


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CHALLENGES TO MALAYSIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY

BY

COLONEL HUSSIN H. A. SENIK

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) Challenges to Malaysia's National Security		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Individual Study Project
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) Colonel Hussin H.A. Senik		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Same		12. REPORT DATE 9 April 1990
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 98
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) The changing environment, internal and external, has a profound influence on the course and events especially of a young nation striving to maintain her survival in the face of various challenges to her national unity, prosperity, and well being. Malaysia had successfully fought the communist and was able to destroy its militant threat. However the challenges to her national security has not diminished because the diversification in her culture,		

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CHALLENGES TO MALAYSIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY
An individual Study Project
by
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April 1990

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Hussin H. A. Senik, COL, INF

TITLE: Challenges to Malaysia's National Security

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: APRIL 9th, 1990 PAGES: 93 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The changing environment, internal and external, has a profound influence on the course and events especially of a young nation striving to maintain her survival in the face of various challenges to her national unity, prosperity, and well being. Malaysia had successfully fought the communist and was able to destroy its militant threat. However the challenges to her national security has not diminish because the diversification in her culture, traditions, and religions of her multiethnic communities in themselves pose a greater threat to the nation. Events occurring in the neighbouring states could also influence Malaysia's security and well being as the close proximity and the relationship existed between the states and the people would have an impact of actions and re-actions on both sides. World order and events do cause re-alignment in policies and a review of inter-state relationship when national interests are in conflict. However Government policies derived from accepted national purpose, values, and interests in the main will determine the unity, prosperity, well being, and the survivality of the nation as long as the internal order is being effectively controlled and all challenges are being tackled successfully. As a consequence Malaysia would continue to address these challenges to her national security so that her national sovereignty and integrity are being upheld.



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CHALLENGES TO MALAYSIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"If I am right and what we will see in the years ahead are increasing examples of economic expansion and decreasing attempts at military expansionism, than we can expect much more of our future to be determined by the trading states rather than by the garrison and the military states".¹

Dr. Mahathir Mohamad
Prime Minister of Malaysia

It is inadequate, even impossible to discuss and understand Malaysia's defense strategy and the changing concept of security without studying her historical background. Malaysian politics and cultures had experienced a series of changes since the glorious reign of the Melaka Sultanate from the onslaught of the Portuguese in 1511, to the Dutch in 1641, British colonialism beginning 1786, to World War II followed by Japanese occupation (1941-1945), to independence in 1957, and finally the formation of Malaysia in 1963, and how she stands today.

It is no wonder that at one time the diversified culture, traditions, and religions of Malaysians posed the greatest security threat to the nation. Those diversifications had resulted in racial disputes and could lead to war if the situation had not been wisely and delicately controlled.² If we were to examine and critically study the history of Malaysia's

culture, traditions, and what the nation upholds, we would tend to conclude that Malaysia's concept of security and defense is more than what the eye could see, for the threat is more from within than from without, hence the motto on Malaysia's emblem "BERSATU BERTAMBAH MUTU" which literally means "UNITY BREEDS QUALITY" but most frequently it is translated as "UNITY IS STRENGTH".

AIM

With that in mind this paper will review and examine the various internal and external issues based on historical background, internal order, current trends and threats in order to determine the challenges faced by Malaysia and the possible policy actions that could be formulated and actions taken in order to improve and ensure her national security based on national purpose, values, and interests.

ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER

The study will commence with a short survey of Malaysia's historical background beginning with Melaka Sultanate, leading to events faced by the nation before and after independence, and finally to analyse the causes of present challenges to Malaysia's national security, and concludes with the determination of her national purpose, values, and inerests.

INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURE

The study was dependent upon a wide variety of historical texts, public document, periodicals and newspaper articles, as well as published and unpublished papers for the information necessary to addresss the subject. This paper will address issues in relation to the nations of South East Asia as a region, in particular those in ASEAN. Some of the matters being addressed are sensitive in nature involving racial issues but they are being presented with sincerity and candour. Some of the conclusions drawn are mainly being dependent on the thoughts of regional specialists while some of them are dependent on the author's experience.

ENDNOTES

1. Dr.Mahathir Mohamad, Beyond Confrontation: The Challenge of Peace in the Pacific, June 17th, 1989, Kuala Lumpur, P 10.

2. Haji Mokhtar Shamsuddin, Kertas Perintah 14 Tahun 1988 Malaysia, Kearah Memelihara Keselamatan Negara, Kuala Lumpur 1988, P 1 (Lampiran A).

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

MELAKA SULTANATE

On the basis of existing knowledge, Malaysia's history may be said to date from the period of the Melaka Sultanate (Kingdom of Malacca) founded just before 1400.¹ Historians and archeologists accepted the fact that the Kingdom of Kedah, a northern state bordering Thailand, preceded the famous Melaka Sultanate, but evidence were surprisingly scanty and discontinuous to work on.² Early in the 15th century, the Melaka Kingdom not only had the advantage of a strategic geographical location where West meets East, but also commanded a much respectable political status and strength. Trade flourished with Malay language as the lingua franca and the Kingdom proved too strong even for the powerful Siamese (Thai) army. Even then, the strength of the Kingdom was not in the strength of her warriors, but in the wisdom of Parameswara, the ruler who had almost immediately sought the recognition of the Emperor of China as soon as his government was established in 1400. Parameswara was fortunate in gaining the attention of the commander of the Chinese sea expedition, Admiral Cheng Hoe, who brought the appropriate regalia including seals and an inscribed "stone of state" in 1409 to bestow on Parameswara as the Sultan (King) for the Kingdom of Melaka from Emperor Yang-Lo of the Ming Dynasty.³ To reinforce his suzerainty, the Emperor of China also gave away

his daughter, Princess Hang Li Po, to marry the second Sultan of Melaka. She set sail to Melaka in royal regatta escorted by loyal Chinese warriors and accompanied by charming maids.⁴ This event was the beginning of the present "Baba and Nyonya" society in Melaka and Penang, a unique Chinese clan who had totally assimilated with the Malays and that they no longer remember the language of their mother tongue - Chinese. Thus looking back in perspective allying with major foreign powers had not been alien in Malaysia's defense strategy and diplomacy.

EARLY CONCEPT OF SECURITY AND DEFENSE

Early concept of security and defence could be traced back to the Melaka Sultanate which dominated the greater part of Peninsula Malaysia, extending even to the north and east coasts of Sumatra. The Melaka ruling house later established the states of Pahang, Johore, and Perak. Brunei Sultanate in the Borneo Island was an extension of Melaka's influence to that region. Each state was being ruled by a Sultan who were descendants of the Sultan of Melaka.

At this point, it is important to understand the basis of the Malay Government. Tradition and culture of the Malay society was such that they offer absolute loyalty to the monarch. To a Malay man, the monarch or Sultan was the government, the country, and the symbol of his race, breed, and religion. At this juncture, religion became a very important factor as Parameswara in 1407, the first Sultan of Melaka, embraced Islam and took the name of

Iskandar Shah.⁵ The seat of the Malay Government was synonymous to the throne of the monarch. The concept of security and defense, then, was to uphold the status quo of the monarch. To quote the legendary Malay hero, Hang Tuah, "PANTANG ANAK MELAYU MENDERHAKA" literally translated means as "FORBIDDEN IT IS FOR A MALAY SON TO DISOBEY.....". In the native lingua, it was understood that absolute loyalty to the ruler was expected, or some sort of calamity would befall him. This particular concept of security and defense had been a source of strength to the Malays even when the Kingdom of Melaka fell to the Portuguese in 1511, or rather fell to their more modern weapons and ammunition. It must be noted that the fall of Melaka did not mark the end of the regime, for it had been embedded in Malay political culture, it was the institution of the ruler rather than the territory which provided the accepted and proper basis for the existence of the "KERAJAAN" or government, the root word "RAJA" referred to is the ruler.⁶ Presently this ideal is still very much upheld by Malays though they are very much aware of the fact that the "KERAJAAN" is not merely the monarch, the Yang Di Pertuan Agong, but more so it is the Government in-being which is democratically elected by the people.

The words of the legendary warrior Hang Tuah "TAKKAN MELAYU HILANG DI DUNIA" sings in every Malay community "NEVER WILL THE MALAY BE WIPED OFF THIS EARTH", a slogan that kept the Malays going even in the face of the tumultuous changes brought about by Western colonization and the influx of immigrants from China,

India, and the surrounding lands their presence was overwhelmingly enough to wipe out Malay traditions and culture.

The early British administrators were wise enough to sense the Malay's sensitivities. Whatever political, social, and economic changes and developments implemented, the colonialists never made any attempt to introduce a government that was totally foreign to the Malays, namely a government without a state monarch. However some of their predecessors misjudged the Malays when the British reimposed their colonial rule after the World War Two whereby the British proposed a centralized Malayan Union amongst which would deprive the Malay Rulers and the Malay States of all but nominal authority. This proposal was never implemented as the British received the full onslaught of the native's wrath.⁷

No concrete dateline could be drawn as to when the Malays became aware the modern concept of security and defense which also include the defense of the nation's territory. It could be said that this awareness was slowly developed during the inter-war years of 1913-1940. However the Japanese occupation of Malaya, Sarawak, and North Borneo from 1941 to 1945 gave the Malays and the Indigenous Natives the impetus to be free and rule their 'Tanah Melayu' or 'native-land'.⁸ The need for Malay unity was made more paramount and pronounced not only in the face of the Japanese occupation and exploitation but more so on the ineffectiveness of the colonial master - the British - to defend Malaya, Sarawak, and North Borneo. Hence the seeds of nationalism were permanently implanted. It is indeed interesting to note that at this point, defense clearly meant defending "NUSA, BANGSA, AND

AGAMA (COUNTRY, RACE, AND RELIGION)". This slogan is upheld to this day except that the term "Bangsa (race)" refers to all Malaysians instead of Malays only. However some staunch Malay Muslim would rather put it as defending "AGAMA, NEGARA, AND BANGSA (RELIGION, COUNTRY, AND RACE)".

When the Japanese surrendered in 1945, the British returned to Malaya, Sarawak, and North Borneo but the people now saw them in a different light. They were no longer looked upon as the invincible "Orang Putih (White People)" but as colonialists, userpers, and all the descriptions that summed up a new awareness. The spirit of nationalism was obviously gathering strength. The British realized that they were losing support not only in the Federated and the Unfederated Malay States but also in the Straits Settlement and the Crown Colonies. Eventually after a series of negotiations with Malayan Representatives, the British agreed to an independent Malaya in 1957.

ROLES OF THE NON MALAYS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE

Since the Chinese and Indians are an integral part of the Malaysian society, it is important to briefly account their roles, perceptions, and their concept of national security and defense prior to and after independence. It is considered inappropriate to include this discussion earlier as the immigrants' concept of security and defense was totally unparalled to that of the Malays and the Indigenous People.

During the 19th Century there were two distinct groups of Chinese in Malaya. One consisted of the Baba - Nyonya or Straits Chinese, born and lived for the most part in the Straits Settlements of Melaka and Penang Island, where their ancestors had come to enjoy the British law and order. The Babas(males) and the Nyonyas(females) although did not embrace Islam, adopted and assimilated themselves with Malay culture to such an extent that the Malays never doubt their loyalty to the monarch or the country although at the same time they were also known to be loyal to their families, clans, and adhered to Confucius ethics. By the 19th Century many had become exceedingly rich merchants, shopkeepers, and craftsmen. They were proud to be British subjects, received Western education with open-mindedness and some even converted to Christianity.

The other group was the "Singkeh", the immigrants who came in the middle of 18th Century whose numbers swelled with the development of tin and later with the rubber industries. They came, not unnaturally, into the country on the bottom of the heap, engulfed in poverty and caught in the turbulence of the Taiping Rebellion in China which cost some twenty million lives. The Rebellion not only devastated China's Central and Southern Provinces but more so stimulated emigration. Like emigrants elsewhere, the Singkehs were fleeing the law, creditors, or personal enemies.⁹

Distinguished from the Malays and the Straits Chinese who were British subjects then, the Singkeh accepted the fact that they were only sojourners in British Malaya. The immigrants' dream was

to make money, return to his native village in South China and be buried in the earth of their ancestors. Many did return to China but by the 20th Century a large permanent Chinese population was established especially in the tin mining areas. Female Singkeh emigrants increased especially during 1930s resulting in rapid growth of Chinese population from 22% in 1911 to 63% in 1947, making 38% of the total population in Malaya then.¹⁰

Such massive waves in immigration led to the creation of large Chinese settlements that had little or no contact with the indigenous Malay Community. It is not surprising that Singkeh settlers, even after a generation of Malayan residence, still considered their primary identity to be CHINESE. As sojourners, they financed their own schools and community services and developed a strong ethnic and cultural Singkeh identity. Under such conditions, the Singkeh community experienced a considerable social and political autonomy almost separated from the stream of the other Malaysians during that period and their presence were not acknowledged in the Malay States by the British masters.

The Indians, on the other hand, had been in contact with Malaya and Borneo Island since before written historical records. However the present population is largely due to British advances in their colonialization efforts of the region. Until 1867 the Straits Settlements were a part of British East India Company. A small number of Indians came to serve the colonial government or set up retail establishments, but the Sikhs from Punjab were good fighters and they were brought over to serve in the British Police and Army in Malaya. Most Indians who came from Southern

India were small scale money lenders and bankers while the Benggalis were prominent in the lower levels of the civil service. In 1921, 82% of the Indian population in Malaya were Tamils from Southern States of India, the majority were labourers in rubber plantation . In 1931, following the rubber boom, the Indians made up 15% of Malaya's total population.¹¹

In the early 20th century the Malay social and political leaders were very much disturbed with the evergrowing roles of the Singkeh in Malaya whose majority are Chinese educated. They lived and worked in ethnically homogenous areas, maintaining an extremely high degree of identity and connections both politically and socially with China and Chinese concerns.

Although the Singkeh were residing in Malaya and reaping her resources, they offered no contribution towards the country's defence. True that they were sojourners, but it did not look as if they were moving anywhere beyond Malaya. This attitude was and still is very much against the Malay principles and traditions that had been passed through generations, that is "DI MANA BUMI DIPIJAK, DI SITU LANGIT DI JUNJUNG" which when literally translated means "WHEREUPON THE EARTH YOU STRIDE, THEREUPON THE SKY YOU SUPPORT". The Malays considered a person should be loyal and must be supportive to the ruler, the community, and to the very earth that provides him with food and shelter. To act otherwise is considered utterly ungrateful, ill-bred, and unbecoming of a Malay.

The Singkeh attitude towards national defence during the onslaught of the Japanese occupation left a deep wound among the

Malays. While the Malays, the Straits born Chinese, and some Indians led by the British fought bravely to defend Malaya, the Singkeh contributed nothing. During this time, however, the Chinese were treated with unrelenting harshness by the Japanese. Subsequently they formed the resistance army against the Japanese, the Malayan Peoples Anti Japanese Army (MPAJA). The word 'Malayan' had been grossly misused as this army was predominantly Singkeh and at the time they were not even permanent residents.

The first clear episode of Malay-Chinese violence occurred in World War II was when some MPAJA soldiers killed Malays who were thought to be Japanese collaborators. One such incident occurred in February 1945 in Batu Pahat, Johor which resulted in a backlash by the Malays who attacked a nearby Chinese settlement.

After the Japanese surrendered in August 1945, the MPAJA emerged as the dominant political authority (Malays and Indians at that time had no proper political organizations) in many towns and cities until the implementation of the British Military Administration (BMA) in September 1945. During the interregnum many Malays, who were thought to be Japanese collaborators, were murdered by the MPAJA.¹²

It was also this Singkeh MPAJA group that formed the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM). Their violence and atrocities lasted for 41 years. It is these incidents and the memories of their terrorism that made the Malays extremely wary over the activities of every Singkeh organisation - social, economic, or

political. Even the Chinese political parties in Malaysia never once made a public statement against the communists.

Members of the security forces are and have always been predominantly Malays. The Government's aim to integrate the races includes non-Malay participation in the Security Forces. The Malaysian Rangers, the Royal Armoured Corps, the Combat Support and Combat Service Support Units, the Royal Malaysian Navy, the Royal Malaysian Air Force, and the Royal Malaysian Police are multi-racial in nature. Various efforts were made by the Government to encourage Chinese participation in the security forces, but their response had been almost negligible. They are more attracted to the more lucrative sectors, and their interest in the security forces are noticeable only in technical units and officers level. Many of them were also found in the Intelligence organizations to facilitate collation of information especially regarding communist subversion and their related elements as the Malays do not speak or understand any of the Chinese dialects. This weakness was resolved when some Malay Intelligence personnels and Special Branch members were required to take intensive courses in Mandarin, Cantonese, and Hokkien.

SUMMARY

From the above discussions it could be concluded that the Singkeh and the Malays do not totally share the same concepts and aspirations in security and defense. As for the Indians, they are readily acceptable because of similarity in culture and they

never showed any distrust towards the locals. The failure of the Singkeh to assimilate with the locals and as all of the members of CPM also came from their group made it extremely difficult for the Malays to be confident of their committment and loyalty to the country should there be an external threat, especially if the threat is from China or any Chinese dominated nation.13

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2. Ibid P 5.
3. Malaysia, A Country Study, Foreign Area Studies, '84 P 13.
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CHAPTER III

CONDITIONS OF INTERNAL ORDER

ENVIROMENT

The promise for independence made by the British in 1948 was based on the understanding that the government to be formed would consist all the races residing in the country. The same understanding was also applied when Malaysia was formed in 1963. So since independence, Malaysia's efforts has always been directed towards creating a united democratic nation with her people enjoying a just progressive life in a stable and developing economic enviroment. However, the nation faced various security problems before she could reach her maturity and be what she is today.

As far as the Malaysian public is concerned, there had been no war since the World War II (1940 - 1945), no real communist threat since the 12 years Darurat (Communist Emergency - 1948 to 1960), no serious external threat since Indonesia's Confrontation (1963 - 1966), and no racial riot since May 13, 1969, but the Security Forces knew otherwise. Security wise, it could be said that Malaysia generally experience a stable and peaceful condition since the end of 1970s. It was not until the middle of 1980s that the Malaysian Security Forces managed to totally suppress the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) in Peninsula Malaysia and the North Kalimantan Communist Party (NKCP) in Sarawak while Sabah continues to be free from such threat since

the end of Indonesian Confrontation in 1966. Even though Malaysian leaders had long since identified other threats to the Malaysian national security, none had received an urgency of purpose compared to the need of suppressing and eventually wiping out all the communist elements and their influence in Malaysia.

This urgency had not merely been based on upholding the existing political ideology, but communism in itself was seen as a way of life which could completely crumble the Malay and subsequently the Indian and Chinese culture and traditions. As the Malays had proved to rear up against the MPAJA brutal rule of two weeks after the Japanese surrender in August 1945 and the British idea of doing away with their monarchs in 1946 their reaction would have been worse had the communist threat not been given priority. This was enhanced by the fact that Malaysia's political power had always been in the hands of the Malays backed by the loyalty of the Security Forces, their members being predominantly Malays. Besides being loyal to the "Kerajaan", the Malays are Muslims and to them the communists are not only natural enemies of Islam but also to every existing religion, namely the widely professed Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity among Malaysian Indians and Chinese. Although it is a known fact that the Chinese are not staunch worshippers, but they would definitely prefer the existing open economic policies to that of the communist state and all could see that the Chinese greatest strength, in Malaysia, is their economic power.

After 41 years of armed struggle, finally on December 2nd, 1989, the last group of the communist members of the outlawed CPM

(Its Headquarters, 10th, and 12th Regiments) led by their leader Chin Peng surrendered to the Malaysian and Thai authorities at Hat Yai in South Thailand.¹ Following this surrender, Malaysia was declared free from the militant communist threat. As their suppression had been the nation's main struggle since 1948, it is considered appropriate to briefly account and discuss the events which had led to this tremendous success. It is suffice to group these events in three periods, namely the "Darurat" or the Malayan Emergency, the communist-inspired Indonesian Confrontation, and finally the communist resurgence and decline.

DARURAT

Immediately after the World War II, the communists in Malaya launched a campaign of violence and murder. The main targets were the British rubber planters and tin miners and those Chinese who actively opposed the communists. To cope with the situation, a state of emergency was declared in June 1948.² Subsequently the British Forces in Malaya obtained reinforcements from various Commonwealth countries to join British forces and the Malay Regiments which were still in their infancy stage. Numerically this move gave British an upper hand in meeting the situation. As it was identified that almost all the communists were Chinese, it was not surprising when it was proved that the Singkeh immigrants had been providing both moral and material support to the communists in their militant and subversive activities. In the same year the British implemented

its counter insurgency strategies to subdue communist influence, atrocities, and violence.

British Counter Insurgency Strategy

The Briggs Plan was launched in late 1948, whereby the Chinese communities, especially those living near jungle fringes and rubber estates were resettled in new villages. Their former communities were split and they were resettled in areas where they could easily be controlled and contained.

Another strategy was the implementation of the People and Resource Control program (PRC). Mobility of individuals, groups, food supplies, and other related resources were tightly controlled. Subsequently the communists were cut off from their sources of information, intelligence, food supply, and medication.

For the first time there was an urgent need for the formation of an effective Intelligence and Civil Enforcement Agencies. The Executive Committee was merged with the War Committee to become National Executive Committee to command and control the counter insurgency efforts. The strength of the Royal Malaysian Police was increased to 163,000 with the formation of Police Field Force and jungle Squads to fight the armed communists and the Special Branch to manage the National Intelligence Organization. Not only the intelligence bodies were centralized and fully utilized but they also gained overwhelming cooperation from the Malays and the Aborigines. Captured and surrendered communists helped the Special Branch to penetrate their former organizations and obtaining accurate information on

the communist plans, movements, and activities which led to their eventual annihilation.³

In 1949 the British promised Malaya her independence by 1957.⁴ This declaration nullified the communist justification that their militant and violent activities were to free Malaya from the British colonial rule. Subsequently a political alliance was formed, the parties reflecting the major races in Malaya, namely the UMNO (United Malays National Organization), the MCA (Malaysian Chinese Association), and the MIC (Malaysian Indian Congress). This newly formed "PARTI PERIKATAN (Alliance Party)" gave tremendous support to the British and all Government agencies in their struggle to suppress communist violence.⁵ This also led to the legitimacy of the new government which eventually took over from the British.

Indeed it was a blessing that during this crucial period Malaya was experiencing an economic boom with her rubber and tin exports. To a great extent this helped the nation to sustain the national efforts in fighting against the communists by easing the financial burden and subsequently forced the communists to discontinue their terrorism. Eventually the forces of communism were destroyed and their survivors were pushed into South Thailand and by August 1960 the 'Darurat' was lifted.

INDONESIAN CONFRONTATION

September 16th, 1963 saw the birth of a new nation in the most strategic part of Asia, namely the Federation of Malaysia

uniting the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, and British North Borneo (renamed Sabah). This unification also meant simultaneous independence from British rule for those three Crown Colonies. The jubilation of this new found nation was short lived as Indonesia launched a communist inspired confrontation against Malaysia. Even during the early stages of negotiations to form this new nation state, Indonesia had rudely announced that their government would not recognize Malaysia. One of their strongest allegations was that the formation of Malaysia marked the beginning of a long term territorial expansion programme whereby eventually even Indonesia would have to merge with Malaysia to form their so called name of "Malaysia Raya". The people of Indonesia and even those in Sabah and Sarawak were led to believe that the newly formed Malaysian Government was a "Neo-Colonialist Government" headed by Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman Putera Al Haj and strongly backed not only by the British but also by other major powers.

This period in Malaysian history is notably interesting because for the first time the nation was confronted with an external threat while her defense forces though loyal, were far from adequate and prepared. At the peak of the confrontation Indonesian paratroopers succeeded in infiltrating into Peninsula Malaysia inflicting a remarkably heavy casualties to the unsuspecting Singapore Infantry Regiment operating in Kota Tinggi District, Southern Johore.⁶ As the confrontation was inspired by the Parti Komunis Indonesia (PKI) they also succeeded in rallying strong support from the communists in Malaysia especially those

operating in the newly independent state of Sarawak which bordered Indonesia's state of Kalimantan Barat. In 1964, relations between Malaysia and Indonesia had deteriorated to such an extent that all trade, travel, and communications were severed. However with perseverance the threat was overcome.

The reasons for Malaysia's success in this confrontation were mainly external and circumstantial. Besides the Anglo Malayan Defense Agreement (AMDA) with the British, other Commonwealth and the United Nations strongly supported Malaysia. Malaysia's new government was legitimate and world recognition was in order. From February till mid April 1962, Lord Cobbold, a former Governor of the Bank of England, headed the Cobbold Commission of Inquiry to ascertain the views of the people in North Borneo and Sarawak regarding the proposed Malaysian federation. By August 1st, 1962, the British and Malayan Government received positive recommendations by the Commission for the formation of Malaysia. Sabah's first general elections saw the presence of 15 official observers from 5 Asian nations namely Ceylon (Sri Lanka), India, Indonesia, Japan, and Thailand. At the end of their stay, the observers expressed that the elections were conducted in a very democratic manner and the people of Sabah had reiterated their intention to stay in Malaysia. As for Sarawak, the mid-August 1963 Election result was overwhelmingly in favour of the pro-Malaysian Alliance Party.⁷

On the neo-colonialist issue, the British assured that they would withdraw their forces from South East Asia and by 1973 all

forces East of Suez would be withdrawn. Indonesia, therefore, had no valid reason to be threatened by the formation of Malaysia.

In late 1965, Indonesia's political situation took a different turn, and subsequently Indonesia's confrontation towards Malaysia lost its intensity and momentum. The PKI led a coup that brutally murdered 6 Indonesian Generals and some members of their families. This event brought chaos within the Indonesian Government and they had to change their political priorities to strengthen their new Government formed after the tragic coup on October 1965. On August 10th, 1966, Malaysia's Deputy Prime Minister the late Tun Abdul Razak signed the peace agreement thus ending the confrontation and directly the ending of PKI in Indonesia and its influence in Malaysia.

At the end of it all, Malaysian and Indonesian leaders alike admitted the actual underlying factor to the termination of the confrontation after such a short period was that Malaysian and Indonesian Malays share the same aspirations, the same cultural heritage, and many having their loved ones residing in both countries. Open aggression, violence and war between them could only end up by destroying their own race and cultural heritage that they had protected for centuries.⁸

THE RESURGENCE AND THE DECLINE OF CPM AND NKCP

The resurgence and the decline of the communists in Malaysia can be covered in three periods namely the consolidation (1960-

1969), the offensive (1970-1979), and finally the decline from 1980 and leading to their final surrender in December 1989.

During the consolidation period, the CPM in the safe sanctuary of Betong salient, South Thailand was able to strengthen their logistic base doubling their strength from 1000 to 2000, increased their assault units in Peninsula Malaysia from 100 to 300 members, and Min Yuen up to about 40,000. In Sarawak, the NKCP strength increased from 300 to 700 after their return from Kalimantan Barat, Indonesia in 1967. After gaining such a strength, the communists launched their offensive in early 1970s by ambushing security forces and attacking military posts. The security forces retaliated and by the middle of 1970s some 250 communists killed and 388 surrendered in Peninsula Malaysia while in Sarawak 296 were killed and/or captured and 381 surrendered together with its leader Bong Kee Chok. As a result of these successes, the security situation in Malaysia was stable by early 1980 and the country was able to develop unhindered. Due to a continued Thai and Malaysian security operations by March/April 1987, 664 members of the Communist Party of Malaysia, Marxist - Leninist group under the leadership of Chan Cheng Ying and Huang Chen surrendered to the Thai authorities in South Thailand. Through a combined Military and Special Branch operations by end of 1988, all the members of the CPM Assault Units in Peninsula Malaysia were eliminated when the last group of 87 members under its leader Chong Chor surrendered to the Malaysian security forces in Kuala Lumpur in September 1988.9 These successes were also the direct result of the Government's

effective counter insurgency measures undertaken in internal defence and development (IDAD).

IDAD

The communists had always been known to function and operate in the jungles and its fringes. The government subsequently launched a series of developmental programs. These programs involved projects that killed two birds with one stone. While the projects helped the rural population to enjoy better standards of living, the clearing of vast jungle areas helped to restrict communist movements.

The above was achieved through two large semi government bodies, namely the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) and the Federal Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority (FELCRA). FELDA's activities include vast land clearance for the purpose of planting rubber, oil palm, sugar cane, cocoa, settlement of rural landless families, and development of village centres. By the end of 1987, FELDA had developed 422 land schemes covering some 714,945 agricultural hectarages and 47,252 village hectarages. The majority of the settlers were Malays and communist activities were forced to move into the more interior areas. FELCRA, on the other hand has developed a total of 167,580 hectares of land throughout the country under its rehabilitation programs by 1987.10

Under the Rural Infrastructure Programs about 2,350 kilometers of rural road, including security roads were constructed and improved, while 5,300 kilometers of existing

village roads were upgraded to bitumen-surface standard achieving 85% of the 4th Malaysia Plan target. The opening of roads led to the establishment of new settlements along these lines of communication, further restricting the communist movement.

During the 4th Malaysia Plan period (1981-1985), emphasis was given to the completion of the Federal Highway Routes in Peninsula Malaysia. Route 1, 912 kilometers long runs along the west coast from Changloon in the Malaysia/Thai border in the North to Johore Baru linking it to Singapore in the South. Route II covers the breadth of the Peninsula Malaysia, but the most important in the security aspect is the 115 kilometer East - West Highway which linked the northern states with the east coast states, the most undeveloped part of Peninsula Malaysia and a convenient sanctuary for communist activities as this area stretches along the Thai border. During the early construction of the highway, communist terrorists destroyed highway construction machineries worth \$1.2 million and harrassed construction workers. Military posts were set up along the pilot tracks of the highway to provide security for the construction and gradually new settlements were formed along the highway and the communists were forced further northwards to the Thai border.¹¹

Security Operations

Security operations along Malaysia/Thai border areas were stepped up. Fences were erected along some border areas, while others were patrolled. Army posts were set up at strategic points along the border.

Under the General Border Committee Agreement (GBC), the Malaysian and Thai Security Forces conducted a series of combined, coordinated, and unilateral operations from time to time along the land border areas and naval patrols in the Gulf of Thailand and the northern part of the Straits of Malacca. The agreement under the GBC also allowed for exchanges of intelligence and other related information. Similar agreement was also reached with Indonesia to cover the border areas of Sarawak/Kalimantan Barat in the efforts to annihilate NKCP threat.¹²

SUMMARY

Eventually the communists realised that the border that had, for a long time, offered a safe refuge for them was no longer what it used to be. They were sandwiched between the Thai Forces in the North and the Malaysian Forces in the South in Peninsula Malaysia, while in Sarawak the NKCP suffered the same fate with the Indonesian Forces awaiting for them across the border in Kalimantan Barat, but above all else the Malaysian Government had the loyalty of its masses to thank for the ultimate success in wiping out communist influence and militant activities. Ultimately on December 2nd, 1989 all 1184 CPM members together with its leader Chin Peng surrendered to the Malaysian and Thai authorities ending their armed struggle of 41 years,¹³ while in Sarawak the last 42 NKCP members are expected to surrender by end of 1990.¹⁴ In the final analysis, communism is dying enabling

Malaysia to concentrate her efforts on socio-economic development.

ENDNOTES

1. The Washington Post, dated December 3rd, 1989 P A33.
2. Malaysia, A Country Study, Foreign Area Studies, P 51.
Information Malaysia 1988 Yearbook, P 8.
3. Author's Personal Knowledge.
4. Malaysia, A Country Study, Foreign Area Studies, P 52.
5. Malaysia Information 1988 Yearbook, P 7.
6. Author's Personal Knowledge.
7. Malaysia Information 1988 Yearbook, P 10.
8. Author's Personal Views.
9. Author's Personal Knowledge.
10. Malaysia Information 1988 Yearbook, P 114.
11. Ibid P 8.
12. National Security Council Instruction No.2, Aug 1971.
13. The Star, December 3rd, 1989.
14. New Straits Times, March 23rd, 1990.

CHAPTER IV

CURRENT INTERNAL ISSUES, TRENDS, AND THREAT

INTERNAL ISSUES

After more than four decades of painful struggle, armed communist threat in Malaysia is at long last resolved. However, Malaysia continues to face several unresolved issues that threaten her national security which are internal as well as external in nature. The issues are so intricate that a wrong move could lead to internal disorder or even a civil war not only within Malaysia but also with neighbouring countries.¹

The Government and the people of Malaysia acknowledge that any factor that negatively affect the solidarity of the people is considered a threat to national security and an infringement to any part of its territory would also amount to a direct threat to Malaysia. It looks as if there are more centrifugal than centripetal forces and the government has geared almost every available machinery to reverse the situation. It is considered beneficial and appropriate to discuss that the very same internal forces designed to integrate the races have bounced off in another direction.

NEW ECONOMIC POLICY (NEP)

Malaysia's political, economic, and social stability depends entirely on the nation's ability to restructure the multi racial

society and the eradication of poverty. To achieve these goals, the Government launched the New Economic Policy (NEP) after the racial riots of May 13, 1969 in 1971 through the Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975). This policy is a 20-year program to redress the social and economic imbalances in the country that exists as the result of colonial legacy. The main objective of the NEP is to create national unity by reducing economic, social, cultural, and other differences.²

Development projects under the NEP are planned and implemented by means of a two-prong strategy namely to reduce and subsequently eradicate poverty irrespective of race and to restructure society to eventually eradicate the identification of the races with economic functions namely the Bumiputras as agriculturalists and rural dwellers, the Indians as plantation laborers, and the Chinese as business entrepreneurs.

The government aims to use the NEP as a centripetal force to integrate the races, but ironically it is this very policy that had given rise to continuous controversies among the races and led to greater polarisation and resentments. The government walks a tightrope between its ever increasingly educated and enterprising Bumiputras and the demands of the non-Bumiputra communities, especially the Chinese.

The NEP calls essentially for economic justice and in its implementation has its own formula, that is by 1990 the following proportions should be achieved in both equity holdings and workers employed:

Malay/Bumiputra	30%
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Other Malaysians 40%

Foreigners 30%

This is a bold experiment in social engineering aimed towards a massive uplifting of the rural Bumiputra community, where the incidence of poverty was highest. A major problem from the outset was the almost complete lack of capital within the Bumiputra community compared with the very substantial reserves available to other Malaysians, more so the Chinese who had been enjoying a major hold on Malaysia's economic resources. The only alternative is for the government to step in, providing large sums of money for the purpose of setting up a number of State and Federal Government Agencies. These ranged from State Economic Development Corporations (SEDC) to one of the largest and most important Government Agencies that is Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB) a trust financed by the Government to acquire stakes in public and private companies in which Bumiputras are encouraged to purchase units. The SEDCs undertake a wide variety of activities as opposed to organizations with much more specific functions such as Petroleum National (PETRONAS), handling the country's oil and natural gas resources.³

As discussed earlier, major success in rural development has been the FELDA, which, since its inception in late 1950s settled 94,000 families comprising 490,000 people in land schemes throughout the country and is widely regarded as one of the most successful land settlement schemes in the world, in addition to financing participation of the Bumiputra community in the commercial activities.

Another important and one of the earliest Government Agencies is the Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA) which provides educational and entrepreneurial development as well as investment opportunities for the Bumiputras.

The above giant agencies together with other minor agencies and government machineries saw to it that various development projects were implemented to create job opportunities, increase productivity and income, provide opportunities for the transfer of workers from lower productivity sectors to more lucrative sectors, reduce the income gap among the races and between the urban and the rural areas, modernize rural areas, create Bumiputra entrepreneurs, provide a working environment which depict the composition of the various races in Malaysia as well as improve the living standards and quality of life of the people.

Since the launching of the NEP, encouraging achievements had been recorded. The poverty rate had decreased from 49.3% in 1971 to 29% in 1980 and is expected to further decrease to 16.7% in 1990. This looks very promising as Malaysia's economy had picked up tremendously after the recent economic recession.⁴

The move to eliminate racial identification with types of employment and economic sector had shown positive results. Government agencies which had been appointed to assist Bumiputras in trade and equity ownership had successfully increased the number of Bumiputras in the sector from 4.3% in 1971 to 18% in 1988. The equity of the other Malaysians also increased from 45% to 70% during the same period.⁵

The overall restructuring of the economy was remarkably successful during the bouyant 1970s and early 1980s and Malaysia enjoyed unparalled prosperity. The government was able to set aside large sums of money to finance the newly established government organizations, acquiring controlling stakes on behalf of the Bumiputra sector.

The NEP formula is used as a yardstick to measure corporate citizenship. Racial balance figures were a prime criterion in granting licences, work permits, and government contracts. Every corporate must meet the 30% requirement in its employment quota. As a result the NEP has been increasingly and deeply resented by many Chinese.⁶

Particular emphasis was laid on Bumiputra participation at managerial levels and the Chinese alleged that this requirement often caused difficulties because of the shortage of suitably qualified Bumiputras, whereas a delinquent organization might be subtly blacklisted or suffer a form of economic malnutrition from exclusion from government business.

The Chinese increasing dissatisfaction and resentments are constantly voiced mostly through their political representatives in and outside parliamentary sessions. The Chinese has accused the Government of treating them as second class citizens. This issue becomes more pronounced each time there is a general or by-election, working on Chinese emotions and sentiments, leading them to believe that they are an oppressed and deprived community.

In the 1970s and early 1980s Malaysian cities experienced an extra ordinary boom in the housing industry. The NEP requires 30% of the buyers in each housing scheme to comprise of Bumiputras to avoid the occurrence of segregated housing areas between the Chinese and the Bumiputras. However the Chinese developers claimed that while housing industries could bring untold profits to the Bumiputra developers, they had difficulties in meeting the racial quota, leaving houses untaken. Subsequently they have to resort to giving special discounts for Bumiputra buyers, much to the resentment of the Chinese buyers who in turn claimed that the Bumiputra privilege seemed to stretch forever.

The fact is that the Bumiputras cannot afford to buy luxury homes as those constructed and sold by some Chinese developers and the housing schemes were mostly situated in exclusive areas where property tax is very high. Most Bumiputras are civil servants and the types of houses that they can afford depends on the amount of government loan that are eligible to them. Unlike the Chinese, the Bumiputras made a heaven of their homes and the idea of renting their first homes to subsidise the payment is a very unusual practice. The Chinese developers therefore had to look for their potential buyers among senior government officials, or successful Bumiputra businessmen but their numbers are much smaller.

The government and the NEP cannot afford to make exclusive exceptions although much pressured by the Chinese community as the whole purpose of the NEP would be defeated. For economic justice, the Government keep reminding the Chinese community to

share the nation's wealth with all other Malaysians or racial unrest would recur. A racial riot would definitely crumble the nation's economy and the Chinese would turn out to be the majority of losers should this happen.⁷

The Chinese allegations that difficulties in filling up managerial posts in their corporates by suitably qualified Bumiputras are considered unjustified. Under the education program up to the end of 1986, MARA alone had sponsored 12,384 Bumiputra students in vocational training locally and abroad. Eleven MARA junior science colleges groom Bumiputra students for vocations in science and technology and they had set a record of brilliant academic performance. This does not take into consideration Bumiputra students sponsored by other agencies such as the Public Services Department, PETRONAS, the National Electricity Board, Banks, State Scholarship, and others. Like their Chinese counterparts, a few Bumiputras had achieve excellent and award winning results with their courses at overseas universities mostly in the United Kingdom, USA, and Australia.

What the government is trying to convince the Chinese community is that the Bumiputras need to be given the opportunities to learn the trade (and tricks) of the business world. It is unfair for Chinese heads of corporates to expect the same performance from a Bumiputra manager when he fills the post compared to his Chinese counterpart who has traditionally been exposed to the business world long before the Bumiputras.

NEP AFTER 1990

The above are only a couple of examples that give rise to the Chinese dissensions towards the NEP and the Government. However the NEP terminates on December 31st, 1990. Due to the recent economic recession, the earlier forecast target in the NEP formula of seeking 30 percent of corporate equity to be held by Bumiputras, 40 percent by other Malaysians especially Chinese, and no more than 30 percent by non Malaysians would not be achieved by end of 1990. The Government had established various trusts which were provided funds to purchase foreign-owned shareholdings on behalf of the Bumiputra population. At the same time, foreign-owned firms have been urged to restructure their equity in line with the NEP guidelines. In spite of all these efforts, the Bumiputras directly and indirectly owned only 18 percent of corporate equity, but the other Malaysians primarily the Chinese owned 70 percent, and 12 percent owned by foreigners by end of 1988.⁸ So in 1988, the Government established a National Economic Consultative Council (NECC) to review the NEP and make recommendations on economic policy beyond 1990. The NECC comprises more than 150 members representing political parties including opposition parties, business, labor, professional groups, and individuals. It is expected that the NECC will recommend a continuation of the NEP in some form beyond 1990 with the continued aims of restructuring of the multi racial society and eradicating poverty irrespective of race so as to achieve political, economic, and social stability and unity.⁹

Thus from the achievements so far, the economic power continues to be in the hands of the Chinese.

EDUCATION

Education And Its Significance

Educacation is a key government priority and throughout the 20 years implementation of the NEP, the highest national budget has always been for the Education Ministry. The Malaysian Government views education not only as an investment for socio-economic development but also as a special tool to unify its multiethnic society.¹⁰

Early History On Education

Besides economy and geography, education has been a major factor to racial polarization during the colonial era and the 12 years period after independence. During the colonial rule, the British viewed that providing vernacular education for the the Singkeh and Indians was not a high priority. However a Chinese language school system was formed, funded by private funds from the Chinese community. Its educational content was China-oriented and the teachers were recruited from China.¹¹ Rubber plantations on the other hand were obliged to provide some primary (elementary) schooling for the children of their largely Indian labor force.¹² Most of these children, however, dropped out of school to begin work by the age of 10.¹³

During the colonial rule, Malay educational attainment was considerably below the levels obtained by the Chinese and the Indians. The general opinion was that most Malays then were rural settlers as peasants and fishermen. Their environment was not conducive to education, but detailed analysis revealed that the primary obstacle to Malay educational advance was lack of access and opportunity. In the more developed West Coast States of the Peninsula Malaysia, their enrolment was the same rate as the other communities, and they were just as likely to continue schooling once they began.

It was possible to transfer from vernacular primary school to an English language secondary (high) school by attending "Remove Classes" which provided intensive English language training to facilitate the transition. Very few students were able to move in this direction. For most students, especially the Malays, vernacular schools were dead ends, whereas English schooling was about the only channel for social mobility.

Educational Development

During the 1950s and 1960s, both before and after independence, a series of committees and national commissions studied Malaysian schooling. Subsequently major policy changes were made under the Laporan Razak (Razak Report) in 1956, and the Laporan Rahman Talib (Rahman Talib Report) after independence. Both reports emphasized the needs to coordinate educational planning with national objectives by restructuring a common syllabi for instructions in all schools and the Bahasa Malaysia

(Malay Language) will be used as the medium of instruction at all educational level, the latter to be implemented in stages.

Immediately after independence, expansion of schooling in rural areas became a major priority and Malay medium secondary schools were made accessible almost everywhere. However English language schooling remained the most prestigious. The Malay school graduates found it extremely difficult to secure jobs, as employment opportunities had been very limited in the rural areas and the commercial sectors in the urban areas preferred (and still does) multilingual or at least bilingual employees. Very few Malays made it to tertiary education. Malaysia inherited from the British an elitist educational system that was designed to screen out all, but the most able students for higher education and until 1982, grading of high school examinations were conducted in Great Britain. Therefore the initial years after independence education did not have much effect on the social mobility of the Malays as anticipated by the Government.

Chinese Discontentment Towards The Educational System

In the late 1960s, the Chinese had become increasingly discontented over what was perceived as the ineffectiveness of the MCA to protect the community's educational interest. On May 10, 1969 a General Election was held in Peninsula Malaysia, the results of which was a blow to the ruling Alliance Party as the three left wing parties (which thrived on non Malay support) won a total of 25 seats, their gains being in urban areas where non Malays were concentrated. Jubilant party supporters held rallies

and parades in the nation's capital of Kuala Lumpur. They taunted and provoked Malay bystanders with racial epithets. The evening of May 13, 1969 saw the worst racial violence since independence. A state of Emergency was declared, parliament was suspended and a special ruling body, the National Operations Council (NOC) was established.¹⁴

The May 13 racial riots and the NOC amendment of the Sedition Act of 1948 brought great changes to the education system. Together with the NEP there was a marked difference in the economic achievements of the Malays beginning in the 1970s including a horizontal mobility towards urban areas as the Malays rapidly gained adequate skill and qualifications in science, technology, banking, and commerce, thus balancing the previously predominant non Malay population in towns and cities.

RACIAL JUSTICE AND MALAY RIGHTS

It is appropriate to discuss the amendment of the Sedition Act as this had been a major and constant issue of discontentment and outraged accusations by the Chinese. This issue has since then been a popular topic in election campaigns and left wing leaders are known to contempt parliamentary sessions over the act. From time to time when racial sentiments are highly provoked, the nation's internal order is threatened. Many a times education became a controversial issue that had led to internal disorder. The amended Sedition Act of 1948 prohibits public questioning of the special status of the Malays, the powers of

the Malay rulers, the status of Malay as the national language, and the citizenship laws particularly in reference to non Malays. Persons violating these provisions could be barred from public office for a period of 5 years and associations challenging Malay rights could be dissolved. The Rukun Negara (National Ideology) was formulated, emphasizing five principles:

Belief in God

Loyalty to the King and Country

Reverence of the Constitution

Upholding the Rule of Law

Maintainance of Good Behaviour and Morality 15

of the above, the third principle has always been of grave controversial issue among the non Malays, particularly the urban Chinese. In the interest of national unity, the government not only decided to promote Malay as the national language, but also as the medium of instruction in all government schools (except in the Chinese and Tamil vernacular schools), in Colleges and Universities. The non Malays had accused the government of hampering non Malay advancement in education and causing increasing polarization. Failure to pass examinations for the Bahasa Malaysia (National Language) papers effectively precludes their opportunities of persuing higher education at College and University levels and deprive them of the chance of a government job. There are also racial quotas on the admission of all students to Malaysian universities, with a bias for rural Bumiputras, as discussed earlier in the NEP.16

NATIONAL LANGUAGE

It depends very much from which angle the view is taken as far as the National Language is concerned. As the media of instruction in all schools, the language has succeeded in breaking the communication barrier between the Malays and non Malays, leading to a better understanding of the other's culture and traditions, especially in the urban areas. On the other hand where the non Malays form a minority in the rural areas, there is and has always been an unwritten understanding and respect between the races.

It is very important to understand that the National Language is not just the Malay Language. The National Language is a standardized language, its spelling has been synchronized with that of the Indonesian with a slight variation in pronunciation to retain the Malaysian identity. As it is meant to be used in all official government matters, as well as at all levels of education, the National Language has turned to be an elite language practiced widely by scholars, prominent government officials, academicians, and political leaders of various races.¹⁷ Special organizations were set up to develop the National Language in order to meet the rapid requirements of terms, ideas, and concepts especially in science, mathematics, and economics in its role as the language of knowledge. The biggest organization is the Dewan Bahasa and Pustaka (DBP) and the Language Center at the University of Malaya. Both these organizations, especially the DBP, a corporate body is involved

in the development and enrichment of the national language. Its primary objective is to further nurture the language into a progressive one, in keeping with its status. Its activities and programs includes language research, terminology, lexicography, and publications of books. Language research covers the setting up of a national linguistic data bank, studying of the effectiveness of the language and morphology. From 1957 to 1985, DBP has coined and standardized 477,237 terms. The DBP has a close rapport with various language committees in government departments and has intensified its activities to promote the use of the national language by public and private sectors. A number of briefings on the correct usage of the language were held in 40 Ministeries/Federal Departments and State Government offices.¹⁸

On the non Malay allegation that the national language hampers their chances in pursuing higher education, thus making the education system grossly biased for the Malays, a certain point needs to be put to light. The Malays, like the Chinese are just as diversified in the use of their dialects to the extent that a Malay from one state does not understand the dialect of another Malay from another state. In Peninsula Malaysia, there are 11 states and a Federal Territory. Each state has a distinct dialect (though basically Malay). In the East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak there are 12 major Malay dialects, none of which can be comprehended by the West Malaysian Malays. This does not take into consideration the sub dialects used by those communities found in the interior areas of Sarawak.

The Malays are just as afraid of failing the Bahasa Malaysia examination as the Chinese and Indians. Where the urban Chinese had the means of attending special tuition classes, the majority of the Malays cannot afford it. It is therefore of no surprise that the urban Chinese has in the recent years obtained excellent grades compared to their Malay contemporaries who are mostly in the rural areas where shortage of dedicated and qualified teachers seems to be an eternal problem. If further justification needs to be made of this language let it be known that Indonesia, Singapore, and Brunei too had recognized Malay as their national language, making it the lingua franca of some 200 million people, which is not surprising as since unwritten historical records Malay had been the lingua franca of the Malay Archipelago.¹⁹

It is also of prime importance to emphasize that the implementation of Malay as the national language does not mean that the government deters its citizen in any way from pursuing the study or the development of any other languages. With the emphasis of the national language, there is a sharp decline in the standard of the English language among most youths, although this had not been the government's objective, as English is recognized as the second official language especially important in international relations. To remedy the situation, the Ministry of Education has stepped up various efforts and draw certain conditions to revive serious learning of English in school befitting its status as a second language. The most recent requirement to pursue tertiary education includes getting a credit in English Paper Examination.

OTHER RELATED EDUCATIONAL ISSUES

It is true that there are not enough universities and colleges in Malaysia to accommodate every youth qualified for university entrance. The non Malay communities have traditionally sent their children overseas primarily to United Kingdom, USA, and Australia and the government compensates by giving them tax reduction on the expenditure incurred to educate their children abroad. Some deserving Malay scholars had also been sent abroad, but almost all of them are Government scholars or sponsored by related organizations.²⁰

Before the May 13th 1969 racial riots, there was only one University in Malaysia which has always enjoyed a reputation of excellence. In the years 1963-1964 there were only 21% Malay undergraduates and they were virtually absent in the science, medicine, and engineering faculties. In 1970s four more new Universities were created but this time the enrolment has been disproportionately Bumiputras. The Chinese community petitioned to start a privately funded Chinese Language University to be named University Merdeka (University of Independence) and the controversy over this proposal simmered for a number of years. The government delicately weighed this proposal and decided it is against the national interest as this issue was raised barely 8 years after the tragic racial riots. The government therefore rejected the proposal in 1978 and compromised to increase the ratio of Chinese students in the University system. Meanwhile the

Government gave the green light for the Chinese community to start the Tunku Abdul Rahman College, a privately funded college using Mandarin as the medium of instruction. In 1980s the government established another three universities.²¹

In spite of this, it is also true that a high proportion of non Malays continue to be educated overseas simply because some of them can afford and choose to do so. Chinese political and social organization leaders alleged that this encourages a brain drain, as inevitably many Chinese youths decided not to return to a society where they feel their abilities may not be fully appreciated, and also heightens their feeling of second class citizenship compared to the large number of predominantly Bumiputra students who are funded by the government throughout their education.

The government is not blinded to the fact that there are poor Chinese as there are rich Malays. However it could not be denied that there are numerous Chinese organizations that are ever willing to sponsor poor Chinese students to pursue their studies overseas, while the only organization who would help the Malays in the same manner are those agencies and corporates that had been formed by the government under the 20 year program of the NEP for that very purpose. Private Chinese corporates stretch from Mining, Plantations, Shipping, and it goes on almost endlessly. Most of them have their own allocations to be used for sponsoring needy and deserving Chinese youths to advance their education locally or abroad.

There is an ironic twist to the brain drain issue.²² While the Chinese at least has a choice of seeking employment abroad, the Malay scholars have no choice at all. They are required by contract to return home and serve the organization that sponsor them. This is not the problem, but unemployment is. Malaysia was hard hit by the economic recession of the 1980s. Every year there are thousands of youths who graduated from Colleges and Universities, not to mention the unskilled school leavers. There was and still is a terrible glut in the "labor market". With the economic recession, the organizations failed to create job opportunities for these youths and poverty had led some of them to become laborers and resort to the very kind of working conditions their forefathers had known an economic and social stigma that the government had struggled to eradicate. A majority of the Malay graduates together with a few of their poor Chinese contemporaries are forced to seek employment in sectors not related to their skills and qualifications. The government tried to buffer this situation by retraining these unemployed graduates in areas where there are employment vacancies especially as Secondary School teachers. After years of struggling in colleges and universities in various disciplines of engineering, economics, applied sciences and the like these youths found themselves undergoing a one year intensive course in teacher training colleges. Most Chinese do not face this dilemma as they can opt to work overseas or given jobs by their sponsors or help out with the family business.

Unless there is no alternative, the Chinese have always been known to shy away from government jobs because of low salary scales and slow rates of promotion as the system of promotion gives a high priority to seniority as empowered to other assets. The Chinese are enterprising by nature and mere patience is definitely not a trait of their race. Government jobs are not lucrative enough for the majority of them. In the recent years Malays have adopted their attitude by leaving the government service for greener pastures or set up their own enterprises, much to the relief of the government as this is its primary objectives when NEP was formulated. In fact a number of major corporates at present are jointly owned by Chinese and Malays.²³

Most racial issues (including educational ones) that had and could lead to internal disorder had actually been magnified by political parties to achieve their political ends. In August 1987, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) held an illegal demonstration in front of the University of Malaya over an issue related to the choice of subjects available. Heated words transpired between the Malay students and the DAP representatives who happened to be the DAP's Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Selangor Branch. The Police Force managed to bring the situation under control, but the Malay undergraduates later retaliated by having an unauthorised assembly within the campus grounds and the police had to be called in to disperse them. On October 9th, 1987 the DAP launched a hunger strike on the same spot. The strike was led by Dr. Eng Seng Chai, the Chairman of Selangor DAP. Eleven

DAP strikers were detained when they refused to disperse as required by the police.²⁴

The DAP challenged the other non Malay political parties of the National Front (NF), namely the MCA and the MIC, displaying banners that accused these parties as having no pride and dignity. On one of the banners were written the words "MCA, MIC -SLEEPING BEAUTIES".²⁵

In the same year, the Ministry of Education created numerous posts in schools that enabled senior teachers to be promoted. As had already been discussed, the major criteria for promotion in the teaching line is seniority. Senior Chinese teachers were promoted as headmasters and assistant headmasters in Chinese primary schools. The Ministry and the people were shocked when this move was followed by a violent protest from the MCA. The issue was that those Chinese teachers selected for promotion by the Ministry of Education had no adequate qualifications in Mandarin. These heads and assistants then have to communicate in Cantonese or Bahasa Malaysia and so they are not able to monitor the progress of the pupil's performance in Mandarin. The DAP and MCA (who never see eye to eye, but for once they are united on this issue) accused the government of trying to slowly abolish non Malay primary schools through this move. In their Information Bulletin, the MCA stated, "its party reiterates its stand...the MCA will swim or sink with Chinese Primary Schools...".²⁶

Chinese based societies and organizations have always been quick to exploit racial issues. The "Mandarin qualification" issue was no exception. Ironically the Chinese political parties

and organizations claimed that this was not a racial issue. In the heat of the moment they went to the extent of making a statement that they would not object if non Chinese were to take up those posts if they had the right qualification. There was a guffaw among the non Chinese teachers that they were willing to take up intensive courses in Mandarin if that could mean a promotion for them.

The issue reached its peak when Chinese political leaders called upon Chinese pupils to boycott classes. This move increased racial sentiments that brought a reaction among Malay youths especially in the UMNO.²⁷

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

As had always been the case with racial issues there are bound to be one reaction after another. On November 2nd, 1986 the MCA had passed a resolution which openly challenged Malay Right and Privileges as provided and protected by the Constitution. UMNO youths held a demonstration demanding the MCA President be stripped of his post for publicly challenging the position of the Malay Rulers and for not upholding the Constitution. In retaliation the MCA youth sent a telegram to the Prime Minister stating that UMNO youth is an uncouth movement/organization, its action beyond "MCA's tolerance.....".

The above are some of the examples of continuing unresolved issues faced by the Malaysian Government. The Police and the Armed Forces are geared to be sensitive towards these

developments for fear of open racial riots. The racial issues in 1987 had left the ordinary Malaysians with a feeling of tension and insecurity that in turn affects their everyday lives. On October 18th, 1987 there was a shooting incident in Kuala Lumpur which had no connection whatsoever with the current racial issues at the time. Rumours spread like wild fire and memories of racial riots were revived. This led to a panicstricken Kuala Lumpur, public leaving their everyday work to hoard food, refraining children from attending schools and a self imposed curfew was obviously the rule.²⁸

The continuation of non Malay primary schools were provided for in the Malaysian Constitution and there is no necessity for the Chinese political parties to raise this issue. Although Malay is the national language, the citizens are free to learn and speak any language except in official matters, especially those related to the government. Professor Nik Safiah Karim, a renowned linguist and advisor to DBP had declared that,

"The need for all Malaysians to be fluent in the national language does not in the slightest way hinder or threaten the learning and progress of other languages. Malaysia is so rich with her dialects that it could it could help further develop the national language as terms and expressions are constantly standardized from those dialects. Abolishing these dialects is the same as abolishing the true Malaysian identity."

At present it could be said that racial issues could not be resolved for as long as they are being exploited and magnified by the various political parties and organizations - Malays and non

Malays alike. The role of the Police and the Armed Forces is to contain and control the actions and reactions of those who claim themselves the champions of their races, for when racial riot breaks out it is often the ordinary citizen, who may not be aware of politics or the Constitution, that suffers more than the 'champions'.²⁹

TEACHING OF HISTORY

Due to the recent developments, the Ministry of Education had directed the National Curriculum Development Center (CDC) to review the school syllabus. In late 1988, CDC resolved that history be made a compulsory subject to all students in primary and secondary schools. Previously history is an optional subject in upper secondary schools and the majority of the science stream students, who are largely Chinese and urban Malays opt not to offer this subject for their examinations.

Subsequently history and its teaching strategies are made compulsory in all teacher training colleges. The main aim is to expose the present youths to the events that led to the provisions in the Constitution especially those pertaining to the Malay Rights, citizenship, and the Internal Security Act.³⁰

PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION

The government considered it very important that the Malaysian public are made aware of how those provisions came to

be protected in the Constitution when it was drawn in 1948 before achieving independence in 1957. When Malaya attained her independence, Chinese sojourners became Malayan citizen, but this citizenship was not offered on a platter. In exchange for automatic citizenship the Singkeh agreed that they would not question the Malay rights and priviliges, the position of the Royal Malay Rulers, the status of Islam as the new nation's official religion, and Malay as the National Language. The same conditions were applied when Malaysia was formed in 1963. Should the non Malays violate this then citizenship would be revoked, not by the government but by the rule of the Constitution. Malaysia hopes through the education system the present generation and their descendants understand the contitution as revoking citizenship is definitely not the ultimate solution. The aspiration of the government and the nation is to establish peace and prosperity through tolerance, unity and harmony in a multi racial country and as ascribed in the Constitution which is being summed up by Tun Mohamed Suffian Hashim the former Lord President of Malaysia as follows:

"The Legislative Power of the various Bodies in the country must be exercised subject to the constraints of the Consti-tution. The Judicial Power of the Courts must be exercised subject to the const-raints of the Constitution. The power of His Majesty as head of the three branches of the Government (the Legislative, the Judicial, and the Executive) must be exercised subject to the constraints of the Constitution..... In Malaysia no single institution is supreme..... .. what is supreme is the Constitution itself."

WAR ON DADAH (DRUG)

Malaysia's highest law enforcement priority is reserved for combating dadah trafficking, abuse/misuse, and addiction.³¹ This problem reached epidemic proportions in 1983 with 92,310 registered addicts, amounting to an average of 6,600 new cases every year since 1970. However there were 14,624 new cases in 1983 alone which was truly an alarming figure considering that for every registered addicts there would be three unregistered ones, forcing the Government to transfer the responsibility of fighting dadah trafficking and its addiction from Ministry of Social Welfare Services to the Ministry of Home Affairs, and subsequently declaring the problem as a threat to Malaysia's national security.³²

According to most estimates, in the early 1980s Malaysia had the highest per capita incidence of dadah addiction of any nation in South East Asia and a considerably higher proportion than that of the United States. Compared to other nations, Malaysia has already enacted very tough antinarcotics laws and control procedures. Since 1975 all traffickers have been liable for life imprisonment or death sentence - the mandatory death sentence is indeed a very stringent measure, and it still stands as far as Malaysia and Singapore is concerned, despite controversial international opinions on the matter.

The increase in dadah trafficking was identified as mainly due to Malaysia's geographical location in relation to the "Golden Triangle". Dadah can easily be smuggled through sea

routes from Thailand and Burma into Malaysian ports especially the Penang Island, or by land into Malaysia through the undeveloped border areas between Malaysia and South Thailand. Law enforcement officials found it impossible to police the entire rugged coastline concerned or manned the entire jungle-covered border, making it possible for traffickers to set up refining laboratories in the area.

The sharp increase in dadah trafficking and its addiction in 1983 forced the Government to further toughen its stand in combating the problem. Besides transferring its responsibility to the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Government passed several new amendments to existing antinarcotics legislation, namely the Dangerous Drug Act 1952 (DDA 52). These include a mandatory death sentence for proved trafficking of 15 grams or more of morphine or heroin, or a combination of both, 200 grams or more of marijuana or 1,000 grams or more of unprocessed opium. The amendments also authorized the Police or Custom Officials to open correspondence and tap telephones of suspected offenders, permitted medical officers to examine, forcibly if necessary, any suspect, authorized the custody of suspected addicts for the duration of 24 hours for the purpose of medical tests, the period could also be extended to two weeks if order of a magistrate was obtained.

As these amendments were implemented and being proven in its effectiveness, there was an outcry of fierce protests by relatives of dadah traffickers, especially among foreigners as

the guilty traffickers were sent to the gallows. The stand of the Government remained steadfast and firm for many valid reasons.

Thorough research and analysis proves that almost 80 percent of dadah victims are youths between 10 to 29 years. For a young and fast developing nation, the Government's present investment in human capital would reach a crippling and tragic loss in the next couple of decades or so if dadah trafficking and dependence are not effectively controlled. Furthermore there are other related facts that are considered intricate and sensitive. 33 Statistics indicate that large scale trafficking is confined to ethnic Chinese, while the majority of the dadah dependence are Malay youths, besides their being small scale dadah pushers, mostly to support their habits. Besides that, it was also believed that the communists and undesirable elements were also using dadah to weaken Malaysian youths. The government seriously viewed this as an effort to slacken the advancement of Malays in their country's political, social, and economic spheres, finally crippling the whole race in the future generation.

In the early 1980s dadah dependence were no longer confined to unemployed youths and school dropouts, but the traffickers had succeeded in extending their tentacles into the security forces, government departments, and other organizations affecting professionals of various levels. Besides the untold pain and misery suffered by dependents and relatives of dadah victims as they loose their jobs, the Government has to allocate millions of ringgit towards combating dadah trafficking and financing rehabilitation centers. This is seen not only as a ceaseless, but

an almost fruitless efforts as traffickers and dadah pushers continue to haunt the ex-addicts, preventing the latter from leading a normal and productive lives as most succumb into addicton all over again.

The sharp increase in dadah dependency was followed by a parallel increase in the country's crime rate. The crimes ranged from pick pocketing, purse snatching, extortion of women and school children of their money and valuables, to car thefts and house breaking. The above crimes became so rampant that it became a cause for public alarm as the citizens felt that it was no longer safe to leave their children and property unattended. This situation was especially felt in the towns and cities where most dadah addicts were found.³⁴

The increasing number of dadah addicts also gave rise to accidents and related health hazards, again causing public alarm when a couple of dadah addicts were also found suffering from AIDS. At the same time other countries were very much aware of the drug situation in Malaysia and this to a certain extent degree had tinted Malaysia's image and caused innocent citizens much embarassment as they were thoroughly searched and at times harassed by foreign customs.

Although it is not the prerogative of the Malaysian Government to justify the internationally criticized Dangerous Drug (Amendment) Act 1952 (DDA 52), it is considered substantially important to present it in this paper as the DDA has succeeded in its objectives only after it had been recognized and dealt with as a threat to national security.

After the amendment of the DDA 52, a special Task Force was formed by the Royal Malaysian Police. The National Security Council endowed the Task Force the authority to enforce the laws of the DDA 52, the Drug Dependent Treatment and Rehabilitation Act, 1983 and later the DDA (Special Preventive Measures) 1985, and the DDA (Forfeiture of Property) 1988. These were given through the NSC Instruction number 13 and also through ministerial, departmental, state, and contingency instructions. In other words, the whole nation had been instructed and called upon to cooperate and contribute towards combating dadah trafficking and addiction.

Subsequently a non governmental and self financed organization, PEMADAM, responsible for monitoring activities of maintaining identification of registered addicts, rehabilitation and its related activities as well as intensification of campaigns, was formed and function at national, state, and district levels. This organization not only intensified anti dadah campaigns, but educate the public on the matter through the mass media and at practically all levels of educational institutions.35

Dadah abuse and trafficking in the Armed Forces is being undertaken by both the civil and military enforcement agencies which included compulsory urine tests for new members, suspects, and random tests for specific targets, individuals and/or units.

By 1985, 10483 persons were arrested and 706 of them were traffickers and peddlers. During the same period, 722.5 kilograms of raw opium, 119 kilograms of processed opium, 3.02 kilograms of

morphine, 124.3 kilograms of heroine, 542.91 kilograms marijuana, and 32,575 psychotropic pills were confiscated. These were part of the successes achieved through 20 special operations conducted by the Task Force which also led to controlling and destroying 34 large syndicates responsible for trafficking dadah, 8 of which were responsible for international trafficking using Malaysia as the transit center. A total of 9,591 addicts were also identified in 1985 as compared to 14,624 in 1983. The numbr of addicts declined further to 7,596 in 1986 and 5,468 in 1989. For 1987 and 1988 there were a total of 14,691 new addicts arrested.³⁶

Presently there are 7 Drug Rehabilitation Centers in operation, three One Stop Centers, three Pusat Insafdiri (Counselling and Treatment Center), and a Drug Work Brigade. Each of the center is manned by an average of 15 military personnel headed by a major, who is also the head of tne center, and 30-40 civilian officers of various disciplines required for counselling and treatment of the addicts. Out of 143,919 drug addicts presently registered only 20,922 are under treatment. The establishment of 102 District/Area Drug Rehabilitation Committees to assist Rehabilitation Officers would ease the situation of getting employment for the rehabilitated addicts.³⁷

Assessing the general drug war situation at present, it can be concluded that the drug situation is still at an epidemic level but under control. With continued cooperation especially sharing of intelligence and conduct of special operations together with neighbouring countries including DEA of USA this

problem could be stabilize in the years to come. However the immediate responsibility of providing rehabilitation to the remainder of 122,997 drug addicts in the country would require great efforts by all concerned failing which it will affect the national security of Malaysia.

RELIGION

Although religion is not as great a threat to national security compared to the communist threat or racial issues, it had come to the government as well as public notice that religious issues are becoming more rampant in the recent years. This includes exploitation of Islam, activities of religious fanatics, Christianization of Malays, and exploitation of any related issues.³⁸

RESURGENCE OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

Islamic resurgence in Peninsula Malaysia draws its strength from various sources. In the budding stage, PAS (Pan Islamic Party) launched serious political campaigns in the Malay/Muslim dominated states of Kelantan, Trengganu, and Kedah. They alleged that the Government, in its quest of development, had almost completely discarded Islamic teachings. What is forbidden (haram) has become halal (permissible). These religious fundamentalists gave examples of sprouting casinos, brothels, movie theaters, high importation of luxury goods including liquor. These issues

work on the sentiments of the uneducated rural Muslims and for a number of years the whole state of Kelantan, some districts in Trengganu and Kedah became PAS strongholds. Although presently PAS seems to have lost its fangs, its influence had been so deeply rooted and helps to set pace for the present trend in what is termed as Islamic resurgence.

There is a time when this issue is given so much publicity that the Malay solidarity simply crumbles. The main features of Islamic resurgence in Malaysia are a deep concern with external manifestation such as dress and the general attire of Muslim community, distrust, if not an outright rejection of nearly all aspect that is Western, combined with a reluctance to accept UMNO and the Government, naming UMNO and their supporters as infidels. This has led to a serious and divisive effect in many Malay villages, with rival mosques being set up and families being split. It is indeed tragic when years of wedded bliss ended in a divorce due to political differences.

To control further damage to the Muslim unity, PAS leaders were detained for short periods under the Internal Security Act (ISA). Despite its poor showing in the 1986 elections, there is no doubt that PAS has a very considerable followings not only in the countryside, but from supporters who choose not to disclose their sympathies at all levels in the Government, especially academicians serving in the Colleges and Universities.

Of grave national concern is the tendency of violence following differences in religious issues. In 1983, a group of fundamentalists attacked a Police Station in Batu Pahat, with the

loss of several lives. A tragic incident happened in Memali, Kedah in 1985 when Police attacked a group of armed religious extremists headed by a Malay graduate of Libyan University, leaving 18 people dead.

Inevitably religion has become politicised, setting Malays against Malays. Where UMNO equates race and nationalism, PAS strives for an Islamic state claiming it would be fairer to Muslims and non Muslims alike as there are provisions in Islamic Law for non Muslim residents in an Islamic state. While UMNO leaders urge Islamic values, PAS find many loopholes for criticism as UMNO leaders are exposed with charges of corruptions, sexual scandals, patronizing casinos, and the like. UMNO believes in the compatability of social progress with Islam, while PAS condemns Western values and regards 'materialism' as anathema.

Of more concern are claims by certain PAS supporters that the use of force is justified in achieving their aim of creating an Islamic State. UMNO is certain these radicals are influenced and have connections if not support from the situation that has developed in Iran. Particularly after the Party's poor showing at 1986 polls, the possibility of assissination attempts on senior UMNO leaders cannot be ruled out. At one time, the Prime Minister was so disturbed with these developments that he openly urged the religious extremists to renounce their Malaysian citizenship so they and their families join the war in Iran if they wanted to assure passports to heaven.

EXPLOITATION OF ISLAM

In recent years activities relating to the exploitation of Islam continued to be monitored. Contrary to PAS with its political and religious aspirations these latter groups are Muslim deviationists who preach within isolated communities that are easy to exploit. Among these groups is the Ahmadiyah or Tarikat Zikrullah, led by Hassan Yaacob. His preachings succeeded in recruiting 300 followers. Among others, he claimed that his soul has merged with that of Prophet Mohamad and Allah and it was time for him to emerge as Imam Mahadi. Imam Mahadi is actually Jesus whom the Muslim believed would return to earth when the earth is in a state of chaos.³⁹

On August 29th, 1987 an illegal organization was formed in the north eastern state of Peninsula Malaysia, Kelantan and known as "Jundullah" or the soldiers of Allah. The aim of this 150 strong organization is to create an Islamic state through armed struggle and military violence. As PAS refused to sympathise with this organization, its programs then were to acquire religious and military training from Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) in Southern Thailand. Ammunition also could be obtained from the PULOs. There are many more such deviationist organizations. Although they seldom have a long life span, their termination has often been only made possible by Police intervention resulting in violence and bloodshed.⁴⁰

CHRISTIANIZATION OF THE MALAYS

That the freedom of religion is guaranteed by the constitution has been made clear by Chapter 13 of the Malaysian Constitution on fundamental liberties. Islam had long been established in the country before the conquest of Melaka by the Portuguese in 1511. The Dutch and the British had left it undisturbed. By 1948 Islam was made the religion of Malaya and later on was extended to Sabah and Sarawak with the formation of Malaysia in 1963.

The Constitution by Article 11 (4) provides that the state and in respect of the Federal Territory, Federal Law may control or restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or belief among Muslims, this includes the propagation of even Muslim doctrine or belief (as had been discussed earlier) so that it is competent for the State Law to provide for the regulation, as had been done by many states, of Muslim Religious Teachers.

It is important to understand at this juncture that Islam is a state subject and there had never been at any time in the past a single head of Islam (the Sultans) with jurisdiction transcending state boundaries. The Yang Dipertuan Agong (the King) is the head of Islam only in his home state, in the states of Melaka, Penang, and the Federal Territory since these states are headed by Governors. For the states of Sabah and Sarawak, however, Article 161D provides that any state law controlling or

restricting the propagation of any religious doctrine or belief among Muslim may not be passed except by a two thirds majority of the State Assembly concerned.

With this brief background given, it is understood that Christianization of Muslims is prohibited by State Law. Generally the churches in Malaysia respect this provision of the Constitution. However a small group identified as the Neglected People's Workers (NPW) centered at the First Baptist Church in Petaling Jaya, Selangor had involved itself in the christianization of seven Muslims.⁴¹

The NPW was formed in 1984 under one Phillip Cheong, an insurance supervisor. To operate more effectively, the NPW sought the services of a Christian Malay, Joshua Ira Jamaluddin bin Othman. Joshua acquired his religious education from the Far Eastern Biblical College in Singapore and obtained his "Diploma in Theology" in 1985.

Among the techniques used to approach and convince the Malays included sitting on the floor and using the traditional Malay attire while praying. NPW's long term plan was to build a church in line with Islamic architecture.

EXPLOITATION OF THE CHRISTIANIZATION ISSUE

The above issue was not only exploited to its fullest, but grossly exaggerated to the extent that there was rising tension and anxiety among the Muslim Community. The issue was at first spread through sermons at the local mosques, schools, and Government Departments. However PAS exploited it to the fullest

will be christianized by the year 2000....." and on September 1st, 1987 the New Straits Times published a statement made by the PAS Chairman where he claimed that 66,000 Malays had renounced Islam for Christianity. This caused panic among the Muslims and led to a launching of a series of campaigns against further christianization of Muslims led by the Anti Christianization Committee. Public gatherings were held displaying banners that read "Gathering and Speech against Christianization". One issue led to another, the DAP made a police report against the use of such provocative words on the banners. These words were alleged to have humiliated Christians who had nothing to do with the issue.42

After a thorough investigation by the Special Branch and Religious Authorities, the Government made it known to the public that the issue was highly exploited and the source of Christianization had been identified.

SUMMARY

It could be concluded that any issue whatsoever can easily be exploited by various political parties and organizations to achieve their own ends, regardless of public order or national security being impaired. The threat to national security could be derived from economic, education, Constitution, National Language, racial, dadah trafficking, its abuse, and addiction, and also religious issues. In the mean time, the Government struggles to placate its multi racial society in every possible

way to attain national unity, peace, prosperity, and stability so as to be able to face any external threat resolutely. Nonetheless the Malay-led multiethnic national leadership has been successful in moving towards these goals while maintaining intercommunal harmony through consensus and compromise strategy.

ENDNOTES

1. The Star, February 28th, 1990.
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3. Malaysia - Last Chance for a New Beginning?, P 4.
4. Ibid P 6.
5. Ibid P 7.
6. Ibid P 5.
7. Author's Views.
8. Foreign Economic Trends, June 1989, P 5.
9. The New Straits Times, March 23rd, 1990.
10. Malaysia Information 1988 Yearbook, P 239.
11. Malaysia, A Country Study, Foreign Area Study, P 109.
12. Ibid P 110.
13. Ibid P 120.
14. Author's Personal Experience.
15. Malaysia - Last Chance for a New Beginning?, P 3.
16. Ibid P 4.
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18. Ibid P 17 and 159.

19. Malaysia, A Country Study, Foreign Area Study, P 3.
20. Malaysia - Last Chance for a New Beginning?, P 11.
21. Ibid P 12.
22. Ibid P 11.
23. Ibid P 5.
24. Haji Mokhtar Shamsuddin, Kertas Perintah 14 Tahun 1988 Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, P 7 and 14.
25. Ibid P 12.
26. Ibid P 15.
27. Ibid P 18.
28. Ibid P 20.
29. Author's Views.
30. Interview Ainon Awang, Malaysian Language Institute Lecturer, Feb 28th, 1990.
31. Malaysia, A Country Study, Foreign Area Study, 1984 P 282.
32. Laporan Dadah, Pasukan Petugas Anti Dadah, MKN, Bil 3/1989. Kuala Lumpur 1990, P 2 (Annex 2).
33. Ibid P 3.
34. Author's own experience.
35. Author's involvement with PEMADAM.
36. Laporan Dadah, Pasukan Petugas Anti Dadah, MKN Bil 3/1989, Kuala Lumpur 1990 P 4.
37. Malaysia Information 1988 Yearbok, P 209.
38. Haji Mokhtar Shamsuddin, Kertas Perintah 14 Tahun 1988 Malaysia, Kearah Memelihara Keselamatan Negara, Kuala Lumpur, P 25.
39. Ibid P 26.
40. Ibid P 27.
41. Ibid P 21.
42. Ibid P 22.

CHAPTER V

CURRENT EXTERNAL ISSUES, TRENDS, AND THREAT

VIETNAM AND CAMBODIAN ISSUES

Vietnam's vast military power imposes a psychological hangover as to how Vietnam would use this power in the region. Her departure from Cambodia in September 1989, ending 11 years of occupation has not totally settle the Cambodian conflict. Hun Sen, the Premier of the ruling communist party, the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party, though gaining power, is still being challenged by three other guerilla groups especially Khmer Rouge (KR). The continued presence of Soviet Union in Vietnam still persists a problem to the local imbalance of power by virtue of superpower presence and involvement. Vietnam's fear of China has made her dependent on the Soviet Union and she still retains the strategic foothold in the region from where she could counter China's influence and activities as well as counter US military presence in the Philippines. China equally preoccupied with the need to counter Vietnam's adventure and Soviet influence in the region, has chosen to pursue their ends by giving political and military assistance to the resistance movements fighting Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, particularly the KR, and sustaining military pressure against Vietnam at their common borders.1

ASEAN has so far played an active role in seeking a political solution to the problem. Its efforts in the UN continues to gain support. But in the meantime Cambodia under Hun Sen is undergoing a series of economic and political reforms of free market economy, greater political pluralism, gradual return to more traditional Cambodian social practices, private property ownership, restoration of Buddhism as the official religion, changing the name of the country to State of Cambodia, rewrote national anthem, and modifying the flag so as to do away with the socialist outlook.²

As a consequence of the Paris Meeting of January 15-16, 1990 the five permanent UN Security Council members underwrite the initiative to end the civil war in Cambodia. UN ICC (International Consultative Commission) will undertake to ensure Cambodian independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, neutrality, and non aligned status.³ Malaysia strongly supports this move and is ever willing to offer its Armed Forces for UN peace keeping role in Cambodia.⁴

However in the interest of regional security, Malaysia does not want to see the polarisation of Southeast Asia into two ideological camps which could be entrenched along the Thai-Cambodian-Laotian borders if the civil war in Cambodia is not resolved peacefully. At the same time Vietnam will be encouraged to scale down its military forces in order to offset her economic burden as she is no longer responsible for the defence of Cambodia. By doing so Vietnam would also reduce the hangover that

she is causing to the ASEAN states with her excessive military forces.

CONFLICTING CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

The legitimisation of right over seabed and underwater resources on the continental shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) led to intense efforts by littoral states to register claims and exercise exclusive national rights over large tracts of oceans and seas previously regarded as open seas.⁵ Almost all of the islands, reefs, and atolls in the South China Sea, numbering about 200, are claimed by two or more peripheral states of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Vietnam and China.⁶ Vietnamese and Philippines troops are respectively occupying 11 and 8 of the islands in the Spratlys, two of which, Amboyna Cay and the Commodore Reef, are claimed by a substantial military build-up. Malaysia occupies Terumbu Layang-Layang, Mantanani, and Ubi.⁷ Of all the claimants, the most aggressive has been China who in 1974 used force against the Vietnamese to invade and occupy the Paracels just to demonstrate her commitment towards its claim. In 1983, two of its naval ships had made a trip around the South China Sea to as far South as the Tsengmu Reefs (James Shoal or Beting Serupai), the southern most tip of China's offshore territorial claims (about 30 nautical miles from Sarawak). Under her modernisation programmes, China is increasing her military capabilities especially her South China Sea Fleet. The sighting of her Fleet comprising eight ships (2 destroyers, 4

frigates, 1 replenishment oiler, and 1 auxiliary ocean tug) between October 25 - 27, 1987 and the presence of People's Republic of China (PRC)'s flag hoisted on Malaysia's Semarang Barat Kecil module, are manifestations of PRC's efforts to stake her rights in the contested areas of South China Sea. Disputes over conflicting claims will therefore be a major feature of regional security problems in the next decade.

Frustrated at the failure of Vietnam to recognise its rightful title to Amboyna Cay, Malaysia occupied Swallow Reef. Seeing Malaysia's development on the reef, Vietnam further developed Amboyna Cay and fortified its infrastructure and increased its military capability there. Still unhappy about the challenge to its territorial claim in the Spratlys, Malaysia then occupied Mariveles Reef and Terumbu Ubi in 1986. Vietnam protested these occupations on the grounds that all of the Spratlys are its territory, and it warned that it would not hesitate to use military force to enforce its claim to the 'islands'. Negotiations between the two countries are still in progress.⁸

It can be deduce that disputes over conflicting claims in the South China Sea will therefore be a major feature of likely regional security problems in the coming decades.

MALAYSIA'S FREE PASSAGE

Malaysia's other concern in the South China Sea is Indonesia's application of its archipelagic concept in relation

to Natuna Islands. Physically, the position of the Natunas has already disrupted the straight-line air and sea passages between Peninsula Malaysia and Sabah Sarawak. These passages will be in serious jeopardy if relations between the two countries become anything less than cordial. For the time being, however, there exists an unwritten agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia on the right of passage by Malaysia, both in the air and sea, within the Indonesian boundary in the South China Sea.

For as long as amity prevails in the relationship between the two countries, the present arrangement seems to suffice.

TRADE ROUTES

Malaysia's dependency on her economic well being is through trading with the outside world. Almost 90 percent of her finished products and raw materials are being transported by ships through the Straits of Malacca and Straits of Singapore. The disruption of these trade routes would compromise her national economy and subsequently it will affect her national security.

Thus Malaysia would do her utmost to ensure that the trade routes will not be compromised through regional cooperation and bilateral agreements or the usage of other instruments of power to gain these access especially with other ASEAN members.

TERRITORIAL DISPUTE

There is also an inactive dispute between Singapore and Malaysia over the ownership of two islands, Pulau Pisang and Pulau Batu Putih, situated at opposite ends of the Singapore Strait. Both islands are equipped with navigation lights that have always been maintained by Singapore. However, Malaysia asserts ownership rights to these islands, claiming that they both lie within Malaysia's territorial waters. The claim to Pulau Batu Putih by Singapore seems more important, for if it were sustained, it would provide Singapore access to an additional sea area and seabed of approximately 240 nautical miles.⁹

The matter is presently in the hands of both Prime Ministers of Malaysia and Singapore and it is hoped that the matter would be resolved in the traditional spirit of ASEAN solidarity.

DOMESTIC PROBLEMS/DISPUTES IN NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

The region faces minority and insurgency problems in varying degrees, with Thailand and the Philippines receiving more of the problems than the other states of ASEAN. While they are essentially internal in nature, they could affect inter-state relations in the near future. The spillover of the problems into Malaysia would then affect Malaysia's relations with Thailand and Philippines which are likely to persist in the future, leading to minor irritations between Malaysia and those two countries.

However, it is not expected to upset the wider spirit of ASEAN solidarity.

THAILAND AND PULO

Thailand's problem with the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) in South Thailand needs to be addressed positively especially after the complete surrender of CPM members last year. Malaysia has given and continues to give all cooperation necessary for Thailand to deal with the problem by allowing the Thai to set its second consular office in Kelantan, a state bordering Thailand in the East Coast of Peninsula Malaysia, and also presently allowing 15 Thai intelligence cells (LOT Teams) to operate along the Malaysia/Thai border states of Perlis, Kedah, Perak, and Kelantan. If the Thai Malays could be given equal rights and the Thai Government's perpetration of organizing the transmigration of Northern Thais into South Thailand to destabilize the Thai Muslim could be stopped then the PULO issue could be resolved amicably.¹⁰

Malaysia would not like to see the exodus of thousands of Thai Malays into the towns of Baling in Kedah, Pengkalan Hulu in Perak, and the border towns of Kelantan in 1981 be repeated as it could cause some irritation between the two nations as many having their loved ones residing in both countries.¹¹

PHILIPPINES INSTABILITY

While most ASEAN countries have successfully contained their communist insurgency problems, the Philippines today not only is facing a serious insurgency problem, but also an unstable political situation. President Aquino has yet able to effectively consolidate her power as president. The Armed Forces is plagued with morale problems arising from poor terms of service, pay, training, and logistic problems. Land tenure problems and related domestic economic issues are yet to be resolved.

Up to now Philippines has not satisfactorily renounced its claim over Sabah inspite of Malaysia's show of sincerity by not supporting and allowing the Muslim secessionist movements to use Sabah as a base. Unless existing political problems are solved, insurgency situation created by the communist New People's Army (NPA) and the Muslim secessionist movements is likely to remain a potent and aggressive challenge which will continue well into the 1990s.¹²

Until such time as effective policies and programmes are launched to undercut the insurgents' appeal, its potential to overflow into Malaysia should not be ruled out, and this might then increase the irritation already existing between the two countries and undermine Malaysia's security especially in Sabah.

ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS

The continued presence of 20,163 Filipino illegal immigrants mostly in Sabah and 144,755 Indonesians especially in Peninsula Malaysia and Sabah is being tolerated as they have, to a great extent, helped to overcome the shortage of manpower in sectors requiring unskilled and semi skilled workers. They also provide cheap labor especially in construction work and in rubber and palm oil plantations.¹³

At the same time, some 154,202 illegal immigrants from both countries had been send back as they had been found to be involved in petty and serious crimes or their activities jeopardize national security and a threat to public order.¹⁴

REFUGEES

On the issue of refugees, Malaysia would deal with the remaining 19,835 Vietnamese (January 1990) in accordance to the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) adopted at Gevena Conference in June 1989. Those refugees who arrived in Malaysia before 15 March 1989 will be given asylum in third countries within the next three years (1990-1992). Those arriving after the cutting off date will undergo Refugee Determination Procedure (RDP) to determine their status whether they are eligible for asylum or be repatriated to Vietnam. With this latest development, Malaysia held two talks with Hanoi authorities in early February and March 1990 to decide on the fate of about 13,000 boat people who are to be repatriated. Malaysia has given assurances of financial

support to resolve the matter by tackling the problem at source, in Vietnam. So far 49 Vietnamese refugees had voluntarily return to Vietnam under CPA agreements.15

With this success, local friction and irritation is better managed without affecting the security of Malaysia. Looking beyond the CPA, nothing short of an overall political agreement can bring about the full solution of the problem of illegal departures from Vietnam without really resolving the economic-political situation in the region.

SUMMARY

From the discussions so far, the threat to Malaysia's national security is more from within than from without even though the militant communist threat had ended in December 1989. Looking ahead at the external current issues and trends, it could be concluded that the threat to her national security could be derived from the unresolved Vietnam and Cambodian issue and the conflicting claims in the South China Sea especially over the control of the EEZ. Any disruption to her sea and air lines of communications between Peninsula Malaysia and East Malaysia would cause Malaysia's disintegration. The blockade of her traditional trade routes would jeopardise Malaysia's economic well being as she is heavily dependent upon her ability to trade with outside world. Territorial disputes though presently is dormant could also escalate into conflict especially when there is an overflow of domestic problems and disputes in neighbouring countries.

Issues over illegal immigrants and refugees too could be a source of threat to Malaysia's national security.

While elements of military power and show of force are bound to be used in exercising rights or to strengthen negotiating positions, it is unlikely that countries involved would embark on an all-out war over such matters as discussed above. However a high state of tension between countries and limited military conflicts could occur unless confidence building and conflict reduction continue to prevail through bilateral and/or regional cooperation, consultation, compromise, and alliances.

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CHAPTER VI

NATIONAL PURPOSE, VALUES, AND INTERESTS

PURPOSE AND VALUES

Since independence, Malaysia's efforts has been directed towards creating a united democratic nation with its people enjoying a just progressive life in a stable and developing economic enviroment.¹ The overall purpose is to project Malaysia as an independent, sovereign, democratic state, dedicated internally to forging national unity amongst its unique multi-racial population and pursuing healthy economic deveopment, social justice, and cultural progress. Externally Malaysia is dedicated to peace in the world, the promotion of goodwill, friendship, and understanding with all the peace-loving nations, irrespective of political systems, adherence to the ideals and purpose of the United Nations' Charter, regional cooperation and opposing all terms of racism and colonialism. At the same time Malaysia is supporting and promoting the growth of regional democratic institutions and an open economy not only within the region but throughout the world by subscribing to a fair international trading system.²

These purposes are being promoted and enhanced through progressive national policies, personal freedom, human dignity, individual rights, pursuit of happiness, and peace and prosperity as ascribed in her Constitution. They are to be achieved through self determination, democratic institutions, economic

development, rule of law, and freedom of choice. These are further being reinforced by 'national will' in dedicating to achieving a greater unity of all Malaysians by continuously maintaining their democratic ways and also by creating a just society through which the wealth of the nation shall be equitably shared and also through a liberal approach to her rich and diverse cultural tradition so that a strong and progressive society, oriented to modern science and technology will emerge.³

To achieve these purposes and values, all Malaysians pledged to work together as a nation and their guiding principles are belief in God, loyalty to the King and country, upholding the constitution, rule of law, and maintain good behaviour and morality.⁴ Their considerations are also based on:

1. The age of ideology is passing away and the age of economy will dominate Malaysian Policy in the coming decades.

2. A more cohesive regional strategy is vital to regional peace and stability.

3. Internal threat will continue to dominate social, political, and internal order of Malaysia.

4. National unity and intergration remains the ultimate national aim.

5. National prosperity and political power will hinge not on military power but on economic power.

6. All treaties and alliances will be honoured.⁵

MALAYSIA'S INTEREST

Malaysia would continue to play an active part in promoting democracy by removing any distrust and misunderstanding within the nation and as well as in the region. The nation needs to secure a healthy balance of forces, a system open to the world, composed of states which are economically prosperous, socially dynamic, strategically secure, domestically at peace and politically at one. Regional reconciliation should then be the order of the day where Malaysia would contribute to achieve the ultimate objective of creating a system of states that are at peace with each other, involved in a dynamic and vigorous relationship of mutual respect and mutually beneficial cooperation.⁶ These will be the basis of Malaysia's national security strategy and they are the key national interests which Malaysia seeks to assume and protect as follows:

1. The survival of Malaysia as an integrated one nation state, free and independent with its fundamental democratic values intact and the national institution and people secure in its multi-racial entirety.
2. The promotion of a healthy and growing Malaysian economy to provide opportunities for individuals' prosperity and national well-being.
3. It is to promote a stable and secure internal order and environment free of any threat to its interests.

4. Enhancing a healthy and vigorous alliance and cooperation with nations sharing similar aspirations irrespective of social systems.

5. Promotion of healthy region free from drug trafficking and its abuse.

6. Malaysia will continue to support and encourage the growth of free institutions and open economy throughout all region based on fair international trading system.⁷

MAJOR OBJECTIVES IN SUPPORT OF MALAYSIA'S INTERESTS

In futherance to the above national interests, the principal national security objectives that Malaysia calls for is the coordinated use of all the national power to achieve the followings:⁸

1. Maintenance of peace and security within the region, specifically:

- a. Safeguarding the country against external aggression.
- b. Protecting the economic interests in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
- c. Contribute to maintaining law and order in the peripheral areas.
- d. Deterring and apprehending the refugees and illegal immigrants from entering Malaysia.
- e. Enforce and ensure national integrity in the territorial waters.

2. Preserving and maintaining public order and internal security, specifically:

a. To provide security and protection for the maintenance and preservation of a peaceful environment so as to create a situation conducive to the progress and development of the nation.

b. To provide security and preservation for the development of a democratic way of life in the country.

c. To oversee publications, films and information technology so as to bring about a unified national culture and tradition.

d. To fight against dadah trafficking and misuse of dadah.

e. To provide dadah treatment and rehabilitation.

f. To deter any form of terrorism and religious extremism.

3. Fostering and maintaining regional and international cooperation especially in South East Asia, promoting Islamic solidarity, consolidating Non-Alignment, seeking friendly relations with as many countries as possible, and strengthening links with nations with whom Malaysia has common interests, specifically:

a. To continue in the pursuit, maintenance, and enhancement of friendly ties with other nations based on the principle of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity and non-interference in each others internal affairs.

b. To project the nation as a peace-loving and developing non-aligned country committed to democratic principles and the principles and objectives of the UN Charter.

c. To maintain diplomatic relations with most states in the international community and the major powers irrespective of their political and social systems.

d. To promote South East Asia region as a Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN).

PRINCIPAL THREAT TO MALAYSIA'S INTERESTS

The threat to Malaysia's national security is more from within than without. The threat could be derived from economic, education, Constitution, National Language, racial, dadah trafficking, its abuse, and addiction, and also religious issues. These issues could threaten Malaysia's interests of attaining national unity, peace, prosperity, and political stability. Eradicating poverty irrespective of race and the ability to restructure her society through new socio-economic policies and equal and fair distribution of wealth are the other main concern of the Government in the decades to come. The unresolved social and political differences either between States and Federal Government or between the multiethnic communities would be another threat to Malaysia's future.

Regional stability and the absence of conflict would be the desired interest of Malaysia in order for her to sustain a fast pace of development. Illegal immigrants, refugees, and the

Vietnam and Cambodian issue are some of the main concerns of Malaysia in her efforts to resolve amicably for the sake of regional order. Conflicting claims in the South China Sea, territorial disputes, and domestic problems and disputes would be managed bilaterally or regionally so as not to destabilize the region and avoid their escalation.

A challenge to her EEZ is considered a significant threat to her strategic interests. The importance of the EEZ that provides 25% of national income (Fish, Gas, Oil, and other resources that are yet to be exploited) will not be allowed to be compromised.

The sea and air lines of communications between Peninsula Malaysia and East Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak), the disruption of which could cause Malaysia's disintegration, remains to be another survival interest of Malaysia.

Since Malaysia's economic well being is heavily dependent upon her ability to trade with the outside world, the challenge to her trade routes, Straits of Melaka and Straits of Singapore, are viewed as a threat to Malaysia's security interest and survival.

Drug trafficking, its abuse, and unresolved addiction problems continue to be a serious threat to Malaysia's desire of promoting a rugged, strong willed, dynamic, and loyal citizens of good behaviour and morality. Drug free society would be an ultimate aim in the decades to come.

Finally Malaysia realizes that all her interests, internal or external, will be challenged as South East Asia still remains

an area of contention especially between military and economic superpowers. In the decades to come, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad the Prime Minister of Malaysia predicts that:

"If I am right and what we will see in the years ahead are increasing examples of economic expansion and decreasing attempts at military expansionism, than we can expect much more of our future to be determined by the trading states rather than by the garrison and the military states."

ENDNOTES

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Malaysia Information 1988 Yearbook, P 224.
8. Ibid P 26.
Ibid P 249.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

In this study, this paper has examined Malaysia's national security beginning with its historical background in order to understand the earlier thoughts of security and defense by her multiethnic communities. Clearly it could be glimpsed that there were already differences in the perceptions of the Bumiputras and the sojourners of their responsibilities towards the nation. The examination on Conditions of National Order revealed that there existed a strong feeling of national will prevailing among the people which eventually resulted in the defeat of militant communist and limited external threat. Of great significance was the survival of the newly born nations, Malaya and then Malaysia in spite of the various challenges that the nation had to face since the last four decades. This also came about as a result of strong successful governments since 1957 committed to national well being and prosperity through socio-economic development and political democratization.

However the study on the current internal trends and issues revealed that for all the successes that Malaysia had achieved, there still exist the national integration problem resulting from the diversification of culture, traditions, and religions of her multiethnic communities. Each community continues to cling to their culture and traditions even though the Government had already introduced the national cultural policy. So the threat to national security in the decades to come will still be from

within the nation itself. This is also closely related to an unbalanced socio-economic and political development and unequal distribution of wealth among the races, and dadah trafficking, its abuse, and addiction problems. On the other hand, the people and the Government have displayed their will and desire to make Malaysia a 'happy nation' for all her people to enjoy. They are willing to sacrifice to safeguard their achievements and way of life.

The examination on the current external issues and trends portrayed a brighter environment as the age of ideology conflict is waning, communism is decaying, forces of war-mongers are returning home, Cambodian issue is on the threshold of political settlement, superpowers are reclining from their 'over-stretch' and 'over-sufficiency' policies in their power projections and competition, rapprochments between adversaries are melting away their mistrust and conflicts, and the economies of states are becoming the new 'power-houses'. If the world order and international trading and economy do not change for the worse, Malaysia does not foresee serious external threat to her national development and security. However, problems relating to conflicting claims in the South China Sea, territorial disputes, escalation of domestic problems/disputes, disruption and blockade to Malaysia's free passage and trade routes, and the unresolved illegal immigrant and refugee problems would continue to be the challenges to Malaysia's national security in the decades to come, needing Malaysia to address them in a more positive ways.

The final examination and the subsequent identification of national purpose, values, and interests revealed that Malaysia's political and economic developments in the decades to come must be based on the objectives of her national interests. Following the determination of the principal threats to those interests, Malaysia would adopt the right strategy by utilizing all of her national powers political, economy, socio-psychological, and military to safeguard her national security and sovereignty.

SUMMATION


Based on the analysis of the above study, it can be concluded that the challenges to Malaysia's national security are more from within than without. Thus it is the responsibility of the Government and all of its agencies and as well as all Malaysians to make a success of the various government policies and to remain united through continuous consultation, goodwill, compromise, and consensus strategy. In the international arena, Malaysia would continue to promote regional and international socio-economic and political cooperation and adhering to international democratic order, UN Charter, and honouring all treaties and alliances.

In the final analysis, Malaysians ought to work diligently towards promoting a stable internal order for peace, prosperity, and national well being while continuing to uphold national integrity and sovereignty.

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
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MALAYSIA

Skel(Scale) 1:4.350.000



-----	Sempadan Antarabangsa
-----	Sempadan Negara
-----	Sempadan Negeri
-----	Sempadan Daerah
-----	Sempadan Muncipaliti
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-----	Sempadan Rempangan
-----	Sempadan Pantai
-----	Sempadan Laut
-----	Sempadan Udara
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