

PARAMETERS

AD-A218 391



US ARMY
WAR COLLEGE
QUARTERLY

VOL. XX NO. 1

MARCH 1990

DIST
AP

In This Issue

Paul Wolfowitz on Regional Conflicts



Book Reviews

By Douglas Pike, Martin Van Creveld, Jacques Gansler,
Allan Millett, William Hauser . . .

90
02
00
27
5

- Liddell Hart and the Mearsheimer Critique:
A "Pupil's" Retrospective Jay Luvaas
- Barrier Defense in Europe: An Option for the 1990s? Wolfgang Schlör
- Abetting Democratic Revolution in the Third World Alexander P. Shine
- Theater Campaign Planning for NATO's Northern Region Guy C. Swan III
- Whither the Long Peace? Sterling J. Kernek
- Soviet Reform and the High-Technology Imperative Donald M. Snow
- NATO's Burden-Sharing Debate in the 1990s Robert C. White, Jr.
- View From the Fourth Estate: Operation Just Cause—Panama
Critique and Reply
A Military Score Sheet Edward N. Luttwak
Don't Underestimate the US Army Tom Donnelly

NOT TO PROMOTE WAR BUT TO PRESERVE PEACE

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Michael P. W. Stone, *Secretary of the Army*
Major General Paul G. Cerjan, *Commandant*

PARAMETERS

The Army's Senior Professional Journal

EDITORIAL STAFF

Colonel Lloyd J. Matthews, USA Ret.—*Editor*
Mr. Gregory N. Todd—*Assistant Editor*
Mrs. Phyllis M. Stouffer—*Editorial Assistant*

EDITORIAL BOARD

Colonel John E. Brown, *Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations*
Dr. Otto P. Chaney, Jr., *Corresponding Studies*
Colonel Michael H. Crutcher, *Center for Strategic Wargaming*
Colonel Ernest H. Dinkel, Jr., *Command, Leadership, and Management*
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas S. Dombrowsky, *National Security and Strategy*
Dr. Jay Luvaas, *National Security and Strategy*
Dr. Thomas-Durell Young, *Strategic Studies Institute*

Parameters is a journal of ideas, providing a forum for the expression of mature professional thought on the art and science of land warfare, national and international security affairs, military strategy, military leadership and management, military history, military ethics, and other topics of significant and current interest to the US Army and the Department of Defense. It serves as a vehicle for continuing the education, and thus the professional development, of War College graduates and other military officers and civilians concerned with military affairs.

This report includes the following topics

PARAMETERS

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE QUARTERLY

Vol. XX, No. 1

March 1990

Regional Conflicts: New Thinking, Old Policy	Paul Wolfowitz	2
Liddell Hart and the Mearsheimer Critique: A "Pupil's" Retrospective	Jay Luvaas	9
Barrier Defense in Europe: An Option for the 1990s?	Wolfgang Schlör	20
Abetting Democratic Revolution in the Third World	Alexander P. Shine	38
Theater Campaign Planning for NATO's Northern Region	Guy C. Swan III	48
Whither the Long Peace?	Sterling J. Kernek	64
Soviet Reform and the High-Technology Imperative	Donald M. Snow	76
NATO's Burden-Sharing Debate in the 1990s	Robert C. White, Jr.	88
View From the Fourth Estate: Operation Just Cause—Critique and Reply		
Just Cause—A Military Score Sheet	Edward N. Luttwak	100
Don't Underestimate the US Army	Tom Donnelly	101
Commentary & Reply		103
Book Reviews		115
Lest We Forget		inside back cover

Parameters (ISSN 0031-1723, USPS 413530) is an official US Army periodical, published quarterly by the US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 17013-5050. Telephone: (717) 245-4943, AUTOVON 242-4943.

The Secretary of the Army has determined that publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department. Use of funds for printing this publication was approved by the Secretary of the Army on 18 May 1989 in accordance with AR 25-30.

Views and opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

Subscriptions are available from the Superintendent of Documents, US GPO, Washington, D.C. 20402. Current annual cost is \$7.00 for domestic or APO addresses, \$8.75 for foreign addresses. Single copies are \$4.50 domestic, \$5.63 foreign. Make checks payable to the Superintendent of Documents. Credit card orders may be placed by calling GPO at (202) 783-3238 during business hours.

Second-class postage is paid at Carlisle, Pa., and additional entry offices. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to *Parameters*, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 17013-5050. Individuals who subscribe through GPO should send their address changes to GPO, not to the *Parameters* editorial office.

Unsolicited manuscripts are welcome; optimum length is 4000 words. Author Guide is available on request. *Parameters* is indexed in, among others, *ABC Pol Sci*, *Current Military Literature*, *PAIS Bulletin*, and *Book Review Index*. *Parameters* is available on microfilm and microfiche from University Microfilms, Inc. Unless copyrighted, articles may be reprinted; please credit the author and *Parameters*.

Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 70-612062.

Regional Conflicts: New Thinking, Old Policy

PAUL WOLFOWITZ

Regional conflicts remain one of the most important issues on the super-power agenda, a fact reinforced by President Bush in his discussions with Chairman Gorbachev at Malta in December of last year. Working toward solutions to regional problems of all types—political, economic, environmental, and military—will be critical to stability and the reduction of tension worldwide. This subject occupies as important a place on the East-West agenda as nuclear arms control. Indeed, the two subjects are intimately connected. Finding solutions to regional conflicts is an essential part of the all-important task of preventing nuclear war. The disturbing frequency with which small wars have become big wars in the past gives caution to us all. As President Bush has said:

The threats to peace that nations face may today be changing, but they've not vanished. In fact, in a number of regions around the world, a dangerous combination is now emerging—regimes armed with old and unappeasable animosities—and modern weapons of mass destruction. This development will raise the stakes whenever war breaks out. Regional conflict may well threaten world peace as never before.¹

This does not mean that regional conflicts should be settled by the dictate of the superpowers, nor is it to deny that the people with the greatest stake in the settlement of regional conflicts are the participants themselves. Indeed, solutions to regional conflicts will be viable only when they reflect the will and desires of the people who must live with those solutions.

But the existence of nuclear weapons makes it important for the whole world, and particularly for the United States and the Soviet Union, to work to prevent those small conflicts that can contain the seeds of larger ones. It is useful to recall in this connection that regional conflicts played a great

part in the development of the Cold War and, more recently, in the demise of detente and the downturn in our relationship in the mid-1970s. As Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security Advisor, noted, SALT II was buried in the sands of the Ogaden.² Whether it happened there or in the mountains of Afghanistan, in either case the basic point is the same: even more than the massive buildup of Soviet military power under Brezhnev, it was the use of that military power directly in Afghanistan and indirectly in support of military interventions by Soviet allies in Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia, El Salvador, and elsewhere that spelled the end of detente. To put US-Soviet relations on a more stable long-term basis, we need to find solutions to those problems and prevent new ones from developing.


We have seen dramatic progress in arms control between the superpowers and in human rights in the Soviet Union. We are hopeful—as are the Soviet people—that *perestroika* and *glasnost* will succeed in the long term. In the area of Soviet policy toward regional conflicts, there have also been some dramatic positive developments. However, I would be less than frank if I said that the United States government is satisfied with the situation it finds today in the Third World.

It is true that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, as well as Vietnamese troops from Cambodia and Cubans from Angola, offers real promise of a more cooperative approach to these problems. Moreover, we have seen much evidence of progressive "new thinking" on the issue of regional conflicts. Key Soviet officials are repudiating past adventures—like the invasion of Afghanistan—and raising serious questions about Soviet interests in the Third World and the utility of military power there. Other Soviet authors have contrasted their own social progress at home with the repressive policies being followed by some of their friends who proclaim a socialist orientation.

However, amidst all the new thinking in the Soviet Union, there's a lot of old policy on regional conflicts. Some of the same areas that were problems in the 1970s—Afghanistan in particular—remain significant sore points today. The Soviet Union and its allies continue to supply sophisticated military equipment in large quantities to countries like North Korea, Nicaragua, and Libya, which threaten their neighbors and support international terrorism.

Paul Wolfowitz is currently the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, having served previously in a number of government positions in the Departments of State and Defense and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Most recently, he was United States Ambassador to Indonesia and before that Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. This article was adapted from his remarks to the Fifth Annual Chautauqua Conference on US-Soviet Relations held at the University of Pittsburgh in November 1989.

March 1990



450
GPO

y Codes
nd / or
cial

3

A-1 24



White House Photo by David Valdez

The importance of regional issues was reinforced during the Malta Summit. Presidents Bush and Gorbachev are shown here in the conference room of the Soviet passenger liner *Maxim Gorky*, on 2 December 1989, along with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and US Secretary of State James A. Baker III.

In Afghanistan, Soviet military aid is pouring in to the Najibullah regime at the rate of more than \$250 million per month, dwarfing all the assistance received by the mujaheddin from all sources. New weapon systems—like the powerful SCUD missile—have been transferred to that regime in the largest airlift of arms and materiel in Soviet history. The whole world, including the United States, applauds Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's condemnation of the war and the secrecy of the decisionmaking process that brought it about; yet, at the same time, the details of this massive ongoing Soviet military assistance to Afghanistan remain unpublicized in the USSR. While the Foreign Minister criticizes the invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet military aid furthers the same objective of imposing an unwanted regime on the people of that country.

In Nicaragua, while we have been assured that direct Soviet military aid has stopped, East bloc and Cuban military aid continues at an annual rate of half a billion dollars per year, even though the United States has long since ceased its much smaller military aid to the resistance forces. In all, since 1980, Soviet bloc military aid to Nicaragua has totaled more than \$3 billion, permitting that country to become the most thoroughly militarized country in Central America.

While the military capability of the resistance is receding, Nicaragua maintains a military force much larger than the armies of all of the Central American democracies combined. Nicaragua continues its support for insurgents

in Honduras and El Salvador despite Daniel Ortega's promise to stop shipping arms to the FMLN. For example, on 18 October of last year, Honduran authorities captured a truckload of assault rifles, grenades, and explosives from Nicaragua that were destined for the Salvadoran guerrillas. President Ortega announced in early November that he was suspending the cease-fire, despite restraint by the United States and by Nicaragua's neighbors. In sum, the backing that Soviet bloc military assistance provides for Nicaraguan policy remains a serious impediment to peace and the just resolution of conflicts in the Western Hemisphere.

North Korea provides a less publicized but perhaps even more dangerous situation. North Korea has repeatedly demonstrated a flagrant disregard for commonly accepted norms of international behavior, while Soviet arms transfers continue to increase its considerable military capabilities. Recent arms deliveries have included advanced fighter aircraft and advanced surface-to-air missiles and radars. The range of these aircraft and missiles extends well south of Seoul, threatening both civilian airliners and US reconnaissance flights that monitor North Korean compliance with the armistice agreement signed 36 years ago. Soviet deliveries of less-sophisticated military equipment such as artillery, trucks, and armored personnel carriers over the last two decades have helped maintain North Korea's significant military advantage over the South and contributed to the continued tension on the peninsula. There are disturbing signs that North Korea may be in the process of developing a nuclear weapon capability, raising even more questions about the purpose of Soviet military support to this irresponsible government.

This pattern of behavior raises some fundamental questions about the extent to which "new thinking" truly guides the Soviet approach to regional conflicts. Does the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and other countries reflect Soviet recognition that the peoples of these countries are entitled to governments of their own choosing? Or does it simply reflect a decision to pursue the same ends by different, less costly, and less controversial means? Unfortunately, today the weight of evidence still appears to support the latter conclusion, which is all the more ironic at a time when the Soviet Union, with a boldness that has captured the world's imagination, is facing up to the need to bring greater openness and democracy into the political process at home.

The solution to many regional problems would benefit from a greater infusion of *glasnost*, if it is fair to interpret that term as implying outcomes that are based, as far as possible, on the desires of the peoples involved, expressed freely through open political processes. This is true for a couple of important reasons. It is true, first, because it is right. People should have a right to determine their own destinies, not to have them imposed by one superpower or another, or even by both acting in concert. Having been

involved in formulating US policy toward the Philippines during the last years of the Marcos regime, I can say that the commitment of the United States to democratic solutions runs deep. We have supported such outcomes, even at some risk, not only in the Philippines but elsewhere in Asia, in Latin America, and throughout the world.

A second reason we favor democratic outcomes is our belief that governments that enjoy true popular support are less likely, in the long run, to provide opportunities for outside military intervention. More specifically, governments that are genuinely open to popular criticism are less likely to engage in military aggression. It is no accident that two of the Soviet allies whose foreign behavior causes us the most concern—North Korea and Cuba—have perhaps the most unreconstructed Stalinist regimes in the world today and most decisively reject the ideas of *glasnost* and *perestroika*.

We believe that this contradiction between the new principles that the Soviet Union is applying at home and the old principles of the regimes it is supporting abroad can best be resolved through more open debate about foreign policy. For example, it will be a positive development if public scrutiny in the USSR of Soviet arms transfers and military assistance increases. As Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has noted:

The shortage of democratic culture, vestiges of an elitist awareness, has given rise to a certain "silent zone" around our nation's diplomatic center. The caste-like exclusiveness of some of its workers, false defensiveness and excessive secrecy, the complete absence of information about its inner life and the artificially implanted assumption of infallibility have contributed greatly during the years of stagnation to the alienating of people from foreign policy and foreign policy from the people.³

In all, we're still awaiting a new Soviet policy toward regional conflicts that fully complements its new thinking—a new policy that shows the same flexibility and good sense as recent Soviet arms control efforts, a new policy that is prepared to apply abroad the very principles the Soviet government has been pioneering at home.

We must act quickly and comprehensively. As Secretary of State Baker reminded us in his recent speech to the Foreign Policy Association:

With the spread of missiles and chemical weapons throughout volatile regions, conflicts in the Third World are likely to take on a more dangerous character. Regional conflicts are likely to be more difficult to contain, more likely to engulf more countries, and more susceptible to escalation.⁴

For stability and the sake of a more cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship, the superpowers must put the same emphasis and expend the

same energy on solving regional conflicts as they have on arms control. Thus, where do we go from here?

The first step in dealing with regional conflicts is for both the United States and the Soviet Union to recognize each other's common interest in the solution of these conflicts by peaceful means, as well as the basic principles on which we believe regional conflicts should be solved. For our part—as a maritime nation whose markets and resources are often found overseas—we believe that we have important and growing interests abroad. These interests include alliances with more than 40 nations and strong bonds with many others. Regional conflicts threaten these friends and allies and hold an unhealthy possibility for escalation.

The United States believes that regional conflicts should be resolved on the basis of self-determination, independence, and democracy. We believe that by promoting freedom and self-determination, we build what is ultimately the most secure foundation for peace as well. Ultimately, peace and freedom are inseparable.

We do not favor spheres-of-influence schemes that are often proposed by armchair strategists. Dividing the world into spheres of influence won't end superpower competition; the dividing line itself would become the crucial locus of contention. "Swapping" influence in one country for advantage in another is as illegitimate as it is impractical—and impossible. We think the Soviet Union would agree with us on that point.

Second, all industrialized nations should join together in taking precautions not to export materials or technologies that will facilitate the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or missile-delivered weapons. The proliferation of these weapons and technologies has already progressed to a dangerous level. By the year 2000 it is anticipated that more than a dozen Third World countries may be able to deploy nuclear weapons. Many more nations will have chemical weapons, like those used in the Iran-Iraq War, and a dozen developing nations will have a ballistic missile delivery capability. Together, the United States and the Soviet Union must work toward correcting or reducing the scope of this challenge to peace.

Finally, and perhaps most important, we have to realize that the superpowers are not the primary cause of regional conflicts. Such conflicts arise out of ethnic strife, historical animosities, poverty, famine, and uneven levels of political and economic development. Thus, the fundamental solutions to regional conflicts won't be found in armaments or even in arms control. To dampen regional conflicts, we must ultimately deal with their causes, primarily through efforts to promote economic and political development.

There is a broad range of actions that we can and do take to achieve those purposes. One is through bilateral and multilateral economic assistance to developing countries. The United States and its allies provide massive amounts

of such assistance, and we would welcome the Soviet Union's joining that effort. Even more important are the markets that the West provides for the new products of developing countries. We would hope, as Soviet economic restructuring proceeds, to see the Soviet Union play a greater role in this area as well.

Among our own contributions, however, two basic ideas are more important than any material aid we might extend. One is that the route to economic development lies not through government control of economic activity but through freeing the creative energies of individuals. The second idea is that democracy and openness are not obstacles to economic development—as was once commonly argued—but, to the contrary, are necessary for its full realization. Those countries that in the past gave up fundamental freedoms in the belief that they would develop faster most often ended up with neither freedom nor prosperity. When the government controls the economy and the government is not open to criticism, the economy does not work.

These two ideas are old and familiar ones to the Western democracies and they seem to be borne out by the experience of the newly developing countries. If I understand the terms correctly, the words *perestroika* and *glasnost* incorporate a Soviet recognition of these two fundamental truths. When, in the past, we suggested to developing countries that they can find useful lessons in our experience, we were often accused of ethnocentrism and parochialism. If today, in fact, the United States and the Soviet Union can agree in broad terms about what works, that is bound to have a positive effect on the rest of the world. There is a connection, for example, between the declining support for a violent Marxist revolution in the Philippines and the growing awareness in that country of the Soviet Union's abandonment of classical Marxism.

The future is fraught with difficult problems requiring increased US-Soviet cooperation on issues ranging from arms control to air pollution. To solve them, we must assure that the current improvement in superpower relations is never again buried in the quicksand of regional conflicts.

NOTES

1. President George Bush, "Outlines of a New World of Freedom," speech to the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 25 September 1989.

2. This refers to the fact that Cuban troops supported by Soviet equipment were fighting in Ethiopia in support of the Marxist government in early 1978, long before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 which ostensibly was the provocation that doomed Senate ratification of SALT II.

3. Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, speech to the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy, Moscow, 25 July 1989.

4. Secretary of State James A. Baker III, "Points of Mutual Advantage," speech before the Foreign Policy Association, New York, 16 October 1989.

Liddell Hart and the Mearsheimer Critique: A "Pupil's" Retrospective

JAY LUVAAS

A Review Essay on *Liddell Hart and the Weight of History*. By John J. Mearsheimer. 234 pages. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1988.

The thesis of this book is that Sir Basil Liddell Hart, the well-known military historian, critic, and theorist, manipulated both the record of his own errant views on the basic military questions of the 1930s and the testimonials of noted German generals of World War II. He did this, according to Mearsheimer, in order to resurrect a reputation lost when the defensive strategy he had advocated failed, and blitzkrieg—the quintessential embodiment of the offense—overwhelmed “the strength of the defensive in modern war.”

In some 200 provocative pages, Professor Mearsheimer argues that Liddell Hart failed to appreciate “the importance of deep strategic penetration” and in fact developed his “strategy of indirect approach” to provide “an alternative to blitzkrieg.” Only after World War II did he “resurrect” the indirect approach by identifying it with blitzkrieg.

Mearsheimer contends that in the years before World War II, Liddell Hart shrank from supporting a foreign policy “that relied on military force to confront the Third Reich,” and that later he distorted the historical record to make it appear he opposed, rather than supported, the political decisions “not to prepare” for the coming war. Mearsheimer portrays how Liddell Hart resurrected his “lost reputation” by maneuvering publishers and German generals Rommel and Guderian in order to claim them as successful students of his prewar theories.

The first issue—the origin of blitzkrieg—is easily dismissed. While Liddell Hart did not produce a distinct treatise on the subject, there is no doubt that even in the 1920s he and Major General J. F. C. Fuller both anticipated the basic role of armored forces in blitzkrieg (although Liddell Hart never developed his ideas as systematically as did Fuller in his *Lectures on F.S.R. III*¹). He did,

however, anticipate as early as 1925 that the tank could be “concentrated and used in . . . large masses . . . for a decisive blow against the Achilles’ heel of the enemy army, the communications and command centres.” As he developed his “strategy of indirect approach,” the role of armored forces became clear:

The land “punch” of the future will be delivered by fleets of tanks, their communications maintained by cross-country and air vehicles. . . . These . . . quick-hitting forces will advance by rapid bounds into the enemy country to strike at its vitals. . . . Speed, on land as in the air, will dominate the next war. . . . Surprise and manoeuvre will reign again.²

If in later years Liddell Hart inserted the word “deep” before early references to movements behind an opponent’s flanks or penetration of his lines by independent armored columns, this does not necessarily mean—as Mearns asserts—that Liddell Hart failed at the time to understand the importance of deep strategic penetration. In 1932 he wrote of mobile fighting units that “would manoeuvre widely to turn the enemy’s flanks and attack his lines of supply . . . [and] carry out a decisive manoeuvre against his rear.” Three years later he analyzed Civil War cavalry operations, concluding that in mobile raids “the nearer to the force that the cut is made, the more immediate the effect; the nearer to the base, the greater the effect.”³ His “strategy of indirect approach”—first articulated in 1927 and later expanded in his analysis of Sherman’s 1864-65 campaigns—was adaptable to armored warfare, and many of his ideas were successfully employed in the blitzkrieg of a later day.

In the judgment of Colonel Richard Swain, a trained historian, experienced soldier, and currently head of the Combat Studies Institute at the US Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth,

Liddell Hart drew his tactical and operational ideas together under the umbrella concept of the “indirect approach,” the unifying proposition that disruption must precede destruction . . . [and] continued to develop his perspective of mechanized warfare throughout the thirties. While . . . criticized for his arguments in favor of the policy of “Limited Liability” (minimal military support for France in case of a continental war) . . . his depiction of the then future war was surprisingly accurate at the tactical and operational level, and most consistent with what he had written prior to 1933 Liddell Hart’s tactical and operational views were generally congruent with the experience of the Second World War insofar as the conduct of operations was concerned.⁴

Many of Liddell Hart’s ideas are alive and well today. According to current US doctrine,

Offensive operations are characterized by aggressive initiative on the part of subordinate commanders, by rapid shifts in the main effort to take advantage of

opportunities, by momentum, and by the deepest, most rapid destruction of enemy defenses possible. The ideal attack should resemble what Liddell Hart called the "expanding torrent." It should move fast, follow reconnaissance units or successful probes through gaps in enemy defenses, and shift its strength quickly to widen penetrations and to reinforce its successes, thereby carrying the battle deep into the enemy rear.⁵

Virtually every book written by Liddell Hart after his *Sherman* (1929) promotes the indirect approach. It is true, as Professor Mearsheimer observes, that "there is hardly any discussion of tank warfare" in the *Sherman* book, but this begs the question: the book was a military biography, written at the request of an American publisher, based largely on primary sources, and in this volume—which is not true of some of his later writings—Liddell Hart blended history and theory so well that the latter does not dominate the former. Years ago, curious on this point, I reread *Sherman's Memoirs* and official correspondence to see if he had understood as clearly as Liddell Hart the use of the indirect approach, the "baited gambit," "alternative objectives," and "organized dispersion" in his later campaigns, for by that time I had learned that history and theory were easily confused. Too often history is made to support and illustrate preconceived theory, while preconceived theory in turn can provide the basis for imposing particular historical judgments and interpretations.

These tendencies are indeed true of many of Liddell Hart's later books, but not in this case—*Sherman's* own words made that clear. Liddell Hart himself later recalled that working on the *Sherman* book

not only helped to stimulate and enlarge my ideas . . . but was a most valuable part of my education in historical research. . . . The *Official Records* . . . provide . . . an unrestricted foundation for the study of a war, presenting the day-to-day and even hour-by-hour impressions and decisions of both sides. . . . It is possible to see what commanders were thinking and doing at the moment.⁶

Professor Mearsheimer claims that Liddell Hart's published views in the late 1930s "make him look like the proverbial general caught preparing for the last war." Wishing above all else to avoid a military commitment on the continent, he says, Liddell Hart was determined that Britain not repeat its World War I experience on the Western Front. But Liddell Hart offered no solution for

Dr. Jay Luvaas is Professor of Military History at the US Army War College. He is a graduate of Allegheny College (Pa.) and earned the M.A. and Ph.D. degrees at Duke University. Dr. Luvaas taught at Allegheny College from 1957 to 1982, and has been visiting professor of military history at the US Military Academy and at the US Army Military History Institute. Among his major works are: *The Military Legacy of the Civil War* (1959), *The Education of an Army* (1964), *Frederick the Great on the Art of War* (1966), and *Dear Miss Em: General Eichelberger's War in the Pacific* (1972).

the Czech problem or the Spanish Civil War, Mearsheimer continues, and increasingly he viewed the indirect approach as a way "to defeat a Continental foe without having to engage his armies." Liddell Hart, he concludes, "was quite wrong on the basic military questions of the 1930s," for he "simply could not bring himself to support the use of military force against Hitler."

There is no question that Liddell Hart's books and articles in the last years before the outbreak of war in 1939 are among his least convincing and most controversial. But if he stressed the "great and growing superiority" of the defense, he also insisted that the offense could still succeed "where the defender has no effective counter-weapons to nullify offensive instruments such as aircraft and tanks."⁷ The discriminating reader should have highlighted both points and then directed his thoughts to whichever seemed to apply to the situation at the time. Liddell Hart was wrong, of course, in a number of particulars, but this is true of many who make a living—as he did in the prewar years—analyzing current policies. We will probably not know for another generation which of the current commentators may be correct in the assessment of events now occurring on the other side of the Iron Curtain.

Rereading Liddell Hart's *Europe in Arms* (1937) and *The Defense of Britain* (1939), and bearing in mind his subsequent reactions to many crises during the Cold War, "the Captain who teaches generals" emerges, it must be admitted, almost as a pacifist, intrigued with the intellectual problems of the strategist but shrinking from that fatal step that could lead to war and a possible return to the conditions of 1914-18. The Berlin Wall was built the second summer I lived at Liddell Hart's residence in Medmenham, Buckinghamshire (known as States House), while engaged in research on a book of my own, and for several weeks it almost appeared—at least in Liddell Hart's "command post"—that this momentous event in 1961 might trigger World War III! Friends back home could not understand the tone of my letters, which reflected what Liddell Hart was saying and writing to numerous friends. "However desirable it may seem politically that the West should make a stand on their rights in Berlin," he reasoned,

strategically it is the worst possible case for a stand—even more fatuous than the British Guarantee to Poland in 1939. Would any sane man stake his life on a game of cards where the opponent held all the trumps, and the only possible alternative to losing every trick in turn would be to commit suicide? Yet the policy and contingency planning of the Western powers amount to nothing better than that! Khrushchev "holds the trumps."⁸

In his chapter titled "The Resurrection of a Lost Reputation," Professor Mearsheimer correctly takes the Captain to task for putting words in the mouths of German Generals and manipulating history to demonstrate that "the roots of the great German victory [in 1940] could be traced back to him." This he

accomplished by asking leading questions in his talks with German generals during their captivity after the war, and by coaxing General Heinz Guderian and the Rommel family into admitting that both of these successful practitioners of blitzkrieg had been familiar with his theories and could therefore be described as his "pupils." A similar quid pro quo "called for the Israelis to shower lavish praise on Liddell Hart and go out of their way to lend credence to the claim they were his disciples." Mearsheimer even attributes Liddell Hart's characteristic and generous efforts to befriend young scholars to a desire to "partially disarm" them. By thus rewriting history, tampering with German records, courting Israeli generals, and coopting young historians, Mearsheimer sums up, Liddell Hart did "very well for himself" and his tarnished reputation.

Professor Mearsheimer has raised some important issues and has demonstrated some neat detective work, but he makes no effort to understand the human dimension of his subject. The resulting portrait is a coarse chiaroscuro in black and white. Those familiar with the writings of Liddell Hart may have difficulty reconciling their impressions with some of the author's assertions. To pose as problematic, for example, the possibility that "widespread exposure" of Liddell Hart's theories could facilitate an opponent's adopting his tactics and using them "against the British army" is naive; to assign motives without evidence can be unfair and misleading; and grudgingly to concede only that Liddell Hart "basically understood the blitzkrieg" is silly. Professor Mearsheimer reminds us that the Liddell Hart case "points up the fragility of history and the importance of being alert." In some respects this is also true of his book.

As a historian who had the rare opportunity to spend considerable time at States House with Liddell Hart, my concern here is not to retouch Mearsheimer's stark portrait so much as to present it in more natural colors. I was working on a book about a group of English military writers (including Liddell Hart) who flourished during the period between Waterloo and the fall of France in 1940. Liddell Hart insisted that I stay at his house, where I enjoyed unlimited access to his vast personal files. He included me in conversation whenever distinguished guests visited—which was nearly every weekend—and he opened the door to many contacts in London. If I was being "used" I was not aware of it, although when he read proofs to a book I was about to publish he did insist that I insert the word "deep" before "strategic penetration" in a part characterizing some past writings of his own. I could not understand why the point seemed so important, and when I retorted that this was not the way it was worded in his analysis of the Mongol campaigns, he replied that it should have been obvious from the context that it was what he had meant. I conceded the point, but wondered at the time why he was being such a stickler about it.⁹ It makes some sense to me now, but I do not accept the notion that he was mounting a deliberate campaign. It was evident from his manner that he honestly believed it.

I recall, too, being initially disappointed when he offered to come along the first time that I went to London to meet Major General J. F. C. Fuller, his partner in the quest for mechanization. It did occur to me at the time that he might have an inhibiting effect on my questions to Fuller, especially as regards Liddell Hart's own theories and influence, but if this was his motive it was worth it to see the two interact. Liddell Hart seemed deferential to the general in a way I never saw again.

Two years later I did spend a day alone with Fuller and asked him many questions about Liddell Hart. He declared that he would never cross swords over issues where Liddell Hart had studied the material and had thought it out. He expressed high regard for him as a historian, and basically he agreed with his theories except for the emphasis upon the defensive *as such*. (Fuller preferred to think of the offensive and defensive as sword and shield—they complemented each other and should not be separated.) Liddell Hart was a good journalist, in Fuller's view, but he always wrote in the same style and would not tailor his manner of presentation to the audience, "especially low-brow audiences." Fuller also observed that the Captain was too much a captive of his own catch-phrases—which he contended had often contributed to a misunderstanding of what he meant—and that he was disliked by many senior officers because he could be overbearing, "bumptious," and



Jay Luvaas (center), then a graduate student at Duke University, is shown with Sir Basil and Lady Liddell Hart at Monticello, Virginia, in 1952.

critical of individual performance on maneuvers. When I asked which of the two—Fuller or Liddell Hart—had wielded the most influence, he responded that Liddell Hart had probably enjoyed wider influence on a greater range of subjects while his own influence “may perhaps have been stronger on some of the generals.” He said that while Liddell Hart’s views over the years had been “very sound,” at times he had overreacted to situations “because of poor health at the moment.” This might help to explain some of Liddell Hart’s views in the years immediately preceding World War II, when he apparently suffered from a heart attack, followed by a collapse from exhaustion.

Normally I spent two days each week in London, and at States House I rarely saw Liddell Hart long enough during the day to engage in conversation except for meals, afternoon tea, and occasionally when he wanted to read something to me or needed me to type after his secretary had gone back to her brood, worn out and sometimes out of sorts. He could be very demanding, and he had a systematic routine that no one could interrupt. Evenings we generally talked until his wife—a saint if ever there was one—appeared about midnight to plead, “Basil, you *really* must come to bed.”

There were many on his “distribution list,” so copies of a letter to one friend might be sent to a dozen others, each with a covering note. He would also float drafts of articles to friends, hoping to get their reaction. Living in the country, this was about the only way he could engage with other minds except on weekends, when he entertained a wide assortment of guests: Israeli generals, French military theorists, American scholars, Commonwealth soldiers, English intellectuals—the range of his interests and the variety of his friends were remarkable. One week it would be Rebecca West; another might bring Alec Guinness, interested in the mannerisms of T. E. Lawrence, whom he was playing on stage. Often it was the widow of a British armored general, the teenaged son of his wife’s friend or of some deceased German general, an American graduate student, and once even one of my undergraduates. To all he devoted the same courtly attention.

One visitor was Major General F. W. von Mellenthin, a former General Staff officer on Rommel’s staff in North Africa. Since Liddell Hart rarely if ever deviated from his established schedule, it was my responsibility to entertain the general for several hours, which provided the opportunity to inquire whether Rommel had in fact ever mentioned Liddell Hart in his presence. “Oh yes,” he assured me, “many times. He had a good opinion of his writings. That is why I have come from South Africa to meet him.” This of course does not make Rommel a *pupil*, except perhaps in the eyes—and books—of Liddell Hart. But Rommel was familiar with his theories, and there is no doubt that other serious military readers found many of his ideas worth thinking about. My conversations with other guests, especially the Israeli Brigadier General Yigal Allon and the French General André Beaufre, made this clear.

Liddell Hart had a simplistic notion of what constitutes "influence." Most of his books published in the last 40 years of his life carried a list of "Appreciations" by prominent statesmen and generals on the dust jacket attesting to his influence. When Liddell Hart met George S. Patton in 1944, shortly before the Third Army became operational, Patton related how he had once spent a leave studying the Atlanta campaign on the ground with Liddell Hart's *Sherman* "in hand." To the Captain this meant that Patton had been attracted to the Captain's own strategy of indirect approach, and we find on the dust jacket of *Defence of the West* (1950) Patton testifying in 1944 that he had been "nourished on your books for twenty years, and gained much from your ideas." But Patton may well have focused on Sherman's thoughts and reactions rather than his application of a strategy of indirect approach, for he subsequently wrote that the paramount value of studying military history was "to learn how human beings react when exposed to the danger of wounds or death, and how high-ranking individuals react when submitted to the onerous responsibility of conducting war or the preparation of war." He probably carried Liddell Hart's *Sherman* on this occasion because it was the best operational history of the campaign available. Liddell Hart impressed Patton as being "very well read but badly balanced."¹⁰

One day I found in his files a copy of one of General Douglas MacArthur's reports to the Secretary of War when he was Chief of Staff in the early 1930s. Liddell Hart had underlined numerous passages and marked in the margins which of his own works a specific idea or phrase had come from. It was an old file, so this had nothing to do with rebuilding a "badly stained reputation." To Liddell Hart these passages signified that MacArthur, who later demonstrated brilliant applications of the indirect approach in New Guinea and the Philippines, was familiar with his books. Certainly it suggests that the two were thinking along similar lines, with Liddell Hart—like many intelligent readers—underlining portions in the text that he happened to agree with. The passages could even have been the work of a staff officer desperate to find words to express his chief's thoughts, although it is difficult to think of MacArthur ever being at a loss for words.

Years ago I attended a banquet honoring the retirement of one of my graduate teachers, Duke University history professor William T. Laprade. A parade of former students testified to something memorable the professor had said or done in class, and finally "Lap" himself marched to the podium. In his experience, he reflected, there were two kinds of students—those who remembered him for some trick he had employed to keep them awake in class, and the occasional individual who seized some point or idea, tucked it away in the recesses of his mind, and let it grow and mature until it emerged as his own concept. He might never know or acknowledge the source of this idea, but the teacher understands and can take satisfaction in the pupil's growth.

Liddell Hart could never have settled for this second form of influence, the anonymous kind: he needed public recognition and acceptance. He was also temperamentally incapable of letting ideas make their own way in the marketplace. He refought World War I every time a new book on the subject appeared, and on occasion he even tried to discourage publication of some offending book. He opposed Richard Aldington's biography of T. E. Lawrence, for example, because he considered it unfair to Lawrence, a cherished friend and the subject of one of his most successful books. I do not recall why he urged Faber and Faber to reject Wintringham's *Story of Weapons and Tactics* in 1942, but it was probably because he did not want his publisher to promote a book in which Fuller was mentioned in the chapter on blitzkrieg and he was not. For Liddell Hart, who wrote for a living, was keenly aware not only of his place in history but of the need to market himself and his books, a point that we sometimes overlook.

Unlike Fuller, who professed not to worry about readers too dense to understand or appreciate what he had written, Liddell Hart insisted upon wholesale acceptance of his theories. He was almost incapable of admitting error. One night, when enjoying a brandy and some casual conversation before retiring, he inquired what I had found of interest in his files that day. I replied that there was one thing that I sought and had not yet found.

"And what's that?"

"The phrase 'I was wrong.'"

His rejoinder was predictable.

"You're quite wrong!"

Nor would he admit that some of his prewar ideas had gone astray in the operations in France and the Low Countries in 1940. When he wrote *The Defence of Britain* on the eve of the war he explained that "the situation was so delicate and the danger so imminent that it was vital to avoid saying anything which might have encouraged the Germans—who followed my writings closely—to attempt a stroke through the Ardennes!"¹¹

In conversation he might change his tone or his opinions, but once in print—never! My mentor at Duke University, Professor Theodore Ropp, spent several days at States House during the first summer I was there. The Captain had just completed a chapter for *The New Cambridge Modern History* titled "Armed Forces and the Art of War: 1830-70," and he asked Ropp to read the draft copy. Ropp questioned his treatment of the Prussian General Staff, which was outdated—a problem that may have reflected dependence upon his personal library. There followed a lively discussion, but the next morning the Captain fired off a revised version. Had Ropp made similar comments once the book was published, there would have been a protracted exchange of letters, for while the Captain grew increasingly critical of the generalship in World War I, when it came to defending a position once taken he displayed as much staying power as Sir Douglas Haig.

The Captain never liked to lose at *anything*—he was a fierce competitor. I once detected him surreptitiously keeping a ball in bounds with his foot while playing croquet—an “indirect approach” of sorts in a game that he used to play against tank generals with considerable skill. Every time he left States House for more than a day, he took with him all contracts with his publishers so that if any dispute should arise he would be prepared. His feelings about the First World War were so intense that he often became involved in protracted struggles with publishers, reviewers, and revisionists on problematic points. This tendency reflected not only his personal experiences but the obvious linkage between his historical writings and the strategy of indirect approach, for if his historical judgments came into question it might also imply that his theories were suspect as well. Throughout his life, Liddell Hart lived in the shadow of the Somme.

In seeking why armies since 1861 have often failed to heed the genuine lessons of history, I have come to believe that doctrine often inhibits the learning process. It can easily guide the search, provide assumptions, and shape the answers. A personal doctrine like the strategy of indirect approach can also act as blinders, and once Liddell Hart had worked out his theory he used it—like the Swiss military theorist Jomini a century before—as the basis for making judgments on past and present. War College graduates will understand Liddell Hart better if I label him a strong ESTJ on the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator—governed by logic, living according to a definite formula, analytical, often critical, given to compiling lists (including one of friends in public life whose wives were liabilities, assets, or neither), and convinced that one can apply and adapt past experience to current problems.¹² Each of the twelve pockets in the suit he wore every day had an assigned mission.

He had also an unusual capacity for friendship, and his many friends doubtless bristle at the claim that Liddell Hart used generous hospitality to “partially disarm young scholars.” He never refused a request for assistance; he placed his library—and so far as I know, his papers—at the disposal of anyone interested in history. He liked young people and, what’s more, he even took us seriously! I recall one occasion when he received, unsolicited, an undergraduate honors thesis on World War I from a senior at Princeton. He devoted the next three or four days to reading it, consulting his files and books, and then composing a critique of about a dozen single-spaced foolscap pages—which is more than the young man’s professor may have provided. Asked why he devoted so much time to this matter when he was desperately behind schedule on *The Tanks*, he rejoined: “My dear boy! I did it for you, didn’t I?” He was referring, of course, to the pains he had taken to critique my master’s thesis, which he had asked me to send him. I, too, had received a dozen foolscap pages of comments and corrections. Come to think of it, everybody got about a dozen foolscap pages of detailed corrections and

suggestions (all duly reflecting his theories, of course). I doubt, however, if many of us made uncomfortable changes.

The Captain felt an obligation to help scholars and he enjoyed his role as "the Sage of Medmenham." He also appreciated young people and the chance to help cultivate a budding intellect. Who else would write a ten-page letter to a stepdaughter explaining why her coming Confirmation would be one of the most significant events in her life—and this from the equivalent of an 18th-century rationalist! He may well have had it in the back of his mind that some of his young protégés would one day rush to his defense, but this is assuming a great deal. It assumes, for one thing, that he believed that he needed it!

I suspect that he was motivated largely by the same impulse that caused him, during World War II, to spend countless hours trying to help the army resolve cases where individuals had not found the right niche for their skills and personalities. He enjoyed helping others. The only occasion when he really lost patience with me was when I first visited Oxford in August 1961. It was toward the end of my stay, and I was practically out of funds. When I returned to States House, there was the usual accounting—my impressions (which, as a Cambridge man, he took pleasure in correcting), the bookstores I had visited, what busses I had taken, etc. When I confessed that I had been forced to hitchhike he became genuinely upset. "My dear boy," he protested, "how could you be so stupid? Why didn't you ask for money?" I gave him the only answer he could comprehend.

"To do that," I explained, "would have required a direct approach." He leaned back in his chair, took several puffs on his pipe, smiled triumphantly, and sputtered, "Quite! Quite. Yes quite."

That evening, at least, I thought of myself as his pupil.

NOTES

1. F.S.R. stands for Field Service Regulations.
2. Liddell Hart, *Paris or the Future of War* (London: Kegan Paul, Trubner and Co., 1925), p. 88.
3. Liddell Hart, *The British Way in Warfare* (London: Faber and Faber, 1932), p. 132; "Analysis of Cavalry Operations in the American Civil War, with Special Reference to Raids on Communications," in Jay Luvaas, *The Military Legacy of the Civil War: The European Inheritance* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 244.
4. Richard M. Swain, "B. H. Liddell Hart: Theorist for the 21st Century," *Advanced Operational Studies*, School for Advanced Military Studies, US Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 1986, pp. 124-25.
5. US Department of the Army, *Operations*, Field Manual 100-5 (Washington: GPO, 1986), p. 109.
6. *The Liddell Hart Memoirs*, 2 vols. (New York: Putnam, 1965-66), II, 168-69.
7. Liddell Hart, *The Defence of Britain* (New York: Random House, 1939), p. 105.
8. Memorandum, July 1961. Liddell Hart Archives.
9. The offending passage still stands in Luvaas, *The Military Legacy of the Civil War*, p. 223.
10. William T. Sherman, *From Atlanta to the Sea*, edited and introduced by B. H. Liddell Hart (London: Folio Society, 1961), pp. 15-16; Martin Blumenson, ed., *The Patton Papers, Vol. 2: 1940-45* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), pp. 463, 751.
11. Liddell Hart, "Comments on E. M. Earle, ed., *The Makers of Modern Strategy*, Chapter 15, 'Maginot and Liddell Hart,'" p. 6. Liddell Hart Archives.
12. Isabel Briggs Myers, *Introduction to Type* (3d ed.; Palo Alto, Calif.: Consulting Psychologists Press, 1985), p. 9.

Barrier Defense in Europe: An Option for the 1990s?

WOLFGANG SCHLÖR

Proposals for improving NATO's ability to defend itself by conventional means in central Europe frequently advocate an increase in antitank barriers as both an inexpensive and militarily effective option.¹ While German officials have repeatedly rejected this idea out of political considerations—and while such considerations have taken center stage with the recent political upheaval in Eastern Europe, including the rending of the Berlin Wall—many US defense experts regard the military usefulness of barriers as almost a truism.² Yet few published proposals go beyond a general endorsement of this option, occasionally supplemented by remarks on its political sensitivity.³

The main rationale for an increased use of barriers is military. However, barriers may also help NATO face the challenges posed by recent developments in conventional arms control, opened borders, shifts in public opinion, and demographic changes. Barriers are already part of NATO's defense plans, although under present arrangements NATO would lack both time and resources to implement them. Strengthening barrier options could contribute to NATO's conventional defense capability. Clearly, such a step would lead to political difficulties. Nevertheless, a number of recent trends have *strengthened* the constituency for barrier defenses, making it increasingly probable that NATO will place more reliance on them in the future.

The Military Need for Barriers

Although the threat may have been somewhat reduced by recent events, particularly by Soviet Secretary General Gorbachev's December 1988 announcement of unilateral troop reductions in Eastern Europe, one of the primary military concerns of Western analysts has been a short-warning, minimal-preparation ground attack by the Warsaw Pact that catches NATO off guard.⁴ While Soviet implementation of the announced troop cuts would

indeed deprive the Warsaw Pact of a standing-start option in central Europe,⁵ NATO still faces a number of problems in the areas of mobilization, deployment, and reinforcement. Furthermore, the alliance might not react to ambiguous warning out of fear of escalating an existing crisis.⁶

According to current NATO planning against a ground attack in central Europe, forward-deployed covering forces (together with those units that arrive first from their peacetime positions) would have to be stretched over the entire forward area until the rest of the assigned forces have arrived. Owing to peacetime maldeployment of some units and crowded roads, arrival might well be delayed. During this initial phase no coherent defensive line could be established, and breakthroughs would be very likely. In turn, these breakthroughs could result not only in early combat engagements of NATO units still on the move, but would also disrupt supply and communication lines and severely hinder NATO's ability to continue the mobilization process.

While previously prepared barriers would not permanently prevent a massive assault from breaking through—which most advocates concede—these structures would slow it down. Attacking troops would have to stop, clear mines, and bring forward earth-moving and bridging equipment. Depending on the type and depth of barrier, the delay could be measured in hours or in days.⁷ If obstacles are emplaced properly, both attacking tanks and engineer equipment would be trapped for an extended period within firing range of those NATO forces already in place, resulting in significantly increased attrition. Even if the effected delay is short, the time gained could be crucial for the critical transition period, providing time for the movement of the bulk of NATO units from peacetime garrisons to assigned forward deployment areas and the initial deployment phase. The need to gain time can only be accentuated by the mutual reduction of forward-deployed forces as promised by the Bush-Gorbachev summit of December 1989, since in the event of hostilities an increased proportion of US reinforcements would have to be deployed from Stateside.

A second argument in favor of barriers concerns the availability of operational reserves. In order to defend a given front, the defending side needs operational reserves to commit to troubled sectors or to exploit enemy vulnerabilities. The ratio of frontline troops to operational reserves, according to

Wolfgang Schlör holds a Diplom-Politologe and is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at the Freie Universität, Berlin. He held a Fellowship at Duke University during 1985-86 and was a visiting scholar at the MIT Center for International Studies from August 1988 to February 1989. The author served in the Signal Corps of the *Bundeswehr* in 1980-81 and later worked briefly as a research assistant with the US Congressional Research Service, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division.

NATO standards, should be roughly three to one. The minimum density of frontline troops—the force-to-space-ratio—on the other hand, is said to be 25 to 60 kilometers per US heavy division, depending on the terrain.⁸ Under current conditions, NATO would be very short on operational reserves, especially during the first weeks after mobilization.

Barriers could effectively address this problem. Frontline sectors that have been prepared with barriers could be covered by fewer and less heavily equipped troops, decreasing the necessary force-to-space ratio and releasing heavy mobile troops for use as operational reserves. One defense analyst estimates the cumulative effect of various barrier measures in the NATO Central Region to be two divisions' worth of force savings.⁹ This effect would be amplified if troops covering the obstacles are protected by hardened defensive positions.¹⁰

Factors Inhibiting Barriers

Despite these positive arguments, a broad constituency is opposed to barriers. The most popular argument against fixed defensive preparations in NATO's central region is not a military, but a political one: the symbolic impact of barriers in Germany. In this view, fortifications and trenches on the western side of the inter-German border would visibly (and psychologically) enhance the division of the country. Barriers would reinforce the notion that reunification is no longer possible. In view of the dramatic pace of recent political change in Europe, the construction of barriers would be criticized by many as a step backward. The political uproar that might follow installation of a barrier system, so the argument goes, could well be too costly for NATO or, in any case, costlier than the expected marginal advantage for NATO's defense.

This argument, while initially persuasive, might be more speculative than substantial. The division of Germany continues to be a very sensitive political issue. Nevertheless, public opinion on how barrier defenses affect the permanency of the German division has not been ascertained.¹¹ This is not surprising, since the concept of barrier defenses in the context of NATO's forward defense is a specialized military issue, attracting little public attention (despite a general increase of interest in defense matters in the aftermath of the INF deployment). Increased public interest in military affairs indeed led to a more active resistance against manifestations of military activity. Gorbachev and his dramatic arms-reduction announcements have created a markedly diminished threat perception.¹² Adding barriers to NATO's defense, as defensive and militarily useful as it might be, makes sense only if a certain degree of threat is perceived. Moreover, the environmental impact of the large-scale military presence in Germany generates concern. Nevertheless, resistance against barriers is likely weak compared to some other items on

NATO's agenda, notably the modernization of short-range nuclear missiles. In fact, barriers might be one of the few options left for NATO to improve its defense capability while upholding public support.

A second argument against barriers questions their effectiveness in modern warfare. France's Maginot Line in World War II is often evoked as the classic example of the limits of strategic barriers. While the Maginot Line's failure has taken on an almost mythlike quality, an increasing number of analysts argue that in fact it worked—that Germany bypassed it, and that France neglected to use its operational reserves properly. Later in the war, US and allied troops had serious and prolonged difficulties breaking through the same fortifications, combined with the West Wall on the other side of the border, when these fortifications were defended by German troops. Several accounts testify to the effectiveness of numerous other fixed defensive lines.¹³

However, the experience along the French-German border is not governing so far as the barrier issue in NATO is concerned. A strategic barrier of the scope of the Maginot Line would never receive serious consideration within NATO. Current proposals that do advocate such large systems, were they disseminated more broadly, would do a disservice to the cause of barriers. Claims that no single strategic barrier in recent history has worked, as well as assertions to the contrary, are therefore not really to the point. Unfortunately, such arguments often dominate the discussion.¹⁴

The lack of enthusiasm for barriers has to some extent infected even the military itself. Gregg F. Martin points to the low institutional prestige of combat engineers—the military branch responsible for the construction of barriers—within the Army. Their lack of bureaucratic clout makes it difficult to influence planning and funding priorities within the Army budget. A doctrinal preference both in the US and German armies for mobile, mechanized warfare also explains some of the skepticism among military officers toward fixed defensive preparations. This orientation has led combat engineers to prefer equipment that is best suited for counter-obstacle missions in concert with heavy armored formations rather than static defensive preparations.¹⁵

In addition, military officers often voice the concern that an extensive use of barriers would inhibit the flexibility of NATO's own troops. Fast movements for counterattacks or retreats to evade encirclement could become as difficult for the defender as for the attacker.¹⁶ This fear may be justified for some of the more comprehensive barrier proposals but not for such flexible options as scatterable and switchable mines and explosive pipes, which will be discussed below. While the services increasingly appreciate these devices, a doctrinal integration that takes advantage of their potential is still missing.

Some observers are worried that NATO may perceive a strategic barrier to be "too effective." France's defeat in World War II is sometimes attributed to the false sense of security generated by the existence of the

Maginot Line. The barrier prevented France from paying enough attention to other, equally important components of a barrier defense strategy, such as sufficient mobile reserves. This "Maginot Line syndrome," it is argued, would also affect NATO were it to construct a barrier system.

Overselling barrier defenses could indeed create similar complacency. Should the public come to believe that barriers are in fact an extremely cost-effective and reliable way to strengthen NATO's conventional defense, it might begin to question whether large expenses for other existing and planned defense programs are justified. From a parochial point of view, a dilemma exists: Public resistance to barriers can be overcome only by pointing out the utility and low cost of the concept, yet this argument can be misinterpreted as a strong case against many of the armed services' current favorite projects.

A handicap for barrier advocates is the difficulty of measuring the effectiveness of obstacles in combat. While historical accounts and anecdotal evidence testify to the potential of barriers, the interaction of multiple barriers and defensive positions as well as their delaying effect are difficult to quantify. Combat simulations either rely on subjective assumptions about the effects of barriers on delay rates or enemy-to-friendly loss ratios, or they fail to include possible reactions and countermeasures by the attacker.¹⁷ Problems in calculating the effects of obstacles thus tend to result in a certain bias against barrier arrangements in warfare computer models, whose outcomes often serve as the basis for defense planning.¹⁸ However, barrier simulation problems could likely be solved if more resources were devoted to such analysis.

Existing Barrier Defenses in NATO

The concept of barrier defenses is not new to NATO. Indeed, current NATO defense plans include the use of natural obstacles as well as artificial barrier preparations.

Forests, rivers, swamps, and mountainous areas near the inter-German border would serve as a barrier for advancing enemy tanks. In addition, the extensive urban sprawl would slow down an armored attack and provide numerous defensive positions. However, the effectiveness of natural obstacles is dependent on the seasons, the weather, and other transient factors, and can be relied on only to some measure.¹⁹ Moreover, significant areas do not feature natural or man-made obstacles.

All NATO combat units assigned for forward defense have barrier plans to implement after mobilization. As soon as they have reached their forward deployment areas, frontline units are supposed to begin construction of obstacles and fortifications, assisted by available combat engineer units. These activities are to continue as long as possible, i.e. until D-day and beyond. Thousands of roads, railways, and bridges in Germany have been built with prechambered demolition sites to prevent their use by advancing

enemy troops. NATO combat engineers are trained and equipped to emplace minefields in areas of expected attacks. The implementation of these barrier options—with the partial exception of charging prechambered demolition sites—will not start before a decision to mobilize.

Given a short-warning scenario, however, some experts are concerned that units will not have the time to prepare anything more than hasty defenses, should they be able to reach their forward deployment areas at all. Although advanced equipment is now being introduced, current mine-emplacement methods are time-consuming and manpower-intensive.²⁰ US Army engineer studies estimate that in order to reach the highest level of survivability for one heavy division, 21 engineer battalion-days of work on fortifications are needed.²¹ In addition, combat engineers are at a premium and have to be allocated for the preparation of both obstacles and shelters. Recent analysis of Warsaw Pact artillery capability suggests that more priority will have to be given to the construction of shelters, resulting in even less barrier preparation.²² Finally, US reliance on reserve components among combat support troops—including combat engineers—is very high. Sixty-seven percent of all US combat support units committed to NATO after mobilization would be drawn from the reserves, compared to 48 percent of combat units. Mobilization of these troops and their transport to the European theater will take several weeks.²³ All of this suggests that in the event of war, NATO's present plans for defensive preparations—however good they look on paper—will not be implemented.

Proposed Barrier Options

Over the course of the last few decades, several categories and specific types of barriers for NATO's central region have been proposed. To assess their political viability in Germany, let us consider their technical characteristics while addressing questions of obtrusiveness, land consumption, and the degree of peacetime preparation required.

Proposed obstacles include traditional measures, such as antitank ditches, dragon's teeth, and minefields, as well as walling of river or road embankments, forestation of open areas, planting of hedgerows, walled terracing of slopes, and adaptation of irrigation and recreation lakes. These types of barriers take considerable time to prepare and must be constructed in peacetime. Antitank ditches and certain concrete steps are easily recognizable as military construction, creating problems of obtrusiveness. Forestation and artificial lakes, while consuming considerable amounts of property, would allow recreational, ecological, and economic use of the areas. Modification of road and railway embankments would probably be obtrusive, although such modifications would not require additional land. More important, the construction would have to take place exclusively on publicly owned property, avoiding time-consuming and costly legal problems.

Partly in response to German domestic political concerns, recent proposals focus on more flexible, less visible, and less obtrusive options. New devices, which are already being procured and fielded in limited numbers, allow the rapid placement of scatterable antitank mines from aircraft, helicopters, multiple rocket launchers, tube artillery, and specialized mine-laying vehicles over wide areas, thus combining flexibility and surprise.²⁴ Even more significant from a tactical point of view is the development of switchable mines, permitting remote-controlled activation and deactivation of minefields after they have been emplaced. All of the scatterable mine types could be inserted rapidly, enabling NATO to withhold their deployment until the actual outbreak of hostilities.

While the military value of these systems is undoubtedly significant, their very flexibility underscores a feature that distinguishes peacetime fixed defensive preparations from other types of barriers. From a deterrence perspective, it may be desirable that the other side be aware of the presence of barriers so that it is deterred from initiating an attack in the first place.²⁵ In a crisis, where NATO would like to avoid measures that might escalate the risk of war, the mere act of emplacing minefields—as unprovocative as it might be—could be perceived as too risky.

Explosive pipes are offered as a compromise in this regard. Resulting from a US Army research program, this type of mine incited considerable



Too obtrusive to construct in West Germany today, but an effective wartime obstacle fifty years ago, these concrete dragon's teeth formed part of the Siegfried Line. This photo was taken near Lammersdorf, Germany, on 25 September 1944.

controversy in Germany upon its first disclosure during the fall of 1984.²⁶ The mine consists of long, flexible plastic pipes which are buried in the ground and stay empty in peacetime but can quickly be filled with an explosive slurry in the event of a crisis. Should an obstacle be needed at the location of the pipe, its detonation would create an antitank ditch that modern tanks cannot cross. If tensions should decrease before detonation, the explosive can simply be pumped out, leaving the pipe available for future contingencies. While this system would probably have to be installed in peacetime, it would be virtually invisible, and harmless when empty. The property would continue to be agriculturally productive, reducing military land consumption to a minimum. The location of the pipes would probably be known to the adversary, however, leaving open the possibility of the preparation of countermeasures, circumvention, and sabotage.²⁷ While the German government has expressed its unwillingness to contemplate a large-scale peacetime installation of the explosive pipes, the US Army has proceeded with the development of the concept and is scheduled to field it with engineer units in Europe beginning this year.²⁸

Barrier advocates point out that barriers have to be covered with direct-fire weapons in order to maximize their effect. For this purpose, but also for the defense of areas that are not protected by barriers, they recommend the construction of fortifications. These defensive positions are intended to enhance the survivability of direct-fire weapons. Some proposals include the prefabrication and storage of concrete shelters that could, on warning, be rapidly emplaced. While this concept would solve the problem of obtrusiveness and reduce the time needed for construction, it would probably not be sufficient to cope with a short-warning scenario. Depending on how effective these shelters are perceived by the other side, the delay between the decision to mobilize and the emplacement of the shelters might even invite preemption.

Peacetime construction of fortifications alleviates this problem. Proposals range from elaborate "forts" equipped with high-tech weapons, to "strongholds" with trenches and bunkers, to simple two-person shelters. Some proposals include sizable peacetime detachments of personnel. All of these fortifications would be visible and obtrusive to some degree, while some of the more ambitious ones would be very much so. These types of proposals do evoke images of the infamous Maginot Line, and they can be considered generally unacceptable to the German government and public. Programs are under way now in Germany to modify selected farm buildings located in corridors of potential attack for use as military strongholds. The reinforced structures would be available for regular civilian use in peacetime.²⁹

Most of the individual obstacles and fortifications outlined above are also part of more comprehensive proposals for barrier defenses. Their scope

ranges from very complex systems that are intended to fully replace NATO's current force posture to supplemental measures to decrease NATO's vulnerability against a short-warning attack. The extent and intensity of land consumption varies considerably.³⁰ Some advocates, acknowledging the political-military tradeoffs involved, offer a spectrum of options, mostly recommending a compromise between military usefulness and political feasibility.³¹ Those few theorists who focus on *optimal* barrier defense, entailing great costs in terms of land, resources, and obtrusiveness, generally avoid the question of political feasibility altogether.³²

Besides fixed peacetime preparations and new developments in barrier technology, a significant increase of combat engineer troops in NATO could improve barrier capabilities. This measure would not solve the problems of a short warning, but it could help NATO implement its existing barrier plans. Improving engineer capabilities has the principal advantage of being unspectacular enough not to arouse public or political controversy. It could be presented as part of a routine NATO improvement program. Given a fixed ceiling for the overall force structure, however, manpower and other resources would probably have to be drawn from other branches. Hence, it might be necessary for the political leadership either to overcome resistance from within the military or to initiate a special program with extra funding.³³ The troop drawdowns promised by the recent conversations between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev perhaps will offer an opportunity to increase the proportion of combat engineers in the remaining force structure.

NATO procedures prohibit any mobilization orders from NATO authorities until the member states have agreed on a decision. However, NATO members could grant limited pre-authorization of engineer troop deployment. During a growing crisis, NATO's engineer units could then start to prepare obstacles and fortifications before an actual mobilization takes place. This certainly would appear less threatening than the dispatch of combat troops.³⁴ While this option could significantly reduce the problems associated with a surprise attack, the inherent political problems are likely to be prohibitive. NATO member states have traditionally been very reluctant to pre-delegate command authority. The current perceived lessening of tensions will make them even less willing to do so.

The financial cost of barrier improvements depends largely on the scope of the proposed system. Some analysts see considerable improvements for NATO's conventional defense with an outlay of less than \$100 million, while complex barrier systems might cost up to \$100 *billion* dollars, including land purchases.³⁵ The low-technology character of most barrier construction permits competitive, local contracting. Some of the barriers that are based on modification of road or rail embankments could even be installed virtually cost-free, over the course of regular civilian infrastructure construction.

Countermeasures and Side Effects

If NATO were to install a system of barrier defenses, the Warsaw Pact would most likely respond with countermeasures, though such a response is perhaps rendered less likely by the Soviets' recent declared intention to switch to a "defensive" doctrine and force structure. What any countermeasures would look like depends on the kind and scope of the barrier. While countermeasures affect NATO military planning, they could also have serious political consequences involving the countries bordering on the NATO Central Region.

If obstacles were placed only in the expected avenues of approach, a Warsaw Pact planner could simply switch the main thrust of an attack to a less well suited, but also less expected, area. However, these areas would then feature natural obstacles such as forests, steep slopes, or rivers that make them less convenient for tank movements and more advantageous for the defender.

The attacker could procure more specialized engineer equipment to cross or destroy obstacles. But such operations would still require considerable time to effect, and this equipment would be at least as vulnerable to defensive covering fire as the tanks attempting to cross the obstacle. The Pact forces also could assume a less tank-heavy posture that would be less vulnerable to antitank barriers, foregoing the option of a quick and massive breakthrough. From a NATO point of view, of course, this response is desirable. Indeed, this is precisely why the Soviets' declared conversion to a "defensive" stance is being cheered in the West.

An alternative to an armored attack is the use of airborne and airmobile troops, which could simply avoid a barrier system by flying over the front line and conducting operations in NATO's rear area. While such operations are already part of Soviet planning, it is doubtful that they could have a decisive effect in an armed conflict in central Europe without a simultaneous armored attack.³⁶

Intra-Alliance Issues

Aside from military considerations, a number of new intra-alliance issues would emerge with the advent of barriers. The most immediate would be the problem of financing. Existing barriers in Germany have been funded, constructed, and administered by the German army, more specifically the Territorial Army's *Wallmeister* organization. This arrangement was worked out between NATO force commanders and Germany under the Northern and Central Region Barrier Agreements.³⁷ A large-scale program, however, would require new, NATO-wide financing arrangements. A number of issues would have to be addressed, including the cost of land procurement, contract awarding policy, and how the overall cost would be fairly divided among the individual NATO countries.

The question of NATO participation becomes even more critical if the barrier system adopted involves routine peacetime staffing, perhaps by specialized troops that would be organized and trained for this purpose. One of the main rationales for NATO's "layer cake" scheme of wartime troop deployment along the inter-German border is political. This arrangement secures NATO commitment to the common defense of Germany by way of the immediate involvement of NATO troops. At least one of the barrier proposals, however, recommends that quickly mobilizable reserve units cover the barriers, while the bulk of active forces remains behind to serve as a mobile operational reserve. Despite the proponent's claims that "some active forces would remain to augment the fires of the mobilized reserves," the combination of quickly mobilizable reserves and deployment along the inter-German border obviously means that German reserves would bear the brunt of the attack. This arrangement in effect gives up the political advantages and deterrent effect of shared responsibility for the forward defense.³⁸

Decisions on the location of barriers also could prove divisive within the alliance. Germany understandably insists that forward defense begin directly at the inter-German border. On the other hand, allied commanders might feel that, out of operational considerations, the forward line of defense should be moved a few miles westward to more advantageous terrain. These details are not widely discussed within the alliance now, since they would materialize only with the outbreak of actual hostilities. Peacetime-emplaced barriers, however, are readily visible indications of where the forward line of defense would be located at the outset of a war. Tradeoffs between operational usefulness and political considerations could thus incite a new area of intra-alliance disagreement.

Another question would be how local barrier preparation relates to existing national corps sectors. Official NATO doctrine for ground forces constitutes only a very general framework, with differing national operational doctrines. A survey of these doctrines in the Central Region suggests that in virtually all cases, defensive preparations and barriers do play an important role. The northern Belgian, British, and Dutch sectors each emphasize variations of area defense, with strong emphasis on defensive positions. The German and US armies both plan a mobile defense, also using barriers and defensive positions as cornerstones.³⁹ While this review of doctrines points to a general agreement on the need for barriers, a uniform barrier system along the inter-German border could well result in compatibility problems with individual national doctrines. An area-defense oriented doctrine, for example, would require preparation of barriers in greater depth and density than a maneuver-oriented doctrine.

Assessments of NATO's conventional defense capabilities often are optimistic about the situation in US and German corps sectors, but paint a gloomy picture for the Dutch and Belgian sectors. These latter countries'

forces have a high mobilization and reinforcement dependency, and are strongly affected by defense budget constraints. If barrier funding, construction, and management were tied to respective national corps sectors and therefore handled on a national basis, problems of uneven quality could continue. Moreover, problem sectors resulting from underfunding in the barrier system would then be similar to those already existing among assigned troops, canceling out the advantages barriers are supposed to offer. In deciding on priority locations for barriers, however, the Belgian and Dutch corps sectors would be prime candidates. Extended mobilization time is one of the main rationales for barriers, and this is a much more serious problem in these two sectors than in the US and German sectors.

Developments Favoring Barrier Defenses

Recent developments in the conventional arms control area may impair the chances for increased use of barriers—or it may enhance them.

NATO's negotiating position in the current Vienna talks on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) is frequently criticized as having little to offer in exchange for reductions in Warsaw Pact forces. This lack of flexibility stems from the so-called force-to-space-ratio problem. According to this concept, the number of troops necessary to coherently defend a given area is not merely contingent on the strength of the opposing force, but is dependent as well on the size and geography of the defended area. NATO troops are purportedly stretched so thin in the Central Region that it would be dangerous to reduce them at all, even with disproportionate reductions on the Warsaw Pact side. An influential RAND study suggests that anything below a 5:1 or 6:1 reduction rate in favor of the West will actually worsen NATO's position.⁴⁰ NATO's initial CFE offer reflected these calculations, creating possible problems of negotiability and public credibility. Economies of force created by an increased use of barriers could significantly improve NATO's perceived bargaining leeway in the CFE talks by adjusting the ratio deemed necessary for NATO's safety.

As we have noted, a consensus is emerging that negotiations on conventional arms control should not aim simply at lower levels of manpower and equipment but rather focus on the establishment of less destabilizing and more defensive force postures. Steps toward such a posture would include primary reductions in those weapon systems that are most suitable for mobile offensive warfare—tanks, artillery, and river-crossing equipment—and a mutual restructuring of forces which removes possible advantages for an aggressor. Barriers are part of several of these kinds of arms control proposals that feature concepts for a such a modified force structure.⁴¹ Barriers could decrease the need for early mobilization and reduce the need for large mobile armored forces, while remaining unambiguously defensive.

Recent developments suggest that the Soviet Union has accepted the idea of barrier defenses. Soviet Defense Minister D. T. Yazov has announced plans to compensate for the unilateral cuts in Soviet armed forces by constructing permanent field fortifications in the western part of the Soviet Union as well as the conversion of motor rifle divisions into "machine gun/artillery divisions" to man these positions.⁴²

Force structure changes that are driven by demography rather than by developments in arms control also might make barrier defenses look more attractive to NATO governments. Declining birth rates have diminished the available pool of conscripts, especially in West Germany. Force planners are scrambling for ways to compensate for the short-term projected shortfall of conscripts for the West German armed forces, which is expected to be as high as 100,000 by 1994.⁴³ An extension of draft service will not be sufficient to close the gap and, moreover, seems to be politically unworkable under current circumstances. Force economies resulting from increased reliance on barriers might solve this problem. Depending on the role that reserves play as part of a barrier defense, this option has even greater potential. Already, German army restructuring efforts emphasize reserve as opposed to active elements.⁴⁴

The German Social Democratic Party (SPD) can be counted—at least implicitly—among the advocates of barrier defenses. In August 1986 the SPD adopted a new security policy platform oriented toward a more defensive force posture for the German army. A more recent SPD document, while refuting the idea of a Maginot-type line or "additional fortifications along the [inter-German and Czechoslovakian] borders," openly calls for "preparation of barriers, which can be activated in case of war . . . [and the] timely availability of earthworking machinery and explosives . . . for the reinforcement of natural obstacles and the creation of artificial ones" as part of defensively restructured land forces.⁴⁵ Even though a restructured alliance as envisaged by alternative defense advocates might not be wholeheartedly endorsed by all US advocates of barrier defenses, a common denominator—possibly a starting point for mustering public support—exists. It is not without irony, however, that some of the more prominent German alternative defense proposals would apply sophisticated technology to implement a barrier strategy.⁴⁶ This trend runs contrary to the low-tech, low-cost character of barriers when proposed as a supplement to NATO's current strategy and force posture.

US appeals to Germany to accept more peacetime preparation of barriers have long been unsuccessful. Now more serious pressure is building up. The rising costs of conventional weapon systems, concerns about military cost-effectiveness, and uneasiness about the consequences of the INF treaty for the military balance in central Europe have created a renewed interest in the idea of barrier defenses, particularly among members of the US Congress. Several have publicly voiced their impatience with German intransigence on

this issue. The Congressional Military Reform Caucus strongly endorses barriers.⁴⁷ It is conceivable that Congress might couple the question of barriers with the chronically divisive issue of burden sharing.⁴⁸ Congress could vote for a pull-out of US troops from Germany or demand German funding for the redeployment of US troops closer to the inter-German border if the German government fails to accept peacetime-installed barriers.

Yet, the burden-sharing lever is weakened by the fact that in recent years Germany has performed quite well in fulfilling its alliance obligations.⁴⁹ And it is Germany, after all, on whose territory barriers would be placed and whose government offers the most resistance. Also, increased visible pressure—and it can be assumed that any kind of significant pressure will become public sooner or later—might have a strongly negative effect on German public support for alliance matters. Finally, the degree of public resistance to new military construction in general—as opposed to the concept of barrier defenses in particular—should not be underestimated. The same dynamics that have led the West German government to cut NATO large-scale exercises by 50 percent, to reduce low-level training flights, and to reject extension of the conscription period to 18 months will also affect any decision on barrier defenses.⁵⁰ A unilateral decision by the German government in order to appease the US Congress will *not* be possible. NATO and its members will have to launch a campaign to explain the virtues of this concept to the public. A possible sweetener in this regard could be linking barrier construction with a significant reduction of training exercises in the affected areas.

Recommendations and Conclusions

Given the constraints outlined above, NATO will not easily gain acceptance for an increased use of barriers in the Central Region. However, under current circumstances, few defense improvement measures are uncontroversial within the alliance. Many of these proposals are more controversial than the use of barriers. If NATO is indeed serious about its conventional improvement efforts, there is ample reason to consider barrier options more seriously than in the past.

Developments in European threat perception do not appear favorable for barriers on first sight. Analyzed more carefully, however, these shifts in public opinion could provide a realistic chance to create support for barriers. In order to take advantage of this opportunity, NATO and its members should start an aggressive public relations effort to explain: (1) the defensive and stabilizing nature of barriers; (2) their potential non-intrusiveness; (3) their low cost; (4) their economy-of-force effect; and (5) most important, their complementarity with conventional arms control. NATO should under no circumstances attempt to implement the peacetime installation of barriers “under cover.”

At the same time, NATO should avoid framing the promotion of barriers within a larger debate over strategy. Forward defense, along with its national doctrinal implementations, can accommodate—and even calls for—barriers. In the long run, a major change in strategy might be unavoidable. At this point, however, it will merely add to the already existing divisive issues within the alliance, thus impeding the implementation of the barrier option.

Installation of an uninterrupted barrier system from the Baltic Sea to Austria—while often suggested—is neither militarily necessary nor politically feasible. Yet, peacetime barrier preparation in only selected critical areas—such as the northern German plain and other expected avenues of approach—would be beneficial to NATO's conventional defense and would address many of its existing weaknesses. In addition, corps sectors with recognized mobilization and reinforcement problems should have a larger degree of barrier preparation. The types of barriers chosen should be as unobtrusive as possible, with explosive pipes, forestation, and landscaping the most desirable candidates.

Apart from the peacetime installation of barriers, NATO should improve its capability to implement existing barrier plans. Specifically, it should increase the number and the readiness of combat engineer troops. Establishing a special program with funding and political supervision, perhaps elevating it to a priority level comparable to the Long Term Defense Program, would serve to limit bureaucratic inertia and intraservice parochialism.

In addition, NATO and its members should develop a concept that integrates the potential of advanced scatterable mines and their delivery systems into ground and air combat doctrines. Procurement of these systems should also be accelerated. Finally, NATO should devote more resources to operational research on barriers. In particular, an effort should be made to learn more about the interaction of fixed defensive preparation and mobile warfare.

In the future, NATO may well give higher priority to barrier defenses, including some form of peacetime preparation. While military considerations may not be sufficient to convince European governments of the merits of barrier defenses, the realities of budget constraints, the need for force economies, and demographic developments may make NATO more receptive. The changing climate in East-West relations and recent movement in conventional arms control also may direct more interest to the defensive and stabilizing nature of barriers. Barriers may be one of the few options still capable of mustering public support in defense matters. This, however, crucially depends on NATO's ability to communicate the rationale and potential of barrier defense to its own public.

NOTES

This article is based on a paper prepared during the author's stay as Visiting Scholar at the Center for International Studies at MIT (August 1988 - March 1989). The paper is a product of the Conventional Forces Working Group (headed by Lynn Whittaker) at the Center for Science and International Affairs at the

Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Support for the research was provided by the *Stiftung Volkswagenwerk* (Arms Control Fellowship Program) and the Center for International Studies at MIT.

1. In this article I will use the term "barriers" to include both obstacles and fortifications. While these two concepts are different, in the public discussion they are often used interchangeably. Technically, barriers are combinations of man made or enhanced natural obstacles whose primary purpose is to stop, delay, divert, or channel enemy (tank) movements. Fortifications or defensive positions are earth or concrete structures intended to enhance survivability of friendly troops and equipment and to increase the effectiveness of weapons.

2. Compare testimony given by Richard Kugler and Leonard Sullivan, Jr., in US Congress, Senate, *Alliance and Defense Capabilities in Europe, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Conventional Forces Alliance Defense of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate* (Senate Hearing 100-504), 4 August; 7, 20 October; 3, 17 November 1987 (Washington: GPO, 1988), pp. 209, 356-57; see also the yearly Brookings studies on the US defense budget, e.g. Joshua M. Epstein, *The 1988 Defense Budget*, Studies in Defense Policy (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1987), p. 39.

3. This generalization is not valid for the concept of alternative defense. The inherently defensive nature of barrier concepts has led to its adoption by a number of defense analysts who advocate defensive or non-provocative force postures. Looked at in more detail, however, these concepts are in some ways quite different from those developed to strengthen NATO's current posture.

4. Compare Carl Levin, *Beyond the Bean Count* (2d ed.; Washington: Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Conventional Forces and Alliance Defense, July 1988), p. 14; Richard K. Betts, *Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1982); Philip A. Karber, "NATO Doctrine and National Operational Priorities: The Central Front and the Flanks: Part I," in *Doctrine, the Alliance, and Arms Control*, ed. Robert O'Neill (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986), pp. 177-78.

5. Phillip A. Karber, "The Military Impact of the Gorbachev Reductions," *Armed Forces Journal International*, 126 (January 1989), 54-64.

6. Compare the NATO reaction to the Warsaw Pact's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Even routine exercises near the border were canceled in order not to appear provocative. Discussed in Betts, pp. 81-86.

7. A 1988 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study suggests that a rather elaborate system of barriers (20 km deep) could effect a delay of about three days, improving the force ratio significantly for the first few days after Pact mobilization. The same study concludes that barriers would reduce the amount of territory lost by NATO after an attack. This effect, however, appears to be much higher for the southern part of Germany, where the situation already is favorable. In the northern part, very high territory losses are to be expected even with the use of barriers. Unfortunately, the CBO study is based on a rather simplistic model, which reduces the value of its findings. US Congress, Congressional Budget Office, *U.S. Ground Forces and the Conventional Balance in Europe* (Washington: GPO, June 1988), pp. 38-43. Interview with Stephen D. Biddle, defense analyst in the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division, Institute for Defense Analysis, Alexandria, Va., February 1989.

8. William P. Mako, *U.S. Ground Forces and the Defense of Central Europe* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1983), pp. 36-38.

9. Interview with James A. Thomson, Vice President, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif., January 1989. The barriers assumed scatterable mines and explosive pipes in selected areas.

10. The availability of hardened defensive positions has been calculated to increase survivability of the defender by 54 to 77 percent in personnel casualties and 34 to 118 percent in tank losses. The effectiveness of direct-fire weapons may rise by five to ten times when barriers and fortifications are used. Quoted in John C. F. Tillson, "The Forward Defense of Europe," *Military Review*, 61 (May 1981), 69. A US Army engineer study concludes that obstacles could increase the effectiveness of the TOW antitank missile system by about 300 percent, and the US main battle tank by about 160 percent. US Department of the Army, *Obstacles*, Field Manual 90-7 (Washington: GPO, 1979), as quoted in Gregg F. Martin, "Another Maginot Line? Prepared Defense and NATO," unpublished paper, Cambridge, Mass., MIT, 1988, p. 42.

11. For possible social and psychological effects of barriers on Germany, see Robert L. Goldich, *NATO Conventional Force Structure and Doctrine: Possible Defensive Changes After an INF Treaty*, CRS Report 88-169 (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 26 February 1988), pp. 29-31. The outcry that followed the reports of US Army plans for an explosive pipe to be buried along the inter-German border is the only recent example of a public reaction to this issue. This incident should be seen as the combined result of a flawed public relations effort, press sensationalism, and misrepresentations, rather than a conscious manifestation of German public attitudes.

12. The German weekly *Welt am Sonntag* reported on a public opinion poll in December 1988 indicating that 75 percent of the West Germans no longer see a communist threat, compared to 47 percent

in 1984. Quoted in Rolf Soederlind, "West German Cut in Maneuvers Only Hints at Changes to Come," *Armed Forces Journal International*, 126 (January 1989), 33.

13. For a discussion of the effectiveness of the Maginot Line, the West Wall, and other fortified defensive lines, see Goldich, pp. 26-28; compare also Omar N. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story* (New York: Henry Holt, 1951), p. 243; and Chaim Herzog, *The War of Atonement* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975), pp. 113-14.

14. For a Maginot Line-type proposal see esp. J.B.A. Bailey, "The Case for Pre-Placed Field Defenses," *International Defense Review*, 17 (No. 7, 1984), 887-92. For the criticism of strategic barriers see West German defense ministry spokesman referring to explosive pipes as quoted in Wayne Biddle, "U.S. Tests Explosive Pipeline To Thwart Advancing Tanks," *The New York Times*, 24 August 1984, p. A2. For a rehabilitation of the Maginot Line idea, see Jeffrey Record, "Maginot Lines and Misinterpreted Military Lessons," *Strategic Review*, 15 (Winter 1987), 75-77.

15. Martin, pp. 95-98.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 91-93.

17. Interview with Stephen D. Biddle, January 1989. It is, however, possible to simulate the effect of individual defensive positions on exchange rate (the ratio of enemy to friendly losses) and survivability, and recent US Army studies provide data for both. See US Army Engineer Studies Center, *Survivability—the Effort and the Payoff*, 1981; and US Department of the Army, Field Manual 90-7.

18. Interview with John C. F. Tillson, Staff of the House Armed Services Committee, Washington, November 1988.

19. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel John Fricas, US Army, National Security Fellow, Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., February 1989.

20. Hans-Henning von Sandrart, "Forward Defence—Mobility and the Use of Barriers," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, 30 (Special Issue 1, 1985), 41.

21. US Army Engineer Studies Center, *Survivability*, p. 37.

22. Analysis conducted by the US Army, Europe, quoted by General Glenn K. Otis, Commander, USAREUR, in Charles D. Odorizzi and Benjamin F. Schemmer, "An exclusive AFJ Interview with General Glenn K. Otis," *Armed Forces Journal International*, 123 (January 1987), 46. A former senior engineer officer with USAREUR says that "the amount of critical work that is scheduled to be done in the plausible warning time 'will overload the engineers. . . . Anything we can do to pre-fabricate, pre-place, or pre-construct will be a great help.'" Major General Scott B. Smith, US Army, quoted in Martin, p. 31.

23. Compare Anthony H. Cordesman, "Fatal Flaws in Presenting the NATO/Warsaw Pact Balance," *Armed Forces Journal International*, 125 (July 1988), 62; Odorizzi and Schemmer, p. 48.

24. Von Sandrart, pp. 41-42; Price T. Bingham, "NATO Needs A New Air Interdiction Approach," *Armed Forces Journal International*, 123 (October 1986), 98; Stephen D. Biddle, "What Does Conventional Stability Mean, What Would a Stable Posture Look Like, and How Can Arms Control or Force Improvements Help Us Get There?" presentation for the US Congress, House Armed Services Committee, *Hearings on Conventional Stability in Europe*, 5 October 1988, pp. 14-15.

25. This argument is valid, however, only so long as the other side actually believes in the potential of barriers and has not succeeded in developing countermeasures. For evidence indicating such a perception on the Soviet side, see M. Bragin (Colonel, Soviet army), "Breaching Obstacles," *Soviet Military Review*, No. 7 (July 1979), 16-17.

26. William Drozdiak, "Bonn Rejects Using Border 'Pipe' Bomb," *The Washington Post*, 24 August 1984, p. A25.

27. Prechambered demolition sites, for example, have on occasion been the target of peace activists in Germany, who filled the chambers with concrete, thus rendering them ineffective. Owing to the immense number of sites which are by definition located at very accessible points, it is virtually impossible to prevent such tampering. The same would be the case for peacetime-installed explosive pipes. This points to the question of peacetime and premobilization security measures for the protection of barriers.

28. Interview with John A. Reed, Defense Intelligence College, Washington, January 1989.

29. Raymond E. Bell, Jr., "Fighting from Fortified Battle Positions," *Army*, 29 (July 1979), 34-39; information from German defense analyst Lutz Unterseher, quoted in Mark Stout, "Defensive Barriers Along the Inner-German Border," unpublished paper, Cambridge, Mass., John F. Kennedy School of Government, April 1988, p. 12.

30. According to Tillson, effective land consumption for installations of a 40 km-deep barrier system would be 40 square kilometers, .02 percent of West German territory. The whole defensive zone would cover 32,000 square kilometers, 13 percent of West Germany.

31. Compare Martin, pp. 47-48.

32. See, for example, Bailey. He elaborates in great detail the features of a very deep and dense system of fortifications and trenches which would cover a sizable part of West German territory—a nightmare for every German politician. It must be granted, however, that he explicitly excludes political considerations from his proposal.

33. Interview with Paul K. Davis, Director, Strategy Assessment Center, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif., January 1989.

34. Interview with William Durch, Center for International Studies, MIT, Cambridge, Mass., January 1989.

35. William Kaufmann gives a figure of \$1 billion over a period of six years for an unspecified belt of barriers along the inter-German border. William W. Kaufmann, "Nonnuclear Deterrence," in *Alliance Security: NATO and the No-First-Use Question*, ed. John D. Steinbrunner and Leon V. Sigal, Studies in Defense Policy (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1983), p. 85. Tillson assesses the cost for a system 40 km deep, including prechambering, landscaping, explosive pipes, and fortifications, at \$5 billion for construction and procurement. The \$100 billion figure was suggested for a modern Maginot Line-type barrier system. Michael G. Sovereign, "Economic Implications, Cost and Manpower," in *Modeling and Analysis of Conventional Defense in Europe*, ed. Reiner K. Huber, German Strategy Forum Workshop on Long-Term Development of NATO's Forward Defense (New York: Plenum Press, 1986), pp. 201-04.

36. If NATO should decide to establish an extensive barrier system along the inter-German border, some strategic scenarios must be given increased attention. Foremost among them is the Warsaw Pact advancing west by way of Austria. Extending the barrier along the German-Austrian border, of course, would touch even more serious political sensitivities than those already apparent in Germany. Goldich, pp. 34-35.

37. Letter from Admiral William Crowe (then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) to Senator Carl Levin, 24 November 1986, and interview with Lieutenant Colonel James P. O'Neal, both quoted in Stout, p. 6.

38. Tillson interview. An early German defense proposal including the use of barriers and blocking forces—the so-called "Bonin-Plan" from 1955—was rejected partly out of concern over the lack of involvement of non-German NATO troops. See Bogislaw von Bonin, *Opposition gegen Adenauers Sicherheitspolitik, Eine Dokumentation* (Hamburg: Verlag Neue Politik, 1976), pp. 21-26, 140-54. In fact, NATO still takes pains to ensure early international involvement in the case of its flank regions, namely with its Allied Command Europe Mobile Force.

39. James A. Blackwell, "Conventional Doctrine: Integrating Alliance Doctrines," in *Conventional Deterrence: Alternatives for European Defense*, ed. James R. Golden et al. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1984), pp. 137-48.

40. James A. Thomson and Nanette C. Gantz, *Conventional Arms Control Revisited: Objectives in the New Phase*, RAND Note N-2697-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, December 1987).

41. See for example, Jonathan Dean, *Watershed in Europe*, Union of Concerned Scientists (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 211-12.

42. Charles G. Pritchard, "Soviet Fortified Regions: A New 'Cult of the Defense'?" *International Defense Review*, 22 (July 1989), 895. Yazov's announcement came in February 1989.

43. Federal Minister of Defence (FRG), *White Paper 1985*, Bonn, June 1985.

44. *Report of the Commission on Long-Term Planning for the Federal Armed Forces*, Bonn, 1982.

45. *Peace and Security: Resolution Adopted by the Party Conference of the Social Democratic Party of Germany*, Nuremberg, 25-29 August 1986, rpt. in US Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Challenges to NATO's Consensus: West European Attitudes and U.S. Policy* (Washington: GPO, May 1987); Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, *European Security 2000—A Comprehensive Concept for European Security from a Sozial-Democratic Point of View* (Bonn: Presseservice der SPD, 6 July 1989), Annex VI.

46. The required technology includes sensors, rocket launchers, intelligent mines, and advanced antitank missiles. Compare Albrecht von Müller, "Technischer Fortschritt und Rüstungskontrolle," in *Sicherheitspolitik Kontroversen*, eds. Heisenberg/Lutz (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 1987), p. 511; John Grin and Lutz Unterseher, "The Spiderweb Defense," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, 44 (September 1988), 28-30. For a general review of these and other alternative defense proposals, see Jonathan Dean, "Alternative Defence: Answer to NATO's Central Front Problems?" *International Affairs*, 64 (Winter 1987-88), 61-82; and David Gates, "Area Defence Concepts: The West German Debate," *Survival*, 29 (July-August 1987), 301-17.

47. US Congress, The Chairmen of the Congressional Military Reform Caucus, *Budgets and Bullets: Improving Our Conventional Forces*, Washington, October 1988.

48. George C. Wilson, "Senator Pushes W. Germany To Erect Antitank Lines," *The Washington Post*, 25 July 1986, p. A23.

49. NATO Defense Planning Committee, *Enhancing Alliance Collective Security*, December 1988.

50. Soederlind.

Abetting Democratic Revolution in the Third World

ALEXANDER P. SHINE

The contention of this article is that US policy toward the Third World in general, and counterinsurgency in particular, is fundamentally and fatally flawed because we lack a coherent vision for positive change; that development of such a vision and a concept for realizing it is possible; and that to do so would be one of the most useful things our nation could do for itself and the world.

Consider the hypothetical case of Manuel: He is 26, one of eight children, the illegitimate son of a tough, moderately wealthy planter in the western province of the country of Montegura. Energetic, intelligent, and physically active, Manuel always excelled in academics, athletics, and school politics in spite of his frequent brushes with disciplinary authorities. From his father, from his observation of the gross inequalities between the small elite and the masses of peasants in his province, and perhaps from his own persecution for being a bastard son of non-aristocratic blood, Manuel developed a strong tendency to sympathize with the underdog.

In the university he was introduced to Marxism. He was impressed by its analysis of the structural causes of oppression and injustice. He was excited by its vision of a classless society, where cooperation rather than competition reigned, service motivated instead of greed, and the people shared in the fruits of their productivity. He was encouraged and challenged by the revolutionary plan of action presented to him by the dynamic leaders of the underground Frente Democrático Popular (FDP); he was inspired by the examples of Lenin, Mao, Castro, Ché, Ho, Ortega, and in his own country the late Santiago—martyred, but not forgotten by those who were carrying on his struggle.

He attended mass at the local church only enough to abate his mother's constant nagging, but he was a regular at the Tuesday evening meetings of the Catholic Justice Society headed by the church's leading exponent of liberation theology, Father Columbo; the vision of social justice he saw at these Tuesday meetings was clearly the vision of the Church, and of its great revolutionary founder, Jesus Christ.

After graduation from the university, Manuel accepted the good offices of an FDP friend who arranged for the young idealist to study at a special school in Cuba. Manuel was quietly spirited out of Montegura and spent a year in Cuba followed by another at the Moscow Institute. His Marxist vision and enthusiasm grew. However, while in Moscow, he began to have a few nagging doubts. What he was *taught* reinforced all he was learning, but what he *observed* was not consistent with the teachings. As the oldest Marxist state in the world, the Soviet Union should have been well along in establishing the workers' paradise, but it was not. There were long lines at the food stores, the KGB was everywhere, the party bureaucrats seemed not much better than the corrupt hacks who managed the government in his own country, and many of the Soviet citizens were profoundly cynical. In fact, even the Soviet leader, while professing continued allegiance to communism, was in effect admitting that as a system it was bankrupt. Perhaps the fault lay in poor leadership, capitalist infiltration, or some weakness in the Russian people. Perhaps this was an aberration; the Marxist concept was good, but the execution was flawed—flaws which the FDP in Montegura had detected and would correct.

But perhaps, just perhaps, there was a better way.

With this possibility in mind, Manuel managed to slip into the United States. He took a few courses at George Washington University, where his quick intelligence, diligence, and intensity soon overcame his language limitations. In the course of his study, he developed a friendship with Major John Doe, US Army, who was working on a master's degree in international relations.

* * * * *

The time is now. The setting is one of the innumerable little cafes in Georgetown.

Manuel: "John, I've got a couple of serious questions to ask you."

John: "Sure, buddy. Shoot. You know me, I've got an opinion on everything. Occasionally, I'm even right."

Manuel: "John, you know the situation in my country. We are a nation of extremes. The overwhelming majority of the people are poor campesinos;

Colonel Alexander P. Shine, Infantry, is Director of Global Military Strategy in the Department of Corresponding Studies at the US Army War College. He is a graduate of the US Military Academy and holds an M.A. in history from Harvard University. He served two tours in Vietnam, as senior advisor to the ARVN 52d Ranger Battalion in 1967, and as a company commander with the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division in 1969. Among his other assignments, he has served in Korea, taught history at West Point, held staff assignments with the 101st Airborne at Fort Campbell, taught military science at Wheaton College, and commanded the 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry Training Brigade, at Fort Benning. His article "Theater Airlift 2010" appeared in the Winter 1988 issue of *Airpower Journal*.

malnutrition and disease are rampant; the barrios are ruled by violence, mitigated only slightly by the influence of the churches. There is virtually no middle class; economic and political power is concentrated in the hands of a few families, comprising at the most ten percent of the population. Elections are a sham, the courts are tools of the elite, and both the government and the army are shot through with corruption. For the poor there is no way out, except the drug gangs for the men or the swank brothels of San Angelino for the women. It has been this way for as long as anyone can remember. But there are rumblings of change.

"As you know, I have studied Marxism at home and abroad. The Marxists sympathize with the condition of my people and say it can and should change. They present to me a vision of a very different society, and they have a well-developed plan to bring this vision about. Yet I am troubled by what I have seen in Cuba and Russia, and what I have read since coming here. It seems that the Marxists never deliver all they promise. They do a lot for the people when they create a revolution in a country like mine, but they also seem to end up with their own form of poverty, oligarchy, and injustice. It seems that there must be a better way.

"I have three specific questions for you John:

"First, as an American giving me advice, what would be your vision for my country 10 or 20 years from now?

"Second, could you suggest a general concept of how to bring that vision about.

"And third, if you cannot answer the first two questions, is there someone I could go to in your government who could give me the answers?—Surely there is?"

* * * * *

How would Major Doe answer? How would you? If he is like most of us, his answer to the question about a vision for Montegura 20 years hence would probably be an ill-defined description of a society vaguely like those of Minnesota, New Jersey, Texas, or California. His answer as to how to bring the vision about would be even more vague, the real essence of it being, "Honestly, Manuel, I haven't got a clue." There might be partial answers to the third question in various US and international agencies. But it is not clear that there is any place in our government where Manuel could find answers to his questions anywhere near as thorough or carefully conceived as he found in Havana or Moscow. Nor is it clear that there is sufficient recognition in Washington of the importance of developing those answers.

Consider the case of El Salvador. Certainly, if there is any country with features like Manuel's where we should have a well-defined policy, it would be there. After all, since 1981 we have been committed to helping the government and people of El Salvador to restructure their society. This

restructuring is recognized as both a desirable end in itself, and as a means to the end of defeating a fairly mature Marxist insurgency. Yet, a marvelously frank report written by four Army Fellows and published in 1988 by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis suggests that we have few answers for the Manuels of that embattled nation. The report is primarily a reflection of information gained by extensive interviews of American military personnel who participated in US efforts in El Salvador. Note the following excerpts:

The United States provided resources not on the basis of some overall vision of success, but in response to successive and increasingly acute crises.¹

The officers we interviewed agree that the United States has yet to define clear policy objectives in El Salvador.²

Asked to describe US national objectives in El Salvador, for example, one general officer replied that the White House was hoping for "a bright shiny democracy to spring into being overnight."³

One former psyops adviser commented, "*although 'the world's premier example of democracy,' the United States 'was of little help in providing substantive, ideological advice with which to counter insurgent propaganda.'*"⁴ [italics added]

The United States has yet to grasp fully what it will take to win such a contest [for popular support] and how to go about doing it. Failure to solve that riddle will condemn Americans to recurring frustration in future small wars.⁵

The theme is repetitive and clear: although the United States is acting primarily in the role of rendering advice and assistance to the Salvadorans, we do not have a coherent idea of what we think the Salvadorans should do, nor how we think they should go about doing it. We are teachers who do not know what we are trying to teach.

The irony is of course that America really *does* have a great deal to offer philosophically, ideologically, and pragmatically to nations and peoples caught in the cycle of poverty, injustice, political corruption, and gross inequality that is often endemic in the Third World. Furthermore, what we have to offer in the long run is a far better alternative than that offered in Moscow, Havana, Beijing, or Managua. We have a superior product to sell, but we haven't taken the time and effort really to decide what the fundamental components of that product are, or how to package and market them. Meanwhile, competitors with a product that both philosophically and historically is demonstrably inferior to ours continue to peddle it around the world with carefully thought-out preparation, slick marketing, and cadres of highly trained and dedicated pitchmen.

True, there are several Third World leaders, such as Corazon Aquino in the Philippines, who recognize the advantages of our product and are trying hard

to implant it under very difficult circumstances. The jury is still out on whether they will succeed. But it seems axiomatic that their difficult task would be easier if the world's leading democracy had been able to provide them a well-considered democratic vision, a conceptual strategy to help bring that vision into being, and truly useful assistance—aside from mere dollars—in carrying out the strategy.

What, then, might be the main components of an American vision for the future of a developing nation? A carefully conceived, well-supported answer to this question should be the result of considerable research and debate. Nonetheless, the major outlines of the vision are open to at least preliminary suggestion. Given time to ponder Manuel's question, Major Doe might suggest two broad principles to guide Montegura toward the year 2010. First, the government would be firmly based on a social contract, the proposition that the people owe their fealty and support to the legally constituted government, and that in return the government will serve the people and be ultimately accountable to them. Second, the country's political, economic, and social systems would be based on a realistic view of human nature. That is, they would recognize that human beings are capable of rational thinking, and—given decent education and reasonably supportive societal structures—they can live together in relative peace and harmony; however, they are neither intellectually, psychologically, nor morally perfectible. Individually and as groups they will always be limited in their wisdom and prone toward self-centeredness in their actions. Disagreements, conflict, and competition will always be prevalent in human society, necessitating patience, tolerance, self-restraint, and compromise. Hence, any philosophy of government that offers a utopian end must be rejected as unworkable and therefore dangerous. Pluralism in politics, in the classroom, and on the streets must always be the expected and protected norm.

The foregoing principles suggest in turn a number of practical features which should be imbedded in the nation's governmental structure.

- It should be a "government of laws, not of men." Within this constitutional framework (and external to it) should be some form of checks and balances so that power is diffused. No individual or group of individuals should be able to ascend to unchallenged power.⁶ There will be no "maximum leader," nor will any group, even a majority, be unconstrained.

- It should have an objective legal system, and to protect its objectivity the judiciary should have a degree of independence from other power centers within the nation's polity.

- There should be some form of representative democracy, based upon periodic elections and peaceful transfers of power, with all adult citizens free to participate in the electoral process.

- The political, economic, educational, and social structures of the society should be designed to provide a high degree of mobility and equal opportunity. Self-perpetuating power monopolies of any kind should be resisted

so that all citizens have the opportunity to advance as far as their character, efforts, talents, and the legitimate rights of others allow.

- A considerable degree of freedom of expression should be protected as the only way to insure the free flow and flowering of ideas, and as a first line of defense against abuse of power.

- The fundamental human rights, including the basic freedom of the individual to life and personal choice, should be protected by the state.

- The state must have a coercive arm. The Marxist goal of a state with no more need for police than to manage traffic must be rejected as silly utopianism, inconsistent with human nature. However, the police and military elements of the state must be subordinate to the law and to democratically elected civilian authority.

- Some mixture of capitalism and socialism should govern the economics of the nation. "Pure" capitalism, unfettered and unmoderated, should be rejected because of its tendency to lead to concentration and exploitation; conversely, "pure" socialism should be rejected because it concentrates political and economic power together, and because of its demonstrated unresponsiveness and inefficiency (a predictable problem given the nature of man).

This listing of what might be termed the "key components of democracy" is suggestive only. The objective, however, is clear: to define those features of government that provide for a decent, civilized life for its citizens, but which are also consistent with a realistic view of human nature and history. On the surface, this may seem to Americans a simple task—"Take our Constitution, substitute Montegura for United States, and use it." But we know better; we know that not everything in our country is as it should and can be. We also know that any concept must be culturally apposite; that it must be built upon the history of the society that adopts it, and be responsive to the particular needs, habits, and enduring values of the people of that society. There are undoubtedly many different ways that government can be organized to provide for the flourishing of humane values. But this is not to deny that there *really is* a core of humane values which must be provided for by government, and that our own government poses a remarkably successful model. Thus, as citizens of this old and successful democracy, we *really do* have a vision.

Manuel's second question is tougher: "O.K., gringo, I understand what your vision for Montegura is, and I like it. It suggests the possibility of a relatively just, humane, and free society without the repression, militarism, and economic stagnation that seem to have been the lot of every Marxist state in history. Obviously, though, if we are to bring this vision to fruition, we must have a strategy for change. To use your expression, 'How do we get there from here?'"

A fundamental problem we have in answering this question is the dilemma of means versus ends. Marxism has faced this problem head-on and

decided unequivocally that the ends justify the means. We cannot come to the same conclusion, both because it is morally repugnant to us and because we recognize that means have a tendency to create, or at least mutate, their ends. But we are faced with a very difficult problem. Montegura is basically a criminal society. Like any criminal, it will seldom be reformed by kind and gentle words alone. Those who enjoy the luxuries of power in Montegura will probably not relinquish them easily, and there are habits of mind and action in all segments of society which reinforce the status quo.

It is almost inconceivable that a corrupt oligarchical society, especially one founded on disproportionate concentrations of wealth and property, could be transformed into a liberal democracy without a period of something in between.⁷ It is likely that the “in between” government would be fairly centralized, and that some of the rights which are intended in the final vision would have to be infringed on the way to attaining it.

It is also highly probable that it would be necessary, at least partially, to centralize and socialize the economy for a period of time, before it gradually could be restructured as a more balanced and efficient system. Some forced redistribution of assets would probably be necessary; years of unrestrained economic concentration, coupled with government corruption, have led to gross poverty, paralleled by great concentrations of wealth and the means to protect it. Land reform and perhaps other forms of expropriation and redistribution would be necessary to break the monopoly of resources and to establish a meaningful degree of equality of opportunity. It is not at all inconceivable that blood might be shed in the process of change.

Furthermore, it is unlikely that Montegura would fully align itself with the United States in the international arena either during or after its period of transition. In fact, if Montegura is in Latin America, it is almost certain that some gringo-busting would be included in its rhetoric and actions. Some of this would be justified, some of it would not. Nonetheless, the challenge for the United States would be to avoid overreaction, realizing that a healthy, maturing, independent but fundamentally compatible neighbor is better than a sycophantic little brother or an avowed enemy seething with resentment.

Let's face it—there is no easy solution to the problem of transforming a corrupt oligarchy into a just, liberal democracy. The best way is certainly the way the United States arrived—through a long period of evolutionary change. But in the world today, the time and patience for such evolution will seldom be available; we are much too interconnected and ideas move too rapidly. Moreover, there are many nations and individuals who make a profession of starting *undemocratic* revolutions whether we want them to or not.

Admittedly, the brief suggestions above fall far short of providing Manuel a detailed roadmap of how Montegura can get from here to there. They do little more than sketch in some of the issues to be considered. To do more

would be beyond both the scope of this article and the expertise of its author. Two generalizations can safely be made, however. First, any useful answer to Manuel's second question is dependent on a good answer to his first. An effective strategy starts with well-defined ends; ways and means follow. The comments from US officers in El Salvador mentioned earlier, and the experience of many veterans of the advisory efforts in Vietnam and elsewhere, strongly suggest that when advising non-democratic Third World nations, the United States is woefully lacking in a clear understanding of the ends of its advice. Second, the difficulty of developing a conceptual strategy for democratic revolution should not be grounds for giving up on the effort. It may never be possible to produce utopian formulas dressed in the trappings of economic determinism and embraced with all the dogmatic certainty and messianic fervor that the Marxists have mustered. A strategy for democratic revolution must be both more restricted in means, and more realistic about its ends, than that used by Marxists. The challenge for Americans is to decide how we can help others bring about revolutionary change where it is really needed, but to do so in ways that avoid the repression, sterility, poverty, and international trouble-making which the Marxist approach inevitably brings.

Turning now to Manuel's third question, is there anyone working on this challenge? Happily, the answer is Yes, but it is still a very diffuse, incomplete, and underfunded Yes. In recent years, a flurry of scholarly research has been directed at answering exactly the types of questions posed by the Manuels of the Third World.⁸ More encouraging, people are reading what is being written. (As Zbigniew Brzezinski said recently, "It is no longer fashionable to be a Marxist in the salons of Paris."⁹) Several US governmental agencies such as the United States Information Agency, the Agency for International Development, and the National Endowment for Democracy are aware of, and in some cases involved in, such investigations, and it is entirely fitting that they should be. To use the language of the strategists, deliberate government-supported efforts to develop and disseminate answers to Manuel's questions are applying the socio-psychological element of national power to support our national interests. However, the agencies involved in this sort of activity are seldom supported up to their potential,¹⁰ and if the experience of US military personnel in El Salvador discussed earlier is representative, then we have given insufficient attention to developing a real strategy for encouraging revolutionary democratic change.

Yet there is one final question. Why address this issue in a military journal? Isn't democratic revolution the business of statesmen, not soldiers? Perhaps that's true in theory, but it is certainly not so in practice. In many countries today the military is both the center of power and the only instrument of stability. The future leaders of these countries will often come out of the military. And if the military does not have a vision for democracy,

or is unwilling to support it, there is more than a fair probability that it will never come about. Furthermore, within even the most corrupt Third World militaries, there are some members who remain true patriots; from among these could come their George Washingtons, their Simón Bolívars. In our many military-to-military contacts, American service men and women with a thorough understanding of democracy will be key links in the formative education of people like Manuel.

It is a truism that the American military has a prominent role in what has come to be known as low-intensity conflict, and that such conflict involves a complex mixture of political, social, ideological, economic, and military factors. If we are to be effective in helping Third World countries to bring about positive change (and thereby preempt negative change), American soldiers are going to have to understand the principles of democratic revolution almost as well as American statesmen.

In Vietnam we focused much attention on "winning the hearts and minds of the people." We had the right idea, but to a degree we put the cart before the horse. We should focus more on winning the hearts and minds of idealistic and dedicated future leaders; if we can win them, *they* will win their people. Our best hope of winning these leaders must start with the development of a realistic vision of a good society, and concepts for making that vision a reality. The vision exists today, as it did in 1776—we simply need to clarify and codify it, and then adapt it to the unique situations prevailing elsewhere. Developing concepts for change is a more difficult challenge; but with hard work and a lot of assistance from the very people we would like to help, it may be that it can be done.

The United States has always been a beacon of hope to the oppressed of the world, not just as a refuge for immigrants, but as an exporter of ideas. In a revolutionary world, it is time to get serious again about exporting the ideas of democracy and freedom. It is time to help the Manuels of the world create democratic revolutions.

* * * * *

Postscript: This article was begun when the dramatic events in Eastern Europe were only beginning to unfold. These events are extremely encouraging. They should not, however, lead us to conclude that the needs stressed in the article do not remain. Rather, current events should spur us even more urgently to seek to define for the Manuels of the world what the heart of democracy really is and how it might be quickened. As Marxism collapses in Europe, the appeal of Castro and Ortega is certainly shaken. But considering the problems of Latin America and other Third World regions, the status quo is not a very attractive alternative either. (Even as the Berlin Wall crumbled, the FMLN was in the streets of San Salvador. Noriega is gone, but

the work of establishing a stable democracy in Panama is just beginning.) The "window of opportunity" is wide open. Now is the time for the US political, economic, social, and military leaders to work hard to help Third World patriots to clearly define a better way.

NOTES

1. A. J. Bacevich et al., *American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988) p. 13.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 45.

6. Research on democracy has increasingly noted the importance of extragovernmental organizations to the development and protection of democracy. Civil organizations such as labor unions, youth groups, private schools, churches, clubs, etc. both protect democracy by diffusing power and serve as schools for democracy by accustoming their members to compromise and the free flow of ideas.

7. During the course of this paper, I have assumed that in those areas of the world where revolutionary ferment is in process, the choice lies generally between the Marxist and democratic solutions. Obviously, however, there is at least in theory a third choice—to squelch the revolutionary ferment and retain the status quo, meaning in most cases that repressive rightist regimes would remain in power. As we view the long succession of rightist dictators who have fallen—Bastista, Trujillo, Somoza, Marcos, etc.—it becomes increasingly clear that the rightist solution is no solution, despite Lyndon Johnson's cynical admonition, "He may be a dictator, but at least he's *our* dictator." The moral price that our nation as the world's preeminent exemplar of liberal democracy would pay by freely continuing to tolerate and consort with such allies is simply too great. Furthermore, change is coming to these nations, and our support for repressive governments will in the long run usually turn against us. As retired General Fred Woerner, former USCINCSOUTH, said, "American liaison with right-wing dictatorships is sometimes convenient, but that convenience is very transitory" (interview at the US Army Military History Institute, December 1989). For an excellent discussion of this subject, see Richard N. Haass, "Dealing with Friendly Tyrants," *The National Interest* (Spring 1989), 40-48.

8. Examples include Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries*, 4 vols. (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989); Gregory A. Fossedal, *The Democratic Imperative: Exporting the American Revolution* (New York: Basic Books, 1989); Giovanni Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, 1987); and Hernando de Soto, *The Other Path* (New York: Harper and Row, 1989).

9. Zbigniew Brzezinski, statement at a meeting of the National Endowment for Democracy, Washington, D.C., April 1989.

10. The very limited funding for security assistance within the defense budget is well known to those involved with national security strategy. The history of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) offers another example. After a long legislative battle, a 1984 Act of Congress established the NED as a non-profit corporation, independent from the US government but funded primarily by annual grants from Congress. Its mission, simply stated, is to advance the development and maintenance of democracy around the world primarily through the spread of ideas. By making carefully considered grants to national and international groups seeking to understand and apply democratic concepts, and by bringing together those doing so for social and intellectual interchange, the NED comes closer than any other government-supported agency to dealing directly with Manuel's questions. The NED is well-managed, respected, and apparently quite effective at a time when the sudden rediscovery of democratic values around the world offers a marvelous opportunity to use ideas to foster change. However, with an appropriation in the Fiscal Year 1989 budget of only \$15.8 million, the NED is fiscally constrained far out of proportion to its potential. For additional information, see Fossedal, pp. 71-74; US General Accounting Office, *Report to Senator Malcolm Wallop: Events Leading to the Establishment of the National Endowment for Democracy* (Washington: GAO, 1984); and National Endowment for Democracy, Annual Report 1988.

Theater Campaign Planning for NATO's Northern Region

GUY C. SWAN III

For years the Northern Region has been considered of secondary importance to NATO theater military operations. But with the buildup of Soviet forces in the area, especially those on the Kola Peninsula and within the Northern Fleet, Soviet military operations now have the potential to seriously threaten NATO's Atlantic sea lines of communication and even outflank allied forces in the Central Region itself.

NATO's response to this threat is a fragmented division of responsibility among the three major NATO commands—Allied Command Europe (ACE), Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT), and Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN). Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH), a major subordinate headquarters of ACE, is the Northern Region warfighting command charged with planning and conducting a joint and combined campaign.¹ However, in view of the growing Soviet naval threat in the Northern Region, we must ask whether AFNORTH still has adequate command structure, forces, operational depth, and agility to plan and conduct an effective campaign in a theater where maritime influences have emerged as a dominant feature of the operational environment. The Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) and Commander-in-Chief Channel (CINCHAN) have overlapping responsibilities for planning and conducting simultaneous yet separate maritime campaigns in the same general area, yet there does not appear to be a mechanism for developing a cohesive combined campaign plan that unites and synchronizes *all* air, land, and sea operations for the entire Northern Region.

At the same time, the Maritime Strategy has been criticized by those concentrating on the continental defense of the Central Region as a US Navy political ploy and a global concept having limited utility in NATO military operations. Ongoing budget and force reductions are likely to further intensify scrutiny of the Maritime Strategy's global perspective and perhaps even limit

the Navy's worldwide commitments. It seems prudent under these conditions to consider ways to refocus the Maritime Strategy at the theater level. Unfortunately, because of ACE's emphasis on a land-based forward defense, the viability of the Maritime Strategy as a *theater warfighting concept* in the European context has not been fully investigated. In a theater like the Northern Region, naval power and the warfighting aspects of the Maritime Strategy deserve a closer look to see if they have application in improving combined theater campaign plans.

This article is intended to do four things: improve general understanding of the Northern Region's operational environment as it relates to the Maritime Strategy; provide a conceptual process for developing the region's combined campaign plans; increase understanding of its joint and combined theater command structures; and offer specific recommendations related to strategy and command arrangements in the Northern Region, with a view to enhancing unity of command, campaign planning, and successful defense both there and in Allied Command Europe.

A Construct for Analyzing Theater Campaign Planning

In September 1988 two members of the US Army War College faculty, Colonel William W. Mendel and Lieutenant Colonel Floyd T. Banks, published an article in *Parameters* which summarized the findings of an extensive study of campaign planning they conducted in late 1986 and 1987. As part of their findings the authors concluded that in virtually every theater-level command they studied (US as well as combined) there was considerable confusion as to how to go about planning a campaign.² In their view this confusion is the result of a lack of doctrine, and they stressed that confusion will continue to reign until a comprehensive, overarching joint and combined doctrine is developed.

Mendel and Banks also recognized that style and format are not as important as the campaign development process and the content of the plans themselves. To this end they offered several "tenets of a campaign plan," four of which are particularly germane to this discussion. In their view, a campaign plan—

- Provides an orderly schedule of strategic military decisions; displays the commander's vision and intent.
- Orients on the enemy's center of gravity.
- Phases a series of related major operations.
- Synchronizes joint air-land-sea efforts into a cohesive and synergistic whole.³

In order to evaluate the ability of the major allied theater commander, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Northern Europe (CINCNORTH), to adequately plan a campaign, we will determine whether he can adhere to these

tenets in his campaign planning effort and, if he cannot, offer solutions to help him do so. Before proceeding, however, we need to take a closer look at the Northern Region itself from the NATO and Soviet perspectives. It will become clear as we go along just how important understanding the operational environment is to a CINC's ability to effectively plan a campaign.

Theater of War and Theaters of Operations

JCS Pub 1 defines a *theater of war* as "that area of land, sea, and air which is, or may become, directly involved in the operations of war." While a theater of war has no spatial limits, it may consist of one or more theaters of operations. A *theater of operations* is in turn defined as "that portion of an area of war necessary for military operations and for the administration of such operations."⁴ The commander of a theater of war generally operates at the strategic-operational level while the theater of operations commander normally functions at the operational level.


In NATO terms, the area of responsibility for ACE and its Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) is considered a theater of war, and the geographic areas assigned to AFNORTH, AFCENT, and AFSOUTH are subordinate theaters of operations.

CINCNORTH's area of responsibility includes Norway, Denmark, the northern tip of West Germany (Schleswig-Holstein), and the coastal waters and airspace above them (see Map 1). This huge area extends some 1750 miles from the North Cape of Norway to Hamburg on the Elbe River. Yet, on land it has even less operational depth than the Central Region—in some places this depth is only four miles!⁵ The emphasis in AFNORTH since its inception in 1951 has been on a land-oriented forward defense against a Soviet ground offensive through Finland or Sweden.

Forces of the Northern Region

To conduct military operations in this huge area, CINCNORTH commands surprisingly few forces. Primary ground defense forces include the 12 brigades of the largely reservist Norwegian army, the Danish Jutland

Major Guy C. Swan III, Armor, is Chief, G3 Plans for 1st Armored Division, Ansbach, West Germany. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College and the School of Advanced Military Studies where he received an M.M.A.S. in theater operations. He has served in Armor and Cavalry units in the 2d Infantry Division and the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment and commanded a tank company in the 9th Infantry Division. He is a graduate of the US Military Academy and holds an M.A. in national security studies from Georgetown University.



Division, the German 6th Panzer Division, and other smaller mobilization units. CINCNORTH is dependent on rapid reinforcement by additional allied ground forces to augment these indigenous forces. The United States is initially expected to provide a 15,000-man Marine Expeditionary Brigade which has prepositioned its equipment at Trondheim in southern Norway. The British and Dutch contribution is the UK/NL Amphibious Force, a combined brigade initially assigned to SACLANT and earmarked for early transfer to CINCNORTH. If not committed elsewhere, the light brigade-sized ACE Mobile Force-Land (AMF-L) could also be dispatched to AFNORTH's area. Canada recently withdrew its 4000-man Canadian Air-Sea Transportable

Brigade from commitment to AFNORTH, a move with political as well as military impact on CINCNORTH's land defense plans.⁶ Generally speaking, all these elements are best characterized as light infantry units capable of defending in the rugged terrain of Scandinavia, but possessing limited staying power. The question raised by a former CINCNORTH, British General Sir Geoffrey Howlett, is whether there will be sufficient warning time to mobilize these forces into a coherent ground defense that can hold against otherwise overwhelmingly superior conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact for any length of time.⁷


CINCNORTH's strongest defensive card is allied airpower. Norway and Denmark possess small but modern air forces and the Federal Republic of Germany's *Luftwaffe* and *Bundesmarine* air arm are among the world's best. But command and control of these forces is complicated, especially in the south where AFCENT's 2d Allied Tactical Air Force's area of responsibility overlaps into AFNORTH's area. Reinforcements from the US Air Force and elements of the British RAF round out CINCNORTH's air forces.

The weakest link in CINCNORTH's defense is maritime forces, which are meager when compared to the growing Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat in the region. The *Bundesmarine* and Royal Navy are of high quality, but even when combined with the coastal navies of the other allies cannot challenge the combined strength of the Soviet Northern and Baltic Fleets.⁸ Only SACLANT commands the forces, principally the Striking Fleet Atlantic—composed largely of carrier battlegroups, surface action groups, and submarine attack groups from the US Second Fleet—which are capable of defeating the Soviet fleets.

The point that CINCNORTH lacks strong maritime forces is important. Because of the ruggedness of the terrain and lack of geographical depth in this area, CINCNORTH must rely on the agility of air and naval forces to give operational depth to his land defense.

To command and control these forces, CINCNORTH's command is subdivided into three sub-regional commands, as shown in the diagram on the next page: Allied Forces North Norway, Allied Forces South Norway, and Allied Forces Baltic Approaches. Because each of these subcommands has its own air, land, and sea components, they function more like regional joint task forces. While this may appear to be a judicious use of available forces, it fragments AFNORTH's forces across a wide area of operations and hinders CINCNORTH's ability to concentrate at decisive points.

Unlike the Central Region, where land lines of communication play an important role in the sustainment effort, CINCNORTH has almost no capability to sustain his forces overland. Virtually all logistical support for AFNORTH operations, as well as the majority of the forces needed for the initial defense, must come by air and sea along lines of communication over



which CINCNORTH exercises neither geographic nor operational control. And since these lines of communication flow directly to the subcommands, he must rely on SACLANT and CINCHAN to command and control the sustainment effort.

As SACEUR's major subordinate commander in northern Europe, it devolves on CINCNORTH to be the principal campaign planner for this area. However, CINCNORTH's area of responsibility must not be confused with the much larger Northern Region, which has broader strategic and operational implications.

The Northern Region as a Theater of Operations

The Northern Region (as opposed to CINCNORTH's assigned area of responsibility) encompasses a vast land and sea expanse that embraces the Norwegian, Barents, Greenland, North, and Baltic seas; the Svalbard (Spitzbergen) Island archipelago; Iceland; the Faeroe Islands; and the Scandinavian, Kola, and Jutland peninsulas, including Schleswig-Holstein. At the strategic level, control of this area could have a far-reaching effect on the outcome of a

NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation in Central Europe. For NATO, control of the maritime reaches of the Northern Region ensures the survivability of critical sea lines of communication from the continental United States. Conversely, the area is vital to the Soviets in achieving their two main strategic objectives in the region: protecting their nuclear ballistic missile submarines and projecting their naval power into the Atlantic and Channel sea lanes to interdict allied sea lines of communication.⁹ Moreover, the region represents a potential operational axis of advance that could enable the Soviets to "envelop" NATO from the north.

In a short war, a Warsaw Pact thrust through the Baltic Sea against the defenses of Denmark and the northern Federal Republic could play a crucial role in unhinging allied defenses in the center. In a protracted war, the Northern Region's maritime character would take on crucial importance largely because of the area's relationship to the allied sustainment effort. In short, both alliances have vital reasons for placing considerable operational and strategic emphasis on the Northern Region.

When the Northern Region is viewed from this broader perspective, it becomes clear that CINCNORTH's land-oriented area of responsibility plays only a part in NATO's overall response to Soviet challenges in this vast area. Indeed, NATO's response at this time is not a simple theater of war/theater of operations arrangement but a complex and often confusing combination of NATO commands. CINCNORTH is not the sole actor. CINCHAN, SACLAN, and CINCENT also exercise control over portions of the Northern Region. The number and variety of joint and combined commands responsible for these overlapping areas and missions make truly effective combined campaign planning difficult if not impossible.¹⁰

Soviet Theater Strategy and Warfighting Capabilities in the Region

The Soviet Union's Northwestern Theater of Military Operations (TVD) is primarily responsible for warfighting in the northwestern USSR, Finland, Scandinavia, northern Scotland, and Iceland. It is expected that TVD ground forces stationed on the Kola Peninsula would be organized as a front for operations against AFNORTH. In the opening days of operations in the Northern Region, the Soviet Northern Fleet would be subordinated to the Northwestern TVD commander to support the early phases of a land campaign in north Norway, principally to provide security on the maritime flank of the main effort overland.

But the Soviets also consider the Northern Fleet an *operational-strategic* or *higher operational* formation capable of conducting independent strategic or operational missions in an ocean or maritime TVD.¹¹ It is conceivable that the Northern Fleet would revert to this more independent role once the land campaign had succeeded in securing tactical and operational objectives and land-based air cover could be provided to the fleet. The Soviet

scheme for achieving its goals offers an interesting example of the inter-relationships among tactics, operational art, and strategy.

The opening phases of a Soviet campaign by the Northwestern TVD would probably see the Soviets launching an overwhelming land offensive through the Finnish wedge supported by naval forces, probably to seize the airfields and ports of north Norway. Success at this tactical level would have distinct operational implications in that control of the airfields would serve to protect the Kola bases by vastly reducing NATO's capability to stage land-based air strikes. Tactical victories would also free the Northern Fleet of the NATO air threat in the Norwegian Sea, thus allowing unimpeded operations. With these operational objectives achieved, the Northern Fleet would be capable of breaking out of the Norwegian Sea. The strategic impact comes from the Soviets' ability to project the Northern Fleet south to cut the sea lines of communication upon which the survival of NATO's main effort in the Central Region will depend. Under these conditions the Soviet center of gravity in the Northern Region, the "hub of all power and strength" to achieve strategic objectives, is the Northern Fleet (and its associated Soviet naval aviation arm) consisting of:

- 55 percent of all Soviet nuclear-powered, ballistic-missile-firing submarines
- 55 percent of cruise-missile submarines
- 45 percent of attack submarines
- 48 naval Backfire bombers
- 30 percent of cruisers
- 7 percent of amphibious craft
- 2 of 3 deployed aircraft carriers¹²

Clearly, it is no longer appropriate to regard the Northern Fleet as an expendable force which must survive long enough to get off one nuclear salvo in the first few hours of war. Indeed, the blue-water character of the "new" Northern Fleet allows the Soviets to pursue the open-ocean operations that could give their early tactical victories a decisive strategic impact.

CINCNORTH and Northern Region Campaign Planning

Based on our earlier definitions, SACEUR is responsible for developing a theater of war campaign plan for all of ACE which seeks to attain *alliance* strategic objectives (for example, deter war, respond to aggression, insure territorial integrity of member nations, etc.).¹³ In support of SACEUR's campaign plan, CINCNORTH should develop his own theater of operations campaign plan which seeks to achieve *theater* strategic military objectives (for example, defend or regain NATO territory, deny Soviet use of friendly airfields and ports, prevent interdiction of sea lines of communication by defeating the Northern Fleet, etc.) through the attainment of operational objectives.

As we saw in the discussion of the Northern Region's operational environment, the balance of forces favors the Soviets, who will have the strategic and operational initiative to seize objectives like Norwegian bases early. Based on the geographic scope of the Northern Region and our assumption that the Northern Fleet is the Soviets' center of gravity in the north, AFNORTH's main effort, the land battle, has only tactical and operational importance while the maritime battle holds in its grasp the theater's strategic decision. If CINC-NORTH's initial forward land defense fails, another operation or several phased major operations will be necessary to regain lost territory. Further, even if CINC-NORTH were successful in his defensive operation, the theater's "flashing sword of vengeance" would still be manifested in a maritime-based counter-offensive phase designed to destroy the Northern Fleet and regain lost alliance territory. With the present command structure, assigned areas of responsibility, and force allocations, CINC-NORTH is capable of fighting only the opening operation of a much larger campaign that must include subsequent maritime operations to achieve overall theater strategic objectives. Clearly, then, CINC-NORTH is not presently in a position to meet the Mendel and Banks tenets of providing an orderly schedule of strategic military decisions and phasing a series of related major operations.

Mendel and Banks make it explicit that "the campaign plan synchronizes land, sea, and air efforts against the enemy center of gravity." CINC-NORTH cannot effectively synchronize the air, land, and sea efforts for the entire Northern Region into a cohesive and synergistic whole because the maritime forces necessary to challenge and defeat the Northern Fleet belong to SACLANT. As noted at the outset, this is fundamentally a unity-of-command issue in that CINC-NORTH, SACLANT, and CINCHAN are conducting independent campaigns in overlapping areas of responsibility. However, SACLANT is the only commander with the forces capable of affecting the Soviet center of gravity, not CINC-NORTH. Therefore, under the present theater structure, CINC-NORTH cannot meet the campaign planning tenets of synchronization and orienting on the enemy's center of gravity.

Maritime Strategy as a Theater Warfighting Concept

Accepting the proposition that the Northern Region is largely a maritime theater, it is incumbent upon us to examine the Maritime Strategy as it might apply to the development of theater campaign plans in this area.

The Maritime Strategy is intended to be a conventional, offensively oriented warfighting strategy. The concept is designated "maritime" rather than "naval" because it is essentially a combined arms concept for maritime theaters, not simply a strategy for the employment of submarines and carrier battle forces.¹⁴ While the US Navy considers the Maritime Strategy global in nature, the concept has a regional focus, some features of which apply directly

to the operational level of war, especially in theater campaign planning and warfighting. The concept is broken down into three sequential phases:

Phase 1: Deterrence or transition to war.

Phase 2: Seizing the initiative.

Phase 3: Carrying the fight to the enemy.

While these phases do not represent a specific time schedule or campaign plan, they do provide a useful framework for planning.

Phase 1 seeks to "win the crisis, to control escalation, and . . . make our intentions clear to cede no area to the Soviets by default . . . through the early worldwide, decisive use of seapower."¹⁵ If such deterrence fails, rapid forward deployment of military forces becomes critical, especially in defending decisive points like the Norwegian airfields and in forcing Soviet attack submarines, surface ships, and aircraft into a defensive role oriented on protecting their nuclear ballistic missile subs.

During Phase 2 allied maritime forces would seek to exploit their qualitative advantage in antisubmarine warfare, aviation technology, command and control, and pilot training to seize control of the airspace over the Northern Region. Vital to this phase is the security or retaking of the Norwegian airfields and concomitant attack submarine operations to help clear the way for surface battlegroups.

"Carrying the fight to the enemy" in Phase 3 is dependent on sufficient attrition of Soviet naval and naval air forces. Then "carrier battlegroups and amphibious task forces would press home the initiative to destroy Soviet forces, regain lost territory, and support the theater land campaign."¹⁶ While this concept of challenging the Soviet fleet in its own home waters is not new, it does have important theater warfighting implications in that it seeks to strike at the Soviet center of gravity in that area, the Northern Fleet.¹⁷ Dr. Robert S. Wood, Dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College, cautions that the offensive flavor of Phase 3 "does not mean a foolhardy rush of forces into the Norwegian Sea but a sea, land, and air campaign partially sequential in character. The viability of various mixes and sequences requires intense campaign planning, gaming, and exercises."¹⁸

Success in Phases 2 and 3 depends on the ability of SACLANT to project adequate forces and transport the reinforcements so desperately needed by CINCNORTH. The principal maritime forces available to SACLANT are three: Standing Naval Forces Atlantic and the two components of the Maritime Contingency Force Atlantic: the Striking Fleet Atlantic and allied amphibious forces.¹⁹

Unlike NATO's Concept of Maritime Operations, which is merely a defensive concept designed to maintain the confusing status quo command structure, the Maritime Strategy provides the necessary direction for building a coherent theater campaign plan.²⁰

Mendel points out that campaign planning at the theater level must begin with the CINC's formulation of a *theater strategy* which applies to his entire area of responsibility throughout the encompassing periods of peace, crisis, and war. The CINC's theater strategy—

provides broad conceptual guidance for deterrence and prosecution of regional war The CINC's strategy is expressed in general terms of ends, ways, and means, with such objectives as "deter war" and "protect the seaward approaches to North America"; such concepts as "US conventional forces will be forward deployed" and "naval presence will be maintained along sea lines of communications"; and such broad categories of resources as "Marine expeditionary forces" and "division force equivalents."²¹ [italics supplied]

The fundamental concepts of the Maritime Strategy discussed above fit this purpose neatly in that they outline how the CINC in a NATO maritime theater would deter, and if necessary, transition to war. Further, they provide an overarching concept for prosecuting the regional campaign to support the theater of war campaign plan proposed by SACEUR. In the Northern Region the Maritime Strategy, with its phased peace-crisis-war approach, represents a theater of operations strategy which can help guide CINCNORTH's theater campaign planning effort.

Mendel goes on to say that the theater of war/theater of operations strategic statement is much too broad for the actual application of military forces. A campaign plan is needed to guide the warfighting itself, but before a comprehensive plan can be devised, the CINC must develop what we will call an *operational concept*.

The commander's operational concept is his visualization of how he intends to prosecute the campaign. It is necessarily broad in scope and purpose, providing only a general framework for follow-up planning. An example of an operational concept in CINCNORTH's theater might include an initial forward defense on land followed up by a theater-wide maritime counteroffensive to achieve the overall objectives of the theater strategy.²² Ideally, the operational concept should dovetail with the theater strategy; in this case it does because a maritime counteroffensive is expressly anticipated in Phases 2 and 3 of the Maritime Strategy.

Once the CINC has clearly defined his operational concept he can proceed with the development and preparation of the campaign plan itself. The campaign plan is essentially the CINC's "scheme of operational synchronization" of air, land, and sea forces within his theater of operations. Additionally, the campaign plan translates the CINC's vision and intent expressed in his operational concept into a more clearly defined sequencing of major operations.

Finally, depending on the nature of the campaign, the CINC's subordinate component commanders and/or joint and combined task force commanders

formulate supporting operations plans and orders. These documents detail the tactical functions of specific groupings of combat forces and round out the overall theater-wide planning effort.

While this construct represents only one approach to theater campaign planning, it does show how the Maritime Strategy can be used as a theater warfighting concept in an area dominated by maritime influences.


Conclusions and Recommendations

When NATO established AFNORTH in 1951 the primary concern in the north was Soviet ground operations against the Scandinavian and Jutland landmasses. The Soviet navy was merely an auxiliary force, clearly unable to challenge US and allied naval forces. In the last two decades, the scope of CINCNORTH's command has been overtaken by the Soviet naval buildup to the point that his current area of responsibility is now only a portion of a much larger maritime-oriented theater of operations.

Today, the Northern Region must be viewed as an organic entity—a theater of operations—which can be managed only through a maritime-oriented strategy aimed both at the Soviet Northern Fleet and at power projection against the shore.²³ This approach is vital to restoring the operational depth and agility currently lacking within CINCNORTH's area of responsibility.

Approaching the entire Northern Region as one unified theater of operations requires a fundamental readjustment of the present areas of command responsibility so as to enhance unity of command and focus the campaign planning effort. I recommend a new, single-theater area of responsibility subordinate to Allied Command Europe which encompasses all of the ocean areas north of the Greenland-Iceland-UK-Norway gap, including the Norwegian and Barents seas and their island chains; and all of the Scandinavian landmass (see Map 2).

Under this proposal SACLANT and CINCHAN would have to provide some maritime forces to bolster the "new" AFNORTH. A reinforcement of CINCNORTH's maritime forces could take several forms. One option is to expand Standing Naval Forces Atlantic and transfer it to CINCNORTH on a full-time basis. Another would be the creation of a Standing Naval Force for Northern Waters²⁴ perhaps reinforced with the three carriers of the Royal Navy. A third option would be to transfer command of the Striking Fleet from SACLANT through SACEUR to CINCNORTH upon its commitment north of the Greenland-Iceland-UK-Norway gap. Naval forces, like air forces, are inherently flexible; the Striking Fleet's ability to exploit its speed and power to move quickly to the theater would enable CINCNORTH to concentrate all maritime, land, and air forces at the decisive point of the campaign. Ideally, a combination of these options would ensure that CINCNORTH possesses



sufficient forces to gain time to launch a theater maritime counteroffensive at the appropriate time. Further, the clear transfer of command authority in each option fosters unity of command in the planning and execution of a campaign. And finally, the realignment of areas of responsibility and forces would enable SACLANT and CINCHAN to better concentrate their efforts on maintaining security of the vital Atlantic and Channel avenues.


The line between the land and the sea is blurred at the operational level of war; any prospective maritime counteroffensive launched by CINCNORTH will rely heavily on a secure land flank. This means that CINCNORTH's land forces must be strengthened, especially to maintain control of key air bases. Early warning, rapid deployment of light forces, and prepositioning of equipment are only partial solutions. The key to ensuring a strong land flank rests on convincing the Norwegians of the necessity of basing some heavier foreign forces in Norway or permitting more frequent and larger exercises in their country. Such forces need not be—indeed, *should* not be—solely US. Rather, they should be multi-

national and European to demonstrate a broad commitment to deterrence and an unwillingness to concede any territory to the Soviets in the Northern Region.

Since the security of Denmark, the northern portion of the FRG, and the Baltic approaches is more directly related to allied success in the Central Region, AFCENT's area of responsibility should also be expanded to include this area. A former deputy commander of Allied Forces Baltic Approaches, Lieutenant General Heinz von zur Gathen, supports this view, noting that "the defense of the Baltic approaches is closely linked to NATO's Central Region. Central Region land and air forces and those of the Baltic approaches are contiguous neighbors. They also face the same enemy. . . . It would seem logical for NATO to place the Baltic approaches under the command of the Central Region of ACE."²⁵

We may also conclude that the land orientation of AFNORTH's present command structure is inappropriate for planning and conducting a multi-phased campaign in a theater where maritime factors hold the key to strategic military decisions. In recognition of the decidedly maritime nature of the region, CINCNORTH should be a naval officer. The command should, however, remain subordinate to Allied Command Europe to enhance unity of command and effort throughout the European theater of war. The proposed structure is depicted in the diagram below.

To further enhance unity of command, CINCNORTH should be dual-hatted as the Commander, Allied Naval Forces, Northern Europe, exercising operational command over all allied naval and amphibious forces transferred to him in time of war. Major General Sir Jeremy Moore, commander of British land



In recognition of the decidedly maritime nature of the region, CINCNORTH should be a naval officer, subordinate to the SACEUR.

forces in the 1982 Falklands War, supports this concept, observing that "the essential nature of the Northern theater . . . being a maritime one, . . . for the most efficient execution in war the command [in AFNORTH] ought to be maritime."²⁶

CINCNORTH, paralleling the structure of AFSOUTH, would have subordinate component commanders responsible for land and air operations throughout the theater. These commanders would be designated Commander, Allied Land Forces, Northern Europe, and Commander, Allied Air Forces, Northern Europe. This structural change would eliminate the regional subcommands now in place, strengthen unity of command, and permit CINCNORTH to concentrate his forces at critical points in the theater instead of trying to defend weakly everywhere. CINCNORTH would still be able, under this design, to form joint and combined task forces for specific missions within the theater of operations. Overall, this comprehensive restructuring of AFNORTH would focus campaign planning responsibility in one commander instead of the current three.

Finally, the maritime nature of this theater of operations warrants a maritime approach to warfighting. Campaign planning within the Northern Region would be enhanced by applying selected elements of the Maritime Strategy to the planning process. Specifically, concepts inherent in the Maritime Strategy have application in the Northern Region as a possible theater strategy for CINCNORTH which, when properly incorporated into the campaign planning process, can only improve the overall preparation of a unified combined campaign plan for the Northern Region.

NOTES

1. Northern European Command (NEC) is an equivalent term used in NATO jargon for this command. For simplicity's sake we will use the term AFNORTH.

2. The Mendel and Banks study examined four US Army component commands, four US unified commands, and six combined commands (the latter including Combined Forces Command in Korea). Though their focus was clearly on the Central Region, the authors' conclusions certainly pertain to campaign planning in AFNORTH and the Northern Region as well. (See Wm. W. Mendel and Floyd T. Banks, "Campaign Planning: Getting It Straight," *Parameters*, 18 (September 1988), 43-53; see also Wm. W. Mendel, "Theater Strategy and the Theater Campaign Plan: Both are Essential," *Parameters*, 18 (December 1988), 42-48. For the study on which these articles were based, consult Mendel and Banks, *Campaign Planning*, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: USAWC, Strategic Studies Institute, 1988).

3. The remaining three tenets are as follows: (1) Provides broad concepts of operations and sustainment to achieve military objectives in a theater of war or theater of operations; serves as the basis for all other

planning and clearly defines what constitutes success; (2) composes subordinate forces and designates command relationships; (3) Provides operational direction and tasks to subordinates. These three tenets also apply to campaign planning in the Northern Region, of course, and should be incorporated in any comprehensive planning effort. Mendel and Banks, "Campaign Planning: Getting it Straight," p. 46.

4. Department of Defense, JCS Publication 1, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington: GPO, 1 June 1987), pp. 34, 370.

5. Geoffrey Howlett, "Concepts and Future Capabilities in NATO's Northern Region," *RUSI Journal*, 133 (Autumn 1988), 13.

6. The Canadian Air-Sea Transportable Brigade is being withdrawn to augment the 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group in the Central Region. These two units will form the nucleus of a new wartime headquarters, the 1st Canadian Division.

7. Geoffrey Howlett, "Alliance Defense of the Northern Flank," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, 31 (December 1986), 22.

8. H. F. Zeiner-Gundersen, "NATO's Northern Flank," in *NATO's Maritime Flanks: Problems and Prospects*, Volume 3 in *The Atlantic Alliance and Western Security: The Maritime Dimension*, a collection of three Special Reports published under the auspices of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis [no editor] (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1987), p. 13.

9. Zeiner-Gundersen, p. 10; and Howlett, "Alliance Defense of the Northern Flank," p. 21.

10. See "Conference Discussion" following Part IV in Geoffrey Till, ed., *Britain and NATO's Northern Flank* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), p. 127: "The NATO tendency to compartmentalize its area of responsibility into discrete regions and not relate them very much to each other tends to conceal the need to work out priorities. It may therefore be that . . . some of the runners do not turn up on the day of the race because they are away somewhere else. This could happen in BALTAP or north Norway."

11. Milan Vego, "The Soviet Envelopment Option in a NATO Contingency: Implications for Alliance Strategy," in *NATO's Maritime Flanks: Problems and Prospects*, p. 104.

12. Zeiner-Gundersen, p. 11; and Vego, pp. 92-95.

13. NATO planners emphasize deterrence over warfighting, focusing their efforts on the transition from peace to war and the preparation of General Defense Plans. Because campaign plans can be construed as having an offensive purpose, planning for operations beyond the initial forward defense phase is considered inconsistent with NATO's charter. While such political restrictions are recognized, our concern remains the soldier's obligation for effective coalition warfare planning.

14. Robert S. Wood, "Maritime-Air Operations in the North: American Perspectives," in *Britain and NATO's Northern Flank*, ed. Geoffrey Till (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), p. 94.

15. James D. Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, Special Edition (January 1986), 9.

16. Hugh K. O'Donnell, Jr., "Northern Flank Maritime Offensive," *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, 111 (September 1985), 28.

17. Harlan Ullman, *Future Imperative: National Security and the US Navy in the Late 1980s* (Washington: Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1985), p. 17.

18. Wood, p. 99.

19. Ellmann Ellingsen, ed., "Military Balance 1983-1984," in the *Norwegian Version of I.I.S.S.* (excerpt written under the auspices of the Norwegian Atlantic Committee, FR. HANSEN Plass 6, Oslo 1), p. 10.

20. Till, p. 124. Further, in the author's view NATO's Concept of Operations and other peacetime cross-command agreements are inadequate substitutes for rigorous campaign planning. In such agreements, responsibilities tend to be divided rather than focused on the kind of clearly defined end state that can come only from a single commander's vision for the campaign.

21. William W. Mendel, "Theater Strategy and the Theater Campaign Plan: Both Are Essential," pp. 43-44.

22. Another example of a commander's operational concept is CINCENT's *Operational Guideline* (Bonn, 20 August 1987) in which the CINC visualizes a campaign involving a "first battle," a "second battle," and perhaps "subsequent operations."

23. Thomas E. Campbell, "The Baltic Approaches: A Strategic Naval Alternative for the Northern Flank," unpublished research paper, US Naval War College, 22 June 1984, p. ii.

24. Geoffrey Till and Richard King, "A Standing Naval Force for Northern Waters?" *Naval Forces*, 8 (No. V, 1987), 16.

25. Heinz von zur Gathen, "The Federal Republic of Germany's Contribution to the Defense of Northern Europe," in *Northern Europe: Security Issues for the 1990s*, eds. Paul M. Cole and Douglas M. Hart (London: Westview Press, 1986), p. 62.

26. Jeremy Moore, "Land-Air Operations in the North," in *Britain and NATO's Northern Flank*, ed. Geoffrey Till (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), p. 137.

Whither the Long Peace?

STERLING J. KERNEK

During the early 1980s two contradictory currents of thought developed. On the one hand, a brief revival of Cold War rhetoric, an intensification of the arms race, and other manifestations of Soviet-American antagonism provoked widespread fears of nuclear devastation. The popular acclaim given to Jonathan Schell's *The Fate of the Earth*, a polemic about nuclear holocaust, reflected that phenomenon.¹ On the other hand, a nascent school of thought began to coalesce around the notion that we are living in a long period of great-power peace. By the mid-80s—about the same time the Reagan Administration softened its attitude toward the Soviet Union—references to various stabilizing factors and the improbability of great-power war had begun to constitute a strong trend in political commentary. Among the most cogent leaders of this development are such distinguished scholars as John Lewis Gaddis, K. J. Holsti, Paul W. Schroeder, Kenneth Waltz, and (more recently) John Mueller.² Buoyed by the rhetoric of “new thinking,” *glasnost*, *perestroika*, and the Reagan-Gorbachev summits, the long-peace theme quickly became fashionable. Yet, while many optimistic remarks have been triggered by recent developments, the long-peace interpretation holds that some key sources of peace and stability have been underlying realities for about two generations.

Of course, those realities did not go entirely unnoticed as they emerged. Indeed, F. H. Hinsley made a prescient case for the central concept of a durable post-1945 peace between leading powers in *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*, published in 1963.³ A couple of years later the book *The Cold War . . . and After*, by Charles O. Lerche, Jr., argued that in the view of both Moscow and Washington “a major war between the Soviet Union and the United States is highly improbable, indeed, virtually impossible.”⁴ Many years passed, however, before this view began to gain widespread acceptance.

Not until the post-1945 period approximately equaled the duration of earlier eras that were free of major war—i.e. about 40 years—did the long-peace interpretation acquire widespread credibility among many scholars.⁵ The increased study of how and why major war was avoided has, in turn, yielded additional insights that enhance the plausibility of what can now be

called the long-peace interpretation—a reevaluation of post-1945 Soviet-American relations as a long and relatively benign period of great-power peace that has been based on much more than containment policies and a balance of power. The long-peace interpretation will help supplant heretofore popular assumptions about the nature and dangers of Soviet-American rivalry, and it has some interesting implications that should be considered in analyses of the recent dramatic changes in East-West relations.

The first task in this article is to demonstrate briefly that a convincing and quite elaborate interpretative framework is emerging, one supporting the view that a pronounced long-peace phase of history commenced after World War II, even though we speak of this period as the Cold War. Then, primarily through an examination of historical parallels, we shall reflect on the promising possibilities for extending the long peace into the post-Cold War era.

The Long-Peace View

Attempting to combine elements from various related works into a coherent synthesis does not imply that all the authors cited have demonstrated unanimity on all points. Moreover, some scholars who have not to my knowledge embraced the long-peace thesis in general terms have provided insights that support it. Given the limits of space, let me also plead that it is impossible to be comprehensive. In this article, the goal is merely to survey enough of the major indicators to suggest that the long-peace thesis is well beyond the status of hypothesis, and has now become a rather widely held interpretation.

- *Aversion to Major War.* The first and most obvious tenet in support of the long-peace interpretation is that the current great-power peace has been sustained by an aversion to the destructiveness of modern warfare. The nuclear balance of terror has become well-established as a seemingly obvious (although unprovable) truism, but even the fear of nonnuclear (so-called conventional) wars can be regarded as a powerful stabilizing factor in relations between the major powers.⁶

- *Renunciation of the Right to Initiate War.* F. H. Hinsley argues that the leading states have, in fact, renounced what had long prevailed as a right to initiate war. The nominal transformation of war offices or departments into defense ministries or departments reflects the normative change. This has not

Dr. Sterling J. Kernek is a professor of history at Western Illinois University, where he teaches courses in US and European diplomacy. He earned a B.A. from the American University in Washington, D.C., an M.A. from the University of Western Australia, and a Ph.D. from Cambridge University. His published works include a book-length monograph about the British government's relations with Woodrow Wilson during the First World War and various articles about the diplomacy of Wilson, Henry Kissinger, and Ronald Reagan.

meant, of course, that the great powers have ceased using military force, but they have rationalized their warmaking as a police action or as military assistance in response to a request for aid.⁷ To be sure, the practical significance of this normative revolution is difficult to assess since rationalization seems to be a universally practiced art in international relations.

John Mueller gives special emphasis to normative transformation. Stressing that war is a social institution that can change, he draws analogies with the abolition of serfdom, slavery, and dueling. In his view, war becomes obsolete as nations come to regard it as abhorrent or ridiculous.⁸

• *Rules of the Game.* To help stabilize and manage their competitive relationship, the superpowers have developed and have generally followed what Seweryn Bialer has called "tacit rules of prudence."⁹ They have, for example, usually maneuvered to avoid direct military confrontations and have consistently shown restraint in numerous crises from the Berlin blockade and airlift of 1948 to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. They have also displayed restraint when dealing with areas where their principal rival has clearly staked out special interests. While this tacit rule regarding respect for spheres of interest has been less scrupulously followed than the avoidance of direct confrontation, the pattern is discernible.¹⁰ Consider US restraint during the suppression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 and of the Prague Spring in 1968. As for the Western Hemisphere, one could cite Soviet passivity regarding the Central Intelligence Agency's overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman in Guatemala in 1954, the US military intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, and the invasion of Grenada in 1983.

Stanley Hoffmann has referred to rules of crisis management. When confrontations have occurred the superpowers have sought a "negotiable way out." They have also restrained their clients.¹¹ Gaddis has emphasized the rule that nuclear weapons are to be used only as an "ultimate resort." Although nuclear threats have been made, especially during the first two decades after Hiroshima, the top statesmen have always shied away from their use—even when they were caught in a military stalemate or losing a war.¹²

• *Peripheral Positions and Mutually Tolerable Interests.* History and geography provide additional insights into the long peace. One of the most stable periods of great-power relations—the heyday of the Concert of Europe following the final defeat of Napoleon in 1815—featured the dominating influence of Russia and Britain, two flanking or "peripheral powers."¹³ Since 1945 Russia and the United States have occupied a strikingly analogous position, albeit on a larger scale.

The current long peace may reflect a fortuitous situation in which the superpowers have, despite their ideological antagonism, mutually tolerable interests. As Kenneth Waltz observed in his *Theory of International Politics*, "The United States, and the Soviet Union as well, have more reason to be satisfied

with the status quo than most earlier great powers had.”¹⁴ Citing Waltz among others, Gaddis points to the “mutual independence” that is remarkably apparent in the Soviet-American relationship despite their extensive involvement in the rest of the world.¹⁵ Neither is economically dependent on the other in a critical way. “Geographical remoteness” has also helped them avoid clashes. Their relations are not complicated by serious boundary disputes, and their vital spheres of influence do not overlap.

- *European Stability.* The postwar territorial and political arrangements, which evolved more by inadvertence than by design, have yielded fortuitous advantages in Europe. The division of Germany constituted a long-lasting solution to the very troublesome German problem that had imperiled the Continent before the First and Second World Wars. As A. W. DePorte remarked in his perceptive analysis of this development, “Thanks, ironically, to the cold war, the outcome of World War II was more sound, more lasting and systemically more beneficent than that of World War I.”¹⁶

The successes of the European integration movement have further reinforced stability in that region. The European Community now seems to be virtually free of the threat of war between its members. Meanwhile, Western Europe and the United States indirectly benefitted from the *Pax Sovietica* in Eastern Europe. While American leaders regretted the trampling of human rights, peace was ensured between the traditionally quarrelsome Balkan states, which historically have been a dangerous source of instability.

- *The Beneficent Impact of the United States.* In sustaining the post-1945 great-power peace, the United States played a beneficent role that is somewhat analogous to the influence exerted by Britain during most of the 19th century. While promoting US interests, Washington helped others by ensuring freedom of the seas and by fostering the International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Also, by providing military security to Japan and West Germany, the United States has helped them sustain a high rate of investment in their export and consumer economies, thus promoting their transformation into relatively peaceful states.¹⁷

- *The Reconnaissance Revolution.* Gaddis has repeatedly stressed the salutary effects of what he calls the “reconnaissance revolution.” The development of spy satellites and other sophisticated devices in the past two decades has provided the leaders of the superpowers with extraordinarily comprehensive and detailed information about each other’s military and economic capabilities. Not only does this reduce the chances of war by surprise attack, but it also reduces the chances for a war stemming—as so many wars have—from a flawed assessment of relative power.¹⁸

- *The Benefits of Bipolarity.* An obvious aspect of the superpower rivalry in the current long peace has been bipolarity. The extent to which that bipolarity continues is a debatable question, but the Soviet Union and the United

States clearly dominated many important events during the first two decades of the Cold War and they remain militarily in an exclusive leading position. This is an important issue in the long-peace interpretation because of a theory (principally formulated by Waltz) that the bipolar configuration of the post-1945 period may be inherently more stable than the multipolar systems that characterized the classic periods of European diplomacy. One stabilizing characteristic is its relative simplicity. Even amateurish, mediocre, and provincial leaders can manage it. The superpowers, being in a class by themselves, are less subject to the pressures of a smaller ally that may change sides. Crises that do arise become relatively inconsequential. Waltz concludes: "Each can lose heavily only in war with the other."¹⁹ Gaddis agrees, noting an interesting consequence of bipolarity. While defections of allies are "more tolerable," in his view, the "alliances are more durable"—as the remarkable longevity of NATO demonstrates.²⁰

Another factor stabilizing the post-1945 bipolar system is that it "realistically reflected the facts of where military power resided at the end of World War II." As Gaddis explains, this differs "markedly from the settlement of 1919, which made so little effort to accommodate the interests of Germany and Soviet Russia."²¹

• *The Counterproductive Results of Expansion.* Industrial productivity and technological sophistication have supplanted population and territory as keys to power. Moreover, there is a much more widespread recognition that even the expansion of influence can be costly to the point of being counterproductive. As Waltz observed, "In power and in wealth, both [superpowers] gain more by the peaceful development of internal resources than by wooing and winning—or by fighting and subduing—other states in the world."²² In the 1980s, the Soviet Union bore heavy burdens in Cuba, Vietnam, and Afghanistan. Such costs have from time to time helped restrain the traditional expansionist tendencies of the Soviet Union. Indeed, the costs of military intervention combined with a desire to concentrate on accelerating internal socioeconomic development apparently brought about a dramatic decision in the Kremlin to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Perhaps this move reflected the realization in Moscow that the Soviet Union reached the practicable limits of its domination soon after the end of the Second World War.²³ The spectacular and rapid changes in Eastern Europe during 1989, and continuing to the present, have raised speculation that even those limits are receding.

The Post-Cold War Era

Those who embrace the long-peace interpretation will generally be regarded as very optimistic.²⁴ That seems obvious since the long-peace thesis stresses various beneficial factors that prevent great-power war. Moreover, the implications of the growing acceptance of the long-peace interpretation are, on balance, likely to be advantageous.

Yet, the shift to a new interpretation, the remarkable reforms afoot in Eastern Europe, and other great changes also pose some potential drawbacks. Unfortunate possibilities could arise as we move into a new era.

Perhaps during the next generation historians will commonly divide the post-1945 long peace into a Cold War period and a post-Cold War era. Ascertaining when (or if) the Cold War ended is, of course, a slippery task. Gary Trudeau simply announced its end in his "Doonesbury" comic strip in June 1988. The President is told "It's over and we won!" Scholars, of course, tend to trace its demise through a more complex process. In his book *Retreat from Doomsday*, John Mueller writes: "As far as the threat of major war has been concerned, the Cold War has gradually mellowed. It has been in remission at least since 1963 with respect to the Soviets and since the early 1970s with respect to the Chinese."²⁵ But the final demise of the Cold War may, according to Mueller, have been signaled by General Secretary Gorbachev's apparent abandonment of the Soviet Union's "revolutionary commitment to worldwide revolution—or at least toward reducing that commitment to warm smiles and lip service."²⁶ Such a fundamental change tends to obviate the containment policy implemented by the Truman Administration and sustained by all subsequent US Presidents.

Despite pointed prompts from news reporters during the December 1989 Malta Summit, no agreement on whether the Cold War has indeed ended was jointly pronounced by George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev. Yet President Bush has been under considerable pressure to welcome Gorbachev's initiatives and to respond positively. After his Administration's lengthy review of East-West relations, Bush announced on 12 May 1989: "Now is the time to move beyond containment. . . . The United States has as its goal much more than simply containing Soviet expansionism: We seek the integration of the Soviet Union into the community of nations."²⁷

Although the pressure for accommodation and aid might increase as long as reform continues in the East, and although the results of the Malta Summit would seem to confirm the sentiment expressed by Bush in the quotation above, the President can be expected to remain primarily intent on preventing Gorbachev's initiatives from breaking up the containment apparatus established during the past two generations. Bush demonstrated his concern by moving quickly in the spring of 1989 to attempt to resolve disagreements within NATO regarding modernization of short-range missiles and the scheduling of disarmament negotiations. The West German public, now less concerned about the Soviet threat and encouraged by favorable signs of change in the East, demands indications of progress toward nuclear disarmament in Europe.

With so much as prologue, let us now reflect on several factors that bear specifically on prospects for extending the long peace into the post-Cold War era.

• *The Shrinking Soviet Threat.* Although the United States has a different strategic perspective from that of West Germany, trends in the Federal Republic apparently foreshadowed a significant drop in the American public's concern about the Soviet threat and a consequent decrease in support for defense and aid to allies. While a good case could be made that the United States has maintained remarkably consistent commitments since the foreign policy initiatives of the Truman Administration, it should be kept in mind that most of those commitments have been substantially based on a popular belief in the necessity of containing Soviet communism. Emphasizing the Soviet threat has been a key political tactic in building mass support for an active international role and a strong defense.²⁸ US leaders may find it more difficult to sustain a vigorous global role without a credible foreign threat.

The origins of the use of the Soviet threat are quite complex. Despite some intriguing "new left" suggestions that the Soviet threat was largely a deliberate exaggeration, recent scholarship has tended to present a more balanced view—acknowledging that policymakers had real and sincere concerns about communist expansion even though they often overestimated the threat. Paraphrasing Sigmund Freud's apt observation that "even paranoids can have real enemies," Gaddis noted that "fear . . . can be genuine without being rational."²⁹

The plausibility of the anti-Soviet themes in containment policy will be further diminished by acceptance of certain tenets in the long-peace interpretation, for example, recognition that Moscow has, in fact, usually followed tacit rules of prudence, or appreciation of the fact that the Soviet Union does not have any intractable territorial disputes with the United States. Much more spectacularly, of course, Gorbachev's peace initiatives are transforming the Soviet image.

By weakening Western alliances, diminishing US influence as a guarantor of security, and eroding support for defense spending or foreign aid, the waning of the Soviet threat undermines bipolarity. If, as the long-peace interpretation suggests, bipolarity has helped to maintain order, any factor that undermines it could increase instability. That may be cause to regret the decline of the superpowers. As Norman Graebner writes, "Established trends in world politics predict the continued erosion of the American and Soviet positions." He notes, however, that this is not necessarily occurring "at the same rate" for each side.³⁰

• *The Asymmetrical Decline of the Superpowers.* Despite American fears of decline, the country will probably come to realize that it is securely in a class by itself. No rival currently can challenge the global preeminence of the United States. Zbigniew Brzezinski rules out any rival for the foreseeable future.³¹ Samuel P. Huntington identifies the European Community as a potential challenger, but that is contingent on its becoming "politically cohesive,"³² a possibility that Brzezinski discounts.

Yet, even if the European Community fails to achieve political cohesion, US influence there seems destined to diminish as fear of the USSR

wanes. In a related development, a mixture of decline and "new thinking" may mean the demise of the *Pax Sovietica* in its principal sphere of influence. Thus, the specter of serious trouble in Eastern Europe seems to be rising as an imperial order recedes. One immediately thinks of the destabilizing role played by the Balkans in the turmoil leading to the outbreak of the First World War. Given the irredentist antagonisms that still fester in the region, the potential for trouble remains enormous. It may become commonplace for future commentators to refer wistfully to the good old days of the Cold War when the United States and the USSR kept the peace in Europe.

Balkan history also flashes a warning that leaders in the Kremlin may show less flexibility in future crises, especially if Gorbachev's reforms fail to reverse the relative decline of the Soviet Union. The recent withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan—though wise and constructive—is nevertheless a retreat, and it has probably heightened Soviet sensitivity to future defeats. That effect could last a long time even if the pro-Soviet Afghan government survives. Further setbacks will only aggravate fears of declining prestige. During the July crisis of 1914, Russia showed great reluctance to back down, in part because it had suffered a diplomatic humiliation in the Bosnian crisis of 1908-09.

• *Dangers in Declining Tensions.* Another warning flag in the historical record is that a serious danger of war can remain even while adversaries are achieving agreements on contentious issues and while tensions are declining. Germany and Britain, for instance, seemed to be enjoying an improvement in their relations on the eve of the crisis that precipitated the First World War.³³ This point—along with some of the less sanguine implications of the long-peace interpretation—gives rise to interesting but perplexing questions. Will the growing realization that we live in a period of great-power peace actually tend to endanger the current international system? Could the persistence of real danger through several more decades of the long peace create conditions for a very perilous irony?

It seems plausible that if the Soviet Union and the United States continue for decade after decade to resolve disputes and intermittent crises peacefully, apathy regarding the dangers of war will become pandemic. A serious Soviet-American confrontation has not occurred since the global military alert associated with the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, and that incident was far less serious than the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. If confidence in peace breeds apathy and boredom, it could insidiously reduce the inhibitions and fears that have prompted the superpowers to evolve prudent and tacit rules of the game. Thus, an inclination to take risks in pursuit of advantages or prestige may eventually offset the careful practice of scrupulously avoiding direct military confrontations. Incursions into the adversary's sphere of influence or brinksmanship in space—perhaps the downing of a spy satellite—may increasingly seem worth trying.³⁴ Such risks would, of course, be taken

on the calculation that the adversary would probably back down, but the hope that war can be avoided does not prevent risk-taking from resulting in catastrophe. Consider 1914, when Austria and Germany risked a major war in their attempt to humiliate Serbia, a Russian client.

The darker implications of the long-peace interpretation underscore a continuing reality. While the current international system has powerful and persistent factors that prevent great-power war, it remains important (and may become increasingly vital) that policymakers be prudent and skillful. The reasons go beyond the obvious point that miscalculation in the nuclear age could be ruinous.

Just as the Munich analogy served as the most prevalent so-called lesson of history in justifications of containment, the 1914 analogy has constituted the most widely cited warning by those concerned about the need for caution and accommodation.³⁵ But there is another historical parallel that should be more widely contemplated. Norman Rich's book *Why the Crimean War? A Cautionary Tale* makes some points that relate to our current situation. The Crimean War marked the end of the heyday of the Concert of Europe, the impressive long peace that lasted from 1815 to 1854. The most distinctive feature of the period was the relatively extensive use of great-power cooperation and consultation to prevent crises from resulting in a major war. There were also impressive efforts to restrain disruptive behavior by including all of the leading states in the conferences that presided over the international order. Rich concluded: "The policy of bringing all the great powers into the system, of keeping them 'grouped,' as the technique came to be called, appears in retrospect to have been the most effective method employed by the statesmen of the concert for the preservation of peace."³⁶

Perhaps President Bush is on the right track when he speaks of moving beyond containment by integrating "the Soviet Union into the community of nations." This might include, for example, seeking the active cooperation of Moscow as a partner in settling (or at least dampening) the Arab-Israeli dispute.³⁷ That would truly signal a Western departure from containment and might help lead us toward the establishment of a more constructive pattern of relations between the superpowers.³⁸

A possible advantage in such a departure is that it could help stabilize an international system that is undergoing potentially dangerous changes. The study of history reminds us, even as we notice repetitious patterns and cycles, that change will occur. In a recent article, Gaddis suggested the importance of thinking about how to maintain a peaceful "Soviet-American relationship in a shifting international system."³⁹ The creation of a new (and necessarily more progressive) concert of leading powers would provide a vehicle for reassuring the Soviet Union of continued prestige and influence despite its relative decline.

The 1914 analogy offers a final historical parallel to underscore the importance of alleviating the anxiety of a declining power. Austria and

Germany felt that they were militarily strong in the short term but they acutely feared decline in the long run. That feeling fostered the mood in which they proved to be willing to risk a major war.

Reasonable Hopes

The best that the West could reasonably expect might be limited success for Gorbachev's reforms—enough to sustain the Soviet Union as a stable leading power without making it a more formidable rival than it has been. One hesitates to wish him spectacular success in light of Russia's long history of intermittent expansionist adventures. While it may be true that the nature of the Soviet regime is changing (as George Kennan predicted it would when he originally sketched a containment policy for the Truman Administration), Russia's record of autocracy and totalitarianism should dampen any great expectations for a liberal democratic transformation that *might* make the USSR a more peaceful state.⁴⁰ Consequently it remains reassuring that historically Russia has had a relatively inefficient economy.

Reassurance can also be derived from the probability that some factors identified as important in the post-1945 long peace will continue despite reform in the East. The favorable geographical positions of the United States and the USSR will, for example, obviously remain. President Bush's restrained response to the momentous changes in Eastern Europe during 1989 reflects awareness of the compelling need for continued understanding of the Soviet Union's interests in that sphere. Some other stabilizing factors may even be enhanced. Gorbachev's extraordinary willingness to open the Soviet arsenal to inspection will reinforce the beneficial effects of the reconnaissance revolution. To be sure, there is merit in warnings by cautious critics that reductions in Soviet military capabilities are lagging far behind the rhetoric of Gorbachev's disarmament proposals, and it seems likely that even impressive arms control agreements in the future will leave the Soviet Union with strong nuclear as well as conventional forces. Yet, if the balance of terror has helped keep the peace, we should not be dismayed by the likelihood that the military balance will persist.

The positive changes that have already occurred during the long peace are also worth emphasizing. Germans have developed what A. W. DePorte has called a "most un-Faustian sense of limits"⁴¹ after suffering defeat and the East-West division of Europe. Undoubtedly the great economic prosperity in West Germany has helped reconcile many Germans to the division of their country, and even if a revival of German nationalism brings about a reunified Germany, the consequences are not necessarily to be feared. Continued integration in the European Community could help minimize the dangers.⁴²

The foregoing analysis thus suggests that the post-Cold War era will prove to be another phase in a permanent great-power peace. Although historical warning flags should be heeded, nostalgia for the Cold War seems

decidedly unwarranted in light of the many encouraging changes and potentially great opportunities. The emergence of a real concert of the leading powers may even be possible in the decade ahead. Perhaps the two main conclusions that can reasonably be inferred from examination of the historical parallels are (1) that persistent efforts to create an effective concert should be made to compensate for any possible attenuation of the current long peace, and (2) that continued caution will remain desirable in our statesmen even if they manage to establish a more explicitly cooperative international system.

NOTES

I wish to acknowledge the help of Dr. William D. Anderson of Western Illinois University, who collaborated with me on a study that provided the synthesis of the long-peace interpretation treated here.

1. Jonathan Schell, *The Fate of the Earth* (New York: Avon Books, 1982).
2. John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," *International Security*, 10 (Spring 1986), 99-142. A slightly different version of this essay appeared in Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries in the History of the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1987), pp. 215-45. More recently he sketched his views in two articles: "How the Cold War Might End," *The Atlantic Monthly*, November 1987, pp. 88-100; and "Looking Back: The Long Peace," *The Wilson Quarterly*, 13 (New Year's, 1989), 42-45. Another recent and readable work is John Mueller's *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989). Mueller provided a preliminary summary of his views in "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World," *International Security*, 13 (Fall 1988), 55-79. For other representative works, see K. J. Holsti, "The Horsemen of the Apocalypse: At the Gate, Detoured, or Retreating?" *International Studies Quarterly*, 20 (December 1986), 355-72; Paul Schroeder, "Does Murphy's Law Apply to History?" *The Wilson Quarterly*, 9 (New Year's, 1985), 84-93; Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1979). See also, Waltz's "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better," *Adelphi Papers*, no. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981). Additional examples include Sterling J. Kernek, "Historical Reflections on the Dangers Ahead," *The Virginia Quarterly Review*, 60 (Spring 1984), 189-209; Linda R. Killen, *Soviet Union and the United States: A New Look at the Cold War* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989); and Jonathan Knight, "The Great Power Peace: The United States and the Soviet Union Since 1945," *Diplomatic History*, 6 (Spring 1982), 169-83.
3. F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1963).
4. Charles O. Lerche, Jr., *The Cold War . . . and After* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 115.
5. The earlier periods of long great-power peace are 1815 to 1854 and 1871 to 1914. They lasted almost 39 and over 43 years, respectively. The post-1945 long peace reached the 39 year mark in 1984. The post-1871 long peace could be reduced if one categorized the Russo-Japanese conflict of 1904-05 as a major war.
6. Mueller has made an elaborate case for this viewpoint. See *Retreat from Doomsday*, pp. 110-16, and "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons." It is worth mentioning, incidentally, that Hinsley presented a similar view over 25 years ago. See *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*, pp. 348-49, 353.
7. F. H. Hinsley, "Reflections on the Debate about Nuclear Weapons," *The Cambridge Review*, 7 February 1981, p. 72.
8. Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday*, pp. 9-13, 242-44, 264.
9. Seweryn Bialer, "Lessons of History: Soviet-American Relations in the Postwar Era," in *U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Next Phase*, ed. Arnold L. Horelick (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1986), pp. 90-92.
10. The tacit nature of the "sphere-of-interest" rule should be noted. In fact, "special rights or advantages" were disavowed by the superpowers in the 12 "Basic Principles" agreement of 1972. Ironically, this relatively weak tacit rule has been followed more consistently than the explicit principle.
11. Stanley Hoffmann, "Superpower Ethics: The Rules of the Game," *Ethics and International Affairs*, 1 (1987), 44.
12. Gaddis, "The Long Peace," pp. 136-38. It should not be assumed that fear of escalation or holocaust was the dominant consideration preventing the use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam or Afghanistan. See Gaddis's book, *The Long Peace*, pp. 141-42.
13. F. R. Bridge and Roger Bullen, *The Great Powers and the European States System, 1815-1914* (London: Longman, 1980), p. 30.

14. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 190.
15. Gaddis, "The Long Peace," pp. 112-13.
16. A. W. DePorte, *Europe Between the Superpowers: The Enduring Balance* (2d ed.; New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1986), p. 149.
17. As Schroeder has pointed out, this transformation also reflects larger historical processes. See "Murphy's Law," p. 92.
18. Gaddis, "The Long Peace," pp. 123-25. As Geoffrey Blainey noted, "Wars usually begin when fighting nations disagree on their relative strength." See Blainey, *The Causes of War* (London: Macmillan, 1973), p. 122.
19. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 172.
20. Gaddis, "The Long Peace," pp. 108-10.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 108.
22. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 191.
23. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*, pp. 352-53.
24. Hoffmann used the phrase "astonishingly optimistic." See Stanley Hoffmann, *Janus and Minerva: Essays in the Theory and Practice of International Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), p. 104.
25. Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday*, p. 214.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 211.
27. Janet Cawley, "Bush Prods Gorbachev on Reform," *Chicago Tribune*, 13 May 1989, pp. 1, 4.
28. Ernest R. May, "The Cold War," in *The Making of America's Soviet Policy*, ed. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1984), pp. 210, 226-27.
29. Gaddis, *The Long Peace*, p. 47. See also, Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday*, p. 213.
30. Norman A. Graebner, "Multipolarity in World Politics: The Challenge," *The Virginia Quarterly Review*, 64 (Summer 1988), 396.
31. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "America's New Geostrategy," *Foreign Affairs*, 66 (Spring 1988), 693-94.
32. Samuel P. Huntington, "The U.S.—Decline or Renewal?" *Foreign Affairs*, 67 (Winter 1988/89), 93.
33. See Laurence Lafore, *The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War I* (2d ed.; New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1971), pp. 200-02.
34. Although the deployment of reconnaissance satellites has undoubtedly been beneficial, further developments of such technology could have unfortunate consequences. Improvements in the capabilities of intelligence-gathering as well as communication satellites will increase their usefulness for managing battles. This will transform them into more valuable targets—thus providing a justification for developing better anti-satellite weapons. Paul Stares has pointed out that space "offers significant attractions as a medium for brinkmanship." By this he means that a superpower leader might be tempted to intercept satellites in a crisis because that option might appear to be a relatively inexpensive way to show determination and because the risks would be lower than if military forces crossed a national boundary or if someone were killed. The main drawback is, of course, that such brinkmanship could create dangerous uncertainties in a crisis. See Paul B. Stares, *Space and National Security* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1987), p. 137.
35. It is possible, of course, for hard-liners to use the 1914 analogy to support the same moral that is featured in the Munich analogy. See Patrick Glynn, "The Sarajevo Fallacy: The Historical and Intellectual Origins of Arms Control Theology," *The National Interest*, no. 9 (Fall 1987), 3-32.
36. Norman Rich, *Why the Crimean War? A Cautionary Tale* (Hanover, N.H.: Univ. Press of New England, 1985), p. 203.
37. In suggesting a similar approach to a Middle East settlement, Richard H. Ullman argued: "The United States has much to gain from treating the Soviet Union as an ordinary state in this situation." See Ullman, "Ending the Cold War," *Foreign Policy*, no. 72 (Fall 1988), 144-45.
38. In a well-received televised address on 22 November 1989, Bush asserted, "America wants the Soviets to join us in moving beyond containment to a new partnership." See *The New York Times*, 23 November 1989, p. A12. For an interesting historical sketch of what Gaddis calls the option of "cooperative coexistence," see his essay "The Evolution of U.S. Policy Goals Toward the USSR in the Postwar Era," in *Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy*, eds. Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum (Boulder: Westview, 1988), pp. 331-37.
39. Gaddis, "Looking Back: The Long Peace," p. 65.
40. Gaddis urges considering how democratization inside the Soviet Union might affect relations with the West. "If the historical record is any guide," he suggests, "the result could be to lessen still further the danger of military confrontation: Wars between democratic states have been rare indeed." *Ibid.*, p. 64. Mueller, using works by Michael Boyle, takes up the discussion in terms of liberal states. See *Retreat from Doomsday*, pp. 23-24.
41. DePorte, *Europe Between the Superpowers*, p. 187.
42. The shattering of the Berlin Wall, the present disarray of the communist leadership in East Germany, and prudent statesmanship in Bonn have fostered rethinking of the separation of the two Germanies. See Edward Cody, "Europeans Back German Reunification," *The Washington Post*, 10 December 1989, pp. A1, A38.

Soviet Reform and the High-Technology Imperative

DONALD M. SNOW

© 1990 Donald M. Snow

The furtive, headlong impetus of Mikhail S. Gorbachev's reform program has been with us for nearly five years, producing enormous changes in Soviet political and economic life. Although some question the permanence of change and speculate that failure could eventuate in a possible Stalinist reversal, the movement toward limited political democratization through *glasnost* (openness) and *perestroika* (economic restructuring) are well entrenched. The question is not the sincerity of Gorbachev's commitment to change; it is whether he can or will be able to change the system enough to succeed.¹

Gorbachev's problem is that he presides over a system truly resting on the horns of dilemma, the root cause of which is a creaky, uncompetitive economy mired in the First Industrial Revolution, while the Western capitalist democracies careen into the Third Industrial Revolution of high technology. To remain a superpower demands an economic transformation which—if possible at all—will result in a Soviet economy that is not recognizably socialist, if the shape of the high technology in the West is a guide. Thus Gorbachev faces an agonizing choice: he can remain true to Marxist economics and watch Soviet superpower status fade; or he can choose to try to make the Soviet economic system—and, given the impact of high technology on military matters, the military system as well—competitive and watch Soviet socialism dissipate. From his perspective, it is a devil's choice.

The heart of the problem, and much of its solution, lies in high technology. Recent analyses have made passing reference to this factor, but have failed to acknowledge its centrality. My thesis is that the role of high technology is crucial, that the Soviets know it, and that the Gorbachev program makes sense specifically in terms of a Soviet attempt to join high-tech society. To do so, they must do two things. First, they must restructure

Soviet society to create the seedbeds for the growth of high technology. Principally, this means creating incentive and reward systems for high technology entrepreneurship and an open flow of ideas and information; these are the goals of *glasnost* and *perestroika*. Second, they must knock down the barriers to Soviet participation in the international high-technology community. This requires removing self-imposed economic barriers and anti-technology-transfer barriers erected by the West; this is the goal of the new political thinking.

Gorbachev and his advisors recognize the problem and the need to attack it. They view an economic and political system in continuing crisis. The problem arose during what Gorbachev and his followers call the period of stagnation during the Brezhnev era, when the continued application of Stalinist command economy methods brought economic growth to a grinding halt while the world economy expanded around them. As Gorbachev puts it, "A country that was once quickly closing on the world's advanced nations began to lose one position after another."² Making matters worse, he argues, a number of domestic problems had accumulated over time and began to surface as reform unfolded.³

The Soviets, revealing motives that are doubtless partly political (discrediting Brezhnev to enhance Gorbachev) and partly economic, have no trouble assigning blame. Even conservative Yegor Ligachov, writing before his recent retirement from the Politburo, acknowledged that scientific and technical progress had largely ceased under the Stalinist system as continued by Brezhnev, thus leading to the need for basic reform of the economy.⁴ Tying general economic progress to scientific and technological proficiency suggests the direction of reform as well. For instance, Soviet economist Abel Aganbegyan, who has emerged as one of Gorbachev's closest advisors, has argued for movement from a command, centrally controlled economy toward a more democratic, independent, self-managing economy, recognizing full well the fundamental changes this will entail.⁵

Most Westerners agree with this economic assessment and with the consequent notions that radical transformation is necessary and that the problems have reached crisis proportions beyond solution through traditional Soviet methods.⁶ Disagreement in the West exists over the adequacy or

Dr. Donald M. Snow is Visiting Professor of Political Science in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the US Army War College. A Professor of Political Science at the University of Alabama, he has also served as Secretary of the Navy Senior Research Fellow at the US Naval War College and Visiting Professor at the US Air Command and Staff College. The author of ten books and over 30 articles and book chapters, Snow's most recent book is *Soviet-American Security Relations in the 1990s*.

possibility of adequate remedy—whether the Soviets will move to something akin to full-scale market economics, a prospect that economic autonomy in the Baltic states raises—or whether it is possible to retrieve a situation that already is beyond saving. Moreover, as the Baltic states and the introduction of the information revolution into a heretofore closed society suggest, the crisis also has clear political implications.

The desperation of present conditions and prospects explains the tempo of change, particularly in the fields of domestic political liberalization and foreign policy initiative. Individual arms control and international political normalization proposals can be written off by skeptics as either public relations ploys to maximize “Gorby fever” or as conscious deceit to cause Western governments unilaterally to engage in defense cuts. Similarly, domestic political actions can be interpreted as stopgap efforts to stimulate worker productivity or as little more than highly visible but ephemeral and reversible phenomena. But such arguments beg the more fundamental point: the Soviets must change in the ways they *are* changing if they are to have any chance to compete technologically.

For present purposes, high technology refers to the revolutionary growth in knowledge development and generation (largely the product of computer and computer-related discoveries), information processing and dissemination (the telecommunication revolution), and a highly diverse set of associated and derivative technologies that cumulatively define technological preeminence. This phenomenon has so far been largely limited to the Western industrial democracies. Seweryn Bialer has been among the leading academic observers of this transformation, arguing that the Third Industrial Revolution, as it is often called, has produced a revolution of communications, information, and services of unprecedented magnitude.⁷ This change is so fundamental that those who understand and master it will be tomorrow’s winners, and those who ignore it will be tomorrow’s losers.⁸

Soviet absence from the third industrial or high-technology revolution is partly imposed by a West worried that the Soviets will turn dual-use high technologies to military ends and partly self-imposed by traditional Soviet isolationist economic policies. The result, however, is progressive Soviet non-competitiveness, because the momentum of technological competition has a cumulative effect marked by fierce inter-company and international competition and the constant movements of innovators and ideas.⁹

This dynamic captures much of the problem identified at the outset. First, it reflects the two primary characteristics of high technology that are simultaneously traditional Soviet disadvantages: the highly innovative nature of high-technology environments and the increasingly international nature of high-technology production and competition. Moreover, the historical timing could not have been worse for the Soviets: the Third Industrial Revolution of

the capitalist world coincided with the downturn in the Soviet economy. The simultaneity of these two developments, according to Bialer, was "calamitous for the domestic and international aspirations of the Soviet rulers."¹⁰

The Soviet dilemma is more than a general economic problem of competitive disadvantage, although it is that too. More fundamentally, years of devoting the best scientific manpower in the Soviet Union to defense projects or sandwiching them into the stifling, bureaucratic environment of huge research institutes has left the Soviet technological base, as well as the general economic base, perilously behind the West. In addition, the political dimension continues to intrude: political authoritarianism and the information revolution do not coexist easily.

The problem is cumulative and circular, and it is getting worse. It is cumulative in that now-missing technological applications (e.g. robotics, computer-aided design and manufacturing) could be used to improve the quality and quantity of basic Soviet goods and services, as well as providing the basis for more sophisticated production down the road. It is circular because Soviet innovators who might make the efforts to advance technology see no material incentives to do so because any resulting improved potential would not be manifested in the civil sector. It is getting worse, because a number of the emerging high technologies are dual-use, with both civilian commercial and military applications, and these new technologies are the basis for yet newer technologies. Moreover, efforts are hampered by a lack of hard-currency capital for investment.

Most Western observers acknowledge these Soviet difficulties, although they rarely recognize their centrality in explaining the Soviet dilemma. A recent *Business Week* study, for instance, argues simply that advanced technology is crucial to Gorbachev's plan to restructure the economy and that his policy of *perestroika* is essentially geared toward pushing the Soviet Union into the late 20th century.¹¹ Bialer maintains that part of Gorbachev's motivation has to do with power and status because Soviet leaders understand that their country's destiny of international greatness has been called into question, creating a sense of urgency in countering the economic and technological challenge.¹²

Such observations amount to no more than the commonplace notion that an economically weak Soviet Union's claim to superpower status is compromised unless high technology, combined with modernization of other parts of the economy—such as management and distribution systems—energizes the economic and military production systems. Bialer, again, notes that the close relationship between a country's economic strength and its military power and international influence has been elevated by the Soviet leadership to be the central premise of their economic policy.¹³ RAND analyst Sergei Zamascikov maintains that this theme has consistently been reflected in the

Soviet literature, which stresses the linkages among the nation's economy, its scientific and technical posture, and its international status and reputation.¹⁴ The Central Intelligence Agency has reached the similar conclusion that the Gorbachev leadership has made its scientific and technological policy the linchpin of its overall economic strategy.¹⁵

But such analysis does not go far enough. If one accepts that the Soviets understand their disadvantages and find the consequences of those disadvantages unacceptable, then the entire Gorbachev program of acceleration, restructuring, openness, and new political thinking clearly becomes an attempt to reassert Soviet competitiveness. More specifically, I submit that the Soviets are motivated by a belief in three fundamental propositions concerning high technology and their position in the high-technology competition:

- *High technology is important for national preeminence, and its importance is increasing.* This is the point already made and recognized in the literature. To reiterate, high technology forms both the research base for today's and tomorrow's weaponry and the tools and processes essential to propel the Soviet economy into the 21st century. The Soviets' well-known fear of technological surprise on the battlefield makes the competition important.

- *The Soviets are behind, and unless current trends are reversed, they will fall further behind.* Ed Hewett, in a Brookings Institution study, observes that the Soviet "economy seems unable to produce a cheap, reliable, automatic washing machine, radio, or phonograph; and cheap, powerful hand calculators and personal computers are no more than a distant hope It would appear that the population's considerable patience with the chronic low quality of Soviet goods and services is eroding."¹⁶ The erosion of Soviet patience, possibly induced by the impact of the information revolution and the consequent inability to suppress access to knowledge about the outside world, may in the long run be the most serious problem the regime faces.

- *The Soviets understand the prospects of a continuing comparative decline and find the consequences absolutely unacceptable.* Gorbachev, in a speech on 25 August 1988, himself has acknowledged the Soviet technological disadvantage: "We are going slowly, we are losing time, and we are losing the game."¹⁷ Losing the game in turn creates problems of its own. First, nuclear weapon capability decreasingly defines the ability to exert power because of the fear of the consequences of nuclear war (what I have referred to elsewhere as "necessary peace"¹⁸), thereby eroding the USSR's chief claim to superpower status. As the importance of the nuclear factor diminishes, the inequality between the two prevailing state systems increases because the West is increasingly superior in the technological, economic, and conventional military dimensions of national power potential.¹⁹ Second, technology increasingly drives both economic and military capability, so that failure to

compete successfully in the high-technology field can leave the Soviets both economically *and* militarily disadvantaged. As a result, a dramatic improvement in Soviet economic performance is not only good domestic politics, but an important component of Soviet national security strategy.²⁰ High-tech proficiency, in brief, will come to define international economic and military superpower status. It is noteworthy in this regard that a recent book on high-technology mentions the Soviet Union only once, and then regarding espionage activities in California's Silicon Valley.²¹

The horns of the Soviet dilemma thus sharpen. The Stalinist command economic system and its accompanying repressive, authoritarian political regime may have been effective in moving the Soviet Union rapidly through the heavy industrialization phase of the first industrial revolution.²² That same Stalinist system, however, is not sensitive to nor adequate for the dictates of a more sophisticated, advanced economy. The system has become a millstone around the neck of Soviet national aspirations. Thomas Naylor has well chronicled that system's impressive list of problems: a stagnant economy, inefficient agriculture, an inadequate supply of consumer goods and services, a substantial technological gap vis-à-vis the West, a rigid political and governmental structure, a police-state mentality, a high death rate, and an increasingly alienated population.²³ Some apparent progress has been made in mitigating the political dimension of this litany of woes, but it is no understatement to assert that Soviet economic, scientific, and technological prospects remain bleak.²⁴

Soviet leaders from Gorbachev down acknowledge these difficulties. Aganbegyan argues that the economic development path and system of management created under Stalin and retained by Brezhnev are the heart of the problem, having become obsolete and incapable of dealing with "the real and growing needs of socio-economic development."²⁵ The result was stagnation in the economy which, predictably enough, Gorbachev blames on the Brezhnev regime. He argues that structural problems, management inefficiencies, and the like were becoming evident in the early 1970s but that these problems were not addressed adequately at the time. Among the most damaging effects was a slowdown in the area of scientific and technological progress, which he describes as having proceeded at a "sluggish pace." In his construction, acceleration of scientific and technological endeavor is the key to rectifying

***The Stalinist system has become a millstone
around the neck of Soviet national aspirations.***

the situation: "There should be revolutionary changes, a transfer to fundamentally new technical systems, to technologies of the latest generation, which ensure the highest efficiency."²⁶ If one is prone to question whether the high-technology race is at the heart of Soviet reformist motivations, he has only to listen to the Soviets themselves.

The remaining question is the most central, especially in a policy environment where the US President has announced an American stake in Gorbachev's success: what must the Soviets do if they are to have any reasonable prospect of closing the technology gap? An answer requires looking at the environment in which high technology has developed and prospered in the West and which the Soviets must emulate if they wish to become technologically competitive. The assessment is grim: the conditions required are virtually the opposite of conditions present in the historical Soviet system; hence, emulation becomes a process of reform aimed at overcoming barriers to progress.

The first set of barriers is domestic, possessing both physical and social elements. The physical elements refer basically to the kinds and qualities of equipment available to potential Soviet technological innovators. The more serious domestic problem is societal: high technology appears to prosper in a peculiarly open, information-sharing, entrepreneurial, high-risk and potentially high-benefit, informal, non-hierarchical societal structure. That structure is the virtual opposite of the traditional Soviet system. According to Richard Judy,

The Soviet economy and society in its present, modified Stalinist form is a behemoth programmed to move predictably and ponderously in an ordained direction. But the informatics age demands agility and the ability to change direction quickly. The Soviet leadership appears to recognize its dilemma: either make the behemoth more agile or lose the game. But can a behemoth lose weight, become agile, and remain a behemoth?²⁷

The other set of barriers is international. Increasingly, both the scientific collaboration that produces the knowledge on which technology is based and the commercial application of that technology are international, with a triangular flow between the United States, Japan, and the countries of the Western European community. The Soviet Union is excluded from that flow on grounds of national security; to gain access to that flow, the Soviets must break down the technology-transfer barrier. At the same time, the Soviets must reverse their own isolationist economic policies (e.g. currency nonconvertibility) that have kept them economically aloof.

These are difficult, possibly insurmountable, problems. The first domestic problem, equipment access and quality, would seem the most tractable, but it is difficult nonetheless. The key physical elements in technology generation are the computer and the equipment allowing effective computer

interface (communication between computers), both of which are Soviet weaknesses. As Ed Hewett observes concerning computer hardware, "Soviet enterprises find it difficult to obtain the few fourth and fifth generation computers produced in the Soviet Union, but far less difficult to obtain second and third generation machines, even though they embody twenty-year-old technology."²⁸ Moreover, the computers available are degraded by what the CIA describes as an underdeveloped network of software, service, and component support.²⁹ Computer interface in the West is accomplished through modems using commercial telephone lines (especially those incorporating fiber-optics technology), but the Soviet Union's limited, primitive telephone system lacks the quality of transmission needed to send computer data on it.³⁰ Moreover, the virtual absence of paper copiers and printers in computer facilities further impedes the flow of information.

The solution to this problem includes great increases in the production of high-quality, state-of-the-art machines, software, and communications equipment. However, these qualitative and quantitative improvements require fundamental change in Soviet production systems. John Battle describes it as a "Catch 22" situation. A radical increase in labor productivity is necessary to resolve the economic crisis threatening to undermine not only the power of the party, but the whole system. Unfortunately, the Soviet worker has little incentive to improve his performance until he can see some positive benefit, such as the consumer goods a reformed system is supposed to make available.³¹ The problem is all the more intractable because improvements in other sectors of the economy, such as management and distribution, are also needed.

The second domestic barrier—societal maladaptation—is even more complex, and successful resolution requires attacking basic values and institutions. The basic problem is that Soviet society is not structured to produce an entrepreneurial class of innovators who will take the lead in discovering and applying new technologies. Gorbachev himself has identified providing active support for "the work of inventors and innovators" as a priority.³² The first, difficult step in that process is to create a cadre of such individuals, because the system lacks the Western-style technical entrepreneurs who energize the Silicon Valleys in the United States, Japan, and Western Europe.³³

These technologists are a special breed, and they require special conditions to flourish. Physicist Dimitry Mikheyev summarizes those conditions as a high degree of motivation, open access to information and colleagues, a flexible workplace, and a generally high quality of life.³⁴ Included in this quality of life is the ability to prosper materially, if the US experience is any guide.

These conditions resemble the requisites of political democracy (freedom of inquiry) and market economics, hardly the hallmarks of the traditional Stalinist state. Soviet spokesmen appear to accept at least the first

“The Soviets now make a microcomputer called the Agat. A bright red machine, it is compatible with the aging Apple II but 30 percent slower; it sells for the equivalent of \$17,000.”

part as necessary for progress. Aganbegyan, for instance, has argued that the command system of economic management “represses democracy, initiative, and the creativity of workers.”³⁵ Even the conservative Ligachov has maintained that greater democratization of the entire social fabric is the lever making it possible to activate *perestroika*.³⁶

Creating material incentives to work hard and excel with the promise of great reward for success attacks such basic Soviet values as social and economic equality and, by allowing for the possibility of failure, the failure-proofing mechanisms like guaranteed jobs. Attacking these values runs real risks. Effective decentralizing reforms will result in wider income differentials, possible class conflict, and change in the political status quo.³⁷ Creating an environment that replaces equal-pay-for-unequal-effort with one that recognizes exceptional effort with exceptional reward will not be easy. The incentive system must simultaneously overcome the lethargy and unproductiveness associated with the guaranteed job system and produce change that is viewed as fair. Since some will benefit and others will not, this is a delicate problem.³⁸ The Soviets have walked gingerly around this aspect of *perestroika*, because it strikes close to the heart of basic socialist values.

The final set of barriers the Soviets must overcome is their virtual exclusion from the process of international cross-fertilization so essential to the full realization of modern high technology. Historically, of course, Soviet aloofness from the international economic order was a conscious national choice enforced by mechanisms such as a nonconvertible ruble. In a world of largely independent and autonomous but competing national economies, that policy made sense for a struggling, developing economy seeking shelter from the buffeting of international economic forces. In an increasingly internationalized economic order where high technology provides the cutting edge of economic competitiveness and is itself an international phenomenon, those who remain on the outside run the risk of being left behind.

The Soviet problem here is twofold: they must remove the barriers raised by others against their participation in the world economy as well as those

they have raised themselves. The Soviets are gradually inviting the world in through devices such as joint ventures with Western corporations. Unfortunately for them, the dual-use nature of most high technology has meant that an external barrier has been placed between the Soviets and the cutting edge of Western technological endeavor. Western states are understandably unwilling to share technologies having national security implications.

Technology transfer is the key to global economic growth, and the acceleration in modern technology transfer across borders has largely passed by the Soviet Union.³⁹ Tapping into Western technology and becoming part of the international economic and technological system would thus clearly benefit the Soviets. It would provide a boost for the Soviet economy, especially in the consumer and service sectors that are largely nonexistent today. One dramatic but not atypical example of the current gap is in personal computers: "The Soviets now make a microcomputer called the *Agat*. A bright red machine, it is compatible with the aging Apple II but 30 percent slower; it sells for the equivalent of \$17,000."⁴⁰ Economic integration with the West would accompany a relaxation of tensions with the United States, which is necessary to lower the technology-transfer blockade anyway. Indeed some argue that substantial relaxation of competition with the United States in the international arena is *necessary* for the Soviets to solve their internal problems.⁴¹

A lowered threat perception on both sides is critical to Gorbachev's program. On the one hand, it can serve to lower international tensions, thereby allowing greater concentration of resources on domestic economic reform. To the extent that outside nations can aid in this effort, a receding threat is a political precondition.⁴² On the other hand, a reduced Soviet military threat would provide access to technologies undergirding the technological battlefield of the 21st century and hence allow the Soviets to remain a first-class power and compete militarily, especially in high-technology weapons.⁴³

The Gorbachev reform program gains a tone of nearly desperate sincerity if one assumes that the Soviets realize they are badly losing the race for technology, which promises to be the defining characteristic of international prosperity and status in the 21st century. Not only are the Soviets badly and possibly irretrievably behind, but their situation, if left unattended, will get worse.⁴⁴ With the superpower deadlock in nuclear and nonnuclear military forces now settling in, a nation whose sole claim to influence lies in military power is potentially in trouble. By that yardstick, the Soviets are indeed in trouble, and they appear to understand this.

It is commonplace to note that by any economically important measure, the Soviet Union is hardly a superpower—it is more akin to a Third World country. The only way the Soviets can even attempt to rectify that situation is through a crash program of total and systematic modernization of their entire economic system. A high-technology proficiency currently absent in the

Soviet Union is the key if such reform is to have any chance of succeeding. If one assumes that the Soviets realize this, then Gorbachev's reform package as the instrument to stimulate technological growth makes great sense. Acceleration of effort can aid consumption, making material rewards available for which citizens can work and strive. A primary goal of *glasnost* and *perestroika* can be seen as an attempt to create a seedbed from which an entrepreneurial class of inventors and innovators will sprout, thus leading to Soviet Silicon Valleys that are something more than Potemkin villages. Finally, the new political thinking which has been the basis for the Gorbachev peace offensive (e.g. arms reduction proposals, Afghanistan withdrawal, renunciation of the Brezhnev doctrine) makes sense if it is motivated by Soviet realization that they must allay Western fears about their motives and behavior to gain access to Western technology.

Given the nature and extent of the Soviet technological problem, it is difficult to conclude that they will be able to join the technology race successfully. Closing the gap may be both conceptually and physically beyond the Soviets, but certainly Gorbachev is pursuing the effort with dogged determination. Although our ability to influence the outcome is marginal at best, US policy enters here: Should it be US policy to try to assist Gorbachev's quest toward high-tech competitiveness? Or should we be content to watch the Soviets slide into the technological backwater of the 21st century? The answer, of course, depends on the way we prefer to see the power map of the 21st century: with a vibrant, prosperous Soviet Union as a full-time member of the community of nations, or with an increasingly backward, brooding, and isolated giant.

NOTES

1. A prime example is Marshall I. Goldman, *Gorbachev's Challenge: Economic Reform in the Age of High Technology* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987).
2. Mikhail S. Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World* (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), p. 46.
3. Mikhail Gorbachev, "The Progress of *Perestroika*," *World Today*, 45 (No. 6, June 1989), 95.
4. Yegor Ligachov, "The Revolutionary Essence of *Perestroika*," *World Marxist Review*, 30 (No. 2, December 1987), 7.
5. Abel Aganbegyan, *The Economic Challenge of Perestroika*, ed. Michael Barratt Brown, trans. Pauline M. Tiffen (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1988), p. 38.
6. Seweryn Bialer, "The Soviet Union in a Changing World," in *The Soviet Union in Transition*, ed. Kinya Niiseki (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 12-13.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
8. Walter B. Wriston, "Technology and Sovereignty," *Foreign Affairs*, 67 (No. 2, Winter 1988/89), 63, 75.
9. Lenny Siegel and John Markoff, *The High Cost of High Tech: The Dark Side of the Chip* (New York: Harper and Row, 1985), pp. 225-26.
10. Seweryn Bialer, "Gorbachev's Program of Change: Sources, Significance, Prospects," *Political Science Quarterly*, 103 (Fall 1988), 412.
11. Peter Galusza, William D. Marbach, and Rose Brady, "Soviet Technology," *Business Week*, 7 November 1988, p. 69.
12. Bialer, "Gorbachev's Program of Change," pp. 412-13.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 411.
14. Sergei Zamascikov, "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military," Rand Library Collection Papers P-7410 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, January 1988), p. 3.
15. Central Intelligence Agency, *The Soviet Weapons Industry: An Overview*, Document DI 86-10016 (Washington: CIA, September 1986), p. 39.
16. Ed A. Hewett, *Reforming the Soviet Economy: Equality vs. Efficiency* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1988), pp. 32, 85.
17. Quoted in Philip Taubman, "Soviet Chief Says Drive for Change," *The New York Times*, 26 September 1988, p. 1.
18. Donald M. Snow, *The Necessary Peace: Nuclear Weapons and Superpower Relations* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987).
19. Bialer, "The Soviet Union in a Changing World," p. 12.
20. Hewett, p. 306.
21. Tom Forester, *High-Tech Society: The Story of the Information Technology Revolution* (Oxford, Eng.: Basil Blackwell, 1987), pp. 74-75.
22. David A. Dyker, "Introduction," in *The Soviet Union Under Gorbachev: Prospects for Reform*, ed. David A. Dyker (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 3.
23. Thomas H. Naylor, *The Gorbachev Strategy: Opening the Closed Society* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1988), p. viii.
24. Zamascikov, p. 8.
25. Abel Aganbegyan, "The Economics of Perestroika," *International Affairs* (London), 64 (No. 2, Spring 1988), 177-78.
26. Mikhail S. Gorbachev, *The Coming Century of Peace* (New York: Richardson and Steirman, 1986), pp. 187, 206.
27. Richard W. Judy, "The Soviet Information Revolution: Some Prospects and Comparisons," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Gorbachev's Economic Plans, Vol. 2*, 100th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: GPO, 23 November 1987), p. 173.
28. Hewett, p. 80.
29. Central Intelligence Agency, *The Soviet Weapons Industry*, p. 33.
30. Robert G. Kaiser, "The U.S.S.R. in Decline," *Foreign Affairs*, 67 (No. 2, Winter 1988/89), 103. The same point is made in Galusza, et al., p. 68.
31. John Battle, "In Search of Gorbachev's Revolution from Below," *International Perspectives*, 18 (No. 3, May/June 1989), 8.
32. Gorbachev, *The Coming Century of Peace*, p. 216.
33. Central Intelligence Agency, *The Soviet Weapons Industry*, p. 16.
34. Dimitry Mikheyev, *The Soviet Perspective on the Strategic Defense Initiative* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1987), pp. 60-61. See also John P. Hardt and Jean Farneth Boone, "Gorbachev's Economic Prescriptions: A Preliminary Analysis," in *The Soviet Union Under Gorbachev: Assessing the First Year*, ed. Arthur B. Gunlicks and John D. Treadway (New York: Praeger, 1987), p. 92.
35. Aganbegyan, *The Economic Challenge of Perestroika*, p. 20.
36. Ligachov, p. 11.
37. Trevor Buck and John Cole, *Modern Soviet Economic Performance* (Oxford, Eng.: Basil Blackwell, 1987), pp. 135-36.
38. Hardt and Boone, p. 78.
39. Frank Press, "Technological Competition in the Western Alliance," in *A High Technology Gap?* ed. Andrew J. Pierre (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1987), pp. 37-38.
40. Siegel and Markoff, p. 216.
41. Graham T. Allison, Jr., "Testing Gorbachev," *Foreign Affairs*, 67 (No. 1, Fall 1988), 21.
42. See, for instance, Christian Schmidt-Hauer, *Gorbachev: The Path To Power* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1986), p. 3; and Helmut Sonnenfeldt, "Gorbachev's First Year: An Overview," in *The Soviet Union Under Gorbachev*, ed. Gunlicks and Treadway, p. 25.
43. US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Defense Policy Panel, "General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet Military: Assessing His Impact and the Potential for Future Changes," 100th Cong., 2d sess., 13 September 1988, p. 6. See also Condoleeza Rice, "Defense and Security," in *The Soviet Union Under Gorbachev*, ed. Martin McCauley (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), p. 198.
44. The point that the technology gap is likely to widen is also made in Richard F. Kaufman, "Economic Reform and the Soviet Military," *Washington Quarterly*, 11 (No. 3, Summer 1988), 206.

NATO's Burden-Sharing Debate in the 1990s

ROBERT C. WHITE, JR.

"A growing number of the American people feel abused by our allies. They feel that we spend a much greater portion of our wealth on the common defense, that we have too large a number of soldiers stationed on their territory, and that the allies use the money they save on defense to subsidize their trade, creating our enormous trade deficit."

—US Representative Pat Schroeder¹

Since 1949 and the first days of the alliance, NATO has experienced repeated waves of controversy over what the appropriate level of shared costs for cooperative defense should be. Many Atlanticists hope that the current furor over burden sharing will fade as it has so often in the past. But this optimistic attitude fails to appreciate either the magnitude or persistence of the problem for the United States. For many on the American side of the Atlantic, the burden-sharing debate is about the trade imbalance, economic policies, base negotiations, security assistance, the deficit, or the perception that the US defense budget has been excessive for too long while allies have been getting a free ride. Rarely, if ever, have so many forces for change come together across the American political and economic spectrum.

Fundamentally, the growth in the relative importance of the burden-sharing debate can be credited to three underlying developments. First and most obvious is the relative economic decline of the United States since World War II. In 1948 the United States was able to finance the cost of reviving the European economic order by directly subsidizing Europe's reconstruction, even while guaranteeing its security. This was possible because of the unchallenged global economic and military dominance of postwar America, a dominance that in many ways was artificial and transient; it could not last. In this light, the United States has slipped from its position of unchallenged global hegemonic leadership and may now be unable to carry on as before.² Paul Kennedy, in his immensely

popular history of global decline, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, uses the term "imperial overstretch" to describe the resulting imbalance between a nation's global obligations and its ability to economically sustain those obligations. If left uncorrected, this imbalance could destroy the national economic foundation upon which, according to Kennedy, hegemonic power is ultimately based.³ In practice, this view, when applied to US-European relations, may be somewhat overstated in that there may not be a satisfactory alternative to continued US alliance leadership. Nonetheless, the relative economic decline—or adjustment, as some prefer to call it—of the United States is real, not just an aberration or a transitory phenomenon.

The second important development that has brought the current burden-sharing controversy to center stage is the public perception of a diminished Soviet threat. Referring to a recent poll suggesting that 75 percent of West Germans felt the Soviet threat was no longer serious, a senior diplomat in Bonn noted that for his countrymen the "threat seems to have departed."⁴ The prevailing attitude is much the same on the US side of the Atlantic. According to a recent *New York Times*/CBS News poll, a growing number of Americans see Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev as a radical departure from his predecessors, and two out of every three Americans now believe Moscow "no longer poses an immediate military threat to the United States."⁵ If in the end Mr. Gorbachev is as successful as he now appears to be, then the principal justification for the Atlantic alliance may well be seriously brought into question. Thus the need to increase or even sustain the present level of national defense spending begins to seem unnecessary.

Third is the budget crunch. Enormous pressure is building in the United States to pare the defense budget. Legislators are caught between the national debt and their constituents, who increasingly resent the reluctance of Europeans to contribute more to their own defense. With tax increases politically unacceptable, with social programs already cut back, with servicing the skyrocketing national debt inescapable, it is not surprising that the military budget and particularly overseas military commitments have come under attack by congressional and administration critics alike.

In the days before huge US deficits, debates over the cost of alliance more often focused on fairness rather than economic necessity. Today the tables

Lieutenant Colonel (P) Robert C. White, Jr., is Director of Advanced Courses and External Development Programs at the US Army War College. In 1988-89 he was a US Army Senior Service College Fellow at the Queen's University Centre for International Relations, in Kingston, Canada. He has served in a variety of military intelligence and aviation command and staff positions in the United States, Europe, and Vietnam, including command of the 15th Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Exploitation) at Fort Hood, Texas. Colonel White is a graduate of the University of Michigan and holds an M.A. in international relations from the University of Texas.

have turned, with the focus shifting to the new global economic realities. The decision to continue in an alliance that has become far more expensive for all participants is now in large measure dependent on the calculus that security benefits are at least equal to shared "roles, risks, and responsibilities."⁶

It may be alarming that the defense posture of the United States and, in turn, its commitments to its allies have become hopelessly entangled with the US budget deficit and the attending foreign trade imbalances. But the reality is that they have. The American attitude toward NATO and alliance strategy in general is today largely shaped by the accurate perception that Europe has experienced a vast economic growth since World War II which leaves it in the enviable position of being able to assume greater economic responsibility for its own security. While in principle it may be desirable to keep security concerns separate from economic relationships, in practice this may no longer be possible. As Ambassador Alton Keel, US permanent representative to NATO, recently stated, "On the one hand, the allies cannot decry the worldwide woes caused by US fiscal and trade deficits and, on the other, become indignant when US political pressures, generated at least in part by those deficits, fuel the debate on burden sharing."⁷ Hence, solutions to the NATO burden-sharing dilemma have little likelihood of success if they fail to provide cost reductions for the United States. This could be the most important key to understanding just how divisive burden sharing becomes for the alliance.

Measuring the Burden

There is little agreement as to how defense burdens can or should be gauged. Any quantifiable measure of effort suffers from some limitation, and virtually every non-quantifiable measure is so subjective that it likewise provides little room for agreement. Clearly, land use, rent-free housing, and other forms of host-nation support all contribute to the common defense and to meeting alliance needs. Unfortunately, many of these defy quantification. Even those measures that are clearly quantifiable can lead different analysts to strikingly different conclusions. Former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger observed in his 1987 report to Congress on burden sharing that the NATO allies were "bearing their fair share of the common defense burden."⁸ A little over a year later, using much the same data, the House Armed Services Panel on Burden-sharing under chairwoman Pat Schroeder flatly declared that the "United States is bearing a disproportionate share of the [alliance] defense burden."⁹ The gap between these two views may not be as wide as it seems. Neither assessment is in fundamental disagreement with the other as to the factors that make up a "fair share," but they differ on the weight that should be given to each. The House Armed Services Committee has taken a more restrictive view, seeing "sharing" essentially as a means to reduce US costs. Secretary Weinberger, on the other

hand, while recognizing the importance of economic considerations, gives greater weight to the intangible contributions of our allies.

For all these reasons, any definition of burden sharing, whether quantifiable or not, is inevitably partial and arbitrary. Every nation can and does find advantages or disadvantages with each formula and selects the one that best presents its own national contribution. The numbers used by the analysts ultimately come from the countries themselves and reflect both the similarities and differences of their respective national economic systems. The effects of domestic inflation, fluctuating exchange rates, and national economic controls—including how tax laws may be applied to defense spending—are often not readily apparent nor reflected in the hard data. While my intent here is not to become bogged down in a debate over the numbers, they do give a sense of the respective national sacrifices made in the name of cooperative defense and thus merit some elaboration.¹⁰

The first measure to consider is Gross Domestic Product, a traditional indicator of a nation's well-being and, in turn, its ability to devote resources to defense or elsewhere. There have been, interestingly, only marginal shifts in wealth within NATO, as measured by GDP, since 1960. As Gordon Adam and Eric Munz note in their 1988 study of alliance burden sharing, "the relatively steady shares of alliance-wide GDP since 1968 reflect the unsurprising reality that economic prosperity and decline tend to happen alliance-wide,"¹¹ and, further, that Europe's postwar economic recovery was all but completed by the early 1960s. In other words, Western Europe has been relatively healthy for some time vis-à-vis the United States.

Another and probably the easiest understood measure of burden sharing may be the percentage of GDP devoted to defense. This measure broadly depicts the total resources generated by an economy in terms of the shares devoted to security expenditures. In 1986 the average defense spending within NATO was 3.5 percent of GDP, with significant variation among the several members. At one end were Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States, all with spending in excess of 4.8 percent. At the lower end of the spectrum, well below the average, were Canada, Denmark, Italy, and Luxembourg.

In isolation these statistics seem to lead to the conclusion that the United States is doing a good deal for the alliance but not necessarily that the United States is carrying a disproportionate share of NATO's fiscal burden. However, this picture changes radically when you consider that from 1960 to 1986, the United States always provided in excess of 61 percent of alliance defense contributions while never achieving more than a 55.5-percent share of the total alliance GDP. The contrast holds true for per capita defense expenditures: the NATO average in 1986 was \$654 while the US contribution was \$1,120. Therefore, not only has the United States contributed more in an absolute sense, but it

has consistently contributed an amount significantly greater than its relative economic position within the alliance would have dictated.

It can be argued, with some justification, that the high levels of defense spending by the United States in the 1960s, by France and the United Kingdom in the 1950s and 1960s, and by Portugal in the 1970s were largely in response to non-NATO commitments. However, the bottom line is that in terms of input measures—that is, dollars spent—the United States has devoted a larger percentage of its GDP to defense than any other NATO ally and has done so for some time.

The translation of input measures into output measures—measures of military capability—is often pointed to by European analysts in particular as a more appropriate determinant of a nation's true contribution to alliance security. From this point of view, what counts is not how much is spent but rather how well it is spent. That is, how much defense capability is actually purchased. In this regard many NATO allies have, in fact, done better than they are often given credit for, and in some areas they are shouldering an equitable share of the alliance defense burden. In main battle tanks, tactical aircraft, and sealift, the allies exceed their proportionate share, and they have essentially matched their fair share for total ground combat forces and artillery. By comparison, the United States exceeds its fair share in airlift, naval surface combatants, naval combat and patrol aircraft, and in all areas of nuclear forces.

While it is true that some allies do better when an output criterion is used, the numbers still demonstrate that the United States, in terms of its economic share and population, continues to make the greatest sacrifice. Moreover, as the US House Armed Services Committee report on burden sharing pointed out, the US contribution may in fact be understated since most measures simply count weapon systems and make little allowance for modernization or quality.¹² For example, former Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci reported to Congress in 1988 that while the US tactical combat aircraft fleet was about equally divided between new-generation and current-generation aircraft, only about 28 percent of the NATO allies' fleets were new-generation aircraft.¹³ The same observation holds true for ground combat equipment, where the allies account for only half of the current- and new-generation tanks and artillery, owing to their greater retention of old equipment.¹⁴

In the end, every discussion of national contribution ultimately returns to the elusive intangible measures of alliance cooperation. The inclusion of social and economic contributions, which cannot be easily quantified, is always fraught with disagreement and controversy. Nonetheless, it is in this bog that burden-sharing discussions most often end up and become irretrievably stuck.

The West Germans are quick to point to the high social and economic costs for their country—about the size of Oregon—to host 400,000 foreign

soldiers along with a large number of foreign civilians and dependents. Aside from the loss of land-use revenues, the Germans must absorb the consequent political and environmental costs of annually hosting some 5,000 military exercises and 80,000 low-level training flights, with their inevitable collateral damage amounting to some 40 million Deutsche Marks per year.¹⁵ In fairness, however, it must be pointed out that there are substantial benefits as well as burdens to be had from the influx of foreign currency into local European economies. And as for the social cost of hosting foreign troops, there is likewise a social cost of being a soldier posted in a foreign land that in many ways is the greater burden. Being far from home, coping with language problems, encountering social and racial prejudices, and having only limited employment opportunities for accompanying dependents are realities which leave many military men and women less than enthusiastic for foreign service.

Conscription is another intangible often touted as a hidden social cost and an understated economic burden for those West European countries that practice it. According to Simon Lunn, the low pay of conscripts results in understating manpower costs by as much as 20 percent for some NATO countries.¹⁶ Lunn further contends that if this figure were used to recompute the personnel costs of European military budgets, the non-US NATO total would be much nearer their fair share. On the other side of the coin, one can generally expect to get what he pays for in terms of training and unit morale. The level of skill that European conscripts attain during their short terms of active service (10-18 months) is generally not comparable to that achieved by the volunteer forces of Canada, the United Kingdom, or the United States. As Representative Schroeder's Burdensharing Panel discovered, not one US military commander was willing to trade the training and preparedness of the volunteer US military forces for that of any European conscript army.¹⁷

Hence, if conscription carries with it political and social costs that a volunteer force does not, so be it. For the economically well-off Western Europeans, the decision to conscript their youth is essentially a national, not an alliance, decision. When the social costs of conscription are determined to outweigh the economic advantage for Europeans, then those allies can choose to switch to a volunteer force. Until then, the issue is largely a matter of national political choice and not one that requires corporate alliance compensation.

Thus, in any realistic review of NATO's defense spending, whether measured by input, output, or any of the intangibles so often cited, one finds significant differences in effort among the allies; by almost every measure the United States is carrying the heaviest burden in both real and relative terms. While this distribution may not be without merit for an alliance leader, it can be allowed to continue only with risk to alliance cohesion and solidarity. It is unreasonable to expect that the United States will be willing to continue to sustain its current level of NATO commitment without a new deal being cut

whereby the allied share of defense expenditures is made more commensurate with today's economic realities. Even should the current euphoric arms reduction hopes engendered by the Bush-Gorbachev summits and the crumbling of the Berlin Wall bear rich fruit in terms of sizable defense economies, some significant level of NATO defense obligations will remain. And as long as this is true, we can expect continued tensions between the United States and its NATO allies as to a fair distribution of the load.

Prescription for Change

Whatever else happens, resolution of the burden-sharing debate will not be easy. Sustaining an adequate level of US commitment to the alliance will entail dispelling the American notion of European indifference to the costs shouldered by the United States and persuading Americans that the allies are fully committed themselves. What is needed is a redistribution of effort which accounts for the diverse national self-interests within the alliance while concurrently providing a mechanism that encourages sufficient European contributions for their own defense.

To establish an equitable formula for burden sharing, five underlying principles should guide NATO efforts.

- First, equitable burden sharing must result in cost reductions for the United States. Whatever method or scheme is devised to define and share the burden, it must ultimately reduce the economic frustrations of US participation. It will not suffice merely to raise the defense expenditures of the non-US NATO allies while maintaining the current level of US defense contributions. That will not satisfy the need for *reduced* US defense spending. Europeans can, should, and must carry a greater relative share of the alliance defense burden.

- Second, the solution should apply alliance-wide and in an alliance context. Burden sharing must not become a case of the United States versus the rest of the alliance. This is, after all, a matter of equitable commitment among essentially equal partners with shared economic, political, and security interests that range far beyond the narrow confines of military strategy.

- Third, any burden-sharing solution must be both credible and politically acceptable to ensure public support on both sides of the Atlantic. This is an especially difficult challenge at a time when the perception of a diminished Soviet threat has added impetus to further cut the already austere European defense budgets. In this climate it is unrealistic to expect that any of the allied governments could dramatically increase defense spending without instituting politically unacceptable adjustments to public-sector spending. Lacking a clear and apparent Soviet threat, there is little likelihood that we will see a reversal of this alliance-wide trend in the near future.

- Fourth, resolution of burden sharing must not weaken NATO militarily relative to the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact. Despite the Western perception of a diminished Soviet threat, the reality is less rosy. The Soviets' *perestroika* and *glasnost* offensives are seen by many as proof of changed Soviet military intentions, but the conclusion that somehow the Soviets have become docile is unfounded. To date, no appreciable change in either the Soviet military posture or capability has occurred. Undeniably there is reason for optimism; nevertheless, it should be a guarded optimism mixed with a fair amount of old-fashioned caution. NATO cannot afford to ignore the fact that the Soviets are continuing to modernize their military forces at a rapid pace. At a time when the viability of NATO is under question, it would be wise to remind ourselves that NATO has maintained a peaceful and stable Europe by sustaining a creditable military deterrent, not by Soviet disarmament, unilateral or otherwise.

- Finally, the United States must not let the burden-sharing debate become the litmus test of alliance solidarity. The real issue is not whether NATO is worth defending, for it is. Rather, the issue is one of equitable sharing of the roles, risks, and responsibilities among sovereign nations which can and should contribute fairly to their own defense. Collective security remains the most cost-effective means of assuring American global interests, and it cannot be set aside as easily as some neoconservatives have suggested without first dramatically changing the scope of US strategic commitments. A return to isolationism would not be an appropriate response to America's budget deficit challenge.

Following these guidelines, a solution to the burden-sharing debate is possible, but not without reshaping America's role within the NATO alliance. If the United States is to retain leadership of NATO and the Western World, it must come to terms with matching strategic ends to economic means. Reducing both the extent and cost of present US commitments, specifically military commitments, should begin in Europe. As long as NATO continues to be based largely on US dominance, even long after European economic recovery from World War II, it will remain inherently unstable in spite of what its 40 years of history might suggest.

A first step would be to recognize that while the forward defense of the United States begins in Europe, this is not to say that it must begin in Europe at any cost. Only so long as NATO remains an essential instrumentality for managing US-Soviet competition will it be in America's interest to remain in Europe without reservations. In this regard, for Europeans to assume that there are no circumstances under which American forces would depart would be a grave miscalculation.

Ultimately, US forces are forward-deployed to demonstrate a US commitment to the alliance and to train where the most important, if not the first,


battle for control of Western Europe is most likely to occur. They are not there because US national survival, narrowly defined, demands it, but rather in support of Western Europe's alliance strategy and European security interests. As Josef Joffe, foreign editor and columnist of West Germany's largest-circulation daily, *Sddeutsche Zeitung*, has correctly observed, "[While] West Europeans serve American security interests in many ways, they do not underwrite the inviolability of America's territory and population."¹⁸

The real question for American strategists is not whether US interest in Europe remains high, or even whether the centrality of NATO in American military strategy is appropriate; rather, the issue is one of what relative weight should be given to a region that has both the economic strength and military potential to do more for itself. What I am suggesting is not the abandonment of Europe—for that is clearly not in the US interest—but recognition that non-US NATO members can do far more of the job of providing for their own corporate security. Hence, the need for costly US forward-deployed ground forces is reduced. Since Europe retains a credible deterrent of its own whether the US forces remain or not, it makes little sense for the United States to continue its present level of overseas force deployments. Any recommended solution must inevitably begin with US force reductions on the order of 50,000 to 100,000 troops over the next ten years. Reductions should, however, be accomplished within an alliance context and as a consequence of asymmetrical Soviet reductions, not at the cost of a credible NATO deterrent.

Obviously any reduction, let alone a unilateral one, comes with a certain risk. Care must be taken to ensure that the United States does not convey the impression that the Warsaw Pact threat has diminished to an inconsequential level. Abrupt, large-scale troop reductions make little sense given the current conventional imbalance in Europe. But substantive asymmetrical Soviet troop reductions now seem to be in the cards. Even were that not so, we should recall that over the past 40 years the level of US forces maintained in Europe has fluctuated considerably without apparently harmful side effects. Today, with US force levels at 326,000, a reduction of some 50,000 soldiers in Europe would return the United States troop levels only to those of the early 1970s.

Since burden-sharing adjustments in NATO will amount first and foremost to cost reduction for the United States, it is inevitable that some US forces will be cut back. We certainly cannot afford a return to the hollow Army of the 1970s, where forces were pared down but missions were essentially unchanged or even expanded. However, neither can we retain every soldier at a cost of reduced training, operations, and maintenance. It is clear that the present US military force structure, including the Army's 28 divisions, will have to adjust to a no-growth defense budget. Here, a word of caution: If Fred Iklé and the seers of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy are correct in asserting

US Troop Levels in Europe



Source: Bruce Harris, "Trends in Alliance Conventional Defense Initiatives: Implications for North American and European Security," a paper presented at the QCIR conference on Canada-U.S. Security (Kingston, Canada: Queen's University, Centre for International Relations, June 1988), p. 40.

that the United States needs more, not fewer, flexible forces,¹⁹ then it would be exceedingly unwise to hastily reduce the new light divisions in an effort to save European heavy units. It is precisely because of the relative economic health of Europe that the United States can consider taking cuts in armor-heavy forces before cutting the already austere light forces.

Beyond US troop reductions NATO has another option, that is, to corporately reimburse the United States or any other ally for the additional costs associated with forward deployment of military forces in Europe, including the costs of transportation, training, and housing. The idea of reimbursement is not new. Bilateral offset arrangements were originally negotiated between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany by the Kennedy Administration in the early 1960s. Under these first protocols it was agreed that the additional costs of stationing American forces in Germany would be offset by the German purchase of US military hardware and US government securities. Between 1961 and 1976 there were eight such agreements, offsetting some \$11.2 billion in stationing costs.²⁰

The problem with past efforts to use an offset formula has been that they were confined to just a few partners, leaving unaffected those allies not having large numbers of US or other foreign troops stationed within their borders. In essence, these efforts have failed to recognize that the forward

stationing of military forces is an alliance strategy which might better be served by an alliance-wide solution. Similar to the infrastructure formula for apportioning construction costs in advance of construction, a burden-sharing formula should be developed which apportions costs and benefits among *all* the NATO partners. In this way burden-sharing offset payments might receive greater alliance-wide support, since individual contributions would be relatively small in terms of national defense budgets, and since, as with infrastructure spending, greater costs could be apportioned to those members who are deemed to receive the greater benefits. Undoubtedly there would be difficulties in negotiating the initial formula, both in terms of what should be credited as a US expense and in terms of what should be the other nations' fair-share contributions based on the expected benefits to be received. Neither of these hurdles is insurmountable, however.

Finally, on the European side, there needs to be a greater appreciation of the fact that their defense cannot continue to rest on an essentially US guarantee. Europe must bear a greater share of the responsibility for its own defense. Europeans must understand that their growing clamor for political and economic independence from the United States rings hollow without first assuming a greater share of their own security costs. A stronger European pillar is not only desirable for future alliance cohesion, it is essential: it is a prerequisite to solving the present burden-sharing debate in a way such that the United States will be able to reduce its deployment levels and costs while the alliance retains a credible deterrent.

Unquestionably, encouraging the growth of a stronger Europe comes at a price. A truly bipolar alliance will increase the economic and political rivalry between the United States and its European allies. The influence of the United States will be diminished relative to Western Europe's growing independence. This eventuality should not cause great gnashing of teeth on either side of the Atlantic, however. The ties that bind the United States to Europe are much stronger than the familiar security domain of NATO. The NATO alliance is not only a security structure, but also a community of like-minded economic, cultural, and political systems linked by history and tradition. Fears of Soviet coercion should the United States lessen its hold over Europe are grossly exaggerated, resting on a failure to appreciate the durability of this linkage. A diminished US influence will not lead to a Europe that falls under Soviet domination, nor is there any reason to believe that in practice the United States would cease to be an active and influential participant in European affairs. Devolution is not disengagement. There will be no decoupling of the North Atlantic link as a result of reasonable and realistic US force reductions.

In the end, the determinant of how divisive the burden-sharing debate becomes for the alliance does not rest in Europe, but rather in the United

States, where deficit reduction and the perception of an excessive defense budget continue to hold political center stage. The US commitment to NATO will remain. The question is whether, after 40 years, the United States must persist in paying a disproportionate share of the alliance costs in order to honor that commitment. I think not.

NOTES

1. Russell Watson et al., "The High Cost of NATO: Burden-sharing Becomes a Hot U.S. Political Issue," *Newsweek*, 7 March 1988, p. 2.

2. For a more complete discussion of the political and economic implications of decline, see Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987); David P. Calleo, *Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance* (New York: Basic Books, 1987); Mancur Olson, *The Rise and Decline of Nations* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1982); and Earl C. Ravenal, *NATO: The Tides of Discontent* (Berkeley, Calif.: Univ. of California Press, 1985). Their message is that the United States, like other great powers before it, has now entered a period of decline.

3. Kennedy, p. 515.

4. Jon Connell, "West Germans 'Going Soft' on Defense Issues," *London Sunday Times*, 18 December 1988, p. 19.

5. R. W. Apple, Jr., "Poll Finds That Gorbachev's Rule Eases American Minds on Soviets," *The New York Times*, 16 May 1989, p. 1.

6. *Enhancing Alliance Collective Security: Shared Roles, Risks, and Responsibilities in the Alliance* (Brussels: NATO Defense Planning Committee, December 1988), p. iv.

7. Alton G. Keel, Jr., "Sharing the Collective Defence Burden: U.S. Debate Must Not Be Ignored," *NATO Review*, 36 (October 1988), 5.

8. *A Report to the United States Congress: Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense by Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense* (Washington: GPO, 1987), p. 258.

9. US Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Defense Burden-sharing Panel, *Report of the Defense Burden-sharing Panel of the Committee on Armed Services*, 100th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington: GPO, 1988), p. 50.

10. For a more complete discussion of the various points of view on this complex issue, see *Report of the Defense Burden-sharing Panel of the Committee on Armed Services; A Report to the United States Congress: Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense by Frank C. Carlucci, Secretary of Defense* (Washington: GPO, 1988); Gordon Adams and Eric Munz, *Fair Shares: Bearing the Burden of the NATO Alliance* (Washington: Defense Budget Project, 1988); and Simon Lunn, *Burden-Sharing in NATO*, Chatham House Papers, No. 18 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983).

11. Adams and Munz, p. 14.

12. *Report of the Defense Burden-sharing Panel of the Committee on Armed Services*, p. 33.

13. *A Report to the United States Congress: Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense by Frank C. Carlucci, Secretary of Defense*, p. 43.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

15. *Enhancing Alliance Collective Security: Shared Roles, Risks, and Responsibilities in the Alliance*, p. 32.

16. Lunn, p. 55.

17. *Report of the Defense Burden-sharing Panel of the Committee on Armed Services*, p. 33.

18. Josef Joffe, *The Limited Partnership: Europe, the United States, and the Burdens of Alliance* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1987), p. 49.

19. Fred C. Iklé and Albert Wohlstetter, cochairmen, *Discriminate Deterrence: Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy* (Washington: GPO, 1987), p. 11.

20. James R. Golden, *The Dynamics of Change in NATO: A Burden-Sharing Perspective* (New York: Praeger, 1983), table 6, p. 103.

View From the Fourth Estate

OPERATION JUST CAUSE—CRITIQUE AND REPLY

Just Cause—A Military Score Sheet

EDWARD N. LUTTWAK

© 1989 Edward N. Luttwak

Amid much self-congratulation from President Bush on down, Operation Just Cause is being presented as a splendid model of expeditionary war. And that justifies at least a first look at what went well in Panama—and what went badly.

One thing that was done very well was the overall planning of the operation. Unlike the October 1983 invasion of Grenada, Just Cause did not begin with a fundamentally flawed plan that had to be redeemed by unnecessarily hard and prolonged fighting.

In Grenada, the Marines initially landed at one end of that small island and the Rangers at the other. That nibbling approach gave full warning to the opposition while leaving the core of the island untouched, even though it contained both the bulk of the enemy and all the student hostages. In the Panama operation by contrast, the format was that of an all-at-once coup de main, with the simultaneous insertion on 20 December 1989 of units walking, driving, parachuting, and landing to block hostile movements, attack major targets, and seize key facilities.

A second very important thing that was done well was the sizing of the US force. The aim of a coup de main is to overwhelm the defenders, to make any resistance seem hopeless. In the Grenada invasion, additional battalions of the 82nd Airborne had to be flown in day after day, as the fighting unexpectedly continued. In Just Cause, by contrast, more than 20,000 troops were sent in from the start against a few thousand Panamanians—thus minimizing casualties, on both sides.

Where Just Cause was far from satisfactory was in the details of its execution. One can always second-guess specific tactical moves, but that is not the issue: The extensive destruction of civilian housing seen by TV viewers around the world was not caused by specific tactical errors. It resulted rather from an entire style of fighting that is based on abundant firepower in place of tactical skill—a style that might be suitable for large-scale conventional war but which was utterly inappropriate in Panama.

The political costs of the invasion were undoubtedly increased by the casual use of field artillery against targets with crowded civilian apartment blocks immediately behind them; by the liberal firing of machine-guns in the general direction of any sign

of resistance; and by the manifestly frivolous use of weapons of all kinds, from the totally unnecessary bombardment carried out by ultra-sophisticated F-117 stealth attack aircraft, to the shooting out of the street lights around the Papal Nunciature.

This grossly excessive use of firepower was partly the result of questionable command decisions, but mostly it reflected the state of training. Even though US troops are now all professionals, they are still the product of a "shake-and-bake" training system designed to quickly mass-produce large armies of draftees for large-scale continental war. Instead of the 30 weeks and more of basic training for new British recruits, instead of the 22 weeks of the Israelis, US Army and Marine recruits have 10 weeks or less. In theory, "advanced" and in-unit training are supposed to remedy all inadequacies. But because of constant troop rotation, skill levels and tactics remain rudimentary.

Instead of the cat-like movements of the well-trained infantryman, instead of the sparing use of firepower that marks the well-trained force which can rely on tactical skill, TV viewers around the world saw the results of an outdated system of mass-production training: troops certainly brave and willing to do their best—but visibly clumsy and much too ready to fire with any and all weapons.

Just Cause may thus prove the opposite of what has been claimed. Far from demonstrating that the United States now has the ability to carry out "surgical" interventions, it has revealed the need for profound structural reforms. The claim that Panama demonstrates a rapid expeditionary capability is also hollow: The difficulty of most expeditionary interventions arises from the lack of secure arrival bases, bulk supplies in place, and ancillary facilities from radars to field hospitals. All those things were already available in Panama, but they are not likely to be present elsewhere.

— Edward N. Luttwak holds the strategy chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. This article is reprinted from *The Washington Post*, 31 December 1989, p. C4.

Don't Underestimate the US Army

TOM DONNELLY

© 1990 The Washington Post

The US Army's stunning success in Panama reveals a startling truth: the Army is a highly competent, even elite, military organization. Nevertheless the assumption that the US Army is tactically incompetent remains deep-seated.

Take Edward Luttwak's "Just Cause—A Military Score Sheet." Although Luttwak is a fine analyst of military strategy and operations, I disagree with many conclusions he came to in that article. I visited all the sites of the major Just Cause operations, talked to many soldiers, and received detailed briefings from their leaders. The view from the ground is quite different from that in Washington.

Luttwak praised Just Cause as a coup de main—a rapid application of overwhelming force to make any resistance seem futile to the defenders. Yet he found it "far from satisfactory . . . in the details of its execution." He wrote that "TV viewers

around the world saw the results of an outdated system of mass-production training: troops certainly willing to do their best—but visibly clumsy and much too ready to fire with any and all weapons.”

His conclusions are contradicted by the facts.

Consider the savage fighting at the Panama Defense Forces' Rio Hato airstrip. Army Rangers assaulted the field and the headquarters of two reinforced PDF companies there, including the 7th Company that broke the October coup attempt by PDF dissidents. These were among the PDF's finest fighters, many trained in US jungle-warfare schools.

The base is a warren of low barracks buildings that hug the jungle. A favorite PDF maneuver was to hide in gullies behind the barracks and ambush Rangers as they emerged out the back, a tactic that cost a number of American lives.

After tense minutes clearing a number of these buildings, one Ranger led a team into one of the last remaining barracks to be secured, only to find 180 unarmed PDF trainees huddled in one room. Somehow, in the dark of night and in the heat of the moment, that Ranger did not fire. He showed discipline and a mastery of even the most dangerous of situations.

The airstrip at Rio Hato was secured in 20 to 30 minutes, the Rangers say. The assessment of Brigadier General Ed Scholes, chief of staff of the XVIII Airborne Corps, a unit that routinely practices such maneuvers, was that the action there was “a classic take-down of an airfield.”

In other cases, US forces also used firepower with relative precision and went to extraordinary lengths to avoid collateral damage. In the assault on the PDF headquarters at Fort Amador, for example, the PDF's buildings are separated from US facilities by the width of a golf course fairway. Not 25 yards from the PDF barracks stands the mausoleum of Omar Torrijos, a symbol of Panamanian patriotism.

When the PDF troops at Fort Amador chose to resist rather than surrender, US forces displayed overwhelming firepower, including 105mm artillery pieces, to bring the action to a quick conclusion and to save lives. The PDF barracks were gutted, but the Torrijos mausoleum sustained only one small nick.

The Army's success, say soldiers from Chief of Staff General Carl Vuono down to squad NCOs, is due to its training system, which Luttwak disparaged.

American combat soldiers get 12+ to 19 (depending on combat specialty) weeks of initial training, not 10 as Luttwak said. Furthermore, paratroopers and rangers, who form the vanguard of expeditionary operations, get several weeks more. And I could not find a single NCO in the 82d Airborne in Panama who had not been to the Army's Primary Leadership Development Course, a four-week school for training combat leaders and a requirement to make sergeant. Finally, the level of realism in training available at the Army's combat training center and at units' home stations is the envy of the British and Israeli armies that Luttwak chose as models of a ready force.

This is not to argue that Just Cause was a perfect operation. But by any reasonable standard it was executed with a high degree of tactical skill. The US Army has quietly become much better than most Americans appreciate and most experts realize. Its performance in Panama should make that abundantly clear.

— Tom Donnelly is Editor of the Army Times. This article, an edited version of the original which appeared in The Washington Post, 6 January 1990, p. A19, is reprinted with the permission of The Post.

Commentary & Reply

TWO ARMIES—EIGHT RESPONSES

To the Editor:

As a proud member of the "display" army that Major Bolger so eloquently spoke of in his recent article "Two Armies" (*Parameters*, September 1989), I applaud his courageous effort and sincerely hope it will generate some serious thought by those whose dominion is the long-term development of the heavy forces of our Army. Perhaps it takes a good strong kick in the teeth to draw forthright attention to the most significant issue facing the heavy force today.

This issue is the ability to project heavy forces to the places in the world where the interests of the United States are at risk. Major Bolger is correct in his assertion that the likelihood of warfare in Western Europe is becoming more and more remote even as we attempt to convince the world that the threat there justifies our heavy force design. Isn't it a bit odd that virtually every heavy division in the Army has as its most important contingency task the reinforcement of Europe, while we pay lip service to or completely ignore the areas where conflict is most likely to take place?

Of course, the deterrent mission is a real and critically important task that has been admirably accomplished for the last 45 years, and it will continue to be the primary concern of the heavy force of USAREUR for the foreseeable future. Unfortunately, however, except for a small nod to the Korean theater, the heavy force as a whole has exclusively sold itself to the SACEUR for use in only one contingency, general war against the Warsaw Pact. It is becoming exceedingly difficult to rationally support the one-contingency deterrent argument in a defense environment of continually diminishing resources. It's a season of growing change in Europe as the seeds of independency from the United States take root; and the arena of potential conflict is changing too. The scenario of direct superpower conflict, the one so long familiar to us "display soldiers," is giving way to the third-rate ruler beating his chest for terrorism, to the drug lords declaring war on whole countries, or to the insurgencies afflicting so many countries around the globe today.

The "fight" is now in CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM, and it is high time that the heavy forces sit down and take a hard look at how we can project our forces in these arenas. In order to project a heavy warfighting force we must either preposition or lighten up. (Yes, Major Bolger, there are warriors in the heavy force!) Prepositioning can be accomplished in the POMCUS vein by playing hardball with our friends and allies to get some basing rights in the theaters where we can affect the action. The other option is to lighten up so that we can project a force that still is able to deliver frightening shock effect, exceptional mobility, and superior firepower, but without consuming the several weeks or even months it would currently take to deliver the punch. We need a cavalry force that can go to the rescue around the globe instead of around the block.

I understand that this is not an easy issue in an environment where low-intensity conflict doctrine is as firm as mush. But unless we can create a role in the business of projecting a heavy force in a hurry to execute the wishes of the National Command Authorities, we are going to have an exponentially more difficult time convincing the powers that be of the validity of our one-theater, one-contingency mission. Even worse, we are depriving the President and the warfighting CINCs of the capability to project the appropriate military force in support of our national interests around the world.

To repeat, the face of warfare is changing and our force needs to be tailored so that we can contribute to the fight. Major Bolger's work should be mandatory reading for every soldier who believes that combined arms teams are the most powerful, lethal, and effective fighting force on any battlefield. Unless we are able to adapt to the new face of warfare while maintaining the deterrent in Europe, we really will be relegated to the role of "display" soldiers. I strongly agree with Major Bolger that we are at war, and that we must give the NCA the ability to commit the true elite forces of the Army to the fray. The armored divisions, mechanized infantry divisions, and armored cavalry *are* the elite: we have learned to operate in a high-tech environment and with the most sophisticated weapons ever fielded. We must now develop the methods to apply our unique warfighting skills to the current conflict, wherever it ignites.

Every "real" warfighter should keep a copy of Major Bolger's article in the cargo pocket of his field uniform to remind him that every time the President wants to deploy forces to a trouble-spot, he must send a light force because it is his only available force option. The President deserves better than that!

Captain Joseph C. Barto III
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

To the Editor:

As a light infantryman I was particularly impressed with Major Bolger's article "Two Armies." It was interesting, extremely well written, and very inspirational. Unfortunately, powerful prose is no substitute for sound argument, and while Major Bolger offered a great deal of the former he provided very little of the latter. Bolger asserts that the US Army needs and has two different kinds of units to perform two distinctly different missions. There is, he believes, an "expeditionary force," consisting primarily of light infantry whose mission is "real fighting," and a heavy force whose major task is to deter. Because of this clear-cut distinction, he infers, troops from the "fighting forces" should be managed separately from their deterrence-oriented counterparts. However, like most simple dichotomies, this one does not stand up under even cursory analysis.

Bolger attempts to support his thesis by citing historical instances since 1945 of what he terms "real fighting." Korea, Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, the *Mayaguez* affair, and Grenada are among the examples he uses. But in Lebanon, the mission of the US Marines was more deterrence than it was real fighting, and in Grenada—political rhetoric aside—the performance of our expeditionary force hardly matched the powerful rhetoric of Major Bolger's article. The Korean War fits the argument even less well; it was a conflict fought by both light and heavy forces in what

used to be called combined arms operations. Perhaps most telling of all is his failure to mention Vietnam—a conflict in which American forces, both light and heavy, did some “real fighting” for nearly eight years. In short, history does not provide evidence for Bolger’s simple dichotomy; light forces do deter and heavy forces do fight.

As is the case with many of the articles advocating a “warrior spirit,” a “fighting” expeditionary force, or a “warfighting mentality,” Major Bolger overlooks the fact that the sole purpose of an army is to serve the national interest. Since, in general, it is not in America’s interest to become involved in a war, the Army serves the nation better by deterring an adversary from pursuing a particular course than by having to fight him after he has adopted it. Our government recognizes this fact and holds light forces in reserve more to deter an adversary than to fight him. This is not to argue that soldiers and units need not be prepared for combat, nor is it to promote a “deterrent spirit” in the Army. For conventional forces, deterrence is based on the readiness and ability of units, both light and heavy, to fight and to win.

It is because of this similarity between the missions of light and heavy forces—and the fact that they may be employed side by side on a future battlefield—that light and heavy forces must understand the capabilities and limitations of the other. Moreover, when assigned to mechanized or armor units light infantrymen bring an appreciation for terrain and an awareness of physical requirements that heavier soldiers sometimes lack, and armored infantrymen bring a perspective and a sense of dash that sometimes eludes light forces. The point is that assigning light infantrymen to heavy units, and vice-versa, is useful both to the units involved and to the force as a whole.

What is most disappointing about Major Bolger’s article is that some of the subtler, more important points he makes get lost in the rhetoric. He is probably correct that the Army has spent far too little time and effort in developing doctrine and equipment for the light infantry, and that the failure to fill the obvious need for a man-portable antiarmor weapon is puzzling and disconcerting to foot soldiers. He may also be correct that our view of the future battlefield is based more on wishful thinking than it is on thorough analysis. But we may never know; for by allowing rhetorical flourish to get ahead of analytical rigor, Major Bolger has allowed the reader to dismiss his valid points. It’s too bad. I would like to have seen the Army’s answer.

Major Michael L. Brown
SHAPE, Belgium

To the Editor:

Daniel P. Bolger’s article “Two Armies” is an extremely useful contribution to a long-standing debate—a debate the Army’s senior leadership quite obviously does not like and is unlikely to appreciate being continued. It is also a debate that needs to be resolved, and one whose resolution is unlikely to be received with acclaim by that leadership.

The notion of bifurcating the Army along functional lines is not new, of course. Then LTC William Hauser raised a similar possibility 15 years ago in *America’s Army in Crisis*, although his “two armies” were not the same as those proposed by Bolger, who actually puts the choice in much starker terms. Bolger’s characterization of the bulk of the active Army as a “display army” is uncomfortably close to

the mark. Unfortunately, his use of the term "display army" to depict the counterpart to his "expeditionary army" may have been a strategic error of the first order, as it is an odds-on certainty to enrage those who have built their careers in that force.

Enraging or not, Bolger's proposal to create an expeditionary army within the force structure of the Total Army may not have taken into account fully some of its implications. First, while the United States definitely needs an expeditionary force, it does not need *two* of them; and one already exists in the form of the Marine Corps (whose expeditionary role Bolger himself acknowledges). A Congress concerned with budget deficits is a sure bet to recognize that it will cost far less to convert some Marine formations into airborne and/or air-assault formations than to carve out a strategically redundant expeditionary force within the Army. And in a head-to-head confrontation between Army loyalists and Marine Corps supporters on Capitol Hill, very few would make book on the Army's chances for success.

Second, even if the Army should survive such a confrontation, Bolger's expeditionary army would find itself unable to avoid being contaminated by the ethos of the numerically larger "display army." The latter would provide the bulk of the senior leadership of the Army as a whole; it would control the lion's share of the Army's budget; it would dominate both the Army Staff and the Army's procurement process; and it would dominate the Army's personnel management system. Indeed, the effects of this process are readily apparent in Bolger's own examples of expeditionary warriors. Few except the Army's own apologists, for example, think that the Army covered itself with glory during the Grenada operation, even though it awarded its participants more medals for *valor* than there were Cuban soldiers on that island; and there is little in the arrays of pins, patches, and badges adorning the uniforms of his contemporary expeditionary warriors that conforms to the image of the "real warriors" he portrays. The Byzantine administrative procedures that would be required to alleviate this display army syndrome, much less preclude its reappearance in his expeditionary army, are mind-boggling, to say the least, and reopen the Army-Marine Corps choice I noted earlier.

Finally, Bolger might consider that the reason we "[bother] with an expensive display army at all" has nothing to do with America's interests. It is because having such a "display army" is the only way the Army as an institution can rationalize the retention of anything approaching its current force structure. If the Army acknowledges the myth upon which the latter is based, it will end up as a significantly smaller active-duty force (perhaps to the benefit of the National Guard and the Army Reserve), much like it was between the world wars—and the expeditionary role will be performed by the Marine Corps, as has often been the case in the past. This, I suspect, the Army knows, and Bolger stands a good chance of learning how the Army deals with messengers who bear true but distasteful news.

Alan Ned Sabrosky, Ph.D.
Memphis, Tennessee

To the Editor:

Having just finished "Two Armies" by Major Dan Bolger, I am saddened by the thought that the author of such fine books as *Dragons at War* and *Americans at War, 1975-1986*, as well as a host of excellent articles on Grenada, has lost his

objectivity. It is hard for any reader to take his article at face value, invalidated as it is at all three levels of warfare—strategic, operational, and tactical.

Major Bolger would have us believe that this “era of violent peace” demands “expeditionary warriors,” rather than “deterrence trained soldiers.” Yet, he misses a fundamental strategic fact. Expeditionary warriors are a reflection of an isolationist society, one willing to attack outside its own borders only on its terms, and at its own choosing. America has had no such luxury for many years. One of the costs of being a global superpower is military alliances and military commitments. Few enjoy the costs of such commitments, least so the soldiers forward-deployed to honor them. Unlike their expeditionary brethren, these forward-deployed soldiers have little say over whether they will be committed should the enemy invade—they (and their families) are in harm’s way. In contrast, no enemy mandates intervention of the expeditionary soldier. His own civilian leadership decides whether he will go forward or stay within the protection of national borders.

The strategic mission of the deterrence Army contrasts dramatically with that of Major Bolger’s expeditionary Army—the former reflects an America willing to commit to the defense of vital national interests outside its own borders, the latter reflects merely the potential to defend those interests within extremely narrow parameters. Ask our allies which Army they feel underwrites our commitment to global alliances and which Army they will call on to protect their interests.

At the operational level, Major Bolger yet again misses the point. The contrast is not between daring, dashing expeditionary warriors and plodding, hidebound deterrence soldiers, but rather between rapidly deployable light forces and large, heavily armored forces. It’s not an issue of skill or dash, but pounds and inches. Expeditionary forces are not sent forward because they are better, but because they are lighter and faster. They are not sent forward because of any warrior ethos, but because they can respond quicker. If a tank battalion could be sent as quickly as an airborne infantry battalion, many contingency operations would have been equally—if not more—successful.

Yet, it is at the tactical level that Major Bolger’s thesis truly falls apart. An expeditionary army, like a deterrence army, fight battles dictated by Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, and Time available. Our leaders can determine whether the factors of METT-T favor commitment of an expeditionary army. If the expeditionary army hasn’t a fighting chance, they don’t have to send it. They have no such luxury with a deterrence army. It has to be right—right now. No doubt that is why the lightly armed, lightly supported expeditionary army is only sent against “terrorists, insurgents, thugs, and tinpot Hitlers that bluster and sputter in odd corners of the world,” and not against first-rate, heavily armored surrogates. METT-T also dictates why the “heavy force dinosaurs” must maintain armored and mechanized formations in Central Europe. The thought of “five or six light infantry divisions” holding terrain, stopping armored formations, and counterattacking must surely qualify as science fiction. It brings to mind a picture of Iranian zealots heading off to eventual slaughter by the heavy guns and equipment of the Iraqis. It’s hard not to imagine unsupported light infantry experiencing the same fate in the Central Region.

In sum, it is ludicrous—if not dangerous—to advance the notion that one army replace the other, or that either army holds a monopoly on the martial virtues. Having once served as an “expeditionary warrior” and now serving as a “deterrence soldier,”

I can only conclude that the major differences in missions and mindset between our "two armies" reside primarily in the mind of Major Bolger. The article "Two Armies" does raise some interesting historical perspectives on expeditionary combat, and Major Bolger's work *Americans at War, 1975-1986* is an excellent source for additional perspective. Yet, *Americans at War* is found on the non-fiction shelf, while "Two Armies" rates no similar merit.

Major Mark T. Kimmitt
Bad Kreuznach, Federal Republic of Germany

To the Editor:

Major Daniel Bolger's article "Two Armies" is bound to provoke many an angry response, possibly even a few brawls in the barroom where his display army comes into contact with his expeditionary (do we really need to copy the Marine Corps' General Gray?) army. I'm not sure it is worthy of such a passionate response.

Unfortunately, Major Bolger's use of historical cases is shallow at best. For example, he sets the tone in the first paragraph, where he credits France's departure from Algeria as due to the power of a display army; surely one can look deeper and draw conclusions that lay the loss to the waning of a colonial power in the face of a waxing revolutionary nation. He conveniently overlooks the purpose and use of a standing army in the national military strategy; the premise that forces not often in combat are for display only is preposterous. One is drawn to the conclusion that in seeking to promote his agenda and to stir up controversy, he attempted to fit his ideas to the clever words of Colonel Raspey.

Changes in Army force structure are coming, driven by the national military strategy, the changing perceptions of threat, arms control, and the budget crunch (among others). The rational process required for determining these changes is not well served by Major Bolger's "off-the-wall" approach.

Lieutenant Colonel John C. Hammond
Newport, Rhode Island

To the Editor:

Daniel Bolger's article "Two Armies" brings to mind Bill Mauldin's *Up Front* cartoon, where the caption has Willy saying, "He's right, Joe, when we ain't fighting, we should act like soldiers." The issue of whether the mission of the Army is to fight or to deter is indeed ripe, but as treated by Bolger it seems oversimplified. At least five points warrant consideration.

First, despite Major Bolger's implication that our expeditionary army is composed solely of warriors, we should recognize that true warriors are in fact rare. Herodotus informs us that King Xerxes, during his invasion of Greece with a host of 2,700,000, complained that while he had many combatants, he had few warriors.

Second, the United States Army—i.e. *both* of its armies—is probably better prepared to fight today than at any other time in peacetime history. The training is intense, the supply of weapons better than prior to any war in the past, and there are enough troops to make their weight felt. Are there problems? You bet, but that doesn't gainsay the point.

Third, deterring war between the superpowers must continue to be the Army's priority concern. The lethality of conventional weapons on the European landscape would make World War II seem like a scrimmage, not to mention the intolerable carnage that might result if conventional war there escalated to thermo-nuclear proportions.

Fourth, it is the mass of national resources, not just warriors, that enables us to prevail in a major war. Many military professionals have a misperception of what it takes to win in war, in part a result of their distorted image of the US role in World War II. The bulk of the fighting in the European theater occurred on the Eastern front, and that for four times longer than Operation Overlord. In Africa, US forces did not land until after the British had imposed a decisive defeat on Rommel's forces. In the Pacific theater the bulk of the Japanese army was tied down in China. US forces dominated in the fighting among the Pacific islands, but the very nature of the geography permitted the war to progress in discrete, manageable segments. Overall, the casualties tell the story. The total military casualties among the Allies were 13,787,000, of which the US share was only 292,000 (about 2.1 percent). When civilian casualties are added, the numbers are 29,657,000, of which the US share was 298,000 (about one percent). It was our logistical contribution, reaching perhaps half of all materiel produced by the Allies, that actually told the story.

Fifth, presuming a war against the Soviet Union can be deterred, there are very few other contingencies that could plausibly threaten US interests to the degree the Axis powers did in World War II. Many of the "threats" we do see today, for example, terrorism, are not readily amenable to military solution.

What this adds up to is that the force engendered by a long-standing deterrent posture is probably inevitable, and, as inflexible as such a force is, the result still satisfies the most pressing needs of the nation. The efficacy of that force would have to drop considerably before the Soviet Union felt secure enough to take it on.

It might be useful to recall what occurred prior to World War II. President Roosevelt, realizing that war was inevitable, was very careful in his choice for Army Chief of Staff. He picked George C. Marshall as CSA over many senior officers. What did Marshall do in the months prior to Pearl Harbor? Arguably, the single most important thing he did was update his small black book, noting which of the Army generals and senior field grades were the most capable. When the crunch later came, the contents of that book more or less dictated who commanded what.

Restated, what we today seem to need more than warriors are senior officers of acute judgment and perspective, officers who understand the efficacy and limits of war. A judicious use of national resources and military power is what is needed. What we don't need is a replay of Vietnam, even if we could quadruple the number of warriors thrown into the melee.

Colonel George M. Hall, USAR Ret.
Tucson, Arizona

To the Editor:

It is disappointing that a self-proclaimed and enthusiastic warrior such as Major Bolger cannot divine a more complex mission for our "display" Army in Europe than the one he adduces. Instead, exhibiting the same misunderstandings

that now plague the Western alliance vis-à-vis the comely Mikhail Gorbachev, he dodges the question of how to defend Western Europe by pronouncing any conventional force (mechanized or light) useless except as a trigger mechanism for the nukes and chemical weapons that, he assures us, "sane political leaders" will use. Presto! Deterrence!

This is the sort of anti-intellectual, anti-strategic fatalism that our "partners" (to use the current euphemism) to the east have been sedulously planting and cultivating for the past decade as part of their overall strategy to neutralize West Germany and, by extension, NATO. Judging by the Alliance's current state of dissolution and confusion (highlighted most recently by the Lance missile flap), one must sadly conclude that this strategy is succeeding admirably.

If we in the Army choose to accept Major Bolger's analysis of European strategy (or, more accurately, non-strategy) it is not very difficult to believe, as he does, that Europe is of secondary importance and that we, in turn, may now return to the romantic days of yore to engage in splendid little wars against today's brigands and desperadoes, i.e. drug traffickers, terrorists, and perhaps the ever-wily illegal alien. Is this change of emphasis to be welcomed or resisted? Do perceived changes in the East-West relationship warrant a redefinition of the Army's *raison d'être*?

The Army should be gravely concerned when it considers that wild enthusiasm for these new missions (especially the specious "war on drugs") comes from highly unlikely quarters—persons, for example, more inclined to perceive the Army as neither "warriors" nor "deterriers" but as an auxiliary social service. The "war on drugs" illustrates with uncomfortable regularity the sheer escapism that is involved with supposedly serious policy promulgated at the highest levels of our government. Victory (as yet to be defined) in this war will not come until we face up to the fact that we must win the drug fight right here on the domestic front.

Fighting terrorists, except for the narrowly defined job of rescuing hostages, is another area where the Army should exercise more caution than revealed by Major Bolger. President Reagan demonstrated on several occasions that the best method of dealing with such reprobates is with precisely the weapons Major Bolger finds so objectionable, viz. high-tech aircraft (F-111s and F-15s over Libya, and Hughes 500s in the Persian Gulf) carrying a variety of sophisticated and powerful ordnance. I will concede to Major Bolger that we sacrifice a great deal of chivalry by employing such means in low-intensity conflicts, but it is here that they find their greatest effect.

In a similar vein, Major Bolger's treatment of Vietnam simply ignores the scholarship of the past 15 years in order to make reality fit theory. When the ignominious end did come in Vietnam, Hanoi was brought to the bargaining table not by Special Forces advisors winning hearts and minds (otherwise the war would have ended in 1965) but by a hail of big bombs dropped by fleets of B-52s. (One can only speculate on the results had President Johnson chosen this option in 1966 rather than the timid and limited use of tactical aircraft.) Similarly, it was not the Viet Cong guerrillas (most of them having been killed by our "deterrence trained army") who crashed the gates of the Presidential Palace in Saigon, but those same tanks and tracks that Major Bolger finds so distasteful, useless, and easy to stop by light infantry armed with anti-tank weapons.

The warrior ethic undoubtedly has a place in the education of all military officers. However, it should not be used to obscure or otherwise distort the historical

record in support of or opposition to any given policy or doctrine. We may choose to agree or disagree with some of the contents of FM 100-5, but it will not be because we call ourselves warriors or something different.

The danger in this sort of reflexive reasoning may ultimately cause us to lose sight of traditionally important foreign policy goals. The "prize" is not "access to Third World allies, peoples, resources, and markets." The objective is national security, the definition of which would be radically altered by the neutralization of Western Europe, something Major Bolger seems to countenance with aplomb. Many of the allies, peoples, resources, and markets he writes of are meaningless outside the context of the current status quo. Strategically speaking, the loss of Vietnam placed no intolerable or irredeemable burdens on America. Today, Hanoi seeks access to Western European, American, and Japanese markets, not Soviet or Chinese. If economic intercourse were the only component of national security, the Soviets would have thrown in the towel long ago. Conversely, does the United States support Israel, Egypt, and a number of other economic basket cases because it desires access to their markets? Major Bolger's broad prescription would have us involved throughout the planet with only the haziest objectives in mind, a policy that would result not in "two armies," or even one, but no army.

Several years ago Colonel Harry Summers, in the introduction to Shelby Stanton's *The Rise and Fall of an American Army*, stated that the myriad counterinsurgency and limited war theories so popular in the 1960s were lost upon our enemies (who did not read them) as well as the soldiers actually doing the fighting and dying. So it goes with this donnybrook about warriors and deterrence. In the space between the flash suppressors of the opposing weapons, there is no thought of limited war or deterrence. There is only total war, a black and white struggle between two absolutes. We would do well to bear this in mind before expending our energies on useless jeremiads that serve more to confuse than to enlighten.

To the extent that the conventional Army does deter anything, it does so through hard training and preparedness. The framers of FM 100-5 clearly recognized this. After nearly five years of busting my gut at such idyllic retreats as Ft. Benning, Ft. Hunter-Liggett, Panama, and Honduras (which included more than 18 months' service with the primary architect of FM 100-5) I can assure Major Bolger that we train to kill and not to deter. If this produces a desired deterrent effect (correctly identified by Major Bolger), so much the better for all involved. In the meantime, it is clearly erroneous to derive some sort of Army-wide weltanschauung from a terse doctrinal statement such as this FM.

Let us therefore resolve to lay aside this superfluous quarrel which poisons the atmosphere and now threatens to be used by partisans in an ever more contentious showdown about national strategy and defense resources. Whatever our problems in the Army, they will not be solved by the victory of one side or the other.

First Lieutenant David A. Crowe
Fort Benning, Ga.

To the Editor:

I'm sure that Major Bolger's article "Two Armies" will draw a lot of comment, probably mostly favorable, particularly from congressional staffers who are

alert to evidence from within the services that the taxpayers' money is being ill-spent on overly sophisticated and expensive heavy equipment. Much in the article I can enthusiastically agree with, and the prose is absolutely superb. But in this case, the prose sometimes overwhelms the case being made.

As one of the old foreign area specialist officers who spent 11 of my 26 years of active duty involved in the Middle East (eight living there), and most of the rest in troop units of the "display army," I have three observations.

First, I detect some condescension toward potential Third World enemies, i.e. the premise that Third World adversaries will provide a rolling stock of heavy equipment ("An intervention army will take and use enemy weapons as needed"). When you look at potential adversaries in the Middle East, you are not looking at Grenadan or Cuban combat service support troops. The Iraqis, Iranians, and Syrians have been at war for years, are inured to hardship and death, and have large inventories of heavy and sophisticated equipment. They are not third-rate opponents; they, and their training, have been fashioned in a cauldron of blood; their forces are led by officers who have little regard for human life. Is a contingency in which we would face opponents similar to that too far-fetched? Consider Iraq, with a debt of over \$70 billion, a huge standing army (35 divisions?), and an immensely wealthy Saudi Arabia lying just over the hard desert tracts to the south. How long will the goodwill literally purchased by the Saudis from the Iraqis during the Iran-Iraq War last? Not long, you can be sure. But that is just one example of a contingency in which two battalions or a light division simply will not do. The argument that we don't have the lift to get the heavy stuff there may be true, but does it then follow that we should insert forces that will surely be overrun and decimated?

Anyone who has been around heavy equipment for as long as I have knows how tough it is to keep troops trained-up, on their M109A2/A3 self-propelled howitzers for example. Think about absorbing a bunch of Eastern bloc counterparts—SO-122 M-1974s or SO-152 M-1973s—and immediately going into battle. Against whom? Against what force in the world today, other than some banana republic, could we really do that? This presupposes, of course, that the original crews would have been so fearful of encountering US forces that they would have abandoned their weapons and fled to the rear. If that environment ever existed, it surely does not now.

Second, I believe it was the same Major Bolger who blew apart the "warrior ethos" in a review of Colonel David Hackworth's book *About Face (Army magazine, June 1989)*. It's ironic that the same Major Bolger is now promoting the "warrior ethos" as a tenet of his "expeditionary army." Nothing can be more demoralizing to troops than to be fed into a killing machine by superiors who look for the "spirit of the offensive," "élan," or some other current buzzword to take the place of preparation, equipment, planning, and support. Read the history of the French army in World War I.

A more recent example is that of the 1st and 3d Rangers in Italy, who were caught in unfavorable terrain by German armor at Cisterna and annihilated. I assume no one questions the rangers' "warrior ethos." In the North African campaign, the Australian soldier was acknowledged even by the Germans as better than his German opponent; yet a study of the 9th Australian Infantry Division operating against German armor near Tobruk reaffirmed that "well-balanced, closely coordinated teams of

armored forces . . . were the organizations that achieved best results in desert fighting." In short, flesh and blood can do only so much against steel and fire.

Third, with the dramatically increasing urbanization in the Middle East, urban warfare has already become a paramount feature of conflict in that region. As an old foreign area hand, I am firmly convinced that the SOF element of an expeditionary force would be of immense value in the Middle East. T. E. Lawrence and those of his ilk were worth divisions of conventional troops, but even the Lawrences were operating within the umbrella of overpowering British imperial power. It was the "display" British forces which ensured that when these British representatives spoke, everyone listened. It is in this role, and literally hundreds of others, that an "expeditionary army"—as I think Major Bolger has conceived it—would be of vital importance. But let's not get mesmerized by eloquent expositions, probably meant to be more provocative than conclusive, that national defense can be bought cheaply or simply.

Colonel Norvell B. De Atkine, USA Ret.
Fayetteville, N.C.

The Author Replies:

It is evident from the tone and content of these responses (and others conveyed to me personally) that my article "Two Armies" struck a chord among professional soldiers and concerned citizens. I appreciate the writers' thoughtfulness and candor. While I disagree with these eight men on many points, ranging from their world views down to interpretations of recent military actions, I think we can all agree that the US Army faces challenging choices regarding the proper mix of heavy and light forces and the correct balance between deterrence and fighting missions. Whatever the final shape of the future US Army, recent world developments suggest that "more of the same" probably won't do. The Army leadership certainly recognizes that times are changing. In his new policy paper "A Strategic Force for the 1990s and Beyond" (see *The New York Times*, 12 December 1989, p. 1), Army Chief of Staff General Carl E. Vuono has already indicated his preference for a tilt toward expeditionary forces and missions. The eight replies to "Two Armies" appearing above deserve consideration in light of the rapidly evolving world order and General Vuono's bold new direction for the Army. I offer three questions that might serve to focus this vital debate.

First, are we at peace or at war? To read most of these replies, one might assume that we are at peace, as the United States has not fought a "proper" war since 1945. Yet in 1989, Americans faced hostile fire in the Philippines, El Salvador, and, most dramatically, in Panama. Comforting distinctions between traditional ideas of peace and war have become badly blurred. Wars create their own dynamics—they rarely conform to preconceived notions. Much of our doctrine, organization, and equipment says we are at peace, ready for mid-intensity conflict against a conventional enemy. The realities of today's globe seem to say we are already at war. We may euphemize this condition as "low-intensity conflict" or "operations short of war," but we must be ready for it *now*. There's no such thing as "killed short of dead."

Second, is deterrence really an Army mission, or just an effect? This is not merely a semantic distinction. Forces designed to deter behave differently from forces intended to fight. For example, as cited by one of the respondents, some

forward-deployed components place service families and other noncombatants in their theater of operations. Major Kimmitt, among others, finds this a sensible situation, indicative of US resolve. I find it bizarre—unless one grants that such American forces are not really expected to fight anyone. The danger, of course, is that the enemy may not recognize any distinction between units ready for deterrence and those ready for fighting. As Major Brown reminded us, the Marines in Lebanon became confused about this aspect of their mission. Local enemies made their own assessment, and our Marines paid with their lives.

Third, if we continue to intervene in the Third World, must we settle for either “too late or too light”? Captain Barto argues this point quite cogently. With hard budget cuts and strategic reevaluations looming, we cannot afford to commit the lion’s share of our limited resources to a fleet of invincible 70-ton behemoths that will never arrive at the crucial Third World battlefields. We can blame the Air Force or Navy, but that’s the way it is, and it won’t get better anytime soon. Yet light troops alone might not cut it. Expeditionary troopers need hand-held tank killers and light armored vehicles; witness the tactical value of Marine Corps light armored vehicles during Operation Just Cause. Current efforts on light/heavy force integration reflect the US Army’s recognition of the problem. Colonel De Atkine correctly observes that certain Third World adversaries bristle with experienced, well-armed tank and artillery formations. To fight and win against such foes, we must address the antitank issue.

With respect to the legitimate complaints about my extreme positions and purple prose, I plead guilty as charged. Despite Dr. Sabrosky’s dire (and I hope unduly pessimistic) prediction of my imminent professional demise, I think most readers recognized the valid concerns beneath my deliberately dramatized argument. These eight reasoned responses tell me that although my message rattled a few cages, it came through loud and clear. An author cannot ask for more.

Major Daniel P. Bolger

Annual subscriptions to *Parameters* are available from the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402. The current subscription cost is \$7.00 for domestic or APO addresses, \$8.75 for foreign addresses. Single copies are also available at a cost of \$4.50 for domestic addresses, \$5.63 for foreign addresses. Checks should be made payable to the Superintendent of Documents. Credit card orders may be placed by calling GPO at (202) 783-3238 during business hours.

Book Reviews

Vietnam: Strategy for a Stalemate. By F. Charles Parker IV. New York: Paragon House, 1989. 257 pages. \$19.95. **Reviewed by Douglas Pike**, Director, Indochina Studies, University of California (Berkeley), and author of *Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance*.

This is a thesis book addressing the question: was the Vietnam War a more or less self-contained historical event largely confined in meaning to the various directly contending participants, or was it a greater entity in which non-participants (i.e. the USSR and China) successfully pursued well-worked-out strategies to achieve predetermined ends? Colonel Parker opts for the latter.

The author's thesis is not simply that there was Sino-Soviet involvement in the war. That was always self-evident, since there were no arms factories in North Vietnam. Outsiders equipped and funded the Hanoi cause. Indeed there would have been no "big unit" war without such aid. Rather it is that US "entanglement" was carefully calculated and precisely engineered, with malice aforethought, as the lawyers would say, by Moscow and Beijing. Reacting to the Sino-Soviet dispute, they set out to orchestrate events in Vietnam in the name of their respective national interests; their performance in retrospect stands as a model of such international intrigue.

Colonel Parker, who holds a Ph.D. in history from Georgetown and is a veteran of Vietnam, thus boldly takes a stand on one side in the Great Debate among historians. This debate is about the essential nature not only of the Vietnam War, but in a broader sense of virtually every other important historical event of the past thousand years. It is a knotty intellectual debate—right up there with the other still unresolved philosophical questions—What is truth? What is beauty? Is there free will?

It is a debate over the degree of coherence, the extent of system to be found in unfolding historical events. Does history have clear design and intent and scheme? Is there some transcendental logic to it, some deliberate overarching purpose? Philosophers since Plato have debated the question. We certainly can't settle it here. Suffice for our purposes to stake out the parameters of the debate so as to understand Parker in context.

The Parker thesis is that what the Vietnam War was all about was clever Moscow (and clever Beijing, in the early years at least) contriving to entrap the United States in Vietnam as a means of debilitating the Americans while also advancing their respective interests in the Sino-Soviet dispute. This ascribes to Moscow a high degree of manipulative skill, strategic nimbleness, and geopolitical accomplishment—too much so, in my opinion. Its success, it is intimated, was facilitated by willful American ignorance—chief villain here being Lyndon Johnson. This is pure Devil Thesis historical interpretation—the notion that when history goes in a certain direction, someone or something is to blame. The devil thesis in history does have merit and is respectable among history writers.

However, there is an opposing school. It sees history as a great river of events on which we are all afloat, aboard our separate secular rafts. The river is full

of cross-currents, eddies, and backwaters, and we can navigate these momentary changes in direction. But none of us can control the river itself. It is a mistake to blame the crew of our raft or to think of them as more than fellow passengers. All, in the final analysis, are victims of a history none could control.

This is a provocative and intellectually stimulating book, far better than the run-of-the-mill output on the Vietnam War produced in the past decade. The fact that I am not persuaded by the author's thesis does not mean I am saying he is wrong. Ours is a philosophical disputation, one in which both positions are to be respected. And the book certainly can be read at another level, as a historical account of the USSR's perception of the Vietnam War from the Khrushchev era onwards. The facts set down are correct—I can attest to these, having written a book on the same subject myself—it is only the neat interpretation of the facts with which I differ. But as they say around the track, difference of opinion is what makes a horse race.

Of Arms and Men: A History of War, Weapons, and Aggression.

By R. L. O'Connell. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1989. 367 pages.

\$24.95. Reviewed by Martin van Creveld, author of *Technology and War*.

Some books put one off at first sight. When this happens, all one can do is give fair notice of the fact and explain the reasons for his dislike. O'Connell's volume claims to be a history of war, weapons, and aggression. As such it is a failure; don't read the book unless, like this reviewer, you have to.

O'Connell took his Ph.D. in history from the University of Virginia, after which he worked first for the US Delegation to the Disarmament Conference at Geneva and then at the Army Intelligence Agency's Foreign Science and Technology Center. Nothing in his background seems to have prepared him for his present Herculean task of combining history—of all periods, in all languages—with psychological, anthropological, cultural, and social factors. Consequently the book fairly bristles with errors. It is *not* true that "Rome had conquered the entire Hellenistic East virtually without fighting." It is *not* true that the first 300 years of the Roman Empire were "remarkable for their pacific nature." It is *not* true that medieval European warships developed by the addition of "castles" to Scandinavian ones. It is *not* true that the Germans in 1870 blew the French apart with high explosives, given that the latter had not yet been invented. Between errors of historical fact, wrongly spelled foreign words (Swisses instead of Suisses!), and plain editorial oversights (Trevor Dupuy, e.g., would be surprised to see his name perverted to Depuy), the list of howlers goes on and on; merely to draw up a complete one would require a volume in itself.

Reliability, then, is not O'Connell's forte. Nor would he claim that it is, given that his objective is not merely to provide a factual account of the past but to penetrate into the "symbolic and cultural significance" of weapons. This lofty aim compels him to try his hand as a litterateur, at which, however, he is abysmally bad. Here are representative samples of would-be evocative sentences: "Alexander was . . . a virtual incarnation of the youthful dream of transcendence"; "Augustus recreated a Rome worth believing in and therefore worth fighting for"; "It was as if the desert wind had whispered to the nomad horse archers that their time was running short"; "Charles VIII had no idea that history's gears were shifting"; early 20th-century battleships were "fire belching

leviathans, veritable floating Achilleuses, or, more accurately, aesthetic embodiments of the entire heroic tradition." One does not know whether to laugh or cry.

Then, too, there is O'Connell's tendency to patronize the past, which I personally found repulsive. Since it is with the hidden aspects of things that he is concerned, very often he cannot prove his claims; hence he is reduced to arguing either that past people were really as clever as we or that they did things without understanding their significance. For example, Alexander had an "instinctive understanding" of transnational tyranny, of the military problems he would face, and of "whom to close in on" (all three instincts occur on a single page); the Romans looked at certain questions "with a realism which is striking even today"; it was "not illogically" that Marius improved his legionaries' training by bringing in experts from the gladiatorial schools; those who developed early firearms worked "unconsciously"; Gustavus [Adolphus] "instinctively" sought to reinforce firepower by firepower; the Indian rebellion against the British in 1857 was the result of the "unconscious belief" that weapons were "polluting" the Hindu way of life. The text is a treasure trove of things that are hidden, secret, instinctive, unconscious, and dimly felt; nor perhaps *would* most of them have been felt had we not had O'Connell to draw our attention to them.

The Oxford University Press—home to some of the world's finest scholarship—probably published this book in the hope of getting a share of the booming military history market. Yet it is to be feared that the end-product will have the effect of diminishing that market rather than increasing it. By writing a book for which he clearly has neither the requisite knowledge nor the literary skill, O'Connell has done the discipline a disservice. By publishing the result, Oxford University Press has done the discipline a greater one still.

The Defense Procurement Mess. By William H. Gregory. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989. 209 pages. \$19.95.

New Weapons Old Politics: America's Military Procurement Model. By Thomas L. McNaugher. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1989. 205 pages. \$34.95.

Reviewed by Jacques S. Gansler, author of *Affording Defense*.

These are both well-written and important books about the way in which the nation goes about buying its weapons, and the need to change that process. Too often, books of this sort focus on the headline-grabbing subjects of overpriced coffee pots and toilet seats and then go on to recommend greater oversight, regulation, and auditing to "make sure it doesn't ever happen again." Properly, both Gregory and McNaugher attempt to shift the discussion toward the much more critical issues of how the nation plans and manages the use of its approximately \$170 billion of annual expenditures on military goods and services. Here, through excellent examples, they both point out that there is room for billions of dollars' worth of savings and for the development of a more effective national security posture for the money we spend.

These two authors come at their tasks from widely different backgrounds. For 30 years, Gregory was a writer and editor-in-chief for the magazine *Aviation Week and Space Technology*. The book can be seen somewhat as a "life's work," an

overview of his observations during a career of reporting on the Pentagon, on Congress, and on "what's gone wrong with defense procurement"—noting that today "both military managers and industry agree that the [weapon] acquisition process is at its most frustrating, lowest ebb that veterans can remember." While McNaugher, a researcher at Brookings, arrives at a similarly negative view, he comes to this issue from a much more academic perspective. (For example, he uses 37 pages of endnotes to document his research, while Gregory has none, basing his data instead on his prior experiences and writing.)

Both writers are cynical in their style—perhaps the subject lends itself to cynicism—and both are realistic in their recognition of the difficulty of achieving change to this large and entrenched system. (In fact, both books vividly illustrate how hard it is to reform DOD procurement.) Yet, after each presents an excellent historical overview and explanation of "the way things are," they each venture forth (in their last chapters) to present their proposed solutions.

Gregory argues that the weapon acquisition process must be "sped up and greatly simplified." He wants to give more authority to the program managers and remove many of the layers of "micromanagement" from over the program manager's head—from within the services, from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and, especially, from Congress (and congressional staffs). This means: reduced regulations, longer-term budgets, fewer and simpler specifications, career opportunities for good program managers, and many of the recommendations made by others in the past. The difference—according to Gregory—is that if these changes aren't made soon, the system will grind to a halt, wasting billions and often even buying the wrong weapons.

One cannot help noting the similarities of many of these recommendations to the findings of the Packard Commission (on defense management) in 1986. While, obviously, they are the "right" solutions—and Gregory's sense of urgency is also valid—the fact that three years later the changes have basically not been implemented (even with Presidents Reagan and Bush vowing to do so) is a clear indication of the formidable nature of making the changes. One wishes that Gregory had offered the magic key to implementation. Perhaps the recent initiative in this direction by Secretary of Defense Cheney will provide the required sustained leadership to bring it about.

McNaugher offers a similar set of recommendations, but he also argues that the only way to cut back dramatically on the amount of regulation and auditing, as well as the overriding political nature of the R&D decision process, is to shift away from the current structure—in which weapon selections are based upon paper proposals by a variety of contractors, with a single contractor then being selected and made responsible for the development and production of a weapon system. Instead, he would place far greater emphasis upon the use of continuous competition throughout the development process. This "competitive development" approach could be between two different solutions to the same military need (for example, between aircraft and missiles), or between two different technological approaches to the same next-generation equipment (e.g. a ceramic armored tank versus a steel one), or even between two different contractors taking comparable approaches, but competing on the basis of performance, production costs, and product quality to see who should be selected for the production phase. McNaugher properly observes that if this competitive development can be maintained through the full test and evaluation phases (including the operational testing by the military), then we would achieve a complete

demonstration of new concepts prior to a commitment to deploy them. We would also eliminate the current perverse practice of "gold plating" weapon systems (adding nice-to-have features to the weapon) once a single contractor has been selected in an environment in which the selected contractor has no incentives to keep down the costs but every incentive in the world to accept the changes and continue to allow the costs to increase. The use of continuous competition throughout development would encourage the two contractors—especially if they thought that the final award was going to be based upon the production costs they had "designed in" during the development phase—to emphasize production and support cost considerations during the design phase and thus use more "commercial like" practices.

Unfortunately, the use of continuous competition would clearly increase the cost of the development phase. Yet it would reduce the far-larger production and support costs of the weapon system dramatically—but at some later date. Thus, a few dollars more spent on continuous development competition would have—if the case study history and theory are believed—enormous savings in future years. But the argument always is that "this year we can't afford it," and so the solution has been to "down select" between the two competitors as soon as possible and save money this year by having to fund only one development source. The result, as would be expected, has been: first, that the winner is forced to "buy in" (bid low in order to win), with costs then rising (due to the initial buy-in plus the added "gold plating" that comes along); and, second, that the development is a much higher-risk program, since no alternatives are being pursued.

In summary, both Gregory and McNaugher have made a valuable contribution to the weapon acquisition literature by focusing our attention on the potential for significant cost savings and—in a period of level or declining defense budgets—on the need to make far more effective use of the defense dollars provided. Achieving the needed changes will be neither easy nor rapid. Yet both DOD and Congress must recognize this need and "make it happen." The taxpayers deserve it, and the nation's security requires it.

U.S. Marines in Vietnam: High Mobility and Standdown, 1969.
By Charles R. Smith. Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1988. 403 pages. \$21.00. Reviewed by Dr. Allan R. Millett, a colonel in the US Marine Corps Reserve and author of *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps*.

Brigadier General Douglas Kinnard, US Army Ret., once told me that the Army generals whose opinions filled his book *The War Managers* had strong views about the competence of the III Marine Amphibious Force in Vietnam. Those generals who worked most closely with III MAF appreciated its professionalism and understood its eccentricities. Those who had little contact with III MAF thought the Marines showed little soldierly efficiency and a recklessness in combat that bordered on criminality.

For Army officers who may really care about III MAF's performance, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: High Mobility and Standdown, 1969*, will show that the Marines in I Corps knew their business, however dull or however violent it might have been

from one moment to the next. Written by former soldier Charles R. Smith, the sixth chronological volume in the Marine official history of the Vietnam War covers operations in the field and selected topics like aviation, artillery, reconnaissance, logistics, advisory activities, pacification support, and amphibious operations. In fact, these topical chapters are the best in the book since they focus on categories of problems, not the repetitive movements of infantry battalions pursuing an elusive and vicious enemy.

Army officers will probably not find much surprising about the nature and tempo of the operations mounted by the First and Third Marine Divisions before the troop drawdowns—KEYSTONE—affected employment in the summer of 1969. The only memorable Operation was DEWEY CANYON, the 9th Marines' assault on Base Area 611, an operation that spilled over into Laos. Smith is almost laconic in his account of DEWEY CANYON, a seven-week struggle of mythic proportions against terrain, weather, the enemy, and constant "friction of war." Smith reports that both sides suffered "heavy casualties," an assessment that carries more political significance than military. Although the 9th Marines lost 130 KIA and 920 WIA, the regiment killed at least 1600 NVA with every weapon known to III MAF. The rest of the operations, especially those in Quang Nam province, kept the NVA at bay, but did not do similar damage to the enemy's capability for large-unit operations. The combination of patrols and sweeps probably placed much of the Viet Cong infrastructure at risk, if not out of business.

Smith provides a forthright account of Marine indiscipline—particularly fraggings—and he shows that senior Marine commanders did, in fact, undertake effective action to curb incidents and identify the criminals. Although Smith smothers the reader in statistics, the ultimate banality of the Vietnam War, he also gives one of the clearest descriptions of the "single management of air" issue. Army officers who trust the Air Force to provide close air support should read this section, if no other. Smith is equally good at describing the synergistic relationship of reconnaissance patrolling and the use of supporting arms as an effective substitute for routine infantry operations. He also covers the post-Tet 1968 emphasis on pacification, a program that expanded beyond the Combined Action Program platoons to many regular Marine battalions.

Although *Marines in Vietnam 1969* carries the usual burdens of official history—naming names, locating places, summarizing official reports—it is a sound review of III MAF operations on the ground and in the air, in the jungles and in the villages. For an Army officer to make a responsible assessment of how the Marine Corps fought the Vietnam War, he should read this book and its companion pieces.

Hoyt S. Vandenberg: *The Life of a General*. By Phillip S. Meilinger. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1989. 279 pages. \$27.50. Reviewed by Dr. Kenneth P. Werrell, author of *Archie, Flak, AAA, and SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air Defense*.

While there is a massive literature on and by World War II general officers, least represented are the airmen. Thus, the recent biographies of Arnold, Chennault, Eaker, LeMay, and Spaatz are much welcome. Hoyt Vandenberg now joins this august company, and his biography by Phillip Meilinger may in fact be the best of the lot.

For unlike most of these generals, Vandenberg is fortunate to have a biographer equal to the task.

Vandenberg was an undistinguished cadet at West Point, graduating 240th out of 261 in the class of 1923, and, like Arnold and Spaatz, without achieving cadet rank. Too low in class standing to get into the cavalry but wanting to escape the infantry, Vandenberg joined the Air Service and became an excellent pilot and instructor. Vandenberg gained the reputation for being one of the hottest pilots in the air arm and punched his ticket by attending the Air Corps Tactical School, the Command and General Staff College, and the Army War College, as well as instructing at the Tac School.

During World War II, he served as a planner and staff officer before becoming commander of the 9th Air Force, America's principal tactical air force. Vandenberg's other wartime accomplishments included a four-month stint in the Soviet Union, 26 combat missions, and front-page coverage in *Time* magazine. His performance and flair put him in a special category of officers primed for higher rank following the war. He served in intelligence for 11 months, commanding a forerunner of the CIA, and subsequently received his fourth star at age 48, making him the second youngest officer in the Army to achieve that rank.

In 1948, Spaatz selected Vandenberg to succeed him as Air Force Chief of Staff. In that post Vandenberg faced numerous problems, such as the buildup of the Air Force from 375,000 personnel and 55 wings to 960,000 personnel and 137 wings when he retired four years later. He also guided the junior service through the Berlin Airlift, the supercarrier vs. B-36 fight, and the Korean War. Despite his youthful appearance and good looks, he seems to have done a good job. The author concludes that Vandenberg was an ideal blend of leader and manager, remarkable for his self-control. In Meilinger's words: "The general's technical expertise as a pilot, combined with his managerial ability, dynamic personality, and aggressive leadership, made him a dominant and respected figure in the cold war era. Unfortunately, his early death in 1954, less than one year after retirement, along with his reticence in committing his innermost thoughts to paper, has caused his significance to be largely overlooked."

Fortunately for Vandenberg, and for us, Meilinger corrects these problems in this well-done, scholarly biography. The author covers the subject with depth and understanding, but perhaps most important, Meilinger puts his subject into the context of the times and writes well. The author is not afraid to come to grips with hard questions such as Vandenberg's racism, his powerful Uncle Arthur (senator on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee), and the Air Force's place within the defense establishment. The major issues are presented clearly and at least adequately, although this reader would have preferred more detail.

Overall, this excellent study can serve as a model for similar works. In fact, a number of the previous biographies would profit if redone with the style and substance of Meilinger's effort. History and students of history would be well served and surely would be grateful beneficiaries. While Vandenberg may not be the most important American airman, he did serve as Chief of Staff during an important period of US and USAF history. For these reasons and because this biography is so much better done than the biographies of other air generals, this book is highly recommended.

A Call to Civic Service: National Service for Country and Community. By Charles C. Moskos. New York: The Free Press, 1988. 226 pages. \$22.95.

Recruiting for Uncle Sam: Citizenship and Military Manpower Policy. By David R. Segal. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989. 221 pages. \$25.00.

Serving America: Prospects for the Volunteer Force. By Richard Halloran. New York: Priority Press Publications, 1988. 71 pages. \$18.95.

U.S. Army Guard and Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks. By Martin Binkin and William W. Kaufmann. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1989. 162 pages. \$8.95 (paper).

Reviewed by Colonel William L. Hauser, USA Ret., author of *America's Army in Crisis*.

All of these books deal with the same general subject: how the United States can, should, and probably will raise and maintain standing military forces in the decade of uneasy peace that lies ahead. Each takes a different piece of the topic—Segal (exhaustively) and Halloran (superficially) the broad one of manning the force; Binkin and Kaufmann the narrower but crucial problem of the reserve components, using the Army as worst-case example; and Moskos the social-plus-military matter of national service. Three of the four will undoubtedly become basic references in their respective areas; the exception is Halloran's book, regrettably for the work of a journalist long noted for excellent reportage on national security.

Professor Segal's work on recruiting is a massive one—more so than the number of pages would indicate, the publisher having used small type and narrow margins. The subject is covered in minute detail, starting with a comprehensive review of pertinent American history and concluding with a marshaling of arguments on all sides of such issues as voluntarism vs. conscription, forces-in-being vs. mobilization, social-welfare vs. military readiness, and big wars vs. small. Just when you think the author cannot possibly tackle another aspect, he does so with crystal-clear logic, seriousness tempered with gentle humor, and graceful prose. Most remarkable is his mastery of the strategic considerations which rightly underlie the design and manning of forces. In an area where muddled thinking is not uncommon, his book is a beacon of sound thought.

Drs. Binkin and Kaufmann, the first of whom is perhaps the preeminent American authority on military manpower, the second an expert on strategy whose counsel has long been sought (if not always heeded) by the US government, have combined their talents to address the reserve components of the Army—an apparently narrow area. It is, they make clear, nothing of the sort. Wars are fought on land and sea and in the air, but they are ultimately struggles for control of the land and its resources; America's principal land force, the Army, has adapted to a "ready now" strategy, but the bulk of its combat support and combat service support is in its

less-ready reserve components. Although couched in the measured language by which each of the authors has maintained his access and influence in governing circles, their message is blunt. Achilles' big muscles are the envy of the beach, but that vulnerable heel will result in sand getting kicked in his face the next time a bully comes along.

Mr. Halloran's book begins with a brief (in contrast to Segal's extensive) review of the American experience in military recruiting. All is now well, he concludes, quoting assurances by various members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that we have "the best Army," a Navy filled with "talented youngsters," and troops "better led, better equipped, and better prepared than ever before." While admitting that "all is not perfect in the volunteer force," he hastens to note that "whatever shortcomings there are reflect more on American society than on the armed forces."

Although generally full-ahead in proclaiming his good news, Halloran takes some extraordinary detours. Of particular note to this reviewer (as an occasional marathoner) are the author's acceptance of the notions that recruits' lack of upper-body strength is attributable to the fad of jogging among our nation's youth, and (as an erstwhile military trainer) that "the most difficult thing for a young private to learn is customs and courtesies, like when to salute." And not only is it inappropriate for the services to "instill values, teach patriotism, or instruct young people in their civic obligations," but "military officers might teach values inimical to American democracy." One wonders how such statements could come from the military correspondent of a major newspaper.

Before discussing Professor Moskos's book, let it be known that the reviewer is a long-time colleague, admirer, and friend. While both of us believe the profession of arms to be a noble calling, worthy of participation by all sorts and conditions of citizenry, we part company on the necessity of peacetime military conscription. I hold that restoration of the draft, however impracticable it may be politically, is crucial to the nation's long-term security. Alternate service—of the sort Moskos recommends—although a valuable approach to many of our society's ills, remains for me essentially a price to be paid for manning the armed forces.

But this is a review of Moskos, so let us examine *his* sequence of thought. His overview of history expands beyond military conscription to include other forms of youth service: the pre-WW I Plattsburgh camps, the Depression-era CCC and WPA, the post-WW II Peace Corps, VISTA, and various conservation organizations. He also devotes a chapter each to "Youth Service at State and Local Levels," to "Youth and Poverty," and to "Education and National Service." Up to this point, he has scrupulously withheld his own opinion, making this initial two-thirds of the text an invaluable reference in itself.

Argumentation begins with a chapter on "The Comparable Worth of Military and Civilian Service." Moskos essentially equates the two in their benefits to nation, society, and participating individuals. "Reconstruction of the Citizen Soldier" similarly equates the values—different, but equally valuable—of citizen soldier and career soldier. The volume concludes with "A Practical Proposal for National Service," and, in case the reader might think the author unrealistic, a discussion of "The Politics of National Service." In these two chapters, Moskos articulates a Hegelian synthesis so brilliant as to almost convince a devoted pro-drafter like myself. National Service's contribution to military readiness, he says, will make the program palatable to conservatives, while the program's support of social welfare and its extension of

benefits to America's disadvantaged will elicit approval from liberals. The book is a *tour de force* and will someday be reckoned an important document in modern American history and sociological analysis.

Woven through all of these works is an optimistic assumption that troubles this reviewer. However doubtful the readiness of our active and/or reserve forces, it says, however dubious our mobilization capability, fortune has smiled on us by reducing the strategic threat. The United States took a calculated risk when it abolished the draft in 1973. Now, with the Soviet Empire raveling at the edges and its economy crumbling from within, the gamble has paid off. In other words, "Maybe we can't get there from here, but it doesn't matter." This reviewer prays that the assumption is so, and that we are not to be subjected, as our country has been so many times before, to one of history's nasty surprises.

Douglas Haig: 1861-1928. By Gerard J. De Groot. Winchester, Mass.: Unwin Hyman. 441 pages. \$34.95. Reviewed by Byron Farwell, author of *The Great War in Africa, 1914-19*.

Was Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, later Lord Haig, the Saviour of the British Empire or the Butcher on the Somme? He was both, actually. He certainly did manage to kill or maim an incredible number of young men, but he also won the Great War—with a little help from the Empire's friends.

Haig was "concerned mainly with his own progress, something from which he was never more than slightly distracted." It is easy to list his many faults of intellect, character, and imagination, and Mr. De Groot, a young American scholar, has done so. Haig was devious, intolerant, stubborn, and arrogant, and his selection of military objectives was frequently unaffected by reality. He lacked imagination, possessed a mind devoid of analytical powers, and was monumentally self-assured, never doubting his own abilities. The spiritualist who revealed to him that he was guided by the spirit of Napoleon and destined to be a great man surprised him not at all. He was cursed, or blessed, with a blinding optimism. For years he predicted, over and over again, that German morale was on the verge of collapse.

Haig was the youngest of the 11 children of an enormously wealthy and socially well-connected distiller. His father died when Haig was an infant, and, according to Mr. De Groot, the lad was spoiled by his mother, who died when he was 19. He was rather backward in school and not good at games, but nevertheless went on to Oxford and passed his examinations there before going to Sandhurst at the advanced age of 22.

Haig's decision to become a soldier appears casual; he had shown no previous disposition or aptitude for a military career. But once committed, he set about to advance himself by the serious study of his profession. The only setback he encountered in his steady rise was his failure to pass the examination for the Staff College. He was, however, eventually admitted, thanks to the influence of friends and relations.

Haig was a splendid horseman, so devoted to the advancement of traditional cavalry that he became paranoid in defending it in the face of technology. When he was made inspector of cavalry, British cavalry became "extremely proficient at obsolete practices." Even the World War I experience of the power of machine guns, breech-loading artillery, and barbed wire did not distract him from the never-abandoned hope that

the German lines would be broken, allowing the tens of thousands of horsemen he kept in reserve to break through and make the war mobile again. As this never happened, the safest British soldier in France was a cavalryman.

Having seen active service in the Sudan under Kitchener and in South Africa under Lord Roberts, Haig in 1914 was "out of touch with the new age of military science." Thus, against the sound advice of Colonel E. D. Swinton, the developer of the British tank, he did not wait until he had sufficient machines to make a significant impact but committed his tanks in dribbles. In his first use he scattered 34 in twos and threes along a 12-kilometer front, thus carelessly squandering the potential for surprise.

De Groot sees Haig as a cold and heartless commander, but he was not that simple a character. He was incensed at the failure of the 49th Division in the Anglo-French attack at Delville Wood, feeling that these troops had not tried hard enough. "The total losses of the Division," he noted, "are under a thousand." Yet after the war he devoted all his energies in the last nine years of his life to organizing the British Legion and he worked hard for the welfare of his veterans.

Historians and biographers who look at Haig's role as the commander of the British Expeditionary Force must ask who could have done better at fighting off the Germans at his front and the machinations of Lloyd George at his back. The answer seems to be no one. John Terraine, who wrote *Douglas Haig, the Educated Soldier* (1963), concluded that Haig did all that could be expected of him under exceedingly difficult circumstances and that no better general was around. De Groot takes Terraine to task for "wild generalizations" and "misguided assumptions," but he, too, admits that Haig was "undoubtedly the best commander available."

It is De Groot's idea that Haig's early life (the subject of De Groot's doctoral dissertation) turned him into a "creature of his society," a mirror of the virtues and vices of the Victorian and Edwardian eras, a conclusion that does not so much explain the man as label him. De Groot's evidence is not altogether convincing, but he has written the best book on Haig to be published in the last quarter century.

Off the Press . . .

- Albinski, Henry S., et al. *The South Pacific: Political, Economic, and Military Trends*. Washington: Brassey's, 1989. 106 pp. \$9.95.
- Auton, Graeme P., ed. *Arms Control and European Security*. New York: Praeger, 1989. 205 pp. \$39.95.
- Bassett, John T. *War Journal of an Innocent Soldier*. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, Shoe String Press, 1989. 119 pp. \$19.50.
- Bausum, Henry S., ed. *Military Leadership and Command: The John Biggs Cincinnati Lectures 1988*. Lexington, Va.: The VMI Foundation, 1989. 154 pp. \$10.00.
- Beckett, Ian F. W. *Johnnie Gough, V.C.: A Biography of Brigadier-General Sir John Edmond Gough, V.C., K.C.B.* London: Tom Donovan, 1989. 244 pp. \$20.00.
- Berent, Mark. *Rolling Thunder*. New York: Jove Books, 1989. 402 pp. \$4.95.
- Bowen, Gary L., and Dennis K. Orthner. *The Organization Family: Work and Family Linkages in the U.S. Military*. New York: Praeger, 1989. 202 pp. \$40.00.
- Brown, Frederick Z. *Second Chance: The United States and Indochina in the 1990s*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1989. 163 pp. \$14.95 (paper).

- Burgess, William H. III, ed. *Inside Spetsnaz: Soviet Special Operations, A Critical Analysis*. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1990. 308 pp. \$24.95.
- Burke, John P., and Fred I. Greenstein. *How Presidents Test Reality: Decisions on Vietnam, 1954 and 1965*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1989. 331 pp. \$29.95.
- Camp, Richard D., Jr., with Eric Hammel. *Lima-6: A Marine Company Commander in Vietnam, June 1967-January 1968*. New York: Atheneum, Macmillan Publishing Co., 1989. 295 pp. \$19.95.
- Catudal, Honore M. *Soviet Nuclear Strategy from Stalin to Gorbachev: A Revolution in Soviet Military and Political Thinking*. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1988. 413 pp. \$50.00.
- Chandler, David G. *Battles and Battle Scenes of World War Two*. New York: Macmillan, 1989. 160 pp. \$19.95.
- Colby, William with James McCargar. *Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America's Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam by the Former Director of the CIA*. Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989. 438 pp. \$22.95.
- Collelo, Thomas, ed. *Lebanon: A Country Study*. Washington: Library of Congress, 1989. 282 pp.
- Collins, John M. *Military Space Forces: The Next 50 Years*. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989. 236 pp. \$24.95.
- Corvo, Max. *The O.S.S. in Italy, 1942-1945: A Personal Memoir*. New York: Praeger, 1990. 324 pp. \$29.95.
- Eckert, Edward K. *In War and Peace: An American Military History Anthology*. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1990. 444 pp.
- Edwards, John E. *Combat Service Support Guide*. Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1989. 288 pp. \$14.95 (paper).
- Erskine, Emmanuel A. *Mission with UNIFIL: An African Soldier's Reflections*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989. 215 pp. \$35.00.
- Fisher, David E. *A Race on the Edge of Time: Radar—The Decisive Weapon of World War II*. New York: Paragon House, 1989. 371 pp. \$14.95 (paper).
- Flanagan, E. M., Jr. *The Angels: A History of the 11th Airborne Division*. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1989. 422 pp. \$24.95.
- Foerster, Schuyler, et al. *Defining Stability: Conventional Arms Control in a Changing Europe*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989. 117 pp. \$19.95.
- Fossedal, Gregory A. *The Democratic Imperative: Exporting the American Revolution*. New York: Basic Books, 1989. 304 pp. \$19.95.
- Frank, Joseph Allan, and George A. Reaves. "Seeing the Elephants": *Raw Recruits at the Battle of Shiloh*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1989. 215 pp. \$39.95.
- Gamba-Stonehouse, Virginia. *Strategy in the Southern Oceans: A South American View*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989. 155 pp. \$49.95.
- Garrett, James M. *The Tenuous Balance: Conventional Forces in Central Europe*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989. 273 pp. \$36.50 (paper).
- Gibbons, William C. *The US Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part III: January-July 1965*. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1989 [originally published by USGPO in December 1988]. 489 pp. \$12.50 (paper).
- Glatthaar, Joseph T. *Forged in Battle: The Civil War Alliance of Black Soldiers and White Officers*. New York: Free Press, 1989. 370 pp. \$24.95.
- Golden, James R., et al. *NATO at Forty: Change, Continuity, & Prospects*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989. 318 pp. \$35.00.
- Gregor, A. James. *In the Shadow of Giants: The Major Powers and the Security of Southeast Asia*. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, 1989. 188 pp. \$20.95 (\$15.95 paper).
- Gudmundsson, Bruce I. *Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918*. New York: Praeger, 1989. 210 pp.
- Hallion, Richard P. *Strike from the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Attack, 1911-1945*. Smithsonian History of Aviation Series. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989. 323 pp. \$24.95.
- Harkavy, Robert E. *Bases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1989. 389 pp. \$74.00.

- Harrison, Marshall. *A Lonely Kind of War: Forward Air Controller, Vietnam*. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1989. 285 pp. \$18.95.
- Higham, Robin, ed. *Bayonets in the Streets: The Use of Troops in Civil Disturbances*. Manhattan, Kans.: Sunflower Univ. Press, 1989. 254 pp. \$11.95 (paper).
- Huston, James A. *Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: US Army Logistics in the Korean War*. Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna Univ. Press, 1989. 492 pp. \$65.00.
- Keegan, John. *The Second World War*. New York: Viking, 1990. 608 pp. \$29.95.
- Ketchum, Richard M. *The Borrowed Years 1938-1941: America on the Way to War*. New York: Random House, 1989. 896 pp. \$29.95.
- Klieman, Aaron S. *Israel & the World After 40 Years*. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989. 275 pp. \$24.95.
- Krehbiel, Carl C. *Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe: The Stockholm Conference*. New York: Praeger, 1989. 389 pp. \$55.00.
- Kruzell, Joseph, ed. *American Defense Annual, 1989-1990*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989. 297 pp. \$42.00.
- Kupperman, Robert, and Jeff Kamen. *Final Warning: Averting Disaster in the New age of Terrorism*. New York, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1989. 249 pp. \$18.95.
- Laird, Robbin F., and Betsy A. Jacobs, eds. *The Future of Deterrence: NATO Nuclear Forces After INF*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989. 200 pp. \$26.50 (paper).
- Lakoff, Sanford, and Herbert F. York. *A Shield in Space? Technology, Politics, and the Strategic Defense Initiative*. Berkeley, Calif.: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1989. 409 pp.
- LePoer, Barbara Leitch. *Thailand: A Country Study*. Washington: Library of Congress, 1989. 366 pp.
- Levi, Barbara G., et al., eds. *The Future of Land-Based Strategic Missiles*. New York: American Institute of Physics, 1989. 287 pp. \$35.00.
- Levie, Howard S. *The Law of War and Neutrality: A Selective English-Language Bibliography*. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1988. 224 pp. \$75.00.
- Livingstone, Neil C. *The Cult of Counterterrorism*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989. 437 pp. \$19.95.
- Lynn-Jones, Sean, et al. *Soviet Military Policy: An International Security Reader*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989. 374 pp. \$14.95 (paper).
- Markham, George. *Guns of the Elite: Special Forces Firearms, 1940 to the Present*. New York: Sterling Publishing Co., 1989. 175 pp. \$24.95.
- Metz, Helen, ed. *Iran: A Country Study*. Washington: Library of Congress, 1989. 344 pp.
- Miller, Steven E., and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, eds. *Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989. 388 pp. \$14.95 (paper).
- Muller, Harald, ed. *A Survey of European Nuclear Policy, 1985-87*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989. 158 pp. \$49.95.
- Murphy, John F. *State Support of International Terrorism: Legal, Political, & Economic Dimensions*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989. 128 pp. \$39.95.
- Nolan, Janne E. *Guardians of the Arsenal: The Politics of Nuclear Strategy*. New York: A New Republic Book/Basic Books, 1989. 320 pp. \$21.95.
- Nosworthy, Brent. *The Anatomy of Victory: Battle Tactics 1689-1763*. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1990. 395 pp. \$25.00.
- Partridge, Michael Stephen. *Military Planning for the Defense of the United Kingdom, 1814-1870*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1989. 248 pp. \$49.95.
- Paschall, Rod. *The Defeat of Imperial Germany 1917-1918*. Chapel Hill, N.C.: Algonquin Books, 1989. 247 pp. \$22.95.
- Pilling, Donald L. *Competition in Defense Procurement*. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1989. 50 pp.
- Pitt, Barrie and Frances. *The Month-by-Month Atlas of World War II*. New York: Summit Books, 1989. 178 pp. \$35.00.

- Rosignoli, Guido. *The Allied Forces in Italy 1943-45*. Devon, Eng.: David & Charles [Dist. in U.S. by Sterling Publishing Co.], 1989. 160 pp. \$24.95.
- Saaty, Thomas L., and Joyce M. Alexander. *Conflict Resolution: The Analytic Hierarchy Approach*. New York: Praeger, 1989. 252 pp. \$49.95.
- Skorupa, John A. *Self-Protective Measures to Enhance Airlift Operations in Hostile Environments*. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air Univ. Press, 1989. 185 pp.
- Sperry, Roland. *China Through the Eyes of A Tiger*. New York: Pocket Books, Simon & Schuster, 1990. 294 pp. \$4.95 (paper).
- Stanton, Shelby L. *America's Tenth Legion: X Corps in Korea, 1950*. Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1989. 342 pp. \$24.95.
- Steelbaugh, Larry. *Tank War*. New York: Berkley Books, 1989. 229 pp. \$4.50.
- Stephens, Michael D., ed. *The Educating of Armies*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989. 237 pp. \$49.95.
- Stubbs, Richard. *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1989. 286 pp. \$29.95.
- Tapert, Annette, ed. *Lines of Battle: Letters from American Servicemen, 1941-1945*. New York: Pocket Books, 1989. 297 pp. \$7.95.
- Taylor, A. J. P. *The Second World War: An Illustrated History*. New York: Penguin, 1976. 240 pp. \$15.95 (paper).
- Taylor, Thomas. *Where the Orange Blooms: One Man's War and Escape in Vietnam*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1989. 387 pp. \$19.95.
- Thompson, Loren B. *Low-Intensity Conflict: The Pattern of Warfare in the Modern World*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989. 207 pp. \$29.95.
- Tuyll, Hubert P. *Feeding the Bear: American Aid to the Soviet Union, 1941-1945*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1989. 200 pp. \$37.95.
- Warden, John A. III. *The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat*. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989. 160 pp. \$11.91.
- Welcher, Frank J. *The Union Army, 1861-1865, Organization and Operations, Vol. 1: The Eastern Theater*. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1989. 1065 pp. \$75.00.
- Wilson, George C. *Treat 'Em Rough: The Birth of American Armor, 1917-20*. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1989. 242 pp. \$24.95.
- Wintle, Justin, ed. *The Dictionary of War Quotations*. New York: The Free Press, 1989. 506 pp. \$29.95.
- Zaloga, Steven J. *Red Thrust: Attack on the Central Front, Soviet Tactics and Capabilities in the 1990s*. Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1989. 274 pp. \$18.95.

We are pleased to announce that *Parameters* issues are now available on microfilm and microfiche through University Microfilms, Inc. To order, write or call:

Serials Customer Service Department
University Microfilms Inc.
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48106
(Phone: [313] 761-4700)

Lest we forget . . .

As of the press date for this issue of *Parameters*, 23 US military personnel had been killed in action in Panama during Operation Just Cause, which commenced on 20 December 1989. Another was killed in the events leading up to the operation. They are listed here to honor them and their families and to record their supreme sacrifice in the service of their country.

- Staff Sergeant Larry R. Barnard**, 19, Hallstead, Pa., B Co., 3d Bn., 75th Ranger Regt., Fort Benning, Ga.
- Private First Class Roy D. Brown, Jr.**, 19, Buena Park, Calif., A Co., 3d Bn., 75th Ranger Regt., Fort Benning, Ga.
- Private First Class Vance T. Coates**, 18, Great Falls, Mont., Headquarters and Headquarters Co., 1st Bn., 508th Infantry, 193d Infantry Bde., Fort Clayton, Panama.
- Lieutenant (j.g.) John P. Connors**, USN, 25, Arlington, Mass., Naval Special Warfare Group Two, Little Creek, Va.
- Private First Class Jerry S. Daves**, 20, Hope Mills, N.C., B Co., 1st Bn., 504th Parachute Infantry, 82d Airborne Div., Fort Bragg, N.C.
- Sergeant Michael A. Deblois**, 24, Dubach, La., C Co., 1st Bn., 508th Infantry, 193d Infantry Bde., Fort Clayton, Panama.
- Private First Class Martin D. Denson**, 21, Abilene, Tex., B Co., 1st Bn., 504th Parachute Infantry, 82d Airborne Div., Fort Bragg, N.C.
- Specialist William D. Gibbs**, 22, Marina, Calif., C Co., 4th Bn., 17th Infantry, 7th Infantry Div., Fort Ord, Calif.
- First Lieutenant John W. Hunter**, 20, Victor, Mont., Headquarters and Support Co., 160th Special Operations Aviation Gp., Fort Campbell, Ky.
- Corporal Garreth C. Isaak**, USMC, 22, Greenville, S.C., D Co., 2d Light Armored Infantry Bn., 2d Marine Div., Camp Lejeune, N.C.
- Specialist Phillip S. Lear**, 21, Westminster, S.C., B Co., 2d Bn., 75th Ranger Regt., Fort Lewis, Wash.
- Specialist Alejandro I. Manrique-lozano**, 20, Miami, Fla., D Co., 2d Bn., 504th Parachute Infantry, 82d Airborne Div., Fort Bragg, N.C.
- Private First Class James W. Markwell**, 21, Cincinnati, Ohio, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Bn., 75th Ranger Regt., Hunter Army Airfield, Fort Stewart, Ga.
- Chief Engineman Donald L. McFaul**, USN, 22, San Diego, Calif., Naval Special Warfare Group Two, Little Creek, Va.
- Chief Warrant Officer Wilson B. Owens**, 29, North Myrtle Beach, S.C., B Co., 160th Special Operations Aviation Gp., Fort Campbell, Ky.
- First Lieutenant Robert Paz**, USMC, 25, Cali, Colombia, Marine Corps Security Forces Company, US Southern Command, Panama (killed 16 December 1989).
- Corporal Ivan D. Perez**, 22, Pawtucket, R.I., B Co., 4th Bn., 6th Infantry, 5th Infantry Div. (Mech.), Fort Polk, La.
- Warrant Officer Andrew P. Porter**, 25, St. Clair, Mich., B Co., 1st Bn., 123d Aviation Regt., 7th Infantry Div., Fort Ord, Calif.
- Private First Class John M. Price**, 22, Conover, Wis., A Co., 2d Bn., 75th Ranger Regt., Fort Lewis, Wash.
- Torpedoman's Mate 2d Class Isaac G. Rodriguez III**, USN, 24, Missouri City, Tex., Naval Special Warfare Group Two, Little Creek, Va.
- Private First Class Scott L. Roth**, 19, Killeen, Tex., 401st Military Police Company, Fort Hood, Tex.
- Private Kenneth D. Scott**, 20, Princeton, W.Va., A Co., 4th Bn., 6th Infantry, 5th Infantry Div. (Mech.), Fort Polk, La.
- Private James A. Tabor**, 18, Montrose, Colo., Headquarters Co., 4th Bn., 325th Airborne Infantry, Fort Bragg, N.C.
- Boatswain's Mate 1st Class Christopher Tilghman**, USN, 20, Kailua, Hawaii, Naval Special Warfare Group Two, Little Creek, Va.

Requiescat in pace.