to conceal his frustration and disappointment at the lethargic pace of restructuring in the armed forces, he intimated that the senior military leadership had advised him to slow down, and that he had grudgingly acceded.⁷⁹ Given the climactic events in Eastern Europe and the continued deterioration of the Soviet economy, it appears that Gorbachev has opted for stability in defense matters, at least until other more pressing policy issues are resolved.

The best public description of the compromise which has emerged appeared in a recent issue of Kommunist vooruzhennikh sil.⁸⁰ The conservative position was expounded in a letter by reader N. Koldaeva, who essentially advocated a wholesale return to the policies and procedures of the Brezhnev era. The "response" by the chief of the General Staff General of the Army Moiseev was illuminating. Moiseev expressed support for the initiatives of the political leadership in defense policy such as the new defensive doctrine, the need for restructuring, and the efficacy of the unilateral conventional force reductions. However, in a departure from some of his earlier articles which expressed unwavering support for official policies, he then proceeded to caveat his support with qualifications. First, he made no secret of his disdain for the current application of glasnost in the military sphere. He chastised the media for "incompetent" and "sensationalist" reporting which "insulted" service members and portrayed the armed forces as a "parasite" on Soviet society. Second, he clearly implied a division of labor between the civilian and

military leadership, asserting that it was the military's job to determine how best to execute the unilateral force reductions. He contrasted "the poorly thought out, voluntaristic reduction of the army and navy by 1,200,000 men in 1960" with the current reductions, stating "we the military specialists must do everything possible to ensure that not only are the earlier mistakes not repeated but that they are avoided in the near future."

In my view, Moiseev's statements roughly define the compromise which has recently emerged between Gorbachev and the armed forces. The senior military leadership appears to be offering its support for his programs in exchange for two things: the freedom to implement his reforms in a manner that it determines, and a significant curtailment of glasnost in military affairs.⁸¹ From Gorbachev's perspective, this deal looks attractive. With events spinning out of control in Eastern Europe and threatening to do likewise at home, he needs the confidence and stability provided by firm military support. Slowing down the pace of restructuring also provides an opportunity for the military to implement the unilateral force reductions and gives society a chance to absorb the career soldiers being demobilized into the work force and the housing market. In addition, the prospects for concluding a negotiated arms reduction agreement through START or CFE in the next year or so are quite good. This relieves the pressure attendant to any further attempt to convince the military to accept additional unilateral cuts. Any future reductions will be conducted in a multilateral framework, and this will make it much easier for Gorbachev to "sell" the cuts to the military and the public. Thus, at present there is a confluence of interest between Gorbachev and the

military hierarchy to slow down the pace of restructuring in the defense arena and digest the reforms that have already been introduced.

The final question which arises concerns the durability of this compromise. How long can we expect the truce to last? Viewed in isolation, it appears to be inherently stable because it is broadly based on mutual interest. Gorbachev should hold up his end of the bargain for two reasons: there are more urgent matters demanding his attention, and he can afford to wait for the arms control process to bear fruit. The military will also probably continue to cooperate for reasons of its own. First, it is not a monolithic entity and it doesn't necessarily oppose everything that Gorbachev is trying to do. Second, the impact of those reforms which it finds most distasteful can be significantly reduced through judicious implementation. Therefore, the potential exists for the compromise to endure through 1990 and perhaps longer. Unfortunately, this relationship can not be viewed in isolation because of the incipient crises in Eastern Europe, the Soviet economy and in several peripheral republics. The very real possibility of ethnic unrest and economic upheaval in the coming months could unleash powerful centrifugal forces which convince either Gorbachev or the senior military leadership that it is advantageous to vitiate the terms of their informal agreement. However, my feeling is that this is unlikely to occur. Gorbachev has repeatedly demonstrated consummate skill in the art of domestic political infighting and he is simply too savvy to leave himself vulnerable in this regard. The more instability and uncertainty that characterizes the situation in Eastern Europe, the non-Russian republics, and the Soviet economy, the more closely Gorbachev will draw the military towards him. The military will

probably elect to live within the framework of the agreement as well. In part because it has limited options for noncompliance, but also because of the potential for obtaining further concessions in slowing, stopping or even reversing the implementation of certain aspects of perestroika in the armed forces. Therefore I see the most likely outcome as one in which the compromise endures throughout the coming year and solidifies while the Soviet civilian leadership attempts to grapple with more urgently pressing policy issues.

CHAPTER TWO

NEW THINKING IN SOVIET DEFENSE POLICY

NEW THINKING IN SOVIET DEFENSE POLICY

During the Gorbachev era, the traditional foundations of Soviet security strategy have become increasingly subject to question, reevaluation and change. The reassessment process has slowly evolved into new declaratory policy and has provided the conceptual framework for the adoption of major foreign policy initiatives, such as the withdrawal from Afghanistan and the conclusion of the treaty to eliminate intermediate range nuclear forces (INF). The process accelerated dramatically on 7 December 1988, when the general secretary announced significant unilateral conventional force reductions during his speech at the United Nations. Under the rubric of "new thinking," a variety of security concepts have sprung up, foremost among them the notions of "reasonable sufficiency" and "defensive defense." A vigorous and exceptionally open (by Soviet standards) debate has ensued, as various bureaucratic constituencies struggle to define these concepts and the means of implementing them, thereby securing control of the defense agenda not only at present, but for years to come.

Understandably, the volatility of the Soviet debate presents a challenge for Western defense analysts in interpreting the scope, meaning and direction of discourse as well as its final impact on the Soviet military and its ability to fight. Compounding the difficulty is the fact that currently the Soviets themselves probably have only a hazy concept of where this process might ultimately lead them, as many of the proposals

being considered are extremely broad and tenuous at best as prescriptions for security policy. However, despite the nascent and rather nebulous nature of the ongoing debate, a number of prominent Sovietologists have attempted to formulate an analytical treatise which explicates the process and its probable results. Two primary schools of thought have emerged. The first contains proponents of the "profound change" thesis,¹ those who argue that the Soviet Union's military strategy is less offensively oriented and less dependent on nuclear weapons than before. They advise us to take Gorbachev at his word when he says that war is unthinkable and that force is no longer a viable instrument for achieving policy goals. The second group consists of adherents of the "continuity" thesis,² those who maintain that little has changed in actual Soviet force structure, deployment patterns, or war planning. They caution us to view Gorbachev's proclamations with skepticism, and urge us to plot a wary course in national security policy. The truth probably lies somewhere between these two poles of thought, and it is too early to tell precisely how close to either axis it lies.

In order to understand the new doctrine, we must first examine its origins; the domestic and international climate that sired it and the political conditions which have fostered its growth. Then, we must analyze its content, to determine what substance exists and what it means in terms of practical policy application. Finally, having done this, we can engage in some informed speculation about the future direction and probable impact of the new doctrine.

THE ORIGIN OF NEW THINKING IN DEFENSE POLICY

The basic tenets of the new Soviet security strategy began emerging shortly after Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev formally assumed the position of general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union upon Konstantin Chernenko's death in March 1985.³ The central concept of "reasonable sufficiency" was first publicly broached by Gorbachev during his initial trip to France in October 1985. He expanded on this idea and introduced the philosophical corollaries which form the foundation of the new thinking on security and defense in his official political report at the 27th Party Congress in February 1986.⁴ Here he first expounded on the theme that military strength was no longer the primary criterion in determining superpower status. He questioned its utility as a instrument to achieve policy objectives and argued that political means rather than the continued expansion of military power would enhance security, ease the arms race, lessen international tension, and improve East-West relations. He announced sweeping proposals for phased arms reductions and the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons, clearly implying to his domestic audience that he considers the bloated Soviet defense budgets of the past part of the problem, not the solution. Specifically, he outlined the parameters of his "all-encompassing system of international security" in the military sphere as follows:

- renunciation by the nuclear powers of war- both nuclear and conventional.
- prevention of an arms race in outer space, cessation of all nuclear weapons tests and the total destruction of such weapons, a ban on the construction of chemical weapons, and renunciation of the development of other means of mass annihilation.
- a strictly controlled lowering of the levels of military capabilities of countries to limits of reasonable sufficiency.
- disbandment of military alliances.
- balanced and proportionate reduction of military budgets.⁵

These concepts were codified into official Soviet and Warsaw Pact policy in the June 1986 Budapest proposal for conventional arms reductions. This proposal widened the scope of the Warsaw Pact's negotiating position significantly. Geographically, it defined a huge zone of consideration, calling for the "reduction of formations and units with organic armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals." And numerically, it envisioned deep cuts, "a reduction in each side of 100,000 to 150,000 (personnel) in one to two years and a reduction of one half million as the next step." Further, it recommended "restrictions on large scale exercises and further confidence-building measures" and called for on-site verification as well as verification by national technical means.⁶ Although the Budapest appeal did not result in immediate reductions of troops or equipment (then still under the auspices of the deadlocked Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks⁷), it did open the door for rapid progress in regulating military activities, and resulted in the September 1986 Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures. This accord asserts the principle that all signatories will refrain from the use, or threat of use of force and requires prior notification 42 days in advance of any exercise or troop concentration involving more than 13,000 troops, 3000 airborne or amphibious troops, 300 tanks, or 200 aircraft sorties. In addition, there are provisions for observers if maneuvers exceed a threshold of 17,000 troops or 5000 airborne or amphibious troops. Compliance is verified through three on-site inspections annually.⁸

The key event in the revision of Soviet national security policy occurred in May 1987, when the member states of the Warsaw Pact officially

declared that their military doctrine was "strictly defensive." They stated that the Warsaw Pact countries consider no state to be an enemy, that they threaten no one, and that they have no territorial pretensions of any kind. Further, they pledged that they would never be the first to initiate hostilities, or the first to use nuclear weapons. They proposed the mutual reduction of conventional forces in Europe to a level "sufficient for one's own defense" and a restructuring of forces so that they "would lack the means for a surprise attack on the other side." They included provisions for verification through national technical means and on-site inspections, and reiterated their usual set of appeals for the creation of nuclear and chemical free zones, the disbandment of military alliances, the immediate cessation of all nuclear testing, and the eventual liquidation of all weapons of mass destruction. Also significant was the Warsaw Pact member states' recognition of the need to make asymmetrical cuts in order to achieve an agreement:

With due regard for the imbalance of forces of the two sides in Europe, which is determined by history, geography, and other factors, they declare their readiness to remove any disparity that may have arisen in some elements in the course of reductions by bringing about a reduction on the side which has the advantage.⁹

The May 1987 Berlin proclamation, perhaps even more than Gorbachev's December 1988 U.N. speech, is what has opened the floodgates of commentary and debate within the Soviet Union on national security and defense policy. Virtually all current Soviet writings on the subject struggle to come to grips with the concept of "reasonable sufficiency" as it relates to "reliable defense of the homeland" in an effort to devise a prudent policy course. One of the main questions that we seek to answer is why the Soviet Union has embarked on this path.

One explanation offered is that this change is a result of a rational and objective policy review. Michael MccGwire is the primary proponent of this thesis. According to MccGwire, the Soviets adjusted their strategic thinking in 1966, a doctrinal shift resulting in reduced reliance on nuclear weapons and a concomitant increased reliance on conventional forces. This move was dictated by their assessment that nuclear war was not only unwinnable, but would inevitably result in catastrophe, thereby making avoidance of nuclear conflict a Soviet national objective of the highest magnitude. MccGwire argues that this necessitated a conventional build-up in order to ensure victory should deterrence fail, the goal being to defeat NATO quickly (without inviting nuclear escalation) and evict U.S. forces from the continent so as to deny them a bridgehead for conducting a ground offensive into the Soviet Union. Further, he maintains that the Soviet military build-up of the 1970s and 1980s has not been "relentless" or "excessive" if we recognize that the Soviets are preparing for the contingency of world war, the objective being not to lose. MccGwire sees the roots of the current changes in a policy review conducted in the summer of 1983. He asserts that since that time the Soviets have shifted the emphasis away from deep offensive operations towards a more defensive posture designed to avoid war and nuclear escalation. He states that "the military disadvantages of this policy were accepted, just as the economic costs of the old policy were accepted."¹⁰

Although MccGwire's argument is inviting, it is also fundamentally flawed. He treats the Soviet decision-making bureaucracy as a monolithic and homogenous entity, capable of rationally and objectively formulating

national security goals and then straightforwardly implementing simple and effective policies to achieve them. He fails to recognize that in any nation-state, and particularly in a major power, there exists a hierarchy of objectives and priorities both domestic and international in nature that the ruling elite must attempt to mesh into coherent policy. Clearly, there are tradeoffs involved, as competing goals may be contradictory, and competing constituencies unwilling or unable to compromise. Further, circumstances change over time, resulting in revaluation of objectives and the policies designed to achieve them. McGwire's approach is also flawed in that he relies primarily on deductive logic to ascertain when decisions were made and why. He maintains that he can precisely date when key decisions were made simply by noting observable changes in military deployment and procurement patterns and then by working backwards in time to uncover the original decision. I find this neat portrayal of a complex process far too convenient to adequately penetrate the ongoing "noise level" of confusion and uncertainty involved in high-level strategic decision-making.

McGwire is also extremely careful to point out the difference between intentions and capabilities, deriding the military's pre-occupation with capabilities as "suitable for contingency planning, but inappropriate at the political-strategic ministerial level" where "primary concern should be focused on the most likely course of events." Again, McGwire's analysis is sloppy. He fails to realize that there are three steps to proper military threat analysis. First, one must explore capabilities, and all possible options open to a potential aggressor. Next, one examines the worst case scenario and its impact. Finally, after

considering all relevant factors, one decides on the most likely course of events, and compares the amount of risk one is willing to accept in national defense posture between the worst case scenario and the most likely course of events. McGwire opts to skip the analytical requirement of performing steps one and two, and arrives immediately at his prescription for step three. Finally, McGwire's thesis that the Soviet Union has followed a policy of minimum deterrence since 1966 and that its conventional forces have been defensively structured since 1983 is simply not supported by the evidence. While the raw numbers of Soviet troops and equipment have remained relatively stable throughout the 1980s, new weapons production and force modernization programs have gone forward at a blistering pace, and continue to do so under Gorbachev.¹¹

Another attempt to explain the rapidly evolving nature of Soviet military doctrine is Jack Snyder's thesis that deterministic internal forces are the primary engine of change. He sees traditional militarist and expansionist Soviet foreign policy as firmly rooted in Stalinist domestic institutions, which Gorbachev seeks to dismantle, thereby disenfranchising the self-serving interest groups which comprise them. He argues that "the requirements of intensive development and the interests of Gorbachev's principal constituency, the intelligentsia, propel new thinking in foreign policy and arms control." Further, he maintains that "the forces favoring radical change" are "objective economic needs, plus the clout of a strengthened professional class and an already strong reforming leadership."¹²

The problem with Snyder's analysis is that he considers "the

intelligentsia" as a homogenous social class which unanimously supports Gorbachev's program of perestroika and is uniform in its opinions about how to achieve its goals. He fails to define who makes up this class, except through inference, by noting that the number of people with full higher education tripled between 1959 and 1979. This fails to take into account the large constituency of educated individuals who have used their education to enter the state and party bureaucracy, thereby acquiring a vested interest in the status quo of rank and privilege, nor the artistic segment of the intelligentsia, whose members often lack higher degrees and have a markedly different political outlook from mid-level managers, engineers, technicians and bureaucrats. Moreover, Snyder's argument tends to overestimate the ability of the intelligentsia to set the political agenda and assumes that within its ranks there is a broad consensus favoring Gorbachev-style reform when in fact no such consensus exists. The wide media coverage of the new Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies has clearly demonstrated that policy debates have become increasingly dominated by factionalism and that it is impossible to draw the battle lines as neatly as Snyder would like to depict them.

A more compelling variant of the deterministic forces argument is that changes in Soviet military doctrine are being driven by economic and social necessity. A number of prominent Sovietologists advance this view, with slight differences in permutation and emphasis. Seweryn Bialer identifies "the main source of new thinking" as a "profound systemic crisis that is political, social, economic, ideological and cultural in nature." Bialer sees the new doctrine as a "serious and authentic

strategic modification in Soviet military thinking imposed on the military by the political leadership." David Holloway argues that the "broad economic and social crisis affecting the country" has been Gorbachev's "first priority" and that the thrust of Gorbachev's policy has been to "create a more stable and predictable international environment for his domestic reforms." Robert Legvold maintains that the Soviets have now recognized that "the real threat has increasingly become the deformation of the Soviet economy produced by a preoccupation with military power."¹³

An important corollary to these arguments is the bankrupt foreign policy legacy bequeathed to Gorbachev by his predecessors. Whereas Holloway and Legvold both cite it as a contributing factor in the equation, Condoleezza Rice assigns it primacy. She notes that the Soviet economy is designed "to serve military needs first, overall economic growth second, and the consumer as an afterthought," but argues that "the rationale for the new security policy is not just economic." Its genesis lies in the fact that Brezhnev's foreign policy, so heavily dependent on military power, is now "viewed widely as a miserable failure." She maintains that the current Kremlin leadership has realized that the rapid expansion of Soviet military power was a mistake; not just because it debilitated the economy, but because it was counterproductive policy. According to Rice, in the 1970s the Soviets viewed national security as a zero-sum game. They believed that their security was enhanced by threatening the security of others. They were imbued with optimism about the shifting correlation of forces and the eschatological inevitability of the final victory of socialism. They viewed detente as a response to

growing Soviet strength, and thought that the stronger they became, the more amenable other states would be to their desires and interests. However, this line of reasoning was faulty. As Rice correctly observes, "the Soviets were becoming so strong that they produced only fear and resentment."¹⁴

The various deterministic forces arguments presented above are all fundamentally accurate and correct. There is no doubt that the severe deformation of the Soviet economy and the ineffectiveness of Soviet foreign policy so clearly evident by the early 1980s was creating severe pressure for change. However, this explanation is inadequate, because it fails to account for the persona of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. I believe that an awful lot of the new thinking is embodied in the firmly held personal beliefs and convictions of the general secretary, and that without him we would see a vastly different Soviet Union.¹⁵ This point is more easily seen if we consider what sort of policies the Soviet Union might be pursuing today if Brezhnev, Andropov, or Chernenko had lived another ten years. Certainly each of these leaders would have crafted some sort of policy response to relieve the pressures created by the domestic and international forces cited above, but just as certainly it is highly unlikely that their responses would remotely resemble the comprehensive reform platform that Gorbachev is promoting. Far more likely would be a scenario in which Brezhnev or Chernenko would continue to attempt to muddle through, treating symptoms rather than causes of problems, and an Andropov regime steering a more moderate course between the legacy of the past and the demands of the future. In sum, my point is that individual general secretaries do matter.

Stephen Meyer concurs in this view, and argues that the "conceptual elements of Gorbachev's new thinking on security are first and foremost tools for gaining control of the Soviet defense agenda." Meyer contends that Gorbachev's primary goal is economic revitalization, and that this is impossible without firm control over not just military spending, but the entire defense agenda, to include force structure, strategy and war planning. Meyer notes that prior to March 1985 "there is no evidence- or reason to believe- that Gorbachev was contemplating a grand scheme for defining a new defense agenda." However, Meyer also reinforces the deterministic forces thesis by observing that unlike previous general secretaries, Gorbachev felt compelled to start revising military doctrine while he was still consolidating his power base.¹⁶

The ambiguous nature of the new Soviet military doctrine, coupled with the haphazard manner in which it has been introduced and defined over time, lends credence to Meyer's hypothesis. Overall, I tend to agree with his assessment. The endemic economic and social crises assailing the Soviet system were a necessary and urgent precondition for change. However, this merely served to set the stage. Rather than forming an overwhelming consensus for change, these phenomena have merely served to prevent the formation of a coalition opposing reform, paving the way for the emergence of a personality like Gorbachev. Again, we must consider the hypothetical- what if Romanov had succeeded Chernenko? Gorbachev continues to grapple with the fact that in the economic sphere the forces of inertia are far more powerful than the forces for change, and in the political sphere the impetus for change is too powerful, especially in the non-Russian republics. He is impatient in his search for answers to

his country's problems and wants to expedite the implementation of those solutions which he believes he has already found. It is to this end that he is striving to revise military doctrine; to gain control of the defense agenda, and to shape it to meet his goals for the revitalization of the economy and the nation.

THE CONTENT OF NEW THINKING IN DEFENSE POLICY

It is important to note that there are two aspects to Soviet military doctrine: political and military-technical. The political aspect defines the political purposes and character of war, and the manner in which those concepts affect the development and structure of the armed forces and the preparation of the country for war. The formulation of the political aspect of military doctrine is a jealously guarded Party prerogative. The military-technical aspect concerns the methods of waging war, the organization of the armed forces, and combat readiness. Formulation of the military-technical aspect has traditionally fallen under the purview of the military. What we have seen so far is an effort by Gorbachev to reassert the primacy of Party authority on the political side, and to insert and firmly establish himself and the civilian leadership on the military-technical side. Without a radical reordering of military doctrine to reduce international tension and the threat of war as perceived by both the West and his domestic constituency, it would simply be impossible for Gorbachev to justify and implement the deep cuts in military spending that he feels are necessary to revitalize the stagnant Soviet economy.

On the political side, the basic tenets of new thinking can be summarized as follows:

- The prevention of war, rather than the successful prosecution of war, is the fundamental goal of Soviet military doctrine.
- War is no longer a legitimate means of achieving policy goals.
- Political and diplomatic means of enhancing security are superior to military means.
- Security is mutual. Soviet security can not be achieved at the expense of others.

- Soviet military strategy, force structure and deployment will now be based on the principles of "reasonable sufficiency" and "defensive defense."

The concept of war prevention in Soviet national security strategy is nothing new. It has been a pillar of Soviet defense and foreign policy since Khrushchev's 1956 enunciation of the policy of "peaceful coexistence." The Kremlin has long recognized the dangers of global war, and nuclear conflict in particular. Some analysts argue that this has made Soviet leaders cautious, and led them to behave in a generally risk averse manner, adhering to "the rules of the game" in international confrontation, and attempting to achieve policy objectives through the implied threat of use of force rather than the actual use of force.¹⁷

Now this concept has been formalized. As Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General M.A. Gareyev put it:

What is new here is the fact that whereas military doctrine used to be defined as a system of views on the preparation for war and the waging of war, its substance now is based on the prevention of war. The task of preventing war is becoming the supreme goal, the nucleus of military doctrine, the basic function of the state and the armed forces.¹⁸

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Numerous military authors echo Gareyev's thoughts. The advantage of making this subtle shift public and official is that it gives Gorbachev leverage in his campaign to reduce the size of the armed forces and its budget. The clear implication is that fewer forces are required to deter war than to win it.

A corollary to the concept that war is no longer a legitimate means of achieving policy goals is the notion that the danger of inadvertent war is now greater than the danger of deliberate war. This is a far more

novel approach. This idea is based on the premise that weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, are themselves inherently destabilizing and dangerous, regardless of the political context in which they exist. This line of reasoning represents a more fundamental break with traditional Soviet thinking,²⁰ which emphasizes the complete integration of nuclear, chemical and conventional fire on the modern battlefield and plans extensively for both employing and defending against the employment of these so-called "weapons of mass destruction." The logical conclusion to be drawn from this argument is that security is enhanced by mutually reducing the level of armaments. It effectively derails the frequent calls for a stronger military and decouples the policy objective of preventing war from the historical companion objective of preparing to win should deterrence fail. Further, this creates an ideological and doctrinal framework which justifies Gorbachev's arms control initiatives, and creates additional pressure for unilateral cuts in defense spending and in the size of the armed forces.

The primacy of political and diplomatic means over military strength as an instrument for enhancing and ensuring security is an idea which has been advanced by the political leadership over the objections of the military hierarchy. This issue strikes at the heart of the military's favored status within Soviet society, and the bitter power struggle it has engendered has already cost the careers of a number of high-ranking military officers and defense industry officials. As we have seen, the struggle is by no means over yet. However at this point, it appears that at least for the time being, the military has accepted the notion that "the political aspect is the main one."²¹

The seeds of this shift were sown during the early 1980s, when the Soviet Union found itself consistently unable to translate its military might into commensurate political gains. The patina of military invincibility began to fade as the involvement in Afghanistan dragged on and NATO refused to be bullied on the INF issue. Exacerbating the sense of frustration was the stridently anti-Soviet rhetoric of the Reagan administration. The international climate turned sour and the United States embarked on a major military rearmament program. Already shouldering a massive defense burden, the Soviet Union could not sustain its present rate of military spending, let alone tolerate a further ratcheting of the arms race without risking economic ruin. Particularly in the realm of space weaponry, the Soviets had no desire to invest the scientific, technological and industrial capital required to maintain qualitative parity with the United States. The U.S. defense budget in general and the strategic defense initiative in particular became a lightning rod for Soviet criticism, reflecting the Kremlin's deep concern and dismay at the general direction of events. The United States was accused of attempting "to bleed the Soviet Union white economically" and of striving "to bring about the economic exhaustion of socialism in the arms race process."²² There had to be a better way.

Enter Gorbachev, who realized that negotiating the threat away was a far more effective countermeasure than attempting to match it. He saw that diplomacy and arms control agreements could do a lot more to enhance security than additional tank divisions or nuclear missiles. Thus, Gorbachev's current political strategy was born. William Odom characterizes it as "a three-pronged offensive" against the United States and

its allies. According to Odom, the first component is to attack the West's basic reliance on nuclear weapons. He notes that trends in weapons development and technology point towards greater destructive capacity, thereby canceling the political utility of nuclear weapons. The second component of the Soviet offensive is the emphasis on arms control. The preponderance of Soviet military power on the continent affords a great advantage in terms of opportunity to make unilateral cuts and to seize the diplomatic initiative in an arms build-down, portraying the West as a reluctant and recalcitrant partner. Odom observes that it is surprising that it took Moscow so long to recognize the opening provided by the zero option for undermining NATO deterrence policy. The third prong of the Soviet diplomacy trident is designed to influence Western public opinion about security in general and about nuclear weapons in particular. By portraying themselves as the champions of peace, civilization and humanity, the Soviets play on public fears about nuclear war, and they create an educational dilemma for NATO. Western governments must justify continuing military expenditures in an atmosphere of eroding public support, and prevent the complete dissolution of the current defense consensus.²³

The idea that security is mutual and that it can not be attained at the expense of other states is another contentious philosophical issue. Again, the concept is being imposed by the political leadership upon a reluctant and unwilling military. However, it would be a mistake to think that the debate is purely a military-civilian issue. At the same time that new thinkers are lauding "the new concept of security" as "comprehensive, dynamic, realistic, humanistic, moral and democratic," old

thinkers are emerging to reinforce the traditional catechism of Marxism-Leninism: the reactionary class nature of bourgeoisie societies, their innate militaristic and aggressive nature, and the concept of war as the result of political struggle between two diametrically opposed systems--capitalism and socialism.²⁴ The distinctly ideological thrust of the mutual security concept attacks the traditional pillars of Communist orthodoxy, and obviously bothers a number of Soviet commentators. Many reject the new thinking outright, pointing to the West's ongoing force modernization program as evidence of its unrelenting hostility towards socialism and its desire to attain military superiority.²⁵ Others, including Gorbachev, attempt to explain the new philosophy within the context of traditional Marxist-Leninist thought, but the results are often less than satisfactory.²⁶

At first, this aspect of Gorbachev's security platform seems to have been met with something less than the enthusiasm he envisioned. The signing of the INF treaty in December 1987 engendered a considerable amount of domestic criticism when the Soviet public discovered the scope of the disproportionate cuts involved.²⁷ However, Gorbachev managed to weather this storm and more importantly, was able to transfer the monkey of public criticism off his back and onto the military. By the end of 1988 the military was placed in the position of trying to defend its bloated force structure against the prospect of deep unilateral cuts. Now it appears that the idea of mutual security as defined by approximate parity has gained wider acceptance among the populace and a sufficient degree of acquiescence among national security elite decision-makers to pave the way for rapid progress in arms control negotiations.

Easily the most ambiguous component of Gorbachev's security platform is the concept of restructuring the armed forces along the lines of "reasonable sufficiency" and "defensive defense." Philosophically, the idea has been a big hit, and a number of rather authoritative articles have appeared which purport to explain the new doctrine.²⁸ However, numerous difficulties arise when Soviet commentators attempt to depart the theoretical plane and enter the realm of practical policy application. Here it becomes rapidly self-evident that there is no consensus whatsoever on the definition of these enigmatic terms or the proper method to employ in their implementation.

The first set of problems arises from those who argue that the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact has always been defensive. This group maintains that the postwar growth in the Soviet military has come about only as a response to Western initiatives, particularly the deployment of new weapons systems. Further, they argue that current force structure represents an adequate, but not excessive, response to the threat posed by the West. Therefore, no real change is needed.²⁹

A more serious challenge for Gorbachev is the line of thinking adopted by a number of senior military leaders who officially support the new doctrine, but supplement it with show-stopping caveats. Many argue that any actions taken must be bilateral in nature. For instance, while describing the new doctrine, Marshal Akhromeyev notes that "the aggressive orientation of current U.S. and NATO doctrine is clearly visible" and that "with each passing year the U.S. and NATO armed forces become increasingly attack and strike oriented." He cautions that "under

the constant military threat being created by the active military preparations of imperialism, defensive sufficiency can not be interpreted unilaterally."³⁰ Virtually all military commentators stress the need to maintain parity with the West. Minister of Defense Yazov points out that "averting war and being ready to repulse the aggressor" are "mutually related tasks." He reminds us that "the USA and NATO do not renounce the first use of nuclear weapons, and are building up their strategic offensive potential on a vast scale in a bid to gain military superiority." He concludes that "the existing military-strategic parity (nuclear and conventional) remains the decisive factor in preventing war."³¹ Others emphasize the difficulties and dangers of quick implementation. Head of the chief political administration, General of the Army Lizichev tells us that "perestroika in the Army does not go on in a simple way" and that "we must develop mechanisms for implementation of all directions of perestroika in the armed forces." He informs us that "it has not yet touched upon all of the links in the Army and Navy" and confesses that "some people have not understood it yet." Lizichev defends the slow pace of implementation rather than criticizing it, and warns us that "the impulse towards disarmament is not irreversible."³² Most military professionals echo these sentiments. The commander-in-chief of the air defense forces, General of the Army Ivan Tretyak seems to be speaking for the majority when he says:

Any changes in our Army should be considered a thousand times over before they are decided upon. Temporary benefits are a great lure. But I repeat once again- the most important thing is to have a reliable defense. If we were not so strong, imperialism would not hesitate to change the world.³³

In contrast, a number of prominent civilian defense analysts advocate a much more radical approach to restructuring the armed forces.

Whereas military professionals tend to think in terms of rechanneling defense spending into more efficient production to improve the qualitative parameters of Soviet forces, the civilians envision deep cuts in the defense budget. They argue that the economic decline of the 1970s and 1980s was symptomatic of a counterproductive preoccupation with military power, and blame this misalignment of priorities for the foreign policy reversals suffered during the period. Interestingly, they credit the United States with promulgating effective policy to exploit the situation, dragging the Soviet Union into the arms race and costly third world entanglements, striving to bring about "the economic exhaustion of socialism."³⁴ These authors contend that today there is a markedly diminished rate of political return from military investments, and clearly feel that the economic aspect of foreign policy is the critical one. They criticize the "cult of parity" mentality prevalent among senior military leaders, and question the likelihood of a U.S. or NATO attack and the notion that all Soviet military developments have been a defensive reaction to provocations by the West. They see military power as only a supplement to political and economic means of achieving foreign policy goals and characterize defense expenditures as "unproductive." They warn that failure to reorder budgetary priorities will further weaken the economy and cause the Soviet Union to fall even farther behind the West economically, technologically and militarily.³⁵

Some of the more interesting ideas regarding "reasonable sufficiency" and "defensive defense" have come from the team of Andrei Kokoshin and Major General Valentin Larionov. This pair burst on the scene in August 1987 with a seminal article analyzing a turning point

in World War II, the July 1943 battle of Kursk. Unlike many western accounts, which focus on the largest tank engagement ever fought, Kokoshin and Larionov emphasize the defensive nature of the battle. They see it as a concrete historical example of successful strategic defense. While admitting that "much has changed" since the battle of Kursk, they claim that it does "refute doubts concerning whether a prepositioned defense can resist the powerful onslaught of offensive forces." Further, they assert that "in this battle, defense as the more economical mode of operations demonstrated its ability to secure maximum advantages on account of increased firepower density." Although they are careful to avoid drawing a direct parallel between the lessons of Kursk and the "non-proactive defense" posture they recommend for NATO and the Warsaw Pact, they do note that over 50% of aircraft losses and up to 70% of tank losses in the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict were inflicted by anti-aircraft and anti-tank guided missiles. They conclude that the technological development of these weapons systems "has resolved the outcome of the competition between mobile armor and anti-tank weapons in favor of the later."³⁶

Unfortunately, Kokoshin and Larionov's analysis suffers from several shortcomings. While they observe that the Germans achieved local superiority of forces at the point of attack on the order of "12 to 1 in men and 11 to 1 in tanks and assault weapons," they fail to consider the fact that the German offensive was completely compromised by the time it was launched. Intelligence leaks and repeated delays not only tipped off the Soviets as to where the blow would fall, but gave them the unprecedented luxury of almost three months to get ready for it. The time was

not wasted; an extensive defense-in-depth was organized, featuring successive belts of prepared positions and anti-tank obstacles covered by fire. Additional assets poured into the sector until each kilometer of front contained 16-20 anti-tank guns,³⁷ a remarkable concentration given the usual density of one or two per several kilometers of front. When the German attack finally came, it quickly disintegrated into a series of costly deliberate head-on assaults in the tradition of the First World War. In applying the lessons of Kursk to today, Kokoshin and Larionov apparently do not consider the political ramifications of laying in dense belts of mines and obstacles supported by successive lines of dug-in positions across either NATO or Warsaw Pact territory. Nor do they entertain any thoughts about the cost of creating such a vast network of prepared defenses, or the possibility that such a defense may be more expensive in the long run than simply maintaining the current structure. Further, they imply that defense alone carried the day, when in fact it was a series of sharp counterattacks (including the massive clash of armor on 12 July) that stopped the German panzer columns. It wasn't until the Soviets launched their own counteroffensive (on a wide front on either side of the Kursk salient) that the Germans were forced to withdraw. Finally, Kokoshin and Larionov fail to see that the battle at Kursk was simply a brief interlude of static defense in a campaign characterized by mobile operations. The shift to the strategic defensive was premeditated and temporary, designed to bleed Hitler white through the execution of a poorly conceived offensive. The success of this strategy set the stage for the rapid offensive advances to follow.³⁸

Another influential article by Kokoshin and Larionov appeared a

year later. This time they tried to flesh out their vision of "reasonable sufficiency and "defensive defense" in contemporary terms, outlining four possible variants of national and bloc military posture. They describe option one as orientation towards immediate counteraction. This option corresponds to "the deep-rooted tradition of military thought according to which only decisive offensive operations and efforts to take the strategic initiative will lead to victory." They argue that in this variant "military operations would be of a decisive and uncompromising nature" because "the political leadership and military high command will be prevented from keeping events fully under control" and "the transition from combat operations where only conventional weapons are used to operations involving weapons of mass destruction may be sudden and unforeseeable." Option two is an orientation towards strategic defense, but with a force structure capable of offensive or defensive operations. Kokoshin and Larionov claim that "the basic ideas and schemes behind such a defense" can "be seen in general terms in the example and historical experience of the battle of Kursk in summer 1943." They maintain that "the probability of a conventional war growing into a nuclear one in this confrontation option is just as high as in the first option." The third variant is very similar to the second, except that it envisages counter-offensives occurring only on friendly territory, and not extending beyond the confines of one's own borders. The authors cite the 1939 Soviet-Japanese conflict in Khalkin-Gol and the U.S. involvement in the Korean war as historical examples of self-restraint in this regard. Option four is pure "non-offensive defense" where each side lacks "the material potential for conducting offensive or counteroffensive operations."³⁹

While Kokoshin and Larionov characterize the first option as "the least stable," they argue that the dangers of nuclear escalation are still present in options two and three. They note that:

When conventional weapons are used on a massive scale it is impossible to rule out a deliberate or accidental attack on the enemy's nuclear and chemical weapons. The consequences of this might prove to be the equivalent of using the corresponding means of mass destruction.

Under certain conditions strikes by conventional weapons are also capable of destroying the numerous European nuclear power stations and power installations. The destruction of nuclear power stations by conventional weapons would be equivalent to the use of radiological weapons.⁴⁰

However, they caution us not to rule out evolution through variants two and three as a means of achieving the "maximally stable balance" represented by option four. They admit that "the transition of both sides to non-offensive defense is bound up with some very considerable difficulties," but note with approval that "the Warsaw Pact member states are de facto moving in the direction of implementing the fourth option." They claim that "it is possible to assign a particular system or weapon to the primarily offensive or primarily defensive type," and argue that limitation of these weapons will enhance stability. Finally, they conclude with a call to reduce the number of major military exercises and maneuvers and to transfer regular formations to reserve status as "graphic evidence of each side's defensive intentions" during its transition to non-offensive defense.⁴¹

Kokoshin and Larionov do not address the role of pre-emption in a modern war, nor do they envisage how a conventional conflict in Europe might unfold. They allow the formation of "high mobility troop formations" for counterattack purposes at tactical level, but do not

specify how these tactical groupings might be constrained from exploiting their success and turning local victories into operational and even strategic advantage, especially since this is the essence of current Soviet offensive military doctrine. These crucial omissions may indicate that what Kokoshin and Larionov don't say has more import than what they do. Nonetheless, the pair have made a big splash with their ideas and have attained what could be termed as semi-celebrity status. In May, they testified before Congress at the invitation of the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis).⁴²

The underlying tension between the military and civilian viewpoint in the doctrinal debate is revealed in the ongoing exchange between Doctor (Historical Science) Alexei Arbatov and Lieutenant General Vladimir Serebryannikov in the English language journal New Times. In February, Arbatov argued that "a war between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., or between the WTO and NATO, could not be won at all" and that "in all cases the only possible outcome is overall catastrophe." He admits that "the counteroffensive as an element of defense remains relevant," but maintains that "a reasonable distinction between defensive and offensive strategy nevertheless can and must be drawn." He advocates a strong defense along the front line, retaining a counterattack force in reserve. According to Arbatov, the stronger the defense along the line of contact, the farther back the "strike reserve" can be stationed. He contends that seeking parity fuels the arms race by forcing the other side to take countermeasures, and notes that it is possible to have parity without sufficiency if the enemy's forces are qualitatively superior or one's own forces are inefficient and unreliable. He posits that sufficiency can be

achieved without parity and argues that "sufficiency presumably implies a much higher degree of independence from the strength and steps taken by the opponent." Serebryannikov takes issue with this approach, stating that "the awareness of it being impossible to win a modern war works only when it is admitted by both sides." He points out that "offense has many advantages over defense" and contends that a unilateral reorganization and reduction of offensive capability amounts to "granting the other side enormous military advantages." He criticizes Arbatov for portraying the Soviet Union as the aggressor if it carries the counterattack beyond its own borders, aiming to rout the enemy on his own territory. He argues that they must "be prepared to use any opportunity to end the war" and that switching to a purely defensive posture reduces the danger of war only "provided both military-political blocs do so." Arbatov defends himself by arguing that the key dilemma in defense planning is not the existence of counterattack forces, but the scale of the contemplated counteroffensive. In an important concession, he concurs that even if retaliatory action results in the deployment of friendly troops on the territory of the aggressor, there is no change in roles. However, he caveats his position by pointing out that the ability to press home the counterattack to the opponent's homeland "presupposes a high military potential for offensive operations, inevitably producing an offensive threat to the other side." He observes that "such a power must always be suspected of aggressive intentions, regardless of its professed good faith." Finally, he argues that "the impossibility of winning a global nuclear war or a war between NATO and the WTO in Europe is an objective reality. Like the law of gravity, it can not be repealed." Therefore, he concludes that the United States does not have to accept the principle of

defensive sufficiency, because unilateral action does not place the Soviet Union at risk.⁴³

Clearly, there is a great degree of divergence among Soviet military and civilian defense experts on what the new doctrine means and what its implementation will entail for the Soviet armed forces. The wide ranging nature and relative openness of the debate is unique in Soviet history and may portend that significant changes are in the offing. But it may also turn out to be nothing more than overblown rhetoric with little substance. In order to rationally and objectively predict what the future holds, we must first examine what effect, if any, the new doctrine has had so far.

THE IMPACT OF NEW THINKING IN DEFENSE POLICY

There are a number of prominent western Sovietologists who argue that despite the new doctrine, there are few visible signs of real change in the Soviet armed forces. Edward Luttwak contends that "the intensity with which the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union have overseen the accumulation of military power, and still do, allows no other interpretation." He notes that in 1946, with the country devastated and the people desperately clamoring to fulfill basic needs such as food, shelter, and medical care, the regime rebuilt Transport Machine Plant Malyshev 75- a tank factory- and other armament production facilities on a priority basis. He maintains that throughout the post-war era "no other regime could have extracted the material and scientific resources from the economy that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union found for its military programs." Luttwak compares the percentage of gross national product (GNP) allocated for defense purposes by the United States and Western Europe relative to the Soviet Union and points out that western defense budgets have declined in real terms over the past five years, whereas Soviet production of new weaponry has continued unabated. He concludes that "the implacability of 1989 differs only slightly from that of 1946." He sees only a shift in emphasis- from quantity to quality- in a continuing program of military accumulation.⁴⁴

Steven Adragna argues that Soviet military doctrine can not evolve until it loses the ideological baggage of the past. He notes that at the basic political level, traditional Marxist-Leninist principles remain at the forefront of Soviet thinking in this area. The fundamental class

irreconcilability between capitalism and socialism still exists, as does the innately aggressive nature and intent of capitalist society. Adragna maintains that so far there has been no serious effort to discredit the historical theorem that any military action the Soviet Union takes is defensive in nature by definition and is therefore justified. Further, Adragna claims that the Kremlin's definition of "defensive" bears "almost no relation to what NATO means by the term." Quoting Akhromeyev, Yazov, and other senior military leaders, Adragna demonstrates that the Warsaw Pact's concept of "defensive orientation" includes the capability to "rout" the enemy by means of a massive counteroffensive, and does not rule out the possibility of pre-emption. Adragna also questions the conclusions of western defense analysts who perceive a shift away from the possible use of nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict. He asserts that Soviet writings have tended to blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional war since the Brezhnev era, and that current arguments about the increasing lethality of high technology weapons continue this trend. Adragna notes that the size of the Soviet armed forces has been cut before- in 1924, 1946, and the early 1960s- but that in each case after a few years "the armed forces emerged at a higher qualitative and quantitative level." He concludes that, from a military perspective, Gorbachev's unilateral cuts and force restructuring are simply a continuation of the force modernization process started in the mid 1980s designed to create more effective units by making them "smaller, more balanced, and more independent."⁴⁵

Edward Warner observes that a number of the basic planks in Gorbachev's platform of new defense thinking are borrowed from Leonid

Brezhnev's famous Tula speech, delivered in January 1977, and designed to coincide with President Carter's inauguration. Then too, the top man in the Kremlin proclaimed that his country's military doctrine was strictly defensive, that his country threatened no one, and that it would never be the first to initiate hostilities against any nation. Brezhnev vowed that the Soviet Union did not seek military superiority over the United States and NATO, only the achievement and maintenance of parity. In the wake of this landmark speech, various Soviet spokesmen went a step further, asserting that nuclear war was unwinnable and that once nuclear weapons were introduced into a conventional conflict, escalation could not be contained. Brezhnev followed through on this theme when he concluded the SALT II agreement with President Carter in 1979 and the Soviet Union made its no-first-use declaration unilaterally in May 1982. Warner notes the limited and rather hollow meaning of these declarations in light of subsequent events, and sees substantial continuity between the Brezhnev era and today in basic Soviet national security policy objectives and the strategies employed to achieve them.⁴⁶

Proponents of the continuity thesis advise us to draw a sharp distinction between rhetoric and reality. Until the practical meaning of the new defense doctrine becomes evident through reduced defense expenditures, decreased weapons production, and a less offensively oriented force structure, they caution us to view Gorbachev's proclamations with skepticism, and not to let western force modernization programs lapse. Certainly there is an advantage to this approach- changes in weapons production and deployment are visible and measureable, whereas changes in attitudes and intentions are not. Even a cursory examination of Soviet

defense spending and military equipment production trends over the past decade reveals consistent growth. There have been periods when the growth rate has paused (1980-1981) or slowed down (1981-1984), but so far it has always managed to return to its brisk pace of the 1970s, about 2% per year. During the Gorbachev era, this inexorable march has continued and even accelerated- since 1984, real growth in Soviet defense spending has increased to about 3% per annum.⁴⁷

The caution inherent in these arguments is not ill-advised. It is difficult to take Gorbachev at his word when one considers his actions. During the first six months of 1989, Soviet tank production surged to a rate of 350 per month, the highest since World War II. In the second half of the year, production gradually returned to its normal level of about 250 per month. This means that in the two years that it will take the Soviets to withdraw the 10,000 tanks that Gorbachev has promised, they will produce over 6000 new ones to take their place. Moreover, of the 10,000 tanks slated for withdrawal, destruction, or conversion to the civilian economy, only 5300 are "the most modern types."⁴⁸ Today the Soviet Union is pumping military assistance to its allies in Kabul at an annual rate of \$3 billion, a level that dwarfs U.S. provided assistance even at the height of the war.⁴⁹ This doesn't seem much like new thinking; nor does the sale of a dozen Su-24D Fencer deep interdiction fighters to Libya last April. With extended range fuel tanks, the 1300 kilometer combat radius of the Su-24D gives Libya the capability to strike targets in Israel, Chad, and Italy. It is not difficult to surmise that given Libya's low technological base, the likely munition of choice for a Fencer strike would be chemical weapons.⁵⁰

However, we should not allow the evidence of considerable continuity between present and past Soviet security policy to obscure the fact that significant change has occurred. Gorbachev has revived the moribund Soviet interest in arms control. Brezhnev was keen on detente as well, but Gorbachev has moved much more quickly, concluding three major agreements in four years.⁵¹ Perhaps more importantly, Gorbachev has expanded the nature of the domestic defense debate radically. First, he has enfranchised civilian defense specialists, allowing them to question conventional wisdom and recommend new policy options in an advisory capacity that formerly fell strictly under the purview of military professionals. Second, the discussion has gone public. Although a western audience would probably not be overly impressed with the amount of data being made available to the population at large, by Soviet standards, the discussion is positively wide open.

It would be a mistake to overrate the significance of these developments, however. So far, the most obvious effect of Gorbachev's new thinking in Soviet defense policy has been confusion. Like Khrushchev before him, Gorbachev has radically altered the parameters of what was previously a rather staid and stable policy formulation process. The rules of the game have changed, and no one is quite sure what the new rules are going to be. The rapid pace of change in Eastern Europe and the extreme volatility of the political situation in the non-Russian republics has only served to complicate matters even further. At present, the national security and defense policy-making environment can only be described as in a state of uncertainty and flux.

Some analysts argue that this confusion works to Gorbachev's advantage. By outlining the content of his new thinking in defense policy only in the broadest terms, he intentionally blurs the policy implications. The doctrine can be fleshed out gradually and incrementally at a later date, when the domestic and international political climate is more propitious.⁵² The assumption inherent in this argument is that Gorbachev can fill in the blank holes in his script when the situation suits him. I think that this implies a degree of flexibility uncharacteristic of any national security decision-making bureaucracy, let alone that of the Soviet Union. Further, it imparts greater personal power to unilaterally dictate policy to Gorbachev than he in fact possesses. Granted, the new Congress of People's Deputies represents an alternate locus of power which dilutes the authority of the Politburo and the traditional party organs. Granted, that by combining the post of general secretary and president, and by manipulating and restricting the number of individuals who hold seats in both the Supreme Soviet and the Central Committee, Gorbachev has amassed great power for himself and a small exclusive elite. But these events have not altered the fact that he still must rule by consensus. Even after four years of continuous purging, it appears that achieving consensus on issues of defense and national security remains a difficult and time-consuming process.⁵³

I tend to favor a theory advocated by Robert Gates, currently serving as deputy national security advisor to President Bush. He maintains that in the Soviet Union, open debate is not necessarily a healthy sign- it can just as easily be an indicator of policy disarray. He argues that vague proclamations and the encouragement of public policy

debate is often a sign of high-level confusion. When the leadership is divided or uncertain, it tolerates a wide range of conflicting views in search of answers. But when the leadership is agreed on a specific policy course, it makes that fact known, and all the various commentators fall into line and support the stated policy, with only minor deviations.⁵⁴

A recent study by the Soviet Security Studies Working Group (SSSWG), Center for International Studies (CIS) at MIT seems to confirm Gates' hypothesis. After examining some 70 articles by 40 individual authors, both civilian and military, on issues concerning the new defense doctrine, the study found an overwhelming consensus in support of Gorbachev's clearly articulated high-level political position on the need for conventional force reductions and restructuring to a posture of "reasonable sufficiency" and "defensive defense." However, as the debate moves away from the broad conceptual issues, the differences in opinion increase sharply, both in number and severity. The consensus shatters completely when less abstract and more concrete policy prescriptions are discussed and reviewed. Interestingly, the study also notes that while there is a "significant systematic divergence" between the views of civilian and military analysts, the divergence "is by no means uniform on all issues."⁵⁵ This evidence suggests that the military is not a monolithic player in support of, or in opposition to, certain proposals advanced by the political leadership. As an institution, it has organizational interests that it seeks to promote and defend. Therefore, it is not surprising that it has attempted to shape the debate in a manner that suits its needs (including subtle alterations of terminology, substituting "defensive sufficiency" for "reasonable sufficiency" to imply a higher level of military readiness; sufficient for actual defense

rather than simply sufficient for deterrence). Further, the broad outlines of these basic institutional interests and needs are not difficult to discern. However, it is important to keep in mind the dangers and pitfalls of referring to the Soviet military as a single entity. Clearly, it is a highly complex organism, and there are individual and intra-service rivalries to be considered as well simple disagreement, indecision and confusion about which policies make the most sense in the long run.

From a political perspective, the primary effect of Gorbachev's revision of Soviet defense doctrine has been to create uncertainty and confusion. Unfortunately, from a military perspective, no comparable loss of direction has occurred. Soviet force modernization programs have continued unabated, including the previously cited increase in tank production. The difference is that now these changes are presented to Soviet and western audiences as "defensive restructuring," a term designed to fall more softly on the ear. Specifically, the Soviets claim that they are in the process of effecting profound changes in three areas: doctrine, training and force structure.

Current Soviet war-fighting doctrine was heavily influenced by the ideas of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, chief of staff from 1977-1984. He advocated large-scale offensive operations using a combined arms approach to achieve decisive victory. He emphasized the need to be able to mobilize military resources quickly in a crisis, and to deploy overwhelming force immediately in the initial stages of a conflict. The objective was to bring about a conclusion on favorable terms as quickly

as possible to both limit casualties and to avoid combat on one's own territory- a painful experience from the Great Patriotic War that Ogarkov was determined not to repeat. Ogarkov was convinced that it was impossible to control nuclear escalation or to fight a "limited" nuclear war. This reinforced his conclusion that Soviet forces would have to win a war quickly, and do it conventionally. Ogarkov also felt that "both the conditions for the outbreak of modern warfare and the potential for waging it" had drastically changed. The advent of new, technologically advanced weaponry with increased range, accuracy and lethality meant that the destructive power of nuclear weapons could be approximated without the collateral effects, and that Soviet quantitative advantages in material could be negated or erased. This conclusion led Ogarkov to stress the importance of modern technology, and to forcefully advocate increased defense spending to insure that the Soviet Union did not fall behind in the competition to develop emerging technologies with military applications.⁵⁶

In September 1984, Ogarkov was replaced as chief of the general staff of the Soviet armed forces by Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev. Ogarkov's demotion could be viewed as the opening move in Gorbachev's drive to reorient military doctrine. Although not yet general secretary, it was probably fairly easy for him to form a consensus within the Politburo against Ogarkov, the man who had dominated Soviet military politics for over seven years. Ogarkov refused to compromise his beliefs, and more importantly, he was willing to openly disagree with the political leadership on issues of key importance in Soviet national security.⁵⁷

Today, the basic precepts of Ogarkov's war-fighting strategy live on. Perhaps by default in the absence of a more compelling view of modern war, but more likely because the ideas are militarily sound, and they ultimately make a lot of sense. A review of Soviet tactical manuals reveals no shift in orientation from the predominant emphasis on offensive operations.⁵⁸ Nor is there a major difference in the content of other military writings. Some analysts have opined that "although articles on conventional offense still predominate," there has been a recent trend towards "articles discussing the advantages of large-scale defensive conventional operations" in military journals.⁵⁹ It is true that professional military journals such as Voyenny Vestnik and Voyenno-Istoricheski Zhurnal often carry articles discussing defensive operations, but the view that this is something new reflects a lack of historical perspective. The regular appearance of defensively oriented articles in the Soviet military press predates Gorbachev by several years.⁶⁰ The increased attention devoted to defense started when the direction of Soviet military developments was firmly controlled by Marshal Ogarkov, and was the result of a number of convergent variables.

First and foremost, the rapid military build-up of the early Reagan years captured the rapt attention of the Soviet military. U.S. force modernization programs accelerated alarmingly, deploying new generations of more capable weapons systems such as the M-1 Abrams main battle tank, the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle and the Patriot air defense system in quantity across the Central European front. Even more disconcerting was the new doctrine that emerged along with the new equipment. American concepts such as AirLand Battle and Follow-on Forces Attack

(FOFA) envisioned a highly fluid battlefield characterized by no clearly discernable unit boundaries. The new doctrine called for bold offensive thrusts into the enemy rear and deep strikes against second echelon and follow-on forces. The concept clearly implied a significantly less static NATO defensive posture, and forced the Soviet high command to reevaluate its war plans. What it found was that inadequate attention had been paid to defensive operations in doctrine and training.

Second, the gnawing fear that western technological superiority could render Soviet and Warsaw Pact numerical superiority meaningless in a future conflict began to manifest itself in a measureable way. The rout of Syrian forces in Lebanon in 1982 threw gasoline on the smoldering fire of Soviet doubts about the ability of Soviet bloc manufactured equipment to compete on an equal basis with arms manufactured in the West. Despite Israel's reputation for regularly defeating client states equipped with Soviet weapons, this setback was particularly damaging to the prestige and reputation of Soviet arms because the Syrians had been equipped with large quantities of first line Soviet weaponry. Nine brand new T-72 tanks were killed by basic TOW rounds of early 1970s vintage,⁶¹ a combat result which coupled with the successful use of "Blazer" explosive armor by the Israelis no doubt strongly influenced the Soviet decision to develop and deploy reactive armor.⁶² An even bigger disaster was the total collapse of the Syrian air defense network. In a single day, the Israelis knocked out 16 Soviet-made anti-aircraft missile batteries, and then proceeded to rack up a kill ratio of 35 to 0 in air-to-air combat against the Syrian air force.⁶³ There is little doubt that the decisive technological superiority displayed by the Israelis made a distinct

impression on the Soviet high command. After the conflict in Lebanon, they embarked on a comprehensive program to reorganize and modernize the Soviet and Warsaw Pact air defense network in Europe, and they redoubled their efforts to field a new generation of air interdiction and air superiority fighters: the Su-27 Flanker, the Mig-29 Fulcrum, and the Mig-31 Foxhound. Soviet concern about the impact of emerging technology on the modern battlefield is reflected in the increased attention devoted to "precision weapons" in the military press which began in the aftermath of the Lebanon debacle and continues unabated today.⁶⁴

Third, the changing international environment led the senior military leadership to question some of its basic assumptions about future conflict with the United States and NATO. Given the shift in western attitudes and the marked improvement in western offensive capabilities, it no longer seemed reasonable or prudent to assume that the Soviet Union would be able to dictate the time and place of a future war, nor would it be able to confine hostilities to NATO territory. In particular, the United States Navy's new "maritime strategy" threatened horizontal escalation and strikes against the Soviet homeland should war break out in Europe.⁶⁵ Obviously, significant portions of national defense capability would have to be allocated to meet these new threats, and assets earmarked for defense could not be utilized in an offensive capacity until these threats were effectively neutralized.

The increased emphasis on defensive operations grew out of a pragmatic reassessment of the military situation. The senior military leadership realized that defensive operations had been neglected, and

took steps to remedy the situation long before Gorbachev became general secretary. However, this reassessment did not involve a shift away from the predominant emphasis on the offensive. It simply represented a reaffirmation of the principle that defense is at times a necessary condition to buy time, hold terrain or wear down the enemy prior to resuming the offensive. Defensive operations are elevated, but not at the expense of offensive operations. In essence, what this process reveals is the emergence of a more balanced strategy, which has little or nothing to do with "reasonable sufficiency" and "defensive defense." I suspect that when the Soviets are done rewriting their tactical training manuals, this fundamental distinction will become self-evident.

The second major area allegedly undergoing great change is training. The Soviets now claim "that the principal task of exercises is developing elements of the defensive doctrine of our armed forces." They have launched an impressive media campaign to reinforce the twin themes of the increasingly defensive nature of military maneuvers and the Soviet Union's strict observance of the provisions of the Stockholm accords for the consumption of their domestic audience.⁶⁶ Similarly, they have taken great pains to demonstrate to foreign observers the new defensive character of Soviet military training. Exercises staged for Admiral Crowe outside Minsk in June clearly demonstrated that the defending forces were the "home team" when they absorbed an enemy attack and then counter-attacked solely to reestablish the original line of defense.⁶⁷

It is important to note, however, that this training format is not a novel concept. At least since the massive 1967 Dnepr river exercises,

the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies have followed a standard scenario in training. It involves an initial period of defensive operations designed to slow and eventually halt a NATO invasion. Once the front has stabilized, the retributive forces of socialism are unleashed in a decisive counteroffensive which expels the aggressor from friendly territory and then achieves the utter destruction of his capability to resist.⁶⁸ What is new is the Soviet effort to exude restraint, rather than display strength. In an interview with the French magazine *Le Figaro*, Marshal Akhromeyev states "we are planning for long defensive operations to repel a possible aggression, if it proves impossible to end the aggression by political means. Then, only after around 3 or 4 weeks, we might launch a counterattack."⁶⁹ Clearly, the Soviets wish to project the image that they will resort to offensive operations only as a last resort, and that their counterattack will be limited in scope and objective to restoring the status quo. Unfortunately, how this differs from traditional Soviet military training is largely a matter of style over substance. Actual maneuvers conducted on the ground continue to follow the same script they have used for two decades. The primary difference is that now the notional framework built up around them has been altered to assuage the fears of western observers and to convince the Soviet populace of the defensive nature of its armed forces.

Force structure is the third area in which the Soviets claim to have implemented significant change. In the August issue of Kommunist vooruzhennikh sil, General of the Army Yazov responds to a question about what has changed in the armed forces during the years of perestroika by

flatly stating that "the structure of the armed forces has changed substantially."⁷⁰ If Yazov is referring to ongoing force expansion, modernization and reorganization programs, then he is undoubtedly correct. Soviet motorized rifle units have been reorganized during the 1980s to accommodate the deployment of the AGS-17 grenade launcher and the 82mm Vasilok mortar. Two new generations of armored personnel carrier (APC) have been fielded, the BTR-70 and BTR-80, as well as a new infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), the BMP 2. Motorized rifle division holdings of APC/IFVs has increased 44% since 1976, and divisional personnel strength has grown 12% over the same period. Tank divisions have increased their holdings of APC/IFVs 73% since 1976, and have fielded two new generations of main battle tank- the T-64B in 2nd Guards Army, 3rd Shock Army and 20th Guards Army, and the T-80 in 8th Guards Army and 1st Guards Tank Army. Artillery battalions have been expanded from 18 to 24 guns, and towed howitzers have been replaced by the self-propelled 122mm 2S1 and the 152mm 2S3. Artillery holdings above division level have been significantly expanded and qualitatively improved through the introduction of new weapons systems such as the 240mm 2S4 mortar, 152mm 2S5 gun, 203mm 2S7 gun and the 220mm BM-27 multiple rocket launcher. Tactical air defense has been extensively reorganized, and new systems such as the regimental 2S6 combination air defense gun and missile launcher have been introduced. In each branch and at every level of the Soviet armed forces, an aggressive modernization effort has been sustained for well over a decade. New weapons systems continue to be fielded at a brisk pace, and new organizations are created to accomodate them. The list goes on and on, covering all aspects of the Soviet armed forces.⁷¹

Cynical analysts can be forgiven if they are not overly impressed with the results of defensive restructuring so far. But General of the Army Yazov has also outlined some specific plans for the restructuring of Soviet ground forces in the future:

Tank regiments will be removed from the motorized rifle divisions of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the Central Group of Forces. They will be left only with motorized rifle regiments, and the number of tanks will be reduced by 40 percent. The number of tanks in tank divisions will be reduced by more than 20 percent as a result of removing from them one tank regiment. In the reorganized divisions there will be an increase in the number of anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, equipment for creating obstacles and laying minefields and also engineer position camouflage equipment. As a result, these formations will acquire a qualitatively different structure- namely, a defensive one.⁷²

While a significant reduction in the number of tanks is a welcome development from a western perspective, it does not intrinsically portend a shift to a purely defensive posture. The fact remains that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to design forces which are undeniably defensive.

In the first place, it is extremely difficult to classify specific weapons systems as "offensive" or "defensive." Handguns are innately dangerous, but their defensive or offensive character is determined by how they are wielded and by whom- the local police or a drug dealing gang member. Similarly, the employment of individual weapons systems is the defining variable in determining whether they are offensive or defensive. It is not particularly useful to consider the offensive or defensive character of a particular weapons system in isolation because most weapons systems are not employed as a single entity- they tend to perform their combat function as part of a unit mix designed to maximize the strengths and minimize the vulnerabilities of each weapons system. Therefore, to

argue that "it is possible to make rough judgments about the relative offensiveness of different weapons"⁷³ reveals a state of limited familiarity with common employment patterns of military hardware.

Despite the currently stylish consensus against them, tanks are the heart of any successful conventional defense. The best defense against a tank remains another tank, and without an armor heavy mobile strike force in reserve to counter enemy penetrations and prevent the enemy from exploiting his success, the integrity of the defense can not be maintained. In short, when facing an armored opponent, a defense without countervailing armor is likely to be outmaneuvered and defeated in short order.⁷⁴ Attempts to classify specific aircraft run into even greater difficulties. The Soviets wish to exclude their substantial holdings of air defense interceptor aircraft from consideration in the Vienna negotiations on the grounds that they are purely defensive in nature. This claim focuses on only one function (defending one's airspace) and conveniently ignores at least two other primary missions for these aircraft. The first is to perform escort duty for the ground attack aircraft, protecting them against the enemy's fighter interceptors. The second is to attain air superiority. Command of the sky achieves greater freedom of maneuver for friendly ground forces and paves the way for strike aviation to pound the enemy mercilessly from above.

Second, military history is cluttered with examples which clearly demonstrate the marked inferiority of a purely defensive strategy. To be effective in modern combat, military forces must be highly mobile. But forces which are mobile and have the capability to launch a credible

counteroffensive by definition will also have substantial offensive capability. Certainly one can not expect to ensure the reliable defense of the homeland without the ability to carry the attack to the enemy, destroy his formations, and expel him from Soviet or Warsaw Pact territory. The seminal event in Soviet post-war national security policy thinking remains the German invasion in June 1941. The brutal years of intense suffering during the Great Patriotic War have been indelibly seared into the collective memory of the Soviet people, and it is unreasonable to assume that they can realistically adopt a military posture which is actually purely defensive in nature.

What is more likely to occur is the implementation of a compromise solution between the political leadership and the military high command. General of the Army Yazov's comments reveal a hybrid approach designed to satisfy both the military's desire for a more effective and balanced force structure, and Gorbachev's desire for significant reductions in conventional forces.

During the Second World War, the Soviets employed tank pure formations against the Germans, primarily because infantry and artillery units could not keep pace with the advancing armor. The shortcomings of this structure became evident during assaults on prepared, in-depth German defensive positions, as the tank units lacked organic infantry and artillery to suppress anti-tank fire, and they suffered severe casualties as a result. This problem was resolved with the advent of the BMP infantry fighting vehicle in 1967 and the introduction of self-propelled divisional artillery (2S1 and 2S3) in 1972. This allowed the Soviets to adopt a

combined arms structure. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, tank units grew larger, primarily through the addition of more organic infantry and artillery. In September 1981, the largest joint military exercises in over ten years (since Dvina 70 and Yug 71) were conducted in the northern Belorussian and Baltic military districts. The expressly stated purpose of ZAPAD 81 was "to test new concepts and methods of Soviet military science and military art." The conduct of the exercise made it fairly obvious that one of the primary goals was to determine the ideal force structure for the Operational Maneuver Group (OMG).⁷⁵ Some analysts have offered the hypothesis that what began as a search for the optimum organization for an OMG has now produced a blueprint for a more efficient force mix for the entire Soviet Army.⁷⁶

It seems reasonable to postulate that the lessons of ZAPAD 81 and Lebanon 82 coupled with the official appearance of AirLand Battle doctrine in the U.S. Army's 1982 version of FM 100-5 "Operations" led Marshal Ogarkov and the senior Soviet military leadership to conclude that their forces were excessively tailored for offensive operations. It was apparent that the future battlefield would require more balanced and flexible forces capable of switching rapidly back and forth from offensive to defensive operations as the situation dictates.

Currently Soviet combined arms units are structured on the 3 to 1 principle. For instance, a motorized rifle regiment (MRR) contains three motorized rifle battalions and one tank battalion. In equipment, this equates to 120 APCs or 111 IFVs and 40 tanks per regiment. Tank regiments (TR) are organized in the same way, with three tank battalions and one

motorized rifle battalion. The trend in the 1980s has been to put more infantry in the tank regiment, first by upgrading its organic motorized rifle company to battalion size, and then by expanding the battalion from 31 to 39 IFVs. At present each tank regiment has 94 tanks and 39 IFVs. At divisional level, the 3 to 1 structure is retained. There are 3 MRRs and a TR in a motorized rifle division. The elimination of one TR would represent a 42.7% reduction in divisional tank assets (94 from 220) and leave the remaining three MRRs to be restructured in an unspecified manner with additional anti-tank and anti-aircraft assets. General Yazov's figures apparently do not take into account the independent tank battalion (51 tanks) which is organic to most Soviet motorized rifle divisions deployed in Central Europe. In tank divisions, there are 3 TRs and 1 MRR, so the removal of one TR and its replacement by a MRR would alter the current force ratio to a more balanced 2 and 2 structure. In equipment, the ratio would shift from 330 tanks and 228 IFVs to 260 tanks and 336 IFVs.⁷⁷

When one weighs all the evidence, it is obvious that the reorganization announced by General Yazov in February is simply a continuation of a process initiated several years ago by the Soviet military to achieve more effective combat formations through a more balanced and versatile force structure. The question is to what degree Gorbachev has influenced the process. Certainly the reorganization is being exploited to achieve maximum political advantage.⁷⁸ But of greater importance is the manner in which the restructuring is executed. The withdrawal of 6 Soviet tank divisions from Central Europe accounts for 1728 tanks.⁷⁹ The elimination of a tank regiment from the remaining 24 divisions accounts for an

additional 2256 tanks, and the conversion of the independent tank regiments organic to each of the five Soviet armies in WGF to independent motorized rifle regiments accounts for another 750 tanks. This results in a total of 4734, somewhat short of the 5300 figure cited for first line battle tanks. However, if the 34 other divisions in the Western Theater of Military Operations (TVD) are reorganized in the same manner, this would produce an additional 3196 excess tanks, for a grand total of 7930. The resulting surplus of over 2500 tanks helps explain the comments of General of the Army Lobov, who was quoted as saying that the reductions would essentially serve to consolidate Soviet forces in the western military districts and Eastern Europe. He noted that a number of divisions in the region were not at full strength and that the reorganization process would allow reconstitution of undermanned and underequipped units. The end result would be fewer but more powerful divisions, manned and equipped at full authorization levels. Colonel General Omelichev reaffirmed the notion that the troop reductions and restructuring would enhance, rather than diminish Soviet military capability by confirming that equipment from disbanded and reorganized units would be transferred to other units. He stated "in view of the troops' inadequate supply of this equipment... it will be channeled into topping off district and group of forces supplies of such equipment."⁸⁰

From this analysis, it appears that Gorbachev will not have to disingenuously skew the reductions by withdrawing only older model tanks or those in depot storage. He can keep his word to the West and not degrade Soviet defense capability. Although the military undoubtedly would have preferred to keep the 5300 first line tanks and to conduct with-

drawals on a bilateral basis, it seems that it also recognized the need for reorganizing its bloated force structure into something more streamlined and efficient. In the end, it is likely that Gorbachev was able to achieve consensus for his unilateral reductions because they cut fat, and not bone. The military demanded and got increased production of new model tanks as well as a leaner but meaner force structure of fully equipped divisions for its acquiescence in the bargain.

CONCLUSION

Given the uncertainty and flux characteristic of the current Soviet defense doctrinal debate, it seems premature to pass judgment on the process at this juncture. One can certainly examine events as they have unfolded over the past few years to discern general patterns of change or continuity in Soviet national security policy. And one can closely monitor the pulse of new developments as they occur to determine the current status and direction of the defense agenda. But attempting to predict where this process will lead the Soviet Union in the next three to five years is risky business, as presently no one, including the senior Soviet political and military leadership, has a clear idea of where they are going and how they are going to get there.⁸¹

While the changes thus far are significant, they are more conceptual than concrete and they remain ultimately reversible. There is a big difference between announcing a completed defense budget to Congress and submitting a proposed draft defense budget for open debate, formulation and approval within the Congress. For all the talk about restructuring and "defensive defense," the Soviet armed forces remain the largest military organization in the world, and still present a formidable threat, at least in terms of sheer numbers of manpower and equipment.

Clearly, there has been a shift in emphasis from quantity to quality. Despite the sometimes rancorous debate about other aspects of defense and national security policy, it seems as if there is substantial congruence on this point between the political leadership and the military

hierarchy. The General Staff would probably prefer to have both quantity and quality, but Gorbachev has convinced them that this is not possible under the present circumstances. Therefore, a compromise has been brokered. By restructuring the armed forces, the political leadership saves money and resources which can be reallocated to other sectors of the economy. The military comes away with a smaller but more manageable and efficient force structure which enhances the nation's defense capability. Moreover, an improved international climate increases access to western capital, production techniques and technology which benefits both the civilian and military components of the Soviet economy.⁸²

Gorbachev's new thinking in defense policy theoretically promises to revolutionize the art of war, but it is highly unlikely that it will have any significant or lasting effects at the tactical or operational level (up to army and front). From a Soviet perspective, it would probably be undesirable for the new doctrine to alter what is already an immensely powerful and intrinsically sound defense posture. However, at the strategic level of consideration, political decisions can be made in the context of military doctrine which affect the substance of military art. For instance, deliberately limiting the objective and constraining the execution of a strategic counteroffensive to restoring the ante-bellum status quo.

Unfortunately, such a shift in strategic vision is unverifiable until it is matched by concrete and measureable actions such as reductions in defense expenditures, decreased weapons production and movement towards less offensively structured and deployed forces. Many in the West are

hopeful that Gorbachev's rhetoric will become the new reality, but thus far the evidence has been contradictory and somewhat less than compelling. In sum, the jury is still out. Gorbachev has indicated that a two year period will be required to complete his phased troop withdrawals, not an unreasonable amount of time to deactivate the number of personnel and amount of equipment that he has specified. But two years is also not an unreasonable amount of time for the West to spend watching and waiting, to determine the end result of his unilateral reductions and to get a better grip on the direction of the Soviet doctrinal debate and its impact on the armed forces and their capability to fight. Unfortunately, the swift onrush of events in Eastern Europe and the non-Russian republics has accelerated the timetable for controlled evolution substantially. Both sides must make critical decisions now which will affect force structure and defense spending for years to come. These issues will be addressed at greater length in chapters three and four.

CHAPTER THREE

CONVERSION FROM AN ARMAMENT ECONOMY TO A DISARMAMENT ECONOMY

CONVERSION FROM AN ARMAMENT ECONOMY TO A DISARMAMENT ECONOMY

In the years following Lenin's death in 1924, a spirited and sometimes rancorous debate developed over the future of the first socialist state. To a large degree, this debate reflected the internal power struggle within the Politburo. But in scope, it far exceeded mere factionalism, as the battleground was ideology, and not just policy. The victor would be able to define socialism and determine the fundamental nature of the Soviet state and society for decades, if not permanently.

The compromise of the New Economic Policy (NEP) had enabled the fledgling Bolshevik regime to survive the economic crisis of 1920-1921, but the results were dissatisfying, both ideologically and practically. Agricultural production figures had recovered rapidly from the catastrophic famine levels of 1920-1921, but remained below pre-war levels. Similarly, industrial output rebounded from the freefall experienced during the years of War Communism (1917-1921), but with undesirable side effects such as inflation, unemployment, and the emergence of a new capitalist class, the Nepmen.¹

By 1928, a decade of agricultural failures had induced a new grain procurement crisis which threatened not only the process of industrialization and the success of the first five year plan, but the future of socialism itself. Concurrently, 1928 marked the year in which Stalin managed to achieve ascendancy in the leadership hierarchy. Stalin was

convinced that industrialization had to be accomplished quickly and at any price. He argued that "one feature of the history of old Russia is the continual beatings she suffered because of her backwardness" and asserted that there was no alternative to his radical solution- "either we do it, or we shall be crushed."² Stalin's will was indomitable, and the Soviet Union industrialized at breakneck speed. The development of heavy industry and military production capability received top priority, and a vast centralized bureaucracy was formed to manage it.

Thus, the Stalinist model of a centrally planned and controlled economy was born. Despite modest tinkering over the years by his successors, the legacy he bequeathed to the nation has endured to this day fundamentally intact. It is the mindless and wasteful inefficiency that characterizes this system, as well as the finely honed sense of self-interest and self-preservation of its managing bureaucracy that Gorbachev wants so desperately to reform.³

For more than two decades after Stalin's death, the tension inherent between the traditional priorities of investing heavily in heavy industry and defense and the need to expand the consumer sector remained relatively muted. As long as the overall growth rate of the economy remained sufficiently high, both needs could be met. From 1951 to 1970, the Soviet economy grew at an average annual rate of 5.4%, more than enough to ensure adequate growth in both the military and civilian sectors of the economy. But in the early 1970s, the growth rate began to decline significantly, to an average of 3.7% per annum during the period 1971-1975, and to 2.7% per annum from 1976-1980.⁴ Naturally, the trend towards increasingly scarce

economic resources created severe budgetary pressures. Clearly, something had to give and the annual growth rate in military spending declined accordingly, from 3% per annum from 1966-1976, to about 2% thereafter.⁵

During the Gorbachev era, the rate of real growth in defense spending has been restored to its previous level of about 3% per annum. The increase took effect in 1986 and may have been indicative of the internal Kremlin power struggle at the time. Moreover, Soviet GNP grew a robust 4.2% that year, so the increase in defense spending seemed to be economically justified as well.⁶ However, in 1987 and 1988, the Soviet economy slumped badly, growing at a sluggish annual rate of 1.5% each year.⁷

From a purely economic standpoint, it would appear that the rate of growth in Soviet defense spending should have decreased significantly over the past two years in accordance with the drop in GNP growth rates. Gorbachev has claimed that this is the case, asserting that the level of defense spending has been frozen since 1987.⁸ However, there is no evidence to support this claim. The CIA and the British Ministry of Defense both estimate that Soviet defense spending has continued to grow at an annual rate of about 3% the past two years. Moreover, Gorbachev has given us no reason to accept his figures at face value. Today there is broad consensus among independent research institutes, civilian defense analysts, and western intelligence agencies that Gorbachev's official figures on defense spending are significantly understated. Even Soviet sources have questioned the veracity of the budget data.⁹

Despite the fact that Gorbachev is either unwilling or unable to shoot straight when it comes to announcing figures on Soviet defense expenditures, I think that the West should take him seriously when he says that one of his primary goals is "making the transition from an armaments economy to a disarmament economy."¹⁰ At least since 1987, he has recognized that the burden of defense spending represents "a load on the economy... because it diverts enormous resources that could be redirected" elsewhere.¹¹ Certainly, the announced unilateral reduction of 500,000 soldiers and 10,000 tanks is more than just a token gesture of goodwill. These numbers are militarily significant. They comprise a force which is greater than the total active assets of the entire U.S. 7th Army currently deployed in Central Europe. Obviously the withdrawal has also produced substantial political dividends, most notably in West Germany. But in this case, the military and political ramifications are subordinate to the economic aspect. Gorbachev intends to divert the resources saved to the civilian sector of the economy. He hopes that the infusion of capital will stimulate growth, particularly in the moribund consumer goods sector.

This leaves us with the question of why Gorbachev is pursuing a policy which provides for 3% annual real growth in defense spending while a massive reduction of the armed forces is ongoing with the primary goal of reducing such expenditures. In the past, various analysts have attempted to explain the irregular fluctuations in Soviet defense outlays by arguing that the procurement cycle for individual weapons systems often dictates increased or decreased expenditures.¹² While there is an element of truth to this thesis, I find it inadequate by itself to explain why the increase in defense spending would remain constant over a three

year period. I think the apparent contradiction in Gorbachev's actions is best explained by looking at two interrelated factors.

First, the defense procurement cycle is characterized by long lead times and institutional inertia. The average amount of time required for a given weapons system to progress from research and development to serial production is usually 10 to 15 years. Ongoing Soviet weapons projects represent an enormous sunk cost. A decision to terminate these programs would probably not result in significant savings in the near term and may irreparably damage national security. In addition, Gorbachev is not unaware of the harm done to other sectors of society when arbitrary changes are made in a planned economy- the sudden diversion of resources often entails negative consequences. This is why the ongoing formulation of economic targets in the 13th five year plan (FYP) is crucial. The defense spending outlays specified in this document will largely determine the structure and capability of the Soviet armed forces during the period 1991-1995. So far Gorbachev has not revealed an inclination to terminate weapons programs. Rather, the evidence suggests that he remains committed to a strong investment policy. He seems to prefer scaling back the production of developed weapons, particularly those of older vintage, while maintaining the pace of research and development of enhanced capability follow-on weapons systems.¹³

Second and perhaps more important is the internal dynamic of the power struggle within the national security elite, which we have examined at some length in chapter one. It appears that a compromise solution has been brokered. In order to gain acquiescence for his proposed cuts in

ground forces, Gorbachev had to pledge an accelerated rate of modernization. As a result, there would be fewer units fielded, but they would all be fully manned and equipped with the latest generation of sophisticated weaponry. This way the size of the armed forces could be reduced without adversely affecting combat capability.

Gorbachev's strategy to revitalize the Soviet economy by reducing the burden of defense consists of two separate but related components; each of which we shall consider in turn. First and foremost is the effort to decrease the proportion of revenue allocated to national security within the state budget and to divert this revenue to other sectors of the national economy. Second is the attempt to convert military production capacity to civilian use thereby stimulating economic growth and alleviating the consumer goods shortage.

CUTTING THE DEFENSE BUDGET

At first glance, it would seem logical to assume that substantial savings would result from Gorbachev's unilateral forces cuts, and that this would provide almost immediate budgetary relief. However, I believe that the promise of significant savings will prove illusory, for a variety of reasons. In the first place, Gorbachev has been forced to mortgage the endeavor heavily by maintaining a constant flow of defense rubles into the modernization effort while he simultaneously reduces troop strength. This set of circumstances can not help but adversely impact the rate of return he derives from the investment, especially over the short term of the next 18 to 24 months, when it is most important that his program yield positive results.¹⁴

Second, the Disneyland nature of Soviet cost accounting procedures will make it difficult to ascertain precisely how much money is being saved and exactly where it is going. The unit price of an individual item of military equipment has traditionally been determined by bureaucratic fiat, and bears little relation to the sum total of labor or material resources required to produce the item. As more and more factories shift over to khozraschyot, or self cost accounting, these hidden distortions are becoming clearly evident. For instance, the plant manager of the Saratov aircraft factory has complained that the Ministry of Civil Aviation purchases the YAK-42 fighter that his plant produces "at a price which is barely half its production cost."¹⁵ Similarly, the true cost of

maintaining military forces on active status is an unknown quantity. Various ministries, and especially the ministry of defense, have been using creative accounting techniques to understate the costs for so long, that the figures being used as a computational basis today have lost all relevance. Until there is a major overhaul of the extant pricing system for the labor, supplies, and services that go into the manufacture and maintenance of Soviet military hardware, it will be impossible to reliably gauge the amount of defense rubles being saved by the force reductions. Clearly, intuition is an inadequate yardstick for measuring economic progress. One hopes that there are more reliable classified figures available to Gorbachev within his inner sanctum in the Kremlin.

Third, there is a considerable degree of uncertainty involved in the premise that any government is capable of returning unused revenues to the people, or of utilizing unspent defense monies in a prudent and useful manner. The U.S. defense budget is illustrative in this regard. If we juxtapose the inflation adjusted 12% real decline in U.S. defense spending over the last four years with the defense spending frenzy that characterized the early Reagan era, we should expect to find a substantial "peace dividend" of unallocated funds. But in fact, there is no such revenue reservoir available, because the monies were simply absorbed into other budget programs. Moreover, there is considerable historical precedent which suggests that there is little reason to expect that the U.S. Congress will demonstrate greater fiscal restraint in disposing of the forthcoming peace dividend resulting from a conventional arms reduction treaty.

Another problem was highlighted recently by Defense Secretary Dick Cheney when he criticized the House of Representatives for restoring funding to the F-14 Tomcat fighter and the V-22 Osprey tilt-wing rotor aircraft. He said the House "has diverted your tax money away from critically important strategic programs and voted to spend it instead to protect jobs in selected home districts." He argued passionately and correctly that opponents of the B-2 bomber "do not plan to return the unspent money to the taxpayers." Instead "they plan to spend it on other projects- so the real issue is not cost but whether the B-2 is worth more than the pork barrel."¹⁶

In the Soviet Union, the evidence strongly suggests that similar forces are at work, and have been involved in shaping fiscal policy for decades. Traditionally, the Soviet version of pork barrel politics has been personal graft and corruption. The scope of the problem is revealed by the case of Yuri Churbanov, Brezhnev's son-in-law. As USSR Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Churbanov accepted gifts and bribes totaling at least 90,960 rubles from senior officials in the Uzbekistan Ministry of Internal Affairs. Together they colluded to falsify cotton crop production figures and defrauded the government out of millions of rubles. Gorbachev used the Churbanov indictment to demonstrate the seriousness and success of his campaign to weed out high level corruption. But the show trial of the 1980s was a bust. Beyond the titilating appeal of watching a Brezhnev intimate receive a sentence of 12 years "deprivation of freedom," the anti-corruption campaign appears to have had little impact on the Party privilege and perquisite system, and the public remains unconvinced.¹⁷

But the drain of resources does not stop here. In addition to the mass diversion of state funds and property for personal use, there is the gross inefficiency of the centralized ministries which debilitates the Soviet economy to an astounding degree. Economist Otto Latsis calls this process "the squandering of the state." He contends that "even when something needed is being built, it is built on a larger scale than we can afford. As a result, the construction of a plant remains uncompleted. The money was invested, but there is no return." Latsis notes that the scale of expenditures is huge. For instance, since 1970 the Ministry of Land Improvement and Water Conservation (Minvodkhoz) has spent 130 billion rubles, and it is only one of 50 such departments. He points out that ministries such as Minvodkhoz "do not build under cost accounting orders. It is interesting in that it itself builds and it itself pays to itself." Latsis singles out the estimated 41 billion ruble cost of the Tyumen gas and petrochemical complex as an example of a project "beyond our strength in total volume," and adds "there is no need to convince me that a Mercedes is better than a bicycle- I don't have the money for a Mercedes." Quoting from the current five year plan, he notes that the projected state budget deficit for 1989 is in excess of 100 billion rubles, and he lays the blame squarely on the ministries. He concludes by saying "they are all capable of understanding everything perfectly well. The matter is in the interests, group interests. They are so slow-witted because it is profitable for them not to understand."¹⁸

Latsis is not alone in his assessment of the ministries' managerial performance. Yegor Gaidar wrote in the February issue of Kommunist that in the sphere of capital construction "last year one third of highly impor-

tant facilities on the state order itemized list were not commissioned. The volume of above norm unfinished construction grew by more than 5 billion rubles." Further, he noted that "the value of unutilized facilities in 1988 reached 24.2 billion rubles. But the construction of new production facilities worth 59.1 billion rubles began in the same year." Gaidar reveals that in the chemical and timber complex alone there are 211 facilities that were commissioned between 1981 and 1987 that "still have not reached rated capacity" and 170 others which "are not being fully utilized." He concludes with a plea for action- "we have acknowledged our lack of skill in spending money and the fact that many major investment projects have not yielded a return. It is time, it seems, to sort things out."¹⁹

In the May issue of Kommunist, a group of ministry officials responded to the criticism. In particular they defended the cost effectiveness of the gas and petrochemical complex at Tyumen, citing the merits of the project and claiming that it will generate substantial hard currency profits as well as produce vast quantities of fuel and energy, without adversely affecting the environment. The editors of Kommunist use this argument as a strawman to launch into a scathing examination of the ministries involved. They point out that in the last 15 years, the Ministry of Petroleum Refining and Petrochemicals has failed to commit more than half the funds allocated for its use, and that there is an average lag of more than 5 years in normative construction time between the date when projects are scheduled to be completed and when they are actually commissioned. They cite the Omutninsk chemical plant as an example- work began in 1961 and still has not been completed. They note

that in 1983-1985, the ministry spent 36.1 million foreign exchange rubles for West German equipment to repair the Urengoi-Uzhgorod pipeline. The warranty expired in May 1987, and so far work has begun on only one of four planned central repair work stations. Similarly, in 1982-1984 French gas cooling stations were purchased for 183 million foreign exchange rubles. The warranty expired in August 1987, and to date none of them have been installed.²⁰

The debate over the construction of the Tyumen gas and petrochemical complex came to a head in early November and required the personal intervention of Gorbachev to arrive at a compromise solution. Of the five plants originally slated for simultaneous construction, now only three will be built. Construction on the Urengoi plant is already underway, and Gorbachev's decision was to "speed work" on this project. The start date for construction of the plants at Tobol and Surgut will be deferred until 1991. According to the Minister of Petrochemicals, N.V. Lemayev, this will entail a cost of only 5.5 billion rubles during the 13th FYP instead of the 41 billion rubles originally proposed. Gorbachev approved the project with the understanding that these two plants will recover their costs in 6 to 7 years.²¹

Clearly, it is going to be difficult for Gorbachev to reap any real benefit from the savings he realizes through military cuts. The centralized bureaucracy is so inefficient that vast sums of money will be wasted no matter where he allocates the funds. This summer premier Nikolai Ryzhkov announced a new plan to streamline the government, reducing the number of ministries by half, to 57, and replacing "practically one out of

every three" ministers. However, this is attacking the symptom, not the disease.²² This effort reflects traditional Soviet thinking in that it seeks to expand organizational boundaries by consolidating enterprises and research institutes into enormous complexes. The ministries that remain become lumberingly large and wield still more power and influence, but are no more capable of providing effective administration than their predecessors. Past reorganizations have not improved managerial efficiency, and it is unlikely that this one will either.²³

Further, the recent relatively free election of district representatives to the newly created Congress of People's Deputies will only exacerbate the problem. As political instincts mature, certain individual deputies will gain stature and power. The more democratic the election process, the more responsive to local voters the deputies must be, and the greater the mandate to attempt to redirect as much state funding as possible to worthy projects in home districts.

Finally, there are the hidden costs of disarmament to consider. Unit deactivation costs money. Transportation charges for rail shipment of tanks and other tracked vehicles will require off budget funding. Similarly, monies must be allocated to cover the fuel and maintenance cost of road marching columns of wheeled vehicles hundreds of kilometers across Eastern Europe. Once the equipment is back in the Soviet Union, it must be transhipped to collection points and prepared for either destruction or conversion for use in the civilian sector. Obviously, the initial value of savings derived from unit deactivation is significantly eroded by the start-up costs of implementation.²⁴

In addition to the ongoing expense incurred by transporting and collecting large quantities of military equipment from all over Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, there are the much greater costs associated with equipment disposition which must be considered. For instance, what will be done with the 30,000 to 35,000 excess tanks that will be generated by a CFE agreement? All of the destruction procedures currently under consideration for inclusion in a conventional arms reduction treaty are tremendously expensive. One study estimates that over 350 manhours may be required to destroy a single tank.²⁵ An alternative solution is converting the tanks to peaceful use. The Soviet media have been rather prolific in extolling the potential virtues of this approach. However, the harsh reality of practical experience is already undermining these roseate claims. First, it has been discovered that tanks perform poorly as civilian prime movers. As one plant manager put it "a tank is intended for powerful swift actions. When its engine operates at lower regimes, its service life is short and when it is exhausted endless overhauls, preventive maintenance, repairs, and a search for spare parts will begin... it will cost you more in the long run." Second, the tank conversion process has proven to be quite costly. Plant manager G.V. Zadykhailo estimates the cost at 25,000 to 70,000 rubles per tank, depending on the model and type of conversion. This figure represents more than a quarter of the original cost of the tank. He does not quote a selling price for these converted prime movers, but notes that he has very few orders and offers "if there are persons interested, they are welcomed here."²⁶

An analogous situation may have developed concerning the ongoing destruction of intermediate range nuclear missiles under the provisions

of the INF treaty. The Soviets claim to have realized a savings of over 300 million rubles. Further, they claim that the treaty has enabled them to "effect the transfer of more than 4000 hectares of land back to the national economy."²⁷ These claims have been backed up by an intensive media campaign designed to reinforce a public image of the agreement as both wise and efficacious. A particularly egregious example aired on Soviet television in October 1988. Entitled "Swords into Ploughshares," it featured a tour of the Rostelmash tractor factory, where metal allegedly recovered from SS-20 missiles was being used to manufacture combines. The announcer made sure that we did not miss the point. "The metal, which quite recently was the basis of a threatening weapon, is now turned into a combine, and very soon these updated machines will come to help representatives of one of the most peaceful professions- grain growers. Grain harvesting instead of lethal missiles. We could only dream about it a few years ago."²⁸

However, there appears to be some doubt about the accuracy of these claims. In an article in Moscow News, Oleg Mamalya claims that the Soviet Union is "blasting away money" by blowing up its missiles. He notes that the United States burns out the rocket boosters, which allows the high grade tungsten and titanium alloys used in missile construction and the ancillary equipment such as steering mechanisms and reinforced plastic tubing to be recovered and reused. He questions the amount of savings being realized by the Soviet technique and charges that the State Planning Committee does not have a system for dealing with the economy of disarmament. Further, he claims that they are totally unprepared for the scope of conversion and disarmament that will be required to implement a CFE agreement.²⁹

In a rebuttal article appearing in Krasnaya zvezda, Gavril Khromov defends the Soviet destruction technique as being safer, and asserts that "many of the author's other suggestions are equally useless in terms of practical implementation." He claims that INF implementation costs the U.S. approximately \$ 50 million annually, and admits that "our expenses are also considerable." He notes that "huge sums were originally invested in the development of these missiles and considerable expenditure will be incurred now that the time has come to eliminate them." Interestingly, he also reveals that the SS-20 transporter-erector-launcher vehicles are not working out for the Ministry of Motor Transport because "they are specially designed and are ill-suited for other uses." He concludes by justifying the treaty as a prudent investment in mankind's survival and world peace.³⁰

However, it is not the equipment aspect of the withdrawal that has caught the attention of the Soviet military. It is the human dimension which has caused far more consternation. The chorus of concern began almost immediately after Gorbachev's speech at the United Nations, as senior Army officers recalled the experience of military personnel during the country's last reduction in force. For example, General of the Army Vladimir Lobov described it this way:

When we reduced Army personnel in the 1960s, there were instances of unfair treatment. Many soldiers were dismissed just two years or even one year shy of retirement age. And a man who had a family had to start all over again from scratch- to find a job and learn a new profession. This time, this will not happen.³¹

These sentiments were also expressed by Major General Yuri Lebedev, who stated "there is another question here- our ability to safeguard in

every way the people affected by the reduction." He notes that 500,000 servicemen will be mustered out, including 83,000 officers and warrant officers. He warns "they must all be provided with work, housing, and so forth."³²

Since the initial flurry of objections however, it appears that the political leadership has transmitted a message to the high command concerning the permissible limits of criticism. Minister of Defense Yazov was undoubtedly trying to toe the official line when he observed that "the officers and warrant officers to be discharged are all highly qualified and experienced specialists" who will "take a worthy place in the working collectives of the country."³³ Now high level military commentary on the human consequences of the reductions has become far more reserved and circumspect. For instance, in May Colonel General N. Moiseev offered the cautious and deferential comment "as a USSR people's deputy, I believe that the social protection of people who have fulfilled their patriotic duty should be an area of special attention for the new Supreme Soviet and its commissions."³⁴

Civilian commentators have been much more sanguine about the prospects of quickly and painlessly integrating half a million soldiers into Soviet society. In discussing the Khrushchev reductions, Alexei Kireyev states that "a comprehensive program was worked out which enabled demobilized servicemen to easily regear to peaceful vocations." Further, he claims that under Khrushchev, everyone had a job in one month, housing in three months, and certain benefits and privileges such as preferential treatment on waiting lists and monetary grants and loans.³⁵

The harsh reality of experience through actual reductions has begun to intrude upon such optimistic projections, however. An interview with Minister of Defense Yazov sheds some light on the problems which have surfaced. He is unable to explain the current deficiencies in social protection for service members and their families, let alone offer any solutions for conducting the unilateral reductions in a manner which will not seriously aggravate the situation. He states that "we will simply not draft 400,000 of the 500,000" but gives no hints as to what employment is available for these people, or how the state plans to absorb the cost of paying them the 220 ruble monthly salary of an average Soviet worker when as conscripts they are compensated at the rate of about 8 rubles a month. He explains that "those who have completed their prescribed period of military service and have the right to a full pension" will be allowed (forced) to retire, but fails to identify how many personnel fall into this category. He admits that the leadership has no answers for these questions when he says "we still have 2 and 1/2 years in which to solve these problems." But Yazov's interviewer, Elena Agapova, does not let him escape so easily. She presses him on the issues of housing and family welfare, forcing him to confess "I can not guarantee that there will be an apartment waiting at every base." Yazov stonewalls Agapova's attempt to get him to offer a figure for the number of servicemen today who don't have adequate government housing, but she is successful in getting him to confirm her estimate that presently there are over 7500 officers in Moscow alone without apartments.³⁶

In the wake of events in Eastern Europe, it is evident that General Yazov's grace period has evaporated. If the Soviet Union fulfills its

agreements with both Czechoslovakia and Hungary to withdraw all its stationed forces from those two countries by 1 July 1991, it will add approximately 125,000 soldiers to the 250,000 servicemen who are already scheduled for discharge. There is little doubt that this additional influx of demobilized personnel will overwhelm an already grossly inadequate social support infrastructure for veterans.³⁷ Currently the first contingent of soldiers withdrawn from Czechoslovakia is arriving in the Gorky oblast of the Moscow military district. There are no accommodations available, so the personnel and their families are being put up in makeshift barracks and tents until the situation can be sorted out.³⁸ However, the prospects for a quick resolution seem rather slim. General of the Army Moiseev recently revealed:

We have about 166,000 families of officers, ensigns and warrant officers on active military service who have no apartment at all while 8,800 families are living in ramshackle apartments. People are experiencing great difficulties because some leaders of local soviet executive committees and enterprises are ignoring the recent USSR Council of Ministers resolution and are failing to grant housing within the stipulated deadlines to those released into the reserve.³⁹

Interestingly, the Navy seems to have taken the lead among the services in the self-criticism derby, and has become quite forthcoming in specifying its problems in the area of social welfare. It could simply be more glasnost, but I suspect an effort to stave off the sort of deep cuts that have been foisted upon the ground forces. This year's Navy Day address delivered by Chief of the Political Administration of the Navy Admiral Panin was unique. In addition to a relatively honest discussion of the Komsomolets sinking- "there are problems in this regard," he openly dealt with social issues such as housing, job placement for wives and the lack of kindergartens. This is an abrupt departure from the speeches of

previous years, which were focused primarily on extolling the heroic contribution of the fleet to the steadfast defense of the motherland. Panin plainly states that "the most urgent problem of officers, warrant officers and their families is housing." He also reveals that currently "officers of our Navy must wait a very long time for legitimate housing, from four to eight years."⁴⁰

In an interview with Krasnaya zvezda only two weeks later, Admiral Kapitanets provided some sobering statistics to back up Admiral Panin's claims. He noted that the proportion of the Navy's capital construction budget dedicated to building "housing, sociocultural and consumer establishments" had increased from 30% in the last five year plan to 42% at present, and was scheduled to go up again to 60% in the next five year plan. Yet, he observed:

Despite this, the housing problem in the Navy is being resolved only slowly. In 1987-1988, the number of families without apartments was reduced by only 4080. As of 1 January 1989, there were 19,220 families without apartments on the Navy's list. In addition, there are 19,362 families needing housing improvements and 866 families living in substandard or dangerous housing.

He goes on to explain that in order to solve the problem, the Navy plans to double "the volume of construction of apartment blocks" at naval bases starting next year. However, he then notes that "by decision of the defense minister of the USSR" the Navy must also provide housing for those officers affected by restructuring who must retire or go on reserve status. He concludes by warning that "all this will come at the expense of reducing the construction of naval bases, training and live firing... which is fraught with undesirable consequences for the future."⁴¹

It is readily apparent that simply cutting the defense budget and reducing the size of the armed forces will not produce a budgetary windfall for Gorbachev. Clearly, he must do more if he hopes to have a decisive impact on the stagnant Soviet economy. He recognizes this fact, and that is why he has also embarked on an ambitious program to harness the power of defense-related industrial production and convert it civilian use.

CONVERSION

One of the most engaging concepts to emerge from Gorbachev's new thinking on defense and national security is the idea of converting the considerable production capacity of the Soviet military-industrial complex (VPK by its Russian initials) from military to civilian production. For over two decades, the Soviet Union assigned top priority to military production and became the world leader in the manufacture of most categories of combat weaponry by a rather wide margin. But over the years, the adverse side effects of an excessively militarized economy increasingly manifested themselves and by the mid 1980s it had become apparent that success in the defense industry sector had been achieved at the expense of the remainder of the economy. In a period of deepening economic crisis, something had to give. In this situation, it should come as no surprise that the Soviet leadership has opted to try to tap into the resources of the one sector of the economy which has been consistently successful over time. A large and well developed industrial infrastructure is already in place, capable of sustaining an impressive level of product output. It would seem that this production capacity could be redirected to peaceful use. Such a shift could have a substantial impact on the Soviet economy, particularly in the critical consumer goods sector. It is to this end that Gorbachev has launched a series of economic reform programs which loosely fall under the overall policy rubric of "conversion."

THE ORIGIN OF CONVERSION POLICY

It is well established that the Soviet defense industry has been involved in the production of civilian goods for a number of years. The degree of this involvement is a subject of some debate, but nonetheless it is clear that the notion of using the defense sector to produce items for use in the civilian sector is not a new one. However, it seems that in the past the manufacture of goods for the civilian sector received low priority from defense industry officials. In fact, judging by the low quality standards and the lack of repercussions concerning the frequent failure to meet output norms, it appears that in the defense ministries military production enjoyed a status approaching absolute priority over civilian production. In other words, factories and assembly lines charged with producing civilian goods would be allocated only those resources which were not necessary for meeting planned military production targets. It was with the apparent aim of altering this status quo that the subject of conversion began to enter the realm of public discussion in 1987 as a possible solution.

Throughout 1988, a number of high level Soviet officials made public statements concerning the goal of "making the transition from an armaments economy to a disarmament economy." These statements advanced a variety of different, and often contradictory, proposals for economic conversion. This apparent lack of consensus is a strong indicator that some sort of internal policy debate was in progress. It is difficult for western analysts to divine when critical decisions were made or even to discern the general outlines of the debate during this period because the evidence

is largely elliptical. Like many Soviet policy debates, it was conducted behind closed doors and much of the information available emerged only months later in the form of veiled references to earlier decisions.

However, there are some key events which provide an overall framework within which the process has unfolded. Sometime in the first half of 1988, the nine ministries responsible for defense production began to structurally reorganize to accept greater responsibility for civilian production.⁴² In August the Council of Ministers passed a series of resolutions calling for increased production of consumer goods by the defense industry.⁴³ After the September Politburo shake-up which included the demotion of Ligachev and the retirement of Gromyko, the pace quickened. Sharp criticism was leveled at a number of civilian ministry heads for "significant shortfalls in the supply of goods" and additional funds were allocated to speed the process of transferring capital assets and production responsibility from the civilian sector to the defense ministries.⁴⁴ It seems that sometime towards the end of 1988 the internal debate was largely resolved, allowing Gorbachev to officially articulate the policy of conversion during his historic speech at the United Nations in December.⁴⁵ Since that time, the views expressed by various high ranking Soviet leaders have displayed a considerable degree of harmony on the subject of conversion.⁴⁶

But what about the people? Recent public opinion polls clearly demonstrate that the prestige of the Party has plummeted during the past year and that the average citizen's patience with the economic reform process is wearing thin. However, at least initially, the policy of

conversion seems to have been greeted with broad public support. Similar polls show that the average Soviet man on the street is generally in favor of any policy which reduces the military burden on the economy and puts more consumer goods on the shelves.⁴⁷

Over the past year, the Kremlin has consistently sought to nurture this generally positive image in the public's mind, or at least to avert or retard the gradual dissipation of popular support for the overall program of conversion. An impressive public relations campaign has been implemented which is noteworthy for both its stamina and longevity. The primary thrust seems to be to reinforce the image that significant progress is being made and that the future holds much promise for additional economic benefits. The media drilled this theme repeatedly throughout 1989. The consistent and sustained nature of the reportage is probably indicative of the high priority that the senior Soviet leadership attaches to this program.⁴⁸

WHAT IS CONVERSION?

The word "conversion" is somewhat misleading as a political and economic concept, largely because Soviet politicians have a tendency to use the term rather loosely when referring to a number of separate, but related programs. This was to be expected during 1988, when the leadership's plan of action for conversion policy was not yet fully formed. But now such broad application of the term obscures the fact that the conversion process is really comprised of a series of programs. As the policy has evolved over a two year period, the general outlines of several

distinct programs have slowly begun to emerge. At this point, it is possible to clearly identify at least three separate components of the overall conversion process.

The first program calls for the radical transformation of certain defense plants. It involves extensive reorganization and retooling so that these plants no longer manufacture armaments and related equipment. As the term implies, they are completely converted from military to civilian production. Accordingly, I will label this process "total conversion." As a concept, the idea is simple, straightforward and easily understood. Most people have this program in mind when the topic of conversion is under discussion. However, the simplicity of the concept does not offer much assistance in dealing with the complexity of execution. The Soviets are fully cognizant of the difficulties involved, and have selected three defense plants to undergo complete conversion on a trial basis: the Ioshkar-Ola and Yuryuzan Machinery Plants and the Lenin Forge Shipyard. The official rationale for this cautious approach was provided by the Chairman of the State Military-Industrial Commission Igor Belousov, who characterized the trial period as necessary because "the experience gained in the process of drafting the plans and in the course of the conversion will be taken into account in creating plans for the further conversion of the defense industry."⁴⁹

The second program involves the absorption of inefficient civilian production facilities by the defense industrial complex. The apparent aim is to take advantage of the superior managerial capability of the VPK ministries to stimulate civilian production. In this case, it is somewhat

of a misnomer to call the process conversion, because there are no defense plants which are being converted. Rather, administrative control over various civilian enterprises is being transferred to the defense ministries. In practice, this process is actually conversion in reverse, so I prefer to use the term "consolidation" to describe it. So far the scale of this effort has been impressive. Sometime in early 1988, the Ministry of Machine Building for Light Food Industry and Household Appliances (Minlegpishchemash) was disbanded. The defense sector assumed full responsibility for the goods previously produced by Minlegpishchemash and took control over the ministry's capital assets. This required the transfer of approximately 110 design bureaus and 220 factories to the Ministry of Defense Industry. At this point, it is unclear whether the Soviet leadership will direct the defense sector to swallow up other civilian ministries, but the possibility can not be ruled out. In a public assessment of the defense industry's adjustment to "macaroni production lines" Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov claimed that "the defense branches have gotten used to their work" and "what they already make today, this is worlds apart, compared to what it was."⁵⁰

The third program is directed toward reducing the output of military hardware and increasing the output of civilian goods produced by the defense industrial complex. This is not a new endeavor, as defense plants have been involved in the production of non-military end items for a number of years and the defense sector already provides 40% of its total output to the national economy. As Chairman of the State Military-Industrial Commission Igor Belousov points out, "enterprises in the defense complex supply 100% of the all-Union output of television sets

and household sewing machines, more than 97% of the refrigerators and tape recorders, over half of the motorcycles, and about 70% of the vacuum cleaners and washing machines."⁵¹ Accordingly, I will use the term "diversification" to describe this process. However, this does not imply that the transition will be an easy one. The current program calls for a sharp increase in the production of "high demand goods" which are "in short supply for the time being." The defense ministries have been directed to increase civilian economic production to 43% of total industry output in 1990 and to continue this expansion until civilian production accounts for 60% of total industry output by 1995.⁵² If the Soviets wish to meet this goal, it is readily apparent that virtually the entire defense sector will have to participate in the process. It has been reported that 345 defense ministry plants have already "switched" to the production of equipment for the food industry and 200 scientific institutes have also "switched to peacetime work."⁵³

THE RECORD SO FAR

At this point, it is difficult to render an objective evaluation of the relative success or failure of the various conversion programs. It is still very early in the game and there is a dearth of hard evidence to support any conclusive judgements. The cheerleading role adopted by much of the media is not particularly helpful, and the evidence which does exist is largely fragmentary and often contradictory. However, it is still possible to examine the indicators and piece together a general picture of how the different conversion programs are progressing.

The first program, total conversion, appears to be stuck in neutral. Although the concept has been widely discussed and it continues to appear in statements by high ranking Soviet officials, reportage on actual progress has been non-existent. The discussion always seems to be couched in terms of plans and proposals, rather than in terms of ongoing implementation.⁵⁴ Judging by the amount of media attention being lavished on the partial conversion process, it seems reasonable to assume that if this program were moving forward, the media would be heavily involved in promoting its success. This lack of media coverage leads me to conclude that nothing much is happening to make total conversion a reality.

The level of activity in the second program, consolidation, is much more vigorous and provides a sharp contrast with the apparent lack of progress towards total conversion. At first glance, it seems odd that the Soviet leadership would choose to boldly implement one conversion program while simultaneously exercising extreme caution in another. Surely the disbandment of an entire ministry and its subsequent absorption by the defense industrial complex involves more risk than the complete conversion of three defense plants to civilian production. Fortunately, evidence has emerged which sheds light on the decision to dissolve Minlegpishchemash.

Evidently, the ministry was more than just inefficient, it was insolvent. As defense industry officials executed the transfer of assets, they uncovered more and more skeletons in the Minlegpishchemash closet. One of their first discoveries was the fact that approximately 60% of the transferred equipment was worn out and useless. This equipment had to be cannibalized for spare parts to bring the remaining production machinery

up to full operating capacity. Moreover, much of the transferred equipment was approaching obsolescence. One defense industry official observed "this sector has been starved of modern equipment. Only one-fourth of the entire range of items transferred to us was up to modern standards. We are essentially creating a fundamentally new sector." The same official also noted the lack of social infrastructure. "The first thing which surprised us was that a number of these plants did not have any consumer facilities. No housing had been built for many years and talented young people did not come to join them."⁵⁶

Not surprisingly, the consolidation of defunct enterprises into the defense industrial complex requires a substantial diversion of assets and resources from scheduled production. The additional funding allocated by the Council of Ministers in 1988 was clearly inadequate to accomplish the transfer, let alone cover the costs of revitalizing an entire ministry. In addition, the defense ministries were not given much of a grace period before they had to start meeting their newly expanded responsibilities for consumer goods production. This means that the bulk of ongoing conversion expenses must be met by the diversion of existing resources. It appears that the capital investment required to purchase new equipment, refurbish run-down plants and build a social infrastructure will be a substantial long term burden. Defense ministry officials have indicated that "dozens of our plants, design bureaus, and technological institutes are already involved in this work" and that financing for this effort is being arranged "at the expense of existing planned projects."⁵⁷

Given the dilapidated condition of Minlegpishchemash's industrial

base, it is not difficult to see why it was an unsuccessful ministry. However, this test case gives rise to speculation concerning the number of other ministries which are in a similar state of advanced deterioration and are possible candidates for takeover by the defense sector. A variety of scenarios immediately come to mind.

For instance, the Ministry of Fisheries (Minrybkhoz) has repeatedly come under fire for gross inefficiency. Last year it commissioned a 40 million ruble state of the art oyster farm, but failed to prepare an adequate processing or distribution capability. As a result, over a hundred tons of harvested oysters remained in open air storage for several weeks and eventually spoiled. In a similar case, tons of salmon were buried or dumped in the woods on Sakhalin island because the ministry's processing plants are located on the mainland and there weren't enough cargo ships at its disposal to transport the catch in a timely manner. The defense sector's Ministry of Shipbuilding has already been given the responsibility of producing 18 Kronstadt class container carrier merchant ships at Leningrad's Baltic Shipyard, so it is not inconceivable that it could absorb the functions of Minrybkhoz as well.⁵⁸

Other possible takeover candidates include the group of ministries responsible for the production of medical equipment. They have been subjected to withering criticism for failure to meet qualitative and quantitative norms across the entire spectrum of health care production. Evidently, shortages run the gamut from basic medicinal supplies such as disposable syringes to technologically complex analytic-diagnostic equipment like hemodialysis machines. The subject of increasing the pro-

duction of medical equipment frequently comes up in conversations about conversion, and it is no secret that the top leadership is extremely dissatisfied with the performance of the ministries involved. A typical broadside was fired by Politburo member Alexandra Biryukova when she stated "our domestic medical production and pharmaceutical industry today is a sorry sight: old, dilapidated factory buildings, worn-out equipment, out-moded technology and so on. Of 30 facilities slated for renovation, expansion and construction during 1988-1989, work has not yet begun on 14 of them."⁵⁹

The problem with this sort of speculation is that the list of inefficient ministries is a long one. Sharp personal criticism has been leveled at N.A. Pugin, USSR Minister of Automotive and Agricultural Machine Building, and O.G. Anfimov, USSR Minister of the Electrical Equipment and Instrument Making Industry for "lagging in the fulfillment of consumer goods production plans." Similarly, N.S. Konarev, USSR Minister of Railways has been repeatedly subjected to scathing criticism for the growing backlog of unloaded freightcars.⁶⁰ At the moment, it remains an open question whether the leadership will direct the further consolidation of civilian ministries into the defense sector. If the sole criterion for consolidation was execrable performance, we would be witnessing the wholesale liquidation of civilian ministries, as there are certainly plenty of available candidates. However, it is likely that the regime is still evaluating the Minlegpishchemash experience to determine the long term effects of such a merger. Currently it is not clear whether the defense industrial complex is capable of digesting such a large acquisition without suffering severe negative economic consequences.

The third program, diversification, is being implemented vigorously and appears to be the most extensive of the three primary conversion programs. A large number of defense plants are already engaged in the production of substantial quantities of civilian goods and the extent of their involvement in this activity is scheduled to increase significantly over the next five years. In addition, the number of enterprises in the defense sector which are oriented solely towards military production will dwindle, as more and more plants are drawn into the effort to expand civilian production. It is hoped that the diversion of industrial potential will "saturate the market" with consumer goods.⁶¹

The question remains however, whether this program will succeed in meeting its goals. At this point, it is by no means clear that the economic results will be positive and that the people will continue to tolerate such costly economic experimentation.

There is a growing body of evidence which suggests that the diversification process is not proceeding as smoothly as planned, and that the reservoir of public good will is slowly draining away. Despite being highly touted by the media as a panacea for the nation's economic ills, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the conversion process does not offer a miracle cure. As the policy has evolved from an abstract concept to a concrete series of measures designed to stimulate the production of consumer goods, the public response has grown increasingly ambivalent. The accumulation of experience through implementation has shown that the initial impact of conversion is frequently quite negative. A. Sarkisyan, deputy general director of a science and production association in the

USSR Ministry of Radio Industry described the effect on his enterprise:

Over a period of a few months, the association has lost output worth millions of rubles due to the demolition of the economic management mechanism and the lack of a clear-cut concept of conversion. This resulted in a sharp decline in the volume of production, which in turn led to a sharp decline in workers' and employees' wages. Over a period of about 6 months, thousands of people found themselves out of a job. They include quite a few highly skilled specialists whose loss could prove to be irreparable.⁶²

Similar adverse effects were described by Sergei Tselishchev, a mid-level manager at the Lenin Admiralty Shipyard. He states "we have always been against war, but when conversion started our family budgets began to suffer. Workers and technicians have been earning less since the switch over." He also notes the morale problems which have resulted. "Many workers need to be retrained and this doesn't make them any more enthusiastic. The changes in product lines are sometimes resented by workers on the shop floor."⁶³

But these ill effects should be of limited duration. It is possible that the regime considers the short term adverse impact on defense industry workers as an acceptable cost of transition, particularly when weighed against the potential long term benefits of a substantial increase in civilian production. This line of thinking would support the notion that in the long run, defense industry workers should benefit along with the rest of the populace from a higher level of output in the production of consumer goods. Such an increase would help eliminate shortages, thereby satisfying pent-up demand for consumer durables and alleviating inflationary pressures.

Unfortunately however, so far there is very little evidence of a

visible increase in the production of consumer goods which might justify the hardships which defense industry workers are now experiencing. Government claims that the output of civilian products increased by 8.9% in 1989 have been met by public incredulity.⁶⁴ A fairly typical response appeared in the journal Sotsialisticheskaya industriya. The author, I. Klimenko, scoffs at these figures, claiming that "it looks as if some well-heeled locusts have devastated our stores." In explaining the lack of progress in the conversion process, he places the blame squarely on the defense ministries. He states:

We should note that we have recently heard and read quite a lot about the great potential of "defense." Alas, these words have not put more goods on the store shelves. It also appears that the attitude of the leaders of the industry and the enterprise managers toward their civilian production has been changing slowly. Even the most severe measures fail to help. This year such measures have been more numerous than ever before.⁶⁵

Klimenko goes on to say that the defense ministries are "steadfastly resisting the production of consumer goods in the amounts capable of meeting the need for them." He notes that the Ministry of Aviation Industry (Minaviaprom) was successful in refusing to accept 1990 plan targets for the production of 600,000 washing machines, 70,000 refrigerators, more than 300,000 vacuum cleaners and 90,000 engine units.⁶⁶

According to Klimenko, it is the foot dragging attitude of the defense ministries that is to blame for the meager results of conversion. No doubt there is an element of truth to this accusation. He is probably right when he claims that the production of weaponry is far more profitable than the production of consumer goods. And he is probably right when he claims that the salary scales and promotion career patterns of defense industry plant managers are still tied to the production of their primary

product- military hardware. V.I. Smyslov, first deputy chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee has confirmed that:

Major problems are caused by losses of profit at defense enterprises. The value of one standard hour worked in the production of military output is two to six times higher than the value of one standard hour in the production of civilian equipment. Therefore, conversion creates new seats of social tension.⁶⁷

Simply blaming the lack of progress on the recalcitrance of defense industry officials is not a particularly useful analytic approach, however. Such finger pointing obscures the fact that there are a number of other factors which are of equal or greater importance in explaining why the diversification program is not meeting its goals. In my view, these factors can be conceptually categorized as originating from one of two primary sources. The first is the rigid system of overcentralized bureaucratic control and the second is the dilution of the traditional advantages enjoyed by the defense sector.

It is readily apparent that the policy of conversion as presently conceived is fatally flawed because it tends to strengthen the hold of the central bureaucracy over the economy, not weaken it. The system lacks the flexibility to adapt to the pressures of a free market, and its administrators lack the imagination to formulate innovative solutions capable of ensuring a smooth transition during a period of extreme economic volatility. These deficiencies manifest themselves in a variety of ways, often with disastrous results.

One major problem is caused by the structure of the administrative oversight system. It is a highly redundant overlapping network of bureaucratic fiefdoms which vie for control of various enterprises and

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frequently issue directives which countermand and contradict the orders of other administrative agencies. Veniamin Kasyanikov, deputy designer general of the Kamov Helicopter Works, described the effects of this excessive bureaucratic interference:

We have four levels of bosses who can command what we should be doing: the Union, the Republic, the Region and the District. We produce spray generators for the Tomilino factory, agricultural machinery for the area and dried fruit packing equipment for the ministry. In the process, we had to postpone a request from Murmansk for external cargo lift helicopters.⁶⁸

Another major problem is caused by the lack of a coordinated conversion plan. In its haste to reap the benefits of conversion, the USSR Council of Ministers passed a series of implementation resolutions before it had developed a comprehensive state-wide program. Predictably, this has resulted in a chaotic hodgepodge of policies as each ministry attempts to implement conversion on its own. The situation is exacerbated as different levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy and entire ministries work at cross-purposes with each other. The level of confusion is illustrated by the numerous directives which seem to defy logic and common sense. Enterprises in the defense sector are being tasked to produce shortage items with little or no regard for the experience and skill level of the workers, the age and technological capability of the plant machinery, the availability of customers and supplies, and a host of other seemingly fundamental considerations. For instance, Genrikh Novozhilov, designer general of the Ilyushin Engineering Works in Moscow complained:

Our research and development agency is working on automated machines to produce plastic bags, while the work on such aircraft as the Il-96, Tu-204, and Il-114 is lagging behind. If we do not use the potential of conversion in the interest of Aeroflot, it may have to pay millions of rubles to buy aircraft abroad.⁶⁹

These sentiments were echoed by Mikhail Siminov, designer general of the Sukhoi Engineering Works, who indicated that his plant had been instructed

to produce packing machines, but lacked the high quality printing facility and specific materials that were required.⁷⁰

A recent article in Sovetskaya Rossiya sheds more light on the situation. A.P. Reutov, head of the defense sector's Radio Industry, freely discusses the numerous problems that he is experiencing with conversion. First, he notes that his ministry has been tasked with producing razors and other shaving equipment, a mission wholly unrelated to the ministry's primary business. He indicates that he contested these orders, but was not heard. "How is it possible to solve a problem without even studying it beforehand? Get on with it, I was told, and do it! Nobody wants to know whether you are prepared." He goes on to say "at times we have to frantically look for customers" and he complains that "subsidies for specialized equipment are being cut back" and "neither we nor our clients have received any additional money for civilian needs." Regarding the bureaucracy, Reutov hits the nail on the head:

According to the prevailing opinion, this is a process whereby major benefits could be achieved without serious costs, just by assigning targets. But this is not so... We build plants for one purpose, then start converting them for another. A waste of both time and money. It is bad when a serious job is done off the cuff without precise coordination.⁷¹

High ranking military officers are also starting to evince a sense of annoyance at the haphazard manner of implementation. For instance, deputy minister of defense Colonel General Yuri Yashin commented:

It seems to me totally impermissible that certain enterprises in the military sectors of industry are not being charged with the production of the sort of consumer goods which those enterprises ought to be producing. For example, is it sensible when aviation works in the Ministry of Aviation Industry manufacture saucepans? Do we need these household items? Of course we do. But surely the military sector ought primarily to address and tackle tasks at the level of technology which these defense enterprises have achieved.⁷²

It seems that the most obvious method of resolving these problems would be to disengage the various defense enterprises from their bureaucratic masters and allow them to formulate their own proposals on constructive ways of implementing conversion. Once these proposals were developed, then the central planners could resolve conflicts and coordinate an overall plan. However, such a common sense approach seems unlikely at this juncture. First, the regime does not appear to be predisposed towards waiting. The conversion process is already underway and stopping to reevaluate would involve further delays which would postpone the day when it starts to pay off in terms of significantly greater output of consumer goods. Second, it has proven exceedingly difficult to create counterinstitutions which are not quickly coopted by the existing hierarchy or organizational structures which can effectively bypass the central bureaucracy with its long tradition of rule by administrative fiat. Third, the idea of individual enterprises acting independently has now been discredited in rather spectacular fashion.

On the first of February, the story broke in the Soviet press about an attempt by the Industrial State Cooperative Association (ANT) to export a dozen T-72 main battle tanks without the approval of the state. ANT was specifically created to stimulate foreign trade by cutting through the usual layers of bureaucratic red tape. ANT was granted a number of unique privileges concerning buying and selling, including the right to deal with foreign clients directly and the authorization to barter. However, ANT took advantage of its special situation and "embarked on a path of illegal activities and cheating the state." The scheme was narrowly foiled when the tanks were discovered being readied for transshipment at the Black Sea

port of Novorossiysk. The fact that the association was able to acquire the tanks and ship them across the country unnoticed has shocked and outraged the populace. One observer expressed his concern this way:

It seems to me that we have fallen into euphoria from conversion... weapons are moving about the country like commodities. And I fear that conversion in the form in which it is now occurring- with poor control, minimal expenditures and the search for advantages first and foremost- can aggravate the situation.⁷³

The continuing revelations have sparked a scandal which has the potential of becoming the Soviet equivalent of the Iran-Contra affair. A number of high ranking officials have already been censured or relieved from their posts. But the scandal continues to snowball. It is clear that massive payoffs and kickbacks are involved, and more and more officials are being implicated, including Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov. During a recent session of the Soviet parliament, deputy Anatoli Sobchak claimed that "Ryzhkov's signature was on the document" authorizing the tank deal. Ryzhkov and Sobchak engaged in a heated exchange of accusations, counter-accusations and denials which was then shown on tape delay before a national television audience.⁷⁴

The second major cause of problems in implementing conversion is the dilution of the traditional advantages enjoyed by the defense industrial complex. The defense sector owes its success to its unique position in the Soviet economy. Its privileges insulate it from the vagaries and uncertainties of the civilian sector. First, the Ministry of Defense has the privilege of being a monopoly customer. It has the power to enforce the fulfillment of contracts and it can reject products which do not meet its quality standards. Second, the defense sector has been given the

authority to draw on the best talent and technology available. It culls the best managers, specialists and facilities nationwide and assembles them under its purview. Third, the defense sector has priority access to resources, materials and supplies. Fourth, it is heavily subsidized so the true cost of producing modern weaponry is hidden, and until recently, largely irrelevant.

Today however, as the defense industry becomes more and more involved in the business of producing consumer goods, it will become increasingly exposed to the harsh realities of the civilian sector. It will no longer enjoy a vertical monopoly over raw materials, transportation means, and facilities for subcomponent and end item production. It will become subject to the same forces which wreak havoc in the civilian economy: resource competition, unreliable suppliers, defective components and subassemblies, lack of incentives and low priority. It will be impossible to operate in this environment using traditional methods because so far the political leadership has not seen fit to subsidize the effort in the usual manner. As the defense sector assumes more and more responsibility for civilian production, its unique position will gradually erode, ultimately to the point where it becomes indistinguishable from the civilian sector.

For a number of years, there was broad consensus among western analysts that the defense industrial complex was a separate, self-contained entity within the Soviet economy. It was believed that the defense sector was able to churn out world class weaponry at record levels because unlike the civilian sector, it was productive and efficient.⁷⁵

Today however, a growing body of evidence is emerging which belies the image of a dual economy. The new openness in defense matters has revealed a number of glaring deficiencies in military production which were previously hidden. The defense ministries suffer from many of the same problems as their civilian counterparts. Moreover, it seems that the defense sector is even more wasteful and inefficient than the civilian sector.⁷⁶

The primary reason this state of affairs has come about is because the political leadership has traditionally issued the defense complex a blank check along with its mission of producing large quantities of modern military hardware. Over time this carte blanche atmosphere has bred a lack of cost consciousness on the part of the military customer. Journalists S. Yelekoyev and E. Chernova, writing in Sotsialisticheskaya industriya, quote defense industry officials as saying "the high quality assemblies are achieved at the price of immense expenditures and strict military acceptance practices" and "defense workers always achieve the necessary result because the state does not limit the cost."⁷⁷ Recently the Chief of the General Staff General of the Army Mikhail Moiseyev admitted that "in the past the people's money has not always been spent carefully enough." However, he also quickly averred that "today the situation has changed radically."⁷⁸

In evaluating the performance of the defense industrial complex, it seems prudent to draw a distinction between effectiveness and efficiency. It is obvious that the defense sector has been effective in mass producing a large volume of modern military equipment year after year. However, it

is considerably less clear how efficient the defense sector has been in utilizing the available resources to achieve this output. The evidence suggests that the overall level of productivity is no higher than in the civilian sector.⁷⁹

One way of testing this hypothesis is to examine the military and civilian products which are manufactured within a single defense plant or defense plant complex. For instance, the Nizhnii Tagil tank factory in the Urals is the largest tank factory in the world. It produces several different types of tanks, including the Soviet Union's current first line main battle tank, the T-80. While the current generation of western main battle tanks such as the U.S. M-1 Abrams and the West German Leopard II are technologically superior, the T-80 is considered sufficiently advanced to make it roughly comparable with western equipment. In addition to tank production, Nizhnii Tagil is the Soviet Union's largest producer of railroad freight cars. In September, an inspection of the rolling stock at the railroad station at Kotka revealed that 62 of 300 cars inspected had faults of a sufficiently serious nature to warrant their immediate removal from service. A number of others were found to be "defective," including some railroad cars which were "only recently delivered."⁸⁰

The wide variance in product quality is reflected throughout the entire range of goods manufactured by the defense sector. Military hardware tends to be competitive on the world market. Certain items, such as Mig-29 and Su-27 fighter aircraft, have even received critical acclaim abroad. In contrast, consumer goods manufactured by the VPK are not noted for their high quality even within the Soviet Union, where domestic

standards are relatively lax. Some items, such as televisions, are notorious for their poor quality and have been known to explode.⁸¹

The low quality of civilian goods produced by defense plants raises questions about the prevailing quality standards for military hardware produced at the same plants. All the evidence suggests that the Soviet military is not shy about exercising its right of refusal over equipment which does not meet prescribed standards. It seems that often this rejected equipment is then turned over for use in civilian production.⁸² However, despite its unique position as a monopoly customer, it appears that the Soviet military still accepts a significant amount of "sub-standard and irregular" equipment into its inventory. The deputy defense minister for armaments, General of the Army Vitali Shabanov recently remarked:

There are two basic reasons for the accidents and catastrophes which take place in the armed forces. The first is the construction and production defects in weapons supplied to us by industry. The second, if one is to be frank, is the inexperienced use of this equipment by personnel.⁸³

The defense industrial complex is still part of the national economy, and the evidence suggests that in terms of productivity and efficiency, its performance is no better or worse than any other sector of the economy. For the most part, the nine VPK ministries have achieved their success at the expense of their civilian counterparts. Historically, their privileged status has given them priority access to scarce expertise and resources, leaving the less fortunate civilian ministries to fight over their leavings. The system was able to function because there were a small number of winners and a large number of losers.

But the implementation of conversion has changed the rules of the game. One rather predictable consequence of this process has been a steep rise in prices. Defense plant managers are unaccustomed to thinking about cost because their military production lines have traditionally been heavily subsidized. Now these subsidies are being curtailed and the plant managers are being directed to dramatically increase the level of civilian output. Suddenly they find themselves in the position of having to operate on a self-financing basis. The only way out is to raise the prices of the civilian goods which they produce. Economist Alexsei Kireyev cites some examples:

These prices are startling indeed. For instance, civilian ministries sold pumps for the transfer of damp grain with a productivity of 2500 liters an hour for 180 rubles apiece, while some defense factories charge 3412 rubles for such a pump. The price of a butter making flow line produced by a defense factory has risen from 90,400 to 160,000 rubles and a bottle washing machine from 11,300 to 50,000 rubles.⁸⁴

Another consequence of the conversion process has been the dilution of political authority. The defense ministries have traditionally been able to rely on high-level political backing to resolve recurrent problems such as uncooperative suppliers, transportation bottlenecks, and equipment breakdowns. When necessary, they could count on the application of political pressure to divert required resources from other sectors so the the VPK would not fail to meet its plan targets. Today however, as the defense ministries become more and more involved in the civilian sphere, this political authority is being stretched thinner and thinner. The political leadership is telling them that now both military and civilian production is top priority. This results in a sort of priority inflation, which ultimately dissipates itself until there is no real authority left to exercise. Simply put, everything can't be top priority.

Even after a given project or program has been clearly designated as being top priority, there is no guarantee that it will be completed in a timely or efficacious manner. The Soviet regime's historical track record in this regard is not particularly encouraging. For instance, the centerpiece of the ninth five year plan (1971-1975) was the construction of the Kama River Truck Plant. This massive complex consists of 6 huge plants occupying 23 square miles, and was built from scratch in the middle of the steppes some 600 miles east of Moscow. A satellite city of 160,000 and a supporting transportation network were also built from scratch, at a staggering cost. The fact that the complex was built at all is a most impressive achievement. However, the mass mobilization of effort and resources required to accomplish this Herculean task beggared other lower priority projects. And despite the concentration of political authority and resources, the project was plagued by problems and delays from start to finish.⁸⁵

Today the economic situation has deteriorated to the point that the regime can no longer afford to simply turn on the fire hose of resource priority to bring a project to fruition. However, this does not mean that Soviet officials have lost their appetite for grandiose projects. In conjunction with the Italian firm Fiat, a huge automobile plant is currently under construction in Yelabuga. When completed, this plant is supposed to produce 300,000 Oka-1 automobiles annually. However, the project is already years behind schedule and suffers from a host of problems which are unlikely to be resolved anytime soon.⁸⁶

The primary lesson to be drawn from this is the fact that the

centrally planned Soviet economic system is so characteristically inefficient that individual plants and even entire ministries can not function effectively unless they are given the advantage of political authority which enables them to win the competition for scarce resources. This special advantage has been key to the performance of the defense ministries over the years. Now that the playing field is being leveled and expanded, it seems unreasonable to expect them to achieve the kind of results that they have in the past. It is not cost effective to reject 90 out of 100 refrigerators to obtain 10 which are of high quality, but this is the traditional VPK approach. The state can not afford to expand its preferential treatment of the defense sector into the realm of civilian production, and without the advantage of subsidies and priority access to resources, the defense sector will not be able to duplicate its magic in the production of consumer goods.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

The bulk of the evidence presented in this chapter clearly supports the conclusion that Gorbachev is unlikely to reap any significant near term economic benefits from either his defense cuts or his conversion program. It is apparent that neither effort is producing the desired effect so far, and there are no indicators which lead me to believe that the situation will get better anytime soon.

From an economic standpoint, the anticipated gains from cutting the defense budget have so far proved to be a cruel chimera. First, the Soviet peace dividend is heavily mortgaged by a continuing commitment to force modernization and a substantial investment in research and development of follow-on weapon systems. Second, the high cost of disarmament is already significantly undercutting the savings realized from the ongoing troop withdrawals, and the verification regime required by a CFE agreement will boost this price tag significantly. Third, the lack of a market-based accounting system makes it extremely difficult to determine whether or not a specific program is actually generating savings, and if so how much. Fourth, the gross inefficiency and rampant corruption characteristic of the civilian ministries that will dispose of the forthcoming peace dividend does not fill one with much confidence about the probability of the wise and judicious employment of this windfall for the economic benefit of the Soviet people. Finally, the process is inducing a severe crisis within the Soviet armed forces which has the potential of

severely damaging national security and may spill over into a much larger societal crisis. If not managed carefully, these negative side effects could easily cancel out any potential benefits to be gained from cutting the defense budget.

The much heralded conversion program has also failed to generate the kind of economic impact that Gorbachev intended. The positive results achieved so far are meager at best, and the adverse effects of dismantling the existing economic structure within the defense industrial complex have been far greater. There are two primary reasons why the policy of conversion as presently conceived is floundering. The first is that it is still being administered by the state bureaucracy. The continued reliance on the central planning process to set plans and targets completely misses the whole point of reform by failing to address the fundamental systemic flaws endemic in the Soviet economic system. This approach will never bear fruit. Second, the special privileges which have enabled the defense ministries to be successful over the years are being hopelessly diluted through the absorption of entire civilian ministries and the assumption of ever increasing responsibilities for civilian production. The nine VPK ministries have already shown themselves to be quite mortal, and the logical end result of this process will be to reduce them to the level of their hapless civilian counterparts.

It is possible that my evaluation of the current situation is excessively pessimistic. Intuitively, there would seem to be a point where Gorbachev's policies finally pay a dividend. After the initial heavy bills for drawing down the force are paid, won't the investment curve in the

civilian sector move sharply upward? Even given the propensity of the Soviet ministries to squander huge sums of money on grandiose projects, won't some proportion of the budget outlay eventually trickle down to benefit the people? Suppose the Soviet consumer realizes a gain of only 10% from the cuts in the defense budget and the conversion process. For every 100 rubles generated by defense cuts or through increased consumer goods production by the VPK ministries, only 10 rubles actually end up benefiting the average man on the street. Even given this paltry rate of return, there obviously does come a point where the savings are so large that they begin to have a visibly positive impact on the Soviet economy.

Obviously, the key question is when will this point be reached? At present, most of the Soviet media continue to proclaim that prosperity is just around the corner. However, most people are not quite as sanguine about the prospects for early results. Among the Soviet leadership elite, some officials have displayed a considerable degree of caution and realism in their personal assessments. For instance, the deputy defense minister for armaments, General of the Army Vitali Shabanov has warned:

Of course, everyone wants to feel an immediate benefit from the reduction of defense spending in the form of a real improvement in living standards. But the calculations of both our own and foreign specialists show that it will be necessary to wait 1 to 3 years for the corresponding results of the transfer of production "to peaceful lines" depending on the volume of work involved.⁸⁷

Other observers are convinced that the present policy course will never yield positive results. Economist Aleksei Kireyev claims that the defense industry is currently being used as a "fire brigade" which can "for a time put out the seething discontent with the shortages of goods of prime necessity." He argues that "the concept of conversion is now reduced

to one thing- to stop up the yawning holes in the economy at any price."⁸⁸ Academician V. Avduyevski of the newly formed Soviet National Committee to Promote Conversion has a similar opinion. He states:

Conversion must be implemented in accordance with the long term tasks of economic reform and perestroika. In my opinion, at present it is being implemented on the basis of transient advantage.⁸⁹

It is difficult to determine who is right in this debate primarily because the Soviets have not been particularly forthcoming in providing hard data, and the economic statistics which are available in open sources are often of dubious reliability and limited utility. Without accurate figures, it is virtually impossible to calculate the amount of time and resources which must be invested before the Soviet economy realizes a significant positive return. The analyst is forced to rely on subjective indicators to form a conclusion.

At this point, the political leadership is having difficulty clearly articulating its economic plans and goals, and does not appear ready to face the hard choices involved in prioritizing them. In addition, the various resulting programs and projects must be coordinated and adequately supported with the requisite resources. For the most part, this is not happening- at present everything is proceeding by way of ministerial edict and there appears to be very little in the way of a coordinated overall economic reform plan. Nevertheless, Gorbachev has clearly signalled a desire to shift the political emphasis away from military production and toward civilian welfare.⁹⁰

I am inclined to believe that the Soviet consumer will not reap any tangible benefits from defense spending cuts and conversion policy for

at least another 3-5 years. The defense industrial complex already allocates 40% of its total output to the civilian sector and this does not seem to be having much of an effect towards alleviating the shortage of consumer goods in the Soviet Union. In addition, from a political perspective, it is not at all clear that these policies will continue through 1995. It is possible that they may be significantly altered or discontinued entirely. In short, the prospects for success appear slim. The Soviet peace dividend is an elusive chimera, and those who have pinned their hopes on it to solve the country's economic problems are likely to be sorely disappointed.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE WARSAW PACT: ENDURING INSTITUTION OR EMPTY SHELL?

THE WARSAW PACT: ENDURING INSTITUTION OR EMPTY SHELL?

To characterize 1989 as "a year of change" in Eastern Europe would be an egregious understatement. The events which have taken place there in recent months have been so sweeping and so unexpected that their impact has been simply breath-taking. Observers on both sides of the iron curtain were caught almost completely unawares, and the massive media coverage of throngs of Eastern Europeans defying oppressive totalitarian regimes to assert their individual rights both astounded and captured the imagination of the free world.

Unfortunately, in this atmosphere of people power and spontaneous democratic reform, the West has been prone to self-congratulation, declaring victory in the cold war and sitting down to divvy up the proceeds of the forthcoming peace dividend. In the excitement of the moment, some political pundits have seen fit to declare the Warsaw Pact null and void without bothering to examine the issue in any depth. That is the avowed purpose of this paper- to step back and examine the issue at length. I plan to evaluate the changes which have already taken place, identify the decisions which must be made in the near future, and attempt to offer a predictive assessment of which aspects of the alliance are likely to change and which aspects are not over the next year or so.

THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE OLD ORDER

On 7 December 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev stood before the United Nations General Assembly and announced his intention to implement large scale unilateral reductions in Soviet conventional forces. At the time, it appeared to be a politically brilliant move. In one bold stroke, he had managed to achieve a foreign policy goal which had eluded him for several years- a radical reduction in the Western perception of a Soviet conventional threat. His speech caught Western governments off guard and significantly undermined the plausibility of NATO's force modernization programs and arms control strategy. Domestically, it demonstrated his personal control of the national defense agenda and marked the first serious effort to reduce military expenditures and redirect state funding to other sectors of the economy.¹

In retrospect, the announcement should not have been so surprising. Politically, Gorbachev reaped an enormous public relations windfall which has helped him shape Western public opinion to a degree unequalled by his predecessors. Economically, the potential for substantial budgetary relief was excellent and seemed to hold great promise for producing other fiscal benefits as well. Militarily, the risks involved were small, as the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies would continue to enjoy a substantial numerical superiority over their NATO counterparts in most categories of conventional armaments. When the huge potential political and economic benefits were weighed against the minimal military risks involved, it simply didn't make sense to pass up such an opportunity.²

Regarding Eastern Europe, there did not appear to be any compelling reason why the number of Soviet troops could not be safely scaled back. The likelihood of a NATO attack was virtually zero, and even after the reductions were implemented, there would still be a sizeable contingent of Soviet troops available to deal with internal unrest, should the need arise. More importantly, among the six non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) member states, the Communist Party had maintained an uninterrupted monopoly on power for over 40 years. The region was characterized by an almost glacial form of governmental stability, with truly serious outbreaks of popular dissatisfaction occurring sporadically only once every twelve years or so. Certainly Gorbachev recognized that his program of radical reform had helped create a political schism within the Pact which arrayed reform-minded Poland and Hungary against a conservative bloc composed of Brezhnevite East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, and neo-Stalinist Romania. But evidently this degree of differentiation was deemed acceptable. Gorbachev was willing to pay the political cost of bloc fragmentation in order to achieve the higher goal of greater economic efficiency. In December 1988, it seemed logical to assume that the price of less direct interference in the internal political affairs of Pact nations would be limited and manageable and that both the rate and scope of change throughout the bloc could be reasonably controlled from the Kremlin.³ As if to underscore this assessment, in the first few months of 1989 all NSWP states except Romania mirrored Moscow's lead and announced similar unilateral conventional force reductions. On issues that really mattered, it seemed that the Soviet Union could still count on bloc obedience by simply making its objectives clear and setting the example.

Under new thinking, the use or threat of use of coercion with one's allies seemed gratuitous and unnecessary.⁴

But by the end of 1989, it turned out that the Soviet Union could take nothing for granted in Eastern Europe. The pace and scope of change picked up so much momentum that expectations, predictions and policy were outdistanced by events on a daily basis. Political changes which took almost ten years to unfold in Poland were compressed into a period of ten weeks in East Germany and ten days in Czechoslovakia. The rapid acceleration of the reform process caught governments on both sides of the iron curtain unprepared and unable to respond. In the West, this incapacity for action was of little consequence. But in the East, the inability to formulate a coherent policy which might stabilize the situation or even influence events in a meaningful way proved fatal to a series of Communist regimes which fell in succession like overripe fruit.

By mid-September, the Soviets realized that events were spiralling out of control. On 7 September Poland announced the formation of its first non-Communist government in the postwar era.⁵ On 10 September Hungary opened the border with Austria, precipitating an exodus of East Germans to the West and providing the catalyst for the severe political crisis to follow.⁶ As the pace of events began to gather momentum, the Soviet leadership hierarchy evidently considered military intervention as a viable option. During the period 15 September to 7 October the Red Army conducted a series of maneuvers throughout Eastern Europe. In East Germany, 13,000 troops from the Western Group of Forces were deployed outside their garrison laager locations conducting offensive battle

drills. Simultaneously in Czechoslovakia, another 13,000 troops from the Central Group of Forces were involved in similar exercises. In the western military districts adjoining Poland, annual military exercises comprising an undisclosed number of troops were held. And in the Baltic military district, approximately 1500 airborne troops practiced assault landings south of Kaunis, Lithuania while another 1500 mechanized infantry trained along the Baltic coast. It is possible that the confluence of military activity at this time was purely coincidental to political developments. But given the past history of Soviet mobilization patterns in 1968 and 1980, it is more likely that the leadership wished to keep its options open by being prepared for the worst. The evidence suggests that the Soviet leadership used this three week period to evaluate the trade-offs involved with the two primary policy options available: large-scale intervention or simply allowing events to unfold on their own. In hindsight, it appears that the military option was rejected, at least for the time being. But the exercises served several valuable purposes. First, they provided Soviet troops with an opportunity to practice invasion procedures by honing tactical skills. Second, they sent a warning to the West by demonstrating the Soviet Union's resolve in its traditional area of influence. This important message was largely missed by the media, but was no doubt absorbed by western governments. Third, they sent a signal to reformers throughout the region to slow down and to keep in mind certain "objective political realities" which the Soviets consider inviolate.⁷

But the pace of change did not slow down, it accelerated. Apparently the Soviet leadership elite had badly overestimated the ability of its Eastern European counterparts to stand on their own without the implicit

threat of Soviet armed intervention as the ultimate guarantor of Communist legitimacy. It was simply too late for minor concessions. In the face of rapidly burgeoning popular discontent, the threatened regimes were left with only two realistic policy options: the use of force or abdication. The responses varied widely, from the scrupulous avoidance of bloodshed in East Germany to the brutal repression and civil war in Romania. But in each case, the end result was the same. The Communist monopoly on power was broken.⁸

At present a rather deceptive aura of relative calm and stability has descended on the region. It appears that the indigenous Party elite in each country has been able to broker a tentative and informal compromise of sorts with the local populace. In Hungary and Bulgaria, the Party is still in power. In East Germany it is holding on by its fingernails in the form of a 25 member temporary working group comprised of individuals not fatally linked to the old regime. In Poland and Czechoslovakia, Communists are junior coalition partners in the government, but still wield a critical amount of influence. In Romania, the situation has not yet been sorted out. So for the time being, there seems to be a somewhat uneasy unofficial truce in effect until elections are held in the spring.

But the prospect of free elections will shatter this fragile compromise as it is almost certain that the results will entail a dramatic decline in the amount of Communist representation at all levels of government. If the anti-Communist mandate presented by Polish voters last June is representative of the mood of the Eastern European electorate as a whole, then the Communist Party will be swept away completely. Under the

rules of the preelection agreement, Solidarity was allowed to contest 161 seats in the Sejm, or lower house of parliament and all 100 seats in the less important Senate, or upper house. Union-endorsed candidates took 160 seats in the Sejm and 92 in the Senate in the initial round of voting. In addition, of the 35 leading Communists who ran unopposed, only two won the requisite 50 percent of the vote to take their seats.⁹ Moreover, the absence of a large and popular opposition group like Solidarity does not seem to affect the results. In the September parliamentary by-elections in Hungary, Communists were again soundly defeated by opposition candidates. Political observers speculated that the Party would do well to win 15 percent of the vote in the upcoming legislative elections.¹⁰ There is little doubt that the Communist Party will do its best to attempt to structure the upcoming elections in a favorable manner by establishing complicated electoral procedures and voting rules. In East Germany and Hungary, such behind the scenes political maneuvering is already under way. But the people are unlikely to tolerate a rigged election, and a free one will almost certainly ensure that Communists are disenfranchised in record numbers.

THE MILITARY CONSEQUENCES

Against this backdrop of convulsive political change, it would be foolish to think that the military status quo in Europe could survive the reform process without undergoing equally rapid and profound change. Postwar security arrangements are being questioned and reviewed. Major revisions have already taken place, and more sweeping changes are sure to follow. The future is acutely uncertain in the military arena, largely because of the extreme difficulty involved in trying to isolate military reform from the context of the overall political process. However, I think that the most likely changes can be grouped into three broad categories, each of which I will consider in turn.

The first is the issue of national sovereignty in military affairs. Traditionally, the ability of individual East European states to exercise independent authority over their own national defense has been highly circumscribed.¹¹ The Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) is essentially a complex control mechanism which functionally integrates the national defense establishments of the allies into the military-industrial complex of the Soviet Union. National authority over the various components of the defense establishment is diluted by a stovepipe control system which isolates each sector and subordinates it to central direction from Moscow. Thus, military units are responsible to the Soviet chain of command and defense industries are subject to planning and production norms established by the Soviet defense ministries. This fragmentation of national control within each Eastern European state is duplicated in multinational relations within the WTO. The auspices of the WTO are used to sever

interstate ties between members and foster a series of bilateral links with the Soviet Union. This results in an organizational pattern which resembles a bicycle tire without a rim. Each spoke of the wheel must connect to the hub in order to work in concert with the other spokes. In this manner, the Soviet Union has managed to create a multinational organization which is not multilateral.¹²

Today there are several aspects of this relationship which are being altered. In Poland, it appears that the new government has terminated the agreement by which Polish troops are formally subordinated to the Soviet high command in wartime. The Poles have been careful to publicly reassure Moscow that they have no intention of withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact, but both Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski have stressed the point that "spheres of security can never mean spheres of influence."¹³ Similarly, it appears that in at least four out of six NSWP countries, the control apparatus of the Soviet Main Political Administration (MPA) and the subordinate groups of forces and national MPAs is being slowly dismantled. MPA officers are responsible for assuring combat reliability through political conformity. They preach the Party line that by virtue of its selfless past sacrifices in the cause of defending socialism, the Red Army has earned the leading role as the benevolent big brother of the WTO, and it rightfully serves as the chief arbiter of what is best for all members of the alliance. This view of reality has long been offensive to Eastern European sensibilities, but previously leadership elites toadied to the Soviet line to maintain their grip on power. Now that regimes with popular legitimacy are beginning to emerge, the system is dissolving. It is now clear that the first loyalty

of each national army is to its country and its people, not to the Communist Party.¹⁴

At present, neither the Soviet Union nor its WTO allies have a clear vision of how the relationship should evolve. But as the political process unfolds, each individual NSWP state will begin to define its own limits of what it perceives as a desirable and tolerable degree of military integration with the Soviet Union. In forming the broad outlines of its security relationship with the Soviet Union, the leadership of each nation will be forced to make four key decisions.

The first will be to determine an acceptable level of Soviet troop presence in the host country. At least two NSWP states have already made the determination that the optimum number of Soviet troops on their soil is zero. The Czechs took the lead in this area in December by proposing that all 73,500 Soviet troops comprising the Central Group of Forces be withdrawn. In January, Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier declared that Prague will push the Soviets to complete the withdrawal by the end of this year.¹⁵ A few weeks later the Hungarians followed suit by proposing that the 50,000 to 60,000 Soviet troops comprising the Southern Group of Forces also be withdrawn "this year or by 1991 at the latest." Foreign Minister Ferenc Somogyi unequivocally averred "there are no reasons, be they of a political, military-security or arms control character, to justify the stationing of foreign troops on Hungarian territory."¹⁶

The Poles have also expressed a desire for additional Soviet troop withdrawals from their territory above and beyond those envisioned under

the unilateral conventional force reductions. But so far they have demonstrated a greater willingness to be patient, deferring to Moscow's request that further reductions take place within the framework of the CFE arms control process. Solidarity leader Lech Walesa has echoed the Hungarian and Czech demands for a complete Soviet troop withdrawal, but the Mazowiecki government was quick to issue an official disclaimer, affirming that Walesa was only stating his personal opinion.¹⁷

From a Soviet perspective, this is an alarming trend. But it will be difficult for Moscow to avoid or even significantly delay compliance with their allies' requests. The joint declaration by the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany and Poland which admitted that the 1968 intervention was "interference in the internal affairs of sovereign Czechoslovakia" completed the delegitimization of the Soviet presence not only in Czechoslovakia, but throughout Eastern Europe. During the "corresponding bilateral consultations" held in January and February, the Soviets attempted to reach an agreement "on the basis of the understanding that the solution of this issue should be linked to the current process of disarmament in Europe."¹⁸ However, the Czechs and Hungarians were adamant in their demand that troop withdrawals begin immediately, and the Kremlin grudgingly acceded to a complete pullout of all Soviet forces by 30 June 1991.¹⁹

The second decision will involve the conduct of joint military exercises. Currently the Red Army conducts joint military exercises with its NSWP counterparts on a regular basis. In 1987 and 1988, the WTO held 36 announced exercises which exceeded the Stockholm Accord notification

limit of 13,000 soldiers (NATO's total was 30). In keeping with the principle of isolating the NSWP allies from each other and building a series of stovepiped military links to Moscow, the vast majority of these exercises were bilateral in nature. Since 1981, the WTO has conducted large scale maneuvers involving the Soviet Union and more than one NSWP country on only two occasions. In addition to improving combat readiness, these exercises are designed to reinforce alliance compatibility and reliability by furthering the integration of national military forces into the Soviet wartime command and control structure.²⁰ The new regimes in Eastern Europe will have to decide what level of participation in WTO exercises is appropriate. Given budgetary constraints and the current mood of the people, it is likely that the number and frequency of WTO exercises will decline significantly over the next few years. Hungary has already requested that the Southern Group of Forces stop all training for the next three months.²¹ If the Czech and Hungarian governments are successful in achieving their goal of a complete Soviet troop withdrawal, it seems rather doubtful that they would invite the Red Army back on their territory to conduct maneuvers.

The third decision will concern reforming the WTO officer education system. At present, the vast majority of NSWP officers are members of the Communist Party and their career progression pattern is structured in such a way that in order to be successful and rise through the ranks, an officer must prove himself in the WTO military education training system. Attendance at a mid-career service academy is a virtual prerequisite for advancement to field grade rank and those who attend one of the 16 Soviet service academies gain a distinct edge in the selection process for key

command and staff assignments. The prestigious Voroshilov General Staff Academy is at the pinnacle of this hierarchy. Voroshilov alumni form an elite within the elite and occupy virtually all the top level positions in the defense ministry, general staff and field commands. The path to success is clear, and a majority of the candidates for selection to attend a Soviet service academy are volunteers. Not surprisingly, the system tends to produce officers who are valued for their political reliability at least as much as for their technical military proficiency. Obviously, the new regimes in Eastern Europe will wish to significantly curtail the amount of influence Moscow currently exerts in the process of determining which officers receive promotions and key assignments. Some states will probably choose to sever this tie with the Soviet Union, at least temporarily. Others will continue to send their officers to Soviet service academies, but a Soviet degree will no longer be a guaranteed ticket to the top.²²

The fourth decision will involve defense production. In this area, there are hard economic choices that will have to be made. Defense plants provide jobs and sometimes generate hard currency export income from clients like India, Syria, Libya and Iraq. And there are technological considerations as well. The Eastern European states are likely to remain dependent on Moscow for certain items of military hardware such as sophisticated missiles or modern combat aircraft because they lack a sufficiently developed technical-industrial base to manufacture this equipment on their own. However, it seems likely that in the future the NSWP defense production industry will increasingly assert its independence from the dictates of the Soviet defense ministries. This is because the

defense ministries frequently try to conduct business with the allies on a highly favorable basis for the USSR in an effort to generate a healthy profit which will justify and subsidize the activities of various Soviet weapons industries. The defense ministries seldom bother to keep the allies informed about the rate of progress in their arms development programs. When a new generation weapon system is ready for deployment, they suddenly foist it upon the allies and charge an inflated market price. Even systems like the T-72 main battle tank which are licensed for production within the bloc are subject to price gouging because the Soviets frequently overcharge for production rights and research and development costs as well as for subsystems and materials. Needless to say, the arbitrary price hikes which characterize this weapons procurement system wreak havoc on a centrally planned economy and provide the NSWP states with a powerful incentive to produce as many of their own weapons as possible. To a considerable degree, they have already moved in this direction, producing almost all their own trucks, light armored vehicles and small arms. But to avoid the exhausting economic drain caused by dependence on the Soviet weapons monopoly, it is imperative that they take further steps towards self-sufficiency in defense production.²³

The second broad category of change involves the restructuring of national defense. As the Eastern European states begin to decouple themselves from the Soviet security sphere, they will be forced to define the limits of their legitimate national security needs. In the past, the Soviet Union played a dominant role in determining the number of divisions each WTO member was required to maintain in order to fulfill its mission in the overall alliance strategy. But today each state will have to

determine its own security requirements. Obviously, as the Eastern European regimes become more independent, they also assume more responsibility. The less integration with the Soviet defense establishment, the greater degree of self-sufficiency required.

In the political arena, the Finnish model has been raised on a number of occasions. Perhaps the Finns can provide a viable option for military development as well. Their armed forces are small but relatively well-equipped and respected as a potent fighting force capable of fiercely resisting a potential invader. Given the size of the economy, their defense industry is highly developed. Moreover, their political position allows them to negotiate with Moscow for military hardware which can not be produced indigenously on a more or less equal basis, resulting in arms deals which benefit both sides.²⁴

Ironically, Gorbachev's policies have served as a catalyst for events which have helped convince the nations of Eastern Europe that their national security interests are not synonymous with those of the Soviet Union. Just as the realization that Soviet troops would not intervene dramatically undermined the legitimacy of the old Communist regimes, the very success of Gorbachev's efforts to reduce the level of military confrontation in Europe has led to a disintegration of the defense consensus within the Warsaw Pact. In December 1988, most western defense analysts concurred in the view that one of the primary aims of Gorbachev's unilateral conventional force reductions was to foment NATO disunity by attacking the political base of support for current levels of defense spending and the completion of selected force modernization programs.

From a Soviet perspective, this peace campaign has been highly successful, as a number of NATO countries are considering or have already adopted unilateral measures which reduce the level of combat readiness.²⁵ However, observers on both sides of the iron curtain overestimated the ability of the Soviet Union to immunize its allies from the salutary effects of peace breaking out all over Europe. Today it appears as if Gorbachev has been hoist with his own petard, as several Eastern European states are in the process of introducing their own unilateral measures to both reduce defense spending and downgrade the level of their armed forces' combat readiness.

Recently Miklos Nemeth, the Chairman of the Hungarian Council of Ministers revealed that in addition to the previously announced 9 percent cut in defense spending, Hungary plans to make a further reduction of 20-25 percent by the end of 1991. Hungary also intends to reduce the length of compulsory military service from 18 to 12 months and to re-deploy its ground forces to positions which provide an all-around border defense.²⁶ Less than two weeks later, Czechoslovakia followed suit when the newly appointed Defense Minister, Colonel General Miroslav Vacek announced the government's plan to shorten the term of compulsory military service from two years to 18 months and to reduce the number of active reserves by 90,000 to about 200,000. In addition, he announced that the government intends to begin dismantling fortifications along its borders with Austria and West Germany.²⁷ The Poles have also dropped hints about the possibility of some sort of unilateral action to reduce the defense burden on the economy, but they are somewhat more circumspect in this regard, as their territory is at once more geostrategically important and

more easily accessible to Soviet forces stationed in the western military districts of the Soviet Union. But even East Germany appears to be weighing possible options for scaling back its defense commitments. Defense Minister Theodor Hoffman has declared that "the National People's Army is on the brink of far-reaching military reform" and Communist Party chief Gregor Gysi has proposed that both Germanys cut their armies in half within a year, eventually leading to the withdrawal of all NATO and WTO troops from German territory by the end of the decade.²⁸

The third broad category of change involves a fundamental shift in the military balance of power in Europe. NATO has never been manned and equipped at a level of combat readiness high enough to pose a credible offensive threat to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. But the WTO has long been a defensive alliance with a patently offensive strategy. The massive preponderance of combat units and military hardware on the WTO side of the ledger has traditionally provided Moscow with the tools to wage large scale offensive conventional warfare if the need to do so arose. But today the press of ongoing political events has drastically eroded the capability of the WTO to conduct sustained combat operations of any type, and some observers have already declared the alliance functionally dead, describing it as nothing more than an impotent empty shell.

The debate over the ability of the WTO to conduct theater offensive operations in Western Europe is not a new one. For years, analysts convinced that the NSWP states will fight if called upon have arrayed their arguments against those who hold the view that the NSWP allies are a dubious threat at best.²⁹ But the focus of this argument has always been

the issue of reliability. The crux of the matter seemed to revolve around the question of how well the allies would fight and how long, especially if the overall WTO offensive did not achieve unqualified success in the early going. However, now the key issue is no longer reliability, but availability. Today it seems doubtful that any of the six NSWP allies would answer the bell in a wartime scenario involving even a limited WTO offensive against NATO.

At present there are 27 Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions located in Eastern Europe (17 in the GDR, 5 in Czechoslovakia, 3 in Hungary and 2 in Poland). Assuming that the unilateral conventional force reductions are completed on schedule, this number will decline to 24 by the end of this year. In East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary there are currently 13 tank and 22 motorized rifle divisions for a total of 35 NSWP maneuver divisions. By the end of 1990, this number is scheduled to decline to approximately 29 divisions. From this simple analysis, it is readily apparent that over half of the WTO's combat divisions stationed in Europe are supplied by the NSWP allies. Obviously the absence of these forces in a wartime situation would seriously degrade the capability of the WTO to conduct any military operations against NATO, let alone a theater conventional offensive.³⁰ However, I believe that it is somewhat premature to declare that the Warsaw Pact is now nothing more than an empty shell. The forces in existence still represent a powerful military capability that could be put to use if political circumstances were to change. But more importantly, alliance membership still holds intrinsic political and military utility for the majority of NSWP states. This becomes evident if we examine the three primary military functions of the alliance.

Two of the functions appear to have faded in importance rather dramatically. The first, invading Western Europe and defeating NATO, no longer seems relevant. The capability to conduct large scale offensive operations has evaporated. The new regimes in Eastern Europe will not support such a venture and the Soviets lack sufficient combat power to go it alone. Similarly, it has become impossible for the alliance to perform its second function of providing a multinational framework for interference in the internal affairs of an individual WTO member. A joint intervention resembling the "fraternal assistance" rendered to Czechoslovakia in 1968 is now almost inconceivable. Polish and Hungarian officials have made it clear that in addition to transforming the WTO "from an alliance of party leaderships into a genuine alliance of states," they intend to amend the treaty charter and various bilateral agreements to "make it impossible for Warsaw Pact forces to interfere in domestic affairs".³¹

The third function, providing for the common defense against a NATO attack, has never been taken very seriously by anyone familiar with the military correlation of forces in Central Europe. But today the concept has taken on new meaning now that the question of German reunification has resurfaced as a bona fide political issue rather than simply an exercise in intellectual debate. The Poles in particular feel threatened by the prospect of a reunified Germany. Wojciech Lamentowicz, a close adviser to Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, has publicly confirmed that "Poland has an interest in being in an alliance with a great power in a time of rapid and uncertain change."³² The Czechs also seem concerned. In an obvious reference to Hitler's 1938 dismemberment of his country, Prime Minister

Marian Calfa stated that Czechoslovakia has "had its experiences" with the Germans. When questioned about whether Czechoslovakia would remain a member of the WTO, President Vaclav Havel waffled somewhat, but reaffirmed the official position that "if a totalitarian system is dismantled, some peculiarities will remain."³³ Even the Hungarians, who have openly declared neutrality as their ultimate goal, are cautiously realistic. Deputy Foreign Minister Ferenc Somogyi has expressed the official view that "no single country is interested in seeing Hungary break away under the present circumstances" and "we consider our membership in the Warsaw Pact as an integral part of the European setup."³⁴ It seems axiomatic that the question of German reunification will be a dominant factor in determining the future security structure of Eastern Europe. Whatever form a reunified German state ultimately assumes will be key in either assuaging or exacerbating Eastern European fears about resurgent German militarism. Moreover, as Soviet influence wanes and bloc unity continues to disintegrate, perceptions of the threat will probably differ from country to country as will the corresponding level of risk that each nation is willing to assume in its national defense posture. In the near term, the pace of the reunification process may very well dictate how far the NSWP allies move towards neutrality in the coming months. It seems unlikely that they will completely discard existing security arrangements before the dust has settled on the German issue.

At present, the armies of the WTO seem to be in a state of suspended animation, incapable of conducting operations above division level, where routine troop training and garrison activities continue. So far there have been no announced changes or cancellations reported in the annual WTO

exercises scheduled to begin this spring, but there is a definite sense that the military hierarchy of the Soviet Union and WTO is waiting for the political dust to clear before making any substantive decisions. As Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev put it in an interview on Italian television "we are trying to understand what is going on."³⁵

In an effort to slow down the pace of change, Moscow has reversed its long standing position that both military alliances be disbanded. The prospect that their half of the bargain could be achieved rather quickly has caused them to do an embarrassing public flip-flop on the issue.³⁶ Exacerbating the situation has been the tendency for public figures such as people's deputies Yevgeni Primakov and Nikolai Shislin to express their personal opinion that the Soviet Union "would not interfere" if Hungary or Poland decides to leave the Warsaw Pact.³⁷

Clearly, the Soviets were unprepared for the swift onrush of events that brought 1989 to a close and they are currently casting about for new ideas which will form the basis of future WTO relations. The closest that they have come so far is a rather ill-defined theory presented by Mikhail Bezrukov and Andrei Kortunov. The new concept is "politization," or the gradual evolution from "monolithic unity" to "harmonious variety" in WTO affairs.³⁸ This vague formulation does not offer the Kremlin leadership much in the way of a blueprint for WTO policy in the near future. More importantly, it seems to indicate that the Soviets are not yet ready to face the reality that Eastern Europe will soon become a genuine buffer zone between East and West rather than the front line of the Red Army.

It is still too soon, however, to think of the WTO in the past tense. Moscow's ability to take unilateral military action remains. Such a scenario is highly unlikely given the probable Western reaction and Gorbachev's pressing problems at home.³⁹ But the mere presence of large numbers of Soviet troops in several Eastern European countries provides a braking influence on those proponents of change who might be inclined to push for the early dissolution of the alliance. In addition, the specter of a reunified Germany could provide a powerful bogeyman for Soviet and Eastern European elites to use in an effort to rekindle interest in security arrangements which are truly defensive. Further, it is not lost on the Soviets and the Eastern Europeans that the tighter they draw the GDR into the alliance, the longer it will take for German reunification to come about. But probably the most important factor arguing for the continued existence of the WTO is genuine mutual interest. Despite the recent divergence between Soviet and Eastern European security interests, a considerable degree of congruence still remains. Until the issue of German reunification is resolved, the situation in Eastern Europe is unstable, and virtually everyone in the bloc recognizes the fact that stability is the key to economic health. The speed of change militates against stability and against most positive outcomes. No one wants a restoration of interwar Central Europe, when border disputes and ethnic clashes were common. And no one wants the status quo to disintegrate into violence and chaos. Few people fail to realize that the WTO is one of the few organizations which provides a modicum of stability to the present situation.

Of course, if German reunification is achieved quickly and amiably without posing a threat to Eastern Europe, the WTO will probably dissolve

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Of course, if German reunification is achieved quickly and amiably without posing a threat to Eastern Europe, the WTO will probably dissolve

in form as well as function. If the non-Communist governments which are likely to be elected this spring do not perceive a threat, there would seem to be far greater political utility in declaring neutrality than in maintaining a formal security relationship with the Soviet Union. Radical changes have already taken place, and this process will undoubtedly continue.

In order to survive the transition, the WTO will have to dramatically reorder its priorities so that they are much more in line with the real, rather than the rhetorical, definition of "reasonable sufficiency." In addition, multinational relations will have to become significantly more pluralized and be restructured on a basis of genuine equality among members. Is this evolution possible? I think so, largely because at this juncture, the Soviet Union has little choice in the matter. The political and economic costs associated with shoring up the crumbling edifice of Communist power in Eastern Europe were judged to be too high last September. The costs involved in an attempt to reverse the democratization process now would be increased exponentially. Further, until a nonthreatening form of reunified Germany is achieved, it is in the best interest of all members of the alliance to retain some aspects of the existing security arrangement. The common goal is to achieve economic revitalization, and this goal is jeopardized if the alliance is disbanded or allowed to wither and die prematurely. Therefore, I believe that all the WTO nations involved are likely to work hard to restructure the alliance in such a way that it remains a viable institution for the time being and for as long as it takes to resolve the issue of German reunification.

CHAPTER FIVE

WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?

HOW MILITARY REFORM FITS INTO THE BIG PICTURE

HOW MILITARY REFORM FITS INTO THE BIG PICTURE

In the preceeding chapters I have examined four separate components of the military reform process: the relationship between the Party, the Army and society; changes in military doctrine; efforts to cut defense spending and convert military production capacity to peaceful use; and the altered character and capability of the Warsaw Pact as a military alliance. This provides us with the analytical framework necessary to perform the next step of analysis- considering the military reform process as a unified whole and examining how it fits into the overall scheme of economic, social, and political reform in the Soviet Union. It is readily apparent that military reform does not occur in a vacuum. But the key question remains. How and to what extent does military reform affect society, and more importantly, how and to what extent does the overall reform process affect the military?

Perhaps the most obvious overarching theme that can be derived from the preceeding discussion of changes in Soviet defense and national security matters is the fact that the military reform process is incredibly complex. The sheer scope and ambition of the ongoing effort is most impressive, and its comprehensive nature tends to magnify the degree of complexity considerably. Virtually all aspects of the way in which the Soviet Union goes about defining and satisfying its security needs have been affected, and it is difficult to isolate and evaluate these changes without falling victim to the analytical pitfalls of simplification and

generalization. Moreover, the military reform process is inextricably linked with Gorbachev's overall program of political, social, and economic reform. Each component of the reform process has its own dynamic, but the success or failure of specific programs within each component often has a significant direct and indirect impact on the others. In this environment, it is impossible to consider military reform in isolation, because it is firmly embedded in the overall panoply of Soviet reform.

I believe that 1989 was a pivotal year in the process of wedding military reform to the overall reform process. In previous years, it was possible to draw a clear line between efforts at military reform and those aimed at economic reform. But during the past 12-15 months, the distinction between military and economic reform has become progressively blurred to the point where it is no longer useful to attempt to describe them as separate processes. At the beginning of the year, Gorbachev seemed to be firmly in control of the reform agenda. He was riding the political momentum created by his dramatic speech at the United Nations, and he seemed able to dictate the pace of events both domestically and internationally. It seemed logical to assume that the costs of reform in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe would be limited and manageable, and that both the rate and scope of change could be reasonably controlled from the Kremlin. But the hopes for a gradual process of peaceful evolutionary change were dashed in April in a spasm of gratuitous violence in the capital of Soviet Georgia, Tbilisi.¹

It is impossible to quantifiably measure the amount of prestige and legitimacy lost by the armed forces and the regime as a result of this

incident, but it would not be an exaggeration to say that the impact was devastating. Admittedly, the level of trust and support for the Party and the Army was already slowly ebbing away, but I believe that this event was a decisive turning point in convincing the populace of the basic, intrinsic criminality of the authorities. Prior to the Tbilisi massacre, glasnost had been relatively successful in drumming up support for perestroika, or at least in guaranteeing the passive acquiescence of the populace to a program of radical reform. The people seemed to accept the distinction between the "good socialism" of Lenin and Gorbachev and the "bad socialism" of Stalin and Brezhnev. However, in the aftermath of Tbilisi, public sentiment increasingly came to embrace the notion that all Communists past and present are responsible for the country's predicament and can not be trusted.²

The Tbilisi incident was critical because it cast a glaring spotlight on the regime's fundamental inability to formulate and implement appropriate solutions for the various incipient social and political crises facing the country. The year had not started out auspiciously, as the earthquake in Armenia had revealed a number of deficiencies in the government's ability to serve the people. The general public perception was that the level of damage and suffering was needlessly high because of lax construction standards and the basic inefficiency and incompetence of the recovery effort. The regime was able to deflect most of this criticism however, because the earthquake could be explained as an unforeseeable act of God.³

But after the Tbilisi massacre, the remainder of the year degenerated into a series of crises which forced the Soviet leadership into a defensive and reactive mode of policy making from which it has yet to recover. In early June, two trains collided following a gas pipeline explosion near Chelyabinsk, killing over 600 people. Then in the Fergana region of Uzbekistan, ethnic Uzbeks went on a six week rampage, killing at least 100 minority Meskhetian Turks. During the same period, in the city of Novy Uzen in Kazakhstan, there were severe outbreaks of violence, including a pogrom against local Armenians, Azeris and Lezgins. In August, a series of strikes broke out in the Donbass and Kuzbass regions of the Ukraine, and later in Vorkuta in Siberia. This was followed by ethnic violence in Georgia directed against Abkhazians and Ossetians and by large-scale rioting in Kishinev, the capital of Moldavia. Meanwhile, as the year drew to a close, Communist regimes in Eastern Europe began to fall like overripe fruit, and the situation in the disputed regions of Armenia and Azerbaijan degenerated into virtual civil war. The fallout from this conflict reverberated throughout the Soviet Union and sparked still more ethnic violence, the worst occurring in Dushanbe, the capital of Tadzhikistan. With the current crisis in Lithuania, the prospects of reversing this trend appear to be rather slim. In short, it seems that things have gone badly awry and will continue to do so.⁴

Recently a number of speakers in the Supreme Soviet have warned that the impending economic crisis of 1990 poses a grave threat to Soviet society. They assert that the failing economy presents a clear danger to Communist authority, just as the Kaiser's armies did in 1918, and that

failure to take decisive measures soon will result in economic collapse and chaos.⁵

The Brest-Litovsk comparison is inviting, largely because the near term economic outlook is decidedly grim. Even before the work stopped in the Donbass and Kuzbass regions this summer, strikes had already cost the nation the equivalent of 15,000 man days per day of work time lost. In the energy industry, oil production is running 2.5 percent lower than last year and coal production is down 5.5 percent. This in turn affects others industrial ministries causing "a very serious shortfall from the point of view of the planned targets."⁶

To make matters worse, the transportation network is near the breaking point. In January there were 108 ships carrying 2.63 million tons of imported grain waiting to be unloaded, with another 4 million tons due to arrive by the end of the month. In 1988, the Soviet Union had to pay approximately \$32 million in penalties for these delays.⁷ In Leningrad alone there are currently over a thousand rail cars stacked up waiting to be unloaded for a week or more. As a result, tons of badly needed produce spoils and wholesale cargo theft has become widespread.⁸

The energy shortfall and the transportation crisis merely serve to exacerbate an already critical situation. The Soviet budget deficit is comparatively four times greater than the U.S. budget deficit and there are over 43 million people living at a subsistence level of less than 75 rubles a month.⁹ Taking into account a hidden inflation rate of 8-10 percent,¹⁰ the economy is contracting and there is little immediate

prospect of reversing this trend. It is clear that the Soviet Union is already in the midst of a full-blown recession and is facing the distinct possibility of sporadic or perhaps even complete economic breakdown.

Obviously, the domestic situation in the Soviet Union affects the armed forces and their ability to effect reform. The purpose of the preceding digression is to demonstrate that continuing ethnic tensions and the lack of progress towards economic reform are serious problems which will have a major impact on the Soviet military. This point is key to understanding the future of the military reform process and in assessing the overall level of combat readiness of the Soviet armed forces.

Western defense analysts have long been aware of the fact that there are a variety of internal factors which tend to degrade the effectiveness of the Soviet armed forces. The armed forces are a reflection of Soviet society as a whole, and they tend to suffer from a number of problems derived from pervasive social ills and common human frailties. Some of these problems are shared by the West. For instance, like a number of Western European countries, the Soviet Union faces a demographic crisis caused by a declining draft age cohort. And like their NATO counterparts, high ranking Soviet officers often complain about the poor physical conditioning of the recruits that they receive and the increase in "pacifist sentiment."¹¹ But in addition to these universal problems, the Red Army also suffers from a variety of maladies which are uniquely Soviet.

One of the most severe problems is drunkenness. Soviet servicemen are infamous for both their ingenuity and lack of judgement in finding substances containing alcohol which can be ingested or imbibed to induce inebriation. Their willingness to drink almost anything is quite remarkable, as recently attested by the hospitalization of 22 sailors at the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky naval hospital after consuming massive quantities of antifreeze.¹²

Another major problem is the lack of discipline in accounting for weapons, ammunition and military equipment. The recent spate of ethnic disputes has revealed an appalling degree of laxity in the enforcement of standard arms control regulations and procedures. Evidently, it is not uncommon for individual soldiers to sell or give away their personal weapons, and the degree of control exercised over unit level equipment does not appear to be much tighter. Insurgent weapons caches discovered by Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) troops in Armenia and Azerbaijan contained automatic weapons, mines, explosives, sophisticated time-delay detonation fuzes, grenade launchers and even anti-tank guns.¹³

Perhaps the most serious problem is the lack of homogeneity in the conscript force structure. Actually, a whole host of problems derive from the ethnic composition of the Soviet Armed Forces. First, there is a significant language barrier. Ethnic Russians dominate the officer corps, but account for only 43 percent of the nation's pool of young men subject to conscription. Representatives of over 40 different nationalities currently serve in the army, and less than half of the non-Russian soldiers are rated as "satisfactory in linguistic readiness." The figure

for conscripts from some of the central asian republics is even lower, around 25 percent.¹⁴ Second, there is a wide variance in education level. Many non-Russian conscripts come from areas where the school system is substandard. Even those who speak passable Russian are often deficient in basic skills and require extensive training to perform rudimentary military tasks that are taken for granted in the West, such as driving a truck.¹⁵ Third, there is a considerable amount of ethnic tension and violence. The Red Army has a long tradition of dedovshchina, or brutal hazing of new draftees by career soldiers and soldiers in their second year of service. This phenomena is by no means limited by racial prejudices, as it is widespread among ethnic Russians as well. However, the intensity of the hazing appears to reach new heights when ethnicity is involved. Central asian soldiers in particular appear to receive extremely harsh treatment. Ethnic Russians use degrading racial epithets such as "wood chip" and "top knot" to refer to these soldiers, and subject them to brutal physical beatings.¹⁶

In the wake of the ethnic strife and economic disintegration that has defined domestic politics in the Soviet Union during the past year, the problems afflicting the armed forces appear to be growing progressively worse. It comes as no surprise that the military is not immune to the centrifugal forces battering Soviet society, but few observers predicted that the effects would be quite as severe as they have been. For instance, there appears to have been a substantial increase in the number of incidents in which non-Russian recruits were subjected to severe beatings, occasionally resulting in serious injury or death. Although some reports can be dismissed as sensationalism, it is clear that the dramatic

increase in the level of senseless ethnic violence in the country as a whole is being matched by a concurrent increase in the number of ethnic incidents in the armed forces.¹⁷

In addition, new problems are cropping up. There has been a sharp increase in the number of Soviet youths evading the draft. Traditionally, on those rare occasions when Soviet military spokesmen cited figures on the number of draft evaders, the figures were usually in the 200 to 500 range. Today however, various high ranking officers have admitted that the problem is reaching epidemic proportions. The Chief of the General Staff General of the Army Moiseev recently stated that "in the fall draft more than 6500 people refused to serve in the army."¹⁸ The actual number is probably considerably higher. Lieutenant General Ter-Grigoryants has noted that more than 1500 youths "failed to present themselves" for induction in Georgia alone.¹⁹

Even more ominous from the high command's point of view is the recent tendency in the non-Russian republics for the local populace to disrupt the draft. General Ter-Grigoryants observes that in Azerbaijan, about 10,000 people demonstrated outside an induction center in Baku, preventing military officials from conducting the draft.²⁰ A related problem is the dependence of the Ministry of Defense on local authorities to assist in conducting the induction process and to enforce the laws concerning the draft. General Moiseev complains that resistance to the draft frequently occurs "with the direct support of the local organs of power" and he notes that prosecution of apprehended draft evaders by local authorities is dilatory at best. During the fall induction period, only 2

of 259 draft evaders in the Baltic republics were convicted and only one of 1146 in the three Transcaucasian republics.²¹

The growing antimilitary sentiment in the non-Russian republics has also resulted in a considerably higher desertion rate. The problem was particularly acute during the ethnic fighting in January when dozens of Armenian and Azeri soldiers deserted the Red Army to go fight alongside their nationalist comrades.²² The situation in that region has now stabilized somewhat, but the increased incidence of desertion throughout the armed forces shows no signs of abating. General Moiseev recently revealed that "in the first ten days of March this year, 1188 people deserted from the armed forces, of which 641 were from the Transcaucasus: 178 in Georgia, 300 in Azerbaijan and 163 in Armenia."²³ Currently most of the media attention is focused on the estimated 900 Lithuanian deserters who have responded to their government's formal decree that "the laws of other states are not valid on Lithuanian territory" and "Lithuanian youth are not subject to the USSR Law on Compulsory Military Service of 12 October 1967."²⁴

Probably the most serious manifestation of antimilitary sentiment is the upsurge in violence directed against ethnic Russians serving in non-Russian republics. Even before the situation flared out of control in January, there was a large MVD troop presence in the Transcaucasian republics. There were 1800 soldiers stationed in Armenia, 3600 in Azerbaijan, 5500 in Nagorno-Karabakh and 3500 in Georgia.²⁵ These soldiers were often the target of stones and random sniper fire, not to mention the object of scorn and resentment by the general populace.²⁶

Colonel General Yuri Shatalin, the chief of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Internal Security Forces described the effects of occupation duty on his troops this way:

Ordinary soldiers, warrant officers and officers do have a limit to their physical strength and morale. It is okay for the regular officers, but as far as the 18 to 20 year olds are concerned, the strain on them is very difficult to bear.²⁷

Now the situation has grown worse. Major General Yevgeni Nechayev, the deputy chief of MVD forces has confirmed the rumor that servicemen have been disappearing in the region. Specifically, he mentions the case of Sergeant D. Kozlov, who "having fallen behind his detail" was "brutally stabbed to death" by 5 youths.²⁸ The media have been quick to draw the Afghanistan analogy. Journalists are sympathetic to the serviceman's plight and interviews with soldiers stationed in the region reveal a high level of anxiety, fear and confusion. "It is as if this is not the Soviet Union, as if one is not at home, as if this is going on somewhere abroad, not in our country." The commentators conclude that "the protectors need protecting. The Army itself needs protecting."²⁹

Evidently this phenomenon is not confined to the Transcaucasian republics. Major General Yuri Balakhonov, commander of MVD toops in Tadzhikistan, described the action in Dushanbe:

The extremists' tactics boiled down to stoning the soldiers, then trying to pull soldiers out of formation using boat hooks and drag them into the crowd in order to capture their sub-machineguns. Also used were metal coils, which were thrown over servicemen... Those people who splashed acid on or hurled broken glass at soldiers' faces cannot be described as lovers of the truth.³⁰

Even in the relatively peaceful Baltic republics there have been reports of sporadic gunfire and incidents where Russian soldiers are spat upon or beaten.³¹ Nor have the families of Russian servicemen been

immune from the violent fallout generated by increasing antimilitary and anti-Russian sentiment. They have been the targets of indiscriminate gunfire and have been the subjects of numerous incidents of intimidation and harassment directed against the ethnic Russian population stationed in the non-Russian republics.³²

Not surprisingly, the senior military leadership frequently rails against these "negative phenomena" blaming their emergence on the "lies and slander of the mass media" which "blacken the history of our armed forces, their combat path and their activities today by undermining the honor and prestige of military service."³³ This sort of fulminating, bombastic response is typical of high ranking Soviet officers and it gives one cause to wonder about their capability to grasp the fundamental nature of the present situation, much less find adequate solutions for resolving it. A case in point is the Minister of Defense, General of the Army Yazov, who fondly recalls his role in "liberating the Soviet Baltic region from Fascist aggressors" this way:

I remember well how joyfully they greeted us in the cities and settlements. I remember the men of my regiment who laid down their lives on Baltic soil. Some 275,000 Soviet servicemen gave their lives for the freedom of the Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian peoples. How can you erase that from the people's memory?³⁴

It is possible that such statements are merely propaganda, but I think it is more likely that General Yazov and a majority of the military professionals of his generation genuinely do not comprehend the present situation and its implications. They are simply incapable of conceiving why they would be perceived as occupiers rather than liberators. They can not fathom the depth of hostility and resentment harbored by the non-Russian nationalities towards continued Soviet troop presence on their territory.

Moreover, it appears that the rise in antimilitary sentiment is not limited to the non-Russian republics. Over the past year the status and prestige of the armed forces has plummeted under the pressure of a rising torrent of negative media coverage. The Afghanistan experience has ripped an open wound in the national psyche, and this will take some time to heal.³⁵ At present, the people are sick and tired of armed conflict and appear generally unwilling to support military solutions. The depth of this popular sentiment was demonstrated in January when the Ministry of Defense attempted to conduct a call-up of reserve forces to assist in stabilizing the situation in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Initially, the call-up was conducted in secret, but it is impossible to conceal such an operation for very long, and the word got out quickly. It immediately generated a severe antimilitary backlash among the civilian populace, and General Yazov was forced to rescind the order less than 24 hours after it became public. Soviet central television didn't do the Ministry of Defense any favors, as it conducted interviews with the mothers of the affected servicemen. These angry women felt free to express their opinions:

I will not give up my son to the Soviet Army! I will not give him over. We keep on enduring, enduring, enduring. How long must we endure? Why are they gathering our boys at night?"³⁶

It is readily apparent that emotions were running high. But the real question is whether or not this type of sentiment is affecting the armed forces as well. Apparently so- there is considerable evidence to suggest that the lack of enthusiasm for military action is shared by service-members, including the officer corps. They seem to be increasingly preoccupied with social concerns affecting their personal welfare, and resentful of the "malevolent attitude" of a society which considers them to be "nothing more than parasites."³⁷ General Yazov shed some light on

the depth of this problem in a recent speech before a group of officers at the Moscow All-Service Assembly:

It should be said that some officers have recently been fulfilling their Party duties without enthusiasm and losing their political fighting qualities. Approximately 30 percent of those who have decided to depart the officer corps are Communists. There have appeared among our officers quite a few grumblers and momma's boys who fear the fresh wind that blows around distant garrisons and domestic disorder.³⁸

THE IMPACT ON THE ARMED FORCES

The primary purpose of the preceeding discussion is to demonstrate that there are a wide variety of diverse factors which contribute to a nation's ability to wage war, many of them outside the realm of what is normally considered in calculating the military balance of power. Obviously, the overall combat capability of a nation's military is more than a simple function of force size and composition. Historically, it has been advantageous to have a bigger army and more weapons than one's opponent, but it is no guarantee of victory or security. There are other, hidden forces at work which often serve to negate significant advantages in numbers. In the Soviet Union's case, I believe that the achievement of economic reform and domestic stability are of paramount importance in determining the overall war fighting potential of the armed forces.

In my view, at present the process of military reform is being swallowed up by more urgent and pressing concerns within the Soviet Union. The core value of the program has subtly shifted from the positive goal of restructuring to the negative goal of averting disintegration and chaos. The army is being pulled into the whirlpool of impending economic collapse and growing ethnic turmoil, and there appears to be little that the high

command can do to prevent these forces from having a severe negative impact on the military's capability to defend the nation and wage war.

But this does not mean that military reform will be put on hold. On the contrary, there are a number of prominent figures in the Soviet Union who argue that the process should be accelerated. They aver that defense spending must be cut deeper, and that force structure must be drawn down faster, in order to avert economic implosion.³⁹ More importantly, the political leadership seems committed to staying the course, firm in the belief that it is the only viable alternative available. In my chapter on conversion, I expounded the view that this is not the path that will lead the Soviet people out of their economic wilderness. I believe that much more needs to be done, all of which is beyond the capability or control of the Soviet military.

A FEW FINAL THOUGHTS

Throughout the course of this thesis, I have endeavored to analyze and explain the many changes in the Soviet military under Gorbachev, focusing on the various facets of the military reform process. This has not been an easy task, as the subject at hand is extremely broad, highly complex and often ill-defined. In my opinion, the enormity and complexity of the topic often precludes insightful analysis because it serves as a deterrent to many scholars. This results in two primary analytical approaches, neither of which I find particularly intellectually satisfying. The first is to narrowly confine one's work to a single issue or group of issues at the risk of missing the big picture. The second is to attempt a broad brush analysis of the entire process, which leaves one prone to oversimplification and distortion. I have tried to steer a middle course, hopefully with some success.

I have done a great deal of original research and I have examined the key issues in depth. Moreover, I have risked a number of judgements and conclusions, some rather controversial. In this endeavor, I hope that I have made a significant contribution towards fostering a better understanding of the Soviet military and the ongoing reform process.

NOTES-INTRODUCTION

¹ A complete translated text of the special report appears in the pamphlet Khrushchev, Nikita S. "The Crimes of the Stalin Era" The New Leader (New York, 1962). Analysis of the speech and Khrushchev's reasons for giving it has occupied Sovietologists for decades. For instance, see Tucker, Robert C. The Soviet Political Mind (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1971) pp. 173-202 and Heller, Mikhail and Nekrich, Aleksandr M. Utopia in Power- The History of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the Present (New York: Summit Books, 1982) pp. 529-565. Also of interest are the official memoirs. See Khrushchev, N. Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970). My intent is not to examine the speech or Khrushchev's motives at any length. Rather, I simply wish to note that the speech paved the way for the comprehensive social and economic reforms to follow, and that it was a necessary precondition for implementing a premeditated policy of radical change.

² Pravda 16 February 1957 cited by William G. Rosenberg and Marilyn B. Young Transforming Russia and China: Revolutionary Struggle in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982) p. 268.

NOTES-CHAPTER ONE

¹ The Collected Works of V.I. Lenin (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1969) vol 10, p. 218 & vol 12, 113-114. Cited in Avidar, Yosef The Party and the Army in the Soviet Union (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1983) pp. 9-10.

² Ibid., vol 31, p. 42. Cited in Avidar The Party and the Army in the Soviet Union p. 11.

³ Leonard Schapiro "The Birth of the Red Army" in The Red Army ed., Liddell Hart (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1956) p. 25.

⁴ There is no doubt that the Provisional Government was structurally hobbled by the destruction of the state apparatus concomitant to the tsar's abdication and the unique requirement of having to share power with the soviets. Moreover, the abortive coup attempt by General Kornilov in August provided a tremendous boost to Bolshevik political fortunes at everyone else's expense. However, I believe that the key element was the Provisional Government's moral and psychological reluctance to govern. It is difficult to cite another regime anywhere in the world in this century less concerned with its own survival when confronted with an armed opposition which openly advocates violent revolution. For details on this period, see Heller, Mikhail and Nekrich, Aleksandr M. Utopia in Power- The History of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the Present (New York: Summit Books, 1982) pp. 24-48.

⁵ Robert C. Tucker The Lenin Anthology (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1975) pp. 311-398.

⁶ Albert and Joan Seaton The Soviet Army (New York: New American Library Books, 1987) pp. 35-37; and Geoffrey Hosking The First Socialist Society- A History of the Soviet Union From Within (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1985) p. 59.

⁷ Soviet Government Decrees (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1965) vol 1, p. 352. Cited in Avidar The Party and the Army in the Soviet Union p. 22.

⁸ George F. Kennan Russia and the West (New York: New American Library Books, 1961) pp. 37-51; and Heller and Nekrich Utopia in Power- The History of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the Present p. 52. It is interesting to note that today the official birthday of the Red Army is considered to be 23 February 1918. Supposedly, this is the date when the German advance on Petrograd was halted because "the newly formed Soviet regiments put up stiff resistance to the German invaders" and "the German command was forced to call off the offensive and agree to conclude peace." Few western scholars concur with this version of events, which remains the official version, even in the era of glasnost. See Sibilev, Mikhail A Safeguard of Peace (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1988) pp. 20-21.

⁹ Robert Conquest The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror Famine (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) p. 50.

¹⁰ Heller and Nekrich Utopia in Power- The History of the Soviet

Union from 1917 to the Present pp. 80-82; and Seaton and Seaton The Soviet Army pp. 38-42.

11 For a detailed examination of the development of the Main Political Administration and the evolution of the commissar system, see Colton, Timothy Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1979).

12 Various scholars disagree about the degree of continuity between the tsarist military legacy and the development of the Red Army. I have intentionally left this issue in abeyance as beyond the scope of this paper. For those interested in pursuing this point, I recommend Keep, John L.H. Soldiers of the Tsar: Army and Society in Russia 1462-1874 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) as a starting point. The substantial continuity thesis is argued in Pipes, Richard Survival is Not Enough: Soviet Realities and America's Future (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984). The counter argument appears in Dallin, Alexander "The Uses and Abuses of Russian History" in Soviet Society and Culture 1988 ed., Terry L. Thompson and Richard Sheldon (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1988) pp. 181-194.

13 For instance, see Colonel Petrov, Yu. P. KPSS- rukovoditel i vospitatel krasnoi armii (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1961) and General of the Army Yepisheva, A.A. Partiya i armiya (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskii Literatury, 1977).

14 Whereas Soviet accounts tend to be universally negative, many western authors are effusive with praise, characterizing Trotsky's leadership during the Civil War as "near genius." For instance, see Scott, Harriet Fast and Scott, William F. The Armed Forces of the USSR (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1984) p. 7. Neither of these assessments provides a particularly accurate picture when one examines the evidence. In truth, the Red Army was not a particularly effective fighting force; its major achievement (to Trotsky's credit) was simply remaining in existence and continuing to fight. The splintered nature of the opposition and the advantage of interior lines allowed it to concentrate its forces on one front at a time, usually doing battle with an outmanned and outgunned opponent who suffered from similar morale and discipline problems. Engagements tended to be vast in geographic scope, but very small in terms of men and material. Ultimate Bolshevik victory was by no means assured, particularly during Deniken's offensive in summer 1919. Trotsky's leadership was certainly energetic and competent, perhaps decisive, but not brilliant. The Red Army's first major encounter with a professional army (the Poles) ended in a crushing defeat and the German army had left the field. For additional information, see Benvenuti, Francesco The Bolsheviks and the Red Army 1918-1922 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) pp. 38-64; Marshal Sokolovskiy, V.D. Soviet Military Strategy edited with analysis by H.F. Scott (New York: Crane, Russack & Co, 1975) pp. 120-131; and Dupuy, Ernest R. and Dupuy, Trevor N. The Encyclopedia of Military History (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1970) pp. 991-993.

15 Translated excerpts of the writings of Marshals Frunze, Tukhachevski, Svechin and others can be found in Scott, Harriet Fast and Scott, William F. The Soviet Art of War- Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics

(Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1982).

16 A more detailed discussion of the military debate of the 1920s is contained in Rice, Condoleezza The Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986) pp. 648-676; and in Benvenuti The Bolsheviks and the Red Army 1918-1922 pp. 92-128.

17 Stalin ordered Frunze to the hospital for a minor operation to remove an old ulcer which had scarred over sometime previously. Frunze did not survive this unnecessary surgery, and he was replaced as Commissar of War by Stalin's close associate, Marshal Kliment Voroshilov.

18 For instance, see Daniels, Robert "Stalin's Rise to Dictatorship" in Politics in the Soviet Union ed., Alexander Dallin (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1966) pp. 1-38. While I tend to agree that tactical considerations were more important than theoretical ones, I think it imprudent to argue, as Daniels does, that Stalin only "believed in what was most convenient to his pursuit of power." This interpretation totally discounts the role of ideology and fails to explain why Stalin would continue to doggedly pursue the policy of immediate and complete collectivization even after the ruinous results of this effort were clearly evident. Surely, a purely pragmatic individual with no ideological predispositions would have done otherwise.

19 Hosking The First Socialist Society- A History of the Soviet Union From Within p. 194.

20 Brian Moynahan Claws of the Bear- The History of the Red Army from the Revolution to the Present (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989) pp. 82-88 & 91-118; and Major K.J. Macksey Panzer Division- The Mailed Fist (New York: Ballantine Books, 1968) pp. 62-79.

21 Marshal G.K. Zhukov The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov (New York: Delacroix Press, 1971).

22 Robert V. Daniels A Documentary History of Communism (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1984) vol 1, pp. 294-298. There is a certain element of truth to Stalin's claim. Mobilization of the whole country for total war did indeed result in a rapid expansion of the industrial base and a vastly improved production capability, which was vital to the war effort. However, it is difficult to justify the death and imprisonment of millions of Soviet citizens as a reasonable cost in achieving this goal.

23 Edward N. Luttwak "Gorbachev's Strategy and Ours" Commentary (July 89) vol 88, no 1, pp. 29-36.

24 Condoleezza Rice "The Party, the Military, and Decision Authority in the Soviet Union" World Politics (October 1987) pp. 55-81.

25 Nikita Khrushchev Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970) pp. 513-520 and E.L. Warner III The Defense Policy of the Soviet Union (The Rand Corporation, N-2771-AF, 1989) p. 69.

26 Different sources vary as to the exact timing and scope of the

unilateral troop cuts. In January 1960, Khrushchev claimed that the armed forces had been reduced from 5,763,000 in 1955 to 3,623,000 in 1958. See Holloway, David The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984) p. 35. However, many contemporary Soviet sources refer to a reduction of 1.2 million in 1960. See Kireyev, Alexei "Cost Accounting for Disarmament Economics" New Times (24-30 Jan 89) no 4, pp. 14-17. In general, the discrepancy seems to center more on when the reductions took place than on precisely how many troops were demobilized. The data on divisional deactivation is drawn from Karber, Phillip A. "The Military Impact of the Gorbachev Reductions" Armed Forces Journal International (January 89) pp. 54-55.

27 Given the degree of secrecy which has traditionally shrouded Soviet defense spending and resource allocation, it is impossible to determine precisely what happened to the excess funds generated by Khrushchev's conventional force reductions. The state budget figures released by the Supreme Soviet in December 1964 indicate a savings of 500 million roubles. However, it appears that very little of this money found its way into the hands of the various ministries charged with producing consumer goods. The available evidence strongly suggests that the resources were used to finance Khrushchev's grandiose projects and that a sizeable amount was used to overcome the technical and operational difficulties attendant to creating a nuclear weapons program from scratch. See Avidar The Party and the Army in the Soviet Union pp. 301-317.

28 Ibid., pp. 275-318.

29 My purpose here is not to suggest that Brezhnev was alone in this effort, or even that military support was decisive in determining the outcome of the coup. A wide array of disaffected interests coalesced to topple Khrushchev. What is important here is not the fact that Brezhnev played the military card, but that Khrushchev forfeited his right to play it by alienating the senior military leadership.

30 See Azrael, Jeremy R. The Soviet Civilian Leadership and the Military High Command: 1976-1986 (The Rand Corporation, R-3521-AF, June 1987) and Cockburn, Andrew The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine (New York: Vintage Books, 1984) pp. 80-119.

31 Michael R. Gordon "INF- A Hollow Victory?" Foreign Policy (Fall 1987) pp. 159-179 and Myron Hedin "Moscow's Line on Arms Control" Problems of Communism (May-June 1984) pp. 19-26.

32 There are a number of proponents of totalitarian theory (Arendt 1951, Fainsod 1953, Friedrich 1954, Friedrich and Brzezinski 1956, Wolfe 1956, Wittfogel 1957 and Shapiro 1972) with differing interpretations, as well as numerous detractors who argue that it was never a valid analytic approach (Lewin 1977, Fitzpatrick 1978, Hough 1978). When I refer to totalitarian theory, I consider Friedrich's 1954 model, later modified in collaboration with Brzezinski, to be the classic version. An excellent discussion of the impact that the totalitarian school of thought had on the discipline of Sovietology is contained in Cohen, Stephen F. Rethinking the Soviet Experience (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985) pp. 3-37.

33 This position is articulated clearly by Viktor Suvorov

(pseudonym), a Russian defector with 15 years service in the Soviet Army. See Suvorov, Viktor Inside the Soviet Army (New York: Berkley Books, 1982) pp. 26-30. Particularly during the early 1970s, it was not uncommon for western analysts to hold similar views. For instance, see Schwartz, Morton The Foreign Policy of the USSR: Domestic Factors (Encino, Cal: Dickensen Publishing Company, 1975) pp. 167-208.

34 The best treatment to date of the Soviet military from a sociological perspective is contained in Jones, Ellen The Red Army and Society (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985).

35 In concert with the general domestic upheaval wrought by perestroika, this aspect of Soviet society is currently undergoing radical and rather uncontrolled change. Broad societal support for the armed forces has wilted badly under glasnost (see footnotes 59-64). Some analysts point to this phenomenon as an indicator that the Soviet people's seemingly strong support for the military during the Brezhnev era was not as solid as we thought; and there is probably some truth to this argument. However, I would argue that it is precisely the strength of their convictions which has fed the intense feelings of betrayal and led to the rapid disintegration of public support for the armed forces.

36 For details about the ongoing process of writing and rewriting history during the age of glasnost, see Davies, R.W. Soviet History in the Gorbachev Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989).

37 For more insight into this phenomenon, see chapter 12, "Patriotism: World War II Was Only Yesterday" in Smith, Hedrick The Russians (New York: Ballantine Books, 1976) pp. 402-434.

38 For more details on the Soviets' extensive pre-induction military training program, see Nelson, Ronald R. and Schweizer, Peter "A New Soviet Military? The Next Generation" Orbis (Spring 1989) vol 33, no 2, pp. 195-207.

39 See U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1986 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987) pp. 151-153; Soviet Military Power (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989) pp. 18-25; and Rubinstein, Alvin Z. Moscow's Third World Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988) pp. 47-64.

40 Stephen Meyer "Civilian and Military Influence in Managing the Arms Race in the USSR" in Reorganizing America's Defense: Leadership in War and Peace eds., Robert J. Art, Vincent Davis and Samuel P. Huntington (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985) pp. 37-61 and Condoleezza Rice "The Party, the Military and Decision Authority in the Soviet Union" World Politics (October 1987) pp. 55-81.

41 Colton Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics pp. 233-234.

42 David D. Finley and Jan F. Triska Soviet Foreign Policy (New

York: McMillan & Company, 1968) pp. 72-74.

43 For more information on the Defense Council, see Yasmann, Viktor "The Internal Security Situation in the USSR and the Defense Council" Radio Liberty Report on the USSR 1 September 1989, pp. 8-14; and Rahr, Alexander "Gorbachev Discloses Details of Defense Council" Radio Liberty Report on the USSR 15 September 1989, pp. 11-12. Viktor Suvorov claims that during World War II, the State Committee for Defense consisted of Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Beria and Voroshilov. See Suvorov Inside the Soviet Army pp. 38-42.

44 Bill Keller "Moscow Says Afghan Role Was Illegal and Immoral; Admits Breaking Arms Pact" New York Times 24 October 1989, p. 1. This revelation helps distance Gorbachev politically from the decision to intervene. A candidate member of the Politburo at the time, Gorbachev claims to have learned about the Soviet military action "from radio and newspaper reports." From what we know about how the Defense Council functions, his defense is plausible. Besides, not one of the figures named is still alive to dispute this version of events.

45 See footnote 73. This issue is examined at greater length in chapter two.

46 For a Kremlinologist's perspective on the changes in Soviet security policy, see Parrott, Bruce "Soviet National Security Under Gorbachev" Problems of Communism (Nov-Dec 88) pp. 1-36.

47 Jerry Hough "Gorbachev Consolidating Power" Problems of Communism (Jul-Aug 87) pp. 21-43 and Marcus A. Kuiper "Power Consolidation: Gorbachev Tightens His Grip" unpublished paper, November 1988.

48 For more details on the military purges, see Herspring, Dale R. "The Soviet Military in the Aftermath of the 27th Party Congress" Orbis (Summer 86) vol 30, no 2, pp. 297-315 and Larrabee, F. Stephen "Gorbachev and the Military" Foreign Affairs (Summer 88) vol 66, no 5, pp. 1002-1026.

49 There are several points to be made here. The first is that advancement and promotion in the higher echelons of the Soviet military is very dependent on personal relationships and patronage. Anyone who doubts this should examine the Far East connection which has arisen since Yazov's appointment as Minister of Defense. Six out of sixteen current Deputy Defense Ministers served there, developing some tie with Yazov, and other Yazov associates are generously sprinkled throughout the Main Inspectorate and other senior command and administrative positions. An interesting description of the Soviet military patronage system is contained in Cockburn, Andrew The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine (New York: Vintage Books, 1984) pp. 80-119. Second, I think it prudent to point out that the new chief of staff is General of the Army Mikhail Alekseyevich Moiseev, not Colonel General Nikolai Andreyevich Moiseev. The latter is chief of staff of the political administration of the Western Group of Forces (formerly GSFG). I have already seen quotes by one misattributed to the other. For a photograph and personal profile on each man, see "Doveriem oblechenniye" Kommunist vooruzhennikh sil (May 89) no 10, p. 16. Finally, I would like to comment on Marshal Akhromeyev's current status. A

number of Sovietologists have offered the thesis that he departed the post of chief of staff involuntarily, or in protest over Gorbachev's December 1988 announcement of unilateral cuts in conventional forces. This seemed like a reasonable hypothesis at the time. See "General Staff Changes" Moscow News (5 Feb 89) no 5, p. 5. However, this theory now requires some revision. Akhromeyev's star has not slowly sunk into oblivion- the traditional fate of senior military officers who have fallen out of favor. Instead, he has become Gorbachev's personal advisor on arms control, and has quickly emerged as the Kremlin's number one spokesman on defense issues with the foreign press. This level of media access certainly does not seem to be in consonance with the premise that Akhromeyev was fired. It appears more likely that he was tapped for promotion, but with a twist. Gorbachev created a high profile job for Akhromeyev, and freed him of the daily managerial requirements which demand the attention of the chief of staff. However, he also deprived him of his power base. The selection of Moiseev, a relatively junior and previously unknown officer, to succeed Akhromeyev strongly suggests patronage. The only question is- whose man is he? Moiseev served as Yazov's first deputy in the Far Eastern military district prior to Yazov's selection as Minister of Defense. He may have caught Gorbachev's eye during the general secretary's visit to the Far East in July 1986. It appears that Akhromeyev would have preferred to appoint his deputy, Colonel General Vladimir Lobov (who also has ties to Yazov through previous assignments in the Central Asian military district), an eminently more qualified candidate. But Lobov was passed over in favor of Moiseev. This would seem to indicate that Gorbachev wished to weaken the authority and prestige of the position of chief of staff without forfeiting the counsel of Akhromeyev. See Zamaschnikov, Sergei "Virtual Unknown to Head General Staff" Radio Liberty Report on the Soviet Union (20 Jan 89) vol 1, no 3, pp. 14-17.

50 This move was designed to break whatever remaining political power the Brezhnev era elite still retained. Marshals Kulikov, Ogarkov, Petrov and Sokolov were all removed. Similarly, former Politburo members Aliyev, Baibakov, Dolgikh, Gromyko, Ponomarev, Solomentsev and Tikhonov all surrendered their seats. For a complete list of those retired "for reasons of age or health," see "V tsentralni komitet kommunisticheskoi partii sovetского soyuza" Izvestiya 25 April 1989, p. 1.

51 Herbert Goldhamer The Soviet Soldier (New York: Crane, Russak & Co, 1975) pp. 202-203.

52 A rather combative interview with Marshal Akhromeyev on Hungarian television cites the figures as 45% of the top military leadership and approximately 60% of the mid-level leaders. See FBIS-SOV "Akhromeyev Interviewed on Role of Military" 30 June 1989, p. 72.

53 General of the Army I. Tretyak "Reliable Defense First and Foremost" Moscow News (21 Feb 88) no 8, p. 12.

54 General of the Army D.T. Yazov Na strazhe sotsializma i mira (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1987) p. 34. Since the Warsaw Pact officially declared its doctrine to be strictly defensive in May 1987, the senior Soviet military leadership has adjusted its rhetoric to bring it more in line with the country's stated policy. However, occasionally frank

personal assessments do find their way into the press. For instance, see Lieutenant General Vladimir Serebryannikov "More on the Defense Doctrine Dilemma" New Times (21-27 March) no 12/89, p. 17.

55 Ibid., pp. 44-56. More recent articles which reinforce these themes include General of the Army Lobov, V. "Vysokoe kachestvo- glavni kriterii boyevoi podgotovki" Kommunist vooruzhennikh sil (Jan 89) no 1, pp. 12-16 and General of the Army Lizichev, A. "Tvorcheskaya aktivnost lyudei- dvizhuschaya sila perestroika" Kommunist vooruzhennikh sil (Jan 89) no 2, pp. 3-11.

56 See the official announcement by the Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers in "O sootnoshenii chislennosti vooruzhennikh sil i vooruzhenni organizatsii varshavskovo dogovora i severoatlanticheskovo soyuza v evrope i privilegatsiyakh akvatoriyakh" Krasnaya zvezda 31 January 1989, p. 2.

57 Throughout the summer and fall of 1988, the Soviet military leadership elite made little effort to conceal its opinion concerning the possibility of unilateral cuts in conventional forces. General of the Army I. Tretyak was particularly outspoken. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (hereafter FBIS-SOV) "Warsaw Pact Defensive Principles Reviewed" 14 July 1988, p. 14. Deputy Chief of the General Staff Colonel General M. Gareyev characterized the proposal as "a course that has no future." Address at the Royal United Services Institution "Soviet Military Doctrine at the Present Stage of its Evolution" 19 October 1988. Since December 1988, there has been a distinct effort by both civilian and military leaders to portray the decision-making process on unilateral cuts as a rational and harmonious one. They claim that the 500,000 figure was arrived at scientifically and that all parties concurred in the wisdom and efficacy of the proposed cuts. However, in a recent television interview, Marshal Akhromeyev belied the official version of events. "Then we received an instruction from comrade Gorbachev to elaborate it- I say we meaning the military leadership, for I was chief of the General Staff then- to elaborate it as to how big a reduction of the armed forces we could undertake and within what time, both in regard to the strength of the armed forces and military expenditures. And elaboration continued during the second half of 1988. We reported more than once to the Defense Council, but once again, we the military men, were advised to elaborate yet further..." Soviet Television Vzglyad 8 October 1989.

58 This phenomenon is examined at greater length in Foye, Stephen "The Soviet Military Under Siege" Radio Liberty Report on the USSR (24 Feb 89) vol 1, no 8, pp. 7-10.

59 Soviet Television I Serve the Soviet Union 23 April 1989. Although this show was dedicated to honoring the crew's "superior training and spirit of collectivism," it clearly demonstrated that Soviet submariners are not equipped with adequate safety gear (such as wet suits for surviving more than a few minutes in frigid water) and that much of the available emergency equipment had failed to function properly. Further, it was apparent that the Northern Fleet's refusal to allow nearby Norwegian vessels to assist in the rescue was a significant contributing factor in the death of 42 crewmen. More recently, Soviet viewers were treated to an unprecedented discussion of the incident, with Soviet journalists inter-

rogating Navy officials in a manner that would have led to imprisonment only a few years ago. Soviet Television Vzglyad 14 July 1989.

60 Michael Dobbs "Glasnost kindles Fiery Debate Over Slaying of Georgian Demonstrators" Washington Post 31 May 1989, p. 16.

61 The Soviet media are awash with introspective coverage of the Afghanistan experience. For instance, Soviet Television I Serve the Soviet Union 2 April, 21 May and 6 August 1989. There are several interviews with bitter veterans (Afghantsi) who complain that while they were fighting, "the country enjoyed beauty contests." Although amputees claim that they are resettling well in civilian life, the visuals of Soviet medical facilities for "warrior-internationalists" reveal the grim realities of a substandard system unable to cope with their needs. Disillusionment is a common thread running through the majority of their responses. Various Afghantsi criticize the lack of training they received prior to deployment, question whether Soviet POWs were captured or deserted to the enemy, and speculate about the number of casualties caused by friendly fire.

62 Stanislav Kondrashov "Poznat samikh sebya" Izvestiya 3 January 1989, p. 7; Stanislav Kondrashov "Paritet v dvukh izmereniyakh" Izvestiya 4 February 1989, p. 5; and Albert Plutnick "Urok voyennovo dela" Izvestiya 20 March 1989, p. 3.

63 On 30 May Gorbachev revealed that total defense outlays for the current year amounted to 77.3 billion rubles. He also indicated that this figure represented 9% of the Soviet gross national product and that the defense budget had been frozen since 1987. See "Soviet Military Budget: \$128 Billion Bombshell" New York Times 31 May 1989, p. 10. Shortly thereafter, General of the Army Moiseev explained the figures in greater detail. He argued that the U.S. military budget was "incomparably higher" than the Soviet Union's "in both absolute and relative terms," claiming that the proportion of defense spending in the Soviet state budget was only 15.6%, versus 27.2% in the U.S. federal budget. See General Moiseev, M. "Oboronni byudzheth SSSR" Pravda 11 June 1989, p. 5. A substantial majority of western intelligence services and military experts feel that these figures are significantly understated. Independent Soviet estimates are considerably higher as well. For example, 104-121 billion rubles in "Skolko tratit na oboronny" Ogonyok (May 89) no 19, pp. 6-7. It is difficult to judge the degree of public acceptance of the official figures, but some insight was provided in a recent television interview of Marshal Akhromeyev. He was badgered by economist Kireyev and correspondent Zakharov to provide historical data for comparison and to reveal the computational methodology used in arriving at the figures. Soviet Television Vzglyad 8 October 1989. An analogous situation exists with regard to the official casualty figures released in May 1988. General of the Army Lizichev announced that Soviet losses were comprised of 13,310 dead, 35,478 wounded, and 311 missing. To many western observers, these numbers seemed quite low after nine years of active ground combat in Afghanistan. Recently an Estonian newspaper has challenged the official figures, publishing its own estimates of 50,000 killed and 150,000 wounded. See Konovalov, Valeri "Legacy of the Afghan War: Some Statistics" Radio Liberty Report on the USSR vol 1, no 14, pp. 1-3. The Soviet people are well aware of the fact that their government often publishes false,

misleading or incomplete data. The question is at what point they recognize it as such and reject it. The conundrum of reconciling the myth of new openness with the reality of contrived half openness in the context of a historical tradition of no openness is one of the great challenges facing the Soviet Union today.

64 A rather bleak portrayal of the harshness of military life for families of servicemen assigned to remote areas under the Soviet equivalent of Strategic Bomber Command is contained in "Palot vo vcherashni denh" Ogonyok (June 89) no 24, pp. 14-17.

65 "Ob osveschenii v tsentralnoi pechati zhizni i deyatelnosti sovetskikh vooruzhennikh sil" Krasnaya zvezda 6 July 1989, p. 2.

66 David Remnick "Supreme Soviet Bows to Gorbachev, Renames Yazov as Defense Minister" Washington Post 4 July 1989, p. 8. Prior to the Yazov vote, an absolute majority of 272 votes in the 542 member legislature was required for confirmation. However, Yazov was approved with only 256 votes, a majority of the deputies present at the time of voting.

67 V. Igarshv and A. Murtazayev Pravda 5 July 1989, pp. 1-2. Translated in FBIS-SOV "Behind the Lines of the Official Report" 6 July 1989. Yazov's extreme discomfort in the face of hostile questioning was broadcast live to the entire country. See Soviet Television Vremya 3 July 1989. The announcer noted "I thought that the scale was just about to tilt not in his favor."

68 Paul Quinn-Judge "Gorbachev Seems Stung by the Polls" Christian Science Monitor 18 October 1989, p. 4; Bill Keller "The Limits of Glasnost?" New York Times 19 October 1989, p. 7; and Bill Keller "Gorbachev and the Wayward Press" New York Times 23 October 1989, p. 8.

69 For example, on 6 July 1989 at Strasbourg he reiterated his goal of radically restructuring the armed forces to "rule out the physical possibility of carrying out an attack and conducting large scale offensive operations" and his intention to "sharply reduce- by 33% to 50%- the share of our national income that goes to defense spending." See "Obshche-Evropeiskii protsess idyot vperyod" Pravda 7 July 1989, pp. 1-2. Translated excerpts of this speech appear in "Gorbachev Addresses the Council of Europe" Current Digest of the Soviet Press (2 August 1989) vol XLI, no 27, pp. 6-8.

70 F. Stephen Larrabee "Gorbachev and the Military" Foreign Affairs (Summer 88) vol 66, no 5, pp. 1002-1026 and John Kohan "The Boss of Smolensky Square" Time 15 May 1989, pp. 29-33.

71 Michael R. Gordon "Soviets Are Trying Out Legislative Oversight of the Military" New York Times 14 August 1989, p. 7.

72 Class discussion at Princeton University, 19 September 1989.

73 The concept of "reasonable sufficiency" was first aired in public during Gorbachev's initial trip to France in October 1985. The remaining planks of his platform of new thinking on security and defense

were formally introduced in his official report to the 27th Party Congress in February 1986. See "Politicheski doklad tsentralnovo komiteta KPSS XXVII syezdu kommunisticheskoi partii sovetskovo soyuza" Kommunist 4/86 pp. 5-80.

74 A common perception among ordinary Russians is that the process of decline and disintegration afflicting the economy and Soviet society in general is accelerating, and they feel that there is little that can be done to stop it. Recently central television ran a story on prime time which illustrated the mood of the populace. It delivered an extremely harsh critique of the current state of society, driving home its point with visuals of Moscow filth, drunks, anger and frustration. A recurring theme was the hopelessness of the situation and an overall sense that everything was out of control. Soviet Television Before and After Midnight 29 July 1989.

75 Gorbachev has made it clear that "the leading role of the Party as the political vanguard" is undiminished. He unequivocally states "we strongly rebuff all those who try to call in question the role and importance of the Party." Further, he declares that the purpose of political reform is to free the Party from "economic-administrative functions" so that it can "concentrate its work on the key areas of domestic and foreign policy, and shift its center of gravity to political methods of leadership." Regarding pluralism, he states that "socialist pluralism (my emphasis)... is the path to finding the best, optimal solutions." See his official report at the 19th Party Conference "Doklad M.S. Gorbacheva" Pravda 29 June 1988, pp. 2-7. He has reiterated his position often, stating "A special role in the new social organism belongs to the Communist Party, which is called upon to be the political vanguard of Soviet society. The destiny of perestroika and the attainment of a qualitatively new aspect of socialism depend on the Party's activities immensely if not decisively." Further, he asserts that "at the present complex stage, the interests of the consolidation of society and the concentration of all its forces on the accomplishment of the difficult tasks of perestroika prompt the advisability of keeping the one-party system." He concludes by saying that "in the effort to renew socialism, the Party will not concede the initiative to either populist demagoguery, nationalistic or chauvinistic currents or to the spontaneity of group interests." See "Sotsialisticheskaya ideya i revoliutsionnaya perestroika" Pravda 26 November 1989, p. 1. Recently he has been forced to soften his position somewhat, stating "I do not see anything tragic about a multi-party system." However, he has made it clear that such a system can not be "artificially imposed" and that it must meet "the realistic interests of society." See "Excerpts From a Speech by Gorbachev Before the Lithuanian Communists" New York Times 15 January 1990, p. 9.

76 M.S. Gorbachev "Zayavleniye o sokrashchenii vooruzheniya" Pravda 16 January 1986 pp. 1-2.

77 Condoleezza Rice "Is Gorbachev Changing the Rules of Defense Decision-Making?" Journal of International Affairs (Spring 1989) pp. 377-397.

78 Stephen M. Meyer "The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New

Political Thinking on Security" International Security (Fall 88) vol 13, no 2, pp. 124-163.

79 Paul Quinn-Judge "Gorbachev Hints at Troubles in Military" Christian Science Monitor 12 July 1989, pp. 1-2 and Alexander Rahr "Gorbachev Discloses Details of Defense Council" Radio Liberty Report on the USSR 15 September 1989, pp. 11-12.

80 General of the Army M. Moiseev "Eshche raz o prestizhe armii" Kommunist vooruzhennikh sil (Aug 89) no 13, pp. 3-14. Analysis of this article appears in Foye, Stephen "Chief of General Staff Responds to Critic of Military Reform" Radio Liberty Report on the USSR 1 September 1989, pp. 22-24 and in Weickhardt, George "Moiseev versus Yazov: Backlash in the Armed Forces?" Radio Liberty Report on the USSR 1 December 1989, pp. 6-8.

81 There are other factors as well. I believe that the military has accepted a reduced force structure based on the understanding that the remaining units would be augmented with additional troops and equipment, and that certain modernization programs would not be sacrificed. This argument is explored at greater length in Kuiper, Marcus "New Thinking in Soviet Defense Policy" unpublished paper, August 1989.

NOTES-CHAPTER TWO

¹ See Garthoff, Raymond L. "New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine" The Washington Quarterly (Summer 88) pp. 131-158; Legvold, Robert "The Revolution in Soviet Foreign Policy" Foreign Affairs (1988/1989) vol 68, no 1, pp. 82-98; and McGwire, Michael "A Mutual Security Regime for Europe?" International Affairs (Summer 88) vol 64, no 3, pp. 361-379.

² See Adragna, Steven P. "A New Soviet Military?" Orbis (Spring 89) vol 33, no 2, pp. 165-179; Goure, Leon "New Soviet Military Doctrine: Reality or Myth?" Strategic Review (Summer 88); and Wettig, Gerhard "New Thinking on Security and East-West Relations" Problems of Communism (Mar-Apr 88) pp. 1-14.

³ Gorbachev was formally elevated to the post of general secretary within 24 hours of Chernenko's death. Most Kremlinologists agree that the relative swiftness of this move indicates that the decision was made sometime prior to Chernenko's demise. There is considerably less consensus, however, on precisely when the decision was made and to what degree Gorbachev could impose his will during the 13 months of Chernenko's rule. It is obvious by his eventual emergence as the victor in the succession struggle that he was a powerful player; however, if we contrast current Soviet domestic and foreign policy with those policies pursued in 1984, it is equally obvious that he lacked the influence to dominate and control the policy agenda.

⁴ Excerpts printed in Izvestiya 26 February 1986. Complete text appears in "Politicheski doklad Tsentralnovo Komiteta KPSS XXVII syezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskovo Soyuzu" Kommunist 4/86, pp. 5-80.

⁵ An English language rendition of this international security conceptual framework appears in Gorbachev, Mikhail S. Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1987) p. 217. Further elaboration on "How We See the World Today" is contained in chapter three, pp. 121-146. Choice quotes include "we have seen the main issue- the growing tendency towards interdependence of the states of the world community" and "military technology has developed to such an extent that even a non-nuclear war would now be comparable with a nuclear war in its destructive effect." Also "security is indivisible: it is either equal security for all or none at all" and "security can no longer be assured by military means... attempts to achieve military superiority are preposterous." Further "diverting huge resources from other priorities, the arms race is lowering the level of security, impairing it. It is in itself an enemy of peace. The only way to security is through political decisions and disarmament."

⁶ See "Kommunike soveshchaniya politicheskovo konsultativnovo komiteta gosudarstv-uchastnikov Varshavskovo dogovora" Pravda 12 June 1986, pp. 1-2.

⁷ For an account of the stalemate while the talks were winding

down, see Alexander, Michael "MBFR- Verification is the Key" NATO Review (June 1986) vol 34, no 3, pp. 6-11. For a comprehensive analysis of the entire 13 year process, see Blacker, Coit D. "The MBFR Experience" in U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation, ed., Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley and Alexander Dallin (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988) pp. 123-143.

8 John Borawski, Stan Weeks and Charlotte Thompson "The Stockholm Agreement of September 1986" Orbis (Winter 87) vol 30, no 4, pp. 643-662; and Richard E. Darilek "The Future of Conventional Arms Control in Europe" Survival (Jan/Feb 87) vol XXIX, no 1, pp. 5-20. The complete text of the agreement is reprinted pp. 79-84.

9 A.A. Gromyko, et al. Borba SSSR protiv yadernoi opasnosti, gonki vooruzhennii, za razoruzheniya (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literaturi, 1987) pp. 535-538. This reference is a compendium of Soviet diplomatic communications from March 1972 to May 1987. It contains the complete text of virtually all Soviet statements, proposals, and agreements in the realm of arms control during this period.

10 Michael McGwire "Soviet Military Objectives" World Policy Journal (Fall 86) vol III, no 4, pp. 667-695; "Update: Soviet Military Objectives" World Policy Journal (Fall 87) vol IV, no 4, pp. 723-732; "A Mutual Security Regime for Europe?" International Affairs (Summer 88) vol 64, no 3, pp. 361-379; and chapters two, three, four and thirteen in Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987) pp. 13-89 & 307-334.

11 The Soviet military build-up of the 1980s has been effectively chronicled since 1982 by the Department of Defense's annual publication of Soviet Military Power. For the latest version, see Soviet Military Power (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989).

12 Jack Snyder "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?" International Security (Winter 87/88) vol 12, no 3, pp. 93-131.

13 Seweryn Bialer "New Thinking and Soviet Foreign Policy" Survival (July/Aug 88) vol XXX, no 4, pp. 291-309; David Holloway "Gorbachev's New Thinking" Foreign Affairs (1988/1989) vol 68, no 1, pp. 66-81; and Robert Legvold "The Revolution in Soviet Foreign Policy" Foreign Affairs (1988/1989) vol 68, no 1, pp. 87-98. Bialer and Legvold both characterize the changes so far as "radical" and "fundamental". Holloway is more cautious and circumspect in his assessment.

14 Condoleezza Rice "Gorbachev and the Military: A Revolution in Security Policy, Too?" The Harriman Institute Forum (April 1989) vol 2, no 4, pp. 1-8.

15 Many proponents of deterministic forces arguments imply that the pressures for change were so great that any Soviet leader would have been forced to implement reforms. Further, several maintain that now that Gorbachev has unleashed these powerful forces, he can not put them back, and the reform process will continue regardless of whether or not he

remains general secretary. While it is true that the Soviet Union's political, economic, and social problems are not likely to resolve themselves, it does not necessarily follow that the leadership's only possible response is Gorbachev-style reform. A major weakness in this line of thinking is the failure to consider leadership alternatives. If Gorbachev were to die of a heart attack tomorrow, I see his most likely successor as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov. Over the past year, he has steadily solidified his position as the number two man in the Party and governmental hierarchy. Ryzhkov would probably continue with perestroika, but with less enthusiasm and more moderation. If Gorbachev were to fall as a result of crisis-induced political intrigue in the throes of a major policy failure, his successor would most likely be someone who is currently relatively unknown, and would probably arrive on the scene with a mandate to significantly roll back the legacy of perestroika.

16 Stephen M. Meyer "The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security" International Security (Fall 88) vol 13, no 2, pp. 124-163.

17 Hannes Adomeit "Soviet Crisis Prevention and Management: Why and When Do the Soviet Leaders Take Risks?" Orbis (Spring 86) vol 30, no 1, pp. 42-64.

18 Colonel General M.A. Gareyev "S pozitsii novovo myshleniya" Krasnaya zvezda 23 February 1988.

19 For instance, see General of the Army Yazov, D.T. "Voyennaya doktrina Varshavskovo dogovora- doktrina zashchity mira i sotsializma" Krasnaya zvezda 28 July 1987, p. 2; and Galin, A. and Kondyrev, I. "Oboronitelniya napravlennost sovetsskoi voyennoi doktriny" Morskoi sbornik (February 88) pp. 9-10.

20 Contrast Zhurkin, Vitali, Karaganov, Sergei, and Kortunov, Andrei "Vyzovy bezopasnosti- stariye i noviye" Kommunist 1/88, pp. 42-50 with the more traditional views of Marshal Sokolovski, V.D. Voyennaya strategiya (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1962); Colonel Sidorenko, A.A. Nastupleniye (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1970); Colonel Savkin, V.Ye. Osnovniye printsipy operativnovo iskusstva i taktiki (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1972); Colonel Sverdlov, F.D. Takticheski manevr (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1982); and Lieutenant General Reznichenko, V.G. Taktika (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1984 and 1987). A good English language source for following the development of Soviet military thought from 1917 to 1982 is contained in the compilation of selected military writings by Scott, Harriet Fast and Scott, William F. The Soviet Art of War: Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982).

21 Marshal S.F. Akhromeyev "Doktrina predotvrashcheniya voyny, zashchity mira i sotsializma" Problemy mira i sotsializma (Dec 87) no 12, pp. 23-28; and Admiral G. Kostev "Nasha voyennaya doktrina v svete novovo politicheskovo myshleniya" Kommunist voeruzhennikh sil (Sept 87) no 17, pp. 10-13.

22 The revaluation of the capabilities and limitations of military

power took place gradually over a period of several years as the counter-productive effects of Soviet policy became increasingly clear. Ironically, it was the Kremlin's inability to discard ineffective dogmatic formulas that made radical reform possible and necessary. The evolution of the Soviet response to the strategic defense initiative is examined in Lambeth, Benjamin and Lewis, Kevin "The Kremlin and SDI" Foreign Affairs (Spring 88) vol 66, no 4, pp. 755-770. The notion that the United States wields its economic power to wear down the Soviet Union through increased defense spending has become a popular theme in the Soviet press. Some authors claim that this is a deliberate governmental policy. See Katasonov, Yuri "Economic Warfare in U.S. Power Politics" International Affairs (Moscow) 1/87, pp. 104-112. Also see Kislov, A.K. "Novoye politicheskoye myshleniye i regionalniye konflikti" Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn (August 88) pp. 39-47 and Zhurkin, Kortunov and Karaganov "Vyzovy bezopasnosti- stariye i noviy" p. 48. Others attribute the phenomenon to the "American military-industrial complex" which is "unwilling under any circumstances to lose the fabulous profits it reaps from arms deals." See Shishkov, Yuri "The Arms Race Boomerang" International Affairs (Moscow) 1/87, pp. 69-76 and Vasilyev, Gennadi "Pochemu oni pritormazhivayut" Pravda 9 September 1989, p. 4.

23 William E. Odom "Soviet Military Doctrine" Foreign Affairs (Winter 88/89) vol 67, no 2, pp. 114-134.

24 Contrast Vladimirovsky, Pyotr "Comprehensive Security- Equal for All" International Affairs (Moscow) 10/87, pp. 9-19; with Radzievski, S.I. Militarizm- ugroza miry i tsivilizatsii (Moscow: Nauka, 1987) and Kirshin, Yu. Ya. et al. Politicheskoye soderzhaniye sovremennikh voyn (Moscow: Nauka, 1987).

25 Nikolai Setunski "The USA- The Arms Race Instigator" International Affairs (Moscow) 4/87, pp. 119-124; Major General Alexei Slobodenko "The US Military Doctrine- Reliance on Force" International Affairs (Moscow) 9/87, pp. 38-46.

26 I. Kulikov "Vneshnepoliticheski aspekt oboronnoi politiki" Kommunist vooruzhennikh sil (April 89) no 7, pp. 20-26. Many Soviet commentators evidently have difficulty reconciling the theoretical need to struggle against capitalism with the practical need to coexist with it. This ambivalence was clearly demonstrated during a series of televised round table discussions last summer. See Soviet Television Impulse 12 & 19 July 1989.

27 The pressure became so intense that a special session of the Supreme Soviet was convened to explain why the treaty "does not cause damage to the security of the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community." Soviet Television The Supreme Soviet 9 February 1988.

28 Marshal S.F. Akhromeyev "Doktrina predotvrashcheniya voyny, zashchity mira i sotsializma" Problemy mira i sotsializma (Dec 87) no 12, pp. 23-28; Admiral G. Kostev "Nasha voyennaya doktrina v svete novogo politicheskogo myshleniya" Kommunist vooruzhennikh sil (Sept 87) no 17, pp. 10-13; L. Semeyko "Vmesto gor oruzhiya... o printsipe razumnoi

dostatochnosti" Izvestiya 13 August 87, p. 5. In English, see General of the Army Yazov, D.T. "Warsaw Treaty Military Doctrine- For Defense of Peace and Socialism" International Affairs (Moscow) 10/87, pp. 3-8.

29 One of the most prominent advocates of this position has been Marshal Kulikov. See Kulikov, V.G. Doktrina zashchity mira i sotsializma: o voyennoi doktrine gosudarstv-uchastnikov Varshavskogo dogovora (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1988). It is not unreasonable to assume that Kulikov's replacement as commander-in-chief, Warsaw Pact forces in February 1989 by General of the Army Pyotr Lushev was related to his reputation as an old thinker. In addition, he lost his seat on the Central Committee in the April purge. However, there is an interesting footnote to Kulikov's political demise that obscures as much as it reveals about the nature of the current doctrinal debate. In March, Kulikov was appointed as a military representative to the new Congress of People's Deputies. For a biographical profile of all 79 military representatives to the Congress, see "Doveriem oblechenniye" Kommunist vooruzhennikh sil (May 89) no 10, pp. 4-29.

30 Akhromeyev "Doktrina predotvrashcheniya voyny, zashchity mira i sotsializma" pp. 23-28.

31 Yazov "Voyennaya doktrina Varshavskogo dogovora- doktrina zashchity mira i sotsializma" p. 2.

32 Soviet Television I Serve the Soviet Union 19 Feb 89.

33 Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (hereafter FBIS-SOV) "Warsaw Pact Defensive Principles Reviewed" 14 July 1988, p. 14.

34 Zhurkin, Kortunov and Karaganov "Vyzovy bezopasnosti-- stariye i noviye" p. 48; A.I. Izyumov and A.V. Kortunov "Sovetsky Soyuz v menyayushchemsya mire" Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn (July 88) pp. 53-64; and A.K. Kislov "Novoye politicheskoye myshleniye i regionalniye konflikti" Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn (August 88) pp. 39-47.

35 A.V. Gavrushkin and N.N. Sokov "O pryamolineinosti gonki vooruzhennii" Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn (August 88) pp. 82-86; V.V. Zhurkin, S.A. Karaganov and A.V. Kortunov "O razumnoi dostatochnosti" SShA (December 87) no 12, pp. 11-21.

36 A.A. Kokoshin and V.V. Larionov "Kurskaya bitva v svete sovremennoi oboronitelnoi doktrini" Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya (August 87) no 8, pp. 32-40.

37 General of the Army S.I. Postnikov "Razvitiye sovetskovo voyennovo iskusstva v Kurskoi bitve" Voyenno-istoricheski zhurnal (1988) no 7, pp. 10-18.

38 Robert J. Icks Famous Tank Battles (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co, 1972) pp. 158-170 and Earl F. Ziemke Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1966) pp. 118-142.

39 A.A. Kokoshin and V.V. Larionov "The Confrontation of Conven-

tional Forces in the Context of Providing Strategic Stability" Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya (June 88) no 6, pp. 23-31. Translated in FBIS-SOV "Journal Discusses Conventional Arms, Strategy" 21 July 1988, pp. 8-14.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid. Also see "Rethinking Victory: An Interview with Andrei Kokoshin" Detente (Dec 88) 13/88, pp. 17-18. When asked which model could be considered a realistic goal for the foreseeable future, he responded "There is now a real possibility that the USSR will adopt the third model as its goal." For more specifics on which types of weapons should be reduced, see Kokoshin, Andrei and Larionov, Valentin "Shift the Emphasis to Defence" New Times (7-13 March) 10/89, pp. 19-21.

42 Charlie Schill "Soviets Run Into Hill Skepticism" Army Times 22 May 1989, p. 29.

43 Alexei Arbatov "Defence Dilemmas" New Times (7-13 February) 6/89, pp. 19-21; Lieutenant General Vladimir Serebryannikov "More on the Defence Doctrine Dilemma" New Times (21-27 March) 12/89, p. 17; Alexei Arbatov "Reasonable Sufficiency: Where Does it End?" New Times (25 Apr-1 May) 17/89, pp. 12-13.

44 Edward N. Luttwak "Gorbachev's Strategy and Ours" Commentary (July 89) vol 88, no 1, pp. 29-36. For a similar argument buttressed by recently declassified data on Soviet defense spending and weapons production, see McCain, John "A New Soviet Military? Weapons and Budgets" Orbis (Spring 89) vol 33, no 2, pp. 181-193.

45 Steven P. Adragna "A New Soviet Military?" Orbis (Spring 89) vol 33, no 2, pp. 165-179.

46 Edward L. Warner III "New Thinking and Old Realities in Soviet Defense Policy" Survival (Jan/Feb 89) vol XXXI, no 1, pp. 13-33.

47 John McCain "A New Soviet Military? Weapons and Budgets" Orbis (Spring 89) vol 33, no 2, pp. 181-193 and Soviet Military Power (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988) pp. 32-43.

48 Charlie Schill "Soviets Run Into Hill Skepticism" Army Times 22 May 1989, p. 29 and General of the Army D.T. Yazov "V interese obsche bezopasnosti i mira" Izvestiya 27 February 1989, p. 3. SACEUR General John Galvin estimates that the Soviets produced an average of 280 tanks a month during 1988 for an annual total of about 3360. See "Soviet Notebook" International Defense Review 1/89, p. 17. Most western analysts estimate current Soviet tank production in the 2800-3000 range (about 250 a month). This is not even in the same ballpark as Marshal Akhromeyev, who claimed during his congressional testimony last summer that tank production had been reduced to an annual rate of only 1700 (about 140 a month). See "Akhromeyev Interviewed on U.S. Visit" FBIS-SOV 7 August 1989, pp. 12-15.

49 E.A. Wayne "US, Soviets Wage Arms Supply War" Christian Science

50 Stephen Engleberg "Soviets Sold Libya Advanced Bomber, US Officials Say" New York Times 5 April 1989, p. 1 and Michael Mecham "Soviet Sale of Su-24 Deepens Concern About Mideast Weapons Proliferation" Aviation Week & Space Technology 10 April 1989, pp. 19-20.

51 The September 1986 Stockholm agreement limiting military activities, the December 1987 INF treaty eliminating medium and short range nuclear missiles, and the June 1989 accord on avoiding accidental confrontation. In addition, the previously glacial pace of negotiations in other areas has quickened considerably and significant progress has been made. Military-to-military contacts have also been expanded, including the first-ever exchange of visits by the senior military officer of each country; Marshal Akhromeyev's July 1988 tour of the United States and Admiral Crowe's June 1989 reciprocal visit to the Soviet Union.

52 Stephen M. Meyer "The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security" International Security (Fall 88) vol 13, no 2, p. 144.

53 The lack of a broad consensus has definitely impeded Gorbachev's ability to implement clear policies to attempt to resolve the various crises besetting the nation. The problem recently entered the public domain during the third session of the Soviet parliament when Gorbachev made an emotional appeal for a strengthened presidency- "unless democracy is protected by appropriate mechanisms, it will perish and we shall lose." It remains to be seen whether the deputies will accede to his request to concentrate still more power in his hands. Soviet Television Vremya 14 February 1990 and Craig R. Whitney "Soviet Legislators Look for Answers" New York Times 15 February 1990, p. 20.

54 David Ignatius "Why Bob Gates is the Beyer of Sovietology" Washington Post 28 May 1989, p. B2.

55 R. Hyland Phillips and Jeffrey I. Sands "Reasonable Sufficiency and Soviet Conventional Defense" International Security (Fall 88) vol 13, no 2, pp. 164-178.

56 Marshal Ogarkov's two major works are Ogarkov, N.V. Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite otechestva (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1982) and Ogarkov, N.V. Istoriya uchit bditelnosti (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985). The quote is drawn from an interview while he was still chief of staff. "Zashchita sotsializma: opyt istorii i sovremennosti" Krasnaya zvezda 9 May 1984, pp. 2-3.

57 A discussion of the differences between Akhromeyev and Ogarkov is contained in Herspring, Dale R. "Marshal Akhromeyev and the Future of the Soviet Armed Forces" Survival (Nov/Dec 86) vol XXVIII, no 6, pp. 524-534. Ogarkov was demoted to the position of Commander, Western Theater of Operations (TVD) in September 1984. In November 1986, he was replaced by General of the Army Stanislav Postnikov, and became the Army inspector general. However, it does not appear that he has been condemned to absolute political oblivion. He holds a teaching assignment at the

General Staff Academy and recently published an article defending the traditional party line about the German invasion in 1941- that no one was at fault and that they stood up as best they could. Ogarkov, N.V. "Pravda istorii neoproverzhima" Kommunist vooruzhennikh sil (June 89) no 11, pp. 4-18. He also appears on television occasionally at ceremonial events.

58 Comparing the 1984 and 1987 versions of Taktika reveals no discernable shift towards defense. The newer edition is expanded by 230 pages, with the chapters on offensive operations (including the meeting engagement) and defensive operations both increasing by about 40 pages. In both volumes, of 16 schematic diagrams, only 2 deal with defense. The primary rationale for the increased length is simply that new weapons require new tactics. The new version discusses "precision weapons" extensively. Lieutenant General V.G. Reznichenko Taktika (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1984 & 1987).

59 Jack Snyder "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?" International Security (Winter 87/88) vol 12, no 3, pp. 93-131.

60 Stephen M. Meyer "The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security" International Security (Fall 88) vol 13, no 2, pp. 153-154. Meyer dates the shift from the late 1970s and lists numerous examples in footnotes 91 and 93.

61 The TOW (Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire guided) missile is the U.S. Army's primary long range anti-tank weapon. It has a range of 3750 meters, and comes in man portable, vehicular mounted and helicopter mounted versions. The TOW first entered service in 1970 and has been exported widely to a number of allied and friendly nations. Enhanced capability warheads have been designed and fielded, including the ITOW (improved TOW) and TOW-2. The tandem warhead TOW 2A, designed to penetrate Soviet reactive armor, began fielding in Europe in September 1987, and the TOW 2B warhead product improvement program is currently underway. See 1989 Weapons Systems United States Army (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989) p. 27.

62 The reactive armor deployed by the Soviets consists of applique tile bricks fixed to the exterior of the tank. Each brick contains an explosive charge of its own which detonates on impact with an incoming anti-tank round, causing the penetrative jet to malform and dissipate its energy. This innovation is a particularly effective defense against the shaped charge warheads characteristic of most infantry anti-tank weapons, but is only marginally useful against tank main gun rounds, which rely on kinetic energy for their destructive potential.

63 Steven L. Spiegel "U.S. Relations with Israel: The Military Benefits" Orbis (Fall 86) vol 30, no 3, pp. 475-497 and Edward N. Luttwak "Gorbachev's Strategy and Ours" Commentary (July 89) vol 88, no 1, p. 35.

64 For instance, Colonel Molostov, Yu "Vysokotochnoye protivotankovoe oruzhiye i obshevoiskovoi boi" Voyenny vestnik 10/86, pp. 81-83; Colonel Molostov, Yu "Zashchita ot vysokotochnovo oruzhiya" Voyenny vestnik 2/87, pp. 83-86; Colonel Molostov, Yu and Major Novikov, Anatoli

"Vysokotochnoe oruzhiye" Sovetskoye voyennoye obozreniye 1/88, pp. 12-13; Major General Vorobyev, I. "Formula pobedy" Sovetskoye voyennoye obozreniye 11/86, pp. 14-15; and Davydov, S. and Chervonobab, V. "Obychnoe, no ne menee opasnoe" Energiya: ekonomika, tekhnika, ekologiya 7/87, pp. 43-48.

65 For a discussion of the pros and cons of John Lehman's proposed maritime strategy, see Mearsheimer, John J. "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe" and Brooks, Linton F. "Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the Maritime Strategy" in International Security (Fall 86) vol 11, no 2, pp. 3-57 & 58-88.

66 Soviet Television Vremya 28-30 July 88 on joint USSR-GDR maneuvers "demonstrating European neighborliness and the non-threatening nature of the exercises"; 18-21 Sept 88 on military exercises in the Ukraine and Moldavia "emphasizing the defensive doctrine of our armed forces"; 20-22 Oct 88 on joint USSR-GDR training which stressed "the openly defensive nature of maneuvers"; 14-20 Apr 89 on Warsaw Pact training conducted in the Moscow military district which "totally corresponded to the defensive character of Soviet military doctrine"; 19-21 May 89 on joint USSR-GDR exercises which "were observed by 40 inspectors from 20 countries in accordance with the Stockholm accords"; and 18-19 July 89 on joint USSR-GDR maneuvers which "practically realized the main provisions of the defensive military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member states."

67 Michael Dobbs "Joint Chiefs View Soviet Weaponry" Washington Post 19 June 1989, p. 1.

68 The standard scenario of repulsing a NATO attack and then counterattacking to completely rout the aggressor has been replayed for the benefit of foreign observers on several occasions. See "The Day Glasnost Came to the Soviet Army" The Economist 29 April 1989, pp. 39-40 and the Report of the Committee Delegation to West Berlin, East Germany and the Soviet Union 6-18 August 1989, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 16 October 1989 (hereafter HASC Report).

69 FBIS-SOV "Akhromeyev Explains Defensive Military Doctrine" 15 June 1989, pp. 70-71.

70 General of the Army D.T. Yazov "Vooruzhennim silam- novoe kachestvo" Kommunist vooruzhennikh sil (Aug 89) no 15, pp. 3-13.

71 Soviet Military Power (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987) pp. 70-71 and Wolfgang Schneider "From the T-64 to the T-80" International Defense Review 6/1987, pp. 745-749. I do not mean to imply that all 211 active divisions in the Soviet ground forces are fully equipped with the latest advanced weaponry. It is well known that approximately 60% of Soviet divisions are maintained at category III readiness, or "not ready for combat." Moreover, modernization fielding is often an uneven process, resulting in substantial discrepancies in equipment holdings between like units. However, this does not obviate the fact that there are over 60 Soviet divisions deployed in Eastern Europe and the western military districts of the Soviet Union which are

maintained at a high level of readiness and continue to receive new generations of modern equipment at an impressive rate. In contrast, the United States Army consists of 28 divisions and 22 combat brigades. Currently, there are 18 active divisions. Five of these are light infantry divisions, and a third of the active units contain a "roundout" reserve component or national guard brigade.

72 General of the Army D.T. Yazov "V interese obsche bezopasnosti i mira" Izvestiya 27 February 1989, p. 3.

73 Jack Snyder "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces" International Security (Spring 88) vol 12, no 4, pp. 48-77.

74 With the advent of reactive armor, the defender's requirement for countervailing armor has become even more acute. The Soviets see this need clearly. As Colonel General Ye. Melyanenko puts it "modern defense is also characterized by mobility, great mobility" and "this weapon includes a high level of protection, a high rate of fire, protection against means of mass destruction, and great mobility. All these qualities are indispensable and our land forces will not do without these qualities, without tanks on a battlefield today." Soviet Television I Serve the Soviet Union 9 October 1989.

75 Operational maneuver groups are large, self-contained, armor heavy formations designed to exploit gaps in the defensive belt ahead of the main body of attacking forces to penetrate swiftly and to seize and destroy high value targets deep in the enemy rear. For elaboration on the OMG concept, see Donnelly, C.N. "The Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Group- A New Challenge for NATO" International Defense Review 9/82, pp. 1177-1186 and Major Hines, John G. "The Operational Maneuver Group: The Debate and the Reality" Review of the Soviet Ground Forces (Aug 83) DDB-1100-418-83, pp. 1-7. The location and timing of ZAPAD 81 was also designed to send a message to the Poles. For analysis of ZAPAD 81, see Shero, Arch and Oden, Richard "Exercise ZAPAD 81" Review of the Soviet Ground Forces (Apr 82) DDB-1100-362-82, pp. 1-9.

76 For some interesting speculation on this point, see Major Pepper, R.H. and WO2 Leonard, P. "A Soviet New Model Army? Future Brigade and Corps Structures" International Defense Review 3/89, pp. 259-263.

77 In comparison, a U.S. mechanized infantry division organized in accordance with the J-series TO&E is structured with 5 mechanized infantry battalions and 5 tank batalions. These units contain 330 IFVs and 290 tanks. A U.S. J-series armored division has 6 tank battalions and 4 mechanized infantry battalions with a combined strength of 348 tanks and 276 IFVs.

78 The Soviets have found it difficult to maintain the interest of western audiences beyond the initial splash of publicity achieved when the announcement was made and when actual unit withdrawals commenced. See Kamm, Henry "Goodbye and Ciao to Soviet Tanks in Hungary" New York Times 26 April 1989, p. 7 and Schmemmann, Serge "Soviet Army Exiting, Says Come Visit" New York Times 8 May 89, p. 9. However, the Soviet media has not allowed the issue to fade from public view at home. See Soviet Television

Vremya almost daily from 25 Apr 89 to 28 May 89, and at frequent intervals thereafter. For instance, Soviet Television Vremya 1,3,6,11,13,17,20 & 24 July 89.

79 The reduction will involve the withdrawal of 4 out of 19 Soviet divisions from Western Group of Forces in East Germany (formerly GSFG- the less ominous designation was announced 29 June 89), 1 out of 5 Soviet divisions from Central Group of Forces in Czechoslovakia and 1 out of 4 Soviet divisions from Southern Group of Forces in Hungary. In August it was discovered that only the organic tank regiments from these divisions are being withdrawn and disbanded. The remaining motorized rifle regiments and other divisional assets such as artillery, helicopters and air defense systems are being redistributed to the new "restructured" divisions in Central Europe. HASC Report, 16 October 1989.

80 General of the Army V.N. Lobov "Nadezhni opлот mira" Krasnaya zvezda 13 May 1989, p. 5 and Colonel General B.A. Omelichev "V obstanovke glasnosti i otkrytosti" Krasnaya zvezda 14 May 1989, p. 3. Their comments shed light on General Yazov's claim that "the number of combined arms divisions will be almost halved as a result of restructuring." Yazov, D.T. "V interese obsche bezopasnosti i mira" p. 3.

81 Even in the age of glasnost, it is fairly rare to find an official Soviet source which admits that the situation is a confused mess of poorly thought out doctrinal contradictions and claims that no one seems to really know what's going on. See Savelyev, A. "Predotvrashcheniye voyny i sderzhivaniye: podkhody OVD i NATO" Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya 6/89, pp. 19-29.

82 Over the years, the Soviets have been remarkably successful at acquiring guarded and restricted access western technology. See U.S. Department of Defense "Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant Western Technology: An Update" (Washington, D.C.: September 1985); Staar, Richard F. "The High-Tech Transfer Offensive of the Soviet Union" Strategic Review (Spring 89) pp. 32-39; and Adams, Paul L. "Technology Security and the United States Navy" Defense Science (February 89) pp. 45-48. Nevertheless, it seems logical to think that being able to buy western technology would result in significant savings in time, effort, and expense over stealing it.

NOTES-CHAPTER THREE

¹ There are a number of interesting parallels which can be drawn between the economic reforms of the NEP period and those of the years of perestroika. For instance, the speculative Nepmen bear a strong resemblance to today's entrepreneurs. Widely disliked and distrusted, they exist on the fringes of Soviet society, and appear determined to take advantage of the situation by making as much money as possible before governmental policies change and put an end to the capitalist bonanza. But such a discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. Detailed examination of this period in Soviet history can be found in Ball, Alan M. Russia's Last Capitalists: The Nepmen 1921-1929 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

² Geoffrey Hosking The First Socialist Society- A History of the Soviet Union From Within (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985) p. 152.

³ An excellent anecdotal description of the mundane realities inherent in the Stalinist model of industrial production is contained in Smith, Hedrick The Russians (New York: Ballantine Books, 1976) pp. 285-319.

⁴ Marshall I. Goldman Gorbachev's Challenge (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1987) p. 15. Another assessment based on recently declassified data estimates that the decline in GNP growth rates after 1976 was even more severe, from approximately 3.5% to around 2% per annum. See McCain, John "A New Soviet Military? Weapons and Budgets" Orbis (Spring 89) vol 33, no 2, pp. 181-193.

⁵ Richard F. Kaufman "Causes of the Slowdown in Soviet Defense" Soviet Economy (Jan-Mar 85) vol 1, no 1.

⁶ "Gorbachev's Modernization Program: A Status Report" a paper presented by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency for submission to the Subcommittee on National Security Economics of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States (DDB-1900-140-87) August 1987, p. iii. Some Sovietologists have offered the hypothesis that the increase in defense spending was a victory for the conservative coalition. Unfortunately, this theory fails to explain why the increase has remained in effect. I prefer Bruce Parrott's argument that Gorbachev used the issue to outmaneuver his political opponents by undermining their support among national security conservatives and by depriving them of the claim that he was "soft on defense." Bruce Parrott "Soviet National Security Under Gorbachev" Problems of Communism (Nov-Dec 88) pp. 1-36.

⁷ "Soviet Economy Not Responding to Change, U.S. Says" New York Times 23 April 1989, p. 10. In contrast, the U.S. economy grew 3.4% in 1987 and 3.9% in 1988. See Rudolph, Barbara "Adrift in the Doldrums" Time 31 July 1989, p. 32.

⁸ This claim first surfaced when he officially announced the

defense budget before the Congress of People's Deputies. See Gorbachev, M.S. "Ob osnovnykh napravleniyakh vnutrennye i vneshnye politiki SSSR" Pravda and Izvestiya 31 May 1989, p. 1. In English, see "Gorbachev Bares Budget for Military" and "Soviet Military Budget: \$128 Billion Bombshell" New York Times 31 May 1989 pp. 1 & 10. A condensed text translation is contained in "Gorbachev's Policy Speech to the Congress" Current Digest of the Soviet Press (19 July 89) vol XLI, no 25, pp. 1-10.

⁹ Estimating the level of Soviet defense spending is an inexact science at best. A discussion of some of the difficulties endemic to this sort of analysis is contained in Holloway, David The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984) pp. 109-130. However, most western estimates agree that annual outlays for defense consume between 13% and 19% of Soviet GNP. See "The Battle of the Burden" The Economist 28 January 1989, pp. 45-46. Gorbachev's figure of 9% seems rather low, and has been attacked in the Soviet media as well as in the western press. See "Skolko tratit na oboronny" Ogonyok (May 89) no 19, pp. 6-7; Izyumov, A. "Military Glasnost Lacks Openness" Moscow News no 4, 17-24 September 1989; and the comments of liberal economist Gavril Popov in "Gorbachev Bares Budget for Military" New York Times 31 May 1989, p. 1. It seems that the harsh criticism caught the regime somewhat off guard. Marshal Akhromeyev's initial response to the statements doubting the accuracy of the figures was succinct- "I consider them to be lies and falsifications." See FBIS-SOV 9 June 1989, p. 58. A more sophisticated and in-depth explanation was published shortly thereafter to defend the data. See General of the Army Moiseev, M. "Oboronni byudzheth CCCP" Pravda 11 June 1989, p. 5. However, the public remains unconvinced. During a televised interview, Marshal Akhromeyev was badgered by economist Kireyev and correspondent Zakharov to provide historical data for comparison and to reveal the computational methodology used in arriving at the figures. See Soviet Television Vzglyad 8 October 1989.

¹⁰ "Vystupleniye M.S. Gorbacheva v Organizatsii Obyedinennykh Natsii" Pravda and Izvestiya 8 December 1988, p. 1. Condensed text translation appears in "At UN, Gorbachev Pledges Military Cuts" Current Digest of the Soviet Press (4 Jan 89) vol XL, no 49, pp. 1-7.

¹¹ "Gorbachev's Modernization Program: A Status Report" CIA & DIA report, p. 15.

¹² For instance, Kaufman, Richard F. "Causes of the Slowdown in Soviet Defense" Soviet Economy (Jan-Mar 85) vol 1, no 1. Kaufman postulates that the 1977-1981 downturn in defense spending was caused by a pause in the procurement cycle attendant to a shift away from strategic offensive weapons in favor of conventional forces and theater nuclear weapons. However, Kaufman fails to consider the possibility that the alleged shift may have been motivated by economic considerations, rather than simply being an unintended by-product of an objective revision in military strategy.

¹³ "The Soviet Weapons Industry: An Overview" DI-8610016 (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, September 1986) and Stephen M. Meyer "The Near Term Impact of SDI on Soviet Strategic Programs: An Institutional Perspective" in On the Defensive? The Future

of SDI eds., J.S. Nye and J.A. Shear (Boston: University Press of America, 1988) pp. 55-86.

14 The two year time limit has been increasingly embraced as a deadline for results by a variety of Soviet economists, journalists, and academics. Nikolai Shmelyov, liberal economist, predicts economic collapse if more radical measures are not taken. See Remnick, David "Economy Faces Crash, Soviet Congress Told" Washington Post 9 June 1989, p. 29. G. Baklanov, editor in chief of the magazine Znamya, says "these next two years are extremely important. Two years for the situation in the stores to get better." See "Gorbachev at Bay: Defending His Policies" Current Digest of the Soviet Press (1 Feb 89) vol XLI, no 1, pp. 1-9. And Yuri Afanasyev, rector of the Moscow Institute of History, warns of popular unrest which will "bring about an alternative to the President, as a principle, as a mechanism, and specifically as an individual figure Mikhail Sergcyevich Gorbachev." See Soviet Television 120 Minutes 16 June 1989. Boris Yeltsin recently revised the estimate downward to "not more than one year and probably about six months" before Gorbachev faces "revolution from below." See American Television ABC's Good Morning America 11 September 1989. Thus far the prognosis is not encouraging. In a series of television interviews, Chairman of the State Committee for Statistics Vadim Kirichenko has had virtually nothing positive to say about the country's economic performance during 1989. He notes that "mass absence from work" (strikes) cost the nation over two million man days during the first half of the year alone. In addition, the "unprecedented growth of money income" has been significantly outpacing the "growth of labor efficiency." Further, the apparent growth in the economy has been "primarily the result of inflation and burgeoning sales of alcohol." He describes the overall economic situation as "significantly worsened in a number of respects." See Soviet Television Vremya 27 July 89 and Topical Interview 19 October 1989 & 24 January 1990.

15 Soviet Television Vremya 13 September 1989.

16 Richard Halloran "Cheney Criticizes Cuts in Military" New York Times 24 August 1989, p. 20. I don't cite this quote to imply support for the B-2, a weapons system of distinctly dubious military utility. See Panyalev, Georg "A Soviet View of the B-2" International Defense Review 8/89, p. 1013. My purpose is simply to demonstrate that cancelling the B-2 will do little to balance the budget or reduce the deficit.

17 The Churbanov trial went on for almost four months, from 5 September 1988 to 31 December 1988, and elicited a great deal of public interest. For details, see "Na protsesse Yuriya Churbanova" Novoe russkoe slovo 7 September 1988, p.1 and "Prigovor" Pravda 31 December 1988, p. 3. The mood of the people regarding Party corruption is not difficult to divine. In May, Soviet television ran its own version of "Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous," touring viewers through the sumptuous environs of one of Brezhnev's secret dachas. The purpose of the show was to expose the decadence of "the years of stagnation," but the cynical tone belied the implication that corruption has been rooted out. Many Soviets believe that there are still thousands of bucolic resort homes hidden in the countryside for the private use of national and regional leadership. Soviet Television Brezhnev's Hunting Lodge 19 May 1989. Moreover, a number of

Soviets feel that the problem starts right at the top. Although it is fairly unusual for criticism of Raisa Gorbachev's flamboyant lifestyle and western wardrobe to find its way into the Soviet media, occasionally indicators of discontent are allowed to surface. See Soviet Television Resonance 20 June 1989. More recently, public anger and indignation over Party privileges and perquisites has spilled over into open debate in the Supreme Soviet. See Soviet Television Vremya 13 & 14 February 1990. For an interesting look at the Soviet elite's system of privilege and perquisites, see Willis, David K. "The Anonymous Social Register of the Soviet Elite- Nomenklatura" Town & Country April 86 pp. 115-122.

18 Soviet Television Vremya 12 May 1989.

19 Yegor Gaidar "Khozyaistvennaya reforma, pervy god" Kommunist (Jan 89) no 2, pp. 22-33.

20 V.S. Chernomyrdin, et al. "Eto ne podarok!" Kommunist (Mar 89) no 5, pp. 75-81. It is interesting to note that Otto Latsis is deputy editor in chief of Kommunist. For more on the debate about the Tyumen gas and petrochemical complex, see Laskorin, B. et al. "Yeschyo odna stroika veka?" Izvestiya 3 April 1989 p. 2 and Lynev, R. "O sibirskoi stroike i glasnosti" Izvestiya 6 April 1989 p. 1.

21 N.V. Lemayev "Novye podkhody k bogatstvu Tyumeni" Pravda 10 November 1989, p. 2.

22 "Streamlining Plan Rids Soviet Ranks of Many Old Faces" Washington Post 12 June 1989, p. 10.

23 I concur with William Odom's argument that bureaucratic reorganization and cadre turnover will do little to foster the success of perestroika. Only fundamental systemic change will bring about the desired results. See Odom, William E. "How Far Can Soviet Reform Go?" Problems of Communism (Nov-Dec 87) pp. 18-33. Drawing a clear distinction between apparent change and actual change, he offers some suggestions for measuring the progress of systemic reform in Odom, William E. "Has the Soviet Union Really Changed?" U.S. News & World Report 3 April 1989, p. 55.

24 The Soviets have made it clear to their Warsaw Pact allies and the West that they will bear the full cost of withdrawal. See the interview with Colonel General Eduard Vorobyev, Commander of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia in FBIS-SOV "General Comments on Troop Withdrawal from CSSR" 6 July 1989, p. 1.

25 "The Peace Non-Dividend" The Economist 4 November 1989, p. 19. Unlike thin-skinned missiles, tanks can not be crushed, and cutting them into pieces is an extremely expensive and time consuming process. One alternative which does not appear to have been given serious consideration is to dump them in the ocean.

26 It is interesting to contrast the enthusiastic tone of last spring's reportage with the more sober assessments that predominate now. Compare Soviet Television Vremya 25 April & 23 May 1989 with Soviet Television Vremya 10 September 1989. The plant manager interviews were

conducted on Soviet Television Vremya 7 & 27 July 1989.

27 See the comments of foreign ministry spokesman V.F. Petrovsky and people's deputy Y.A. Yashin on Soviet Television Vremya 13 January & 1 May 1989.

28 Soviet Television Vremya 29 October 1988.

29 Oleg Mamalya "Blasting Away Money. Conversion- A Look into the Future" Moscow News (1 Oct 89) no 40, p. 6.

30 Gavril Khromov "Skolko stoyat vzryvy. Dogovor po RSMD- v deistvie" Krasnaya zvezda 20 October 1989, p. 4. Actual U.S. INF costs are closer to \$ 200 million a year. See Brigadier General Lajoie, Roland "The On-Site Inspection Agency Earns its Stripes" Defense 89 January/February 1989, pp. 18-23.

31 General of the Army V. Lobov "Unilateral Soviet Armed Forces Cuts" Moscow News (25 Dec 88) p. 2. It is of some interest to note that Lobov was still a Colonel General when this article appeared. He and the new chief of staff, Colonel General Mikhail Moiseev, were both promoted to General of the Army on the same day. See "Ukaz Prezidiuma Verkhovnoy Soveta SSSR" Pravda 16 February 1989, p. 3.

32 Major General Yu. Lebedev and Colonel V. Markushin "Sokrascheniye armey i oboronosposobnost" Krasnaya zvezda 16 December 1988, p.3.

33 Soviet Television Vremya 27 Feb 89.

34 N. Sautin "Tanki vykhodyat domoi" Izvestiya 26 May 1989, p. 3. Contrast the cautiously optimistic tone of this piece with General of the Army Ivan Tretyak's characterization of the unilateral reductions under Khrushchev as "a sorry experience." See General of the Army I. Tretyak "Reliable Defense First and Foremost" Moscow News (21 Feb 88) no 8, p. 12.

35 Alexei Kireyev "Cost Accounting for Disarmament Economics" New Times (24-30 January) 4/89, pp. 14-17. Most civilian accounts don't claim that the Khrushchev reductions were an unqualified success. But many either argue or imply that the current reductions can be completed with servicemen undergoing only minimal disruption and hardship.

36 Elena Agapova "Vremya stavit voprosy. Kak ikh reshat?" Krasnaya zvezda 28 July 1989, p. 2.

37 A case in point is the recently opened veterans hospital in Volgograd. After 17 years of construction, it has finally become operational. However, like many "new" Soviet buildings, it suffers from a variety of defects. For example, there is no water on the upper floors because of insufficient pressure- a rather serious shortcoming in a hospital. See Ostanin, S. "I vot- razpezzana lentochka" Krasnaya zvezda 21 January 1990, p. 4. For more on the shabby treatment awaiting demobilized officers, see Lieutenant Colonel Falichev, O. "Pishu s bolyu i nadezhdoi" Krasnaya zvezda 25 January 1990, p. 2. He notes that "older officers being forced out encounter red tape and must fight for the

benefits to which they are entitled by law."

38 Soviet Television Seven Days 4 March 1990.

39 "General Moiseyev Discusses the Defense Budget" FBIS-SOV 26 February 1990, p. 83.

40 Soviet Television Today is Navy Day 30 July 1989. Admiral Panin delivered the address instead of Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union Chernavin because the latter was in London with various other high ranking Soviet officers trying to charm the British.

41 Captain Second Rank S. Turchenko "Kak razvivatsya flotu?" Krasnaya zvezda 15 August 1989, pp. 1-2.

42 This was revealed by Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov. Soviet Television Vremya 19 October 1988.

43 "V Sovete Ministrov SSSR" Pravda 21 August 1988, p. 1.

44 "Eshchyo 15 milliardov" Izvestiya 15 October 1988, p. 2.

45 "Vystupleniye M.S. Gorbacheva" Pravda 8 December 1988, p. 1.

46 At least for the time being, conservatives and reformers alike seem to be reading off the same script when it comes to expressing their views about conversion. Compare the comments of Nikolai Ryzhkov and Mikhail Gorbachev with those of Yegor Ligachev and Oleg Baklanov. Soviet Television Congress of People's Deputies 26 May & 7 June 1989; Vremya 13 June 1989; and Talking to the Point 22 July 1989.

47 Yuri Levada and Elena Petrenko, Director and Deputy Director of the newly formed National Institute of Public Opinion, talk at Princeton University, 15 February 1990. Published results reveal that over half of the people polled assess the prestige of the Party as low, while only 4 percent consider it high. See V. Boikov and Zh. Toshchenko "Posmotrim pravde v glaza" Pravda 16 October 1989, p. 2.

48 As a general rule of thumb, at least one story on conversion will appear each week either in the central press or on television. It is relatively rare for the issue to fade from public view for more than two weeks at a time. For instance, see Soviet Television Vremya 3, 10, 11, 27 & 30 September 1989. To date, there are no indications that the propaganda campaign is abating. See Soviet Television Vremya 8, 13, & 19 February 1990.

49 A. Pokrovski "Konversiya. Chto eto znachit" Pravda 28 August 1989, pp. 1 & 4.

50 Soviet Television Congress of People's Deputies 26 May 1989.

51 Pokrovski "Konversiya. Chto eto znachit," p. 1. For more data, see Vestnik statistiki 5/89, pp. 72-73 and Tedstrom, John "Is the Contribution of the Defense Complex to Civilian Production Growing?"

52 See the comments of Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov on Soviet Television Congress of People's Deputies 7 June 1989 and the interview with Politburo and Defense Council member Lev Zaikov in Izgarshev, V. "V Sovete Oborony" Pravda 27 November 1989, p. 2. Other sources put the 1990 figure somewhat higher at 45%, but all agree that the ultimate goal is 60% by 1995.

53 B. Ponomarev "Potentsial Konversii" Pravda 13 June 1989, p. 4.

54 Pokrovski "Konversiya. Chto eto znachit," p. 4.

55 Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov comments on Soviet Television Vremya 19 October 1988.

56 Vmesto raket i tankov" Pravda 14 March 1989, p. 2.

57 Ibid.

58 Soviet Television Vremya 16 August, 24 September, 30 September and 1 October 1989.

59 "Lekarstvennaya likhoradka" Pravda 9 November 1989, p. 2.

60 "V Sovete Ministrov SSSR" Pravda 24 September 1989, p. 3.

61 There are relatively few public statements concerning conversion policy which articulate plans and goals in a clear and comprehensive manner. One such statement is contained in "State Civilian Conversion Plan Discussed" FBIS-SOV 4 October 1989, pp. 104-106. Here V. Komarov, a department chief at the State Military-Industrial Commission, states that "as early as 1990, the beginnning of conversion is scheduled at one-half of the enterprises of the defense complex."

62 Lieutenant Colonel V. Martynenko and Major I. Ivanyuk "Oborona. Konversiya. Ekonomicheskaya otvetstvennost" Krasnaya zvezda 29 June 1989, p. 2.

63 "Defense Conversion Sometimes Resented" FBIS-SOV 30 August 1989, p. 85.

64 For instance, see Piyasheva, Larisa "Statistics and Reality" New Times (6-12 Feb 90) no 6, p. 35.

65 "Defense Plants Seen Resisting Conversion" FBIS-SOV 4 October 1989, pp. 102-104.

66 Ibid.

67 B. Konovalov "Programma konversii" Izvestiya 1 March 1990, p. 2.

68 Robert R. Ropelewski "Soviet Defense Industry Frustrated by Lack

of Conversion Blueprint" Armed Forces Journal International November 1989, p. 26.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid. Similarly, the Tashkent and Ulan-Ude Aircraft Works are shifting production capacity to the manufacture of washing machines, weighing and filling machines and "a splendid machine for washing apricots and tomatoes." Soviet Television Report on the Work of the Supreme Soviet 5 October 1989.

71 L. Teushchakov "Po lezviyu konversii" Sovetskaya Rossiya 4 March 1990, p. 2.

72 "Yashin on Future of Military Reform, Conversion" FBIS-SOV 27 February 1990, p. 76.

73 A. Dyatlov "Tanki ne proshli" Komsomolskaya Pravda 1 February 1990, pp. 1 & 4. Also see "Attempt to Export 12 T-72 Tanks Foiled" FBIS-SOV 1 February 1990, p. 40 and "V Prezidiume Soveta Ministrov SSSR" Rabochnaya tribuna 1 February 1990, p. 2 translated in "Ryzhkov, Presidium on Abortive T-72 Sale" FBIS-SOV 6 February 1990, p. 113.

74 Francis X. Clines "Scandal Erupts in Soviet Parliament" New York Times 15 March 1990, p. 10.

75 For a fairly recent articulation of the dual economy theory, see Rosefielde, Steven "Economic Foundations of Soviet National Security Strategy" Orbis (Summer 86) vol 30, no 2, pp. 317-330.

76 See Isaev, A. "Reforma i oboronnye otrasli" Kommunist (May 1989) no 5, pp. 24-31.

77 S. Yelekoyev "Posledny kozyr" Sotsialisticheskaya industriya 28 January 1989, p. 2 translated in FBIS-SOV 2 February 1989, p. 81 and E. Chernova "Oboronka menyaet professiyu" Sotsialisticheskaya industriya 7 February 1989, p. 2 translated in FBIS-SOV 15 Feb 1989, p. 81.

78 V. Livotkin "Spory Generalnovo Shtaba" Izvestiya 23 February 1990, p. 3.

79 The distinction between effectiveness and efficiency is drawn from Alexander, Arthur J. "Soviet Defense Industry and Perestroika: The Second Phase" The Rand Corporation, June 1989.

80 Soviet Television Vremya 11 September 1989. A similar story was aired on Soviet Television 120 Minutes 16 August 1989.

81 During the period 1980-1986, faulty television sets caused 18,000 fires which resulted in the deaths of 927 people. See Hickey, Neil "Good Morning, USSR!" TV Guide 3 September 1988, p. 9. The defense sector accounts for 94% of all television sets produced, and 100% of color televisions.

Alexsei Kireyev "Restructuring the Military-Industrial Complex"
New Times (5-11 September 89) no 36, pp. 28-30.

83 Soviet Television The Army and Perestroika 23 February 1990. For a scathing indictment of the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry, see Captain First Rank Bystrov, S. "Gibel atomokhod" Krasnaya zvezda 15 March 1990, p. 3. He claims that between 1985 and 1989 the ministry "was the subject of 529 complaints, incurring fines amounting to more than 3 million rubles, for delivering substandard equipment for use in nuclear submarines."

84 Kireyev "Restructuring the Military-Industrial Complex."

85 Hedrick Smith The Russians (New York: Ballantine Books, 1976) pp. 75-76 & 291-294.

86 For 1990, Gosplan allocated only 132 million rubles out of a 242 million ruble requirement. The project is short 40,000 tons of cement, 980 tons of boarding and 600 tons of galvanized steel. In the meantime, thousands of construction workers are idle. See Soviet Television Vremya 28, 29, 30 August and 4, 5 September 1989.

87 General of the Army V.I. Shabanov "Novye podkhody" Krasnaya zvezda 18 August 1989, pp. 1-2.

88 Kireyev "Restructuring the Military-Industrial Complex."

89 "Academician Promotes Conversion to Civilian Economy" FBIS-SOV 14 February 1990, pp. 118-121.

90 It is worth noting that the Soviet space program has also undergone a nasty funding scare. So far it has avoided deep cuts by selling the idea that space research results in spin-off technologies which can be adapted for use in the civilian sector. For the budget debate, see Soviet Television Vremya 28 & 31 July, 19 August and 4 October 1989. For coverage of technology spin-offs, see Soviet Television 120 Minutes 25 August 1989 and In the World Today 29 September and 2 October 1989.

NOTES-CHAPTER FOUR

¹ "Vystupleniye M.S. Gorbacheva" Pravda and Izvestiya 8 December 1988, p. 1.

² A small number of prescient western observers foresaw this development. For instance, see Larrabee, F. Stephen "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military" Foreign Affairs (Summer 88) vol 66, no 5, pp. 1002-1026. The timing of Gorbachev's initiative has been a matter of considerable speculation. It seems reasonable to assume that such a move became possible only after the 30 September 1988 Politburo shake-up which included the demotion of Ligachev and the retirement of Gromyko. It is less clear however, why Gorbachev would choose to voluntarily forfeit these forces as a bargaining chip in the upcoming conventional forces in Europe (CFE) reduction talks, rather than wait for them to convene in Vienna. My view is that the decision to implement the unilateral cuts was sound policy, but the timing indicative of the severe economic crisis afflicting the Soviet Union and the personal impatience of the general secretary.

³ Gorbachev's modified, less heavy-handed approach to Eastern Europe gradually emerged over the course of 1987. Originally it embodied a curious and confusing mix of old and new thinking. See Gorbachev, Mikhail Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (New York: Harper & Row, 1987) pp. 147-156. But as it unfolded in 1988, the new Soviet policy granted greater autonomy to Eastern European regimes to control their own destiny, and it seemed moderately successful (at least in Poland and Hungary) at promoting change in a calculated and measured manner.

⁴ The proposed unilateral reductions by the NSWP states are detailed in "Documentation" Survival (May/June 89) vol XXXI, no 3, pp. 269-273. They are briefly analyzed in Clarke, Douglas "The Warsaw Pact Arms Cuts" Radio Liberty Report on the USSR (17 February 1989) vol 1, no 7, pp. 7-10.

⁵ William Echikson "Mazowiecki's Strange Bedfellows" Christian Science Monitor 11 September 1989, p. 3. The new government consists of 11 Solidarity members, 4 Peasant Party members, 3 Democrats and 4 Communists. To mollify Soviet concerns, the Communists received the Defense and Interior Ministry portfolios.

⁶ The flight of East German citizens to the West actually started in May, when Hungary dismantled the barbed wire fence along the border with Austria. For instance, in July a total of 2144 East Germans arrived in West Germany without exit permission in addition to the 9563 who had emigrated legally. See Protzman, Ferdinand "Westward Tide of East Germans Is a Popular No-Confidence Vote" New York Times 22 August 1989, p. 1. However, it was the Hungarian government's decision to open the border with Austria which opened the refugee floodgates and sparked the beginning of serious political unrest. Over 45,000 East Germans departed the GDR in a single month and on 20 September a crowd of 20,000 marched in Leipzig demanding democracy and reform. It was the largest unsanctioned political gathering in decades. See Schmemmann, Serge "Exodus Galls East Berlin"

New York Times 14 September 1989, p. 14 and Kiefer, Francine S. "East Germany Faces Protests" Christian Science Monitor 10 October 1989, p. 1.

7 Interview with officers from the Defense Intelligence Agency, 1 December 1989 and Peter Schweizer "Soviet Actions Belie Silence on Events in a Changing Poland" Army Times 27 November 1989, p. 23. The Soviet troop deployments probably achieved the first two goals of providing military training and serving as a warning to the West. But it is not easy to determine how successful the Soviets have been in achieving their third goal of slowing down the reform process. On the one hand, events in Eastern Europe have been an unmitigated disaster from a Soviet perspective and the reasonable limits of change that they have tried to set have been exceeded repeatedly. But on the other hand, with the exception of Romania, the reform process has had a self-limiting aspect to it which so far has kept the situation from degenerating into complete anarchy and violent reprisals against Communists.

8 An analysis of the social, political and economic forces which created this volatile situation in Eastern Europe is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, I will comment on the issue of why the Soviet Union chose to relinquish its dominant role in the region. I reject the simplistic explanation offered by much of the western media that it is because Gorbachev is an enlightened tsar. See Isaacson, Walter "Yes, He's For Real" Time 6 November 1989, pp. 40-47 and Morrow, Lance "Man of the Decade- Gorbachev, The Unlikely Patron of Change" Time 1 January 1990, pp. 42-45. More sophisticated and compelling versions of the rational policy choice argument are presented in Dashichev, V. "The Soviet Perspective" Problems of Communism (May-Aug 88) pp. 60-67 and Gati, Charles "Eastern Europe on Its Own" Foreign Affairs (88/89) vol 68, no 1, pp. 99-119. I believe objective conditions were such that Gorbachev's range of policy options was highly constrained. Undeniably, he started the process by loosening Moscow's grip on Eastern Europe with the initial goal of promoting efficiency through greater autonomy. But as the economic crisis in the Soviet Union deepened, he was forced to make difficult choices about the allocation of precious resources. It made little sense to expend political and economic capital on the maintenance of empire when the preservation of the Soviet Union itself was at stake. The continuing deterioration of the Soviet economy and the steep decline in Gorbachev's domestic popularity led to a gradual shift of the regime's core value from the positive goal of revitalization to the negative goal of averting impending economic collapse. In this environment, the costs of intervention were far greater than the costs of inaction. So far, Gorbachev has demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice the status quo in Eastern Europe on the altar of urgent domestic priorities. In the end, he may be forced to jettison Eastern Europe altogether. This issue is examined at greater length in Kuiper, Marcus A. "The Legitimacy of Communist Rule in the Soviet Union" unpublished paper, 19 December 1989.

9 John Tagliabue "Poland Announces Solidarity Sweep and Party Losses" New York Times 9 June 1989, p. 1. During the second round of voting, Solidarity completed its electoral demolition of the Communist Party by winning the remaining 8 seats in the Senate.

10 Ruth E. Gruber "Hungarian Communists Brace for Shakeup"

11 An interesting discussion on how this situation developed historically is contained in Suvorov, Viktor Inside the Soviet Army (New York: Berkley Books, 1984) pp. 14-25.

12 Christopher Jones "Gorbachev and the Warsaw Pact" Eastern European Politics and Societies (Spring 89) vol 3, no 2, pp. 215-234. My discussion here is focused primarily on the four most geostrategically important countries of East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Romania has been an anomaly within the Warsaw Pact since the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1958.

13 Marvin Howe "Polish Foreign Minister Pledges No Withdrawal From Warsaw Pact" New York Times 26 September 1989, p. 17 and John Tagliabue "Shevardnadze Is in Poland for Talks" New York Times 25 October 1989, p. 12. This point was also made by Bronislaw Geremek in his talk at Princeton University, 20 November 1989.

14 Bernard E. Trainor "Polish Army: Enigma in the Soviet Alliance" New York Times 22 August 1989, p. 13; "Army Daily Ponders Hungarian Developments" FBIS-SOV 30 October 1989, pp. 32-33; David Binder "East Germany Revamping and Taking the Politics Out of its Army" New York Times 7 December 1989, p. 20 and John Tagliabue "Prague Would Cut Defenses Along West German Border" New York Times 16 December 1989, p. 9.

15 "Czech Official Wants Soviet Military Out" Los Angeles Times 15 December 1989, p. 1 and "Prague Wants Soviet Pullout by Year's End" New York Times 10 January 1990, p. 10.

16 Alan Riding "Hungary Seeks Withdrawal of Soviet Forces in Two Years" New York Times 19 January 1990, p. 10.

17 "Walesa Demands Troop Withdrawal from Poland" FBIS-SOV 19 January 1990, p. 1 and "Polish Government Spokesman Cited on Troops" FBIS-SOV 22 January 1990, p. 39.

18 Soviet Television Vremya 4 December 1989.

19 See "Text of USSR-CSSR Troop Withdrawal Accord" FBIS-SOV 5 March 1990, p. 34 and "Text of Agreement on Soviet Troop Withdrawal" FBIS-SOV 13 March 1990, p. 29. A number of high ranking Soviet officers acknowledged the slim prospects of reaching a compromise which would allow some Soviet units to stay; including Colonel General Eduard Vorobyev, commander of the Central Group of Forces. See "Soviet Commander Foresees Total CSSR Pullout" FBIS-SOV 4 December 1989, p. 59.

20 Robert D. Blackwill and Jeffrey W. Legro "Constraining Ground Force Exercises of NATO and the Warsaw Pact" International Security (Winter 89/90) vol 14, no 3, pp. 68-98 and Michael Sadykiewicz The Warsaw Pact Command Structure in Peace and in War R-3558-RC (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp, 1988).

21 Jonathan C. Randal "Soviet Union Informs Czechoslovakia of Start

of Partial Troop Withdrawal" Washington Post 10 February 1990, p. 20.

22 Jones "Gorbachev and the Warsaw Pact" pp. 228-229.

23 Steven J. Zaloga "Eastern Bloc Two-Way Street Has Its Share of Potholes" Armed Forces Journal International December 1988, pp. 52-53. So far only the Czechs have publicly broached the issue, indicating that they intend to scale back weapons production and to cease their rather substantial involvement in the international arms market. Czech arms exports generate roughly a billion dollars a year in hard currency income, so it will be interesting to see whether pragmatism or morality triumphs in this case. Craig R. Whitney "Prague Arms Trade to End, Foreign Minister Says" New York Times 25 January 1990, p. 10 and Kenneth W. Banta "The Arms Merchants' Dilemma" Time 2 April 1990, p. 29.

24 Richard A. Bitzinger "Finnish Defense Today" International Defense Review 11/89 pp. 1477-1480. The Hungarians seem to find the Finnish comparison particularly attractive. See Echikson, William "Bloc Buster" World Monitor June 1989 pp. 29-35.

25 The declining credibility of the Soviet conventional threat has had a major impact on the defense posture of several NATO countries. See Schulte, Heinz "Defence Budget Freeze for West Germany" Jane's Defence Weekly 15 July 1989, p. 70; "Key Projects Hit by West German Cuts" Jane's Defence Weekly 29 July 1989, p. 146; and "Changing West German Stance Draws Concern" Jane's Defence Weekly 5 August 1989, p. 203. Also see Delaere, Martijn "Dutch Army Tank Forces Face Cuts" Jane's Defence Weekly 15 July 1989, pp. 70-71 and Lewis, J A C "Belgium's Cuts Hit All Arms" Jane's Defence Weekly 29 July 1989, p. 149. As the NATO defense consensus slowly unravels, the United States has tried to be sensitive to European concerns. NATO has significantly reduced the amount of low level flight training and has carefully circumscribed both the size and conduct of force-on-force maneuvers such as Reforger. See "NATO Looks at Smaller, Fewer Exercises" Jane's Defence Weekly 15 July 1989, p. 61; Kiefer, Francine S. "NATO Scales Back Maneuvers" Christian Science Monitor 28 September 1989, p. 4 and Gordon, Michael R. "U.S. War Game in West Germany to Be Cut Back" New York Times 14 December 1989, p. 23. Interestingly, at the same time that the U.S. Congress is debating deep cuts in American military strength, a provision has been inserted into the 1990 defense authorization bill which mandates a proportionate reduction of American forces in Europe if NATO allies reduce their active duty end strength. See Maze, Rick "A Warning Shot to NATO" Army Times 14 August 1989, p. 7; "Congress Weighing Big Cut in Troops" Army Times 9 October 1989, p. 4; and "Hill Begins Pressure for Bigger Europe Cuts" Army Times 15 January 1990, p. 18.

26 "Hungary Reduces Armed Forces, Military Service" FBIS-SOV 5 December 1989, p. 37.

27 John Tagliabue "Prague Would Cut Defenses Along West German Border" New York Times 16 December 1989, p. 9. President Havel laid out his position rather unequivocally "it is necessary for our Army to become a really effective combat force capable, if need be, of fighting rather than letting others ruin our land on the pretext of defending it." Colonel

P. Chernenko "Chekhoslovakiya: Kakoi budet armiya?" Krasnaya zvezda 26 January 1990, p. 3.

28 "GDR Defense Minister on Warsaw Pact Communiqué" FBIS-SOV 30 November 1989, p. 1 and Serge Schmemmann "Berlin Communist Urges Troop Cuts" New York Times 7 January 1990, p. 16.

29 Contrast Jones, Christopher Soviet Hegemony in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact (New York: Praeger, 1981) and Boczek, Boleslaw A. "NATO and the Warsaw Pact: The Present and Future" in The Warsaw Pact: Political Purpose & Military Means eds., Robert W. Clawson and Lawrence S. Kaplan (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Research Inc., 1982) pp. 93-108 with Alterman, Eric R. "Central Europe: Misperceived Threats and Unforeseen Dangers" World Policy Journal (Fall 85) vol II, no 4, pp. 681-709 and Atkeson, Edward B. "The Fault Line in the Warsaw Pact: Implications for NATO Strategy" Orbis (Spring 86) vol 30, no 1, pp. 111-131. In light of recent events, it has become fashionable to assert that there never was a WTO conventional threat. See Talbot, Strobe "Rethinking the Red Menace" Time 1 January 1990, pp. 66-72.

30 The numbers change somewhat if we expand our perspective to theater level. The Western Theater of Military Operations (TVD) includes an additional 33 Soviet divisions stationed in the Baltic, Byelorussian and Carpathian military districts and excludes 6 Hungarian divisions which are part of the Southwestern TVD. However, these additional Soviet divisions must traverse Poland and East Germany to reach the front and a ratio of 60 Soviet to 29 NSWP divisions at theater level still reflects a heavy alliance dependence on NSWP forces. See Soviet Military Power (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989) pp. 14-15.

31 Jim Hoagland "Eastern Europe's Danger Zone" Washington Post 24 October 1989, p. 25.

32 Ibid. Premier Mazowiecki himself has confirmed that "as long as the blocs exist, Poland's place is where it is." Soviet Television Seven Days 26 November 1989. For more on Poland's strained relations with the GDR and its concerns over West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's failure to make an unequivocal statement about the legitimacy of the Oder-Neisse line as the Polish-East German border, see Whitney, Craig R. "New Measures Strain Poland's Ties to 2 Germanys" New York Times 16 December 1989, p. 8.

33 John Tagliabue "Prague Would Cut Defenses Along West German Border" New York Times 16 December 1989, p. 9 and Craig R. Whitney "Havel Traces Passage From Jail to the Castle" New York Times 12 January 1990, p. 14.

34 Henry Kamm "Hungarian Serenade: Wooing Voters and the West" New York Times 26 September 1989, p. 8.

35 "Akhromeyev Interviewed on Warsaw Pact Future" FBIS-SOV 30 November 1989, p. 105.

36 Contrast Marshal Akhromeyev's interview with the West German magazine Stern "the Soviet Union is prepared for both military alliances

to be abolished" with his comments on Italian television two weeks later. "The West must realize this: the Warsaw Pact existed in the past, exists now, and will exist in the future too." See "Akhromeyev Wants Warsaw Pact, NATO Dissolution" FBIS-SOV 16 November 1989, p. 3 and "Akhromeyev Interviewed on Warsaw Pact Future" FBIS-SOV 30 November 1989, p. 105. There is little doubt that events in Prague were key in bringing about this dramatic shift in Soviet attitudes. It is instructive to examine the radical transformation of Moscow's position from strongly pro-government to unabashedly pro-demonstrator during the Czech crisis. See Soviet Television Vremya 17, 21 & 26 November 1989.

37 Deputy Foreign Minister Ivan Aboimov responded tersely "the question of Hungary or Poland leaving the Warsaw Pact is not on the agenda, thus it is not worth pursuing the question even in theory." See "Hungarian, Polish Roles in Pact Viewed" FBIS-SOV 31 October 1989, p.19.

38 Mikhail Bezrukov and Andrei Kortunov "What Kind of an Alliance Do We Need?" New Times 41/89, pp. 7-9.

39 More likely is the application of economic pressure. The Soviet Union supplies 80 percent of the NSWP countries' imported oil and oil products, 99 percent of their natural gas, and more than 70 percent of their coal. See LTC Gruzkov, Aleksandr "In the Interests of Collective Defence" Soviet Military Review 8/89, pp. 26-28.

NOTES-CHAPTER FIVE

¹ Some of the best analysis to date of this incident is contained in Fuller, Elizabeth "Official and Unofficial Investigations into Tbilisi Massacre Yield Contradictory Results" Radio Liberty Report on the USSR (hereafter RLR-USSR) 3 November 1989, pp. 26-29.

² This view of Communists is nothing new in the non-Russian republics. But it is a dramatically new political phenomenon among ethnic Russian workers. Last summer, it was not difficult to find striking miners who felt free to express apocalyptic opinions on central television. For instance, "states and systems come and go. People remain. And people always know how to feed themselves." And "you say that we want to bring the country to its knees. By no means. Our country has not been able to rise from its knees for four years already." Soviet Television Difficult Days of Donbass 14 August 1989; After the Strike 18 & 25 August, 1 & 12 September 1989; and Seven Days 12 November 1989. Similar views of a violently chaotic future are also being expressed in Moscow and Leningrad. The people are clearly concerned about the possibility of anarchy- "today I have begun to be afraid of living in this country" and "I have the feeling that we shall have 1917 all over again." Soviet Television Vzglyad 6 October 1989 and Topical Interview 12 October 1989. Most lay the blame squarely on the Party. Typical comments include "ours is the only country where all the leaders are either crooks or fools" and "the whole Party has to repent en masse." Soviet Television Vzglyad 5 November 1989 and Seven Days 12 November 1989. Public opinion poll results rating the prestige of the Party at an all time low were published in Boikov, V. and Toshchenko, Zh. "Posmotrim pravde v glaza" Pravda 16 October 1989, p. 2.

³ Probably the most comprehensive coverage of the earthquake and its aftermath is contained under the rubric "Armenian Quake: Major Problems" in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (11, 18, 25 January and 1 February 1989) vol XL, nos. 50-52 and vol XLI, no 1.

⁴ Michael Dobbs "Soviets Say 600 Are Killed As Gas Blast Wrecks Two Trains" Washington Post 4 June 1989, p. 1. To the best of my knowledge, so far there are no comprehensive sources which cover all the ethnic and economic unrest which plagued the Soviet Union in 1989. For those interested in pursuing this discussion, I recommend FBIS-SOV as a good starting point for reconstructing events.

⁵ Soviet Television Vremya 13 December 1989. Economist Nikolai Shmelyev puts it this way- "our economy is so sick that this disease threatens to swallow the political system itself." Soviet Television Vzglyad 1 September 1989.

⁶ Reports by Vadim Kirichenko, Chairman of the State Committee of the USSR for Statistics. Soviet Television Vremya 27 July 1989 and Topical Interview 19 October 1989. In addition to the industrial chaos, there are indications that the energy crisis has also had an impact on the Soviet consumer. For instance, see "Kto kran perekryvaet?" Pravda 19 September 1989, pp. 1-2. The energy situation is examined at greater length in

Dienes, Leslie "Energy: From Bonanza to Crisis" RLR-USSR 1 December 1989. pp. 1-5.

7 "Delays in Unloading Grain Ships Fought" FBIS-SOV 19 January 1990, p. 119.

8 Soviet central television has given increasing attention to this issue. For stories on: the shortage of rail cars, see Vremya 22 & 30 July, 24 August, and 4 & 28 September 1989; obsolete and defective railroad equipment, see 120 Minutes 16 August 1989 and Vremya 11 September 1989; theft from rail cars, see Vremya 8 & 14 August, 10 October 1989 and 120 Minutes 18 September and 27 November 1989; the back up at the unloading docks and the resulting spoilage, see Vremya 7 August and 19 September 1989 and 120 Minutes 9 & 10 November 1989. According to economist Yuri Maltsev, the transportation crisis has exacerbated a situation in which "243 of 278 basic items on the Soviet shopping list are absent from the market." Yuri Maltsev, talk at Princeton University, 17 November 1989.

9 Economist Otto Latsis' frank discussion of the budget deficit is probably the best to date. See Soviet Television Vremya 12 May 1989. Last fall the Supreme Soviet was forced to revise the official estimate of the budget deficit upward by 49 billion rubles. One delegate commented "there is absolutely nothing to pay off this sum." Soviet Television Vremya 20 October 1989. Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov has been the government's primary spokesman on pensioners and price reform. See Soviet Television Vremya 20 May 1989 and Topical Interview 24 September 1989. Ryzhkov admits that the increased benefits voted by the Council of Ministers can not be funded in Dolganov, V., Korolkov I. and Lynyov, R. "Neotlozhnye mery. Iz kakikh istochnikov?" Izvestiya 2 August 1989, pp. 1 & 3.

10 I base my estimate on an interpolation of Kirichenko's figures (see footnote 6). He states that cash income increased by 12.2 percent in the first nine months of 1989, but the total volume of production increased by only 3.2 percent. The official Soviet estimate is 2.4 percent, the CIA estimate is 8.5 percent, and Abel Abanbegyan's estimate is 12.5 percent. In truth, no one really knows what the actual inflation rate is, but it is safe to say that it is probably considerably higher than the projected GNP growth rate for 1989 of 1.5 percent.

11 For instance, see Lieutenant Colonel A. Olynik "Obshchestvo dolzhno proyavit trevogu" Krasnaya zvezda 30 September 1989, p. 6. Also see Soviet Television Vremya 17 September 1988 and I Serve the Soviet Union 26 November 1989. The lack of adequate upper body strength is blamed on the average soldier's diet which is said to be "at least 30-40 percent below norms in calories and nutrients."

12 I do not mean to imply that American soldiers do not drink. They most definitely do, and often to excess. However, I have never encountered one who drank the sorts of things that Soviet servicemen do: shoe polish, antifreeze and windshield de-icer. See Captain Lukhanin, M. "Pir v nochnoi kazarme" Krasnaya zvezda 16 February 1990, p. 4.

13 The military is certainly not the only source of weapons for insurgent forces. But it is a major supplier of ammunition and firearms,

and the only source of sophisticated modern equipment. Major General L. Zaika "Na prestupnost- edinyim frontom" Krasnaya zvezda 21 September 1989, p. 2; Z. Kadymbekov "Napryazhennost ne spadaet" Pravda 9 October 1989, p. 4; A. Gomonov and N. Modestov "Devyat meshkov s pistoletami. Na prestupnost- edinyim frontom" Pravda 24 October 1989, p. 6.

14 "V osnove uspekha- otnoshenie k lyudyam" Voenny vestnik (December 1988) no 12, pp. 12-17.

15 Ibid.

16 Soviet Television I Serve the Soviet Union 11 & 18 June 1989.

17 Stephen Foye "Baltic Nationalism and the Soviet Military" RLR-USSR 30 June 1989, pp. 22-27; Suzanne Crow "Soviet Conscripts Fall Victim to Ethnic Violence" RLR-USSR 13 October 1989, pp. 8-9; James Critchlow "Uzbek Army Recruits Believed Murdered to Avenge Fergana Killings" RLR-USSR 3 November 1989, pp. 23-24.

18 "Moiseev Views Military Section of Party Platform" FBIS-SOV 15 February 1990, p. 117. The New York Times has quoted the figure of 66,500 from the Minister of Defense General of the Army Yazov, but this appears to be a misprint. See Pear, Robert "Moscow Worries About Effect of Nationalist Tensions on Army" New York Times 28 March 1990, p. 6.

19 Lieutenant Colonel N. Burbyga "Oseny priyiv: zaboty i trevogi" Krasnaya zvezda 29 October 1989, p. 4.

20 Ibid.

21 V. Badurkin "Kto boikotiruet armeiskuyu sluzhbu" Trud 13 March 1990, p. 3.

22 Major General V.I. Vasilyev "Budut nesti otvetstvennost" Krasnaya zvezda 21 January 1990, p. 4.

23 General M.A. Moiseyev "Vazhny shag v voennom stroitelstve" Krasnaya zvezda 15 March 1990, pp. 1-2.

24 "Lithuania Adopts Decree on Military Service" FBIS-SOV 13 March 1990, p. 29. Estimates of the number of Lithuanian deserters currently run as low as 250 and as high as 1500. In the absence of more compelling data, I am inclined to split the difference.

25 V. Zaikin "MVD SSSR i goryachie tochki" Izvestiya 24 October 1989, p. 8.

26 Lieutenant Colonel A. Deryabin "A ved ne voina" Krasnaya zvezda 29 October 1989, p. 4. Also see Soviet Television Vremya 11, 27 & 28 October 1989.

27 A. Semenyaka "Kak voyn i grazhdanin" Krasnaya zvezda 17 March 1990, p. 3.

A. Kraynin "Novye podrobnosti sobyty v Baku" Komsomolskaya pravda 17 February 1990, p. 1.

29 Soviet Television Vremya 20 January 1990 and Pavel Gutiontov "Dolg soldat i dolg obshchestva" Izvestiya 28 January 1990, p. 1.

30 N. Sautin "V gorode stalo spokojnee" Pravda 20 February 1990, p. 6.

31 "Troops in Lithuania Fired At" FBIS-SOV 22 February 1990, p. 84 and Soviet Television I Serve the Soviet Union 19 November 1989.

32 Igor Andreyev "Baku, 25 yanvarya" Izvestiya 26 January 1990, p. 1 and Lieutenant General O. Zinchenko "Sluzhim v Pribaltike" Krasnaya zvezda 20 December 1989, p. 2.

33 General of the Army P.G. Lushev "Obshchee delo naroda" Krasnaya zvezda 23 February 1990, pp. 1-2.

34 General of the Army D.T. Yazov "Zashchita otechestva ne terpit mestnichestva, egoizma, svoekorystiya" Pravda 13 November 1989, p. 3.

35 Media coverage of the Soviet military is examined at greater length in chapter two.

36 Soviet Television Vremya 19 January 1990. It is also of interest to note the formation of the group Nadezhda ("hope") whose membership consists of wives and mothers of Soviet POWs still in Afghanistan. Representatives of the group were scheduled to appear on the popular television program Vzglyad, but the authorities pulled the plug on the transmission at the last minute. See Yasmann, Viktor "Afghanistan Comes Up, Glasnost Goes Down" RLR-USSR 10 November 1989, pp. 9-10.

37 For instance, see Soviet Television I Serve the Soviet Union 27 July, 13 October and 19 November 1989.

38 General D.T. Yazov "Vysoko nesti chest ofitsera, byt v avangarde perestroiki" Krasnaya zvezda 8 December 1989, pp. 1-2.

39 For instance, economist Nikolai Shmelyev on Soviet Television Vzglyad 1 September 1989 and Vremya 30 October 1989 and academician Georgy Arbatov "Armiya dlya strany ili strana dlya armii?" Ogonyok January 1990, no 5, p. 4.