

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
**MANPOWER
REQUIREMENTS
REPORT**
FY 1991



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MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT FY 1991

Prepared by
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense



(Force Management & Personnel)
(Health Affairs)
(Reserve Affairs)

Department of the Army
Department of the Navy
Department of the Air Force

Defense Agencies

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FY 1991 DEFENSE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Secretary of Defense hereby submits to the Congress the Defense Manpower Requirements Report (DMRR) for FY 1991 in compliance with Section 115(b)(3) of Title 10, United States Code. This report should be read and used along with the Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress on the FY 1991 Budget.

I. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT.

This report explains the Department of Defense manpower program incorporated in the President's Budget FY 1991. The report is organized into seven chapters, three appendices, and three annexes. The annexes are bound and provided separately.

Defense Manpower Program (Chapters I through VIII). Chapter I provides an introduction to the report. Chapter II is a summary of the FY 1991 manpower program. Chapters III through VII contain details on manpower programs for each of the military Services and the Defense Agencies. Chapter VIII summarizes manpower costs.

Unit Annex. As requested by Senate Armed Services Committee, a Unit Annex is provided that describes the planned allocation of manpower to specific types of units within the force.

Officer Flow Annex. Section 115 (b)(3)(D) of Title 10, USC, requires the submission of specified detailed data on the Services' officer corps. These data are contained in the Officer Flow Annex.

Medical Manpower Annex. Section 115(b)(1) of Title 10, USC, requires the submission of detailed information on medical manpower. This information is contained in the Medical Manpower Annex.

II. THE TOTAL FORCE.

The structure of our armed forces is based on the DoD Total Force Policy which recognizes that all elements of the structure contribute to national defense. Those elements include the Active and Reserve Components, the civilian workforce, retired military, host nation support, and DoD contractors.

A. Active Component Military

The active component military are those full-time military men and women who serve in units that engage enemy forces, provide support in the combat theater, other support units, and who are in special accounts (transients, student, etc.). These men and women are on call twenty-four hours a day and receive full-time military pay. There are over 2 million active component military people.

B. Reserve Component Military.

Reserve component military manpower is divided into three categories: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve.

The Ready Reserve is the major source of manpower augmentation for the active force. It has two principal elements: the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve. The Selected Reserve includes three groups divided into Training Retirement Categories (TRC), numbering approximately 1.2 million personnel: (1) units organized, equipped, and trained to perform wartime missions (TRC A); (2) Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs), who provide wartime augmentation on or shortly after M-day (TRC B), and (3) those members of the Selected Reserve who have not completed sufficient training to be awarded a military skill designation (TRC C). Training pipeline personnel may not deploy overseas upon mobilization until minimum training is completed (12 weeks or its equivalent.) Selected Reservists assigned to units, and IMAs, train throughout the year and participate annually in active training. As many as 200,000 Selected Reservists may be involuntarily recalled by the President for up to 90 days, with an option for a 90 day extension, to augment active forces. The Reserve Component manpower requested by the Department of Defense (for the purpose of this report) is limited to that of the Selected Reserve, including full-time support personnel, since that number is authorized by Congress.

The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Inactive National Guard (ING) consist of those Ready Reservists who are not in the Selected Reserve. Members of the IRR and ING have served recently in the active force or the Selected Reserve and have some portion of their military service obligation remaining or have volunteered to remain beyond their statutory obligation. The majority of IRR and ING members do not participate regularly in organized training. All members of the IRR and ING are subject to being ordered to active duty during a national emergency declared by the President or the Congress. An IRR screening program commenced during FY 1987, calls IRR members to active duty for one day to allow a review of their personal military records and physical condition.

The Standby Reserve consists of personnel who maintain their military affiliation, but are unable to remain in a Ready Reserve status, or who are determined to be more essential in their civilian jobs. The Retired Reserve consists of former members of the active and reserve and do not generally participate in reserve training or readiness programs. They may be ordered to active duty by the Secretary of the military department concerned in the interest of national defense. However, Standby and Retired Reservists who have not completed 20 years of active service may not be activated until it has been determined that there are not enough qualified members in the Ready Reserve. Retired Reservists who have completed 20 or more years of active service may be ordered to active duty at any time.

C. Civilian Component

Civilians constitute approximately one-third or 1.1 million of the Department's active manpower. Civilians occupy roles that do not require military incumbents. Our civilian work force repairs airplanes, ships, and tanks; provides research, medical, communications, and logistical support; and operates and maintains military installations. Civilians contribute directly to the readiness of the armed forces by providing continuity and expertise and by freeing the uniformed personnel to perform military-specific tasks.

D. Retirees.

Retired military manpower is a major portion of the Total Force. There are over 800,000 physically able retirees under age 60. These individuals are trained, highly motivated, and can be rapidly recalled at any time by the service secretaries to perform a wide variety of jobs. There are also large numbers of retirees age 60 and over who can make major contributions to our defense effort.

III. MANPOWER MIX.

The Department's policy is to maintain as small an active peacetime force as national security policy, military strategy, and overseas commitments permit. National military strategy dictates which missions must be performed by military persons. Department policy is to employ civilian employees and contractors wherever possible to free our military forces to perform military functions.

Often the most cost-effective way to meet overseas peacetime and wartime requirements in non-combat activities is to use host nation support (HNS). The agreements we have with the United Kingdom, Norway, Turkey, Italy, and the BENELUX countries to provide port operations, surface transportation and many other support functions are examples of this support. The same type of arrangements also exist in Japan and Korea. Increased reliance on HNS makes strategic warning and allied response even more important. It also allows our strategic lift to focus on the transport of reinforcements and sustainment to the theater of operations.

The primary criterion that must be satisfied in determining whether a military unit should be active or reserve is the responsiveness required to perform the mission. Units that must be immediately ready for deployment and combat operations must be manned with active component military manpower. In peacetime, we also authorize active component military manpower for training and military rotational purposes.

Since the Total Force Policy was announced in 1973 the Department has greatly increased its reliance on Reserve Component units. The Army relies heavily on reserve units to provide essential combat and tactical support. Naval Reserve units form an integral part of most mission areas, including surface combatants, carrier air wings, maritime patrol, airlift, and medical support. The Selected Marine Corps Reserve provides a division-wing team with balanced combat, combat support, and combat

service support forces similar to active force counterpart units. Air Force Reserve Component units have demonstrated their capability to maintain high readiness levels. In general, however, high readiness levels increase the cost of maintaining these units due to the additional training and full time support required.

The Department is developing guidelines that will establish the general criteria and procedures for determining and evaluating force mix options. At the direction of Congress, the Department is conducting a major review of its Total Force Policy. The final report will be submitted to the Congress by December 31, 1990.

IV. MOBILIZATION MANPOWER.

Mobilization manpower is the time-phased build-up of manpower needed above our current peacetime strength to prepare for and conduct wartime military operations. Additional military and civilian personnel are necessary to bring our current peacetime forces up to their full wartime strengths; to man activated units, ships, and squadrons; and to replace casualties. The individual Service chapters describe the wartime manpower requirements and the overall mobilization manpower situation in more detail.

V. MANPOWER COUNTING.

The discussion of manpower and personnel readiness in this report requires that the reader understand the terms describing manpower counting categories. For that reason, a glossary of defense manpower terms is provided in Appendix B. The basic distinction between "spaces", that is billets or positions, and "faces", people to fill the positions, must be understood. Our forces are made up of a variety of different types of units. Each unit has associated with it a collection of positions that must be filled by qualified people in order for the unit to perform its mission.

During peacetime, it is neither necessary nor desirable to fill all positions in all units. Some units may not be staffed at all, due to a lack of funding or because we can fill them in an expeditious manner following mobilization. Some units may be staffed with a combination of active and reserve people; as the unit is tasked to perform more in peacetime, the proportion of full-time people, whether active, reserve, or civilian, may be expected to increase.

The Department's work force does not change overnight to match changes in the programmed force structure. As the force structure is being established, the programmed manning must be adjusted to best balance the requirements of force changes, available inventory, accession and separation predictions, fiscal constraints, manpower ceilings, etc. The collection of positions authorized to be filled with trained personnel is called the authorized or programmed manning.

The Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC) entitled "Undistributed" appears in active component DPPC tables throughout this Report. Negative entries project temporary undermanning at the end of a fiscal

year; positive entries project ry overmanning at the end of a fiscal year. Budgeted manpower be completely distributed to DPPC mission categories because of transient phenomena primarily resulting from cyclic variations in the "Individuals" category. The Individuals category is comprised of several dynamic components which vary throughout the year, e.g., the number of trainees and students varies daily because most courses of instruction are less than one year. In consonance with the Congressional practice of authorizing military manpower end strength, all DPPC categories, including Individuals, are portrayed as of September 30th.

VI. DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES.

Defense Planning and Programming Categories (DPPCs) are used throughout this report to describe and explain the Department's manpower resources. All three types of defense manpower are allocated to specific DPPCs, no position being counted more than once.

DPPCs are based on the same program elements as the eleven Major Defense Programs, but the elements are aggregated differently. The Major Defense Programs aggregate, for each program, all the resources that can be reasonably associated with the "output" of that program. For example, the Strategic Program includes not only the bomber program, but also the base support personnel that sustain these units. The DPPCs on the other hand, aggregate activities performing similar functions. For example, personnel support is given separate visibility. The DPPC structure used in this year's report remains the same as was displayed in the FY 1990 Defense Manpower Requirements Report. Definition of the categories is provided in Appendix C.

CHAPTER II

MANPOWER PROGRAM SUMMARY

This chapter presents the Department of Defense manpower request and provides an overview of manpower strength trends.

I. NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES, POLICY, AND DEFENSE MANPOWER.

The Department's basic national security objective is to preserve the United States as a free nation with its fundamental institutions and values intact. This involves assuring the physical security of the United States and maintaining an international climate in which US interests are protected. Achieving this objective is dependent upon the ability to influence international affairs and deter aggression and coercion across the conflict spectrum. Should deterrence fail, our forces must be capable of defeating armed aggression and ending hostilities on terms favorable to the U.S. To achieve those ends, strong and capable armed forces are essential. A detailed and comprehensive statement of the objectives of American national security policy and the way in which defense policies and strategy support their attainment can be found in the Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to Congress for FY 1991.

Defense manpower is made up of active and reserve military, civil service personnel, contractor, and host nation support personnel. Manpower requirements are developed based on the forces required to execute our military strategy. However, the size of the force structure is also affected by fiscal constraints and our capability to mobilize and deploy forces in the event of war.

The composition of Defense forces is based on DoD's Total Force Policy, which recognizes that all units in the force structure contribute to deterrence and success in wartime. In structuring our military forces, units are placed in the Selected Reserve, whenever feasible, to maintain as small an active component peacetime force as national security considerations permit. Service planning assumes that Selected Reserve units and Individual Mobilization Augmentees will be made available for any contingency for which they are required to bring the total force to its required combat capability. Active component units, on the other hand, are those forces needed for a contingency not involving mobilization, for immediate deployment in a major war before Selected Reserve units can be deployed, and for peacetime deterrence. To supplement the active component units some reserve component units must be maintained in a combat ready state for immediate call up for limited periods.

Civilians are the third essential component of the Total Force. In addition to managing critical defense resources, civil servants repair ships, tanks, trucks, and airplanes; maintain military installations; operate communications systems; do research and development; perform intelligence analysis; operate the supply systems; and perform many other functions that do not specifically require military personnel. Overseas, foreign nationals provides important host nation support at many U.S. installations.

The Department also employs a large number of contractors to provide important support services. Work is contracted out when it is cost effective to do so except when activities are inherently governmental, such as contract management, or a function is closely tied to mobilization.

For all types of activities the Department assigns a high priority to increasing productivity. For example, several programs promote labor-saving capital investment whereas another initiative requires both military and civilian activities to determine their most effective organizational structure.

The following table is a summary of the major force elements planned for the end of FY 1990 and FY 1991.

Table II-1

SUMMARY OF MAJOR FORCE ELEMENTS

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
<u>Strategic</u>			
ICBMs	1,000	1,000	1,000
Bombers (PAA) <u>1/</u>	358	315	303
Tankers (KC-135) (PAA) <u>1/</u>			
Active	460	446	446
Guard/Reserve	134	145	148
<u>Strategic</u>			
Interceptor Squadrons/PAA			
Active	2/36	1/18	1/18
Guard/Reserve	12/216	12/216	12/216
Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNS)			
	36	34	35
Mobile Logistics Ships	4	4	4
Support Ships	2	2	2
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>			
Land Forces			
Army Divisions			
Active	18	17	16
Guard	10	10	10
Army Separate Brigades & Regiments			
Active <u>2/</u>	9	9	9
Guard/Reserve <u>3/</u>	18	18	16
Marine Corps Divisions			
Active	3	3	3
Reserve	1	1	1

Tactical Air Forces			
Air Force			
Ground Launched			
Cruise Missile (GLCM)	14/224	7/112	0
Flights/Missiles			
Air Force Squadrons/PAA <u>4</u>			
Active	112/2207	110/2148	110/2155
Guard/Reserve	35/306	35/317	35/311
Navy Squadrons/PAA			
Active	92/903	92/903	94/904
Reserve	14/97	14/97	14/104
Carriers (active only)	14	14	14
Marine Corps Squadrons/PAA			
Active	33/454	33/456	33/460
Reserve	10/118	10/118	10/120
Naval Forces			
Attack Submarines			
(active only)	99	92	86
Surface Combatants			
Active	188	174	160
Reserve	24	30	36
Amphibious Assault Ships			
Active	63	61	62
Reserve	2	3	4
Patrol Ships (active only)	6	6	6
Mine Warfare Ships	5	8	10
ASW and FAD Squadrons/PAA			
Active	62/521	64/533	64/545
Reserve	20/101	20/101	20/106
Mobility Forces			
Airlift Squadrons/PAA <u>5/</u>			
Active	40/523	40/509	40/506
Guard/Reserve	29/483	29/479	29/465
Sealift Ships			
Nucleus Fleet <u>6/</u>	77	75	76
Chartered Fleet (Longterm) <u>7/</u>	46	48	51

1/Primary aerospace vehicle authorized (PAA).

2/Includes the Berlin Brigade, three armored cavalry regiments, one ranger regiment, and four theater defense brigades (to include the 193d Inf. Bde in Panama).

3/For FY 1990-FY 1991, this includes seven reserve component brigades that round out active divisions, three theater defense brigades, one infantry group, and two armored cavalry regiments (one more armored brigade in FY 1991).

4/Includes combat coded tactical fighter, tactical reconnaissance, and tactical air control squadrons, combat/combat support coded special operations and tactical electronic warfare squadrons; and combat support coded tactical tanker/cargo (KC-10) and airborne warning and control squadrons.

5/Includes C-17, C-130, C-141, C-5 and C-9s. Excludes rescue and weather.

6/Includes naval fleet auxiliary force. (Underway replenishment ships and support ships).

7/Military Sealift Command Ships

II. Manpower Request. The Department's request for manpower is summarized in this section.

A. Active Component Military Strength

Active Component Military Personnel
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	
Army	769.7	744.2	727.5	
Navy	592.6	590.5	584.8	
Marine Corps	197.0	196.7	196.5	
Air Force	570.8	545.0	530.0	
Total	2130.2	2076.4	2038.8	

Note: Detail may not add due to rounding.

B. Selected Reserve Strength.

The following table shows the manpower request for the Selected Reserve, expressed in end strengths. These figures include Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) and full-time Active Guard/Reserve members.

Selected Reserve Military Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Army National Guard	457.0	447.3	447.3	
Army Reserve	319.2	309.2	309.2	
Naval Reserve	151.5	153.4	149.7	
Marine Corps Reserve	43.6	44.0	43.9	
Air National Guard	116.1	116.2	116.3	
Air Force Reserve	83.2	84.9	85.2	
DoD Total	1170.6	1155.0	1151.6	

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.
All years include AGR/TARs and Cat. 'B' IMAS.

The following table shows the number of personnel involved in full time support of the Reserve Components. The Guard and Reserve military technicians, who are also DoD civilians, are included in the Selected Reserve totals throughout this report.

Full-Time Support to the Selected Reserve^{1/}
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Army National Guard			
Active Guard/Reserve	25.9	26.2	26.2
Military Technicians	25.9	26.3	26.3
Civilians <u>2/</u>	3.1	2.6	2.6
Active Component	.6	.6	.6
Total	55.5	55.7	55.7
Army Reserve			
Active Guard/Reserve	13.3	13.3	13.3
Military Technicians	8.5	8.5	8.3
Civilians	4.6	4.5	4.5
Active Component	1.2	1.2	1.2
Total	27.6	27.5	27.3
Naval Reserve			
Active Guard/Reserve (TAR)	21.9	22.7	22.9
Civilians	2.9	3.0	3.0
Active Component	7.0	7.5	8.3
Total	31.8	33.2	34.2
Marine Corps Reserve			
Active Guard/Reserve	1.9	2.3	2.4
Civilians	0.4	0.4	0.4
Active Component	5.4	5.0	5.0
Total	7.7	7.7	7.8
Air National Guard			
Active Guard/Reserve	8.0	8.5	8.5
Military Technicians <u>3/</u>	23.7	24.3	23.9
Civilians <u>2/</u>	2	2.0	2.0
Active Component	0.6	0.6	0.6
Total	34.3	35.4	35.0
Air Force Reserve			
Active Guard/Reserve	0.6	0.7	0.7
Military Technicians	9.3	10.3	9.9
Civilians	4.9	4.4	4.4
Active Component	0.5	0.7	0.7
Total	15.3	16.1	15.7
DoD Total			
Active Guard/Reserve	71.6	73.7	74.0
Military Technicians	67.4	69.4	68.4
Civilians	17.9	16.9	16.9
Active Component	15.3	15.6	16.4
Total	172.2	175.6	175.7

- 1/Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) personnel are included in Selected Reserve strength throughout the report.
2/Includes non-dual status National Guard civilian technicians and Army Reserve and Air National Guard status quo technicians.
3/Includes reimbursable military technicians.

C. Civilian Component Strength

Civilian Manpower^{1/}

(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Actual</u> <u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>Budget</u> <u>FY 1991</u>
Total DoD	1,116.8	1,100.7	1,095.7

Consistent with Section 501(c) of Public Law 94-361, the requested civilian strength includes U.S. direct and foreign national indirect hire employees; it excludes the following three categories of DoD civilian personnel:

1. Special Student and Disadvantaged Youth.

Included under this category are: Stay-in-School, Temporary Summer Aid, Federal Junior Fellowship, and Worker Trainee Opportunity programs. Employment in these categories is estimated at 5,200 in FY 1991.

2. National Security Agency.

NSA personnel are excluded in accordance with Public Law 86-36.

3. Civil Functions Personnel.

Civil functions, administered by DoD, include the Army's Corps of Engineers, Arlington National Cemetery, and the Air Force's Wildlife Conservation Program. Civil employment in FY 1991 is estimated at approximately 30,000 employees.

III. MANPOWER OVERVIEW

Military and civilian manpower strength trends are shown in the following tables.

Defense Employment
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Military			
Active	2,130	2,076	2,038
Officer	(303)	(297)	(293)
Enlisted	(1,814)	(1,765)	(1,731)
Cadets/Midship- men	(14)	(14)	(14)
Selected Reserve	1,172	1,155	1,152
Civilian ^{1/}	1,117	1,101	1,096

^{1/} Full time equivalent (FTE) end strength.

A. Military Manpower.

The FY 1991 authorization request for active component military personnel is 2,038,800. The Selected Reserve authorization request is 1,151,600. Highlights of the military manpower programs by Service follow.

ARMY

Recent changes in the international environment, particularly those in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, will enable the Army to shape its future. This represents the first step of a transition from a Cold War posture, primarily oriented on the Soviet Union, to a more versatile posture shaped to meet the requirements of the 1990s and beyond. This change in focus, coupled with recent and projected long range resource reductions has caused the shaping of both the Active and Reserve Components into a force which will be smaller but highly trained and ready to discharge the missions assigned to it.

The Army's plan envisions an end-state in the mid-1990's in which our active force structure and overseas presence (given the completion of appropriate international agreements) are substantially reduced, or reserve component forces are reduced and upgraded in warfighting capability, and a greater emphasis is placed on the contingency capability of a more "U.S. based" force.

The Army plans to inactive two CONUS active divisions and support forces while maintaining combat unit readiness. Reserve force reductions will be taken in both combat and support forces in consonance with warfight requirements. Continued transition to Army of Excellence designs will provide the forces necessary to execute Army doctrine on future battlefields.

Modernization of unit designs and equipment continues in maneuver battalions and support elements of armored and mechanized infantry divisions. Separate infantry and theater defense brigades begin conversion of modernized designs in FY's 1991 and 1992.

NAVY

In FY 1990 total Battle Force ships decrease from 566 to 551 and in FY 1991 total Battle Force ships will decrease to 546. The end strength requested for FY 1990 and 1991 are 590,501 and 584,800 respectively. Navy forces will continue to be employed in regional/world conflicts and as instruments of foreign policy throughout the 1990's and into the next century. Sustaining readiness to meet ongoing and emergent operational commitments is the Navy's challenge for FY 1991. Navy will prepare battle forces for future requirements by replacing older ships with more economical, efficient, and capable units.

Navy's biennial budget places considerable emphasis upon medical manpower support in conjunction with shared Departmental/Congressional concern. Navy is also applying increased resources to help reverse serious manpower shortages among mid-grade aviators (approx. 1300 short) and experienced nuclear power trained officers (over 550 short). Recruiting resources are also enhanced in recognition of retention trends within critical areas, a declining base of potential recruits, and increased competition from the private sector.

Navy's FY 1990/FY 1991 manpower request continues the trend toward a lean sea-going Navy, while pursuing every economy for necessary shore support. Navy Reserve end strength will increase 1900 in FY 1990 primarily to accommodate additional ships being introduced into the Naval Reserve. In FY 1991, despite assignment of additional ships in the Naval Reserve Forces, end strength decreases by 3669 due to proposed infrastructure reductions.

MARINE CORPS

The Marine Corps end strength goal for FY 1991 is 196,500, and reflects a balance between existing resource constraints and the dynamics of the international security environment. With the world in flux, naval expeditionary forces, with their inherent flexibility and power projection and strategic reach, remain indispensable. Their capabilities have been most recently demonstrated by Marine deployments and operations in the Persian Gulf, Panama, and in support of counter-narcotics operations.

The Marine Corps employs a "bottom-up" approach to restructuring the active duty Fleet Marine Force (FMF). The central aim is the development of an optimal, light, active force that is tailored for expeditionary missions. While the Corps retains the capability to field powerful Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) to fulfill the CINC's warfighting plans, it has shaped and enhanced its active FMF into a rapidly deployable and capable expeditionary force. This force is considerably more responsive to the entire range of threat scenarios while retaining the ability to respond rapidly to global war.

Through a series of special task forces and study reports, the Marine Corps has developed over 30 initiatives for implementation in the next few years. These initiatives represent a considerable enhancement to current capabilities, and will be achieved within current manpower authorizations by prioritizing missions and requirements.

Marine Corps Reserve FY 1991 end strength request is for 43,900. This represents a decrease of 100 over the FY 1990 authorization. The decrease in end strength is related to the retiring of aging equipment.

AIR FORCE

Since FY 1986, the peak of the Reagan military build-up, the Air Force has reduced its projected military end strength by over 63,000 in FY 1990 and 78,000 in FY 1991. These reductions show the Air Force in transition, with fiscal constraints forcing the Air Force to reduce manpower, both programmatically and non-programmatically. In the FY 1991 Amended President's Budget (PBA), the Air Force programmed a decrease of 15,000 military authorizations between the FY 1990 level reflected in the FY 1991 PBA and the level requested for FY 1991. Major reductions are accounted for in base closure initiatives, the Air Force Logistics Command and Air Force Systems Command restructure, deactivation of B-52 aircraft at Anderson AFB, the elimination of the Ground Launched Cruise Missile units resulting from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty, and extension of the impact of the FY 1990 sequester on military end strength. These changes bring the Air Force military authorization level to its lowest in 40 years.

The resulting military end strengths programmed for FY 1990 are 545,000 and 530,000 in FY 1991.

B. Civilian Manpower

The Defense Department anticipates additional civilian manpower reductions as a result of implementation of the recommendations of the Secretary's Defense Management Report (DMR). These reductions will be additive to the adjustments already identified in this report. Since these DMR recommendations have not yet been implemented, it is not yet possible to quantify the specific resulting military and civilian manpower reductions. In order to prepare the civilian workforce for additional reductions and to avoid potential reductions-in-force and furloughs, the Defense Department has frozen hiring for its civilian workforce for the remainder of FY 1990. This hiring freeze should allow the Department to reach a reduced level which will facilitate a match up of funded workload levels and mission requirements with a smaller civilian workforce.

C. Total Force Productivity

The Department employs a wide variety of tools and techniques to improve productivity. Productivity improvements apply to both the military and civilian work force, and are reflected in the Department's programmed manpower structure. The focus of our efforts is on raising awareness, recognizing successes, and developing and refining those tools used to enhance individual and organizational performance.

Total Quality Management (TQM) is evolving as the primary strategy to achieve continuous improvements in productivity and quality. This approach requires top management leadership, a focus on the customer, and the involvement of all employees. Statistical process control is one of the tools used to identify the processes that require management attention and to involve each employee in achieving continuous quality improvement. Application of TQM to DoD operations has been successful.

The efficiency review process is directed to continue our improvement of work processes and procedures and serves as a method to better define resource requirements.

Productivity Gain Sharing is a process that rewards employees monetarily (or with administrative leave) for exceeding preestablished quality and productivity standards. Normally, 50 percent of the savings are shared with eligible employees and 50 percent are retained by the activity.

Investments in productivity enhancing tools and equipment continue to improve the requirements process through capital-labor substitution. OSD-sponsored productivity investments of \$204 million are planned for FY 1991 with an expected return of \$36 for each \$1 invested.

D. Improved Oversight Process

In the FY 1989 Defense Officer Requirements Report the Department of Defense committed itself to improving oversight of manpower management. That commitment is being met. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management & Personnel) analyzed programmed manpower changes during development of the FY 1990/91 Budget and the FY 1990-94 Five Year Defense Program. This Report provides the foundation for more detailed analysis and oversight of the Department's manpower. The information compiled in this report becomes the basis for analysis which improves our insight into manpower demand and the linkage of manpower budgets, billet-level manpower distribution plans, and personnel inventories. These ongoing oversight efforts will identify potential problems, audit compliance with Congressional directives, and allow aggressive managerial involvement to improve stewardship of the Department's manpower resources.

E. Overseas Troop Strength.

The Department of Defense has complied with the congressionally mandated European troop strength ceiling (326,414) in FY 1989. Further, the Department intends to stay beneath the ceiling for FY 1990 and FY 1991. However, the ceiling has outlived its usefulness and will, in fact, be a detriment as the US implements the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty and conduct the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) negotiations. While the Department has no intention of significantly increasing forces (if for no other reason than fiscal constraints), there is a need for flexibility during the transition years to make appropriate force structure changes.

In addition to the European Theater ceiling, Congress has now established a strength cap for Northeast Asia. Like the strength cap in Europe, the regional Unified Commander (CINCPAC) will administer the mix of Service personnel within the legal limit. The new statutory stricture further constrains the Department's flexibility to make appropriate force structure changes and respond to changing conditions in the region.

IV. MOBILIZATION MANPOWER

A. Requirements Determination.

The Department of Defense uses an analytic framework to estimate its wartime military and civilian requirements. The Wartime Manpower Planning System (WARMAPS) compiles all the manpower estimates (demand, supply, and shortfalls) by Service, by theater, and by manpower category (officer and enlisted skill groups) over the time frame of the scenario.

The wartime force structure is designed to support our national strategy for mobilizing and prosecuting a war. The size and structure of our forces are developed in a sequential process. The components included in our calculations are:

- o over 2 million military members of the Active force
- o almost 1.2 million military members of the Selected Reserve
- o almost 500 thousand individual members of the Ready Reserve
- o more than 700 thousand military retirees under age 60 and about 600,000 between 60 and 70 years of age
- o about 1.1 million U.S. civilian members of the DoD peacetime work force
- o more than 100 thousand foreign nationals in the work force
- o about 17 million potential draftees

B. Military Manpower Demand.

Trained military manpower demand is the sum of manpower to field the force and the cumulative casualty replacements to sustain the force. Peak demand occurs when the size and configuration of the force has stabilized and when cumulative replacement demand is at its highest point. This may occur at different times in different Services. Military manpower demand peaks for the Coast Guard at M+180, the Air Force at M+90, the Marine Corps at M+120, the Army at M+180, and the Navy at M+180. The peak demand for trained military manpower is shown below.

Wartime Trained Military Manpower: Peak Demand
(Strength in Thousand)

	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Army	2,051	2,036
Navy	1,066	947
Air Force	858	870
Marine Corps	400	421
Coast Guard	66	66

C. Civilian Manpower Demand.

The civilian manpower demand surges immediately upon mobilization when: active units are being fielded and deployed; reserve units are being mobilized, filled, trained, and deployed; and early logistical demands are straining our resources. We need to increase our US direct hire civilian workforce by about 320 thousand, most within the first 30 days after mobilization.

Wartime U.S. Civilian Manpower (Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Wartime Demand</u>	<u>New Hires Required</u>
Army	404	281
Navy	351	87
Air Force	212	57
Marine Corps	24	7
Defense Agencies	94	21

D. Military Manpower Supply

By about M+60, existing active and mobilized reserve forces are brought to required wartime strength by the mobilization of individual reservists and military retirees. By about M+120 a significant number of trained replacements become available to units. Thus, the peak shortfall of trained military manpower usually occurs by M+60: when all available pretrained individual reserves and retirees have been mobilized; when no significant training output has occurred; and, while casualty replacement requirements are increasing.

DoD is moving to overcome the military manpower shortfalls with several initiatives:

- o We are increasing the size of the Individual Ready Reserve.
- o We are obtaining the medical resources necessary to: provide better medical treatment in the field; ensure prompt evacuation of casualties to medical facilities in the U.S.; and to enable their rapid return to duty.
- o We are improving the management of pretrained military manpower resources (retirees, IRR): however, funding constraints limit our ability to conduct annual reporting, screening, and address updates; peacetime refresher training; and peacetime preassignment.
- o We are improving our planned use of pretrained manpower to meet skill shortfalls.
- o We are looking into ways to identify inductees with critical skills who would require only minimum military training.

E. Civilian Manpower Supply

Our estimated civilian workforce supply reflects the loss of civilian employees recalled to military duties and the utilization of peacetime employees to fill wartime requirements.

DoD is moving to overcome potential civilian manpower shortfalls with several initiatives:

- o A clear definitions of demand for additional wartime civilian manpower by specific occupations, grades and locations.
- o Planning to redistribute available civilian personnel assets from one location to another and from one position to another.
- o Planning to convert part-time personnel to full-time status.
- o Planning to rehire retired civilian personnel who volunteer.
- o Planning to secure additional personnel using multiple employment sources.
- o Considering the recall of military retirees to fill civilian positions.
- o Expanding the planning processes to identify foreign national civilian manpower requirements and supplies.
- o Considering the use of contracts/contractors as an alternative way to meet some of our wartime civilian manpower requirements.

F. Manpower Sustainability. Military manpower availability and sustainability have been greatly enhanced and actually exceed the estimated sustainability for munitions and spare parts.

V. MANPOWER PROGRAM SUMMARY.

The following tables summarize the FY 89-91 Defense manpower programs and compare them to the FY 1988 programs. The presentation is by DPPC category.

TABLE II-2
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>BUDGET</u>		
	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
<u>FY 1989</u>			
<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES</u>			
<u>STRATEGIC</u>	94.1	89.7	89
Offensive Strategic Forces	75.5	72.2	71.5
Defensive Strategic Forces	3.9	3.3	3.3
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	14.6	14.2	14.2
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>	1027.9	1042.5	1026.4
Land Forces	583.6	577.0	565.3
Tactical Air Forces	203.3	203.6	202.3
Naval Forces	213.7	225.9	222.7
Mobility Forces	36.1	35.2	35.5
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>	66.9	68.9	67.4
Intelligence	35.7	37.2	37.2
Centrally Managed Comms	31.2	31.7	30.2
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	170.9	164.3	158.3
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	50.2	49.6	47.9
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	98.7	100.8	102.0
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>	23.6	24.2	24.6
Int'l Military Org	8.1	8.8	8.8
Unified Commands	5.4	5.1	5.0
Federal Agency Support	3.0	3.1	3.1
Joint Staff	1.2	1.1	1.1
OSD/Defense Agencies/Activities	5.9	6.1	6.6
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	20.4	20.3	19.8
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>	26.5	26.8	26.2
Combat Commands	13.2	13.4	13.3
Support Commands	13.2	13.4	12.9
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>	27.0	27.6	26.8
Research and Development	17.0	18.3	17.9
Geophysical Activities	9.3	9.3	8.9
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>	128.5	128.2	125.8
Personnel Support	32.4	32.9	32.4
Individual Training	96.1	95.3	93.4

TABLE II-2 (Continued)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER
 (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	113.1	107.8	105.1
Support Installations	76.6	70.8	69.0
Centralized Support Act'y	36.5	37.0	36.1
PROGRAMMED MANNING	1857.0	1850.7	1819.3
UNDISTRIBUTED	0.0	-20.9	-22.1
INDIVIDUALS	271.1	246.8	242.7
Transients	44.7	53.0	53.7
PPH	11	11.2	11.2
Trainees and Students	201.6	168.8	164
Cadets and Midshipman	13.8	13.8	13.8
END-STRENGTH	2130.2	2076.4	2038.8

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

TABLE II-3
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>BUDGET</u>
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES			
STRATEGIC	21.5	20.9	20.9
Offensive Strategic Forces	11.4	11.6	11.6
Defensive Strategic Forces	9.4	8.8	8.8
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	.7	0.5	0.5
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	877.7	875.9	868.5
Land Forces	666.6	654.8	650.2
Tactical Air Forces	79.5	81.5	81.2
Naval Forces	70.5	77.5	75.2
Mobility Forces	61.1	62.1	61.9
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	17.4	19.2	18.8
Intelligence	2.1	2.2	2.0
Centrally Managed Comms	15.3	17.0	16.8
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	25.7	22.5	22.2
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	1.2	0.7	0.7
MEDICAL SUPPORT	36.2	35.0	35.9
JOINT ACTIVITIES	1.5	1.2	1.2
Int'l Military Org	0.2	0.2	0.2
Unified Commands	0.6	0.5	0.5
Federal Agency Support	0.7	0.5	0.5
Joint Staff	0	0	0
OSD and Defense Agencies/ Activities	0	0	0
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	8.2	7.4	7.3
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	5.1	4.5	4.3
Combat Commands	2.4	2.0	1.9
Support Commands	2.7	2.5	2.4
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	1.6	1.9	1.8
Research and Development	0.6	0.7	0.6
Geophysical Activities	1.0	1.2	1.2
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	67.6	70.5	69.3
Personnel Support	3.9	3.1	3.1
Individual Training	63.7	67.4	66.2

TABLE II-3 (Continued)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER
 (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	60.5	58.0	57.5
Support Installations	35.3	35.0	34.7
Centralized Support Act'y	25.2	23.0	22.8
TOTAL UNIT STRENGTH	1124.2	1117.1	1108.4
INDIVIDUALS	(38.4)	(38.2)	(41.4)
INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION	29.2	29.7	29.6
AUGMENTEES			
END-STRENGTH	1170.6	1155.1	1151.6

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

TABLE II-4
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CIVILIAN MANPOWER
 (Direct and Indirect End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES</u>			
<u>STRATEGIC</u>	13.5	13.9	14.0
Offensive Strategic Forces	7.8	8.2	8.4
Defensive Strategic Forces	3.6	3.8	3.8
Strategic Control Forces	2.1	1.9	1.8
Surveillance Force			
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>	56.7	64.7	66.5
Land Forces	16.8	23.5	25.3
Tactical Air Forces	16.1	15.6	13.7
Naval Forces	1.4	2.9	3.0
Mobility Forces	22.4	22.7	22.5
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>	21.4	23.2	23.3
Intelligence	10.6	11.4	11.4
Centrally Managed Comms	10.8	11.8	11.9
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	157.4	155.1	159.2
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	7.5	7.3	7.1

TABLE II-4 (Continued)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CIVILIAN MANPOWER
(Direct and Indirect End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
MEDICAL SUPPORT	44.5	45.8	47.1	47.1
JOINT ACTIVITIES	18.2	20.3	20.6	20.6
Int'l Military Org	2.8	4.5	4.5	4.5
Unified Commands	.8	.9	.9	.9
Federal Agency Support	.1	.1	.1	.1
Joint Staff	0	0	0	0
OSD and Defense Activity	14.5	14.8	15.1	15.1
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	381.7	360.3	344.5	344.5
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	28.7	30.0	29.6	29.6
Combat Commands	6.1	6.4	6.6	6.6
Support Commands	22.6	23.6	23.0	23.0
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	77.0	78.0	78.0	78.0
Research and Development	66.6	67.4	67.5	67.5
Geophysical Activities	10.4	10.6	10.5	10.5
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	51.6	52.5	54.1	54.1
Personnel Support	27.4	28.2	29.1	29.1
Individual Training	24.2	24.3	25.0	25.0
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	259.3	247.2	248.9	248.9
Support Installations	167.9	156.2	158.9	158.9
Centralized Support Act'y	91.4	91.0	90.0	90.0
END-STRENGTH	1116.8	1100.7	1095.7	1095.7

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

CHAPTER III

ARMY MANPOWER PROGRAM

I. INTRODUCTION.

A. General.

This chapter describes the Army's manpower program for the active military, Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and civilian components as requested in the Budget Submission for FY 1990 and 1991. In this program Army manpower is reduced 68,000 billets. It outlines causes for major changes in the manpower program, discusses peacetime manpower readiness, and explains efforts to develop and maintain a highly qualified, efficient, and dedicated military and civilian work force.

B. Wartime Manpower Requirements.

In conjunction with the two year budget cycle and Program Objective Memorandum, FY 1990/1994 data was submitted in FY 1988 and FY 1992/1997 data will be submitted during the 3rd quarter of FY 1990.

1. Military Manpower.

The programmed combat force is prescribed annually in conceptual form by the Defense Planning Guidance, which establishes the planning scenario and specifies such parameters as warning time and theaters of operation. Support forces needed to sustain combat units are determined by computer-assisted analysis. This process results in a wartime force structure of about 1.60 million soldiers in FY 1991 and 1.3 million in FY 1994. Casualty replacements needed to maintain units at fighting strength are then estimated using a warfighting computer simulation. The number of personnel in trainee, transient, holdee (primarily prisoner and patient) or student status is also estimated.

This establishes a total peak demand for trained military manpower at M+180 as shown below:

Wartime Military Manpower Peak Demand (Trained Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
Peak demand	2,050.7	2,036.2

2. Civilian Manpower.

The Army's civilian work force provides overseas and U.S.-based support to sustain deployed and deployable military forces. Civilian manpower is based on the number of people needed to ready, deploy and then sustain these military forces. The majority of civilians would perform support activities such as logistics, maintenance, transportation, supply, engineering, research, medical and ancillary support and operation of installations.

With the sudden increase in workload that would occur in wartime, the Army's civilian work force must grow immediately in order to provide the support that will enable the military forces to accomplish their mission. Thus, the demand for civilian manpower peaks earlier than the demand for military manpower. The total estimated peak demand for U.S. direct hire civilian manpower is about 404,000 on M-day.

C. Strength Request.

Requested strengths for the Active and Reserve Components and the Civilian Employment Plan are shown below:

<u>Army Strength Request and Civilian Employment Plan</u>			
<u>(Strength in Thousands)</u>			
	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Active Military	769.7	744.2	727.5
Selected Reserve			
Army Reserve*	319.2	309.2	309.2
Army National Guard	457.1	447.3	447.3
Civilians**	402.9	392.0	391.9

(*Includes IMAs of 14.2K in FY 1990 and 14.0K in FY 1991).

(**Includes Civilian Technicians)

Strengths requested for active forces are based primarily on peacetime missions and budgetary constraints, and do not include the significant increase in manpower which would be needed under full mobilization.

D. Major Changes Affecting Manpower Program.

1. Overview.

a. Public Law 100-526, "Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act" was signed into law 24 October 1988. This law directed the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to close or realign bases as recommended by a Commission chartered by the SECDEF to examine the military basing structure within the U.S., its commonwealth, territories and possessions. As a result of this law the Army will close 76 installations (including 52 stand-alone housing areas) and realign missions among some 60 plus installations. Based on the work done by the field commands and HQDA, the Army will realize savings of 2269 military and 3657 civilian authorizations attributable to Base Closure initiatives. These savings come primarily from the elimination of Base Operations overhead at closing posts but are also composed of efficiencies realized in the realignment of operational commissions and organizations.

b. Force structure/manpower plans for FY 1990 - FY 1991 will maintain the Total Army's deterrent capability by continuing emphasis on combat unit readiness and training, continuing and sustaining modernization, improving the equipment posture of the Army, increasing productivity programs, and modestly expanding Special Operations Forces. These actions work toward an end state in the Mid-1990's in which active force structure and overseas presence (given the completion of appropriate international agreements) are substantially reduced. Reserve component forces are reduced

in number but upgraded in warfighting capability, with a greater emphasis placed on the contingency capabilities of a more "U.S." based forces. The Army continues to balance its active and reserve component forces and mission assignments to provide the optimum blend of wartime/crisis capability and cost effectiveness consistent with the projected threat. In addition, the Army continues planning and programming efforts to implement the cost, military and civilian end strength estimates reflected in the FY 1990 and FY 1991 President's Budget for Base Realignments and closures while still maintaining sufficient warfighting capabilities and ensuring support to the CINCs. The following tables display the strength changes by major Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC), for the active, Selected Reserve, and civilian components. (Note: Due to rounding, detail in the tables may not add to the totals shown.)

Army Active Manpower Program by DPPC
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>		
	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Strategic	.5	.6	.6
Tactical/Mobility	484.6	475.7	463.8
Commun/Intel	17.3	17.7	17.1
Combat Installation	17.6	16.0	14.3
Force Spt Tng	6.3	5.4	6.1
Medical Spt	33.9	34.1	34.1
Joint Activities	8.8	9.1	9.2
Central Logistics	3.1	3.1	3.0
Svc Mgt Hdqtrs	6.4	6.2	6.1
Research/Devel	4.4	4.6	4.3
Tng/Personnel	53.3	54.8	52.7
Spt Activities	33.9	31.8	31.0
Force Structure	670.2	658.9	642.2
Deviation		-1.4	4.3
Individuals	<u>99.5</u>	<u>86.7</u>	<u>81.0</u>
TOTALS	<u>769.7</u>	<u>744.2</u>	<u>727.5</u>

U.S. Army Reserve Manpower Program by DPPC
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Strategic	.0	.0	.0
Tactical/Mobility	211.9	210.2	206.2
Communications/Intell	.6	.6	.5
Combat Installations			
Force Support Tng			
Medical Support	10.9	9.2	9.1
Joint Activities	.7	.4	.4
Central Logistics			
Service Mgt Hqtrs	.8	.8	.8
Research & Dev			

Tng & Personnel	56.4	57.7	56.5
Spt Activities	23.4	22.2	21.8
Undistributed Manning			
Individuals	(34.5)	(22.9)	(25.7)
Indiv Mob Aug	14.7	14.2	14.0
TOTALS	319.2	309.2	309.2

Army National Guard Manpower Program by DPPC
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Tactical/Mobility	425.5	415.6	415.5
Medical Support	0.2	0.3	0.4
Support Activities	25.1	25.1	25.1
Central Supt Act	1.4	1.3	1.4
Spt Installations	23.7	23.8	23.7
Trng & Personnel	6.2	6.2	6.4
Undistributed Manning	0.0	0.0	0.0
Individuals (Trainees)	35.1	35.1	38.1
TOTALS	457.0	447.3	447.3

Army Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)
Manpower Program by DPPC
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Strategic	0.2	0.2	0.2
Tactical/Mobility	18.8	25.8	27.6
Commun/Intel	5.0	5.5	5.5
Combat Installation	76.3	74.1	74.7
Force Spt Tng	3.9	3.7	3.6
Medical Spt	26.6	26.9	27.6
Joint Activities	1.7	3.2	3.2
Central Logistics	84.8	72.2	68.2
Svc Mgtr Hqtrs	11.8	12.6	12.4
Research/Devel	20.3	21.9	21.4
Tng/Personnel	21.6	21.3	21.9
Spt Activities	131.9	124.6	125.6
TOTALS	402.9	392.0	391.9

* Numbers may not add due to rounding.

2. The FY 1991 Program.

FY 1991 program adjustments will eliminate two divisions and downsize a brigade to accommodate reductions in the threat and the resource constraints. The Reserve Component will continue modernization. Heavy divisions (armored and mechanized infantry) will continue conversions to a streamlined Army of Excellence (AOE) design as they field modern, more effective equipment. Modernization and structural changes coupled with fewer combat divisions will enhance the capability of the remaining force. Light divisions continue transition to objective designs. The resulting force structure will be smaller, better-manned and better-equipped.

As a result of budget constraints, the Army will reduce NCO authorizations plus individuals (API) from 285,424 to 273,716 by the end of FY91. As a result, NCO manning will be 276,000 in FY90 and 268,000 in FY91. Eliminating the shortfall of 7,200 and 5,700 NCO in FY90-91, respectively, would increase the number of units reporting a personnel readiness rating at or above ALO by 3.5% in FY90 and 2.0% in FY91.

Officer reductions for FY 1989 were accomplished and will be accomplished in FY 1990 through lower accessions, the force out of officers passed over for promotion, the early retirement of some senior officers, and the selected retention of junior officers with less than five years of service. Reductions for FY 1991 and beyond will, to the maximum extent possible, be achieved by voluntary means. However, the reductions will require the use of involuntary separations if the force is to be reduced in a balanced manner. Legislation has been proposed to Congress which will provide the increased management flexibility to shape the force. Proposed legislation is discussed further in paragraph IE(3).

The Reserve Components (RC) program continues to provide significant and increasing contribution to the Total Army in spite of planned reductions. The primary thrust is toward improving the readiness of existing RC units. In addition, modernization efforts continue in both the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR).

The FY 1990 and FY 1991 program reflects civilian strength adjustments associated with approved funding levels and force structure actions. FY 1989 actual civilian employment level of 402.9 thousand was consistent with the planned level of 402.1 thousand. The FY 1990 and FY 1991 program is projected to be about 392 thousand and reflects a reduction of 12 thousand from the FY 1990/1991 Budget Revision.

3. Active Component.

In FY 1991 active force structure changes will continue in the Continental United States (CONUS), Europe, and the Pacific regions.

a. North America

(1) The 6th Infantry Division (L) in Alaska, activated in FY 1986, did not complete its activation during FY 1989 as programmed previously. Due to current fiscal constraints the Army deferred the activation of few infantry battalions than had been planned originally.

(2) Within FORSCOM one division will inactivate, one division will inactivate/downsize to a brigade and one brigade will restructure/downsize to a task force. These reductions will be accompanied by appropriated reductions in affected installation's BASOPS all within CONUS, two field artillery battalions will inactivate at separate locations. Further TRADOC, CIDC, MTMC, HSC and others commands also will eliminate several regional headquarters merge organizations/function and other installation function to meet mandated reductions.

(3) Increased readiness and modernization of Special Operation Forces (SOF) units remains a high priority. Special Operations

Forces enhancements continue with the activation of a fifth Active Component special forces group beginning in FY 1990; improvements in ARSOF Command and Control; upgrade of intelligence support and sustainment; and enhancement of aviation and communications elements.

b. Europe

USAREUR continue to refine its force structure to resemble the modernized configurations inherent in the Army of Excellence (AOE) design. Major force structure initiatives in FY 1990 include activation of 2 corps AH-64 attack helicopter battalions (VII corps and V corps). Conversions in FY 1990 include engineer battalions (Heavy Division), field artillery battalions, infantry battalions (mechanized), signal battalion (DIV MSE), armor battalions (TANK), MI battalions (CEWI), combat support battalions (forward support), combat support battalions (maintenance support), and a special forces battalion (Airborne). The force structure changes will be accomplished within the reduced end strength constraints prescribed for military personnel in European NATO countries. Host Nation Support will continue to be a vital ingredient for wartime tactical support of Army Forces in Europe.

c. Pacific

In Korea, the 2d Infantry Division will convert the division support command to the modernized Army of Excellence (AOE) design in FY 1990, convert two infantry battalions to air assault configuration in FY 1990 and FY 1991, and inactivate one infantry battalion in FY 1990. The 8 inch/MLRS composite battalion will transfer to Echelons Above Division in FY 1991, and convert to two separate battalions. The two tank battalions will be modernized with ABRAMS tanks. In Hawaii, the 25th Infantry Division remains configured in the light infantry design.

4. Reserve Component.

a. Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC) Mix.

The Army is reducing force structure and end strength in response to changes in the global security environment and reduced resourcing levels. The revised Active Duty end strength for FY90 and FY91 is 744,169 and 727,500 respectively. This represents a 6% reduction from the FY89 authorization level. During the same period Reserve Component end strength is being reduced by 9,500 in the Army Reserve and 10,000 in the National Guard.

The number of force structure changes are proposed based on the following considerations: maintaining a forward deployed force presence; maintaining the capability to deploy contingency forces; maintaining the capability to reinforce forward deployed forces; maintaining an appropriate force mix; Active Army, Reserve Component, and heavy/light or special design. The active force reductions include the inactivation of a CONUS based heavy division and the conversion of the Army's only motorized division, which is also CONUS based, to a motorized

brigade. Included in the reserve component reductions are the inactivation of two brigades and selected combat support and combat service support units.

As the Army manages these reductions there are several key imperatives that will be vigorously pursued: high unit readiness and quality force standards will be maintained; development of competent, confident leaders will be ensured; tough, realistic training and high quality of life for soldiers and families will be resourced; solid doctrine will continue to be developed; and force modernization will continue on schedule.

The end state will be a smaller Total Army that, with quality people and facilities, is modernized and ready to meet all types of threats. It will be versatile, deployable and lethal, with capabilities to support National security objectives, execute the National Military Strategy, provide a full range of military options and support domestic civil authorities.

b. Directed Training Associations (DTA). To improve readiness and warfight capabilities, the majority of RC units (at a minimum, all Battalion size and above) have a DTA with an AC unit. The DTA fall in one of the 3 subcategories (levels) defined below:

(1) Roundout - These units are given the same Troop Program Sequence Number (TPSN) and priority for resources as their AC sponsor unit. These units are organized to complete an under-structured AC unit. In a roundout relationship the two units merge their identities into one entity. This category is therefore considered the strongest DTA.

(2) Affiliation - This is dedicated training assistance relationship between an AC sponsor and a selected RC unit based on specific unit training needs. High priority RC units are candidates for affiliation.

(3) Partnership - This is an alignment of major combat and Special Forces RC units with similar AC units for the purpose of improving training readiness of the RC units. Included in this category are the Army National Guard (ARNG) attack helicopter units and their DTAs with partnership (counterpart) divisional aviation units. This is strictly a training relationship; the AC unit and the RC unit remain two distinct units.

c. U.S. Army Reserve (USAR).

Budget and Program reductions affecting FY90-91 require force structure reductions. The plan to accomplish these reductions is based on an evolving threat and a responsive strategy to meet that threat. The Army will be balanced, versatile, lethal- a smaller, more ready force than today. The USAR will have enhanced its readiness and capabilities during this time of drawdown by eliminating combat support and combat service support organizations that are no longer required because the units in the AC have been inactivated. Modernization to AOE designs continues but at a somewhat reduced pace based on reduced funding.

d. Army National Guard (ARNG).

(1) ARNG units continue conversion to Army of Excellence design as the total Army standardizes its organizational structure and equipment. Within this context, ARNG will reduce force structure by eliminating two divisional brigades and support structure to reflect the impact of resource reductions and changes in the international environment. These inactivations will permit realignment of unit personnel, full-time support cadre and equipment to improve wartime capability.

5. Civilian Component.

The projected civilian strength levels for FY 1990 of 392 thousand and 391.9 thousand for FY 1991 reflect reductions of approximately 12 thousand from the FY 1990 Amended Budget Submission. These reduced program levels are consistent with the significantly reduced funding and force structure levels. The Army's goal continues to be to maintain optimum civilian force levels to achieve maximum efficiency and effectiveness. However, the civilian workforce has been declining since FY 1988 as a result of funding reductions and directed force structure reductions. These significant reductions offset any flexibility gained by the elimination of end strength ceilings. Hiring freezes, reductions in temporary employees, and reductions in force have caused skill and location imbalances and disrupted functions currently being performed by military.

E. Key Manpower Issues.

FY 1991 Army manpower initiatives seek to improve the quality and stability of the Army's force.

1. Quality:

The quality of manpower has significantly improved in recent years and has resulted in better training, higher quality reenlistments, and improved readiness. The success of modernization programs will depend heavily on maintaining this quality as national economic conditions create an environment less favorable to recruiting and retaining soldiers. Enlistment bonuses, Education Incentives, Selective Reenlistment Bonuses, special incentives, competitive compensation, and family quality of life programs will need continued Congressional support as the Army seeks to recruit and retain quality soldiers with the required skills.

2. Stability:

FY 1990 and 1991 will witness significant force reductions and present the personnel community with a unique challenge. To meet the challenge will require maintenance of strong leader development programs for both officers and NCO, constant focus on personnel readiness, and innovative approaches to minimize the turbulence which will occur at both the installation and agency level. During the turbulence of force reductions, PCS dollars are essential to maintain readiness.

3. Officer Reduction Management:

a. The Army is taking all reduction measures available under current statutes. Despite these actions, problems remain and will worsen as reductions continue in FY91 and beyond. Increased management flexibility, as outlined in a legislative proposal submitted to the Congress is required. Only thus, can the Army implement reductions in a balanced manner that properly shapes the force and ensures readiness.

b. Summarized below is the proposed legislation that would grant the Secretary of the Army temporary personnel management authority as the Army reduces the size of the force and returns to a steady state.

(1) Selective Early Retirement. SecArmy could expand the pool of senior officers eligible for Selective Early Retirement Boards (SERBs) by including colonels with at least two years-in-grade and lieutenant colonels passed over once. Limited to 30 percent of those considered.

SecArmy could also select regular officers in the grade of lieutenant colonel and below for retirement at their earliest retirement eligibility date (normally 20 years of service). Officers who are on a list recommended for promotion would be excluded. Limited to 30 percent of those considered.

Under current law, officers who are considered by SERBs may not be considered for another five years. This provision would be waived.

(2) Voluntary Retirement Waiver. Under current law, in addition to 20 years of active service, officers must have three years-in-grade and at least 10 years active commissioned service to voluntarily retire in their current grade. To encourage voluntary retirements, SecArmy could lower these requirements to two and eight years, respectively.

(3) Temporary Army Reduction-in-Force Authority. The SecArmy could involuntarily discharge Regular Army officers in grades below lieutenant colonel.

(4) Separation Pay For Officers. SecArmy could identify cohort groups of regular officers with 5-20 years of service for reduction (by grade, competitive category, year group, specialty, and/or other identifying factors, along with any other constraints). Eligible officers who volunteered to resign, subject to secretarial approval, would be authorized separation pay.

(5) Continuation Curtailment. SecArmy could curtail the period of continued service of any officer previously continued on active duty.

II. SIGNIFICANT PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS.

A. Active Component Military Manpower.

1. General.

The active Army entered FY 1989 with an authorized strength of 771,800 and finished with an actual end strength of 769,741. Active Army military end strength is programmed for 744,169 in FY 1990, (down from 764,400) and 727,500 in FY 1991 (down from 763,700).

2. Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning, and Operating Strength.

Table III-I shows that planned force structure manning decreases by nearly 28,000 between FY 1989 and FY 1991.

Table III-I shows that in FY 1990 the Army plans to man 658,900 of the total 730,800 programmed manpower structure, leaving nearly 71,900 spaces unmanned. In FY 1991 the Army plans to man 642,200 of the total 734,500 programmed manpower structure, leaving 92,300 spaces unmanned. Even with these unmanned requirements in FY 1990-1991, the Army has maintained its tactical and mobility forces at 90 percent of its total force structure requirement.

Section III of this chapter explains in detail Tables III-1, III-1A, and III-1B.

TABLE III-1
ACTIVE ARMY PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

TOTAL AC MILITARY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 89		FY 90		FY 91	
	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	RQMT	AUTH
				% MNG		% MNG
<u>STRATEGIC</u>						
Offensive Strategic Forces	.6	0.5	0.6	100.0	0.7	85.7
Defensive Strategic Forces	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	
	.6	.5	0.6	100.0	0.7	85.7
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>						
Land Forces	489.5	484.6	505.4	94.1	503.2	92.2
Division Forces	489.2	484.3	505.0	94.1	502.7	92.2
Theater Forces	427.7	421.8	438.4	93.2	435.4	91.4
Mobility Forces	61.5	62.5	67.2	99.3	67.3	97.2
	0.3	0.3	0.4	75.0	0.5	60.0
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>						
Intelligence	18.7	17.3	20.2	87.6	21.6	79.2
Centrally Managed Comm	9.9	9.5	10.7	93.5	12.0	83.3
	8.8	7.8	9.5	81.1	9.6	74.0
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	17.2	17.6	18.6	86.0	19.7	73.0
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	5.2	6.3	5.6	96.4	6.7	91.0
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	33.6	33.9	46.8	72.9	46.8	72.9
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>						
Int'l Military Org	10.3	8.8	11.0	82.7	11.9	77.3
Unified Commands	4.3	3.7	4.6	93.4	4.6	93.5
Federal Agency Support	1.1	1.3	1.1	100.0	1.2	91.7
Joint Staff	0.2	.2	0.2	100.0	0.2	100.0
OSD/Def Agcy/Acty	0.3	0.4	0.3	100.0	0.4	75.0
	3.0	3.2	4.4	70.4	5.5	60.0
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>						
Supply Operations	3.3	3.1	3.7	83.8	3.8	78.9
Maintenance Operations	.9	.8	1.0	70.0	1.1	54.5
Logistics Support Operations	1.2	1.1	1.3	76.9	1.2	83.3
	1.3	1.3	1.5	93.3	1.6	87.5

III-11

	FY 89		FY 90		FY 91	
	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	RQMT	AUTH
TOTAL AC MILITARY						
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES						
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS						
Combat Commands	6.2	6.4	7.3	6.2	7.2	6.1
Support Commands	2.0	2.1	2.3	2.0	2.2	2.0
	4.2	4.3	5.0	4.2	5.0	4.1
R&D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES						
Research and Development	4.4	4.4	5.6	4.6	6.3	4.3
Geophysical Activities	4.4	4.4	5.6	4.6	6.3	4.3
	0.0	0.0		0.0		0.0
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL						
Personnel Support	53.5	53.3	65.8	54.8	64.7	52.7
Individual Training	12.7	12.6	17.4	13.2	16.7	12.8
	40.7	40.7	48.4	41.6	48.0	39.8
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES						
Support Installations	31.9	33.9	40.2	31.8	41.9	31.0
Centralized Support Act'y	15.0	16.3	20.0	13.0	20.0	13.1
	16.8	17.6	20.2	18.7	21.9	17.9
TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING	672.9	670.2	730.8	658.9	734.5	642.2
Undistributed Manning				-1.4		4.3
INDIVIDUALS						
Transients		99.5		86.7		81.0
Holdees		16.4		15.1		14.6
Trainees/Students		5.9		5.1		5.1
Cadets		72.7		62.0		56.7
		4.5		4.6		4.6
TOTAL END STRENGTH		769.7		744.2		727.5

Notes: Numbers may not add due to rounding.

The total requirements and requirements by DPPC are subject to change as individual unit decisions are determined.

TABLE III-1A
ACTIVE ARMY PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

AC OFFICERS DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 89			FY 90			FY 91		
	AUTH	INV	%	RQMT	AUTH	%	RQMT	AUTH	%
			MNG			MNG			MNG
<u>STRATEGIC</u>	0.1	0.1	100.0	0.1	0.1	100.0	0.2	0.2	100.0
Offensive Strategic Forces	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	
Defensive Strategic Forces	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	0.1	0.1	100.0	0.1	0.1	100.0	0.2	0.2	100.0
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>	46.8	45.5	88.0	51.5	45.3	88.0	51.7	44.5	86.0
Land Forces	46.7	45.5	88.1	51.2	45.1	88.1	51.5	44.4	86.2
Division Forces	40.2	39.5	88.5	43.3	38.3	88.5	43.4	37.6	86.6
Theater Forces	6.5	6.0	86.1	7.9	6.8	86.1	8.1	6.8	83.9
Mobility Forces	.1	0.1	50.0	0.2	.1	50.0	0.2	0.1	50.0
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>	2.0	2.6	83.3	3.6	3.0	83.3	3.6	2.9	80.5
Intelligence	2.1	1.8	84.0	2.5	2.1	84.0	2.5	2.1	84.0
Centrally Managed Comm	1.0	.9	72.7	1.1	0.8	72.7	1.1	.8	72.7
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	1.8	2.0	85.0	2.0	1.7	85.0	2.0	1.4	70.0
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	1.0	1.1	85.7	1.4	1.2	85.7	1.5	1.2	80.0
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	12.0	11.8	83.4	14.5	12.1	83.4	14.5	12.1	83.4
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>	4.5	3.7	75.5	4.9	3.7	75.5	5.4	3.7	68.5
Int'l Military Org	.6	1.1	87.5	1.2	1.2	87.5	1.2	1.2	100.0
Unified Commands	.7	70.8	87.5	0.8	0.7	87.5	0.8	0.7	87.5
Federal Agency Support	.2	0.1	100.0	0.2	0.2	100.0	0.2	0.2	100.0
Joint Staff	.2	0.3	75.0	0.4	0.3	75.0	0.3	0.3	100.0
OSD/Def Agcy/Acty	2.8	1.4	60.8	2.3	1.4	60.8	3.0	1.4	46.6
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	1.6	1.4	83.3	1.8	1.5	83.3	2.0	1.4	70.0
Supply Operations	.4	0.4	60.0	0.5	.3	60.0	0.6	.3	50.0
Maintenance Operations	.5	0.4	75.0	0.4	0.3	75.0	0.4	0.3	75.0
Logistics Support Operations	.8	0.7	90.0	1.0	.9	90.0	1.0	0.8	80.0

AC OFFICERS DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 89			FY 90			FY 91		
	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	RQMT	% MNG	AUTH	RQMT	% MNG
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>									
Combat Commands	4.4	4.3	5.4	4.4	5.4	81.4	4.3	5.4	81.1
Support Commands	1.3	1.3	1.6	1.3	1.6	81.2	1.3	1.6	81.2
	3.1	3.1	3.8	3.1	3.8	81.5	3.0	3.8	78.9
<u>R&D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES</u>									
Research and Development	1.4	1.4	1.9	1.6	1.9	84.2	1.5	1.7	88.2
Geophysical Activities	1.4	0.0	1.9	1.6	1.9	84.2	1.5	1.7	88.2
				0.0			0.0		
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>									
Personnel Support	10.0	9.8	12.6	10.4	12.6	82.5	10.0	12.7	78.7
Individual Training	1.1	1.0	1.4	1.2	1.4	85.7	1.1	1.4	78.5
	8.9	8.8	11.2	9.2	11.3	82.1	8.8	11.3	77.8
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>									
Support Installations	8.6	9.2	9.6	8.4	9.6	87.5	8.3	9.6	86.4
Centralized Support Act'y	1.5	1.6	1.9	1.4	1.9	73.6	1.3	1.9	68.4
	7.0	7.6	7.7	7.1	7.7	92.2	7.0	7.7	90.9
<u>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</u>	<u>94.3</u>	<u>91.8</u>	<u>109.3</u>	<u>93.3</u>	<u>110.2</u>	<u>85.3</u>	<u>91.6</u>	<u>110.2</u>	<u>83.1</u>
Undistributed Manning				-3.3			-2.4		
<u>INDIVIDUALS</u>									
Transients	15.1	15.1	14.3	14.3	14.3		13.3	13.3	
Holdees	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.9		1.8	1.8	
Trainees/Students	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5		0.6	0.6	
	12.6	12.6	11.9	11.9	11.9		11.1	11.1	
<u>TOTAL END STRENGTH</u>	<u>106.9</u>	<u>106.9</u>	<u>104.3</u>	<u>104.3</u>	<u>104.3</u>		<u>102.6</u>	<u>102.6</u>	

Notes: Numbers may not add due to rounding.
The total requirements and requirements by DPPC are subject to change as individual unit decisions are determined

TABLE III-1B
ACTIVE ARMY PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

AC ENLISTED	ACTUALS				FY 90	FY 91			
	FY 89	INV	RQMT	AUTH			% MNG	RQMT	AUTH
<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES</u>									
<u>STRATEGIC</u>									
Offensive Strategic Forces	.4	.4	0.5	.4	80.0	0.6	.5	83.3	
Defensive Strategic Forces		0.0		0.0			0.0		
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	.4	.4	0.5	0.4	80.0	0.6	0.5	83.3	
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>									
Land Forces	442.7	439.2	453.9	430.4	94.8	451.5	419.3	92.8	
Division Forces	442.5	438.8	453.6	430.3	94.8	451.5	419.1	92.8	
Theater Forces	387.5	382.3	393.6	370.4	94.1	392.0	360.5	91.9	
Mobility Forces	55.0	56.5	60.0	59.9	99.8	59.2	58.6	98.9	
	.1	0.2	0.3	0.2	66.6	0.3	.2	66.6	
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>									
Intelligence	15.7	14.7	16.6	14.7	88.5	18.0	14.2	78.8	
Centrally Managed Comm	7.8	7.7	8.2	7.9	96.3	9.5	7.9	83.1	
	7.8	6.9	8.4	6.9	82.1	8.5	6.3	74.1	
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	15.4	15.6	16.6	14.3	86.1	17.7	12.9	72.8	
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	4.2	5.2	4.2	4.2	100.0	5.3	4.8	90.5	
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	21.6	22.1	32.3	22.0	68.1	32.3	22.0	68.1	
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>									
Int'l Military Org	5.4	5.1	6.1	5.4	88.5	6.5	5.5	84.6	
Unified Commands	3.2	2.6	3.4	3.1	91.1	3.4	3.1	91.1	
Federal Agency Support	.4	.5	0.4	.4	100.0	0.4	.4	100.0	
Joint Staff	.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100.0	0.1	0.1	100.0	
OSD/Def Agcy/Acty	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100.0	0.1	0.1	100.0	
	1.7	1.8	2.1	1.7	80.9	2.5	1.9	76.0	

AC ENLISTED	ACTUALS			FY 90			FY 91						
	FY 89	FY 90	FY 91	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	RQMT	AUTH	INV	RQMT	% MNG	% MNG
<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES</u>													
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>													
Supply Operations	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.9	1.6	1.9	1.6	1.7	1.9	84.2	84.2
Maintenance Operations	0.5	0.4	0.5	.4	0.7	0.5	.4	0.5	.3	0.7	0.5	80.0	60.0
Logistics Support Operations	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.7	.6	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.7	.6	0.8	87.5	87.5
	0.5	.6	0.5	.6		0.5	0.5	0.8	.6		0.8	100.0	100.0
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>													
Combat Commands	1.8	2.1	1.9	2.1	2.1	1.9	1.7	1.9	1.7	1.7	1.9	89.4	89.4
Support Commands	.7	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	100.0	100.0
	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.0	1.0	1.2	83.3	83.3
<u>R&D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES</u>													
Research and Development	3.0	3.0	3.6	3.0	3.0	3.6	3.0	4.6	2.8	2.8	4.6	60.8	60.8
Geophysical Activities	3.0	3.0	3.6	3.0	0.0	3.6	3.0	4.6	2.8	0.0	4.6	60.8	60.8
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>													
Personnel Support	43.4	43.5	53.2	43.5	43.5	53.2	44.4	52.0	42.7	42.7	52.0	82.1	82.1
Individual Training	11.6	11.6	16.0	11.6	11.6	16.0	12.0	15.3	11.7	11.7	15.3	76.4	76.4
	31.8	31.9	37.2	31.9	31.9	37.2	32.4	36.7	31.0	31.0	36.7	84.4	84.4
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>													
Support Installations	23.3	24.7	30.6	24.7	24.7	30.6	23.4	32.3	22.7	22.7	32.3	70.2	70.2
Centralized Support Act'y	13.5	14.7	18.1	14.7	14.7	18.1	11.8	18.1	11.8	11.8	18.1	65.1	65.1
	9.8	10.0	12.5	10.0	10.0	12.5	11.6	14.2	10.9	10.9	14.2	76.7	76.7
<u>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</u>	578.6	578.4	621.5	578.4	578.4	621.5	565.6	624.6	550.6	550.6	624.6	88.1	88.1
Undistributed Manning			1.9			1.9		6.7		6.7			
<u>INDIVIDUALS</u>													
Transients	79.9	79.9	67.8	79.9	79.9	67.8	67.8	63.1	63.1	63.1	63.1	84.2	84.2
Holderes	14.6	14.6	13.2	14.6	14.6	13.2	13.2	12.8	12.8	12.8	12.8	87.5	87.5
Trainees/Students	5.2	5.2	4.6	5.2	5.2	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.6	100.0	100.0
	60.1	60.1	50.1	60.1	60.1	50.1	50.1	45.8	45.8	45.8	45.8	87.5	87.5
<u>TOTAL END STRENGTH</u>	659.1	658.3	621.5	658.3	658.3	621.5	635.3	624.6	620.4	620.4	624.6	88.1	88.1

Notes: Numbers may not add due to rounding.

The total requirements and requirements by DPPC are subject to change as individual unit decisions are determined

3. Skill and Grade.

The data in Table III-2 outlines the alignment of the Army by skill and grade.

a. Enlisted.

An integrated Enlisted Force Alignment Plan implemented in January 1985 continues to significantly improve the balance of the enlisted force, particularly non commissioned officer, by reducing overages and shortages. The Army has focused at the MOS and grade level to satisfy authorizations by better synchronizing and integrating the major force alignment tools: recruiting procures soldiers in the right skills at the right time; promotion motivates them to more productive service based on potential and past performance; reclassification encourages soldiers to move to understrength MOS from overstrength MOS following retraining; and, reenlistment ensures career force needs are met. To meet new challenges in structure reductions, the Army is more intensively utilizing all these force alignment tools to minimize the impact on readiness and reduce the impact on soldiers.

NCO critical imbalances (the number of personnel by skill and grade who are less than 80% or greater than 120% of Programmed Manning plus individuals), the most serious category of imbalances, have decreased by 83% since FYE84. Continuous progress has been made in aligning critical imbalances; however, critical imbalances will slightly increase as force structure cuts are implemented and MOS/Grade cells adjust to new manning levels. Due to NCO strength reductions and resulting promotion policies, moderately short imbalances (the number of personnel by skill and grade who are greater than 80% but less than 95% of Programmed Manning Plus Individual levels at MOS/Grade) have grown significantly. Since FY 1986 moderately short imbalances have increased by 247 percent. In FY90-91, due to structure turbulence, moderate short imbalances will slightly increase, then level off until FY94 when moderate short imbalances should again begin to decrease. Increasing NCO fill to 97.5% in FY90-91 and to 100% in FY92-94 will dampen moderate short imbalance increases. Structure reduction timing and lead time for execution will determine the severity of increases in imbalance of grade/MOS cells and must be closely managed to minimize readiness impacts. Imbalance problems will not be reduced until structure turbulence and full manning by grade is achieved.

TABLE III-2
Active Army Skill and Grade
Actual and Projected Inventory Programmed Manning Plus Individuals (PMI)
MOSIS ALT M880910P

	ACTUAL FY 89			PROGRAMMED FY 90			ACTUAL FY 91					
	OVER*	BAL*	SHORT*	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER*	BAL*	SHORT*	TOTAL
E1 - E4												
Number of Skills	110	98	55	263	85	144	29	258	85	138	35	258
PMI	128252	194760	48716	371728	49535	275428	30792	355755	102819	199516	38525	340860
Inventory	142593	193109	42751	378453	57463	274028	27851	359342	117947	199957	34462	352366
Over/Short	14341	-1651	-5965	6725	7928	-1400	-2941	3587	15128	441	-4063	11506
E5 - E9												
Number of Skills	60	210	56	326	46	205	75	326	44	214	67	325
PMI	14486	221959	48979	285424	14712	201461	67047	283220	18084	215644	39988	273716
Inventory	16905	218778	44185	279868	17635	197686	60679	276000	21183	211740	35080	268003
Over/Short	2419	-3182	-4794	-5556	2923	-3775	-6368	-7220	3099	-3904	-4908	-5713
Total E1 - E9												
Number of Skills	73	188	67	328	69	196	61	326	76	191	58	325
PMI	92588	474388	90176	657152	70820	478264	89891	638975	154785	376981	82810	614576
Inventory	102029	474213	82079	658321	80269	472538	82535	635342	171521	374606	74242	620369
Over/Short	9441	-175	-8097	1169	9449	-5726	-7356	-3633	16736	-2375	-8568	5793

b. Officer/Warrant Officer.

Since FY87 the Army has undergone mandated reductions in officer end-strength. Further reductions are planned through FY 1994. In an Army of reduced size, the most significant problem to contend with is the inadequate planning lead time and management tools to shape the force prudently. In a rapidly changing environment, the Army is obliged to reduce the officer corps in selected year groups. Inventory imbalances will worsen as the force continues to be reduced. This problem will be especially prevalent in the field grades.

To stay within reduced end-strengths, tighter personnel budgets, and the DOPMA field grade ceilings the Army has had to lower promotion opportunity and increase promotion timing. In the case of majors and lieutenant colonels promotion opportunity and timing are outside DOPMA objectives. Reductions planned for FY 1991 and beyond will require changes to legislation which will provide the increased management flexibility needed to prudently shape the force.

The Army will continue to closely monitor and manage grade/MOS cells in an attempt to minimize readiness impacts. However, imbalance problems will not be reduced until inventory and structure turbulence is abated.

4. Experience.

The Army will continue to retain productive, progressive soldiers, while taking a more aggressive approach to the identification and separation of non-productive and/or non-progressive soldiers. Notwithstanding these actions, experience levels will temporarily rise as the Army transitions to reduced strength levels. Experience levels will peak in FY 1994 and then begin a steady decline, ultimately returning to FY 1989 levels.

TABLE III-3
ACTIVE ARMY EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY
MOSLS ALTERNATIVE: M89011PA

	ACTUAL FY 1989		AVG		PROGRAMMED FY 1990				PROGRAMMED FY 1991			
	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVG YOS
E1-E4 PMI** Inventory	371728 378453	61246	2.41		355755 359342	65026	2.46		340860 352366	67672	2.52	
E5-E9 PMI Inventory	285424 279868	265608	11.28		283220 276000	265426	11.59		273716 268003	256592	11.80	
TOTAL E1-E9 PMI Inventory	657152 658321	326854	6.18		638975 635342	330452	6.42		614576 620369	324263	6.61	

TABLE III-3
ACTIVE ARMY EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY
MOSLS ALTERNATIVE: M945002X

	ACTUAL FY 1989			PROGRAMMED FY 1990			PROGRAMMED FY 1991		
	TOTAL PEOPLE	4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	4 YOS	AVG YOS
<u>WARRANT OFFICER</u>									
PMI	15.8			15.6			15.7		
Inventory	15.3	14.0	15.2	15.3	13.9	15.2	14.9	13.5	15.4
<u>01-03</u>									
PMI	58.5			55.8			54.3		
Inventory	59.9	32.4	5.2	57.1	30.2	5.5	56.1	28.7	5.6
<u>04-06</u>									
PMI	36.0			35.4			35.1		
Inventory	31.3	31.3	17.5	31.5	31.5	17.7	31.2	31.2	17.9
<u>TOTAL 01-06</u>									
PMI	94.5			91.2			89.3		
Inventory	91.2	63.7	9.6	88.6	61.5	9.7	87.3	59.9	9.7

5. Personnel Management.

a. Enlisted.

(1) Recruiting.

(a) Overview. The Army achieved its end strength goal and met its overall recruiting objective for FY 89. However, the quality achieved was slightly less than in the previous three years. The active Army recruited 89.9 percent high school graduates, 62.5 percent AFQT Test Category I-III A personnel, and 6.9 percent Category IV personnel. FY 88 Category I-III A content and Category IV content was 65.7% and 4.4% respectively; high school diploma graduates were 92.7 percent. Changes in Army structure and strategy continue to be based on the foundation of quality soldiers to accomplish the mission in the dynamic, highly technological world. To maintain the quality soldiers for the Army of the future and to provide the innovative noncommissioned officers for the 21st Century, the objective to attract and retain quality with competitive compensation, educational incentives, and appropriate enlistment bonuses should not be diminished.

Enlisted Accession Plan (In thousands)

<u>Category</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Prior Service	8.9	4.5	3.0
Non-Prior Service	111.7	93.6	92.5
Male	95.5	79.9	78.8
(Male I-III A)	59.7*	47.9	47.3
(HSDG)	84.3	71.1	70.0
(HSDG I-III A)	51.1	44.0	42.6
Female	16.1	13.8	13.8
(Female I-III A)	10.0	8.6	8.6
(HSDG)	16.1	13.8	13.8
(HSDG I-III A)	10.0	8.6	8.6

* Includes 2.6K non high school graduate male As.

(b) Quality. A capable, ready force is predicated on recruiting the number and quality soldiers able to handle the advanced equipment on the dynamic battlefield. The Army accession goal is to recruit 63 percent or more AFQT Test Category I-III A soldiers each year, to recruit at least 90 percent High School Diploma Graduates (HSDG), and to limit the Category IV accessions to less than or equal to 4 percent.

(2) Retention. The Army achieved all reenlistment goals in FY 1989 and continued to improve enlisted force alignment. Even though FY 1990 and 1991 will result in reductions to the enlisted force, adequate Compensation, selective Reenlistment Bonus funding, and educational incentives remain essential to the maintenance of a quality force.

Reenlistments
(In thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>		<u>FY 90</u>		<u>FY 91</u>	
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Initial Term	34.4	39.5	31.4	31.4	31.4	31.4
Mid Term	25.4	32.3	22.0	22.0	22.0	22.0
Career	28.2	30.4	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0
Total	88.0	102.2	78.4	78.4	78.4	78.4

b. Officer/Warrant Officer.

(1) Accessions.

(a) Accession Program. In FY 1989, the Army accessed 9,553 commissioned and warrant officers into the active component to maintain a budgeted end strength objective of 106,877. The revised accession goals and achievements by fiscal year are shown below:

Active Component Officer/Warrant Officer Accession Goals

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Programmed	9,440	8,054	7,703
Actual	9,553	--	--

(b) Accession Trends.

[1] The Army expects to graduate approximately 7,800 commissioned officers from ROTC in FY 1990. This will satisfy active and reserve component requirements from this accessing source.

[2] Despite increased efforts and resources directed toward physician recruiting, the Army has been able to attract only a modest number of qualified, unobligated physicians and other selected health care professionals into the active force for the past several years. To overcome these shortfalls, the Army plans to increase accessions from the Health Professional Scholarship Program (HPSP). The HPSP will allow the Army to have a more predictable and continuous flow of physicians and other health professionals into the service. The HPSP is critical to the staffing of an all-volunteer AMEDD.

[3] Recruitment of Army nurses has become especially difficult, in part because of the national nurse shortage. Several strategies to increase nurse recruitment have been or are being implemented; e.g., a nurse accession bonus, incentive pay for nurse anesthetists, more nurse recruiters, expanded ROTC scholarship marketing effort for student nurses, relaxed age restrictions for new officers, and educational guarantees for nurse specialties. To improve nurse recruitment, congressional action is needed to provide recruitment bonus programs, tuition assistance, loan repayment, and relax age restrictions for ROTC scholarships.

[4] The Army anticipates additional health professional shortages in various skill categories. Recruitment for these specialties is receiving increased emphasis to include an increased ROTC market where appropriate. However, the Army is recruiting in a labor market in which the demand for these skills is escalating. To be successful the Army must remain competitive in pay and benefits.

(2) Retention. Extraordinary "loss management" programs are required to accomplish mandated strength cuts in FY 1990 and FY 1991; legislative changes will be needed in FY 1990 to expand these programs and conduct selection boards in time to achieve both strength and dollar reductions in FY 1991. The Army's retention policy for FY 1990 and beyond is described as follows:

(a) The retention of a maximum number of new officer accessions, consistent with quality standards, will be emphasized.

(b) Retirement with immediate recall to active duty for commissioned officers in critical specialties will be considered on a case-by-case basis; special consideration will be given to officers with expertise in procurement and acquisition management and selected health care professionals. Recall of retired Regular Army (RA) warrant officers in critical military occupational specialties on a case-by-case basis will also be considered.

(c) The selective continuation program for captains twice nonselected for promotion will be continued on an extremely limited basis (restricted to officers in medical and other professional branches) in FY 1989 and beyond. Regular and Reserve Majors twice nonselected for promotion who are within six years of retirement, normally will be selected for continuation until completion of 20 years of service. Except for any extraordinary, "loss management" programs required to accomplish Congressionally mandated end strength cuts, it is anticipated that officer retention (except for selected AMEDD officers) in FY 1990 and FY 1991 will continue to be high.

(d) The difficulty in recruiting health professionals has underscored the importance of retaining AMEDD officers. The Army has been an active participant in a Tri-Service study of retention and compensation for health professionals. The Army will continue to seek Congressional action as necessary to achieve retention goals.

6. Stability

a. Aggregate Population Stability

This measure reflects the number of personnel who remain in service over the period of a year. Lower attrition, higher overall personnel quality, and greater job satisfaction have contributed to the relatively constant trend for both officer and enlisted stability from FY 1985 to FY 1989.

Aggregate Population Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Officer	92.3	91.9	91.0	91.2	91.2
Enlisted	82.5	80.8	82.0	82.9	82.9

b. Unit Personnel Stability

This measure reflects the number of personnel who remain in the same unit over the course of a year. Unit stability for officers and enlisted personnel has increased for officer enlisted personnel in FY 1985 and FY 1989 due to both an expansion of the Army's Unit Manning System and extension of tour lengths. The largest share of change points to the enlisted force sub-account as shown in Table III-IA.

Unit Personnel Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Officer	40.3	42.6	42.1	44.0	42.7
Enlisted	39.4	40.4	42.2	44.8	45.6

7. Readiness Assessment

a. During FY 1989, the Army continued to develop and sustain a strong, combat-ready force. This can be attributed to three primary factors: better force alignment, reduced NCO shortfall, and more intensive distribution management.

(1) The Enlisted Force Alignment Program, which includes the application of selective reenlistment bonuses (SRB) toward shortage MOS/grade cells, continued to realign the force by reducing critical imbalances.

(2) Through reprogramming actions, the Army was able to increase NCO manning from 274,700 to 279,900 by the end of FY 1989. This reduced the Army's NCO shortfall to 5,700 and had a positive effect on overall Army readiness.

(3) The Army leadership took a more proactive approach to the distribution of personnel at battalion and lower levels. The application of this "eye dropper" management technique resulted in more relative personnel readiness during periods of declining operating strength.

b. While the Enlisted Force Alignment Program has been successful, it is likely that MOS/grade imbalances will increase slightly during FY 1990-1991 because of force structure changes. Planned reductions of the NCO shortfall should dampen the effect of these imbalances. However,

the combination of imbalances and an overall NCO shortfall will prevent the Army from maximizing readiness in FY 1990 and 1991.

c. The impact of NCO strength on readiness cannot be overstated. In general, a one percent increase in NCO operating strength causes nearly a two percent increase in the number of units reporting readiness ratings at or above ALO. In fact, Army readiness is nearly twice as sensitive to the NCO operating strength as it is to the junior grade content. By eliminating the NCO shortfall, the number of units reporting readiness ratings at or above ALO could increase by as much as 3.5 percent in FY 1990 and 2 percent in FY 1991.

d. To maintain readiness in the face of significant force reductions in FY 1990 and 1991, the Army must also perpetuate efforts to ensure an organizational climate which attracts and retains a quality force. Educational, enlistment and reenlistment incentives are key components in this endeavor and warrant continued support.

e. The Army goal for FY 1992 through 1995 is to maintain an NCO inventory which is equal to authorizations plus individual levels (API). As Army structure is further reduced, commitment to aligning NCO inventory to demand by grade and MOS in FY 1990-1991 will move the Army closer to that goal and also have a positive impact on personnel readiness.

B. Reserve Component Military Manpower.

1. Ready Reserve:

a. Selected Reserve.

(1) US Army Reserve (USAR).

(a) General The USAR Selected Reserve grew to an end strength of 319,244 in FY 1989. This end strength includes Drill Strength of 291,192, Active Guard Reserve of 13,344 and Individual Mobilization Augmentees of 14,708. High school graduates comprised 86 percent of the non-prior service accessions in FY 1989. This achievement was a result of continued congressional support of the Selected Reserve Incentive Program and a lot of hard work by our commanders, recruiters and retention personnel.

(b) Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning and Operating Strength. The Army Reserve requirements shown in Table III-4 increases by 1,205 in FY 1990 and decreased by 3,313 in FY 1991 to a total of 312,266. The number of positions authorized for fill in this structure increases 66 in FY 1990 and decreases by 5,810 in FY 1991 (excluding Individual Mobilization Augmentees, which do not man USAR structure), to a total of 295,307. The percentage of structure which is authorized for fill remains about 95 percent through the budget years. Because Army data bases have not been updated to reflect all force structure reductions planned, the distribution by Defense Planning and Programming Categories has been estimated.

(c) Trained in Unit Strength. Trained in unit strength, shown in Table III-5, will improve in the current year.

TABLE III-4
US ARMY RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
 (Thousands)

TOTAL ARMY RESERVE MILITARY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 89			FY 90			FY 91		
	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>									
Land Forces	210.4	211.9	220.3	210.2	95.4%	218.0	206.2	94.6%	206.2
Division Forces	210.4	209.9	218.4	208.4	95.4%	216.1	204.3	94.6%	204.3
Theater Forces	191.5	193.2	200.5	191.3	95.4%	198.4	187.6	94.6%	187.6
Mobility Forces	17.1	16.7	17.9	17.1	95.4%	17.7	16.7	94.6%	16.7
	1.9	1.9	2.0	1.9	95.4%	1.9	1.8	94.6%	1.8
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>									
Intelligence	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	95.4%	0.6	0.5	94.6%	0.5
	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	95.4%	0.6	0.5	94.6%	0.5
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>									
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQS</u>									
Combat Cmts	9.3	10.9	9.7	9.2	95.4%	9.6	9.1	94.6%	9.1
Support Cmts	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	95.4%	0.8	0.8	94.6%	0.8
	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	95.4%	0.8	0.8	94.6%	0.8
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>									
Federal Agency Support	0.4	0.7	0.4	0.4	100.0%	0.4	0.4	100.0%	0.4
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>									
Personnel Support	57.7	56.4	60.4	57.7	95.4%	59.8	56.5	94.6%	56.5
Individual Training	0.0	2.3	0.0	0.0					
	57.7	54.1	60.4	57.7	95.4%	59.8	56.5	94.6%	56.5
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>									
Support Installations	23.3	23.4	23.3	22.2	95.4%	23.1	21.8	94.6%	21.8
Centralized Support Act'y	4.7	4.6	5.0	4.7	95.4%	4.9	4.6	94.6%	4.6
	17.5	18.8	18.3	17.5	95.4%	18.1	17.2	94.6%	17.2
SUBTOTAL	301.4	304.7	315.6	301.1	95.4%	312.3	295.3	94.6%	295.3
Individuals		34.5		22.9			25.7		25.7
Individual Mobilization Augmentees		14.7		14.2			14.0		14.0

TOTAL ARMY RESERVE MILITARY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 89		FY 90		FY 91	
	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	RQMT	AUTH

	% MNG		% MNG		% MNG	
--	-------	--	-------	--	-------	--

319.2 309.2 309.2

END STRENGTH

NOTES:

- o The term Authorization is synonymous with Force Structure Allowance
- o The term Requirement is synonymous with Wartime Required
- o Totals may not add due to rounding. FY 90 and FY 91 distribution shown are estimates.

TABLE III-4A
US ARMY RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

OFFICERS	FY 89			FY 90			FY 91		
	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	RQMT	% MNG	AUTH	RQMT	% MNG
<u>DPPC</u>									
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>									
Land Forces	33.2	30.3	33.4	33.0	32.7	98.6%	31.9	32.7	97.5%
Division Forces	33.2	30.3	33.4	33.0	32.7	98.6%	31.9	32.7	97.5%
Theater Forces	31.0	28.2	31.2	30.7	30.5	98.6%	29.7	30.5	97.5%
Mobility Forces	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.6	98.6%	1.6	1.6	97.5%
	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	98.6%	0.6	0.6	97.5%
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>									
Intelligence	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	98.6%	0.2	0.2	97.5%
	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	98.6%	0.2	0.2	97.5%
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>									
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQS</u>									
Combat Cmds	2.5	3.4	2.5	2.5	2.5	98.6%	2.4	2.5	97.5%
Support Cmds	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	98.6%	0.3	0.3	97.5%
	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	98.6%	0.3	0.3	97.5%
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>									
Federal Agency Support	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>									
Personnel Support	11.6	11.1	11.7	11.5	11.4	98.6%	11.1	11.4	97.5%
Individual Training	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	98.6%	11.1	11.4	97.5%
	11.6	11.9	11.7	11.5	11.4	98.6%	11.1	11.4	97.5%
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>									
Support Installations	4.6	5.1	4.6	4.6	4.5	98.6%	4.4	4.5	97.5%
Centralized Support Act'y	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	98.6%	1.1	1.1	97.5%
	3.5	4.1	3.5	3.4	3.4	98.6%	3.3	3.4	97.5%
<u>SUBTOTAL</u>	52.5	50.5	52.8	52.0	51.6	98.6%	50.4	51.6	97.5%
Individuals		0.0		0.0			0.0		
Individual Mobilization Augmentees		11.3		10.6			10.4		

TABLE III-4B
US ARMY RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

ENLISTED	FY 89			FY 90			FY 91		
	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	RQMT	% MNG	AUTH	RQMT	% MNG
<u>DPPC</u>									
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>									
Land Forces	177.2	181.6	187.0	177.3	185.5	94.8%	174.3	185.5	94.0%
Division Forces	177.2	181.6	187.0	177.3	185.5	94.8%	174.3	185.5	94.0%
Theater Forces	160.5	165.1	169.4	160.6	168.0	94.8%	157.9	168.0	94.0%
Mobility Forces	15.4	15.1	16.3	15.4	16.1	94.8%	15.2	16.1	94.0%
	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3	94.8%	1.3	1.3	94.0%
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>									
Intelligence	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	94.8%	0.3	0.3	94.0%
	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	94.8%	0.3	0.3	94.0%
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>									
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQS	6.7	7.5	7.1	6.7	7.0	94.8%	6.6	7.0	94.0%
Combat Cnds	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.6	94.8%	0.5	0.6	94.0%
Support Cnds	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.6	94.8%	0.6	0.6	94.0%
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>									
Federal Agency Support	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	94.8%	0.4	0.4	94.0%
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>									
Personnel Support	46.1	45.0	48.7	46.2	48.3	94.8%	45.4	48.3	94.0%
Individual Training	0.0	2.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	94.8%	0.0	0.0	94.0%
	46.1	42.8	48.7	46.2	48.3	94.8%	45.4	48.3	94.0%
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>									
Support Installations	17.7	18.3	18.6	17.7	18.5	94.8%	17.4	18.5	94.0%
Centralized Support Act'y	3.6	3.6	3.8	3.8	3.8	94.8%	3.5	3.8	94.0%
	14.1	14.7	14.8	14.1	14.7	94.8%	13.8	14.7	94.0%
<u>SUBTOTAL</u>	248.9	253.7	262.8	249.1	260.6	94.8%	244.9	260.6	94.0%
Individuals		34.5		22.9			25.7		

ENLISTED	<u>FY 89</u>		<u>FY 90</u>		<u>FY 91</u>		
	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>INV</u>	<u>RQMT</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>RQMT</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>% MNG</u>
Individual Mobilization Augmentees		3.4		3.6		3.6	
<u>END STRENGTH</u>		256.9		247.9		248.0	

NOTES:

- o The term Authorization is synonymous with Force Structure Allowance
- o The term Requirement is synonymous with Wartime Required
- o Totals may not add due to rounding. FY 90 and FY 91 distribution shown are estimates.

TABLE III-5

US ARMY RESERVE
(THOUSANDS)

	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
End Strength	319.2	309.2	309.2
- Training Pipeline	34.5	22.9	25.7
- IMA	<u>14.7</u>	<u>14.2</u>	<u>14.0</u>
Operating Strength	270.0	272.1	269.5
- Non Unit AGR	4.7	4.7	4.7
+ Unit AC Personnel	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.0</u>
Trained Unit Strength	266.4	268.4	265.8
Structure Requirements (Wartime)(Programmed Structure)	314.4	315.6	312.3
% Trained/Requirements	84.7%	85.1%	85.1%

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

(d) Skill and Grade. The USAR skill and grade, actual and projected inventories are displayed in Table III-6. The principal shortages of trained non-commissioned, warrant, and commissioned officers continue in the medical, aviation, maintenance, and transportation specialties. Significant progress has been made in resolving the Troop Program Unit (TPU) nurse shortfall. This progress can be attributed to increased recruiting emphasis and Reserve Component Incentive programs. There still remains, however, a large shortfall of nurses. The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) which lacks a sufficient number of trained nurses to meet the shortfall is being targeted as the TPU's are filled. Progress has been made in reducing the critical shortage of surgeons in the Reserve. Recruiting is being targeted to the surgical specialties and incentive programs are currently in place. Additional recruiters are needed, however, to resolve the remaining Reserve Component shortfalls. Existing incentive programs should serve to reduce some of the critical shortages of doctors and nurses in units and the Individual Ready Reserve and the Individual Mobilization Augmentee Program.

TABLE III-6
U.S. ARMY RESERVE SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL AND PROJECTED DRILL STRENGTH INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED MANNING
(Strength in 000s)***

	FY 89			FY 90			FY 91					
	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL
E1 - E4												
Number of Skills	100	39	254	393	100	39	254	393	100	39	254	393
PMI	85.8	16.7	19.8	122.3	85.8	16.7	19.8	122.3	85.8	16.7	19.8	122.2
Inventory	114.4	16.5	17.6	148.6	110.6	16.0	17.1	143.7	110.6	16.0	17.1	143.7
Over/Short	28.6	-0.2	-2.2	26.2	24.8	-0.7	-2.7	21.4	24.9	-0.7	-2.7	21.5
E5 - E9												
Number of Skills	28	36	352	416	28	36	352	416	28	36	352	416
PMI	1.4	3.1	121.3	125.8	1.4	3.1	121.3	125.8	1.4	3.1	122.8	127.3
Inventory	2.3	3.0	90.0	95.3	2.2	2.9	87.1	92.2	2.2	2.9	87.1	92.2
Over/Short	0.9	-0.1	-31.3	-30.5	0.8	-0.2	-34.2	-33.6	0.8	-0.3	-35.7	-35.1
TOTAL E1 - E9												
Number of Skills	64	66	330	460	64	66	330	460	64	66	330	460
PMI	79.6	41.9	126.7	248.2	87.2	19.8	141.1	248.1	87.2	21.4	142.6	251.1
Inventory	92.0	42.4	109.5	243.9	112.9	18.8	104.2	235.9	112.9	18.8	104.2	235.9
Over/Short	12.4	0.5	-17.2	-4.3	25.7	-0.9	-36.9	-12.2	25.7	-2.5	-38.4	-15.2
Warrant Officer												
Number of Skills	4	12	137	153	4	12	137	153	4	12	137	153
PMI	0.0	1.0	4.5	5.5	0.0	1.0	4.5	5.5	0.0	1.0	4.5	5.6
Inventory	0.1	1.0	2.6	3.7	0.1	0.9	2.5	3.5	0.1	0.9	2.5	3.5
Over/Short	0.0	-0.1	-1.9	-1.9	0.0	-0.1	-2.0	-2.0	0.0	-0.1	-2.0	-2.1
01 - 03												
Number of Skills	49	39	173	261	49	39	173	261	49	39	173	261
PMI	3.4	5.7	19.1	28.2	3.4	5.7	19.1	28.2	3.4	5.8	19.3	28.6
Inventory	4.7	5.7	14.6	24.9	4.5	5.5	14.1	24.1	4.5	5.5	14.1	24.1
Over/Short	1.3	-0.1	-4.6	-3.3	1.1	-0.2	-5.0	-4.1	1.1	-0.3	-5.3	-4.5

(e) Experience. The data in Table III-7 indicate that the Army Reserve may continue to experience shortage in senior NCO's, Warrant Officers and Officers.

TABLE III-7
 USAR EXPERIENCE
 PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY
 (Strength in thousands)

	ACTUAL FY 1989			PROGRAMMED FY 1990			PROGRAMMED FY 1991			
	TOTAL PEOPLE	4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	4 YOS	AVG YOS	
	PEOPLE	YOS	YOS	PEOPLE	YOS	YOS	PEOPLE	YOS	YOS	
<u>E1-E4</u>										
PMI**	157.3	NA	NA	146.1	NA	NA	151.3	NA	NA	NA
Inventory	148.8	59.3	2.6	143.2	57.0	2.6	143.3	57.1	2.6	2.6
<u>E5-E9</u>										
PMI	131.2	NA	NA	135.0	NA	NA	135.4	NA	NA	NA
Inventory	105.0	100.9	17.4	101.0	97.1	17.4	101.1	97.2	17.4	17.4
<u>TOTAL E1-E9</u>										
PMI	288.5	NA	NA	281.2	NA	NA	286.7	NA	NA	NA
Inventory	253.8	160.2	7.7	244.3	154.1	7.7	244.4	154.2	7.7	7.7
<u>WARRANT OFFICER</u>										
PMI	6.1	NA	NA	6.0	NA	NA	5.8	NA	NA	NA
Inventory	4.5	4.4	19.2	4.5	4.4	19.2	4.5	4.4	19.2	19.2
<u>01 - 03</u>										
PMI	29.0	NA	NA	27.8	NA	NA	27.8	NA	NA	NA
Inventory	27.3	20.6	7.0	25.9	19.6	7.0	25.7	19.5	7.0	7.0
<u>04 - 06</u>										
PMI	23.4	NA	NA	21.6	NA	NA	21.7	NA	NA	NA
Inventory	21.8	21.5	21.7	20.6	20.4	21.7	20.5	20.3	21.7	21.7
<u>TOTAL 01 - 06</u>										
PMI	52.5	NA	NA	49.4	NA	NA	49.5	NA	NA	NA
Inventory	49.0	42.1	14.3	46.5	40.0	14.3	46.2	39.8	13.6	13.6

*Detail may not add to totals due to rounding. Excludes IMAs.
 **Programmed Manning plus Individuals

(f) Personnel Management.

[1] Accessions.

[a] Enlisted. Actual USAR recruiting performance and projected goals are shown in the following table:

	<u>USAR Enlisted Accessions</u>			
	<u>FY 89</u>		<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Prior Service (PS)	49,270	46,207	38,991	41,190
Non Prior Service (NPS)	30,619	29,239	27,412	35,008
Male (HSDG)	22,928	22,310	19,791	24,785
Female (HSDG)	20,635	19,061	17,812	22,307
Female (HSDG)	7,691	6,929	7,621	10,223
Female (HSDG)	7,691	6,929	7,621	10,223
TOTAL	79,889	75,446	66,403	76,198

*NOTE: HSDG Does not include GED.

[b] Officer. Officer accessions for the USAR come primarily from ROTC and transfers from the Active Component. ROTC production and USAR performance and goals from all sources are shown in the following tables.

	<u>ROTC</u>		
	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
AC	4428	3500	3200
ARNG	1774	1100	1200
USAR	1840	3100	2700
TOTAL	8042	7700	7100

	<u>USAR Officer Accessions</u>			
	<u>FY 89</u>		<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
	12,092	11,703	9,637	9,730

[2] Retention.

[a] Enlisted. Actual USAR retention performance and projected requirements are shown in the following table. Because of the increase in the military service obligation from six to eight years, there will be no first term reenlistment between June 1990 and May 1992.

USAR Reenlistments

	<u>FY 89</u>		<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
First Term	10,677	9,592	5,221	0
Career	17,279	18,704	20,248	15,366
TOTAL	27,956	28,296	25,469	15,366

[2] Losses.

[a] Enlisted

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Troop Program Enlisted Losses	70,002	75,763	76,198
Losses as a percentage of average enlisted troop program strength	29.2	31.9	32.6
Non-ETS Losses	63,730	65,533	70,191
Losses as a percentage of average enlisted strength	26.6	27.6	30.0

[b] Officer. Losses from the USAR may not be losses to the Army overall, as some USAR officers transfer to the active component or Army National Guard. However, these losses do create USAR vacancies which must be filled to maintain readiness. The actual and projected overall losses for the USAR are shown below. Achieving projections for both accessions and losses should assist in reducing personnel shortages.

USAR Officer Losses

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
	6,751	8,268	8,190

[3] Inventory Stability. Both USAR aggregate population stability and unit personnel stability were evaluated in the same manner as for the active force.

Aggregate Personnel Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Officers	87.2	86.9	87.7	88.6
Enlisted	76.0	75.9	75.1	77.5

Unit Population Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Officers	69.4	67.7	68.1	68.4
Enlisted	64.7	62.2	60.3	61.1

(g) Readiness Assessment.

The personnel readiness of the USAR improved in FY 1989 with paid drill strength increasing by 3,588 to 290,593. The increase in paid drill strength coupled with a decrease in the number of soldiers in the training pipeline resulted in a 7,399 increase in trained in unit strength. Efforts will continue in FY 1990 and the budget years to acquire and retain quality personnel with critical skills through the use of incentives such as bonuses, loan repayment and other special programs.

(h) Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Program.

[1] The purpose of the IMA program is to pre-assign individual selected reservists in peacetime to active component units, the Selective Service System, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency to train for their wartime duties.

[2] The IMA program gives the active Army the necessary manpower resources to expand rapidly in periods of national emergency. Since its inception, approximately 17,000 positions have been identified in response to increased requirements to support the Active Army. Funding is required to support two weeks of annual training by each soldier assigned to the IMA program and those soldiers designated for drilling positions (24 paid drills per year). Actual and projected strength is shown below:

<u>IMAs</u>		
<u>FY 89</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
14,708	14,166	14,038

(i) Full Time Support Program. The Full Time Support Program assists Reserve Component units in achieving higher levels of readiness by providing drilling reservists the maximum available training time to prepare for the wartime mission. Full-time support personnel (Active Guard/Reserve personnel, civil service personnel, active Army members, and Military Technicians) improve readiness by assisting in training, supply, maintenance, administration, and mobilization planning. As shown in the following chart, the USAR is not requesting increases in the number of AGR personnel assigned to the Full-time Support Program. The decrease shown in Army Reserve Technicians was the result of a transfer of the Special Operation Forces technicians to another appropriation.

USAR Full-time Support

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
AGR	13,344	13,344	13,344
Army Reserve Techs	8,529	8,529	8,252*
Active Army with			
USAR	1,163	1,163	1,163
DA Civilians	<u>4,589</u>	<u>4,452</u>	<u>4,473</u>
TOTAL	<u>27,625</u>	<u>27,488</u>	<u>27,232</u>

* Does not include 177 technician for Special Operations Forces

(2) Army National Guard.

(a) General. The aggregate ARNG FY 1989 Selected Reserve strength increased 1,778 from 455,182 to 456,960 or .3%. This was only 340 short of the FY 1989 end strength objective of 457,300. The ARNG is programmed to decline to 447,300 in FY 1990 and remain at this level for FY 1991.

(b) Programmed Manpower Structure Programmed Manning, and Operating Strength. Programmed manning will rise to 95 percent in FY 1990 and drop to 94 percent in FY 1991 and remain at that level.

TABLE III-8
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD (ARNG) PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
 (Thousands)

TOTAL ARNG MILITARY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 89		FY 90		FY 91		% MNG
	REQ	INV	PROG MNPWR REQ	PROG AUTH	PROG MNPWR REQ	PROG AUTH	
<u>TACTICAL/MOEBILITY</u>	-						
Land Forces	456.3	425.5	437.1	415.6	441.6	415.5	94
Division Forces	456.3	425.5	437.8	415.6	441.6	415.5	94
(Divisional Increment)	434.2	404.9	415.9	395.5	420.2	395.4	94
(Non-Div Cbt Increment)	186.9	174.3	179.0	172.9	180.9	172.8	96
(Tactical Spt Increment)	134.1	125.1	128.5	116.9	129.8	116.9	90
Theater Forces	113.2	105.6	108.4	105.7	109.5	105.7	96
	22.1	20.6	21.2	20.1	21.4	20.1	94
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.3	0.5	0.4	100
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>							
Support Installations	27.0	25.1	26.4	25.1	26.7	25.1	94
Centralized Support Act'y	25.5	23.7	24.9	23.8	25.2	23.7	94
	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.3	1.5	1.4	94
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>							
Individual Training	6.7	6.2	6.6	6.2	6.6	6.4	96
<u>TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	490.2	457.0	480.3	447.3	485.1	447.3	92
<u>UNDISTRIBUTED MANNING</u>		0		0.0		0.0	
<u>OPERATING STRENGTH</u>		422.0		422.2		419.2	
<u>INDIVIDUALS (TRAINEES)</u>		35.1		35.1		38.1	
<u>END-STRENGTH</u>		457.1		447.3		447.3	

TABLE III-8A
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD (ARNG) PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
 (Thousands)

OFFICER DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 89			FY 90			FY 91		
	REQ	INV	% MNG	PROG MNPWR REQ	PROG AUTH	% MNG	PROG MNPWR REQ	PROG AUTH	% MNG
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>									
Land Forces	45.7	46.5	101	46.3	46.5	101	47.4	46.4	98
Division Forces	45.7	46.5	101	46.3	46.5	101	47.4	46.4	98
(Divisional Increment)	43.5	44.3	101	44.0	44.3	101	45.1	44.2	98
(Non-Div Cbt Increment)	18.7	19.1	101	18.9	19.1	101	19.4	19.0	98
(Tactical Spt Increment)	13.4	13.7	101	13.6	13.7	101	13.9	13.6	98
Theater Forces	11.3	11.5	100	11.5	11.5	100	11.8	11.5	98
	2.2	2.3	101	2.2	2.3	101	2.3	2.2	98
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	0.3	0.1	39	0.3	0.1	39	0.3	0.2	67
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>									
Support Installations	2.6	2.8	99	2.8	2.8	99	2.8	2.8	98
Centralized Support Act'y	2.6	2.6	100	2.6	2.6	100	2.6	2.6	98
	0.1	0.1	50	0.2	0.1	50	0.2	0.2	100
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>									
Individual Training	0.7	0.7	95	0.7	0.7	95	0.7	0.7	98
<u>TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	49.8	50.1	101	49.9	50.1	101	51.1	50.1	98
<u>UNDISTRIBUTED MANNING</u>		0			0			0	
<u>OPERATING STRENGTH</u>		50.1			50.1			50.1	
<u>INDIVIDUALS (TRAINEES)</u>		0			0			0	
<u>END-STRENGTH</u>		50.1			50.1			50.1	

TABLE III-8B
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD (ARNG) PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
 (Thousands)

ENLISTED DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 89		FY 90			FY 91		
	REQ	INV	PROG MNPWR REQ	PROG AUTH	% MNG	PROG MNPWR REQ	PROG AUTH	% MNG
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>								
Land Forces	406.8	378.9	390.9	369.1	94	394.2	369.1	94
Division Forces	406.8	378.9	390.9	369.1	94	394.2	369.1	94
(Divisional Increment)	387.1	360.5	371.9	351.2	94	375.1	351.2	94
(Non-Div Cbt Increment)	166.6	155.2	160.1	153.8	96	161.5	151.8	95
(Tactical Spt Increment)	119.6	111.4	114.9	103.2	90	115.9	103.2	89
Theater Forces	100.9	94.0	97.0	94.1	97	97.8	94.1	96
	19.7	18.3	19.9	17.9	94	19.1	17.9	94
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100	0.2	0.2	100
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>								
Support Installations	24.0	22.4	23.6	22.4	95	23.8	22.3	94
Centralized Support Act'y	22.7	21.2	22.3	21.2	95	22.5	21.1	94
	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.2	94	1.3	1.2	93
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>								
Individual Training	5.9	5.6	5.9	5.6	95	5.9	5.7	96
<u>TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	440.4	407.0	430.4	397.2	95	434.0	397.2	94
<u>UNDISTRIBUTED MANNING</u>		0		0			0	
<u>OPERATING STRENGTH</u>		372.1		372.1			369.1	
<u>INDIVIDUALS (TRAINEES)</u>		35.1		35.1			38.1	
<u>END-STRENGTH</u>		407.0		397.2			397.2	

(c) Trained in Unit Strength. Table III-8C reflects the trained personnel assigned to units compared to the wartime unit structure. The percent trained units lowers as budget end strength does not grow in relationship with structure. This table also reflects a positive ratio of operating strength to trained personnel.

TABLE III-8C
ARNG Trained In Unit Strength

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
End Strength	457.1	447.3	447.3
-Training Pipeline	38.5	35.1	38.1
Operating Strength	421.3	412.4	409.2
-Non Unit AGR	5.5	5.5	5.5
+Unit AC Personnel			
Trained Unit Strength	415.9	407.7	403.7
Structure Requirements (Wartime)	486.0	480.3	485.5
Wartime Unit Structure	486.0	480.3	485.5
% Trained in Units	85.6%	82.5%	82.5%

(d) Skill and Grade.

[1] The data on actual and projected inventory by skill and grade in Table III-9 show that the mismatch of NCO skill improves through FY 1990. A key contributor to this continuing mismatch is the location of existing ARNG structure compared with availability of personnel. The ongoing restructuring of the ARNG will provide for continued reduction of MOS mismatch.

[2] Critical shortages in the current fiscal year include Captains in all basic branches as well as the traditional shortages of medical doctors, nurses, and chaplains. Structure modernization continues to aggravate this problem. Efforts for improving all shortages include continued screening of the US Army Reserve (USAR) Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) to fill all basic branch company grade officer vacancies.

(e) Experience. The average years of service of ARNG enlisted personnel shown in Table III-10 are projected to decrease

TABLE III-9
 ARMY NATIONAL GUARD SKILL AND GRADE
 ACTUAL AND PROJECTED INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED MANNING AND INDIVIDUALS (PMI)
 (Strength in 000s)

	FY 1989				FY 1990				FY 1991			
	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL
E1 - E4												
Number of Skills	127	17	134	278	124	17	131	271	124	17	131	271
Authorized	48469	29024	170350	247843	47244	28291	166406	241581	47318	28335	166305	241958
Inventory	58785	27299	131774	217858	57389	26651	128645	212685	57389	26651	128645	212685
Over/Short	10316	-1725	-38576	-29985	10145	-1640	-37401	-28896	10071	-1684	-37660	-29273
E5 - E9												
Number of Skills	180	42	129	351	176	41	126	343	176	41	126	343
Authorized	86932	38854	44373	170159	87261	39001	44541	168094	84868	37931	43319	166119
Inventory	117035	37466	34489	188990	114256	36576	33670	184503	114256	36576	33670	184503
Over/Short	30103	-1388	-9884	18831	26996	-2424	-10871	16409	29388	-1355	-9649	18384
TOTAL E1 - E9												
Number of Skills	145	53	157	355	142	52	153	347	142	52	153	347
Authorized	115592	99091	203319	418002	134505	67292	409675	408077	112847	96738	198491	408077
Inventory	146730	94838	165280	406848	143246	92586	161356	397188	143246	92586	161356	397188
Over/Short	31138	-4253	-38039	-11154	30399	-4152	-37136	-10889	30399	-4152	-37136	-10889
Warrant Officer												
Number of Skills	15	11	44	70	15	11	44	70	15	11	44	70
Authorized	2723	1652	6459	10834	2723	1652	6459	10834	2723	1652	6459	10834
Inventory	3335	1542	5002	9879	3335	1542	5002	9879	3335	1542	5002	9879
Over/Short	612	-110	-1457	-955	612	-110	-1457	-995	612	-110	-1457	-995
01 - 03												
Number of Skills	114	23	35	172	115	23	35	173	115	23	35	173
Authorized	12270	10056	4406	26732	12324	10100	4425	26850	12324	10100	4425	26850
Inventory	16448	9647	2862	28957	16521	9690	2875	29085	16521	9690	2875	29085
Over/Short	4178	-409	-1544	-2225	4196	-409	-1551	2235	4196	-411	-1551	2235

04 - 06

Number of Skills	104	20	65	189	104	20	65	190	104	20	65	190
Authorized	3661	1770	5800	11231	3677	1778	5826	11281	3677	1778	5826	11281
Inventory	5013	1691	4395	11099	5035	1698	4414	11148	5035	1698	4414	11148
Over/Short	1352	-79	-1405	-132	1358	-79	-1411	-133	1358	-79	-1411	-133

TOTAL 01 - 06

Number of Skills	126	26	57	209	127	26	57	210	127	26	57	210
Authorized	16494	15209	6260	37963	16567	15276	6288	38131	16567	15276	6288	38131
Inventory	20981	14583	4492	40056	21074	14647	4512	40233	21074	14647	4512	40233
Over/Short	4487	-626	-1768	-2093	4507	-629	-1776	2102	4507	-629	-1776	2102

as a result of the projected increase in the ratio of non-prior to prior service accessions during FY 1989 and FY 1990. However, this trend should enable the ARNG to correct enlisted grade imbalances as shown in Table III-9. Currently, a disproportionate number of E5-E6 positions are filled by accession of prior service personnel, as opposed to progression of non-prior service members through the ranks. The ARNG is working to improve recruitment and retention of both officers and enlisted personnel.

TABLE III-10

ARNG EXPERIENCE

PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY* (Strength in thousands)

	ACTUAL FY 1989			PROGRAMMED FY 1990			PROGRAMMED FY 1991		
	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVG YOS
<u>E1-E4</u>									
Authorized	248031	NA		240815	NA		241896	NA	
Inventory	217861	NA	4.2	211501	93029	4.2	211501	93079	4.2
<u>E5-E9</u>									
Authorized	170292	NA		172114	NA		180535	NA	
Inventory	188987	182550	14.2	185687	182550	14.2	185687	182650	14.3
<u>TOTAL E1-E9</u>									
Authorized	418323	NA		412929	NA		422431	NA	
Inventory	406848	275579	8.9	397188	275579	8.9	397188	275729	9
<u>WARRANT OFFICER</u>									
Authorized	10847	NA		11316	NA		11318	NA	
Inventory	9879	9776	21.9	9879	9776	21.9	9879	9750	21.0
<u>01 - 03</u>									
Authorized	26741	NA		27198	NA		27488	NA	
Inventory	28914	22204	8.7	28914	22350	8.7	28914	22350	8.7
<u>04 - 06</u>									
Authorized	11248	NA		11541	NA		11710	NA	
Inventory	11099	11065	21.8	11099	11065	22	11099	11060	22
<u>TOTAL 01 - 06</u>									
Authorized	37989	NA		38739	NA		39198	NA	
Inventory	40013	33269	12.3	40013	32990	12.6	40013	32990	12.6

(f) Personnel Management.

[1] Accession.

[a] Enlisted. ARNG recruiting performance and projected goals are shown in the table below:

ARNG Enlisted Accessions (Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>		<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Prior Service	35.0	35.3	35.3	34.7
Non-Prior Service	(42.7)	(35.8)	(35.4)	(42.5)
Male	35.7	30.8	28.4	35.5
(HSG)	31.8	27.6	25.3	31.6
Female	7.0	4.2	7.0	7.0
(HSG)	7.0	4.2	7.0	7.0
TOTAL	77.7	71.4	70.7	77.2

NOTE: HSG includes GED.

[b] Officer/Warrant Officer Accessions

Total FY 1989 Officers strength represents a 3.8 percent net growth from FY 1988. This represents a growth of 865 over the FY 1989 program. This growth can be attributed to several factors such as enhanced officer recruiting; improved retention efforts; excellent performance by the ARNG Lieutenants Management Team (ALMT) (approximately 40 percent of total FY 1989 accessions, and record production from the state Officer Candidate School (OCS) Program. The above efforts were aided by enhanced overstrength policies which resulted in a 116 percent of programmed officer gains. Total losses were 99 percent of programmed. These gains and losses resulted in an overall officer loss rate of 8.7 percent.

Shortages of combat arms captains and selected Medical Corps officers continue to exist in the ARNG. Achievement of the FY 1990 objective of 4,455, will require continued emphasis on accession goals from all sources.

ARNG Officer/Warrant Officer Accessions

	<u>FY 89</u>		<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
	<u>Programmed</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Programmed</u>	<u>Programmed</u>
Commissioned Officers	3,975	5,385	3,455	3,455
Warrant Officers	<u>1,225</u>	<u>607</u>	<u>1,000</u>	<u>1,000</u>
Total	5,200	5,992	4,455	4,455

2. Retention

Total officer losses were 4,160 and was 99 percent of loss program (4,200). The resulting 8.7 percent officer loss rate, though higher than FY 1988, provided the ability to better manage overall officer strength. During the period FY 1990 through FY 1992 emphasis will continue to focus on specific tailored recruiting and retention programs including support of the Full-time Recruiting Force for AMEDD shortages; waivers of age, overstrength, and alternate training requirements for doctors; establishment of temporary positions for Army Nurse Corps officers in States without large medical units; and enrollment of full-time seminary or theological graduate students in the ARNG Chaplain Candidates Program to alleviate chaplain shortages. Actual and projected loss goals for total officers follow:

ARNG Officer/Warrant Officer Losses

<u>FY 89</u>		<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Programmed</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Programmed</u>	<u>Programmed</u>
4,200	4,160	4,455	4,455

3. Officer Strength Initiatives.

Several initiatives have been implemented that will significantly impact future ARNG officer accessions. These include development of an enrollment enhancement program for State OCS, refinement of the Total Warrant Officer System (TWOS), and continued success of the ALMT.

[2] Retention.

[a] Enlisted.

a. As the structure and missions of the ARNG have increased, like wise the strength of the ARNG has continually risen. There has been an increase of 53,000 soldiers during the past four years.

b. However, the requirement to reduce the strength of the ARNG will increase the attrition rate. We will meet this goal by slightly increasing accession quality and by separating unsatisfactory participants and marginal performers.

c. The quality of the non prior service enlistments has also continued to improve. The test category (CAT IV) non prior service enlistments has decreased from 14.0% in FY 86 to 9.6% in FY 89. Additionally, the number of high school graduate accessions has increased from 86.8% to 89.4% during the same period. The established goal for these areas is 9% CAT IV and 90% high school graduates.

ARNG Reenlistments (Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>		<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
First Term	32.6	29.0	20.1	20.1
Career	31.9	35.4	39.6	39.6
TOTAL	64.5	64.4	59.7	59.7

[b] Officer. Officer retention problems continue to exist at the rank of Captain in the basic branches, in all ranks of selected Army Medical Department (AMEDD) personnel and chaplains. Increased emphasis in State retention programs will be developed with recruiting efforts in these officer specialties.

[3] Inventory Stability. Lower attrition, higher personnel quality and greater job satisfaction have contributed to the relatively constant trend for both officer and enlisted stability from FY 1981 to FY 1987. The decrease in unit personnel stability from FY 1988 to FY 1989 is attributed to force structure turbulence (activations, inactivations, and reorganizations).

ARNG Aggregate Personnel Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Enlisted	82.2	84.1	82.9	83.5	85.7	88.5	83.7
Officer	90.8	90.7	89.2	91.0	94.2	95.4	90.7

ARNG Unit Population Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Enlisted	72.3	75.6	71.5	72.2	69.1	72.5	67.1
Officer	66.1	69.4	66.6	68.0	64.3	68.2	60.7

(g) Readiness Assessment. ARNG personnel readiness is affected by available strength and MOS qualification. Ongoing recruiting and retention programs are dealing effectively with the available strength shortfall. MOS qualification (MOSQ) remains the primary readiness inhibitor. To address this problem, the ARNG is involved in an effort to improve MOSQ through command emphasis and increased management of available school seats to ensure best use of training resources. However, recent ARNG force modernization has had a significantly negative impact on MOSQ. As MOSs are changed to match new equipment, personnel first undergo new equipment training and become MOS-qualified to support the new modernized equipment. During the transition period from old to new requirements, personnel are not MOS-qualified according to new document requirements. Highly technical and professional skill areas (e.g. medical, chemical) requiring lengthy schooling are also a major problem. M-day soldiers frequently experience difficulty obtaining leave from their civilian jobs commensurate with school seat availability.

(h) Full-time Support Program.

[1] The goal of the Full-time support program is to provide the Army with operationally ready units prior to mobilization. In order to accomplish this, sufficient full time manpower must be available to train, supply, maintain, administer, recruit and manage the force. As there is not sufficient time between mobilization and deployment to correct significant deficiencies, the units must be ready before mobilization. Full time support for ARNG units consists primarily of the Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) program and the military technician program; active component soldiers and civil service personnel are also involved.

ARNG Full-time Support

	<u>FY 89</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
AGR	25,893	26,199	26,199
Dual Status Military Technicians	25,923	26,257	26,257
Non Dual Status ARNG Civilians	2,667	2,200	2,200
Active Army with ARNG	576	576	576
Army Civilians	420	406	406

* Congressional floor total 26,629

b. Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

(1) With a current strength of approximately 275,000 the IRR is the second largest pool of pretrained individual manpower available during mobilization. It will provide filler personnel for both active component and reserve component units.

Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
274.6	329.5	432.0

(2) The Army plans on approximately 70 percent of the enlisted IRR and 90 percent of the officer IRR being available for use during mobilization.

(3) In FY 1989, the Army IRR Screening program was conducted at over 2,000 recruiting stations nationwide. Approximately 54,700 members of the IRR participated in the one day recall during their birth month to check personnel data, medical fitness, and some basic military skills knowledge in selected MOSs. A significant number of corrections were made to the personnel records and mobilization data base. Further, a number of leads were developed for recruiting. This screening process is planned to continue into FY 1990 and FY 1991.

c. Inactive National Guard (ING).

The ING consists of those ARNG members who are unable to participate in peacetime training (training assemblies and/or annual training), but who wish to retain their Guard affiliation. They will join and deploy with their units when called to active duty. The ING are not members of the Selected Reserve; therefore, they are not available for mobilization unless a national emergency or a war is declared. ING members muster for one training session each year and are qualified in a military skill. Actual and projected strengths for the ING are shown below:

Inactive National Guard
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>FY 89</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
10.1	10.5	10.5

2. Retirees. Regular Army and Reserve retirees with 20 years or more of active duty, who are receiving retirement pay, can be recalled to active duty at any time in the interest of national defense. The Army's retiree recall program preassigns retirees to appropriate mobilization positions throughout the CONUS support base. Exercises are conducted periodically to test mobilization procedures for retirees. The total number of retirees with high mobilization potential is shown below:

Retirees
Mobilization Potential
(Strengths in Thousands)

Twenty Year Active Duty Retirees

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Under Age 60	201.4	204.2	203.9

Other Retired Reserves

Under Age 60	32.4	32.6	33.0
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3. RC Personnel on Active Duty

The FY 1989 (Actual) figures are for those individuals serving on active duty as of the last day of FY 1989 under orders specifying an aggregate period in excess of 180 days.

USAR Personnel on
Active Duty for Training and Special Work in
Excess of 180 Days

	<u>FY 89</u> (Actual)	
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Recruit and Specialized Training	14	596
Flight Training	34	62
Professional Training at Military Institutions	2	5
Professional Training at Civilian Institutions	0	81
Officer Acquisition Training	0	0
Active Duty Special Work	<u>35</u>	<u>56</u>
Total	85	800

ARNG Personnel on
Active Duty for Training in
Excess of 180 Days

	<u>FY 89</u> (Actual)	
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Recruit and Specialized Training	18	1937
Flight Training	120	163
Professional Training at Military Institutions	17	14
Professional Training at Civilian Institutions	2	160
Officer Acquisition Training		
Other Training	<u>275</u>	<u>995</u>
Total	432	3,269

C. Civilian Manpower.

1. General.

a. Role of Civilians.

Army civilians provide a major contribution in support of the Army's mission. Army civilians, which comprise nearly 21 percent of the Army's work force, including the Reserves and National Guard, manage and operate most bases, depots and laboratories. They support the Army mission by performing a full range of logistics functions, including depot maintenance, supply and acquisition management, and transportation management. Civilians also provide essential support in training, medical care, research and development, engineering, and facilities management. Most recently, through Defense Management Review initiatives, the Army has sought to streamline these missions and processes by consolidating functions and operations, improving the performance of the defense acquisition system and more effectively managing the Army's resources.

The majority of the Army's manpower resource savings brought about through DMR are civilian. We must caution that it is critical that, once streamlined, we have the capability to recruit and retain the quality civilian force needed to accomplish these critical missions. Nearly 25 percent of the Army's appropriated fund civilian force are stationed overseas and provide a critical mobilization base needed for transition to wartime operations.

b. The Army has experienced increasing difficulty in recruiting and retaining civilian employees with required skills in a number of areas. Noticeable shortages or unusual recruitment and retention difficulties have occurred in the health, science and other professional occupations. The difficulty is in the ability of the Army to compete with the private sector in offering competitive compensation, professional growth and other benefits. Reform of the General Schedule pay system to provide greater market sensitivity, along with other recent initiatives designed to streamline management of the civilian labor force, could increase the Army's competitive posture for recruiting and retaining critical skills.

b. Civilian End Strength Ceilings

(1) Since FY 1985, annual authorization and appropriations legislation have prohibited the management of civilian employees on the basis of end strength ceilings. The FY 1989 Defense Authorization Act has continued the prohibition into FY 1989 and FY 1990. This allows the Army to match employment level to funded workloads. However, beginning in FY 1987, annual appropriations legislation has limited civilian workyears expended outside the 50 United States to levels achieved in the previous year. The Legislation also requires (a) submission of a plan, by month, of strength and workyears by Service, broken out by U.S. direct hire, foreign direct hire, and foreign indirect hire (b) Monthly report on the execution of civilian employment levels by end strength and workyears, comparing budgeted to actual employment of civilian employment levels and funding obligations by appropriation, and (c) quarterly reports on civilian actual employment and obligation by appropriation.

(2) Army strongly favors continuing the end strength ceiling prohibition and prefers to eliminate the overseas workyear limitation. Experience from FY 1986 to FY 1989 shows that commanders are able to manage civilian employment levels responsibly, without arbitrary limitations on the number of civilians employed. Some of the benefits of operating without ceilings include avoidance of administrative costs associated with hiring and releasing employees to meet ceiling levels; greater ability to respond to emergency or unplanned workload; more cost effective use of civilian appointment categories; and enhanced ability to recruit civilians in light of the difficult recruiting environment discussed previously.

c. Managing the Civilian Work Force to Budget

Managing the Civilian Work Force to Budget (MCB) is a major initiative of the Army Civilian Personnel Modernization Project. MCB provides for delegation of the authority, responsibility, and accountability for position classification and the approved Army budget for civilian personnel resources to the lowest practical level of management. Its purpose is three-fold: Give commanders and supervisors increased flexibility by replacing conventional cost control mechanisms (e.g., employment and high grade controls) with a flexible civilian pay ceiling; strengthen the accountability of supervisors for the cost of their personnel decisions; and build the foundation of fiscal accountability prerequisite to substantive legislative change to the civilian personnel system (e.g., market-sensitive pay and simplified classification. The Army plans to implement MCB CONUS-wide in FY 1991 with overseas areas to follow in FY 1992.

2. Major Program Changes. The FY 1990 and FY 1991 civilian strength requests reflect a reduction of 12,000 from the FY 1990 Amended Budget Submission. The 12,000 reduction reflects the significant funding reductions and a reduced force structure level. Major changes include reductions to logistics support, Base Operations, and support to force structure. Other adjustments include savings from Base Closures and Defense Management Review actions, transfer of Special Operations Forces, and civilization of military positions. The following table shows the civilian employment estimate by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC).

TABLE III-11
ARMY CIVILIAN PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING & END STRENGTH
 (Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in thousands)

CIVILIANS	FY 89			FY 90			FY 91		
	AUTH	MNG	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES</u>									
<u>STRATEGIC</u>	0.2	0.2	100.0	0.2	0.2	100.0	0.2	0.2	100.0
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	0.2	0.2	100.0	0.2	0.2	100.0	0.2	0.2	100.0
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>									
Land Forces	21.4	18.8	84.0	30.7	25.8	84.0	30.7	27.6	89.9
Division Forces	19.5	16.8	92.9	25.3	23.5	92.9	25.3	25.3	100.0
Theater Forces	12.7	10.5	82.8	20.3	16.8	82.8	20.3	18.5	91.1
Mobility Forces	6.8	6.3	83.8	8.0	6.7	83.8	8.0	6.8	85.0
	2.0	2.0	95.8	2.4	2.3	95.8	2.4	2.3	95.8
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>									
Intelligence	5.2	5.0	87.3	6.3	5.5	87.3	6.3	5.5	87.3
Centrally Managed Comm	2.6	2.6	90.3	3.1	2.8	90.3	3.1	2.8	90.3
	2.6	2.4	84.4	3.2	2.7	84.4	3.2	2.6	81.3
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	75.2	76.3	83.7	88.5	74.1	83.7	88.5	74.7	84.4
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	2.3	3.9	88.1	4.2	3.7	88.1	4.2	3.6	85.7
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	26.2	20.6	84.3	31.9	26.9	84.3	31.9	27.6	86.5
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>									
Int'l Military Org	1.5	1.7	100.0	3.2	3.2	100.0	3.2	3.2	100.0
Unified Commands	1.1	1.4	100.0	2.8	2.8	100.0	2.8	2.8	100.0
Federal Agency Support	0.3	0.2	100.0	0.3	0.3	100.0	0.3	0.3	100.0
Joint Staff	0.1	0.1	100.0	0.1	0.1	100.0	0.1	0.1	100.0
OSD/Def Agcy/Acty	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

CIVILIANS

FY 89

FY 90

FY 91

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES

	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>MNG</u>	<u>RQMT</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>% MNG</u>	<u>RQMT</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>% MNG</u>
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>								
Supply Operations	85.2	84.8	98.9	72.2	73.0	98.9	68.2	69.0
Maintenance Operations	27.9	28.0	39.9	21.2	53.1	39.9	18.9	47.4
Logistics Support Operations	35.9	36.9	34.7	30.8	88.8	34.7	30.3	87.3
	21.5	19.9	24.3	20.1	82.7	24.3	19.0	78.2
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>								
Combat Commands	12.5	11.8	14.1	12.6	89.4	14.1	12.4	87.9
Support Commands	2.8	2.6	2.9	2.8	96.6	2.9	2.9	100.0
	9.7	9.2	11.2	9.8	87.5	11.2	9.5	84.8
<u>K&D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES</u>								
Research and Development	20.2	20.3	24.3	21.9	90.1	24.3	21.4	88.1
Geophysical Activities	20.2	20.3	24.3	21.9	90.1	24.3	21.4	88.1
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>								
Personnel Support	23.5	21.6	28.7	21.3	74.2	28.7	21.9	76.3
Individual Training	9.5	8.2	10.5	8.4	80.0	10.5	9.0	85.7
	14.0	13.4	18.2	12.8	70.3	18.2	12.9	70.9
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>								
Support Installations	128.5	131.9	144.9	124.6	86.0	144.9	125.6	86.7
Centralized Support Act'y	61.6	65.1	74.2	58.3	78.6	74.2	59.8	80.6
	66.9	66.8	70.7	66.3	93.8	70.7	65.8	93.1
<u>TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	<u>402.1</u>	<u>402.9</u>	<u>475.9</u>	<u>392.0</u>	<u>82.4</u>	<u>475.9</u>	<u>391.9</u>	<u>82.3</u>
(Military Technicians)		37.1		37.0			36.7	

Note: Detail may not add due to rounding.

Fewer than 50 spaces. *Includes Military Technicians

D. Mobilization Manpower

1. Military Manpower.

The peak trained military manpower demand occurs late in the scenario (at M+180) when the expanded size and composition of the force has stabilized and the cumulative demand for casualty replacements is near its peak. Although increased manning of the Selected Reserve and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) has eliminated aggregate shortfalls beyond M+20, shortfalls still exist in a number of essential skills, especially combat arms and medical. These peak trained manpower shortfalls normally occur in the middle of the scenario (at about M+90), because early battle losses are high; sizable returns to duty of wounded personnel previously evacuated have not yet occurred; and newly trained personnel are not yet available in significant quantities from the mobilized training base (not until M+113).

Early military manpower demand can only be filled, therefore, from manpower assets already under military control (mobilized early in the scenario). Such resources include:

- o Non-Unit Trained Individuals: Transients, holdees (primarily prisoners and patients), and students.

- o Pretrained individual manpower: Individual Ready Reservists IRR, Inactive National Guardsmen (ING), Standby Reservists, and retirees. We estimate these resources will be fully mobilized by M+50.

- o Training Output: Accelerated output of active and reserve personnel already in the training base on M-Day.

It should be noted that the major factor determining shortfalls and overages, especially after M+40, is the model-derived estimate of casualty replacements required to maintain the fighting force in wartime. However, in a future war, these casualty estimates and thus Army personnel shortfalls may actually be significantly different. In addition, the demand is limited to requirements to fill and sustain the existing force structure. It does not include personnel requirements that would be needed if the force structure is expanded, as is likely for a war that extends beyond 180 days.

2. Civilian Manpower.

Before M-Day, the requirement for U.S. direct hire full-time civilian manpower is represented by the peacetime civilian work force (294,000). On M-Day, the requirement for civilian manpower increases to reflect the support requirements associated with mobilization buildup and preparation of military forces for employment/deployment. A total of about 217,000 additional civilian requirements are created at that time. Concurrently, about 107,000 peacetime positions that are not required in wartime will be terminated (including virtually all the support positions for the USAR and ARNG). This causes a net peak demand of about 404,000 positions at M-Day.

Prior to M-Day, the primary component of the civilian manpower supply is the peacetime U.S. direct hire Full-time permanent work force of about 292,000. At M-Day, this number is reduced to about 250,000 by the loss of 42,000 civilian employees called up for military duty (ready reservists and retirees). The combination of new positions, terminated positions and losses to military duties causes an M-Day shortfall of about 154,000 civilians (404,000 required compared with 250,000 available).

The Army plans to offset this shortfall by converting about 30,000 civilian employees from their peacetime temporary, part time, or intermittent status to full time status and reassigning all available personnel from terminated positions. After M-Day, the new hire requirement for 124,000 civilians will be drawn from other manpower sources, including civil funded manpower, new hires provided by the U.S. Employment Service offices and the Office of Personnel Management, and the rehiring of retired Federal employees. However, competition with private industry and other federal agencies will impact on these resources.

E. New Manpower Management Improvements.

The Army has implemented many programs to improve both personnel and manpower management as part of its concerted effort to become more efficient using available resources. Some of these programs are described below.

1. Efficiency Review (ER) Program

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) requires the Service Secretaries to review functions under their purview with the primary goal of increasing productivity. One way the Department of the Army accomplishes this goal is through the Efficiency Review (ER) Program. The objective is to assure that assigned missions of nondeployable activities are accomplished in the most efficient and cost effective manner.

ER are utilized to determine operational and organizational improvements for TDA activities. To accomplish this more effectively, the Army transferred the program management functions for ER to USAFISA, where it will be performed in conjunction with the Manpower Staffing Standards System (MS-3). In FY 1989, the Army completed 41 ERs and began FY 1990 with 69 on-going studies covering 27,122 civilian and military spaces.

Every commander, project manager and resource manager must foster an environment that encourages innovative cost savings. That environment is characterized by positive leadership, openness, and a willingness to listen. Innovators champion new ideas, encourage horizontal and vertical communications, allow subordinates the "freedom to fail," and encourage creative problem solving. The Army ER program provides a framework by which to accomplish the above.

2. The Army's Integrated Productivity Efforts.

The Army has quite successfully applied the tools of productivity and efficiency (e.g., Productivity Capital Investment Programs, Value Engineering, Organizational Efficiency Reviews, Quality Circles, Productivity Gain Sharing), fostering an environment where innovative management on the part of individuals, organizations, and contractors can flourish. Reinforced by Executive Order 12637, 27 April 1988, which directs that federal agencies improve productivity by an average three percent annually, Army will promote even broader application of the existing tools to ensure that maximum productivity is achieved at all organizational levels. In order to achieve the President's goal, it is necessary, first, to identify those areas that are susceptible to improvement and broad input/output measurement. Seventeen functions have been selected for measurement since the program began. All functions are to be covered by 1992. Dedicated leadership, an aware and motivated workforce, and use of already-proven tools and techniques will help achieve the President's goal while meeting the ongoing challenge to produce a better Army.

3. Manpower Staffing Standards System (MS-3).

The Manpower Staffing Standards System is a program designed to provide credible manpower requirements for the Army's TDA organizations through the application of workload-based staffing standards. Approximately 450,000 of the Army's 620,000 peacetime TDA requirements are workload-driven and, as such, will be determined through the application of staffing standards developed by performing detailed work measurement studies or by using statistical analyses of historical data. By end FY 1989 standards were approved or applied for 168,578 spaces, studies were in progress on an additional 201,589 spaces, and 135,714 spaces were formally scheduled for study.

4. Manpower Requirements Criteria (MARC) Program.

MARC is the Army's process for determining wartime manpower requirements for combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) functions in all TOE/MTOE units. Approximately 500,000 of the Army's TOE manpower requirements in the Active Army and Reserve Components are

determined by this process. MARC is designed to reflect more accurately the minimum essential CS/CSS requirements for sustained operations. Accuracy of the criteria developed for maintenance functions is assured by firmly anchoring the determination process to sample data collection and other equipment and maintenance data reporting programs presently ongoing within the Army. Many of the 500,000 requirements are being determined through a systematic method which uses computer modeling in conjunction with scenario-oriented data to enhance the process. Work on functional studies and the computer modeling of MARC studies continues. Aviation maintenance was approved in FY 1988. Track/Automotive is scheduled for completion in FY 1990. Emphasis will be placed on interim procedures to update manpower requirements in these specific functional areas during FY 1990 until the modeling process can be completed.

5. Capital Investment Programs.

These programs include the Quick Return on Investment Program, Productivity Enhancing Capital Investment Program, and OSD Productivity Investment Funds. Under the productivity Capital Investment Programs, money is set aside for fast payback capital tools, equipment, and facilities that save manpower, reduce costs, increase productivity, and improve readiness. Modernized equipment and facilities provided through these programs raise organizational productivity and improve the quality of support services. In addition, troops are trained with state-of-the-art equipment leading to a more ready force. For example, the types of equipment purchased under these programs include loading ramps, weapons training simulators that enhance feedback on marksmanship while saving live ammunition, hand-held radios that assisted in the Grenada incident, and asphalt reclaimers that refurbish roads damaged by training exercises. For every dollar invested, \$17 is returned in benefits over the economic life. A positive environment is created for Army leaders through opportunities enabling them to obtain modern equipment and facilities, to reapply manpower and dollars toward other priority initiatives, to motivate the work force, and to achieve an efficient and cost effective organization. These achievements will assist the Army in meeting its goal established by the President to increase productivity three percent per year.

6. Commercial Activities (CA) Program

This program designs a streamlined Government work center (called the "most efficient organization" or "MEO") to perform contractible functions, compares MEO cost to the cost of contracting out the work, and then determines the most cost effective source (Government or private sector) for obtaining required commercial services in the future. The result is increased efficiency and cost reduction regardless of whether the work is contracted out or remains in house. Under the CA Program, the Army completed studies of about 3,100 announced civilian and military spaces in FY 1989, and plans to complete studies of approximately 2,000 spaces in FY 1990. Savings from the CA Program are incorporated in the Army's manpower estimates.

7. Army Acquisition Corps

The Army Acquisition Corps (AAC) is the Army's program to develop a dedicated corps of military and civilian acquisition specialists and leaders. The challenges of developing, producing, and fielding new systems demand the focused attention of knowledgeable professionals. This initiative is the next logical step in the Army's efforts to streamline acquisition management and improve efficiency. The AAC will build on the success we have achieved thus far in implementing Packard Commission recommendations and the Goldwaters-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act and will address the concerns and recommendations contained in the Defense Management Review.

The Army Acquisition Corps will enhance and sustain the acquisition skills of a select group of officers with a solid foundation of operational experience, and civilian specialists with proven technical experience. The program will integrate education, training, assignments and promotion for military and civilian members of the AAC.

III. PROGRAMMED MANPOWER BY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORY (DPPC): Since March 1988, the Army's manpower accounting, force structure, and Planning/Programming/Budgeting systems have been subjected to a massive review/restructure under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel). This effort identified many cases of DPPC misclassifications of existing Army tactical units, as well as difference in information for the units contained in the three major Army manpower information systems. This report contains DPPC structure adjustments necessary to correct the classification of existing tactical units, with battlefield missions, as well as the adjustments to strength levels for Active Army units reflecting the approved budget position in all management systems. Additional work in this area remains to be done.

A. Strategic Forces.

1. Defense Strategic Forces.
2. Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces.

Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.5	0.6	0.6
Reserve Component			
USAR	0.4	0.4	0.4
<u>Civilian</u>	.2	.2	.2

Manpower in this subcategory is for support of the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS), including airborne command posts and an alternate National Military Command Center.

B. Tactical/Mobility Forces.

1. Land Forces.

a. Division Forces.

Division Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	421.8	408.7	398.1
Reserve Component			
USAR	191.5	191.3	187.6
ARNG	404.9	395.5	395.5
<u>Civilian</u>	10.5	16.8	18.5

Manpower in this subcategory is assigned to, or in support of, the Army's combat divisions, separate combat brigades, regiments, and tactical support units.

The decrease (-13,113) in active military manpower in FY 1990 results primarily from Congressional imposed reductions associated with INF Treaty implementation, a Congressional general force structure reduction and the initial phase of the Army's plan to reshape the force in the 1990's with the recent changes in the international environment.

The decrease (-10,593) in active military manpower in FY 1991 results from enlisted adjustments to reduce manning shortfalls in combat support and combat service support activities (3,000), increase to field artillery units to backfill missile units removed as a result of INF implementation (+1,450), and the initial phase of the Army's plan to reshape the force in the 1990's with the recent changes in the international environment. This includes plans to inactivate two CONUS active divisions and support forces while maintaining combat readiness.

The decrease (-3,700) in USAR manpower for FY 1991 reflects changes in USAR force structure based on the Army's plan to reshape the force.

The decrease (-9,400) in ARNG military manpower in FY 90 reflects the Army's plan to reshape the total force.

The increase (+6,211) in civilian manpower in FY 1990 reflects a reprogramming of Logistics Support units to Division Forces (+3,434), Army Reserve Division support (+603), and undermanning (+2,174).

The increase (+1,768) in FY 91 reflects Logistics Support reprogramming to Division Forces (+1,609), Army Reserve Division support (+92), and civilianization (+67).

b. Theater Forces.

Theater Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	62.5	66.7	65.4
Reserve Component			
USAR	17.1	17.9	17.7
ARNG	20.6	20.1	20.1
<u>Civilian</u>	6.3	6.7	6.8

Manpower in this subcategory provides theater-wide tactical support to include maintenance to tactical equipment, air defense forces, tactical support to other services, Berlin defense forces, intelligence support, electronic warfare technology and development, and special operation forces.

The increase (+4,186) in military manpower in FY 1990 results from realignment of tactical units in Korea (+1,536), enhancements to special operations forces (+888), increases to US South Forces in Panama (+713), communications support (+1,064), air defense forces (+527), overmanning (-542).

The decrease (-1,362) in active military manpower in FY 1991 results from completion of INF Treaty implementation (-3,274), partially offset by increases for support units in Europe (+622), support units in Korea (+620), and manpower realigned from support to Joint Activities as directed by the DoD IG review of Unified and Specified Command Headquarters (+62). Research and Combat Development in support of SOF enhancements (+772), and miscellaneous reprogramming (-164).

The changes for USAR manpower in FY 1990 and FY 1991 reflects the projected force structure adjustments.

The increase (+34) in civilian manpower for FY 1991 reflects the transfer of Special Operations Forces (-436), Tactical Equipment Maintenance support (+257), Communications support (+270), and Special Mission Forces (Army Reserve) (-57).

2. Mobility Forces.

	<u>Mobility Forces Manpower</u> (End Strength in Thousands)		
	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	.3	.3	.3
Reserve Component			
USAR	1.9	1.9	1.8
<u>Civilian</u>	2.0	2.3	2.3

Manpower included in this category supports CONUS ocean terminal operations, DoD traffic management and engineering services, and accountability and maintenance of the Defense Railway Interchange Fleet.

The decrease (-88) in active military manpower in FY 1991 is in transportation units and strategic deployment activities.

C. Communications/Intelligence.

1. Intelligence.

	<u>Intelligence Manpower</u> (End Strength in Thousands)		
	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	9.5	10.0	10.0
Reserve Component			
USAR	0.6	0.6	0.6
<u>Civilian</u>	2.6	2.8	2.8

Manpower in this category supports both the Consolidated Cryptologic Program and the General Defense Intelligence Program, the Intelligence

and Threat Analysis Center, Foreign Science and Technology Center, Missile Intelligence Agency, Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center, as well as service support to the Defense Intelligence Agency, and to the National Security Agency.

The increase of +485 in active military manpower in FY 1990 is due to undermanning.

2. Centrally Managed Communications.

Centrally Managed Communications Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	7.8	7.7	7.1
<u>Civilian</u>	2.4	2.7	2.6

Manpower in this category supports nontactical defense consolidated telecommunications and the worldwide command and control system to include strategic Army communications, long-haul communication, communication security, inter-Service/Agency automated message processing, SATCOM ground environment, and the National Science Center for Communications and Electronics. This category excludes support to tactical units (included under Land Forces) and installations (included in support activities).

The decrease (-588) in active military manpower in FY 1991 results from signal unit realignment to Theater Forces (-391), a decrease to communications security (-235), and miscellaneous reprogramming (+38).

The decrease (-48) in civilian manpower in FY91 is for long haul communications support.

D. Combat Installations.

Combat Installations Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	17.6	16.0	14.3
<u>Civilian</u>	76.3	74.1	74.7

Manpower in this category supports the Army's combat mission commands: US Army Europe, US Army Japan, Eighth US Army-Korea, US Forces Command, US Western Command and US Army South.

The decrease (-1,592) in active military manpower for FY 1990 results from realignments of military manpower from installation support activities in Europe (-691) and the US (-768), and overmanning (-133).

The decrease (-1,674) in military manpower in FY 1991 results from functional transfer of resources (-238), civilianization of military spaces (-237), base closure initiatives (-57) and reprogramming of CONUS base operations support of FORSCOM (-1,142).

The decrease (-2,211) in civilian manpower in FY 90 is due to Real Property Maintenance activity - Europe (-2,274), Base Operations support - Europe (+1,817), Pacific support (+218), Real Property Maintenance activity - Pacific (+1,182), Base Operations support - CONUS (-1,564), Real Property Maintenance activity - CONUS (-679), Base Operations support - Pacific (+211), miscellaneous manning adjustments (-29), and overmanning (+1,093).

The increase (+656) in civilian manpower in FY 91 is due to Europe support (+686), Base Operations support - Panama (+115), Real Property Maintenance activity - CONUS (-383), Base Operations - CONUS (-136), Pacific support (+269), civilianization (+158), and miscellaneous manning adjustments (-53).

E. Force Support Training.

Force Support Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY89</u>	<u>FY90</u>	<u>FY91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	6.3	5.4	6.1
<u>Civilian</u>	3.9	3.7	3.6

Manpower in the category supports the Army's Jungle Warfare School in Panama, the National Training Center, the Joint Readiness Training Center, the Battle Command Training Program, the Northern Warfare Training Command in Alaska, and the Seventh Army Training Center in Germany and JCS directed/coordinated exercises.

The decrease (-967) in active military manpower in FY 1990 is due to overmanning.

The increase (+736) in active military manpower in FY 1991 is for increased support to special activities (+1198) and a decrease in training support to units (-216) and miscellaneous reprogramming (-246).

The decrease (-114) in civilian manpower for FY 1991 represents training support to units (-66), force related training-Europe (+4), and special activities-FORSCOM (-52).

F. Medical Support.

	<u>Medical Support Manpower</u> (End Strength in Thousands)		
	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	33.9	34.1	34.1
Reserve Component			
ARNG	0.2	0.3	0.4
USAR	9.3	9.7	9.6
<u>Civilian</u>	26.6	26.9	27.6

Manpower in this category supports health care activities, to include health care research and development, care in regional defense facilities, CHAMPUS support, dental care activities, and station hospitals/medical clinics.

The increase (+663) in civilian manpower for FY 1991 reflects programmed increases to support other health activities (-47), and medical support units (Army Reserve) (+8), care in regional defense facilities (+102), dental care activities (+3), station hospitals/medical clinics (+520), and civilianization (+77).

The changes in USAR manpower reflect project force structure changes.

G. Joint Activities.

1. International Activities.*

	<u>International Activities Manpower</u> (End Strength in Thousands)		
	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	3.7	4.3	4.3
<u>Civilian</u>	1.4	2.8	2.8

Manpower in this category is assigned to Management Headquarters activities in international military organizations.

* Includes other non Management Headquarters activities.

The increase of 527 in active military manpower in FY 90 is due to undermanning.

The increase (+1,405) in civilian manpower in FY 90 represents an increase in support to Foreign Military Sales.

2. Unified Commands.

Unified Commands Manpower*
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.3	1.1	1.1
<u>Civilian</u>	.2	.3	.3

Manpower in this category is assigned to Management Headquarters in unified commands.

* Includes other non Management Headquarters Activities.

3. Federal Agency Support.

Federal Agency Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	.2	.2	.2
<u>Civilian</u>	0.1	0.1	0.1

Manpower in this category is assigned to non-DoD agencies in support of various functions. Assignments are normally on a reimbursable basis, unless they support a DoD mission.

4. Joint Staff.

Joint Staff
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY89</u>	<u>FY90</u>	<u>FY91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	.4	.3	.3

Manpower in this category represents service support to the Joint Staff.

5. OSD/Defense Agencies and Activities.

OSD/Defense Agencies & Activities Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY89</u>	<u>FY90</u>	<u>FY91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	3.2	3.1	3.3

Manpower in this category represents service support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, foreign counterintelligence activities, security and investigative activities, foreign military sales, miscellaneous support to other nations, military assistance program and various other Defense support agencies such as Defense Nuclear Agency and Defense Logistics Agency.

The increase (+200) in active military manpower for FY 1991 is in security/investigative activities (+216), and support to miscellaneous defense agencies (-16).

H. Central Logistics.

1. Supply Operations

Supply Operations Manpower (End strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 92</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	.8	.7	.6
<u>Civilian</u>	28.0	21.2	18.9

Manpower in this category serve in the operation of supply depots for both industrially funded and direct funded activities, inventory control point operations and procurement operations worldwide, with the largest strength concentration in the US Army Material command and US Army Europe.

The decrease (-94) in active military manpower in FY 91 reflects supply depot operations (-42), procurement operations (-42), inventory control points (-7), and supply depots (-3).

The decrease (-6,816) in civilian manpower in FY 1990 reflects supply depot operations (-1,583), inventory control points (-962), procurement operations (+205) and supply depots (industrial fund) (+97), reprogramming of Logistics support units to Division Forces (-3,434), reprogramming of Foreign Military Sales (-1,006), and overmanning (-133).

The decrease (-2,264) in civilian manpower in FY 91 reflects inventory control points (-588), procurement operations (-850), supply depots (industrial fund) (-670), supply depot operations (-236), and civilianization (+80).

2. Maintenance Operations

Maintenance Operations Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.1	1.0	1.0
<u>Civilian</u>	36.9	30.8	30.3

Manpower in this category serves in support of industrial and non-industrial funded depot maintenance facilities, munitions facilities, missile facilities, and other maintenance support activities worldwide, with the largest strength concentration in the US Army Material command and US Army Europe.

The decrease (-6,034) in civilian manpower in FY 1990 reflects depot maintenance (industrial fund) (-93), munition facilities (industrial fund) (-7), missile facilities (industrial fund) (-7,089), maintenance support activities (+1,001), and depot maintenance (direct funded) (+1,115), and overmanning (-961).

The decrease (-547) in civilian manpower in FY 1991 reflects munitions facilities (industrial fund) (-17), depot maintenance (industrial fund) (-433), and maintenance support activities (-97).

3. Logistics Support Operations

Logistics Support Operations Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.3	1.4	1.4
<u>Civilian</u>	19.9	20.1	19.0

Manpower in this category provide worldwide logistics support for the following activities: construction (planning and design), overseas port units, transportation related activities, RDTE for nondevelopmental items, administration, industrial preparedness, and general logistics support. The largest strength concentration is in the US Army Corps of Engineers, US Army Material command, and US Army Europe.

The decrease (-1,130) in civilian manpower in FY .991 reflects industrial preparedness (-1), logistics administrative support (-168), logistics support activities (-106), construction (planning and design) (+75), maintenance activities (Army Reserve) (-76), and overseas port operations (-854).

I. Service Management Headquarters.*

1. Combat Commands Management Headquarters

Combat Commands Management Headquarters Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY89</u>	<u>FY90</u>	<u>FY91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	2.1	2.0	2.0
<u>Civilian</u>	2.6	2.8	2.9

Manpower in this category is assigned to service support in combat commands.

The increase (+92) in civilian manpower for FY 1991 reflects realignment of civilian manpower in Army Management Headquarters activities.

2. Support Commands Management Headquarters*

Support Commands Management Headquarters Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY89</u>	<u>FY90</u>	<u>FY91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	4.3	4.2	4.1
Reserve Component			
USAR	0.8	0.8	0.8
<u>Civilian</u>	9.2	9.8	9.5

Manpower in this category is assigned to service support in support commands to include Department of the Army (Office of the Secretary and Office of the Chief of Staff).

The decrease (-119) in active military manpower in FY 1991 reflects a realignment of Army Management Headquarters activities.

* Includes other non Management Headquarters activities.

The increase (+635) in civilian manpower in FY 1990 is due to Management Headquarters adjustments (+158) and undermanning (+477).

The decrease (-294) in civilian manpower for FY 1991 reflects decreases in Management Headquarters - Logistics and Administrative.

J. Research and Development.

Research and Development Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	4.4	4.6	4.3
<u>Civilian</u>	20.3	21.9	21.4

Manpower in this category performs in-house efforts and directs contractor efforts for basic and applied research; exploratory, advanced, and engineering development; and test and evaluation for the Army's weapon systems and other equipment items. In addition, it provides administrative and logistical support for other RDTE installations and activities.

The decrease (-273) in active military manpower in FY 1991 reflects a decrease in support to operational testing (-230), civilianization of military spaces (-42), and miscellaneous reprogramming (-1).

The increase (+1,560) in civilian manpower in FY 1990 reflects aviation technology (+111), missile technology (+1,124), joint services small arms program (-2,913), test and evaluation support (+98), program wide activities (+144), weapons and munitions technology (+2,787), Military Engineering technology (+89), other adjustments (+217), and overmanning (-97).

The decrease (-483) in civilian manpower in FY 1991 reflects support of operation test (-193), program wide activities (-41), Special Operations Forces (-91), Test Range facilities (-81) and other adjustments (-77).

K. Training and Personnel.

1. Personnel Support.

Personnel Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY89</u>	<u>FY90</u>	<u>FY91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	12.6	13.2	12.8
<u>Civilian</u>	8.2	8.4	9.0

Manpower in this category is used in the US Army Recruiting Command, the Army Junior ROTC Program, Army personnel processing activities, off duty education programs, other recruiting and examining activities, civilian training and education and development, and education and training system development.

The increase of (+556) in active military manpower in FY 90 represents an increase to recruiting activities (+220), an increase in support to special activities (+211) and undermanning (+125).

The decrease (-367) in active military manpower in FY 1991 is for civilianization of military spaces.

The increase (+600) in civilian manpower for FY 1991 reflects conversion of Non-Appropriated Fund employees to Appropriated Fund (+234), Other Personnel activities (+315), and civilianization (+51).

2. Individual Training.

Individual Training Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY89</u>	<u>FY90</u>	<u>FY91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	40.7	41.6	39.8
Reserve Component			
ARNG	6.2	6.2	6.4
USAR	57.7	57.7	56.5
<u>Civilian</u>	13.4	12.8	12.9

Manpower in this category supports the conduct of individual training to include recruit training units, service academies, officer candidate/training schools, Senior ROTC, general skill training, general intelligence skill training, flight training, professional military education, health care education and training, and training development. Individuals actually undergoing training are carried in the student/trainee and cadets portions of the Individuals Account.

The increase (+936) in active military manpower for FY 1990 is in general skill training (+539), support of training establishment (+109), air traffic control and flight training support (+280), and miscellaneous reprogramming (+8).

The decrease (-1,733) in active military manpower in FY 1991 is caused by the Congressional force structure reduction (-1,085), civilianization of military spaces (-549) and miscellaneous reprogramming (-99).

The decrease in USAR manpower in FY 1991 is based on the projected change in force structure.

The decrease (-536) in civilian manpower in FY 1990 represents special operations forces training (+26), general skill training (-851), professional military education (-22), support of training establishments (+135), training developments (-757), aviation flight training (+146), other flight training (+32), medical education and training (-60), recruit training (+30), undergraduate pilot training (+82), miscellaneous manning adjustments (+38), and undermanning (+665).

The increase (+69) in civilian manpower in FY 1991 reflects the transfer of Special Operations Forces (-389), Civilianization (+557), and General Skills training (-99).

L. Support Activities.

1. Support Installations.

Support Installations Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY89</u>	<u>FY90</u>	<u>FY91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	16.3	13.0	13.1
Reserve Component			
ARNG	23.7	23.8	23.7
USAR	4.7	4.7	4.6
<u>Civilian</u>	65.1	58.3	59.8

Manpower in this category provides support for base operations, real property maintenance activity, base communications, visual information activities, commissary retail sales, troop issue subsistence, Defense Environment Restoration Program, and family housing operations for Army support-oriented commands: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, US Army Materiel Command, US Army Information Systems Command, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, and US Army Health Services Command.

The decrease (-3,275) in active military manpower in FY 1990 results from realignment of installation personnel in Military District of Washington activities to Centralized Support Activities (-1,609), a reduction to base operations training (-487) and overmanning (+1,179).

The increase of (+92) in active military manpower in FY 91 results from a decrease in communication in support of BASOPS (-108), an increase to BASOPS training (+261), and miscellaneous reprogramming (-61).

The decrease (-6,783) in civilian manpower for FY 1990 reflects base communications (+73), visual information activities (-24), family housing operations (-12), commissaries (-117), troop issue subsistence (-242), BASOPS - logistics (-887), BASOPS - training (-424), BASOPS - administration (-32), BASOPS - RDTE (+134), BASOPS - medical (+85), BASOPS - other

activities (+65), RPMA - RDTE (-107), BASOPS - Army Reserve (-367), RPMA - RPMA - Army Reserve (-33), BASOPS - communications (-118) training (-1,157), RPMA - logistics (+11), miscellaneous manning adjustments (-1,864), and overmanning (-1,767).

The increase (+1,513) in civilian manpower for FY 1991 reflects troop issue subsistence (+2), commissaries (+31), BASOPS - medical (-54), BASOPS - communications (+22), BASOPS - logistics (+397), BASOPS - training (+903), BASOPS - RDTE (+117), BASOPS - Army Reserve (+7), RPMA - logistics (-169) RPMA - training (+64), RPMA - communications (+181), RPMA - Army Reserve (-16), RPMA - RDTE (-42), visual information activities (+29), family housing (+4), base communications (+13), and miscellaneous manning adjustments (+24).

2. Centralized Support Activities.

Centralized Support Activities Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY89</u>	<u>FY90</u>	<u>FY91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	16.8	18.7	17.9
Reserve Component			
ARNG	1.4	1.4	1.4
USAR	17.5	17.5	17.2
<u>Civilian</u>	66.8	66.3	65.8

Manpower in this category supports combat development activities, public affairs, personnel administration, criminal investigation activities, information management-automation, and base operations/real property maintenance support for the US Army Military District of Washington.

The increase (+1,172) in active military manpower in FY 1990 results from realignment of military manpower with transfer of Military District of Washington from the support installations category to Centralized Support Activities (+986), increased administrative support in Europe (+821) and overmanning (-635).

The decrease (-881) in active military manpower for FY 1991 results from a decrease of administrative support in Europe (-612), decrease to combat development (-39), decrease to information management (-159) and miscellaneous reprogramming (-71).

The decrease (-516) in civilian manpower in FY 90 is due to Service Wide support (-486) and overmanning

The decrease (-566) in civilian manpower for FY 1991 reflects criminal investigation (+6), public affairs (+1), combat development activities (-202), administrative support - combat commands (-129), information management reprogramming (+96), administrative support - CONUS (-24), base operations - CONUS (+31), reserve readiness support (-38), Personnel Administration (+68), transfer of Special Operations Forces support (-141), civilianization (+100), and service wide support (-334).

M. Undistributed Manning.

Undistributed Manning
(Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active (End Year)	0(-2.7)	-1.4	4.3
(Manyears)	(4.1)	(2.2)	(3.4)

Usually the total of all unit spaces (force structure) does not exactly match the total manpower available to fill them (the operating strength or force structure manning). This delta is termed "Undistributed Manning". A positive figure (overmanning) indicates that more trained personnel (faces) were available than the structure (spaces) required. A negative figure (undermanning) means that the structure (spaces) was larger than the available operating strength (faces).

These deviations from exact manning of the structure are a result of the seasonal distribution of gains and losses, total strength, and changes in the Individuals subaccounts. The projected figures above show the expected deltas for future year ends (FY 90 and FY 91).

For historical years, the DMRR distributes all personnel to either the operating strength or the individuals accounts. As always, though, the operating strength does not exactly match the total structure manning target. For information and for comparison to the FY 90 and 91 undistributed manning figures, the year end FY 89 numbers are presented above in parenthesis. For a historical year, however, they should not be added to the preceding detailed breakouts of operating strength personnel, because they are already included there.

As always, manyear figures provide a more representative measurement of what occurred (or will occur) in a fiscal year than do end year snapshots.

N. Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs).

Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs)
(Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Reserve Component			
USAR	14.7	14.2	14.0

An IMA is an individual reservist (officer or enlisted) who is preassigned to an Active Component organization in peacetime to train for wartime duty with that organization.

O. Individuals.

The Individuals subaccounts include manpower in trainee, transient, holdee (patient, prisoner, separatee), student, officer accession student, and US Military Academy cadet status. All of these subaccounts are affected by seasonal or other factors. As a consequence, manyear numbers should be used to accurately gauge the average size of these subaccounts. End year numbers are not ordinarily useful in this regard and are seldom a basis for meaningful comparisons.

(1) Transients.

Transient Manpower
(Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active (End year)	16.4	15.1	14.6
(Manyears)	(17.7)	(16.7)	(16.3)

Transient strengths are based on the projected volumes of PCS moves for accessions, separations, and retirements, and on operational, rotational, and training move requirements. The changes in transient strengths are a result of changes in volume, timing, and duration of PCS moves. Moves are seasonally influenced, and manyear figures are more reflective of average transient strength than are end year numbers, which are often atypical.

(2) Holdees (Patients, Prisoners, Controllees, and Pending Separations).

Holdee Manpower
(Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active (End year) (Manyears)	5.9 (5.1)	5.1 (5.2)	5.1 (5.0)

Holdee numbers generally remain fairly stable over time. Manyear numbers reflect average holdee strength. End year values have no particular significance.

(3) Trainees, Students and Cadets.

Trainees, Students, and Cadets
(Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active (TOTAL) (End year) (Manyears)	77.3 (66.5)	66.5 (59.3)	61.3 (56.7)
Trainees/Students (EY) (Manyears)	72.7 (62.2)	62.0 (55.1)	56.7 (52.4)
Cadets (End year) (Man years)	(4.5) (4.3)	(4.6) (4.2)	(4.6) (4.3)

Reserve Component

Trainees/Students (Pay categories F, P, Q, T and X)

ARNG	35.1	35.1	38.1
USAR	34.5	22.9	25.7

The active component trainee data largely mirror the flow of non-prior service accessions. Manyear values are much more meaningful than end year positions, particularly in view of the seasonal nature of accessions which directly impact on the numbers of trainees and officer accession students. Both of these groups are particularly subject to change at end year as accessions are managed to meet the overall end strength.

The Reserve Component Individuals Account consists of Troop Program Unit junior enlisted personnel who have not completed initial entry qualification training and are not deployable. The USAR decrease in FY90 is caused by a reduction in paid drill strength.

CHAPTER IV
NAVY MANPOWER PROGRAM

I. INTRODUCTION:

A. General

This chapter outlines the Navy's manpower program for active, reserve, and civilian manpower for FY 1990 and FY 1991. It addresses manpower trends from actual performance in FY 1989 to projections into FY 1991 and reflects changes contained in the President's Budget submission for FY 1990/91. Further, it reviews Navy initiatives and programs geared to meet the challenge of maintaining our readiness posture within the context of a more fiscally-constrained environment. The Navy manpower program supports the force structure required to accomplish Navy missions as defined by national, political, and military strategy.

In FY 1990, Navy will have a total of 551 ships. In FY 1991 this number will decrease to 546, a reduction of 20 ships from the FY 1989 level. Authorized Navy end strength in FY 1990 is 590,501 (72,493 officers and 518,008 enlisted) and 584,800 in FY 1991 (71,999 officers and 512,801 enlisted). This represents a reduction of 154 officers and 7,698 personnel between FY 1989 and FY 1991.

Navy's manpower strategy is to retain high quality personnel, increase experience levels, gain better sea/shore rotation, improve training levels and reduce overall manpower costs. This strategy includes a continued effort to provide the quality of life for Navy personnel that will contribute to increased retention and readiness.

Navy must be able to fill key positions to perform its mission successfully and safely. Therefore, the recruiting and retention of high caliber officer and enlisted personnel to man our technologically-sophisticated Navy remains a top priority. Declining numbers of potential male recruits and low civilian unemployment rates magnify the importance of sound retention and recruiting programs.

Key manpower issues for the 1990's include resolving a shortage of experienced nuclear-trained officers, mid-grade pilots, key enlisted technical personnel, and health care professionals. Through the combined efforts of Navy, OSD, and Congress, significant progress has been made in retaining personnel in these key areas and in attracting new, high caliber individuals. Continued effort is essential to maintain a trained and ready force.

The Report of the Secretary of Defense to Congress on the FY 1991 Budget addresses plans for attracting and retaining to Naval Service our nation's best and brightest individuals. Included in the plans are prudent pay raises, retention bonuses for critical ratings, reasonable housing allowances, and adequate medical benefits.

The Navy chapter of the FY 1991 DMRR substantiates the President's FY 1991 budget figures, accounts for ongoing changes in the naval force structure, addresses manpower issues with potential long-term impact, and details present Navy manpower requirements.

B. Wartime Manpower Requirements

The military Wartime Manpower Planning System (WARMAPS) is a DoD directed manpower data report based upon the wartime scenario in the Defense Planning Guidance. It identifies the wartime manpower requirements and compares them against the resources available from the active component, selected reserve, training pipeline output, and pretrained individual manpower (PIM). The PIM consists of personnel from the individual ready reserve, standby reserve and retired military. Casualty replacements are estimated as well as number of personnel in trainee, transient, holdee, patient, or student status. The civilian WARMAPS report identifies civilian mobilization manpower demand and supply. The FY 1989 civilian WARMAPS report reflects a recent update of quantity and quality to the wartime manpower requirements. The military and civilian data in the table that follows indicate when peak demand for military and civilian personnel occurs.

	<u>Wartime Peak Demand For Trained Manpower</u> <u>(Strength in Thousands)</u>		
	<u>Military</u>		<u>Civilian</u>
	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
Time at which peak demand occurs	M+180	M+150	M+180
Peak Demand	1,064.8	937.4	351.1

C. Strength Request

The Navy requests resources for active military, reserve military, and civilian manpower for FY 1990 and FY 1991 as follows:

	<u>Navy Manpower Program</u> <u>(Strength in Thousands)</u>		
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Military			
Active	592.6	590.5	584.8
Selected Reserve/TAR	151.5	153.4	149.7
Civilian	332.3	326.6	320.2

The Navy manpower program shows only the authorized end strength required to effectively operate the Navy during peacetime, while wartime requirements, as indicated in paragraph B above, reflects end strength which would be needed during mobilization.

The Civilian Manpower requirements are for the manpower levels required to execute funded programs, and comply with concerted efforts to contain personnel costs through pursuit of economy, efficiency, and productivity improvement programs.

The Selected Reserve component is the difference between the trained manpower needed at the start of a protracted conventional war and the Active Navy we can afford and attain in peacetime.

Navy reassesses military billet assignments at shore establishments and considers substituting civilians or contractors for all non-military essential billets when more cost effective and consistent with sea-shore rotation requirements.

D. Major Changes Affecting Manpower Program

1. Manpower Program by Major DPPC

The distribution of military manpower from FY 1989 to FY 1991 reflects an end strength reduction tied to force structure reductions. Using programmed end strength for each Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC) between FY 1989 and FY 1991, the following tables depict the Navy Active Strength distribution. The specific figures may change as a result of annual budget decisions; however, the general proportions should remain relatively stable.

Navy Active Strength Distribution By DPPC
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Strategic	22.4	23.6	23.4
Tactical/Mobility	286.4	303.8	299.5
Communications/ Intelligence	15.3	16.7	16.5
Combat Installations	25.4	26.2	25.9
Force Support Training	15.7	15.6	15.6
Medical Support	24.7	26.4	26.3
Joint Activities	4.9	5.2	5.2
Central Logistics	6.5	6.6	6.6
Service Management Headquarters	5.4	5.6	5.5
Research and Development	7.1	7.7	7.6
Training and Personnel	36.0	37.1	37.6
Support Activities	29.9	29.1	28.3
Operating Strength Deviation		-7.0	-7.0
Individuals**	112.7	93.8	93.8
TOTALS***	<u>592.6</u>	<u>590.5</u>	<u>584.8</u>

Navy Selected Reserve Strength Distribution by DPPC
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Strategic	0.5	0.5	0.5
Tactical/Mobility	82.0	90.1	87.4
Communications/			
Intelligence	6.0	6.3	6.0
Combat Installations	10.6	8.9	8.6
Force Support Training	1.2	0.7	0.7
Medical Support	17.1	16.4	16.7
Joint Activities	0.8	0.8	0.8
Central Logistics	8.2	7.4	7.3
Service Management			
Headquarters	4.3	3.6	3.5
Research and Development	1.1	1.1	1.0
Training and Personnel	1.4	3.1	2.8
Support Activities	8.9	8.3	8.2
Operating Strength			
Deviation	0	0	0
Individual Mobilization			
Augmentee	0.1	0.6	0.6
Individuals**	9.4	5.5	5.5
TOTALS***	<u>151.5</u>	<u>153.4</u>	<u>149.7</u>

Navy Civilian Strength Distribution By DPPC
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Strategic	4.3	4.5	4.5
Tactical/Mobility	7.4	9.0	9.3
Communications/			
Intelligence	3.4	3.6	3.4
Combat Installations	20.4	19.8	20.6
Force Support Training	1.7	1.7	1.7
Medical Support	8.2	9.2	9.4
Joint Activities	6.2	6.4	6.3
Central Logistics	169.1	162.8	153.8
Service Management			
Headquarters	9.0	8.9	8.8
Research and Development	37.7	37.7	38.3
Training and Personnel	5.9	6.1	6.3
Support Activities	58.9	57.2	57.9
TOTALS***	<u>332.3</u>	<u>326.6</u>	<u>320.2</u>

* End Year Actuals

** Individuals includes students, transients, and trainees.

*** Totals may not add due to rounding.

2. Major Force Structure Changes

Major force structure consists of total ship battle forces (strategic forces, major surface combatants and attack submarines, support ships and mobilization forces), local defense (auxiliaries and sealift forces), miscellaneous support forces, and naval aviation forces.

a. Total Battle Forces

In FY 1990 the total ship battle forces decreased by fifteen to 551 ships. In FY 1991 this number will decrease to 546. Changes in each of the four categories comprising total ship battle forces are as follows:

(1) Strategic Forces

Strategic forces decrease from 42 to 40 in FY 1990 with the decommissioning/deactivation of three Lafayette class SSBNs and the commissioning of the USS West Virginia. In FY 1991, total strategic forces increase to 41 with the commissioning of the USS Kentucky.

(2) Battle Forces

In FY 1990 battle forces will decrease by twenty two to 412 and in FY 1991 battle forces will decrease by fifteen to a total of 397. In FY 1990, the commissioning of USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) and decommissioning of USS Coral Sea (CV 43) will make a net total of 14 aircraft carriers in FY 1990. In FY 1991, USS Kitty Hawk returns to the active force from the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) and USS Constellation (CV 64) enters into SLEP.

Surface combatants decrease by fourteen to 174 in FY 1990, and decrease by fourteen more in FY 1991 for a total of 160 ships. Battleships will remain at four in FY 1990 and decrease by two in FY 1991 as the USS Iowa and USS New Jersey are placed in inactive service. Cruisers will grow from 40 to 43 in FY 1990 with the addition of three Ticonderoga cruisers, and to 47 in FY 1991 with the addition of four more Ticonderoga class cruisers. Destroyers will drop from 68 to 57 in FY 1990 as eight Adams class and three Farragut class destroyers are placed in inactive status. In FY 1991 the number of destroyers decreases to 47 with three Farragut and eight Adams class destroyers are placed in inactive status, while the USS Arleigh Burke is commissioned. Frigates decrease by six in FY 1990 to 70 as four Knox class and two Perry class frigates are transferred to the Naval Reserve Force (NRF). In FY 1991, frigates will decrease to a total of 64 with the transfer of six Knox class frigates to the NRF.

Attack submarines will decrease to 92 in FY 1990. The decommissioning/deactivation of one Darter and one Barbel class SSS leaves only one diesel-powered submarine in the Navy inventory. The USS Glenard D. Lipscomb, three Skipjack class, and four Permit class submarines will be decommissioned. Three Los Angeles class will be commissioned for a total reduction of seven attack submarines in FY 1990. In FY 1991 the number of attack submarines decreases by six to 86 with three Los Angeles class commissionings and one Barbel, six Permit, and two Sturgeon Class decommissionings.

Pegasus class patrol combatants will remain constant at six through FY 1991.

In FY 1990 the total number of amphibious warfare ships will decrease to 61 as three Thomaston class LSDs are placed in inactive status, one Newport class LST is transferred to the NRF, and two Whidbey Island class LSDs are commissioned. In FY 1991, amphibious warfare ships increase to 62 with the commissioning of two Whidbey Island LSDs and the decommissioning of one Anchorage class LSD.

Mine warfare ships will increase in FY 1990 to 8 when three Avenger class mine countermeasure ships are commissioned. In FY 1991 two additional Avenger class ships will be commissioning raising the total to 19 mine warfare ships.

Combat logistics ships will decrease to 57 in FY 1990 with two Kaiser class being commissioned, two Ashtabula class AOs being placed in inactive status, and two Mispillion class TAOs being transferred to the NRF. In FY 1991, two additional Kaiser class TAOs and one AOE-6 class will be commissioned and one Mispillion class TAO will be transferred to the NRF, raising the total of combat logistics ships to 59.

(3) Support Forces

In FY 1990 the number of support ships will increase by two to a total of 66 with the addition of two TAGOS ocean surveillance ships. FY 1991 forces will increase to 68 support ships with two additional TAGOS ocean surveillance ships added to the inventory. There will be a total of 19 mobile logistic ships through FY 1991.

(4) Mobilization Forces Category "A"

In FY 1990 Mobilization Forces Category "A" will increase by seven ships to a total of 33 with the addition of six frigates and one amphibious warfare ship (LST). FY 1991 Mobilization Forces Category "A" increases by seven to total 40 with the addition of one LSD amphibious warfare ships and six frigates.

b. Local Defense and Miscellaneous Support Forces

(1) Auxiliaries and Sealift Forces

In FY 1990 auxiliaries and sealift forces will increase by three to a total of 139 with the addition of two TAKRs and one TAP. There is an increase of one TAC and one TAKR in FY 1991 to total 141.

(2) Mobilization Forces Category "B"

In FY 1990 Mobilization Forces Category "B" will decrease by two MSO mine warfare ships for a category total of 19 and two more MSO mine warfare ships in FY 1991, for a total of 17.

c. Naval Aviation Forces

During FY 1990, 92 active and 14 reserve deployable tactical squadrons will be operational. In FY 1991, active deployable tactical squadrons increase to 94 and reserves remain at 14. The number of active fixed-wing and rotary-wing Anti-Submarine Squadrons (ASW) and Fleet Air Defense (FAD) squadrons is 64 in FY 1990 and FY 1991. The number of ASW/FAD reserve squadrons is 20 in FY 1990 and FY 1991. There will be 18 active and 17 reserve direct-support squadrons from FY 1990 to FY 1991.

E. Key Manpower Issues

1. Medical Department Officer Shortfall and Planned Growth

With the authorized strength for Navy officers in the FY 1988/89 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress mandated a minimum of 11,940 health care professionals. This represent an increase of 492 over the FY 1988 ending inventory. Navy achieved a growth of 107 health care professionals, approximately one-fifth of the requirement. The following table summarizes:

	<u>Health Care Professionals</u>			
	<u>FY 89(Plan)</u>	<u>FY 89(Actual)</u>	FY 90	FY 91
Budgeted				
End Strength:	12,694	-	12,751	12,810
Minimum Authorized				
End Strength:	11,940	11,555	12,240	12,510

Attaining these increasing end strength targets continues to be complicated by a national nurse shortage and an inability to recruit and retain the required physician specialty mix. To meet this challenge, Navy has implemented significant initiatives to increase the number of health care professionals in FY 1990 and beyond:

- Increased health care professionals in medical recruiting;
- Increased health professional scholarships;
- Instituted education/accesion programs for nurses;
- Increased retention bonuses for physicians;
- Strengthened graduate medical education programs;
- Implemented a commissioning program for qualified Physician's Assistants;
- Implemented a Nurse Accession Bonus and Incentive Special Pay for Nurse Anesthetists.

Navy believes these initiatives, in combination with those authorized by the FY 1990/91 DoD Authorization Act, will facilitate reaching an end strength of 12,240 health care professionals in FY 1990.

2. Shortage of Experienced Nuclear Trained Surface and Submarine Officer

The shortage of experienced nuclear-trained officers in the grade of Lieutenant Commander through Captain continues to be a critical problem. These officers are required to fill commanding officer, executive officer, and department head billets at sea as well as key fleet support billets ashore.

Enhancements to Nuclear Officer Incentive Pay (NOIP) enacted in FY 1986 and FY 1988 enable the Navy to optimize accessions and maximize retention of nuclear trained officers. Through the Continuation Pay (COPAY) provision of NOIP, Navy pays \$10,000 per year (authorized ceiling of \$12,000) to nuclear-trained officers agreeing to remain on active duty for three, four, or five years beyond their existing service obligation. Those nuclear officers beyond service obligation who do not opt for COPAY are paid an Annual Incentive Bonus (AIB) of \$7,200 (authorized ceiling is \$10,000). This program, in conjunction with a 35 percent raise in Submarine Duty Incentive Pay (SUBPAY) enacted in FY 1988, has improved submarine junior officer retention to 54 percent in FY 1989. However, community wide retention declined in FY 1989.

NOIP is an invaluable personnel management tool for the nuclear trained officer communities and must continue to receive strong Navy and Congressional support. Authority for this program has recently been extended to 30 September 1995 by the FY 90/91 DoD Authorization Act.

3. Aviation Officer Retention

The Navy has a shortage of about 1,300 mid-grade (O-3/O-4) pilots. When measured against an annual retention requirement of 43 percent, pilot retention has been below the required level for 10 of the last 13 years. The most serious retention shortfall occurred in FY 1978 and FY 1979 when pilot retention was 18 percent and 16 percent respectively. To counteract this trend, Navy sought, and was granted, Congressional authorization for an aviator retention bonus in FY 1981. The retention bonus, Aviation Officer Continuation Pay (AOCP), helped raise pilot retention in FY 1982 through 1984 to an adequate level. Pilot retention reached a high of 54 percent in FY 1984. In FY 1985, however, a surge in commercial airline hiring, together with a decline in the real value of AOCP, caused pilot retention to fall to 32 percent.

Since FY 1985, airline hiring has continued at unprecedented levels and is projected to remain high through the end of the century. Recognizing the DoD-wide problem of pilot retention, Congress authorized a substantial increase in the retention bonus in FY 1989. Under the new bonus program - Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) - the maximum annual payment rate was raised from \$6,000 per year to \$12,000 per year for each year an officer agrees to remain on active duty beyond his existing service obligation. As a result of the new bonus, pilot retention rose to 38 percent in FY 1989, a 4 percent increase over FY 1988.

In the FY 1990/91 DoD Authorization Act, Congress extended the ACP program through FY 1991 and raised Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP) or "flight pay" for the first time since 1982. Navy is optimistic that the

combined effect of continued ACP and increased ACIP will achieve a pilot retention level of over 40 percent during FY 1990. If so, this will be the first time since FY 1984 that pilot retention closely approached the annual retention requirement.

4. Implementation of Title IV of the DoD Reorganization Act of 1986

On 1 October 1989 the Title IV transition period ended and all provisions of Title IV took full effect. During the transition period, 197 flag officers and 3,141 04-06 officers were designated by the Secretary of Defense as Joint Specialty Officers (JSO).

Complete compliance with Title IV requirements will be difficult for Navy particularly in the area of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME).

JPME requires a two-phase process of education except for those attending National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. JPME Phase I is satisfied by attendance at one of the service colleges. Phase II requires joint training taught only at the Armed Forces Staff College. While the requirement that 50 percent of JPME graduates must go directly to follow-on joint tours applies only to those graduating from Phase II and those who attend National War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces, to satisfy Title IV virtually every graduate from Phase II must be sent directly to a joint billet.

Further, JPME increases the length of time an officer is away from his primary warfare area. Congressionally mandated course lengths for Phase I and II combined with attempts to require Phase I attendance prior to Phase II will further hinder Navy's ability to meet the quality requirements of Title IV without diminishing Navy's war fighting capabilities.

For nuclear-trained officers, the Title IV joint service prerequisite for flag promotion is a particularly severe problem because of the shortage of officers, sea-intensive nuclear career paths, and Navy's unique responsibility to ensure nuclear safety. Although Congress has allowed Navy to waive the joint duty requirement for nuclear-trained officers until 1 January 1994, meeting these prerequisites will be extremely difficult.

By policy and in practice, Navy is sending many of its finest officers to JPME and joint duty billets. However, in an environment of decreasing resources and increasing demands on military personnel, Navy will need relief from strict compliance with Title IV or it will be forced to sacrifice some measure of readiness, safety, and operational proficiency. Despite the difficulties described above, Navy is totally committed to the spirit and intent of Title IV.

II. Significant Program Highlights

A. Active Component Military Manpower

1. General

Navy's highest priority continues to be the accession and retention of manpower in the necessary quantity and quality to meet operational requirements. People are as integral to new weapon systems as hardware and must not only be recruited, but retained. Therefore, Navy continues to focus on retaining those enlisted and officer personnel whose mission critical skills contribute directly to readiness and whose talents are in shortest supply. End strength authorizations, critical skill retention, and a quality of life for service members and their families that encourages retention will determine our ability to man the modern Navy.

Closing the military/civilian pay gap and maintaining military at fully competitive levels are essential in our efforts to recruit and retain manpower quality and to compensate Navy personnel for the demands of a mobile, arduous, and sometimes dangerous lifestyle.

2. Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning, and Operating Strength

Navy's program in FY 1990 and FY 1991 is oriented toward ensuring that personnel manning is available to meet the requirements established by force structure. The active manpower shown in Table IV-1 reflects the decreasing manpower requirements in response to the reduction in force structure.

TABLE IV-I
ACTIVE NAVY MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands) a/

TOTAL AC MILITARY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1989		FY 1990		FY 1991			
	AUTH	INV	RQTS	AUTH	%	RQTS	AUTH	%
<u>STRATEGIC</u>	23.1	22.4	24.2	23.6	98	24.3	23.4	96
Offensive Strategic Forces	20.7	20.2	21.6	21.0	98	21.6	20.8	96
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	2.3	2.3	2.6	2.5	97	2.8	2.6	95
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>	306.3	286.4	320.5	303.8	95	319.2	299.5	94
Land Forces	5.1	4.5	5.1	5.1	100	5.2	5.2	100
Tactical Air Forces	72.9	68.5	72.4	72.3	100	71.4	71.1	100
Naval Forces	227.8	212.9	242.4	225.9	93	242.1	222.7	92
Warships and ASW Forces	113.6	109.1	119.4	110.4	92	116.4	103.5	89
Amphibious Forces	37.9	34.1	38.8	37.7	97	38.9	38.2	98
Naval Support Forces	76.3	69.7	84.2	77.8	92	86.8	81.0	93
Mobility Forces	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.5	85	0.6	0.5	84
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>	16.6	15.3	19.9	16.7	84	19.9	16.5	83
Intelligence	9.2	8.5	11.1	9.3	84	11.1	9.2	83
Centrally Managed Com.	7.4	6.9	8.8	7.4	84	8.8	7.3	83
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	25.9	25.4	31.2	26.2	84	31.4	25.9	82
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	15.9	15.7	17.0	15.6	92	16.7	15.6	93
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	26.1	24.7	30.8	26.4	86	30.7	26.3	86
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>	5.2	4.9	5.2	5.2	100	5.2	5.2	100
Int'l Military Org	1.5	1.3	1.5	1.5	100	1.5	1.5	100
Unified Commands	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	100	1.4	1.4	100
Federal Agency Support	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	100	1.1	1.1	100
Joint Staff	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	100	0.3	0.3	100
OSD/DEF AGY	0.8	0.7	0.9	0.9	100	0.9	0.9	100

	<u>FY 1989</u>		<u>FY 1990</u>		<u>FY 1991</u>	
TOTAL AC MILITARY						
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	6.6	6.5	7.5	6.6	7.5	6.6
						88
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>						
<u>Combat Commands</u>	5.7	5.4	5.9	5.6	5.8	5.5
<u>Support Commands</u>	2.7	2.6	2.8	2.6	2.7	2.6
	3.0	3.9	3.1	3.0	3.1	2.9
						94
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>						
<u>Research and Development</u>	7.7	7.1	8.4	7.7	8.4	7.6
<u>Geophysical Activities</u>	5.8	5.2	6.2	5.7	6.2	5.7
	2.0	1.9	2.2	2.0	2.2	2.0
						90
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>						
<u>Personnel Support</u>	37.1	36.0	40.3	37.1	40.2	37.6
<u>Individual Training</u>	9.1	8.9	9.1	9.1	9.1	9.1
	28.0	27.0	31.2	28.0	31.1	28.5
						93
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>						
<u>Support Installations</u>	29.9	29.9	35.4	29.1	36.4	28.3
<u>Centralized Support Act'y</u>	24.7	24.4	27.8	24.0	27.9	23.4
	5.2	5.4	7.6	5.1	8.5	4.9
						78
<u>TOTAL PROGRAMMED</u>						
<u>MANNING</u>	506.1	479.8	546.2	503.7	545.8	498.0
						91
<u>UNDISTRIBUTED MANNING</u> b/						
(Manyyears)	-7.0			-7.0		-7.0
<u>INDIVIDUALS</u> c/						
<u>Transients</u>	93.9	112.7	93.8	93.8	93.8	93.8
<u>Patients/Prisoners/Holdees</u>	24.3	24.7	24.7	24.7	24.5	24.5
<u>Students/Trainees</u>	4.4	4.0	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4
<u>Midshipmen/NAVCAD</u>	60.4	79.1	60.0	60.0	60.0	60.0
	4.8	4.9	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8
						100
<u>END STRENGTH*</u>	593.0	592.6	640.0	590.5	639.6	584.8
						91

*End strength may not equal total of DPPC categories due to rounding.

ACTIVE NAVY MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands) a/

AC OFFICERS	FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV	RQTS	AUTH	RQTS	%	AUTH	RQTS	%
<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES</u>									
<u>STRATEGIC</u>	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.3	99	2.4	2.4	96
Offensive Strategic Forces	1.9	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.9	99	1.9	1.8	96
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	99	0.5	0.5	95
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>	25.0	24.8	25.3	24.9	25.3	98	25.3	24.8	98
Land Forces	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	100	0.7	0.7	100
Tactical Air Forces	6.2	5.9	6.2	6.2	6.2	100	6.1	6.0	99
Naval Forces	17.9	18.1	18.2	17.9	18.2	98	18.3	17.8	97
Warships and ASW Forces	11.1	11.5	11.4	11.1	11.4	97	11.4	10.9	95
Amphibious Forces	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	100	2.8	2.9	101
Naval Support Forces	4.1	3.8	4.0	4.0	4.0	99	4.1	4.1	100
Mobility Forces	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	91	0.2	0.2	89
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>	1.6	1.4	2.0	1.7	2.0	85	2.0	1.7	84
Intelligence	1.2	1.1	1.4	1.2	1.4	90	1.4	1.2	89
Centrally Managed Com.	0.4	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.6	73	0.6	0.5	73
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	2.0	1.9	2.3	2.1	2.3	88	2.3	2.0	87
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	2.3	1.7	2.4	2.1	2.4	91	2.3	2.1	92
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	8.8	7.8	9.8	8.8	9.8	90	9.8	8.8	90
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>	2.4	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.3	100	2.4	2.4	100
Int'l Military Org	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	100	0.5	0.5	100
Unified Commands	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	100	0.7	0.7	100
Federal Agency Support	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100	0.2	0.2	100
Joint Staff	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100	0.2	0.2	100
OSD/Defense Agencies	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	100	0.7	0.7	100
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	2.9	2.7	3.0	2.8	3.0	95	3.0	2.8	94

	<u>FY 1989</u>			<u>FY 1990</u>			<u>FY 1991</u>		
<u>AC OFFICERS</u>									
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>									
Combat Commands	3.3	3.1	3.3	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.2	3.2	98
Support Commands	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	98
	2.0	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	98
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>									
Research and Development	1.5	1.3	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.5	1.5	87
Geophysical Activities	1.2	1.0	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.2	90
	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	77
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>									
Personnel Support	5.1	4.9	5.6	5.2	5.2	5.6	5.2	5.2	93
Individual Training	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	99
	4.3	4.1	4.8	4.3	4.3	4.8	4.4	4.4	92
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>									
Support Installations	5.2	5.3	5.8	5.1	5.1	5.9	5.0	5.0	84
Centralized Support Act'y	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.0	3.0	3.2	2.9	2.9	91
	2.1	2.2	2.6	2.1	2.1	2.7	2.1	2.1	76
<u>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</u>	<u>62.4</u>	<u>59.3</u>	<u>65.9</u>	<u>62.1</u>	<u>62.1</u>	<u>6.6</u>	<u>61.7</u>	<u>61.7</u>	<u>94</u>
<u>UNDISTRIBUTED MANNING b/</u>									
(Manyyears)	-1.4			-1.4			-1.4		
<u>INDIVIDUALS c/</u>									
Transients	11.7	12.9	11.7	11.7	11.7	11.7	11.7	11.7	100
Patients/Prisoners/Holdees	4.0	3.3	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	100
Students/Trainees	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100
Midshipmen/NAVCADS	7.6	9.5	7.6	7.6	7.6	7.6	7.6	7.6	100
<u>END STRENGTH*</u>	<u>72.7</u>	<u>72.2</u>	<u>77.6</u>	<u>72.5</u>	<u>72.5</u>	<u>77.7</u>	<u>72.0</u>	<u>72.0</u>	<u>93</u>

*End strength may not equal total of DPFC categories due to rounding.

ACTIVE NAVY MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands) a/

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1989		FY 1990		FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV	RQTS	AUTH	RQTS	AUTH	%
<u>AC ENLISTED</u>							
<u>STRATEGIC</u>	20.7	20.3	21.8	21.3	22.0	21.1	96
Offensive Strategic Forces	18.8	18.4	19.7	19.2	19.7	18.9	96
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	1.9	1.9	2.1	2.1	2.3	2.2	95
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>	281.4	261.6	295.2	278.9	293.9	274.7	93
Land Forces	4.4	3.9	4.4	4.4	4.5	4.5	100
Tactical Air Forces	66.8	62.6	66.2	66.1	65.3	65.0	100
Naval Forces	209.9	194.8	224.2	208.1	223.8	204.9	92
Warships and ASW Forces	102.5	97.6	108.0	99.3	104.9	92.6	88
Amphibious Forces	35.2	31.3	36.0	34.9	36.1	35.3	98
Naval Support Forces	72.3	65.9	80.2	73.9	82.8	76.9	93
Mobility Forces	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.3	81
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>	15.0	13.9	17.9	15.0	17.9	14.9	83
Intelligence	8.0	7.4	9.7	8.0	9.7	8.0	82
Centrally Managed Com.	7.0	6.5	8.2	7.0	8.2	6.9	84
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	23.9	23.5	28.8	24.1	29.1	23.8	82
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	13.6	14.0	14.6	13.5	14.4	13.5	94
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	17.2	17.0	21.0	17.6	20.9	17.5	84
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>	2.9	2.7	2.9	2.9	2.8	2.8	100
Int'l Military Org	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	100
Unified Commands	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	100
Federal Agency Support	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	100
Joint Staff	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100
OSD/Defense Agencies	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	3.7	3.8	4.5	3.8	4.5	3.8	84

AC ENLISTED	FY 1989		FY 1990		FY 1991	
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>						
Combat Commands	2.4	2.3	2.6	2.4	2.6	2.3
Support Commands	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.4
	1.0	0.9	1.1	1.0	1.1	0.9
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>						
Research and Development	6.2	5.7	6.7	6.2	6.7	6.1
Geophysical Activities	4.6	4.1	4.9	4.5	4.9	4.5
	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.6	1.8	1.7
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>						
Personnel Support	32.0	31.1	34.7	31.9	34.6	32.3
Individual Training	8.3	8.1	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3
	23.7	22.9	26.4	23.7	26.3	24.1
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>						
Support Installations	24.7	24.5	29.6	24.0	30.5	23.4
Centralized Support Act'y	21.6	21.3	24.6	21.0	24.7	20.5
	3.1	3.2	5.0	3.0	5.8	2.9
<u>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</u>	443.8	420.5	480.3	441.5	479.8	436.3
<u>UNDISTRIBUTED MANNING</u> b/	-5.6			-5.6		-5.6
(Manyyears)						
<u>INDIVIDUALS</u> c/						
Transients	82.2	100.0	82.1	82.1	82.1	82.1
Patients/Prisoners/Holdees	20.3	21.4	20.7	20.7	20.6	20.6
Students/Trainees	4.3	4.0	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
Midshipmen/NAVCAD	52.8	69.8	52.3	52.3	52.4	52.4
	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8
<u>END STRENGTH</u> *:	520.3	520.5	562.4	518.0	561.9	512.8

*End strength may not equal total of DPPC categories due to rounding.

Notes:

a/ Programmed Manpower Structure (RQMT) reflects Active Duty military resources and is defined as the aggregation of billets describing the full active manning requirements for all units and organizations in the program force, which is the table of organization structure (or its equivalent) for operational units, and the structure associated with full peacetime workload requirements for non-operational units. Operational units are those cor .t, combat support, and combat service support organizations with operational readiness reporting requirements under UNITREP.

Programmed Manning (AUTH) is defined as those billets in the programmed manpower structure planned to be staffed. The term "Programmed manning" recognizes that 100% staffing of the programmed manpower structure may not always be desirable or achievable within fiscal and manpower constraints. Programmed manning is a statement of distribution policy; the term is synonymous with Distributable Billets.

b/ Undistributed Manning shows the difference between distributable strength and distributable billets as of the end of the fiscal year.

c/ Individuals refers to the transients, trainees (for the Reserve Components, the training pipeline), patients, prisoners, cadets and students in "overhead" and not available for staffing programmed manning spaces.

3. Skill and Grade

Navy's skill imbalance is expected to worsen as Navy experiences a reduction in force. Older ships with outdated technology are being identified for removal. As these ships are phased out, so too, will be the need for personnel with the obsolete skills required for those platforms. In a Navy of reduced size, the flexibility to utilize personnel in generic or non-technical employment is greatly reduced. Navy is managing these imbalances by using lateral conversions and maximum accession and reenlistment bonuses for critical ratings.

Navy's established petty officer requirements (E4 through E9) are 71 percent of the total enlisted force. MPN funding constraints have restricted petty officer growth to 67 percent of the force. Navy is committed to fund petty officer growth to requirements.

Table IV - 2 is structured to compare Programmed Manning Plus Individuals (PMI) quantities to inventory figures. It provides actual data for FY 1989 and projected data for FY 1990 and FY 1991. The table distinguishes the number of skills that are, or are projected to be, over - supplied ("over"), balanced, or under - supplied ("short") within ranges of officer and enlisted pay grades. Skills overlap ranges of pay grades; therefore, the total number of skills for the complete group of officer or enlisted pay grades cannot be obtained by adding the quantity of skills for individual ranges.

Table IV-2
Active Navy
Skill and Grade
Actual & Projected Inventory
Versus
Programmed Manning Plus Individuals (PMI)

	<u>FY 1989</u> <u>(Actual)</u>			
<u>E1-E4</u>	<u>Over*</u>	<u>Balanced*</u>	<u>Short*</u>	<u>Total</u>
Number of Skills	49	26	15	90
PMI	149.3	62.9	55.0	267.2
Inventory	169.6	62.5	46.2	278.3
Over/Short	+20.3	-.4	-8.8	+11.1
 <u>E5-E9</u>				
Number of Skills	4	27	71	102
PMI	3.8	17.2	226.6	247.6
Inventory	4.4	18.3	213.3	236.0
Over/Short	+.6	+1.1	-13.3	-11.6

Total E1-E9

Number of Skills	68	18	20	106
PMI	109.6	322.6	82.6	514.8
Inventory	121.8	321.1	71.4	514.3
Over/Short	+12.2	-1.5	-11.2	-.5

WO

Number of Skills	0	1	1	2
PMI	**	2.8	0.3	3.1
Inventory	**	2.6	0.2	2.8
Over/Short	**	-0.2	-0.1	-0.3

01-03

Number of Skills	3	11	11	25
PMI	9.4	26.8	7.4	43.6
Inventory	11.1	26.6	6.1	43.8
Over/Short	+1.7	-0.2	-1.3	+0.2

04-06

Number of Skills	6	14	4	24
PMI	6.5	14.1	4.8	25.4
Inventory	7.4	14.3	3.6	25.3
Over/Short	+0.9	+0.2	-1.2	-0.1

Total 01-06

Number of Skills	2	20	3	25
PMI	17.1	48	4	69.1
Inventory	19.3	46.4	3.4	69.1
Over/Short	+2.2	-1.6	-0.6	0.0

Skill and Grade
Actual & Projected Inventory
versus

Programmed Manning Plus Individuals (PMI)

FY 1990
(Projected)

<u>E1-E4</u>	<u>Over*</u>	<u>Balanced*</u>	<u>Short*</u>	<u>Total</u>
Number of Skills	59	21	10	90
PMI	130.2	84.7	48.7	263.6
Inventory	155.5	87.2	35.6	278.3
Over/Short	+25.3	+2.5	-13.1	+14.7

E5-E9

Number of Skills	5	22	75	102
PMI	3.8	6.0	238.9	248.7
Inventory	4.5	5.7	223.8	234.0
Over/Short	+7	-.3	-15.1	-14.7

Total E1-E9

Number of Skills	24	66	16	106
PMI	74.6	364.1	73.6	512.3
Inventory	85.3	371.5	55.5	512.3
Over/Short	+10.7	+7.4	-18.1	0

WO

Number of Skills	0	1	1	2
PMI	**	2.8	0.2	3.0
Inventory	**	2.7	0.1	2.8
Over/Short	**	-0.1	-0.1	-0.2

01-03

Number of Skills	5	15	5	25
PMI	9.4	29.1	5.2	43.7
Inventory	10.5	29.1	4.3	43.9
Over/Short	+1.1	0.0	-0.9	+0.2

04-06

Number of Skills	7	12	5	24
PMI	7.4	12.9	5.2	25.5
Inventory	8.4	12.9	4.2	25.5
Over/Short	+1.0	0.0	-1.0	0.0

Total 01-06

Number of Skills	2	20	3	25
PMI	6.5	61.6	1.2	69.3
Inventory	7.2	61.3	0.9	69.4
Over/Short	+0.7	-0.3	-0.3	+0.1

Skill and Grade
Actual & Projected Inventory
versus
Programmed Manning Plus Individuals (PMI)

FY 1991
(Predicted)

<u>E1-E4</u>	<u>Over*</u>	<u>Balanced*</u>	<u>Short*</u>	<u>Total</u>
Number of Skills	71	11	8	90
PMI	184.2	27.6	48.5	260.3
Inventory	217.5	27.4	28.9	273.8
Over/Short	+33.3	-.2	-19.6	+13.5
 <u>E5-E9</u>				
Number of Skills	5	21	76	102
PMI	3.8	5.4	237.5	246.7
Inventory	4.4	5.2	223.6	233.2
Over/Short	+6	-.2	-13.9	-13.5
 <u>Total E1-E9</u>				
Number of Skills	34	59	13	106
PMI	150.6	287.7	68.7	507.0
Inventory	165.2	296.2	45.6	507.0
Over/Short	+14.6	+8.5	-23.1	0
 <u>WO</u>				
Number of Skills	0	1	1	2
PMI	**	2.8	0.1	2.9
Inventory	**	2.9	0.0	2.9
Over/Short	**	+0.1	-0.1	0.0
 <u>01-03</u>				
Number of Skills	6	13	6	25
PMI	17.1	20.6	6.0	43.7
Inventory	18.5	19.7	5.3	43.5
Over/Short	+1.4	-0.9	-0.7	-0.2
 <u>04-06</u>				
Number of Skills	7	12	5	24
PMI	6.5	14.7	4.3	25.5
Inventory	7.2	15.0	3.1	25.3
Over/Short	+0.7	+0.3	-1.2	-0.2

Total 01-06

Number of Skills	4	18	3	25
PMI	17.8	49.9	1.5	69.2
Inventory	18.8	48.8	1.2	68.8
Over/Short	+1.0	-1.1	-0.3	-0.4

* Status is based on programmed manning + individuals (PMI) for each skill

Skills with PMI of 500 or more people (over if fill is 105% or more of PMI, balanced if between 95% and 105%, short if fill is less than 95%).

Skills with PMI of 100-499 people (over if fill is 110% of PMI balanced if 90% or greater and 110% or less, short is fill less than 90%).

Skills with PMI of 100 people (over if fill is 115% of PMI, balanced if 85% or greater and 115% or less, short if fill is less than 85%).

** Less than 50 people

4. Experience

Table IV-3 shows programmed versus actual experience level. The need for experienced personnel (people with greater than 4 years of service (YOS)) continues to increase. Experienced manpower is essential to operate and maintain our sophisticated and highly technical weapon systems and to provide the training and supervision necessary to effectively develop similar skill levels in our junior personnel. Navy's objective is to continue retaining personnel at the first and second term reenlistment points and to grow the experience in the force structure through advancements and training. However, even with these initiatives, Navy will continue to have petty officer shortages in many of the sea intensive ratings. To correct this situation, Navy requires the requested bonuses and recruiting resources.

TABLE IV-3
ACTIVE NAVY EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS PROJECTED INVENTORY
(Thousands)

	FY 1989		
	<u>Total Billets/</u> <u>People</u>	<u>People with</u> <u>greater than</u> <u>4 YOS</u>	<u>AVG YOS</u>
<u>E1-E4</u>			
EPA	267.2	N/A	N/A
Inventory	278.3	39.9	2.3
<u>E5-E9</u>			
EPA	247.6	N/A	N/A
Inventory	236.0	220.0	10.9

E1-E9

EPA	514.8	N/A	N/A
Inventory	514.3	259.9	6.2

WO

OPA	2.9	N/A	N/A
Inventory	2.8	2.8	22.2

01-03

OPA	43.7	N/A	N/A
Inventory	43.9	22.1	4.9

04-06

OPA	25.5	N/A	N/A
Inventory	25.5	25.3	16.6

01-06

OPA	69.2	N/A	N/A
Inventory	69.4	47.4	9.2

FY 1990		
<u>Total Billets/</u>	<u>People with</u>	<u>AVG YOS</u>
<u>People</u>	<u>greater than</u>	
	<u>4 YOS</u>	

E1-E4

EPA	263.6	N/A	N/A
Inventory	278.3	42.6	2.4

E5-E9

EPA	248.7	N/A	N/A
Inventory	234.0	218.3	10.9

E1-E9

EPA	512.3	N/A	N/A
Inventory	512.3	260.9	6.3

WO

OPA	2.9	N/A	N/A
Inventory	2.8	2.8	22.2

01-03

OPA	43.7	N/A	N/A
Inventory	43.9	22.1	4.9

04-06

OPA	25.5	N/A	N/A
Inventory	25.5	25.3	16.6

01-06

OPA	69.2	N/A	N/A
Inventory	69.4	47.4	9.2

FY 1991

<u>Total Billets/ People</u>	<u>People with greater than 4 YOS</u>	<u>AVG YOS</u>
----------------------------------	---	----------------

E1-E4

EPA	260.3	N/A	N/A
Inventory	273.8	44.3	2.5

E5-E9

EPA	246.7	N/A	N/A
Inventory	233.2	216.7	11.0

E1-E9

EPA	507.0	N/A	N/A
Inventory	507.0	261.0	6.4

WO

OPA	2.9	N/A	N/A
Inventory	2.9	2.9	22.3

01-03

OPA	43.6	N/A	N/A
Inventory	43.5	21.9	4.9

04-06

OPA	25.5	N/A	N/A
Inventory	25.3	25.1	16.2

01-06

OPA	69.1	N/A	N/A
Inventory	68.8	47.0	9.1

5. Personnel Management

a. Enlisted

(1) Recruiting. Navy attained 100 percent of its FY 1989 accession goal of 89,379 Non-Prior Services (NPS) men and women (compared to 90,231 in FY 1988). Of this total, 51,840 (58 percent) were upper AFQT (Armed Forces Qualification Test) (IIIUA) and 80,441 (90 percent) High School Diploma Graduates (HSDG). The total lower AFQT (IV) attainment of 9,939 (11.1 percent) is under the Congressional ceiling of 20 percent and Navy's ceiling of 12 percent. Navy fell short of its FY 1989 New Contract Objectives (NCO) by 5875 with 88,928 new contracts (compared to 90,060 in FY 1988). Recruits from the Delayed Entry Program (DEP) numbered 25,652 at the end of FY 1989 (compared to 31,911 for FY 1988). In addition, the DEP quality composition is lower than planned and entry is more skewed toward the summer months.

In FY 1989 Navy's goal for recruiting prior service personnel was achieved (5,807 as compared to 3,703 in FY 1988). Recruitment of prior service personnel is targeted to shortage skills since these personnel are available for immediate assignment to fleet units upon enlistment and effect a real time improvement in readiness.

While accession goals have been achieved in the near term, this has been at the expense of the DEP. An economy of low unemployment and reduced numbers of male youths in the population, results in increasingly difficult recruiting. In addition, the Department of Defense Youth Attitude Tracking Survey shows a tendency for fewer young males to join due to misconceptions of the Navy's mission, perceptions of the Navy as lacking modern technology, and lacking training opportunities.

Navy is concerned about the increasing difficulty of recruiting, especially in sufficient numbers from the upper mental group category to supply the nuclear power program and advanced technical skills. Navy's recruiting strategy for the 1990's included increasing enlisted recruiters by 382, increasing recruiting support personnel by 127, increasing recruiter support funding by 7.8 percent to \$84.7 million, and improving its public image through a long-range advertising and public relations campaign. Navy's advertising budget of \$27.5 million includes funding for 16 weeks of television commercials. Ship port visits, aircraft static displays, and open houses will expand our interaction with the public and give our nation's youth a favorable impression of our Navy. Finally, new programs, aimed at the large number of youth who seek further education, include the Navy College Fund and the Navy Technical Scholarship Program.

To supply the Navy's manpower needs, the goals identified in Table IV-4 must be met.

TABLE IV-4
ACTIVE NAVY ENLISTED STRENGTH PLAN

	FY 1989		FY 1990	FY 1991
	Actual	Goal	Goal	Goal
End Strength	515,714	515,815	513,233	508,026
Accessions	95,186	94,892	89,853	88,305
Prior Service	5,807	7,100	5,351	2,579

Non-Prior Service

Male	78,515	78,042	74,932	76,569
AFQT I-III A	45,058	44,874	430,856	44,027
HSDG	69,579	69,848	67,064	68,529
Female	10,864	9,750	9,570	9,157
(%)	(12.15)	(10.28)	(11.33)	(10.68)
AFQT I-III A	6,796	5,606	5,886	5,632
HSDG	10,860	8,775	8,613	8,241

(2) Retention. Sustaining the force in the 1990s will require the right balance of accessions and retention. A strategy which is too reliant on accessions will be difficult to execute because the quantity of the male youth population in the 1990s may be insufficient. Navy must focus on the synergistic relationship of retention and recruiting.

Keeping a favorable retention climate, as evidenced in FY 1989, when gross retention reached a post-Vietnam era high was due primarily to stability in personnel policy and proper associated resource funding. Continued emphasis on retention programs, bonus programs, and increased dedication to providing quality of life for Navy personnel and their families are critical. Limited resources must be allocated judiciously.

Of particular importance is resisting the temptation to reduce quality of life programs by the same percentage as force reduction. Quality of life programs should better match force size as Navy becomes smaller. This will result in high retention essential to a better trained/experienced force.

The following table presents gross retention results for FY 1989 and retention goals for FY 1990 through FY 1992.

	FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1991	FY 1992
	Actual	Goal	Goal	Goal
1st Term	37.4	37.4	37.4	37.4
2nd Term	56.0	56.0	56.0	56.0
3rd Term	66.9	67.0	67.0	67.0

(3) Aggregate population stability. As shown, Navy has experienced fluctuations but shows a relatively level aggregate population stability (see stability definition in Appendix B).

Aggregate Population Stability

(Percent)

	<u>FY 1983</u>	<u>FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY1989</u>
Officer	92.6	91.9	91.4	91.4	91.4	91.7	90.8
Enlisted	85.9	84.8	84.8	85.1	85.4	83.6	83.8

(4) Unit personnel stability. The Navy also shows a relatively level unit personnel stability (defined in Appendix B).

Unit Personnel Stability

(Percent)

	<u>FY 1983</u>	<u>FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
Officer	50.8	47.9	51.5	50.0	51.0	53.8	51.0
Enlisted	50.2	49.7	49.4	50.5	52.1	53.5	51.4

(a) Enlisted Attrition. First-term enlisted attrition for FY 1989 was 12.2 percent, a 0.3 percent decrease from the FY 1988 level of 12.5 percent.

(b) Enlisted Desertion and Unauthorized Absence (UA). The FY 1989 desertion rate decreased to 8.79 per 1000 (4,622 incidents) from the FY 1988 rate of 9.39 per 1,000, representing a 6.0 percent improvement over FY 1988. The unauthorized absence rate declined from 24.18 per 1,000 in FY 1988 to 17.33 per 1,000 (9,119 incidents) in FY 1989.

b. Officer/Warrant Officer

(1) Accessions. Active officer procurement goals and attainment for the FY 1990 and FY 1991 budget period are as follows:

Active Navy Officer Procurement Goals

<u>FY 1989</u>		<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
6,555	6,744	6,854	5,832

Accessions to the Navy officer corps come from both regular and reserve officer commissioning sources including the Limited Duty and Chief Warrant Officer programs. Of the 6,290 officers commissioned in FY 1989, 3,045 (48 percent) received regular commissions and 3,245 (52 percent) received reserve commissions. Of the 3,045 regular officers, 2,364 came from the U.S. Naval Academy and the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) scholarship program.

Navy continues to experience some shortfalls in attainment of nuclear power officer requirements from regular officer commissioning programs. Navy met 98 percent (749 of 765) of FY 1989 requirements for nuclear power officer accessions compared to 92 percent (715 of 775) in FY 1988.

FY 1989 recruiting goals for reserve commission officer designators (including surface, submarine, and aviation programs) were attained with 102 percent (5047 of 4972) achievement of the accession target.

Attainment of physician accession goals continues to be a problem. For FY 1989, the Navy achieved 50 percent (120 of 241) of total accession goal, down from 57 percent (86 of 150) in FY 1988. Only 44 percent (105 of 241) of overall specialty goal was made. Specific accession goals were met in 3 of 21 specialties.

Nurse recruiting is also a continuing problem area, although improvement is readily apparent. FY 1989 nurse goal attainment was 71 percent (300 of 425), up from 63 percent (235 of 376) in FY 1988. The 300 nurses accessed in FY 1989 represent a 26 percent improvement in accessions over FY 1988.

The Navy has made a commitment to increase the number of Physician's Assistants (PAs) to 375 (300 military, 75 civilian) by the end of FY 1994. This increase of 137 PAs over the end FY 1988 inventory is intended to improve access to quality medical care for all beneficiaries. At the end of FY 1989, the physician assistant inventory was 205 military and 32 civilian. The program growth is on track for making inventory goals by the end of FY 1989.

(2) Officer Retention. Current officer retention rates are sufficient to fill all operational billets. However, shortages do exist within the Pilot, Nuclear, Medical Corps and Nurse Corps communities. This situation is attributed to increased competition from outside the Department of the Navy, pay gaps between Navy and Civilian professions, family separations, and shortages of ancillary support personnel. Nonetheless, FY 1990 retention outlook for the Pilot, Nuclear Propulsion, and Medical Corp communities appears optimistic based on recently approved increased authorizations in these key areas. Retention rates from FY 1985 to FY 1989 are displayed in Table.

OFFICER RETENTION

CUMULATIVE CONTINUATION RATES (Note 1)

3 to 12 Years of Service

	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
Surface	32%	26%	32%	30%	27%
Pilot	29%	28%	31%	29%	33%
NFO	54%	51%	56%	55%	44%
Nuclear Submarine	35%	25%	29%	29%	24%
General URL	26%	25%	25%	29%	22%
Medical Corps	33%	46%	38%	36%	36%
Nurse Corps	34%	20%	21%	19%	16%

Note 1: CCR retention rates are a probability statement that personnel in year groups 3 through 12 will remain in the service.

c. Women in the Navy

During FY 1989 we continued to increase the number of women in the Navy, achieving a total of 9.7 percent of enlisted end strength and 10.3 percent of officer end strength.

Navy policy is to employ women to the fullest extent possible, assigning them to positions commensurate with their skills and pay grades. Title 10, U.S.C., Section 6015, prohibits permanent assignment of women to ships or aircraft engaged in combat missions. Women may be assigned TEMDU/TEMADD to any ship or aircraft for a maximum of 180 days as long as the unit is not expected to execute a combat mission duty the time of temporary duty.

Currently, 14 of 102 enlisted ratings are closed to women because billets in these ratings are almost exclusively in combat ships and squadrons, or because they do not provide a viable career path for women. For the same reasons, the Submarine Warfare and Special Warfare communities are closed to women officers.

There were 6,452 enlisted women and 269 women officers serving on 79 ships and afloat staffs, 232 female pilots (including trainees), and 88 female Naval Flight Officers (including trainees) at the end of FY 1989.

An OPNAV instruction concerning the assignment of women in the Navy is expected soon. It contains a list of all ships, aviation squadrons, sea duty units, and USMC units with Naval personnel assigned authorized for the permanent assignment of women. All shore and neutral duty activities are considered available for the permanent and temporary assignment of women.

A ship alteration/female embarkation plan has been implemented that will make 15,000 bunks available to women on the ships available for the permanent assignment of women by 1996. In addition, fifty percent women officers in wardrooms is the objective on ships where women are permanently assigned.

6. Readiness Assessment

The Navy experienced a high state of overall personnel readiness in FY 1989 and expects the trend to continue or improve in FY 1990. Most deployed units have maintained C1/C2. No deployed fleet units reported below the "safe to operate - ready for deployment" limit of C3.

B. Reserve Component Military Manpower

1. Ready Reserve

a. Selected Reserve Manpower

(1) General. The Naval Reserve force structure is currently projected to increase. Navy continues to review programs and initiatives that, in keeping with congressional guidance on Active/Reserve

provide the Naval Reserve with new missions and greater integration with the Active Forces.

Several manpower sources exist to fill the gap between peacetime capability and wartime requirements. However, the Selected Reserve remains the principal source of trained units and personnel to augment active Navy forces during initial stages of mobilization. The Selected Reserve is therefore manned, equipped, and trained to a high state of readiness. To ensure effective training and integration of forces, the Naval Reserve provides "mutual support" to assist active forces in performing their missions while concurrently fulfilling mobilization training requirements.

The Navy has programmed Selected Reserve manpower for FY 1989 through FY 1991 as follows:

Navy Selected Reserve Manpower Program
(Strength in 000s)

	(Actuals)		
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Total Selected Reserve	151.5	153.4	149.7
Unit Reservist Trainees (Cat A)	129.5	130.1	126.1
SAM <u>1</u> /	(4.1)	(2.6)	(2.6)
OSAM <u>2</u> /	(0.5)	(0.6)	(0.6)
Full Time Support	22.0	22.7	23.0
TARs	(20.4)	(21)	(21.4)
Canvasser/Recruiters (TEMACS)	(1.4)	(1.5)	(1.4)
Title 10 USC 265	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
IMAs <u>3</u> /	0.1	0.6	0.6

The number of TARs increases to 21,231 in FY 1990 and 21,620 in FY 1991 to meet required NRF ship manning (TARs include TAR officers, TAR enlisted, and Title 10 USC 265s). The Selected Reserve (Categories A, B, F, Q, and P) increases to 130,692 then decreases to 126,703 in FY 1991 in connection with proposed infrastructure reductions. Naval Reserve manpower is distributed throughout the DPPC structure, as shown in Table IV-5.

1/ Sea and Air Mariner Program

2/ Officer Sea and Air Mariner Program

3/ Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) perform up to 48 paid drills per year, plus two weeks of active duty.

The Sea and Air Mariner (SAM) program was inaugurated in FY 1984 to help the Naval Reserve meet its junior enlisted personnel mobilization requirements (E-4 and below). Since then, SAM accession plans have evolved to emphasize recruiting non-prior service personnel for those skills for which there are insufficient veterans available to fill Naval Reserve E-6 and below vacancies. SAMs make use of a variety of training opportunities to develop these critical skills, which are primarily in the medical field and construction force. SAM accession goals have steadily decreased over the past three years, with FY 1990 goal currently at 4,900.

The program also includes junior officers (Officer Sea and Air Mariner (OSAM)). OSAM accessions were decreased to 150 in FY 1990 and none are planned for FY 1991.

(2) Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning and Operating Strength. The Naval Reserve is integral to the capabilities of the Total Force. The following is the Naval Reserve trained strength in units.

TABLE IV-4

Naval Reserve Trained in Unit Strength
(In Thousands)

	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
End Strength	151.5	153.4	149.7
- Training Pipeline/ Transients*	9.4	5.5	5.5
- IMAs	0.1	0.6	0.6
Operating Strength	142.1	147.3	143.6
- NON Unit AGR	11.6	11.7	11.3
- Unit AC Personnel	5.3	6.2	6.4
Trained Unit Strength	135.8	141.8	138.7
Wartime Unit Structure	145.2	147.9	144.8
%Trained in Units	93.5%	95.9%	95.8%

* FY 1989 Training Pipeline includes 1,860 TAR Enlisted Personnel (TEPs) currently reported in RCCPDS as category X. For FY 1990 and later, TEPs are reported as category R and are not reflected in Training and Retirement Category P - personnel awaiting entry for initial active duty for training.

Past and proposed changes in Selected Reserve manpower are distributed among the Defense Planning and Programming Categories as shown in Table IV-5.

TABLE IV-5
NAVY RESERVE TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING, & END STRENGTH
(Thousands) a/

TOTAL NAVY RES MILITARY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH	MNG		PROG RQMT	PROG AUTH	% MNG	PROG RQMT	PROG AUTH	% MNG
<u>STRATEGIC</u>									
Offensive Strategic Forces	0.5	0.5		0.5	0.5	100%	0.5	0.5	100%
Defensive Strategic Forces	0.5	0.5		0.5	0.5	100%	0.5	0.5	100%
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces				0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>									
Land Forces	90.5	82.0		94.2	90.1	96%	94.9	87.4	92%
Division Force	2.3	2.1		2.3	2.3	100%	2.3	2.3	97%
Theater Forces	2.3	2.1		2.3	2.3	100%	2.3	2.3	100%
Tactical Air Forces	8.4	7.9		9.3	8.5	92%	9.3	8.4	90%
Naval Forces	77.8	70.5		80.6	77.5	96%	81.3	75.2	93%
Warships and ASW	30.1	25.5		30.5	29.6	97%	31.4	29.7	95%
Amphibious Forces	8.7	7.0		9.1	8.8	96%	9.3	8.1	87%
Naval Support Forces	39.0	38.0		40.9	39.1	96%	40.6	37.4	92%
Mobility Forces	2.0	1.5		2.0	1.8	88%	2.0	1.5	76%
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>									
Centrally Managed Comms Intelligence	6.2	6.0		6.3	6.3	99%	6.4	6.0	95%
	1.6	1.5		1.6	1.6	97%	1.6	1.5	92%
	4.7	4.5		4.7	4.7	100%	4.7	4.5	96%
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>									
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	9.2	10.6		9.4	8.9	95%	9.1	8.6	95%
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>									
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	0.7	1.2		0.7	0.7	100%	0.7	0.7	100%
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>									
MEDICAL SUPPORT	16.2	17.1		19.4	16.4	85%	21.3	16.7	79%
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>									
Int'l Military Org	0.8	0.8		0.8	0.8	100%	0.8	0.8	100%
Unified Commands	0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2	100%	0.2	0.2	100%
	0.5	0.6		0.5	0.5	100%	0.5	0.5	100%

TOTAL NAVY RES MILITARY

FY 1989

FY 1990

FY 1991

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES

	AUTH	MIG	PROG RQMT	PROG AUTH	% MNG	PROG RQMT	PROG AUTH	% MNG	PROG RQMT	PROG AUTH	% MNG
Federal Agency Support	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	100%	0.1	0.1	100%	0.1	0.1	100%
Joint Staff	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-
OSD/Defense Agencies and Activities	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>											
Supply Operations	7.4	8.2	7.6	7.4	97%	7.6	7.3	96%	7.6	7.3	96%
Maintenance Operations	3.2	3.6	3.2	3.2	100%	3.2	3.2	98%	3.2	3.2	98%
Logistics Support Operations	3.6	3.9	3.6	3.5	98%	3.6	3.5	98%	3.6	3.5	98%
	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.7	83%	0.8	0.6	73%	0.8	0.6	73%
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>											
Combat Commands	3.7	4.3	3.7	3.6	98%	3.7	3.5	95%	3.7	3.5	95%
Support Commands	2.0	2.4	2.0	2.0	98%	2.0	1.9	92%	2.0	1.9	92%
	1.6	1.9	1.7	1.7	100%	1.7	1.6	98%	1.7	1.6	98%
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>											
Research and Development	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.1	98%	1.2	1.0	89%	1.2	1.0	89%
Geophysical Activities	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.7	96%	0.7	0.6	82%	0.7	0.6	82%
	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.5	100%	0.5	0.5	100%	0.5	0.5	100%
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>											
Personnel Support	2.6	1.4	3.1	3.1	100%	3.1	2.8	93%	3.0	2.8	93%
Individual Training	2.5	1.1	2.6	2.6	100%	2.5	2.5	100%	2.5	2.5	100%
	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.4	100%	0.4	0.2	55%	0.4	0.2	55%
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>											
Support Installations	8.5	8.9	8.5	8.3	97%	8.5	8.2	95%	8.7	8.2	95%
Centralized Support Act's	6.7	7.0	6.5	6.5	99%	6.5	6.4	98%	6.5	6.4	98%
	1.8	1.8	2.0	1.8	90%	2.0	1.8	83%	2.1	1.8	83%
<u>TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	<u>147.5</u>	<u>142.0</u>	<u>155.4</u>	<u>147.4</u>	<u>95%</u>	<u>157.8</u>	<u>143.6</u>	<u>91%</u>	<u>157.8</u>	<u>143.6</u>	<u>91%</u>
<u>OPERATING STRENGTH DEVIATION</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>

INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION
AUGMENTEES

INDIVIDUALS b/

END-STRENGTH

<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>
<u>4.3</u>	<u>9.4</u>	<u>5.5</u>	<u>5.5</u>	<u>5.5</u>	<u>5.5</u>
<u>152.6</u>	<u>151.5</u>	<u>161.5</u>	<u>153.4</u>	<u>163.9</u>	<u>149.7</u>
				<u>95%</u>	<u>91%</u>

*Less than 50

NAVY RESERVE OFFICER PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING, & END STRENGTH
(Thousands) a/

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV	% INV	PROG RQMT**	PROG AUTH	% INV	PROG RQMT**	PROG AUTH	% INV
<u>STRATEGIC</u>									
Offensive Strategic Forces	0.1	0.1	100%	0.1	0.1	100%	0.1	0.1	100%
Defensive Strategic Forces	0.1	0.1	100%	0.1	0.1	100%	0.1	0.1	100%
Strategic Cont and Surv	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-
	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>									
Land Forces	12.9	11.4	97%	13.0	12.7	97%	13.0	12.3	94%
Division Forces	0.4	0.4	100%	0.4	0.4	100%	0.4	0.4	100%
Theater Forces	0.4	0.4	100%	0.4	0.4	100%	0.4	0.4	100%
Tactical Air Force	1.2	1.2	100%	1.3	1.3	100%	1.3	1.3	100%
Naval Forces	10.5	9.2	98%	10.5	10.3	98%	10.5	10.0	95%
Warships and ASW	6.1	5.1	99%	6.0	5.9	99%	5.9	5.7	96%
Amphibious Forces	1.2	1.0	95%	1.4	1.3	95%	1.4	1.2	90%
Naval Support Forces	3.2	3.1	98%	3.2	3.2	98%	3.2	3.1	95%
Mobility Forces	0.6	0.5	83%	0.8	0.6	83%	0.8	0.6	72%
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>									
Centrally Managed Comm	1.9	2.1	100%	2.0	2.0	100%	2.0	2.0	100%
Intelligence	0.1	0.1	100%	0.1	0.1	100%	0.1	0.1	100%
	1.8	2.0	100%	1.9	1.9	100%	1.9	1.9	100%
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>									
	1.2	1.3	100%	1.1	1.1	100%	1.1	1.1	100%
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>									
	0.3	0.3	100%	0.3	0.3	100%	0.3	0.3	100%
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>									
	3.9	4.8	79%	5.4	4.2	79%	5.9	4.5	77%
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>									
Int'l Military Org	0.4	0.5	100%	0.4	0.4	100%	0.4	0.4	100%
Unified Commands	0.1	0.1	100%	0.1	0.1	100%	0.1	0.1	100%
Federal Agency Support	0.2	0.3	100%	0.2	0.2	100%	0.2	0.2	100%
Joint Staff	0.1	0.0	100%	0.1	0.1	100%	0.1	0.1	100%
	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV	PROG RQMT**	PROG AUTH	% INV	PROG RQMT**	PROG AUTH	% INV	
OSD/Defense Agencies and Activities	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>									
Supply Operations	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	100%	2.2	2.1	96%	
Maintenance Operations	0.9	1.0	0.9	0.9	100%	0.9	0.9	95%	
Logistics Support Operations	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.8	100%	0.8	0.8	100%	
	0.5	0.3	0.5	0.5	95%	0.5	0.4	81%	
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>									
Combat Commands	2.1	2.5	2.2	2.2	100%	2.1	2.0	95%	
Support Commands	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.1	100%	1.1	1.0	90%	
	1.0	1.2	1.1	1.1	100%	1.1	1.1	100%	
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>									
Research and Development	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	93%	0.3	0.3	93%	
Geophysical Activities	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2	91%	0.3	0.2	91%	
	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100%	0.1	0.1	100%	
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>									
Personnel Support	0.6	0.5	0.8	0.8	100%	1.2	1.2	76%	
Individual Training	0.6	0.3	0.6	0.6	100%	0.6	0.6	100%	
	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.2	100%	0.2	0.2	13%	
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>									
Support Installations	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.1	97%	2.5	2.1	87%	
Centralized Support Act's	1.0	0.9	1.0	1.0	98%	1.0	1.0	98%	
	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.1	97%	1.4	1.1	79%	
<u>TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	28.1	28.2	30.0	28.5	95%	30.7	27.9	91%	
<u>OPERATING STRENGTH DEVIATION (Manyears)</u>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		
<u>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES</u>	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1		
<u>INDIVIDUALS</u>	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.6		0.6	0.6		
<u>END-STRENGTH</u>	29.1	29.0	30.7	29.3	95%	31.4	28.6	91%	

NAVY RESERVE ENLISTED PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING, & END STRENGTH
(Thousands) a/

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV	PROG RQMT*	PROG AUTH	% INV	PROG RQMT*	PROG AUTH	% INV	
<u>STRATEGIC</u>									
Offensive Strategic Forces	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	100%	0.4	0.4	100%	
Defensive Strategic Forces	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	100%	0.4	0.4	100%	
Strategic Control and Surveillance Force	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>									
Land Forces	77.6	70.6	81.3	77.4	95%	81.6	75.1	92%	
Division Forces	1.9	1.7	1.9	1.9	100%	1.9	1.8	96%	
Theater Forces	1.9	1.7	1.9	1.9	100%	1.9	1.8	96%	
Tactical Air Forces	7.2	6.6	8.0	7.2	90%	8.0	7.1	88%	
Naval Forces	67.2	61.3	70.1	67.2	96%	70.4	65.2	93%	
Warships and ASW	23.9	20.4	24.6	23.7	96%	25.0	24.0	96%	
Amphibious Forces	7.5	6.0	7.8	7.5	96%	8.0	6.9	86%	
Naval Support Forces	35.8	34.9	37.7	36.0	95%	37.4	34.3	92%	
Mobility Forces	1.3	0.9	1.3	1.1	85%	1.3	1.0	74%	
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>									
Centrally Managed Comms Intelligence	4.3	3.9	4.4	4.3	99%	4.4	4.1	92%	
	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.4	97%	1.5	1.4	91%	
	2.9	2.5	2.9	2.9	100%	2.9	2.7	93%	
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	8.0	9.3	7.8	7.8	100%	8.0	7.5	94%	
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	0.5	0.9	0.5	0.5	100%	0.5	0.5	100%	
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	12.3	12.3	14.2	12.2	86%	15.4	12.2	79%	
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>									
Int'l Military Org	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	100%	0.4	0.4	100%	
Unified Commands	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100%	0.1	0.1	100%	
	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	100%	0.3	0.3	100%	

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV	% INV	PROG RQMT**	PROG AUTH	% INV	PROG RQMT**	PROG AUTH	% INV
Federal Agency Support	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-
Joint Staff	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-
OSD/Defense Agencies and Activities	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>									
Supply Operations	5.2	6.0	96%	5.4	5.2	96%	5.4	5.2	96%
Maintenance Operations	2.3	2.6	100%	2.3	2.3	100%	2.3	2.3	100%
Logistics Support Operations	2.8	3.0	96%	2.9	2.8	96%	2.9	2.8	96%
	0.1	0.4	57%	0.2	0.1	57%	0.2	0.1	57%
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>									
Combat Commands	1.5	1.8	94%	1.6	1.5	94%	1.6	1.5	94%
Support Commands	1.0	1.2	95%	0.9	0.9	95%	0.9	0.9	95%
	0.6	0.6	93%	0.6	0.6	93%	0.6	0.6	93%
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>									
Research and Development	0.8	0.6	100%	0.8	0.8	100%	0.8	0.7	88%
Geophysical Activities	0.4	0.3	100%	0.4	0.4	100%	0.4	0.3	76%
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>									
Personnel Support	2.0	0.9	99%	2.3	2.3	99%	1.2	1.2	99%
Individual Training	1.9	0.8	100%	2.1	2.1	100%	2.0	2.0	100%
	0.1	0.1	94%	0.2	0.2	94%	0.2	0.2	95%
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>									
Support Installations	6.4	6.8	97%	6.3	6.1	97%	6.2	6.0	98%
Centralized Support Act's	5.7	6.2	99%	5.5	5.5	99%	5.5	5.4	98%
	0.7	0.6	82%	0.8	0.7	82%	0.7	0.6	91%
<u>TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	<u>119.4</u>	<u>113.8</u>	<u>95%</u>	<u>125.2</u>	<u>118.8</u>	<u>95%</u>	<u>126.8</u>	<u>115.7</u>	<u>91%</u>
<u>OPERATING STRENGTH DEVIATION</u> (Manyyears)	0.0	0.0			0.0			0.0	

<u>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION</u>									
<u>AUGMENTEES</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>
<u>INDIVIDUALS</u>	<u>3.7</u>	<u>8.7</u>	<u>4.9</u>	<u>4.9</u>	<u>4.9</u>	<u>4.9</u>	<u>4.9</u>	<u>4.9</u>	<u>4.9</u>
<u>END-STRENGTH</u>	<u>123.5</u>	<u>122.5</u>	<u>130.5</u>	<u>124.1</u>	<u>132.1</u>	<u>132.1</u>	<u>132.1</u>	<u>121.1</u>	<u>92%</u>

* Programmed Requirement reflects the presence of Full-Time Support personnel (TARs) in addition to NAMMOS requirements

NOTE: Programmed Requirement reflects the presence of Full-Time Support personnel (TARs) in addition to NAMMOS requirements. FY 1989 Programmed Requirement figures are based on NAMMOS requirements used for POM 88. FY 1990 and later Programmed Requirements are based on POM 88 NAMMOS requirements adjusted for known program changes (e.g., delays in ship transfers to NRF).

a/ Programmed Manpower Structure (RQMT) is defined as the aggregation of billets describing the full manning requirements for all units and organizations in the program force, which is the table of organization structure (or its equivalent) for operational units, and the structure associated with full peacetime workload requirements for non-operational units. Operational units are those combat, combat support, and combat service support organizations with operational readiness reporting requirements under UNITREP.

Programmed Manning (AUTH) is defined as those billets in the programmed manpower structure planned to be staffed. The term "programmed manning" recognizes that 100% staffing of the programmed manpower structure may not always be desirable or achievable within fiscal and manpower constraints. Programmed manning is a statement of distribution policy; the term is synonymous with Distributable Billets.

End strength (ES) is the sum of programmed manning or individual mobilization . and the individuals account at the end of the fiscal year.

b/ Individuals refers to the transients, trainees, patients, prisoners, students in "overhead" not available for staffing programmed manning spaces, and individual mobilization augmentees.

(3) Reserve Skill and Grade. In the past, Table IV-6 has only reported on the inactive Selected Reserve. This year, it has been expanded to reflect Full Time Support as well. While this provides a more complete view of the Selected Reserve, it obscures the progress made in reducing imbalances in the inactive Selected Reserve. Improvements in enlisted skill matches are due to a variety of initiatives, including revised methods of developing recruiting and advancement goals, a new recruiting reservation system, and High Year Tenure. For officer skill matches, the number of junior officer billets which must be filled by more senior officers will remain high although not perceived as a problem. Except for some staff communities, training new officers is more expensive than affiliating veteran officers, making the grade imbalance cost effective. Additionally, in the aviation field, pilots do not ordinarily complete obligated service until 0-4 selection/promotion.

TABLE IV -6
NAVAL RESERVE SKILLS AND GRADE
ACTUAL INVENTORY VERSUS
PROGRAMMED MANNING PLUS INDIVIDUALS (PMI)
(Strength in thousands)

	OVER*	BALANCED*	SHORT*	TOTAL*
<u>E1 - E4</u>				
Skills	33	30	42	105
PMI	15.1	5.0	39.9	60.0
Inventory	18.6	5.0	28.7	52.3
Over/Short	+3.5	-0.0	-11.2	-7.7
<u>E5 - E9</u>				
Skills	33	67	45	145
PMI	10.2	26.0	28.3	64.5
Inventory	12.2	26.3	24.7	63.2
Over/Short	+2.0	+3	-3.6	-1.3
<u>E1 - E9</u>				
Skills	34	48	68	150
PMI	24.9	24.7	75.0	124.6
Inventory	29.4	24.6	61.4	115.4**
Over/Short	+4.5	-.1	-13.6	-9.2
CWO				
Skills	8	6	19	33
PMI	0.1	0.1	0.4	.6
Inventory	0.1	0.1	0.2	.4
Over/Short	0.0	0.0	-0.2	-.2

01 - 03

Skills	21	13	32	66
PMI	1.1	4.1	9.9	15.2
Inventory	1.8	4.3	4.5	10.6
Over/Short	+0.7	+0.2	-5.4	-4.5

04 - 06

Skills	18	16	27	61
PMI	6.9	3.9	2.5	13.3
Inventory	11.7	3.9	1.6	17.2
Over/Short	+4.8	0.0	-0.9	+3.9

01 - 06

Skills	23	17	27	67
PMI	10.5	8.0	9.9	28.4**
Inventory	11.8	8.0	7.9	27.7
Over/Short	+1.3	0.0	-2.0	-7.10

* See definitions in Appendix B under "Balanced".

** Does not include 6,908 enlisted and 730 officers in the Inactive Selected Reserve awaiting/performing Initial Active Duty for Training, in a non-pay status, or for which accurate skill/pay grade data was unavailable 30 September 1989.

(4) Reserve Experience. Efforts to improve the accuracy of average years of service data on both inactive Selected Reservists and Full Time Support personnel are on-going.

The FY 1989 data in Table IV-7 shows a continuing imbalance of officer inventory to requirements. Except for some staff communities, training new officers is more expensive than affiliating veteran officers making the grade imbalance cost effective.

TABLE IV-7

Navy Reserve Experience

Programmed Versus Actual/Projected Inventory
(Strength in Thousands)

FY 1989

	<u>Total</u> <u>People</u>	<u>People With</u> <u>Greater Than 4</u> <u>Years of Service</u>	<u>Average</u> <u>Years of Services</u>
<u>E1-E4</u>			
PMI	60.0	*	*
Inventory	59.4	20.4	3.95

E5-E9

PMI	64.5	*	*
Inventory	63.1	59.6	13.49

E1-E9

PMI	124.6	*	*
Inventory	122.5	80.0	8.86

WO

PMI	0.6	*	*
Inventory	0.4	.4	23.6

01-03

PMI	15.2	*	*
Inventory	11.1	8.8	7.87

04-06

PMI	13.3	*	*
Inventory	17.4	17.2	17.88

01-06

PMI	28.4	*	*
Inventory	28.5	26.0	13.98

*YOS not programmed.

(5) Reserve Personnel Management(a) Enlisted Personnel

(1) Recruiting. The actual number of Selected Reserve Personnel recruited in FY 1989 and the accession goals for FY 1990 and FY 1991 are shown below:

Enlisted Reserve Accession Plans*

	<u>FY 1989</u>		<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
NAVETS	21,035	27,200	27,659	28,460
SAM	5,222	5,120	2,615	2,615
OSVETS	813	**	**	**
APG	1,563	**	**	**
TAR	2,623	2,628	2,722	2,582

* Actual accessions do not include gains from IRR for members temporarily transferred to the IRR for 90 days or less due to being not physically qualified or due to unavailability of pay billets.

** A total Veteran goal is identified as the NAVET goal. Individual goals are not established for OSVET and APG accessions.

(2) Retention. Retention for FY 1989 is shown below. The only retention goal for out years is to retain sufficient numbers of trained quality personnel to maintain R-2 or better readiness.

Enlisted Reserve Retention
(Percent)

<u>Affiliated</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>		<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1992</u>
	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
1st Enlistment	84.6%	*	*	*	*
2nd Enlistment	86.5%	*	*	*	*
3rd or more Enlistment	92.4%	*	*	*	*
Overall Naval Reserve	87.3%	*	*	*	*

* Retain sufficient number of trained, quality personnel to maintain R-2 or better readiness.

(b) Officers. In FY 1989, the Naval Reserve invested significant effort in medical direct commission and warfare specialty veteran recruiting with marked success. Actual numbers of Selected Reserve officers recruited in FY 1989 and accessions goals for FY 1990 and FY 1991 are shown below:

Officer Reserve Accession Plans*

	<u>FY 1989</u>		<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
NAVET	3,806	3,726	3,544	3,577
OSAM	303	300	150	0
Direct Appointments	1,241	789	1,170	1,323
TAR	236	238	200	170

* Actual accessions do not include gains from IRR for members temporarily transferred to the IRR for 90 days or less due to being not physically qualified or due to unavailability of pay billets.

(6) Reserve Readiness Assessment. Personnel readiness improved in FY 1989 as the Naval Reserve made improvements in closer skill matches and attainment of training requirements. Continued improvements are anticipated.

(a) Reserve Aggregate Population Stability

	<u>Reserve Aggregate Population Stability</u>						
	<u>(Percent)</u>						
	<u>FY 1983</u>	<u>FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
Officer	86.2	88.6	86.6	87.8	83.4	87.4	87.0
Enlisted	75.4	81.6	70.3	79.3	76.1*	78.1	79.9

*Corrected from FY 1987 report.

(b) Reserve Unit Personnel Stability.

	<u>Reserve Unit Personnel Stability</u>						
	<u>(Percent)</u>						
	<u>FY 1983</u>	<u>FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
Officer	58.5	59.7	*	*	*	47.0	50.8
Enlisted	47.2	54.5	*	*	*	47.9	49.3

*Data not available.

(7) Individual Mobilization Augmentee Programs. An IMA is an officer or enlisted person in the Selected Reserve who will fill a specific billet in the Active Force upon mobilization. Each IMA will be assigned to a mobilization billet within the active force, training in that billet during peacetime.

Individual Mobilization Augmentees

	<u>FY 1989</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Total IMAs	31*	555	580

* Due to long-standing ADP difficulties which are being resolved on an on-going basis, only 31 IMAs were reported to RCCPDS for FY 1989.

(8) Full Time Support Programs. Currently, an increase in full-time support is programmed.

Reserve Full Time Support Programs

(End Strength in Thousands) ^{1/}

	<u>FY 1989</u> <u>(ACTUAL)</u>	<u>FY 1990</u> <u>(PROJ)</u>	<u>FY 1991</u> <u>(PROJ)</u>
Sect. 265 ^{2/}	0.2	0.2	0.2
TAR Officer	1.9	1.9	1.9
TAR Enlisted	18.4	19.1	19.5
Canvasser Recruiters	1.4	1.5	1.4
Reserve Subtotal	<u>21.9</u>	<u>22.7</u>	<u>22.9</u>
Active Navy	7.0	7.5	8.3
Navy Civilians	2.9	3.0	3.0
TOTAL	<u>31.8</u>	<u>33.2</u>	<u>34.2</u>

^{1/} Totals may not add due to rounding.

^{2/} Reserve Officers in headquarters billets in accordance with Section 265, of Title 10, U.S. Code.

b. Individual Ready Reserves (IRR)

Navy IRR is composed primarily of personnel with recent active duty experience who still have a remaining military service obligation (MSO). The FY 1986 increase in IRR end strength marked the reversal of declining IRR strength that began in 1981.

In June 1984, the eight year MSO began and in August 1984 the \$900 bonus for a three year IRR reenlistment was instituted. The extension of the MSO from six to eight years and the IRR bonus implementation should allow continued IRR growth through FY 1992. With the FY 1989 transfer of IRR personnel with a reenlistment code of RE-4 to standby, the IRR showed a slight decrease in FY 1989 with an increase in standby Reservists.

Decreases in enlisted strength of VTUs have resulted due to implementation of high year tenure (HYT) rules for drilling Reservists. HYT and eight year MSO will increase IRR (not drilling) inventory through FY 1992.

	<u>FY 1989</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 1990</u> (Projected)	<u>FY 1991</u> (Projected)
<u>Drilling Without Pay (Volunteer Training Unit)</u>			
Officers	2,454	2,502	2,552
Enlisted	547	520	504
Total	3,001	3,022	3,056
<u>Not Drilling</u>			
Officers	15,186	15,353	15,640
Enlisted	68,369	84,081	109,606
Total	83,555	99,434	125,246
Total IRR	86,556	102,456	128,302

2. Standby Reserve

The Standby Reserve is composed of personnel who maintain their military affiliation without being in the Ready Reserve or Retired Reserve and who are liable for active duty in accordance with Title 10 USC 672 and 674. The Standby Reserve Active Status List (S1) includes members transferred from the Ready Reserve as a result of temporary hardship, key employees in Federal and non-Federal employment, and theological/medical/dental students. The Standby Reserve Inactive Status List (S2) includes those volunteers who are no longer required to remain in an active status. Starting in FY 1989, all members entering the IRR with an RE-4 reenlistment code were transferred to S2 status. This will initially increase the S2 population in FY 1989, but it will level out in FY 1992 and out.

Standby Reserve Strength

	FY 89 (Actual)	FY 90 (Projected)	FY 91 (Projected)
Active (S1)			
Officers	61	65	70
Enlisted	<u>816</u>	<u>835</u>	<u>855</u>
Total	877	900	925
Inactive (S2)			
Officers	8,691	8,805	8,925
Enlisted	<u>411</u>	<u>4,825</u>	<u>5,250</u>
Total	9,102	13,630	14,175
Total Standby Reserve	9,979	14,530	15,100

3. Retirees

This program includes regular and reserve retirees who have completed 20 years or more of active duty and, separately, reserve retirees who are eligible for reserve retired pay at age 60. Twenty-year active duty retirees (regular or reserve) are liable for recall to active duty at any time by the Secretary of the Navy in the interest of national defense, under regulation presented by the Secretary of Defense. The reserve retirees are liable for recall only in time of war or national emergency declared by Congress or when otherwise authorized by law. Eighty percent of the Fleet Reserve, 70 percent from the Retired USN/USNR Class I and II (includes those non-disabled, under age 60, retired) and 10 percent from the retired USN/USNR Class III (includes over age 60 or disabled), are expected to respond to a call up.

Retired Strength

	<u>FY 1989</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 1990</u> (Projected)	<u>FY 1991</u> (Projected)
Twenty-year Active Duty Retirees (USN/USNR)*			
CAT I/II (20 yr + active duty retiree)	122,922	124,150	125,391
CAT III	229,625	231,921	234,240
Other Retiree Reserves (Excluding Honorary Retirees)*			
*CAT I/II	71,081	71,791	72,509
*CAT III	56,018	56,570	57,143

*Statistical changes since last report are due to changes in data collection methods and sort criteria to more closely align with DoD retirement categories.

4. Active Duty For Training

Officers and Enlisted Members Serving on Active Duty for Training

	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>
<u>Category</u>		
<u>Enlisted</u>		
Recruit and Specialized Training (Including SAM Trainees)	5,222	2,615
<u>Officer</u>		
Flight Training (Includes OSAM acquisition training)	39	22
Professional (Includes OSAM acquisition training)	429	413
TOTAL	5,690	3,050

C. Civilian Manpower

1. General

Civilian manpower comprises a vital segment of Navy's overall resources. The majority of Navy civilian employees directly support our fleet readiness posture. Approximately half of them work in industrial activities, performing depot maintenance and repair, engineering, RDT&E, printing, public works, and transportation functions essential to the readiness of the fleet. Many of the Navy's civilians employed at operation and maintenance activities perform essential readiness support in supply centers, air stations, and ship and aircraft repair and maintenance facilities. The balance of the civilians provide essential support in functions such as training, medical care, engineering, development, and acquisition, all of which have an indirect but important impact on readiness.

The civilian estimates represent the manpower levels required to execute program funding levels and reflect a concerted effort to contain personnel costs. To manage civilian costs effectively, the DON implemented in FY 1987 a new policy called "Manage to Payroll". Under this program, greater authority, incentive, and flexibility for the position classification and position management programs are placed on appropriate management levels. Military and civilian line managers are provided authority for establishing and classifying civilian positions, subject to the civilian payroll resources available to their organizations. The concurrent allocation of authorized payroll funding levels to

line managers is part of the emphasis on managing civilian employment as an element of costs. Civilian estimates are balanced and structured to reflect declining end strength levels in FY 1990 and FY 1991 consistent with reduced program funding levels. The Navy civilian manpower request also demonstrates a continued strong commitment to manpower economies and efficiencies.

The FY 1990/1991 request is for 326,600 and 320,200 civilians, respectively. This request is shown by DPPC in Table IV-8.

TABLE IV-8
NAVY CIVILIAN PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
 (Direct and Indirect Hires in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
<u>CIVILIANS</u>	<u>ACTUALS</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>
<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES</u>			
<u>STRATEGIC</u>			
Offensive Strategic Forces	<u>4.3</u>	<u>4.5</u>	<u>4.4</u>
Defensive Strategic Forces	<u>4.2</u>	<u>4.2</u>	<u>4.4</u>
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	0.2	0.2	*
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>			
Tactical Air Force	<u>7.4</u>	<u>9.0</u>	<u>9.3</u>
Naval Forces	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>
Warships and ASW	1.4	2.9	3.0
Amphibious Forces	0.3	.3	0.3
Naval Support Forces	0.1	0.1	0.1
Mobility Forces	1.1	2.5	2.6
	5.6	5.9	6.1
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>			
Intelligence	<u>3.4</u>	<u>3.6</u>	<u>3.4</u>
Centrally Managed Comm	<u>1.8</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.8</u>
	1.6	1.7	1.6
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	<u>20.4</u>	<u>19.8</u>	<u>20.6</u>
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>1.7</u>
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	<u>8.2</u>	<u>9.2</u>	<u>9.4</u>
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>	<u>6.2</u>	<u>6.4</u>	<u>6.3</u>
Int'l Military Org	0.2	0.3	0.3
Unified Commands	6.0	6.1	6.0
OSD/Defense Agencies and Activities			

	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>
CIVILIANS			
<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES</u>			
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	<u>169.1</u>	<u>162.8</u>	<u>153.8</u>
Supply Operations	<u>24.4</u>	<u>24.2</u>	<u>23.0</u>
Other Logistics Activities	<u>24.4</u>	<u>24.2</u>	<u>23.0</u>
Maintenance Operations	<u>123.5</u>	<u>117.5</u>	<u>109.2</u>
Naval Shipyards	<u>70.0</u>	<u>66.9</u>	<u>57.9</u>
Ordnance Activities	<u>21.6</u>	<u>21.0</u>	<u>21.4</u>
Other Logistics Activities	<u>31.9</u>	<u>29.6</u>	<u>29.9</u>
Logistics Support Activities	<u>21.2</u>	<u>21.1</u>	<u>21.6</u>
Logistic Support Activities	<u>21.2</u>	<u>21.1</u>	<u>21.6</u>
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>	<u>9.0</u>	<u>8.9</u>	<u>8.8</u>
Combat Commands	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.1</u>
Support Commands	<u>8.0</u>	<u>7.9</u>	<u>7.7</u>
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>	<u>37.8</u>	<u>37.7</u>	<u>38.4</u>
Research and Development	<u>36.6</u>	<u>36.4</u>	<u>37.0</u>
Geophysical Activities	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.4</u>
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>	<u>5.9</u>	<u>6.1</u>	<u>6.3</u>
Personnel Support	<u>2.4</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>2.6</u>
Individual Training	<u>3.5</u>	<u>3.6</u>	<u>3.7</u>
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>	<u>58.9</u>	<u>57.2</u>	<u>57.9</u>
Support Installations	<u>57.1</u>	<u>55.5</u>	<u>56.2</u>
Centralized Support Act'y	<u>1.8</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>1.7</u>
<u>TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	<u>332.3</u>	<u>326.6</u>	<u>320.2</u>
<u>END-STRENGTH**:</u>	<u>332.3</u>	<u>326.6</u>	<u>320.2</u>

*Rounds to zero.

**End strength may not equal total of DPPC categories due to rounding.

2. Major Program Changes

The FY 1990 and FY 1991 estimates reflects a net reduction of 5,700 and 12,100 respectively from FY 1989 inventory. Significant changes in civilian manpower program are discussed below.

Major increases are for the substitutions of civilians for military personnel, the conversion to direct funding of reimbursed non-appropriated fund employees in Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) activities, and several programmatic actions. The substitution of civilians for military personnel will increase civilian end strength by 1,655 in FY 1991 with a significant savings in labor costs.

The conversion of MWR employees will result in an increase of 1,939 end strength and will be accomplished in compliance with Congressional direction in the Authorization Conference Report for Fiscal Year 1989. The Conference report directs that reimbursement of non-appropriated fund services with appropriated funds cease by October 1, 1990. This conversion will increase the requirement for overseas civilian work years.

Programmatic increases are in two major areas. FY 1990 was the first year of an initiative to replace Contracted Advisory and Assistance Services with civilian personnel to reduce the risk of compromising the competitive acquisition process. Congress approved increases in personnel for this initiative in FY 1990 and the FY 1991 budget reflects plans to convert an additional 782 personnel, which will be accomplished at a net saving to the government. The FY 1991 budget also reflects an increase of 681 end strength due to refined workload estimates at Navy Aviation Depots and Ordnance Stations.

Offsetting decreases in personnel reflect revised estimates of civilian personnel due to a major functional transfer, Commercial Activities and Efficiency Review savings, and decreases in personnel required to perform major programs. The functional transfer of 1,416 end strength from Navy Plant Representative Offices to the Defense Contract Management Agency in order to consolidate contract administration function is an initiative approved in the Defense Management Review. It is anticipated that the Efficiency Review and Commercial Activity programs will achieve savings of 1,903 end strength. The FY 1990 Congressional direction to reduce Commercial Activity program administration has been reflected in both FY 1990 and FY 1991. A decrease of 9,019 end strength is based on revised workload estimates for naval shipyards as a result of lower funding estimated to be available from industrial fund customers.

A majority of the civilian employees of the Department of the Navy are directly related to our readiness posture. Over half of the civilians work in industrial fund activities, which are primarily engaged in depot level maintenance and repair of ships, planes, and associated equipment. Many of the civilians employed at operation and maintenance activities such as supply centers, ship repair facilities, and Naval and Marine Corps air stations and bases contribute directly to operational readiness. The balance of the civilians provide essential support in

functions such as training, medical facilities, and the engineering, development, and acquisition of weapons systems, which have a definite, although longer range, impact on readiness.

3. Improvements and Efficiencies

The Navy estimate of civilian manpower requirements reflects a continuing commitment to increase the efficiency of the civilian work force. The majority of the Navy's efforts in this area are concentrated in the Commercial Activities (CA) and in the Navy Industrial Improvement Program (NIIP).

Under the CA program, Navy is conducting cost studies using OMB Circular A-76 procedures to determine whether performance of CA functions are more cost effective when performed under contract or by using in-house resources. In FY 1989, Navy completed CA Program studies of 1,318 civilian positions and 1,299 military billets. 707 civilian positions and 1,299 military billets were saved either by implementing a more efficient government operation or by converting to contract. Recent direction in the Conference Report accompanying the 1990 Defense Appropriations Act to cancel ongoing studies exceeding specified timeframes makes it difficult to project future program output. This direction will result in approximately 70 percent of ongoing study efforts being cancelled. The problem is compounded by language in the 1990 DoD Authorization Act which gives commanding officers final authority to identify new cost comparison candidates. Since the CA program threatens the jobs of government workers performing the tasks undergoing comparison with the private sector, it can be disruptive and, as a result, is not popular with commanding officers. This statute thus has drastically reduced the number newly identified candidates for cost comparison. These two Congressional initiatives should result in a major decline over the next several years in our program output, which has until now averaged around 3,000 positions per year.

The Naval Industrial Improvement Program (NIIP) is designed to implement a series of cost-avoidance management improvements within the Navy's industrial base. These efforts do not constitute a sweeping reform, but rather represent the implementation of the basics of management and control which in turn facilitate significant efficiencies of operations. With respect to civilian manpower considerations, Navy is drawing upon private sector experience and expertise in managing workforce levels in a more orderly manner commensurate with workload requirements. At each major industrial activity (including Naval shipyards, Naval Aviation Depots, Ordnance Facilities, and Public Works Centers) Navy is conducting detailed reviews of overhead staffing and workload requirements in order to better align resources. Additionally, various initiatives are directed at issues which limit Navy's flexibility to pursue productivity improvements, including:

- Fostering changes to rules which limit the quality of personnel resources and cause the retention of larger than necessary numbers of people.

- Refocusing personnel rules to more closely align with industrial activity needs through the concept of competition and reinforcement of cost consciousness in the workplace.

- Pursuing the realignment of the compensation system to relate productivity and compensation, thereby providing workers the opportunity to have more of a stake in the process and be evaluated for the bottom line results of their efforts.

Finally, Navy is attempting to remove a number of obstacles which preclude the maintenance of a lean, flexible workforce, including the use of more flexible employment hiring programs and the use of Transition Staffing Pools to lessen the adverse impact on employees while transitioning to new workforce configurations.

Navy also participates in a number of programs designed to enhance productivity and achieve economies of operation. The Productivity Investment Fund and the Navy Industrial Fund Asset Capitalization programs invest in modern equipment, methods, and labor saving devices to replace labor-intensive, costly operations and bring activities to a state-of-the-art position. The Defense Retail Interservice Support Program and Productivity Enhancing Investment Fund provide local commanders with a means to achieve cost effectiveness and economies of operation through interservice consolidations and acquisition of capital investments in areas of fast payback potential.

D. Mobilization Manpower

1. Military Manpower

Immediately upon mobilization, Navy will experience a manpower shortfall due to casualties, peacetime active duty manning, and mobilization delays. The shortfall will be eliminated quickly with the mobilization surge and the commencement of casualties returning to duty.

Manpower shortages will persist, however, in certain designators and ratings. The pre-trained individual manpower (PIM) will not be able to meet all of the requirements because of shortfalls in certain specialties. To alleviate these shortages, stop-loss measures will be initiated and training school output will be directed toward reducing remaining shortfalls.

2. Civilian Manpower

The peacetime civilian authorizations form the baseline for civilian mobilization manpower planning. On M-Day and after, the peacetime numbers increase to reflect the growth in support required to build toward and sustain full mobilization. During mobilization, civilian positions will be created to support the buildup, and concurrently, positions will be terminated in activities that do not directly support the war effort.

To replace recalled retirees and reservists, wartime manpower requirements include 28,258 additional people needed on M-Day and 58,779 new positions created to support the mobilization mission. Therefore, Navy needs to procure 87,037 new hires over the 180-day mobilization scenario. These requirements cover a wide range of skills and occupations, such as depot-level maintenance and repair of ships, planes, and missiles, as well as associated equipment and supply support.

Navy plans for offsetting the shortfall in civilian manpower after M-Day include substantive recruitment efforts using the Emergency-Indefinite appointing authority for the rapid acquisition of new personnel. Other efforts include recall of recently retired civilian personnel and cross training of on-board staff.

E. Manpower Management Improvements

1. Navy Total Force

The Navy's Total Force Advocate is a flag officer who heads the Plans, Policy and Operations Directorate of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and assesses the optimum mix of Active and Reserve Component manpower and units in the Navy. Potential changes in Total Force composition are evaluated by the Total Force Advocate to determine whether the Naval Reserve can shoulder a larger share of peacetime naval operations and is able to train and be equipped to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations in wartime. The Total Force Advocate is also tasked with acting as an "honest broker" in resolving issues with Navy program sponsors and other agencies. He is a member of the Navy's Program Development Review Committee, a flag-level board that meets during the POM cycle to prioritize each program within the overall Navy POM and to assess the impact of recommended program changes. He and his staff will be heading the Navy's participation in the Department of Defense review of Total Force policy, force mix, and military force structure required by Section 1101 of the National Defense Authorization Act, 1990.

The expansion of Reserve participation in various mission areas since 1980 has generated additional manpower requirements for the Reserve. To meet the demand for more personnel, Selected Reserve end-strength has grown over 50 percent in the 1980s. The Naval Reserve, combined and thoroughly integrated with the Active Navy, will ensure that the United States will prevail in any conflict at sea. While the assumptions underlying Total Force mix are under review, great reliance will continue to be placed on the Naval Reserve.

Placing much of the Navy's warfighting capability in the Reserve hinges on the availability of Reserve assets. From the equipment perspective - ships, aircraft, etc. -- availability is good. In the manpower area, the just completed Exercise Proud Eagle 90 allowed the Navy to test its ability to support Fleet Commander in Chief requirements by recalling Selected Reservists and Individual Ready Reservists as authorized within the 200K Presidential Call-up and Partial Mobilization. Exercise results were highly favorable and demonstrated the validity of the Total Force mix for the threat they were designed to deter. However,

the availability of Reserve personnel to man the equipment in other-than-mobilization situations is less clear. There is a broad range of statutory options available to involuntarily recall reservists. However, the domestic and international implications associated with these actions have severely restricted their use. Naval Reservists have only been involuntarily recalled to active duty four times since Korea in other than exercise situations.

III. NAVY PROGRAMMED MANPOWER BY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES

This section summarizes changes in Navy's manpower totals in terms of force and program changes resulting in year-to-year adjustments in overall Navy strength.

Current projections are for 551 total battle force ships and 283 aviation squadrons in FY 1990, and 546 total battle force ships and 285 aviation squadrons in FY 1991.

A. Strategic

The Strategic category includes nuclear offensive, defensive, and control and surveillance forces having the objective of deterrence and defense against nuclear attack upon the United States, its military forces, bases overseas, and allies. The majority of Navy manpower in this category is associated with the Fleet Ballistic Missile System, including both SSBNs and their tenders. The Trident program, strategic operational headquarters, and communications and automated data processing support are also included.

1. Offensive Strategic Forces

In FY 1990, Offensive Strategic Forces increase overall by +881. There are +1,039 spaces to Support Ships (FBMS) and +502 spaces to the Trident Program, which are offset partially by -680 spaces to Fleet Ballistic Missile Systems. FY 1991 Offensive Strategic Forces decrease overall by -285 which include -204 spaces to Fleet Ballistic Missile Systems.

2. Active Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces

In FY 1990 Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces increase overall by +271 active spaces in part due to an increase of +187 to Relocatable Over-the-Horizon Radar (ROTHR) spaces. The FY 1991 overall increment includes a +167 increase to ROTHR.

There are no significant changes in Naval Reserve spaces in FY 1990 through FY 1991.

3. Civilian Strategic Forces

The increase in civilian spaces through FY 1990 largely results from completion of staffing of the Trident facilities at Kings Bay, Georgia. In FY 1991 civilian resources for Trident Refit Facility and Trident Training Facility transition from the special project office to the fleet and Naval Education and Training Command.

B. Tactical and Mobility

The Tactical and Mobility manpower is associated with conventional warfare forces and their operational headquarters and supporting units. The active military end strength in Tactical/Mobility forces supports the manning of ships and squadrons, all of which require full time manpower due to deployment requirements. The Naval Reserve manpower decrease from FY 1990 to FY 1991 in Tactical/Mobility forces is due to relatively small reductions in a number of areas which were under-executed in FY 1989.

1. Land Forces

Navy Land Forces include physicians, dentists, chaplains, hospital corpsmen, and dental technicians assigned to the Fleet Marine Forces and Marine Corps bases.

In FY 1990 significant changes in Land Forces occur with an increase of +570 which include increases of +380 Force Service Support Group (FSSG) active spaces and of +209 active spaces to Divisions (Marine). No major changes occur to Land Forces in FY 1991.

There are no major increases or decreases in Naval Reserve or civilian spaces for FY 1990 through FY 1991.

2. Tactical Air Forces

The Tactical Air Forces subcategory includes manpower associated with Navy fighter, strike fighter, airborne early warning and electronic warfare squadrons; attack, multipurpose aircraft carriers; and tactical air operational headquarters units.

In FY 1990 Tactical Air Force spaces increases by +3,827. There are increases of +3,093 spaces to Multi-Purpose Aircraft Carriers, +307 to A-6 squadrons, +207 to F-14 squadrons, +192 to Early Warning Aircraft Squadrons, and +322 to Sea-Based EW Squadrons. Decrements include -265 to A-7 squadrons and -183 to Shore Based EW squadrons. In FY 1991 Tactical Air Force spaces decrease by -1,226. There are decreases of -1,374 spaces to Multi-Purpose Aircraft and -736 to A-7 squadrons and partially offsetting increments of +600 to F/A-18 squadrons and +129 to F-14 squadrons.

The decrease in Naval Reserve personnel in FY 1991 of -122 is due to reductions in augmentees to active TACAIR squadrons.

There are no major changes in civilian manpower.

3. Naval Forces

The Naval Forces subcategory includes manpower for anti-surface warfare forces, anti-submarine warfare and fleet air defense forces, amphibious forces and support forces. It is the largest subcategory of active military and Selected Reserve manpower in the Navy. Naval Forces include virtually all ship manpower requirements except the fleet ballistic missile manpower in the Strategic category and the carrier manpower in Tactical Air Forces.

In FY 1990, active spaces in Warships and ASW Forces increase by +1,306 with increments of +862 to Battleships, +2,941 to Cruisers, +769 to non-missile Destroyers, +116 to Lamps, +162 to Submarines, +389 to Mine Counter Measure Forces, +159 to Air Mine Countermeasure Squadrons, +129 to Operational Headquarters (Sea Control - Surface), and, +314 to non-missile frigates. Decrements include: -2,463 to missile destroyers, -984 to non-missile frigates, -797 to ASW Patrol Squadrons, -111 to Mines and Mines Support, and -189 to missile frigates. In FY 1991 active spaces in Warships and ASW Forces decrease by -6,882 with decrements of -3,056 in Battleships, -3,755 in non-missile Destroyers, -1,696 to non-missile Frigates, and -431 to Mine Counter Measure Forces. Increments include: +1,177 to Cruisers, +162 to non-missile destroyers, +136 to S-3 Squadrons, +181 to Lamps, and, +680 to non-missile Frigates.

FY 1990 Amphibious Forces active spaces increase by +3,595 which includes: +2,592 in Amphibious Assault Ships, +239 in Amphibious Tactical Support, +264 in Explosive Ordnance Disposal Forces, and +568 in Ongoing Operational Activities. In FY 1991 Amphibious Forces active spaces increase by +514 with increments of +151 in Amphibious Tactical Support and +324 in Amphibious Assault Ships.

In FY 1990, there is a total increase of +8,116 in Naval Support Forces due to increases of +4,795 to Support Forces, +1,351 to Underway Replenishment Ships, +1,099 to Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities, +118 to Fleet Logistics Support, and +466 to Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities. In FY 1991, there is a total increase of +3,177 to Naval Support Forces due to increments of +1,906 to Support Forces, +643 to Underway Replenishment Ships, +285 to Major Fleet Support Ships, and +320 to Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities.

FY 1991 ASW and Fleet Air Defense active spaces decrease by -2,835 with decreases of -4,060 to Guided Missile Destroyers (due to the decommissioning of 13 ships), -236 to Mine Countermeasure Forces, and -234 to Reserve Mine Countermeasure Forces, partially offset by increases of +1,262 to Cruisers, +163 to Non-Missile Destroyers, +126 to S-3 Squadrons, and +153 to LAMPS.

FY 1991 Amphibious Forces active spaces increase by a total of +105 with increases of +132 to Amphibious Tactical Support Units and +324 to Reserve Amphibious Assault Ships, partially offset by a decrease of -343 to Amphibious Assault Ships.

In FY 1991, active Naval Support Forces increase by +3,379 due, in part, to increases of +1,604 to Support Forces (ADs), +181 to Support Forces (AFDMs, ARDs, ARDMs, ASs, etc.), +594 to Underway Replenishment Ships, +351 to Major Fleet Support Ships, and +587 to SIMAs.

Modernization of the Naval Surface Reserve continues, but there is an overall decrease in the numbers of Naval Reserve personnel in FY 1991. The net increase in FY 1991 of +118 in Warships and ASW Forces results from an increase of six frigates and decreases to Reserve augmentees to active ASW squadrons and staffs. The Selected Reserve reduction of -2,451 in Amphibious and Naval Support Forces reflects adjustments in areas that were under-executed in FY 1989.

The civilian increase in the Naval Forces subcategory in FY 1990 is due to the realignment of some planning and engineering functions and of some civilian technical aviation specialists from Program 7 to provide for increased effective and efficient use of resources (+1,300). Minor decreases are associated with commercial activities study conversions.

4. Mobility Forces

The Mobility Forces subcategory includes Navy strength for airlift and sealift capability, plus port terminal and traffic management operations.

There are no major increases or decreases of active duty spaces in FY 1990 and FY 1991.

Naval Reserve mobility forces decrease by -230 from FY 1990 to FY 1991, primarily due to a reduction of augmentees for Military Sealift Command Staffs.

The increase in civilian spaces in FY 1991 reflects the civilian manning of TAGOS 20 and 21, TAO 192 and 196, the USS Furman, and the revised manning of the USS Hayes. These increases are partially offset by the contractor operation of various TAGOS.

C. Communications/Intelligence

This category includes Manpower associated with Intelligence and Centrally Managed Communications.

1. Intelligence.

This category includes strength for the centralized intelligence gathering and analytic agencies and activities within the Department of Defense.

In FY 1990 Intelligence increase by +777 in part due to the addition of +288 spaces in Cryptological Activities. No major changes are programmed for 1991.

Naval Reserve spaces for FY 1990 through FY 1991 were reduced by -200.

The civilian increase in FY 1990 is primarily for Cryptologic Activities and HUMINT.

2. Centrally Managed Communications

This subcategory includes strength associated with the Defense Communication System, internal Navy communications requirements, satellite communications system, communications security, and other related communications units.

In FY 1990 Centrally Managed Communications increase by +566 with increase of +153 in Satellite Communications and 288 in Navy Communications. No major changes are programmed for 1991.

D. Combat Installations

This category includes strength associated with Base Operating Support for Combat Installations. Manpower in this category provides operation and maintenance of strategic, tactical, airlift and sealift commands including base communications and air traffic control.

In FY 1990, Combat Installation active spaces increase by +740 in Base Operations (Naval Air Bases) and decrease by -194 in Base Ops (Fleet Support Services). In FY 1991 Combat Installation active spaces decrease overall by -322 active spaces which includes a reduction of -107 in Base Ops (Fleet Support Services).

From FY 1990 to FY 1991, Naval Reserve Air Bases end strength was reduced by -258, primarily in conjunction with proposed infrastructure reductions.

Decreases in civilian spaces in FY 1991 reflect projected Commercial Activity and MEO savings and additional shore reductions in the the fleets.

E. Force Support Training

Force Support Training manpower sustains units providing training to organized crews or teams in conjunction with performance of a specific mission. Civilian support in this area consists of maintenance and clerical support for fleet air training units.

In FY 1990, Force Support Training does not change significantly, however, there is a decrease of -136 active spaces in Fleet Support Training. No significant changes occur in FY 1991.

There are no significant increases or decreases to Naval Reserve, and civilian manpower in FY 1990 or FY 1991.

F. Medical Support

Navy manpower in this category provides medical care in DoD military medical facilities.

In FY 1990 Medical Support active spaces increase by +1,669 primarily due to increments of +729 in Care in Regional Defense Facilities spaces and +927 in Station Hospitals and Medical Clinics. In FY 1991 Medical Support active spaces decrease by -157 in Care in Regional Defense Facilities.

The growth of +300 in Selected Reserve manpower in FY 1991 reflects a DoD-directed increase for an additional 150 doctors and 150 nurses.

Civilian increases in FY 1990 reflect Congressional guidance and support of Navy medical treatment facilities. Increases include inspection-directed help to overseas hospitals and clinics, increased civilian technician positions, administrative and clerical support, and rebuilding the physician assistant program. Increases are slightly offset with projected savings from the Commercial Activities Program.

G. Joint Activities

This category includes International Military Organizations, Unified Commands, Federal Agency Support, Joint Staff, and OSD/Defense Agencies and Activities.

1. International Military Organizations

FY 1990 International Military Organizations increase active spaces in Foreign Military Sales Support by +115. In FY 1991 there are no major increases or decreases for active spaces.

2. Unified Commands

There are no major manpower increases or decreases to active duty, Reserve or civilian manpower for FY 1990 and FY 1991.

3. Federal Agency Support

There are no major increases or decreases to active, Reserve or civilian manpower for FY 1990 and FY 1991.

4. Joint Staff

There are no major manpower increases or decreases to active, Reserve or civilian manpower in FY 1990 and FY 1991.

5. OSD/Defense Agencies and Activities

There are no major active, reserve or civilian manpower changes in FY 1990 and FY 1991 OSD/Defense Agencies and activities.

H. Central Logistics

Manpower in this subcategory is associated with Supply, Maintenance, and Logistics Support operations. This manpower provides critical support to the fleet and directly affects readiness.

There are no significant changes in active or reserve maintenance operations in FY 1990 and FY 1991.

Civilian changes for FY 1990 and FY 1991 are discussed separately by type of operation as summarized below:

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Supply Operations	-265	-1,180
Maintenance Operations	-5,992	-8,303
Logistic Support Operations	-37	+489

1. Supply Operations

Included in this category are supply depots, inventory control points and procurement operations activities that provide fleet support and contract expertise for ship and aircraft systems acquisition.

There are no significant Active or Reserve manpower changes in this category.

The decreases in civilian manpower in FY 1990 and FY 1991 reflect defense management report savings, offset by increases in the conversion of some Contract Advisory and Assistance Services (CAAS) support to in-house personnel in acquisition organizations. This action was deemed necessary as a result of examinations by the Naval Investigative Service and Navy Inspector General which showed that the level of contract support in acquisition organizations represented an unacceptable risk to the integrity of the acquisition process.

2. Maintenance Operations

In FY 1990 Maintenance operations decrease by -150 active spaces in Ship Maintenance Activities, by -285 in Naval Ordnance Activities and increase by +148 in Ship Maintenance Activities and +174 in Maintenance Support Activities. FY 1990 active spaces increase in total by +161. There is no major change for FY 1991.

The decrease in civilian manpower between FY 1990 and FY 1991 are predominantly in the naval shipyards (-3,000 in FY 1990, and -9,000 in FY 1991). The manpower levels reflect requirements based on shipyard workload phasing. Additionally, while funding levels influence the manning levels, other factors also impact the civilian manpower requirements. These include improved productivity, transition from overhauls to selected restricted availabilities, phased maintenance availabilities and intermediate maintenance, and influence of strategic homeporting on intermediate maintenance workload.

Other decreases in FY 1990 are the result of the transfer of some planning and engineering functions and some technical aviation specialists to another budget activity. FY 1991 civilian decreases reflects projected CA program savings and a decrease in resources for the Depot Maintenance Modifications program.

There are no significant Reserve manpower changes in this category.

3. Logistics Support Operations

The increase in civilian manpower in FY 1991 will provide support to execute planning studies, facilities support, real estate administration, transportation workload, and conversion of some contract advisory and assistance service.

There are no active or reserve manpower changes in this category.

I. Service Management Headquarters

This category includes management headquarters manpower required to support Combat and Support Commands.

1. Combat Commands

There are no major increases or decreases to active or civilian spaces in FY 1990 and FY 1991.

Naval Reserve end strength decreases by -110, mostly due to a reduction in augmentees in Fleet Headquarters units from FY 1990 to FY 1991.

2. Support Commands

There are no major increases or decreases to active or Reserve spaces in FY 1990 and FY 1991. There is a decrease in civilian manpower in FY 1990 due to management efficiency savings. No major changes occur in FY 1991.

J. Research and Development

Within this category fall Research and Development and Geophysical Activities.

1. Research and Development

The Navy's Research and Development (R&D) community comprises headquarters, laboratories, Research and Development, Test and Evaluation project ships, test and evaluation activities, and support offices. A large portion of the manpower is attached to R&D laboratories. The Navy's R&D efforts are comprehensive, involving land, sea, air, and undersea operations.

In FY 1990 there is an increase of +428 active spaces in Facilities/Installation Support. FY 1991 has no significant changes.

In FY 1991 the increase in civilian manpower levels reflect increased support for the Air Combat Environmental Test and Evaluation Center, in-service missile engineering support, Joint Tactical Information Distribution System Integration, Aerial Target System development, TACIT RAINBOW, and other programs.

There are no significant reserve manpower changes in this category.

2. Geophysical Activities

The Navy's geophysical programs include the Naval Observatory and various oceanographic and meteorological activities throughout the world. These employ professional meteorologists, oceanographers, geophysicists, mathematicians, engineers, and technical specialists, directed by a small headquarters staff.

There are no significant changes in FY 1990 and FY 1991 to active spaces in this area. Naval Reserve end strength was reduced by 100.

The increase in civilian spaces in FY 1990 is associated with the Weather Service, and reflects a civilian substitution of shore intensive ratings.

K. Training and Personnel

This category includes manpower associated with Personnel Support and Individual Training.

1. Personnel Support

This subcategory includes manpower associated with Navy recruiting and examining, education of overseas dependents, reception centers, disciplinary barracks, centrally funded welfare and morale programs, the Armed Forces Information Program, and civilian career-training and intern programs. The Personnel Support category also includes research and development manpower requirements for human factors and personnel development research.

In FY 1990 Other Personnel Activities increase by +101 active spaces. There are no significant changes in FY 1991.

In FY 1991, the decrease of -100 reserve spaces reflects the realignment of the Naval Reserve Recruiting organization.

There are no significant changes in civilian manpower in FY 1990. There is an increase of +100 in FY 1991 to Other Personnel Activities for the Naval Supply Systems Command Intern Program.

2. Individual Training

This category includes manpower for formal military and technical training, as well as for professional education of military personnel conducted under the centralized control of service training commands. Training activities in this category include recruit training, officer acquisition training (including ROTC), general skill training, flight training, professional development education, health care, individual training, and training support activities.

Manpower in the Individual Training Category is dedicated to training of active Navy students and trainees and Naval Reservists on active duty for training. The students and trainees in permanent change of station status are carried in the Individuals subcategory; those in temporary additional duty status are included in the categories of their parent commands.

In FY 1990 Individual Training active spaces increase overall by +971. Significant increases include: +120, in Base Operations - Training - Navy by +202, in Base Operations-Other General Personnel Activities by +100, and in Base Operations - Logistics - Navy by +313. Decrements occur in Base Operations-Other Base Support by -356, in Base OPS - Other Naval Reserve by -120, in Commissary Retail Sales by -106, and in Base Operations - Training - Navy by -624. In FY 1991, a decrease of -259 occurs in Base OPS - Training - Navy.

Reductions of -190 in Naval Reserve end strength was taken in Individual Training for FY 1991.

Decreases in FY 1990 Civilian Manpower are due to workload decreases in maintenance and transportation at Public Works Centers and reduced commissary operations. Commercial Activities and Efficiency Reviews also add to the reduction. FY 1991 increases are due to MWR conversion.

An increase in civilian manpower in FY 1990 is attributed to an increase for continuing education, the professional development program, and for academic excellence.

L. Support Activities

This category includes strength associated with Base Operating Support (BOS) for Support Installations and for Centralized Support Activities.

1. Support Installations

Support forces (BOS) includes auxiliary forces, research and development, logistics, training, medical, and administrative commands.

In Support Installations, the decreased active duty manning in FY 1990 of -547 is attributed primarily to a -427 decrease to Base Ops-Training-Navy. There are no significant increases or decreases in FY 1991.

There are no major increases or decreases to Naval Reserve manpower in FY 1990 through FY 1991.

Decreases in FY 1990 civilian spaces are due to workload decreases in maintenance and transportation at Public Work Centers. Reduced Commissary Operations Commercial Activities and efficiency reviews add to the reductions. FY 1991 increases are due to Morale, Welfare, and Recreation conversions.

2. Centralized Support Activities

This subcategory includes non-management headquarters strength for unified commands, international military organizations, foreign military sales support, counterintelligence, reserve readiness support, public affairs, personnel administration, finance centers, criminal investigations, support of Defense Agencies, and other miscellaneous support activities.

FY 1990 Centralized Support Activities active spaces increase in Combat Developments by +189 but decrease in Service-Wide Support by -197 and Personnel Administration by -223. FY 1991 Centralized Support Activities decrease overall by -187 active duty spaces, primarily due to a decrease of -166 in Service-Wide Support.

There are no significant reserve manpower changes in this category.

Decreases in civilian manpower FY 1990 results from savings realized through the Commercial Activities Program and Efficiency Review Programs. There are no major changes in FY 1991.

M. Undistributed

The Navy's internal manpower management is based on an average strength projected for force structure manning. Average strength for the force differs from the actual end strength because of seasonal fluctuations in manning, usually related to permanent change of station moves and accessions. These seasonal fluctuations may result in undermanning (fewer people than spaces) or overmanning (more people than spaces) in both the active and reserve force. Through proper management of the distributable force, Navy endeavors to maintain a steady active force deviation.

N. Individuals

The Individuals account represents spaces to accommodate Navy's manpower not in the Force Structure due to a specific type of status described in the following subcategories.

1. Transients

FY 1990 has no significant change in active Transients, but in FY 1991 Transients decrease by -123 active spaces due to reduced force structure.

There are no significant reserve or civilian changes in this category.

2. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees

Patients manpower spaces are provided to offset lost time in units resulting from hospitalization for extended periods (30 days for members assigned to operating force units, 45 days for all others).

Prisoners manpower spaces are provided to offset lost time in units resulting from confinement in a military disciplinary facility in excess of 30 days.

Holdees manpower spaces are provided to accommodate personnel who are dropped from their assigned units and are awaiting administrative discharge or separation from active duty.

There are no major increases or decreases in active, reserve and civilian spaces for patients, prisoners, or holdees in FY 1990 and FY 1991.

3. Trainees, Students, Midshipmen, and NAVCADS

Spaces for manpower completing initial entry training (trainees), manpower attending other courses of instruction in a permanent change of station status or in a temporary duty status while executing a permanent change of station move (students), students (Midshipmen) attending the United States Naval Academy, and Naval Aviation Cadets (NAVCADS).

In FY 1990 Trainees, Students, Midshipmen and NAVCADS decrease overall by -19,373. Significant decreases include -111 in Fleet Support, -9,280 in Recruit Training Units, -258 in Officer Candidate/ Training School, -398 in Other College Commissioning Programs, -7,410 in General Skill Training, -369 in Undergraduate Navigator/NFO Training, -228 in Undergraduate Pilot Training-Strike, -181 in Undergraduate Pilot Training-Maritime -153 in Undergraduate Pilot Training-Rotary, -227 in Other Professional Education, and -696 in Education and Training-Health Care. In FY 1991 there are no major changes.

CHAPTER V

MARINE CORPS MANPOWER PROGRAM

I. INTRODUCTION

A. General

This chapter describes the Marine Corps active military, Reserve military, and civilian manpower program; presents the manpower levels requested for FY 1991; depicts manpower trends; discusses initiatives; and explains the changes from year to year. It also describes changes to provide the Reserve with new missions, more modern equipment, and greater integration with the Active Forces, in keeping with the Total Force Policy.

The Marine Corps has a unique mission as established by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, which provides that the Marine Corps will consist of and shall provide:

- "Three combat divisions, air wings and such other land combat, aviation, and other services.. organized, trained, and equipped to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms...for service with the fleet."
- "Detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy."
- "Security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases."
- "Marines to perform such other duties as the President may direct."
- "Guards for U.S. embassies...as a result of a Memorandum of Agreement based on the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended."

The National Security Act of 1947 also requires that the Marine Corps provide rapidly deployable forces for contingency missions in support of the national strategy. The requirement to deploy forces rapidly has resulted in a Fleet Marine Force (FMF) that provides a balance between strategic mobility and tactical capability.

The Marine Corps possesses a full range of combat capabilities integrated into a single-Service, air ground combined arms team. The Marine Corps is an expeditionary Service by virtue of overseas support within the fleet and as an element of a joint force. Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) are task organized for rapid deployment/employment and are part of a conducting sustained operations. Our MAGTFs are part of a capabilities ranging from the smaller Contingency MAGTFs, (as deployed and actually employed in the Persian Gulf in April 1988) up to multiple Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) in a Corps size force. Furthermore MAGTFs are organized as reservoirs of combined arms to provide forces for peacetime contingencies such as security teams, mobile training teams, small independent action forces (SIAFs) as well as sea based, assault forces. The power and influence resident in MAGTFs can be

projected and sustained deep inland against potential adversaries of in support of developing nations. The Marines are an in existence crisis response force, strategically mobile, tactically flexible, and logistically sustainable.

There are four types of MAGTF's that may be formed in support of national strategy and combatant CINC crisis response requirements. They are the powerful MEFs, capable of prosecuting operational campaigns against the most capable potential enemy threat, the rapidly deployable and employable Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB); and routinely forward deployed Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU); and the small special purpose forces formed for specific missions or contingencies.

The largest and most powerful MAGTF is the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) consisting of 30,000-60,000 Marines and Sailors. It may range in size from less than one to multiple infantry divisions and aircraft wings, together with a force service support group. It is normally commanded by a lieutenant general. It is capable of conducting a wide range of expeditionary and amphibious operations, and with its 60 days of support, is capable of sustained operations ashore in any geographic environment. Each MEF has the capability to task organize special operations capable forces to execute specific missions supporting fleet and combatant CINC contingencies.

The MEB, with 4,000-18,000 Marines and Sailors, is normally built around a reinforced infantry regiment, an aircraft group, and a brigade service support group. It is commanded by a general officer and is capable of rapid deployment and employment in expeditionary, amphibious, and reinforcement roles as required to execute CINC contingencies. MEBs may be forward deployed on amphibious shipping, deployed by strategic or tactical airlift to fall in on prepositioned equipment and sustainment, or deployed by air as required. As with the MEF, the MEB has special operations capabilities derived from the enhanced training and equipment possessed by its subordinate units. The MEB deploys with up to 30 days of sustainment.

The Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is a MAGTF of 1,000-4,000 Marines and Sailors, normally comprised of a reinforced battalion, a helicopter squadron reinforced with deployed and CONUS on-call fixed wing assets, and a service support group. The MEU is commanded by a colonel and is routinely forward deployed as the immediately responsive, on-scene, sea-based Marine component of the Fleet Commander's amphibious and power projection forces. The MEU is task organized, trained, and equipped to conduct a wide variety of conventional and specialized operations. Foremost is its capability to conduct long-range amphibious raids from over-the horizon, without electronic emissions, during periods of darkness, and under adverse weather or sea conditions. For sustained operations ashore, the MEU may serve as the forward element of a MEB. The MEU, like other MAGTFs, can also deploy on short notice by a mix of tactical and strategic airlift for contingencies in support of fleet and combatant CINC's. MEUs deployed in amphibious shipping normally carry 15 days of sustainment.

Finally, the Special Purpose Forces are small, task organized MAGTFs configured to accomplish missions for which the MEF, MEB, and MEU are not appropriate. They can be configured, trained, and equipped to conduct

a wide variety of conventional and other operations. Recent special purpose forces have been employed in Panama, the Persian Gulf, and on the southwest border of the U.S. in counternarcotics operations. They can be deployed by a variety of means, to include amphibious or commercial ships, tactical or strategic airlift, or by organic Marine Corps aviation assets. These forces are normally composed of Marines highly trained in day/night operations to include insert/extract, raid, and strike operations. They may possess extensive surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to include Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, radio reconnaissance, and counter-intelligence assets, as required.

B. Wartime Manpower Requirements

The Wartime Manpower Planning System (WARMAPS) data prepared in accordance with the Defense Guidance Illustrated Planning Scenario is one of the tools available for the Marine Corps to determine military and civilian manpower requirements.

Wartime Peak Demand for Trained Manpower (M+180)
(Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Military</u>		<u>Civilian</u>
	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Peak Demand	399.7	399.7	*24.1

*Excludes Foreign National Indirect Hire

C. Marine Corps Military Strength Request and Civilian Employment Plan

The Marine Corps selectively mans its authorized force structure to maximize combat capability, placing top priority on manning combat forces. Except in time of emergency e.g., during wartime, the active forces are manned at less than 100 percent of requirements and are scheduled to be augmented by reassigning active component or pretrained manpower (Selected Marine Corps Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve, and Retirees). Fiscal realities preclude manning of certain units in peacetime.

If the Marine Corps were to fully man all active authorized Marine Corps units and organizations 221,019 Marines would be needed in FY 1991.

The Marine Corps request for Active and Reserve military and civilian manpower for FY 1990 and FY 1991 is as follows:

Marine Corps Manpower Program
(Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Active Military	197.0	196.7	196.5
Marine Corps Reserve	43.6	44.0	43.9
Civilian Personnel	21.7	21.2	20.8

The difference between the peacetime manpower program and wartime demand for manpower is the requirement to man vacant FMF billets, supporting establishment (non-FMF) billet increases, and provide for casualty replacements. To meet the demand for wartime manpower, the Marine Corps will use all available assets: Active Component personnel, Selected Marine Corps Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, Retirees, and non prior service accessions.

D. Major Force Structure Changes

The Marine Corps' long term program includes a carefully planned restructuring to modernize and standardize the force. This program provides for improved Active and Reserve Force capabilities, retaining in the Active Component only those forces and functions essential for the timely response to contingencies and maintenance of the nation's force in readiness. All other forces and functions are placed in the Reserves.

The structure changes planned from FY 1991 to FY 1994 are designed to meet the most likely low-to-mid intensity conflicts of the future.

1. Active Structure Changes

Significant changes to the Command Element (CE) and the Ground Combat Element (GCE) are in progress as a result of the FY 1988 Force Structure Study Board. These recommendations are designed to enhance the warfighting capability of the Marine Expeditionary Forces. Implementation began in FY 1988 and will continue through FY 1995. The most substantial change to the GCE is the cadreing of three infantry battalions. This action, however, is offset by substantial enhancements to the 24 remaining infantry battalions available for all contingency plans. These enhancements include adding 41 Marines to each infantry battalion and all battalions being manned at 94 percent of their Table of Organization (T/O), representing a four percent increase over current manning; and adding a fourth rifle company to each of the battalions designated special operations capable. The Light Armored Infantry Battalions have been enhanced with the addition of 168 scout infantrymen and the headquarters company of each infantry regiment will be enhanced by the addition of a scout platoon of 22 Marines. During 3D Quarter, FY 1989, a fourth reconnaissance company was added to each reconnaissance battalion in all three of the active divisions and a fourth direct support combat engineer company will be added to the Combat Engineer Battalion in each Division. The plans to activate a second general support artillery battalion for I and III MEF in FY 1989 were cancelled and the second general support artillery battalion for II MEF was deactivated in FY 1990. In FY 1991 active artillery regiments will replace self-propelled howitzers with towed, increasing mobility and decreasing maintenance costs.

Finally, a Surveillance Reconnaissance and Intelligence (SRI) Group was activated in two of the Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs), with a third group to be activated 1st quarter FY 1991 thereby consolidating a large portion of the intelligence gathering and analysis capability available to the MEF Commander.

The aviation combat forces are transitioning to improved models of aircraft including the F/A-18 and the AV-8B fixed wing aircraft. The fielding of these weapons systems drives the increased requirement for tactical combat support.

The combat service support forces are in a dynamic transition. The programmed Force Service Support Group reorganization will ensure that the combat service support forces are efficiently organized to provide the required support. New or improved items of equipment currently being introduced or programmed are the Logistics Vehicle System (LVS) and the Medium Lift Motor Transport Item/Container Handling Equipment (MHE). The new weapons and equipment being fielded impact directly on the supporting establishment, to meet the sophisticated training requirement of the modern Marine Corps.

2. Reserve Structure Changes

The Marine Corps' is continuously reviewing requirements within the Total Force. Currently, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command is studying reserve artillery structure and the best total force mix. Aviation planners are being challenged by the complexities presented by future fixed wing aircraft transitions in the Reserves.

3. Manpower Plan

The Marine Corps Manpower Plan is given in the following tables:

Marine Corps Active Manpower Plan (Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
*STRATEGIC	*	*	*
TACTICAL MOBILITY	119.8	120.9	120.8
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELLIGENCE	0.9	0.9	0.9
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	9.5	8.9	8.9
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	3.1	3.3	3.3
JOINT ACTIVITIES	2.0	2.1	2.1
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	0.9	0.8	0.8
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS	1.5	1.5	1.5
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	0.9	0.9	0.9
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	14.2	13.8	13.6
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	13.9	13.0	12.8
UNDISTRIBUTED	0	0.7	0.9
INDIVIDUALS	30.3	29.8	30.1
Transients	6.0	5.5	5.7
Holdees	1.1	1.2	1.2
Students	23.2	23.1	23.2
** Total	197.0	196.7	196.5

* less than 50

** Numbers may not add due to rounding.

Marine Corps Reserve Manpower Plan
(Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Tactical/Mobility*	37.4	37.7	37.8
Support Activities	0.9	0.6	0.6
Individuals	4.0	4.3	4.1
IMA	1.3	1.4	1.4
TOTALS	43.6	44.0	43.9

* Includes Reserve Full Time Support assigned to tactical mobility forces.

Marine Corps Civilian Manpower Plan
(Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Support Activities	21.7	21.2	20.8
TOTALS	21.7	21.2	20.8

E. Key Manpower Issues

In FY 1990 and FY 1991 the Marine Corps will complete manpower initiatives to enhance warfighting capability. Marine Corps manpower initiatives will enhance the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Command Elements and infantry battalions. Within the constraints of current end strength ceilings the Marine Corps cadred three infantry battalions to meet a 3,000 end strength reduction resulting from the FY 1989 Presidents Amended Budget Submission. The artillery restructure resulted in two general support battalions not standing up as previously planned and two batteries being deactivated in FY 1989. In FY 1990, one general support battalion and three batteries were deactivated. The missions of these units will be assumed by existing artillery battalions and batteries in the reserves until FY 1992 when they will be reestablished as reserve. The general support battalions of active artillery regiment will transition from self-propelled to towed howitzers in FY 1991. Additionally, the structure of the LAI Battalions is currently under review. There is an internal initiative to restructure the battalions into four line companies versus the current three. In conjunction with this initiative, a 3d LAI Battalion detachment is being formed at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, 29 Palms, California in order to support the pending unit deployment of that unit.

Also, changes in the Marine Corps Aviation Combat Element and Combat Service Support Element structure were made to support warfighting enhancements by transferring selected units to the reserves. These changes provided for increased manning to Infantry Battalions, Force Reconnaissance Companies, Radio Battalions, Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies and allowed for the stand up of three Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Groups by FY 1991.

II. SIGNIFICANT PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS

A. Active Military Manpower

1. General

Congress authorized the Marine Corps a FY 1990 end strength of 196,735. An end-strength of 196,500 is requested for FY 1991.

2. Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning, and Operating Strength

a. Programmed Manpower Structure and Programmed Manning

Total Active Force structure remains constant at 187,000 for FY's 1989/90 and 91. Programmed manning decreases in relation to force structure and the Total Active Force Structure is maintained.

In FY 1990 the Force Structure Study Group was reconvened to reduce the active force structure slightly in FY 1991. A decision regarding these recommendations is pending and will result in a programmed manning of 90% or greater, complying with the Defense Planning Guidance.

Tables V-1, V-2, and V-3 provide an overview of the changing relationship between programmed manpower structure, programmed manning, and end strength, by officer, enlisted, and total manpower.

TABLE V-1
ACTIVE MARINE CORPS PROGRAMMED MANPOWER, PROGRAMMED MANNING, AND END STRENGTH
(in thousands)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1989		FY 1991		FY 1991	
	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	RQMT	AUTH
* STRATEGIC	*	*	*	*	*	*
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces						
						% MNG
						100
						100
<u>TACTICAL MOBILITY</u>						
Land Forces	138.7	119.8	139.2	120.9	139.2	87
Tactical Air Forces	110.5	94.8	110.8	96.5	110.9	87
Naval Forces	27.3	24.2	27.6	23.7	27.6	86
Warships and ASW	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.6	98
Amphibious Forces	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.4	96
Naval Support Forces	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	98
	*	*	*	*	*	95
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>						
Intelligence	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	98
Centrally Managed Comm	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	98
	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	10.5	9.5	10.5	8.9	10.5	84
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	3.1	3.1	3.3	3.3	3.3	98
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>	2.1	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.1	100
Int'l Military Org	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100
Unified Commands	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	100
Federal Agency Support	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.5	100
Joint Staff	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100
OSD/Defense						
Agencies/Activities	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.9	92
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.6	95
Combat Commands	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	96
Support Commands	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.9	94

	FY 1989		FY 1990		FY 1991	
	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	RQMT	AUTH
AC TOTAL MILITARY						
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES						
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT						
Research and Development	0.9	0.9	1.0	0.9	1.0	0.9
	0.9	0.9	1.0	0.9	1.0	0.9
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL						
Personnel Support	13.9	14.2	13.9	13.8	13.9	13.6
Individual Training	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.7	4.6	4.6
	9.3	9.6	9.3	9.1	9.2	9.0
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES						
Support Installations	13.5	13.9	13.6	13.0	13.6	12.8
Centralized Support Act'y	11.1	11.5	11.2	10.8	11.2	10.5
	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.2	2.4	2.2
TOTAL PROGRAMMED	186.2	166.7	187.0	166.2	187.0	165.6
MANNING						
UNDISTRIBUTED	0	0	NA	0.7	NA	0.9
** INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4
INDIVIDUALS						
Transients	30.3	30.3	NA	29.8	NA	30.1
Holdees	6.0	6.0	NA	5.5	NA	5.7
Students	1.1	1.1	NA	1.2	NA	1.2
	23.2	23.2	NA	23.1	NA	23.2
END-STRENGTH	216.5	197.0	NA	196.7	NA	196.5

* Less Than 50.

** Non-additive.

TABLE V-2
ACTIVE MARINE CORPS PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING, AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

AC OFFICERS DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1989		FY 1990		FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
* <u>STRATEGIC</u> Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	*	*	*	*	*	*	100
<u>TACTICAL MOBILITY</u> Land Forces	10.7 7.9	9.9 7.4	10.7 7.9	10.0 7.4	10.7 7.9	10.1 7.4	94 94
Tactical Air Forces	2.7	2.4	2.6	2.5	2.6	2.5	96
Naval Forces	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	95
Warships and ASW	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	94
Amphibious Force	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	95
Naval Support Forces	*	*	*	*	*	*	100
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u> Intelligence	0.2 0.2	0.2 0.1	0.2 0.1	0.2 0.1	0.2 0.2	0.2 0.1	97 95
Centrally Managed Comm	*	*	*	*	*	*	100
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	88
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	100
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u> Int'l Military Org	0.5 0.1	0.5 0.1	0.5 0.1	0.5 0.1	0.5 0.1	0.5 0.1	100 100
Unified Commands	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100
Federal Agency Support	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100
Joint Staff	*	*	*	*	*	*	100
OSD/Defense	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100
Agencies/Activities							
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	96
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HOTS</u> Combat Commands	0.9 0.3	0.8 0.3	0.9 0.3	0.9 0.3	0.9 0.3	0.9 0.3	98 96
Support Commands	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	98

AC OFFICERS DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1989		FY 1990		FY 1991			
	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u> Research and Development	0.4 0.4	0.4 0.4	0.5 0.5	0.4 0.4	96 96	0.5 0.5	0.4 0.4	96 96
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u> Personnel Support Individual Training	1.9 0.4 1.5	1.9 0.4 1.5	1.9 0.4 1.5	1.9 0.4 1.4	98 100 98	1.9 0.4 1.5	1.9 0.4 1.4	98 100 98
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u> Support Installations Centralized Support Act'y	1.3 0.7 0.6	1.4 0.7 0.6	1.3 0.7 0.7	1.3 0.7 0.6	95 98 93	1.3 0.7 0.7	1.3 0.7 0.6	96 98 93
<u>TOTAL PROGRAMMED</u> <u>MANNING</u>	17.8	16.6	17.8	16.8	95	17.8	16.9	95
<u>UNDISTRIBUTED</u>	0	0	NA	-0.2	NA	NA	-0.3	NA
<u>** INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION</u> <u>AUMENTEES</u>	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	NA	0.8	0.8	NA
<u>INDIVIDUALS</u> Transients Holdees Students	3.5 0.6 *	3.5 0.6 *	NA NA NA	3.4 0.5 *	NA NA NA	NA NA NA	3.4 0.5 *	NA NA NA
<u>END-STRENGTH</u>	21.2	20.1	NA	20.1	NA	NA	20.0	NA

* Less Than 50.
** Non-additive.

TABLE V-3
ACTIVE MARINE CORPS PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING, AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

AC ENLISTED DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1989		FY 1990		FY 1991			
	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
* <u>STRATEGIC</u>	*	*	*	*	100	*	*	100
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	*	*	*	*	100	*	*	100
<u>TACTICAL MOBILITY</u>								
Land Forces	128.0	109.9	128.4	110.8	87	128.7	110.7	86
Tactical Air Forces	102.6	91.4	102.5	89.0	87	102.9	89.2	87
Naval Forces	24.6	21.8	25.2	21.2	85	25.0	21.2	85
Warships and ASW	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.7	99	0.7	0.7	99
Amphibious Forces	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	99	0.5	0.5	99
Naval Support Forces	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	97	0.1	0.1	98
	*	*	*	*	94	*	*	100
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>								
Intelligence	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	100	0.7	0.7	99
Centrally Managed Comm	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	100	0.7	0.7	99
	*	*	*	*	100	*	*	100
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	9.4	8.5	9.4	8.0	85	9.4	7.9	84
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	2.7	2.6	2.9	2.8	98	2.9	2.8	98
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>								
Int'l Military Org	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.6	100	1.6	1.6	99
Unified Commands	*	*	*	*	100	*	*	100
Federal Agency Support	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	99	0.1	0.1	99
Joint Staff	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.4	100	1.4	1.4	100
OSD/Defense	*	*	*	*	100	*	*	100
Agencies/Activities	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	94	0.1	*	83
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6	91	0.7	0.6	91
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>								
Combat Commands	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6	91	0.7	0.6	91
Support Commands	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	96	0.4	0.4	95
	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	84	0.3	0.2	84

	FY 1989		FY 1990		FY 1991	
	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	RQMT	AUTH
<u>AC ENLISTED</u>						
<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES</u>						
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>						
Research and Development	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>						
Personnel Support	12.0	12.4	12.0	11.9	12.1	11.8
Individual Training	4.2	4.2	4.2	4.2	4.3	4.2
	7.8	8.2	7.8	7.7	7.8	7.6
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>						
Support Installations	12.2	12.4	12.2	11.7	12.3	11.5
Centralized Support Act'y	10.5	10.7	10.5	10.1	10.5	9.9
	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.6	1.7	1.6
<u>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</u>	<u>168.4</u>	<u>150.0</u>	<u>169.1</u>	<u>149.3</u>	<u>169.1</u>	<u>148.7</u>
<u>UNDISTRIBUTED</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>NA</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>NA</u>	<u>1.2</u>
<u>** INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>
<u>INDIVIDUALS</u>						
Transients	26.8	26.8	NA	26.4	NA	26.6
Holdees	5.4	5.4	NA	5.0	NA	5.1
Students	1.0	1.0	NA	1.1	NA	1.1
	20.3	20.3	NA	20.3	NA	20.4
<u>END-STRENGTH</u>	<u>195.3</u>	<u>176.9</u>	<u>NA</u>	<u>176.7</u>	<u>NA</u>	<u>176.5</u>

* Less Than 50.

** Non-additive.

b. Operating Strength

For FY 1990 and FY 1991 the Marine Corps has programmed operating strength supply equal to programmed manning demand, forming a balanced manpower plan in the sense that if all elements of the program are executed (recruitment, training, staffing, etc.), the average operating strength population will be sufficient to staff the billets programmed for manning. Actual execution of the plan in FY 1990 and FY 1991 may deviate somewhat from the program, but these deviations have historically been minimal.

3. Skill and Grade

Table V-4 summarizes the existing and projected inventories as they compare to programmed manning and individuals. In the aggregate, the enlisted population is believed to be sufficient to meet the programmed manning demand through FY 1990/91. However, there will continue to be imbalances in specific military occupational specialties (MOSs). The total number of enlisted skills which remain unbalanced is projected to decrease by FY 1990. This decrease will be reflected primarily in the E5-E9 population, as the new Marine Corps policy of selecting career force Marines for promotion by MOS requirements better shapes the career force inventory. The Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program (SRBP) continues to be the most important tool for reducing career force skill imbalances in the Fleet Marine Forces. The overall trend is favorable.

4. Experience

Table V-5 displays the average years of service (YOS) by grade for officer and enlisted. The enlisted force is becoming more experienced. The career force is expected to approach 76,000 by the end of FY 1990. This reflects a more mature and experienced career force, providing a stable leadership cadre in the Corps. However, this careerist growth has not been matched by grade growth, and the resulting promotion stagnation is now affecting retention, especially at the first term reenlistment point. Programs are being examined which may relieve this problem.

TABLE V-4
ACTIVE MARINE CORPS SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL AND PROJECTED INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED MANNING AND INDIVIDUALS (PMI)
(Strength in thousands)

	FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991									
	OVER**	BAL**	SHORT**	OVER**	BAL**	SHORT**	OVER**	BAL**	SHORT**	TOTAL	OVER**	BAL**	SHORT**	TOTAL		
<u>E1-E4</u>	92	25	180	297	70	137	90	297	70	137	90	297	70	137	90	297
Number of Skills	0	120.5	0	120.5	0	121.5	0	121.5	0	121.5	0	121.5	0	121.5	0	121.5
PMI	16.9	86.6	17.3	120.8	10	101.5	10	121.5	10	101.5	10	121.5	10	101.5	10	121.5
Inventory	+16.9	-33.9	+17.3	+0.3	+10.0	-20.0	+10.0	0.0	+10.0	-20.0	+10.0	0.0	+10.0	-20.0	+10.0	0.0
Over/Short																
<u>E5-E9</u>	105	26	111	242	50	142	50	242	50	142	50	242	50	142	50	242
Number of Skills	0	56.6	0	56.6	0	55.0	0	55.0	0	55.0	0	55.0	0	55.0	0	55
PMI	4.7	46.9	4.4	56.0	5	45.0	5	55.0	5	45.0	5	55.0	5	45.0	5	55
Inventory	+4.7	-9.7	+4.4	-0.6	+5	+10.0	+5	0.0	+5	-10.0	+5	0.0	+5	-10.0	+5	0.0
Over/Short																
Total E1-E9	140	73	188	401	90	221	90	401	90	221	90	401	90	221	90	401
Number of Skills	0	177.1	0	177.1	0	177.1	0	177.1	0	177.1	0	177.1	0	177.1	0	177.1
PMI	21.6	133.5	21.7	176.8	15.0	147.1	15.0	177.1	15.0	147.1	15.0	177.1	15.0	147.1	15.0	177.1
Inventory	21.6	-43.6	+21.7	-0.3	+15.0	-30.0	+15.0	0.0	+15.0	-30.0	+15.0	0.0	+15.0	-30.0	+15.0	0.0
Over/Short																
<u>W1-W4</u>	23	23	08	54	15	28	10	53	15	28	10	53	15	28	10	53
Number of Skills	.4	.6	0.5	1.5	0.2	0.9	0.4	1.5	0.2	0.9	0.4	1.5	0.2	0.9	0.4	1.5
PMI	.6	.6	0.4	1.5	0.3	0.9	0.3	1.5	0.3	0.9	0.3	1.5	0.3	0.9	0.3	1.5
Inventory	+2.2	*	-0.1	*	+0.1	*	.1	*	+0.1	*	-0.1	*	+0.1	*	-0.1	*
Over/Short																
<u>01-03</u>	18	22	34	74	16	35	23	74	16	35	23	74	16	35	23	74
Number of Skills	3.1	2.2	6.4	11.7	3.0	5.2	3.5	11.7	3.0	5.2	3.5	11.7	3.0	5.2	3.5	11.7
PMI	3.9	2.1	74.8	10.8	3.5	5.2	2.9	10.8	3.5	5.2	2.1	10.8	3.5	5.2	2.1	10.8
Inventory	+1.8	*	-1.6	-9	0.5	*	-1.4	-9	0.5	*	-1.4	-9	0.5	*	-1.4	-9
Over/Short																
<u>04-06</u>	20	14	38	72	18	24	30	72	18	24	30	72	18	24	30	72
Number of Skills	1.1	1.4	3.2	5.7	1.0	2.2	2.5	5.7	1.0	2.2	2.5	5.7	1.0	2.2	2.5	5.7
PMI	2.0	1.4	2.1	5.5	1.8	2.2	1.5	5.5	1.8	2.2	1.5	5.5	1.8	2.2	1.5	5.5
Inventory	+2.9	*	-1.1	-2	0.8	*	-1.0	-2	0.8	*	-1.0	-2	0.8	*	-1.0	-2
Over/Short																

Total 01-06	15	22	43	80	13	35	32	80	13	35	32	80
Number of Skills	15	22	43	80	13	35	32	80	13	35	32	80
PMI	4.2	3.5	9.6	17.4	4.0	4.0	9.4	17.4	4.0	4.0	9.4	17.4
Inventory	5.9	3.5	0.9	16.3	5.7	4.0	6.7	16.3	5.7	4.0	6.7	16.3
Over/Short	+1.7	*	-2.7	1.1	+1.7	*	-2.7	-1.1	+1.7	*	-2.7	*

*Less than 50.

**See definitions in Appendix B.

TABLE V-5
ACTIVE MARINE CORPS EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY
(STRENGTH IN THOUSANDS)

	FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	TOTAL	PEOPLE	AVE.	TOTAL	PEOPLE	AVE.	TOTAL	PEOPLE	AVE.
	PEOPLE	WITH >	YOS	PEOPLE	WITH >	YOS	PEOPLE	WITH >	YOS
<u>E1-E4</u>									
PMI*	120.6	N/A	N/A	121.3	17.9	3.6	121.5	17.9	3.6
Inventory	120.7	18.2	3.6	121.3	N/A	N/A	121.5	N/A	N/A
<u>E5-E9</u>									
PMI	58.6	N/A	N/A	55.8	55.0	10.5	55.6	55.0	10.5
Inventory	56.0	55.4	10.6	55.8	N/A	N/A	55.6	N/A	N/A
<u>E1-E9</u>									
PMI	177.1	N/A	N/A	177.1	73.4	5.8	177.1	73.4	5.8
Inventory	176.9	73.6	5.9	177.1	N/A	N/A	177.1	N/A	N/A
<u>W1-W4</u>									
PMI	1.5	N/A	N/A	1.4	N/A	N/A	1.4	N/A	N/A
Inventory	1.5	1.5	13.0	1.5	1.5	13.0	1.5	1.5	13.0
<u>01-03</u>									
PMI	13.0	N/A	N/A	13.0	N/A	N/A	13.0	N/A	N/A
Inventory	10.8	7.4	7.0	13.0	7.2	7.1	13.0	7.3	7.1
<u>04-06</u>									
PMI	5.5	N/A	N/A	5.5	N/A	N/A	5.5	N/A	N/A
Inventory	5.5	5.5	18.0	5.5	5.5	18.0	5.5	5.5	18.0
<u>01-06</u>									
PMI	18.6	N/A	N/A	18.6	N/A	N/A	18.6	N/A	N/A
Inventory	18.6	12.9	12.0	18.6	12.9	12.0	18.6	12.9	12.0

*Programmed Manning Plus Individuals

5. Personnel Management

a. Enlisted

(1) Recruiting. The Marine Corps achieved 100.6 percent of the combined prior service and non-prior service enlisted recruiting goals in FY 1989. The Marine Corps recruited 197 two and three-year, 25,363 four-year, and 7,470 five and six-year enlistees. In FY 1990, enlistments will be for three or more years, with a goal of 90 percent for four or more years.

The Marine Corps continues to emphasize quality accessions. In FY 1989, 94.6 percent of male and 99.2 percent of female non-prior service enlistees were Tier I high school graduates under the new DoD educational credential system. The recruiting goal for FY 1991 is for 90 percent of all male and female non-prior service recruits to be Tier I high school graduates.

The Marine Corps will be required to access a relatively constant number of quality personnel in the future. At the same time the eligible population will be declining and there will be increased competition from industry and colleges for these personnel. In order to insure that the Marine Corps will have sufficient high quality personnel for duty in critically short skills, the Marine Corps will need a fully funded enlistment bonus program (EBP). The FY 1990 EBP is budgeted for \$3.7 million with approximately 1,193 allocations. The FY 1991 EBP is budgeted for \$5.4 million with approximately 1,438 allocations. The increase in FY 1992 will help substantially in ensuring accession of quality recruits in key skills.

The Marine Corps has adopted a "level load" accession policy, i.e., modifying the flow of recruits so that Marines are accessed more evenly throughout the year. The expected benefits are more efficient entry level training, more even separation patterns, and increased readiness.

Enlisted Accession Plans

	<u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 89</u> <u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 90</u> <u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 91</u> <u>Goal</u>
<u>Accessions</u>				
Prior Service	1,394	1,100	539	1,200
Non-Prior Service	33,030	33,101	34,138	34,804
Male	30,910	31,001	32,038	32,704
(HSG)	(29,674)	(27,901)	(28,835)	(29,434)
Female	2,120	2,100	2,100	2,100
(HSDG)	(2,120)	(2,100)	(1,890)	(1,890)

(2) Retention. The overall FY 1989 Retention Goal was met, and reflected rates typical of the 1980's. The Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program (SRBP) is still essential as the most significant factor in retaining skilled and experienced career force Marines. It is a key reason why the Marine Corps is experiencing a continuation of the quality recruiting and retention trends realized in both FY 1988 and FY 1989.

Enlisted Retention Plans

<u>RETENTION</u>	<u>FY 89</u>		<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
First Term	3,611	4,307	3,215	4,714
Career	7,353	10,414	7,848	10,463

(3) Aggregate Population Stability. Since 1980, the Marine Corps have maintained population stability. This measure reflects the number of personnel who remain in service over the period of a year.

Aggregate Population Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Enlisted	52.2	32.8	52.7	50.5	43.6

(4) Unit Personnel Stability. The improvement in retention and the population stability has translated into greater unit stability. This unit stability provides the commander with the ability to maintain a trained, cohesive unit throughout the year. Consequently, FMF readiness increases and deployment preparation improves. This measure reflects the number of personnel who remain in the same unit over the course of a year.

Unit Personnel Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Enlisted	57.9	56.6	56.5	58.6	63.5

(5) Other. The degree of difficulty in meeting the FY 1990 enlisted accession plan will depend in part on the youth unemployment rate, competition with educational institutions, and the competitiveness of military pay with civilian pay.

b. Officer and Warrant Officer

(1) Accessions. Officer end strength is programmed to be 20,063 in FY 1990 and 20,039 in FY 1991. When the DOPMA grade ceilings are applied to these end strengths, however, the Marine Corps is nearly 675 field grade officers deficient of that number needed to meet validated mission requirements. Despite this serious shortcoming, as well as various promotion timing and opportunity concerns, the officer strength and distribution will continue to provide the quality of leadership necessary for the future.

Active Marine Corps Officer Procurement Objectives

<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
1,698	1,731	1,731

(2) Retention. Overall officer retention in FY 1989 exceeded the historic averages. Overall retention rates are expected to remain stable during FY 1990. Pilot shortages have emerged in all fixed wing aviation communities.

Active Marine Corps Officer Retention
(Percent)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Ground Unrestricted	90.8%	91	91
Aviation Unrestricted	89.3%	89	89

(3) Aggregate Population Stability. High officer retention contributes to high population stability.

Aggregate Population Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Officer	91.3	91.3	92.1	92.1	90.3

(4) Unit Personnel Stability. The officer community shows a steady trend in unit stability.

Unit Personnel Stability
(Percent)

	<u>85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Officer	44.6	46.8	46.5	46.8	46.8

6. Readiness Assessment

The Marine Corps FY 1991 end strength request is for 196,500. Necessary structure improvements continue to reflect modest growth, based upon previous programmed structure decisions, although the overall manning decreases. The present readiness levels will be maintained from improving trends in occupational imbalances and personnel stability through continued quality accessions and retention bonus programs. As the Marine Corps retains level accessions in FY 1991, stability will be maintained in readiness, training pipeline flow, and separation patterns.

B. Reserve Component Military Manpower

The mission of the Marine Corps Reserve is to maintain highly trained units and qualified individuals for active duty in time of war or national emergency. The Marine Corps Reserve is divided into three categories: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve and the Retired Reserve. The primary source of both units and individual manpower upon mobilization is the Ready Reserve, which consists of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) and the Individual Ready Reserve.

1. Ready Reserve

a. Selected Marine Corps Reserve

(1) General. The SMCR units taken together form a Division, Aircraft Wing, and Force Service Support Group. These units present a balance of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces similar to their Active Force counterparts.

(2) Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning, and Operating Strength.

(a) Programmed Manpower Structure and Programmed Manning. Tables V-6, V-7, and V-8 provide an overview of the changing relationship between the programmed manpower structure, and programmed manning.

(b) Trained in Unit Strength. Table V-9 reflects trained in unit strength for the Selected Marine Corps Reserve.

(3) Skill and Grade. Table V-10 summarizes the existing and projected Reserve inventory as compared to programmed manning.

(4) Experience. Table V-11 reflects the SMCR experience and grade mix.

TABLE V-6
MARINE CORPS SELECTED RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

TOTAL MILITARY	FY 1989		FY 1990		FY 1991		% MNG
	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	RQMT	AUTH	
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>							
Land Forces	37.6	37.7	40.9	37.7	40.9	37.8	92
Tactical Air Forces	28.2	29.1	30.3	28.5	30.3	28.1	93
	9.4	8.6	10.6	9.2	10.6	9.7	92
<u>SUBTOTAL</u>	<u>37.6</u>	<u>37.7</u>	<u>40.9</u>	<u>37.7</u>	<u>40.9</u>	<u>37.8</u>	<u>92</u>
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>							
Central Support Activi	0.5	1.0	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	100
<u>TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	<u>38.1</u>	<u>38.7</u>	<u>41.5</u>	<u>38.3</u>	<u>41.5</u>	<u>38.4</u>	<u>93</u>
<u>IMA's</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>1.4</u>	
<u>INDIVIDUALS</u>	<u>4.2</u>	<u>3.5</u>	<u>4.3</u>	<u>4.3</u>	<u>4.3</u>	<u>4.1</u>	
<u>END-STRENGTH</u>	<u>43.6</u>	<u>43.6</u>	<u>47.2</u>	<u>44.0</u>	<u>47.2</u>	<u>43.9</u>	

NOTE: Tactical air forces requirements and programmed authorized do not reflect active component personnel.

TABLE V-7
MARINE CORPS SELECTED RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
 (Thousands)

OFFICER	<u>FY 1989</u>		<u>FY 1990</u>		<u>FY 1991</u>		<u>% MNG</u>
	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>INV</u>	<u>RQMT</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>RQMT</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>							
Land Forces	2.8	2.6	3.3	2.8	3.3	3.0	91
Tactical Air Forces	1.6	1.5	1.9	1.6	1.9	1.7	89
	1.2	1.1	1.4	1.2	1.4	1.3	93
<u>SUBTOTAL</u>	2.8	2.6	3.3	2.8	3.3	3.0	91
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>							
Central Support Activi	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100
<u>TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	2.9	2.8	3.5	3.0	3.5	3.2	91
<u>IMA's</u>	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	
<u>END-STRENGTH</u>	3.7	3.6	4.3	3.8	4.3	4.0	

NOTE: Tactical air forces requirements and programmed authorized do not reflect active component personnel.

TABLE V-8
MARINE CORPS SELECTED RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
 (Thousands)

ENLISTED	FY 1989		FY 1990		FY 1991		% MNG
	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	RQMT	AUTH	
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>							
Land Forces	34.8	35.1	37.6	34.9	37.6	34.8	93
Tactical Air Forces	26.6	27.6	28.4	26.9	28.4	26.4	93
	8.2	7.5	9.2	8.0	9.2	8.4	91
<u>SUBTOTAL</u>	<u>34.8</u>	<u>35.1</u>	<u>37.6</u>	<u>34.9</u>	<u>37.6</u>	<u>34.8</u>	<u>93</u>
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>							
Central Support Activi	0.4	0.8	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	100
<u>TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	<u>35.2</u>	<u>35.9</u>	<u>38.0</u>	<u>35.3</u>	<u>38.0</u>	<u>35.2</u>	<u>93</u>
<u>IMA's</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	
<u>INDIVIDUALS</u>	<u>4.2</u>	<u>3.5</u>	<u>4.3</u>	<u>4.3</u>	<u>4.3</u>	<u>4.1</u>	
<u>END-STRENGTH</u>	<u>39.9</u>	<u>40.0</u>	<u>42.9</u>	<u>40.2</u>	<u>42.9</u>	<u>39.9</u>	

NOTE: Tactical air forces requirements and programmed authorized do not reflect component personnel.

Table V-9
TRAINED IN UNIT STRENGTH

	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
End Strength	43.6	44.0	43.9
-Training Pipeline	3.5	4.3	4.1
-IMAs	1.4	1.4	1.4
Operating Strength	38.7	38.3	38.4
-Non Unit Personnel	1.0	0.6	0.6
+Unit AC Personnel	5.4	5.0	5.0
Trained Unit Strength	43.1	42.7	42.8
Structure Requirement (Wartime)	43.1	45.3	45.5
-Non-Unit Structure	0.6	0.6	0.6
Wartime Unit Structure	44.5	44.7	44.9
% Trained in Units	96.9%	95.5%	95.3%

NOTE: Structure requirement (wartime) and wartime unit structure numbers include active component structure in the tactical air forces.

TABLE V-10
RESERVE MARINE CORPS SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL AND PROJECTED INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED MANNING AND INDIVIDUALS
(Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991			
	OVER	BAL	SHORT	OVER	BAL	SHORT	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL
<u>E1-E4</u>										
Number of Skills	26	32	192	250	65	163	250	85	145	250
PMI	3.1	3.8	22.6	29.4	7.7	19.2	29.5	9.9	16.9	29.7
Inventory	5.6	3.8	21.5	30.9	7.7	18.9	30.9	9.9	17.1	30.5
Over/Short	2.6	0.0	-1.1	1.5	0.0	-0.3	1.4	0.0	0.2	1.3
<u>E5-E9</u>										
Number of Skills	44	34	232	310	64	208	310	97	177	310
PMI	1.5	1.2	7.9	10.5	2.2	7.2	10.7	3.4	6.2	10.8
Inventory	2.1	1.2	5.8	9.1	2.2	5.4	9.3	3.4	4.5	9.4
Over/Short	0.7	0.0	-2.1	-1.4	0.0	-1.8	-1.4	0.0	-1.7	-1.4
<u>Total E1-E9</u>										
Number of Skills	27	45	257	329	76	219	329	99	198	329
PMI	3.3	5.5	31.2	39.9	9.3	26.8	40.2	12.0	24.1	40.0
Inventory	5.1	5.5	29.4	40.0	9.3	25.2	40.2	12.0	23.0	39.9
Over/Short	1.8	0.0	-1.7	0.1	0.0	-1.6	0.0	0.0	-1.1	-0.1
<u>W1-W4</u>										
Number of Skills	19	12	15	46	16	14	46	20	12	46
PMI	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.5
Inventory	0.8	0.1	-0.4	0.5	0.2	-0.2	0.5	0.2	-0.2	0.5
Over/Short	0.6	0.0	-0.6	0.0	0.0	-0.4	0.0	0.0	-0.4	0.0
<u>01-03</u>										
Number of Skills	7	6	55	68	10	52	68	14	49	68
PMI	0.2	0.2	1.9	2.4	0.4	1.8	2.4	0.5	1.8	2.5
Inventory	0.3	0.2	0.9	1.5	0.4	1.0	1.7	0.5	1.1	1.9
Over/Short	0.1	0.0	-1.0	-0.9	0.0	-0.8	-0.7	0.0	-0.7	-0.6
<u>04-06</u>										
Number of Skills	27	2	28	57	8	25	57	11	24	57
PMI	0.4	0.0	0.4	0.8	0.1	0.4	0.9	0.2	0.4	0.9
Inventory	1.3	0.0	0.2	1.6	0.1	0.2	1.6	0.2	0.2	1.6
Over/Short	1.0	0.0	-0.2	0.8	0.0	-0.2	0.7	0.0	-0.2	0.7
<u>Total 01-06</u>										
Number of Skills	17	6	48	71	10	46	71	13	44	71
PMI	0.8	0.3	2.2	3.2	0.5	2.1	3.3	0.6	2.1	3.4
Inventory	1.2	0.3	1.6	3.1	0.5	1.8	3.3	0.6	1.7	3.5
Over/Short	0.5	0.0	-0.6	-0.1	0.0	-0.4	0.0	0.0	-0.4	0.1

TABLE V-11
RESERVE MARINE CORPS EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY
(STRENGTH in THOUSANDS)

	FY 1989		FY 1990		FY 1991	
	TOTAL PEOPLE AVE. WITH > PEOPLE 4 YOS	YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE AVE. WITH > PEOPLE 4 YOS	YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE AVE. WITH > PEOPLE 4 YOS	YOS
E1-E4 PMI INVENTORY	29.4 30.9	7.7 2.9	29.5 30.9	7.0 2.9	29.2 30.5	7.0 2.9
E5-E9 PMI INVENTORY	10.5 9.1	11.8 9.0	10.7 9.3	9.3 11.5	10.8 9.4	9.4 11.2
Total E1-E9 PMI INVENTORY	39.9 40.0	16.7 4.9	40.2 40.2	16.3 4.9	39.9 39.9	16.4 4.7
W1-W4 PMI INVENTORY	0.5 0.5	0.5 22.0	0.5 0.5	0.5 21.8	0.5 0.5	0.5 21.5
01-03 PMI INVENTORY	2.4 1.5	10.7 1.5	2.4 1.7	1.8 10.5	2.5 1.9	1.8 10.3
04-06 PMI INVENTORY	0.8 1.6	20.1 1.6	0.9 1.6	1.6 19.8	0.9 1.6	1.6 19.6
Total 01-06 PMI INVENTORY	3.2 3.1	15.4 3.1	3.3 3.3	3.4 15.4	3.5 3.5	3.4 15.3

* Programmed Manning Plus Individuals

5. Personnel Management

(a) Recruiting. Recruiting goals and actuals for the SMCR are as follows:

Marine Corps Reserve Enlisted Recruiting Goals

	<u>FY 89</u>		<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Non-prior Service	7,630	7,679	7,800	7,900
Prior Service	4,300	4,352	4,200	4,300

For FY 1989, the SMCR attained its prior service enlistment goal. In FY 1989, the Selected Marine Corps Reserve achieved a total paid end strength of 43,576.

Accession criteria and quality goals for the SMCR are essentially the same as for the Active Force. Officer input into the Selected Marine Corps Reserve comes primarily from officers leaving active duty who have not yet completed their mandatory obligated service, recently extended from six to eight years.

(b) Retention. The FY 1989 turnover in the Selected Marine Corps Reserve was slightly lower than the FY 1988 level, which was down 10% from the FY 1987 level.

(c) Inventory Stability. Both aggregate enlisted population stability and unit personnel stability increased in FY 1989. This is in spite of the fact that nearly 33 percent of the personnel are non-mandatory participants who can leave the SMCR at will.

Enlisted Population Stability (Percent)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Aggregate Stability	68.4	71.9	74.8	77.0	77.3
Unit Stability	57.7	52.0	57.9	59.3	59.5

(d) Officer Recruiting. We are attempting to attract more company grade officers leaving active duty by contacting them 90 days prior to expiration of service, through better advertising of available officer billets, and assignment of officer recruitment quotas to prior service recruiters.

(6) USMCR Readiness Assessment. From a manpower perspective, the combat capability of the SMCR has been consistently improving since 1980. As the SMCR end strength rises, there has been a corresponding increase in MOS match within the units. Recruitment by MOS within each unit by the recruiting service will continue to reduce the enlisted MOS imbalances and increase overall readiness.

(7) Other. SMCR end strength requirements are 44,000 for FY 1990, and 43,900 in FY 1991. These requirements provide sufficient personnel to ensure SMCR units report to Station of Initial Assignment with a minimum of 95% of their wartime manning through FY 1991, maintain a training pipeline, and maintain ancillary mobilization manpower requirements.

The SMCR average strength authorization for FY's 1990 and 1991 are 43,776 and 43,643 respectively. This strength supports the force structure and personnel support requirements. The end strength authorization also includes reservists on initial active duty, individual mobilization augmentees and full-time active duty personnel for administration and training of reserves.

(8) Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Program. The IMA Program assigns pre-trained Marines to wartime billets in order to ensure the designated Marine is prepared to function in a critical duty effectively on or shortly after mobilization.

Individual Mobilization Augmentees
(In Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 90</u> (Goal)	<u>FY 91</u> (Goal)
<u>Drills</u> ^{1/}			
(48)	1.4	1.4	1.4
(24)	*	*	*
(32)	*	*	*
TOTAL	1.4	1.4	1.4

*Less than 50.

^{1/} IMAs listed in this Table serve two weeks of active duty a year plus the number of drills shown in parentheses. They are paid for all active duty and for all drills.

(9) Full Time Support Program (FTS). FTS Reservists contribute to mobilization readiness and the accomplishment of the Reserve mission in two ways. First, they are qualified Marine reservists on active duty for periods of two to four years to support the Marine Corps Reserve. Their knowledge and efforts assist the active forces with administration and understanding of reserve programs. Secondly, knowledge and expertise gained by FTS reservists on active duty are taken back to SMCR units, thereby enhancing their effectiveness.

Full-Time Support Personnel
(In Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 90</u> (Goal)	<u>FY 91</u> (Goal)
Reserve (AGR)	1.9	2.3	2.4
Civilian	.4	.4	.4
Active Duty	<u>5.4</u>	<u>5.0</u>	<u>5.0</u>
Total	<u>7.7</u>	<u>7.7</u>	<u>7.8</u>

b. Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)

The IRR consists of members of the Ready Reserve who have no mandatory training requirement. The IRR provides pre-trained Marines to fill shortfalls in Active Operating Forces and Reserve units, and also provide for the expansion of the supporting base, as necessary, to meet wartime contingency requirements.

Individual Ready Reserve
(In Thousands)

<u>FY 89</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 90</u> (Goal)	<u>FY 91</u> (Goal)
36.6	45.0	62.0

2. Standby Reserve

The Standby Reserve consists of members of the Reserve Component other than those in the Ready Reserve or Retired Reserve. The Standby Reserve provides additional manpower to augment Active and Reserve Forces in a national emergency declared by the Congress. If mobilized, Standby Reservists would require refresher training.

Standby Reserve
(In Thousands)

<u>FY 89</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 90</u> (Goal)	<u>FY 91</u> (Goal)
1.4	1.4	1.4

3. Retirees

The retired military population is composed primarily of (1) retirees, both regular and reserve, who have completed 20 years active duty; these retirees are liable for recall at any time by the Service Secretary in the interest of national defense; (2) reserve retirees who are eligible for reserve retired pay at age 60.

Retirees
(Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Twenty Year Active Duty Retirees			
Categories I and II	37.0	37.0	37.0
Category III	45.4	45.4	45.4
Other Retiree Reserves			
Categories I and II	2.9	2.9	2.9
Category III	5.4	5.3	5.2

4. Marine Corps Reserve Personnel on Active Duty for Training in Excess of 180 Days

The Marine Corps did not have any Reserve personnel on Active Duty for training in excess of 180 days in FY 1990, nor are any programmed for FY 1991.

C. Civilian Manpower

1. General

Marine Corps military and civilian manpower resources are integrated to maximize efficiency and avoid duplication of effort. Civilian personnel are used to meet the requirements of supporting activities to the maximum extent practicable and to permit more effective manning of operational forces with Marines, thereby enhancing training, readiness, and sustainability. It also ensures continuity in operations. Marine Corps civilian personnel are employed in a wide variety of professional, technical, trade, and administrative functions.

The Marine Corps actively seeks means to use civilian manpower more economically and efficiently. Through the Efficiency Review program and the Manpower Requirements Determination Program the Marine Corps has been able to satisfy the DoD requirement in determining the most effective and efficient mix of number of staff and appropriate grade levels during the two processes.

The FY 1991 request for 20,865 civilians is essential to continue mission responsibilities while minimizing the requirement for military personnel. This request, displayed by DPPC, is shown in Table V-12.

TABLE V-12
MARINE CORPS CIVILIAN PROGRAMMED MANPOWER
(DIRECT AND INDIRECT HIRE END STRENGTH IN THOUSANDS)

	<u>FY 89</u>		<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>INV</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>AUTH</u>
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	11.0	11.0	10.8	10.6
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05

CENTRAL LOGISTICS	4.0	3.9	3.9	3.7
SERVICE MANAGEMENT	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
HEADQUARTERS				
Combat Commands	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Support Commands	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
Personnel Support	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Individual Training	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	5.7	5.5	5.3	5.3
Support Installations	4.1	3.9	3.8	3.8
Centralized Support	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.5
Act'y				
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE	21.8	21.7	21.2	20.8
STRUCTURE				

2. Major Program Changes

The FY 1990 strength of 21,223 requested reflects a net decrease of 541 from the strength of 21,764 planned for FY 1989. The FY 1991 strength of 20,865 reflects a net decrease of 358 from the planned FY 1990 strength.

3. Efficiency Review

The Marine Corps has implemented an effective Position Management Program that works within the "Managing-To-Payroll" concept. Also, the Marine Corps, as directed by DoD, has combined the Efficiency Review, Position Management, and Manpower Requirements Determination Program. The Position Management Review process will assist in determining the most effective and efficient mix of number of staff and appropriate grade levels developed during the Efficiency Review process.

4. Civilian End Strength Management

Removal of statutory civilian personnel end of year number constraints permits Marine Corps activities to adjust their work force to workload fluctuations. That flexibility allowed management to increase productive output for urgent, high priority requirements while maintaining scheduled production on routine workload.

5. Recruiting

The Marine Corps has been able to fill the majority of its civilian positions without undue difficulties. Problems continue to exist, however, in recruiting personnel to fill clerical positions in some labor markets and professional engineering positions in almost all labor markets.

6. Commercial Activities (CA) Program

No commercial activities studies were completed during FY 89. The Marine Corps will complete CA studies in FY 1991 which affect 685 civilian positions and 125 military positions.

D. Mobilization Manpower

1. Military Manpower

The Marine Corps enjoys an acceptable amount of pre-trained manpower for mobilization. Modest overages early in FY 1988 increase somewhat in FY 1992. The increased Active Component and Selected Reserve end strengths are sufficient to meet initial deployment requirements. In most manpower categories the supply is adequate for the demand. Of course, the Marine Corps is seriously affected by medical manpower shortages in the Navy. The decrease in the total shortfall for FY 1991 is attributed to an assumed improved medical evacuation policy and the change in the Military Service Obligation from 6 to 8 years.

A more significant concern is meeting mobilization requirements with adequate numbers of trained personnel by skill category. Major emphasis is being placed upon enhancements in the mobilization and training process to reduce mobilization time for Pretrained Individual Manpower and to quickly provide refresher training or cross-training. As a result, the Marine Corps will be able to meet its wartime shortfalls with pretrained and current service personnel more rapidly. By establishing a better match between peacetime skills and wartime requirements, the Marine Corps will ensure the availability of mobilization manpower for the needed skills.

2. Civilian Manpower

In peacetime, the requirement for civilian manpower is represented by the authorized civilian work force. On M-Day, the requirement for civilian manpower increases to reflect the support requirements associated with mobilization buildup and preparation of military forces for deployment. At M-Day, the peacetime civilian source is reduced because some civilian employees are subject to call-up as reservists or military retirees. The Marine Corps continuously identifies those individuals who hold key positions in the Federal government and who are also either members of the Ready Reserve or retired military personnel eligible for recall.

To avoid the loss of civilians in essential government positions, the Marine Corps would need to recruit at least 6,995 new direct-hire civilian personnel. Although these wartime requirements cover a wide range of skills and occupations, our needs are concentrated in logistics support personnel.

E. Manpower Management Improvements

The Marine Corps continues to integrate military manpower management initiatives designed to enhance overall Fleet Marine Force readiness. These initiatives include conversion of Western Pacific unaccompanied billets, the Unit Deployment Program, and development of automated systems and models which improve the planning and assignment process.

1. Conversion of Unaccompanied Billets

The Marine Corps expansion of accompanied tours in the Western Pacific improves tour stability and promotes unit integrity. Many one year unaccompanied tours are being converted to three year accompanied tours. The current plan will convert an additional 300 billets in FY 1990 and another 600 billets in FY 1991 from one year unaccompanied tours to three year accompanied tours. During FY 1989 the Marine Corps began a comprehensive review of this program which will be completed during the second quarter of FY 1990. The general thrust of the review is to determine if the planned total number of accompanied tours, about 4,800 by FY 1996, is still viable. Overall cost in transients and permanent change of station (PCS) moves continue to be reduced as a result of the program.

2. Unit Deployment Program

The Marine Corps unit deployment program is designed to enhance uniform readiness and reduce organizational and individual turbulence. It permits Marines assigned to infantry battalions and tactical aviation squadrons to be homebased in CONUS or Hawaii while deploying for approximately six months to meet a portion of the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean commitments. This program reduces requirements for individual replacements in the Western Pacific and the percentage of Marines on unaccompanied tours. There is a net annual budget savings associated with this program. Many year savings are also realized from the reduction of the transient pipeline in comparison with 12 month PCS moves.

The full implementation of the initial phases and expansion plans has proved to be highly successful. During FY 1989 3d LAI Battalion was identified for inclusion in the program. It is anticipated that this unit will begin unit deployment during the 3d quarter of FY 1990. This further expansion will continue to decrease PCS moves to the Western Pacific while strengthening uniform readiness and reducing personnel turbulence.

3. Military Manpower Management Initiatives

To best use our manpower assets, the Marine Corps is continuing development of a computer-based planning and assignment system designed to provide cost effective, equitable allocation of first-term Marines among all units in the active structure. The goal is to provide improved readiness through the use of automated systems that best fill requirements with first-term Marines consistent with approved manning policies.

During early FY 1990 the prototype of a Woman Assignment and Classification Computer Model will be reviewed for inclusion as an additional manpower management tool. The purpose of the model will be to provide optimal recommendations for the assignment and classification of the women Marine population. The model will mesh current assignment and classification policies as they relate to women with equitable promotion and FMF vs non-FMF service opportunities. The plan will provide help to determine and manage the maximum number of women, by MOS and unit, that can serve in the Marine Corps and support and contribute to combat readiness.

In addition to management actions that improve tour stability and support unit deployments, models dedicated to providing by-grade projections in specific skill areas and management of the career force are improving enlisted force management. The Marine Corps has begun work on other models that will support the same goals for the officer force and would extend our capabilities in the management of the mobilization force.

One of the most important Manpower initiatives is the continuing of Enlisted Career Force Controls during FY 1990. Enlisted Career Force Controls is a comprehensive Manpower Management Program designed to provide equitable promotion opportunity and tempo across all Marine Corps skills. The program involves the shaping of the grade structure in order to provide structural equitability and to control the flow of Marines into the Career Force Grade Structure. By controlling the demand (Grade Structure) and the supply (Marines with greater than 4 YOS), promotion equitability will result.

In early FY 1989, the Marine Corps undertook Enlisted Grade Structure Review II to ensure promotion equitability in the structure. On the supply side, during FY 1988 we extended promotion by MOS to the grade of Sergeant and limited retirement-eligible SNCO reenlistment to 3 years. During FY 1989, the Marine Corps controlling the overall number of first term reenlistments within each MOS in order to prevent career force overages/shortages and their associated promotion problems. In addition, directed lateral movement of first termers from over skills to short skills will help balance the force, particularly the career force. Retirement eligible staff non-commissioned officers in over grades/MOS will be denied further service at reenlistment in order to create upper grade vacancies, thereby preventing promotion stagnation. Finally, the Marine Corps will seek additional resources to increase our top 5 authorizations in order to meet our requirements.

In summary, Enlisted Career Force Controls will provide the right Marine in terms of Grade and Skill to the units, the appropriate level of experience for each grade and career equitability.

Classification and assignment of enlisted Marines is currently supported by sophisticated models providing optimal recommendations to decision makers. The system is becoming even better as testing has started to integrate all the separate models into the Precise Personnel Assignment System (PREPAS). PREPAS integrates both planning and execution

of the manpower plan for the first term enlisted force. The models make the best use of this portion of the force through the reduction of turbulence, improvement in tour stability, and uniform staffing. Recommended assignments will support the total plan over time, rather than merely making the best use of manpower resources to solve the short term assignment problem. The implementation of the complete PREPAS started with the testing of the first model in FY 1987.

On the officer side, a Review Panel is completing a careful analysis and validation of all restricted and unrestricted officer billets. Designed to correct MOS imbalances and curb billet growth and grade creep, the Officer Force Management Review is the first comprehensive examination of our officer force structure since 1976. Due for completion in early 1990, the Review has already proposed significant improvements in the management of our Limited Duty Officer and Warrant Officer communities.

Level load recruiting, first implemented in FY 1984, was designed to correct both manpower and training plan imbalances that resulted from the past cyclic nature of accessions, which were disproportionately higher in the summer months. The Marine Corps adherence to level load goals is constrained by fiscal, marketing, and recruiting consideration along with effects from unanticipated changes in loss patterns. The goal of level load policy has been the stabilization of readiness, reduction in the number of missed school seats, and more evenly distributed separation patterns.

III. MARINE CORPS MANPOWER BY DPPC

A. Tactical and Mobility Forces

Marine Corps tactical and mobility forces include land forces, tactical air forces, and naval forces. About 121,000 Marines (62 percent of the Corps) will be in this category in FY 1991. Tactical and mobility units are all rapidly deployable and intended to operate in the combat theater. Only military personnel are included in these units.

With the exception of Reserves filling Individual Mobilization Augmentation billets, undergoing initial active duty for training, or serving on full-time active duty, the entire Selected Reserve contributes to tactical and mobility forces.

1. Land Forces

Land Forces include the four Marine divisions and supporting force service support groups. Additionally, this category includes land force aviation units which are the helicopter, observation, and air defense units from the Marine aircraft wings. The following table displays land forces for FY 1989 - FY 1991.

Marine Corps Land Forces Manpower
(End-Strength in Thousands)
FY 89 FY 90 FY 91

Military

Active	94.8	96.5	96.6
Reserve	29.1	28.5	28.1

The FY 1991 Land Forces end strength decreased from the FY 1990 level by 54, as a result of program manning changes. The changes which have occurred within the combat service support, land force aviation, and Marine Divisions sub-categories of land forces are discussed below.

In land force aviation, structure and manning decrease to support warfighting enhancements. One HAWK battery is being transferred to the reserves. Execution of the warfighting enhancements resulted in reducing the active force structure by 1 MAG headquarters, 1 Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron and two Light Anti-Aircraft Missile batteries.

Within the Marine Divisions, three infantry battalions were cadred in FY 1989. However, there are activations, deactivations, enhancements, and reductions in manning levels of selected units which occur in FY 1990 and FY 1991.

The activations and enhancements which occur in FY 1989, FY 1990 and FY 1991 are as follows. The Marine Air Ground Task Force Command Elements will increase due to programmed activation of Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Intelligence groups. Reorganization of the Tank Battalion will occur as the M1A1 tank is fielded. Changes to the artillery regiments will result in the replacement of self-propelled howitzers, increasing mobility and decreasing maintenance costs.

2. Tactical Air Forces

Tactical air forces manpower includes air crews, and aircraft organizational and intermediate maintenance personnel who support fixed wing tactical aircraft squadrons. It also includes the manpower associated with Reserve Component support and various command, control, and support functions.

Marine Corps Tactical Air Forces Manpower

(End-Strength in Thousands)
FY 89 FY 90 FY 91

Military

Active	24.2	23.7	23.6
Reserve	8.6	9.2	9.7

Overall manning decrease from FY 1989 through FY 1991 as a result of end strength reductions and program manning changes.

Several types of units will receive changes to their manning level. The transition from the A-4 to the AV-8B squadrons will result in increased manning in FY 1990 and FY 1991. A reconfiguration from the Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron to the Marine Air Group Headquarters and Marine Aviation Logistics squadrons will reduce manning in tactical air combat support. Tactical air control systems decrease manning from FY 1989 as a result of equipment changes for the Tactical Air Operations Center to the Tactical Air Operations Module. The A-6E and RF-4B communities will begin transitioning to the F-18D squadrons in FY 1990

3. Naval Forces

The Marine Corps request for naval forces includes Marines assigned to ships' detachments (except those assigned to aircraft carriers which are included in tactical air forces), security detachments aboard submarine tenders and missile support ships, and Marine Corps staff billets for Naval operational and amphibious commands and ships. In FY 1991, Marine Detachments assigned to two battleships will be deactivated.

Marine Corps Naval Forces Manpower
(End-Strength in Thousands)

<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
--------------	--------------	--------------

Military

Active	0.8	0.8	0.6
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B. Communications and Intelligence

1. Intelligence

The manpower in the intelligence category supports the national intelligence effort under the Director of the National Security Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and at Unified and Specified Commands. The manpower program also provides for a small number of Marines who provide Marine Corps representation at Naval Intelligence Centers.

Marine Corps Intelligence Manpower
(End-Strength in Thousands)

<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
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Military

Active	0.8	0.8	0.8
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The Marines in the Intelligence function in peacetime are cryptologic specialists gaining experience through actual national signal intelligence collection activities. Marine general intelligence specialists assigned to the DIA and the Unified and Specified Commands also gain valuable training and experience while supporting the national intelligence effort. Under wartime conditions, approximately one-third of these Marines would be returned to duty with the Fleet Marine Forces, remaining in the same type of billet, but contributing directly to the support of a deployed Marine Expeditionary Force.

2. Centrally Managed Communications

In FY 1990 and FY 1991, 62 Marines will be in the Centrally Managed Communications category. Marines in this category support the Naval Communications Activities and the Defense Communications Agency. Marines in this category also support the Military Affiliate Radio System.

<u>Centrally Managed Communications</u>		
<u>(End-Strength in Thousands)</u>		
<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>

Military

Active	0.1	0.1	0.1
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C. Combat Installations

Marines in this category are assigned to bases and stations which provide support to the Fleet Marine Force Units assigned. The type of support provided includes maintenance, communications audiovisual, and administrative support. Civilians in this category reinforce capabilities that directly affect the readiness and sustainability of Marine Corps operating forces and support safety and quality of life functions.

<u>Combat Installations</u>		
<u>(End-Strength in Thousands)</u>		
<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>

Military

Active	9.5	8.9	8.9
<u>Civilian</u>	11.0	10.8	10.6

The Marine Corps determines manpower requirements for base operating support-combat installations using a fixed and variable support concept. Only the fixed portion is presently included in the base operating support manpower request. The fixed portion consists of the functions and services that are required because of the existence of the base, apart from the Fleet Marine Force units that are located there. Examples of these functions are road maintenance and repair, utilities

operations, and sewage disposal. The variable support portion of the manpower requirement results directly from the presence of the tenant units. To the extent feasible, the tenant unit provides augmentation to the base under agreements worked out by local commanders and monitored and approved by Headquarters Marine Corps. Since the augmentation manpower is part of the tenant unit and will train and deploy with that unit, it is counted in the tactical and mobility forces. This system, which enables a percentage of the Marines assigned to augmentation duties to maintain their military skills in a garrison status prior to deployment, significantly reduces the manpower assigned to base operating support-combat installations. It does, of course, correspondingly reduce the number of personnel available to Fleet Marine Force units for routine training.

The Marine Corps constantly reviews the requirement for base operating support manpower at all combat installations. All support functions are reviewed periodically to determine if economies can be achieved by changing the method of performance from in-house to contract (and vice versa), consistent with military readiness requirements. Organizations, functions performed, and services provided are evaluated to determine manpower staffing requirements. Once the functions to be performed are determined and a work measurement system devised, staffing becomes a matter of deciding the level of support or service that will be furnished. These manpower requirements determination reviews will improve support organizations by consolidating duplicate functions, improving staffing efficiency, and eliminating dual staffing requirements, thereby releasing manpower resources for reallocation into areas of more critical need.

D. Force Support Training

Force support training units train recently designated aviators and flight officers in combat aircraft prior to their assignment to operational squadrons and provide standardized training to other aviation personnel. In addition, designated units within the Marine Corps combat readiness training group are tasked with providing wartime interceptor support for the Continental Air Defense Command. The manpower program is based on the projected student load and the need to provide instructors, maintain aircraft, and perform the air defense mission. This category also includes manpower to support the Marine Corps Institute which provides military skill training to individual Marines through correspondence courses. It also includes instructor personnel for unit training at the Mountain Warfare Training Center, Bridgeport, California. The following table summarizes the manpower profile for the force support training mission.

Marine Corps Force Support Training Manpower
(End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	3.1	3.3	3.3
<u>Civilian</u>	*	*	*

E. Joint Activities

Marines assigned to Joint Activities provide Marine Corps representation in the joint arena and provide fair share manning of joint billets. This ensures Marine Corps knowledge and participation in joint matters which involve the Marine Corps. Marines provide support or augmentation to four types of joint activities: international military organizations, unified commands, federal agencies, and other activities. Marines assigned to the International Military Organizations and the Unified Commands provide two important functions. First, they provide readily available expertise on amphibious warfare matters. Second, they provide a channel through which the Marine Corps keeps current on contingency planning alternatives and through which external staffs stay aware of current Fleet Marine Force capabilities and limitations. A summary of the manpower assigned to joint activities is provided below.

1. International Military Organizations

Marines assigned to International Military Organizations are assigned to international activities such as the United Nations Truce Observer Team, Military Advisory and Assistance Groups in Venezuela and Spain and the U.S. Military Observation Group, Palestine. Marines in this category are also assigned to the management headquarters of International Commands and the Northern Air Defense Command. Finally, this category includes Marines assigned to foreign military sales activities. The following table displays the manpower assigned to the International Military Organizations.

International Military Organizations
(End-Strength in Thousands)
FY 89 FY 90 FY 91

Military

Active	0.1	0.1	0.1
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2. Unified Commands

Marines assigned to the Unified Commands are Marines assigned to the management headquarters of the U.S. Space Command, U.S. Atlantic Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Readiness Command, and U.S. Central Command. A summary of the manpower assigned to the Unified Commands is provided.

Unified Commands
(End-Strength in Thousands)
FY 89 FY 90 FY 91

Military

Active	0.3	0.3	0.3
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3. Federal Agency Support

Federal Agency Support refers primarily to those Marines who are assigned to the Marine Corps Security Guard program which provides security for the foreign posts of the Department of State. The number of Marines assigned to this program is based upon a signed memorandum of understanding between the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Secretary of State. The last memorandum of understanding was signed on 15 December 1986. Marines in this category are also assigned to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Federal Aviation Agency, and the Selective Service System.

Federal Agency Support (End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Active	1.4	1.5	1.5

4. Defense Agencies

The Marines assigned to the Defense Agencies in this category are Marines assigned to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Defense Logistics Agency, the Defense Nuclear Agency, and the Defense Mapping Agency.

5. The Joint Staff

The Joint Staff (End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.1	0.1	0.1

6. Office of the Secretary of Defense/Defense Agencies/Activities

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.2	0.2	0.2

F. Central Logistics

The Central Logistics manpower displayed below is required for the conduct of centrally managed supply, maintenance, and logistics

support activities. These activities procure materiel, maintain centralized inventory control, perform depot level maintenance, and provide other logistics support services for Marine Corps units. Marines in this category also provide support to Navy Logistics Operations such as the Naval Ships Ports Control Center and the U.S. Naval Magazine in Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines.

Marine Corps Central Logistics Manpower
(End-Strength in Thousands)
FY 89 FY 90 FY 91

Military

Active	0.9	0.8	0.8
<u>Civilian</u>	3.9	3.9	3.7

G. Service Management Headquarters

The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433) imposed manpower ceilings to management headquarters activities.

1. Combat Commands

Manpower in this category are assigned to major Navy operational commands and Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Headquarters.

Combat Commands
(End-Strength in Thousands)
FY 89 FY 90 FY 91

Military

Active	0.7	0.7	0.7
<u>Civilian</u>	*	*	*

2. Support Commands

Service support commands include Navy and Marine Corps departmental headquarters and service administrative headquarters.

Support Commands
(End-Strength in Thousands)
FY 89 FY 90 FY 91

Military

Active	0.8	0.8	0.8
<u>Civilian</u>	0.5	0.5	0.5

H. Research and Development

1. Research and Development

Marine Corps participation in research and development activities is small and remains essentially constant throughout the period. It also includes the Marine Corps Research, Development, and Acquisition Command which performs research and development for human factors and personnel development research. A subordinate organization of the Marine Corps Research, Development, and Acquisition Command is the Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity, and it is a tenant activity at Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California. Marine Corps research and development efforts in this category include the development of the equipment and weapons for employment by the Fleet Marine Force. Primary emphasis is placed on efforts in support of the landing force during amphibious operations. All development activity is closely coordinated with the other Services to avoid duplication. Some Marines are also assigned in a liaison capacity to development activities of the other Services to avoid duplicate efforts. Also, Marine Corps Research and Development includes an active evaluation of foreign developments for possible adoption.

Marine Corps Research and Development Manpower (End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.9	0.9	0.9

Marines assigned to research and development activities manage materiel development projects designed to satisfy requirements, and conduct and coordinate developmental and operational test and evaluation of all systems intended for procurement and deployment. Marines in this category are assigned to industrially funded research and development labs, Marine Corps Operations, Test, and Evaluation Activities and the Pacific Missile Test Range.

I. Training and Personnel

1. Personnel Support

Marine Corps activities in this category include recruiting and examining and the Marines assigned to the Marine Corps Districts and the Marine Barracks, Washington, D.C.

Marine Corps Personnel Support Manpower (End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	4.6	4.7	4.6
<u>Civilian</u>	0.3	0.3	0.3

2. Individual Training

Individual Training manpower is required to conduct formal military and technical training and professional education of Marine Corps personnel through the use of other Service and Marine Corps schools. The following provides a summary of the manpower assigned to this category.

Marine Corps Individual Training
(End-Strength in Thousands)
FY 89 FY 90 FY 91

Military

Active	9.6	9.1	9.0
<u>Civilian</u>	0.3	0.3	0.3

J. Support Activities

1. Support Installations

Marines assigned to support installations are primarily assigned to Marine Corps Security Forces (which provide security to naval installations); Marine Corps Logistics Bases; Real Property Maintenance Activities; Recruit Depots; the Marine Corps Combat Development Command; Headquarters Battalion, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps; and the Marine Helicopter Squadron, Quantico Virginia which provides support to the President.

Personnel are provided to the Marine Corps Security Forces based upon the number of hours that each post is required to be manned per week. Supervisory, supply, mess, and administrative personnel are provided based on the number of guards in that unit and other assigned responsibilities. Also, the determination of manpower in the support installations category is based upon analysis of the functional and work load requirements. The manpower determination process mirrors the process for determining the manpower requirements for combat installations (previously discussed in paragraph IIIC) except that the input action of the variable support element is excluded, as the bases in this category do not support Fleet Marine Force tenant units.

Marine Corps Support Installations
(End-Strength in Thousands)
FY 89 FY 90 FY 91

Military

Active	11.5	10.8	10.5
<u>Civilian</u>	3.9	3.8	3.8

2. Centralized Support Activities

The Marines in this category provide service wide centralized support for non-management headquarters activities. They serve in such diversified areas as United Nations Truce Teams, audit and judiciary activity support, Marine membership on the Naval Council of Review Boards, public affairs activities, family assistance activities, the Joint Postal Service Agency, and the Far East Network. Military and civilian personnel in this category also include the Marine Corps Personnel Administration Support Activity, which administers all active and reserve Marine Corps personnel records; the Marine Corps Automated Service Centers, which maintain the automated Marine Corps Manpower Management System; and the Marine Corps Finance Center, which administers the Joint Uniform Manpower Pay System for the Marine Corps. Reserve personnel on full-time active duty in support of reserve training and administration are accounted for in this category. Increases in the reserve program reflect support of additional aviation assets and full manning of the centralized Individual Reserve Management Organization.

Marine Corps Centralized Support Activities Manpower

(End-Strength in Thousands)

FY 89 FY 90 FY 91

Military

Active	2.4	2.2	2.2
Reserve Components	1.0	0.6	0.6

<u>Civilian</u>	1.6	1.5	1.5
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K. Undistributed

The Marine Corps internal manpower management is based on an average strength projected for force unit manning. Average strength for a given unit differs from the actual end strength because of seasonal fluctuations in manning. The projected undermanning or overmanning for September 30 is expressed as undistributed.

Undistributed

(End-Strength in Thousands)

FY 89 FY 90 FY 91

Military

Active	0	0.7	0.7
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L. Individuals

The estimates for the individuals accounts are based on historical data modified by current and projected manpower plans and policies. The individuals accounts are as necessary as the force structure spaces, because shortages in authorizations for these accounts will result in strength reductions in the combat or support forces.

Marine Corps Individuals Manpower
(End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active			
Transients	6.0	5.5	5.7
Patients/Prisoners/ Holdees	1.1	1.2	1.2
Trainees/Students	23.2	23.1	23.2
Total	30.3	29.8	30.1
Reserve			
Trainees/Students (Category F)	3.5	4.3	4.1

From FY 1990 to FY 1991, the Individuals account increased by 236. This was due to an increase in transients by 113 from FY 1990 to FY 1991; as a result of increased operational, accession, and separation moves, and the implementation of Marine Battle Skill Training. This training program which will significantly enhance the battle skills of all Marines will result in increased students/trainees in FY 1990 and FY 1991. In addition, there is an increased non-prior service accession requirement in FY 1990 to FY 1991.

CHAPTER VI

AIR FORCE MANPOWER PROGRAM

I. INTRODUCTION

A. General.

This chapter describes the Air Force manpower requirement in terms of active military, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and civilian manpower components. The manpower need derives from the force structure required to accomplish Air Force missions within the scope of the national political and military strategy. In that light, the chapter identifies wartime manpower requirements, requested manpower strengths for the budget years and major changes by component.

B. Wartime Manpower Requirements.

The Air Force's total wartime manpower requirement flows from the Joint Strategic Capability Plan (JSCP), the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD), and the Secretary of Defense's Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The DPG establishes a warfighting scenario which serves as a baseline against which we compare our aggregate capability, and thus influences planning and programming activities. Each Air Force major command, under the guidance of the appropriate theater commander, identifies its total wartime requirements, and these are compared against the total active component and Selected Reserve manpower resources. Consideration is also made for casualties and the availability of Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), Standby Reserve and retired personnel. Finally, the supply and demand data are broken out by occupation and time phased over the DPG scenario. Peak demand for trained military manpower occurs at M+90. The demand is 857.5 thousand in FY 1991 and increases to 870.2 thousand in FY 1994.

The end strength requested in the President's Budget still falls short of peak wartime demand. In fact, the wartime demand for trained Air Force manpower exceeds our supply for 20 days after mobilization (M-Day) begins. Our peak shortfall of 15,000 (FY 1990) occurs at about M+20. Continuing analysis of manpower requirements to ensure the most economical force required to meet wartime taskings led to a reduction in the Air Force's wartime shortfall from FY 1989. The Air Force plans to further reduce the shortfall in a variety of ways, one of which is a change to acceptance criteria applied to Pretrained Individual Manpower (PIM). For example, medical disabilities that previously disqualified people from service are being reevaluated against job requirements. The Air Force is also reviewing degradation of skills of IRR and retired personnel to better address their ability to immediately contribute to meeting wartime requirements. Further, the Air Force will continue to review the use of contractor and host nation support to satisfy mission requirements, as well as advances in technology to reduce manpower intensive requirements.

C. Strength Request.

The FY 1991 request for active military, reserve military, and civilian manpower is as follows:

Air Force Strength Request and Civilian Employment Plan
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Active Military	570.8	545.0	530.0
Selected Reserve			
ANG	116.1	116.2	116.3
USAFR	83.2	84.9	85.2
Civilian	260.6	261.8	258.7

D. Major Changes Affecting Manpower Requirements.

The tables below display manpower requirements by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC), showing inventory for FY 1989 and the FY 1990 - 1991 totals in the FY 1991 request (End strength in thousands).

Active Military

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Strategic	71.0	65.6	64.2
Tactical/Mobility	148.4	142.0	142.3
Communications/ Intelligence	33.3	33.6	32.9
Combat Installations	118.4	113.2	109.2
Force Support Training	25.1	25.3	22.9
Medical Support	40.1	40.3	41.6
Joint Activities	7.9	7.7	7.9
Central Logistics	9.9	9.8	9.4
Service Mgt. HQs	13.0	13.5	13.1
R&D/Geophysical Act.	14.6	14.4	13.9
Training & Personnel	25.1	22.5	22.0
Support Activities	35.5	34.0	33.0
Individuals	28.5	36.3	37.9
Undistributed	0.0	-13.2	-20.3
Totals	570.8	545.0	530.0

Air National Guard

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Strategic	19.1	18.3	18.3
Tactical/Mobility	70.1	71.4	71.2
Communications/ Intelligence	10.7	12.2	12.2
Combat Installations	4.2	2.5	2.5
Medical Support	4.5	5.0	5.0
Service Mgt. HQs	.1	.1	.1
R&D/Geophysical Act.	.5	.6	.6

Training & Personnel	3.6	3.5	3.5
Support Activities	1.7	1.3	1.3
Individuals	1.5	1.2	1.6
Totals	116.1	116.2	116.3

US Air Force Reserve

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Strategic	2.0	2.2	2.2
Tactical/Mobility	50.7	50.8	50.6
Communications/ Intelligence	1.8	1.9	1.9
Combat Installations	14.0	14.3	14.3
Joint Activities	.4	.4	.4
Central Logistics	1.4	1.4	1.4
Service Mgt HQT	1.1	1.2	1.2
Medical Support	5.1	6.0	6.5
R&D/Geophysical Acty	1.3	1.3	1.2
Training and Personnel	1.6	1.7	2.0
Support Activities	2.4	2.3	2.3
Individuals	1.3	1.2	1.0
Totals	83.2	84.9	85.2

Note: The totals counted on the summary chart do not include Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) and Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) authorizations. The AGR and IMAs are included in the DPPC line entries as part of the total requirement for that DPPC. The DPPC charts for the AFR on pages VI-21 thru 23 have the AGR and IMAs extracted from the DPPC columns and displayed in the appropriate category line entry.

Civilian

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Strategic	8.8	9.2	9.3
Tactical/Mobility	30.5	30.9	29.7
Communications/ Intelligence	6.5	7.4	7.7
Combat Installations	49.7	50.4	53.3
Force Support Training	1.9	2.2	2.1
Medical Support	9.4	10.1	10.5
Joint Activities	1.9	2.3	2.1
Central Logistics	82.3	81.1	75.3
Service Mgt. HQs	7.3	7.9	7.8
R&D/Geophysical Act.	10.1	9.7	9.6
Training & Personnel	9.2	9.8	10.0
Support Activities	42.9	40.7	41.1
Totals	260.6	261.8	258.7

The following sections highlight Air Force major force structure areas and include a brief rationale for participation by either the Active or Reserve Component. Specific changes in force structure are detailed in Section II, Manpower Requirements by DPPC.

1. Strategic Offensive Forces.

These forces consist of strategic bomber and tanker aircraft and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). Participation by the Air National Guard/United States Air Force Reserve (ANG/USAFR) in the strategic offensive mission is limited to tanker operations because of the highly time sensitive nature of bomber and missile operations and the intensive peacetime training. ANG/USAFR tanker units are operationally capable.

2. Strategic Defensive Forces.

These forces include aircraft and ground radars for surveillance, control, and defense. The air defense fighter mission is well suited to the Air Reserve Forces because of its in-place wartime role. For over 30 years, ANG units have performed air defense alert in the United States.

3. Tactical Air Forces.

To meet current tactical commitments, the Air Force must have strong, flexible, in-place forces to support a forward defense. Overseas basing represents roughly one-third of our total tactical fighter forces, with another third providing stateside rotational and training units. The final third is made up of Air Reserve Forces units able to provide a responsive surge of military capability during a national crisis. The ANG/USAFR tactical fighter force is being modernized simultaneously with the active force with F-15 and F-16 aircraft. This force posture has been developed so that the rotation base supports overseas tactical force commitments. In addition, the Air National Guard provides forty six percent of the tactical reconnaissance forces and the Air Force Reserve contributes KC-10 associate aircrew.

Training requirements must be considered in developing the total tactical force structure. Close air support, interdiction, and counterair missions are complex and require high levels of training and, in many cases, specialized training ranges to retain proficiency. The part-time nature of the Air Reserve Forces and physical location of individual units are carefully assessed when assigning roles and missions that require skills that must be continually exercised to achieve and maintain essential levels of proficiency.

4. Mobility Forces.

The proper mix of active and reserve force units is necessary to maintain a non-mobilized surge and contingency support capability in addition to performing day-to-day airlift missions. Peacetime airlift augmentation and wartime surge missions are well suited to the Air Reserve Forces. We have completed transfer of additional C-5 aircraft to the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve to provide measured, nearly simultaneous Active/Air Reserve Forces expansion as the Air Force took delivery of C-5B aircraft in FY 1989. In addition to providing strategic and tactical airlift aircraft units and associate C-5, C-9, and C-141 units in FY 91, the Air Reserve Forces provide substantial capabilities in aeromedical evacuation, rescue and recovery, aerial port, and weather reconnaissance.

5. Other Forces.

There are several missions which are full-time functions required for support of the combat forces, such as centralized logistics, and research and development. Because of their full-time requirement, these missions require full-time personnel. Transfer to the Air Reserve Forces would not diminish the required level of support, but it would increase the number of ANG/USAFR full-time personnel, offsetting some of the intended cost savings. Other types of activities have been and will continue to be established in the Air Reserve Forces when the active peacetime requirements are satisfied, but the wartime requirements are not. Some examples of units of this type include Guard and Reserve communications and civil engineering units, and Guard weather units.

E. Key Manpower Issues

Programmatic versus Non Programmatic Reductions: Military manpower end strength in the proposed FY 1991 President's Budget is 545,000 authorizations in FY 1990 and 530,000 in FY 1991. This represents a decrease of 22,900 authorizations in FY 1990 and 37,900 end strengths in FY 1991. This is baselined on the FY 1990 President's Budget (Amended) submission.

Approximately 56 percent of the FY 1991 decrease is associated with force structure and/or other programmatic changes. The remaining 44 percent is not tied to specific programmatic actions and results in a temporary hollow force condition. As the Department of Defense and the Air Force work toward a force structure consistent with recent events in Europe, all end strength programmatic freed up will be used to alleviate this temporary situation.

Management Headquarters: The FY 91 request reflects a modest decrease within the management headquarters accounts. However, the Air Force's field commanders are currently finalizing more reductions. This initiative is but one of a number to reduce, if not eliminate, the temporary hollow force we have in FY 1991.

II. SIGNIFICANT PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS

A. Active Component Military Manpower.

1. General.

Military manpower end strength in the proposed FY 1991 Presidents Budget is 545,000 authorizations in FY 1990 and 530,000 in FY 1991. This end strength is a decrease of 22,900 authorizations in FY 1990 and 37,900 authorizations in FY 1991. This is baselined on the FY 1990 President's Budget Amended.

The FY 1991 manpower decrease is associated with programmatic force structure adjustments and with nonprogrammatic adjustments. The FY 1990/1991 Presidents Budget decisions required most of the reductions to be absorbed through actions such as undermanning the force and accessions

reductions rather than cuts to programs. There is an attempt to return accessions to their required level in the outyears and to fully man the force. This is not real growth but a return to a fully manned force.

2. Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning, and Operating Strength.

Table VI-1 reflects Air Force Programmed Manpower Structure and Programmed Manning. Budget reduction decisions eliminated 25,000 authorizations in FY 1989 below the end strength originally programmed. Where possible, these reductions were related to specific programs and reductions were reflected in appropriate DPPCs. However, the lateness of the budget decisions made a complete allocation of reductions to specific programs impossible for FY 1989 and FY 1990. Budgetary timing precluded identification of personnel reductions with the proper program. Therefore, the table reflects a high programmed manning level in all DPPCs, with a large undistributed total. This undistributed total will be identified with specific DPPCs during the year of execution.

3. Skill and Grade.

a. Enlisted.

As shown in Table VI-2, inventory imbalances existed in 46 percent of all occupations at the end of FY 1989 (141 of 307 skills, E1-E9). In grades E5-E7, which are a convenient gauge of mid-grade NCO manning, inventory imbalances existed in 55 percent of all occupations at the end of FY 1988 (130 of 237 skills).

b. Officer.

The mandated officer strength reduction is reflected in Table VI-2. Lag time between personnel management decisions and manpower authorization changes drive skill/grade imbalances. When force structure decisions have been finalized, we can fix many of those problems through targeted accession, crossflows, and assignments.

4. Experience.

As shown in table VI-3, experience levels, as measured by average years of service, both overall and within each grade, have shown relatively little change over the past several years. This results from the combined effect of improved retention of experienced personnel, and decreased accessions to support the lower end strength.

TABLE VI-1
ACTIVE AIR FORCE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In Thousands)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV*	REQT	AUTH	REQT	AUTH	REQT	AUTH	REQT
			% MNG		% MNG		% MNG		% MNG
TOTAL AC MILITARY	65.8	71.0	67.2	65.6	67.2	65.6	65.2	64.2	65.2
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES									
STRATEGIC									
Offensive Strat Forces	51.4	55.3	52.7	51.2	52.7	51.2	50.7	49.8	50.7
Defensive Strat Forces	3.2	3.9	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3
Surveillance Forces	11.2	11.8	11.2	11.1	11.2	11.1	11.2	11.0	11.2
TACTICAL/MOBILITY									
Tactical Air Forces	144.6	148.4	146.0	142.0	146.0	142.0	144.2	142.3	144.2
Mobility Forces	110.1	113.1	109.6	107.6	109.6	107.6	106.9	107.6	106.9
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL									
Centrally Managed Comm Intelligence	33.5	33.3	34.0	33.6	34.0	33.6	33.3	32.9	33.3
	16.4	16.4	16.7	16.5	16.7	16.5	15.9	15.7	15.9
	17.1	16.9	17.3	17.1	17.3	17.1	17.4	17.2	17.4
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	115.4	118.4	119.1	113.2	119.1	113.2	115.1	109.2	115.1
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	25.3	25.1	25.5	25.3	25.5	25.3	23.0	22.9	23.0
MEDICAL SUPPORT	40.5	40.1	45.1	40.3	45.1	40.3	46.4	42.0	46.4
JOINT ACTIVITIES									
Int'l Military Org	8.1	7.9	7.9	7.7	7.9	7.7	8.2	7.9	8.2
Unified Commands	3.5	3.0	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.9
Federal Support Actys	1.9	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2
Joint Staff	.4	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3
OSD/Def Actys & Agencies	.4	.4	.4	.4	.4	.4	.4	.4	.4
	1.9	1.8	2.1	1.9	2.1	1.9	2.4	2.2	2.4
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	9.7	9.9	10.0	9.8	10.0	9.8	9.6	9.4	9.6
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	13.5	13.0	15.8	13.5	15.8	13.5	13.4	13.1	13.4
Combat Commands	8.1	7.8	8.3	8.1	8.3	8.1	8.3	8.0	8.3
Support Commands	5.4	5.3	5.5	5.4	5.5	5.4	5.2	5.1	5.2
R&D GEOPHYSICAL ACTYS	14.5	14.6	15.1	14.4	15.1	14.4	14.5	13.9	14.5
Research and Development	7.1	7.2	7.4	7.1	7.4	7.1	7.2	7.0	7.2
Geophysical Activities	7.4	7.4	7.7	7.3	7.7	7.3	7.3	6.9	7.3

TOTAL AC MILITARY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1989		FY 1990		FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV*	REQT	AUTH	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>							
Personnel Support	23.3	25.1	23.1	22.5	22.8	22.0	96
Individual Training	5.9	6.3	6.2	5.9	6.3	5.9	94
	17.4	18.8	16.9	16.6	16.5	16.1	98
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>							
Support Installations	33.0	35.5	36.5	34.0	35.3	33.0	93
Centralized Support Act.	23.7	24.4	25.1	23.0	24.0	21.9	92
	9.3	11.1	11.4	11.0	11.5	11.1	97
<u>UNDISTRIBUTED</u>	-1.0	0.0	-13.2			-20.3	
<u>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION</u>							
<u>AUGMENTEES**</u>	13.8	13.0	13.8			13.7	
<u>INDIVIDUALS</u>							
Transients	44.8	28.5	36.3	36.3	37.9	37.9	
Patients, Prisoners & Holdees	10.0	-2.4	7.7	7.7	8.8	8.8	
Trainees & Students	.5	.0	.5	.5	.5	.5	
Cadets	29.9	26.6	23.7	23.7	24.2	24.2	
	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	
<u>END STRENGTH</u>	571.1	570.8	545.0	545.0	530.0	530.0	

Totals may not add due to rounding.

*Actuals

** Not included in AC end strength. IMAs are counted as Selected Reserve end strength, but will man active component billets upon mobilization.

OFFICERS	FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV*	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
<u>DPPC</u>									
<u>R&D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTYS</u>									
Research and Development	4.1	4.1	95	4.1	3.9	95	4.0	3.9	98
Geophysical Activities	2.3	2.3	96	2.3	2.2	96	2.2	2.2	100
	1.8	1.8	94	1.8	1.7	94	1.8	1.7	94
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>									
Personnel Support	6.7	6.6	100	6.6	6.6	100	6.6	6.7	101
Individual Training	.7	.7	100	.6	.6	100	.6	.6	100
	6.0	5.9	100	6.0	6.0	100	6.0	6.1	100
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>									
Support Installations	6.2	5.8	92	6.6	6.1	92	6.5	6.1	94
Centralized Support Act.	2.3	1.8	100	2.1	2.1	100	2.0	2.1	100
	4.0	4.0	89	4.5	4.0	89	4.5	4.0	89
<u>UNDISTRIBUTED</u>	-0.1	-1.4		-2.3				-2.4	
<u>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES**</u>	7.7	7.7		7.9				7.8	
<u>INDIVIDUALS</u>									
Transients	10.3	10.0		9.8				9.6	
Patients, Prisoners, & Holdees	1.9	2.2		1.8				1.6	
Trainees & Students	**	**		**				**	
	8.4	8.2		8.0				8.0	
<u>END STRENGTH</u>	105.7	103.7		102.2				98.8	

Totals may not add due to rounding.

* Actuals

** Less than 50.

*** Not included in AC end strength. IMAs are counted as Selected Reserve end strength, but will man active component billets upon mobilization.

TABLE VI-1
ACTIVE AIR FORCE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In Thousands)

AC ENLISTED	FY 1989		FY 1990		FY 1991	
	AUTH	INV*	REQT	AUTH	REQT	AUTH
DPPC				% MNG		% MNG
STRATEGIC						
Offensive Strat Forces	53.4	58.0	54.7	53.2	53.2	51.5
Defensive Strat Forces	42.2	45.6	43.4	42.1	41.8	40.8
Surveillance Forces	2.5	3.2	2.7	2.6	2.8	2.7
	8.7	9.2	8.6	8.5	8.6	8.6
TACTICAL/MOBILITY						
Tactical Air Forces	126.9	130.3	127.7	124.4	125.7	122.5
Mobility Forces	97.1	99.7	96.5	94.8	94.3	94.8
	29.8	30.6	31.2	29.6	31.4	29.9
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL						
Centrally Managed Comm	28.9	28.6	30.1	28.9	28.4	28.1
Intelligence	14.7	14.7	14.8	14.7	14.0	13.8
	14.2	13.9	14.4	14.2	14.4	14.3
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	107.9	111.5	111.5	105.9	106.7	101.1
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	22.1	22.0	22.6	22.1	20.3	19.7
MEDICAL SUPPORT	27.8	27.8	30.5	27.7	31.6	28.9
JOINT ACTIVITIES						
Int'l Military Org	3.9	3.8	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7
Unified Commands	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8
Federal Support Actys	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1
Joint Staff	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1
OSD/Def Actys & Agencies	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1
	.5	.5	.6	.6	.6	.6
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.2
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS						
Combat Commands	5.5	5.5	5.4	5.6	5.7	5.5
Support Commands	3.7	3.7	3.6	3.7	3.8	3.7
	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.8

FY 1991

FY 1990

FY 1989

AC ENLISTED

DPPC	FY 1989		FY 1990		FY 1991	
	AUTH	INV**	REQT	AUTH	REQT	AUTH
						% MNG
<u>R&D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTYS</u>						
Research and Development	10.5	10.6	10.6	10.5	10.4	97
Geophysical Activities	4.9	4.9	5.1	4.9	4.9	98
	5.6	5.7	5.5	5.6	5.5	96
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>						
Personnel Support	16.7	16.7	16.8	16.7	16.7	96
Individual Training	5.3	5.6	5.4	5.3	5.4	96
	11.4	11.1	11.4	11.4	11.3	100
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>						
Support Installations	26.9	29.3	29.8	27.5	28.9	92
Centralized Support Act.	22.6	22.6	22.9	20.9	22.0	91
	5.3	6.7	6.9	6.6	6.9	96
<u>UNDISTRIBUTED</u>						
	-9	0	-11.8		-17.9	
<u>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES***</u>						
	5.9	5.9	5.9	5.9	5.9	
<u>INDIVIDUALS</u>						
Transients	35.0	18.2	26.9	26.9	28.1	
Patients, Prisoners, & Holdees	8.2	-4.6	6.3	6.3	7.2	
Trainees & Students	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5	
Cadets	21.9	18.4	15.7	15.7	16.0	
	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	
<u>END STRENGTH</u>						
	468.8	467.2	468.8	444.7	427.3	

Totals may not add due to rounding.

* Actuals

** Not included in AC end strength. IMAs are counted as Selected Reserve end strength, but will man active component billets upon mobilization.

TABLE VI-2
ACTIVE AIR FORCE SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED MANNING PLUS INDIVIDUALS
(in thousands)

	<u>FY 1989</u>			<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>OVER*</u>	<u>BALANCED*</u>	<u>SHORT*</u>	
<u>E1 - E4</u>				
Number of Skills	60	65	93	218
PMI**	28.1	114.6	100.2	242.9
Inventory	32.7	120.1	87.9	240.7
Over/Short	4.6	5.5	-12.3	-2.2
<u>E5 - E7</u>				
Number of Skills	50	107	80	237
PMI**	34.9	97.1	77.7	209.7
Inventory	39.3	110.5	68.4	218.2
Over/Short	4.4	13.4	-9.3	8.5
<u>E8 - E9</u>				
Number of Skills	38	77	71	186
PMI**	1.9	5.7	7.0	14.6
Inventory	2.4	6.0	5.5	13.9
Over/Short	0.5	0.3	-1.5	-0.7
<u>Total E1 - E9</u>				
Number of Skills	45	166	96	307
PMI**	32.0	266.7	168.5	467.2
Inventory	35.5	271.8	155.5	462.6
Over/Short	3.5	5.1	-13.0	-4.4
<u>01 - 03</u>				
Number of Skills	14	19	8	41
PMI**	14.8	27.1	24.6	66.5
Inventory	16.7	27	22.2	65.9
Over/Short	2.0	-0.1	-2.4	-0.5
<u>04-06</u>				
Number of Skills	9	15	27	51
PMI**	13.4	6.3	18.5	38.2
Inventory	16.7	6.3	14.4	37.4
Over/Short	3.3	0	-4.1	-0.8
<u>Total 01-06</u>				
Number of Skills	0	39	12	51
PMI**	0	77	27.7	104.7***
Inventory	0	77.9	25.5	103.4***
Over/Short	0	0.9	-2.2	-1.3

*For definitions see Appendix B

**Programmed Manning Plus Individuals

*** Table VI-1, FY 89 Authorized equals 105.7. The National Defense Authorization Act FY 89 reduced 339 General Officer billets from funding, the result was 104.7 end strength. FY 89 Inventory (VI-1) equals 103.7 vice (VI-2) 103.4. Due to the nonfunding of 333 General Officers.

TABLE VI-3
ACTIVE AIR FORCE EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORIES *
(in thousands)

	ACTUAL FY 1989			PROGRAMMED FY 1990			PROGRAMMED FY 1991			PROGRAMMED FY 1992		
	TOTAL PEOPLE	AVG YOS	NA	TOTAL PEOPLE	AVG YOS	NA	TOTAL PEOPLE	AVG YOS	NA	TOTAL PEOPLE	AVG YOS	NA
<u>E1 - E4</u>												
PMI**	242.9	NA	NA	0.0	NA	NA	0.0	NA	NA	0.0	NA	NA
Inventory	240.7	75.6	3.8	220.0	81.2	3.9	209.7	79.6	4.0	221.4	80.0	3.9
<u>E5 - E7</u>												
PMI	209.7	NA	NA	0.0	NA	NA	0.0	NA	NA	0.0	NA	NA
Inventory	208.2	207.8	13.2	206.9	206.6	13.4	203.8	203.6	13.5	192.9	191.8	13.8
<u>E1 - E9</u>												
PMI	467.2	NA	NA	0.0	NA	NA	0.0	NA	NA	0.0	NA	NA
Inventory	462.8	297.2	8.6	440.3	301.2	9.0	426.8	296.6	9.1	426.7	285.2	9.0
<u>01 - 03</u>												
PMI	66.4	NA	NA	65.0	NA	NA	61.6	NA	NA	0.0	NA	NA
Inventory	65.9	43.8	6.8	63.1	42.3	6.8	61.6	40.7	6.6	6.19	39.2	6.4
<u>04 - 06</u>												
PMI	38.3	NA	NA	36.8	NA	NA	36.9	NA	NA	35.9	NA	NA
Inventory	37.4	37.0	17.2	36.8	36.4	17.3	36.9	36.5	17.4	35.9	36.5	17.5
<u>01 - 06</u>												
PMI	104.7	NA	NA	101.9	NA	NA	98.4	NA	NA	97.8	NA	NA
Inventory	103.4	80.7	10.5	100.0	78.7	10.6	98.4	77.2	10.6	97.8	75.7	10.5

*Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.
**Programmed Manning Plus Individuals

5. Personnel Management

a. Enlisted.

(1) Recruiting. The Air Force attained its non-prior service (NPS) and prior service (PS) objectives for FY 1989. The Air Force measures NPS accession quality using a combination of high school diploma graduate (HSDG) rates, upper AFQT category (CAT I&II) and lowest acceptable AFQT category (CAT IV) scores from the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). In FY 1989, 99.1 percent of our NPS accessions were HSDGs and 52.8 percent were in the top two AFQT categories. However, 43,450 accessions in FY 1989 were the second lowest in Air Force history, a decrease largely due to budget reductions. Due to a significant budget reduction in FY 1990 we will have a 36,000 NPS accession level, the lowest accessions level in Air Force history.

Recruiting Results

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
HSDG	40,826 (99.1%)	43,073 (99.1%)
CAT I&II	21,335 (51.8%)	22,939 (52.8%)
CAT IV	43 (0.1%)	83 (0.2%)
Objective	41,200	43,450
Attained	41,200	43,450

(2) Retention. Excellent retention continued as a result of increased emphasis on leadership and military values, efforts to protect institutional programs, improved professional education, adequate recognition, and a reasonable quality of life for the Air Force member and his or her family.

Enlisted Retention
(Percent)

	<u>FY85</u>	<u>FY86</u>	<u>FY87</u>	<u>FY88</u>	<u>FY89</u>
First-term	54.0	57.9	64.5	54.7	68.2
Second-term	78.1	77.4	78.6	78.9	85.7
Career	96.0	96.3	97.1	97.1	97.8

Retention successes this decade rebuilt experience levels and brought about a significant shift in the enlisted force structure. In FY 1980, our first-term airmen comprised 52 percent of the enlisted force; today that figure is 39 percent. Excellent retention and end strength limitations forced lower non-prior service accessions and reduced the first-term airmen reenlistment eligible population. Larger year group populations are starting to build in the career force as a result of good second-term airmen retention and light retirement activity. As we move into a no-growth or reduced strength environment, this shift in structure will require new approaches for working retention.

In the past, our challenge during periods of conflict and force expansion was to influence retention as much as possible. Large numbers were brought in, served one term, and most separated. Now, first-termers are more inclined to enter the career force and career airmen are not retiring as early in their career. But without force expansion to accompany this increase in retention, factors such as diminished promotion opportunities, quality losses through early release programs and the filling of a lower grade manning position with a more senior member could have a negative effect on career decisions.

Managing retention, which includes many influencing factors both internal and external, presents a unique challenge. The Air Force's reputation for first-class technical training in highly marketable skills is recognized by the private sector, especially in the airline maintenance and electronics/communications career fields. Current airline expansion and an aging civilian maintenance force will place a large demand for highly skilled and qualified aircraft mechanics. Airlines require Airframe and Powerplant (A&P) licenses prior to being hired. Our mechanics under Rivet Work Force will become valuable resources to both the Air Force and the airlines. Growing demand from the private sector for educated, trained, and motivated young people could seriously challenge our ability to retain the best airmen, especially first-termers, in the coming years. While we could sustain losses for the short-term in our career force, any significant loss of our first-term airmen would impact our readiness in the 1990s. This competition requires us to continue to target retention efforts and emphasizes the need for a viable selective reenlistment bonus program.

Future concerns include the effects of continued promotion slowdowns and reduced promotion opportunities. Additionally, fewer bonus dollars, out-of-pocket PCS expenses, dwindling morale, welfare and recreation funds, and the widening pay gap, make the potential for increased losses a reality.

(3) Aggregate Population Stability. This personnel retention factor continues at a very high level.

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Officer	92.6	93.5	93.5	92.3	91.7	91.5
Enlisted	88.8	87.6	88.7	89.6	86.4	90.4

(4) Unit Personnel Stability. This indicator combines retention with a personnel stability factor. The indicator is a measure of how many personnel assigned to a unit at the beginning of a fiscal year are still there at the end of that fiscal year.

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Officer	52.9	55.1	55.3	57.9	55.8	51.4
Enlisted	52.8	58.9	57.9	59.9	59.0	61.4

b. Officer.

(1) Accessions. The officer recruiting program supports line officer requirements for flight training (pilot and navigator), scientific, engineering, and a range of other skills necessary to sustain Air Force capabilities. The broad spectrum of Health Professionals, including physicians, nurses, etc., is also recruited under this program.

Due to the combined effect of force drawdowns and Military Personnel, Air Force (MPA) Account shortfalls, our line officer accession requirements were reduced. However, those selected for active duty continued to be of the highest quality. The critical challenge in FY 1990 is the physician/physician specialist program. Shortages of physician and nurse specialists affect our ability to treat combat casualties, as well as the overall health and well-being of our members and their families. The overall physician recruiting objective for FY 1989 was missed by 25%. The FY 1990 objective has increased by 87% over the FY 1989 objective. To help meet this critical challenge, manpower and O&M resources have been reallocated from the reduced enlisted program to the medical program.

(2) Retention. Officer retention is reported as a Cumulative Continuation Rate (CCR). CCR is the percent of officers ending their initial service obligation who would complete their eleventh year of service if current retention rates continue, computed yearly. For pilots and navigators the 6-11 year group's rate is reported, while the 4-11 year group's rate is used for engineers, nonrated operations officers (NRO) and mission support officers (Msn Spt). After reaching a critically low point in FY 1979, officer retention climbed steadily to record levels in FY 1983. Today, navigator rates are healthy and NRO, Msn Spt, and engineer rates have all shown improvement over last year. Pilot retention, on the other hand, has been on a steady decline. Pilot rates decreased from a high of 78 percent in FY 1983 to 36 percent in FY 1989. Below is a summary of officer CCR trends.

OFFICER RETENTION
(CCR)

	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84</u>	<u>FY85</u>	<u>FY86</u>	<u>FY87</u>	<u>FY88</u>	<u>FY89</u>
PILOT	78	72	59	56	48	43	36
NAVIGATOR	76	75	78	74	75	71	75
NONRATED OPS	69	68	68	72	62	60	69
MISSION SPT	62	61	61	57	55	54	56
ENGINEER	58	65	62	54	47	46	52

There are several factors contributing to our pilot retention problem. The strength of the economy, expansion of the airline industry, and the mandatory retirements of large numbers of commercial pilots, have combined to create the highest sustained pilot hiring levels in industry history. Since 1984, 35,000 hirings occurred. Of the approximate 9,000 hires for 1989, 56% had military experience. This trend is projected to continue well into the 1990s with anywhere from 5,000 to 9,000 hires per year. The Air Force pilot force has been susceptible to recruitment. Voluntary separation for pilots in FY 1989 were 25.9% higher than for the same period in FY 1988. Also, over half of the pilots in the 6-11 year group who were eligible to separate after their initial commitment for flying training, did. Not only are our young pilots leaving at increasing rates, a large number of retired military pilots have also found airline jobs. For example, American Airlines reports that 15% of its total hires for the next five years will be retired military pilots. This compares to an average of 5% for the previous five year period. The bottom line: the national pool of qualified pilot applicants is shrinking and experienced, well-trained military pilots are in high demand by the industry. This vanishing pool translates into an Air Force shortfall of 5,000 pilots by FY 1995. We anticipate that this shortage will be reduced to approximately 2,300 pilots after all force structure adjustments have been finalized. Although the airlines provide a ready alternative for pilots, there are other internal factors which have caused pilots dissatisfaction with their military careers.

Through numerous information gathering tools, we've been able to identify some of these retention related problems. Sources include surveys of both career and separating pilots, conferences and symposiums, and Major Air Command feedback. From our efforts, we've found that pilots have concerns about assignment policies, pay and entitlements, leadership and communications, additional duties, family issues, and job security.

The Air Force has instituted a number of initiatives to address pilot concerns. At the forefront of the Air Force's plan is Officer Professional Development (OPD) a comprehensive shift in emphasis from careerism to job performance as the basis for maturing the officer corps. In conjunction with OPD, the Air Force has changed its officer evaluation system to highlight performance. Efforts to deal with perceived communication and leadership problems were evident as well. Direct chain of command involvement in assignments and performance evaluation should help. Also, through increased use of policy letters, news releases, briefing, seminars, symposiums and the Chief of Staff Flash Message Program, the "word" is getting out to field units. Furthermore, in July 1988, a Pilot Retention Electronic Bulletin Board (EBB) was created to keep pilots informed in a timely manner about personnel issues which affect them. The response to the EBB continues to be outstanding.

Additionally, in June of 1989, 31 flying squadron commanders from around the world met at Randolph AFB to outline the issues affecting the pilot retention problem. Over 20 issues surfaced and subsequently 35 recommendations were briefed to the Air Force Chief of Staff (AF/CC). Several of these recommendations have been adopted and many more are being staffed.

The Air Force has also instituted policy changes to address family concerns. A Blue Ribbon Panel was established to address the policy of the working spouse and a regulation was published to institutionalize the spouses right to work. We've also attempted to use our Family Support Centers in spouse referrals and PCS counseling for family members. Two reports were given to Congress outlining a major retention initiative for 1989, the Aviation Career Improvement Act was approved on 29 Nov 89, and includes several initiatives. It provides authority to extend the pilot bonus to 30 Sep 91 while raising the maximum flight pay from \$400/month to \$650/month. In addition the Active Duty Service Commitment (ADSC) for Upgrade Pilot Training (UPT) and Upgrade Navigator Training (UNT) was established by law to be 8 and 6 years respectively and takes effect on 30 Sep 90. Another important feature of the law is the identification of the pilot shortage as a national problem. The law calls for the formation of a Presidential Commission to study the pilot issue.

The flight pay increase, our first since 1981, indicates a long term commitment and sends a positive message to our rated aircrews. On the other hand the extended bonus authority allows us to continue with an immediate short term attempt to influence our younger pilots who are within the most retention critical part of their careers. Although we are hopeful these efforts will be productive, the lucrative draw from the airline industry caused by a national shortage of pilots is likely to continue to aggravate our pilot retention dilemma.

Unless we are successful in reversing the trend, pilot retention will remain below sustainment level.

B. Reserve Component Military Manpower.

1. Ready Reserve.

a. Selected Reserve.

(1) US Air Force Reserve (USAFR).

(a) General. The U.S. Air Force Reserve (USAFR) programmed total force structure end strength increases by 300 (331 and -31 full-time active duty Guard and Reserve) between FY 1990 and 1991. This growth is the net result of reductions in tactical/Mobility force structure, due to modernization and loss of 6 PAA C-130 aircraft, and increases in KC-135E Strategic tankers and medical force structure. Three USAFR KC-135E units increased from 8 PAA to 10 PAA and picked up a second line of SIOP alert in FY 90. Medical service authorizations increase to redress wartime shortfalls. Finally, the small increase in full-time personnel was made to support medical recruiting requirements. IMA strength increased by 500 drill authorizations due to increased funding of authorized positions by Air Force Systems Command.

(b) Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning and End Strength. Table VI-4 displays by DPPC category the USAFR programmed manpower structure, programmed manning and end strength. The

USAFR structure increases by approximately 300 spaces, while the FY 1990 and FY 1991 programmed manning of that structure increases by 500 people (does not include IMAs and active duty Reserve who do not man the structure).

(c) Trained in Unit Strength. Table VI-5 displays Air Force Reserve end strength, then adds or subtracts appropriate personnel to show the trained in unit strength. This strength is compared to the wartime unit structure to compute the percent trained in units. The results show the Air Force Reserve is growing, yet maintaining a high percentage of trained personnel.

(d) Skill and Grade. Table VI-6 compares actual inventory to programmed manning plus individuals for USAFR personnel.

(e) Experience. Table VI-7 compares programmed manning plus individuals to actual inventory. Trends show that the average enlisted grade was relatively constant while the level of experience increased. The average grade and experience of the USAFR officer corps remained stable.

TABLE VI-4
 US AIR FORCE RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
 (In Thousands)*

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV**	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
TOTAL AFR MILITARY									
STRATEGIC									
Offensive Strat Forces	2.0	2.0	100	2.2	2.2	100	2.2	2.2	100
TACTICAL/MOBILITY									
Tactical Air Forces	51.8	50.7	98	51.6	50.8	98	51.7	50.6	98
Mobility Forces	11.5	11.3	98	11.8	11.6	98	11.5	11.2	98
	40.3	39.3	98	39.8	39.2	98	40.2	39.3	97
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL									
Centrally Managed Comm	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	11.2	10.9	97	11.4	11.1	97	11.4	11.1	97
MEDICAL SUPPORT	3.8	3.5	104	4.0	4.1	104	4.5	4.7	104
R&D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES									
Geophysical Activities	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL									
Individual Training	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES									
Centralized Support Act.	.5	.5	83	.5	.5	83	.5	.5	83
TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE***	69.5	67.8	98	69.9	68.9	98	70.6	69.2	98
AGR		.6			.7			.7	
INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES		13.0			13.8			13.7	
INDIVIDUALS (Trainees & Students)		1.8			1.9			1.7	
END STRENGTH		83.2			84.9			85.2	

* Numbers may not total due to rounding

*** Actuals

**** See page VI-24.

TABLE VI-4
US AIR FORCE RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In Thousands)*

AFR OFFICERS DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV***	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
<u>STRATEGIC</u>									
Offensive Strat Forces	0.3	0.3	95	0.4	0.3	95	0.4	0.3	95
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>									
Tactical Air Forces	7.1	7.1	96	7.1	6.9	96	7.1	6.9	96
Mobility Forces	1.4	1.4	96	1.4	1.3	96	1.3	1.3	97
	5.7	5.7	96	5.7	5.5	96	5.8	5.6	96
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>									
Centrally Managed Comm	**	**	100	**	**	100	**	**	100
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	0.5	0.5	91	0.5	0.5	91	0.5	0.5	91
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	0.9	0.8	106	1.0	1.0	106	1.1	1.2	105
<u>RSD/GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES</u>									
Geophysical Activities	**	**	100	**	**	100	**	**	100
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>									
Individual Training	**	**	100	**	**	100	**	**	100
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>									
Centralized Support Act.	0.3	0.2	90	0.2	0.2	90	0.2	0.2	90
<u>TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE***</u>	9.2	9.0	97	9.3	9.0	97	9.4	9.1	97
<u>AGR</u>		0.2			0.2			0.2	
<u>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION</u>									
AUGMENTEES		7.9			8.1			8.1	
<u>END STRENGTH</u>		17.1			17.3			17.4	

* Numbers may not total due to rounding
 ** Less than 50
 *** Actuals

TABLE VI-4
US AIR FORCE RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In Thousands)*

AFR ENLISTED DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1989		FY 1990		FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV**	REQT	AUTH	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
<u>STRATEGIC</u>							
Offensive Strat Forces	1.7	1.7	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	100
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>							
Tactical Air Forces	44.7	43.5	44.5	43.9	44.6	43.7	98
Mobility Forces	10.1	9.9	10.4	10.2	10.2	9.9	97
	34.5	33.7	34.1	33.7	34.4	33.7	98
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>							
Centrally Managed Comm	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	100
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	10.6	10.4	10.9	10.6	10.9	10.6	97
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	2.9	2.7	3.0	3.1	3.4	3.5	103
<u>R&D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES</u>							
Geophysical Activities	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	100
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>							
Individual Training	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	100
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>							
Centralized Support Act.	.3	.3	.3	.2	.3	.2	76
<u>TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE***</u>	60.3	58.7	60.7	59.9	61.2	60.1	98
<u>AGR</u>		.4		.5		.5	
<u>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES</u>		5.1		5.3		5.5	
<u>INDIVIDUALS (Trainees & Students)</u>		1.8		1.9		1.7	
<u>END STRENGTH</u>		66.1		67.6		67.8	

* Numbers may not total due to rounding

** Actuals

*** This does not include AGR and IMA authorizations in the Inventory/ Authorized column by DPPC line entry. The AGR and IMA authorizations are counted below.

TABLE VI-5

TRAINED IN UNIT STRENGTH - USAFR
(in thousands)

USAFR	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
End Strength	83.2	84.9	85.2
-Training Pipeline*	1.8	1.9	1.7
-IMAs	13.0	13.5	13.6
Operating Strength			
-Non Unit AGR	.6	.7	.7
Unit AC Personnel	0	0	0
Trained Unit Strength	67.8	68.9	69.2
Structure Requirements (WARTIME)	69.5	69.9	70.6
% Trained in Units	98	98	98

* Includes categories F and P

TABLE VI-6

US AIR FORCE RESERVE SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED MANNING PLUS INDIVIDUALS
(in thousands)

	<u>OVER*</u>	<u>FY 1989</u> <u>BALANCED*</u>	<u>SHORT*</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>E1 - E4</u>				
Number of Skills	46	6	33	85
PMI**	2.3	1.2	16.7	20.2
Inventory	3.8	1.2	9.4	14.4
Over/Short	+1.5	-a	-7.3	-5.8
<u>E5 - E7</u>				
Number of Skills	35	32	21	88
PMI**	24.1	7.2	6.5	37.8
Inventory	31.1	7.3	5.4	43.8
Over/Short	7.0	+1	-1.1	+6.0
<u>E8 - E9</u>				
Number of Skills	7	22	42	71
PMI**	.1	.6	2.2	3.1
Inventory	.1	.6	1.7	2.4
Over/Short	-a	-a	-6	-6

<u>Total E1 - E9</u>				
Number of Skills	88	60	96	244
PMI**	26.5	9.0	22.5	61.1
Inventory	35.0	9.1	16.5	60.6
Over/Short	8.6	-a	-9.0	-.5
<u>01 - 03</u>				
Number of Skills	52	14	29	95
PMI**	.6	1.5	2.3	4.4
Inventory	1.3	1.5	1.3	4.2
Over/Short	+7	-a	-1.0	-.3
<u>04 - 06</u>				
Number of Skills	61	33	26	120
PMI**	1.4	.9	1.3	3.5
Inventory	3.1	.8	.9	4.8
Over/Short	+1.7	-a	-.3	+1.3
<u>Total 01 - 06</u>				
Number of Skills	113	47	55	215
PMI**	1.9	2.4	3.6	7.8
Inventory	4.3	2.4	2.3	9.0
Over/Short	2.4	-a	-1.3	+1.1

*See definitions at Appendix B.

**Programmed Manning Plus Individuals
a Less than 50

TABLE VI-7

US AIR FORCE RESERVE EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED vs ACTUAL INVENTORY
 (in thousands)
FY 1989

	<u>Total People</u>	<u>People with Greater than 4 YOS</u>	<u>AVG-YOS</u>	<u>FY 90** Total People</u>	<u>FY 91** Total People</u>
<u>E1 - E4</u>					
PMI*	20.2	NA	NA	20.1	20.3
Inventory	14.4	4.2	3.3	14.7	14.7
<u>E5 - E7</u>					
PMI	37.8	NA	NA	37.6	37.9
Inventory	43.8	41.8	12.9	44.7	44.7
<u>E8 - E9</u>					
PMI	3.0	NA	NA	3.0	3.0
Inventory	2.4	2.4	25.3	2.4	2.5
<u>E1 - E9</u>					
PMI	61.1	NA	NA	60.7	61.2
Inventory	58.7	48.4	11.3	61.8	61.8
<u>O1 - O3</u>					
PMI*	5.1	NA	NA	5.1	5.2
Inventory	4.2	3.3	9.2	4.1	4.2
<u>O4 - O6</u>					
PMI*	4.1	NA	NA	4.1	4.2
Inventory	4.8	4.8	19.9	4.8	4.9
<u>O1 - O6</u>					
PMI*	9.2	NA	NA	9.3	9.4
Inventory	9.0	8.1	15.0	9.0	9.1

*Programmed Manning plus Individuals

**Estimates

(f) Personnel Management.

[1] Enlisted.

[a] Recruiting. The US Air Force Reserve placed emphasis on matching accessions to critical skills and programmed structure requirements, while closely controlling its FY 1988 adjusted goals for both prior and non-prior service personnel. The actual numbers of enlisted personnel recruited in FY 1989 and the accession goals for FY 1990 and FY 1991 are shown below:

USAFR Enlisted Strength Plan

	<u>FY 89</u>		<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
<u>Accessions</u>				
Prior Service	8,480	8,681	8,815	8,915
HSDG	-	8,409	-	-
Non-Prior Service	2,950	2,873	3,187	3,034
Male	1,975	1,902	2,129	2,064
Female	975	942	1,000	970
HSDG	-	2,822	-	-

The above data shows that 95 percent of prior service accessions and 99 percent of non-prior service accessions were high school diploma graduates. In addition, 72 percent of prior service accessions and over 99 percent of non-prior service accessions were in the top three AFQT categories. This data shows the continued high quality of USAFR accessions.

[b] Reenlistment. Reenlistment rates for the US Air Force Reserve enlisted force for FY 1989 and goals for FY 1990 through FY 1991 are shown below:

USAFR Retention Rates
(percent)

	<u>FY 89</u>		<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
First Term	80	82.65	80	80
Career	85	92.84	85	85

Retention

The FY 1989 enlisted reenlistment rates continued to show favorable results.

[c] Aggregate Population Stability. Since aggregate population stability is a measure of retention, it is logical that this factor should remain at a very high level.

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Enlisted	83.6	86.8	87.7	84.8	92.2	86.1
Officer	90.9	90.6	90.0	95.3	91.2	91.9

[d] Unit Personnel Stability. This category is also impacted by the strong retention statistics.

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Enlisted	78.6	77.0	76.2	73.0	76.9	77.3
Officer	82.3	81.0	80.0	67.2	77.3	81.2

[2] Officer.

[a] Accessions. The U.S. Air Force Reserve receives officers separated from the active force, other reserve status components, and from the non-extended active duty commissioning program for qualified enlisted personnel who hold needed skills and are presently participating in reserve activities. The actual number of officers recruited in FY 1989 and the estimated requirement for FY 1990 through FY 1991 are shown below:

USAFR Officer Strength Plan

	<u>FY 89</u>		<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
	<u>Est Req</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Est Req</u>	<u>Est Req</u>
Accessions	1,730	2,112	2,138	2,154

[b] Retention. Retention has not been a problem in the US Air Force Reserve. Manning levels historically exceed the 90 percent level; therefore, no specific goals have been established.

(g) Readiness Assessment. The readiness of the U.S. Air Force Reserve is a function of unit staffing, stability, occupational imbalances, and the level of experience. Improvement can be documented in three of these four areas. If the existing skill imbalances do not worsen substantially, the personnel readiness posture should remain unchanged or improve slightly through FY 1991.

(h) Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Programs. The purpose of the IMA program is to provide highly skilled individuals who augment active units during wartime or emergency situations. All IMA positions are reviewed annually as part of the Wartime Manpower Planning Exercise (MANREQ) and justified solely on the basis of wartime or contingency requirements for which the active forces are insufficient. An IMA is not authorized based on peacetime tasks or peacetime manning shortages. U.S. Air Force Reserve IMA program growth is approximately 5% from FY 1989 through FY 1991.

Individual Mobilization Augmentees

	<u>FY 89</u>		<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Total	13,230	12,985	13,450	13,647
48 Drill	700	744	750	750
24 Drill	12,230	11,952	12,400	12,597
Other	300	289	300	300

(i) Full-Time Support Programs. Active Duty Guard/Reserve (AGR) statutory tour personnel are Guardsmen and Reservists on active duty for periods in excess of 179 days who provide full-time support to the Reserve Components and are paid from Reserve personnel appropriations. They serve on the staff of active component headquarters organization responsible for Reserve Component management, policy, planning, programming, and training; assist in developing and implementing Reserve Forces policies, procedures, and programs; and assist in organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, and training the Reserve components.

In the Air Force Reserve, AGRs are not assigned to unit level. Full time support at the combat and combat support unit level is comprised of Air Reserve Technicians (ARTs) serving in dual status. As civilians they provide full time support to an Air Force Reserve unit. As members of the Air Force Reserve they perform all military training and duty in their unit, and are available to enter active duty should their unit be mobilized.

Growth in Air Reserve Technicians in FY 90 is due to an increase in KC-135 tankers by 6PAA and 3 lines of SIOP alert and offset partially by losses in C-130 aircraft. Losses in FY 91 are due to the transfer of special operations program and management responsibilities to USSOCOM.

Because actual assigned strength is used in FY 89, not all programmed growth between FY 89 and FY 90 in full time support is real growth. Actual assigned strength is often less than programmed due to recruiting and hiring difficulties.

	<u>USAFR Full Time Support</u>		
	(In Thousands)		
	<u>FY 89*</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Active Duty Guard/Reserve	.6	.7	.7
Air Reserve Technicians	9.3	10.3	9.9
Civilians	4.9	4.4	4.4
Active Air Force with AFR	.5	.7	.7
Total	15.3	16.1	15.7

*Actuals

(2) Air National Guard.

(a) General. The Air National Guard (ANG) has a programmed increase of 100 between FY 1990 and FY 1991. This includes an increase of 149 drilling guardsmen offset by a decrease of 49 full time active guard/reserve (AGR) personnel. Revised strength supports additional security, intelligence, and chemical/biological manpower offset by decreases tied to force structure changes.

(b) Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning and End Strength. Table VI-8 displays ANG programmed manning and operating strength by DPPC category. The Air National Guard programmed end strength of 116,200 in FY 1990 will allow for an overall manning level of 95% when compared to the total requirements line.

(c) Trained in Unit Strength. Table VI-9 displays Air National Guard end strength, then adds or subtracts appropriate personnel to show the trained in unit strength. This strength is compared to the wartime unit structure to compute the percent trained in units.

(d) Skill and Grade. ANG skill and grade imbalances are depicted in tables VI-10 and VI-11. The overall enlisted skill and grade overages in the ANG are caused by several factors: low number of authorizations for grades E-1 to E-4, unit conversions/new missions, the required time lag to realign or attrit resources, and filling some projected authorizations up to one year in advance. Overall enlisted shortages are mainly caused by the inability of the ANG as a reserve component to reassign overages in one geographical location to fill shortages in another geographical area.

TABLE VI-8
AIR NATIONAL GUARD PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In Thousands)

	FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV:**	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
TOTAL ANG MILITARY	18.4	19.1	98	18.7	18.3	98	18.7	18.3	98
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	8.3	8.9	99	9.0	8.9	99	9.0	8.9	99
Offensive Strat Forces	9.3	9.4	96	9.2	8.8	96	9.2	8.8	96
Defensive Strat Forces	0.8	0.7	100	0.5	0.5	100	0.5	0.5	100
Surveillance Forces									
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	74.0	70.1	95	74.5	71.4	95	74.6	71.2	95
Tactical Air Forces	54.8	51.7	95	55.0	52.2	95	54.7	51.9	95
Mobility Forces	19.2	18.4	97	19.5	19.2	97	19.9	19.3	97
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	11.7	10.7	96	12.8	12.2	96	12.8	12.2	96
Centrally Managed Comm	11.7	10.7	96	12.8	12.2	96	12.8	12.2	96
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	4.8	4.2	67	3.6	2.5	67	3.7	2.5	67
MEDICAL SUPPORT	5.6	4.5	79	6.3	5.0	79	6.3	5.0	79
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	0.1	0.1	86	0.2	0.1	86	0.2	0.1	86
R&D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTVS	0.6	0.5	100	0.6	0.6	100	0.6	0.6	100
Geophysical Activities	0.6	0.5	100	0.6	0.6	100	0.6	0.6	100
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	3.7	3.6	96	3.8	3.5	96	3.8	3.5	96
Personnel Support	0.5	0.5	100	0.6	0.5	100	0.6	0.6	100
Individual Training	3.2	3.1	93	3.2	3.0	93	3.2	3.0	93
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	1.8	1.7	71	1.8	1.3	71	1.8	1.3	71
Centralized Support Act.	1.8	1.7	71	1.8	1.3	71	1.8	1.3	71

	FY 1989		FY 1990		FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV**	REQT	AUTH	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
<u>TOTAL ANG MILITARY</u>							
<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES</u>							
<u>TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	120.7	114.5	122.4	115.0	122.4	114.7	94
<u>INDIVIDUALS (Trainees & Students)</u>		1.5		1.2		1.6	
<u>END STRENGTH***</u>	120.7	116.1	122.4	116.2	122.4	116.3	95

* Less than 50

** Actuals

*** Numbers may not total due to rounding

TABLE VI-8
AIR NATIONAL GUARD PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In Thousands)

ANG OFFICERS DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV**	REQT	AUTH	REQT	% MNG	AUTH	REQT	% MNG
<u>STRATEGIC</u>									
Offensive Strat Forces	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.4	98	2.3	2.4	98
Defensive Strat Forces	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3	99	1.3	1.3	99
Surveillance Forces	1.2	1.2	1.0	.9	1.3	99	1.3	1.3	99
	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>									
Tactical Air Forces	8.2	8.0	8.4	8.1	8.4	96	8.0	8.3	96
Mobility Forces	5.1	5.1	5.3	5.0	5.3	96	5.0	5.2	96
	3.1	2.9	3.2	3.0	3.2	94	3.0	3.1	97
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>									
Intelligence	.8	.6	.8	.7	.8	96	.7	.8	96
Centrally Managed Comm	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	.8	.6	.8	.7	.8	96	.7	.8	96
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	.3	.2	.3	.2	.3	71	.2	.3	71
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	1.8	1.3	2.0	1.6	2.0	79	1.6	2.0	79
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	86	.1	.1	86
<u>R&D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTYS</u>	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100
Geophysical Activities	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>									
Personnel Support	.4	.4	.4	.4	.4	100	.4	.5	89
Individual Training	*.4	*.4	*.4	*.4	*.4	100	*.4	*.5	90
	.4	.4	.4	.4	.4	90	.4	.5	89
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>									
Centralized Support Act.	1.1	.9	1.1	.8	1.1	70	.8	1.1	70
	1.1	.9	1.1	.8	1.1	70	.8	1.1	70

ANG OFFICERS DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1989		FY 1990		FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV**	REQT	AUTH	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
<u>TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	15.3	14.1	15.6	14.3	15.6	14.2	91
<u>END STRENGTH</u>	15.3	14.1	15.6	14.3	15.6	14.2	91

Totals may not add due to rounding.

* Less than 50

** Actuals

TABLE VI-8
AIR NATIONAL GUARD PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In Thousands)

	FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV**	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
<u>ANG ENLISTED</u>									
<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES</u>									
<u>STRATEGIC</u>									
Offensive Strat Forces	15.9	16.5	98	16.4	16.0	98	16.3	15.9	98
Defensive Strat Forces	7.1	7.7	99	7.7	7.6	99	7.7	7.6	99
Surveillance Forces	8.2	8.3	96	8.2	7.9	96	8.1	7.8	96
	.7	.6	100	.5	.5	100	.5	.5	100
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>									
Tactical Air Forces	65.8	62.1	96	66.1	63.3	96	66.2	63.1	95
Mobility Forces	49.7	46.6	95	49.0	47.1	95	49.5	46.9	95
	16.1	15.5	100	16.3	16.2	100	16.7	16.2	97
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>									
Intelligence	10.9	10.1	96	12.0	11.5	96	12.0	11.5	96
Centrally Managed Comm	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	10.9	10.1	96	12.0	11.5	96	12.0	11.5	96
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	4.4	4.0	68	3.3	2.3	68	3.3	2.3	68
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	3.8	3.1	79	4.4	3.5	79	4.4	3.5	79
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>	.1	.1	87	.2	.1	87	.2	.1	87
<u>R&D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTYS</u>	.5	.4	100	.5	.5	100	.5	.5	100
Geophysical Activities	.5	.4	100	.5	.5	100	.5	.5	100
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>	3.3	3.3	93	3.3	3.1	93	3.3	3.1	93
Personnel Support	.5	.5	100	.5	.5	100	.5	.5	100
Individual Training	2.8	2.7	91	2.8	2.5	91	2.8	2.5	91
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>	.8	.8	71	.8	.5	71	.8	.5	71
Centralized Support Act.	.8	.8	71	.8	.5	71	.8	.5	71

TABLE VI-9

TRAINED IN UNIT STRENGTH - ANG
(in thousands)

	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
End Strength	116.1	116.2	116.3
-Training Pipeline*	2.6	2.2	2.6
Operating Strength	113.5	114.0	113.7
-Non Unit AGR	.4	.5	.5
+Unit AC Personnel	.6	.6	.6
Trained Unit Strength	113.7	114.1	113.8
Structure Requirements (WARTIME)	120.7	122.4	122.4
-Non-Unit Structure**	.5	.5	.5
Wartime Unit Structure	120.2	121.9	121.9
% Trained in Units	95	94	93

* Includes categories F and P.

** AGR in Management Headquarters, ANG Support Center, and ANG State Headquarters.

TABLE VI-10

AIR NATIONAL GUARD SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED MANNING PLUS INDIVIDUALS
(in thousands)

	<u>OVER*</u>	<u>BALANCED*</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>SHORT*</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>E1 - E4</u>					
Number of Skills	26	10		34	70
PMI**	3.5	4.7		21.2	29.4
Inventory	5.9	4.6		15.2	25.7
Over/Short	2.4	-0.1		-6.0	-3.7
<u>E5 - E7</u>					
Number of Skills	15	32		57	104
PMI	10.5	30.1		29.5	70.1
Inventory	12.1	29.8		23.3	65.3
Over/Short	1.6	-0.3		-6.2	-4.8
<u>E8 - E9</u>					
Number of Skills	4	17		60	81
PMI	0.008	1.2		5.1	6.2
Inventory	0.03	1.1		3.5	4.6
Over/Short	0.022	-0.1		-1.6	-1.6

<u>Total E1 - E9</u>				
Number of Skills	0	52	56	108
PMI	0	37.8	69.5	107.3
Inventory	0	36.8	61.3	98.1
Over/Short	0	-1.0	-8.2	-9.2
 <u>WO (Total Numbers)</u>				
Number of Skills	1	0	0	1
PMI	0.001	0	0	0.001
Inventory	0.001	0	0	0.001
Over/Short	1	0	0	1
 <u>01 - 03</u>				
Number of Skills	20	3	8	31
PMI	1.7	1.7	1.7	5.1
Inventory	2.6	1.7	1.4	5.7
Over/Short	0.9	0.0	-0.3	0.6
 <u>04 - 06</u>				
Number of Skills	3	1	33	37
PMI	0.8	0.0	8.5	9.3
Inventory	1.0	0.0	3.5	4.5
Over/Short	-0.2	0.0	5.0	4.8
 <u>Total 01 - 06</u>				
Number of Skills	3	18	16	37
PMI	0.7	7.4	6.3	14.4
Inventory	1.1	7.3	5.3	13.7
Over/Short	0.4	-0.1	-0.1	-0.7

*See definitions at Appendix B.

**Programmed Manning Plus Individuals.

(e) Experience.

TABLE VI-11

AIR NATIONAL GUARD EXPERIENCE
ACTUAL/PROGRAMMED INVENTORY
(in thousands)

FY 1989

	<u>Total</u> <u>People</u>	<u>People with</u> <u>Greater than</u> <u>4 YOS</u>	<u>AVG-YOS</u>
<u>E1 - E4</u>			
PMI*	29.4	NA	NA
Inventory	31.6	14.7	3.8

<u>E5 - E7</u>			
PMI	70.1	NA	NA
Inventory	65.6	65.4	14.7
<u>E8 - E9</u>			
PMI	6.2	NA	NA
Inventory	4.6	4.6	27.7
<u>E1 - E9</u>			
PMI	107.3	NA	NA
Inventory	101.8	84.7	11.9
<u>WO (Total Number)</u>			
PMI	0	NA	NA
Inventory	0.001	0	38
<u>01 - 03</u>			
PMI	5.1	NA	NA
Inventory	6.2	5.4	9.7
<u>04 - 06</u>			
PMI	9.3	NA	NA
Inventory	7.5	1.5	20.6
<u>01 - 06</u>			
PMI	14.4	NA	NA
Inventory	13.7	12.8	15.6

*Programmed Manning plus Individuals

(f) Personnel Management.

[1] Enlisted.

[a] Recruiting. The actual number of ANG enlisted personnel recruited in FY 1989 and the accession goals for FY 1990 and FY 1991 are shown below:

	<u>ANG Enlisted Plan</u>			<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
	<u>FY 89</u>		<u>HSDG</u>		
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual*</u>			
Non-Prior Service (NPS)	5,535	4,293	3,746	4,040	4,040
Male	4,070	3,222	2,782	3,030	3,030
Female	1,465	1,071	964	1,010	1,010
Prior-Service (PS)	5,748	7,356	7,332	6,811	7,122
Male	4,885	6,332	6,312	5,857	6,125
Female	863	1,024	1,020	954	997

[b] Retention. Retention rates for the ANG enlisted forces for FY 1989 - FY 1991 are shown below:

ANG Reenlistment Rates
(percent)

	<u>FY 89</u>		<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
First Term	75	78	75	75
Mid Career	80	75	80	80
Career	85	96	85	85
Overall	90	89	90	90

First Term, Career and Overall Retention Effectiveness Rates met or exceeded established goals for FY 1989.

[c] Aggregate Population Stability. The Air National Guard continues to maintain a stable force as reflected below:

Aggregate Population Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>
Officer	94.5	94.6	94.3	95.5	93.9	94.0
Enlisted	90.0	91.3	90.7	92.7	91.9	91.1

[d] Unit Personnel Stability. The Air National Guard unit personnel stability since FY 1984.

Unit Personnel Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY84</u>	<u>FY85</u>	<u>FY86</u>	<u>FY87</u>	<u>FY88</u>	<u>FY89</u>
Officer	80.5	81.1	81.6	79.7	81.7	81.5
Enlisted	91.0	91.0	80.8	79.5	81.5	80.5

[2] Officer Accessions. The actual number of ANG officers recruited in FY 1989 and accession goals for FY 1990 through FY 1991 are shown below:

ANG Officer Accession Plan

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>
	1,356	1,141	1,292
			<u>Goal</u>
			973

(g) Readiness Assessment. A continued high level of programmed manning, greater stability (particularly at the unit level), and an increasing level of experience will maintain the Air National Guard's overall readiness posture.

(h) Full-Time Support Program. Full-time support manpower represents an essential element for mission accomplishment and readiness of Air National Guard units. Full-time manpower consisting of military technicians, active Guard and Reserve (AGR), Active Component and civil service personnel perform the day-to-day duties necessary for mission accomplishment and readiness objectives. Adequate full-time manning is a key factor in mission readiness. Half of the full-time manpower available to the ANG is dedicated to equipment maintenance. The remainder is dedicated to training, logistics, administration and other support functions. The elements of full-time manpower programmed for the ANG are as follows:

	<u>ANG Full-Time Support</u>		
	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Military Technicians*	23,688	24,310	23,949
Civilians	1,963	1,991	2,021
Active Duty Guard/Reserve (AGR)	8,019	8,517	8,468
Active Air Force with ANG	600	596	603
Total	34,270	35,414	35,041

*Includes non-dual status National Guard civilian technicians.

b. Individual Ready Reserves (IRR).

The IRR consists of people who have recently served in the active forces or Selected Reserve and have remaining a period of obligated service. They are subject to being called to active duty during a national emergency declared by the President or the Congress.

Individual Ready Reserve
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
53.1*	46.5**	46.5**

* Includes categories J and K.

** Does not includes categories J and K.

2. Standby Reserve.

The Standby Reserve consists of people who have completed their statutory military obligation and have chosen to maintain a reserve status, or who have been designated key civilian employees, or who have a temporary hardship disability. They are not in a pay status and do not generally participate in reserve training or readiness programs, but are liable for active duty in time of war or a national emergency declared by Congress.

Standby Reserve
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
17.3	26.2	26.2

3. Retirees.

Retirees
(Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Twenty Year Active Duty Retirees (AC/RC)	266.8	266.9	270.0
Categories I and II	250.2*	250.3**	250.4**
Category III			
Other Retiree Reserves			
Categories I and II	18.8	18.8	18.9
Category III	44.5	44.5	44.6

* Includes 54,838 Disability Retirees.

** Includes estimated 55,000 Disability Retirees (Honorary retirees not included.)

4. Reserve Component Personnel on Active Duty

The following charts depict the numbers of officers and enlisted members serving on active duty for training as of the last day of FY 1989 under orders specifying an aggregate period in excess of 180 days and an estimate for FY 1990 of the number that will be ordered to such duty.

Air National Guard

	<u>FY 1989</u>		<u>FY 1990</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
Recruit and Specialized Training	-	275	-	275
Flight Training	309	225	309	207
Professional Training in Military and Civilian Institutions	27	-	30	-
Officer Acquisition Training	-	-	-	-

Air Force Reserve

	FY 1989		FY 1990	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
Recruit and Specialized Training	-	1,343	-	1,214
Flight Training	48	-	51	-
Professional Training in Military and Civilian Institutions	33	-	33	-
Officer Acquisition Training	-		-	

C. Civilian Force Management

1. General

Air Force civilians comprise approximately one third of the Total Force. Civilian end strength includes Air Force Reserve military technicians, who serve their units as civilians during peacetime, and as uniformed members upon mobilization. The civilian work force supports the Air Force mission in numerous capacities. Their largest concentrations are in Air Force Logistics Command, where they perform depot level maintenance on major weapons systems, as well as materiel management and distribution; and in Air Force Systems Command, where they perform basic scientific research, technology development, and contract management functions. However, all of our major commands and organizations depend on the contributions of civilian employees to accomplish their mission, with civilians assigned to virtually every Air Force installation worldwide.

2. Major Program Changes

Air Force civilian manpower strength for FY 1989 reflects actual civilian employment that was below the programmed level as of the FY 1990 President's Budget (Amended (PB(A))). The vast majority of this decrease was due to the hiring freezes that resulted from Operations and Maintenance dollar limitations and the control on outlays during the latter part of FY 1988. The beginning of the Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) drawdown resulted in approximately 400 positions being decreased. These losses were partially offset by the conversion of 400 officer billets to civilian billets. The continuation of the GLCM drawdown reduces civilian strength by approximately 650 positions between FY 1990 and FY 1991. The net effect of numerous other actions account for the remaining decreases.

3. Management Improvements

In continuing our efforts to manage human resources to budget, the Air Force, has instituted a project, known as PALACE COMPETE, which has entered its first phase of expansion, and allocates personnel budgets to supervisors, who are permitted management flexibility to make employment and classification decisions, but must remain within budget. This has been aided by computer software (CIVCOST) developed by HQ USAF which provides detailed work force and payroll information. This project continues at Edwards AFB, while expanding to 10 additional sites.

Another major personnel management initiative began at McClellan AFB in February 1988; it tests the viability of productivity gain sharing and modifications to the personnel system. Known as PACER SHARE, the project seeks to emphasize unit productivity and streamlining of the personnel system. The personnel system has been streamlined by establishing pay banding, job series consolidation and a demonstration on-call employment program. A gainsharing was paid to employers for the second, third and fourth quarters of FY 1989 and produced a net savings to the Air Force Logistics Command. One of the programs designed to simplify and streamline procedures in civilian personnel management - such as job classification, recruitment, and performance management, is called PALACE AUTOMATE. This project provides managers and employers with a computer-generated personnel document and a one-stop for supervisors to create a position and its accompanying job analysis and performance plan. This test, which began at the Air Force Academy Civilian Personnel Office, has expanded to fourteen Air Force installations.

4. Civilian Employment

The absence of statutory ceilings on our stateside work force has provided the Air Force a welcome opportunity to manage its work force requirements from a resource perspective. However, civilian workyear ceilings on overseas employment have been imposed in recent fiscal years. We continue to press for the elimination of these ceilings because they reduce flexibility for programmatic manpower adjustments. The civilian workyear ceiling, coupled with congressionally-imposed overseas troop strength ceilings, continues to impact on the readiness and sustainability of Air Force units overseas.

D. Mobilization Manpower.

1. Military.

In section IB we noted that the peak demand for military manpower occurs mid-way in the scenario, when force strength has stabilized and casualty replacement requirements peak. The peak manpower shortages occur earlier in the scenario. Peak shortfalls of approximately 15,000 in FY 1990 at M+20 and 14,000 in FY 1994 are the result of shortfalls in the active/guard/reserve force structure to meet initial deployment requirements, early casualty losses not yet offset by returns to duty, and the lag in the mobilization and training process.

Reduction in the shortfall between FY 1990 and FY 1994 is primarily due to additional Wartime Host Nation Support made available through agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany, and through efforts to reduce the lag time in mobilization and training. Significant shortfalls in civil engineering, and lesser shortfalls in such areas as food services and transportation, will persist.

2. Civilian.

On M-Day, the requirement for civilian manpower changes to reflect the support requirements associated with mobilization buildup and preparation of military forces for deployment/employment. Civilian positions are created to support the buildup and concurrently, positions are terminated in activities that are not required in wartime. The net result is that the total requirement declines from 241,000 in peacetime to 214,000 in wartime.

At M-Day, the civilian work force is reduced by the loss of civilian employees subject to call-up as guardsmen, reservists, and retired military. Approximately 44,000 Guard and Reserve dual status technician positions are terminated reflecting their mobilized military status. In addition, approximately 18,000 civilian employees are recalled to active duty. To insure the availability of civilians in essential federal positions, the Air Force continually screens employees who are also members of the Ready Reserve or are retired personnel eligible for recall.

TABLE VI-12
ACTIVE AIR FORCE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In Thousands)

CIVILIAN	FY 1989		FY 1990		FY 1991	
	AUTH	INV**	REQT	AUTH	REQT	AUTH
DPPC	% MNG		% MNG		% MNG	
<u>STRATEGIC</u>	9.0	8.8	9.3	9.2	9.4	9.3
Offensive Strat Forces	3.8	3.6	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
Defensive Strat Forces	3.7	3.6	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.8
Surveillance Forces	1.4	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.6	1.5
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>	30.5	30.5	30.5	30.9	28.2	29.7
Tactical Air Forces	15.9	15.6	15.6	15.8	13.7	14.9
Mobility Forces	14.7	14.8	14.9	15.1	14.5	14.9
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>	7.6	6.5	7.3	7.6	7.8	7.9
Centrally Managed Comm	5.2	4.4	5.1	5.2	5.4	5.5
Intelligence	2.4	2.2	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	51.0	49.7	53.7	50.4	56.6	53.3
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.0	2.1
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	9.3	9.4	10.1	10.1	10.5	10.5
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>	1.8	1.9	2.2	2.3	2.1	2.1
Int'l Military Org	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7
Unified Commands	.3	.3	.3	.4	.3	.3
Federal Support Actys	**	**	.1	.1	.1	.1
Joint Staff	**	**	**	**	**	**
OSD/Def Actys & Agencies	**	**	**	**	**	**
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	83.1	82.3	88.7	81.1	83.1	75.3
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>	8.0	7.3	8.1	7.9	7.9	7.8
Combat Commands	2.7	2.5	2.7	2.6	2.7	2.6
Support Commands	5.3	4.8	5.4	5.3	5.2	5.2

CIVILIAN

FY 1991

FY 1990

FY 1989

DPPC	AUTH	INV*	FY 1990		FY 1991	
			REQT	AUTH	REQT	AUTH
						% MNG
<u>R&D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTYS</u>						
Research and Development	9.4	10.1	10.2	9.7	10.3	9.6
Geophysical Activities	8.4	9.1	9.1	8.5	9.2	8.5
	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1
						100
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>						
Personnel Support	9.1	9.2	10.5	9.8	10.6	10.0
Individual Training	2.8	2.9	3.5	2.7	3.5	2.8
	6.2	6.3	7.0	6.9	7.1	7.0
						92
						77
						99
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>						
Support Installations	40.9	42.9	43.1	40.7	43.6	41.1
Centralized Support Act.	32.5	31.7	33.9	29.7	34.6	30.4
	8.5	9.6	9.2	8.9	9.0	8.8
						98
<u>END STRENGTH</u>	261.6	260.6	275.6	261.8	272.0	258.7
						95

Totals may not add due to rounding.

* Actual

** Less than 50

The Air Force plans to offset a shortfall of approximately 58,500 civilian employees at M-Day by converting employees who are currently in other than full time permanent civilian status, i.e. they will be converted from their peacetime temporary, part time, or intermittent status to full time permanent status. Additional manpower sources include available new-hires provided by the United States Employment Service and the Office of Personnel Management, and retired Federal civilian employees. Skill shortages in critical occupations such as logistics management, engineering, aircraft systems repair, and materiel handling make such positions prime targets for the utilization of retired Federal civilian employees. Also, civilians who are reassigned from areas of conflict or other terminated positions are, where possible, retained and assigned to wartime positions in safer areas, thus reducing the shortfall by approximately one half. Finally, we are reviewing military retirees for potential filling of remaining civilian wartime vacancies.

III. MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS BY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC).

A. Strategic.

1. Offensive Strategic Forces.

Air Force Offensive Strategic Forces (PAA)

<u>Active Force</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Bombers</u>			
B-52	220	187	171
FB-111	48	24	24
B-1B	90	90	90
B-2	0	0	0
<u>Tankers</u>			
KC-135	460	446	436
<u>Missiles</u>			
Minuteman	950	950	950
Peacekeeper	50	50	50
<u>Reserve Forces</u>			
<u>Tankers</u>			
ANG KC-135	110	115	118
AFR KC-135	24	30	30

Offensive Strategic Forces consist of combat aircraft and intercontinental ballistic missiles under the control of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). SAC's primary mission is to deter nuclear war by maintaining the ability to deliver nuclear weapons to any part of the world. SAC is also capable of delivering conventional weapons with its bomber aircraft. To perform these missions in FY 1990, we have 12 B-52 squadrons, three FB-111 squadrons, six B-1 squadrons, 31 active force and 16 smaller Air Reserve Force KC-135 tanker squadrons, 19 Minuteman squadrons, and one Peacekeeper squadron with the Primary Aircraft/Aerospace Vehicle Authorizations (PAA) shown in the above table.

Air Force Offensive Strategic Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	55.3	51.2	50.7
Selected Reserve			
ANG	8.9	8.9	8.9
AFR	2.0	2.2	2.2
<u>Civilian</u>	3.6	4.0	4.0

The significant reduction in active military manpower in FY 1990 results from the retirement of 33 B-52G aircraft (-2645), the transfer of 24 FB-111 aircraft to the Tactical Air Forces (-1338), the transfer of 14 KC-135A aircraft to the Guard and Reserve (-256), adjustment of the B-1B crew ratio/flying hours (-121), a command-initiated realignment of manpower from Combat Operations Staff to Management Headquarters, transfer of KC-135 overhead to the KC-10 wing at March AFB (-95), and a military/civilian conversion (-101). These reductions were partially offset by KC-135 wing and maintenance supervision manpower (+220) added to create a stand-alone air refueling wing following B-52 retirement actions, and additional manpower for the B-2 (+376) in preparation for activation of the first wing in FY 1991.

FY 1991 active military manpower decreases are due to retirement of 16 B-52G aircraft (-1973, -815 of which represents end strength associated with -14 B-52G conventional PAA implemented as an undistributed reduction in FY 1990). B-1B security change (-275), and KC-135 savings due to Pease AFB closure (-346). The growth in active military manpower resulted from preparation for fielding the first operational B-2 aircraft in FY 1992 (+695), manpower to support an additional stand-alone KC-135 wing (+220), manpower in preparation for the activation of the Peacekeeper Rail Garrison squadron in FY 1992 (+205), and growth in the Advanced Cruise Missile Program (+73).

Air Force Reserve increases between FY 1989 and FY 1990 (261 drill and 138 civilians) results from the robbing of its three KC-135 units from 8 to 10 PAA each and the assumption of a second line of alert.

Civilian increases in FY 1990 result from transfer of KC-135 aircraft to the Guard and Reserve (+338) offset by reductions associated with the retirement of B-52G aircraft (-60).

2. Defensive Strategic Forces.

Air Force Defensive Strategic Forces (PAA)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Active Force</u>			
F-15	36	18	18

Reserve Forces

ANG F-4	108	18	0
ANG F-16	90	162	180
ANG F-15	18	36	36

Air Force Strategic Defensive Forces include aircraft and ground radars of Tactical Air Command and Air National Guard, and ground radars of Alaskan Air Command for atmospheric tactical warning/attack assessment, airspace control and limited defense.

Air Force Defensive Strategic Force Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	3.9	3.3	3.3
Selected Reserve			
ANG	9.4	8.8	8.8
AFR(IMAs)	.1	.1	.1
<u>Civilian</u>	3.6	3.8	3.8

The FY 1990 decrease in active military manpower is attributed to the inactivation of one fighter interceptor squadron (-652).

The FY 1990 decrease in the Air National Guard reflects the modernization of air defense forces through conversion of F-4 units to F-16, and F-15 aircraft (-591).

3. Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces.

In FY 1990, Control and Surveillance Forces include 27 PAA EC-135 Post Attack Command and Control System aircraft, which are used by the Strategic Air Command for airborne command posts, communications relay, and launch control centers, and three PAA E-4B National Emergency Airborne Command Post aircraft. The ground environment activities include the NORAD Command Post in Cheyenne Mountain near Colorado Springs, which is the nerve center for aerospace defense of the North American continent; the Consolidated Space Operations Center at Falcon AFB, CO, for command and control of selected military satellites; three ballistic missile early warning sites; six Submarine Launch Ballistic Missile (SLBM) detection and warning sites; six SPACETRACK facilities consisting of radars and ground-based, electro-optical deep space surveillance system sites; the ground data system for the satellite early warning program; three Air National Guard aircraft control and warning sites; and portions of the National Military Command System. Control and surveillance forces also include communications and command and control support equipment. Finally, some of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System automatic data processing resources are also included in this category.

Air Force Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>Military</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Active	11.8	11.1	11.0
Selected Reserve			
ANG	.7	.5	.5
<u>Civilian</u>	1.6	1.4	1.5

The active military decrease in FY 1990 results from the final drawdown of the SR-71 program (-663), Space Tracking Systems (-69), and Command Center Operations (-144). The decrease is partially offset by an increase for the Cheyenne Mountain Complex and National Military Command Center (+102).

B. Tactical/Mobility.

1. Tactical Air Forces.

Air Force Tactical Air Forces

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Active Force</u>			
Tactical Fighter Wing Equivalents	24.6	24.2	24.3
Tactical Fighter Aircraft	1769	1743	1746
Reconnaissance Aircraft (RF-4C and TR-1)	102	79	79
Special Operations Force Aircraft	72	82	89
Airborne Warning and Control Aircraft (E-3)	29	29	29
Airborne TACS Aircraft (OV-10, OA-37, OA-10)	91	103	79
Tanker/Cargo Aircraft (KC-10)	57	57	57
Electronic Combat Aircraft 1/	48	48	48
Ground Launched Cruise Missiles	224	112	0
<u>Reserve Forces</u>			
ARF TAC Fighter Wing Equivalents	12.3	11.9	11.7
ANG Fighter Aircraft	666	648	612
AFR Fighter Aircraft	216	222	216
ANG Reconnaissance Aircraft (RF-4C)	90	90	90
AFR Special Operations Aircraft	14	14	13
ANG Airborne TACS Aircraft (OA-37, OV-10, OA-10)	54	78	78
ANG Special Operations Aircraft (EC-130)	6	6	6
Tanker/Cargo Squadron (KC-10) (AFR-Assoc) 2/	3	3	3

1/ Includes EF-111A and EC-130H (Compass Call) squadrons.

2/ Associate squadrons currently provide one-half of the wartime required aircrews for utilization with active USAF squadrons.

Tactical Air Forces consist of the tactical fighter, attack, reconnaissance, special operations, and command and control aircraft (for close air support, interdiction, counterair, reconnaissance), tanker/cargo aircraft, the Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM), and special purpose missions. Manpower supporting these forces includes air crews, organizational and intermediate aircraft maintenance personnel, GLCM missile operations crews, weapon systems security, and GLCM and munitions maintenance personnel. Also included in this category are the forces and manpower for the Air Force's Tactical Air Control System, the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center, civil engineering RED HORSE (Rapid Engineer Deployable, Heavy Operational Repair Squadron, Engineer) squadrons and tactical intelligence squadrons.

Air Force Tactical Air Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	113.1	107.6	107.6
Selected Reserve			
ANG	51.7	52.2	51.9
AFR (Includes IMAs)	11.3	11.6	11.2
<u>Civilian</u>	15.6	15.8	14.9

The active military decrease in FY 1990 results from the transfer of manpower from this DPPC to other categories and savings caused by declassification of the F-117 program (-1501), other tactical force structure changes (-1599), the continued drawdown of the GLCM force structure (-662), and the FY 1990 troop strength reduction (-1840).

The FY 1990 Guard increases are caused by several changes. Manpower is provided to support the six A-7 aircraft restored in FY 1989 (+68). Conversion of four F-4D units to three F-16 units and one OA-10 unit (-378). An increase in tactical control manpower is the result of restoration of a reduction in FY 1989 (+294). These positions are programmed for the Air Support Operations Center and Air Liaison Officers required for operation of the mission. Finally, an increase in civil engineering RED HORSE units reflects a manning level increase to 92 percent of the required level (+625).

In FY 1991 the Air National Guard decrease is due to the conversion of an F-4E unit and one A-7 unit to two 18 PAA F-16s units (-352).

Air Force Reserve decreases between FY 1990 and FY 1991 result from conversion of Reserve fighter units from F-4E to F-16 aircraft (-338).

The civilian decrease in FY 1991 results from continued GLCM drawdown (-17), tactical force restructuring (-23), Guard and Reserve force structure modernization (-258) and transfer special operations forces from the Active (-350) and the Guard (-212) to USSOCOM.

2. Mobility Forces.

Air Force Mobility Forces (PAA)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Active Force</u>			
Tactical Airlift Aircraft	200	170	170
Strategic Airlift Aircraft	288	288	288
Aeromedical Aircraft*	17	18	18
<u>Reserve Forces</u>			
Tactical Airlift Aircraft	308	294	282
ANG Tactical Airlift Aircraft	180	176	174
Strategic Airlift Squadrons (AFR-Assoc) 1/	17	17	17
Aeromed Airlift Squadrons (AFR-Assoc) 1/	1	1	1
Strategic Airlift (AFR-unit equipped)	37	37	37
Strategic Airlift (ANG-unit equipped)	19	19	21
ANG Rescue Aircraft	18	22	22

*Manpower to support Aeromedical activities is counted in the Medical DPPC.

1/ Associate airlift squadrons provide aircrews and maintenance personnel for utilization with active USAF squadrons. These include one C-9 aeromedical evacuation squadron, four C-5A squadrons, and 13 C-141 squadrons.

Air Force Mobility Forces consist of the tactical airlift, strategic airlift, and aerospace rescue and recovery aircraft of the Military Airlift Command, the Air Force Reserve, and the Air National Guard. Manpower supporting these forces includes crews, organizational and intermediate aircraft maintenance, and aircraft security personnel. This category also includes manpower for aerial port operations, Air Force special airlift missions, administrative airlift, and special operations forces.

Air Force Mobility Forces Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	35.3	34.4	34.7
Selected Reserve			
ANG	18.4	19.2	19.3
AFR (Includes IMAs)	39.3	39.2	39.3
<u>Civilian</u>	14.8	14.5	14.1

The decrease in active military in FY 1990 results from the elimination of 30 C-130 (-1118), 15 CH/HH-3 helicopters (-292), an increase of 9 MH-60 (238), initial manpower for C-17 (82), reduced C-5 maintenance (-100), and the transfer of industrial funded (IF) overhead manpower that drives an increase in airlift mission activities (non-IF) for C-130, C-141, and C-5 overhead (320).

The increase in active military in FY 1991 results in the following -5 C-141 (-176), +2 C-17 and initial maintenance (227), +6 MH-60 (93), +5 C-27 (54).

In FY 1990, Air National Guard strength increases to support a new rescue unit in Alaska (+399), improved manning levels in the C-5 unit (+434) and aeromedical evacuation units (+398), additional aerial port advisors and restoration of drill officer positions (+148), and newly assigned operational support aircraft (+26). These increases are partially offset by decreases resulting from modernization of three C-130A/B units to C-130Es, coupled with a drawdown of 12 C-130 aircraft (one 16 PAA unit going to 12 PAA and one 16 PAA unit going to 8 PAA) (-620). The FY 1991 increase supports a conversion from C-130 to C-141 aircraft (+57). Air Force Reserve increase (+78) between FY 1990 and FY 1991 is associated with the conversion of USAF equipped C-130 units to C-141 and the completion of the Air Force Reserve's second C-5 equipped wing.

A FY 1990 Congressional reduction to the industrial fund (-102) has only been programmed for FY 1990 creating an increase in FY 1991 (+102). Anticipated future budgetary actions will extend this reduction through the program.

Most of the FY 1990 Congressional increases to the civilian technician program have not been extended into FY 1991. Consequently, FY 1991 reflects a technician authorization level lower than FY 1990. It is anticipated future budgetary actions will rectify the FY 1991 technician strength program.

C. Communications/Intelligence

1. Centrally Managed Communications.

This category includes manpower supporting long-haul defense communication systems, Air Force communications systems, satellite communications systems, communications security, and the Air Force Communications Command engineering and installation activities.

Air Force Centrally Managed Communications Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>Military</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Active	16.4	16.5	15.7
Selected Reserve			
ANG	10.7	12.2	12.2
AFR (Includes IMAs)	.1	.1	.1
<u>Civilian</u>	4.4	5.0	5.3

The active military decrease in FY 1991 results from the 401 TFW rephase (-59), military-to-civilian conversions (-258), Air Force Communications Command (AFCC) Headquarters streamlining (-189), integration and operability and productivity enhancements (-394).

In FY 1990 the Air National Guard realigned manpower spaces from the Combat Installations DPPC to Centrally Managed Communications to more accurately identify the appropriate category (+1477).

The civilian increase in FY 1990 (+883) reflects improved manning levels. The civilian increase in FY 1991 results from military-to-civilian conversions (+268) in AFCC.

2. Intelligence.

This category includes manpower for selected National Foreign Intelligence Programs and other Air Force intelligence related activities. The Air Force Intelligence Agency and the Air Force Electronic Security Command are the two Air Force organizations whose primary mission is intelligence; however, nearly all major Air Force organizations also support these activities.

Air Force Intelligence Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	16.9	17.1	17.2
Selected Reserve			
AFR (IMAs)	1.7	1.9	1.9
<u>Civilian</u>	2.2	2.4	2.4

D. Combat Installations.

This category contains manpower resources essential for the direct support and overall readiness of our combat forces in such vital functions as air traffic control operations, aircraft dispatch, airfield and combat facilities maintenance and battle damage repair, fire protection and crash rescue, security, base communications, food service, transportation, data automation, and supply.

Air Force - Combat Installations Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	118.4	113.2	109.2
Selected Reserve			
ANG	4.2	2.5	2.5
AFR (Includes IMAs and AGR)	14.0	14.3	14.3
<u>Civilian</u>	49.7	50.4	53.3

The decrease in active military in FY 1990 reflects reduced manning levels (-2626), decreases to force structure support (-648), GLCM support (-80), potential Commercial Activities (A-76) savings (-961), and an FY 1990 troop strength reduction (-1958). These decreases are partially offset by the transfer of spaces from the Tactical DPPC for the F-117 (+728) and support requirements for Patriot (+97).

The active military decrease in FY 1991 results from continued GLCM drawdown (-1963), force structure reductions (-198), data automation initiatives (-280), a military to civilian conversion (-1744), realignment of spaces to the medical DPPC for improved primary care access (-704), base closure (-980), and Commercial Activities (A-76) adjustments (-99). This reduction is partially offset by the restoration of the FY 1990 troop strength reduction (+1958).

The increase in civilians in FY 1990 is the result of improved manning levels (+2190), and Commercial Activities (A-76) adjustments (+1063). This is partially offset by an OSD-directed reduction (-1725), continued GLCM drawdown (-20), a decrease in force structure support (-141), and the FY 1990 troop strength reduction (-419).

The increase in civilians in FY 1991 is due to military to civilian conversion (+1805), improved MWR funding (+1567), restoration of the FY 1990 troop strength reduction (+419), and Commercial Activities (A-76) adjustments (+19). This increase is partially offset by an OSD-directed reduction (-160), completion of the GLCM drawdown (-383), force structure (-113), and base closure (-202).

E. Force Support Training.

Included in this category is all manpower required to conduct strategic, tactical, and mobility support training: ~~Also included are~~ tactical fighter aggressor squadrons and manpower supporting chemical/biological defensive training.

Air Force Force Support Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>Military</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Active	25.1	25.3	22.9
<u>Civilian</u>	1.9	1.9	1.8

The decrease in active military and civilian spaces in FY 1991 is due to a decrease in tactical air forces training force structure (-1017), a reduction in the aggressor force throughout the TAF (-1171), transfer of RF-4C training to the Air National Guard (-132), and deletion of Lead-in Fighter Training (-109).

F. Medical Support

Included in this category is manpower required to provide medical and dental care to eligible individuals in Air Force medical centers and dental facilities. It also includes medical research and development and Air Force Reserve medical service units.

Air Force Medical Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>Military</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Active	40.1	40.3	41.6
Selected Reserve			
ANG	4.5	5.0	5.0
AFR (Includes IMAs)	5.1	6.0	6.5
<u>Civilian</u>	9.4	10.1	10.5

The civilian increases in the Medical DPPC for FY 1990 are due to an increase of 666 authorizations to provide a greater medical support capability to health care providers, and an adjustment to potential commercial activities (A-76) actions (+52). Civilian increases were partially offset by decreased manning levels (-57).

The FY 1991 military increases were driven by a BOS to medical conversion to provide improved primary care access (+1000), and an increase for medical war readiness (+762). The DoD directed military/civilian conversion partially offset the increases (-440).

Civilian increase in FY 1991 resulted from the DoD directed military/civilian conversion (+400).

The Air National Guard increase in FY 1990 reduces active Air Force wartime medical shortages (+565) by providing a second echelon of care in ANG medical units.

The Air Force Reserve increases in FY 1990 (+869), and FY 1991 (+530) serve to reduce a continuing medical shortfall.

G. Joint Activities.

The manpower in this category is for centralized support of activities outside the Air Force. It includes support to international military organizations, unified commands, and other federal agencies on either a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis. Manpower supporting OSD, JCS, foreign military sales and counterintelligence activities is also included.

Air Force Joint Activities Manpower

(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	7.9	7.7	7.9
AFR (Includes IMAs)	.4	.4	.4
<u>Civilian</u>	1.9	2.3	2.1

The active increase in FY 1991 results from the transfer of AFSC's Contract Management Division to DLA (+289). The civilian decrease in FY 1991 results from the transfer of budget responsibility from Air Force to USSOCOM under new MFP 11 responsibilities (-140).

H. Central Logistics

Air Force manpower for this category is required for centrally managed supply, procurement, maintenance, and logistics support activities, primarily in the Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC).

Air Force Central Logistics Manpower

(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	9.9	9.8	9.4
Selected Reserve			
AFR (IMAs)	1.4	1.4	1.4
<u>Civilian</u>	82.3	81.1	75.3

Military reductions in FY 1991 were caused by AFLC's program review (+43) and the follow-on restructures of AFLC (-37) and AFSC (-130). The transfer of the Contract Management Division to DLA resulted in a decrease of -289.

The civilian decrease in FY 1990 was caused primarily by the Depot Maintenance efficiency reductions (-1910), the conversion of certain logistics activities to USSOCOM (-239), and an internal AFSC total program review (-125). These reductions were partially offset by improved manning levels (+663) and the reinstatement of manpower previously taken in anticipation of potential A-76 contract savings (+413).

Several actions drove reductions in the civilian end strength in FY 1991. AFLC initially reviewed its existing program (-90) and then both AFLC and AFSC restructured and streamlined their entire commands (-3157 and -770, respectively.) Competition advocacy was reduced in a separate action (-200). Contract Management Division was transferred to DLA (-2883) and certain logistics functions were converted to USSOCOM (-31). Congressionally mandated actions also cut end strength (-57). Depot Maintenance savings were reduced from the FY 90 estimate resulting in a civilian end strength increase (+1436).

I. Service Management Headquarters.

The manpower in this category supports Air Force Management Headquarters, including the Departmental Headquarters, Air Force Secretariat, and the Air Staff (including the National Guard Bureau and Air Force Reserve), Departmental Support Activities, major command headquarters and their numbered Air Force headquarters, Air Force Reserve headquarters, and Air Force Systems Command's product divisions.

Air Force Manpower in Service Management Headquarters
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	13.0	13.5	13.1
Selected Reserve			
ANG	.1	.1	.1
AFR (IMAs and AGR)	1.1	1.2	1.2
<u>Civilian</u>	7.3	7.9	7.8

The active military and civilian increase in FY 1990 reflects improved manning levels. The active military and civilian decrease in FY 1991 is due to restructuring/streamlining Air Force Logistics Command, Air Force Systems Command, and Air Force Communications Command (-261 military/-155 civilian) and reducing intermediate headquarters personnel staffs at Military Airlift Command, Strategic Air Command, Tactical Air Command, and Pacific Air Forces (-61 military/-26 civilian). The civilian decreases are partially offset by a military to civilian conversion of management headquarters support functions throughout the Air Force (-44 military/+44 civilian).

Over the period from 1968 to 1988 the Air Force has reduced management headquarters by approximately 33,000 authorizations. The effect of those actions has been a cumulative reduction of 62 percent in management headquarters manning as compared to a total Air Force end strength reduction during the same period of 34 percent.

J. Research and Development/Geophysical Activities

1. Research and Development.

This category includes manpower, primarily in the Air Force Systems Command, which carries out basic and applied research and design, development, test, and evaluation of Air Force systems and subsystems. Manpower in this category also supports various Department of Defense research and development activities and agencies.

Air Force Research and Development Manpower

(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	7.2	7.1	7.0
Selected Reserve			
AFR (IMAs)	1.2	1.2	1.1
<u>Civilian</u>	9.1	8.5	8.5

The active decrease in FY 1991 results from the AFSC restructure (-115). The civilian decrease between FY 1989 and FY 1990 results from reduced manning levels (-349) and civilian reduction (-110) in FY 1989.

2. Geophysical Activities.

The manpower in this category supports active and Reserve weather service activities, meteorological, navigational satellite, and space programs.

Air Force Geophysical Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	7.4	7.3	6.9
Selected Reserve			
ANG	.5	.6	.6
AFR (Includes IMAs)	.1	.1	1
<u>Civilian</u>	1.0	1.1	1.1

The active military decrease in FY 1991 is primarily due to the inactivation of one weather squadron (-323).

K. Training and Personnel

1. Personnel Support.

Included in this category is manpower to support all recruiting activities (recruiting, examining, and personnel processing), American Forces Information Service, honor guards, and other activities such as drug and alcohol training, equal opportunity race relations training, and civilian education/training development.

Air Force Personnel Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	6.3	5.9	5.9
Selected Reserve			
ANG	.5	.5	.6
AFR (IMAs and AGR)	.4	.4	.4
<u>Civilian</u>	2.9	2.7	2.8

2. Individual Training.

Included in this category is all manpower required to conduct training. Individuals actually undergoing training are carried in the Trainees, Students, and Cadets accounts of the Individuals category.

Air Force Individual Training Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	18.8	16.6	16.1
Selected Reserve			
ANG	3.1	3.0	3.0
AFR (Includes IMAs)	.7	.6	.6
<u>Civilian</u>	6.3	6.9	7.0

The active military decrease and civilian increase in FY 1990 are primarily due to accession changes, and Commercial Activities (A-76) actions. These changes decreased general skill training (-514) and Basic Military Training (-30 military). These are partially offset by several Commercial Activities (A-76) actions in Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) aircraft maintenance that either stayed in house operation or converted to contract (-1579 mil; +560 civilian). Additionally, 73 civilians were added to reverse a civilian reduction.

Active military decreases and civilian increases in FY 1991 are due to accession changes, Commercial Activities (A-76) actions, and technical training adjustments. These changes decreased general skill training (-329 military), and Basic Military Training (-219 military) while contracting aircraft maintenance resulted in an increase of 80 civilians.

L. Support Activities.

Support Activities are subdivided into Support Installations and Centralized Support Activities.

Accounting for Base Operating Support (BOS) manpower varies among the Services. All the Services include in the BOS category those people who provide fixed-site services such as housing and real property maintenance. The Air Force also includes all manpower providing food, transportation and supply type services in the BOS category and carries

only operations and maintenance manpower in its Strategic and Tactical/Mobility categories. These accounting differences between Services preclude making simple "combat to support" comparisons among the Services.

1. Support Installations.

This category contains manpower resources for the operation and maintenance of auxiliary, logistics, and training installations and other base operating support activities such as laundries and commissaries.

Air Force Support Installations Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	24.4	23.0	22.0
Selected Reserve			
AFR (IMAs)	1.4	1.3	1.3
<u>Civilian</u>	31.7	29.7	30.4

The FY 1990 military reduction is the result of decreased manning levels (-531), adjustments to non-prior service accessions (-629), and the INF treaty (-23).

Civilian reductions in FY 1990 are due to decreased manning levels (-766), congressionally mandated actions (-564), a reduction in civilian personnel specialists (-197), an OSD directed civilian reduction (-563), and the INF treaty (-54). Partial offsets to those reductions include commercial activities (A-76) adjustments (+280), the disestablishment of the San Antonio Real Property Maintenance Activity (SARPMA) (+158), increased manning at the Okinawa laundries (+29), and special project support (+29).

Military reductions in FY 1991 were driven by potential commercial activities (A-76) (-231), an OSD directed military/civilian conversion (-509), AFCC streamline (-24), the WC-130 addback (-14), the AFESC restructure (-22), and realignment to the medical DPPC for improved primary care access (-296). Partial offsets of these reductions include force structure changes (+16), AFLC's environmental management (+11), the development of the acquisition career field (+17), and base closure actions (+16).

FY 1991 civilian end strength increase resulted from a military-to-civilian conversion (+580), congressionally mandated actions (+58), and improved MWR manning (+400). The overall increase was reduced because of the conversion of potential commercial activities (A-76) (-15), force structure changes (-10), WC-130 add-back (-15), AFLC restructure (-193), civilian personnel specialist reduction (-82), AFESC restructure (-19), an OSD directed civilian personnel reduction (-40), and base closure actions (-47).

2. Centralized Support Activities.

The manpower in this category is for centralized support to multiple missions and functions that do not fit other DPPCs. It includes manpower supporting readiness support, personnel administration, finance centers, public affairs, and various Air Reserve Force activities.

Air Force Centralized Support Activities Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	11.1	11.0	11.1
Selected Reserve			
ANG	1.7	1.3	1.3
AFR (Includes IMAs)	1.0	1.0	1.0
<u>Civilian</u>	9.6	8.9	8.8

The active military increase in FY 1991 results from the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) restructure, Pease AFB closure, and Foreign Counter-intelligence Program adjustment (+62).

The civilian decrease in FY 1990 results from manning level changes (-634). The civilian decrease in FY 1991 results from the transfer of the Contract Management Division from AFSC to Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) (-260) and AFSC restructure rephase (-94). This reduction is partially offset by improved funding of morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) activities (+114) and additional manpower provided for defense testing and simulation activities (+50).

M. Undistributed.

The manpower management system of the Air Force records authorized strength for force units as opposed to the projected actual strength shown in this report. Authorized strength for a given unit, and hence for a given DPPC, differs from the actual in-place strength because of fluctuations in manning. Active Air Force military strength fluctuates continuously as personnel enter and leave the service. Historically, the number of transients tend to be higher in the summer than on average due to seasonal variations in PCS moves; hence there are fewer numbers of people in operating units at the end of the fiscal year. The Air Force accounts for this by projecting year end vacancies in field units in a separate, undistributed manpower program element or account.

Fiscal constraints implemented in the FY 1989 President's Budget (Amended) resulted in significant arbitrary budget reductions being imposed in addition to those programmed. These reductions resulted in decisions to eliminate more than 25,000 in FY 1989, below those originally programmed. The specific programming actions that would be taken to

implement these reductions were still being adjusted well into FY 1989. The lateness of these decisions made an orderly allocation to the manpower file impossible for both FY 1989 and FY 1990. As a result the Undistributed account was decremented to maintain the proper end strength level. Actual allocation of the reduction to the appropriate DPPCs occurred during execution in FY 1989 and will occur during execution for FY 1990. Additionally, in response in fiscal guidance during preparation of the FY 1990-1991 President's Budget, a decision was made to eliminate approximately 3200 authorizations in FY 1991 in order to save dollars. The programming actions that will specify the appropriate DPPC in which the reduction will occur will be identified prior to the year of execution.

Undistributed
(End Strength In Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.0	-13.2	-20.3

N. Individuals.

The Individuals account contains manpower required for transients; patients, prisoners, and holdees; trainees and students; and Air Force Academy cadets. The manpower in the Individuals account is based primarily on end strengths required for training military people and moving them to and between duty assignments. Many years are also included to cover unit personnel losses due to prolonged sickness, criminal confinement, and holding while processing out for disciplinary separation.

1. Transients.

Air Force manpower in this category accounts for personnel in travel, leave, or proceed status while under PCS orders.

Air Force Transient Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	-2.4	7.7	8.8

Active military increases reflect improved manning levels (+12,258) as well as adjustments to the Permanent Change of Station (PCS) program projected levels (-2153).

Military increases in FY 1991 are due to adjustments in the PCS program projected levels (+1076).

2. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees.

Air Force manpower in this category includes patients, prisoners, and personnel assigned to the Correctional and Rehabilitation Squadron for retraining, patients in a hospital for over 90 days, and personnel awaiting discharge for disciplinary reasons.

Air Force Patient, Prisoner, and Holdee Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.0	.5	.5

Active military increases in FY 1990 reflect improved unit manning (+499).

3. Trainees and Students.

This category accounts for people undergoing basic military and initial skills training, and all other formal training in courses at least 20 weeks long.

Air Force Trainee and Student Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	26.6	23.7	24.2
Selected Reserve			
ANG	1.5	1.2	1.6
AFR	1.8	1.9	1.7

During the FY 1991 Amended Presidents Budget (PBA), significant budget reduction decisions resulted in substantial decreases in Air Force end strength below programmed levels. Further, it was decided that this lower end strength would require a sharply reduced accession program compared to previously approved accession levels. Accordingly officer accessions were reduced to 5,498 and Non-Prior Service (NPS) accessions were reduced to 36,000 in FY 1990. The resulting military reductions in FY 1990 include reductions to the Airmen Student Trainee account (-2341), General Skills Training students (-168), and officer students (-337). The growth in military in FY 1991 is due to the fact that, although NPS accessions remained at the 36,000 level, officer accessions increased to 6,814. This increased officer students by +400.

The Air National Guard did not achieve the programmed numbers of basic military training entries in FY 1989, and therefore the FY 1990 program was further reduced. It is anticipated that FY 1991 recruiting will improve.

The Air Force Reserve decrease in FY 1990 (-129) and FY 1991 (-221) decreases are as directed by OSD.

4. Cadets.

This category includes only Air Force Academy cadets and remains constant throughout the program.

Air Force Cadet Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u> Active	4.4	4.4	4.4

CHAPTER VII

DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1958, the Congress authorized the Secretary of Defense to integrate as a separate organizational entity, "any supply or service activity common to more than one military department, whenever (he) determines it will be advantageous to the Government in terms of effectiveness, economy, or efficiency". Since that time, the Secretary has utilized that authority several times to create the 13 Defense Agencies and 7 DoD Field Activities that currently exist. The missions of these organizations vary widely, ranging from communications, mapping, intelligence, education, logistics, and other support to the Military Services and other parts of the federal government. Consolidations increase organizational efficiency, while at the same time permit the Services to devote a greater portion of their resources to their primary military missions.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), assisted by the Joint Staff (JS), oversees, assigns responsibilities, and periodically evaluates the organizational effectiveness of Defense Agencies and related organizations.

II. MISSIONS AND MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

The missions and associated manpower requirements of the following organizations are contained within this chapter:

- A. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD);
- B. Joint Staff (JS);
 - 12 Defense Agencies (NSA excluded);
 - 7 DoD Field Activities;
 - Inspector General (IG, DoD);
 - Armed Services University of the Health Sciences
- G. US Court of Military Appeals (USCMA); and
- H. United States Special Operations Forces Command (USSOFCOM).

The manpower data depicted reflects actual year end full-time equivalent (FTE) end strength for FY 1989, programmed manpower levels for FY 1990, and requested manpower levels for FY 1991. The military strength figures represent active component manpower allocated to organizations outside of the Services, and are also reflected in the active component strength levels of the Military Departments. The manpower data, displayed by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC), is portrayed at the end of this chapter.

DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS
CONSOLIDATED MANPOWER
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Military	9,363	10,092	35,493
Officer	(5,890)	(6,420)	(11,114)
Enlisted	(3,473)	(3,672)	(24,379)
Civilian	<u>99,320</u>	<u>99,139</u>	<u>104,102</u>
Total	108,683	109,231	139,595

The change in the manpower level projected for Defense-related organizations, as a whole, in FY 1990 reflects congressional adjustments resulting from the FY 1990 Appropriations Act. The change in the overall manpower level requested for FY 1991 reflects an increase over the current year (FY 1990) of approximately 28 percent (or 30,364 end strength). However, 90 percent of the increase is the result of transferring 27,432 military and civilian personnel assigned to the US Special Operations Forces Command (USSOFCOM) under the Military Departments to Defense Agency appropriations accounts in FY 1991. This migration makes the USSOFCOM responsible for the determination of all SOF unique program requirements and the justification of related resources to the Congress.

The balance of the increase in manpower between FY 1990 and FY 1991 (approximately 2,932 end strength) is the net result from a recommendation contained in the Defense Management Report (DMR) to consolidate all of the Department's contract management functions within the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) offset by another DMR initiative aimed at achieving a 5 percent reduction in all Defense Agencies' operating costs by FY 1991.

The changes in manpower levels for each organization are explained below.

A. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (OSD)

OSD is the principal staff element of the Secretary, responsible for overall policy development, planning, resource's management, and program evaluation.

OSD Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Military	616	588	573
Officer	(534)	(510)	(497)
Enlisted	(82)	(78)	(76)
Civilian	<u>1,426</u>	<u>1,545</u>	<u>1,511</u>
Total	2,042	2,133	2,084

The decline in OSD manpower between FY 1990 and FY 1991 reflects implementation of the DMR initiative aimed at achieving a 5 percent reduction in Defense Agency operating costs in FY 1991. The reduction is predicated upon efficiencies resulting from organizational streamlining, management headquarters reductions, automation and management information improvements, and functional consolidations.

B. JOINT STAFF (JS)

The Joint Chiefs are the principal military advisors to the Secretary of Defense and the President. Members of the staff, other than the Chairman, include senior military officers from each Service.

JS Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Military	1,319	1,319	1,310
Officer	(930)	(930)	(923)
Enlisted	(389)	(389)	(387)
Civilian	286	308	292
Total	<u>1,605</u>	<u>1,627</u>	<u>1,602</u>

The decline in the Joint Staff's manpower between FY 1990 and FY 1991 reflects implementation of the DMR initiative aimed at achieving a 5 percent reduction in Defense Agency operating costs in FY 1991. The reduction is predicated upon efficiencies resulting from organizational streamlining management headquarters reductions, automation and management information improvements, and functions consolidations.

C. DEFENSE AGENCIES:

There are currently 12 Defense Agencies, excluding the National Security Agency, which is exempted from this publication in accordance with Public Law 98-36. The On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA), established in FY 1988, represents DoD's most recent Defense Agency creation.

1. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)

DARPA manages and directs advanced basic research and development projects which employ high risk and high payoff technologies.

DARPA Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Military	27	28	27
Officer	(24)	(25)	(24)
Enlisted	(3)	(3)	(3)
Civilian	111	145	139
Total	<u>138</u>	<u>173</u>	<u>166</u>

The decline in DARPA's manpower between FY 1990 and FY 1991 reflects implementation of the DMR initiative aimed at achieving a 5 percent reduction in Defense Agency operating costs in FY 1991. Specifically, the reduction is predicated upon efficiencies resulting from consolidations of functions and support-type contracts.

2. Defense Communications Agency (DCA)

DCA is responsible for planning, developing and supporting command, control, communications (C3), and information systems that serve the needs of the National Command Authorities under all conditions of peace and war.

DCA provides operational direction and management control over the Defense Communications System (DCS) and engineering and technical support to the National Military Command, Minimum Essential Communications Network, and Worldwide Military Command and Control Systems. DCA also supports the Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM) Systems and provides ADP support to OSD, JS, and other DoD Components.³ The Joint Tactical Command, Control and Communications Agency (JTC³A) was consolidated under DCA in FY 1988 to ensure the interoperability of "tactical" communications systems for joint operations.

3. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

The mission of DIA is to satisfy the military foreign intelligence requirements of DoD and other authorized recipients, and to provide the military intelligence contribution to national intelligence. DIA's manpower requirements are not specifically identified in the Defense Manpower Requirements Report.

Communications/Intelligence Manpower (End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Military	4,039	4,479	4,543
Officer	(1,973)	(2,370)	(2,370)
Enlisted	(2,066)	(2,109)	(2,173)
Civilian	<u>6,347</u>	<u>6,522</u>	<u>6,419</u>
Total	<u>10,386</u>	11,001	10,962

The decline in manpower between FY 1990 and FY 1991 reflects DCA's implementation of the DMR initiative aimed at achieving a 5 percent reduction in Defense Agency operating costs in FY 1991. Specifically, the reduction is predicated upon efficiencies resulting from consolidating and/or closing various DCA field activities and computer facilities.

4. Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)

DCAA is the Department's "contract" auditor, responsible for providing audit and financial advisory services to DoD Components involved in procurement and contract administration operations. These advisory services are performed in connection with the negotiation, administration, and settlement of contracts.

DCAA Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1989</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
		<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Civilian	7,115	7,458	7,085

The decline in DCAA's manpower between FY 1990 and FY 1991 reflects implementation of the DMR initiative aimed at achieving a 5 percent reduction in Defense Agency operating costs in FY 1991. Specifically, the reduction is predicated upon efficiencies resulting from automation efforts, improved methods of information handling, and elimination of duplicative contractor oversight.

5. Defense Investigative Service (DIS)

DIS is DoD's law enforcement, personnel investigative, and industrial security arm. DIS also provides industrial security services to over twenty Federal civilian agencies.

DIS Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1989</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
		<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Civilian	4,080	4,250	4,038

The decline in DIS's manpower between FY 1990 and FY 1991 reflects implementation of the DMR initiative aimed at achieving a 5 percent reduction in Defense Agency operating costs in FY 1991. Specifically, the reduction is predicated upon efficiencies resulting from streamlining industrial security and personnel investigative processes and continuation of management information and automation enhancements.

6. Defense Legal Services Agency (DLSA)

DLSA provides centralized legal advice, services, and support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and to the Defense Agencies and related organizations.

DLA Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Military	9	9	9
Officer	(1)	(1)	(1)
Enlisted	(8)	(8)	(8)
Civilian	<u>79</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>86</u>
Total	<u>88</u>	<u>95</u>	<u>95</u>

7. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)

DLA provides common support supplies and worldwide logistic services across DoD and to other federal agencies and authorized foreign governments. Supply management responsibilities include clothing, subsistence, medical goods, industrial and construction material, general and electronic supplies, and petroleum products. Logistic services include contract administration, surplus personal property reutilization and disposal, documentation services to the Research and Development (R&D) community, and operation of the Federal Cataloging System.

DLA Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Military	920	983	1,343
Officer	(755)	(806)	(1,134)
Enlisted	(165)	(177)	(209)
Civilian	<u>52,647</u>	<u>50,078</u>	<u>53,503</u>
Total	<u>53,567</u>	<u>51,061</u>	<u>54,846</u>

The net increase in DLA's manpower between FY 1990 and FY 1991 (3,785 end strength) results primarily from the DMR initiative to consolidate all of the Department's contract management functions within DLA offset by two other DMR initiatives aimed at achieving a 5 percent reduction in Defense Agency operating costs in FY 1991. DLA's offsetting reductions include efficiencies resulting from consolidating financial operations, regionalizing computer operations, discontinuing retail sales of DoD excess property, streamlining depot return procedures, and continuing to modernize/automate materials handling, warehousing/storage, and cataloging processes. In addition, approximately fifteen different OSD Management Support Activities, under the operational control of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), are being transferred to the Washington Headquarters Services field activity in FY 1991.

8. Defense Mapping Agency

DMA provides mapping, charting, and geodetic (MC&G) services in support of the Department's strategic and tactical military operations and weapon systems. DMA also compiles general aeronautical and marine navigation data.

DMA Manpower (End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Military	438	470	456
Officer	(187)	(207)	(201)
Enlisted	(251)	(263)	(255)
Civilian	<u>8,362</u>	<u>8,412</u>	<u>8,005</u>
Total	<u>8,800</u>	<u>8,882</u>	<u>8,461</u>

The decline in DMA's manpower between FY 1990 and FY 1991 reflects implementation of the DMR initiative aimed at achieving a 5 percent reduction in Defense Agency operating costs in FY 1991. Specifically, the reduction is predicated upon efficiencies resulting from streamlining DMA's management structure and production center and from consolidating various telecommunications, hardware and software maintenance functions.

9. Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)

DNA acts as the principal staff advisor on matters concerning nuclear weapons, acquisitions, effects on weapon systems and forces, land-based storage facilities, and arms control verification, compliance, development, testing, and evaluation.

DNA Manpower (End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Military	541	560	544
Officer	(339)	(361)	(351)
Enlisted	(202)	(199)	(193)
Civilian	<u>829</u>	<u>942</u>	<u>911</u>
Total	<u>1,370</u>	<u>1,502</u>	<u>1,455</u>

The decline in DNA's manpower between FY 1990 and FY 1991 reflects implementation of the DMR initiative aimed at achieving a 5 percent reduction in Defense Agency operating costs in FY 1991. Specifically, the reduction is predicated upon efficiencies resulting from organizational realignments and consolidations (i.e., Comptroller, Library, etc).

10. Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA)

DSAA is responsible for management of the DoD Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Programs.

DSAA Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Military	28	29	28
Officer	(25)	(25)	(24)
Enlisted	(3)	(4)	(4)
Civilian	<u>93</u>	<u>112</u>	<u>113</u>
Total	121	141	141

11. The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO)

SDIO was organized in FY 1984 as a research activity designed to eliminate the threat posed by nuclear ballistic missiles, and to increase the contribution of defense systems to U.S. and Allied security.

SDIO Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Military	130	164	159
Officer	(117)	(152)	(147)
Enlisted	(13)	(12)	(12)
Civilian	<u>114</u>	<u>186</u>	<u>191</u>
Total	244	350	350

12. On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA)

OSIA was created in 1988 as a result of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty signed by the President on December 8, 1987 and ratified by the Congress on June 1, 1988. OSIA is responsible for all on-site inspections in the Soviet Union, all escort duties for Soviet teams visiting the United States, and operation of the Portal Monitoring facility in the Soviet Union.

OSIA Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Military	133	152	151
Officer	(72)	(66)	(66)
Enlisted	(61)	(86)	(85)
Civilian	44	71	68
Total	<u>177</u>	<u>223</u>	<u>219</u>

The decline in OSIA's manpower between FY 1990 and FY 1991 reflects implementation of the DMR initiative aimed at achieving a 5 percent reduction in Defense Agency operating costs in FY 1991.

D. DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES:

DoD Field Activities perform designated DoD-wide services which are more limited in scope than those of a Defense Agency. Seven of these organizations currently exist, including the following:

1. Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) provides administrative support (including space management, budget and accounting, personnel, and security) to OSD and to various other DoD Components, as assigned.

WHS Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Military	134	131	178
Officer	(54)	(57)	(105)
Enlisted	(80)	(74)	(73)
Civilian	1,579	1,777	2,096
Total	<u>1,713</u>	<u>1,908</u>	<u>2,274</u>

The increase in WHS's manpower between FY 1990 and FY 1991 reflects a DMR recommendation aimed at streamlining OSD and the Defense Agencies. Specifically, the increase reflects the transfer from DLA of approximately fifteen different OSD Management Support Activities under the operational control of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel).

2. The American Forces Information Service (AFIS) is responsible for the DoD Armed Forces Information Program and the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service.

AFIS Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Military	52	68	66
Officer	(15)	(20)	(20)
Enlisted	(37)	(48)	(46)
Civilian	<u>147</u>	<u>165</u>	<u>167</u>
Total	199	233	233

3. The Office of the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (OCHAMPUS) administers civilian health and medical care programs for retirees, dependents, and survivors of active duty, retired, and decreased Service members. OCHAMPUS also administers a similar program for selected beneficiaries of the Veterans Administration.

OCHAMPUS Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Military	10	10	10
Officer	(8)	(8)	(8)
Enlisted	(2)	(2)	(2)
Civilian	<u>219</u>	<u>223</u>	<u>223</u>
Total	229	233	233

4. The Defense Medical Support Activity (DMSA) is responsible for all aspects of DoD information systems used to support military health care and medical facility construction projects.

DMSA Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Military	47	51	49
Officer	(45)	(47)	(47)
Enlisted	(2)	(4)	(2)
Civilian	<u>64</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>88</u>
Total	111	137	137

5. The Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) provides economic advice and assistance to communities significantly affected by major program changes such as base closures, contract cutbacks, reductions-in-force, or substantial Defense-oriented growth.

OEA Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Military	6	7	7
Officer	(4)	(5)	(5)
Enlisted	(2)	(2)	(2)
Civilian	<u>32</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>32</u>
Total	38	39	39

6. The Department of Defense Dependents Schools (DoDDS) administers and operates primary and secondary schools for the dependents of Defense personnel assigned overseas. DoDDS also operates a junior college in Panama.

DoDDS Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Civilian	13,451	14,200	14,224

The increase in DoDD's manpower between FY 1990 and FY 1991 reflects congressional adjustments resulting from the FY 1990 Appropriations Act.

7. The Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) administers the DoD technology security program, and is responsible for processing export license applications.

DTSA Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Military	51	62	61
Officer	(21)	(31)	(31)
Enlisted	(30)	(31)	(30)
Civilian	<u>73</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>98</u>
Total	124	158	159

E. INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (IG, DoD)

The Inspector General serves as an independent and objective official within the Department of Defense responsible for the prevention and detection of DoD fraud, waste and abuse.

DoD Inspector General Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Military	34	37	36
Officer	(34)	(37)	(36)
Enlisted	(---)	(---)	(---)
Civilian	<u>1,378</u>	<u>1,586</u>	<u>1,511</u>
Total	1,412	1,623	1,547

The decline in the IG's manpower between FY 1990 and FY 1991 reflects implementation of the DMR initiative aimed at achieving a 5 percent reduction in Defense Agency operating costs in FY 1991. Specifically, the reduction is predicated upon efficiencies resulting from consolidating certain administrative and management functions, more selective pursuit of investigative issues, and greater coordination overall in the conduct of audits.

F. UNIFORMED SERVICES UNIVERSITY OF THE HEALTH SCIENCES (USUHS)

The USUHS is a fully accredited four year School of Medicine whose primary mission is to select, educate, and train qualified applicants to become "military" physicians. The University is also authorized to grant appropriate advanced academic degrees in basic medical sciences and public health.

USUHS Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Military	829	945	913
Officer	(752)	(762)	(735)
Enlisted	(77)	(183)	(178)
Civilian	<u>805</u>	<u>810</u>	<u>841</u>
Total	1,634	1,755	1,754

G. US COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS (USCMA)

The Court serves as the supreme court of the United States system of military justice. It has jurisdiction over every court-martial case involving death, flag or general officers, dismissals, discharges, and confinement for a year or more.

USCMA Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Civilian	39	49	59

The increase in the Court's manpower between FY 1990 and FY 1991 represents two additional judges and their support staff (four attorneys and four administrative personnel) as authorized by Congress in Title 13, Sec. 1301 of P.L. 101-189. The congressional intent is to provide for stability in personnel levels and reduce the adverse impact of judicial turnover.

H. UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (USSOCOM)

The USSOCOM is a unified command with worldwide responsibilities to train, maintain, and provide Special Operations Forces in support of the contingency plans developed by the five regionally oriented unified commands. Beginning in FY 1991, USSOCOM is the only operational command within DoD directly responsible for determining its own force structure and requirements for unique material, equipment, and training. Such responsibility makes the Commander-in-Chief, SOCOM, also responsible for presenting, programming, budgeting, and defending the SOF program to Congress.

USSOCOM Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Military			25,030
Officer			(4,389)
Enlisted			(20,641)
Civilian			<u>2,402</u>
Total	<u>---</u>	<u>---</u>	<u>27,432</u>

In addition to the above active military and civilian components, SOCOM has also requested approximately 16,659 Selected Reserve and National Guard personnel strength for FY 1991.

III. PROGRAMMED MANPOWER BY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORY (DPPC)

The following tables portray military and civilian manpower of the Defense-related organizations by DPPC.

TABLE VII-1
DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

ACTIVE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1989</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
		<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)</u>			
<u>STRATEGIC</u>			
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	.1	.1	.1
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>			22.2
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>			
Intelligence	6.2	6.8	6.8
Centrally Managed Comm.	4.8	4.9	4.8
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>			
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>			
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	.2	.2	.2
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>	7.1	7.5	8.3
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	42.7	41.4	45.3
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HDQTRS</u>			
Support Commands	.2	.1	.2
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>			
Research and Development	.8	.9	.9
Geophysical Activities	8.4	8.4	10.3
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>			
Personnel Support	13.6	14.4	14.4
Individual Training	1.5	1.6	3.3

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)	ACTUAL	BUDGET	
	FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1991
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>			
Support Installations	10.2	9.0	8.8
Centralized Support Act'y	10.3	11.2	10.8
Headquarters Management	<u>2.6</u>	<u>2.7</u>	<u>3.2</u>
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE	108.7	109.2	139.6
INDIVIDUAL MOBIL. AUGMENTEES	.3	.4	.4

TABLE VII-2
DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

ACTIVE CIVILIAN MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)	ACTUAL FY 1989	BUDGET	
		FY 1990	FY 1991
<u>STRATEGIC</u>			
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces		.1	.1
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>			1.4
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>			
Intelligence	3.9	4.2	4.2
Centrally Managed Comm.	2.5	2.4	2.3
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>			
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>			
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	.2	.2	.2
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>	6.2	6.5	6.9
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	41.6	40.3	43.9
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HDQTRS</u>			
Support Commands	.1	.1	.1
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>			
Research and Development	.6	.6	.6
Geophysical Activities	8.2	8.2	8.0
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>			
Personnel Support	13.6	14.3	14.4
Individual Training	.7	.7	1.1

<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>			
Support installations	10.1	8.9	8.7
Centralized Support Act'y	10.2	11.1	10.6
Headquarters Management	<u>1.4</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.6</u>
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE	99.3	99.1	104.1

TABLE VII-3
DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)</u>	<u>ACTUAL FY 1989</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
		<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
<u>STRATEGIC</u>			
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	.1		
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>			20.8
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>			
Intelligence	2.3	2.6	2.6
Centrally Managed Comm.	2.3	2.5	2.5
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>			
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>			
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>			
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>	.9	1.0	1.4
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	1.1	1.1	1.4
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HDQTRS</u>			
Support Commands	.1		.1
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>			
Research and Development	.2	.3	.3
Geophysical Activities	.2	.2	2.3
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>			
Personnel Support	.8	.1	
Individual Training		.9	2.2

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)	ACTUAL		BUDGET	
	FY 1989		FY 1990	FY 1991
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>				
Support Installations	.1		.1	.1
Centralized Support Act'y	.1		.2	.2
Headquarters Management	<u>1.2</u>		<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.6</u>
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE	9.4		10.1	35.5
INDIVIDUAL MOBIL. AUGMENTEES	.3		.4	.4

TABLE VII-4
 DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

ACTIVE OFFICER MANPOWER
 (End Strength in Thousands)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)	ACTUAL FY 1989	BUDGET	
		FY 1990	FY 1991
<u>STRATEGIC</u>			
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces			3.3
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>			
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>			
Intelligence	1.4	1.6	1.6
Centrally Managed Comm.	.8	.9	.9
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>			
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>			
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>			
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>	.7	.7	1.1
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	.8	.9	1.2
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HDQTRS</u>			
Support Commands			
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>			
Research and Development	.1	.2	.1
Geophysical Activities	.2	.2	.7
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>			
Personnel Support			
Individual Training	.8	.8	1.0

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)	ACTUAL	BUD.	
	FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1991
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES			
Support Installations	.1	.1	.1
Centralized Support Act'y	.1	.1	.1
Headquarters Management	.9	.9	1.0
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE	5.9	6.4	11.1
INDIVIDUAL MOBIL. AUGMENTEES	.2	.3	.3

TABLE VII-5
DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

ACTIVE ENLISTED MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1989</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
		<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
<u>STRATEGIC</u>	.1		
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces			
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>		17.5	
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>			
Intelligence	.9	1.0	1.0
Centrally Managed Comm.	1.5	1.6	1.6
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>			
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>			
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>			
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>	.2	.3	.3
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	.3	.2	.2
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HDQTRS</u>			
Support Commands	.1		.1
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>			
Research and Development	.1	.1	.2
Geophysical Activities			1.6
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>			
Personnel Support		.1	
Individual Training		.1	1.2

<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>			
Support Installations			.1
Centralized Support Act'y			<u>.6</u>
Headquarters Management	<u>.3</u>	<u>.3</u>	
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE	3.5	3.7	24.4
INDIVIDUAL MOBIL. AUGMENTEES	.1	.1	.1

TABLE VII-6
 DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

SELECTED RESERVE MILITARY MANPOWER ^{1/}
 (End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)</u>	<u>ACTUAL FY 1989</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	
		<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>			3.3
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>			
<u>Headquarters Management</u>			<u>13.4</u>
<u>TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	<u>2/</u>	<u>2/</u>	<u>16.7</u>

1/Includes Selected Reserve and Guard personnel.

2/Included in the Military Department's force structures in FY 1989 and FY 1990

TABLE VII-7
 UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

SELECTED RESERVE OFFICER MANPOWER ^{1/}
 (End Strength in Thousands)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPFC)	ACTUAL FY 1989	BUDGET	
		FY 1990	FY 1991
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>			.6
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>			3.7
Headquarters Management			
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE	2/	2/	4.3

^{1/}Includes Selected Reserve and Guard personnel.

^{2/}Included in the Military Department's force structures in FY 1989 and FY 1990.

TABLE VII-8
DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

SELECTED RESERVE ENLISTED MANPOWER ^{1/}
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)</u>	<u>ACTUAL FY 1989</u>	<u>BUDGET FY 1990 FY 1991</u>
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>	—	2.7
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>	—	<u>9.7</u>
Headquarters Management	—	—
<u>TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	<u>2/</u>	<u>12.4</u>

^{1/}Includes Selected Reserve and Guard personnel.

^{2/}Included in the Military Department's force structures in FY 1989 and FY 1990.

CHAPTER VIII

COST OF MANPOWER

I. INTRODUCTION.

This chapter discusses the DoD manpower program from a fiscal perspective. Under the Congressional funding process, manpower costs are included in appropriations for many purposes. This chapter is a recapitulation of cost information from various DoD budget documents. It provides a concise statement of the Department's FY 1990 and FY 1991 cost of manpower.

The remainder of the chapter is organized into three sections.

Section II Summary costs and trends.

Section III Detailed Manpower Costs

- FY 1990

- FY 1991

Section IV Pay tables for military and civilian employees.

II. SUMMARY COSTS AND TRENDS. The table below (VIII-1) shows the aggregate trend of manpower costs as a proportion of total Defense outlays. This table shows dollar outlays in order to consistently present cost trends; it should be noted that the more detailed budget year data in Section III (Tables VIII-3 and VIII-4) shows obligational authority which is not precisely the same as the FY 1990 and FY 1991 outlays shown in Table VIII-1. Definitions of the summary costs categories are at the end of this section.

TABLE VIII-1
DEFENSE MANPOWER COST^a
(Outlays, \$ Billion)

	Actual										BUDGET		
	FY 74	FY-78	FY-80	FY-83	FY-85	FY-86	FY-87	FY-88	FY-89	FY 90	FY 91		
TOTAL DEFENSE	77.6	103.0	132.8	205.0	245.4	265.6	274.0	281.9	294.9	286.8	292.1		
<u>Direct Manpower Costs</u>													
<u>Military Personnel</u>													
Appropriations	22.1	25.1	33.3	41.0	60.3	63.1	63.8	67.6	71.6	66.4	69.5		
Military Retired Pay	5.1	9.2	13.7	15.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Appropriation Reserve and Guard	1.6	2.0	3.0	4.5	7.5	8.4	8.2	8.7	9.1	8.9	9.3		
Personnel Appropriations	14.1	18.9	22.3	27.8	31.4	32.2	34.1	36.1	37.5	39.5	41.4		
Civilian Costs	.7	1.1	1.6	2.1	2.6	2.8	2.9	3.0	3.2	3.3	3.4		
Family Housing Costs ^d													
Subtotal-Direct Costs	43.7	56.0	73.9	91.3	101.8	101.5	109.8	115.4	121.4	118.1	123.6		
Personnel Support Costs ^e	2.9	4.2	5.3	8.9	11.8	12.9	13.8	13.9	14.6	15.8	16.6		
TOTAL MANPOWER COSTS	46.6	60.2	79.1	100.2	113.6	119.4	122.8	129.3	136.0	133.9	140.2		
END STRENGTHS (000's)													
Active Military	2,161	2,061	2,040	2,123	2,151	2,169	2,174	2,138	2,130	2,076	2,039		
Selected Reserve	925	788	869	1,005	1,088	1,130	1,151	1,158	1,171	1,155	1,152		
Civilian Direct Hire	1,016	935	916	980	1,043	1,027	1,049	1,010	1,037	1,018	1,013		
Civilian Indirect Hire	94	81	75	84	87	85	85	80	80	83	82		
Total Civilians	1,110	1,016	991	1,064	1,130	1,112	1,133	1,090	1,117	1,101	1,096		
Retired Military	1,012	1,243	1,330	1,480	1,419	1,506	1,535	1,567	1,601	1,635	1,668		

NOTE: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

- a/ Data exclude civil functions, NSA, and special programs for disadvantaged youths.
- b/ For those already retired. Future retirement costs for current members were not reflected in the budget prior to 1985. After FY 1985, payments into the retirement fund are included in the military personnel appropriations.
- c/ The cost of civilians is budgeted under the functional appropriations--e.g., operations and maintenance, family housing, RDT&E.
- d/ Excludes civilian pay portion of family housing which is included under civilian costs.
- e/ Includes costs of individual training, medical support, recruiting and examining, overseas dependent education, half of base operating support, and other miscellaneous support costs. Excludes the pay of military and civilian personnel, since they are accounted for separately.
- f/ Includes National Guard and Reserve technicians who are also counted as civilian employees. Includes all people attending paid drills or receiving initial training. From 1980 on, the reserve data also included officers on statutory tours and other reservists on full-time duty for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the reserve forces.

TABLE VIII-2
PERCENTAGE PAY RAISES^{a/}

<u>FY</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>General Schedule</u>	<u>Wage Board</u>
74	4.8	4.8	10.2 ^{b/}
75	5.5	5.5	8.9
76	5.0	5.0	9.0
77	4.8	4.8	8.3
78	7.1	7.1	7.9
79	5.5	5.5	5.3
80	7.0	7.0	6.4
81	11.7	9.1	9.1
82	14.3 ^{c/}	4.8	4.8
83	4.0	4.0	4.0
84	4.0	3.5	3.5
85	4.0	3.5	3.5
86	3.0	0.0	0.0
87	3.0	3.0	3.0
88	2.0	2.0	2.0
89	4.1	4.1	4.1
90	3.6	3.6	3.6
91	3.5	3.5	3.5

a/ This table expresses percentage increases over the previous year's pay scale. General Schedule and Wage Board percents are for base salary only. The military figures are the overall average percentage increase in basic pay, basic allowance for quarters, and basic allowance for subsistence.

b/ Includes approximately 4 percent catch-up increase upon the release from economic controls effective the first pay period after April 30, 1974.

c/ Enlisted basic pay raises for FY 1982 ranged from 10 percent for pay grade E-1 to 17 percent for E-7 through E-9. All warrant officers and commissioned officers received a 14.3 percent increase.

Definition of Cost Categories

The manpower cost categories discussed in this section are described below:

1. Military Personnel Appropriations.

There is one appropriation for each Service which funds active component military pay, cash allowances, matching Social Security contributions (FICA), enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, permanent change of station travel expenses, the cost of feeding military people (subsistence-in-kind), the cost of individual clothing and retired pay accrual costs. Beginning in FY 1991, subsistence-in-kind costs will be funded in the Operation and Maintenance appropriation rather than the Military Personnel appropriation based on a realignment of funding responsibility reflective in the FY 1991 budget.

2. Military Retired Pay.

Prior to FY 1985, military retired pay was funded by the Military Retired Pay appropriation. This appropriation, managed by DoD, provided funds for the compensation of military personnel retired from previous service. Commencing in FY 1985, DoD implemented a new accrual accounting system for military retired pay. Under this concept, accrual costs are budgeted in the Military Personnel accounts (Active and Reserve Components) and subsequently transferred to a new Military Retirement Trust Fund. Retired pay is paid from the trust fund. Beginning in FY 1987, separate accrual calculations are made for members on active duty and members of the Ready reserve who serve in a part-time status. Unfunded liability for retired pay will be liquidated over a period of time to be determined by the DoD Retirement Board of Actuaries. This Board of Actuaries also determines an amortization schedule for the transfer of funds from the general fund of the Treasury to the new DoD Military Retirement Trust Fund. Retirement accrual costs are further reduced by the significant revision to the Military Retirement system in 1986 for new entrants on or after August 1, 1986. This revision reduced retirement benefits in comparison to the pre-existing system thereby reducing accrual costs.

3. Reserve and Guard Personnel Military Appropriations.

There is one appropriation for each of the six Reserve Components which funds inactive duty drills; active duty for training; ROTC; full-time guard members and reservists for organization, administration, training, maintenance and other logistical support; educational and bonus programs; training; the Health Professions Scholarship Program; and management and training of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

4. Civilian Costs.

Unlike military personnel costs, which are funded by specific appropriations, civilian costs are spread among several appropriations according to the function performed. Civilian costs include compensation for both direct and indirect hire employees. Also included are DoD contributions to retirement and to health and life insurance for civilian employees.

Nearly 90 percent of DoD civilian costs are paid from the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) appropriations or from industrially-funded activities largely financed by O&M funds. Much smaller percentages of civilian costs are paid from the RDT&E, Military Construction, and Family Housing appropriations.

5. Family Housing Costs.

These are costs incurred to lease, construct, and maintain family housing for military personnel. This category excludes funds to pay civilians who operate and maintain family housing since they are already included in other cost categories.

6. Personnel Support Costs.

Personnel Support Costs include individual training, medical support (including CHAMPUS), recruiting and examining, overseas dependent education, 50 percent of all Base Operating Support costs, and other miscellaneous personnel support. Direct personnel costs are not included in personnel support costs since they are already included in other cost categories.

III. DETAILED MANPOWER COSTS.

The costs in this section are derived from detailed budget exhibits submitted to Congress and, therefore, are stated as total obligational authority (TOA). Since these estimates are expressed as TOA, they will not agree with the cost data (outlays) provided in Section I of this chapter.

Tables VIII-3 and VIII-4 provide details of manpower costs by DoD Component. Key elements are indexed in the margin of these tables and defined at the end of this section.

TABLE VIII-3
FY 1990 MANPOWER COSTS BY COMPONENT
(In TOA - \$ M)

<u>INDEX</u>	<u>COST CATEGORIES</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>MARINE CORPS</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>DEFENSE AGENCIES</u>	<u>DOD WIDE</u>	<u>TOTAL DOD</u>	<u>INDEX</u>
	<u>MILITARY PERSONNEL APPROPRIATIONS</u>								
1	Basic Pay	12,288	9,323	2,894	10,115			34,637	1
2	Retired Pay Accrual	5,394	4,093	1,270	4,441			15,206	2
3	Basic Allowances - Quarters (BAQ)	1,535	1,363	365	1,394			4,657	3
4	Variable Housing Allowance (VHA)	214	489	132	256			1,092	4
5	Subsistence Allowance	1,361	1,007	329	1,103			3,800	5
	(In-Kind and Cash Allowance)								
6	Incentive Pays	129	263	24	285			701	6
7	Special Pays	391	812	103	222			1,528	7
8	Other Allowances	677	380	159	518			1,716	8
9	Separation Pays	174	144	38	107			320	9
10	FICA	1,132	859	272	943			3,339	10
11	PCS Travel	1,116	596	210	743			2,665	11
12	Cadets	36	40		37			130	12
13	Miscellaneous	79	40	17	35			156	13
	<u>SUBTOTAL</u>	24,526	19,409	5,813	20,199			69,947	
	Less Reimbursables	(144)	(119)	(19)	(172)			(454)	
	<u>TOTAL OBLIGATIONS</u>	24,382	19,290	5,794	20,027			69,493	
	<u>RESERVE AND GUARD PERSONNEL APPROPRIATIONS</u>								
14	Basic Pay	3,202	864	178	1,035			5,277	14
15	Retired Pay Accrual	700	234	36	202			1,172	15
16	Other Allowances & Benefits	1,119	313	61	333			1,828	16
17	Clothing	'98	27	11	23			159	17
18	Travel	329	134	28	127			618	18
	<u>TOTAL OBLIGATIONS</u>	5,746	1,572	314	1,720			9,054	

TABLE VIII-3 (Continued)

<u>INDEX</u>	<u>COST CATEGORIES</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u> ^a	<u>MARINE CORPS</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>DEFENSE AGENCIES</u>	<u>DOD WIDE</u>	<u>TOTAL DOD</u>	<u>INDEX</u>
19	Family Housing Appropriation (non-pay)	1,619	815		1,936	22	1	3,393	19
	<u>CIVILIAN COSTS</u> ^b								
20	Compensation	11,045	10,860		7,515	4,050	60	33,530	20
21	Benefits	1,872	1,915		1,378	811	8	5,984	21
	<u>TOTAL OBLIGATIONS</u>	<u>12,917</u>	<u>12,775</u>		<u>8,893</u>	<u>4,861</u>	<u>68</u>	<u>39,513</u>	
22	<u>PERSONNEL SUPPORT COSTS</u>	6,309	4,001	382	3,972	1,074	61	15,800	22
	<u>TOTAL MANPOWER COSTS</u>	49,347	37,572	6,262	34,696	5,957	130	133,964	

NOTE: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

a/ Navy civilian costs are Department of Navy totals including Marine Corps.
b/ Defense-wide totals include the costs of civilians employed under the Military Court of Appeals and Military Assistance accounts.

TABLE VIII-3b

FY 1990 ACTIVE COMPONENT PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION (PCS) COSTS
(\$ MILLIONS-TOA)

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>DoD</u>
Accession travel	121	73	28	42	262
Training travel	75	64	7	44	192
Operational travel	62	128	41	78	313
Rotational travel	662	205	87	425	1,371
Separation travel	147	83	40	107	379
Travel of Organized Units	18	25	3	5	52
Non-Temporary Storage	25	10	3	21	60
Temporary Lodging Expense	6	8	1	21	36
Total Obligations	<u>1,116</u>	<u>596</u>	<u>210</u>	<u>743</u>	<u>2,665</u>
Less Reimbursements	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>9</u>
Total Direct Obligations	<u>1,113</u>	<u>594</u>	<u>208</u>	<u>741</u>	<u>2,656</u>

TABLE VIII-3c

FY 1990 RESERVE COMPONENTS PAY COSTS
(\$ THOUSANDS-TOA)

	<u>Army</u>		<u>Navy Reserve</u>	<u>Marine Corps Reserve</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	
	<u>Reserve</u>	<u>National Guard</u>			<u>Reserve</u>	<u>National Guard</u>
Pay Group A	962	1,586	632	125	345	510
Pay Group B	29		1	10	61	
Pay Group F	157	149	46	57	17	24
Pay Group P	3	13	*	*	*	2
Mob Training	36		10	4	3	
School Training	120	191	15	10	46	64
Special Training	90	103	24	16	97	68
Admin & Spt	653	118	798	82	45	377
Education Benefits	12	87	10	4	10	12
Senior ROTC	50		17		17	
Junior ROTC	5		4	1	4	
Reserve Officer Cand			*			
BOBC	67					
HPSP	16		15		18	
Chaplain Candidates	1					
Plt Ldrs School				5		
Total	<u>2,201</u>	<u>3,247</u>	<u>1,572</u>	<u>314</u>	<u>663</u>	<u>1,058</u>

* less than \$500

Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

TABLE VIII-4
 FY 1991 MANPOWER COSTS BY COMPONENT
 (In TOA - \$ M)

INDEX	COST CATEGORIES	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE	DEFENSE AGENCIES	DOD WIDE	TOTAL DOD	INDEX
	<u>MILITARY PERSONNEL APPROPRIATIONS</u>								
1	Basic Pay	12,437	9,655	3,007	10,197			35,366	1
2	Retired Pay Accrual	5,373	4,169	1,299	4,405			15,276	2
3	Basic Allowances - Quarters (BAQ)	1,496	1,398	378	1,368			4,642	3
4	Variable Housing Allowance (VHA)	213	505	137	254			1,113	4
5	Subsistence Allowance (Cash Allowance)	1,004	707	235	995			2,941	5
6	Incentive Pays	136	268	24	289			717	6
7	Special Pays	382	816	107	235			1,540	7
8	Other Allowances	727	427	193	500			1,804	8
9	Separation Pays	202	149	40	103			323	9
10	FICA	1,110	861	269	910			3,260	10
11	PCS Travel	1,180	610	218	854			2,862	11
12	Cadets	37	42		38			134	12
13	Miscellaneous	98	39	17	34			169	13
	SUBTOTAL	24,395	19,646	5,924	20,182			70,147	
	Less Reimbursables	(99)	(283)	(5)	(135)			(522)	
	TOTAL OBLIGATIONS	24,296	19,363	5,919	20,047			69,625	
	<u>RESERVE AND GUARD PERSONNEL APPROPRIATIONS</u>								
14	Basic Pay	3,329	889	191	1071			5,479	14
15	Retired Pay Accrual	717	240	39	209			1,205	15
16	Other Allowances & Benefits	1,177	333	64	346			1,920	16
17	Clothing	115	28	13	23			179	17
18	Travel	358	135	29	125			647	18
	TOTAL OBLIGATIONS	5,696	1,625	336	1,773			9,430	

TABLE VIII-4 (Continued)

<u>INDEX</u>	<u>COST CATEGORIES</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY^a</u>	<u>MARINE CORPS</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>DEFENSE AGENCIES</u>	<u>DOD WIDE</u>	<u>TOTAL DOD</u>	<u>INDEX</u>
19	Family Housing Appropriation (non-pay)	1,617	881		1,954	21	1	3,474	19
	<u>CIVILIAN COSTS^b</u>								
20	Compensation	11,541	11,144		7,950	4,247	67	34,948	20
21	Benefits	1,951	2,062		1,527	864	10	6,414	21
	<u>TOTAL OBLIGATIONS</u>	<u>13,492</u>	<u>13,206</u>		<u>9,477</u>	<u>5,111</u>	<u>77</u>	<u>41,362</u>	
22	<u>PERSONNEL SUPPORT COSTS</u>	6,616	4,233	392	4,154	1,145	61	16,600	22
	<u>TOTAL MANPOWER COSTS</u>	51,610	39,237	6,625	36,343	6,277	139	140,231	

NOTE: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

a/ Navy civilian costs are Department of Navy totals including Marine Corps.

b/ Defense-wide totals include the costs of civilians employed under the Military Court of Appeals and Military Assistance accounts.

TABLE VIII-4b

FY 1991 ACTIVE COMPONENT PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION (PCS) COSTS
(\$ MILLIONS-TOA)

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>DoD</u>
Accession travel	122	67	29	46	259
Training travel	78	69	7	55	210
Operational travel	75	136	41	111	373
Rotational travel	706	211	92	500	1,514
Separation travel	140	83	43	96	350
Travel of Organized Units	26	25	1	4	57
Non-Temporary Storage	27	11	4	22	64
Temporary Lodging Expense	6	8	1	20	35
Total Obligations	1,180	610	218	854	2,862
Less Reimbursements	3	2	2	2	9
Total Direct Obligations	1,177	608	216	852	2,853

TABLE VIII-4c

FY 1991 RESERVE COMPONENTS PAY COSTS
(\$ THOUSANDS-TOA)

	<u>Army</u>		<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	
	<u>National</u>		<u>Reserve</u>	<u>Reserve</u>	<u>National</u>	
	<u>Reserve</u>	<u>Guard</u>			<u>Reserve</u>	<u>Guard</u>
Pay Group A	1,003	1,629	633	129	361	522
Pay Group B	32		1	10	62	
Pay Group F	166	149	51	64	15	25
Pay Group P	4	14		*		2
Mob Training	42		10	4	4	
School Training	141	210	15	10	48	60
Special Training	103	113	24	16	95	66
Admin & Spt	675	1156	844	92	48	403
Education Benefits	12	88	10	5	10	11
Senior ROTC	52		17		17	
Junior ROTC	5		4	1	4	
Reserve Officer Cand			*			
BOBC	83					
HPSP	17		16		20	
Chaplain Candidates	2					
Plt Ldrs School				5		
Total	2,337	3,359	1,625	336	684	1,089

* less than \$500

Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

Definition of Cost Categories
(by Index Number)

The manpower cost categories discussed in this section are described below (keyed to the index numbers in Tables VIII-3 and VIII-4).

1. Active Component Basic Pay is the only element of compensation received in cash by every active duty military member. The amount of basic pay a member receives is a function of pay grade and length of military service. For this reason, the total cost of basic pay is determined by the number of manyears distributed across grade and length of service.

2. Active Component Retired Pay Accrual provides the funds (accrual costs) necessary to fund the retired pay accrual provision contained in 10 USC Chapter 74. Under the accrual concept, each Service budgets for retired pay in the Military Personnel account and transfers funds on a monthly basis to the new Military Retirement Trust fund from which payments are made to retirees.

3. Active Component Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) is paid to military members who do not occupy government housing or when the government housing occupied is declared inadequate. There are two BAQ rates for each military grade: one for members without dependents and another for members with dependents. Members without dependents who are provided government quarters, or who are assigned to field or sea duty, receive a partial BAQ payment. BAQ costs are a function of overall strength, the grade and dependency status distribution of the force, and the numbers and condition of units of government housing.

4. Active Component Variable Housing Allowance (VHA) is paid to military members receiving BAQ who reside in areas of the United States (including Alaska and Hawaii) where housing costs exceed 80 percent of the national median housing cost or who are assigned overseas, but whose dependents reside in those areas qualifying for VHA. The cost of VHA is a function of the number of military members, by grade and dependency status, or their dependents, residing in the VHA qualifying areas.

5. Active Component Subsistence represents both the cost of food for military personnel eating in military messes and cash payments to military members in lieu of food (called Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS)). All officers receive BAS at the same rate enlisted members receive either "subsistence-in-kind" in military messes or BAS at one of three rates applicable to the following conditions: when on leave or authorized to mess separately, when a mess is not available, or when assigned to duty under emergency conditions where no US messing facilities are available.

6. Incentive Pay, Hazardous Duty, and Aviation Career Pay provide incentive for service in aviation and certain hazardous duties. Included are aviation career pays for rated and nonrated crew members, parachute jump pay, and demolition pay.

7. Special Pays include bonuses provided to certain medical and selected other occupations as further inducement for continued service. Also included in this category are Enlistment Bonuses, Overseas Extension Pay, Diving Duty/Hostile Fire, Foreign Language Proficiency Pay, Overseas Extension Pay, and Special Duty Assignment Pay. Special Duty Assignment Pay is authorized for enlisted personnel who have been assigned to demanding duties or duties requiring an unusual degree of responsibility. The Secretaries of the Military Departments designate the skill areas that meet these criteria.

8. Active Component Other Allowances include uniform allowances, overseas station allowances, and family separation allowances.

9. Separation Payments provide disability and non-disability Separation Pay, Terminal Leave Pay, Lump-sum Readjustment Pay, and Donations which may be given to enlisted members involuntarily discharged.

10. Active Component FICA Contributions are those payments made for Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (Social Security) by the Defense Department as the employer of military personnel. Payments are influenced by the levels of basic pay and the Social Security tax rates established by law.

11. Active Component PCS Travel is the cost of moving people and their households when they enter the Service, move for training, leave the Service, are reassigned to a new duty station, or are part of a unit movement to a new duty location. Tables VIII-3b and VIII-4b show detailed PCS costs by type and Service.

12. Cadet Pay and Allowances includes the pay and allowances of those cadets and midshipmen attending the Military Academy, the Naval Academy, the Air Force Academy, and Naval Aviation Cadets.

13. Miscellaneous Costs include death gratuities, unemployment compensation, survivor benefits, Montgomery GI Bill education (MGIB) benefit costs, adoptions expense reimbursement, and apprehension of deserters. Death gratuities are paid to beneficiaries of military personnel who die on active duty. Funds for apprehension of deserters cover the costs of finding and returning military deserters to military control. Unemployment compensation is for payment to eligible ex-service personnel. Survivor benefits provides funds for payment of benefits provided by the Veteran's Administration to spouses and children of deceased service members. MGIB costs reflect future costs for benefits budgeted on an accrual basis. Adoption expense costs reflect reimbursement of a military member for qualifying expenses.

14. Reserve Component Basic Pay includes drill pay, pay for periods of active duty for training of reserve component people, and the pay of reserve component full-time support personnel. Table VIII-4c and VIII-5c shows detailed pay costs by type and Service.

15. Reserve Component Retired Pay Accrual provides the funds (accrual costs) necessary to fund the retired pay accrual provision

contained in 10 U.S.C. 74, the FY 1984 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 98-94). Under the accrual concept, each Service budgets for retired pay in the Reserve and National Guard Personnel accounts and transfers funds on a monthly basis to the Military Retirement Trust Fund from which payments are made to retirees.

16. Reserve Component Allowances and Benefits include BAQ, subsistence, other allowances including special and incentive pays, and FICA payments; monthly student stipends (ROTC, Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarships, Branch Officers Basic Course, and Platoon Leader Class); Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB) educational benefits; disability and hospitalization benefits; death gratuities; administrative duty pay; adoption expense reimbursement; and management and training costs for the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

17. Reserve Component Clothing includes both cash allowances and in-kind clothing issued to recruits.

18. Reserve Component Travel includes the cost of travel and transportation of reserve component personnel.

19. Family Housing Appropriation (Non-Pay) funds leasing, construction, and maintenance of family housing for military personnel. The total appropriation includes funds for paying civilians, which are counted in this report under civilian costs. To avoid double counting, this civilian pay has been excluded from the Defense Family Housing cost category.

20. Civilian Salaries are the direct monetary compensation paid to civilian employees including basic pay, overtime, holiday, incentive, and special pays.

21. Civilian Benefits includes the government share of the DoD Civilian Health and Life Insurance programs, FICA, Retirement programs (Civil Service Retirement System and Federal Employees Retirement System), severance pay, disability compensation, and other such payments.

22. Personnel Support Costs include individual training, medical support (including CHAMPUS), recruiting and examining, overseas dependent education, 50 percent of all Base Operating Support costs, and other miscellaneous personnel support costs. Direct personnel costs are not included in this category since they are already included in other cost categories.

IV. CURRENT CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PAY RATES (As of January 1, 1990)

Active component military pay rates are shown in Table VIII-5. Table VIII-5a shows Regular Military Compensation (RMC) for active military personnel. RMC is the total of basic pay, quarters (BAQ) and subsistence (BAS) allowances, variable housing allowance (VHA), and the estimated value of the tax advantage which results because BAS, BAQ and VHA allowances are not taxed. Figures show the average cash and in-kind RMC for each pay grade and longevity step, assuming that the total housing allowance received by members living off post is the sum of BAQ plus VHA and the value of in-kind quarters is equivalent to the BAQ rate.

Pay per training weekend for military reserve personnel is shown in Table VIII-6. A training weekend is defined as 4 four-hour training periods. The annual pay for reserves is a function of the number of drills, which varies by individual according to his level of authorized participation.

Current civilian pay rates are shown in Tables VIII-7 (General Schedule), VIII-8 (Wage Board-Appropriated Fund), and VIII-9 (Wage Board-Non-appropriated Fund). Note that the Wage Board pay table entries are national averages. Each wage area has its own distinct pay table.

TABLE VIII-5

MILITARY BASIC PAY (MONTHLY)
EFFECTIVE 31 JANUARY 1990

YEARS OF SERVICE

PAY GRADE	2	3	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	26
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS													
O-10	5916.30	6124.50	6124.50	6124.50	6359.40	6359.40	6711.90	6711.90	7191.90	7191.90	7673.40	7673.40	8151.60
O-9	5243.40	5380.80	5495.40	5495.40	5635.20	5635.20	5869.20	5869.20	6359.40	6359.40	6711.90	6711.90	7191.90
O-8	4749.30	4891.50	5007.60	5007.60	5380.80	5380.80	5635.20	5635.20	5869.80	6124.50	6359.40	6516.00	6516.00
O-7	3946.20	4214.40	4214.40	4403.40	4403.40	4658.70	4658.70	4891.50	5380.80	5751.00	5751.00	5751.00	5751.00
O-6	2925.00	3213.60	3423.20	3423.20	3424.20	3424.20	3540.30	3540.30	4100.10	4309.50	4403.40	4658.70	5052.60
O-5	2339.10	2746.80	2936.70	2936.70	2936.70	3025.50	3188.10	3402.00	3656.70	3866.40	3983.40	4122.60	4122.60
O-4	1971.90	2401.20	2561.40	2608.80	2724.00	2909.70	3073.20	3213.60	3354.60	3447.30	3447.30	3447.30	3447.30
O-3	1832.40	2048.70	2190.30	2423.40	2630.40	2772.60	2909.70	2981.40	2981.40	2981.40	2981.40	2981.40	2981.40
O-2	1597.80	1745.10	2096.40	2212.20	2212.20	2212.20	2212.20	2212.20	2212.20	2212.20	2212.20	2212.20	2212.20
O-1	1387.20	1444.20	1745.10	1745.10	1745.10	1745.10	1745.10	1745.10	1745.10	1745.10	1745.10	1745.10	1745.10

COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WITH OVER 4 YEARS ACTIVE DUTY
AS AN ENLISTED MEMBER OR WARRANT OFFICER

O-3E	0.00	0.00	0.00	2539.20	2630.40	2772.60	2909.70	3025.50	3025.50	3025.50	3025.50	3025.50	3025.50
O-2E	0.00	0.00	0.00	2212.20	2282.10	2401.20	2493.00	2561.40	2561.40	2561.40	2561.40	2561.40	2561.40
O-1E	0.00	0.00	0.00	1864.20	1932.90	2002.80	2072.70	2166.90	2166.90	2166.90	2166.90	2166.90	2166.90
WARRANT OFFICERS													
W-4	1866.90	2002.80	2202.80	2141.70	2236.20	2330.10	2493.00	2608.80	2700.30	2772.60	2862.30	2958.00	3188.10
W-3	1696.80	1840.50	1840.50	1885.80	2023.80	2141.70	2212.20	2282.10	2350.20	2423.40	2517.60	2608.80	2700.30
W-2	1485.90	1607.70	1607.70	1745.10	1840.50	1910.40	1980.30	2048.70	2120.70	2190.30	2259.30	2350.20	2350.20
W-1	1238.10	1419.60	1419.60	1607.70	1677.00	1745.10	1817.10	1885.80	1956.30	2023.80	2096.40	2096.40	2096.40

TABLE VIII-5 (Continued)

PAY GRADE	2	3	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	26
ENLISTED MEMBERS													
E-9	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2171.70	2220.60	2271.00	2322.90	2374.80	2421.00	2796.00
E-8	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1821.30	1873.20	1922.70	1972.50	2024.70	2071.20	2122.20	2246.70	2496.90
E-7	1271.40	1372.50	1473.30	1523.40	1572.00	1622.40	1672.80	1748.70	1798.20	1848.30	1872.30	1998.00	2246.70
E-6	1094.10	1192.20	1294.80	1343.10	1391.70	1443.00	1517.40	1564.80	1615.50	1640.10	1640.10	1640.10	1640.10
E-5	960.00	1044.90	1143.30	1218.30	1268.10	1318.50	1366.80	1391.70	1391.70	1391.70	1391.70	1391.70	1391.70
E-4	895.50	945.60	1001.10	1078.80	1121.40	1121.40	1121.40	1121.40	1121.40	1121.40	1121.40	1121.40	1121.40
E-3	843.60	889.80	925.50	962.10	962.10	962.10	962.10	962.10	962.10	962.10	962.10	962.10	962.10
E-2	811.80	811.80	811.80	811.80	811.80	811.80	811.80	811.80	811.80	811.80	811.80	811.80	811.80
E-1>4	724.20	724.20	724.20	724.20	724.20	724.20	724.20	724.20	724.20	724.20	724.20	724.20	724.20
E-1<4	669.60	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
C/S	8994.60	M/S	3398.70										

NOTE--BASIC PAY IS LIMITED TO \$6,516.60
BY LEVEL OF THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE
OASD(FMSP)MMSP(C)

Note: No limitation uncaptable.

TABLE VIII-5 (Continued)

MONTHLY BAQ RATE BAQ90		BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR SUBSISTENCE	
PAY GRADE	SINGLE	MARRIED	CASH/IN KIND
0-10	635.40	781.80	
0-9	635.40	781.80	123.92/MONTH
0-8	635.40	781.80	
0-7	635.40	781.80	
0-6	582.90	704.40	
0-5	561.30	678.60	
0-4	520.20	598.50	
0-3	417.00	495.30	
0-2	330.90	422.70	
0-1	278.40	377.70	
0-3E	450.00	531.90	
0-2E	382.80	480.00	
0-1E	329.10	443.40	
W-4	469.50	529.50	
W-3	394.50	485.40	
W-2	350.10	446.40	
W-1	293.40	386.10	
E-9	385.50	508.20	
E-8	354.30	468.30	
E-7	302.40	435.30	
E-6	273.60	402.00	
E-5	352.30	361.50	
E-4	219.60	314.40	
E-3	215.70	292.50	
E-2	175.20	278.40	
E-1>4	155.70	278.40	
E-1<4	155.70	278.40	
OFFICERS			
ENLISTED MEMBERS			
E-1<4MONTHS			
ALL OTHER ENLISTED			
When on leave or authorized to mess separately:			
	5.46/DAY	5.91/DAY	
When rations in-kind are not available			
	6.16/DAY	6.67/DAY	
When assigned to duty under emergency conditions where no messing facilities of the United States are available:			
	8.17/DAY	8.84/DAY	
OASD(FM&P)(NM&PP)C			
1 JANUARY 1990 3.6%			
Service Academy Cadet Pay is \$543.90, effective on January 1, 1990, as per section 203(c)(1) of Title 37, United States Code.			

TABLE VIII-5a

REGULAR MILITARY COMPENSATION (RMC) - ACTIVE MILITARY PERSONNEL

CASH AND IN KIND PAY GRADE AVERAGES

YEARS OF SERVICE

PAY GRADE	2	3	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	26
UNDER													
C/S	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	93601.59
0-10	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	93499.18
0-9	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	94669.76	94665.41
0-8	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	85628.73	85665.70
0-7	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	85643.59	0.	85628.73	85665.70
0-6	0.	57703.79	54362.06	54362.06	0.	57131.41	56789.42	58230.04	65458.00	67930.15	69058.07	72121.58	76847.75
0-5	42338.89	47192.89	49535.68	49594.37	49876.20	49491.42	50798.41	53025.80	56019.19	59565.27	62372.10	63847.33	65562.55
0-4	46135.26	41291.04	43251.53	43254.10	43826.75	45273.47	47690.60	49891.02	51811.36	53772.81	0.	0.	0.
0-3	32314.28	35039.78	36745.31	39543.81	40933.29	42040.72	43800.02	45552.06	46486.94	0.	0.	0.	0.
0-2	27508.94	29439.19	34005.94	34851.65	35395.21	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.
0-1	23614.36	24297.29	28250.69	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.
0-3E	0.	0.	0.	40236.12	41645.41	42737.11	44519.39	46281.76	47810.79	0.	0.	0.	0.
0-2E	0.	0.	0.	36051.19	36476.46	37303.82	38736.76	39834.64	40656.02	0.	0.	0.	0.
0-1E	0.	0.	0.	29303.41	30919.92	31852.99	32801.91	33733.75	34888.12	0.	0.	0.	0.
ALL03	32314.28	35039.78	36745.31	39544.81	40935.03	42051.64	43843.03	45730.28	47503.45	0.	0.	0.	0.
ALL02	27508.94	29439.19	34005.95	34852.88	35429.75	37303.82	38736.76	39834.64	40656.02	0.	0.	0.	0.
ALL01	23614.36	24297.29	28250.69	29303.41	30919.92	31852.99	32801.91	33733.75	34888.12	0.	0.	0.	0.
ALL C024608.68	28464.05	33139.40	38340.17	40005.46	41657.95	44509.44	47827.83	49296.44	55677.04	58666.33	64505.88	68912.06	78249.10
WARRANT OFFICER													
W-4	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	41294.40	42185.37	43342.20	44248.80	45374.40	46633.94	49765.40
W-3	0.	0.	0.	0.	34207.15	35680.39	36540.31	37382.20	38196.78	39074.90	40208.06	41301.37	42416.93
W-2	0.	28531.29	29103.63	30209.39	31378.15	32226.03	33079.54	33916.39	34781.64	35617.39	36545.83	37538.66	0.
W-1	32034.05	25170.15	25175.71	26574.63	27410.28	28281.29	29114.39	30005.54	30845.80	31710.94	32525.50	33478.44	0.

TABLE VIII-5a (Continued)

REGULAR MILITARY COMPENSATION (RMC) - ACTIVE MILITARY PERSONNEL
CASH AND IN KIND PAY GRADE AVERAGES

PAY GRADE	YEARS OF SERVICE													26
	2	3	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22		
ALLW0	23034.05	25170.15	26575.00	28137.43	29053.63	30288.94	31306.84	32605.75	34480.19	36620.43	38756.50	40320.99	42428.15	47944.22
ALLOFF	24595.31	28405.26	33059.62	38164.62	39769.31	41291.24	43645.64	46350.21	48341.85	52759.49	56091.29	60212.89	65971.89	73922.81
ENLISTED MEMBERS														
M/S	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	51476.44
E-9	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	36359.61	38936.07	39244.29	39874.06	40426.63	41965.01	45050.32
E-8	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	33674.86	33659.48	34247.04	34879.05	35440.44	36052.75	37546.60	40548.87
E-7	0.	0.	0.	26413.10	28024.85	28627.22	29246.88	29859.13	30781.22	31382.60	31991.47	32282.92	33810.13	36803.57
E-6	2222.44	53424.53	23993.87	24640.51	25212.57	25783.94	26393.32	27280.30	27861.42	28483.94	28786.15	0.	0.	0.
E-5	19603.44	20639.55	21263.51	21848.47	22741.58	23334.52	23933.17	24501.37	24794.09	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.
E-4	17571.04	18200.53	18882.89	19812.68	20324.58	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.
E-3	16324.60	16889.68	17326.41	17774.07	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.
E-2	15217.45	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.
E-1>4	13751.36	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.
E-1<4	12884.20	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.
ALLENL	15341.59	17647.79	18968.21	20288.42	21915.01	24061.19	25347.62	27079.85	28251.15	30480.16	31331.02	34060.06	36997.00	42587.64
ALLDOD	15819.52	18775.02	20491.27	22246.16	24285.80	26976.23	28661.55	30619.05	34043.19	35636.75	38511.44	41795.69	48672.99	54507.99

TABLE VIII-6

RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD PERSONNEL PAY PER TRAINING WEEKEND

YEARS OF SERVICE

PAY GRADE	UNDER	YEARS OF SERVICE													
		2	3	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	26	
0-10	197.21	204.15	204.15	204.15	204.15	211.98	211.98	223.73	223.73	239.73	239.73	255.78	255.78	271.72	
0-9	174.78	179.36	183.18	183.18	183.18	187.84	187.84	195.66	195.66	211.98	211.98	223.73	223.73	239.73	
0-8	158.31	163.05	166.92	166.92	166.92	179.36	179.36	187.84	187.84	204.15	204.15	211.98	211.98	217.20	
0-7	131.54	140.48	140.48	140.48	140.48	146.78	155.29	155.29	161.01	179.36	191.70	191.70	191.70	191.70	
0-6	97.50	170.12	114.14	114.14	114.14	114.14	114.14	114.14	118.01	136.67	143.65	146.78	155.29	168.42	
0-5	77.97	91.56	97.89	97.89	97.89	97.89	100.85	106.27	113.40	121.89	128.88	132.78	137.42	137.42	
0-4	65.73	80.04	85.38	85.38	85.38	90.80	96.99	102.44	107.12	111.82	114.91	114.91	114.91	114.91	
0-3	61.08	68.29	73.01	80.78	84.64	87.68	92.42	96.99	99.38	99.38	99.38	99.38	99.38	99.38	
0-2	53.26	58.17	69.88	72.23	73.74	73.74	73.74	73.74	73.74	73.74	73.74	73.74	73.74	73.74	
0-1	46.24	48.14	58.17	58.17	58.17	58.17	58.17	58.17	58.17	58.17	58.17	58.17	58.17	58.17	

COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WITH OVER 4 YEARS ACTIVE DUTY AS AN ENLISTED MEMBER OR WARRANT OFFICER

0-3E	0.00	0.00	80.78	84.64	87.68	92.42	96.99	100.85	100.85	100.85	100.85	100.85	100.85	100.85
0-2E	0.00	0.00	72.23	73.74	76.07	80.04	83.10	85.38	85.38	85.38	85.38	85.38	85.38	85.38
0-1E	0.00	0.00	58.17	62.14	64.43	66.76	69.09	72.23	72.23	72.23	72.23	72.23	72.23	72.23
W-4	62.23	66.76	68.29	71.39	74.54	77.67	83.10	86.96	90.01	92.42	95.41	98.60	106.27	
W-3	56.56	61.35	62.14	62.86	67.46	71.39	73.74	76.07	78.34	80.78	83.92	86.96	90.01	
W-2	49.53	53.59	55.16	58.17	61.35	63.68	66.01	68.29	70.69	73.01	75.31	78.34	78.34	
W-1	41.27	47.32	51.27	53.59	55.90	58.17	60.57	62.86	65.21	67.46	69.88	69.88	69.88	

WARRANT OFFICERS

TABLE VIII-6 (Continued)

RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD PERSONNEL PAY PER TRAINING WEEKEND

YEARS OF SERVICE

PAY GRADE	YEARS OF SERVICE															
	2	3	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	26			
E-9	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	72.39	74.02	75.70	77.43	79.16	80.70	84.94	93.20	
E-8	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	60.71	62.44	64.09	65.75	67.49	69.04	70.74	72.41	74.89	74.89	83.23	
E-7	42.38	47.45	49.11	50.78	52.40	54.08	55.76	58.29	59.94	61.61	62.41	64.67	66.60	66.60	74.89	
E-6	36.47	41.40	43.16	44.17	46.39	48.10	50.58	52.16	53.85	54.67	54.67	54.67	54.67	54.67	54.67	
E-5	32.00	36.52	38.11	40.16	42.27	43.95	45.56	46.39	46.39	46.39	46.39	46.39	46.39	46.39	46.39	
E-4	29.85	33.37	35.96	37.38	37.38	37.38	37.38	37.38	37.38	37.38	37.38	37.38	37.38	37.38	37.38	
E-3	28.12	30.85	32.07	32.07	32.07	32.07	32.07	32.07	32.07	32.07	32.07	32.07	32.07	32.07	32.07	
E-2	27.06	27.06	27.06	27.06	27.06	27.06	27.06	27.06	27.06	27.06	27.06	27.06	27.06	27.06	27.06	
E-1>4	24.14	24.14	24.14	24.14	24.14	24.14	24.14	24.14	24.14	24.14	24.14	24.14	24.14	24.14	24.14	
E-1<4	22.32	22.32	22.32	22.32	22.32	22.32	22.32	22.32	22.32	22.32	22.32	22.32	22.32	22.32	22.32	

ENLISTED MEMBERS

NOTE--BASIC PAY IS LIMITED TO \$6,516.60
BY LEVEL V OF THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE
OASD(FM&P)M&PP(C)

TABLE VIII-7

ANNUAL GENERAL SCHEDULE (GS) PAY RATES

(AS OF JANUARY 1, 1990)

STEP	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS-1	\$10,581	\$10,935	\$11,286	\$11,637	\$11,990	\$12,197	\$12,544	\$12,893	\$12,910	\$13,232
2	11,897	12,180	12,574	12,910	13,053	13,437	13,821	14,205	14,589	14,973
3	12,982	13,415	13,848	14,281	14,714	15,147	15,580	16,013	16,446	16,879
4	14,573	15,059	15,545	16,031	16,517	17,006	17,489	17,975	18,461	18,947
5	16,305	16,849	17,393	17,937	18,481	19,025	19,569	20,113	20,657	21,201
6	18,174	18,780	19,386	19,992	20,598	21,204	21,810	22,416	23,022	23,628
7	20,195	20,868	21,541	22,214	22,887	23,560	24,233	24,906	25,579	26,252
8	22,367	23,113	23,859	24,605	25,351	26,097	26,843	27,589	28,335	29,081
9	24,705	25,529	26,353	27,177	28,001	28,825	29,649	30,473	31,297	32,121
10	27,206	28,113	29,020	29,927	30,834	31,741	32,648	33,555	34,462	35,369
11	29,891	30,887	31,883	32,879	33,875	34,871	35,867	36,863	37,859	38,855
12	35,825	37,019	38,213	39,407	40,601	41,795	42,989	44,183	45,377	46,571
13	42,601	44,021	45,441	46,861	48,281	49,701	51,121	52,541	53,961	55,381
14	50,342	52,020	53,369	55,376	57,054	58,732	60,410	62,088	63,766	65,444
15	59,216	61,190	63,164	65,138	67,112	69,086	71,060	73,034	75,008	76,982
16*	69,451	71,766	74,081	76,396	78,190	79,438*	81,708*	83,978*		
17*	79,762*	82,420*	85,078*	85,740*	85,500*					
18*	86,682*									

* The rate of basic pay payable to employees at these rates is limited to the rate for level V of the Executive Schedule, which would be \$78,200.

TABLE VIII-9

Regular Wage Schedules for U.S. Citizen Wage Employees in Foreign Areas (Nonappropriated Fund)

NA NL-NS GRADE	NA-RATES					NL-RATES					NS-RATES				
	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
1	3.95	4.12	4.29	4.45	4.62	4.36	4.53	4.71	4.90	5.08	5.30	5.52	5.74	5.96	6.18
2	4.36	4.54	4.72	4.90	5.08	4.79	4.99	5.19	5.39	5.59	5.69	5.93	6.17	6.40	6.64
3	4.77	4.97	5.17	5.37	5.57	5.25	5.47	5.69	5.91	6.13	6.11	6.36	6.61	6.87	7.12
4	5.16	5.38	5.60	5.81	6.03	5.68	5.92	6.16	6.39	6.63	6.50	6.77	7.04	7.31	7.58
5	5.55	5.78	6.01	6.24	6.47	6.05	6.31	6.58	6.83	7.11	6.86	7.15	7.44	7.73	8.02
6	5.92	6.17	6.42	6.66	6.91	6.50	6.77	7.04	7.29	7.57	7.21	7.52	7.82	8.13	8.43
7	6.27	6.55	6.81	7.07	7.34	6.90	7.20	7.50	7.78	8.08	7.59	7.93	8.26	8.58	8.90
8	6.66	6.95	7.22	7.51	7.78	7.34	7.66	7.96	8.27	8.58	8.00	8.32	8.66	8.98	9.32
9	7.06	7.35	7.64	7.94	8.23	7.77	8.09	8.41	8.74	9.06	8.46	8.82	1.17	9.53	9.88
10	7.43	7.74	8.05	8.36	8.67	8.17	8.51	8.85	9.19	9.53	8.92	9.29	9.66	10.03	10.40
11	7.80	8.13	8.46	8.78	9.11	8.58	8.94	9.34	9.66	10.01	9.37	9.76	10.15	10.54	10.93
12	8.18	8.52	8.86	9.20	9.54	9.00	9.37	9.74	10.12	10.49	9.81	10.22	10.63	11.04	11.45
13	8.55	8.91	9.27	9.62	9.98	9.41	9.80	10.19	10.58	10.98	10.26	10.69	11.12	11.55	11.97
14	8.93	9.30	9.67	10.04	10.42	9.82	10.23	10.64	11.05	11.46	10.71	11.15	11.61	12.05	12.50
15	9.30	9.69	10.08	10.47	10.85	10.23	10.66	11.09	11.51	11.94	11.16	11.63	12.10	12.56	13.03
										NS-16	11.63	12.11	12.59	13.08	13.56
										NS-17	12.10	12.60	13.10	13.61	14.11
										NS-18	12.56	13.08	13.60	14.13	14.65
										NS-19	12.54	13.08	13.60	14.13	14.64

Effective Date: First day of the first pay period which begins on or April 1, 1989.

Authority is granted under 5 CFR 532.229 to use step 5 as the hiring rate for Food Service Worker, NA-7400- at NAF activities in Giessen, Germany and Custodial Worker, NA 3566-1 at NAF activities in Berlin, Germany.

APPENDIX A

MANPOWER DATA STRUCTURE

I. Introduction

This appendix provides audit trails of changes to the DPPC structure that have been implemented since publication of the Defense Manpower Requirements Report for FY 1989.

II. Structure Changes

Activity transfers and other management actions result in a number of changes within the DPPC structure. These changes do not affect total manpower, but do represent corrections, refinements, and management actions that alter the manner of accounting for this manpower. The changes since the FY 1989 DMRR, by component, are included in the following table.

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM (DPPC)	TO (DPPC)	MILITARY			CIVILIAN		
			FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1991	FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1991
<u>ARMY</u>								
DEV/HUA TRF	THEATER FORCES	CEN MANAGED COMM	0	0	0	0	0	.1
DEV/HUA TRF	FORCE SPT TNG	CEN MANAGED COMM	0	0	0	0	0	.1
DEV/HUA TRF	CHBT INSTALLATIONS	SPT INSTALLATIONS	0	0	*	0	0	1.0
DEV/HUA TRF	CEN SPT ACTIVITIES	SPT INSTALLATIONS	0	0	0	0	0	*
DEV/HUA TRF	FORCE SPT TNG	THEATER FORCES	0	0	*	0	0	0
DEV/HUA TRF	CEN MANAGED COMM	INDIVIDUAL TNG	0	0	*	0	0	0
DEV/HUA TRF	CHBT INSTALLATIONS	SPT INSTALLATIONS	0	0	*	0	0	0
LOGISTICS	LOG SPT OPERATIONS	THEATER FORCES	0	*	*	0	0	0
SPT TO USUHS	INDIVIDUAL TNG	OSD DEF AGENCIES	0	*	*	0	0	0
TACTICAL SPT	DIVISION FORCES	CHBT INSTALLATIONS	0	0	0	0	.1	.1
LOGISTICS	SER SPT-SPT CHDS	LOG SPT OPERATIONS	0	0	0	0	*	*

ACTIVITY	AUDIT TRAIL (End Strength in Thousands)		MILITARY		CIVILIAN	
	FROM (DPPC)	TO (DPPC)	FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1989	FY 1990
ort to OSD	TNG & PERS - Personnel Support	OSD/Defense Agencies & Act	.1	*	.1	.1
ort to USUHS	TNG & PERS - Individual TNG	OSD/Defense Agencies & Act	.1	.1	.1	.
ical Communication Maint	Support Act-Support Instal	Combat Installations	*	*	*	*
ice Wide Support	Centralized Support Activities	OSD/Defense Agencies & Act	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4

s than 50

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>TO</u>		<u>MILITARY</u>		<u>CIVILIAN</u>	
	<u>FROM</u>		<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>
<u>INFANTRY</u>						
<u>ADAC</u>						
	Training and Personnel Personnel Support		.7	.7		
	Research and Development					.7

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	MILITARY		CIVILIAN	
			FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1989	FY 1990
port to OSIA	Support Activities Central Support Activities	Joint Activities Defense Agencies	*	*	*	*
port to DSPO	Support Activities Central Support Activities	Joint Activities Defense Agencies	*	*	*	*

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	MILITARY		CIVILIAN	
			FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1990	FY 1991
<u>AIR FORCE</u>						
F-117 Support	Tactical	Combat Installations		.7		.7
		Medical Support		*		*
ANG Base Communication	Combat Installations	Centrally Managed Commo		1.8		1.8

*less than 50

APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

- AC: Active Component
- AFR: Air Force Reserve of the Air Force
- ARF: Air Reserve Forces of the Air Force. Includes Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard.
- Authorized (Manpower): Synonymous with programmed manning.
- Authorized Strength Report: A Marine Corps term synonymous with programmed manning.
- Balanced Occupation: An occupation in which the inventory when compared to the programmed manning plus individuals (PMI) meets the following criteria: (See overage and shortage occupations also)
- | <u>Skills with PMI of</u> | <u>% of PMI filled</u> |
|---------------------------|------------------------|
| 500 or more people | > 95% and < 105% |
| 100-499 people | > 90% and < 110% |
| less than 100 people | > 85% and < 115% |
- Billet: A programmed manpower structure space that defines by grade and occupation a job to be performed which is associated with a specific unit or organization (see position).
- Borrowed Military Manpower (BMM): Military personnel assigned to tactical units who are actually employed in civilian positions in support activities. BMM usually occurs when civilian position requirements have been identified, but no civilian personnel are authorized due to budget or end strength ceiling constraints.
- Careerist: A service member with more than four years of completed Total Active Federal Military Service (TAFMS). (see First-Termer)
- Critical Occupation: An occupation in which the inventory is equal to or less than 85% of the desired population for the fiscal year.
- Distributable Billets: A Navy term synonymous with programmed manning.

End-Strength: Manpower strength as of the last day of the fiscal year. The term may be further defined in combination with other terms but always indicates manpower strength as of September 30th, e.g.,

Actual end strength: Prior fiscal year(s) personnel inventory.
Budgeted end strength: As contained in a Service or DoD budget.
Programmed end strength: As contained within the DoD Six Year Defense Plan.

First-Termer: An enlisted service member who has completed four years or less Total Active Federal Military Service (TAFMS). (see Careerist)

Force Structure: The numbers, size, and composition of the units that comprise our Defense forces; e.g., divisions, ships, air wings.

Force Structure Allowance: An Army term synonymous with active component programmed manning.

Force Structure Authorizations: An Air Force term synonymous with active component programmed manning.

Force Structure Deviation: A manpower accounting convention which allows Programmed Manning for the Programmed Force Structure and the Individuals accounts to be depicted within programmed and budgeted end strength. Force Structure Deviation appears as "Undistributed" in Active Component Defense Planning and Programming Category tables. Positive values indicate temporary overmanning; negative values indicate temporary undermanning projected for the last day of a fiscal year (DoD Handbook 7045.7-H and DoDI 1120.11).

Funded Peacetime Authorizations: An Air Force term synonymous with programmed manning.

Grade: The pay grade requirement of a billet or the pay grade possessed by a service member.

Individuals: Transients, trainees (includes Reserve Component training pipeline for the Reserve Component), patients, prisoners, holdees, cadets and students --

personnel not filling programmed manpower structure spaces. This "overhead" is required to maintain the programmed structure at one hundred percent of programmed manning.

Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA):

Individuals carried in the Selected Reserve programmed manning who fill Active Component billets upon mobilization. IMA billets are not included in Active Component Programmed Manpower Structure in the DMRR.

Inventory

Synonymous with Actual End Strength. The Actual personnel strength for a prior year.

Lateral Movement:

A reclassification action resulting in a change of a service member's primary occupation.

Manning Level:

Synonymous with programmed manning.

Occupation:

The specialty skill requirement of a billet, and the skill qualifications of personnel. Occupations are defined according to the following coding systems.

- Army: SSI (officer), MOS (Enlisted)
- Navy: NOBC (officer), Rating/NEC (enlisted)
- USAF: AFSC (officer & enlisted)
- USMC: MOS (officer & enlisted)

Occupational Field:

An aggregation of discrete occupations.

Operating Strength:

An Army personnel management term identifying the number of people (or projected strengths for future periods) in units. The term is synonymous with the following:

- Navy: distributable strength
- USAF: assigned strength
- USMC: chargeable strength

Overage Occupation:

An occupation in which the inventory when compared to the programmed manning plus individuals (PMI) meet the following criteria: (see balanced and shortage occupations also)

<u>Skills with PMI of</u>	<u>% of PMI filled</u>
500 or more people	> 105%
100-499 people	> 110%
less than 100 people	> 115%

Position:

Same as Billet above,

Programmed Force Structure:

The set of units and organizations that exists in the current year, and which is planned to exist in each future year of the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP).

Programmed Manpower Structure:

The aggregation of billets describing the full manning requirement for units and organizations in the programmed force structure. This does not include IMAs or Individuals.

Programmed Manning:

Those billets in the programmed manpower structure planned to be filled. The term "programmed manning" recognizes that 100% fill of the programmed manpower structure may not always be desirable or achievable within fiscal and manpower constraints. For the active components the term "programmed manning" is synonymous with:

- Army: Force Structure Allowance
- Navy: Distributable billets
- USAF: Force Structure Authorizations, and
Funded Peacetime Authorizations
- USMC: Authorized Strength Report

RC:

Reserve Component; the Air Force also uses the term Air Reserve Forces (ARF).

Required (Manpower):

Synonymous with programmed manpower structure.

Round out:

An Army term wherein Reserve Component units are assigned to Active Component divisions to make up the difference between the number of Active Component units required in a standard division configuration and the number of Active Component units actually assigned. These Reserve Component units are scheduled to deploy with the Active Component division, or as soon thereafter as possible.

Round Up:

An Army term wherein Reserve Component units are assigned to Active Component divisions to augment the division structure. These Reserve Component units are scheduled to deploy with Active Component divisions, or as soon thereafter as possible.

Shortage Occupation:

An occupation in which the inventory, when compared to Programmed Manning plus Individuals (PMI), meets the following criteria: (see balanced and overage occupations also)

<u>Skills with PMI of</u>	<u>% of PMI filled</u>
500 or more people	< 95%
100-499 people	< 90%
less than 100 people	< 85%

Skill: Same as occupation

Stability: Aggregate: The percentage of personnel who have remained in the Service continually for one year as of the date the statistics are calculated.

Unit: The percentage of personnel who have remained in the same unit continually for one year as of the date the statistics are calculated.

Staffing: The process of distributing personnel to fill programmed manning targets in accordance with assignment policies, tour length constraints, and projections of the trained operating strength population.

Training and Administration of Reserves (TARS): A Navy term referring to full-time manpower support to the Navy Reserve. This manpower is budgeted and accounted for within the Selected Reserve.

Training Pipeline: Reserve component military personnel in training status, including training/pay categories F, Q, U, P, and X.

Trained Strength in Units: The number of personnel in Selected Reserve unit(s) who have completed 12 weeks of basic military training (or its equivalent) and are eligible for deployment overseas, on land, when mobilized under proper authorities. Excludes personnel in non-deployable accounts. The reserve component manpower category functionally equivalent to active component programmed manning.

APPENDIX C

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORY DEFINITIONS

1. STRATEGIC. The DPPCs in the Strategic category consist of those nuclear offensive, defensive, and control and surveillance forces that have as their fundamental objective deterrence of and defense against nuclear attack upon the United States, our military forces and bases overseas, and our allies.

a. Offensive Strategic Forces. This category contains program elements for land-based ICBMs, sea-based SLBMs, ballistic missile submarines and supporting ships, long-range bombers and refueling tanker aircraft, strategic cruise missiles, and operational headquarters for these forces.

b. Defensive Strategic Forces. This category contains program elements for interceptor aircraft and anti-ballistic missile systems, including directly supporting communications, command, control, and surveillance and warning systems.

c. Strategic Control and Surveillance. This category contains program elements for the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS), airborne satellite and ballistic missile early warning and control systems, satellite and orbiting objects surveillance systems, and supporting radar and optical sensor systems.

2. TACTICAL/MOBILITY. The DPPCs in the Tactical/Mobility category consist of land forces (Army and Marine Corps), tactical air forces (Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps), naval forces (Navy), and mobility forces (Army, Air Force, and Navy). Special operations forces are imbedded in this DPPC.

a. Land Forces. This group consists of DPPCs for Army and Marine Corps comprising division forces and theater forces.

(1) Division Forces. This category contains program elements for Army and Marine divisions, nondivisional combat brigades/regiments, other nondivisional combat forces, and tactical support forces; and for Marine Corps combat and combat support units (including helicopter support units of the Marine Air Wings). Program elements for the procurement and stockpiling of Army and Marine war reserve materiel, for Army resources for the Joint Tactical Communications Program (TRITAC) are also included in this category.

(2) Theater Forces. This category contains Army program elements for theater-wide and specialized units, including separate infantry brigades stationed in Berlin and Panama; units in Europe that provide for supply, maintenance, and security control of nuclear ammunition support of NATO; theater surface-to-surface missile units; tactical surface-to-air missile units; theater heavy engineering battalions for support of other Services; theater psychological operations, civil affairs, and unconventional warfare units (Special operations forces); and their supporting supply, maintenance, and command and control units. Also included are similar reinforcing units in Army Forces Command.

b. Tactical Air Forces. This category contains program elements for Air Force, Navy, and Marine fighter, attack, reconnaissance, and special operations squadrons; direct support aircraft, armament and electronics maintenance units, and weapon system security units; multi-purpose aircraft carriers; air-launched tactical missile systems and ground launched cruise missiles; tactical air control systems; Fleet Marine Force direct support aircraft; and operational headquarters for these forces. Also included are program elements for Air Force command control facilities and systems in Europe and the Pacific, Air Force resources for the Joint Tactical Communications Program (TRITAC), war reserve materiel, and the Air Force Component of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.

c. Naval Forces. The DPPCs in the Naval Forces group include the Navy's anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and fleet air defense forces, amphibious forces, and supporting forces.

(1) Warships and Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) Forces. This category contains program elements for surface combatant ships (cruisers, battleships, destroyers, and frigates), fixed wing and helicopter ASW squadrons, attack submarines, mines and mine countermeasures, and tactically supporting forces. Also included are program elements for air-, sea-, and submarine-launched ordnance and missiles.

(2) Amphibious Forces. This category contains program elements for amphibious assault ships, supporting ships and tactical support units, coastal/river forces, Navy special warfare forces, the Navy component of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, explosive ordnance disposal forces, and inshore undersea warfare forces.

(3) Naval Support Forces. This category contains program elements for forward logistical supporting forces, carrier-on-board delivery squadrons, intermediate maintenance activities, fleet support ships, underway replenishment ships, construction forces, deep submergence systems, and fleet telecommunications. Also included are program elements for tactical intelligence, war reserve materiel, and the Navy component of the Joint Tactical Communications Program (TRITAC) program.

d. Mobility Forces. This category contains program elements for strategic, tactical, and administrative airlift; sealift, and land movement of passengers and cargo by both military and commercial carriers, including military cargo, tanker, and support ships; and the Defense Freight Railway Interchange Fleet. This category also contains program elements for tactical medical airlift squadrons, air and sea port terminal operations, traffic management, integral command and control systems, aerospace rescue and recovery, Air Force special mission forces, and the non-management headquarters activities within the Joint Deployment Agency.

3. COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE. This category contains program elements for the centrally managed communications and intelligence gathering activities.

a. Centrally Managed Communications. This category contains program elements for the long-haul Defense Communications Systems, the military Service's communications systems, satellite communications systems, communications security, communications engineering and installation activities, and the Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center. Excluded are program elements for base and command communications, intelligence communications, and communications systems dedicated to strategic, tactical, or WWMCCS missions, and management headquarters.

b. Intelligence. This category contains program elements for the centralized intelligence gathering and analytic agencies and activities of the Department of Defense, consisting of the Consolidated Cryptologic Program and the General Defense Intelligence Program, including intelligence communications.

4. COMBAT INSTALLATIONS. This category contains program elements for the operation and maintenance of installations of the strategic, tactical, airlift and sealift commands (Programs 1, 2, and 4), including supporting real property maintenance, base communications, installation audiovisual support, and air traffic control. Also included are resources for installation headquarters administration and installation operational, housekeeping, and service functions.

5. FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING. This category contains program elements for Air Force and Naval advanced flight training conducted by combat commands; Navy training conducted at sea and ashore in direct support of submarine, surface combatant, surveillance, and mine warfare forces; fleet level training at fleet training centers, submarine schools and anti-submarine warfare schools; and certain Army and Marine Corps unit and force-related training activities. Included are resources for fleet readiness squadrons, and Air Force combat crew training squadrons.

6. MEDICAL SUPPORT. This category contains program elements for medical care in DoD regional medical facilities, including medical centers and laboratories; and for medical care to qualified individuals in non-DoD facilities. This category also includes research and development program elements in support of medical research, medical equipment and systems, and health care in station hospitals and medical clinics.

7. JOINT ACTIVITIES. This category contains program elements for those source manpower billets which are outside of service control. They include manning requirements of such organization as the Joint Staff, and the like.

a. International Military Organizations. This category contains the program elements for the military Services' support of the headquarters of international military organizations. Example is NATO, United Nations Command (Korea), etc.

b. Unified Commands. This category contains the program elements for the military Services' support of the headquarters of the unified commands. Examples are: US European Command, US Pacific Command, etc.

c. Federal Support Activities. This category contains program elements for military and civilian DoD manpower assigned on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis to support other federal agencies.

d. Joint Staff. This category contains the program element codes for the staff of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

e. OSD/Defense Agencies/Activities. This category contains the program element codes for the Staffs of the Secretary of Defense and Defense Agencies and Activities.

8. CENTRAL LOGISTICS. This group includes DPPCs for centrally managed supply, procurement, maintenance, and logistics support activities.

a. Supply Operations. This category contains program elements for the operation of supply depots and centers, inventory control points, centralized procurement offices. It also includes resources for POL pipeline and storage operations and other resources specifically identified and measurable to centralized supply operation and corresponding reserve component program elements.

b. Maintenance Operations. This category contains elements for the centralized repair, modification, and overhaul of end items of equipment and their components conducted at depots, arsenals, reprocessing facilities and logistic centers.

c. Logistics Support Operations. This category contains program elements for centralized logistics activities, other than supply and maintenance.

9. SERVICE MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS. This category contains the program elements for the service combat and support commands.

a. Combat Commands. This category contains the program elements for the headquarters of the military Service combat commands, i.e., those in Major Defense Programs 1, 2, and 4. Examples are: US Army, Europe; US Navy, Pacific Fleet; Strategic Air Command; etc.

b. Support Commands. This category contains the program elements for the headquarters of military Service support commands, i.e., those in Major Defense Programs 3, 6, 7, 8, and 9.

10. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES. This category also includes program elements for major defense wide activities conducted under centralized OSD control.

a. Research and Development Activities. This category contains all research and development (Program 6) program elements, except those for weapons systems for which procurement is programmed during the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) projection and for program elements identifiable to a Support Activities DPPC such as Medical or Personnel Support. Also excluded are operational systems development and other program elements not in Program 6, but containing research and development resources.

b. Geophysical Activities. This category contains program elements for meteorological, topographic, oceanographic, and navigational activities, including the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, the Air Force and Navy weather services, navigational satellites, oceanography, and mapping, charting and geodesy activities.

11. TRAINING AND PERSONNEL.

a. Individual Training. This category contains the staff and faculty program elements for formal military and technical training and professional education of military personnel conducted under centralized control of Service training commands. Program elements include those for recruit training, officer acquisition training (including ROTC), general skill training, flight training, professional development education, health care individual training, and training support activities. This category also includes research and development program elements in support of new or improved training equipment, techniques, and technology.

b. Personnel Support. This category contains program elements for provision of varied services in support of personnel, including recruiting and examining, the overseas dependents education program, Section 6 schools, reception centers, disciplinary barracks, centrally-funded welfare and morale programs, the American Forces Information Program, civilian career training and intern programs, and the VEAP program. This category also includes research and development program elements for human factors and personnel development research.

12. SUPPORT ACTIVITIES. The DPPCs in the Support Activities category consist of the base operating support functions for support installations and centralized activities.

a. Support Installations. This category contains program elements for the operation and maintenance of installations of the auxiliary forces, research and development, logistics, training, and administrative commands (Programs 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9), including supporting real property maintenance, base communications, and installation audiovisual support. Also included in this category are all family housing activities. These program elements include resources for installation headquarters administration; installation operational, housekeeping, and service functions; and commissaries.

b. Centralized Support Activities. This category contains miscellaneous Service program elements that provide centralized support to multiple missions and functions that do not fit other DPPCs. Specifically included are non-management headquarters program elements for combat

developments, reserve readiness support, public affairs, personnel administration, audiovisual activities, claims, service-wide support, and other miscellaneous support.

13. INDIVIDUALS. The DPPCs in this group account for military personnel who are not considered force structure manpower. They are transients, patients, prisoners, holdees, students, trainees, and cadets/midshipmen.

a. Transients. This category contains only the Transient program element, which consists of active duty military personnel in travel, leave enroute, or temporary duty status (except for training) while on Permanent Change of Station orders.

b. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees. This category contains only the Personnel Holding Account program element that consists of active duty military personnel who are dropped from the assigned strength of an operational or training unit for reasons of medical, disciplinary, or pre-separation nonavailability.

c. Trainees, Students, and Cadets/Midshipmen. This category contains active service officer students, active enlisted students, active enlisted trainees, Service Academy Cadets/Midshipmen, active officer accession students, and the Reserve Components training pipeline personnel.

14. MISCELLANEOUS. This group consists of three DPPCs: Retired Pay, International Support Funds, and Undistributed. The Undistributed category includes the program element Forces Structure Deviation, which reflects the under or over manning of the force units (see the Defense Manpower Requirement Report for an explanation of accounting technique). International Support Funds include the program element for Defense support of the Olympic Games. The Retired Pay category contains only the one program element for Retired Pay.