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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
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1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE September 1989		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Key Themes in Soviet Published Sources on the Federal Republic of Germany			5. FUNDING NUMBERS Independent Research	
6. AUTHOR(S) Susan L. Clark				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Institute for Defense Analyses 1801 N. Beauregard Street Alexandria, VA 22311			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER IDA Document D-651	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Institute for Defense Analyses 1801 N. Beauregard Street Alexandria, VA 22311			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) This paper examines Soviet assessments of the Federal Republic of Germany's (FRG) security policy during the Gorbachev period. In this context, the main issues discussed in the Soviet open-source literature are: nuclear weapons; West German defense cooperation with France; the FRG's role in NATO; Soviet-West German relations; the German question and revanchism; and arms control. Soviet assessments of the FRG have clearly become more positive in the past two years. In short, the Gorbachev leadership recognizes the fundamentally important role the FRG plays in the West and between East and West.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Federal Republic of Germany; Soviet policy toward and relations with the FRG; Intermediate-range nuclear forces--deployment, treaty; FRG security policy; German question; nuclear weapons; France; United States; North Atlantic Treaty Organization; defense cooperation; revanchism; arms control			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 25	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL	

IDA DOCUMENT D-651

KEY THEMES IN SOVIET PUBLISHED SOURCES ON
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Susan L. Clark

September 1989

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PREFACE

This paper was prepared under funding from the Institute for Defense Analyses' Central Research Program fund. It represents a continuation of previous work by the author, a research staff member at IDA, on Soviet-West European relations.

This paper examines some of the key themes developed in the Soviet open source literature on the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), with a particular emphasis on politico-security issues, since Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985. The purpose of this study is to develop a greater awareness of those issues which the Soviets deem important in their analyses of the FRG in order to better understand their policy toward this country and toward the West in general. In contrast to the first years of Gorbachev's rule, when the FRG was largely ignored or negatively portrayed, the Soviet leadership now generally emphasizes the important role the FRG plays in the context of East-West relations.

This paper has not been subject to review.

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KEY THEMES IN SOVIET PUBLISHED SOURCES ON THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

This paper provides detailed references to and quotations from material found in the Soviet open-source literature on the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). In selecting appropriate samples from the literature, emphasis has been placed on those materials published since Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985. This review of the literature encompasses newspapers (*Pravda*, *Izvestiya*, and *Krasnaya zvezda*), journals (*International Affairs*, *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* (MEMO), *SShA*, and *Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie* (ZVO)), as well as several monographs published since 1986.

This paper is divided into the following sections: nuclear weapons and the FRG (which includes the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) issue, Lance modernization, and the FRG's own "nuclear aspirations"); West German defense cooperation with France; the FRG's role in NATO and the U.S. factor; Soviet-West German relations; the German question (that is, the division of Germany) and revanchism; and arms control.

That the Soviets pay a great deal of attention to the Federal Republic is readily evident from the volumes of material published in the Soviet open literature about this country. In large part, analyses focus on foreign and security policy issues and the state of relations between the Soviet Union and the FRG. Another indicator of the importance the Soviet leadership has attached to West Germany is the fact that both *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* have each had two correspondents in Bonn.

A. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Not surprisingly, the subject of nuclear weapons receives a significant amount of attention in Soviet newspapers, scholarly journals, and monographs. With respect to West Germany, the Soviets have concentrated on several nuclear issues, including its role in the deployment of U.S. INF and the subsequent U.S.-Soviet agreement to eliminate these missiles, the debate surrounding the modernization of the short-range Lance system, and

the FRG's own supposed nuclear aspirations. Each of these subjects are examined in this section.

1. The Decision to Deploy Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces

NATO's decision to deploy U.S. Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe, also known as the "dual track decision," was formally adopted in December 1979. In Soviet analyses, the West German government's support for this decision was frequently contrasted with public opposition to this move. These analyses also noted the serious effect this decision had on the individual political parties. For example, L. Bezymensky wrote in the March 1985 issue of *International Affairs* that three-quarters of the West German population opposed deployment of these missiles.¹ In an excellent book on U.S.-West German relations, M. S. Ziborova identified the INF decision as having "serious political consequences for the SPD-FDP [Social Democratic Party-Free Democratic Party] government." She argues that the rise of the peace movement and the split between the party leadership and the masses effectively led to the fall of this coalition.²

Constant themes in Soviet writings with respect to INF were the implications for the international situation and negative role that West Germany played in this trend. Bezymensky, a political analyst at *New Times* who has written books on World War II, Nazism, and neo-Nazism, characterized the INF deployment in the following way: "West Germany is thus becoming a launching pad for American first-strike nuclear missiles, which means that for the first time since the war a threat to the Soviet people and Soviet allies will be emanating from German soil."³ Bezymensky was not alone in pointing out the threat to the Soviet homeland. In his 1986 book on revanchism, V. V. Pustogarov argues that the INF deployment fundamentally changed the situation in Europe; it was not just a matter of a disruption in the balance of forces. He states that the FRG was turned into a base for delivering a first nuclear strike against the USSR, which led the Soviet leadership to conclude that "for the first time in postwar history, a military threat to the Soviet people once again emanates from German soil."⁴ Numerous others sources also

¹ L. Bezymensky, "The Wild Dreams of Modern Revanchists," *International Affairs* (hereafter *IA*), No. 3, 1985, p. 32.

² M. S. Ziborova, *Bonn-Vashington: 70-80-e gody* (Moscow: Nauka, 1988), p. 79.

³ Bezymensky, "The Wild Dreams of Modern Revanchists," p. 33.

⁴ V. V. Pustogarov, *Zapadnogermanskii revanshizm i mezhdunarodnoe pravo* (Moscow: Nauka, 1986), p. 98.

point to the FRG's new role as a "bridgehead for a first nuclear strike."⁵ G. Kirillov adds a slightly different twist to the argument, reasoning that by accepting the INF missiles Bonn "is creating a situation where a new war could be launched from the territory of the FRG even without the knowledge of its authorities."⁶ Kirillov further rejects Bonn's argument that these missiles have brought the Soviets back to the negotiating table; he believes that all the deployment did was raise the level of nuclear confrontation and worsen the political situation in Europe.

West Germany is, indeed, seen to share responsibility for the deployment decision with the United States. Writing in *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* in early 1985, I. Basova et al. state that "having agreed to deploy American Pershing and cruise missiles in the country, the West German government acted, in effect, as one of the main initiators of the realization of NATO's decision to 'rearm.'"⁷ In a 1986 book on West Germany's *ostpolitik*, I. S. Kremer similarly argues that "the FRG government (above all Chancellor Schmidt and Foreign Minister Genscher) not only did not restrain American plans to expand the U.S. nuclear presence in Europe and disrupt the existing correlation of forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization on the European continent, but even actively supported [these plans]."⁸ Because of this support, Kremer reasons, the FRG "shares with the U.S. the responsibility for the serious complication in the international situation."⁹

Related to the issue of West German responsibility is the notion in the Soviet writings that revanchism is again on the increase. Kremer writes that it is not only the socialist countries but also the FRG's allies who are concerned about the revival of revanchism after the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union-Free Democratic Party (CDU/CSU-FDP) coalition came to power "and especially after the beginning of the deployment of American medium-range missiles in the FRG, aimed at the Soviet Union."¹⁰ Bezymensky's assessment of the situation was even stronger: "Detente was hit hard when

⁵ See, for example, *Krasnaya zvezda*, 28 April 1985; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (hereafter *FBIS*), 31 December 1985, p. C1.

⁶ G. Kirillov, "Bonn: Peaceable Rhetoric and Militaristic Practices," *IA*, No. 4, 1986, p. 60.

⁷ I. Basova, L. Volodin, S. Sokol'skii, and V. Shenaev, "The FRG: Dangerous Tendencies," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* (hereafter *MEMO*), No. 1, 1985, p. 57.

⁸ I. S. Kremer, *FRG: etapy "vostochnoi politiki"* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1986), p. 172.

⁹ Kremer, *FRG: etapy "vostochnoi politiki,"* p. 191.

¹⁰ Kremer, *FRG: etapy "vostochnoi politiki,"* p. 195.

new U.S. nuclear first-strike weapons began to be deployed in West Germany with the consent of the FRG government, in keeping with the will of the U.S. ruling elite. . . . Revanchism and the missile deployment appeared to be communicating vessels."¹¹

Finally, Soviet analyses have also paid considerable attention to the role of the peace movement in the INF controversy. For example, L. Istyagin argues that the United States and West Germany had thought that the peace movement would fade away once the first INF missiles were actually deployed. On the contrary, these forces continued to oppose the government's policies. In the previous decade

the Schmidt-Genscher "social-liberal" government made constant concessions to the opponents of detente, and beginning in the second half of the 1970s moved away from [detente], having assumed a position of active complicity in the elaboration and realization of the American plans to 'rearm' that were dangerous for the cause of peace. It was precisely this turnaround that prompted West German anti-war forces to decisively come out against the SPD-FDP coalition's policy, and to an even greater extent against the course of Kohl's current conservative government that has intensified this policy, which has also led to the direct encouragement of militaristic and revanchist circles.¹²

In his 1988 book, Istyagin similarly notes that "the anti-missile campaign was marked by a very substantial expansion of the socio-political composition of anti-militarist forces."¹³

Thus, from the Soviet perspective, the INF deployment decision was frequently identified as a negative turning point in West Germany's foreign and security policy. These sentiments continued to prevail during the U.S.-Soviet negotiations to eliminate these forces, at least until the Bonn government changed its position on the inclusion of the Pershing-1As (P-1As) in these negotiations.

2. The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Agreement and the Obstacle of the Pershing-1As

Soviet analysts frequently identify the Reykjavik summit of October 1986 as a turning point in Bonn's thinking on the INF issue. Soviet commentaries have pointed out that prior to the Iceland meeting, Chancellor Kohl had supported NATO's zero option. Yet after Reykjavik, the Kohl government indicated grave concerns about the possibility of

¹¹ Bezymensky, "The Wild Dreams of Modern Revanchists," p. 29.

¹² L. Istyagin, "The Invincibility of the Ideas of Peace," *MEMO*, No. 2, 1985, p. 131.

¹³ L. Istyagin, *Obshchestvenno-politicheskaya bor'ba v FRG po voprosam mira i bezopasnosti* (Moscow: Nauka, 1988), p. 110.

eliminating the INF missiles completely, calling instead for progressively lowering their numbers (but not abolishing them).¹⁴

Differences among the West German political parties and between the government and the people on an INF treaty certainly have not gone unnoticed in the Soviet press and journals. For example, *Pravda* correspondent Yu. Yakhontov explained that the public supported a double zero solution, and the SPD and the Greens called for a serious approach to this proposal. Even Chancellor Kohl affirmed his support for the idea. But Yakhontov also pointed out existing opposition to the idea, namely from the Ministry of Defense, the Bundeswehr, and some highly-placed politicians.¹⁵

The real controversy surrounding the INF negotiations and West Germany came when the Soviets announced on 28 April 1987 that they wanted the P-1As to be included in the treaty since, they argued, the warheads are under U.S. control. Bogachev elaborates the reasoning behind this decision: "Nuclear warheads for these systems are deployed on West German territory but are under the control of the U.S. military command. It goes without saying that the question whether it is nuclear or conventional warheads that will be used on these missiles will be decided primarily by the USA. That is why the Soviet draft treaty . . . provides among other things for eliminating also the American warheads for West German Pershing 1A missiles."¹⁶

When Bonn rejected the Soviet insistence on including the Pershing-1As in the INF treaty, many Soviet articles attributed Bonn's position, at least in part, to West German nuclear aspirations. While this issue is addressed in greater detail in Section 4, another quote from Bogachev illustrates this Soviet attitude: "Are they acting out in Washington and Bonn a comedy of 'not understanding' the substance of the Soviet proposals or has the West German Bundeswehr already become the owner of nuclear warheads contrary to international agreements signed by the USA? It is possible that West Germany has not given up hopes to be a nuclear power and sees control over U.S. nuclear warheads for its Pershings as the short cut to realizing these hopes."¹⁷

Again differences of opinion among the various political parties and even within the governing coalition were highlighted, this time with respect to the P-1A issue. *Pravda*

¹⁴ See, for example, *FBIS*, 28 October 1986, p. G2 and *FBIS*, 6 November 1986.

¹⁵ Yu. Yakhontov, *Pravda*, 3 April 1987.

¹⁶ I. Bogachev, BBC: *Summary of World Broadcasts* (hereafter *SWB*), 5 May 1987, p. A1/2.

¹⁷ Bogachev, *SWB*, p. A1/2.

correspondent Yakhontov described the debate held in the Bundestag on the Soviet proposal, with the CDU/CSU aligned on one side and the SPD and the Greens aligned on the other. Only later in the article does he mention that the FDP members "in effect have supported the government statements, although they have declared that a 'double zero solution' . . . is considered desirable. But it, they say, requires careful study."¹⁸ While the Bundestag eventually adopted the government resolution, Yakhontov notes that 33 of the 269 deputies from the ruling parties voted against it, demonstrating that "on the issue of disarmament opinions within the coalition have diverged."¹⁹ Another article by Yakhontov, which appeared less than two weeks later, again noted the division of opinion within the FRG coalition government: not only was the FDP split from the CDU/CSU on this issue, but even within the CDU/CSU block no unified position existed.²⁰

In late May 1987, Kohl issued a special government statement on the INF issue, which according to the other *Pravda* correspondent in Bonn, Evgenii Grigor'ev, was designed in part to overcome inner-party differences of opinion and in part to calm public opinion in Europe, which saw the FRG's reaction to the Pershing dispute as a cause for concern. Grigor'ev notes that, in contrast to Kohl's reaction after Reykjavik, he apparently now supports the elimination of INF; to this extent, Bonn's policy has undergone "positive movement." Grigor'ev posits the question: will the West German government be realistic and not let the opportunity pass?²¹

The West German government did, in fact, agree to the inclusion of the Pershing-1As in the INF treaty, but not before the Soviets would have ample opportunities to criticize FRG and U.S. policy throughout the summer months of 1987. Essentially, many Soviet commentaries during this time portrayed the United States as wanting to circumvent the INF treaty by retaining the P-1As. For example, according to Viktor Levin,

The USA asserts that these [P-1As] are--as they say--the weapons of third countries and therefore there can be no discussion of them. But the nuclear warheads for such missiles belong to the USA. What kind of third-country weapons are these? And what kind of zero in operational-tactical missiles is it if there are 72 missiles remaining on the NATO side? Moreover, in the FRG itself now no particular secret is being made of the fact that in the very near future the Pershing-1A missiles are supposed to be replaced by Pershing-1B missiles, which are nothing other than one step

¹⁸ Yu. Yakhontov, *Pravda*, 9 May 1987; see also E. Bovkun, *Izvestiya*, 3 June 1987.

¹⁹ Yakhontov, *Pravda*, 9 May 1987.

²⁰ Yu. Yakhontov, *Pravda*, 18 May 1987.

²¹ E. Grigor'ev, *Pravda*, 21 May 1987.

short of Pershing-2. The Soviet Union cannot close its eye to open attempts by the USA to insert into the agreement on the elimination of missiles a loophole which allows it to circumvent the accord.²²

In an article published in *Krasnaya zvezda*, Yu. Lebedev explained that the Pershing-1B is a "one-stage version of the Pershing-2" and the procedure required to convert the 1-B into the Pershing-2 takes about 48 hours. Lebedev reasons that "Bonn is thus trying to secure a loophole for 'upgrading' the Bundeswehr with improved operational and tactical missiles capable of being easily and quickly converted into medium-range missiles. At the same time it can please the United States, which wants to keep nuclear weapons in Europe on the false pretext of 'meeting its NATO allies' needs.'" ²³

President von Weizsaecker's visit to the Soviet Union in July 1987 provided Andrei Gromyko with the opportunity to make known his views on the West German stance in this controversy: "The position taken by the FRG regarding the Pershing-1A missiles on its territory gives cause for regret. Such a position is capable of spoiling things--the vessel might be wrecked before it is launched."²⁴ The current foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, offered his own assessment of the situation in early August, echoing many of the arguments that had already been made, with the added twist of the East European reaction:

"If, as certain American leaders and their West German partners pretend, the Pershing 1-As belong to a third country, let us ask once again why and with what right does West Germany have nuclear weapons," Mr. Shevardnadze said. He said that if West Germany had nuclear weaponry in its arsenal it would be creating a "world political crisis." It would jeopardize the Soviet-US talks and create a situation where "our allies could demand the installation of similar systems on their territory and the Soviet Union could respond to their demand."²⁵

The article concluded that "either the Pershing 1-As belong to the United States, and should be included in the INF negotiations, or they belong to West Germany, which 'has neither the legal nor moral right to possess them.'" ²⁶

²² Viktor Levin, Moscow Home Service, 22 June 1987, as translated in "FRG's Pershing Missiles Being Used to 'Emasculate' INF Agreement," *SWB*, 26 June 1987, p. A1/3. See also, Gerasimov, as translated in "Gerasimov: Space Arms, Pershing-1A, Conventional Arms, Seoul Olympics," *SWB*, 26 June 1987, p. A1/1; Viktor Karpov, as translated in " 'Alliance Commitments' No Excuse for Refusal to Eliminate Pershing-1A Warheads," *SWB*, 6 August 1987, p. A1/3.

²³ Yu. Lebedev, *Krasnaya zvezda*, 21 July 1987, p. 3.

²⁴ As reported in *Pravda*, 9 July 1987, p. 2.

²⁵ As reported in *FBIS*, 10 August 1987, p. AA3.

²⁶ *FBIS*, 10 August 1987, p. AA4.

When Chancellor Kohl announced on 26 August that "under certain conditions" the Pershing-1As could be eliminated rather than modernized, Soviet press reaction was mixed. *Pravda's* correspondent Grigor'ev favorably assessed this shift, while *Izvestiya* paid more attention to all the conditions Kohl had attached to this statement.²⁷ Finally, following the agreement and signing of the treaty, at least one observer, writing in *New Times*, felt compelled to recognize the ultimately positive role Kohl had eventually played and the occasionally negative role the other West German political parties have played in the INF issue:

At the critical moment when the fate of the treaty was at stake, Helmut Kohl--who by no means commanded unanimous support on the issue within his own party--displayed political realism and farsightedness by removing the barriers which obstructed progress towards the treaty. Nevertheless, doubts as to the correctness of this move still persist in the CDU, let alone CSU.

Social Democrats celebrate the "double zero" as a personal victory. Indeed, they have more reason to do so than the conservative parties. Let's not forget, however, that it was the Social Democrat Helmut Schmidt, who, as Chancellor, "godfathered" the NATO decision on rearmament. Later the party's stand on Euromissiles was not always consistent either, and all but led to a split in the party.²⁸

Zholkver adds that "On the whole, Bonn welcomes the treaty as the first step towards real disarmament."²⁹ And, indeed, an article by M. Maksimova in *MEMO* in October 1988 noted that a change has been evident in the Federal Republic since the INF agreement. Although the country still officially adheres to flexible response, nuclear deterrence, the preservation of tactical nuclear weapons, and French nuclear cover, it is now possible to see large segments of the population calling for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.³⁰ Thus, Soviet hopes for the denuclearization of Europe persist.

²⁷ E. Grigor'ev, *Pravda*, 1 September 1987; *Izvestiya*, 28 August 1987. Other favorable assessments can be found in Serov, *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, as translated in *FBIS*, 8 September 1987, p. 27 and Gerasimov, *FBIS*, 9 September 1987, p. 1.

²⁸ Nikita Zholkver, *New Times*, No. 52, 1987, p. 3, as translated in Joint Publications Research Service, JPRS-TAC-88-005, 16 February 1988, p. 7.

²⁹ Zholkver, JPRS-TAC-88-005, p. 7.

³⁰ M. Maksimova, "To Uncover the Potential for Cooperation," *MEMO*, No. 10, 1988, p. 63.

3. The Post-INF World and Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Lance Modernization

The INF controversy--surrounding both NATO deployment and treaty negotiations--occupied a central place in Soviet writings during the mid-1980s, particularly in the leading newspapers. Within this context, the FRG consistently played a prominent and frequently negative role from the Soviet perspective. Yet it seems that no sooner had this controversy been resolved than the issue of tactical nuclear weapons emerged. Just as INF was a dominant theme in Soviet treatments of West Germany, so now the Lance modernization issue and the question of eliminating tactical nuclear weapons in Europe has taken center stage in many of the Soviet daily reports coming from Bonn. In fact, a sampling of the writings from *Pravda's* and *Izvestiya's* correspondents in the FRG highlight both the internal and the external pressures (especially by the Americans and the British) placed on the West German government in this debate.

Izvestiya's correspondent in Bonn, E. Grishin, and *Pravda's* Grigor'ev covered the appearance of Chancellor Kohl in the Bundestag in late April 1989 following the reshuffling of his cabinet; the issue of tactical nuclear weapons was also debated at this time.³¹ Grishin's article is more positive and focuses more on Kohl's statements about the importance of Soviet-West German relations than Grigor'ev's coverage. Grishin also devoted more attention to Kohl's position and the ensuing debate, namely with SPD representative Vogel. In Grishin's assessment of the situation, the debate "reflected deep differences between the government and parliamentary parties" and the government had come to recognize that the West German people do not see a threat from the East. Grigor'ev also saw the internal pressures evident in the FRG on this issue. He argues that the debate showed that the government was trying to change public sentiment in its favor by correcting its policy and making new promises, but that Kohl had not, in fact, said much new.

The other *Izvestiya* correspondent in Bonn, E. Bovkun, interviewed Karsten Voigt of the SPD on foreign policy and disarmament.³² Voigt noted the commonality of all of the FRG's parties on two issues: they are for a sharp reduction in battlefield nuclear weapons and for beginning talks with the Warsaw Pact to reduce short-range missiles. But he also noted their differences: the SPD is for a third zero, the CDU insists on modernizing the

³¹ E. Grishin, *Izvestiya*, 28 April 1989; E. Grigor'ev, *Pravda*, 28 April 1989.

³² E. Bovkun, *Izvestiya*, 7 April 1989.

tactical nuclear weapons, and the FDP wants to keep the question open at least until 1991. Bovkun points out that, with Bundestag elections pending, the current government does not wish to perpetuate a new arms debate. In addition to the domestic side of the issue, Bovkun's article also addresses the foreign pressure being applied to West Germany, citing the various visits to the capital from Bonn's allies, as the allies tried to push the government toward accepting the modernization decision. In two later articles, Bovkun similarly underscores the pressure being applied to the German government.³³

Another article by Grishin similarly focuses on American (and British) pressures and the West Germans' reaction to this pressure.³⁴ The United States resorted to "overt blackmail" according to Grishin: "Irritated by the obstinacy of its Rhine ally, the U.S. administration set the strongest operating means in motion. U.S. Ambassador to the FRG Walters threatened: if Bonn does not display 'solidarity,' then Washington will raise the question of withdrawing U.S. troops from West German territory." Grishin then notes that Helmut Schmidt's reaction to this "threat" was that the West Germans had been hearing such threats for years; Egon Bahr characterized the U.S. and British actions as "irresponsible." Finally, Grigor'ev poses the blunt question: Will Bonn give in to the United States in the name of Atlantic solidarity in the face of support for negotiations by the overwhelming majority of the public and the main political forces in West Germany?³⁵

4. West Germany's Nuclear Aspirations

Soviet analysts perceive the West Germans to have an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons--either through production of their own or some kind of joint agreement, most likely with France or the United States. With respect to the U.S. connection, the issue of a German hand on the "nuclear button" was raised during the controversy over the Pershing-1As and West Germany's reluctance to include them in the INF negotiations (see preceding section). For example, according to Borin, appearing on the *News Today* program,

I think the issue of Pershing-1A missiles goes beyond the framework of the arms control negotiations. It has crucial political implications for the future of Europe, and not only of Europe. You know that Federal Germany is forbidden to have nuclear weapons. I think that any attempts to upset this and to give Bonn any hopes of possessing its own nuclear potential is fraught with grave consequences. But Pershings are American-made

³³ E. Bovkun, *Izvestiya*, 19 May 1989 and 23 May 1989.

³⁴ E. Grishin, *Izvestiya*, 10 May 1989.

³⁵ E. Grigor'ev, *Pravda*, 24 May 1989.

missiles, and their warheads are under American control. But nonetheless I see in Bonn's position not a lack of logic but the deepseated ambitions to join the nuclear club.³⁶

As proof of this, Borin cites the fact that Franz Josef Strauss, the "staunchest supporter" of a "European nuclear force," has been backed by Chancellor Kohl. Borin thus reasons that "It is clear that through a European nuclear fighting force, Bonn is seeking to gain access to nuclear decisions and nuclear arms."³⁷

Grigor'ev draws a picture of such nuclear aspirations ultimately threatening the security of Europe:

Why does Bonn need these 72 missiles and, the main question, the nuclear charges for them? It is sometimes said that this is the "bone" which the chancellor has allegedly been forced to throw to the "steel helmet" (the militarist Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union faction) for domestic policy reasons. But can the "pacification" of the far right in any NATO country at the expense of European security be tolerated? Can it be allowed to objectively become a demand for unilateral military advantages, moreover in the nuclear sphere? It appears that while officially renouncing nuclear weapons, Bonn actually wants to be a "near-nuclear power" with its finger on the button of nuclear missiles.³⁸

Writing in *International Affairs*, Igor Borisov argues that either the Pershing-1A warheads are under U.S. control and should therefore be eliminated under the treaty or they are under West German control, which would be a gross violation of the nonproliferation treaty. He continues his argument, "What would be the reaction in the FRG if the USSR's allies had similar carrier missiles and the nuclear warheads for them were stored close to the launching positions in Soviet depots? In this case, perhaps, Bonn would look at the issue of third countries' weapons in a different way."³⁹ Borisov also postulates that West Germany fears that without the P-1As, it would lose some of its influence concerning NATO's nuclear policy. He further argues that the FRG has not relinquished its aspirations for its own nuclear weapons.⁴⁰

³⁶ Borin, on 5 June 1987, as reported in "Borin Views Bonn's Nuclear Arms Objectives," *FBIS*, 10 June 1987, p. H4.

³⁷ Borin, "Borin Views Bonn's Nuclear Arms Objectives," p. H4.

³⁸ E. Grigor'ev, *Pravda*, 15 June 1987. Other articles that link the Pershing-1A dispute with West German nuclear ambitions include *FBIS*, 12 August 1987, pp. AA3-4 and Karpov statement in Kuvshinnikov, *Izvestiya*, 13 August 1987.

³⁹ Igor Borisov, "Bonn: Words and Deeds," *IA*, No. 10, 1987, p. 45.

⁴⁰ Borisov, "Bonn: Words and Deeds," p. 45.

In addition to the Pershing-1A issue, Soviet analysts have also underscored the nuclear component of the Franco-German relationship. Here, they argue, West Germany seeks to have access to nuclear weapons through a bilateral arrangement. For example, *Pravda* notes Strauss' comment that "the time has come when it is necessary to create a joint European nuclear arsenal." The article further alleges that there are increased West German aspirations to have France and, if possible, Britain, provide a nuclear umbrella for the FRG and that Paris has no objections to moving in this direction.⁴¹ Another account draws the explicit connection between the INF agreement and a French nuclear guarantee: "This is not the first time Bonn has shown its nuclear ambitions, and there is thus no surprise on that score. What is surprising, however, is the exceptional readiness with which Paris wants to satisfy the nuclear appetite of the West German military."⁴²

Both the West German and French governments are portrayed as seeking to counter Soviet peace initiatives with a "Eurodefense." According to TASS military specialist Vladimir Chernyshev, "All this seems to be closely linked with Paris' stubborn commitment to nuclear weapons and Bonn's long-standing aspiration to join the 'nuclear club.' "⁴³

More recently, Nikolai Afanasyevsky et al. wrote in the May 1988 issue of *International Affairs* that "while rejecting the NATO doctrine of flexible response as well as the idea of the permissibility of a limited nuclear conflict, Paris speaks more and more often of France and the FRG having a 'common strategic space,' of the desirability of drawing Bonn into choosing targets for French tactical nuclear weapons or even of supplying the FRG with a 'second key' to them."⁴⁴

B. WEST GERMAN RELATIONS WITH FRANCE: THE DEFENSE SPHERE

Following the signing of the INF agreement, V. Pustov writes that Franco-German defense cooperation has been expanding and that France is the main instigator in this process. According to Pustov, France is playing the FRG off the United States, telling West Germany that the United States is pulling out of Europe, so the FRG should rely

⁴¹ *Pravda*, 23 June 1987.

⁴² *FBIS*, 29 June 1987, p. H1.

⁴³ Vladimir Chernyshev, as reported in "FRG-French Military Ties Viewed," *FBIS*, 28 September 1987.

⁴⁴ Nikolai Afanasyevsky, Eduard Tarasinkevich, Andrei Shvedov, "Between Yesterday and Today," *IA*, No. 5, 1988, p. 28.

more on cooperation with France, while telling the United States that with neutralism increasing in the FRG, the United States should count more on France.⁴⁵ Prior to the INF agreement, the Soviet daily press gave considerable coverage to meetings between the French and West German leaders as they sought to develop some common West European approach to the issue. For the most part, Soviet press analyses underscored the lack of consensus *within* each of these countries, which clearly impeded their ability to develop a common line *between* them.⁴⁶ But in this context, Defense Minister Giraud was under no illusions about the need to establish a common position; as reported in *Pravda*, Giraud argued: "It is precisely the Soviet-American disarmament talks that have shown France and the FRG how close their solidarity must be."⁴⁷

More broadly, Franco-German defense cooperation is perceived by the Soviets to be the main impetus in the West European military integration effort. In an article published in July 1985 in *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, Lt. Colonel V. Konobeev analyses the reasons behind this evolving cooperation, explaining that, aside from the benefits to be derived for both countries' military-industrial complexes, it is seen as a way of strengthening the European pillar in NATO. He also suggests that some believe the France cannot ensure its own security alone, so it has turned to West Germany as a partner. In addition, Konobeev raises the question of the reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella; given the doubts surrounding the U.S. guarantee, he argues that a system of European defense must be created, which can only be done through the unification of French nuclear weapons and West German industry.⁴⁸

As already indicated, the subject of nuclear weapons is raised frequently in Soviet discussions of the Franco-German relationship. According to *Pravda's* correspondent in Paris, V. Bol'shakov, this bilateral defense cooperation shows "the obvious determination of the French ruling class to use French nuclear weapons to ensure its command position in the future 'united Europe.' " For its part, the FRG "perceives France's 'nuclear payment' as a certain condition of the proposed alliance."⁴⁹ In September 1987, the military newspaper *Krasnaya zvezda* argued that this cooperation was entering a new level: "As an

⁴⁵ V. Pustov, "The Nuclear Zeal of Paris and London," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 7 February 1988.

⁴⁶ See, for example, *Izvestiya*, 5 May 1987; *Pravda*, 23 May 1987; *Pravda*, 24 May 1987.

⁴⁷ *Pravda*, 9 July 1987. See also, *Izvestiya*, 22 July 1987.

⁴⁸ Lt. Col. V. Konobeev, "In the Spirit of 'Atlantic Solidarity,' " *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 13, 1985, pp. 85-86.

⁴⁹ V. Bol'shakov, *Pravda*, 28 August 1987.

important step on this path it is proposed to station on FRG territory French tactical nuclear weapons--future missiles of increased range with neutron warheads." The author further states that the FRG would be able to participate in the decision on their use and that one should not rule out the possibility of the Bundeswehr being outfitted with French nuclear missiles.⁵⁰

Similarly, Gusenkov argued in 1986 that the emphasis on military cooperation and the creation of a bilateral commission which discusses "strategic coordination" matters puts the nuclear issue clearly on the agenda:

It is known that Bonn long ago sought pledges from Paris concerning the possible use of French nuclear weapons on West German territory. These are the Pluton tactical missile and the Hades missile, which is under construction, as well as the Mirage and Jaguar aircraft, with which France has equipped its Air Force. According to press reports, the French government has agreed to hold consultations on these questions with the FRG. It is true that Paris immediately declared that agreement to hold consultations by no means meant agreement to FRG participation in adopting a decision on the use of nuclear weapons. The right to use it, they said, remains as before the exclusive prerogative of France's supreme political and military leadership. A question arises in this connection: Will not French-West German consultations be a prelude to the admission that "France's vital interests" also extend to FRG territory? After all, there is only one step between this admission and the pledge to expand the French "nuclear umbrella" to the other side of the Rhine.⁵¹

But Gusenkov also recognizes the continued differences between the two countries on certain issues, such as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

France and the FRG have different views of Western Europe's place in the current interdependent world. Paris, which by no means questions the leading role of the United States in the Western camp, regards Western Europe as one of the "centers of power,"--by depending on its own economic potential and political influence--to be able to more boldly defend its specific interests in the face of its mighty transoceanic ally. Bonn does not share this philosophy. It increasingly counts on Western Europe's direct entry into the global strategy of the United States. Does not the so-called "European defense initiative," which is being nurtured by FRG ruling circles, testify to this? It envisages the creation of an antimissile defense system in Western Europe--a kind of adjunct to the SDI. . . . The Bonn coalition will not make any decision that could create the impression that it is dissociating the FRG from the United States. The Rhine clearly does not

⁵⁰ *Krasnaya zvezda*, 13 September 1987.

⁵¹ Gusenkov, *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 15 February 1986; as translated in *FBIS*, 20 February 1986, pp. G2-3.

intend to sacrifice its close ties with the United States for the sake of strategic cooperation with France.⁵²

In a May 1988 article appearing in *International Affairs*, Afanasyevsky et al. differentiate between the political and military aspects of this bilateral relationship:

Nobody can reasonably object to stronger good-neighbor relations between the two countries, particularly in view of their poor record in mutual relations. But what is one to make of the fact that France and the FRG are increasingly "militarising" their cooperation? What or whom are these efforts directed against? Why is it that closer ties between them are not a generator of constructive proposals for ending division and confrontation in Europe and for building a common European home?⁵³

Clearly, the Soviets do not see this relationship evolving in a direction favorable to their interests.

Finally, Soviet discussions of the Western European Union (WEU) frequently note the important role France and West Germany have played in reviving this organization. Vladimir Stupishin notes this fact and then outlines the general aims of the WEU:

The WEU sees its official objective in converting itself into a European Union (this would move it close to a United States of Europe). The military integration trend, still a rather feeble rivulet, is gradually merging with the general integrational process that is going on within the EC [European Community], swelling to a more and more powerful stream.

The military integration trend is now motivated above all by the likelihood of a slackening of the U.S. commitment to defend Western Europe against the "Soviet military threat."⁵⁴

Such defense efforts are obviously not seen to be in keeping with Soviet urgings to adapt to a "new political thinking" in international relations.

C. WEST GERMANY'S ROLE IN NATO AND THE U.S. FACTOR

Particularly on the pages of the military journal *Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie*, Soviet analyses consistently highlight the important role the Federal Republic plays in the NATO Alliance and in Western defense efforts more generally:

⁵² Gusevskov, *FBIS*, p. G4.

⁵³ Afanasyevsky et al., "Beyond Yesterday and Today," p. 27.

⁵⁴ Vladimir Stupishin, "Common European Home and the Slogan for a United States of Europe," *IA*, No. 3, 1989, p. 93.

The FRG's military-political course at the present stage is aimed at further increasing the country's role in NATO, comprehensively strengthening its ties with the U.S., expanding and deepening Franco-West German military cooperation, and constantly building up the Bundeswehr's combat might.

The FRG's leadership is actively participating in the elaboration and implementation of a coordinated military policy for the North Atlantic bloc vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact, is taking upon itself the basic obligations to build up the combat potential of the bloc's allied forces, and is constantly pressuring the West European allies to increase their contribution to collective militaristic preparations.⁵⁵

The same author, V. Lyudchik, wrote several months later a quite similar assessment, this time emphasizing the Bundeswehr's role:

Completely approving and supportive of the aggressive foreign policy course of the U.S. and NATO ruling circles, the FRG is actively participating in augmenting the bloc's military preparations. This is reflected, in particular, in the further increase in the Bundeswehr's striking might through the constant improvement of its organizational structure and the outfitting of formations and units with modern weapons and combat equipment. According to foreign specialists' appraisals, the Bundeswehr is presently the largest and most combat ready armed force in Western Europe. Thus, in Central Europe it accounts for 50 percent of the ground troops, 60 percent of the tanks, 30 percent of combat aircraft, and 30 percent of naval men and materiel.⁵⁶

Within the Alliance framework, the two issues to which the Soviets generally pay the most attention is the FRG's close relationship with the United States and the country's role in West European integration efforts. As for the U.S.-FRG link, M. S. Ziborova has dedicated an entire book to the subject, entitled *Bonn-Vashington: 70-80 gody*. This excellent and in-depth analysis provides a useful sense of how relations between these two important countries are viewed by the Soviets. Briefly encapsulated, Ziborova argues that in the 1970s Bonn developed its *ostpolitik*, which led to a change in its relations with the United States from complete dependence to mutual dependence. In the mid-1970s, Bonn's relative independence was seen to emerge. Ziborova then notes that in the 1980s, there has been a gradual movement to subordinate West German interests to those of the United States. The reasons for this shift are identified as including: the INF deployment, Ronald

⁵⁵ V. Lyudchik, "The Armed Forces of the FRG," *Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie* (hereafter ZVO), No. 12, 1988, p. 7.

⁵⁶ V. Lyudchik, "The Ground Troops of the FRG," ZVO, No. 3, 1989, p. 19.

Reagan's style of pressuring U.S. allies, and the increase in the strength of the West German right-wing.⁵⁷

The question of the FRG's independence or lack of independence in its relations with its transatlantic ally is a frequent theme in the Soviet literature. Two 1985 assessments were considerably more pessimistic about West Germany's independence, laying particular blame on the INF issue, than the Ziborova book, published in 1988. According to Basova et al.:

The Kohl-Genscher government is turning the country from an equal partner into the U.S.' faithfully servile assistant. National interests are being sacrificed for solidarity with the Reagan administration. This was manifested above all in the deployment of American medium-range missiles in the FRG's territory, aimed at changing the strategic balance of forces in the U.S. and NATO's favor.

At the same time, Bonn is seeking to use relations with Washington to strengthen its own position in the European Economic Community.⁵⁸

Similarly, Bezymensky sees the FRG willingly playing the role of servile ally: "There has not been a single issue on which the West German authorities would not toe the Washington course towards building up world tensions and stepping up military preparations. The only exceptions are instances when the USA unscrupulously demands too much of the FRG budget."⁵⁹

With the INF controversy resolved, Ziborova is able to give a more credibility to West German independence, although this is still qualified:

The United States of America is the leader of the capitalist world with global ambitions and possessing colossal military might. The Federal Republic of Germany is a West European country which has emerged in the position of the leading power in the region. Despite Bonn's continued military-political dependence on Washington, the FRG has acquired such a solid position in NATO that a kind of reverse dependency has arisen--ensuring the participation of the Bundeswehr in its military-political measures has become an integral element of the American strategy for the Atlantic Alliance.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Ziborova, *Bonn-Vashington*, pp. 8-9.

⁵⁸ Basova et al., "The FRG: Dangerous Tendencies," p. 49.

⁵⁹ Bezymensky, "The Wild Dreams of Modern Revanchists," p. 33.

⁶⁰ Ziborova, *Bonn-Vashington*, p. 5.

In conclusion, Ziborova writes that "despite the bursts of contradictions on a wide range of problems, these relations are dominated by the tendency to support and develop cooperation, cultivated by the ruling circles of both countries."⁶¹

Finally, with respect to the Federal Republic's role in integration efforts, Soviet analyses generally carefully point out the balance of West German interests between wanting such efforts to succeed but not wanting them to affect the U.S. commitment to the Continent. Ziborova provides one of the best assessments of this issue:

As a whole, the West German government strives to be the "motor" of West European integration, not relinquishing this to French leadership. It seeks to step up the activities of all the organizations that see their task to be coordinating the West European countries' approaches to today's military-political problems. But this policy is also aimed at increasing [the FRG's] role and potential in its relations with the US; it is being worked out in such a way so that cooperation by West European states in the military-political sphere does not contradict, at least in the foreseeable future, NATO objectives. Coordination of military-political issues by the West European states and an increase in their military contribution should, according to the calculations of the FRG's ruling circles, lead to the transformation of NATO's West European component into a most important integral part of the bloc, indispensable for the US, which will ensure close military-political ties between Western Europe and the US and the conformity of the bloc's policy to West European interests, and in the long-term will prepare the foundation for a military-political community of West European states, especially in the event of a reduction of the US presence in Western Europe.

At the same time, the special significance which Bonn accords to military-political cooperation with the US inevitably limits the possibilities and restrains the tempo of development of the integrational processes in the military-political area within the West European framework.⁶²

In the final analysis, the Soviets recognize that West Germany has a multi-dimensional role in Western Europe within the NATO alliance, in its bilateral relations--especially with the United States and France--and within the framework of other European institutions--all of which affect the Federal Republic's relations with the Soviet Union.

D. SOVIET-WEST GERMAN RELATIONS

Soviet-West German relations experienced prolonged periods of strain in the 1980s, in large part because of the INF disputes and because of the conservative government's (CDU/CSU-FDP coalition) coming to power in 1982. Writing in

⁶¹ Ziborova, *Bonn-Vashington*, p. 237.

⁶² Ziborova, *Bonn-Vashington*, pp. 115-116.

International Affairs in late 1985, Kirillov provides a straight-forward assessment of the status of their bilateral relations:

Summing up, one is bound to conclude that the relations between the USSR and the FRG have become noticeably more complex in the 1980s as compared to the 1970s. But this is not to say that they have come to a standstill. The impetus given to the Soviet-West German relations by the Moscow Treaty is still at work. The two states continue political contacts at various levels. The two countries maintain a relatively high level of trade and economic ties. . . . There is no doubt, however, that both business and, above all, political relations between the two countries could have been far more effective if the FRG government pursued a constructive policy on security matters.⁶³

In I. S. Kremer's 1986 book, which examines the FRG's *ostpolitik*, it is noted that the FRG sought to continue economic relations despite negative trends in the two countries' political relations: "the West German government, even during the period of worsening relations between East and West, sought to continue cooperation with the socialist countries in the economic area."⁶⁴ In assessing the general state of Soviet-West German relations in the 1980s, Kremer includes the economic dimension as well as a differentiation among the German political parties:

The tendencies toward reviving the trade-economic and other ties between the FRG and the socialist countries testifies to the fact that the FRG did not want to completely throw away the positive experience of cooperation in the 1970s.

But, in examining the main aspects of *ostpolitik*, above all connected with the FRG's military-political strategy, the approach of its leadership to the problems of ensuring national and European security, it must be admitted that the ruling CDU/CSU-FDP coalition has greatly moved away from the course which had contributed to an improvement in the situation in Europe and has supported Washington's dangerous course of forcing the build-up of military preparations. . . .

One should also note the substantial positive changes in the foreign policy views of the leaders of the Social Democratic Party. Having lost their governmental responsibility, the leaders of this largest opposition party

⁶³ G. Kirillov, "The Moscow Treaty: A Basis for USSR-FRG Relations," *IA*, No. 9, 1985, pp. 34-35. For a more negative assessment that concentrates more on the security policy aspects, see Pustogarov, *Zapadnogermskii revansizm*, pp. 97-98.

⁶⁴ Kremer, *FRG: etapy "vostochnoi politiki"*, p. 184. For a good summary of the interrelations between trade relations and political relations and between Soviet-West German and East-West relations generally, see the conclusion in L. M. Chetvertnoi, *SSSR-FRG: problemy torgovo-ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1988), pp. 150-154.

began to much more fully reflect the mood of the rank and file of the SPD members and the country's democratic public. . . .

On the whole, the development of events in the first half of the 1980s has shown that the *ostpolitik* begun by the Moscow Treaty has put down deep roots and contrary to the actions of the rightists and the pressure from the outside, it is finding support from the overwhelming majority of the population of the Federal Republic of Germany.⁶⁵

An interesting comparative assessment was provided by Yu. Kvitsinskii when he became the Soviet Union's ambassador to the Federal Republic; he contrasted the current state of affairs with the period 1978-1981, when he had last been in Bonn. In true diplomatic fashion, he indicated that the potential for cooperation existed, the times were obviously more difficult, but nothing must allow the relations to deteriorate.⁶⁶

However, Kohl's unfortunate remarks likening the Gorbachev leadership to Goebbels did bring about such a deterioration.⁶⁷ This statement combined with the controversy surrounding the INF systems created perhaps the worst strain in Soviet-West German relations in recent memory. The July 1987 visit of President von Weizsaecker to Moscow signalled at least a first step toward better relations, although the INF dispute over the P-1As continued for a few more months. During this visit, Gorbachev assessed the situation, making reference to Foreign Minister Genscher's trip to the Soviet Union the previous year: an "agreement seemed to have been reached on 'opening a new page' in relations between the two countries. However, to date, it has remained unfilled, and at one time there was even a threat that it would be shut. Fortunately, this did not happen."⁶⁸ Thus, the worst seemed to have passed, but there was still much progress to be made.

Naturally, the FRG's subsequent decision to allow the Pershing-1As to be included in the INF negotiations further contributed to the development of more positive relations. Of particular significance in the bilateral relationship was the visit of conservative politician Franz Josef Strauss to Moscow in December 1987. Gorbachev used this opportunity to express "the hope that the new year 1988 would be marked by more intensive constructive political dialogue between the USSR and the FRG, and broader contacts and meetings

⁶⁵ Kremer, *FRG: etapy "vostochnoi politiki,"* pp. 202-204.

⁶⁶ Yu. Kvitsinskii, *FBIS*, 25 April 1986, p. G2.

⁶⁷ For Soviet reaction to this statement, see, for example, the front-page editorial in *Pravda*, 27 November 1986.

⁶⁸ M. S. Gorbachev, *Pravda*, 8 July 1987, p. 1.

between the two countries. Both sides showed understanding of the importance of making Soviet-West German relations a matter of practical policy."⁶⁹

Maksimova's article in *MEMO* underscores the importance of West Germany in the USSR's policy toward Western Europe: "The significance of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Soviet Union's European policy will, we are deeply convinced, objectively grow. This is connected above all with the fact that in the future the FRG will reserve for itself first place in Western Europe and third place in the capitalist world after the U.S. and Japan in the level of economic and scientific-technological potential. . . . The FRG will in the near future apparently remain our leading trade partner among the capitalist countries."⁷⁰ Maksimova also notes the improved atmosphere in the bilateral relationship: "Bonn's appraisal of the Soviet Union is also changing. For many decades the FRG clung stubbornly to the outmoded idea that it was necessary to weaken the USSR economically in order to thereby undermine its military potential and international position. It is now coming to understand that it is in the fundamental interests of the FRG and, incidentally, all the rest of the West, to have the USSR be not an illusory weak opponent, but a really strong partner."⁷¹ In this connection, the author notes that the FRG has proved more willing to develop a constructive dialogue with the USSR than its other Western allies.

Having served as the Soviet ambassador to the Federal Republic since 1986, Yulii Kvitsinskii's assessment of the situation in 1989 is considerably more optimistic than when he first arrived: "There is no need to say that the FRG by its significance is a central state in Western Europe and a major power in the capitalist world. Our relations with it have been changing for the better over the past years. . . . Both countries are determined to open a new chapter in their relations, and the important thing is that there is a consensus on this question practically among all political parties in the FRG."⁷² He does temper this analysis by mentioning that in addition to the "vast possibilities" of this relationship, there are also difficulties such as the German question.

It seems fair to say that nothing has attracted as much attention in the Soviet press as Gorbachev's long-awaited trip to Bonn in June 1989. Although there was only limited

⁶⁹ *FBIS*, 30 December 1987, p. 36.

⁷⁰ Maksimova, "To Uncover the Potential for Cooperation," p. 61.

⁷¹ Maksimova, "To Uncover the Potential for Cooperation," p. 62.

⁷² Yu. Kvitsinsky, "An Embassy on the Rhine," *IA*, No. 5, 1989, pp. 36-37.

coverage in *Krasnaya zvezda*, *Pravda* published numerous pre-visit assessments⁷³ and both *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* provided extensive, daily coverage during and after the visit. The constant theme of the press coverage was the noticeably improving relations, despite occasional differences of opinion. It is also interesting to note that the newspaper correspondents teamed up in filing their reports. Thus, *Pravda's* Grigor'ev was joined by A. Maslennikov (long-time *Pravda* correspondent in Britain) twice and by Maslennikov and another *Pravda* correspondent, I. Mel'nikov, twice.⁷⁴ All of the *Izvestiya* reports were filed jointly by that newspaper's two Bonn correspondents, Grishin and Bovkun, and they were almost always joined by S. Guk,⁷⁵ who has occasionally co-authored pieces in *Izvestiya* with Grishin before.⁷⁶ Clearly, the extensive press coverage devoted to this event and the positive tone of the analyses indicate the Soviet determination that relations are moving in the right direction, a new page is beginning.

E. THE GERMAN QUESTION AND REVANCHISM

Soviet articles focusing on alleged West German revanchism began appearing in 1984, following the decision to deploy the INF systems, the lifting of the ban on West German production of strategic bombers and long-range missiles, and the German Democratic Republic's initial steps toward improving relations with the FRG.⁷⁷ Although these articles have appeared in various Soviet publications, including *Pravda*, *Izvestiya*, and *International Affairs*, since the improvement in Soviet-West German relations, this subject has appeared primarily only on the pages of *Krasnaya zvezda*.

Reflective of the tone of the revanchist articles during strained Soviet-FRG relations is an article by Bezymensky in *International Affairs*. In it he argues that those who believe that revanchism is a nostalgic reaction by people who were evicted from former German

⁷³ See, for example, E. Grigor'ev's interview with Willy Brandt, *Pravda*, 5 June 1989; TASS report, *Pravda*, 7 June 1989; and two articles filed jointly by E. Grigor'ev and A. Maslennikov, *Pravda*, 10 and 12 June 1989.

⁷⁴ Grigor'ev and Maslennikov co-authored articles on 10 June (an interview with Kohl) and 12 June; Mel'nikov joined them in filing reports on 13 and 14 June 1989. Yakhontov was apparently transferred from the Bonn assignment in mid-1988.

⁷⁵ All three of the writers signed the articles appearing on 12, 13, 15, and 16 June 1989; Grishin and Bovkun filed one story together (without Guk) on 17 June.

⁷⁶ Guk has also authored articles in *Pravda* on the FRG himself, including articles appearing on 27 December 1986, 9 May 1987, 15 May 1988, 21 October 1988, and 3 March 1989.

⁷⁷ See, for example, Bezymenskii, *Pravda*, 27 July 1984, p. 4; D. Davidovich, "Revanchism and Neo-Nazism in the FRG," *IA*, No. 4, 1985.

territories that will die as they die are wrong. "All this is far from the truth. And the more attempts to belittle the scope of revanchism there are, the clearer the ideological, propaganda and other aims of those who are behind this campaign become."⁷⁸ He also distinctly links the INF deployment with revanchism: "Revanchism of both forms--territorial and social--has been growing since the start of the Pershing deployment and an anti-communist 'crusade'. . . . As a result of the deployment of new U.S. nuclear missiles on West German soil, forces are again rearing their heads in the FRG which are calling in question postwar political and territorial realities in Europe."⁷⁹

Just one month later, another article published in *International Affairs* by D. Davidovich uses strong and colorful language to describe this trend:

Today's filthy froth on the surface of West Germany's political life whipped up by the insolent revanchist propaganda is obviously just reconnaissance in force foreboding more dangerous actions. As is shown by the course of the events, it has in view a strategic objective to undermine all aspects of the postwar peaceful settlement. A coalition of neo-Nazism and revanchism and the militaristic policies of the USA in Western Europe is considerably aggravating the threat to peace. . . . Provocative neo-Nazi and revanchist rallies attended by the FRG's government leaders convey a serious warning, especially in view of the fact that revanchism becomes particularly dangerous at a time when the FRG is being turned into a bridgehead for a new world war through the deployment of American first-strike nuclear missiles on its territory.⁸⁰

In another statement published in September 1986, this time in the more authoritative but military-oriented journal, *Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie*, the stridently anti-German tone persists: "A necessary condition for stability in the positive processes in Europe and in other regions is a respect for the territorial-political realities which came about as a result of the Second World War. The CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] . . . will quash any appearance of revanchism. This serious reminder is directed primarily to the FRG where revanchism became a component part of state politics of the ruling coalitions CDU-FDP."⁸¹ In fact, throughout Soviet analyses is the constant theme of the Kohl government's support for revanchist tendencies.

⁷⁸ Bezynensky, "The Wild Dreams of Modern Revanchists," p. 30.

⁷⁹ Bezynensky, "The Wild Dreams of Modern Revanchists," pp. 35, 37-38.

⁸⁰ D. Davidovich, "Revanchism and Neo-Nazism," pp. 145-146.

⁸¹ Col. A. Tsvetkov, "West German Special Services--Weapon of Aggression and Revanchism," *ZVO*, No. 9, 1986, as translated in JPRS-UMA-87-015, p. 1.

Not surprisingly, President Reagan's visit to West Germany in June 1987 during which he called for the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, precipitated additional Soviet articles about revanchism. For example, political commentator Aleksandr Bovin cautioned that Reagan "should realize that in present conditions trying to undermine the 'wall' and blow it up politically can have only one meaning--that of putting West Berlin back into the position of a 'frontline city,' sharply intensifying the danger of crisis in Central Europe and wrecking hopes for disarmament."⁸²

In September 1987, the long-delayed visit of Erich Honecker to West Germany finally took place. The improved international atmosphere, especially in Soviet-West German relations, was evident in Soviet coverage of this event. The trip was portrayed as an event capable not only of improving inter-German relations, but of making a positive contribution to East-West relations as a whole. Only passing mention is made of Kohl's commitment to the "unity of Germany." Addressing the GDR-FRG relationship more broadly, Maksimova writes in *MEMO*: "Soviet international affairs scholars are obviously indebted to the scientific community and our foreign policy practice. . . . The defense doctrine we have proposed, the abolition of foreign bases, and other initiatives naturally cannot help but have an effect on the future development of the two German states and relations between them."⁸³ Thus, Soviet discussions of revanchism have largely disappeared from the literature now, with the exception of *Krasnaya zvezda*.⁸⁴

F. ARMS CONTROL

During the early 1980s, Soviet analysts perceived the Federal Republic to be playing a largely negative role in the arms control process. The main reasons for this negative assessment were West German support for INF and for the U.S. SDI program. The INF issue has already been well-documented in preceding sections; in terms of SDI, Kirillov draws a link between this program and (yet again) West German nuclear aspirations: "There is little cause to doubt that those circles on the Rhine who are unhappy that the FRG has no nuclear weapons hope that by being involved in SDI West Germany could gain access to a new generation of strategic weapons, the space weapons. . . . Bonn

⁸² A. Bovin, *Izvestiya*, 18 June 1987.

⁸³ Maksimova, "To Uncover the Potential for Cooperation," 1988, p. 66.

⁸⁴ For example, one article was published as recently as 13 July 1989: E. Babenko, "A Distance of Enormous Scope," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 13 July 1989.

would thereby get a chance to achieve parity with France and Great Britain."⁸⁵ It was also noted that the Bonn government opposed proposals to establish a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, reasoning that this would not be in West German interests and that it is aimed at undermining Atlantic solidarity and separating West European NATO from the United States.⁸⁶

Not surprisingly, following the INF agreement, Soviet analyses became more positive. For example, Kvitsinskii's May 1989 assessment of West Germany's role in arms control includes not only the INF issue, but other areas as well: "We can state with satisfaction that the FRG has already played its constructive part in the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles in Europe. It has contributed considerably also to the reaching of understandings in Stockholm and Vienna. A good deal will depend on its stance at the forthcoming talks on reducing the armed forces and armaments in Europe and in the efforts to free the continent from more nuclear arms."⁸⁷

Finally, a July 1989 article in *MEMO* authored by V. Baranovskii and G. Kolosov, points out that whereas in nuclear weapons, the United States plays the key role in determining NATO's position, in the area of conventional arms, "the contribution of the West European allies significantly exceeds that of the Americans."⁸⁸ Within this context, the vital role of the FRG's contributions to the Alliance's conventional defense capabilities has been well documented in Soviet sources.

⁸⁵ Kirillov, "The Moscow Treaty," p. 61.

⁸⁶ E. Grishin, *Izvestiya*, 16 September 1987.

⁸⁷ Kvitsinsky, "An Embassy on the Rhine," pp. 44-45.

⁸⁸ V. Baranovskii and G. Kolosov, "The Approach of the West European Countries," *MEMO*, No. 7, 1989, p. 112.