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# THESIS

**THE TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT OF  
AREA SPECIALISTS IN THE MILITARY**

by

Randy P. Burkett

June 1989

Thesis Advisor:

Edward J. Laurance

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This thesis examines the programs of study administered by the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps used to qualify commissioned officers as specialists on foreign regions. The Foreign Area Officer (FAO) programs are compared and contrasted in terms of types of training, extensiveness of training, and how well each service balances academic work with practical experience. The post-training missions of these officers are also reviewed. The opinions of FAOs concerning how well their training matched their later assignments is extensively examined by way of an original survey sent to 483 graduates of the Naval Postgraduate School National Security Affairs/Area Studies Masters degree program. Respondents are members of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and data concerning both language training and graduate education is provided.

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**The Training and Employment of  
Area Specialists in the Military**

by

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## **I. INTRODUCTION**

### **A. STEPS LEADING TO THE SELECTION OF THE TOPIC OF THIS THESIS**

This thesis shall address the selection, training, and utilization of commissioned foreign area officers (FAOs) in the armed forces. This topic may seem a strange choice for an Air Force officer who was sent to the Naval Postgraduate School to study to the Far East, but many forces came together during the course of my studies that made it the best choice. As the Chinese say, the longest journey begins with one step, and now as I look back on the events that led to my choosing this subject, I can identify several of the steps that led to this paper. Perhaps by recounting these steps I can explain my interests and the procedure I used in creating the material that follows.

I had never heard of FAOs or the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and had no idea that officers could attend the Defense Language Institute when I took the first step that led to this thesis. I explored the possibility of "cross-flowing" into the intelligence career field from the missile operations career field in 1987. To my delight, I was not only allowed to make this move but was offered a free Masters degree as the first step in leaving the missile world for intelligence work. My background as an enlisted signal intelligence analyst, my undergraduate degree in Political Science, and my Defense Language Aptitude Battery score of 122 all seemed to add up to the right combination for the Air Force program, which was then described as a two-year (or

less, depending on language difficulty) program that started with a year of academic work at NPS and ended with language training at DLI/FLC.

Although I had experienced a tour in Germany and my background, both in intelligence and in college, had been Soviet focused, I was offered a slot studying the Far East and my choice of Chinese, Japanese, or Korean language training. I questioned the value of each language in terms of later assignments and was told that most likely none of these languages would prove to be useful later, but that language training was simply part of the degree. Therefore, since I was equally unfamiliar with all three languages and all seemed to be of equal difficulty, I chose Chinese, reasoning that the PRC offered the biggest potential military threat in the region. This choice was my unknowing second step.

The next step was reporting to NPS in June of 1987 to start the academic program. At NPS, I learned a number of interesting facts. First, my fellow students were primarily officers from the Navy and the Air Force and all of the Naval officers seemed to envy the fact that the Air Force officers would get to "use" their area specialist education immediately after completing the degree, while they (the Naval officers) would be returning to sea duty after graduation. The Air Force officers, in turn, had been told (by officers at AFMPC) they would not be using their language skills as "most would be assigned to DIA after graduation" and could not understand why they had to go to DLI/FLC

when many of the Naval officers were getting the same degree with just two more quarters of education and no language training.

On top of all this confusion were rumors about why no Army officers were in the area studies curriculum with us and why they had been present a few years before but had since been withdrawn. Added to this were the letters which some of the Army officers who had graduated sent to their professors, many coming from the regions the Army officers had studied and written during some type of training these officers called "in-country" training. Luckily, one of my professors was a Reserve Army officer and a Foreign Area Officer who was able to explain the Army's program to me.

The third step took place when I was approached by a fellow officer about entering the Air Force Human Resources Intelligence program as a special duty assignment. I became very interested in this possibility (as it offered an interesting alternative to a DIA desk job) and filled out the required paperwork to apply. To my surprise, I found in the course of the application process that my upcoming Chinese language training would be a drawback to my being accepted. It seems that, since this training is so long and expensive, the officers that run the HUMINT section are not keen on accepting officers with languages they will not be able to use. While my Asia-oriented education, and background in operations and intelligence, made me a desirable candidate, my Chinese training could not be used or justified by the jobs they had in mind.



The final step that led to this thesis topic was when I later had difficulty in the Chinese language course itself. Specifically, I could not learn the ideograms (Chinese characters) that are used in Chinese writing at the pace necessary to successfully complete the course. Early in September 1988, I began to explore the options that might be available if I found myself unable to pass Chinese. I was told that two options were available: either I could start a different language or I could return to NPS and complete the degree in the same manner as a Navy student by taking two additional quarters of academics and writing a thesis. Before doing anything else, I tried extra tutoring and other means of continuing in Chinese, but by late in the month, the writing appeared to be on the wall. Therefore, I contacted the Air Force Military Personnel Center, which sent me to NPS to ask their advice. I was told that they could foresee no assignment that required Chinese and they did not care which of the other options I chose as long as I graduated on time.

I chose to return to NPS and write a thesis. I did so for three reasons: the other languages in my area would all take a full year to complete, the two primary languages in my area (Japanese and Korean) both used Chinese characters extensively, and I wanted to find some answers to a number of questions that had arisen from this situation. Among these questions were: Why are the training programs so different between the services? Is it true that Air Force officers do not use their language training and, if so, why does the Air Force insist on language, unlike the Navy? Why does the Navy not send its officers to

language training? Do Naval officers ever use their area studies educations and, if so, how?

The result of trying to answer these questions is the following thesis. Along the way, I discovered that many of the answers I wanted did not already exist in a book where I could simply read them. Instead, I found that no one had bothered to ask the people who could answer these questions for their thoughts, a problem I solved by creating, administering, and analyzing a survey that accounts for about half of the information to come. This work does not answer all the questions that exist on this subject, but it does lay the foundation for more study and it can serve to abolish some of the myths that pervade this subject.

## **B. THE PROBLEM**

The purposes of this thesis are to:

- examine the selection, training, and employment of the FAO by each service branch;
- identify what philosophy each service employs in designing a program to train FAOs; and
- determine whether the *current* methods are bringing about the desired results.

In order to establish the success of the services in preparing their FAOs, we will rely on the survey responses of FAOs who are actually functioning in missions in which they use their specialized FAO training and see how they evaluate the appropriateness of their training experiences to their real-world missions. It appears that all four branches of the Department of Defense believe that there are certain

duties in each service that are best filled by FAOs. Furthermore, because the roles and missions of the armed forces differ, these differences are reflected in the services' FAO training programs. However, I will attempt to show that the commonalty of FAO missions should have more influence on the design of FAO training programs (to include the mix of language and area expertise skills as well as the mix of academic training and practical experience) than the self-perceived service differences. Along the way, recommendations will also be made to improve the services' individual programs by highlighting unique innovations of one service's program that could be readily adapted by the others. This attempt to make each service aware of what the others are doing is important because all four services define the skills of a FAO in very similar ways. In my research, no one I interviewed in any service had more than a cursory knowledge of what the other services' programs entailed. Furthermore, some of the information which exists and is relied upon is incorrect, resulting in each service grappling individually with similar problems without much opportunity of learning something from each other's past experiences.

## **II. THE NEED FOR FAOs**

### **WHAT ARE FAOs AND WHY DO WE NEED THEM?**

Foreign Area Officers are commissioned officers in the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps who are fully qualified in some military specialty and have a specialized knowledge of a foreign country or region. At best, he or she should be intimately familiar with the history, culture, geography, climate, politics, military, economy, and religions of the area, as well as be familiar with one or more languages of that area. Also, the FAO should have lived in the region of interest for an extended period of time in order to have a measure of personal experience to supplement his or her professional training. Therefore, the ideal FAO is an accomplished military officer with a graduate degree in a region, a fluent grasp of one or more languages spoken there, and a background of personal experience gained first-hand in one or more relevant countries. This FAO would be "ideal" because he or she would offer a blend of fact and theory gained through education with practical experiences gained first-hand in the region. This balanced type of approach to FAO training could be depicted as in Table 1.

The above represents just a sample of the possibilities of combining the academic with the practical and, clearly, in any of the given cases a FAO who experienced just one side of this list would be less knowledgeable than one who had experienced both, and thus be less

than ideal. This ideal FAO is achievable (in fact, the Army can boast of having several hundred at the present time), but the ideal FAO's training costs approximately \$195,000 per officer and cannot be completed in less than two and one-half years (and may take much longer, depending on language demands).<sup>1</sup>

TABLE 1  
**EXAMPLES OF BALANCED FAO TRAINING EXPERIENCES**

<b>Academic</b>	<b>Practical</b>
Language training at DLI/FLC	Daily use of language in-country
Study of religions	Visits to <del>shrines</del> , temples, etc.
Study of geography	Personal trips in the region
Study of military	Participation in local exercises
Study of culture	Living among the people of the region and socializing with them
Study of politics	Observation of local political culture

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<sup>1</sup>Data on costs comes from Major Cary, Chief of the Army FAO Proponent Team at the Pentagon, and is also based on the following Army estimates:

Language training at DLI/FLC—\$323.00 per week, with average course length of nine months.  
 Cost of a civilian graduate school—\$14,250.00 for 18 months.  
 Cost of in-country training—\$30,000.00 for 12 months, with an additional \$10,000 for regional travel.  
 Three permanent change-of-station (moving) costs—\$4,500.00 each.

Adding all the above, plus the salary of a senior captain (O-3) during this training, results in a total of \$195,000 per FAO.

For some of the services, this ideal FAO price is seen as too high, so they attempt to economize in one way or another. The FAOs that result are certainly not as well trained as their more expensive counterparts but may be just as effective, depending on the missions they are given. Also, in view of the prospects for shrinking budgets, certainly an argument could be made that \$195,000 is too high a price to turn out an officer who is bilingual and well educated about some foreign land. The current deemphasis on civilian education and concurrent push to reward officers for staying in operational jobs (particularly in the Air Force) might also be cited as good reasons to keep training time to a minimum for FAOs, if they are needed at all! Surely spending a couple of years getting a Masters degree in international relations or area studies and another year or so learning a foreign language will not help an officer advance in his or her career as fast as would spending that time in command positions or doing his primary job. What is it about FAOs that makes the expense to both the government and the officer worthwhile? What do we need them for?

Military forces have always needed people who have comprehensive knowledge of other nations. We must remember the classic admonition of Sun Tzu, who said,

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear a hundred battles. If you know yourself, but not the enemy, for every victory you will suffer defeat. If you know neither yourself nor the enemy, you are a fool and will meet defeat in every battle. [Ref. 1]

In the past, it was easier to know who the "enemy" was. In fact, we often made heroes out of men who were particularly adept at

"knowing the enemy" in our American popular culture. Men with names like Davy Crocket and Kit Carson were the de facto FAOs of their time. They and other "Indian scouts" had the same skills we demand today—knowledge not only of the martial skills but of the geography, culture, and language of their adversaries. These and other skills have come to be equated with acquiring intelligence on the enemy, and indeed today we find the FAO is best suited for a host of intelligence positions in the services. Later FAOs like Joseph Stilwell and Evans Carlson are more modern reminders that the FAO is still just as needed in combat operations as in intelligence work or in diplomacy [Refs. 2, 3].

The modern world provides even greater demands for FAOs than we find in the past for two reasons. First of all, it is getting increasingly difficult to identify the enemy. One can no longer simply point to the Soviet Union as the sole enemy and then rush out and train officers in Soviet subjects and the Russian language. There are new demands, such as in the Middle East, and even new sources of potential threats as we find economic power starting to rival military power as a reason for concern over our national security. The very nature of the United States' global power status results in our having global interests and no one can predict where in the world our interests will be threatened next. Therefore, just as the U.S. must bear the expense of maintaining large and mobile military forces in the modern world because threats appear too quickly to give us time to build up to meet a challenge (as we did in World War II and so forth), so too must we

maintain at least a cadre of officers whose specialized regional knowledge, when taken together, covers all areas of the world. Who knows when the next Grenada-type invasion will take place or where U.S. citizens might need to be rescued from some terrorist threat? The lives saved by maintaining a corps of officers who both understand the requirements of the military and are experts in foreign regions make the cost of this training very bearable indeed.

The second reason the demand for FAOs is rising is more related to peace than to conflict. Dramatic breakthroughs in international negotiations that result in treaties like the INF treaty and the Southwest Africa treaty also create a need for FAOs to serve on treaty compliance evaluation teams like the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) and on peacekeeping forces. Of course, these organizations can be staffed by non-FAOs, but the choice between sending an officer who speaks the local language, knows the customs, understands the political situation, and is fully competent in relevant military matters vice one who holds only the last qualification is a poor choice indeed. The chance is great that non-FAOs will be less effective as inspectors/peacekeepers, themselves commit some gaffe to embarrass the United States, or end up endangering themselves and others through ignorance.

This growing second need, to provide the military manning to fulfill our growing treaty obligations, has already been demonstrated by several mini-crises. To provide the manpower for the OSIA (which must be equally staffed by the Army, Navy (including the Marine



Corps}, and Air Force), each service had to frantically search for Russian linguists in their ranks, run them through a quick course in Russian nuclear terminology, and put together teams who could escort Soviets who visit the United States and/or who could themselves travel to the U.S.S.R. on inspection tours. Luckily, the U.S.S.R. has long been the primary focus of the U.S. military and the required number of linguists was eventually found. However, if we were to acquire a similar mission that required Chinese linguists or face a need for Africa specialists, it is doubtful that we would succeed nearly as well.

Looking at Europe, there is a good chance that the future will bring a conventional arms treaty similar to the aforementioned INF Treaty. If this treaty is ratified, the Department of Defense will face an even greater demand for Russian linguists and new demands for FAOs who speak Polish, German, Hungarian, Romanian, Bulgarian, or Czechoslovakian. One would hope that the services would today be getting ready for this; instead, we find the single largest institution on which all branches of the armed forces rely for language training, the Defense Language Institute/Foreign Language Center (DLI/FLC), is in the process of ending its language training programs for the Hungarian, Romanian, and Bulgarian languages [Ref. 4].<sup>2</sup> Therefore, when and

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<sup>2</sup>Also being cut are Norwegian, Serbo-Croatian, Pahtu and Dari (two Afghan dialects), Indonesian, Malaysian, and Cantonese. Even the Vietnamese and Japanese departments are at risk, although they are not on the current list for closure.

if the conventional arms treaty is signed, we should expect to find the Department of Defense again scrambling to meet increased demands with fewer trained resources. Once programs like the language training programs at DLI/FLC are lost, they cannot be brought back quickly or effectively because many instructors will retire and/or move out of the expensive Monterey area. The United States needs officer FAOs in the OSIA and similar agencies, in our intelligence organizations, in attaché positions, in security assistance missions, and in positions to train other soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines who cannot all be sent through extensive programs. This need may be even greater if the "post-Cold War" era actually dawns and we face a more complex world that offers enhanced opportunities for the nation that is best prepared and more numerous pitfalls for the ignorant.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>The need for FAOs in intelligence positions, including desk analysts, indications and warning positions, and long-term strategic analysis positions is discussed by John Godson [Ref. 5]. The Air Force currently runs a program for quickly training members of security assistance teams on country- and region-specific issues, to include cultural sensitivities. The director of this program, Lieutenant Colonel Stanley Wilusz, would like to staff his regional instructor roles with Air Force FAOs who have graduate degrees on these regions but has difficulty getting these officers due to bureaucratic reasons that will be covered in a later chapter.

### **III. THE U.S. ARMY FAO PROGRAM**

#### **A. OVERVIEW AND HISTORY**

Without a doubt, the United States Army has the best FAO training program in the Department of Defense because it offers the most complete combination of academic training balanced with practical experience. The Army's four-phase program is the envy of the de facto FAOs in its sister services and is the result of more than 40 years of experimentation and evolution. Far from stagnant, it continues to evolve today with the most recent development being the separation of the Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations training from the rest of the FAO program, which is actually a return to a previous situation. With its own long history, replete with FAO heroes like General Joseph Stilwell, the Army FAO program has served as the subject for numerous papers at the Army War College and other institutions. Although this paper will focus on current programs, I believe the large measure of experience the Army brings to this subject makes it worthwhile to pause to briefly review some of the history of its program.

The most comprehensive single overview of the history of the Army FAO program exists in a paper written by Captain David W. Davis. This paper is undated and provides only the name of the author; no additional information is available regarding the origin of the paper. It is entitled "The Foreign Area Officer Program: An Overview of the History of the Program" and was given to me by Major John Cary, who is

the current head of the Army FAO Proponent Team. He was given the paper at the John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare Training in 1987. The information it contains has been verified by him and by another Army captain, John Stoner, who also used it as a reference when he wrote his own study, "Taking the Plunge: The Army's Foreign Area Officers." Given these endorsements, one may confidently be assured that Captain Davis' work is accurate; it is certainly interesting.

Davis starts out by tracing the roots of the Army FAO program to the Language and Area Training Program (LATP) created by the Department of the Army Circular Number 83, published in 1947. Although others might argue that the roots could be traced further back, extending to the language training programs Stilwell and others attended prior to World War II, to consider earlier programs would *only tend to confuse* FAO-specific training programs with general attaché training and further muddle the two concepts. Therefore, for the purpose of this paper, the line of distinction between the FAO and the attaché is that the attaché is an officer who is specifically trained to represent U.S. interests in a specific country, while the FAO must be more regionally minded and may be used in many different jobs within the region, attaché duty being only one of them.

Davis described the twists and turns the Army has taken on the road to creating the modern FAO. The number one cause for changes in the program is the infighting between the Army intelligence community and the operations community over who would control the FAO program. Between 1947 and 1957, the intelligence community clearly

held the upper hand; not only did the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI or G-2) office determine who would be selected, the applying officer had to be eligible to work in either that office or in the attaché system to have a hope of being picked [Ref. 6].

The course of instruction during this period can be divided into several phases. First, the officer spent a year studying Russian, Greek, Chinese, Persian, Turkish, or Arabic at Colombia, Yale, Princeton, or Stanford (depending on which region he was assigned).<sup>4</sup> The officer then would spend a second year at that university studying the country's geography, history, culture, etc. Finally, the officer would go abroad and spend an additional year or two primarily studying the language and "soaking up" the culture. Often, programs set up by the Department of State for training its Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) were broadened to allow the participation of these early FAOs [Ref. 6:p. 5].

In 1953, an additional course requirement was introduced as the Army intelligence community further tightened its control over FAO training by requiring all FAOs to attend a "strategic intelligence course." At this point, the program was renamed. The LATP became the FAST or Foreign Area Specialist Training and the governing directive was now Special Regulation 350-30-80-1, published in 1952 [Ref. 6]

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<sup>4</sup>Other languages and other universities were added as the program progressed.

It was at this time that the Army operations community, led by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (DCSMO) began to gain more clout in running the FAO program. Under the ACSI, the eligibility requirements had become much stricter. Only three officer pay grades were eligible (O-2 through O-4), both an officer and his wife had to be U.S. citizens by birth, and other such potential disqualifying rules seemed destined to continue to proliferate.

By 1956, the regulation governing FAST changed. This time it was issued as Army Regulation 350-23 and the program rapidly moved from the management of the intelligence group to operations. Among the ramifications of this switch in leadership was the extensive broadening of the program goals to meet the needs of all the branches of the Army (to include even the Judge Advocate General Corps and the Corps of Engineers, among others). In addition, the sponsorship of the program moved from the G-2/Intelligence shop to the Adjutant General's office. This regulation also resulted in dropping the requirement for intelligence schooling, marking a significant bureaucratic defeat for the intelligence community, although it did continue to fill one-half of each year's openings with its own men and shared the control over the direction of the program with the operations group.

The Army soon again broadened its objectives to include the need to have all of its officers become bilingual and published this goal in Army Regulation 350-24 the following year. This push to get ever greater numbers of officers trained in foreign languages (but not in other FAO skills) finally caused the sponsorship of FAST to move to the

office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. In the 1957-1967 period, more languages and more universities were added until any officer who had the ability and desire to learn a language would be accepted. Needless to say, in this rush to expand the FAST program, quality control was significantly reduced.<sup>5</sup>

The support for the Army FAO program benefitted significantly during this period from the growing interest in unconventional warfare and the establishment of such specialized training centers as the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The influence of the Vietnam War can further be seen in the decision made in 1967 to direct FAO training at "individual countries rather than areas." [Ref. 6:p. 9]<sup>6</sup>

As the demand for FAO-type officers grew with U.S. commitments in Indochina, the Army commissioned two panels to review its training procedures and recommend changes. The first was the Davis Board,<sup>7</sup> which recommended that the FAST program be further expanded to encompass all the civil affairs, psychological operations, and similar politico-military affairs programs that were expanding to

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<sup>5</sup>For an excellent overview of how poor language training became during this period, see "Vietnamese Language Training in the Department of Defense 1955-1973," by Dr. James C. McNaughton, Command Historian for the Defense Language Institute [Ref. 7].

<sup>6</sup>This change was part of AR 621-108, published in 1967.

<sup>7</sup>Which, Davis points out, issued "The Report of the Department of the Army Board to Review Army Officer Schools." [Ref. 6:p. 10]

meet the war's demands. For unknown reasons, the Chief of Staff decided that additional study was needed, and a second panel, known as the DCSPER 40 group, met. This group recommended an opposite approach to the problem, that the FAST and the new programs be kept separate and that the new programs be grouped under a new name, the Military Assistance Officer Program (MAOP). This recommendation was accepted in 1969.

Evidence exists to suggest that these two programs, FAST and MAOP, were kept separate in spite of the similarity of their goals because of the Army officers' negative perception of advisory assistance duty. It appears that the FAST program was more highly regarded as a way to gain some language training and work one's way into a combat command, which every Army officer needed in his records if he hoped for high rank. MAOP, on the other hand, had connotations of advisor duty, which was to be avoided if one wanted a successful career. As Davis put it, "MAAG duty is looked on as a deviation from the normal or ideal combination and succession of schools, staff, and command billets that lead to promotion. Some officers consider MAAG tours a waste of time—even a retrograde step from a career standpoint." [Ref. 6:p. 16]

The obvious contradiction created by having two such similar programs finally resulted in the MAOP and FAST being merged in 1972, despite objections from both. In a letter to each officer, General Westmoreland informed the 422 members of the MAOP and the 560 members of the FAST program that they were henceforth joined [Ref.



6:p. 16]. This merger, which was finalized on 6 March 1973 by Army Regulation 614-142, created the foundations of the modern FAO program we see today. On top of this foundation have been added changes recommended by the Hutton Study of 1982, an Officers Professional Management Program study in 1983, the FAO Enhancement Plan of 1985, and, most recently, the spin-off (again) of civil affairs and psychological operations into their own separate program and the establishment of Special Operations as a separate branch [Ref. 6:pp. 22-29; Ref. 8:pp. 7-9]<sup>8</sup>

Of these later studies, the FAO Enhancement Plan of 1985 is by far the most important. It

formally put in motion the recommendations of the Hutton Study, DCSOPS assumed proponency, the number of FAO billets was streamlined, a typical FAO career path was established, and the four phases of training were reaffirmed. [Ref. 8:p. 8]

More specifically, the 1,300 FAO "slots" were weeded down to about 760 true positions. Captains were barred from the program until they were deemed to be "fully qualified" in their primary branch (infantry, armor, military intelligence, etc.). This "fully qualified" status is generally accepted to mean successful command of a company. The emphasis on FAO training was returned to creating regional expertise (vice country or job-specific expertise) in an effort to turn away from the earlier push to prepare advisors for duty in specific nations.

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<sup>8</sup>For insight into the new Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations functional area (FA 39), see Reference 9.

The new, streamlined program also meant a drop in new accessions from 250 to 300 officers per year to around 135. This number is still significantly greater than the other services, but the Army has maintained this level and promised to ensure all 135 volunteers that they will be "fully trained." The criteria for selecting these 135 officers was also enhanced, accepting only volunteers (who may indicate their volunteer status in their fifth year of service but who will not normally begin training before their seventh year) who are "branch qualified," have acceptable scores on the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) (acceptable scores vary by proposed language difficulty), have baccalaureate degrees and pass the Graduate Record Examination with scores that would make an officer eligible to attend a "prestige university," are eligible for a security clearance, and whose health would allow for assignment world-wide [Ref. 10].

Obviously, the individuals who are accepted must meet some fairly stringent standards before they begin training. But before I describe the four phases of the Army FAO training program, let us review specifically what the Army wants a FAO to be when the long training process is complete.

#### **B. ARMY GOALS AND TRAINING FOR THE FAO**

To answer the question of what the Army wants in a FAO, I would offer the following excerpts from a letter sent to newly selected FAOs:

Congratulations on your selection and designation as a Foreign Area Officer!

..2. The FAO selection process is stringent because the profession of "Soldier-Statesman" demands that officers acquire and maintain skills and qualifications unique to the specialty:

a. You are expected to be a SOLDIER. The professional expertise and skills of your basic branch and the competencies, ethics, and values demanded of all commissioned officers are the foundation of your credibility as a FAO. Your assignments will alternate between branch material and FAO functional area positions.

b. You are expected to be a LINGUIST in a foreign language of your designated regional area of concentration (AOC). Your ability to communicate orally and in writing with foreign officials involved in political-military affairs is critical to your credibility and effectiveness, and will contribute materially to accomplishing U.S. foreign policy objectives.

c. You are expected to be a POLITICAL-MILITARY SPECIALIST, with an in-depth knowledge of U.S. and foreign political-military relationships. This knowledge includes understanding the processes of formulating U.S. national security and foreign policies, the political role of military forces in government, and the interface of political, economic, socio-cultural, and military environment in the development of national policies.

d. You are expected to be a REGIONAL EXPERT, with a detailed understanding of the region's politics, economies, cultures, military forces, geostrategic importance, and applicable U.S. interests/policies. The analysis of regional issues—as a basis for advice to policymakers—is the principal function FAOs perform in the Army and the Department of Defense. [Ref. 11]

The goal set by the Army is a hard one to reach. To create a combination soldier/linguist/political-military specialist/regional expert is a difficult task and one that takes time, money, and prodigious effort by the officer, yet the Army accomplishes this goal year after year through the four-phase program which begins with a mere seven-day Foreign Area Officer Course (FAOC). This course is our next subject for discussion.

### C. THE FAOC

The first step to becoming an Army FAO, the Foreign Area Officer Course, has seen almost as many changes as the Army FAO program in general. It was born at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and for many years was six months long. During those six months, officers were given a host of "quick courses" to try to cover their lack of more formal education (in many cases) and to get them into field positions more quickly. From talking to past graduates of this course as well as interviews with officers who are currently reviving the program to use in the new Functional Area 39/Civil Affairs, the author has learned that officers were given 40 hours of training on their region of interest, 20 hours on other regions, and additional training on civil affairs, psychological operations, fundamentals of intelligence, and similar courses. It is safe to say that the course eventually died from lack of interest, as less than 45 percent of Army FAOs attended the full course, with the number dropping to less than 30 percent at the end.<sup>9</sup>

This course did not, however, remain dead. It has been resurrected and shortened into an extremely useful one-week course, given twice a year at the Defense Language Institute/Foreign Language Center in Monterey, California. I attended the January 1989 class of the

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<sup>9</sup>These percentages were provided by Major Cary and confirmed by LTC Wise at DLI/FLC.

FAOC and, although the course is geared for an Army FAO, I found the training to be very useful.

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Wise, U.S. Army, runs the course and provides a very full week of presentations by guests from the academic community and various government agencies, by FAOs assigned to DLI/FLC, and by their spouses. I found the inclusion of spouses to be a particularly good idea because the officer's full family needs to adjust to the demanding program of language school, graduate schooling, and the in-country training that comes later.

The week starts with LTC Wise, members of the Army FAO Proponent Team, and representatives for the Army's military personnel center telling the new FAO exactly what this program will mean to their careers. FAOs are told exactly what is expected of them in each phase of the training and reassured that their language training and graduate schooling will be utilized during their in-country training phase and again, later in their careers. Questions are taken after each briefing, at the breaks, and at every other opportunity throughout the day. This procedure helps new FAOs get a clear understanding of where they are going from the start and provides a long list of names and phone numbers of people to turn to if problems arise as their programs progress.

As the week progresses, new FAOs are introduced to the world of international relations from a political science rather than from a military perspective. They are also given briefings on the Department of State and, since most FAO's will be depending on a U.S. embassy for

support during the final phase of their training, a detailed discussion of how an embassy works is provided.

The next topic covered is a discussion of the U.S. intelligence community. Although the FAOs are repeatedly reminded that they will not be functioning in any type of intelligence role throughout their four phases of training, the intelligence community continues to need trained FAOs for many assignments and the briefings provided are often the FAO's only training on this area.

Along with possible future assignments in intelligence, the FAO might expect to be selected for a job in the attaché corps or in security assistance. Therefore, speakers from the Defense Attaché system and the Defense Security Agency each get a day to discuss their roles and needs for FAOs. In both cases, experienced FAOs who have held positions in these areas provide insights from their own experiences.

Finally, the role of political-military staff officer is discussed by LTC Wise, who also provides a case study to demonstrate the roles FAOs play in helping to formulate and implement U.S. foreign policy. This week-long program consists of the above lectures and two panel discussions, the panels being staffed in one case by FAOs from varying regions at different stages in their careers, and in the second case by their wives, who gave their side of the stories. It gets the new FAO family started off on the best possible footing. The strong support network begun through this first phase is continued throughout the language portion of the FAO's training by way of "mentors," senior officers at DLI/FLC who are individually assigned to help each FAO, and

by a regular newsletter that keeps FAOs informed about changes in their new career field. LTC Wise has added an even greater information access channel through the creation of a computer information network called FAONET.

The FAO course that died from neglect at Fort Bragg is thriving at DLI/FLC due to the direct interest taken by the Army in the program. The program is staffed and run at all levels by FAOs who are experts in filling the needs of the Army. The FAO Proponent Team benefits both from having direct access to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations through his office for Strategy, Plans, and Policy and from its direct relationship with the individuals involved in making FAO assignments. The FAOC sets the goals for the FAO to achieve in each of the next three phases.

#### **D. LANGUAGE TRAINING**

The second step in the FAO training process is language training and, although I intend to look at language training in much greater detail in a later chapter, I think it is important to look at how the Army views language training.

The Army views language training as progressive. Rather than expecting DLI/FLC to turn out a fluent linguist in a year or less, the Army sees only the foundation for fluency as being laid there. On top of this foundation, further language skills will be built at both graduate school and, most importantly, through in-country immersion.

This outlook, coupled with the expressed willingness to switch the FAO to a different regional language if the first one proves too

difficult, is very productive. Taking the language first and not pushing for immediate fluency allows officers to better handle this extremely difficult phase of training. They are motivated by the knowledge that they will put the language to good use both in graduate studies and in the time abroad and are reassured that they will have a chance to greatly improve their language skills before ending their training.

This is not to suggest that the officer is not encouraged to achieve the highest level of language proficiency possible at DLI/FLC. There is a standardized measurement scale for language proficiency within the armed forces that ranges from 0 to 5, as established by a multi-service commission. On this scale, 0+ is equated with a very limited language capability, able to translate, for example, only the occasional word or phrase, while a 5 level is native speaker proficiency. The goal of the FAO is to achieve a 2 level (or "working proficiency") at the end of the DLI/FLC tour and eventually raise this to a 3 level (or "general professional proficiency") by the end of all language training (to include tutoring and/or other in-country training).

Depending on a host of factors, to include the difficulty of the language, the officer's previous exposure to it, the officer's general language learning aptitude, and the type of language test administered, the 2 level goal may or may not be a reasonable expectation. Again, language will be discussed in greater detail later and the important point here is merely to note that the Army is flexible on the language taken and provides the FAO the opportunity to study the language in



three of the phases of its training program (at DLI/FLC, graduate school, and in-country).

#### **E. GRADUATE SCHOOL**

The next phase of the Army program is the graduate schooling phase. During the 18 months of graduate education the Army pays for, it expects the FAO to pursue "in-depth academic studies on a given regional area leading to a Masters degree from a recognized high quality academic institution." [Ref. 12]

When the FAO Enhancement Program reduced the number of FAO slots by more than 600 positions, certain high-level officers in the Army decided that the remaining FAOs would be afforded the opportunity to attend "prestigious" schools. The idea was that these officers would attend universities like Harvard, Yale, Stanford, and other Ivy League schools in order to have impeccable credentials that would match any State Department Foreign Service Officer.<sup>10</sup>

To date, this plan of the Army to turn out only "Ivy League FAOs" has not fully succeeded. In spite of the requirements of having GRE scores of 1100 or better and acceptable undergraduate records to

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<sup>10</sup>To identify what "prestigious" schools would be acceptable, the Army turned to the Department of Education listing of schools that have qualified for matching government funds under Title VI of the National Defense Education Act. This act, set up as a result of concerns about the quality of the American educational system in the wake of the Sputnik launch, provided matching funds for universities that would set up centers for language and area studies. For a complete review of this subject, see Reference 13.

qualify for admission to top-level universities, the 135 FAO applicants per year do not all find themselves in Harvard, Yale, Stanford, and the like. What results is numerous waiver requests as FAOs scramble to get into schools that often are not "name" schools and which in some cases do not have programs in their area of study. Many a FAO has found himself in a history or political science department, trying to create an area studies program by picking and choosing from a laundry list of courses, or, worse, majoring in departments like Chinese Language and Literature and learning more about Han Dynasty poetry than about the People's Republic of China or contemporary Asia in general.<sup>11</sup>

The Army at least tries to point the student in the right direction by providing a two-page list of "graduate school educational objectives" but a number of factors get in the way of the officer fulfilling these objectives. Among the problems officers face at civilian colleges are continuing ill feelings toward having a military student on a civilian campus, the difficulty in creating a policy-oriented graduate program when the academic bureaucracy has assigned responsibility for "area studies" students to a non-policy-oriented department, the relative inflexibility created by the Army student's schedule of 18 months (e.g.,

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<sup>11</sup>Interviews with the Army FAO Proponent Team brought this problem to light. In response, the Army has sent surveys to the colleges that they currently use to find out how well these schools are prepared to meet the Army's need for more policy-oriented courses. To date, most of the colleges have not bothered to reply.

if a professor is on sabbatical or if for some reason a course is not offered during those months, the elements that make a program "prestigious" may be missing from the Army FAO's program), and the fact that Army students are terminal Masters degree students (as opposed to many of their peers who will be seeking Ph.D.s) may all lead to a less than satisfactory educational experience.

Many of the FAOs I interviewed during the FAO course at DLI/FLC told me they had applied to a number of prestigious schools at their own expense, but expected to attend a college in their home state where relatives could help with housing difficulties and other problems of living in a civilian community for 18 months. Many of the new FAOs also told me they were particularly handicapped in trying to get into a good university by the fact that their language training would end in the late fall or early winter, while most universities required them to start in August or September.

In 1985, the Army ended its relationship with a military school that had been satisfactorily fulfilling its graduate education needs. The United States Naval Postgraduate School is an accredited graduate school which offers Masters degree programs in area studies and is located less than five miles from DLI/FLC. For many years, it served as one of the primary sources of graduate education for Army FAOs<sup>12</sup> and it continues to serve the needs of the Air Force, the Navy, and most

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<sup>12</sup>The alumni list I used for mailing surveys lists 241 graduates from the Army.

recently the Marine Corps. The Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School provides area studies specialization in several regions, including the Soviet Union and Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and North Africa, and the Asia-Pacific sub-regions. However, as an institution that is fully funded by the federal government, its name cannot appear on the DOE Title VI list of schools that receive *matching federal funds*, so the Army has disqualified it from the list of possible FAO schools, although Army officers continue to attend NPS for other degrees. This "Catch-22" situation, and the Army's focus on equating a school's presence or absence on the Title VI list as a rating of its "quality," are all that prevent the Army from saving an average of \$8,000 per FAO by using the same school the other three services use.<sup>13</sup>

When the Army moved the FAO course to DLI/FLC, it saved a permanent change of station (PCS) move and the associated costs for its officers between Fort Bragg and Monterey. Additional money could be saved by similarly using NPS for its graduate schooling. Not only would the officer not have to move after language school but NPS would also provide housing for the FAO throughout his time in Monterey and would offer the officer the option of completing his degree in 12

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<sup>13</sup>These savings are based on the average cost of civilian graduate education, \$14,000, as provided by Major Cary, versus the cost of an NPS degree, \$6,000.

months rather than 18 months if need be and would allow the officer to start in either June or January, instead of just in the fall.<sup>14</sup>

## **F. IN-COUNTRY PHASE**

Finally, when graduate training is complete and the officers have their degrees in hand, the fourth and final phase of training begins. This is the in-country phase of the Army program and it is unique to the Army and Marine Corps. During this phase, the FAO is administratively assigned to the Army's Intelligence and Security Command but will most likely be directly supervised by an Army attaché at a foreign embassy. Programs vary widely for in-country training and, in fact, this phase of training may force modifications in the other phases. As the types of in-country training can best be subdivided into five different patterns, a survey of these patterns will serve to clarify my point.

### **1. The "Foreign Military School Pattern"**

This is the most favored pattern of most FAOs because it provides opportunities to interact with military elites in one's area of interest, additional training in the target language, and a chance to live and travel in the foreign country. This pattern usually follows the "normal" path of FAO training: first the one-week FAOC, then language training at DLI/FLC, followed by graduate schooling. Next, the FAOs go

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<sup>14</sup>I was informed by Dr. Edward Laurance, who was the original Academic Associate and co-author of the area studies curriculum at NPS, that these factors accounted for the original decision by the Army to begin sending student to NPS [Ref. 14].

to a country in their region of training and attend some form of formal military training school. These schools are usually roughly equivalent to our Command and General Staff Colleges and are taught in the foreign tongue.

Because officers are immersed in the foreign language and must function academically as well as socially in it, they must quickly gain fluency. Tutors are provided from Army funds when necessary and, in most cases, this pattern is limited to cases in which the foreign language is relatively easy to master.

## **2. The "Tough Language Pattern"**

This is the program used when the target language is Chinese, Japanese, Korean, or Arabic—all four of which are rated as the most difficult for English speakers to master.<sup>15</sup> In this pattern, we again see the FAOC, followed by a full year at DLI/FLC, and then graduate school. Following these three phases, the FAO will be sent to Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, or Morocco (respectively) for an additional year to 18 months of language instruction and regional travel.

As in the past, the Army utilizes State Department training facilities, under the control of the Foreign Service Institute, for training its FAOs. This reliance on civilian facilities occasionally results in

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<sup>15</sup>In a study of the DLPT scores obtained by all officer students over a three-year period at DLI/FLC, after a 47-week basic course less than 18% scored an L2/R2/S2 in Chinese, less than 34% scored an L2/R2/S2 in Japanese, less than 7% scored an L2/R2/S2 in Korean, and less than 14% scored an L2/R2/S2 in Arabic.

some friction because the FAOs are often frustrated by their lack of contact with military terminology and native speakers from the armed forces, but on the whole the program does very well. There is a heavy emphasis in the fourth phase of this pattern on trying to bring the FAOs up to a 2 or 3 level in their language, but time is still set aside for numerous trips and tours to provide real-world opportunities for language use as well as to improve the FAO's knowledge of the area. In fact, soon after arriving, each FAO must draw up an individual program of instruction (POI) which spells out the intended accomplishments of the in-country tour in addition to language skill improvement. This plan is approved by the defense attaché and the FAO Proponent Team and is tracked throughout the tour.

FAOs will also accomplish a mid-tour report and an end-of-tour report while in this phase, detailing changes to their original plans, describing their experiences, and making recommendations for future students. Additionally, each FAO is required to file a trip report after returning from any form of in-country or regional travel. These unclassified trip reports are unusually useful sources of information on the current conditions within countries and copies are provided to the FAO Proponent Team, the staff of the FAOC, the language departments at DLI/FLC, and other interested agencies. FAOs who are in their second phase of training are encouraged to read and correspond with the writers of these reports because these individuals are a useful source of information about what is ahead.

### **3. The "Soviet Pattern"**

Of course, some countries are not agreeable to letting American Army officers come to their country, study their language, and wander around the area on their time off. The Soviet Union is one such nation and, due to the interest the U.S. continues to have in this nation, qualifies for its own pattern. This "Soviet Pattern" also follows the norm until the last phase is reached. The FAO attends the FAOC, then DLI/FLC, then graduate school, and then travels to the city of Garmisch in the Federal Republic of Germany. Here the FAO will attend the Army's Russian Language Institute and will earn the virtual equivalent of another Master's degree. The differences between this second degree and his first degree are twofold: the degree earned in Garmisch will take a full two years and all courses will be taught in Russian. Once FAOs survive this four and one-half year gauntlet (i.e., FAOC, year of Russian at DLI/FLC, 18 months of graduate school, and two years at USARI), they will be absolutely proficient in Russian and may, in fact, find their next assignment as a member of the White House-Moscow communications link team.

### **4. The "Pure Regional Travel Pattern"**

The fourth pattern is used when travel is not a problem but finding an acceptable military school and/or deciding what language would be best to study in a region are. For obvious reasons, this pattern is labeled the "Pure Regional Travel Pattern" and it is most often used in Africa. FAOs are usually assigned to one of the U.S. embassies and, just as in the other patterns, must create and follow a POI, but they are



much more free than their counterparts in the other patterns to set goals and travel at will.

#### **5. The "Indian Subcontinent Pattern"**

The fifth and last pattern differs from the rest in interesting ways. First of all, language training under this pattern usually takes place in-country and lasts for only six months. Following this, the FAO attends a full year of military schooling and will then spend an additional six months in regional travel. The graduate education phase is "fit in," either before the FAO starts the above program or afterward.<sup>16</sup>

None of these patterns is carved in stone. Reporting dates for foreign military schools have frequently been known to force FAOs to alter their plans. Also, unique opportunities to serve with foreign officers on United Nations peacekeeping forces or in similar organizations may be deemed to be suitable substitutes for more formal in-country training. The important point is that the Army FAO program has such plans, has the support of the highest levels of its command structure in implementing its plans, and keeps the program going by only using FAOs to run the program. The result, at the end of training, is a highly trained specialist who is ready for employment in intelligence functions, attaché duty, security assistance duty, political-military assignments, or any such related field. Therefore, the next logical question is, what does the Army do with its newly minted FAO?

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<sup>16</sup>All of the patterns I discuss were presented to me in interviews with LTC Wise. The names for the patterns are his also.

#### **G. THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE TRAINED ARMY FAO**

It is employing their FAOs once they are fully trained that the Army runs into some problems. Remember, we started this training with young Captains who were entering their seventh year of service (in most cases). Now, after spending six months to a year at DLI/FLC, 18 months in graduate schooling, and one to two years in in-country training, they emerge from the training pipeline as new Majors—having been away from their branch (infantry, armor, etc.) for three to five years! This is a long time for an officer to be in “training” and the result usually is that the newly trained officer will not be used as a FAO but rather will return to his or her branch of origin to serve as a battalion-level executive officer or on a staff for three to four years.

The Army term for this cycle of spending a tour with one's basic branch, then doing a FAO-type tour, and then repeating is “The Dual-Track” system. Captain Stoner talked about this system extensively in his paper and, in his words,

This dual-track career path forces FAOs to make awkward choices throughout their military service. These choices potentially affect their chances for promotion, Senior Service school selection, and the quality of life their families will face. This issue is one of career uncertainty for officers considering the program. [Ref. 8:p. b, Executive Summary]

Ideally, the dual-track career system would work as follows: following the FAOs' completion of training, they would return to their branches of assignment as executive officers or battalion-level staff officers. After this tour, he or she would then have a FAO tour, serving in

intelligence, in security assistance, as an attaché, or in a similar political-military job.<sup>17</sup> Following this FAO tour, the officer would ideally take command of a battalion or serve on a battalion staff and then, again, return to a FAO tour. During this alternating assignment pattern the officer would, of course, be promoted to O-5 and O-6 and find time to attend a senior service school.

However, fitting all of these assignments and schools together in the real world is an extremely difficult chore, owing as much to luck as to good planning to work. This fact is not so much due to problems in the FAO program or the dual-track system as the enormous difficulties involved in running the complex Army personnel management system. After talking to officers who work in the Army personnel system at the FAOC, it appears that they do not have the time or manpower to actually ensure that positions in either track are assigned to meet the individual FAO's career needs but rather must quickly find a "qualified" individual to fill a vacant position. Often, being a warm body who is eligible for reassignment will clinch a choice assignment for an officer even if said officer is not the best possible choice for the job.

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<sup>17</sup>Actual FAO positions by job type are provided by Stoner [Ref. 8:p. 27] and are reproduced below:

FUNCTION	POSITIONS (%)
Attaché	133 (17.4%)
Senior Security Officer	90 (11.8%)
Political-Military Officer	418 (54.8%)
• Plans/Policy	228 (29.8%)
• Intelligence	191 (25.0%)
Instructor (language)	122 (16.0%)

The internal politics that play an ever-increasing role in an officer's life as field and flag grades are reached and command positions become increasingly attractive provide disincentives for the FAOs to take jobs outside their branches (as attachés, etc.) at the very ranks where such FAO-type job opportunities expand dramatically (i.e., O-5 and O-6).

The problem of trying to create and maintain an individual who is both a soldier and a statesman has no ideal solution. Although some officers, Stoner included, would argue that the Army should offer a single-track FAO career field to members who would desire such a career this suggestion undermines the credibility of the program. If only a linguist/regional expert/political-military specialist were needed to fill a FAO role, then the State Department could fill the position with a FSO. Instead, the Army must try to keep its FAOs current on their military skills (or, in their terms, keep them "green") as well as keep the FAOs current in their language and regional expertise. The fact that most of the writers who urge a single-track system forget is that FAOs must be first and foremost military officers. Their greatest contributions will be in planning military actions in their areas of expertise, not in their diplomatic skills.

With the above fact in mind, few suggestions to improve the Army's dual-track system can be made, even if this system does cause "difficult career choices." Other recommendations can be made for improving this already extensive program.

## **H. PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE ARMY FAO PROGRAM**

The first suggestion is that the Army reconsider its graduate schooling decision. Having read what they themselves want their FAOs to learn during their graduate school phase and knowing what is actually taking place as far as where FAOs are going to school, it appears that the Army is missing a major opportunity by not also using the program available at the Naval Postgraduate School.

More importantly, the Army's decision to leave NPS and the drive to create what could be called "Ivy League FAOs" has eliminated the chance to train FAOs from all services together in a joint environment. Many of the FAOs from all services will eventually serve in the joint arena (as attachés, on security assistance teams, with DIA, at the Major Commands, etc.), and the absence of the Army is all that prevents joint working relationships being established among FAOs very early in their careers. The Naval Postgraduate School and the Defense Language Institute/Foreign Language Center could serve to help and strengthen one another if this "prestige" question could be resolved. Already, NPS informally allows FAOs at DLI/FLC to audit courses if they so desire yet there is no obvious effort underway to reverse the Army's earlier decision. If lost, the unique opportunity NPS offers for officers of all services to study foreign areas and U.S. policy toward those nations together will not be regained. By allowing even a fourth of the 135 new FAOs the Army brings in each year to attend NPS, the Army would greatly contribute to joint education in foreign area studies and get a better educated FAO in the bargain.

The second recommendation is that the Army review the effects the FAO program has had on its intelligence career field. I have talked with several organizations that employ FAOs and in an interview at one of the largest, the Defense Intelligence Agency, I came across an interesting attitude.<sup>18</sup> It seems that the Army FAO program's product is so well respected that agencies like DIA are afraid to ask for non-FAO-trained officers. As one official in charge of DIA personnel selection told me, if DIA does not request a FAO to fill an Army slot in its military manpower pool, it tends to get an "under-educated Army intelligence officer who only understand tactical intelligence. We then have to try to educate him or her on the strategic intelligence environment."

Thus, the "all or nothing" approach to training Army FAOs has tended to create increasing demands for them in jobs that may or may not really require FAOs and disdain for non-FAO Army assets. The FAO officer who fills one of these slots is likewise likely to feel underutilized, as demonstrated in a letter by Army FAO Major George G. Boyd [Ref. 15].

Major Boyd is a Southeast Asia FAO who completed the Royal Thai Command and General Staff College as his in-country training and had hoped for a "utilization tour" (i.e., FAO assignment) with the Joint U.S.

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<sup>18</sup>December 1988.

Military Assistance Group in Thailand. Instead, he was assigned to the Intelligence Center, Pacific (IPAC) as an intelligence analyst. He wrote,

As a desk officer at IPAC I have spent the last year learning the military analyst's trade. I was pretty well equipped to handle the information concerning my countries, and I can deal with the writing requirements--no complaints there. And I have had many opportunities that the other desk officers, who are not FAOs, have not had, *nor do they seem to have a requirement for.* Many do not have the advantage provided by the area-orientation program during FAO in-country training. In the civilian marketplace I would probably be out of a job because I would be "over-qualified." [Ref. 15 (emphasis added)]

This officer appears to be thoroughly discouraged by his situation and can hardly be blamed. After a full year of Thai language training, a graduate degree, and his excellent in-country experience, he finds himself spending yet another year "learning the military analyst's trade" alongside officers from other services who have not been through his experiences but, as intelligence professionals, are perhaps more capable of carrying out the mission at hand. He also writes that, in his opinion,

...our Thai-FAO training program is unproductive (in the long-term), that our FAO branch managers are unable or unwilling to assist in correcting assignment procedures which have the potential to damage individual careers because of command mismanagement and misunderstanding.

One may or may not agree with these assessments, but the result is a need for the Army to begin either sending more intelligence officers through the FAO program (less than 20 percent of FAO slots go to

intelligence officers currently)<sup>19</sup> or to create and advertise alternative programs to enhance the ability of the Army intelligence officer to handle strategic intelligence missions.

Finally, it would be highly advisable for the Army to start demanding that the other services pull their own weight in filling FAO needs. In interviews with Army officials, I was told that the Army member of Defense Attaché Offices (DAOs), joint peacekeeping forces, and similar operations was often relied on to serve as chief interpreter, point of contact between American forces and the host country, head of protocol, etc. because he was a "known quantity." In other words, the other services were able to avoid the costs borne by the Army FAO program because joint missions would include an Army FAO and could make do with less qualified officers from other services by letting him take care of most of the details. This "free rider" position on the part of the other services (the Air Force and Navy in particular) is not in anyone's best interest and violates the intent of having joint-service missions. As the federal budget tightens, the Army should demand that the other services beef up their own programs to better share the FAO burden.

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<sup>19</sup>According to the Army FAO Proponent Team Briefing slides, Combat Arms branches (Infantry, Armor, Air Defense, Aviation, and Special Forces) get more than 70% of Army FAO slots, 23% are given to Combat Support branches (which include not only Military Intelligence but also Military Police, Signal Corps, and Engineers), and the remaining 5% is given to Combat Service branches (Adjutant General, Finance, Chemical, Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Transportation).



#### **IV. THE FAO PROGRAMS OF THE MARINE CORPS AND NAVY**

##### **A. THE MARINE CORPS FAO PROGRAM**

###### **1. Goals**

The goals of the Marine Corps FAO Program sound much like those put forth in the Army program. Specifically,

The FAO Program is designed to train selected officers in the languages, military forces, culture, history, sociology, economics, politics, and geography of selected areas of the world. A secondary purpose of the FAO Program is to identify those officers who, by virtue of family, academic or professional background, already possess a level of linguistic and area expertise comparable to that gained by those officers trained under the auspices of the FAO Study Program. The goal of the FAO Program is to identify and prepare participants for future assignments to high-level Marine Corps/joint/combined staffs in operations, planning, or intelligence billets, and for duty with the Defense Attaché System. [Ref. 16:para. 3]

###### **2. Selection and the "Formal Study Track"**

Major Walter McTernan is currently the head of both the FAO Proponent Team and the Personnel Exchange Program at Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, in Washington, D.C. There, he concentrates on finding Marines to meet the above-stated goals. To do this, he relies on the FAO program laid out in Marine Corps Order 1520.11C.

Currently, the Marine Corps also has a type of "dual-track" FAO program, the difference being that their two tracks are means of acquiring FAOs rather than using the term for a post-training management system. The two tracks have been labeled the "Formal Study

Track" and the "Experience Track" and both offer a way of speedily increasing the number of Marine FAOs, either by voluntary recruitment or by "capture."

The Formal Study Track currently starts four Marine officers a year on a two-year course of study which will result in the award of Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 994X.<sup>20</sup> The first stop for these four will be the Defense Language Institute/Foreign Language Center (DLI/FLC), where one will take Chinese (Mandarin), one will take Russian, one will take Spanish, and one will take Arabic. As all of these languages, except Spanish, require a full year of study, only a single year remains available for additional study due to the strict requirement that FAO training take no more than 24 months [Ref. 16:p. 6, subpara. 8]

After completing their language training, each officer proceeds to in-country training (called "Phase II" training). For the Chinese and Russian student, Phase II will mean some formal education, with the former attending the National University of Singapore and the latter going to the U.S. Army Russian Institute (USARI) in Garmisch, West Germany. However, neither will receive a degree from

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<sup>20</sup>The final numeral in the MOS code designates the region of specialization. MCO 1520.11C lists the following codes and meanings:

9941-- Latin America  
9942-- U.S.S.R.  
9943-- P.R.C.

9944-- Middle East/North Africa  
9945-- Sub-Saharan Africa  
9946-- Southwest Asia

9947-- West Europe  
9948-- East Asia  
9949-- East Europe

his respective school because both will be withdrawn from the programs after a single year (due to the strict time limit).

The Spanish and Arabic students will receive less than the single year of training their counterparts get but will instead travel to Valparizo, Chile, and Rabat, Morocco to continue their studies without the benefit of formal educational guidance. During this time, both will enroll in whatever local language schools and/or academic programs they can set up. They are also eligible to be called on to act as translators for American forces that visit their regions for exercises. Also, both will normally make contact with their host country's military forces and act as informal liaisons between these forces and the Marine Corps.

Regardless of program, all are given ample time and money to travel throughout the country in which they are assigned and throughout the region. In addition, all four will be put into some type of additional language training/tutoring to try to bring their linguistic skills up to the desired 2 or 3 level.

In the Marine philosophy regarding FAOs, language skills play a very strong role. In fact, Major McTernan would go so far as to say the Marine Corps seeks an officer who is "one-half linguist and one-half a country expert" in their FAOs [Ref. 17] They, like the Army, are willing to invest the time and money to send FAOs to their region of interest where they can be immersed in the target language. They, too, cite DLI/FLC as a place for building a foundation with the goal of achieving a skill level of 2, but stress that this goal is often unachiev-

able in difficult languages for officers without previous training and are satisfied with a 2 level after the added second year of language training.

The Marines have not been willing to invest their money in graduate degrees for their FAOs. As mentioned before, only two of the four Formal Track FAOs a year go on to academic programs other than simply additional language training, and even these two officers are withdrawn before finishing an academic program. This situation will change in the summer of 1989, when the first two Marine officers report to the Naval Postgraduate School to begin graduate programs in the East Asia and Latin America programs.

Technically, these two students cannot count their graduate schooling as part of their official FAO program. The strict two-year training rule prevents this "official" addition of graduate education to the FAO program but nevertheless the Marines being sent were selected to attend the Naval Postgraduate School in preparation for the start of their FAO training. This change is part of an expansion of the Marine FAO program that will result in the doubling of inputs to eight Marines per year and the coverage of regions such as Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia, which have been neglected in the smaller previous program. As currently envisioned, one of the four added FAO inputs will study Portuguese (to expand Latin American coverage), one will study a East European language with the possibility that a second Russian student will be substituted in alternating years, one will study an Asian language other than Chinese, and the fourth will study

Hebrew or an alternative non-Arabic language. No coverage for Africa is foreseen at this time.

### **3. Selection and the "Experience Track"**

Officers who hold regular, unrestricted commissions (as opposed to a reserve or limited duty commission) have between seven and 14 years of service, are serving as Captains or Majors, are college graduates (baccalaureate degree), and pass a few other restrictions<sup>21</sup> may apply. Their applications go through a screening process that includes the Marine Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower's office and will ultimately be decided upon by a board that convenes each August for the purpose of picking FAO candidates. The Marine Director of Intelligence's office also gets involved, helping both to provide members for the board and to fund the program.

Of course, as mentioned before, the Marine Corps does not rely solely on this voluntary recruitment/board selection method to gain needed FAOs. When I last visited Major McTernan at his office in December 1988, he was pleased to tell me that he had added 14 more FAOs to the Marines rolls that very day—at no cost to the Marine Corps! The way the Marines manage to increase their FAO ranks so quickly and cheaply is the other track for becoming a Marine FAO—the

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<sup>21</sup>Other requirements include a good record, a Secret clearance, medical clearance for world-wide duty, U.S. citizenship (including U.S. citizenship for all members of the officer's immediate family), and Defense Language Aptitude Battery score of 110 or higher (within the previous three years). [Ref. 16:pp. 4, 5]

"Experience Track." Basically, what this involves is reviewing the records of Marine officers who have had FAO-type jobs in the past and "capturing" them (to use Major McTernan's preferred phraseology) for the FAO program. Therefore, any Marine officer who has served in a Defense Attaché position, on a security assistance mission, attended a foreign military school through an officer exchange program, or lived overseas for an extended period of time as an Olmstead or Fullbright scholar, etc. is eligible to be "captured" by Major McTernan (i.e., have the FAO MOS added to his records as an additional MOS), although former attachés and Olmstead scholars are the most likely "victims."<sup>22</sup>

#### **4. Problems and Recommendations**

Certainly good arguments can be made both for and against this non-voluntary program (i.e., the Experience Track). On one hand, these officers have gained particular skills at government expense that the Marine Corps should be able to tap as demanded. On the other hand, although these officers might be easier to get up to speed on language and area knowledge than an officer without their background experiences, they cannot be expected to be current in their language or regional knowledge and should not be accepted as "experts" just because they have some language skills on their records and they have spent some time in the region. To be fair, those officers who are

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<sup>22</sup>Major McTernan says that through these two programs the Marine Corps FAO ranks have grown from 33 officers in 1987 to 97 officers today.

notified that they are eligible for the FAO MOS should not be relied upon in policy-making jobs unless they are willing to invest the time to become knowledgeable on the current issues in their region.

This brings us to what may safely be identified as the major failing of the Marine Corps FAO program: its need for education and training more oriented toward specific regions. Aside from the two officers who will be getting complete graduate educations at the Naval Postgraduate School and the partial educations the Soviet and Chinese FAOs currently receive in Garmisch and Singapore, the Marine FAOs are generally expected to gain regional expertise through individual study. The officers are not even provided a suggested readings list and must rely on whatever material is available in the local marketplace.

Some of the more resourceful officers at DLI/FLC who can find the time come to the Naval Postgraduate School informally for a class or two or at least request reading guidance from the NPS professors. Others cannot even find the time to audit any classes and often turn to magazines at DLI/FLC and/or NPS for their information. Given the possibility that these same officers will eventually be looked to as the "experts" in the Fleet Marine Force and other billets, I believe the Marine Corps should immediately take steps to improve this situation.

One positive step the Marines have already taken has been to begin sending their FAOs through the week-long regional courses taught at the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School at Hurlburt Field in Florida. Here courses are taught on Southeast Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and other regions by Air Force officers who

are often graduates of the Naval Postgraduate School area studies programs. In the single week, the Marine FAO at least gets an introduction to the geography, history, culture, and religions of his region through a series of films and lectures presented by the Air Force instructors or, more often, by visiting experts from academia and government.

I attended one of the Southeast Asia courses given at this school to evaluate how well these courses familiarize the student with a region in such an incredibly short time.<sup>23</sup> What I found was an intense yet entertaining course that gives the novice FAOs some basic direction from which they can begin their self-study programs. The lectures given by both the staff and visitors were interesting and provided brief overviews of the countries and issues of the region. More importantly, sample sources of more comprehensive information, such as the *Far East Economic Review* and *Asian Defense Journal* were distributed and the school's small library was well stocked with books on individual countries and the region as a whole. The programs offered at this school are probably the best, if not the only, "short course" for FAOs currently available.

The Marines use other "short courses" in addition to the U.S.A.F. Special Operations School to prepare their FAOs. Before the two years are over, Marine FAOs can expect to attend a course on

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<sup>23</sup>February 1989.



terrorism awareness at Fort Bragg, a defensive driving course in Washington, briefings by the Foreign Service Institute, and a number of other classes offered by the Departments of Defense and State. Still, these courses are not good substitutes for a complete graduate education, which brings us to the subject of recommendations for the Marine Corps FAO Program.

The Marine Corps has always had a reputation for being more concerned with fighting than studying, and Major Les Stein demonstrated that the Marine officer still questions the need for graduate education. For example, only 35 percent of the officers Major Stein polled stated they felt an officer's career suffered if he or she did not have a graduate degree, and only 49 percent thought a graduate degree would improve an officer's job performance [Ref. 18]. However, graduate training for a Marine FAO in a program designed to "train selected officers in the languages, military forces, culture, history, sociology, economics, politics, and geography of selected areas of the world" [Ref. 16:subpara. 3] is not a question of "square-filling" or "ticket punching"—graduate-level education is vital to fulfilling the requirement. Therefore, I strongly recommend that the Marine Corps increase the academic opportunities it affords its FAOs. At first, this could simply be done by allowing the two officers who are going to the National University in Singapore and the U.S. Army Russian Institute to stay and complete the academic programs in which they are enrolled. Also, as already mentioned, two Marine officers will begin graduate training at the Naval Postgraduate School in the summer

quarter of 1989. These two should serve as "test cases" and, providing that the Marines are pleased with the education these two officers receive, efforts should be made to expand this program, with an eventual goal of sending all eight Marine FAO inputs to graduate school each year. Here again, the Army's FAO program can serve as a guide for sequencing of training as it would be best for the Marines to continue to send their officers to language school first, and then to graduate school.

As for the Marine FAOs on the Experience Track, the Marines should either arrange for refresher language courses and academic opportunities for them to bring them up to the same level as the Formal Education enrollees or else designate their less than fully qualified status by adding an additional code letter or number to their FAO MOS. This is vital because the only thing worse than having a non-FAO officer in an important policy position is to have an unqualified FAO officer in that position. If the FAO, regardless of service, is to have continuing credibility, then all FAOs must be fully qualified to hold the title. The Marine Corps is doing a pretty good job of upholding its side on a tight budget and with a small officer corps to choose from. Therefore, overall, I would rate their program second best to the Army because the Marine Corps FAO program fails to provide the balanced training in both language and area studies. They do meet the ideal balance criteria discussed in the previous chapter on the language side of training; basic language training is balanced with practical language experience opportunities offered by in-country training. However, the

Marines lack the theory and education that would make their regional travel and personal contacts with the target region culture useful. As previously discussed, the FAO cannot fully absorb the lessons offered by living in the region without a strong foundation of knowledge concerning what he is experiencing.

This "second-best" rating should concern the Marine FAOs because, when the time comes for them to be assigned to FAO billets, they will very likely find themselves working side by side with Army FAOs. Aside from a limited number of Marine FAO billets at Headquarters Marine Corps and the Fleet Marine Forces, the majority of billets are on joint staffs, at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), on allied and United Nations commands, and with the war-fighting commands. While on one hand these chances for "joint duty" may prove to be a strong boost to an officer's career and induce more Marines to seek FAO designation, on the other hand these "joint duty" positions could be extraordinarily damaging to the FAO's career if he or she is ill-prepared for the demands entailed. Marine FAOs could quickly find themselves in a difficult and embarrassing position if their views on ground warfare issues clash with Army FAOs while they are both advising a third party and the Marine FAO is viewed as less qualified than the Army counterpart. Since "jointness" appears to be the wave of the future, the Marines, like the Navy and the Air Force, must reevaluate the costs involved in turning out FAOs who can match the Army or, if not, reconcile themselves to continuing to let the Army dominate the decision-making process in the joint arena.

## **B. THE NAVY PROGRAM**

### **1. Different Goals and Different Philosophy**

Ironically, it is the Navy, which owns the Naval Postgraduate School that has trained hundreds of FAOs and continues to meet any service's needs, that does not have a real FAO program.<sup>24</sup> Nor does the Navy appear to be interested in establishing a FAO program in the near future. The closest thing the Navy does have to a FAO Proponent Team is OP-602, which is the Navy office in the Pentagon that is charged with managing the political-military (Pol-Mil) subspecialist in the Navy's ranks. Captain Figueras, USN, who heads OP-602, gave the Navy views that follow and, in doing so, tried to explain how the Navy's self-perceived role in the Department of Defense has led it to turning out FAOs for others yet not for itself.

The fundamental philosophy the Navy uses in setting up its program differs radically from the other services. According to Captain Figueras, the Navy expects an officer who has just completed the area specialist program here at NPS (or elsewhere) to have an awareness of

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<sup>24</sup>The stated objective of the National Security Affairs curricula of NPS is:

To provide graduate subspecialists in the field of security affairs with regional area specialists. Specific objectives are: familiarity with a geopolitical region in terms of its global strategic importance; ability to assess major trends relating to policy choices in domestic and foreign affairs; familiarity with regional military and political relations and regional defense agreements; knowledge of the geography, principal resources, political relationships of the region to the rest of the world, culture and religions of the region, and current religions. [Ref. 19]

staff work and research skills, to basically understand the Washington scene (i.e., political realities as applied to military programs), and a foundation established on which the specific skills needed can be built. It is more important for the new Pol-Mil specialist to understand concepts such as how treaties influence decision making than try to train someone who can walk in and do any job right off the bat. The officer may not know exactly which issues are hot at the moment, but he or she should understand the relations of the area well enough to see how the issue of the moment will affect regional relations. He gave an example of a country wanting to purchase a specific weapon system—the new officer might not know all about that country or weapon, but he should be able to make some educated guesses as to what the repercussions of such a sale would be in a region.

## **2. Training and Utilization**

Language training for Naval officers in this specialty is by exception. Only if the specific follow-on assignment requires the skill will the officer be sent. Otherwise, all Naval officers now pursue a straight 18-month course of instruction at NPS and write a thesis. This allows the officer to take a greater number of courses, both of a regional nature and in related subject areas (e.g., strategic planning,

maritime strategy, advanced economics, terrorism, and arms transfer/security assistance classes).<sup>25</sup>

This type of program makes particular sense due to the unique "ship-to-shore" rotation schedule Naval officers follow throughout their careers. Since duty at NPS is considered shore duty, the vast majority of male Naval officers will rotate back to sea duty immediately after graduation. Female Naval officers also often fill "department head" tours at Naval Air Stations and other activities rather than performing immediate payback tours. In both of these cases, language skills gained would be quite eroded before any use could be made of the foreign language.

Utilization tours are required for Naval officers who attend the area studies programs at NPS. Navy "detailers" (i.e., the Naval officers who make officer assignments) are directed to attempt to schedule this tour for the officer's next assignment after the sea duty (usually three years later). The detailer handles all officers of specific year groups and, since most officers attend NPS at approximately the same career point, the group comes up for paybacks in a glut.

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<sup>25</sup>There is still some room for flexibility in this area by the Navy. Officers who are particularly interested in learning a related regional language or who already have some language skills can still be trained at DLI/FLC. I personally know of two Naval officers who obtained additional language training there as "auditing" students, which allowed them to carry full course loads at NPS and sit in on classes at DLI/FLC without having to stay for a full seven-hour day there and accomplish the three to four hours of homework every night that is the norm for that school.

preventing many from being used in politico-military subspecialty positions for several years, if ever.

The Bureau of Naval Personnel selects officers for entry into this subspecialty. Fitness reports are the primary instrument used in making the selections and the officers picked are in the top 50 percent of ratings Navy-wide. Twice as many officers are selected by each board as can attend. Individual officers are notified of the selection and then the officer and the detailee work out the specifics. Apparently, the specific curriculum the officer will attend is also fairly flexible, as a number of officers start in one school and then switch to another. Furthermore, when the Navy was sending officers to DLI in concert with this program, they were allowing the officer to pick any language in the region for study, not assigning languages as is the custom of the other services. After notification of selection, officers have a five-year window in which to work out a specific time to go to NPS.

Captain Figueras said that approximately 1,503 Naval officers possess the Pol-Mil subspecialty but only 333 billets need filling. Most officers gaining the Pol-Mil subspecialist code are from the unrestricted line officer community and, much like with the Army's dual-track system, most must return to fill department head positions at sea if they are to remain competitive for promotion. Officers may also gain the code through prior experience, working in the Pol-Mil area without the formal education.

Still, since the Navy has the same requirements to fill vacancies in the attaché, security assistance, and intelligence areas, I could

not understand why the political-military area was emphasized while other FAO-type positions were ignored. My question continued to be, why did the Navy not have FAOs, especially in light of the fact that the Navy one had a FAO-like program in the 1970s called the "Country and Regional Specialist Program" (CARS)?<sup>26</sup> According to Captain Figueras, the Navy tries to manage each and every officer's career as if that officer were on track to become the future Chief of Naval Operations. It is for this reason that the vast majority of Naval officers who come to NPS or civilian schools return to sea tours (or other department head tours) when they leave rather than fill a utilization tour. Frankly, like the Army officer, the Naval officer who does not return to an operational billet after spending 18 months to two years in education is giving up his or her chances for advancement. It is possible for the Naval officer to create a strictly "Pol-Mil officer career path" by working with his detailee, but to do so will almost certainly mean the

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<sup>26</sup>CARS was first announced by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., in NavyOp 73, issued in 1971. According to a report in the *Navy Times* [Ref. 19], this program was supposed to create CARS officers who would "have specialized in politico-military affairs, strategic planning, and foreign areas" and ensure these officers became "true specialists in their regions of expertise and be fully utilized to meet commitments for area-trained officers." Today, CARS still exists, and by meeting the provisions laid out on page 1420310 of the *Naval Military Personnel Manual*, a Naval officer may still be designated a CARS officer. The requirements for CARS designation are extremely tough and include an S3/R3 rating on the DLPT and such other in-country experience, family background, and/or graduate training to convince the Navy one is suitable for "highly visible" assignments abroad and "occasional special assignments not involving a permanent change of station."



officer will not advance beyond the O-4 (pay grade) level. The Navy highly discourages this type of specialization.

The above does not mean that the officer who graduates from the Department of National Security Affairs or is one of the four officers a year sent to civilian colleges for graduate area studies education by the Navy will not use his area specialist training. The truth is this "payback tour" probably will occur, but it will be a little later in the officer's career. Two prime points for this tour are following the officer's tour as an executive officer aboard ship (usually as a senior O-4, awaiting the O-5 board) and/or after serving in a command at sea position. In both cases, a two-year gap can easily be identified where the "payback tour" can be plugged in. Still, Captain Figueras believes that not more than 50 percent are ever used in a Pol-Mil billet but that the training is not wasted because the Navy benefits from having "area specialists" at sea who can be tapped at any time a need arises.

The Pol-Mil subspecialist field remains a real "buyer's market" in the Navy, with 1,503 qualified officers regularly vying for 333 billets. To maintain this pool, the Navy inputs 24 officers a year into NPS but OP-602 does no control how many go into the area specialist side of the NSA house and how many go into related training in either intelligence or strategic planning. Users of these graduates include OP-06 (the single biggest employer), fleet staffs, numbered fleets, the Naval Academy and War College, JCS, the Unified and Specified Commands, and others.

### **3. Problems and Recommendations**

The harmonious picture painted of the Navy's program was not completely shared by the above-mentioned OP-06, which was queried for additional views on this subject. This organization, which is the Politico-Military Policy and Current Plans Division for the Navy, has a continuing need for Navy FAOs and a growing desire for language-qualified FAOs. Recent events, such as the difficulty in finding a sufficient number of Naval officers who are qualified to support a planned ship visit by the P.R.C. to Pearl Harbor, have reinforced the need for such officers. However, the OP-06 official I interviewed<sup>27</sup> was quick to point out that he still did not believe language training was necessary for all Navy FAOs and to attempt to extend it to all such officers would be a waste of money. Captain Robert Hofford, the Deputy Director of OP-06, went on to point out that he has received a steady supply of politico-military subspecialists to fill his needs and that he felt Navy thinking on how to best train its specialists was cyclical in nature. In his view, the current deemphasis on language training for Pol-Mil subspecialists would probably shift in time to a return to a push for language skills and, in general, he felt the Navy is making steady improvement in obtaining and using its version of FAOs. He cited the need for the Navy to adopt and support an Army-like, dual-track career system which would bring officers back into assignments as attachés, on security assistance teams, and in other Pol-Mil work two

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<sup>27</sup>April 1989.

or more times in their career. He would oppose the creation of a "single-track" system and, like others, said the officer needed to stay current in his operational skills in order to be most credible and useful in his subspecialty assignments.

Since the Navy seems to be happy with its system, suggestions for change are unlikely to be heeded. Many factors come together to make the Navy rather unique in its needs. It is the service in which the majority of the officers will have the most direct exposure to foreign areas by nature of its seagoing mission, yet it is destined to be the service with the least in-depth knowledge of these regions if it continues to forego a real FAO program. The Navy, like the Air Force, is affected by the highly technical nature of its operations, by its tendency to carry out missions autonomously, and by its ability to operate in overseas areas with little or no direct contact with the foreign nationals. Still, the Navy, like the other services, must provide officers in attaché, security assistance, intelligence, and politico-military billets, often involving joint duty and/or direct contact with foreign nationals. For this reason, I would recommend the Navy at least match the Marine Corps in providing four to eight officers a year for a full FAO program. The Navy should also ensure a sufficient number of its quota of NPS students each year are enrolled in the area studies program to provide a mix of service views. This, in turn, could lead to the certification of the NPS program as a joint education assignment, to the mutual benefit of all the services.

The Navy, thus far, has been concentrating on building its own forces and strategies and has yet to be strongly affected by some of the current trends that have rocked its sister services. This situation could change, and change quickly, if some form of naval arms limitation agreement were reached between the U.S. and Soviet Union involving on-site inspection. If such a scenario were to occur, the Navy might find itself in a difficult position, sorely lacking the FAOs it needs to man the openings that would be created. Unless and until such an event occurs, however, it is very doubtful any suggestion to change the current program would meet with approval, so I will end by recommending that the Navy have, at a minimum, the mechanisms in place to expand (by training at least four FAOs a year, complete with in-country training) so that they can avoid possible future embarrassment and create a small core group of "Sailor-Statesmen" for FAO-type assignments today.

## V. THE AIR FORCE FAO PROGRAM—FASP

### A. BACKGROUND

If you ask almost any officer in the Air Force, including field-grade officers in the upper reaches of the Headquarters Air Force policy-making branches, whether the Air Force has a FAO program, they will almost certainly tell you it does not. This answer is both right and wrong. The Air Force FAO program was formally established on 5 March 1987 and is designated the Foreign Area Studies Program (FASP). However, after months of research, I believe the program should instead be called the Foreign Area Studies "Stealth" Program because neither the Air Force hierarchy, the student officers "participating" in it, nor the Military Personnel Center officials who assign Air Force "FAOs" knows much at all about it.

The documents that were familiar to all parties were the two regulations that had long been relied on to create what the Air Force called "area specialists." These were the 3 August 1984 version of Air Force Regulation 36-16, entitled *U.S.A.F. Area Specialist Program* and chapter 35 of Air Force Regulation 36-23, known as the *Intelligence—Career Progression Guide*.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>28</sup>The second regulation, chapter 35 of AFR 36-23, devotes only a single paragraph to the issue of Air Force FAOs. On page 202, under a discussion of specialty code prefixes, the following is included:

(b) "L"—Area Specialist Officer (Second Lieutenant through Colonel). This prefix reflects requirements of about 4 percent of the total intelligence authorization. It designates positions requiring special geographic or language expertise which is

The old AFR 36-16 was just three and one-half pages long with a single attachment to provide a breakdown of the regions by special experience identifier (SEI) and advanced academic degree (AAD) codes [Ref. 22]. There was no mention of language under the old regulation's paragraph on "program objectives." In fact, under the old regulation, the goal was merely to help officers prepare for assignments which "...require special knowledge and understanding of countries or geographic regions of the world."

Language was by no means left out entirely. In fact, it was to be provided for all officers in the program and a Listening level of 2 was expected to be maintained by program graduates. A Listening level of 3 was required for attachés. However, reading and speaking levels were not mentioned. Also, further down in the regulation, it said that "knowledge of a regional language is a key to understanding the culture of a people."<sup>29</sup>

Under the old regulation, an Air Force Area Specialist was someone who filled three squares:

1. was fully qualified in an Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC),

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normally obtained by advanced academic study. [Ref. 21, emphasis added]

This regulation is still current as far as I know, even though its provisions directly conflict with the new version of AFR 36-16.

<sup>29</sup>The old regulation may have meant to say that a skill level of 2 was required in all three DLPT areas (i.e., listening, speaking, and reading), but the use of the alphanumeric L2 as it actually appears in the regulation is officially construed to mean a skill level of 2 in the Listening portion of the DLPT.

2. had "formal academic training in a geographic area of the world and is well versed in the political and economic conditions, cultural environment, threats to stability, and U.S. foreign policy toward a region," and
3. had an L2 (L3 for attaché) on the DLPT.

Once these few requirements were met, an "L" prefix was placed in front of the officer's AFSC and the appropriate AAD code was placed in the officer's records. In later assignments, this AAD code would be used to match officer with region when making assignments (language was only considered in special cases, such as attaché duty).

#### **B. FASP—NEW GOALS FOR A NEW AIR FORCE PROGRAM**

In March 1987, a new version of AFR 36-16 was released. Entitled *Foreign Area Studies Program* (or *FASP*), this new regulation outlined a much larger program designed to create true Air Force FAOs for the first time. The stated goal of the program is

to produce, sustain, and effectively utilize a resource of qualified Air Force officers for worldwide assignment to designated positions that require a special knowledge and understanding of a country or geographic area of the world and a related foreign language. A key function of FASP officers is to provide sophisticated linkage between, understanding of, and influence on foreign and U.S. political and military institutions and personalities. Foreign area officers, specifically, possess the comprehensive, up-to-date knowledge of the language, military services, geography, history, economics, politics, culture, religion, and sociology of a specific foreign country or area required to make sound decisions and estimates concerning U.S. military activities. The FASP designations should be assigned to any Air Force specialty position in which the above knowledge would enhance mission accomplishment through an individual's ability to relate with foreign nationals and interpret events and behaviors. [Ref. 22]

Following this statement of purpose, the regulation goes on to discuss the four levels of training that may lead to the FAO designation.

namely designation as a "foreign language [qualified] officer," designation as a "country specialist," designation as an "area specialist," and, finally, designation as a "foreign area officer." Officers may qualify for one or more of these titles either by attending formal courses of training or by applying for direct designation if they already have the required level of language proficiency (L2/R2/S2), a "minimum of a master's degree in area studies or a similar bachelor's degree with extensive knowledge and experience in a specific geographic area," and "have in-country or in-area training and experience." [Ref. 22:p. 4] On first reading, this regulation appears to be a close approximation of the Army FAO program, complete with a list of in-country training programs broken down by region, a liaison office at the Air Force Military Personnel Center to act as a proponent team, and the administrative details (i.e., identifiers of areas of expertise, levels of experience, etc.) worked out so that FAOs could be properly tracked and utilized throughout their careers. Although the old regulation provided the Air Force with officers who had limited language skills and masters degrees in area studies, the new program added the chance for added language training and a chance for practical experience needed to create a well-balanced FAO training program. Unfortunately, this has not been the true result to date.

### **C. FLAWS IN FASP**

Although much more could be written about the new AFR 36-16, to include a discussion of the division of responsibilities for the program and the in-depth outline of academic objectives for FASP



officers, to do so would be a waste of time. This regulation is severely flawed, unknown to most of the Air Force, and ignored by those agencies that are aware of its existence. It is not consulted by the Air Force Military Personnel Center (AFMPC) when assigning officers to language and/or graduate area studies programs, nor, apparently, does AFMPC solicit FASP inputs when assigning officers who complete these programs to billets that require advanced academic degrees and/or language skills. As of this writing, the Air Force has exactly **one** FAO in its ranks—a Lieutenant Colonel at DIA who obtained the honor through direct designation and only after months of battling obstacles erected by the current administrators of FASP, the Intelligence Training department under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Currently, the FASP is “unfunded” and, reportedly, will soon be the subject of a functional management inspection by the Air Force Inspector General. This inspection, which reportedly was requested by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, will find a program that is based on a regulation that could not have been written by FAOs and is in need of numerous corrections and clarifications.

For example, language training is called one of the “keystones” of the FASP and, although the requirements for direct designation list a requirement for “2” levels in all three DLPT areas, Attachment 1 to this regulation states that officers who wish to obtain the FAO designation must obtain an L3/R3/S3 on the DLPT. This is just one of the contradictions in the document.

Another contradiction involves area studies education. While the program states that a FAO must have a full Masters degree in area studies (or a related discipline) and that this degree is required to even obtain "Area Specialist" designation, another section suggests the Air University can design non-degree programs "to provide the amount of academic training required for follow-on assignments [Ref. 22:p. 5]. Even the Army Foreign Area Officer Course, the Defense Intelligence College, and the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management are listed as sources of "area studies related coursework." [Ref. 22] These courses, while useful for preparing the trained FAO for specific duties (as in the cases of DIC and DISAM) and helping the new FAOs learn what is expected of them (as in the FAOC case) are hardly adequate sources of FAO academic training. By listing such possibilities, the FASP quickly loses its credibility as a guide for quality FAO training.

Other, less important examples of flaws in this regulation include the listing of the Philippines under the "Far East" rather than "Southeast Asia" in Attachment 2, failing to list a language school for additional Japanese training even though the Foreign Service Institute runs a well-known school in Japan that the Army FAOs attend, and the complete omission of the Soviet Union from any form of advanced training. Currently, due to its "unfunded" status, no form of in-country training takes place for Air Force officers other than that available through DIA, the Olmstead Scholar program, and similar arrangements that long predate FASP and are wholly unrelated to it.

#### **D. SELECTION AND TRAINING OF AIR FORCE FAOs—REALITY**

The above is not to suggest that Air Force officers are not being trained in foreign languages and areas. Rather, Air Force officers continue to receive language and area studies training and fulfill roles requiring this training throughout the Air Force and in joint missions. The program remains virtually the same one which the 1984 version of AFR 36-16 sponsored.

The Air Force Institute of Technology runs numerous programs through which Air Force officers can obtain a Masters degree at government expense. The program that directly affects the Air Force's need for officers who are particularly knowledgeable on foreign areas is administered by the Civilian Institutes Special Programs division of AFIT. The degree offered is a Master of Arts in National Security Affairs with emphasis on area studies (Soviet Union, Middle East, Latin America, Far East, or Africa). The sole school used by the Air Force is the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.

Officers who are interested in entering this program begin by requesting an evaluation of their undergraduate records by AFIT and by taking the Graduate Record Examinations. If these records and scores pass AFIT's standards they are notified by mail that they are academically qualified to apply.

The next steps are to indicate this desire to attend to AFMPC on the assignment preference form, take the Defense Language Aptitude Test and score in the 90s or better, and begin working with one's appropriate assignments officer to help obtain one of the 10 to 20

slots allocated each year. As most of these slots go to the intelligence section of AFMPC, the officer has the best chance of winning a slot if he or she is in or "cross-flows" to the intelligence career field. A second steady source for slots is the Office of Special Investigations, which gives the officer another possible career choice.

#### **E. GRADUATE SCHOOL**

Once selected, the Air Force officers will normally attend the Naval Postgraduate School for one year, during which they will be exposed to a mix of area studies courses and broader national security-related courses. A normal year will begin with officers enrolled in four four-hour courses for each of their four quarters of education. Each quarter, two classes will be in the area of interest, starting with broad history, geography, and culture classes, and two courses will be outside this area. Each officer is required to take a course in American defense policy, research methods (statistics), international relations, and international economics. Other electives offered can provide an officer with some foundation on the U.S. intelligence community, military history and strategy, international law, nuclear issues, and a host of related topics. Officers are also well schooled in past and present U.S. foreign policy toward their region and take courses on "the current problems of government and security" in individual nations in their area.

At the end of the year, the officers usually take a comprehensive examination on their areas. Every officer is given the option to write a thesis, but most find they are unable to take on such a task in a

four-quarter program. Navy officers, who attend the same course of study, remain for two more quarters in most cases and are required to write a thesis. Occasionally, an Air Force officer does remain for a full 18-month program and, in this case, a thesis is also required. In addition, an Air Force officer with particularly strong background in area studies occasionally can validate certain courses and/or elect to complete a thesis within a four-quarter program.

Following the academic year at NPS, officers move across town to DLI/FLC. Language training at DLI/FLC is counted as part of the Masters program and, upon successful completion of this training, a Master of Arts degree is awarded by NPS. The officer then is reassigned out of AFIT and, if not already qualified as an intelligence officer, OSI agent, attaché, or other career field that funded the degree, is then sent to accomplish this training.

After all training is complete, the officer's records have a special four-letter code added to indicate that he holds an advanced academic degree (AAD) involving knowledge of a specific area of the world.<sup>30</sup> In practice, this four-letter code, in conjunction with the officer's Air Force Specialty code, is then all that is used in assigning the graduate

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<sup>30</sup>The following four-letter codes are used to identify areas of specialization [Ref. 22:Attachment 2]:

OYLA— Western Europe  
OYLB— Eastern Europe  
OYLC— U.S.S.R.  
OYLD— North Africa

OYLE— Sub-Saharan Africa  
OYLF— Middle East  
OYLG— South Asia  
OYLH— Mediterranean

OYLJ— Southeast Asia\*  
OYLK— Caribbean  
OYLL— Latin America  
OYLM— Far East†

\*excluding the Philippines

†including the Philippines

officer to FAO assignments.<sup>31</sup> By regulation, only officers with the right AAD can fill certain positions and AAD-holding officers must perform a tour in an AAD position to "pay back" the Air Force for the education. As with the other services' FAOs, most of these AAD positions are on joint staffs, in intelligence organizations (particularly DIA), and overseas as attachés or in security assistance missions.

#### **F. PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

Of course, what is obviously missing in the above Air Force program is the in-country training that the Army and Marine Corps rely on both to complete their FAOs' course of language training and to give them personal experience through living in the region. Therefore, it is not uncommon for the Air Force "expert" to be assigned to a position which might require policy advice even though he or she had never even visited the area in question. Additionally, depending on the assignment the Air Force FAOs draw, they may never have a chance to use the sometimes limited language skills they acquire at DLI/FLC. The fact that their language training may very well never be used is revealed to the student officers by their assignments branch at AFMPC (which invariably tells the officer he or she will end up as an analyst at DIA or on a joint staff somewhere). This has an undisputable negative

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<sup>31</sup>To be absolutely fair, the factors used for making Air Force officer assignments rank as follows: (1) Officer's AFSC and AAD, (2) Air Force needs, (3) Officer's overseas duty vulnerability, (4) Officer's preference sheet data, and (5) Intangibles to include past record of assignments, levels of duty, need to broaden career, etc.

impact on the officer's morale while in language training. Unlike the Army and Marine Corps FAOs, who are absolutely sure they will at least use and improve their language skills in-country, Air Force FAOs know that they will be lucky to use their language as tourists and that no effort will be made to maintain or improve their skills unless they later get assignments as attachés, in security assistance, or a similar assignment that would result in an officer attending language school without being in the Air Force FAO program. Of course, in-country training is provided for by the new AFR 36-16, but, as mentioned before, this provision only exists on paper due to lack of funds.

Currently, it appears that the Air Force is not sure what its needs are as far as officers with special language and area studies training. One effort was made to determine these needs by the office that is currently responsible for FASP, Headquarters Air Force/INFP (which handles all intelligence-related educational programs). The survey, entitled "Foreign Area Studies Program (FASP) vs. Language Designated Position (LDP) Requirements," was mailed in the summer of 1987. Reportedly, the goal of the survey was to determine exactly what requirements for language *and/or* advanced academic degrees existed among the agencies the Air Force helped staff. However, for unknown reasons, the survey contained a statement that made many of the potential respondents unable to honestly respond with their needs for officers with AADs *and/or* language. At the bottom of the survey was the following statement: "In all cases, if you designate a position as a FASP requirement, AF Form 1779 (Request to Establish/Change an

Advanced Academic Degree) must be accompanied by an AF Form 1780 (Request to Establish/Change Foreign Language Designated Position).<sup>32</sup> Therefore, the true result of the "survey" would have been that all agencies that desired Air Force officers with advanced academic degrees in foreign area studies would be forced to say the job also required a foreign language. This is not the true situation most potential respondents found in their organizations.

Many agencies reacted like the official I interviewed at DIA—they simply ignored the "survey." Other agencies, including some of the Air Force's own major commands, simply wrote their requirements on the survey form and returned it. In the case of the Tactical Air Command, the reply was something like, "We have 11 AAD requirements, five of these also require language skills and six do not."<sup>32</sup>

The reasoning behind this office sending out such a product is unclear, just as other behavior on the part of the FASP program managers is questionable. According to sources at the Defense Intelligence Agency Attaché Affairs Directorate, in recent months this office (INFP) also announced its intention to inform the Undersecretary of the Air Force for Low Intensity Conflict that the Air Force had no requirements for FAOs under the definition of AFR 36-16. Possibly they had come to this conclusion as the result of the above-mentioned "survey," but only the timely intervention of the DIA Attaché managers, who

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<sup>32</sup>I was only given brief access to these replies when I visited the office in question, in spite of my repeated requests for this material.



filed seven requests for fully trained Air Force FAOs, prevented this announcement and the possible demise of the program.

The confusion surrounding the current condition of the Air Force FAO Program, FASP, lends itself to many possible recommendations for improvement. However, any suggestions made must hinge on an eventual decision by the highest levels of command on whether the Air Force truly wants a FAO program. In order to make this decision, a complete, impartial evaluation of Air Force requirements must be made. A new survey, without the "note" that skewed the results of the last survey, should be carried out in order to find out what specific skills are needed by the major commands. Furthermore, regardless of which direction the Air Force decides to pursue in the future, AFR 36-16 must be revised. To this end, if the Air Force elects to build an effective FAO program in the future, a new FAO Proponent office should be established, possibly at Randolph AFB in order to ensure close coordination with the officers who make assignments.

I believe a complete study of Air Force FAO requirements will reveal that FAOs are needed and that the Air Force is possibly the only service that could easily support a "single-track" FAO system. One could easily envision such a system in the intelligence career field, with different degrees of training being offered depending on the planned utilization for each officer. By piecing together parts from the Army, Marine Corps, and Navy programs, the Air Force could create a multi-tiered FAO program that would fill all needs and save money too.

Of course, the simplest suggestion would be for the Air Force to mimic the Army FAO program entirely. After all, based on our ideal model for balanced FAO training, the Army has the best and most balanced program. However, I will not suggest the Air Force try to take on such a large task for two reasons: cost and its special need to limit non-flying time for pilots.

The first reason, cost, is self-explanatory. Even though the Army finds the funds for sending 135 officers a year through its program and the Air Force would only need 25 or so, I cannot really foresee the Air Force spending \$195,000 for each and every FAO. What would be reasonable to suggest is that the Air Force match the Marine Corps and fund four to eight officers per year for a complete program of language study, graduate study, and in-country training. If these officers were then to be made available for attaché assignments, in light of the generally held belief that attachés need the best language skills possible, then the pay-off for this investment would be certain.

Another lesson the Air Force could learn from the Marine Corps would be to build up its FAO ranks by identifying and "capturing" officers who have the experience to be immediately certified as FAOs. Attachés, Olmstead Scholars, and officers with similar backgrounds should be actively brought into the FAO program and designated FAOs. Officers who believe they have the necessary prerequisites to be designated FAOs should be able to apply and receive judgment on their applications with minimum red tape. A new FAO Proponent office, if

established, should make identifying and recruiting Air Force officers that can be quickly certified as FAOs one of its primary objectives.<sup>33</sup>

From the Navy, I think the Air Force should adopt the practice of separating graduate schooling from language training. As was discussed in the last section, the Navy no longer sends its NPS students to DLI/FLC automatically for language courses. Rather, the student is given 18 months of graduate education and the opportunity to write a thesis. Language training can then be given if the officer's next assignment requires it, or, if the officer is certain to need a language and the Navy wishes to get that officer to his next station more quickly, the option of a combination of one year of academic work and a language course is still available.

The Air Force would have much to gain through adopting this policy. In many cases, where the language course would have taken a full year, the six-quarter/academics-only option brings the officer back to work six months earlier. An academics-only option would also give every officer a chance to write a thesis, the topics for which could be suggested by Air Force agencies. This could lead to expanded research on policy options and strategic questions by Air Force students at a time when increasing pressure is being brought to bear on the services to reduce their headquarters staffs and made do with fewer

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<sup>33</sup>From my own survey, I could immediately identify not less than 20 active-duty Air Force officers that would be called "Experience Track" FAOs in the Marine Corps and could be equally acceptable to Army FAO standards.

workers. The benefits of such an arrangement are limited only by the imagination of the staffs and students involved.

Furthermore, by eliminating language training unless the officer is certain to use it, either in an assignment or in in-country training, the Air Force would eliminate the widespread perception that this training was being wasted. Language skills, particularly in difficult Asian and Arabic languages, are too easily eroded to expect officers to retain them on a long-term basis after only a single course at DLI/FLC. If the Air Force cannot afford to send every officer to an in-country tour, why should it send every officer to language training? The time saved could be used to expand the officer's regional expertise and to carry out research projects that could benefit the Air Force. If the goal of the language training is just familiarity, with the idea being that officers need to know something of the language in order to better understand the indigenous people of a region, then the Air Force should experiment with substituting short, intensive language courses (as are offered at many universities nation-wide in the summer on a one- to three-month basis) or some type of general familiarization course on one or more than one language(s) spoken in an area through a cooperative arrangement between DLI/FLC and NPS. Either of these options would probably be just as beneficial to the officer as the current process of requiring language, funding only minimal training, and then letting these limited skills erode.

Of course, all the above would require the current AFR 36-16 to be completely rewritten, an idea I strongly endorse. If the Air Force

wants to use different terms to identify officers who have special area knowledge but who are not fully qualified FAOs, this is acceptable, but the current four-phased process is the wrong way to approach the problem. Once a new, objective survey is carried out to identify what skills Air Force officers really need, then a new set of terms can be created or the current terms can be redefined.

What I believe a new survey of Air Force needs would reveal (based on part on my own survey, which will be discussed later, by which I asked the FAOs themselves what skills they use in their jobs), is that the Air Force has many needs for officers with AADs but little or no need for officers who *only* have language skills. Therefore, having language skills as the basic requirement on which all other training is added, as the current AFR 36-16 reflects, makes this regulation fatally flawed from the start. The second level, "Country Specialist," is likewise a useless term because every Air Force or joint position I can identify requires *regional* knowledge, not just knowledge of a specific nation. The world is much too interdependent today for such outmoded, limited "specialists" to be needed. These two ideas, having a "language officer" and a "country specialist," may have been worthwhile in the pre-World War II time frame but today they are antiquated.

Due to this situation, and because positions exist for AAD officers without languages and for full FAOs, I suggest that the Air Force retain the term "Area Specialist" to identify the former and the term "FAO" for the latter. In addition, I suggest that the same FAO proponentcy

team handle both in the future, that all FAOs and those Area Specialists with current "2" level language skills be identified by the addition of the "L" prefix to their Air Force Specialty Code, and that these language-skilled officers be paid their language proficiency pay as long as they have the AAD and current qualifying DLPT scores in their records.

By adopting the above recommendations, the Air Force would obtain a small core group of highly qualified FAOs, have a larger pool of "Area Specialist" officers who could quickly be trained up to the FAO level as needed, and gain a free source for professional research in the future. These changes would also be morale-enhancing because each officer would be sure that he would use the training he received and could, in coordination with his assignments branch, work out the best program for his own situation.

The flexibility of having programs that range from a low of 18 months to a high of several years to obtain full FAO designation, would make the program more attractive for our pilots, who, as the primary operations element of the Air Force, are expected to fill attaché and security assistance roles, but who should not be forced into multi-year, non-flying duties. By having the multi-tiered system I suggest, we could limit the amount of time it would take to educate pilots who might someday fill command and/or policy positions that require special knowledge of the dynamics of an area without forcing them to take unnecessary language training and, at the same time, give them time to research thesis topics that could not be handled as well by a non-rated officer. If language skills were needed or desired, that option

would still be available (under the one year of academics and language training system we use almost exclusively today), and, in cases where a pilot was needed for an exchange program that involved flying, the Air Force could easily wind up with a complete FAO from the deal (with the exchange program counting for in-country training).

Of the four programs examined in this paper, the Air Force FASP appears to be the one with the least chance of matching training to stated goals. This "paper FAO program" benefits neither the officers enrolled in the programs that are functioning nor the managers who must fill the needs of the various commands and joint missions, and it does not help prepare the Air Force officers to meet future demands. Although adequate academic training is being provided, the language training is incomplete and the lack of in-country training severely handicaps the credibility of the Air Force FAO. The Air Force needs to completely reevaluate its programs and rewrite AFR 36-16. Ideally this will be accomplished before some performance failure brings the shortcomings outlined above to the attention of a wider audience, with the concurrent possibility that the "fixes" put in place in response might further damage the Air Force's ability to contribute to meeting future DOD needs.

## **VI. EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY FAOs**

### **A. SOURCES OF INFORMATION**

Now that we have covered the training programs of each of the services, the next subject is how these officers are employed. In order to examine this, one might examine the list of potential assignments each service publishes and subdivide these positions into the categories of attaché, political-military officer, etc., as Stoner did in "Taking the Plunge." [Ref. 8]<sup>34</sup> However, this approach has a significant flaw. In the modern military, the presence of slots for FAOs in any of the aforementioned FAO fields (attaché, intelligence, security assistance, and political-military officers) does not automatically guarantee that FAOs will be employed in the same percentages. Therefore, although 17 percent of the Army's FAO-designated positions are in the attaché area and 54 percent of the Army's FAO-designated positions are in the political-military area, this does not ensure that more Army FAOs will actually hold political-military jobs than attaché jobs. The truth is that many slots, both FAO-designated and otherwise, go unfilled year after year. The Defense Department has been steadily required to "make do" with fewer officers to fulfill its stated needs for many years. Therefore, looking at authorized billets as an indication of

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<sup>34</sup>Reproduced in the chapter on the Army program.



how the services employ their FAOs is insufficient and could be misleading.

This fact was one of the motivators for me to try to contact individual FAOs to discover first-hand how they had been used as well as how well their individual training programs had prepared them for their later assignments. In order to accomplish these objectives, a survey was prepared in order to poll the FAO population concerning their opinions on their training and employment. A list of 483 graduates of the area specialist programs given at the Naval Postgraduate School was obtained, complete with their addresses. A copy of the survey (included in Appendix B) was mailed to these graduates. Within the next three months, 270 of the graduates replied and, although not all graduates had completed all parts of the survey, 82 Army graduates, 118 Air Force graduates, and 46 Navy graduates gave specific information on whether they had held FAO jobs since graduation and the specific type of positions they held. The experience of these 246 officers (24 of the 270 did not provide assignment information) provides a sufficient sampling to answer the following two questions:

1. Do the services use the specialized training?
2. If so, how do the services use the officers?

**B. WHAT PERCENTAGES OF TRAINED SERVICE FAOs GO ON TO HOLD FAO JOBS?**

The specific question dealing with FAO employment asked on the survey was:

Since graduation from the Naval Postgraduate School, have you worked as any of the following: Foreign Area Officer, Area Specialist, Country or Regional desk specialist in an intelligence organization, a Political-Military officer, in the attaché field, or as a member of a security assistance team in the region you studied here?

The officers were also asked to indicate whether they had performed a "payback tour" (i.e., assignments to "repay" their services for costs involved in the education program, which are required by all services). If the officers answered positively to either question, they were asked to provide specific information, such as job titles, on their FAO positions.

In the case of the Army, 87 percent of the respondents had held FAO jobs. However, the Army was not the most successful in employing graduates in FAO positions, perhaps due to the previously discussed dual-track employment difficulties. It was the Air Force, rather than the Army, that employed the highest percentage of respondents in FAO positions. A full 93 percent of the 118 Air Force officer graduates had held FAO jobs since graduation. The Navy, true to Captain Figueras' prediction, had the fewest graduates going on to hold FAO jobs, with only 52 percent of the Navy respondents indicating they had held these positions.

### **C. TYPES OF FAO JOBS HELD**

Starting with the Army, 70 out of the 76 officers have held FAO jobs in the four previously outlined FAO-oriented mission areas: attaché/liaison, intelligence, security assistance, or political-military. Six of the officers had used their FAO skills in an area not previously

mentioned. They had been employed in educational assignments, teaching other officers at the Military Academy at West Point or teaching more senior officers at the Army War College and in similar institutions about their areas of specialization. Although this "fifth FAO job" was also found in the other services, it will be treated as a special mission and not considered a true FAO position for the purposes of this thesis.

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, an analysis of the actual positions held by the respondents did not correspond to the breakdown of slots for FAOs in Army manpower documents. Although the allocation of FAO slots would lead one to rank the need for Army FAOs in the following order,

Job	Percentage of Slots
Political-Military	29%
Intelligence	25%
Attaché/Liaison	17%
Security Assistance	11%

the actual division of respondent answers by job type was as follows:

Job	Percentage of Officers Holding This Job
Intelligence	35%
Attaché/Liaison	29%
Security Assistance	17%
Political-Military	16%

The Air Force officers reported similar numbers in their responses. Like the Army, the majority of the Air Force officers who had FAO jobs had worked in intelligence (40 percent). The second most often reported FAO mission for the Air Force FAOs was in the

attaché/liaison area, with 39 percent reporting having served in Defense Attaché Organizations. Ranking third among Air Force respondents were reports of duty in political-military positions; 26 percent of the Air Force officers reported performing this type of duty. Finally, well below the rest, came reports of security assistance duty. A mere four percent of Air Force officers had such duty, and an equal number (4 percent) had worked in education positions since graduation. With the recent expansion of graduates going to teach at the USAF School of Special Operations, as discussed in the chapter on Marine Corps and Navy programs, this number could exceed the number of officers with security assistance experience within the next two to three years.

The Navy, like the Army and the Air Force, sent a large number of its officers who did hold FAO assignments to work in the intelligence area. Unlike its sister services, the number of Navy FAOs in intelligence (21 percent) was exactly equal to the number of Navy FAOs who worked in political-military jobs. The next most popularly reported assignment for Navy FAOs was in educational duties (8 percent). Both the attaché career field and the security assistance career field did appear among the lists of Navy FAO assignments. Coincidentally, both accounted for 4 percent of Navy FAO jobs.

These results are not only interesting in and of themselves, but they bring out certain points that must be highlighted before we can go on to look at the opinions these officers gave on how well their language and area studies training prepared them for their later

assignments. For example, when we later attempt to define what degrees of language and area studies training are most useful to an attaché, the data primarily will be based on answers given by Air Force officers. This is, of course, because 63 percent of the officers who responded that they were attachés came from the Air Force in this sample. Similarly, 34 percent of the attachés came from the Army and only 2 percent were Naval officers. This raises the question as to whether the skills needed to be an Air Force attaché differ from those needed to be an Army or a Navy attaché. Apparently, the Department of Defense does not believe the needed skills differ, for attachés from all services currently are trained together prior to being sent abroad. Likewise, security assistance team members are trained together and, in the past, intelligence officers from different services have been trained in joint classes. A similar comparison of political-military officer training cannot be made as no particular course of training exists for these officers in any service. Therefore, because all indications point to the generally accepted assumption that the FAO missions discussed above do not require service-specific training and the sub-areas of language training and area studies have been (and in most cases continue to be) performed in classes composed of officers from the different branches of the armed forces learning together, we will assume that needs stated by FAOs holding a particular FAO-type job will be equal for all services, regardless of the particular service with which the respondent is affiliated. Each job type will also be discussed,

both as a whole and service by service, and where disparities do exist between answers, these differences will be highlighted.

With the above assumptions established, we can now turn to the next question pertaining to FAO training: How important is foreign language training for FAOs?

## **VII. THE NEED FOR FOREIGN LANGUAGE SKILLS BY FAOs**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

The issue of foreign language training for Americans has filled volumes of books, served as the subject for countless theses and editorials, and has even been the basis for the creation of blue-ribbon commissions. The report issued in 1979 by one such panel, The President's Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies, aptly discussed the recurring theme that few Americans are able to function effectively in a language other than English. Some of their findings included the fact that 91.9 percent of Americans used only English at home during childhood, only 30 percent reported studying a foreign language in school, and "overall, more than three Americans out of four cannot speak, read, or write any language other than English." [Ref. 23:p. 78]

However alarming one does or does not find these figures to be, the focus of this thesis is not on the American population as a whole but on a specialized group of American military officers. Figures such as those given above or focusing on slots such as one commission member of this panel did can give misleading information, as we have seen before. Still, it is interesting to note that this commission member, James R. Ruchti, a Foreign Service Officer with the Department of State, in his chapter of the report, entitled "The U.S. Government Requirements for Languages," pointed out, "Of 5.5 million total

civilian and military positions in the USG on 1/1/79, only a small percentage required language competence other than English, 29,000 or about 0.5%." [Ref. 23:p. 197]

Contrasting with this apparent diminution of the military's need for foreign language-trained officers is a host of correspondence concerning specific needs for language training that circulates around the Pentagon on a daily basis, much of which concerns efforts to obtain monetary incentives for military personnel to gain and/or maintain their language skills. This high level of interest is the result of years of experience by the military and the presence of an active lobby for funding for the Defense Language Institute/Foreign Language Center in Washington, D.C. Part of this experience is based on lessons learned over the past 40 years, stretching back to the language classes created during World War II. Stories concerning the origins of DLI/FLC and the accomplishments of its graduates have reached near mythic proportions in the services and, before we can look at how modern officers replied to questions concerning the need for foreign language skills, the roots of the service's interest in language training must be explored.

## **B. OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF THE ARMY AND NAVY LANGUAGE PROGRAMS**

The roots of the Army and Navy language training programs reach back to the earliest days of American officers filling overseas posts as attachés. The opportunities for such assignments grew and fell with the general interest of the United States in overseas relations and,



predictably, were comparatively few in the isolationist period between World War I and World War II. The rare officers who managed to obtain foreign language training and, more importantly, lived and worked overseas during this time, found their special skills in great demand during the second world war. This fact allowed men like Joseph Stilwell and Evans Carlson the chance to be given great responsibilities; their successes sealed their places in history as great officers and FAOs.

Once the war was underway, additional language-qualified officers were also called for but few could be found. To help meet this need, the Rockefeller Foundation stepped in. The Rockefellers provided \$50,000, a tremendous sum in 1941, to the American Council of Learned Societies to help set up intensive language training in a host of unusual languages.<sup>35</sup> Included in the languages to be taught were Arabic, Burmese, Chinese, Dutch, Fanti, Finnish, Greek, Hindustani, Hungarian, Icelandic, Japanese, Kurdish, Malay, Mongolian, Pashtu, Persian, Pidgin English, Portuguese, Russian, Thai, and Turkish. Purposely omitted were the four languages most commonly taught in colleges and universities of the period: French, Spanish, German, and Italian [Refs. 24, 25].

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<sup>35</sup>For more information on the early training programs, see References 24 and 25. This information on ACLS is drawn heavily from the former, particularly pages 3-14.

This effort, plus the realization that the war would demand officers who could speak to allies and enemies, and the fact that victories along the way as well as eventual occupation duty would require a number of officers in combat duties and civil affairs work to talk to the native populations—all resulted in the eventual establishment of the Defense Language Institute/Foreign Language Center. Drawn from the college campuses the Army Specialized Training Programs and Navy Japanese Language Schools had originally called home, and combined with the various military language training camps such as the one created at Camp Savage, Minnesota, the job of training U.S. military personnel in foreign languages was eventually centralized at DLI/FLC despite service protests that their “unique” language needs made joint training a poor idea.

It is important to note that, even with the urgent wartime demand for linguists, descriptions of the language training programs all point to one fact: language training could not be rushed. Even during the height of the war, it still took a full 18 months to create a Japanese linguist. This 18-month time requirement is particularly interesting when one notes that students were trained in a “total language immersion” environment: they lived together in all-Japanese language student barracks, had Japanese magazines, newspapers, and movies available throughout their training, ate together with the instructors, and generally were encouraged to speak Japanese at all

times.<sup>36</sup> In contrast to this, modern students of Japanese at DLI/FLC are only given 12 months to learn the language, do not necessarily live or eat together, and only see their instructors during four to five hours of class time each day.

One would assume that such intense training resulted in extremely competent Japanese linguists, but "guessing" is the only option available on this point. As both Miele and Matthew point out in their histories of this period, no systematic study was ever undertaken to determine the success of these language training programs!<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>36</sup>The same was true for all languages. To the extent possible, all students of a language were housed together and were exposed to their target language throughout the day. In addition, English-speaking Americans actually taught the vocabulary and grammar to the students, while the "native speakers" were used to let the students practice the language and to coach on pronunciation. It was not uncommon for a student to be exposed to 10 to 20 native speakers during his training, as opposed to the four or five teachers a modern DLI/FLC student may see, at best.

<sup>37</sup>Miele states,

The ASTP trainees were scattered around the globe in every theater of operations. There was no "feedback" mechanism of an official and reliable nature to rate the overall performance of these language trainees in the field. No one has calculated the numbers of these specialists in languages who were actually assigned to duties in which they employed their language in an official capacity. There were individual reports, individual observations, but no scientific machinery set up to measure achievement or success. [Ref. 24:p. 6]

Matthew is even more succinct. He states, "There is little if any objective data available to substantiate the many claims that have been made of the success of the courses." [Ref. 25:p. 13]

Thus, without any real substantiating facts, the "successes" of these early programs have been carried down in the language training programs still used today at DLI/FLC, although these programs are obviously not even as complete and comprehensive today as they were in the 1940s (i.e., not the "total immersion" environment they achieved at that time).

Lacking real, quantifiable data on the success of these programs, some officials at DLI/FLC point to the individual success stories that emerged from World War II. They would point to individual acts that led to U.S. soldiers being awarded medals for achievements like talking groups of Japanese into surrendering or yelling "cease fire" in the enemy language (which fooled many enemy soldiers) and thereby gaining the upper hand in battle. Indeed, many buildings at DLI/FLC are currently named in honor of these men. What such arguments overlook is that fact that these men often had names like "Nakamura" and, in every case I could find, had language training from sources other than just the military program prior to being sent to war. Indeed, many were only second- or third-generation Americans and had spoken the target language at home before learning English.

Similarly, the officials at DLI/FLC point to the role the early graduates of the military language training programs played in the occupation of Japan. It is argued that the positive relations that resulted between the Japanese and their American occupiers is an indication of the success of their school in preparing these officials for their duties. Here again, a closer examination of history erases what

has become a popular myth. Rather than improving relations between the American occupiers and the occupied, the Japanese language training (and concurrent study of the Japanese culture) turned out to be too limited for the circumstances under which the military forces were employed.

The historical fact that has been lost on many of the officials who point to occupation duty as a general indicator that these early programs were beneficial is that many of the individuals trained for Japan were instead sent to Korea to perform occupation duty. This situation was the result of the change in the plan to occupy Japan directly (i.e., using the native government officials minimally and instead substituting our own troops in government positions under martial law) to one of indirect occupation (i.e., continuing to use the native government officials in place as much as possible). The direct occupation plan had been drawn up during a period in which U.S. officials believed the home islands of Japan would have to be invaded with occupation governments having to be set up in controlled areas while the fighting continued elsewhere. When Japan surrendered, General Douglas MacArthur himself demanded that the officers who had been trained to take direct control be sent elsewhere, specifically to the Japanese possessions of Korea and Taiwan, where direct rule would be necessary.

While MacArthur's orders appeared to be logical from a military standpoint (i.e., officers trained to run a government directly would be sent where this type of government was needed), the results of this

last-minute switch were disastrous. Arriving in Korea, unable to speak any foreign language but Japanese and ignorant of the intense hatred the Koreans felt toward the Japanese (who had occupied their country since 1905), the Americans got along better with the defeated enemy than with the liberated Koreans. The first order the Americans had was to disarm the Japanese, but when the local population began to attack the defenseless Japanese soldiers, the Americans returned some of the weapons to the Japanese and reestablished order with their help. This infuriated the Koreans, who frequently could only explain their actions to the Americans in Japanese, a language they had been forced to learn and despised using. Although the Japanese were soon disarmed again, this poor beginning to post-war U.S.-Korean relations should be remembered as a warning of what can happen if training is too specific. If there had been even a little more regional training in the curriculum of these officers, then many of these difficult situations could have been avoided.<sup>38</sup>

One last lesson, also from Korea, deserves to be mentioned before closing this section on history. This is the lesson provided by the USS Pueblo concerning the possible cost of relying too much on records of language training and not understanding how these skills can erode. In the case of the Pueblo, there were two Marine Corps noncommissioned officers on board who had the responsibility to monitor the

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<sup>38</sup>For more information concerning the trials of the U.S. forces in liberated Korea, see *Korea, the Untold Story of the War* [Ref. 26].

North Korean maritime radio traffic. Both of these individuals, to their credit, had protested prior to being sent on this mission that their Korean language skills were woefully outdated and eroded. In spite of their protests, both were told that they were to take part in this mission, the attitude being, "If it says in your records you are a Korean linguist, then you are a Korean linguist." The results of this tragic decision are, of course, history. The "linguists" could neither understand the radio traffic that might have alerted them to the hostile intentions of the North Koreans nor could they even understand the shouted commands when the North Koreans boarded their vessel. The lesson is, even if Mr. Ruchti is absolutely right in writing that less than 0.5 percent of the jobs in the United States Government (USG) require one to know a foreign language, at times this knowledge can mean the difference between life and death for those USG employees who rely on this skill.<sup>39</sup>

### **C. MODERN TRAINING OF MILITARY OFFICER LINGUISTS**

Having reviewed the origins of DLI/FLC, which trains the vast majority of military linguists, we next turn to the current results of language training. As discussed in the previous chapters, different services see the language training at DLI/FLC in different ways. For the Army and Marine Corps, DLI/FLC provides the foundation of foreign language skill upon which they can build until they obtain the desired

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<sup>39</sup>The information in this incident is drawn from Reference 27.

"2" level language skills. The Navy does not apparently specify the level of skill it desires from its graduates but continues to recognize the "1" level as sufficient for its Masters degree candidates at NPS and holds out for "3" levels for its CARS officers. The Air Force specifies a "2" level for its language officers, country officers, and area specialists, and a "3" level in speaking, reading, and writing for its FAOs. It, unlike the Army and Marine Corps, expects these levels to be reached without providing any formal training beyond DLI/FLC.

This broadly common objective, to have officers achieve a 2/2/2 or a 3/3/3, led me to question how well officers perform on DLPTs after taking only the basic class and after taking higher-level classes at DLI/FLC. The answer to this question came from the DLI/FLC Test and Evaluation Division and, more specifically, from a computer search of DLPT test results made by Dr. John Lett and Mr. Victor Shaw for me. Through this program, all DLPT scores achieved by all officers and warrant officers over the three-year period 1986-1988 were analyzed. A printout was created listing 27 languages taught and the score achieved by the officers who completed these languages on each of the three parts of the DLPT (i.e., reading, writing, listening).<sup>40</sup> As the chance the officer would receive a 2/2/2 on a DLPT is no greater than the then smallest number for that language, it is easy to see from the partial list provided below that the 2/2/2 goal is not easy to achieve at

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<sup>40</sup>Copies of these printouts are on file with my thesis advisor, Dr. Edward Laurance, at the Naval Postgraduate School.



DLI/FLC for most languages.<sup>41</sup> Using this formula, the changes of FAOs scoring 2/2/2s on their first DLPTs out of the DLI/FLC basic courses are as follows:

Chinese— 17.4%	Japanese— 30%	Korean— 6%	Arabic— 13.6%
Russian— 57.9%	French— 46.4%	German— 40.7%	Spanish— 52.6%
Thai— 29.4%	Turkish— 11.1%	Greek— 84.5%	Italian— 59.5%

As one can see, the chances of scoring a 2/2/2, even in a relatively "easy" language such as French or German, are less than 50-50, according to the figures provided by DLI/FLC. However, these figures were drawn from *all* officers and warrant officers who attended DLI/FLC and tested during this period (1986-1988); this was not a FAO-specific list.

#### **D. THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE IN CONTEMPORARY FAO MISSIONS**

In order to obtain information on the need for foreign language skills by modern FAOs, we must again turn to the data provided by the survey of the graduates of the NPS area studies program. In the

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<sup>41</sup>For example, in Chinese, only 17.4% of the officers scored a 2 or better in listening, 34.7% scored a 2 or better in reading, and 26.1% scored a 2 or better in reading on the DLPTs given between 1986 and 1988. Therefore, the chance that an officer would score a 2/2/2 is no greater than the lowest number, or 17.4%. There is even some disagreement among the instructors and administrators I interviewed at DLI/FLC concerning the chances being this high. Some of those I talked to thought that the person who scores one 2 is likely to score other 2s, while other officials thought that individual students tend to do very well in one of the three areas but less well in the other two, thus the person who scored the listening 2 would more likely score lower in the other areas.

subsection of the survey devoted to questions on language skills, 213 officers responded: 114 respondents were from the Air Force, 75 from the Army, and 24 from the Navy. The extremely small number of responses in this area from the Navy, due primarily to the Navy's policy of not sending officers to language training unless the immediate follow-on assignment from NPS demands these skills, makes the answers provided by these officers of marginal utility. Therefore, the following paragraphs will focus on the responses provided by the Army and Air Force alumni.

First, we will consider the Army responses. Approximately 60 percent of the Army officers polled reported that they had in fact used their foreign language skills in later assignments. When the replies were further divided between those officers who had held FAO jobs and those who had not, the population that held FAO jobs and had used their foreign language skills grew to 65 percent. This population was then further examined to find out how frequently they used these skills and how important these skills were (in the opinions of the respondents) to successfully performing their missions.

In response to the question, "How frequently do you use your language skills in your official duties," 51 percent replied that they use their foreign languages "daily," 7 percent replied that they use their skills "weekly," another 19 percent answered that they use their skills "monthly," 7 percent said they only use their skills "infrequently," 3 percent said they only use their skills "quarterly," and the remaining 9 percent gave various other answers (to include "once a

year"). In response to the question, "How necessary are your language skills to carrying out your official duties," 45 percent answered "essential," 41 percent answered "helpful," 7 percent answered "unnecessary," and 5 percent provided other replies.

On the Air Force side, although an equal percentage of officers replied affirmatively to the question concerning whether they had used their language skills, the Air Force responses concerning the frequency and need for these skills differed slightly from the Army. Like the Army, approximately one-half of the Air Force FAOs who used their language training in their later jobs said they used their skills "daily," but in contrast to the 7 percent of the Army officers who said they used their skills "weekly," 26 percent of the Air Force officers appeared in this category. This increase over the Army in the "weekly" use category was balanced by a lower number of officers falling into the "monthly" category, 19 percent for the Army versus 10 percent for the Air Force, and, finally, 1 percent of the Air Force officers answered the question with "infrequently." Unlike the Army, the Air Force did not have any officers who only used their skill on a "quarterly" or "once a year" basis. Table 2 summarizes these findings and the answers given by Air Force FAOs concerning how important language skills were.

**TABLE 2**  
**USE OF LANGUAGE SKILLS BY FAOs**

	<b>Army</b>	<b>Air Force</b>
1. Used language	65%	64%
2. Used language daily	51%	49%
3. Used language weekly	7%	26%
4. Used language monthly	19%	10%
5. Used language other	19%	1%

#### **E. ROLE OF LANGUAGE BY JOB TYPE**

Turning now to the issue of how the FAOs rated their need for their language skills in light of the types of FAO jobs they held, we find different jobs definitely call for different levels of skill. As one might expect, those FAOs who worked as attachés or liaisons most often rated their need for their languages highly. In the case of the Army FAOs, 91 percent of the officers who held attaché/liaison positions replied that they had used their languages. For the Air Force, this number was a much lower 77 percent. The Navy, which had only two respondents who had worked as attachés, resulted in one FAO using the language and one FAO not using the language. Table 3 summarizes these findings.

As a whole, more attaché-FAOs used their language (80 percent), reported they used it more frequently than any other career field, and rated the need for language skills more highly. Table 4 gives the frequency of language use, and Table 5 represents the perceived need for their foreign language skills:

TABLE 3  
NEED FOR LANGUAGE SKILLS BY FAOs<sup>42</sup>

	Army	Air Force
1. Language was essential	45%	40%
2. Language was helpful	41%	45%
3. Language was unnecessary	7%	7%
4. Other	5%	7%

TABLE 4  
FREQUENCY OF LANGUAGE USE REPORTED BY FAOs WITH  
ATTACHÉ/LIAISON EXPERIENCE

Daily	62%
Weekly	20%
Monthly	7%
Other	9%

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<sup>42</sup>For the Navy, of the five officers who replied to this part of the survey, four said they used their skills "daily" while one replied he only used his language "infrequently." Also, concerning the need for language skills by their jobs, only one said his language was "essential," while the other four all replied that these skills were "helpful." The fifth officer's response did not fall into any of the four categories.

TABLE 5  
**NEED FOR LANGUAGE SKILLS REPORTED BY FAOs WITH  
 ATTACHÉ/LIAISON EXPERIENCE**

Essential	56%
Helpful	30%
Unnecessary	3%
Other	9%

FAOs who had later worked as intelligence officers reported less need for their foreign language skills in all services. Less than half of the Army FAOs who had worked in intelligence reported they had even used their foreign language skills (48 percent). Interestingly, a higher percentage of Air Force FAO intelligence officers reported that they had used their language skills (54 percent), but further study revealed that many of the affirmative answers had come from two special categories of Air Force intelligence work: the officers assigned to the Office of Special Investigation and the Human Resources Intelligence career field. If these special cases are excluded, the percentage of Air Force FAOs who used their language skills in intelligence assignments drops to 40 percent. The Navy, with only ten respondents who had taken language training and then gone on to perform intelligence missions, had only two officers reporting that they used their languages.

The relative weights FAOs in intelligence assignments gave to the frequency their languages were used and the need they saw for these languages is represented in the Tables 6 and 7.

**TABLE 6**  
**FREQUENCY OF LANGUAGE USE REPORTED BY FAOs IN**  
**INTELLIGENCE ASSIGNMENTS**

Daily	38%
Weekly	13%
Monthly	22%
Other	25*

\*To include "Infrequently"—6% and "Quarterly"—6%.

**TABLE 7**  
**NEED FOR LANGUAGE SKILLS REPORTED BY FAOs IN**  
**INTELLIGENCE ASSIGNMENTS**

Essential	17%
Helpful	63%
Unnecessary	13%
Other	6%

Wide disparities between the Army and the Air Force responses did occur in the security assistance career field. There are several possible explanations for these differences, including the large difference between the number of Army FAOs channeled into this field (17 percent) versus the number of Air Force FAOs who reported experience in this area (4 percent) or the fact that English is the language of

the air.<sup>43</sup> Regardless of reason, 91 percent of the 11 Army FAOs in security assistance roles reported they had used their language skills in accomplishing their missions, while only 66 percent of the Air Force FAOs gave similar replies. There were no Naval respondents who had been through language training and had subsequently served on security assistance teams.

Those FAOs who had been in this role had found their foreign language skills useful, but not to the degree the attaché/liaisons reported. Their replies to questions concerning frequency of language use and need for language skills are provided in Tables 8 and 9.

TABLE 8  
**FREQUENCY OF LANGUAGE USE REPORTED BY FAOs IN  
SECURITY ASSISTANCE ROLES**

Daily	58%
Weekly	23%
Monthly	11%
Other	5%

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<sup>43</sup>For more on the role of English in this career field, see the article "English Language Training: An Essential Component of Security Assistance," by Michael L. Layton [Ref. 28]. In it, he quotes an article from the 18 February 1985 issue of *U.S. News and World Report* that well illustrates this point. "When an Argentine pilot lands his airliner in Turkey, he and the ground controller talk in English." It is also for this reason that the Air Force runs the Defense Language Institute/English Language Center at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas.



**TABLE 9**  
**NEED FOR LANGUAGE SKILLS REPORTED BY FAOs IN**  
**SECURITY ASSISTANCE ROLES**

Essential	58%
Helpful	35%
Unnecessary	5%
Other	0%

Finally, FAOs in political-military assignments were also analyzed to determine their needs for language training. In this case, again the replies made by the Army and the Air Force were much more similar. Sixty-four percent (64%) of the Army FAOs and 66 percent of the Air Force FAOs in political-military assignments replied that they had used their foreign language training in their work.

Tables 10 and 11 show the replies given by the FAOs in political-military roles concerning frequency of language use and need for these skills.

**TABLE 10**  
**FREQUENCY OF LANGUAGE USE REPORTED BY FAOs**  
**WITH POL-MIL ASSIGNMENTS**

Daily	45%
Weekly	25%
Monthly	8%
Other	20%*

\*To include "Infrequently"—2% and "Quarterly"—2%.

TABLE 11  
**NEED FOR LANGUAGE SKILLS REPORTED BY FAOs  
WITH POL-MIL ASSIGNMENTS**

Essential	42%
Helpful	51%
Unnecessary	0%
Other	5%

#### **F. CONCLUSIONS**

From the above information, some interesting conclusions can be drawn. First of all, regardless of service, FAOs who are assigned to intelligence missions have the least chance of using their foreign language skills in their duties. Also, even when used, these skills will often only be "helpful" in carrying out the mission.

The remaining possible FAO assignments do not lend themselves to such easy generalizations. Based on the answers given, it would appear that the Army FAOs have an equal chance of using their foreign language skills in either attaché or security assistance team assignments, a reduced chance of using these skills in political-military duties, and the least chance to use them as intelligence officers. This list is different when one looks at Air Force FAOs, with clearly the best chance of using languages falling to the attachés, a much reduced chance of using these skills in either the security assistance or political-military career fields, and a slightly better than 50 percent chance of using this skill in intelligence work (unless the FAO is assigned to human resource intelligence-related activities). It would be interesting

to see this exercise replicated with a larger population of FAOs being polled in order to determine how closely the Navy and Marine Corps follow the patterns shown above. It would only be through an expanded study that we might determine more precisely whether language usage in FAO assignments is more influenced by the FAO's service affiliation or by the job held, a situation we see some indication of in the data presented here. Until this larger study is done, however, the answer to this question will remain uncertain.

## **VIII. THE NEED FOR GRADUATE EDUCATION BY FAOs**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

The need for graduate education by military officers, like the need for language training, has been a topic of debate in the armed forces for a long time. Often this debate has centered around questions concerning whether the exposure to a civilian-dominated academic environment is or is not good for officers in and of itself. Officers, proponents argue, gain broadened perspectives through such programs, these programs reinforce the acceptance by the officer of civilian control, and such programs help break the officer away from the "military mindset." These broad questions are beyond the scope of this paper, but some of the programs created as the result of such discussions will be examined in the next section, dealing with the history of FAO area studies programs. Since all four branches of the armed forces currently appear to agree that advanced education is beneficial for the creation of FAOs, we will dispense with following this debate and rely on the opinions provided by FAOs on this topic to determine how necessary graduate education is to the training of a FAO and what specific types of courses FAOs say they need in order to better perform in their subsequent assignments.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>43</sup>For information concerning the debate over graduate officer education, see References 18 and 29.

## **B. OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF AREA STUDIES AND FAO TRAINING**

Area studies programs were virtually nonexistent before the 1930s. The programs that did exist had often grown out of the history, language, and early anthropology departments at a handful of universities. Of note during this period were the programs run by W. Norman Brown at the University of Pennsylvania, by Raymond A. Kennedy at Yale University, and by Philip K. Hitti at Princeton University. These programs on South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East, respectively, along with a few scattered Latin America studies, provided the few trained area specialists [Ref. 30].

The war brought funds and officers that the Army and Navy wanted prepared to take on the task of governing foreign-occupied lands, able to understand the native peoples in those lands, both linguistically and culturally. However, even as the Army and Navy rushed to prepare their officers for similar duty, they set up their programs differently. This was done because, while the Army

had an interest in military government on a broader scale and in which the trainees were assigned for study in a specific area, the Navy schools could not know in advance the exact area to which the officers were to be assigned. Consequently, the individual trainee had to learn all that he possibly could about several vast regions of divergent characteristics. Ideally, he had to emerge with a full knowledge of the land and people of the whole Pacific region, a thorough understanding of the psychology of each racial group in the region, a grasp of the economic organization and financial problems of all the widely different island groups, and a mastery of the techniques of conducting military government—not to mention the pertinent languages. [Ref. 25:p. 29]

When many of these "specialized" Army troops later found themselves in Korea rather than Japan, their country of training, they may have wished they had had a broader program like the Navy.

Still, regardless of service affiliation, many of the universities that currently boast area studies programs can trace the roots of these departments back to these World War II organizations with strange-sounding acronyms like ASTP and CATS. Pure military schools were also established to supplement these civilian programs at sites like Charlottesville, South Carolina (home of the Navy School of Military Government and Administration) and Fort Custer, Michigan (where the Army's Civil Affairs Training School was located) [Ref. 25:p. 5]

What was the course of study like at one of these schools? Unlike the 18 months allotted for language training, graduate education was rushed as much as possible. Often officers were withdrawn prior to the actual completion of the programs, with the hope that they had learned enough to get by. However, if one was able to complete the full course of study, the material covered would probably not be unlike the following discussion of a nine-month Navy program.

The nine-month program was to be broken up into three successive terms. This meant giving basic instruction during the first term in the law and technique of military government, geography, anthropology, the history of earlier belligerent occupations, and basic language training. The second term was to concern more intensive study of the areas involved, begin study of naval courts and boards, and undertake the study of elective or supplementary languages. For the third term, the officers' classroom work was to be devoted to what was called "laboratory work," involving projects requiring the development of military government plans for assigned areas. Along with these courses, there were numerous lectures on distinctly naval subjects... [Ref. 25:pp. 29-30]

The end of the war did not mean the end of interest in area studies education. Instead, the rush of servicemen home, with their G.I. Bill education money in hand and their keen interest in global affairs, resulted in the dramatic expansion of area studies programs. By 1946, 22 universities boasted 45 area studies programs, with 16 on Latin America, 14 on the Far East, and 11 on East Europe and/or the U.S.S.R. [Ref. 13:p. 11]. This pace continued—10 years later the number of universities offering programs had risen to 40 offering 80 formal programs. However, by this time the Korean War and other activities in Asia had brought about the replacement of Latin America as the most studied area. The Far East, with 18 programs available for students, was now number one. Latin American programs continued to rank second, with 16 programs, and were closely followed by Russian programs (13). The remainder of the list read as follows: Near East (or Mid-East)—9, East Europe—6, West Europe—6, Southeast Asia—5, South Asia—4, and Africa—4. [Ref. 31:p. 16]

C. Dale Fuller, in writing on the "Strengths and Weaknesses" of these programs in his book, *The Training of Specialists in International Relations* [Ref. 31], surveyed graduates of some of these programs in 1957, including 12 military officers, some of whom were probably FAOs. Opinions expressed by two of these officers were included in his book and are worth noting here. The first officer wrote,

I attended graduate school as a Regular Army officer knowing that I had to be, by Army regulations, put into a job utilizing the education I received at government expense. I received this type of assignment but found my political training left me in a rather peculiar position. My superiors and contemporaries in the Army

who had not had this type of outside civilian training thought I was a rather confused, permeable politician whose mind no longer comprehended military realities. My compatriots in other departments of government, with whom I had to coordinate and collaborate daily, thought I had a stupid, backward, inflexible military type of mind. I am not sure whether my position was complimentary or not but it was interesting and challenging.

I think Defense did well to send some of us "militarists" to school to learn international politics. I believe the interdependence of military realities and political maneuverings today are such that the Department of State would do well to send more of its people to our high-level military schools. [Ref. 31:p. 99]

The second officer wrote more succinctly, "Practical examples were not stressed enough. There is too great a tendency on the part of instructors to teach theory and not tie it up with everyday problems we face." [Ref. 31]

Also relevant to this study are the opinions expressed more recently by two members of the 1979 President's Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies, one concerning whether it is really possible to train area specialists and the second concerning the need of the United States Government for such training. The first was a personal statement inserted by one of the commission members, Betty Bullard, into the final product. In this statement, she wrote:

Unless students are diligently and progressively prepared in a step-by-step fashion for "globe-wide perspective," it is not practicable suddenly to impost such a perspective upon them in college or later, no matter how splendid college and university programs in global studies may be or become. We must be reminded that international education is cumulative; it is a building process. It is not enough that students be given substantive, cognitive learning about other cultures; these must be accompanied by attitudinal changes of a radical sort. [Ref. 23:p. 2]

On the question of the need for this type of training by the United States Government, another committee member wrote,



A statistical study of all US Government (USG) positions in the listing of the Office of Personnel Management shows that only 1 of 3 USG employees at a profession level currently on the rolls is using the area specialty—even approximately—in which he or she holds a Bachelors degree or higher. An examination of area specialists by their particular specialty shows that only those with degrees in Russian or Slavic studies approach a 1 in 2 chance of using their skills in a USG job. For African specialists, the chances are 1 in 6. Thus, many area specialists are employed in the various agencies for reasons other than their main academic preparation. [Ref. 23:p. 190]

Still, all of the above was the situation in the past and is based on manpower data and individual opinions of persons who are not active, modern-day FAOs. To get up-to-date information on what impact FAOs perceive their graduate educations to have had on their subsequent careers, we must again turn to my survey.

#### **C. FAO OPINIONS ON THE ROLE OF GRADUATE EDUCATION**

In the opinion study carried out among the FAO graduates of the Naval Postgraduate School, a number of questions were devoted to the issue of how well the courses they took at NPS prepared them for later FAO assignments. The objective was to explore the following questions:

1. Did the graduates think their advanced degrees had particularly helped them with their subsequent assignments?
2. Looking back, did the graduates now wish they had attended a civilian school for their education rather than NPS?
3. Could certain core courses be isolated that were seen as useful by the graduate FAOs, regardless of their service or later assignment type?
4. Would there be more difference in the types of courses cited as helpful when the answers were analyzed by service or by type of FAO job held?

Overall, 94 percent of the graduates polled replied that they believed the attainment of their Masters degrees in National Security Affairs had helped them better carry out their subsequent assignments. This number included both graduates who had gone on to hold FAO jobs and those who had returned to the general officer population following graduation. When asked if attending the Naval Postgraduate School (as opposed to a civilian institution) had been particularly beneficial, 88 percent replied affirmatively. Only 6 percent disagreed with the view that attending NPS had particularly helped them perform in their later missions, while 3 percent had no opinion in this area. Finally, in a question at the opposite extreme, graduates were asked if they wished they had attended a civilian school rather than NPS for their degrees. A slim 14 percent replied that they do regret not having attended a civilian school, while a majority of 56 percent disagreed with this view (34 percent just disagreeing and 22 percent replying that they "disagreed strongly").

Having determined that the majority of respondents believe they did benefit from their educational experiences at NPS, the question arises as to what courses in particular were seen as helpful. In order to accumulate data in this area, graduates were asked to rate how closely they agreed with statements concerning the importance of various courses. For example, a statement like the following was made: "I believe taking courses that dealt with Arms Control issues helped me perform my subsequent mission(s)." The respondent could then indicate whether he or she "agreed strongly," "agreed," had "no

opinion," "disagreed," "disagreed strongly," or believed the question was "not applicable."

In analyzing the results, I concentrated on those graduates who had held FAO jobs after graduation and, by combining the "agreed strongly" and "agreed" responses to particular statements, have created Table 12 to show, in order, the levels of importance various courses held in the opinions of FAOs.

**TABLE 12**  
**COURSES LISTED BY FAOs AS HELPFUL TO**  
**PERFORMING SUBSEQUENT FAO JOBS**

<b>Course Type</b>	<b>% Who Cited</b>
1. Courses on Country and Regional Studies	96%
2. Courses on International Relations/Comparative Foreign Policy	95%
3. Courses on American Foreign Policy toward a Country or Region	94%
4. Courses on Economic or Defense Resource Allocations	77%
5. Courses on Military History or Naval Warfare/Strategy	65%
6. Courses on Arms Control Issues	63%
7. Courses on Research Methods/Comparative Analysis	54%
8. Courses on International Law or Law of the Sea	50%

This list, while interesting, still is insufficient to determine precisely what courses FAOs need to prepare for their later assignments. Therefore, a second section of the survey listed the above courses and others and asked the respondent to rank the five most important

courses taught in the National Security Affairs Department at NPS. This ranking was to be based on the respondent's current opinion, given all the assignments he or she had held since graduation, not on the individual's own transcript. Therefore, even if the graduate had not had the opportunity to take a course on international economics or terrorism during his or her own time at NPS, if subsequent experiences made them wish they had taken such a course, this desire could now be indicated.

#### **D. OPINIONS CONCERNING COUNTRY AND REGIONAL STUDIES COURSES**

When the results of this section were tallied, courses on foreign countries and regions were again cited as the most important. A full 53 percent of the respondents picked this area as the most important type of course over the 14 other possibilities. No other course area was close to this mark. In addition to the first-place rating given by 53 percent of the graduates, another 13 percent rated country and regional studies as the second most important course area, 7 percent rated it third 5 percent rated it fourth, and 3 percent rated it fifth. In all, then, only 46 of the 260 graduates who responded to this section did not rate country and regional studies as one of the five most important courses offered. Table 13 shows how this course was rated by members of each service.

TABLE 13  
RATINGS OF COUNTRY AND REGIONAL STUDIES COURSES

	Army	Air Force	Navy
First	59%	53%	39%
Second	11%	14%	15%
Third	12%	5%	4%
Fourth	1%	5%	10%
Fifth	4%	2%	2%
N/A	11%	18%	28%

FAOs were even more adamant about the importance of this course area. Of the FAOs with attaché experience, 80 percent rated country and regional studies-type courses as one of the five most important, with 60 percent citing this type of course as their choice for the number one position. FAOs who had gone on to intelligence positions were similarly minded: 54 percent rated country and region studies first and 81 percent placed them somewhere among the top five. For FAOs with experience with security assistance teams, these figures were 59 percent rating it first and 90 percent rating it within the top five, and for FAOs with political-military backgrounds the ratings were 48 percent placing it first and 82 percent rating it in the top five.

These high ratings for courses concerning countries and regions are very logical. For FAOs, these courses are the basic foundations of their study of their areas of interest. For an East Asian FAO, for example, this course area would begin with a course on "History, Geography, and Cultures of Asia," progress with more specific courses on "The Problems of Government and Security of Japan" (and

equivalent courses on Korea, China, and Southeast Asia), and be capped with courses such as "Asia and the Soviet Union" and "Future Problems of Asia and the Adjacent Oceans." Through such courses, the student FAO is introduced to the region as a whole, studies individual countries and relates them to the region, and studies the role the region plays in global affairs. Therefore, it would be surprising if this course area was not the most important area studied in the view of the FAOs and it is logical that the courses on United States foreign policy toward these regions (which the FAO will later be called upon to help shape) was cited as the second most important course areas.

#### **E. UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD A COUNTRY OR REGION**

Just as the FAO must understand the geography, history, cultures, and other aspects of a region, so too must he or she know the past and present U.S. foreign policy toward the region. Even non-FAOs may find this type of education useful and this fact is readily recognized by the respondents, as demonstrated by the high rating they gave this course area. Although only 7 percent cited this course area as the first most important, 31 percent rated it second and 73 percent rated it in the top five. Among the Army students, 11 percent rated it first, 42 percent rated it second, and 79 percent placed it in the top five. Just 5 percent of the Air Force students placed it first, 25 percent placed it second, and 70 percent rated it in the top five. For the Navy students, 6 percent rated it first, 28 percent rated it second, and 65 percent rated it in the top five.

The ratings the FAOs gave, by job type, are provided in Table 14.

TABLE 14  
**FAO RANKINGS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF  
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD A COUNTRY OR REGION**

	<b>Attaché</b>	<b>Intelligence</b>	<b>Security Assistance</b>	<b>Pol-Mil</b>
First	7%	7%	9%	10%
Second	35%	33%	40%	27%
Third	13%	23%	27%	21%
Fourth	11%	5%	9%	10%
N/A	21%	23%	9%	27%

The above chart shows that a ranking of how important a course on U.S. foreign policy is toward a country or region by FAO job type would put the FAO jobs in the following order: Security Assistance (80 percent), Attaché (75 percent), Intelligence (73 percent), and Pol-Mil (70 percent). It would be interesting to speculate (as well as further investigate) why those officers involved in security assistance are more interested in courses on U.S. foreign policy toward foreign areas than attachés. My estimate is that attachés know they will be more fully briefed during their later job-specific training, while those going to security assistance are less likely to get additional training in this area.

#### **F. AMERICAN NATIONAL INTEREST/DEFENSE POLICY COURSES**

Another area in which assumption was borne out by data was in the area of how important courses on the interests and defense policy

of the United States were to graduates. Like the previously discussed course areas, one would assume the student officer, whether destined to hold FAO jobs or not, would profit from studying the structures and policies associated with the role of defense in pursuing U.S. national interests as well as studying where our interests lie. Although courses on the American national interests and defense policy were rarely cited as the most important subject studied, these courses were often placed in one of the top five slots. Overall, 71 percent of the respondents placed this course area in the top five: 14 percent rating it first, 15 percent rating it second, 24 percent rating it third, 12 percent rating it fourth, and 6 percent rating it fifth. The course ratings by service and by FAO job are provided in Tables 15 and 16.

TABLE 15  
**RANKINGS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN NATIONAL  
INTEREST/DEFENSE POLICY COURSES VS. BRANCH OF SERVICE**

	<b>Army</b>	<b>Air Force</b>	<b>Navy</b>
First	15%	12%	15%
Second	17%	14%	10%
Third	25%	20%	34%
Fourth	13%	14%	4%
Fifth	6%	5%	8%
N/A	20%	32%	26%



TABLE 16  
**RANKINGS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN NATIONAL  
 INTEREST/DEFENSE POLICY COURSE VS. FAO JOB HELD**

	<b>Attaché</b>	<b>Intelligence</b>	<b>Security Assistance</b>	<b>Pol-Mil</b>
First	13%	14%	13%	16%
Second	19%	11%	18%	24%
Third	23%	20%	22%	32%
Fourth	9%	16%	27%	5%
Fifth	13%	2%	4%	2%
N/A	19%	34%	13%	18%

**G. RESPONDENTS' RANKINGS OF OTHER COURSE AREAS**

Of the remaining 14 course areas available for ranking, none was ranked in the top five places by 50 percent or more of the respondents as were the three areas just covered. Rather, what is notable in some cases is the high percentage of absence from this table associated with some of the courses. For example, in spite of the prevalent mood that terrorism is becoming an increasing threat in the world, less than 12 percent of the respondents listed a course on international terrorism as being one of the five most important. Similarly, the higher importance economic factors have assumed in modern discussions of security might lead one to suspect that courses in this area would be viewed as important. However, less than 22 percent of the respondents listed courses in domestic and/or international economics in the top five. Courses on international relations did manage to find their way onto the top five lists given by 41 percent of the

graduates, but international law, which in the past was closely associated with international relations, received the worst rating of any course area, being listed in the top five by less than 3 percent of the graduates. Other course areas that were rarely rated among the top five are as follows: arms transfers/security assistance (21 percent), arms control (6 percent), intelligence systems and products (6 percent), naval warfare/military history (14 percent), international negotiation (4 percent), defense resource allocations (6 percent), comparative foreign policy (22 percent), research/comparative analysis (7 percent), and strategic planning (11 percent). The category of "Individual Reading/Individual Study" was listed in the top five course roll 22 percent of the time, meaning the students found it as helpful to have the time to study on their own as it was to take a course in comparative foreign policy and more helpful to study alone than it was to take eight of the other course areas listed. A comparison of how often these courses were *absent* from the lists of the five most important courses in the responses given by the different service members is given in Table 17.

The officers from the different services tended to agree much more than they disagreed as to the importance of various courses. A few probably service-unique differences do appear, such as the much more frequent appearance of courses on naval warfare/military history on lists given by Naval officers over those given by their Army and Air Force counterparts, who are not required to take Navy-oriented

TABLE 17  
**ABSENCE OF COURSES FROM RESPONDENTS' LISTS  
 OF THE FIVE MOST IMPORTANT COURSES  
 TAKEN AS A REFLECTION OF SERVICE AFFILIATION**

(Note: a rating of 100% would mean **no** officer from this branch listed this course as one of the five most important courses offered.)

	<b>Army</b>	<b>Air Force</b>	<b>Navy</b>
1. Arms Transfer/Security Assistance	75%	73%	82%
2. Arms Control	92%	93%	93%
3. International Terrorism	95%	82%	80%
4. Intelligence Systems and Processes	89%	93%	86%
5. Naval Warfare/Military History	93%	88%	54%
6. International Law	98%	100%	84%
7. International Negotiation	96%	93%	97%
8. Defense Resource Allocation	93%	93%	86%
9. Comparative Foreign Policy	71%	77%	71%
10. International Relations	51%	59%	54%
11. Research/Comparative Analysis	92%	87%	95%
12. Economics	76%	76%	82%
13. Strategic Planning	85%	87%	86%
14. Individual Study/Reading	74%	73%	76%

courses in their program at NPS. Similarly, the slightly higher preference Army and Air Force officers had for security assistance/arms transfer courses might be a reflection of the fact that only two Naval officer respondents have served on security assistance teams since graduation. Regardless of these deviations, it is clear that the views

expressed on all of these subject areas by officers from all three services clearly show that future graduates from all services have similar needs. Those officials who are involved in designing and reviewing curricula for providing graduate education for officers and those officers who choose which institutions student officers will attend should both take note of these findings and consider their impact in future decisions.

#### **H. FAO OPINIONS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF VARIOUS COURSE TYPES**

Just as one might expect there to be differences in the rankings given by officers of different services, so too might one expect there to be differences in the responses given by FAOs who held different types of jobs. In the preceding section, we found that few differences exist between the responses given by officers from various branches, thus the second hypothesis, that differences exist between answers given by FAOs who have held different jobs, must also be tested.

Three course areas have already proven to be roughly equal in their importance, as cited by FAOs in all job areas. Courses on foreign countries and regions, courses on American foreign policy toward these countries and regions, and courses on American's national interest and defense policy all have been cited by the majority of the FAOs in each area as being among the five most important. However, as we found in the preceding section, there is little consensus among FAOs as to what is important beyond these three areas. An analysis of how the other courses fared in FAO rankings is in Table 18.

**TABLE 18**  
**FAO RANKINGS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF**  
**U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD A COUNTRY OR REGION**

(Note: a rating of 0% means no FAO in this job  
listed this course as one of the five most important.)

<b>Course</b>	<b>Attaché</b>	<b>Intelligence</b>	<b>Security Assistance</b>	<b>Pol-Mil</b>
1. Arms Transfer/Security Assistance	34%	15%	58%	19%
2. Arms Control	3%	4%	8%	4%
3. International Terrorism	7%	13%	13%	12%
4. Intelligence Systems and Products	3%	11%	0%	6%
5. Naval Warfare/Military History	9%	8%	8%	17%
6. International Law	0%	1%	0%	4%
7. International Negotiations	3%	4%	0%	9%
8. Defense Resource Allocation	3%	6%	8%	7%
9. Comparative Foreign Policy	11%	22%	17%	24%
10. International Relations	43%	33%	49%	40%
11. Research/Comparative Analysis	2%	12%	8%	4%
12. Economics	26%	18%	23%	28%
13. Strategic Planning	4%	16%	8%	17%
14. Individual Study/Reading	35%	23%	21%	20%

Once again, the officers tended to rate the need for these courses more similarly than differently, regardless of FAO job held, reflecting the fact that all FAO jobs have very similar information needs.

However, to a greater extent than for the officer population as a whole, specific differences did emerge. The best example was the fact that 58 percent of the FAOs who held security assistance jobs rated their NPS class on security assistance and arms transfers among the five most important. Another instance involving this group, along with the FAOs who held attaché posts, was their tendency to rate international relations courses more highly. For the security assistance FAOs, this rating was 49 percent, and the attachés followed closely with 43 percent. On the negative side, it is noteworthy that no attachés or security assistance team members and only 1 percent of the FAO intelligence officers rated international law in the top five. International negotiations fared almost as poorly. In another example of answers being more closely related to jobs than to branch of service, more FAO intelligence officers rated their intelligence systems and products course among the top five than any other type of FAO.

## **I. CONCLUSIONS**

In this chapter, we have looked at the range of courses set up to provide advanced education for U.S. military officers on overseas areas from the period of World War II and today. The information provided by the officers surveyed provides clear indications that the early course designers were on the right track when they concentrated their available class time on teaching officers about the areas of interest, about U.S. policy toward these areas, and about how our own government operates and help the officer define what are the U.S. national interests. By understanding ourselves, understanding our

policies toward their areas of interest, and understanding the areas themselves, the FAO is best prepared to carry out the missions he or she may be assigned, be it in the attaché world, as a member of a security assistance team, in an intelligence assignment, or as a political-military advisor. When looking for educational programs to help prepare these officers for these duties, officials should look for strong concentrations in the three areas cited and realize that the officer may gain as much from being given time to study other subjects individually (with the guidance of a professor) as he or she would gain from being required to take courses not directly related to either this country or the foreign area of interest.

## **IX. THE FUTURE FOR FAOs**

### **A. THE ROAD AHEAD**

Another blue-ribbon commission whose findings should be of interest to FAOs and those concerned with the training and employment of FAOs was President Reagan's Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy. This panel, co-chaired by Fred C. Ikle and Albert Wohlstetter and staffed by members who would fill a volume of *Who's Who in America*, warned the American people in its January 1988 report that "the decades ahead are likely to bring drastic changes." [Ref. 32:p. 1] In a summation of the commission's "main points" (which reads like an obituary for the old bipolar world), we are told that the balance of power in the coming years is likely to shift dramatically. Rather than the superpowers merely declining, other countries are likely to become increasingly important regional powers. United States interests will more often be endangered, these dangers will occur in our own backyard, and the source of the threat will more often result from regional pressures than from foreign agitation. Additionally, even traditional friends and allies may be unwilling or unable to join with us in meeting these challenges, just at a time when our forward deployments, overseas basing rights, and past agreements concerning overflights and treaties of mutual support are disappearing.



The commission goes on to make numerous suggestions concerning how the United States should go about crafting a strategy to meet these complex challenges, but the key point for those concerned with the military aspects of this problem is the fact that virtually all these suggestions require working more closely and more smoothly with foreign nations. FAOs, who are best suited for this task, will be needed in even greater numbers to help assess the new threats as they arise and to help create the cooperative working relations this country will have to develop with others to meet these needs. If the commission is correct in its prediction that future

U.S. forces will not in general be combatants...but our forces' principle [sic] role there (in Third World conflicts, the most likely arena of combat in the near future) will be to augment U.S. security assistance programs...[specifically by providing] military training, technical training and intelligence and logistic support

then the need for FAOs is certain to expand accordingly [Ref. 32:p. 16]. In this one section, we see two of the traditional FAO jobs being cited as becoming increasingly important: security assistance and intelligence. Of course, along with these two missions that directly interact with the foreign military forces, the U.S. will also need officers who can work with the foreign government to ensure that the military objectives of the United States and the host government coincide, as well as officers to advise the Pentagon on matters concerning the region of interest. In other words, the roles of both the military attaché and the political-military staff advisor will likewise become more important under this strategy. Therefore, all four of the roles

commonly identified with FAOs are likely to become even more vital as the bipolar world fades.<sup>44</sup>

## **B. NEED TO CHANGE ATTITUDES**

If quality officers are to be attracted to fill these important roles, an effort must be made to change the attitudes held by many of the officers currently serving in the military today. Just as during the late sixties and early seventies, when Army officers avoided duty as military advisors due to the perception that such duty was less than career enhancing, officers today still appear to have a negative attitude toward this and other FAO jobs (see Appendix C). Evidence of this attitude exists in the resistance the Marine Corps FAO Proponent office faces when it "captures" officers with FAO-like backgrounds, and this problem served as a topic of discussion at the FAOC I attended at DLI/FLC. One reason for the negative attitude many non-FAOs have toward FAO assignments may be that so many of these assignments are outside one's own service. This resistance on the part of quality officers to serve in a joint environment led, in part, to the passage of the Goldwaters-Nichols Reorganization Act, creating the current requirement for flag officers to obtain education and experience in "joint" organizations. Perhaps this piece of legislation will be all that is required to change the minds of our future military leaders on the

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<sup>44</sup>The consequences of U.S. and host government objectives not coinciding can be seen in Neil Sheehan's *A Bright Shining Lie...* [Ref. 33].

value of the non-traditional training the FAOs require, but the answer is still unclear.

### **C. BALANCING THE "SOLDIER" WITH THE "STATESMAN"**

Perhaps the most difficult problem both FAOs and non-FAOs face is the problem of balancing the need for the FAO to be politically aware but retain the apolitical loyalty of the professional officer. In American culture, the relationship between the civilian political world and the military has been central to our self-identity as a unique society. Even today, the highest ranking officers of this country face disciplinary action if they cross the hazy line that lies between what is seen as the proper relationship between the military and the civilian government. The FAOs, who are charged with knowing not only a foreign land but also our own, who are urged to be both soldiers and statesmen, and who are likely to be placed in positions in which they are held up as the representatives of the United States, must accept the fact that political forces play as important a role in their success or defeat as military forces.

General Joseph Stilwell, who is revered as one of the great FAOs in our history, did not understand this point. General Stilwell appeared to be the right man at the right place at the right time when President Franklin Roosevelt sent him to take over the forces of Chiang Kai-shek in World War II. Roosevelt needed a soldier to go to China and get the Chinese Nationalist forces into the fight against Japan. He needed someone who could both tie up the Japanese forces on the ground there and who could protect the new airfields from

which General Claire Chennault could begin bombing the Japanese war machine as soon as possible. Stilwell appeared to fit all these needs. He was an extremely well qualified infantryman with experience commanding large forces at home and overseas. He spoke Chinese, knew the country of China well from an in-country training tour, and had interacted with the Nationalist Chinese forces. Who better could be selected for this mission?

Stilwell's weakness was his inadequate understanding of the political forces at work both in China and in the United States. This liability would later lead to his removal, at the behest of Major General Patrick Hurley (whose status and position both were direct results of Hurley's political relationship with FDR) and replacement by General Albert Wedemeyer (whose highest ambition was to be made ambassador to China after the war).<sup>45</sup> Stilwell's mistake was that he arrived in China prepared to fight a real war against Japan and this ambition directly clashed with the leader of China, Chiang Kai-shek, who was more interested in killing his political rivals with the weapons America was providing than in killing Japanese. By the time this fact was clear to Stilwell and he began to complain to Roosevelt, Chiang had already begun the process of getting him replaced. Roosevelt, who had made public statements referring to Chiang as "the undisputed

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<sup>45</sup>For more on Stilwell, Chiang, Hurley, and Wedemeyer, see References 34 through 36.

leader of 400 million people," found it easier to replace his general than to change his policy of absolute support for Chiang.

Another FAO who was more politically astute owed the continuation of his career to another Roosevelt. This was the Marine Corps FAO hero from the same period, General Evans Carlson. Carlson, like Stilwell, would today be called a China FAO. He also spoke Chinese and had served on the ground in China with Chinese forces. The differences between Carlson and Stilwell were that Carlson served with the Communist's Eighth Route Army and wanted to incorporate their organization and tactics in an American fighting force, while Stilwell had served with the Nationalists and was sent to China to organize Chiang's forces along the lines of American warfighting doctrine.

Carlson's endorsement of the Communists' methods, including the organization of forces into two groups—"fighters" and "leaders"—and the *election* of the leaders by the soldiers, were not readily accepted by the Marine Corps. Generally, Carlson was considered to have "gone native" and lost the perspective on reality that should be held by a professional officer. The conflict that grew between Carlson and his fellow Marines, in fact, led to his resigning his commission. He probably would have ended up a footnote in history if not for his friendship with the President of the United States' son and the effort to find creative ways to stop the flood of defeats that faced this nation in the opening days of World War II. Jimmy Roosevelt's personal support and the rapid successes Japan had in capturing islands in the Pacific both played a part in Carlson's return to active duty. Carlson's

own powers of persuasion and leadership ability, in turn, led to his being given the authorization to create Marine Raiders, who would employ some of the "unconventional warfare" tactics Carlson had learned in China. When these Raiders then captured the imagination and support of the American voters, Carlson's place in history as a successful officer and FAO was assured.<sup>46</sup>

There are no clear-cut guidelines to help the FAOs determine exactly how to be proper soldiers and statesmen without going too far in carrying out one role over the other. Likewise, the FAOs are likely to find their loyalties are suspect when dealing with other services. When working in joint assignments, FAOs will find it not uncommon to be accused of showing partiality toward their own service and being accused of betraying their service's interests at the same time. All the FAO can do is try to avoid the appearance of one vice or the other and make decisions as fairly as possible. The future holds great demands on FAOs and all military officers, for the days when most officers could simply follow orders, look out for their own particular interests, and rely on the overwhelming economic and military power of the United States to ensure the security of our interests may be ending.

#### **D. CONCLUSIONS**

The United States Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps are rapidly running out of excuses for not working together. Arguments

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<sup>46</sup>Reference 3 tells Carlson's story in greater detail.

that services are too unique to cooperate very well may have been plausible back when there was only a Department of War and a Department of the Navy, but these arguments are hollow in the modern world. Today, each of the services has expanded to have interests in ground, air, and naval warfare. Concepts such as the Air-Land Battle and the Maritime Strategy are grounded on the idea that the branches of the Department of Defense can and must work together. The United States can no longer afford to waste money on services duplicating each other's efforts in procurement, research and development, and other areas. This fact makes the current situation in which each service muddles along on its own in training FAOs equally unsatisfactory. Most of the men and women who pass through each of the service's FAO training programs will eventually find themselves working together in one of four areas: as attachés, in intelligence organizations, on security assistance teams, or as political-military advisors on service or joint staffs. Why, then, are these officers not trained in a like fashion at centralized locations? Why is there not more cooperation between the offices that select and train officers for these positions? Why can each service not profit from the experiences of its sister services?

The survey of FAOs used in this thesis has shown that the needs of the FAOs in the field are very similar. More differences exist between the requirements of the specific FAO jobs than exist between the needs of the services. In other words, the Army FAO assigned to attaché duty has more in common with an Air Force FAO assigned as

an attaché in terms of specific levels of training than the Army attaché has in common with the Army FAO assigned to an intelligence billet. Furthermore, all three have the same core education needs (as shown in the chapter on education) and this need for policy-oriented education (particularly with emphasis on *security policy*) is unavailable at most civilian universities. Two government schools are available to fill these requirements and both have language training facilities close by. One is the Naval Postgraduate School and the other is the Defense Intelligence College located on Bolling Air Force Base. These two schools, if properly utilized in conjunction with the Defense Language Institute/Foreign Language Center and the Foreign Service Institute (also located in the Washington, D.C. area) could serve as west- and east-coast centers of FAO training. Both sites offer a mix of language training and policy-oriented advanced education that, when coupled with the in-country training that is necessary to produce a FAO who has an optimum mix of theory and practical experience, would result in trained officers who could meet any projected need for FAOs.

If the appropriate officials from each service would spend some time studying what their counterparts are doing in this area, if these officials would meet with their counterparts to discuss the problems they face in managing FAOs, and if they would replicate the survey contained in this thesis on a much larger and even more representative scale, the reward for their efforts would be better training programs, less unnecessary training, clearer objectives, more useful



regulations and directives, and an officer corps that is better prepared to meet the needs of this country in the years ahead.

**APPENDIX A**

**REGULATIONS AND DOCUMENTS ASSOCIATED  
WITH THE CURRENT PROGRAMS**



**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS AND PLANS**  
**WASHINGTON, DC 20310-04**



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

**DAMO-SSF**

**MEMORANDUM FOR: OFFICERS DESIGNATED INTO FUNCTIONAL AREA  
48/FOREIGN AREA OFFICER**

**SUBJECT: Foreign Area Officer Development Program**

1. Congratulations on your selection and designation as a Foreign Area Officer! The criteria for designation into functional area 48 are among the most stringent of all functional areas. Your selection indicates you possess both a competitive file and excellent potential for future service in a demanding and highly visible career field.

2. The FAO selection process is stringent because the profession of "Soldier-Statesman" demands that officers acquire and maintain skills and qualifications unique to the specialty:

a. You are expected to be a **SOLDIER**. The professional expertise and skills of your basic branch and the competencies, ethics, and values demanded of all commissioned officers are the foundation of your credibility as a FAO. Your assignments will alternate between branch material and FAO functional area positions.

b. You are expected to be a **LINGUIST** in a foreign language of your designated regional area of concentration (AOC). Your ability to communicate orally and in writing with foreign officials involved in political-military affairs is critical to your credibility and effectiveness, and will contribute materially to accomplishing U.S. foreign policy objectives.

c. You are expected to be a **POLITICAL-MILITARY SPECIALIST**, with an indepth knowledge of U.S. and foreign political-military relationships. This knowledge includes understanding the processes of formulating U.S. national security and foreign policies, the political role of military forces in government, and the interface of political, economic, socio-cultural, and military environment in the development of national policies.

d. You are expected to be a **REGIONAL EXPERT**, with a detailed understanding of the region's politics, economies, cultures, military forces, geostrategic importance, and applicable U.S. interests/policies. The analysis of regional issues--as a basis for advice to policymakers--is the principal function FAOs perform in the Army and the Department of Defense.

DAMO-SSF

SUBJECT: Foreign Area Officer Development Program

3. The FAO Management Section in TAPA will establish your individual training/development program. FAO training will begin shortly after you complete company grade qualifications established by your basic branch (normally includes completion of your advanced course and successful command of a company). The standard FAO development program consists of four phases over a 3-5 year period:

a. FAO Orientation Course (FAOOC). Held at the Defense Language Institute (DLI) in Monterey, California, this 40-hour course is designed to acquaint you with the roles, duties, and responsibilities of a FAO, and to outline the goals and objectives you should pursue during subsequent development phases. All designated FAOs entering language training at DLI will attend the FAOOC. Distinguished guest speakers supplement the FAOOC curriculum throughout the year. Spouses are encouraged to attend.

b. Initial Language Training. Normally conducted at DLI, initial language training (6-12 months) provides you the basic foundation to develop language proficiency. Spouses may attend on a space available basis.

c. Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS). FAOs are required to earn a Master's degree in Area Studies or closely related discipline, normally under a fully-funded program at a selected, high quality university. You will be required to gain admission to one of these graduate programs based on your personal qualifications and individual preferences. ACS must be completed within eighteen months. A list of currently approved schools and graduate school objectives is attached.

d. In-Country Training (ICT). The vast majority of FAOs will complete a 12-24 month training assignment in a country within their designated AOC. ICT normally includes advanced language training, attendance at a host military school, and extensive travel/study within the region. A list of ICT sites and ICT objectives is attached.

4. The FAO development program is designed to be a progressive educational opportunity, with each phase building upon skills and knowledge gained in previous phases. Your individual motivation, initiative, and desire for excellence is the key to success in acquiring the capabilities and expertise offered during the four phases.


DAMO-SSF

SUBJECT: Foreign Area Officer Development Program

5. You are at the threshold of a challenging and rewarding period of your military career. FAOs occupy key positions throughout the Army and DOD; senior leaders involved in political-military affairs rely daily on their analysis and advice. I urge you to give your best effort in becoming a skilled professional soldier, directly involved in accomplishing the foreign policy goals of the nation.

6. Again, congratulations on your selection as a Foreign Area Officer, and best wishes for a successful and fulfilling career as an Army Soldier-Soldier.

4 Encls

  
JOHN O. B. SEWALL  
Major General, GS  
Director of Strategy,  
Plans, and Policy

GRADUATE SCHOOL EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES  
FOR  
FOREIGN AREA OFFICERS

The goals of graduate schooling in area studies are to provide the officer with a solid base of regional knowledge across a range of disciplines; the ability to perform research, analysis, and synthesis; and, the capability to apply that knowledge to his/her development as an area expert. Specific educational objectives are divided into three general areas:

1. LANGUAGE AND RESEARCH SKILLS:

- LANGUAGE:

- o Maintain expertise at the DLI graduation level in the given language for the area.

- oo Read newspapers and journals written in the language of the area to be aware of current developments.

- oo Use language as a tool of research.

- oo Find courses or programs where oral expression in the language is required.

- o If already fluent in the major language of the area, acquire an introductory knowledge of a second language used in the region.

- ANALYTICAL AND RESEARCH SKILLS:

- o Demonstrate scholarly skills in research and analysis.

- o Refine oral and written expression.

- o Be able to interpret and evaluate data.

- o Know the elements of problem solving and decision processes.

- o Know modes of negotiation and debate.

2. SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES OF THE REGION:

- HISTORY:

- o Understand in detail the region's political evolution, traditional enemies and conflicts, regional alignments and historical antecedents of domestic issues.

- CULTURE AND RELIGION:

Encl 1

- o Know the region's class structure, ethnic, cultural and religious values and ideologies.

- o Understand how the area's culture and religious power base impact on domestic and foreign affairs.

- GEOGRAPHY:

- o Know major aspects of the region's geography.

- o Relate the geography of the area to its national development, transportation systems, economic sufficiency and military posture.

- o Understand the geostrategic implications and geopolitical significance of the region.

- ECONOMICS:

- o Know the political economy and institutions as they affect society.

- o Understand the economic bases for military capabilities, industrial and social development.

- o Understand the relationships between the political, social, and economic environments.

- POLITICS:

- o Know the political culture of the region.

- o Understand current political institutions and processes.

- o Understand the interaction of the local political system with both western and communist governments.

- 3. U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AND CURRENT ISSUES:

- U. S. FOREIGN POLICY:

- o Obtain a basic understanding of U. S. foreign policy and the processes for its formulation.

- o Understand U. S. policy toward the region.

- o Know how U. S. policy towards the region/country affects relations with neighboring areas.

- CURRENT ISSUES:

- o Know present political, economic, and military issues that affect the region.

- o Understand the impact of any social or economic reforms to the status and well-being of the area.

- o Know key leaders in the region and their relationships to all elements of society.

# GRADUATE SCHOOLS FOR FAO STUDENTS

## AFRICA

BOSTON  
BERKELEY  
UCLA  
FLORIDA  
ILLINOIS  
INDIANA  
MICHIGAN ST  
NORTHWESTERN  
STANFORD  
WISCONSIN  
YALE

## WEST EUROPE

COLUMBIA  
CORNELL  
ILLINOIS  
INDIANA  
MINNESOTA

## EAST ASIA

BERKELEY  
UCLA  
CHICAGO  
COLUMBIA  
HARVARD  
HAWAII  
ILLINOIS  
INDIANA  
KANSAS  
MICHIGAN ST  
OHIO ST  
MICHIGAN  
PENNSYLVANIA  
PITTSBURGH  
PRINCETON  
SOUTHERN CAL  
STANFORD  
TEXAS  
WASHINGTON  
WISCONSIN  
YALE

## MIDDLE EAST

BERKELEY  
UCLA  
CHICAGO  
COLUMBIA  
GEORGETOWN  
HARVARD  
MICHIGAN  
NEW YORK  
PENNSYLVANIA  
PRINCETON  
SUNY-BINGHAMTON  
TEXAS  
UTAH  
WASHINGTON  
YALE

## SE ASIA

CORNELL  
HAWAII  
MICHIGAN  
NORTHERN ILLINOIS  
OHIO U  
WISCONSIN

## EAST EUROPE/USSR

BROWN  
BERKELEY  
UCLA  
CHICAGO  
COLUMBIA  
CORNELL  
HARVARD  
ILLINOIS  
INDIANA  
KANSAS  
MICHIGAN  
OHIO ST  
PENNSYLVANIA  
STANFORD  
WASHINGTON  
WISCONSIN  
YALE

## SOUTH ASIA

BERKELEY  
CHICAGO  
COLUMBIA  
CORNELL  
ILLINOIS  
MICHIGAN  
MINNESOTA  
PENNSYLVANIA  
SYRACUSE  
WASHINGTON  
WISCONSIN

## LATIN AMERICA

BERKELEY  
UCLA  
SAN DIEGO  
CHICAGO  
COLUMBIA  
CORNELL  
FLORIDA  
ILLINOIS  
INDIANA  
KANSAS  
NEW MEXICO  
NEW MEXICO ST  
PITTSBURGH  
STANFORD  
TEXAS  
TULANE  
VANDERBILT  
WISCONSIN  
YALE

Encl 2



IN-COUNTRY EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES  
FOR  
FOREIGN AREA OFFICERS

The goal of in-country training (ICT) is for the officer to achieve regional expertise through the application of previous language and graduate schooling. Objectives of ICT are to attain language fluency; develop a detailed knowledge of the region; and acquire a firsthand practical sense of country and region that will provide the officer the means to serve effectively in key political-military positions. Specific educational objectives are divided into seven areas:

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY:

- o Attain a professional foreign language ability through daily reading, listening, speaking, and writing.

MILITARY:

- o Know the service capabilities, present leadership, key military contemporaries, operational concepts, and force structure of host country forces.
- o Gain familiarity with regional forces.

GEOGRAPHY:

- o Acquire a detailed appreciation for the major physical features of the country and a general appreciation of key geographic features of the region.
- o Understand spatial relationships of political, cultural/ethnic, economic and transportation structures/patterns in the country/region.

ECONOMIC:

- o Gain a firsthand knowledge of the local economic structure and the key features of the regional economic system.
- o Understand the national demands placed upon the economic system and how economic issues are viewed by the local population.

CULTURE:

- o Gain an in-depth understanding of social, ethnic, political, religious, and economic issues perceived by the local populace.

POLITICAL:

- o Know in detail how the region/country functions, officially and unofficially (who decides what and how), including the mechanics of the bureaucracy in actual practice; know political leadership.

INTER-PERSONAL SKILLS/CONTACT:

- o Gain the ability to use conversations, news reports, visual observations, first person and second person contacts to form a clear understanding of the local/regional situation when integrated with other background data.
- o Develop professional contacts with both military and civilian representatives from the host country.

Encl 3

**FOREIGN AREA OFFICER  
IN-COUNTRY TRAINING SITES**

ARGENTINA  
AUSTRIA  
BANGLADESH  
BELGIUM  
BRAZIL  
CAMEROON  
CHILE  
CHINA  
COLOMBIA  
EGYPT  
FRANCE  
GERMANY  
GREECE  
GUATEMALA  
HONDURAS  
HONG KONG  
INDIA  
INDONESIA  
ITALY  
IVORY COAST  
JAPAN  
JORDAN  
KOREA

MALAWI  
MALAYSIA  
MEXICO  
MOROCCO  
NETHERLANDS  
NORWAY  
PAKISTAN  
PERU  
PHILIPPINES  
PORTUGAL  
SINGAPORE  
SUDAN  
TAIWAN  
THAILAND  
TUNISIA  
TURKEY  
URUGUAY  
UNTSO\*  
USARI\*\*  
VENEZUELA  
YUGOSLAVIA  
ZAIRE

\*Due to shortage of ICT sites for Middle East FAOs, a small number of FAO trainees are assigned to observer duties with UNTSO and receive constructive ICT credit during their 1-year tour with UNTSO. These officers conduct FAO regional travel when excused from UN duties.

\*\*ICT for Soviet/East European FAOs is completed through the 2-year program at the U.S. Army Russian Institute, Garmisch.

Encl 4



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20380-0001

MCO 1520.11C  
INTM  
21 Mar 1989

MARINE CORPS ORDER 1520.11C

From: Commandant of the Marine Corps  
To: Distribution List

Subj: Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program

Ref: (a) MCO P1200.7H, MOS Manual  
(b) MCO 1550.4D, Defense Foreign Language Program  
(c) MCO 7220.52, Foreign Language Proficiency Pay (FLPP) Program

Encl: (1) Sample Sources of Nonschool Trained FAO's  
(2) FAO Performance Evaluation Chain  
(3) FAO Study Program Application Format  
(4) FAO Additional MOS Application Format  
(5) List of Appropriate FAO Billets

1. Purpose. To provide information on the FAO Program and to publish prerequisites for selection and assignment of Marine Corps officers to this program.

2. Cancellation. MCO 1520.11B.

3. Background. The FAO Program is designed to train selected officers in the languages, military forces, culture, history, sociology, economics, politics, and geography of selected areas of the world. A secondary purpose of the FAO Program is to identify those officers who, by virtue of family, academic or professional background, already possess a level of linguistic and area expertise comparable to that gained by those officers trained under the auspices of the FAO Study Program.

a. The goal of the FAO Program is to identify and prepare participants for future assignments to high-level Marine Corps/joint/combined staffs in operations, planning, or intelligence billets, and for duty with the Defense Attache System.

b. Those designated as FAO's constitute a nucleus of Marine Corps experts on specific areas of the world; per reference (a), they will be assigned an additional MOS of 994X, Foreign Area Officer (by region/language), as follows:

(1) 9941 - Latin America - Spanish/Portuguese/French (Haitian Creole)

- (2) 9942 - USSR - Russian/Ukrainian
- (3) 9943 - People's Republic of China - Chinese
- (4) 9944 - Middle East/North Africa - Arabic/Hebrew
- (5) 9945 - Sub-Saharan Africa - Swahili/French
- (6) 9946 - Southwest Asia - Farsi/Afghan/Pushtu/Urdu/  
Hindu/Bengali
- (7) 9947 - Western Europe - Romance/Germanic/Greek/ Turkish
- (8) 9948 - East Asia (excluding PRC) - Japanese/Thai/  
Lao/Vietnamese/Malay/Tagalog/Indonesian
- (9) 9949 - Eastern Europe (excluding USSR) - Czech/  
Polish/Bulgarian/Magyar/Romanian/Serbo-Croatian \*

\* Other appropriate languages may apply to each region.

c. Officers designated as FAO's are expected to continue their studies in order to maintain their foreign language capability and related area expertise. Reference (b) contains information on obtaining language refresher training material to enhance foreign language skill maintenance. Accordingly, Defense Language Proficiency Tests (DLPT's) will be retaken yearly, as required by reference (c).

d. Those FAO's not qualified to receive Foreign Language Proficiency Pay (FLPP), by virtue of their primary MOS, may receive such pay as long as they hold a 994X additional MOS and remain otherwise qualified as established in reference (c).

#### 4. General

a. The Marine Corps FAO Study Program is oriented toward four study areas and language sets:

- |                              |                     |
|------------------------------|---------------------|
| (1) Middle East/North Africa | Arabic              |
| (2) Far East                 | Chinese/Thai/Korean |
| (3) USSR                     | Russian             |
| (4) Latin America            | Spanish/Portuguese  |

b. Two primary candidates and one alternate candidate will be selected each year for each of the four areas of concentration offered in the FAO Study Program. An alternate will replace a primary selectee, should either primary candidate be unable to enroll in the program.

c. In addition to the four FAO Study Program areas, the FAO Program also includes five additional linguistic/geographic areas for which academic study is not currently funded, but for which the FAO MOS can also be assigned. This facet of the FAO Program is primarily geared toward identifying and designating those officers who have already obtained the requisite linguistic and area expertise by virtue of having lived in and/or studied about the region previously. These areas and associated languages are listed in paragraph 3b above.

d. It is emphasized that this experience-track aspect of the FAO Program is to identify officers who are truly area experts, as opposed to those who merely have a facility with a language from a given region. Likely candidates would be officers who have, for example, already served a tour in the region. (See enclosure (1).) No further service obligation is incurred from this aspect of the program, nor is any formal training or travel automatically provided. However, per reference (c), FLPP is authorized for all qualified FAO's. Additionally, all FAO's may qualify to participate in available language maintenance programs such as the Defense Advanced Language and Area Studies Program (DALASP). (See reference (b).)

e. Any future expansion of the FAO Program will be disseminated by change to this Order. Performance evaluation of student FAO's will be as delineated in enclosure (2).

f. Language Training

(1) Mideast (Arabic). Phase I of this program is taught at the Defense Language Institute, Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) at the Presidio of Monterey, California. Phase II provides regional experience while based in Rabat, Morocco or other designated locations.

(2) Far East (Chinese/Thai/Korean). Phase I is taught at DLIFLC. Phase II of training is conducted at the National University of Singapore (Chinese), or at universities in Bangkok (Thai) or Seoul (Korean), respectively.

(3) Warsaw Pact (Russian). Phase I is taught at DLIFLC. Phase II is conducted at the U.S. Army Russian Institute (USARI), Garmisch, West Germany.

(4) Latin America (Spanish/Portuguese). Phase I is taught at DLIFLC. Phase II is conducted in residence in Chile (Spanish), or Brazil (Portuguese).

g. Phase I training is provided at DLIFLC. It will be preceded, timing permitting, by a 1-week U.S. Army FAO Orientation Course taught at DLIFLC. Basic courses in Chinese, Thai, Korean, Arabic, and Russian will normally commence in July and last for 1 year; Spanish and Portuguese basic courses will normally start in

August each year and last for 6 months, and Portuguese/Spanish intermediate courses may be offered, pending quota availability, to complete a year's instruction at DLIFLC. Phase II training is scheduled for 1 year in duration, and will commence after completion of study at DLIFLC.

h. The objective of Phase I language training is to give the officer a language proficiency level of L2/R2/S2 (Listening/Reading/Speaking) on the Defense Language Proficiency Test III, which will enable the individual to converse freely and read and comprehend semitechnical publications and the contemporary press in the target language.

i. Advanced Studies. All four areas of the FAO Study Program include advanced language study and extensive travel. This allows for total immersion in the language in its natural environment and provides maximum exposure to the area of specialization for the development of individual expertise to a level appropriate to the goals of the FAO Program. All tuition costs associated with Phase II are funded by this Headquarters. In the case of married officers, Phase II overseas training is an accompanied tour of duty, and the spouse is encouraged to participate in all areas of training. Free language training for spouses is available at DLIFLC on a space available basis. Language training for the spouse during Phase II would be at the FAO's expense, as would be travel costs, should the spouse accompany the officer during periods of TAD travel.

j. It should be noted that funding constraints or changing political-military relations with host countries could cause modifications to Phase II training.

##### 5. Eligibility Criteria

a. FAO Study Program. Any regular, unrestricted officer who meets the following criteria is eligible to apply for the FAO Study Program. (Reserve officers refer to paragraph 10 below.)

(1) Serving in the grade of captain or major, with at least 7 but not more than 14 years of commissioned service.

(2) Agree to remain on active duty for at least 4 years after completion of training.

(3) Possess a baccalaureate degree from an accredited college or university and have demonstrated a high level of academic performance. It is desired that the applicant have at least 2 years of college level foreign language study, with a minimum collegiate foreign language grade average of "B."

(4) Possess a record of prior assignments which reflects a balanced background in command and staff assignments appropriate to grade, length of service, and MOS(s).

(5) Possess a final secret security clearance upon application. Each primary selectee will submit for a Special Background Investigation (SBI) upon notification of selection. An SBI package should be requested from a local Special Security Office (SSO), if not available, the package should be requested from the CMC (INT/SSO Administration).

(6) Have competent medical authority certify that the officer and all dependents are free from recurrent/chronic diseases which require specialized medical care or extended routine treatment. Officers with dependents who are mentally or physically handicapped or require special facilities, or who have chronic dental problems, should not volunteer for this program.

(7) Be a U.S. citizen. Members of an applicant's immediate family (including spouse, parents/step-parents, siblings, and children) must also be U.S. citizens. Applicants should have no near relatives or other persons to whom they may be bound by ties of affection, kinship, or other obligation residing in a country in which physical or mental coercion is known to be a common practice, either against persons accused of acting in the interests of the U.S. or against relatives of such persons. Near relatives include parents, children, siblings, aunts/uncles, grandparents, in-laws, step-relations corresponding to any of the above, and persons acting in loco parentis. Furthermore, neither the applicant nor spouse should have any commercial or other vested interest in the country of assignment.

(8) Be free of abnormal family situations or business complications which might divert attention from an intense study regimen. Foreign financial interests and investments and continual excessive personal indebtedness are possible causes for disqualification.

(9) Attain a Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) score of 110 or higher within the last 3 years, and/or demonstrate a language capability by obtaining a minimum score of L2/R2 on any DLPT II, or L2/R2/S2 on any DLPT III. These tests are administered by interrogation-translation teams, base education facilities, the Marine Corps Recruit Depots, DLIFLC and the DLI East Coast representative located in Washington, DC.

b. Experience Track. Any regular officer who meets the following criteria is eligible to apply for the appropriate FAO additional MOS. (Reserve officers refer to paragraph 10 below.)

(1) Serving in the grade of captain to lieutenant colonel.

(2) Possess a final secret security clearance upon application. Each selectee will submit for a Special Background Investigation (SBI) upon notification of selection. An SBI package should be requested from a local Special Security Office (SSO), if not available, the package should be requested from the CMC (INT/SSO Administration).

(3) Be a U.S. citizen. Members of an applicant's immediate family (including spouse, parents/step-parents, siblings, and children) must also be U.S. citizens. Applicants should have no near relatives or other persons to whom they may be bound by ties of affection, kinship, or other obligation residing in a country in which physical or mental coercion is known to be a common practice, either against persons accused of acting in the interests of the U.S. or against relatives of such persons. Near relatives include parents, children, siblings, aunts/uncles, grandparents, in-laws, step-relations corresponding to any of the above, and persons acting in loco parentis.

(4) Demonstrate foreign language capability in an appropriate target language by obtaining a minimum score of L2/R2 on the DLPT II or L2/R2/S2 on the DLPT III.

(5) Submit a concise summary of country/area expertise and background related to the target language/region.

c. Upon completion of overseas tours with the Defense Attache System in non-English speaking countries, Marine officers will be awarded the appropriate FAO additional MOS.

6. Application. Officers desiring assignment to the FAO Study Program should submit an Administrative Action (AA) Form (NAVMC 10274), utilizing the format contained in enclosure (3), to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (MMOS-3, with a copy to CMC (INTM)). Applications should reach the CMC by 15 July each year. Officers who desire a FAO additional MOS based on prior experience should also submit an AA Form, per enclosure (4), to reach the CMC (MMOA-1/2, INTM) by 15 July of the year in which applying.

#### 7. Selection

a. Applications will be screened by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (CMC (MM)) to determine an officer's eligibility/availability for assignment to the FAO Program or qualification for an FAO additional MOS.

b. The DC/S for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (CMC (MM)) will convene a selection board in August to choose the primary and alternate selectees for the FAO Study Program. The board will also select experience-track FAO's for assignment of the appropriate FAO additional MOS, based on prior language and area expertise as reflected in the applications.

c. Upon notification of the results of the selection board, the CMC (MM) will announce the results via ALMAR and make the appropriate assignments.



8. Assignment Policy. Assignment to the FAO Study Program will be for a maximum of 24 months. Requests for extension will not normally be approved. Graduates of the FAO Study Program will be assigned a utilization tour, as soon as practicable, following completion of Phase II training and consistent with a balanced career pattern. This post-training utilization tour is designed to derive maximum benefit from the FAO 's training, and is the central purpose of the FAO Study Program. Those school-trained FAO's who return to FMF duty after Phase II training will be assigned, to the maximum extent possible, to commands which are operationally-oriented toward the FAO's areas of expertise. Nonschool-trained FAO's are encouraged to request assignment to billets in which they can apply their linguistic and area expertise, both within the FMF and without. Enclosure (5) contains a representative list of appropriate FAO billets.

9. Action

a. Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (CMC (MM))

- (1) Screen applicants to determine their eligibility/availability for assignment to the FAO Program.
- (2) Convene an annual selection board in August to select eight primary and four alternate selectees for the FAO Study Program, and to assign FAO additional MOS's to suitably qualified applicants.
- (3) Announce selection board results via ALMAR.
- (4) Ensure that officers who complete the FAO Study Program or who are otherwise qualified are assigned the appropriate FAO additional MOS per reference (a), and are subsequently assigned to appropriate duties per paragraph 8 of this Order and other applicable directives.
- (5) Ensure the FAO's DLPT scores are entered into the Manpower Management System.

b. Director of Intelligence (CMC (INT))

- (1) Monitor USMC participation in the FAO Program.
- (2) Coordinate with the DC/S for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (CMC (MM)) in FAO matters and provide a qualified occupational field sponsor for MOS's 9941 to 9949.
- (3) Act as the point of contact between the CMC and the Department of the Army (DC/S for Operations) in all FAO Program matters.

(4) Provide board members for the annual FAO selection board, as required by the DC/S for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (CMC (MM)).

(5) Provide a detailed funding profile for the FAO Program to the Commanding General (TE335), Marine Corps Combat Development Command (CG MCCDC) by 15 August of each year for the next fiscal year.

(6) Administer the disbursement of funds for Phase II FAO students and report this information to the CG MCCDC (TE335) monthly.

c. CG MCCDC (TE33)

(1) Obtain FAO Orientation Course and foreign language quotas, in coordination with the Director of Intelligence (CMC (INTS)), for Phase I training at DLIFLC. Additionally, coordinate with the DirInt for Phase II training quotas.

(2) Budget for the FAO Study Program and provide funding data to the CMC (INTM), based on costing information provided by the CMC (INTM).

d. Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower and Reserve Affairs (for Reserve Affairs). Make appropriate Reserve Manpower Management and Pay System (REMMPS) entries for those Reserve officers selected for an FAO additional MOS.

10. Reserve Establishment. The FAO Study Program is not applicable to the Marine Corps Reserve Establishment. However, Reserve officers who have the requisite language and regional expertise may apply for an FAO additional MOS (i.e., without participation in the FAO study portion of the overall program), as discussed above. Interested Reserve officers should submit their applications per paragraphs 5b and 6.

11. Notification of Selection. Officers selected for either the FAO Study Program or the FAC experience-track additional MOS will be notified by ALMAR.

12. Reserve Applicability. This Order is applicable to the Marine Corps Reserve.

  
J. D. BEANS  
By direction

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SAMPLE SOURCES OF NONSCHOOL TRAINED FAO'S

The following types of duty, in tandem with the corresponding foreign language capability, are primary examples of the kinds of experience which provide the linguistic-country-area expertise requisite for an FAO additional MOS:

1. Military Advisory and Assistance Groups (MAAG's)
2. U.S. Defense Attache Offices (USDAO's)
3. Marine Corps Foreign Personnel Exchange Program (MCFPEP)
4. Allied Professional Military Education Courses
5. Joint/Combined Staffs (Overseas)
6. Marine Barracks (Overseas)
7. Marine Security Guard (Overseas)
8. Olmsted Scholarship Program
9. Cox Scholarship Program

ENCLOSURE (1)

1

FAO PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CHAIN

1. Phase I: While in residence at DLIFLC, FAO Formal Study Program Phase I students will be evaluated by the Commanding Officer of the Marine Corps Administrative Detachment at the Defense Language Institute, Foreign Language Center, who will serve as their Reporting Senior (RS). The Reviewing Officer will be the Assistant Commandant of DLIFLC.
2. Phase II: In Phase II training, the FAO's RS's will be the Defense Attaches (in Singapore, Thailand, South Korea, Chile, and Morocco) and the Director of Training (at USARI). For all Phase II FAO's the Director of Intelligence at HQMC will serve as the Reviewing Officer.
3. Fitness Reports: Fitness reports will be marked "Not Observed" in Section "B"; other Section "B" markings are not appropriate. Section "C" should contain the following statement, "This report and attachment are submitted per MCO P1610.7." Other comments may be included in Section "C," if the reporting senior so desires. Academic reports, where applicable, will be attached to the FAO's fitness report.

ENCLOSURE (2)

# Pol/Mil Newsletter

10 February 1989

Welcome once again to the POL-MIL NEWSLETTER. Our purpose here is to enhance your career planning and to foster better communication within the POL-MIL community. There is much to be covered this time, so let's get down to business.

This edition's contents:

1. XX2X Coded Billets by PRD
2. How to Get the Pol-Mil Job You Want
3. A Note for the XX27 Community
4. References
5. Harvard/Tufts Masters Degree Program
6. The Admiral Arthur S. Moreau Program
7. Subspecialty Selection Board
8. The Joint Scene
9. Future Editions.

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## 1. XX2X Coded Billets by PRD

For the convenience of those who make long-term plans, and in response to your comments on the June 1988 Newsletter, we are including in this issue a listing of all XX2X billets. Within each subspecialty - XX20, XX21, etc., - the billets are listed by PRD; the first billets in each category are currently gapped (no PRD listed). In reviewing this list, keep the following in mind:

- The 1050 designator (BDESG) indicates billets which can be filled by officers qualified in any warfare specialty.
- The 1000 designator indicates billets which can be filled by any line officer (usually unrestricted line).
- The rank codes (BGRADE) are: G/CAPT, R/CDR, I/LCDR, J/LT.
- The XX20 subspecialty billets (BSUB1) are open to officers with any Pol-Mil (XX2X) subspecialty.

1/10/89 XX2X CODED BILLETS BY PRD

PRD	AUIC	BSC	ACTIVITY	BTITLE	BDESG	BGRADE	BSUBJ	HOMEPT
	42091	14340	PG SCH PROFESTRG	ASST CURR/NSA	1000	J	0020P	MONTEY
	42134	06300	NWACOL NPTRIPMT	STRATEGY PROFESS	1000	H	7020P	NEWPRY
	42134	19100	NWACOL NPTRIPMT	DIRECTOR NSC	1050	G	7020H	NEWPRY
	41999	00100	FMSDEFINST SAM	DEPUTY COMDT	1050	G	0020P	WRIGHT
	41999	00500	FMSDEFINST SAM	INSTRUCTOR	1050	J	0020P	WRIGHT
	63415	01675	DEFINTEL AGENCY	FACULTY MEMBER	1050	H	0020P	ARLING
	42547	42200	PEP USAF ACADEMY	POL SCI INSTR	1000	J	0020P	COLSPS
8805	00011	00130	OPNAV	OP-00K3 ASST FOR	1000	H	0020P	ARLING
8806	57011	05600	COMINHEWARCOM	ACOS ALLIED PLAN	1050	H	7020S	CHARLE
8809	41566	00300	NAVOTTS A FMS	ADMIN OFFICER	1000	H	7020S	ARLING
8811	00011	00130	OPNAV	OP-00K3 ASST FOR	1000	H	0020P	ARLING
8902	42134	32150	NWACOL NPTRIPMT	POLITICAL ANALYS	1050	I	7020P	NEWPRY
8902	41566	70400	NAVOTTS A FMS	ASST E ASIA/PACI	1000	J	0020S	ARLING
8903	68876	20100	NAVOTTS A WASH DC	TECHNOLOGY TRANS	1050	I	7020S	ARLING
8904	42134	06400	NWACOL NPTRIPMT	STRATEGY PROFESS	1050	H	7020P	NEWPRY
8906	42134	32150	NWACOL NPTRIPMT	POLITICAL ANALYS	1050	I	7020P	NEWPRY
8906	65895	13325	CINCIBERLANT	SA FOR CMD/CNTRL	1050	H	7020S	LISBON
8907	00161	68200	NAVAL ACAD	INST POL SCI	1000	I	0020P	ANNAP
8907	42134	19100	NWACOL NPTRIPMT	DIRECTOR NSC	1050	G	7020H	NEWPRY
8907	00011	01265	OPNAV	OP-906E6 AST HD	1050	I	7020S	ARLING
8907	64590	02965	SACLANT	STRAT BRIEF COOR	1050	H	7020T	NORVA
8907	42134	17200	NWACOL NPTRIPMT	ACADEMIC COORDIN	1050	H	7020H	NEWPRY
8907	68876	10200	NAVOTTS A WASH DC	DOC DISCLOSURE S	1110	I	7020S	ARLING
8907	42134	06500	NWACOL NPTRIPMT	STRATEGY PROFESS	1000	H	7020P	NEWPRY
8907	42134	19300	NWACOL NPTRIPMT	AVIATION WARFARE	1310	H	7020H	NEWPRY
8908	42134	06100	NWACOL NPTRIPMT	STRATEGY PROFESS	1000	G	7020P	NEWPRY
8908	42134	06210	NWACOL NPTRIPMT	STRATEGY PROFESS	1000	G	7020D	NEWPRY
8908	42134	06400	NWACOL NPTRIPMT	STRATEGY PROFESS	1000	H	7020P	NEWPRY
8908	42134	19200	NWACOL NPTRIPMT	SURFACE WARFARE/	1110	H	7020H	NEWPRY
8909	00011	61215	OPNAV	OP-603F STRATEGI	1050	G	0020P	ARLING
8909	00011	60100	OPNAV	OP-06C EXEC SEC	1000	H	7020R	ARLING
8909	03161	65700	NAVAL ACAD	DIRECTOR	1000	G	7020P	ANNAP
8910	00064	34100	USCINCLANT	DIR	50 1050	G	7020R	NORVA
8910	64591	01020	JNTSTRATARPPLNSTF	AIDE TO VICE	0 1000	I	7020S	OMAHA
8910	65895	13327	CINCIBERLANT	SUB OPS/EXERCISE	1120	J	0020T	LISBON
8911	00011	60950	OPNAV	OP-602 HD POLICY	1050	G	7020H	ARLING
8912	00161	65800	NAVAL ACAD	EXEC AST	1000	I	0020P	ANNAP
8912	00161	68100	NAVAL ACAD	CHMN/ASSOC CHMN	1000	H	7020D	ANNAP
9001	44069	79300	OSD WASH DC BRUS	PLN OFF	1110	H	7020H	BRUSLS
9003	41566	50000	NAVOTTS A FMS	SPECIAL PROJECTS	1000	H	7020S	ARLING
9006	42134	17450	NWACOL NPTRIPMT	NCC/FACULTY	1050	H	7020H	NEWPRY
9007	42134	26475	NWACOL NPTRIPMT	NAV SCI RSCH/ASS	1110	H	7020S	NEWPRY
9007	41566	00200	NAVOTTS A FMS	DIR OPS AND ADMN	1050	G	7020P	ARLING
9007	42134	17100	NWACOL NPTRIPMT	DIRECTOR NCC	1050	G	7020H	NEWPRY
9007	42547	42200	PEP USAF ACADEMY	POL SCI INSTR	1000	J	0020P	COLSPS
9008	57805	00200	COMNAVSURFGR MED	CHIEF STF OFF	1110	G	0020S	NAPLES
9008	42547	42150	PEP USAF ACADEMY	USAF ACAD FAC IN	1000	I	0020P	COLSPS
9009	00011	60060	OPNAV	OP-06A EXECUTIVE	1000	G	7020R	ARLING
9009	42134	15300	NWACOL NPTRIPMT	HD STRAT/POLICY	1000	H	7020P	NEWPRY
9010	42134	06300	NWACOL NPTRIPMT	STRATEGY PROFESS	1000	H	7020P	NEWPRY
9011	57071	00110	CINCHAN/CINCELT	ASST CDS OPERATI	1110	G	7020S	N WOOD
9011	00011	60970	OPNAV	OP-602C DEFENSE	1000	I	0020T	ARLING
9011	00011	03530	OPNAV	OP-095A1 AIDE/AD	1050	I	0020S	ARLING
9012	42134	26420	NWACOL NPTRIPMT	ASST DIR STRAT S	1000	H	7020R	NEWPRY
9102	41566	70400	NAVOTTS A FMS	ASST E ASIA/PACI	1000	J	0020S	ARLING
9104	00011	63050	OPNAV	OP-61B DEP DIR P	1000	G	7020D	ARLING
9105	00161	68500	NAVAL ACAD	INST POL SCI	1000	I	7020P	ANNAP
9107	41566	90000	NAVOTTS A FMS	DEP NEAR EAST/50	1000	H	0020T	ARLING
9107	00011	61000	OPNAV	OP-602D COMMAND	1050	H	7020P	ARLING
9108	00011	61203	OPNAV	OP-603 STRATEGY	1050	G	7020D	ARLING
9108	00011	00125	OPNAV	OP-00K1 ASST FOR	1000	G	7020P	ARLING
9108	41566	00500	NAVOTTS A FMS	ORIENTATION TOUR	1000	J	0020S	ARLING
9108	00011	60090	OPNAV	OP-06A1 AIDE/ADM	1000	I	0020T	ARLING
9108	41999	00200	FMSDEFINST SAM	COURSE DIR - MAA	1050	H	0020P	WRIGHT
9109	00064	30100	USCINCLANT	DEP DIR	50 1050	G	7020R	NORVA
9109	42134	06500	NWACOL NPTRIPMT	STRATEGY PROFESS	1000	H	7020P	NEWPRY
9111	42134	06200	NWACOL NPTRIPMT	ADV C&S INST/STR	1000	G	7020P	NEWPRY
9201	00029	85250	OSD	CNTFY DIR IRAM/I	1000	H	7020P	ARLING
9201	65143	00550	INTERAMER DEF BD	ADVISOR/INSTR	0 1000	G	7020P	WASHDC
9202	64590	02965	SACLANT	STRAT BRIEF COOR	1050	H	7020T	NORVA
9203	57020	32000	COMSUBPAC	STF PLNS/STF MIN	1120	H	7020S	PEARL
9204	00161	68200	NAVAL ACAD	INST POL SCI	1000	I	0020P	ANNAP
9205	42134	26475	NWACOL NPTRIPMT	NAV SCI RSCH/ASS	1110	H	7020S	NEWPRY

PRD	AUIC	BSC	ACTIVITY	BTITLE	BDESQ	BGRADE	BSUBJ	HCNEPT
	79109	04805	CINCUSCENTCOM	SCY ASST STF 76	1050	M	70215	MACDIL
8812	63415	01505	DEFINTEL AGENCY	COUNTRY OFF	1000	M	3021R	ARLING
8903	41566	90200	NAVOTTS FMS	ASST NEAR E/S AS	1110	J	0021T	ARLING
8905	63415	01490	DEFINTEL AGENCY	COUNTRY OFF	1000	M	3021R	ARLING
8906	00011	63150	OPNAV	OP-611 HD MID-EA	1000	Q	70210	ARLING
8907	63415	01505	DEFINTEL AGENCY	COUNTRY OFF	1000	M	3021R	ARLING
8907	07172	00700	AGF 3 LA SALLE	NAVIGATOR	1110	J	00215	PHILA
8912	00061	50130	CINCUSNAVEUR	BALKAN/MIDEAST/A	1300	I	70215	LONDON
9003	68009	00300	OFFUSDEFREP PAKI	CHIEF/NAVY DIV 5	1050	M	0021P	ISLAMA
9004	63415	00690	DEFINTEL AGENCY	INTEL OFF(IRAQ)	1630	I	0021P	ARLING
9007	35306	00202	MILLIOFF TUNISIA	MIL ASST PROG OF	1050	I	7021P	TUNIS
9007	46452	07903	DIA ELE CENTC	ID (MIL/POL-APR)	1630	I	0021P	MACDIL
9007	63415	00670	DEFINTEL AGENCY	INTEL OFF(LEBANO	1630	I	0021P	ARLING
9009	66690	02040	FOSIF ROTA PROD	ANALYTICAL SPEC	1630	J	00215	ROTA
9105	41566	60300	NAVOTTS FMS	ASST EUROPE AND	1000	M	0021T	ARLING
9108	00011	63205	OPNAV	OP-611B ASST BR	1000	M	70210	ARLING
9108	41566	60300	NAVOTTS FMS	ASST EUROPE AND	1000	M	0021T	ARLING
	00070	22950	CINCPACFLT	MIL ASSTC PROG/D	1000	J	00225	PEARL
	00038	44220	USCINCPAC	FORCE PLANS	53	I	60225	PEARL
	46626	00210	USPAC JNT SA THI	CHIEF/JNT EXER O	1110	M	70225	BANKOK
	41566	70000	NAVOTTS FMS	DIR EAST/PACIFIC	1050	Q	7022P	ARLING
8807	00011	63325	OPNAV	OP-612D NORTHEAS	1000	I	70225	ARLING
8903	41566	20400	NAVOTTS FMS	TECH TRANSFER CO	1110	I	0022T	ARLING
8906	41566	20600	NAVOTTS FMS	TECH TRANSFER CO	1000	M	70225	ARLING
8906	41566	00150	NAVOTTS FMS	ASST FOR JCS MAY	1000	M	0022T	ARLING
8906	46626	00210	USPAC JNT SA THI	CHIEF/JNT EXER O	1110	M	70225	BANKOK
8907	57006	00200	COM NAVFOR JAPAN	CHIEF OF STAFF	1000	Q	70220	YOKSKA
8911	41566	70300	NAVOTTS FMS	ASST E ASIA/PACI	1000	M	00225	ARLING
9003	64755	12120	COMUSKOREA	PLANS OFF	51	I	7022H	SEOUL
9003	63851	10030	USCINCPAC R PHIL	STF NEGOTIATIONS	1000	Q	7022R	SUBIC
9006	00038	42400	USCINCPAC	CHIEF 521/01	1000	Q	70220	PEARL
9008	46626	00220	USPAC JNT SA THI	ASST JNT EXER OF	1050	I	7022T	BANKOK
9008	00038	43700	USCINCPAC	FORCE PLANS	53	M	60225	PEARL
9009	43465	00000	JSOC	PLNS/POL PAC	51	M	7022R	F BRAG
9010	68627	01410	HQUNC MOROKUSCFC	UNC LIA OFF	4	I	70225	SEOUL
9010	00038	26100	USCINCPAC	CHIEF	34	M	60225	PEARL
9104	00038	42500	USCINCPAC	PLANS OFF 521/03	1000	M	7022P	PEARL
9104	57006	06720	COM NAVFOR JAPAN	P & P CHIEF	1300	I	70225	YOKSKA
9106	00011	63250	OPNAV	OP-612 HD EAST A	1050	Q	70220	ARLING
9106	57006	06710	COM NAVFOR JAPAN	P & P DIRECTOR	1110	M	7022P	YOKSKA
9107	00038	44220	USCINCPAC	FORCE PLANS	53	I	60225	PEARL
9107	57006	06710	COM NAVFOR JAPAN	P & P DIRECTOR	1110	M	7022P	YOKSKA
9109	00011	63325	OPNAV	OP-612D NORTHEAS	1000	I	70225	ARLING
9110	57011	05700	COMINWARCOM	NATO/ALLIED PLAN	1050	I	70225	CHARLE
9111	00011	63311	OPNAV	OP-612C ASST BR	1000	I	00220	ARLING
9207	57006	00200	COM NAVFOR JAPAN	CHIEF OF STAFF	1000	G	70220	YOKSKA
	43574	01000	US MILLOF BARBAD	CHIEF USMLO BARB	1110	M	7023G	BTOWN
8810	46630	00330	USCINSO IN/ANA C	CHIEF	103	J	0023G	BALBOA
8811	65143	00300	INTERAMER DEF BD	STF MBR	0	M	7023R	WASHDC
8901	65143	00300	INTERAMER DEF BD	STF MBR	0	M	7023R	WASHDC
8906	44092	00100	US MILGRP EL SAL	NAVY REP	01/05	M	7023H	SANSEL
8907	63415	01460	DEFINTEL AGENCY	COUNTRY OFF	1110	M	3023R	ARLING
8908	65143	00350	INTERAMER DEF BD	STF MBR	0	G	7023R	WASHDC
8908	46630	00330	USCINSO IN/ANA C	CHIEF	103	J	0023G	BALBOA
9001	43574	01000	US MILLOF BARBAD	CHIEF USMLO BARB	1110	M	7023G	BTOWN
9003	57061	00710	COM SOLANTFOR	FLAG SECRETARY	1110	I	0023T	RODSRD
9004	57061	02010	COM SOLANTFOR	AIR ASM/PLANS	1300	M	70235	RODSRD
9005	57061	01810	COM SOLANTFOR	OPERATIONS	1110	M	70235	RODSRD
9007	00011	63450	OPNAV	OP-613C ASST BR	1000	I	7023P	ARLING
9008	41566	70200	NAVOTTS FMS	ASST E ASIA/PACI	1000	M	7023P	ARLING
9009	41566	00200	NAVOTTS FMS	ASST LATIN AMERI	1110	J	0023T	ARLING
9011	00066	34400	USCINCLANT	STRATSPOLICY	50	M	70235	NORVA
9107	00011	63350	OPNAV	OP-613 HD WESTER	1000	Q	70230	ARLING
9108	00011	63425	OPNAV	OP-61301 CUBA/CC	1000	I	7023P	ARLING
9111	63415	01447	DEFINTEL AGENCY	COUNTRY OFF	1000	M	3023R	ARLING
9202	00066	34500	USCINCLANT	SECTY	50	G	7023R	NORVA

PPD	AUC	BSC	ACTIVITY	BTITLE	BDESG	BGRADE	BSUBI	HOMEPT
	43665	00810	JSDC	PLNS/POL EUR 51	1050	H	7024R	F BRAG
	00061	50110	CINCUSNAVEUR	HD POLICY BR ADD	1000	H	7024P	LONDON
	64766	00130	SOCEUR	CHIEF OF STAFF 0	1050	G	7024P	VAIHIM
	63849	00210	EUCOM US ELEM	NAVY COORD OFF 0	1000	G	7024P	CASTEA
8812	62370	00902	JNTMIL MISS TURK	SURF & TRN PL/PR	1110	H	0024S	ANKARA
8902	00011	61240	OPNAV	OP-603K NATO RAT	1050	I	0024S	ARLING
8903	63845	00410	USCINCEUR	SECTY STF OFF 0	1000	I	7024S	STUTTG
8903	00061	50110	CINCUSNAVEUR	HD POLICY BR ADD	1000	H	7024P	LONDON
8905	64590	00955	SACLANT	ACOS PLANS C	1000	G	7024S	NORVA
8906	64771	02500	HQ AF SOUTH	CHIEF	1300	H	0024S	NAPLES
8906	62370	00602	JNTMIL MISS TURK	CHIEF 06/01	1050	G	0024S	ANKARA
8907	65986	00510	NATO MIL COMMIT	STF PLN (NAV/NUC	1000	G	7024S	BRUSLS
8907	62370	01602	JNTMIL MISS TURK	AVN/SUB PLNS/PRO	1312	I	0024S	ANKARA
8908	66030	02710	HQ NAVSOUTH	DACOS PXX	1050	G	7024S	NAPLES
8908	00011	63600	OPNAV	OP-614C ASST BR	1000	I	0024T	ARLING
8910	63415	01410	DEFINTEL AGENCY	CHIEF	1000	G	3024R	ARLING
8911	00011	61235	OPNAV	OP-603J NATO STR	1000	I	7024Q	ARLING
8911	41566	90100	NAVOTTS FMS	ASST NEAR E/S AS	1000	I	0024T	ARLING
8912	00001	20110	CINCUSNAVEUR	GEOPOLITICAL INT	1630	I	0024P	LONDON
8912	63415	02230	DEFINTEL AGENCY	IO (MC WE/NATO)	1630	I	0024H	ARLING
8912	41566	60200	NAVOTTS FMS	ASST EUROPE AND	1000	H	7024S	ARLING
9001	63415	01810	DEFINTEL AGENCY	INTEL OFF	1630	H	0024S	ARLING
9004	63415	00650	DEFINTEL AGENCY	INTEL OFFCWE/NAT	1000	I	3024P	ARLING
9005	57011	05800	COMINELWARCOM	ASST ALLIED PLAN	1300	I	7024S	CHARLE
9006	43665	00810	JSDC	PLNS/POL EUR 51	1050	H	7024R	F BRAG
9007	00061	50120	CINCUSNAVEUR	EUROPE/NATO POLI	1000	I	7024S	LONDON
9007	64590	02610	SACLANT	DCOS INTEL PLNS	1300	N	7024S	NORVA
9009	64766	00410	SOCEUR	CHIEF REG OPS 31	1130	H	7024R	VAIHIM
9011	62370	00902	JNTMIL MISS TURK	SURF & TRN PL/PR	1110	H	0024S	ANKARA
9012	00011	61240	OPNAV	OP-603K NATO RAT	1050	I	0024S	ARLING
9012	41566	70100	NAVOTTS FMS	ASST E ASIA/PACI	1110	I	0024T	ARLING
9103	00011	63500	OPNAV	OP-614 HD EURNA	1050	G	7024Q	ARLING
9106	41566	60000	NAVOTTS FMS	DIR EUROPE AND H	1050	G	7024P	ARLING
9107	63415	01410	DEFINTEL AGENCY	CHIEF	1000	G	3024R	ARLING
9108	63849	00210	EUCOM US ELEM	NAVY COORD OFF 0	1000	G	7024P	CASTEA
9108	00011	61235	OPNAV	OP-603J NATO STR	1000	I	7024Q	ARLING
9109	64166	00350	SHAPE	STAFF OFF PPI	1310	H	7024P	CASTEA
9206	63415	01420	DEFINTEL AGENCY	COUNTRY OFF	1630	H	0024S	ARLING
9209	62370	01602	JNTMIL MISS TURK	AVN/SUB PLNS/PRO	1312	I	0024S	ANKARA
	64590	02940	SACLANT	FORCE RQMTS OFF	1050	H	0025P	NORVA
	00011	64810	OPNAV	OP-652C ASST FOR	1000	H	7025P	ARLING
8810	63845	07010	USCINCEUR	STF OPS PLNS 66	1050	H	7025P	STUTTG
8908	39096	02000	NAVLIADOFF BAHAMA	LIAISON OFF AMBA	1110	I	7025P	NASSAU
9001	68876	10100	NAVOTTS WASH DC	HD VISITS CONTR0	1300	I	7025S	ARLING
9002	65986	00620	NATO MIL COMMIT	SO NAV BOARD (IN	1000	I	0025T	BRUSLS
9003	00011	64815	OPNAV	OP-652D ASST FOR	1000	I	7025P	ARLING
9003	00011	64810	OPNAV	OP-652C ASST FOR	1000	H	7025P	ARLING
9004	00011	64800	OPNAV	OP-652 HD NUCLEA	1000	G	7025Q	ARLING
9007	65986	00610	NATO MIL COMMIT	US NAVY DELEGATE	1000	G	7025Q	BRUSLS
9008	44069	79100	OSD WASH DC BRUS	DEF DIR DEF OPS/	1050	G	0025H	BRUSLS
9008	00011	06457	OPNAV	OP-132H4 ASST FO	1000	I	0025T	ARLING
9008	00029	19300	OSD	COUNTRY DIR/SPAI	1000	G	0025H	ARLING
9012	64590	02940	SACLANT	FORCE RQMTS OFF	1050	H	0025P	NORVA
9105	00011	06457	OPNAV	OP-132H4 ASST FO	1000	I	0025T	ARLING
9109	63845	07010	USCINCEUR	STF OPS PLNS 66	1050	H	7025P	STUTTG
9109	68876	30000	NAVOTTS WASH DC	DIR TECH TRANSFE	1000	G	7025H	ARLING
9112	64122	00420	ARMCON&DISARMAGY	OPERATIONS OFF	1000	H	0025S	WASHDC
9203	00029	85030	OSD	ASST FOR JAPAN	1000	I	0025P	ARLING
9207	63415	00300	DEFINTEL AGENCY	INT OFF (INTL NE	1630	H	0025S	ARLING
	32791	72482	OPNAV/RPM	OP-601E WARMAPS	1000	I	7026S	ARLING
	00011	60450	OPNAV	OP-60F ASST FOR	1050	G	7026M	ARLING
	00011	60540	OPNAV	OP-601C2 JOINT F	1000	I	7026S	ARLING
	00011	61900	OPNAV	OP-60S BEN PUR F	1050	G	7026M	ARLING
	00038	22510	USCINCPAC	SPEC PLNS STF 31	1050	I	7026H	PEARL
	63852	00410	COMSTRIKEFLTANT	ASST FOR NATO OP	1050	H	7026S	NORVA
	00070	22400	CINCPACFLT	STF MINE WRF-SE/	1050	H	0026T	PEARL
8804	00070	14000	CINCPACFLT	STF NUCIEP/NUCIE	1300	H	7026S	PEARL
8810	00070	19500	CINCPACFLT	STAFF PLANS/FLEE	1050	G	7026R	PEARL
8812	00011	60350	OPNAV	OP-60D ASST FOR	1050	G	7026M	ARLING
8901	00011	61223	OPNAV	OP-603M STRATEGI	1000	I	0026S	ARLING
8901	00070	19500	CINCPACFLT	STAFF PLANS/FLEE	1050	G	7026R	PEARL



PRO	AUTC	OSC	ACTIVITY	BTITLE	BDESG	BCRADE	BSNCR	CONCEPT
8901	64590	00660	SACLANT	STF OFF - EXERCI	1300	H	70265	NORVA
8901	32798	73000	CINCPACFLT/RPH	STAFF LIAISON/NA	1000	H	70265	PEARL
8902	00011	60400	OPNAV	OP-60E ASST FOR	1050	G	70266	ARLING
8903	00011	62010	OPNAV	OP-605B AIR WARF	1300	H	7026P	ARLING
8904	32791	72487	OPNAV/RPH	OP-606B MISSION	1110	H	70265	ARLING
8905	00061	50410	CINCUSNAVEUR	UNCONVENTIONAL W	1130	I	70265	LONDON
8905	00011	60535	OPNAV	OP-601C1 JOINT S	1310	H	70265	ARLING
8905	63852	00500	COMSTRIKEFLTLANT	ASST NATO PLANS	1300	H	70265	NORVA
8906	00030	22510	USCINCPAC	SPEC PLMS STF J1	1050	I	7026H	PEARL
8906	00011	61202	OPNAV	OP-602J OPS POLI	1000	H	7026P	ARLING
8906	00011	60320	OPNAV	OP-608 DEP DIR S	1050	G	7026H	ARLING
8907	42134	12100	NWARGCOL NPTRIPHT	CHAIRMAN OPS DEP	1050	G	70265	NEWPR
8907	00070	20200	CINCPACFLT	STF OPS&PLANS/FO	1300	H	0026T	PEARL
8907	64166	00490	SHAPE	STAFF OFF OOP	1050	I	7026P	CASTEA
8907	00011	60530	OPNAV	OP-601C JOINT PL	1000	H	70265	ARLING
8907	64763	00110	COM CANLANT	INTERNATIONAL PL	1110	I	70265	HALIFX
8907	00066	36200	USCINCLANT	STRATIPOLICY 50	1050	H	70265	NORVA
8907	00070	21100	CINCPACFLT	STF OPS & PLMS/A	1300	H	0026T	PEARL
8908	00011	60450	OPNAV	OP-60F ASST FOR	1050	G	7026H	ARLING
8908	64736	03220	NORAD HDOTRS	PLANS OFF J11	1050	H	7026P	COLSPS
8908	00070	19900	CINCPACFLT	STF OPS&PLANS/ST	1110	H	0026T	PEARL
8908	00070	20300	CINCPACFLT	STF OPS & PLANS/	1000	H	70265	PEARL
8909	00011	63225	OPNAV	OP-611D ASST BR	1000	H	70265	ARLING
8909	42091	20200	PG SCH PROFESTRG	INSTR NSA (EUROP	1000	I	70260	MONTEY
8909	00070	21450	CINCPACFLT	STRK OPS/AIR STR	1310	I	0026T	PEARL
8909	42134	26445	NWARGCOL NPTRIPHT	CAMPAIGN ANALYST	1050	H	70265	NEWPR
8909	00061	50210	CINCUSNAVEUR	STRATEGIC PLANS	1050	H	70265	LONDON
8909	64166	01100	SHAPE	NAVAL STF OFX	1110	H	7026P	CASTEA
8910	46632	05550	DCA DSCD SACRAM	LIAISON OFF	1000	H	5026P	SACRAM
8910	68869	07900	NSPECWARCEN CORO	ANALYST	1130	J	4026P	CORNDO
8910	32791	72487	OPNAV/RPH	OP-606B MISSION	1110	H	70265	ARLING
8910	45582	04200	SOCAPAC	MARITIME OPS 3	1130	H	7026H	AJEA
8911	42134	26450	NWARGCOL NPTRIPHT	CAMPAIGN ANALYST	1120	H	70265	NEWPR
8911	00070	21400	CINCPACFLT	STF PLANS/HD WAR	1300	G	7026R	PEARL
8911	00061	30130	CINCUSNAVEUR	STF A OPS ADDU T	1300	H	70265	LONDON
8911	42134	26430	NWARGCOL NPTRIPHT	CAMPAIGN ANALYST	1000	I	70265	NEWPR
9001	42134	26445	NWARGCOL NPTRIPHT	CAMPAIGN ANALYST	1050	H	70265	NEWPR
9003	00011	61990	OPNAV	OP-605A SURFACE	1110	I	7026P	ARLING
9003	00070	21500	CINCPACFLT	STF OPS & PLMS/G	1120	I	70265	PEARL
9003	00070	21700	CINCPACFLT	STF OPS&PLMS/CEN	1110	H	70265	PEARL
9004	32791	72480	OPNAV/RPH	OP-601D MOB POLI	1000	H	70265	ARLING
9004	63852	00410	COMSTRIKEFLTLANT	ASST FOR NATO OP	1050	H	70265	NORVA
9005	00011	61210	OPNAV	OP-603E STRATEGI	1000	H	7026C	ARLING
9005	00061	50140	CINCUSNAVEUR	MINE WRF POLICY	1050	I	70265	LONDON
9006	00011	61220	OPNAV	OP-603G STRATEGI	1050	H	0026P	ARLING
9006	00060	15300	CINCLANTFLT	DIR FOR LOGISTIC	1200	G	7026R	NORVA
9006	46632	05530	DCA DSCD SACRAM	LIAISON OFF	1000	H	5026P	SACRAM
9007	00011	62000	OPNAV	OP-605G SUBSURFA	1120	H	7026P	ARLING
9007	68869	07700	NSPECWARCEN CORO	ANALYST	1130	H	4026P	CORNDO
9008	00011	61205	OPNAV	OP-603C STRATIC	1050	H	7026Q	ARLING
9009	00061	50420	CINCUSNAVEUR	UNCONVENTIONAL W	1130	J	0026T	LONDON
9009	00011	61200	OPNAV	OP-603D STRATEGI	1000	I	0026P	ARLING
9010	00011	61080	OPNAV	OP-602G OPS POLI	1110	I	0026T	ARLING
9010	65146	60185	OPNVSUPACT WASH	OP-00K3C TACTICS	1050	I	00265	ARLING
9010	42134	26460	NWARGCOL NPTRIPHT	CAMPAIGN ANALYST	1110	H	70265	NEWPR
9102	00011	60535	OPNAV	OP-601C1 JOINT S	1310	H	70265	ARLING
9103	00011	62010	OPNAV	OP-605B AIR WARF	1300	H	7026P	ARLING
9104	00070	22400	CINCPACFLT	STF MINE WRF-SE/	1050	H	0026T	PEARL
9106	65146	50100	OPNVSUPACT WASH	STRATEGIC PLANMI	1050	I	70265	ARLING
9106	00070	19700	CINCPACFLT	STF PLANS/HD STR	1110	G	70265	PEARL
9107	00011	61090	OPNAV	OP-602H OPS POLI	1310	H	70265	ARLING
9107	44081	00810	USCINCEUR ELE SH	STF OP PLN OFF 0	1000	G	7026Q	CASTEA
9107	00011	61625	OPNAV	OP-614D ASST BR	1000	H	70265	ARLING
9107	00061	50030	CINCUSNAVEUR	HD PLMS BR/WAR P	1110	H	7026R	LONDON
9107	64763	00210	COM CANLANT	PLANNING	1302	I	70265	HALIFX
9108	00011	61225	OPNAV	OP-603H STRATEGI	1000	I	70260	ARLING
9108	64590	00660	SACLANT	STF OFF - EXERCI	1300	H	70265	NORVA
9108	00011	60500	OPNAV	OP-601 HEAD. MOB	1050	G	70265	ARLING
9109	57016	00500	COMSUBLANT	STF PLANS-ACOS	1120	H	70265	NORVA
9109	00011	61230	OPNAV	OP-603I STRATEGI	1050	H	70260	ARLING
9110	00011	62020	OPNAV	OP-605C LOGISITI	1050	I	00265	ARLING
9110	32798	73000	CINCPACFLT/RPH	STAFF LIAISON/NA	1000	H	70265	PEARL
9111	42134	26455	NWARGCOL NPTRIPHT	OPS ANA/CAMPAIGN	1050	H	70265	NEWPR
9111	00061	50040	CINCUSNAVEUR	UNCON WARFARE PL	1130	I	70265	LONDON
9112	00011	60350	OPNAV	OP-60D ASST FOR	1050	G	7026H	ARLING

PRO	AUIC	BSC	ACTIVITY	BTITLE	ODESG	SGRADE	BSUB1	HOMEPT
9201	65146	50030	OPNVSUPACT WASH	STRATEGIC PLANMI	1050	H	70260	ARLING
9201	00070	19900	CINCPACFLT	STF OPS&PLANS/ST	1110	H	00261	PEARL
9202	00070	21500	CINCPACFLT	STF OPS & PLNS/G	1120	I	70265	PEARL
9204	00070	20300	CINCPACFLT	STF OPS & PLANS/	1000	H	70265	PEARL
9204	64166	00490	SHAPE	STAFF OFF OOP	1050	I	7026P	CASTEA
9207	00070	21100	CINCPACFLT	STF OPS & PLNS/A	1300	H	0026T	PEARL
9210	00066	34200	USCINCLANT	STRATAPOLICY	50 1050	H	70265	NORVA
9301	64736	03220	NORAD HQTRS	PLANS OFF	311 1050	H	7026P	COLSPS
	00011	66730	OPNAV	OP-65B DEP DIR S	1120	G	7027M	ARLING
	64591	06090	JNTSTRATARPLNSTF	STRAT PLANS	0 1310	I	7027P	OMAHA
	64591	11010	JNTSTRATARPLNSTF	MSL OPS STAFF OF	1120	G	7027Q	OMAHA
	64591	11150	JNTSTRATARPLNSTF	DEP CHIEF(NOM)	1 1000	H	7027P	OMAHA
	46632	05520	DCA DSCO SACRAM	LIAISON OFF	1000	H	7027P	SACRAM
8802	64591	11100	JNTSTRATARPLNSTF	MSL OPS STAFF OF	1120	J	7027P	OMAHA
8806	64591	13060	JNTSTRATARPLNSTF	CHIEF, C OF E	1 1050	H	7027P	OMAHA
8809	00011	66770	OPNAV	OP-651D STRATEGI	1000	H	7027P	ARLING
8810	63545	04610	USCINCEUR	STF OPS PLNS	52 1300	H	7027S	STUITG
8901	39305	00100	CSUBGR 9 RM DLGM	STAFF WEAPONS/CS	1120	I	7027P	DAIGRM
8904	00011	66750	OPNAV	OP-651 HD STRAT	1000	H	7027Q	ARLING
8905	64166	00480	SHAPE	STAFF OFF OON	1120	I	7027P	CASTEA
8906	64591	11010	JNTSTRATARPLNSTF	MSL OPS STAFF OF	1120	G	7027Q	OMAHA
8907	00066	27200	USCINCLANT	DEP DIR NUC	30 1120	H	7027Q	NORVA
8907	57020	60010	COMSUBPAC	STF OPS & PLNS/A	1120	G	7027Q	PEARL
8907	64591	06090	JNTSTRATARPLNSTF	STRAT PLANS	0 1310	I	7027P	OMAHA
8908	00011	66910	OPNAV	OP-654C4 SIOP/RI	1000	I	7027S	ARLING
8908	64591	10010	JNTSTRATARPLNSTF	CHIEF (NOM)	1 1000	G	7027Q	OMAHA
8908	00066	27100	USCINCLANT	DIR NUC OPS	30 1120	G	7027M	NORVA
8909	00066	27400	USCINCLANT	SSBN CURRENT	30 1120	H	7027S	NORVA
8910	00011	66840	OPNAV	OP-653D THEATER	1050	H	7027P	ARLING
8911	00038	44400	USCINCPAC	NUC SPEC PLNS	54 1300	H	6027S	PEARL
8911	63007	01450	NUCWEAPTRGR LANT	INSTYR CONV WAF	1320	J	0027T	NORVA
9001	00070	22000	CINCPACFLT	STF OPS & PLNS/A	1300	H	7027S	PEARL
9001	57020	63000	COMSUBPAC	STF OPS & PLNS/S	1120	I	7027P	PEARL
9002	57020	60040	COMSUBPAC	STF OPS & PLNS/S	1120	H	7027P	PEARL
9003	64591	11150	JNTSTRATARPLNSTF	DEP CHIEF(NOM)	1 1000	H	7027P	OMAHA
9003	57020	64000	COMSUBPAC	STF OPS & PLNS/S	1120	I	7027P	PEARL
9004	57020	64200	COMSUBPAC	STF OPS & PLNS/A	1120	J	0027T	PEARL
9004	64591	11300	JNTSTRATARPLNSTF	STRAT PLNS OFF	1 1120	J	7027P	OMAHA
9006	00038	23100	USCINCPAC	CHIEF 320/01	1120	G	0027R	PEARL
9007	00011	66820	OPNAV	OP-653 THEATER M	1000	H	7027Q	ARLING
9007	64590	02620	SACLANC	SPEC ASST NUC AF	1000	G	7027S	NORVA
9007	00011	66770	OPNAV	OP-651D STRATEGI	1000	H	7027P	ARLING
9009	64591	08020	JNTSTRATARPLNSTF	ASST DEP DIR	0 1120	G	7027Q	OMAHA
9009	57020	63100	COMSUBPAC	STF OPS & PLNS/S	1120	I	7027S	PEARL
9010	00066	35100	USCINCLANT	DIR NUC	50 1050	G	0027S	NORVA
9011	63845	04610	USCINCEUR	STF OPS PLNS	52 1300	H	7027S	STUITG
9011	00038	23400	USCINCPAC	SSBN OPS OFF	321 1120	H	0027Q	PEARL
9101	79109	03005	CINCUSCENTCOM	DEP DIRECTOR	30 1050	G	7027S	MACDIL
9101	00061	50190	CINCUSNAVEUR	ASST NUC PLNS/PO	1050	I	0027P	LONDON
9106	65986	00910	NATO MIL COMMIT	STF PLN NUC PLN	1000	G	7027S	BRUSLS
9106	64166	00470	SHAPE	STAFF OFF OON	1310	H	0027P	CASTEA
9107	00061	50180	CINCUSNAVEUR	NUCLEAR PLNS/POL	1300	H	7027Q	LONDON
9108	46632	05520	DCA DSCO SACRAM	LIAISON OFF	1000	H	5027P	SACRAM
9112	64166	00480	SHAPE	STAFF OFF OON	1120	I	7027P	CASTEA
9112	00011	66760	OPNAV	OP-651C HD STRAT	1120	I	7027P	ARLING
9203	00011	66730	OPNAV	OP-65B DEP DIR S	1120	G	7027M	ARLING

## 2. How to Get the Pol-Mil Job You Want

Less than half of all Pol-Mil billets - the billets listed above - are currently filled by officers with a Pol-Mil subspecialty. The problem is not a lack of subspecialists (there are 327 Pol/Mil coded billets and over 1500 Pol/Mil subspecialists) but rather that we Pol-Mil types often lack the data we need to get the jobs we want and for which we are coded.

The listing provided above goes a long way towards solving this problem. To ensure that the list is as helpful as possible, a walk through some of its more subtle aspects follows.

(1) Begin by turning to the section which exactly matches your subspecialty code (e.g., XX26; ignore the first two digits). If you do not yet possess a Pol-Mil code, look through the entire list for billets coded with T (e.g., XX26T). These are entry level billets (Pol-Mil code not required).

(2) Within that section, run down the left-hand column until you reach your PRD. Mark off those billets with a PRD within three months of yours.

(3) Of these billets, cross out those for which your designator renders you ineligible (e.g., 1630 billets if you are a URL). Remember that 1050 billets are open to all warfare specialists, and 1000 billets to all line officers.

(4) Examine carefully the remaining billets. Do the activity, billet title, and location (HOMEPT) of these billets appeal to you? Highlight those which are of interest.

(5) By now, you probably have a very short list of potential Pol-Mil jobs. Here's where some subtleties come into play.

(a) Grade/rank: Consider yourself a candidate for billets with two ranks - yours and the next higher paygrade. Many of these LCDR billets, for example, are currently held by LTs.

(b) Subspecialty suffix: The letter after each subspecialty code designates a level of achievement within the subspecialty; e.g. "P" denotes a Master's degree in the subject. (For a complete list of these codes, see NAVPERS 15839F, Part E). If you don't possess the requested amount of education or experience, press on -- after all, less than half of these billets are currently filled by individuals with any background in Pol-Mil. If you do have the qualifications for which the billet is coded, you are a leg up on the competition. Remind your detailer of this fact, early and often.

(c) Other subspecialties: Glance through the listings for the other Pol-Mil subspecialties. If you see any interesting billets in these areas, remember again that most are filled with nonspecialists. Your Pol-Mil code gives you an edge for any Pol-Mil billet, whether or not the fourth digits match.

(6) Finally, remember that detailing is an inexact science. While no billets are specifically coded for 'hot runners', some will in fact go only to these officers. Your reputation in your warfare community, your fitness reports, your PRD, and the amount of money available for PCS moves will all have as much impact on your assignment as your subspecialty code. However, by understanding the factors involved, approaching the situation reasonably (and early), and knowing what the possibilities are, you can tip the odds in favor of the assignment you desire.

### 3. A Note for the XX27 Community

OP-06 is the community manager for all Pol-Mil subspecialties. Since the OP-602 branch is assigned responsibility for seven of the eight Pol-Mil codes, this newsletter originates there. However, officers in the Strategic Plans (Nuclear) community (XX27) should be aware that their Primary Consultant is OP-651, the Strategic Nuclear Plans, Policy, and Requirements Branch. The OP-651 point of contact for subspecialty matters is LCDR Jan Rivenburg, (202)-693-3919, A/V 223-3919.

### 4. References

The following publications provide much of the information you'll need to properly manage your subspecialist career:

- NAVPERS 15839F, Manual of Navy Officer Manpower and Personnel Classifications;  
Volume I: Major Code Structures  
Volume II: The Officer Data Card
- MILPERSMAN:  
1420320 Country, Area, or Regional Specialist  
(CARS) Qualifications  
1430300 Officer Subspecialty System
- OPNAVNOTE 1520, Fully Funded Graduate Education Programs
- OPNAVINST 1520.34A, Admiral Arthur S. Moreau Program For Post-Masters Study in International Relations and Strategy

5. Harvard/Tufts Masters Degree Program  
(OPNAVNOTE 1520, Course #668)

Congratulations to the officers who were picked in a December 1988 board action to attend Harvard and Tufts for a year beginning September 1989.

Harvard - LCDR Jeffrey L. Fowler, 1120  
- LT Charles W. Fowler, 1320

Tufts - CDR William M. Dunaway, 1110  
- LCDR Donald M. Burks, 1310

Welcome to Pol-Mil!

6. The Admiral Arthur S. Moreau Program

The Admiral Arthur S. Moreau Program for Post-Masters study in International Relations and Strategy provides for one year of Pol-Mil post-Masters study at a choice of six universities. For more information see OPNAVINST 1520.34A of 22 Nov 1988. Extended deadline for applications is 15 Feb 1989; selections will be announced in March 1989.

7. Subspecialty Selection Board

The Pol-Mil Subspecialty Selection Board is convened by Commander, Naval Military Personnel Command, to review the Lieutenant Commander (select) through Captain unrestricted line membership of the community and to identify proven subspecialists. The Board convenes every two years and is scheduled to meet 24 July 1989. Requests for any consideration should reach NMPC-440 prior to the convening of the Board.

8. The Joint Scene

The DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 has changed the way Naval Officers plan careers. The law, as amended in FY 88, requires a Joint Duty tour (3 years) for an officer to be eligible for promotion to O-7. It also creates the Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) designation, which requires Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) and a Joint Duty tour. JPME was redefined in January, 1989, as comprising any Service War College (Phase I) followed by a Joint Course (junior, 9 weeks; senior, 5 weeks) at the Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA (Phase II). This program will be effective for those commencing Service War College in AY 89-90.

9. Future Editions

We welcome, even encourage, feedback from you, the Pol-Mil community. Please tell us what you'd like to see in future editions of the newsletter - it exists to serve your needs. Career guidance, Pentagon rumors, estimates of important trends in global Pol-Mil affairs - any and all of these, and more, can be included. Your questions, suggestions, and (short) submissions are solicited for this ongoing communication.

The XX20-XX26 Community Manager is CAPT Ray Figueras (OP-602). The newsletter editor and POC is LT Christopher McDonald (OP-602G1), Pentagon 4E516, (202)-695-4726, A/V 225-4726. Our next edition is scheduled for late summer, 1989.



C. R. LARSON  
VICE ADMIRAL, U.S. NAVY  
DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
(PLANS, POLICY AND OPERATIONS)

**Officer Personnel**  
**FOREIGN AREA STUDIES PROGRAM**

This regulation establishes the Foreign Area Studies Program (FASP) and prescribes the education, training, and use of officers to meet the Department of the Air Force requirements for officers with specialized knowledge of selected geographic areas and foreign languages. It applies to all Air Force officers who are or may be assigned primary functional duties requiring knowledge of a foreign area and related foreign language. It also applies to offices in HQ USAF, joint, specified, unified, and major commands, separate operating agencies (SOA), the Air Force Reserve (AFRES), and the Air National Guard (ANG) that use or train FASP officers or administer the program. This publication is affected by the Privacy Act of 1974. Each form subject to AFR 12-35, Air Force Privacy Act Program, paragraph 30, and required by this publication, contains a Privacy Act Statement either incorporated in the body of the document or in a separate statement accompanying each document. Authority to obtain this information is 10 U.S.C. 8012.

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## Section A—FASP Management

### 1. Reference Material:

- a. AFR 0-7, Index of Air Force Personnel Tests.
- b. AFR 35-8, Air Force Military Personnel Testing System.
- c. AFR 36-1, Officer Classification.
- d. AFR 36-19, Advanced Academic Degree (AAD) Management System.
- e. AFR 36-20, Officer Assignments.
- f. AFR 36-23, Officer Career Development.
- g. AFR 50-5, USAF Formal Schools Catalog (Policy, Responsibilities, General Procedures, and Course Announcements).
- h. AFR 50-40, Management of the Defense Language Program.
- i. AFR 50-50, Training for Security Assistance Personnel.
- j. AFR 700-20, volume I, Air Force Data Dictionary.

### 2. Program Objective:

a. The FASP is designed to produce, sustain, and effectively utilize a resource of qualified Air Force officers for worldwide assignment to designated positions that require a special knowledge and understanding of a country or geographic area of the world and a related foreign language. A key function of FASP officers is to provide sophisticated linkage between, understanding of, and influence on, foreign and US political and military institutions and personalities. Foreign area officers, specifically, possess the comprehensive, up-to-date knowledge of the language, military services, geography, history, economics, politics, culture, religion, and sociology of a specific foreign country or area required to make sound decisions and estimates concerning US military activities. The FASP designations should be assigned to any Air Force specialty position in which the above knowledge would enhance mission accomplishment through an individual's ability to relate with foreign nationals and interpret events and behaviors.

b. The FASP meet the above objective by providing training and assignments designed to satisfy requirements for officers with specific levels of training:

(1) Foreign language training only prepares officers as foreign language specialists. They may be assigned to billets requiring foreign language proficiency but not country or area expertise.

(2) Area or country-specific academic training and foreign language training prepare officers

as country specialists who may perform duties as required by security assistance organizations and Defense Attache offices.

(3) Area studies advanced academic degree and foreign language training prepare area specialists to work country desks at various levels and in assorted Air Force specialties.

(4) Area studies advanced academic degree, foreign language training, and in-country training or experience develop a resource of foreign area officers (FAO). These highly trained area experts may be attaches, advisors, politico-military affairs officers, liaison officers, or key security assistance organization personnel. They are frequently assigned in-country or to billets at the Joint or DOD level or at HQ USAF where their expertise can most effectively be used.

### 3. Terms Explained. See attachment 1.

### 4. Assigned Responsibilities:

a. Program Manager. HQ USAF/DPP, as program manager:

(1) Evaluates requests for direct designation into the FASP as described in paragraph 6.

(2) Recommends to the Air Force Military Personnel Center (AFMPC) the award of a special experience identifier (SEI) for direct designees.

(3) Consolidates annual graduate education quotas for the FASP in coordination with using agencies, AFMPC, and the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT).

(4) Maintains liaison with AFIT/CI on area studies academic programs.

(5) Confers with functional sponsors and the AFMPC FASP liaison office (FASPLO) on the selection, training, and assignment of FASP officers.

(6) Establishes policy and procedures for the FASP under coordination with functional managers.

(7) Reviews all AF Forms 1779, Request to Establish/Change Advanced Academic Degree Position, relating to the academic specialty codes (ASC) listed at attachment 2.

(8) Reviews and monitors all administrative and operational aspects of FASP academic, in-country, and foreign language training.

(9) Works with functional managers to arrange in-country training.

(10) Monitors all FASP officers in cooperation with the functional managers and AFMPC FASPLO.

(11) Represents US Air Force in the Defense Foreign Language Program.





**b. Functional Manager.** Each functional manager must:

(1) Establish annual AFIT FASP graduate education requirements in coordination with using agencies, command and SOA managers, and the program manager.

(2) Confer with assignment officers on the selection, training, and assignment of FASP officers.

(3) Have administrative and operational responsibility for all FASP officers within their functional control.

(4) Establish policy and procedures for internal operation of the FASP in coordination with other US Air Force and interested agencies.

(5) Develop specific career progression opportunities for FASP officers.

**c. AFMPC FASPLO.** The AFMPC FASPLO serves as the single point of contact in AFMPC for FASP policy and program matters.

**d. AFMPC Assignment Officers.** Assignment officers not having responsibility for filling FASP requirements, but who receive applications from officers under their functional control who wish to career broaden or crosstrain into a FASP position, will forward a copy of the officers' AF Form 90, Officer Career Objective Statement (if approved for career broadening or cross training) to the appropriate assignment officer for action. Each assignment officer responsible for filling FASP requirements:

(1) Reviews each application for the FASP for availability and qualifications.

(2) Notifies the applicant if qualified or available for a FASP assignment.

(3) Requests academic evaluation of qualified applicants from AFIT/RR if applying for an advanced academic degree (AAD).

(4) Nominates academically qualified officers for entry into the AFIT area studies degree program to HQ AFMPC/DPMRPC, when required.

(5) After conferring with the sponsoring agency, determines the geographic area of specialization and foreign language for each selected applicant based on projected assignment and Air Force requirements.

(6) Identifies individuals requiring in-country training to the functional manager and program manager when they are selected for the program.

(7) Schedules foreign language and area studies training, when required.

**e. Applicant.** An officer interested in the FASP must apply directly to his or her assignment officer according to the procedures outlined in para-

graph 5. Those officers wishing to career broaden or crosstrain from a non-FASP utilizing Air Force specialty code (AFSC) to a FASP utilizing AFSC should indicate such on their AF Form 90. If approved, the respective assignment officer will forward a copy of the AF Form 90 to the assignment officer for action according to d above.

**f. Using Agency.** All joint, specified, unified, major commands, separate operating agencies, and HQ USAF, AFRES, or ANG offices that have FASP billets must ensure these positions are validated and properly coded into the command manpower data system and the unit manning document. AAD positions are validated according to AFR 36-19 and language designated positions (LDP) are validated in accordance with AFR 50-40.

**g. Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT).** As the Academic Program Manager and Evaluating Agency, AFIT:

(1) Establishes the academic eligibility standards for entry into the FASP.

(2) Evaluates the academic eligibility of each AAD applicant.

(3) When an individual is selected for an education program, assigns him or her to the applicable school.

(4) Monitors academic progress, provides administrative support, and acts as the student's point of contact while in the education program.

(5) Provides AFMPC information on the award of an ASC.

## Section B—Management of FASP Officers

### 5. Application and Selection:

**a.** All officers applying for the FASP must meet the following prerequisites as well as those listed in AFR 50-5, paragraphs 4-15 and 4-18d, or applicable AFRES or ANG directives.

(1) Military Availability. Officers must:

(a) Have an outstanding military record.

(b) Be medically unrestricted for worldwide duty.

(c) Have at least 3 years of intervening service since last permanent change of station (PCS) education assignment on the date of class entry.

(d) Have, or be eligible for, a Top Secret Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) clearance.

(e) Be in a Regular or career Reserve status.

(2) Academic Eligibility. Officers must:

(a) Have undergraduate records which

qualify them for admission to reputable graduate schools, if applying for an AAD program.

(b) Earn qualifying scores on the Graduate Record Examination (GRE), if required. All fees for the GRE must be paid for by the officer and are not reimbursable. Although undergraduate grade point average (GPA) and GRE test scores are considered in evaluations, strong credentials in one area may compensate for minor deficiencies in the other. It may also be possible to qualify by taking additional coursework.

(c) Achieve the minimum score required for training for the category language of the area of specialization on the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) or obtain a skill level of L-1, R-1, S-1 on the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) in one or more languages of a specific geographic area.

b. If the officer meets the above listed prerequisites, he or she then makes application to his or her assignment officer using the AF Form 90, Officer Career Objective Statement or the AF Form 620, Colonel Resume. The remarks section should include desired area and language; qualifications; previous experience; GRE, DLAB, and DLPT scores; educational background and GPA; and desired follow-on assignment. Incomplete applications will be returned to the applicant without action unless prior arrangement has been made with the assignment officer. Application should normally be made 18 to 24 months before the date of availability for PCS.

c. The assignment officer will review each application.

(1) Determine the applicant's availability for assignment to a FASP position.

(a) If the applicant is not initially qualified and available, he or she must be notified in writing stating the reasons.

(b) If the applicant is initially qualified and available, the application must be sent to AFIR/RR for an academic evaluation, if applying for an AAD program.

(2) Nominate academically qualified FASP AAD applicants to HQ AFMPC/DPMRPC. Each nomination must include:

(a) Name, grade, SSN.

(b) Educational program and language desired.

(c) Desired school entry date.

(d) Desired assignment on completion.

(e) Projected duty AFSC, ASC appropriate to the area of study, and foreign language code.

(f) Certification from AFIT/RR that the

applicant is academically qualified for the program. AFIT/RR will indicate the total number of months of prior AFIT education, if any.

(3) Assign each officer selected for the FASP a geographic area of specialization and foreign language based on the projected assignment of the officer and the needs of the Air Force.

d. Once notified of selection, geographic area of specialization, and foreign language, the officer may decline training without prejudice and without restriction from future application. If the officer concurs with the selection, he or she will then be notified by AFIT of the training institution. Although the officer may request a specific area studies program, foreign language, and institution in the application, the assignment officer has final determination of the area and language and AFIT is responsible for selecting the most appropriate academic institution.

e. Due to the ever changing international political environment, the Air Force requirements for assignments may change in the course of training. If this occurs, the officer may respond according to AFR 36-20. Also, due to accelerated requirements, an officer may be ordered to a new duty assignment before completing the training.

6. Direct Designation. The Air Force has a resource of officers whose experience, training, and education makes them eligible for direct designation into the FASP.

a. Officers eligible to be directly designated must:

(1) Have an outstanding military record.

(2) Have a minimum of a master's degree in area studies or a similar bachelor's degree with extensive knowledge and experience in a specific geographic area.

(3) Have a skill level of L-2, R-2, S-2 language proficiency on the DLPT in one or more languages of the specific geographic area.

(4) Have in-country or in-area training experience.

b. Officers meeting the above criteria must apply for direct designation to the program manager, HQ USAF/DPP, by 15 January for the winter board or by 15 June for the summer board. The application must include:

(1) Copies of all Officer Effectiveness Reports.

(2) A Report on Individual Personnel (RIP) records review.

(3) One copy of a transcript from each college attended. The transcripts must bear the seal and the school official's signature. Photostatic

copies of the seal and signature are not acceptable.

(4) Evidence of language skill level.

(5) A double-spaced biography stating the specific geographical area and language of expertise and detailing the related cultural and military experience.

c. The program manager will convene and chair two selection boards a year, one in February and one in July, to evaluate applications based on the program definitions in paragraph 3. The board will consist of one major or above representative from each HQ USAF and HQ AFOSI functional sponsor office. The program manager will notify AFMPC to award direct designation of the proper SEI to qualified individuals based on the board's recommendations.

**7. Special Experience Identifiers (SEI).** SEIs are used to indicate completion of a minimum of 1 year in a FASP position or experience in a geographic area of specialization and skill level 2 in a foreign language.

a. FASP SEIs. SEIs authorized for use in this program are listed in attachment 2 and AFR 36-1. Requests for the award or withdrawal of an SEI are made according to AFR 36-1. The program manager evaluates the individual's qualifications and, if approved, requests AFMPC/DPMR to add the proper SEI to the officer's record. Length and recency of training or experience are key to an individual's eligibility for designation of an SEI. Failure to maintain the required foreign language proficiency skill level 2 and failure to test for language proficiency according to AFR 35-8 will result in the automatic withdrawal of the SEI. The SEI may be reawarded when the individual is redesignated language proficient at the proper skill level and makes application as described above.

b. SEIs in the Officer Assignment Process. Although there are no formally established programs within the officer assignment process for using SEIs, the assignment officer will use officer SEIs in selecting and assigning officers into FASP positions. Officers with FASP SEIs should be considered for a FASP assignment before officers requiring FASP training.

c. Unit Commander and Staff Responsibilities. Unit commanders and base level directors must ensure that unit manpower documents are coded with SEIs proper to the position requirements. This aids timely designation of SEIs to each individual's record, recording this experience for future assignment considerations. If it is known that an individual has acquired sufficient experience or training while performing in a position that is not

coded or cannot be coded, that experience should be reported to the program manager who will evaluate the request for an SEI. Local commanders and directors of staff agencies should ensure that personnel selected to fill specific requirements by virtue of their SEIs are indeed assigned to these positions. Effective use of assigned resources within their AFSC and specialized experience will greatly enhance unit effectiveness and eliminate unnecessary training.

**8. Selection and Assignment.** Assignment officers should make every effort to use an officer with FASP experience in more than one assignment using their special experience, especially those who volunteer for such assignments. Rotation into FASP duties will follow career progression guidelines in AFR 36-23 and stated requirements of the using agencies. The assignment officer should give particular consideration to the lead time required for an area studies and language training when making assignments. A ratio of three officers to each validated FASP position will provide the following utilization cycle: one in training, one performing the job, and one available in the inventory.

**9. Accession of Foreign Language Qualified Officers.** Precommissioning sources, the United States Air Force Academy, the Air Force Reserve Officers' Training Corps, and Officer Training School, should access foreign language qualified officers based on the annual requirement established by HQ USAF/DPP. This requirement should be considered when establishing scholarship and recruiting programs.

#### Section C—Academic Programs

**10. Nongraduate Area Studies Academic Programs.** Nongraduate area studies academic programs can be designed by Air University to provide the amount of academic training required for follow-on assignments. Some programs can be tailored to meet specific officer and mission requirements by contracting training through civilian institutions. The Foreign Service Institute, Defense Intelligence College, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, and the Army Foreign Area Officer Course can also provide area studies related course work for FASP officers.

**11. Area Studies Graduate Degree Programs.** AFIT/CI determines the graduate school to be used for the area studies degree based on area of

specialization, tuition costs, and quality of program. Many officers selected for graduate education in area studies attend the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California. Completing the area specialty curriculum along with language training at the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) leads to the degree of Master of Arts in National Security Affairs. The program lasts from 1 to 2 years depending on the curriculum and option selected, the language studied, and previous educational background. Officers are assigned to NPS for the full duration of the combined program. Student programs are individually tailored based on an officer's academic and professional background, using agency requirements, and the area specialty and language concerned. Course mix and sequence will also vary according to time of entry. The four area specialty curricula blocks at NPS are: Middle East, Africa, South Asia; Far East, Southeast Asia, Pacific; Europe, USSR; and Western Hemisphere. These programs and related curricula are designed to provide graduate education in the field of National Security Affairs with particular emphasis on the following areas: politico-military affairs, strategic and operational planning, attache affairs, foreign intelligence, and area analysis. Listed below are specific educational skill requirements related to the area specialty curriculum that should be met by students in the NPS area studies program, as well as students in area studies programs at other institutions, at the conclusion of their academic program:

a. **Analytical and Research Skills.** Students should have achieved a high level of expertise in scholarly skills, to include effective oral and written expression, research techniques, interpretation and evaluation of complex data, problem solving, forecasting, decision processes, modes of negotiation and debate, the formulation of strategy and politico-military objectives.

b. **Culture and Religion.** The students should be cognizant of the influence of class structure, ethnic, cultural, and religious values, and ideology on domestic and foreign affairs. They should understand the origins of current cultural and religious differences and conflicts and how these factors affect regional and national unity.

c. **Current Issues.** Students must be familiar with the major security issues in the world. These include, but are not limited to, political, economic, and military conflicts, insurgencies, social problems and other issues that affect both the status or well-being of nations. These issues

should be related to the formulation and implementation of US foreign and security policies.

d. **Economics.** Students must be aware of the economic strengths and weaknesses of the major power blocs and of economic phenomena which influence ideology, military doctrine, industrial and social development. The students must be familiar with the principal resources, economic influence, industrial capacity, and major industries of their region.

e. **Geography.** Students should have a grasp of geography and its impact on national development, agriculture, spatial relationships, transportation systems, economic sufficiency, and military posture. They also should have detailed knowledge of their geographic areas and the concomitant strategic significance.

f. **Geopolitics.** Modern international politics is deeply rooted in geography. Students should be familiar with the geopolitical aspects of world regions in terms of their global strategic importance. They should understand how scholars view the influence of geography, climate, economics, political culture, and demography on political thought and foreign policy.

g. **Historical Development.** The student should understand the historical trends and influences that have shaped and provided the context for interaction in today's international environment and future developments. The students also should acquire detailed knowledge concerning the historical developments in their region of specialty, with particular emphasis on the political evolution, traditional enemies and conflicts, regional alliances, and domestic issues.

h. **Language.** Students must have sufficient language proficiency to be able to maintain their expertise in their professional area. This would include the reading of newspapers and journals written in the language of the area in order to be cognizant of developments as they occur. The ideal area specialist should have proficiency in one major language group and acquire working knowledge of a second language of the region.

i. **Military Forces.** Students should understand the roles, political influences, social positions, composition, structure, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of the armed forces. They should be informed of current political and military developments, regional politico-military relations, and regional defense agreements.

j. **Politics.** Students should have a knowledge of the major political system, political culture and governmental organizations, be aware of current political doctrine and issues, and know the

strength, appeal, and influence of communism and other ideologies. The students also should have a detailed knowledge of their area and be aware of the current relationships, attitudes, and perspectives toward both the United States and potential adversaries.

k. **Strategic Posture.** Students should perceive national strengths and weaknesses that affect a nation's strategic posture and capabilities and be able to identify and assess major military, political, economic, and sociological trends which affect policy choices in domestic and foreign affairs.

#### Section D—Training Programs

##### 12. Foreign Language Training:

a. Knowledge of a foreign language is one of the keystones of the FASP. The contribution of language skill to military effectiveness in the international arena is significant. The length of language training for FASP officers will vary according to their current level of proficiency and the difficulty of the language required for the follow-on assignment. Language training is provided to meet specific using agency requirements and falls into two basic categories.

(1) The first, basic language training which includes basic, intermediate, and advanced language training courses, is for positions where the performance of the primary or technical specialty in the subsequent duty assignment requires foreign language skill. Positions requiring foreign language proficiency are coded on Unit Manpower Documents and required proficiency levels are stated by the using agency at the time the personnel requisition is submitted.

(2) The second, survival level language training (level 1 or less than level 1) and cultural orientation sufficient for some social amenities, is provided for positions where the incumbent has limited interface with foreign national personnel.

b. Resident foreign language instruction will be accomplished at DLIFLC. Requests for exceptions will be submitted in writing to HQ Air Training Command Technical Training (HQ ATC/TTPPN).

c. The DLAB is designed to evaluate aptitudes essential for successfully completing foreign language training. The test is used in the screening and preselection of potential foreign language trainees. Besides any tests and measurements administered during the language training course, officers are given the DLPT upon completion of foreign language training. The DLPT is also used

on a periodic basis to reestablish proficiency skill level. This retesting is mandatory for all officers who received foreign language training at Air Force expense. The individual is responsible for language maintenance and may request refresher training, if required, for a subsequent duty assignment. Additional information on the DLAB and DLPT can be found in AFR 35-8.

d. An officer desiring assignment to a position with an established foreign language requirement must apply to the appropriate assignment officer. Before application, the eligibility requirements listed in paragraph 5 must be met. Refer to AFR 50-5 and AFR 50-50 for additional information.

13. **In-Country Training.** The in-country training and orientation phase is reserved primarily for foreign area officers (FAO) as the final segment of their education and training in foreign area studies. During this phase, the FAO continues academic studies in the area of specialization and among the people of that area. The success of this phase depends, to a great extent, on the facilities available in the area and the attitude of the host government. As a minimum, the program should include continuation of foreign language training, extensive travel throughout the region, and contacts with military and civilian elements of the indigenous population. The FAO should participate in individual reading and research, visits and observer training, seminars, and, whenever possible, formal military and civilian schooling to amplify, clarify, and verify previous studies. The length of this training will vary based on the country involved, funding available, and Air Force requirements.

a. FAO students are attached to major overseas commands. Their duty station is with the in-country monitor, the Air Force attache office, security assistance or advisory group office, or another designated US Air Force office while receiving cultural orientation or attending a host country's military service school, university, or other institution of learning with subsequent area travel and research. The FAO students' sponsor, along with the program manager, will select the in-country monitor based on personnel availability in the specific country. The length and type of training vary by country (see attachment 3).

b. FAOs are not accredited members of the diplomatic mission and, therefore, are not entitled to diplomatic immunity. They are not to represent themselves as assistant attaches.

c. Language fluency is a necessary tool if the FAO is to achieve maximum benefit from training

and orientation activities. Usually, additional training can be accomplished at a school in-country, by using a local tutor, and immersion in the host culture. The time devoted to language training will depend on the degree of difficulty of the language and the FAO's proficiency and language aptitude. A comprehensive reading program will also develop fluency and enhance area knowledge. Duty with advisory groups also offers opportunities for daily language use.

d. Travel is an important part of in-country training and should be designed to develop a thorough knowledge of the physical aspects of the area and the total culture of the people. Travel will be coordinated with US agencies by the program manager sufficiently in advance to allow complete access to the area and flexibility to attend educational and cultural events. Travel should also include visits to host country military units. These forces should be viewed in the context of their position in relation to the other elements of the national composite. Suspensions may be aroused among the host country military personnel toward the FAO student unless clear training objectives for the visit are communicated to the hosts by the student and the US agency arranging the visit. The student should clearly establish a preference for an exchange of information type visit to aid mutual understanding. Classified information will not be exchanged. To minimize misunderstanding of the FAO mission by host country officials, FAOs will not associate with, or engage in, any intelligence activities. Student projects must be planned and executed in such a way as to avoid even the slightest appearance that these projects are associated with intelligence collection or advisory functions.

e. FAO students will establish a FAO library and operational and administrative files at each training site. Books, reports, and other materials purchased or obtained for the FAO library will remain on station for use by future students. FAO students are required to provide trip reports to the program manager on an as required basis. Besides trip reports, the FAO student may, under the guidance of the in-country monitor, prepare research projects. These should deal with current affairs, be relatively short, and are of a lower priority than travel and language study.

f. FAO students should attend embassy and military social functions in order to become acquainted with as many host country diplomats and senior military officials as possible.

g. Attendance at host country military schools is encouraged, preferably at the company grade level. In-country monitors are encouraged to seek other proper courses for FAO students. FASP officers who meet basic eligibility requirements to enroll in intermediate or senior service school correspondence or seminar courses may be nominated to attend intermediate and senior service schools hosted by other nations and taught in the host nation's language. Designation on the Air Force intermediate or senior service school list is not a prerequisite for these officers when attendance at another nation's equivalent level school is deemed to be in the best interest of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the United States.

#### Section E—Related Programs

14. **Defense Advanced Language and Area Studies Program (DALASP).** The DALASP is sponsored by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and is designed for mid-career officer and civilian intelligence analysts. FASP officers may be eligible for DALASP which provides an opportunity for up to 2 years of graduate level research of the third world and the study of unusual languages. Funding provides for tuition, books, fees, research, worldwide travel, and language tutoring. The DALASP program manager is Air Force Intelligence, Directorate of Force Management (HQ USAF/INF).

15. **Other Training Opportunities.** The following list of education opportunities and programs are related to the area studies program and is provided as information only. Contact base education officers for details.

a. Fellowships. Research Associates; Olmstead Scholarship Program; East-West Fellowship; Harvard Fellowship; Woodrow Wilson Fellowship.

b. Training Programs. Defense Academic Research Support Program; DLI Nonresident Language Training; Defense Intelligence College Master's Degree Programs.

AFR 36-16 5 March 1967

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

OFFICIAL

LARRY D. WELCH, General, USAF  
Chief of Staff

NORMAND G. LEZY, Colonel, USAF  
Director of Administration

**SUMMARY OF CHANGES**

This revision changes the Area Specialist Program to the Foreign Area Studies Program; adds references (para 1); expands the "Terms Explained" section (atch 1); changes program manager OPR to HQ USAF/DPP; assigns responsibilities to applicable agencies (para 4); explains the application and selection processes (para 5); explains use of special experience identifiers (para 7); lists educational objectives for the area studies degree program (para 11); redefines the SEI and AAD geographic designations (atch 2); adds sections on foreign language training, in-country training (sect D), and accessions (para 9); and lists other training programs (sect E).

## TERMS EXPLAINED

**Academic Program Manager.** Air Force Institute of Technology Civilian Institution Programs (AFIT/CI) is responsible for managing the academic portion of the FASP.

**Academic Specialty Code (ASC).** A four character code which defines an academic field of study.

**Advanced Academic Degree (AAD).** An academic degree at the doctorate or masters level.

**Air Force Military Personnel Center FASP Liaison Office (AFMPC FASPLO).** AFMPC/DPMRN is the AFMPC focal point for all FASP matters.

**Area Specialist.** An officer who:

- a. Is operationally qualified in an AFS.
- b. Holds a Master's Degree in Area Studies or an approved related field, and has been awarded the appropriate academic specialty code. The officer must be well versed in the political, economic, cultural, and religious environment, threats to stability, and US foreign policy toward the area.
- c. Has a minimum foreign language proficiency of L-2, R-2, S-2 in a principal language of the area of specialization as evidenced on the DLPT.

**Area Specialist Position.** An authorized and validated advanced academic degree billet identified by:

- a. AN AFSC indicating the utilization field or career area.
- b. An advanced academic degree (AAD) academic specialty code (ASC) as authorized by AF Form 1779, Request to Establish/Change Advanced Academic Degree Position, per AFR 36-19. The ASC specifies the geographic area of specialization required for the position (see attachment 2).

**Assignment Officers.** Those AFMPC officers responsible for the selection, assignment, and monitoring of FASP officers within their functional control.

**Command and SOA Managers.** The office at a joint, specified, unified, major command, or SOA that manages and is responsible for the FASP within their command or SOA; may also interface with the functional managers on career development and Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) degree programs. This office is usually located in the DP community.

cated in the DP community.

**Country Specialist.** An officer who has had area or country-specific academic training or the equivalent, has a minimum foreign language proficiency of L-2, R-2, S-2 in a language of the country/area of specialization, and is operationally qualified in an AFS.

**Country Specialist Position.** An authorized and validated billet identified by an AFSC, foreign language required, and specific area or country academic training as noted on the manning document.

**Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB).** A standardized testing instrument designed to provide a quantitative estimate of an individual's aptitude to learn a foreign language.

**Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC).** The primary DOD facility for foreign language training located at the Presidio of Monterey, California.

**Evaluating Agency.** AFIT Admissions/Registrar Directorate (AFIT/RR) is responsible for establishing academic evaluation standards, evaluating transcripts, and maintaining academic specialty codes applicable to the FASP.

**Foreign Area Officer.** An officer who:

- a. Has the qualifications listed under area specialist explanation.
- b. Has a minimum foreign language proficiency of L-3, R-3, S-3 in a principal language of the area of specialization as evidenced on the DLPT.
- c. Has received in-country training or equivalent experience.

**Foreign Area Officer Position.** An authorized and validated advanced academic degree billet as defined in area specialist position explanation with an additional note on the manning document indicating the kind of in-country training required for the position.

**Foreign Language Specialist.** An officer who has a minimum foreign language listening (L), reading (R), and speaking (S) proficiency skill level of L-2, R-2, S-2, defined in AFRs 50-40 and 35-8, as indicated on the Defense Language Proficiency



Test (DLPT) and is operationally qualified in an Air Force specialty (AFS).

**Functional Managers.** Those agencies in HQ USAF, including intelligence (IN), programs and resources (PR), and plans and operations (XO), HQ Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), AFRES, and ANG that are directly responsible for the development and operation of the FASP for career areas within their functional control. The functional managers also act as students' sponsors while the officer is in FASP training.

**In-Country Training and Experience.** Training and experience in-country is crucial to the development of a fully qualified FAO. This can take one or more of several forms. Specially designed orientation training in the area or country of specialization followed by independent study and cultural familiarization is essential. This training and experience can be augmented through attendance, in-country, at a professional military school or civilian institution, or assignment as an attache, liaison officer, advisor, or exchange officer.

**Language Designated Position (LDP).** An authorized billet requiring foreign language proficiency identified by an Air Force specialty code (AFSC); a two-digit alpha code for the language required according to AFR 700-20, volume I, part V; a one-digit alpha code indicating the foreign language proficiency skill level required for listening, reading, and speaking (minimum level 2) as described in AFR 35-8, tables 19-1 and 19-2.

**Language Proficiency Skill Level.** Qualitative statement of the degree of skill in using a language. Foreign language skill levels 0 through 5 are described in AFRs 35-8 and 50-40 and are

listed as alpha characters in the Advanced Personnel Data System (APDS). AFR 35-8 contains the table converting the numeric scale 0 to 5 to the appropriate alpha code.

**Language Proficiency Test.** A standardized instrument or measurement technique to determine the degree of skill attained through experience or training. These tests are listed in AFR 0-7.

**Language Skill.** Ability to perform specific language activities, i.e., speaking, listening, writing, reading, translating, and transcribing.

**Program Manager.** Headquarters USAF, DCS Personnel, Directorate of Personnel Programs (HQ USAF/DPP) is the office of primary responsibility (OPR) for the FASP.

**Service Program Manager.** HQ USAF/DPP is the Air Force focal point for all foreign language training and represents the Air Force in the Defense Foreign Language Program.

**Special Experience Identifiers (SEI).** A three-character alphanumeric code set consisting of an activity code (first character) and an experience set (last two characters) (see attachment 2 for applicable SEIs). SEIs are used to identify an officer's special experience or training that cannot be coded elsewhere in the classification system. SEIs complement other classification tools and provide the means to retrieve specific experience or training for use in satisfying resource management requirements. SEIs are also required to indicate special training and experience required for a position.

**Using Agency.** Any joint, specified, unified, major command, separate operating agency, HQ USAF, AFRES, or ANG office with FASP billets.

**GEOGRAPHIC DESIGNATIONS FOR SPECIAL EXPERIENCE IDENTIFIERS (SEI)  
AND ADVANCED ACADEMIC DEGREE (AAD) ACADEMIC SPECIALTY CODES (ASC)**

SEI	ASC	AREA	COUNTRIES
ITA	OYLA	Western Europe	Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Liechtenstein, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom
ITB	OYLB	Eastern Europe	Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia
ITC	OYLC	Soviet Union	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
ITD	OYLD	North Africa	Algeria, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Tunisia, Western Sahara
ITE	OYLE	Sub-Saharan Africa	Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Upper Volta, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe
ITF	OYLF	Middle East	Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen Arab Republic
ITG	YLG	South Asia	Afghanistan, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka
ITH	OYLH	Mediterranean	Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Turkey
ITI	OYLJ	Southeast Asia	Australia, Brunei, Burma, Indonesia, Kapuchea, Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam
ITJ	OYLK	Caribbean	Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Barbuda, Belize, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Grenadines, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Saint Lucia, St Vincent, Tobago, Trinidad
ITK	OYLL	Latin America	Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Uruguay, Venezuela
ITL	OYLM	Far East	China, Japan, North Korea, Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan

**REGION**

	WESTERN EUROPE	EASTERN EUROPE	SOVIET UNION	NORTH AFRICA	SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	MIDDLE EAST	SOUTH ASIA	MEDIAN AREA	SOUTH-EAST ASIA	CARIBBEAN	LATIN AMERICA	EAST ASIA
TRAVEL ONLY					Mali					Jamaica	Guatemala	
										Haiti	El Salvador	
										Dominica	Honduras	
										Republic	Panama	
										Paraguay	Bolivia	
LOCAL UNIVERSITY & TRAVEL		Yugoslavia				Jordan				Costa Rica		Singapore China
										Mexico		
										Colombia		
										Ecuador		
										Uruguay		
LOCAL LANGUAGE SCHOOL & TRAVEL				Tunisia	Ivory Coast Senegal Kenya							Hong Kong
LOCAL LANGUAGE SCHOOL, MILITARY SCHOOL & TRAVEL												
MILITARY SCHOOL & TRAVEL	Austria France Greece Germany Italy Norway Spain Turkey			Morocco	Sudan	Bangladesh India Pakistan	Indonesia Malaysia Thailand			Argentina Brazil Chile Peru Venezuela		Japan

TRAINING NOT AVAILABLE IN COUNTRIES NOT LISTED

APPENDIX B  
**SAMPLE SURVEY**

I. Survey of NPGS NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT  
GRADUATES

Please take a few minutes to answer the following questions on the subjects you studied at the Naval Postgraduate School and on your subsequent experiences as a graduate of our program. I am also asking several questions about your foreign language skills because a large part of my thesis deals with the need for foreign language skills in the area specialist career field.

NOTE: This survey has been reviewed and approved by Headquarters Air Force Military Personnel Center and the Air Force Institute of Technology. A survey control number of USAF SCN 88-115 has been assigned and is in effect until 1 May 1989. All responses are strictly voluntary.

PLEASE PLACE AN "X" IN THE APPROPRIATE BLOCK

1. Which service are you in?

Army	( )
Navy	( )
Air Force	( )
Marine Corps	( )
2. What was your age while attending the Naval Postgraduate School?\_\_\_\_\_
3. What was your rank while attending NPGS?\_\_\_\_\_
4. What was your undergraduate major(s)?\_\_\_\_\_
- 
5. In which of the following subspecialty areas did you receive your Master of Arts degree?

a. Mid East, Africa, South Asia	681	( )
b. Far East, SE Asia, Pacific	682	( )
c. Europe, USSR	683	( )
d. Western Hemisphere	684	( )
e. Other (please specify)	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

6. Have you passed a Defense Language Proficiency Test on a major language of your area with a minimum score of S1, L1, and/or R1?

YES ( )  
NO ( )

---

IF YOU ANSWERED YES TO NUMBER 6 ABOVE, PLEASE CONTINUE, IF NOT PLEASE SKIP TO QUESTION NUMBER 15 BELOW.

---

7. Where did you get your foreign language training? (Note: Please "X" all appropriate boxes)

- a. The Defense Language Institute ( )  
b. High School and/or College ( )  
c. Taught by family member(s) ( )  
d. Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

8. What was your fluency level on your first DLPT?

- a. Speaking: SO+( ) S1( ) S1+( ) S2( ) S2+( ) S3( ) S3+( ) S4( ) S5( )  
b. Listening: LO+( ) L1( ) L1+( ) L2( ) L2+( ) L3( ) L3+( ) L4( ) L5( )  
c. Reading: RO+( ) R1( ) R1+( ) R2( ) R2+( ) R3( ) R3+( ) R4( ) R4( )

9. What was your fluency level on your last DLPT (last one taken)?

- a. Speaking: SO+( ) S1( ) S1+( ) S2( ) S2+( ) S3( ) S3+( ) S4( ) S5( )  
b. Listening: LO+( ) L1( ) L1+( ) L2( ) L2+( ) L3( ) L3+( ) L4( ) L5( )  
c. Reading: RO+( ) R1( ) R1+( ) R2( ) R2+( ) R3( ) R3+( ) R4( ) R4( )  
d. \*\*\* I have not taken another DLPT since my first DLPT.( )

10. When was your last DLPT taken, what language was tested, what version of the DLPT for that language was administered (i.e. DLPT I, II, or III)?

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_  
LANGUAGE: \_\_\_\_\_  
DLPT VERSION: \_\_\_\_\_

11. Have you, since the completion of training and your return to noneducational or training assignments used a foreign language in carrying out your official duties?

YES ( )  
NO ( )

---

IF YOU ANSWERED YES TO NUMBER 11 ABOVE, PLEASE CONTINUE. OTHERWISE  
PLEASE SKIP TO QUESTION 14 BELOW.

---

12. Please circle the choices that best complete the statements below as they apply to your use of a foreign language in your official duties.

EDUCATION AND/OR TRAINING ASSIGNMENTS SUCH AS TIME AT DLI DO NOT  
APPLY! IF YOU HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED AS A LANGUAGE INSTRUCTOR PLEASE  
SKIP TO QUESTION 13 AND CONTINUE THE SURVEY

Circle more than one choice per statement if applicable (i.e. if you use speaking, listening, and reading skills, you would circle all three choices in the first subquestion).

- a. I use foreign language (speaking) (listening) (reading) skills in my official duties.
  - b. I use the above skills on a (daily) (weekly) (monthly) basis in my official duties. (NOTE: If the above frequencies don't seem to be exactly right for your job, please specify: \_\_\_\_\_.)
  - c. Knowledge of a foreign language is (essential) (helpful) (unnecessary) to carrying out my official duties.
  - d. I (am) (am not) called on to act as an interpreter and or translator in my official duties.
  - e. I (am) (am not) called on to read and/or translate foreign documents, technical manuals, and/or newspapers in my official duties.
  - f. I (am) (am not) called on to give briefings in a foreign language in the course of my official duties.
  - g. I (am) (am not) called on to use aural translating skills in the course of my official duties.
13. Please specify what foreign languages you use in your official duties. (examples: Japanese, Russian, Spanish, Arabic, etc.)

-----  
-----  
-----

14. Does the nature of your duties require that you maintain a specific fluency level in one or more foreign languages?

YES ( )  
NO ( )

If YES, what level? S \_\_\_\_\_ L \_\_\_\_\_ R \_\_\_\_\_

\*\*\*\*\*  
 FOR EACH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS PLEASE CIRCLE WHETHER YOU  
 AGREE STRONGLY (AS), AGREE (A), HAVE NO OPINION (NO), DISAGREE (DA),  
 DISAGREE STRONGLY (DS), OR THE STATEMENT IS NOT APPLICABLE (NA).  
 \*\*\*\*\*

15. I feel getting an advanced academic degree has enhanced my ability to perform the jobs I have held since graduation.

AS                      A                      NO                      DA                      DS                      NA

--- IF YOU ANSWERED THAT YOU DISAGREE (DA) OR DISAGREE STRONGLY (DS) TO QUESTION #15 ABOVE, DOES THE FAULT LIE WITH THE EDUCATION YOU RECEIVED OR WITH THE TYPE OF JOBS YOU HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO?

- (a) Fault is with the education. ( )  
 (b) Fault is with jobs held since graduation. ( )  
 (c) Other, please specify: \_\_\_\_\_

-----

16. I think attending the Naval Postgraduate School for my advanced degree has particularly improved my ability to perform the jobs I have held since graduation.

AS                      A                      NO                      DA                      DS                      NA

17. I believe taking courses that dealt with country and/or regional studies improved my ability to perform my subsequent mission(s).

AS                      A                      NO                      DA                      DS                      NA

18. I believe taking courses that dealt with U.S. foreign policy toward a country or region helped me perform my subsequent mission(s).

AS                      A                      NO                      DA                      DS                      NA

19. I believe taking courses that dealt with U.S. National Interests, U.S. Security/Defense Policy issues, and/or Arms Transfers helped me perform my subsequent mission(s).

AS                      A                      NO                      DA                      DS                      NA

20. I believe taking courses that dealt with Arms Control issues helped me perform my subsequent mission(s).

AS                      A                      NO                      DA                      DS                      NA

21. I believe taking courses that dealt with International Relations and/or Comparative Foreign policy issues helped me perform my subsequent mission(s).

AS                      A                      NO                      DA                      DS                      NA

22. I believe taking courses that dealt with Research, Comparative Analysis, and/or Strategic Planning issues helped me perform my subsequent mission(s).

AS                      A                      NO                      DA                      DS                      NA

23. I believe taking courses that dealt with Military History, Maritime Strategy, and/or Naval Warfare issues helped me perform my subsequent mission(s).

AS                      A                      NO                      DA                      DS                      NA

24. I believe taking courses that dealt with International Economics, Defense Resource Allocation, and/or other economic issues helped me perform my subsequent mission(s).

AS                      A                      NO                      DA                      DS                      NA

25. I believe taking courses that dealt with International Law, the Law of the Sea, and/or International Negotiation issues helped me perform my subsequent mission(s).

AS                      A                      NO                      DA                      DS                      NA

\*\*\*\*\*

PLEASE RATE THE FOLLOWING COURSES/AREAS OF STUDY AVAILABLE AT THE NPGS BY HOW IMPORTANT YOU FEEL THEY ARE TO GRADUATES RETURNING TO REAL WORLD MISSIONS. ON THE LIST ON THE RIGHT PLEASE INDICATE WHICH FIVE COURSES ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT BY WRITING A NUMBER 1 BY THE MOST IMPORTANT, A NUMBER 2 BY THE SECOND MOST IMPORTANT, ETC. THROUGH FIVE. ON THE LIST ON THE LEFT, PLEASE INDICATE THE COURSES YOU FEEL ARE LEAST IMPORTANT BY PUTTING A NUMBER 1 BY THE LEAST IMPORTANT COURSE, A NUMBER 2 BY THE SECOND LEAST IMPORTANT, ETC. THROUGH 5. DON'T WORRY IF YOU DIDN'T TAKE COURSES IN SOME OF THESE AREAS. THIS LIST SHOULD BE BASED ON YOUR CURRENT KNOWLEDGE RATHER THAN YOUR TRANSCRIPT.

\*\*\*\*\*

MOST IMPORTANT COURSE	LEAST IMPORTANT COURSES
-- Country/Regional Study Courses	-- Country/Regional Study
-- American foreign policy toward a country or region	-- American foreign policy toward a country or region
-- American National Interest/Security or Defense Policy/Arms Transfer courses	-- American National Interest / Security or Defense Policy/ Arms Transfer courses
-- Arms Control courses.	-- Arms Control courses
-- Courses on International Terrorism	-- Courses on International Terrorism.
-- Intelligence Systems /Product	-- Intelligence Systems/Product
-- Navy Warfare/History/Strategy	-- Navy Warfare/History/Strategy
-- International Law/Law of the Sea/ International Negotiation courses	-- International Law/Law of the Sea/ International Negotiation courses
-- Defense Resource Allocation courses	-- Defense Resource Allocations courses
-- Comparative Foreign Policy or International Relations courses	-- Comparative Foreign Policy or International Relations courses



-- Research/Comparative Analysis  
-- International and/or Domestic  
Economics courses  
-- Strategic Planning/Deception or  
Strategic courses  
-- Individual Study or Individual  
Reading Courses

-- Other (please specify)\_\_\_\_\_  
-----  
-----

-- Research/Comparative Analysis  
-- International and/or Domestic  
Economics courses  
-- Strategic Planning/Deception or  
Strategic courses  
-- Individual Study or Individual  
Reading Courses

-- Other (please specify)\_\_\_\_\_  
-----  
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\*\*\*\*\*

\*\*\*\*\*

PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING

\*\*\*\*\*

26. Since graduation from the Naval Postgraduate School have you worked as any of the following: Foreign Area Officer, Area Specialist, Country or Regional desk specialist in an intelligence organization, a Political-Military officer, or as a member of a security assistance team in the region that you studied here?

YES ( )  
NO ( )

27. Since graduation have you been assigned to a "payback tour" as required by your service?

YES ( )  
NO ( )  
NA ( )

\*\*\*IF YES, WAS IT IN YOUR AREA OF STUDIES HERE AT NPGS?\*\*\*

YES ( )  
NO ( )

28. Since graduation have you had one or more assignments in the geographic region in which you specialized here at NPGS?

YES ( )  
NO ( )

29. IF YOU ANSWERED "YES" TO 25, 26, OR 27 ABOVE, PLEASE FURNISH YOUR JOB TITLE AND/OR ASSIGNMENT INFORMATION IN GENERAL TERMS (I.E. KOREA DESK OFFICER AT DIA OR "ASSIGNED TO PACOM AS A SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER") THEN GO TO QUESTION #29 BELOW. IF YOU ANSWERED "NO" TO 25, 26, AND 27, PLEASE SKIP TO QUESTION #29 AND CONTINUE.

-----  
-----  
-----

30. Below is a "pie" for you to divide. Please draw boundaries to indicate the relative importance of the PROFESSORS YOU HAD, the MATERIAL YOU WERE PRESENTED IN THE COURSE, and the KNOWLEDGE YOU GAINED FROM INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH OR STUDY in achieving an understanding of concepts that have benefitted you in your subsequent assignment(s). PLEASE LABEL EACH SLICE OF THE PIE AND, IF POSSIBLE, WRITE THE PERCENTAGE OF IMPORTANCE YOU ARE ASSIGNING. FOR EXAMPLE IF YOU WEIGHTED ALL THREE FACTORS EQUALLY, YOUR PIE WOULD LOOK LIKE THIS:

\*\*Example:

Your "pie":

31. IF YOU TOOK THE COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION AT NPGS, do you wish you had written a thesis instead?

YES ( )  
NO ( )  
NA ( )

32. IF YOU WROTE A THESIS AT NPGS, do you wish you had taken the comprehensive examination option instead?

YES ( )  
NO ( )  
NA ( )

33. What suggestions do you have for improving the curriculum offered by the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School and/or the Defense Language Institute (if applicable)?

---

---

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---

-----Please continue on the reverse side of the paper-----

\*\*\*\*\*

THANK YOU FOR TAKING THE TIME TO FILL OUT THIS SURVEY. YOUR ANSWERS ARE NOT ONLY VITAL TO MY THESIS, THEY WILL ALSO HELP THE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL BETTER SERVE THE INTERESTS OF ITS STUDENTS IN THE FUTURE. PLEASE RETURN THIS FORM IN THE ENVELOPE PROVIDED AND THANK YOU AGAIN FOR YOUR HELP.

\*\*\*\*\*

## APPENDIX C

### **SAMPLE OPINIONS EXPRESSED BY SURVEY RESPONDENTS ON SUBJECTS**

The following are examples of specific opinions given by FAO graduates of the NPS area studies program. Each quote is followed by the specific control number assigned to the particular respondent.

#### **ARMY/JOBS**

Track utilization (assignment into a FAO billet) and monitor actual duties performed by speaking or communicating with the FAO. [245]

Unfortunately, NPS is not viewed as a "prime" or "quality name" institution by DA. This factor does not directly pertain to study but is an important factor in the careers and subsequent assignments of USA FAOs. [334]

#### **NAVY/JOBS**

Place higher restrictions upon Navy Detailing to ensure utilization of masters study at NPS. [503]

Would appreciate if sponsor would stay in contact with area specialist graduates. Keeping us in touch re jobs, further educational opportunities, etc. Please use us! [507]

Perhaps the NSA curriculum could contain a "guarantee" of future language training prior to a payback tour. Otherwise, why bother? I didn't speak much French working as a catapult officer on the flight deck of the Midway. [555]

#### **AIR FORCE/JOBS**

As Air Force Officers, we weren't "pipelined" into special billets upon graduation. Instead, we went out job hunting, trying to find billets which matched our training...a good number failed to get

jobs which required our newly found specialties. It was very hard to get excited about Polish when I knew I wouldn't be using it. [115]

Too often an analyst is assigned to an area specialist billet initially and then "reassigned" (without MPC's knowledge) to a non-area specialist billet within the organization. [70]

Create "area specialist" AFSCs so as to track and develop area specialists throughout their careers. As it is now, after one pay-back tour they disappear into the Air Force. [138]

The Air Force could save a lot of money by identifying positions for their graduates before they get to the field. In four years and four months I never used my language ability on an official basis (Swahili and Portuguese). On 5 occasions while at DIA, requirements existed for an officer to either act as escort or translator for a foreign national officer who spoke Swahili or Portuguese. I was never allowed to use my training because I wasn't a Major. In four of the instances, a Major who could not speak the required language was selected to escort. [214]

Follow-on assignments were a waste from my experience. I saw many area specialists made into watch officers, briefers, or put into planes. Two years of training seem to be ignored. Also the AFIA people managing assignments for area specialists were personnel managers and not area specialists. [159]

For Air Force personnel...especially pilots, three years of school, followed by a three-year "pay back tour" is a major career depressant. [116]

Need a longer program. I know that the services are reluctant to have people out of the mainstream for too long—that's too bad, because NPS grads should be groomed and selected for the "joint" assignments throughout the military departments. Therefore, DOD as a whole needs these people in joint policy positions more than the services need them in cockpits, foxholes, or minesweepers. [144]

## **ARMY DLI**

DLI taught a version of spoken Arabic used nowhere in the world. [327]

May FAOs arrive in country knowing how to say "howitzer" but unable to order a meal in a local restaurant. [359]

In the case of Chinese, decrease DLI course for officers from one year to six months and send the officer for in-depth language training in Taiwan or Hong Kong or even the PRC. Anything beyond six months at DLI is wasted because progress is slow, standards are low, and Chinese teachers are ossified and incredibly bureaucratic. [409]

DLI is a boring grind. Housing and support is severely limited and expensive. DLI needs to take on the perspective that they must support language skill development and retention after the student departs. [242]

Separate the officers and enlisted. The former must learn to speak, write, and listen. The latter should be exposed to or given the opportunity to speak and write while concentrating on listening. [224]

All services should have a similar program of 1 year of studies, 6-12 months of language training. It makes it easier for classes to stay together throughout their training. Government housing during language school is another bonus for students. [506]

Orient courses to conversational use of language as opposed to current emphasis on hearing skills required for [SIGINT] assignments. [490]

I would like to see language as a mandatory part of the 681 through 685 curriculum. We sell ourselves short when working in the joint business or as an in-country expert without having a language background. Foreign nations' experts on our country will most certainly be capable of speaking, reading, and writing English. [519]

Include language training as either a prelude or subsequent course of study to area studies. Best option is prior to, allowing students to use original source material during subsequent course/thesis research. [507]

Incorporate into the Navy program language and in-country training similar to the Army's FAO program. [503]

Let the students take some language courses for credit. Surely a deal could be worked out with DLI. This could be in addition to the regular NPS requirements for those students who could

overload a little. (I was forced to hire a DLI instructor as an evening tutor in order to take advantage of the talent there.) [496]

## **AIR FORCE/DLI**

Complete the language training first. Several classmates and I completed the language requirement prior to NPS and I had a prior tour in Thailand—both of which put me way ahead of the program. [87]

Focus on what it is we should be able to do with the language, i.e., survive in the country using the language, know military terms, etc. We spent too much time learning bird names, parts of the car, etc. [61]

The Turkish course materials were extremely old when I went through—many words from the text are no longer in use while many words in use are not in the text. Otherwise the DLI course was invaluable. The combination of the NPS Middle East courses and DLI training made both my wife and I real experts on Turkey. [185]

DLI was a big disappointment. Although there were only 2 of us in the class, my wife was not allowed to audit the course. Also the materials were very dated. [91]

DLI first. This would enable NPS students to research in the target language and to know more about their respective countries/regions. [144]

The Japanese Basic Course is in severe need of modern/updated lessons and materials. Also the sequence of instruction should be changed so there is more continuity between the various phases. [5]

The instructors in the Japanese department were certainly competent, caring, and personable. However, I believe their hands were tied by a system trying to make blanket policy instead of operating an educational environment satisfying the needs of various classes. The overriding objective of the school was to pass the "military competency" test that included a multitude of military terms and phrases that we really didn't need. [31]

Only send those students to DLI who will actually be assigned to a foreign country (i.e., attachés, security assistance officers, etc.) Intelligence analysts should forego language training and spend

approximately 20 weeks TDY learning foreign military capabilities before reporting to their next duty station. This could probably be accomplished at the Defense Intelligence College, DIA, Washington, D.C. [70]

For the Russian course—much less emphasis on the fine points of grammar and much, much more on speaking idiomatic Russian. I'm dying over here trying to speak to forklift operators, military personnel...they don't quote Pushkin. [180]

DLI is a waste. Almost any other institution would prepare you better in the Korean language. I have taken many courses from many institutions and DLI is by far the worst. [178]

I give DLI a solid "D." The program in Japanese was far outdated with an apparent emphasis on "Kanji" depicting military hardware, of all things. Focus should be on conversation. [184]

Ensure that if the student is learning a language that he/she will use it in the follow-on assignment. If he/she won't, make a thesis mandatory instead. [152]

DLI was not so useful. I spent one year learning Japanese. It was a skill I used not at all as an analyst. The course itself was too long (after six months, a student needs a chance to go TDY to the country and experience the language firsthand). [138]

## **ARMY/NPS**

Continue to send Army FAOs to NPS. The curriculum is outstanding and exactly what the Army needs. [450]

Soviet FAOs need a specific Russian history course for one term and then a European history course (including Russia) for one term. [418]

We should have absolutely top-notch instruction from a series of visiting professors from all over the U.S.—something that is better and less expensive than sending the students to a single civilian university. [418]

Continue to hire high-quality professors. Professors who have strong academic credentials and reputations and who have lived in the regions which they teach about will always have the most to offer their students. Academic credentials without practical experience in the region or country leaves a gap. [409]



Keep attendance from all services—the “network” effect of schooling with folks from the other services results in greater efficiency and a more social group in later assignments. [224]

The Far East curriculum should include an introduction to the U.S. command structure in the Pacific, possibly as a single briefing during a core course. [291]

Require all students to attend 6 quarters and reduce the required load to 12. 16 hours were simply too many, and led to “selective neglect” and “garbage in-garbage out” work. [304]

Emphasize “insider” opportunities at PG School and work to draw key players to Monterey at least once a year to meet with students (at assistant secretary level or ambassador level). [272]

The Army in particular has never come to grips with the true value of an NPS education over its “rival” civilian institutions, i.e., the cross-fertilization of the multi-service atmosphere in an academic environment. NPS should capitalize on the student body more. [269]

Because of the limited time to cover many dimensions in a particular country or issue, the present situation and policies tend to be briefly covered. I recommend recognition of this fact and more priority to recent U.S. policy and political events. [440]

When I talk with my peers who attended civilian universities—their programs seemed to be lacking in substance and rigor. I think if NPS keeps a good nucleus as permanent faculty and keeps a top-quality flow of visiting professors, it will provide what we need in DOD. [249]

#### **AIR FORCE/NPS**

Everyone should be obliged to do a thesis—it really forces the student to “pull everything together.” Writing a thesis has served me well repeatedly since my graduation: all that I learned and all the ideas/opinions I formed. [212]

Bring people in to tell you what it is really like in D.C.—it’s not like the books the professors have you read. [164]

Add guest lectures by military personnel who have attended NPS and spent a duty assignment in the subject area. Officer-level Ph.D. in National Security Affairs should be offered. [55]

I don't believe now that one day of testing can adequately defend several semesters of research. Thesis would have been more useful to the Air Force. [143]

Now with the INF treaty a reality and START, conventional arms talks on the horizon, the NSA department should be giving these treaties the maximum attention in developing courses. Many NPS grads are deeply involved in the INF business and are working on negotiations or providing support to negotiators for the other possible agreements with the Soviets. [129]

Increase greatly the area/country courses and reduce greatly the "theory" courses, such as comparative analysis. [126]

Need cross-course arrangement to allow individual papers to be chapters of a final thesis. More guest speakers in security cleared, no-holds-barred sessions. [102]

I think all area specialists should be required to do a thesis. I learned so much more from doing research on my region and trying to assemble the data coherently than I could have from taking tests. Writing a thesis forced me to use and expand on the knowledge gained from formal instruction. [37]

Provide selected bibliography of readings to student as soon as identified for a particular curriculum. This would help students who have not been active in the curriculum to get a feel from the program focus. [3]

When I arrived in Lisbon, I found myself more knowledgeable of Portuguese history (particularly recent) and the Portuguese government and military than my State Department Foreign Service counterparts. This background was invaluable to me and gave me access to the host country which others were not so fortunate to have. I really do not think that a Texas, Michigan, Tufts, or my old alma mater, Georgetown, could have given me a better preparation for my two European assignments. [156]

## **NAVY/NPS**

Don't do away with a thesis. This is very important to an area specialist. When you research and write it, you don't forget it. [519]

Keep the high quality of visiting professors and lecture by people with real-world experience outside the academic field. [519]

Limit outside activity of NPS professors. They spend too much time at other jobs. [512]

Because of payback tours often lasting 2 or more years, officers must bring themselves back up to speed. This is not especially difficult to do, but points out that a real requirement for NPS is to ensure the student knows how and where to locate the current information on his area. Personal contact with professors and a good understanding of the literature by study is critical. [538]

Link the students directly to OP-06 for projects and thesis work. [590]

Offer more in the South Asia region. In my 18 months, only 1 course specifically covered this important area. [624]

For Mid-East students, it's imperative to have in-depth courses on creation of the State of Israel and Israeli treatment of Palestinians in '48, '67, and '88. [516]

Don't keep the Intel curriculum so sequestered. There were courses I wanted to take but was not allowed to (no need to know). A greater acquaintance with Intel would help a line officer. [496]

Take note of National War College speaker program and try to get similar level of expertise to NPS. [618]

Return Army Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) and add Marine Corps officers. The education offered at the Naval Postgraduate School is first rate, and more applicable than similar graduate programs at private or state universities. For junior officers, it equates to a mini "joint tour" and has helped me work in a joint environment at USSOUTHCOM. [506]

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