


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**PERSEREC**



**SCREENING ENLISTED ACCESSIONS FOR  
SENSITIVE MILITARY JOBS**

*ADA 210159*

**Kent S. Crawford  
Martin F. Wiskoff**

**November 1988**

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**SCREENING ENLISTED ACCESSIONS FOR  
SENSITIVE MILITARY JOBS**

Prepared by

Kent S. Crawford   
Martin F. Wiskoff

Released by

Carson K. Eoyang  
Director

## PREFACE

The improvement of screening procedures for military enlistees who will have access to classified information is one of PERSEREC's primary goals. Each of the military services prescreens enlisted accessions seeking sensitive jobs prior to requesting background investigations. Indeed, far greater numbers are rejected during the prescreening phase than during the phase when background investigations are formally adjudicated. The procedures employed by the services vary greatly and have not been systematically evaluated to determine their effectiveness. This technical report describes the service prescreening procedures and documents the desirability of improved and standardized prescreening instruments and methods.

A major operational finding is that while the service programs are functioning reasonably well, there are strong and weak points to each of them. Given the great expense involved in clearing personnel, and training and assigning them to sensitive occupations, even minor improvements in prescreening could result in considerable cost saving. Each of the services' prescreening programs has impressive features that should be considered by the other services.

Greater consideration needs to be given during prescreening to eliminating personnel who are likely to be subsequently discharged from military service for reasons of unsuitability. It is not very cost-effective to invest heavily in selecting and training personnel for sensitive occupations and then have to relieve them from duty. It is also not very rational from a security perspective for large numbers of personnel being unsuitably discharged into civilian life to be carrying Top Secret and SCI information in their heads.

An additional major finding is that the Defense Investigative Service (DIS) is not fully benefitting from the excellent information being collected by the services during prescreening. Only in selected instances is prescreening information forwarded to DIS for use in scoping their investigations. Procedures need to be developed, using standardized formats, for the interpretation of prescreening findings and their routine transmission to DIS. It is believed that this information could assist DIS in the better allocation of its scarce resources and in more efficient conduct of the investigations.

PERSEREC has work under way to address some of these issues. In particular, research is being conducted to develop a standardized background questionnaire that could be used during prescreening as a job aid and guide to security interviewers. A second effort, directed at developing biodata instruments, is predicated on earlier PERSEREC research that evidenced the potential of biodata items in screening

individuals likely to become issue cases and to be discharged for reasons of unsuitability.

The authors would like to acknowledge the assistance of numerous individuals who provided information on the prescreening procedures of their respective services. In particular, the authors would like to thank Mr. Van Hakes of the Naval Security Group Field Office at the Recruit Training Center at San Diego. He provided considerable information on Navy SCI screening as well as being an extremely knowledgeable source on effective techniques for conducting personnel security screening interviews.

SGM Jourdan C. Wells, Chief, Personnel Security Branch, Total Army Personnel Agency, was invaluable in arranging visits for the authors to the Army screening points. In addition, he provided a detailed knowledge of the development and operation of the Army's Personnel Security Screening Program. Lt. Hector Munoz, who is assigned to the 3507th Airman Classification Squadron at Lackland Air Force Base, provided extensive details on the Air Force's screening efforts. Finally, the authors owe a particular debt to Dr. John Goral of the Defense Manpower Data Center, Monterey, who generated the data on issue case and unsuitability discharge rates for personnel entering sensitive jobs.

Carson K. Eoyang  
Director

## **SCREENING ENLISTED ACCESSIONS FOR SENSITIVE MILITARY JOBS**

Prepared by  
Kent S. Crawford  
Martin F. Wiskoff

### **SUMMARY**

#### **Problem and Background**

The military services have formal programs to screen enlisted applicants and accessions seeking high security risk or sensitive jobs. These jobs either require Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) and/or Top Secret access or require nuclear duties under the Personal Reliability Program. This prescreening reduces the probability of assigning unreliable or untrustworthy personnel to positions where they might become security risks. It also saves the Department of Defense a considerable amount of money by eliminating high security risk individuals prior to requesting costly Defense Investigation Service background investigations and before incurring technical training costs. The procedures employed by each of the services have evolved over the years to accommodate their unique requirements for processing personnel. There has been no systematic evaluation of the instruments and methods employed during this prescreening to determine their effectiveness.

#### **Objective**

The purpose of this study was to systematically document the current prescreening procedures used by each service in reviewing applicants for sensitive jobs. This included: (1) policy guidelines and requirements; (2) the prescreening information collected by each service; (3) the decision process used within each service; and (4) the rejection rates at each stage of the prescreening. This information was then used as the basis for providing recommendations for research to improve this process through better prescreening instruments and methods.

## Approach

The information concerning service prescreening procedures was obtained through: (1) discussions with headquarters personnel to ascertain policy objectives for each of the services; (2) review of applicable instructions and guidelines to determine current policy requirements; and (3) visits to sites conducting prescreening for each of the services to observe operational activities and obtain relevant materials. In addition, unsuitability discharge and issue case data were obtained from the Defense Manpower Data Center to compare discharge rates among personnel entering sensitive and non-sensitive jobs as well as to examine issue case rates for enlisted accessions across the services.

## Results

The review showed that each of the services uses different procedures for prescreening their accessions for sensitive jobs. The Army emphasizes front-end screening at the Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS) because of a need to provide school guarantees to all applicants. The Air Force, on the other hand, has limited screening at the MEPS since school guarantees are provided to a relatively smaller percentage of applicants but has intensive screening during recruit training at Lackland Air Force Base. The Air Force recovers from security disqualifications of job-guaranteed individuals at Lackland by side-loading personnel who were only guaranteed broad job categories at the MEPS. The Navy also performs limited MEPS screening but has fewer personnel at recruit training to side-load since it guarantees specific jobs to approximately 70 percent of its applicants at the MEPS. The Marine Corps, like the Navy, conducts limited screening at the MEPS, and has intensive screening at recruit training along with side-loading to fill potentially unused school seats.

In addition to differences in locale and points in military service when prescreening occurs, there is a proliferation of questionnaires/forms and interview protocols across the services. The forms vary in type, sequencing and format of questions. Interview procedures range from relatively superficial contacts to intensive probing of applicants' backgrounds. Similarly, the amount and depth of information collected on applicants varies greatly across services.

Relatively small percentages of prescreened personnel are later rejected for clearances based on information from the background investigation. The services consider this a positive endorsement of their prescreening procedures as well as the considerable savings from eliminating training costs of personnel who would later have their clearance denied. On the other hand, a significant percentage of these screened personnel are discharged for reasons of unsuitability after receiving their clearances.

## Conclusions

Personnel security screening procedures for enlisted accessions could be enhanced through the development of more systematic data-gathering forms and structured interview protocols that directly follow from these forms. These forms and interviews should be tailored to unique service requirements to maximize their appropriateness and effectiveness for a given service.

The services could assist themselves by considering the modification of a particularly effective procedure of a sister service for incorporation into its own procedures. Each service's prescreening procedures exhibited at least one strong feature not employed by another service:

1. Army - use of a standardized and thorough questionnaire to help guide the interviewing process at the MEPS.

2. Navy - use of extremely thorough and effective interviewing procedures for screening SCI candidates at recruit training.

3. Air Force - implementation of comprehensive screening at its recruit training site including the use of a biodata instrument, psychological interviews (where needed), reference checks, and peer evaluations.

4. Marine Corps - use of highly effective selection procedures at recruit training prior to sending personnel to be interviewed by a Naval Security Group representative.

Consideration needs to be given to screening for service unsuitability concurrent with attempts to identify individuals who would not qualify for security clearances. In much the same way as prescreening reduces the costs associated with selecting personnel for sensitive occupations, it should also be used to reduce the costs associated with premature separation from service of those individuals who receive clearances for sensitive jobs.

Finally, there needs to be better coordination between the prescreening programs of the services and the Defense Investigative Service (DIS). There is a need for a standardized procedure for the transmittal of information gathered during prescreening to DIS for use in scoping and conducting investigations. This wealth of information needs to be placed in a format whereby it efficiently provides the maximum necessary information to investigators conducting background investigations.



## Recommendations

Efforts should be undertaken in the following four areas:

1. Development of background information forms and interview protocols for use during personnel security screening of enlisted applicants for sensitive jobs. One set should be designed for use at the MEPS, another for employment during recruit training. These forms should be designed for ease of use by job counselors/interviewers and to facilitate more standard interpretation of applicant responses.

2. Continued evaluation of experimental DoD biodata instruments for potential application to the personnel security prescreening process. Such instruments would include the Armed Services Applicant Profile being developed by the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center under sponsorship of Accession Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) and the Assessment of Background and Life Experiences (ABLE) questionnaire being developed by the U.S. Army Research Institute.

3. Determination of the feasibility and utility of maintaining personnel security information for individuals who are rejected during prescreening for sensitive jobs but who still go on active duty in their respective services. This information could include data from prescreening questionnaires and interviews that would be useful in future adjudicative decisions.

4. Design of prescreening procedures for more systematic use of information collected during the prescreening process. These new procedures might include (a) standardized forms for the transmittal of significant prescreening information to DIS for use during the background investigation, (b) more standardized interpretation of background information and interview results, (c) elimination of duplicate information collection at different stages of the prescreening process, and (d) provision for improved accumulation and transmission of information throughout the steps involved in prescreening and initiation of the formal background investigation.

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# INTRODUCTION

## Background

Annually, approximately 15,000 enlisted personnel (5% of the total enlisted accessions) have background investigations initiated by their respective service. Successful adjudication of the background investigation results allow these individuals to qualify for billets requiring Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) access, Top Secret access, or critical nuclear duties under the Personnel Reliability Program. The military services have formal programs to prescreen these personnel prior to requesting background investigations.

This prescreening reduces the probability of assigning unreliable or untrustworthy personnel to positions where they might become security risks. It also saves the Department of Defense a considerable amount of money by eliminating high security risk individuals prior to incurring the costs of Defense Investigative Service (DIS) background investigations. Finally, considerable training costs are saved by not sending to technical training courses personnel who would later fail to qualify for their required security clearances.

The procedures employed by the services have evolved over the years to meet each service's unique requirements for manpower. Appendix A provides a general description of the selection and classification processes used by each of the services. Security-relevant prescreening occurs at three distinct points in time during the process of accepting personnel for military service. This is reflected in Figure 1.

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<u>Interaction</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Decision</u>	<u>Instruments</u>
1. Applicant- Recruiter	Recruiting	Moral Waiver Environment	Enlistment Application
2. Applicant- Classifier/ Security Interviewer	MEPS	Assignment/ Clearance Eligibility	Varies by Service
3. Recruit- Counselor/ Security Interviewer	Recruit Training	Assignment/ Clearance	Varies by Service Eligibility

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Figure 1. Military service prescreening paradigm.

The first decision point occurs during the interaction between the applicant and the recruiter. While there is no explicit screening for personnel security, the recruiter evaluates the applicant's potential for military service in general and for particular occupational specialties. Where the applicant's record contains evidence of past behavior that would render the individual ineligible for military service, e.g., certain drug and criminal behavior, a moral waiver may be granted. Some individuals who are given moral waivers are eventually assigned to sensitive occupations. Two recent PERSEREC reports have evaluated the implications of having moral waiver personnel in military service (Fitz & McDaniel, in press; Wiskoff & Dunipace, in press). Appendix B provides a listing of the moral standards used by each service.

The second and third prescreening stages, at the Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS) and Recruit Training Centers respectively, are discussed in great detail in subsequent sections of this report. At the MEPS, depending upon the particular military service, each applicant is screened by a military classifier/counselor and, in the Army, by a security interviewer. Decisions are made whether to accept or reject applicants for sensitive occupations. If individuals are accepted and enter the Delayed Entry Program (DEP), they are screened again at the end of DEP before entering active duty. Finally, during recruit training, most individuals who have been selected for sensitive positions are screened once more prior to initiating the formal process of a background investigation and adjudication.

### Policy Guidance

There are two basic policy documents that provide the framework within which prescreening for sensitive jobs is conducted within the military services. For individuals being considered for jobs that require SCI access, the Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) No. 1/14, Minimum Personnel Security Standards and Procedures Governing Eligibility for Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (Director of Central Intelligence, 14 April, 1985) provides basic screening criteria. For individuals being considered for Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential clearances, the Defense Personnel Security Program Regulation DoD 5200.2-R (Department of Defense, January, 1987) provides similar adjudicative criteria.

Both of these documents provide specific factors to be considered during the adjudication of results from background investigations. These factors range from loyalty and financial issues to drug and alcohol abuse problems. In essence, the function of prescreening is to identify, prior to conducting a background investigation, individuals who would fail to meet the trustworthiness and reliability criteria outlined in these documents. Each of the services also promulgates additional policy guidance for personnel security screening and these documents are mentioned in later sections of this report.

## Criteria

While prescreening procedures should help reduce both background investigation and technical training costs, their primary function is to prevent untrustworthy and unreliable personnel from being assigned to sensitive jobs. If such personnel were allowed to enter sensitive occupations, they could represent significant security threats. The ultimate effectiveness measure for the personnel security prescreening systems would be the extent to which they reduce the rate of unauthorized disclosure of classified material by personnel in sensitive occupations. The objective of prescreening is to reject personnel who might commit security violations (the most extreme case being espionage). Unfortunately, there is no easily accessible data measuring security violation rates, and the base rate for espionage is too low to conduct meaningful comparisons. However, there are two measures that could serve as surrogate indicators of prescreening effectiveness.

### Background Investigation Issue Cases

In background investigations where potential derogatory information is uncovered during normal investigative procedures, an expanded investigation is often conducted in the problem area. This situation is called an issue case. Issue cases are important because they signify that there is adverse information in the person's background that reflects on that person's trustworthiness and reliability and thus on his or her qualifications to hold a high level security clearance. While most issue case personnel ultimately receive security clearances, one would still hypothesize that effective prescreening should reduce the issue case rate among those personnel who pass the prescreening process. Issue case status has been used as a criterion in two recent PERSEREC reports directed at validating biographical questionnaires for personnel security screening (see Crawford & Trent, 1987; McDaniel, in press).

### Unsuitability Discharges

Another measure of prescreening effectiveness is the degree to which personnel who pass the prescreening are later discharged from sensitive jobs for unsuitability reasons. Approximately 30 percent of military enlistees fail to complete their first 3 years of military service (Buddin, 1984). While premature attrition can be due to reasons ranging from medical disqualifications to hardship cases, the largest proportion result from failure to meet minimum behavioral and performance criteria. These criteria include such categories as trainee discharge (poor entry level performance and conduct), character disorders, financial irresponsibility, drug use, sexual perversion, Courts Martial, etc. Many of these have direct relationships to the adjudicative factors listed in DCID 1/14 and DoD Regulation 5200.2-R.

Unsuitability attrition from any occupational area has significant economic implications to the military; unsuitability attrition from sensitive jobs also has security implications. Many of these personnel being discharged from sensitive positions are likely to be quite negative about their military service. They would also still be extremely knowledgeable about classified information and technology. These factors, combined with possible financial uncertainty upon return to civilian life, make them potential targets for recruitment to espionage (Flyer, 1987).

### **Objective**

The purpose of this study was to document systematically the current prescreening procedures used by each service in reviewing applicants for sensitive jobs. This documentation included: (1) policy guidelines and requirements; (2) the prescreening information collected by each service; (3) the decision process used within each service; and (4) the rejection rates at each stage of the prescreening. In addition, both issue case rates and unsuitability discharge rates were examined for personnel who passed the prescreening process. The above information was then used as the basis for recommendations to improve the prescreening process.



## APPROACH

The information concerning service prescreening procedures was obtained through three sources. Discussions were held with headquarters personnel to ascertain the policy objectives of their respective prescreening programs. In addition, applicable instructions and guidelines were reviewed to determine specific policy and procedural requirements. Finally, visits were made to sites conducting prescreening for each of the services to observe operational activities and obtain copies of forms and questionnaires being used as a part of the prescreening process. Copies of these forms and questionnaires are provided in the appendixes C, D, E, and F for the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps respectively.

For purposes of this report, sensitive jobs were divided into the following four categories:

1. **SCI** - These jobs require a Top Secret clearance as well as access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). The Special Background Investigation (SBI) is used to meet investigative requirements.
2. **Top Secret** - Jobs in this category require a Top Secret clearance. The Interview Oriented Background Investigation (IBI) is used to meet the investigative requirements.
3. **PRP Critical** - These jobs require nuclear duties where the assigned individual possesses both access plus technical knowledge or other attributes that could potentially place the nuclear weapons at risk. The jobs are covered under the DoD Personal Reliability Program (PRP) and may or may not require a Top Secret clearance. The IBI meets investigative requirements.
4. **PRP Controlled** - Jobs in this category require nuclear duties; however, the individual has access but no technical knowledge of the weapons. The jobs are covered under the PRP program and the Entrance National Agency Check meets investigative requirements. Clearance level is at Secret or below.

### Issue Case Rates

Selective data on all background investigations (including issue case status) are maintained on the Defense Central Index of Investigations (DCII) data base, a copy of which is stored at the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). DMDC provided PERSEREC with issue case rates for enlisted accessions during the period FY-83 to

FY-86. The sample included 60,329 enlisted accessions (i.e., individuals who actually entered active duty) who had received either an IBI or a SBI during their first 6 months of active service. The 6-month restriction was placed on the sample in order to eliminate those personnel whose processing was not initiated upon entry (or shortly thereafter) into military service. Issue case rates were broken out by type of investigation and branch of service. This sample represented individuals who had favorably passed the initial service prescreening since investigations are not requested for personnel who fail to pass this hurdle.

### **Unsuitability Discharge Rates**

DMDC also provided PERSEREC with data on unsuitability discharge rates. In order to examine rates of unsuitability discharges during the first 3 years of active duty, the total sample included all first-term (non-prior service) enlisted personnel who entered active duty during FY-83 and FY-84. Unsuitability attrition was defined as being discharged during any point in the first 3 years of service for failure to meet minimum performance and behavioral criteria. (Operationally, this was defined as having inter-service separation codes in the range of 060 to 087 or 101 and 102.)

In order to make comparisons with personnel who did not go through prescreening, data were obtained for both personnel who received a background investigation and for all other enlisted accessions. The sample included 578,560 accessions for the 2-year period, FY-83 and FY-84, who did not receive a background investigation during their first 6 months of active duty. Unsuitability discharge data were also obtained for the 29,138 enlisted accessions who entered service during this 2-year period and who also received background investigations during their first 6 months in service.

# RESULTS

## Air Force Screening Process

There are two key factors that influence the current Air Force security screening process. First, the Air Force has the largest manpower pool upon which to draw, i.e., more young men and women make the Air Force, rather than another military service, their first choice. Due to this selectivity, the Air Force only provides specific job guarantees to approximately 50 percent of its accessions. Although the percentage can vary depending upon the recruiting climate, it is usually a far lower percentage than the other services. The remaining accessions are guaranteed jobs in one of four aptitude areas (mechanical, administrative, general, or electronic). Second, the Air Force is the only service where all enlisted accessions go through recruit training at one site -- in this case, Lackland Air Force Base.

The above factors affect the program in two ways. First, the Air Force has less need for conducting intensive security screening at the MEPS. Even if personnel guaranteed schools at the MEPS are later screened out at Lackland, there are still a large number of other highly qualified personnel who can be side-loaded into the potentially vacant school seats. The Air Force can thus choose from approximately 50 percent of its accessions while they are at recruit training. Second, the use of just one recruit training site allows the Air Force to operate a centralized organization to screen all potential accessions for high security risk jobs. This provides advantages in terms of economies of scale, allocation and training of personnel, and consistency of program implementation.

### Policy Guidance

Headquarters, Air Force Office of Security Police (AFOSP), Directorate of Information Security, located at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, administers the Air Force Personnel Security Program. The key implementation instruction is Air Force Regulation 205-32, USAF Personnel Security Program, dated 26 June 1987. AFOSP formulates, interprets, and disseminates Air Force personnel security policy. The Air Force Security Clearance Office (AFSCO) adjudicates all personnel security investigations and is the single Air Force authority for granting, denying, or revoking security clearance eligibility. For SCI access, AFSCO personnel perform an initial adjudication of the SBI for a Top Secret clearance. However, final adjudication and granting of SCI access is performed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (HQ/INSB Personnel Security Division) located at Bolling Air Force Base.

## Jobs Covered by Special Screening Procedures

The Air Force has a large number of job categories or Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSCs) that are covered by special screening procedures for personnel security. A list of these AFSCs by different job categories is presented in Table 1.

Overall, the Air Force currently has 12 SCI, 11 Top Secret, seven PRP (Critical), and nine PRP (Controlled) specialty codes that require special screening for new enlisted accessions entering those job types.

## Security Screening at the MEPS

The Air Force strategy for prescreening applicants for sensitive jobs is very functional. All applicants, after they have been determined to be mentally, physically and morally qualified for entry into the Air Force, complete ATC form 1408 (independent of whether or not they are seeking a sensitive job classification). The process of filling out the form is relatively straightforward. It is completed by the Air Force job counselor, who is usually a senior enlisted person. This is accomplished at the MEPS during a face-to-face interview with the applicant. A copy of this form appears in Appendix C, page C-1. The form covers marijuana use in last 6 months, waiver status, alcohol abuse, psychological problems, financial irresponsibility, suspension from school, employment problems, and non-US citizenship status. A yes answer to any one of these questions results in a sensitive job code (SJC) of (B), which means ineligible for sensitive jobs.

A (C) SJC code, ineligible for some sensitive jobs, results if the above questions are answered no but either any member of the applicant's immediate family is not a U.S. citizen or if the applicant has a blood relative residing in a communist country. This code limits the applicant to some of the PRP jobs. Finally, a "clean" form results in a SJC code of (F) or eligible for sensitive jobs.

The goal is to get a clear yes or no answer. If there are any strong doubts, as there can be with the alcohol abuse and financial irresponsibility questions, the counselor usually opts towards the more conservative B or ineligible code. Later screening at Lackland can change these codes, which could affect job assignments for recruits who were not guaranteed specific jobs at the MEPS. The SJC code for an applicant is entered into the computerized school assignment system called PROMIS (see Appendix A for a description). The result is that for those 50 percent or so of the applicants who will be in the guaranteed training enlistment program (GTEPs), the assignment system only allocates sensitive job guarantees for applicants with a (F) or (C) code. The computer algorithm never even considers a (B) coded applicant for these jobs.

Table 1

List of Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSCs)  
Screened for Personnel Security

AFSC	Job Description
<b>SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION</b>	
11130	Defensive Aerial Gunner (This is a PRP rating that requires an SBI)
20130	Intelligence Operations Specialist
20131	Target Intelligence Specialist
20230	Radio Communications Analysis Security Specialist
20530	Electronic Intelligence Operations Specialist
20630	Imagery Interpreter Specialist
20731	Morse Systems Operator
20732	Printer Systems Operator
208XX	Cryptologic Linguist Specialist
20930	Defensive Countermeasure Specialist
30630	Electronic Communications and Cryptologic Equipment Systems Specialist
30633	Telecommunications Systems Maintenance Specialist
<b>TOP SECRET</b>	
11230	In Flight Refueling Operator
11630	Airborne Communication Systems Operator
23330	Imagery Production Specialist
27430	Communications and Control Specialist
32835	Airborne Command Post Communications Equipment Specialist
34137	Missile Trainer Specialist
49131	Communications Computer Systems Operator
49330	Communications Computer Systems Control Specialist
99104	Systems Repair Technician
99105	Scientific Measurement Technician
99106	Scientific Laboratory Technician
<b>PRP (CRITICAL)</b>	
41130	Missile Systems Maintenance Specialist
41131C	Missile Maintenance Specialist
41132	Missile Facilities Specialist
41133	Missile Pneudralic Specialist
46230	Missile Liquid Propellant Systems Maintenance Specialist
46330	Nuclear Weapons Specialist
46430	Explosive Ordnance Disposal Specialist
<b>PRP (CONTROLLED)</b>	
32130	Bomb Navigation Systems Specialist
32131	Defensive Fire Control Systems Specialist
41130F	Missile Systems Maintenance Specialist
43131J	Tactical Aircraft Maintenance Specialist
43132	Strategic Aircraft Maintenance Specialist
45733A	Offensive Avionics Systems Specialist
45733B	Aircraft Computer and Multiplexing Systems Specialist
45733C	Defensive Avionics Systems Specialist
81130	Security Specialist

It should be noted that the job counselor has additional information besides the interview that can be used to determine the answers to the ATC form 1408 questions. All applicants have already completed the DD form 398-2, which is used to request the Entrance National Agency Check (ENTNAC). The 398-2 has arrest information since the ENTNAC is basically a computerized check of FBI and security clearance records. Likewise, the applicant has completed DD form 1966, which is the basic application for enlistment into the military services. The DD form 1966 also contains information on problems with the law and citizenship status. Finally the job counselor has access to the AF Form 2030 (USAF Drug and Alcohol Abuse Certificate), which was completed earlier and has information on drug waivers.

As is true in all the services, many applicants do not enter the Air Force immediately after being processed at the MEPS. They enter the Delayed Entry Program (DEP) where they are allowed a period of time (sometimes up to a year) prior to reporting for active duty. When applicants come out of the DEP, they come to the MEPS for final processing. At this time, the 2030 drug form is completed again and any drug usage during DEP would automatically disqualify the individual for sensitive jobs.

During FY-86 and FY-87, the distribution of SJC codes for enlisted accessions entering Lackland was approximately as follows: (B) ineligible - 14 percent, (C) ineligible for some sensitive jobs - 5 percent, and (F) eligible for sensitive jobs -81 percent.

The Air Force screening at the MEPS for sensitive jobs is very limited. Job counselors receive limited training in filling out the 1408, and any counselor can gather the 1408 information. However, given the more selected manpower pool the Air Force draws upon as well as the capability to classify recruits at Lackland into sensitive jobs, the Air Force system serves as a very cost effective and non-time consuming initial screening process. The thorough followup screening that occurs at Lackland compensates for the less intensive early screening.

#### Security Screening at Recruit Training

The second stage of the security screening is performed by the 3507th Airman Classification Squadron at Lackland Air Force Base. This screening encompasses an evaluation on the sixth day of recruit training performed by enlisted job counselors and, for any accession requiring a BI/SBI, an additional 10th day evaluation. The 10th day screen, which is the most indepth interview, is conducted by personnel from the Sensitive Skills Support Section. As of mid-1988, this section had four junior officers (01/02) and two GS-9 civilians.

The job counselors who conduct the sixth day screen have not received any specific training in personnel security screening; however, they have conducted numerous interviews as part of the classification process at Lackland. Likewise, interviewers in the Sensitive Skills Support Section have only received on-job training.

The screening process at Lackland can best be understood in terms of sequential stages occurring at various points in the 31 days of recruit training. These four stages are presented below.

Day 4. On day 4 of recruit training, all basic trainees come to the 3507th for processing. If they are nonschool guarantees, they also see lists of jobs for that week's group and read written job descriptions and then indicate their assignment preferences. All recruits fill out the four-part ATC form 712, which is a biographical questionnaire (see Appendix C, pages C-2 to C-5).

Page one of form 712 requests basic background information including educational, employment, and criminal data as well as any involvement with illegal drugs. Page two is used to record interview results from the 10th day evaluation. Page three consists of a two-part psychological questionnaire including a sentence completion test. Finally, page four is used for legal, privacy act, and other administrative concerns.

Day 6. On the sixth day, the trainees come back for additional processing. Job counselors verify information in personnel and medical records. These records are compared with information disclosed by the recruit on the front page of the ATC form 712 biographical questionnaire. Interviewers also look at ATC Form 722, PRP/in-Service Drug Use, which is filled out just prior to the interview. This form is very similar to the ATC form 1408 filled in at the MEPS except that it has more questions on drug usage. The counselor also assesses emotional stability using information available in the recruit's personnel records. If the counselor spots a problem, the recruit will be referred to a psychologist for a more indepth examination.

Based on the above assessments, the interviewer determines whether or not the recruit is qualified for a sensitive job. This is done for both individuals with job guarantees and for other recruits before they state their choices. Thus, recruits are not permitted to state a choice for a job for which they do not qualify. Individuals who are being considered for classification into sensitive jobs will later participate in the 10th day screen along with individuals who pass this screen and who were previously guaranteed a sensitive job.

From a personnel security standpoint, the interviewer is attempting to determine whether the individual will meet the reliability and trustworthiness criteria required for a

successful SBI/IBI or for the PRP program. The orientation at this point is to qualify the individual rather than to emphasize disqualification. Only the most obvious cases are disqualified. Nonetheless, besides steering non-GTEP recruits away from sensitive jobs, some recruits guaranteed sensitive jobs are also disqualified. In most cases, these individuals are reclassified into nonsensitive jobs rather than discharged from the Air Force.

For individuals who have been classified into PRP (Controlled) jobs, day six is the final screening prior to an assessment at their new assignment. However, individuals in the other three categories (PRP (Critical), Top Secret, and SCI) now proceed on to a more thorough 10th day screen.

Day 10. On the 10th day, all trainees who have potential sensitive job assignments (either as a GTEP or as a result of the sixth day classification) report back to the 3507th for additional screening. Prior to reporting, these trainees have completed a rough draft of their DD Form 398-2, which will provide the interviewer with additional information for consistency checks. The 398-2 form is the basic document used by the services to request either an IBI or an SBI. The interviewers, called Sensitive Skills Adjudicators, also have personnel and medical records available for background information as well as the biographical questionnaire.

The interview is conducted face-to-face and takes approximately 15 to 25 minutes. Each interviewer uses a similar structured format; however, styles vary in terms of techniques used for probing potential problem areas. The interview covers criminal, citizenship, financial, reliability, trustworthiness, and drug and alcohol abuse areas. One assessment, unique to the Air Force, is the use of the psychological data provided in the biographical questionnaire. These psychological tests are not keyed to provide an overall adjustment score. Rather, the interviewer focuses on certain critical items that could indicate potential problem areas and that require followup in the interview, e.g., "It is usually true that I am unable to control my temper."

According to 3507th personnel, the orientation of the 10th day interview, unlike the sixth day interview, is to disqualify rather than qualify. It is interesting to note that the screening process does not differ as a function of access level. Interviewers conduct similar interviews independent of whether the individual is in the SCI, Top Secret, or PRP (Critical) group. One minor difference is that former Peace Corps members are not allowed to enter SCI billets but may go to PRP jobs.

This Peace Corps restriction is also the case for SCI billets in the other military services. It resulted from a concern when the Peace Corps was established that it not be perceived as an intelligence gathering agency of the U. S. government. As such, participation in the Peace Corps followed by subsequent service in military intelligence



billets might be seen by foreign governments as linking the Peace Corps with our intelligence agencies.

During FY-87, 8505 interviews were conducted by the 3507th on the 10th day. A total of 914 or 10.7 percent of the trainees are disqualified at this stage. The disqualification rates were 14.7 percent for recruits on open contracts who were classified into sensitive jobs on the 6th day of training and 5 percent for GTEPs. Again, unless the disqualification resulted from fraudulent entry, an attempt is made to place these personnel in other nonsensitive ratings. Table 2 presents a list of the factors that resulted in disqualification.

**Table 2**  
**FY-87 Disqualifications of Air Force**  
**Accessions During 10th Day Screening**

Reason for Disqualification	Percentage (N = 914)
Character Disorder	24.5
Legal History	22.0
History of Irresponsibility	10.1
Unfavorable Credit References	8.5
Citizenship of Relatives	7.6
Drug Abuse/Marijuana	7.4
Excessive Indebtedness	6.9
Excessive/Habitual Use of Alcohol	6.5
All Others	6.5

The area that resulted in the most disqualifications (24.5%) was character disorders/psychological problems, followed by an unfavorable legal history (22.0%). Individuals who were disqualified because of character disorders were also assessed by a psychologist in addition to the assessment during the 10th day interview. It should be noted that all individuals reporting to the 10th day interview had already successfully passed the 6th day screen. Hence, it appears that the more indepth interview was

important in identifying another subset of potential security risks. Independent of security considerations, the 914 individuals disqualified at this stage represent a significant cost avoidance. First, a large number of potentially unfruitful SBI/IBIs were eliminated. Second, if these individuals had completed all or a portion of their technical training prior to having a clearance denied, these training costs would have been wasted.

Additional assessments. After trainees successfully pass the 10th day screen, a formal request is initiated to DIS for a SBI or IBI depending on the job clearance requirement. However, the 3507th now initiates another phase of screening that is again unique to the Air Force program. For each trainee for whom a SBI or IBI is being requested, at least three letters are sent to request character references (see Appendix C, pages C-6 and C-7 for a copy of the form). Also, at least one law enforcement inquiry is initiated (see Appendix C, pages C-8 and C-9). Finally, a credit, employment, and/or education inquiry is sent if there are any doubts in these areas (see Appendix C, pages C-10 to C-15).

If replies from these inquiries uncover any new derogatory information, the trainee is brought back to discuss the issue. If the trainee has left Lackland, the derogatory information is forwarded to his or her new training command for action. While these inquiries very seldom uncover new derogatory information, 3507th personnel feel they are still important because a few potential security risks are identified. Also, it allows them to cancel some requests for formal DIS investigations that may prove to be too negative to grant a clearance.

The 3507th unit performs one final screen that is again unique to the Air Force. For every trainee who successfully passes the 10th day screen, peer evaluations are obtained from other individuals in his or her flight squadron (see Appendix C, page C-16). These evaluations are then scanned by the adjudicator who conducted the original interview. If the evaluations warrant followup, the trainee is called back in for additional consultation. Again, this process leads to only a few disqualifications, but 3507th personnel feel it has merit because it taps a source of information not covered in other parts of the screening and usually not assessed in the DIS SBI/IBI.

### Final Adjudication

While the 3507th performs a screening and adjudication function, it does not perform the final adjudication. As mentioned earlier, this function is performed by AFSCO. AFSCO has access to all the information gathered by the 3507th as well as new data generated by the formal DIS investigation. There are no data available giving clearance denial rates for enlisted accessions receiving SBIs or IBIs; however, it has been estimated by adjudicators to be less than one percent. Also, in some cases, this

is the result of activities by the new accession that occurred after training at Lackland. Overall, this low denial rate suggests that the Air Force screening program is doing an effective job of screening out individuals who would not successfully pass final adjudication.

### **Army Screening Process**

The current structure of the Army security screening process is predicated on the facts that (1) the Army must recruit many more enlisted accessions than the other services, and (2) to compete successfully for such a large number of quality personnel, the Army must provide specific job guarantees to most of its accessions while they are being processed at the MEPS.

These factors necessitate that the Army conduct intensive screening at the MEPS. If individuals who are guaranteed school seats for sensitive jobs later become disqualified during recruit training, the Army, unlike the Air Force, cannot replace or side-load new personnel into these slots. In the early 1970s, the Army did not conduct intensive screening at the MEPS. Recruiters filled quotas; however, approximately 30 percent of these enlistees did not qualify for their security clearances. Clearly, the recruiters were responding more closely to quota requirements rather than to security requirements. The result was a loss of valuable school seats and a resultant shortage of personnel in certain sensitive job specialties.

The Army's current screening effort, the Personnel Security Screening Program (PSSP), includes four basic phases:

Phase I - Initial preenlistment screening and selection is conducted by a security interviewer at the MEPS. IBIs are requested where appropriate.

Phase II - A followup intensive interview for SCI candidates is conducted by a military intelligence interviewer during the basic training phase.

Phase III - Interim security adjudications are made and an interim security clearance is granted/denied for SCI candidates. SBIs are requested for SCI candidates. Both of these steps are accomplished right after the phase II interview.

Phase IV - Final adjudication is completed based on information from either Phase I and/or Phase II along with the results of the SBI/IBI.

After a brief overview of policy guidance and jobs included in the program, Phase I and Phase II will be discussed in detail. Phase III and IV will only be discussed as they interact with the processes occurring during the first two phases.

### Policy Guidance

Personnel Security policy in the Army is under the purview of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence. However, the PSSP is operated and managed by the Commander, U. S. Total Army Personnel Agency (TAPA) Alexandria, Virginia. Specifically, the Chief of the Personnel Security Branch at TAPA is the central management point for PSSP. This branch also performs the necessary coordination with other affected commands including Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), US Army Recruiting Command (USAREC), and US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM).

Program guidelines are provided by TAPA Operating Instruction 604.1 (28-86) of 1 January 1986, Personnel Security Screening Program. In addition, a TAPA SOP dated 1 January 1987 entitled Security Interviewer provides detailed instructions for security interviewers operating at the MEPS. The Army has one central adjudication facility, the U. S. Army Central Personnel Security Screening Clearance Facility (CCF), located at Ft. Meade, Maryland.

### Jobs Covered by Special Screening Procedures

The Army has a large number of jobs or Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) that are covered by the special screening procedures of the PSSP. A list of these MOSs by different categories is presented in Table 3.

For enlisted accessions, the Army currently has 19 SCI, two Top Secret, three PRP (critical), and four PRP (controlled) MOSs. Overall, approximately 56 percent of the PSSP workload involves screening for the linguist MOSs (e.g., 98C and 98G)

Table 3

List of Army Military Occupational  
Specialties (MOSS) Screened for Personnel Security

MOS	Job Description
<b>SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION</b>	
05D	EW/SIGINT Identifier/Locator
05H	EW/SIGINT Morse Interceptor
05K	EW/SIGINT Non-Morse Interceptor
29G	Digital Communications Equipment Repairer
29H	Automatic Digital Message Switch Equipment (ADMSE) Repairer
33P	EW/Intercept Strategic Receiving Subsystem Repairer
33Q	EW/Intercept Strategic Signal Processing/Storage Subsystem Repairer
33R	EW/Intercept Aviation System Repairer
33V	EW/Intercept Aerial Sensor Repairer
33T	EW/Intercept Tactical System Repairer
72G	Automatic Data Telecommunications Operator
81Q	Terrain Analyst
96B	Intelligence Analyst
96D	Imagery Analyst
97B	Counter-Intelligence Agent (Assistant)
97G	Signal Security Specialist
98C	EW/SIGINT Analyst
98G	EW/SIGINT Voice Interceptor
98J	EW/SIGINT Noncommunications Interceptor
<b>TOP SECRET</b>	
29F	Fixed Communications Security Equipment Repairer
36L	Electronic Systems Switching Repairer
<b>PRP (CRITICAL)</b>	
12E	Atomic Demolitions Munition Specialist
55D	Explosive Ordnance Disposal Specialist
55G	Nuclear Weapons Maintenance Specialist
<b>PRP (CONTROLLED)</b>	
15E	Pershing Missile Crew Member
21G	Pershing Electronics Material Specialist
24U	Hercules Electronic Mechanic
95B	Military Police

## Security Screening at the MEPS

The Security Interviewers (SIs) at the MEPS only screen Army applicants who have already met the moral, physical, and mental qualifications for enlistment into the Army. The potential interviewees meet first with an enlisted Army job counselor to discuss job options. The SIs then interview personnel who have been assigned a sensitive job MOS via the Army's computerized job-person match system, the Army Recruiting Quota System (REQUEST) (see Appendix A for a description). In some cases, individuals who express a strong desire for a particular sensitive MOS will first be sent to the SI to determine if he/she meets the requisite security requirements. If this individual passes the screen, job classification will then be finalized via REQUEST.

The Army initiated intensive security screening at the MEPS with establishment of the PSSP in 1979. Initial consideration was given to using military intelligence (MI) personnel as security interviewers; however, Army Recruiting command felt that MI personnel might negatively impact on recruiting new accessions. Also, there was a shortage of MI agents. For these reasons, the Army opted for using Personnel Sergeants (MOS 75Z) at the E6/E7 level. These senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) are currently assigned to a Personnel Security Detachment (PSSD) at one of three TRADOC installations (Fort Dix, New Jersey, Fort Jackson, South Carolina, or Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri).

The SIs work at and are assigned to a MEPS in a particular geographical region. They are attached to their respective Army Recruiting Battalion for logistical support only. Operational control is maintained by the PSSD Commander, who in turn reports to the Chief, Personnel Security Branch, at TAPA. All new SIs are closely screened by TAPA and only volunteers are ultimately assigned to the MEPS.

From 1979 to 1984, there were 68 SIs assigned to different MEPS. However, manpower constraints resulted in a 50 percent reduction during FY-85 and FY-86. As a result, the remaining 34 personnel were assigned to the larger MEPS and went temporary duty to the smaller or satellite MEPS on an "as required" basis. This change had a negative impact on the quality of the overall screening, which is discussed in a later section.

The Army has solved the above problem by drawing on a second source of personnel for their SIs. The current plan is to select approximately 50 percent of the SIs from the Spaced and Imbalanced MOS (SIMOS). SIMOS personnel are working in cryptology and almost every SIMOS individual has SCI access. Most jobs for SIMOS personnel are at overseas bases; hence, there are limited billets in the United States for alternative rotation. Thus, some of these individuals will be selected for SI duty. Similar to the Personnel Sergeant SIs, new personnel will be screened on past performance,

initiative, communication skills, success at previous independent duty, and lack of any financial problems.

On-job training is the only interviewing preparation that the SI receives. Initial assignment orders direct the new SI to spend 3 days temporary duty at the cognizant detachment for general orientation. Additional refresher training is conducted once a year at each of the three detachments. All SIs in the geographical region are called in for this annual training along with headquarters' staff, DIS agents, and other selected individuals for the purpose of improving field performance. Also, all SIs are visited at least once a year by the Chief of PSSP Branch as well as on a more frequent basis by the Detachment Commander.

The SIs employ two different types of screening approaches described below depending upon whether the applicant is being considered for SCI and/or Top Secret access or for the PRP program.

Security screening process (SCI and Top Secret). All applicants at the MEPS who are classified for MOSs requiring either SCI access or a Top Secret clearance are sent by the job counselor to the SI for an indepth security interview. The applicant first completes the Army's Security Screening Questionnaire (Form 169-R) (see Appendix D, page D-1 through D- 9 for a copy of the 169-R).

The 169-R requests basic identifying information, foreign connections and travel, drug use, background data on financial, legal, and moral areas, employment problems, and a variety of other relevant issues. The security interview lasts 10 to 30 minutes depending on the type of information reported on the 169-R. The SI also has access to the applicant's other personnel and medical records. While the SI strives to obtain the most complete information, he/she does not want to cause the applicants to change their mind about enlisting in the Army. In this regard, the SIs wear Army uniforms, stress that they are interviewers and not military intelligence agents, and operate within a context where the applicant is still a civilian.

In those cases where self-reported derogatory information may be disqualifying, the SI obtains telephonic adjudication determinations from either the PSSP Detachment Commander (for minor issues) or the CCF at Fort Meade. Policy directives stress that the SI is an information gatherer and not an adjudicator. Nonetheless, the quality of the information gathered by the SI clearly impacts on the initial adjudication decision.

Most individuals who qualify for a sensitive job enter the DEP rather than reporting directly to recruit training. They thus must complete an updated 169-R when they return to the MEPS for final processing. They are not given access to their answers on the original 169-R since detection of initial falsification as well as reporting

of interim activities are the objectives of this exercise. Any new derogatory information must again be telephonically adjudicated.

For those individuals qualified for a job requiring an IBI, the SI will forward a DD Form 398 to the PSSP Detachment Commander along with a request for DIS to conduct an ENTNAC and a Personal Security Investigation. This can be done after the initial MEPS interview so that the DIS IBI can be initiated and sometimes completed while the individual is in DEP. Applicants for SCI MOSs take the 398 along with the original and updated 169-R forms to the PSSP Detachment at their basic training site.

Security screening process (PRP). The screening process for applicants at the MEPS entering PRP critical MOSs is identical to the procedures described above. However, these individuals along with personnel applying for PRP controlled MOSs also see the SI for the purpose of completing a four part Personnel Reliability Program Screening Questionnaire (189-R) (see Appendix D, pages D-10 and D-11). It should be noted that those applicants in the PRP critical MOSs will also have completed and been interviewed concerning their responses to the 169-R; PRP controlled applicants do not go through this process.

The interview using the 189-R is shorter and more focused than that using the 169-R. The emphasis is on identifying objections to nuclear weapons, experimental marijuana and hashish use, morally disqualifying waivers, and illegal use of hard drugs. Unlike individuals who apply for SCI and Top Secret MOSs, even one use of hard drugs (e.g., cocaine, amphetamines, LSD, etc.) is an automatic disqualifier for the PRP. Like the 169-R, separate 189-R forms are filled out when entering the DEP and when leaving the DEP to begin active duty.

During FY-85, 8799 security interviews were conducted at the MEPS by SIs. A total of 4143 individuals or 47 percent were disqualified from sensitive MOSs. The rejection rate for FY-86 was 36 percent based on 8508 interviews, and the rejection rate for FY-87 was 33 percent based on 8274 interviews. Without this screening and given that a formal DIS background investigation would have been requested for a large proportion of these rejected individuals, the cost avoidance generated by the MEPS screening process was very significant for the Army. Also, if any of these rejected individuals would have made it past the screen at basic training and the final adjudicative screen, and the initial SI assessment was correct, it would have meant that a number of potential security risks would have entered sensitive jobs in the Army.

The large drop in the number of rejections from FY-85 to FY-86 was the result of the decrease in the number of SIs. At the MEPS without a permanent SI, job counselors did not want to wait until the SI could come TDY; thus, they often sold the



applicant on another nonsensitive MOS. Only applicants with extremely clean records were sold sensitive jobs.

While at first glance this may appear to be functional for the Army, it actually created problems. The Army had fewer people to choose from for sensitive jobs and started losing training seats. Also, each SI was now forced to conduct more interviews (of lower quality) in a shorter period of time when they returned from their TDY assignments. This resulted in a higher disqualification rate for SCI applicants during phase II with the resultant loss of training school seats. The pressures created by these problems led to the SIMOS solution discussed earlier.

It should be noted that individuals disqualified during phase I are usually not lost to the Army. Indeed, if a SI disqualifies an applicant, an attempt is made to interest the person in a nonsensitive job. Actual job classification is left to the job counselor at the MEPS; however, the SI tries to ensure that the disqualification has not soured the individual on an Army enlistment.

### Security Screening at Recruit Training

As mentioned earlier, the Army has three PSSP detachments located at Fort Dix, New Jersey; Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; and Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Depending on the location of the advanced training school attended after recruit training, all accessions potentially entering sensitive jobs will go to one of these three sites. Accessions that are entering PRP or Top Secret jobs only have a final records check at this stage. Additional screening for the Top Secret and PRP critical groups will occur during adjudication of background investigation findings. Also, all PRP candidates will undergo a final screen at their new command.

Phase II, then, is primarily directed at applicants for jobs that require SCI access (see Table 3). This screening is essential for the Army because it provides final information used in granting or denying interim SCI access. All SCI accessions must have this interim clearance prior to reporting to advanced training.

On the third day after their arrival at recruit training, new accessions entering SCI jobs report to the PSSP Detachment. They receive a group briefing stressing the importance of the screening interview and other personnel security assessments that they will be undergoing prior to getting a final clearance. In addition, each accession views a 34-minute movie that provides an orientation to SCI access and controls. A detailed review is made to ensure all paperwork is in order and an interview is then scheduled with a military intelligence (MI) interviewer.

The MI interviewers are all active or reserve duty Army personnel who range from E4 to O2. They all have experience as trained MI agents; however, there is no formal training for the phase II interviews. The Army MI interviewers all dress in civilian clothes because they feel that this presents a "new and imposing" element to the basic trainee. Up to the point of the interview, every authority figure the recruit has seen has worn a uniform. Now, the recruit faces an imposing MI agent in civilian clothes who can read the enlistee his rights. Army PSSP people feel this situation creates a strong impact on the interviewees that often makes them report information previously withheld. A secondary reason for the civilian clothes is to de-emphasize the role of military rank in the interviews. All agents want to be considered as professionals independent of their grade or rank.

This final interview, on day four of training, includes completion of the Personnel Security Screening Interview form (IA Form 92) (see Appendix D, pages D-12 through D-15). This form requires background data, legal history information, and other administrative data. The form is also used to document the results of the interview. The MIs use a semi-structured interview format and also have access to the applicants' personnel records, 169-R, the 398, and the IA-92. Prior to the interview, the agents assess internal consistency of the information reported on the different forms. The actual interview can run anywhere between 15 and 30 minutes depending on whether or not new derogatory information is uncovered. If any potentially serious information is uncovered, the MI will read the trainee his/her rights prior to probing in greater depth.

The orientation of the MIs, like DIS investigators, is to be objective rather than to evaluate. The goal of the interview is to uncover potentially derogatory information but not to judge it. This adjudicative role is left to CCF. If CCF decides to deny interim SCI access, a formal letter of inquiry (LOI) is sent to the PSSP detachment, and the individual is removed from consideration for an SCI job. Trainees rarely challenge this denial although they do have due process rights. They are then either reclassified into nonsensitive jobs or, if the information is serious, discharged from the Army.

During FY-86, a total of 4733 phase II interviews were conducted. These interviews resulted in a rejection rate of 195 trainees or 4.1 percent. Again, the cost avoidance gained by not initiating these SBIs was significant. In most of these denials, multiple areas of derogatory information were uncovered, i.e., drugs, law violations, debts. As mentioned earlier, because of the decrease in SIs at the MEPS, the rejection rate for FY-87 (4.6% based on 4472 interviews) was higher than the rate for FY-86. Because the Army front loads SCI job applicants to cover for expected losses during recruit training (based on historical data), this unexpected increase resulted in lost school seats for the Army in FY-86. The recent use of SIMOS personnel to augment the number of SIs at the MEPS should help reduce the rejection rate during phase II.

## Final Adjudication

The information gathered during phase II interviews, as well as the 169-R from the MEPS, is forwarded to CCF. The CCF then makes the final adjudication for SCI access based on the DIS investigation results and on the phase I and phase II information. The denial rate for clearances at this point is very low (estimated to be approximately one percent). This denial can often be the result of activities that occurred after the individual completed the phase I and phase II screen. Hence, the actual number of individuals who do not report potentially disqualifying derogatory information at some point in the screening process, and later have this information uncovered during the background investigation, is less than one percent.

## **Navy Screening Process**

Compared to the Air Force and the Army, the Navy has the most decentralized process for screening enlisted accessions for sensitive jobs. Unlike the Air Force but like the Army, the Navy must compete more intensely for its new accessions. Interestingly, unlike the Army, the Navy has not opted for intensive screening at the MEPS. Instead, it allows job counselors at the MEPS to conduct limited security screening and then conducts more intensive screening at the Recruit Training Centers. The Navy is unique in one other way. The screening for jobs requiring Top Secret clearances or PRP status is considerably less intense than that conducted for SCI access. On the other hand, the final interviews conducted at boot camp for potential SCI access are perhaps the most thorough of any of the services.

## Policy Guidance

The Office of Naval Intelligence (OP-009) is tasked with establishing policy for and implementing the Navy's Personnel Security Program. For collateral clearances (Top Secret and below), the Naval Security and Investigative Command in Silver Spring, Maryland, is specifically tasked with program implementation. Implementation of the SCI screening program is the specific responsibility of two agencies. For the Intelligence Specialist (IS) rating, the Navy Intelligence Command (NIC) takes the lead. For Cryptologic Technician (CT) ratings, the Naval Security Group Command Headquarters (NSG HDQS) has responsibility.

The Navy is currently centralizing its adjudication for collateral clearances. This responsibility will be vested in the Department of the Navy Central Adjudication Facility (DON CAF). Adjudication for SCI access is again split with the NSG HDQS handling the cryptologic ratings and NIC the intelligence ratings. The key implementation vehicle for the Navy's personnel security program is OPNAVINST 5510.1H dated 29 April 1988.

## Jobs Covered by Special Screening Procedures

The Navy has a number of ratings that are covered by special screening procedures for personnel security. A list of these ratings by different job categories is presented in Table 4.

The Navy currently conducts security screening for accessions for eight SCI , three Top Secret, eight PRP critical, and three PRP controlled ratings. In the following sections, the significantly different screening procedures for jobs requiring SCI access are discussed separately from those in the other three categories.

## Security Screening at the MEPS

Screening differs depending upon whether or not the individual is being considered for jobs that require SCI access.

SCI ratings. After applicants meet the basic moral, physical, and aptitude requirements, the job counselor or classifier at the MEPS uses the on-line computer job match system (Navy Classification and Assignment with Pride (CLASP)), which is discussed in Appendix A. If an applicant is matched with a sensitive job requiring SCI access, the job counselor must conduct an informal screen. The counselor ensures that the applicant and his/her immediate family members, including spouse, parents, and siblings, are U.S. citizens.

In addition, the applicant is encouraged to report any significant derogatory information at this time. He/she is warned that intensive screening will be conducted later at boot camp and during a DIS investigation. Navy regulations specify that moral turpitude offenses are generally disqualifying. However, this area requires considerable subjective judgment. At some of the MEPS (San Diego, for example) the counselors use a structured interview form to guide them in asking questions about areas that could potentially disqualify the individual for SCI access (see Appendix E, pages E-1 and E-2 for a copy of the form).

The above form is not mandatory and the screening that occurs can vary as a function of both the counselor and the MEPS location. If the applicant is rejected at this stage, the counselor tries to find a different job in a nonsensitive rating. If the applicant passes the screen, he/she will also undergo a similar screen after the completion of DEP. No data are currently available on the percentage of personnel accepted or rejected at this stage of the screening for SCI jobs.

Table 4

List of Navy Ratings  
Screened for Personnel Security

Rating	Job Description
<b>SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION</b>	
CTA	Cryptologic Technician Administrative
CTI	Cryptologic Technician Interpretive
CTM	Cryptologic Technician Maintenance
CTO	Cryptologic Technician Communications
CTR	Cryptologic Technician Collection
CTT	Cryptologic Technician Technical
CTM	Cryptologic Technician Maintenance
IS	Intelligence Specialist
<p><i>Note: Some logistic support billets for NSG and NIC code "Q" are also screened for SCI. These sometimes include Radioman and Engineman ratings.</i></p>	
<b>TOP SECRET</b>	
QMS	Quartermaster
RM	Radioman
RMS	Radioman (Submarine)
<b>PRP (CRITICAL)</b>	
FTB	Fire Control Technician (Ballistic Missiles)
FTG	Fire Control Technician Gunfire
GMM	Gunner's Mate Maintenance
GMT	Gunner's Mate Technician
MT	Missile Technician
STS	Sonar Technician (Submarine)
TMS	Torpedo Mate (Submarine)
WT	Weapons Technician
<b>PRP (CONTROLLED)</b>	
STG	Sonar Technician (Surface)
TM	Torpedoman's Mate
GM	Gunner's Mate

Top Secret and PRP ratings. After individuals are linked by CLASP with jobs requiring Top Secret clearances or PRP screening, the job counselor conducts an informal screen. For the Top Secret jobs, the counselor ensures that the applicant meets citizenship status and does not have any disqualifying moral turpitude offenses. For PRP ratings, special attention is given to ensuring the individual meets the basic

drug abuse screening criteria discussed in an earlier part of this report. Again, no data are available on rejection rates.

Overall, the screening conducted at the MEPS is not intensive for either SCI applicants or other sensitive job applicants. The job counselors are aware that most candidates will undergo more thorough screening at the MEPS as well as have a DIS investigation. At this point, no paperwork is initiated for background investigations.

### Security Screening at Recruit Training

Again, different procedures are used depending upon level of access being considered.

SCI screening program. Formal prescreening for Navy SCI occupations (Cryptologic Technicians and Intelligence Specialists) is conducted during basic training at the Naval Training Centers in Orlando, Great Lakes, and San Diego. The screening process is conducted by civilian interviewers in the Naval Security Group (NSG) Field Offices at each training site. NIC has an agreement with NSG HDQS to allow these facilities to conduct the screening interviews for personnel in the Intelligence Specialist rating. There are currently three interviewers at Orlando, two at San Diego, and one at Great Lakes.

There is no formal school training for these interviewers; however, these personnel receive significant on-the-job training before being allowed to conduct personnel security screening interviews alone. The Navy currently has extremely competent personnel working at these offices. Their civilian grade levels range up to GS-12. Also, some of the interviewers have 10 or more years of experience in conducting these screening sessions. This combination of relatively senior personnel with considerable job experience results (from the authors' assessment) in the Navy having the most qualified SCI screening interviewers of any of the services.

There are about 200 interviews per month being conducted at Orlando, 90 a month at San Diego, and a limited number at Great Lakes. Orlando processes all female applicants as well as all individuals in the IS ratings. In addition, these offices also screen Marine SCI candidates. This process is discussed in a later section.

The Navy is currently having difficulty attracting sufficient qualified personnel to the sensitive SCI ratings. For this reason, both job classifiers and the NSG interviewer spend time trying to identify suitable candidates at recruit training who were not guaranteed a training school at the MEPS. Thus, the screening interviews are conducted both with individuals who were guaranteed training in these ratings at the

MEPS and with recruits who are now being considered for SCI ratings (nonschool guaranteed personnel).

The interview process begins with a briefing to a group of candidates covering the nature of the ratings, the consequences of not agreeing to take part in the interview, and the paramount importance of honesty during the interview. Recruits are told that if dropped from the program at this stage, they still may get another training assignment. However, if they deceive the interviewer, and are later rejected by information turned up in the very thorough DIS investigation to follow, they are liable to get a general detail assignment. Applicants are then allowed to ask any questions they have about the program.

Those willing to be interviewed (almost all applicants) are then summoned individually and assessed by the interviewer. The interview proceeds in a semi-structured fashion with a general set of topics to be covered. The interviewer has the candidate's personnel folder to refer to in identifying potential security-related issues. This material and the agent's own style and reactions to the interviewee combine to determine the exact sequence and depth of the interview, which can last from 20 minutes to 2 or 3 hours.

Key areas covered in the interview include: citizenship of family and friends, contact with foreign nationals, foreign travel, drug use, alcohol use, police involvement, previous employment, school experiences, financial affairs, relevant sexual behavior, suicide attempts, mental health problems, organizational memberships, and any previous military discipline problems.

Other approaches and areas of inquiry intended to expose information relevant to personnel security are also used depending on the circumstances. These include probing into spare-time interests and activities and asking about parents' occupations. A final approach may involve asking the recruit what is the worst thing that he or she has ever done or what are the most negative things anyone might say about them to a DIS agent during the SBI.

When the interview is completed, the interviewer usually makes the decision on whether or not to continue processing for an SBI; however, if there are unusual circumstances, telephonic adjudication can be conducted with either NIC or NSG Headquarters. The interviewer also prepares a report to document any findings that have security significance. If the individual is rejected at this point, the report provides documentation on the specific reasons. If the SBI is initiated, the report includes any relevant issues discussed during the interview and then is forwarded as part of the request for the DIS SBI as well as being sent to NSG HDQS for consideration during final adjudication.

During FY-86, a total of 1644 interviews were conducted with school guaranteed CT candidates. The rejection rate was 15 percent. In addition, 493 interviews were conducted with nonschool guaranteed CTs, the rejection rate for this group was 29 percent.

For the intelligence ratings, a total of 284 interviews were conducted with school-guaranteed IS candidates. Again, 15 percent of these candidates were rejected. For nonschool-guaranteed ISs, 126 interviews were conducted with a rejection rate of 33 percent. It should be noted that these rejection rates are far higher than those reported at recruit training by the Army (about 5 percent) or the Air Force (about 10 percent). Given the lack of intensive screening at the MEPS, this disqualification rate is not unexpected. However, it does place a heavy burden on the Navy to continue to fill all training seats.

The Navy conducts one additional screening interview that is unique to its program. All CT applicants who pass the recruit training screen and proceed to Monterey, California, for advanced language training, are given one final screening interview toward the end of their training. Because the training can last up to 52 weeks and many of the young enlistees are on their own for the first time, the Navy feels that there are considerable opportunities for the candidates to get into trouble. The same field unit at San Diego that conducted the initial interview also conducts this followup interview, which lasts approximately 15 minutes. While the rejection rate at this stage is very low, it does provide an opportunity to follow up on potential problem areas that were identified during the first interview.

Screening for Top Secret and PRP. The screening program for individuals potentially entering jobs that require a Top Secret clearance or PRP screening is conducted separately from the SCI screening discussed above. This function is performed by military personnel assigned to the Personnel Support Detachment at the Recruit Training Command. The interviewers are usually Navy enlisted personnel at the E-6 and E-7 level. These individuals assume this role as a rotational 2 to 3 year assignment. There is no formal training for the assignment, and interviewing skills are learned on the job. However, interviewers usually have a sensitive job rating.

Candidates for Top Secret and PRP jobs (both school and nonschool guarantees) are brought to the Personnel Support Detachment during the early part of their recruit training. A group briefing describes the program and the security requirements and stresses that those individuals expressing personal mental reservations about the use of tactical nuclear weapons will not be certified for a nuclear related job. This group briefing is then followed by a personal interview that lasts 10 to 15 minutes.



Topics covered during the interview are essentially the same basic areas addressed during the NSG interview discussed earlier. However, this interview is far less intensive and does not involve the indepth probes used by the NSG interviewer. There are currently no data available on the rejection rate from these interviews. Individuals who pass this screening stage have a formal request for a DIS background investigation initiated by the detachment.

### Final Adjudication

As mentioned earlier, final adjudication for CT SCI candidates is performed by NSG HDQS while NIC performs this function for the IS rating. Rough estimates are that approximately one to two percent of the applicants have their final SCI access denied. Applicants for Top Secret and PRP critical ratings will have their final adjudication performed by the DON CAF starting in 1989. Until the CAF is fully operational, Commanding Officers at local commands will continue to perform the adjudication for military personnel. No data are available on clearance denial rates.

### **Marine Corps Screening Process**

The Marine Corps screens the least number of people for sensitive jobs. With regard to the MEPS and recruit training, only three occupational fields are screened. These include occupational field 0200 or intelligence (similar to the Navy's IS rating), occupational field 2600 or signals intelligence/ground electronic warfare, and two specific jobs within the 0300 infantry field (the 0311 presidential support option and the 0300 Marine Corps Security Forces or BV option). Personnel entering the BV option are assigned to Marine Barracks or sea duty that may involve PRP-related duties. Table 5 provides a list of specific occupational titles.

The Marine Corps personnel security screening effort operates under the same policy guidance and instructions as the Navy's program. However, specific segments, e.g., Marine Corps recruiters and job counselors, operate under specific Marine Corps policy instructions. The Marine Corps security screening process includes three basic steps. The first takes place with recruiters in the field and at the MEPS while the second and third parts of the process are accomplished at the San Diego or Parris Island Recruit Depots during basic training.

Table 5

List of Marine Corps Occupational  
Titles Screened for Personnel Security

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MOS	Title
SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION	
0200	Intelligence Occupational Field
0231	Intelligence Specialist
2600	Signals Intelligence and Ground Electronic Occupational Field
2621	Manual Morse Intercept Operator
2631	Non-Morse Intercept Operator
2651	Special Intelligence Communicator
2671	Cryptologic Linguist - Middle Eastern
2672	Cryptologic Linguist - Chinese
2673	Cryptologic Linguist - Korean
2674	Cryptologic Linguist - Spanish
2675	Cryptologic Linguist - Russian
0311	Presidential Support (requires SBI but not SCI access)

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PRP (CONTROLLED)	
0300	Infantry-BV Option (Marine Corps Security Forces)

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Security Screening at the MEPS

After Marine Corps applicants meet the basic requirements, Marine recruiters perform a classification role in terms of matching applicants to available training slots (see Appendix A for a discussion of the Marine Corps recruit distribution model). For applicants who appear to be interested in and qualified for the 0200, 2600, or 0300 (BV option) occupational fields, the recruiter must first use the following screening criteria as detailed in MCO 1130.53K of 10 June 1986:

- a. No felony convictions
- b. No more than experimental use of marijuana
- c. No other illegal drug use or convictions
- d. No history of alcoholic or psychological problems
- e. No more than six moving violations
- f. No more than two nontraffic misdemeanors
- g. No court-imposed probation of more than 6 months

The recruiter must screen on the above criteria through examinations of the individual's personnel records. In addition, the Marine Corps has developed a questionnaire form for use in interviewing potential 0200 and 2600 applicants. A copy of this form appears in Appendix F, pages F-1 to F-4. The questions are in a yes/no format and unfavorable answers are discussed to determine if there are sufficient grounds for not processing the applicant for these jobs. The following areas are covered by the questionnaire: foreign connections, citizenship, drugs, mental illness, financial responsibility, criminal record, school record, sexual offenses, and employment history.

Instructions for the form dictate automatic disqualification for unfavorable answers to questions in the following four areas: (1) if the individual is not a U.S. citizen, (2) if the person advocates use of force or violence to overthrow the U.S. government, (3) if the individual has violated security regulations in prior service, or (4) if the applicant was ever a member of the Peace Corps. Other guidance to the interviewer states that while three or more unfavorable replies to other questions on the form should disqualify an applicant, the final determination should be based on an overall common-sense assessment of all available information.

Applicants who successfully pass this screen and who are guaranteed training in the 0200, 2600, or 0300 (BV) fields also undergo a followup check by the Marine Corps Liaison at the MEPS. This individual performs a quality control function by reviewing the information on the sensitive job applicants at both the initial processing and when the individual reports back to the MEPs after DEP. Inconsistencies or new derogatory information reported occurring during DEP may result in disqualification. The liaison, usually a Sergeant, can also request adjudication assistance from security screening personnel at the recruit depots.

### Security Screening at Recruit Training

If recruits are classified into the 0300 (BV option) at recruit training, they must meet the same screening criteria used at the MEPS. In addition, the Marine Corps security screening process at recruit training has two phases.

Phase I. The first phase involves the identification and screening of additional applicants besides those recruits with school guarantees for the 0200 and 2600 occupational fields. In addition, potential applicants for presidential support duties are identified and screened. This process is accomplished by Marine Corps liaison personnel who work at the Depots but who are actually under operational control of the Naval Security Group Command. These individuals are senior enlisted personnel (E-6

to E-8) who have 2600 MOSs. They receive no training for this assignment except on-the-job experience.

Because the Marine Corps, like the Navy, only guarantees job contracts to 60 to 80 percent of the applicants at the MEPS, additional job applicants must be identified at recruit training. This presents an added problem for the 2600 field because of the language score requirements as well as the stringent security criteria. Likewise, the 0200 and 0311 applicants must also meet the stringent security criteria.

In order to identify new applicants, the liaison personnel (usually two at each Depot) review the records of all 300 or so members of each new recruit company. Out of the initial 300, perhaps 150 are potentially qualified for assignment to one of the above three job categories, i.e., they meet minimum cognitive and personnel security requirements. These recruits are sent to a special orientation briefing where job opportunities and security requirements for the above jobs are discussed. Recruits are then asked to volunteer for additional screening. At this point, approximately 50 percent volunteer, leaving approximately one-fourth of the original 300 recruits.

Those personnel that remain are asked to answer in writing a series of questions posed orally to the group by the Marine Corps liaison. A copy of these questions appears in Appendix F, page F-5 to F-6. The liaison personnel then review the answers to these questions for every applicant looking specifically for information that would potential result in clearance denial. This process usually results in two to four applicants who appear to have a strong chance of getting the required clearance.

These individuals are then summoned for a face-to-face interview with the Marine Corps liaison during which most of the questions answered in the group interview are reviewed; however, the interviewer is now free to probe certain areas in more detail. This final screening usually leaves about two individuals who appear strongly qualified with regard to security requirements. Thus, out of the original group of 300 recruits, less than one percent are selected.

The individuals identified during this phase I screen are now sent to participate in a second screening interview. Marine Corps policy dictates that recruits with school guarantees for 0200 and 2600 jobs automatically proceed to the phase II interview. In no case are these individuals screened out during the phase I process. The Marine Corps liaison personnel at San Diego reported that they would have screened out a number of the school guarantees if they had participated in the phase I screen. In addition, they noted that a large number of job-guaranteed individuals reported to recruit training without having had the MEPS screening form completed.

Phase II. The phase II screening interview is conducted by the same civilian interviewers who perform the SCI screening for the Navy. The interview format and process is identical for these Marine Corps personnel as for the Navy SCI applicants. Initial Adjudication is obtained by telephone for the 0200 Marines from NIC while NSG HDQS provides this function for the 2600 Marines. The 0311 Marines who will ultimately provide presidential support at Camp David are adjudicated through Marine Headquarters. SBIs are then requested for candidates who successfully pass this hurdle.

During FY-86, a total of 267 phase II interviews were held with Marine Corps applicants for 2600 jobs. The rejection rate for this group was nine percent. Phase II interviews were also held with 126 applicants for 0200 jobs. The rejection rate was about 14 percent. Data on rejection rates for 0311 Marines were not available. One interesting statistic was provided by the liaison personnel at San Diego. They reported that during the period 1 October 1985 to 30 April 1987, 127 job guaranteed personnel were sent to phase II interviews. Of these, 37 percent were rejected. On the other hand, of the 255 applicants identified and screened at the recruit depot, only 1.5 percent were rejected.

The above statistics point out the difficulty of having recruiters perform a security screening function. They lack training in this area, and they have tremendous pressures to meet quotas. Because liaison personnel at the depots aggressively recruit and screen new 0200 and 2600 applicants, they are able to avoid significant lost training seats due to the high rejection rate of school guaranteed recruits.

### Final Adjudication

Final adjudication of all prescreening information plus results from the DIS SBI for the 0200 Marines is performed by the Navy Intelligence Command while the Naval Security Group Headquarters performs this function for the 2600 applicants. Marines applying for presidential support duty at Camp David receive additional screening at advanced training as well as final screening and adjudication by DoD.

### **Issue Case Rates**

Table 6 presents issue case rates for background investigations conducted for enlisted accessions who successfully passed their service prescreening. During the period FY-83 to FY-86, a total of 60,252 enlisted accessions had background investigations initiated during their first 6 months of service.

Table 6

**Issue Case Rates by Service and  
Type of Background Investigation  
(FY-83 to FY-86 Accessions)**

Service Group	Number of Investigations	Issue Case Rate
Air Force		
SBI	16,741	8.6%
IBI	7,129	6.8%
Total	23,870	8.1%
Army		
SBI	12,826	11.2%
IBI	2,766	10.4%
Total	15,592	11.0%
Navy		
SBI	6,280	12.0%
IBI	13,102	16.2%
Total	19,382	14.8%
Marine Corps		
SBI	1,408	6.7%
<hr/>		
Totals (All Services)	60,252	11.0%

Of the total number of investigations, Air Force personnel represented the largest percentage (40%) followed by Navy (32%), Army (26%), and Marine Corps (2%). In terms of issue case rates, the Marine Corps had the lowest percentage (6.7%) while the Navy had the highest percentage (16.2%). Three factors must be remembered in interpreting the data in Table 6. First, the quality level of accessions in general can vary

across the services. The Air Force has recently been the most selective of the services with almost all accessions being high school graduates. Thus, the Air Force has more flexibility in rejecting personnel from sensitive jobs and is, on the average, processing higher quality personnel (see Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), August, 1988).

Second, IBIs and SBIs differ in some of their investigative elements. Hence, it may be most meaningful to compare issue case rates across the services by type of investigation. However, in the current data set, the Navy still has the highest issue case rate for both SBIs and IBIs. On the other hand, the Air Force has the lowest IBI rate while the Marine Corps has the lowest SBI rate. Finally, issue cases only signify that derogatory data were present and that an expanded investigation was initiated. It does not mean that this information is necessarily disqualifying for granting a clearance. Indeed, given anecdotal estimates of clearance denial rates of about one percent for accessions passing the initial security prescreening, it can be surmised that very few of these issue case personnel have their clearances denied.

Nonetheless, all other things being equal, effective prescreening should result in lower issue case rates. A more critical indicator of prescreening effectiveness would be whether or not individuals who pass prescreening complete their initial service obligation through meeting minimum behavioral and performance criteria.

### Unsuitability Discharge Rates

Table 7 presents unsuitability discharge rates by service for personnel who had a background investigation requested during their first 6 months of service. It includes all accessions during the FY-83 to FY-84 period with attrition being defined as loss for reasons of service unsuitability during the first 36 months of service. Personnel who went through their service's prescreening for jobs that required background investigations appear in the IBI or SBI lines, while the "all other accessions" line represents personnel who were not prescreened for an SBI or IBI (i.e., accessions in general).

Similar to the issue case data, those Marines who went through prescreening prior to having an SBI requested had the lowest proportion of unsuitability discharges (5.8%). This was far lower than other Marine accessions (19.9%). Those Navy personnel who were prescreened prior to having SBIs requested also had a very low rate (6.5% versus 14.8% for other Navy accessions). As will be recalled, both Marine and Navy personnel who have SBIs requested for potential SCI access go through the identical NSG screen at recruit training.

Table 7

**Unsuitability Discharge Rates During First 36 Months  
of Active Duty by Service and Type of Investigation  
(FY83 and FY84 Accessions)**

Service Group	<u>N</u>	Unsuitability Discharge Rate
Air Force		
IBI	2,564	9.1%
SBI	9,082	9.9%
All Other Accessions	106,941	13.4%
Army		
IBI	1,523	19.2%
SBI	6,455	12.4%
All Other Accessions	254,622	21.2%
Navy		
IBI	6,008	12.5%
SBI	2,734	6.5%
All Other Accessions	143,992	14.8%
Marine Corps		
SBI	772	5.8%
All Other Accessions	73,005	19.9%

*Note. Unsuitability discharge rates are based on incomplete loss data for those accessions entering near the end of FY-84. The actual discharge rate for the 2-year period may be marginally higher for all service groups.*

Army personnel who were prescreened prior to having IBIs requested had the highest unsuitability discharge rate of any of the service (19.2%). This was only slightly lower than other Army accessions at 21.2%. One problem in interpreting this rate is that the Army is the only service that requests IBIs prior to the individual reporting to recruit training. The other services (as is also the case for Army SBIs) all request both IBIs and SBIs at some point during recruit training. Thus, recruits who may potentially be entering sensitive jobs and who attrite very early during recruit training would never have an investigation requested. These personnel would never appear under the IBI/SBI unsuitability discharge rates. The Army statistics for IBIs, on the other hand, would



reflect this early attrition since IBIs would already have been requested by the time the individual reported to recruit training.

One final problem in interpreting the data in Table 7 is that the performance standards for what behavior necessitates an unsuitable discharge may vary across the services. If one service or even a subgroup within a service (i.e., intelligence MOSs in the Army) had more stringent criteria, it could result in higher discharge rates. This would confound comparisons across services or service subgroups.

The data presented in Table 7 are offered as an initial look at the unsuitability issue for personnel going through prescreening for sensitive jobs. It is beyond the scope of this report to explore this issue in greater depth; a future PERSEREC report will address this topic. What is most apparent from the data is that the Naval Security Group prescreening appears to be more effective than the other services' screening procedures when unsuitability discharge rates are used as the main criterion. Also, when considering prescreening for all sensitive jobs, i.e., both SBIs and IBIs, the Air Force program has the lowest unsuitability discharge rates.



## **DISCUSSION**

The previous sections have described in detail the prescreening procedures used by each of the services for sensitive jobs. In order to facilitate discussion, Table 8 presents a summary by service of these different procedures.

### **Variability in Screening Procedures**

One issue that clearly emerges from Table 8 is the use of different procedures by each of the services for screening their accessions. The Army emphasizes front-end screening at the MEPS because of its commitment to provide school guarantees to all applicants. The Air Force, on the other hand, has limited screening at the MEPS since it only provides job guarantees to approximately 50 percent of its applicants. Intensive screening is then conducted during recruit training at Lackland. The Air Force recovers from security disqualifications of job guaranteed individuals at Lackland by side-loading personnel who were only guaranteed broad job categories at the MEPS.

The Navy also performs limited screening at the MEPS but has fewer personnel at recruit training to side-load since it guarantees jobs to approximately 70 percent of its applicants at the MEPS. Finally, the Marine Corps, like the Navy, conducts limited screening at the MEPS and has intensive screening at recruit training along with side loading to fill the potentially unused school slots. The basic question that remains to be answered is which procedures are most efficient and effective under what types of circumstances? Also, could some of the best aspects of each program be used by a sister service?

### **Variability in Screening Forms**

Another issue that emerges from Table 8 and from previous sections is the proliferation of forms and different interview protocols used by each of the services. While all services use the DD398 to document background information for later use in the DIS investigation, service-specific screening forms vary from the extensive Army form 169-R to the brief 1408 form used by the Air Force. The different forms also vary in the types of questions, the sequencing of questions, and the formatting of questions, i.e., yes/no, multiple choice, or open-ended response options.

Table 8

Summary of Screening Procedures Used For  
Enlisted Accessions Entering Sensitive Jobs

Service Group	MEPS	Recruit Training
<b>AIR FORCE</b>		
SCI	Interview 1408 Form	Interview 2nd Intensive Interview Questionnaire Peer Ratings References
Top Secret	Same as SCI	Same as SCI
PRP Critical	Limited PRP Review 1408 Form	Same as SCI
PRP (Ctrl.)	Limited PRP Review 1408 Form	Interview Questionnaire
<b>ARMY</b>		
SCI	Intensive Interview 169-R Form	Intensive Interview IA-92 Form
Top Secret	Intensive Interview 169-R Form	Minimal Review
PRP Critical	Intensive Interview Limited PRP Review 169-R Form 189-R Form	Minimal Review
PRP (Ctrl.)	Limited PRP Review 189-R Form	Minimal Review
<b>NAVY</b>		
SCI	Interview Navy Screening Form	Intensive Interview
Top Secret	Limited PRP Review	Interview
PRP Critical	Limited PRP Review	Same as Top Secret
PRP Ctrl.	Limited PRP Review	Same as Top Secret
<b>MARINE CORPS</b>		
SCI	Interview Marine Screening Form	Intensive Review Intensive Interview 2nd Intensive Interview
Top Secret PRP Critical PRP Controlled	NO JOBS SCREENED FOR THESE CATEGORIES	

There has been no systematic work done on the optimal type of information-gathering forms for use at the MEPS and at recruit training. These forms should (1) require minimal time to fill out, (2) provide required personnel security information, and (3) facilitate the conduct of a structured security interview. It is not clear whether the current forms fulfill these functions in an efficient and effective manner. This use of multiple forms may also result in a less effective interface with DIS in cases where this information is passed on for possible use during the SBI or IBI. Also, this proliferation increases the potential for variance across services during the adjudicative phase, since each service has access to different information in different formats.

The above problems suggest that DOD personnel security screening for enlisted accessions may be enhanced through the development of more systematic data-gathering forms and structured interview protocols that directly follow from these forms. The services currently operate personnel security screening programs that meet their own specific needs and constraints. Thus, the policy objectives of the proposed research work would not be to change radically or centralize the current systems but rather to augment them with forms and protocols having greater consistency and based on more systematic screening criteria. The services could still use the same personnel and sequencing to conduct their security screening; however, each step in the process would be improved by new and improved data-gathering forms and more systematic interview protocols.

### Screening for Unsuitability

The current personnel security screening procedures used by the services are primarily directed at identifying individuals who will not qualify for the required security clearance. This avoids the costs of conducting unnecessary background investigations. Since a number of the factors that could result in clearance denial are indicative of general unreliability, this screen also eliminates some individuals who would potentially be unsuitably discharged from the service prior to completion of their initial service obligation. This second focus is indirect since the initial criteria for screening are based on the adjudicative guidelines provided in DoD 5200.2-R and DCID 1/14. These guidelines are specific to the granting or denying of clearances and are not intended to predict unsuitability.

The data presented earlier in Table 7 suggest that unsuitability discharge rates for personnel entering sensitive jobs may not be much lower than accessions in general. This is surprising considering that they have already passed stringent personnel security screening. As discussed earlier, enlistees being discharged from sensitive jobs for unsuitability reasons represent potential security risks. A reduction in the number of unsuitability discharges from sensitive jobs would help reduce this problem and would

also save considerable money in terms of eliminating unnecessary DIS investigations and non-amortized technical training costs.

If operationally and politically feasible, there is a need for the use of a security screening questionnaire at the MEPS that is predictive of unsuitability discharges. Scores from such an instrument could be used as a part of the job/match computerized systems used by the services and/or as a flag for conducting a more indepth screening interview. A recent PERSEREC report indicated that biodata instruments such as the Armed Services Applicant Profile (ASAP) may have specific applications in personnel security screening. ASAP has already been demonstrated to show practical significance in predicting unsuitability discharges for enlisted accessions during their first year of service as well as in predicting issue case status during background investigations (see Trent, in press; Crawford & Trent, 1987.)

In addition, the Army Research Institute, as part of Project A, is currently testing a self-report instrument, the Assessment of Background and Life Experiences (ABLE), that measures temperament and background experiences. While it has not yet been systematically evaluated against security criteria, it has potential application in the personnel security arena.

At the present time the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, under sponsorship of Accession Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), is developing the Adaptability Screening Profile (ASP) consisting of shortened versions of ASAP and ABLE. It is anticipated that the ASP will be operationally administered to applicants for military service starting in FY 90.

### Tracking Personnel

As was discussed in earlier sections of this report, far more applicants for sensitive jobs are rejected at the MEPS and during recruit training than during the final adjudication of background investigation results. Rejection after a background investigation represents a formal denial of clearance which is recorded on the Defense Central Index of Investigations. However, rejection at the earlier stages is more of an administrative adjudication than a formal denial of clearance and is not recorded in the DCII. Also, in most cases, the services do not retain questionnaire data and results from interviews for individuals rejected at the earlier stages.

A large proportion of these rejected personnel actually enter their respective services and are assigned to non-sensitive jobs. However, a number of these same individuals are considered for sensitive jobs during some future point in their service tenure. The information from the earlier rejection should be available to be considered as one factor in later adjudicative decisions. Current procedures do not allow for such

an assessment unless the individual is actually denied a clearance or SCI access during formal adjudication of the DIS background investigation.

### **Systems View**

Finally, the proceeding sections of this report suggest that there is a need for more of a systematic view of the personnel security screening process. Such a focus would identify procedures and instruments for improving the overall system rather than treating the parts of the program as disconnected segments. The program should be examined as a linear system, where information is transmitted (ideally both efficiently and effectively) from one point in the system to the next. Each screening point should then utilize all available information to make the required personnel security decisions. Where possible, weak points at one juncture should be balanced by compensatory screening procedures at a later point. In addition, special consideration should be given to places where information must pass across system boundaries, i.e., from the services to DIS and then back to the service adjudicators, or from the MEPS to recruit training.





## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Personnel security screening procedures for enlisted accessions could be enhanced through the development of more systematic data-gathering forms and structured interview protocols that directly follow from these forms. These forms and interviews should be tailored to unique service requirements to maximize their appropriateness and effectiveness for a given service; however, they should also include common elements that are fundamental to personnel security screening.

The services could assist themselves by considering the modification of a particularly effective procedure of a sister service for incorporation into its own procedures. Each service's prescreening procedures exhibited at least one strong feature not employed by another service:

1. Army - use of a standardized and thorough questionnaire to help guide the interviewing process at the MEPS.

2. Navy - use of extremely thorough and effective interviewing procedures for screening SCI candidates at recruit training.

3. Air Force - implementation of comprehensive screening at its recruit training site including the use of a biodata instrument, psychological interviews (where needed), reference checks, and peer evaluations.

4. Marine Corps - use of highly effective selection procedures at recruit training prior to sending personnel to be interviewed by a Naval Security Group representative.

Consideration needs to be given to screening for unsuitability service concurrent with attempting to identify individuals who would not qualify for security clearances. In much the same way as prescreening reduces the costs associated with accessioning personnel into sensitive occupations, it should also be used to reduce the costs associated with premature separation from service of those individuals who receive clearances for sensitive jobs.

Finally, there needs to be better coordination between the prescreening programs of the services and the Defense Investigative Service (DIS). There is a need for a standardized procedure for transmitting information gathered during prescreening to DIS for use in scoping and conducting investigations. This wealth of information needs to be placed in a format whereby it efficiently provides useful information to investigators for conducting background investigations.

It is recommended that efforts should be undertaken in the following four areas:

1. Development of background information forms and interview protocols for use during personnel security screening of enlisted applicants for sensitive jobs. One set should be designed for use at the MEPS, another for employment during recruit training. These forms should be designed for ease of use by job counselors/interviewers and to facilitate more standard interpretation of applicant responses.

2. Continued evaluation of experimental DoD biodata instruments for potential application to the personnel security prescreening process. Such instruments would include the Armed Services Applicant Profile being developed by the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center under sponsorship of Accession Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) and the Army Basic Life Experiences questionnaire being developed by the U. S. Army Research Institute.

3. Determination of the feasibility and utility of maintaining personnel security information for individuals who are rejected during prescreening for sensitive jobs but who still go on active duty in their respective services. This information could include data from prescreening questionnaires and interviews that would be useful in future adjudication decisions.

4. Design of prescreening procedures for more systematic use of information collected during the prescreening process. These new procedures might include (a) standardized forms for the transmittal of significant prescreening information to DIS for use during the background investigation, (b) more standardized interpretation of background information and interview results, (c) elimination of duplicate information collection at different stages of the prescreening process, and (d) provision for improved accumulation and transmission of information throughout the steps involved in prescreening and initiation of the formal background investigation.

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
APPENDIX A

DESCRIPTION OF THE GENERAL  
SELECTION AND CLASSIFICATION PROCESS AT THE MEPS

TAKEN FROM WATERS, B. K., LAURENCE, J. H., AND  
CAMARA, W. J. (1987). PERSONNEL ENLISTMENT AND  
CLASSIFICATION PROCEDURES IN THE U.S. MILITARY.  
WASHINGTON, D.C.: NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS

## Military Enlisted Selection Process

To understand the selection procedures used by the Military Services, the reader should understand how the process works and its terminology. Figure 2 provides a simplified model of this system. Members of the potential manpower pool (predominantly 18-23 year olds) enter the process by interacting with Service recruiters, who provide initial screening of applicants. Recruiters verify citizenship, age, juvenile or criminal offense background, education status, and other information—Step 1 of Figure 2. Service recruiters frequently use an enlistment screening test to predict applicant scores on the full AFQT. On the basis of the examinee's score on this test, a recruiter can estimate the person's likelihood of passing the AFQT or qualifying for special bonuses or job assignments. No data are available on the proportion of applicants who are screened out at the recruiter level. It is generally assumed that this proportion is low. The authors estimate (on the basis of discussions with Service recruiting



SOURCE: Waters (1983: 8, Figure 1)

Figure 2. Military Enlisted Selection Process

managers) that about 10 percent of those applicants desiring to take the enlistment test are screened out at this stage during periods of low to average youth unemployment and approximately 20 percent during periods of high unemployment. A subset of the applicants, termed examinees, formally enters the selection system—Step 2 of Figure 2—by taking the ASVAB at one of nearly 1,000 testing locations throughout the United States and overseas.

For the most part, a Service recruiter interests a potential recruit in the Service, not in a specific job within the Service. That function is left to a Service career counselor (classifier) at a Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS). A MEPS is one of 68 locations around the country where military applicants can take the ASVAB, get medical and physical testing, and be processed for enlistment. Each MEPS also has numerous remote mobile examining team sites that provide ASVAB testing in local post offices and other distributed locations throughout the geographic area served by the MEPS.

A Service career counselor has available a computer data file that includes results from the examinee's ASVAB tests, physical examination, educational records, and other data. A counselor also has access to Service current and future (near-term) vacancies in technical schools and jobs. By considering the occupational interests and background of the examinee, and "selling" specialty training slots of highest priority to the Service for which the applicant qualifies, a job-person match is made. Ideally, the assignment meets the requirements of both the Service and the individual. Once a contract—Step 3—is agreed upon,

the recruit either enters active duty and basic training immediately, or, more often, joins the Reserves as a member of the Delayed Entry Program (DEP) for up to one full year prior to entry onto active duty.

The Army is the only Service that provides a guaranteed job training contract to all recruits at the MEPSs. The Marine Corps and Navy each provide guaranteed contracts to 60 to 80 percent of recruits at the MEPSs; the remaining recruits enter under an open contract and are assigned to a job specialty during basic training. The Air Force provides guaranteed job training contracts to 50 percent of new recruits, and the remainder are guaranteed an assignment in one of four areas (i.e., mechanical, administrative, general, or electronic) with the specific job being determined at a later date.

## The Job-Person Match

Just as meeting selection standards does not guarantee entry into the military, meeting minimum classification standards does not guarantee that a recruit will be assigned to a particular specialty.

The actual classification and assignment of recruits to specific jobs is determined by each Service's increasingly sophisticated methods for making job-person matches. Each Service uses a computer model (algorithm) that reflects its current standards, policies, and relative priorities for filling jobs or training school slots. In addition to matching the specific requirements of a job with a recruit's scores, the algorithms used by each Service may include Service priority for filling a job, the percentage of minorities and females in a job, projected Service costs for job attrition, schedule of training school classes, and a recruit's job preferences. Each Service has specific definitions and weights for each component. Although the actual algorithms used for assignment in these computerized job-person match systems—e.g., Army-Recruiting Quota System (REQUEST), Navy-Classification and Assignment within PRIDE (CLASP), Marine Corps-Recruit Distribution Model, Air Force-Procurement Management Information System (PROMIS)—are quite complex, may change over time, and are Service-specific, an example of the functions that are included in the process of assigning recruits to jobs can be illustrated using the Navy's system.

The Navy's CLASP system incorporates six components or functions for determining training school (and associated follow-on job) assignments:

1. School success. Predicted school success (for a specific school/job) obtained by regression analyses that yield maximum multiple correlations between school success and ASVAB composite scores.
2. Technical aptitude vs. job complexity. Desired correspondence between a specific school/job (based on its complexity) and a person's technical ability (as measured by a composite of ASVAB subtests).
3. Navy priority vs. individual preference. Person/job match based on job requirements (e.g., difficulty to fill openings, manpower needs, etc.) and an applicant's interest in the job.
4. Minority fill rate. Desired minority/majority balance within each job category is attempted by reducing the difference between actual and desired proportions of minorities in a job.
5. Fraction fill rate. Attempts to fill different job categories (i.e., training school seats) at the same rate.
6. Attrition. Match based on a recruit's survival chances (first enlistment term) and a job's cost/importance to the Navy.

These components are weighted and integrated to produce a decision index for each job (Kroeker and Rafacz, 1983; Kroeker and Folchi, 1984). The final product is a list of available jobs for a period of time, rank-ordered with respect to Navy priorities. The job-person match proceeds as the applicant and the Navy classifier review the available job options and reach agreement on a specific job/training opportunity.

The Army and Air Force systems are similar to CLASP. The Marine Corps uses a recruit distribution model that assists in meeting classification goals by assigning recruits to the most complex job opening that exists at a given time for which they are qualified. Minority quotas and the scheduling of training classes also help determine assignment. The classification decisions of these systems are determined by the distribution of recruit applicant component scores, classification requirements, job priorities, and available training slots open at a given time.

Again, systems are not static, but reflect changing policies and priorities. For example, changes in PROMIS are often initiated by discussions between manpower analysts at the Air Force Human Resources Laboratory (AFHRL) and recruiting policy makers. A feasibility study may be requested to determine whether data exist or could be developed to support the change. Overall, the Service classification systems reflect current data, needs, and policies of the Services and they appear to be quite successful in meeting complex Service needs for enlisted manpower.



APPENDIX B

MORAL STANDARDS FOR ENLISTED ACCESSIONS  
TAKEN FROM MEANS, B. (1983). MORAL STANDARDS FOR MILITARY  
ENLISTMENT: SCREENING PROCEDURES AND IMPACT (FR-PRD-83-26).  
ALEXANDRIA, VA: HUMAN RESOURCES RESEARCH ORGANIZATION.

Key: N - No waiver needed
W - Waiver needed and may be granted
I - Ineligible, non- waivable

# AIR FORCE MORAL STANDARDS

<u>Behavior</u>	<u>Waiver Status</u>	<u>Level of Waiver Authority</u>
1. <b>Traffic offenses<sup>a</sup></b>		
0-5 in a single year	N	NA
6 or more in a single year	W	Commander, Recruiting Squadron
2. <b>Minor nontraffic offenses     (less than 4 month sentence)</b>		
1	N	NA
2 or more	W	Commander, Recruiting Squadron
3. <b>Nonminor misdemeanors     4-12 month sentence)</b>		
1 or more	W	Commander, Recruiting Group
4. <b>Juvenile felony<sup>b</sup></b>		
1 or more	W	Commander, Recruiting Service
5. <b>Adult felony<sup>b</sup></b>		
1 or more	W	Commander, Recruiting Service
6. <b>Combination of offenses     6 or more traffic/minor     nontraffic misdemeanors     in any one-year period</b>	W	Commander, Recruiting Service
7. <b>Drug abuse-related conviction</b>	I	NA
8. <b>Alcohol abuse leading to loss     of job, arrest or treatment</b>	I <sup>c</sup>	
9. <b>Marijuana</b>		
Use without conviction <sup>c</sup>	N	NA
Possession conviction	W <sup>d</sup>	Commander, Recruiting Service
Trafficking conviction	I	NA
10. <b>Narcotics</b>		
Use without conviction <sup>c</sup>	N	HQ USAF/DPXOA
Possession conviction	W <sup>d</sup>	HQ USAF/DPXOA
Trafficking conviction	I	NA
11. <b>Other drugs</b>		
Barbiturate or amphetamine use <sup>c</sup>	W <sup>d</sup>	HQ USAF/DPXOA
Hallucinogen use <sup>c</sup>		NA
Possession conviction	I	NA
Trafficking conviction	I	NA

Source: ATCR 33-2, 15 Jan 88

<sup>a</sup>Does not include paid overtime parking tickets.

<sup>b</sup>Felony committed before age 18 for which a conviction or adverse adjudication was made in civil or juvenile court is treated the same as adult felony.

<sup>c</sup>The Air Force considers these behaviors as part of its drug and alcohol abuse policy rather than moral standards per se.

<sup>d</sup>Waivers granted "only in the case of unusual and deserving applicants otherwise fully qualified."

# ARMY MORAL STANDARDS

<u>Behavior</u>	<u>Waiver Status</u>	<u>Level of Waiver Authority</u>
1. <b>Traffic offenses<sup>a</sup></b>		
0-3 in a single year	N	NA
4 or 5 in a single year	N	NA
6 or more in a single year	W	Commander, Recruiting Area
2. <b>Minor nontraffic offenses     (less than 4 month sentence)</b>		
1	N	NA
2 or more	W	Commander, Recruiting Area
3. <b>Nonminor misdemeanors     (4-12 month sentence)</b>		
1 or more	W	Commander, Recruiting District
4. <b>Juvenile felony<sup>b</sup></b>		
1 or more	W	CG, USAREC
5. <b>Adult felony<sup>b</sup></b>		
1 or more	W	Commander, MILPERCEN
6. <b>Combination of offenses</b>		
1 adult + 1 juvenile felony	W	Commander, MILPERCEN
1 adult + 1 juvenile felony + 1 misdemeanor	W	Commander, MILPERCEN
1 adult, 1 juvenile felony + 2 or more misdemeanors	I	NA
1 adult, 1 juvenile felony + 3 or more minor nontraffic misdemeanors	I	NA
1 adult + 2 or more juvenile felonies	I	NA
1 adult felony + 1 nonminor misdemeanor	W	Commander, MILPERCEN
1 adult felony, 1 nonminor misdemeanor + 1-2 minor nontraffic misdemeanors	W	Commander, MILPERCEN
1 adult felony, 1 nonminor + 1-2 minor misdemeanors	I	NA
1 adult felony + 2 nonminor misdemeanors	W	Commander, MILPERCEN
1 adult felony + 3 or more nonminor misdemeanors	I	NA
7. <b>Drug abuse-related offense<sup>c</sup></b>	W	Commander, MILPERCEN
8. <b>Alcohol abuse leading to loss     of job, arrest or treatment</b>	W	CG, USAREC
9. <b>Marijuana</b>		
Use without arrest	N	NA
Possession conviction <sup>c</sup>	W	Commander, MILPERCEN
Trafficking conviction <sup>c</sup>	I	NA
10. <b>Narcotics</b>		
Use without arrest		
Over 12 months ago	N	NA
Possession conviction <sup>c</sup>	W	Commander, MILPERCEN
Trafficking conviction <sup>c</sup>	I	NA
11. <b>Other drugs (hallucinogens, barbiturates, amphetamines)</b>		
Use without conviction		
Over 12 months ago	N	NA
6-12 months ago	W	CG, USAREC
Possession conviction <sup>c</sup>	W	Commander, MILPERCEN
Trafficking conviction <sup>c</sup>	I	NA

Source: AR 601-210, Oct 1980.

<sup>a</sup>Includes improper parking.

<sup>b</sup>Felony offense committed before age 18 for which a conviction or adverse adjudication was made in civil or juvenile court was determined by a civil or juvenile court.

<sup>c</sup>All drug-related convictions are treated as felonies, regardless of their maximum penalty under state law.

# NAVY MORAL STANDARDS

<u>Behavior</u>	<u>Waiver Status</u>	<u>Level of Waiver Authority</u>
1. <u>Traffic offenses<sup>a</sup></u>		
0-3 in a single year	N	NA
4 or 5 in a single year	W	Cdr, Recruiting District
6 or more in a single year	I	NA
2. <u>Minor (nontraffic) misdemeanors</u>		
1-4 violations	W	Cdr, Recruiting District
5 or more	I	NA
3. <u>Nonminor misdemeanors</u>		
1 misdemeanor	N	NA
2 misdemeanors	W	Cdr, Recruiting District
3 misdemeanors	I	NA
4. <u>Juvenile felony<sup>b</sup></u>		
1 or more	W	Cdr, Recruiting Command
5. <u>Adult felony</u>		
1 or more	W	Cdr, Recruiting Command
6. <u>Combination of offenses</u>	W	Varies <sup>c</sup>
7. <u>Drug abuse-related offense<sup>c</sup></u>	W	Varies <sup>d</sup>
8. <u>Alcohol abuse leading to civil conviction</u>	W	Varies <sup>d</sup>
9. <u>Marijuana<sup>a</sup></u>		
Use without conviction or dependence	N	NA
Possession conviction	W	Varies <sup>d</sup>
Trafficking conviction	I	NA
10. <u>Narcotics<sup>e</sup></u>		
Use without conviction or dependence	N	NA
Over 12 months ago	W	Cdr, Recruiting District
Within last 12 months	I	NA
Possession conviction	W	Varies <sup>d</sup>
Trafficking conviction	I	NA
11. <u>Other drugs<sup>d</sup> (hallucinogens, barbiturates, amphetamines)</u>		
Use without conviction or dependence		
Over 12 months ago	N	NA
6-12 months ago	W	Cdr, Recruiting District
Possession conviction	W	Varies <sup>d</sup>
Trafficking conviction	I	NA

Source: COMNAVCRUITCOMINST 1130.8 CH-18, 15 March

<sup>a</sup>Includes improper parking.

<sup>b</sup>Handled as though offense committed by an adult.

<sup>c</sup>Applicants with offenses in more than one category (whose number of offenses in any one category does not exceed the maximum for that category) require a waiver at the level stipulated for the most serious offense type committed.

<sup>d</sup>Treated as civil conviction, felony or misdemeanor, as stipulated by state law.

<sup>e</sup>Stricter standards apply for Nuclear Field, submarine duty, and sensitive nuclear weapons programs.

# MARINE CORPS MORAL STANDARDS

<u>Behavior</u>	<u>Waiver Status</u>	<u>Level of Waiver Authority<sup>a</sup></u>
1. Traffic offenses <sup>b</sup>		
0-5 not treated as felony or misdemeanor <sup>c</sup>	N	NA
6 or more <sup>c</sup>	W	Cdr, Recruiting Station
2. Minor nontraffic offenses ( < 6 month sentence)		
1-6 involving civil restraint totaling less than 6 months and/or fines costing less than \$500.	W	Cdr, Recruiting Station
7-10 involving civil restraint totaling 6 months but less than a year and/or fines totaling \$500 but less than \$1,000	W <sup>d</sup>	Cdr, Recruiting District
3. Nonminor misdemeanors		
1 or more with civil restraint totaling 1 or more years and/or fines totaling \$1,000 or more	W <sup>d</sup>	CG, Recruit Depot
4. Juvenile felony <sup>a</sup>		
1 or more	W <sup>d</sup>	CG, Recruit Depot
5. Adult felony		
1 or more	W <sup>d</sup>	CG, Recruit Depot
6. Combinations of offenses		
1-6 involving civil restraint totaling less than 6 months and/or fines costing less than \$500.	W	Cdr, Recruiting Station
7-10 Involving civil restraint totaling 6 months but less than a year and/or fines totaling \$500 but less than \$1,000	W <sup>d</sup>	Cdr, Recruiting District
7. Drug abuse-related conviction	I	NA
8. Alcohol abuse leading to loss of job, arrest or treatment	W	Cdr, Recruiting Station
9. Marijuana		
Use without arrest		
Fewer than 10 times over 90 days ago <sup>f</sup>	N	NA
10 times or more and/or within last 90 days	W <sup>d</sup>	CG, Recruit Depot
Possession conviction	W <sup>d</sup>	CG, Recruit Depot
Trafficking conviction	W <sup>d</sup>	CG, Recruit Depot
10. Narcotics		
Use without conviction <sup>g</sup>	W <sup>d</sup>	CG, Recruit Depot
Possession conviction <sup>g</sup>	W <sup>d</sup>	CG, Recruit Depot
Trafficking conviction	I	NA
11. Other drugs (hallugenogens, barbituates, amphetamines)		
Use without conviction <sup>g</sup>		
Possession conviction <sup>g</sup>	W <sup>dh</sup>	CG, Recruit Depot
Trafficking conviction	I	NA

Source: MPPM ENLPROC MCOP 1100.764A, June 1983

<sup>a</sup>Authority levels apply to male high school graduate applicants in AFQT Categories I - IIIB. Male Category IV high school applicants are Ineligible for waivers granted at District or CG Recruit Depot level. All waivers for female applicants must be approved at HQ Marine Corps. For nongraduate applicants, waivers that are not authorized for approval at the Recruiting Station level can only be granted at HQ Marine Corps.

<sup>b</sup>Includes improper parking.

<sup>c</sup>Provided none of the offenses involved hit and run, driving while intoxicated, or resulted in confinement, probation, or suspension/revocation of driving privileges.

<sup>d</sup>Applicants in AFQT Category VI or without a high school diploma or GED certificate are ineligible for waivers granted at District or Recruit Depot level.

<sup>e</sup>Felony committed before age 18 for which a conviction or adverse adjudication was made in civil or juvenile court.

<sup>f</sup>Provided marijuana use did not involve trafficking or result in arrest, conviction, or adverse adjudication; medical or psychological treatment; loss of employment; or failure, dismissal, or expulsion from an educational institution.

<sup>g</sup>Requires a one-year delay in enlistment.

<sup>h</sup>Those who have used hallucinogens are not eligible for Personnel Reliability Program or other nuclear-related programs.

APPENDIX C

MATERIALS USED BY THE AIR FORCE  
DURING THE SECURITY SCREENING PROCESS  
FOR ENLISTED ACCESSIONS

# AIR FORCE

## ATC FORM 1408

JOB SCREENING WORKSHEET					
<b>INSTRUCTIONS:</b> Recruiter completes Name and SSN block and includes in casefile to MEPS. The USAF MEPS LNCO will determine an applicant's qualification for Sensitive Job Classification (SJC), based on responses. Applies to PS applicants since separation only, and all NPS applicants. 1. Complete in one set. Enclose the original with enlistment case file and keep copy with the residual file. 2. SJC Codes are: B - Ineligible for sensitive job    C - Ineligible for some sensitive jobs    F - Eligible for sensitive job					
NAME OF APPLICANT (Last, First, Middle Initial)			SSN		
SECTION I.	SJC QUESTIONS	(SOURCE FOR INFORMATION)	YES (✓)	NO (✓)	IF YES, SJC CODE IS
1. Has the applicant:					
	a. Used marijuana in the last 6 months, as of date of reservation?	(Interview)			B
	b. Received an approved moral OR drug waiver?	(DD Form 1966)			B
	c. Been a chronic user to excess of alcohol, OR in the last two years been arrested for 2 or more alcohol related incident regardless of disposition, except not guilty?	(SF 93, DD Forms 1966 & 398-2)			B
	d. Admitted to any psychological problems OR received an "S" profile evaluation, other than "1"? (Family counseling as a result of family discord is not a psychological problem)	(SF 93)			B
	e. Filed for OR been declared personally bankrupt in the last five years, OR has written bad checks OR generated excessive debts on which payments are not being made?	(DD Form 398-2, Interview)			B
	f. Exhibited financial irresponsibility by failing to pay child support?	(Interview)			B
	g. Ever been suspended OR expelled from school for truancy OR misconduct more than once within the last 2 years?	(Interview)			B
	h. Ever been released from employment due to misconduct, theft OR inability to get along with co-workers?	(Interview)			B
	2. Is applicant a non-US citizen?	(DD Form 1966)			B
	3. Is applicant from the Northern Mariana Islands?	(DD Form 1966)			B
	<b>DELETED</b>				
	4. Is any member of applicant's immediate family not a US citizen?	(DD Form 1966)			C
	5. Does applicant or any blood relative maintain a close continuous relationship with anyone residing in a communist country?	(DD Form 398-2)			C
	6. If "NO" is answered to all of the above, then SJC code is "F".				
SECTION II FOR NATURALIZED US CITIZENS ONLY					
	1. Is any one of the countries listed below the applicant's country of origin or did the applicant ever reside in any one of these countries? (If "YES", go to 2) (If "NO", SJC is "F") (Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Berlin (Soviet Sector), Bulgaria, Cambodia (Kampuchea), People's Republic of China (Including Tibet), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Hungarian People's Republic (Hungary), Iran, Iraq, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), Kurile Islands and South Sakhalin (Karafuto), Laos, Latvia, Libyan Arab Republic, Lithuania, Mongolian People's Republic (Outer Mongolia), Nicaragua, Poland, Rumania, Southern Yemen, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), South Vietnam, and Yugoslavia.)	(DD Form 1966)			
	2. Has the applicant been a naturalized US Citizen less than 5 years? (If "YES", go to 3) (If 5 years or more, SJC is "F")	(DD Form 1966)			
	3. Has the applicant resided in the US for 10 or more years immediately preceding naturalization? (If "NO", SJC is "B") (If "YES", SJC is "F")	(DD Form 1966)			
REMARKS (Use for additional comments and a record of justification for SJC changes)					
SECTION III SJC CODE					
Based on the above response, the SJC Code has been assigned and entered into PROMIS.					SJC CODE IS:
DATE	SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF LNCO			PIC	

# AIR FORCE BIOGRAPHICAL QUESTIONNAIRE PAGE 1

BRIEF-ER	ROSTER NO	NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)					SSAN					FLT		SO		<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO BYPASS BASIC		AFSC BYPASS		INTER-VWR NO		DATE	
MECH	ADMIN	GEN	ELEC	AFOT	OLAB	EOPT	RDA	AAT OR AFOAT	PULNES	A	DP	CV	WR GP	WAIV-ER	PRP	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		REFERRALS		FEAR OF FIRE <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		CLAUSTROPHOBIA <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	
I																							
AGE		MARRITAL STATUS <input type="checkbox"/> MAR <input type="checkbox"/> ANGL <input type="checkbox"/> DVO <input type="checkbox"/> SEPD		SPOUSE OF MILITARY <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> N/A AFSC (Spouse)		LEGAL DEP		CITIZENSHIP		ORVS LIC (State)		JOB CODE		M/G CODES		FEAR OF GUNS <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		SPEECH IMPEDIMENT <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		FEAR OF HEIGHTS <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		FULL USE OF FINGERS <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	
REASON FOR JOINING AIR FORCE				SPECIFIC JOB INTEREST				EVENTUAL CAREER OR PROFESSIONAL GOAL										VISION UNCORRO    CORRO    E-					
II																							
EDUCATIONAL DATA																							
<input type="checkbox"/> NDN HS GRAD <input type="checkbox"/> HS GRAD <input type="checkbox"/> CED		SPECIFY OR DESCRIBE										<input type="checkbox"/> GEOMETRY		AFSC (Select)		GUDYA		CTEP					
TOTAL COLLEGE HRS		REASON FOR LEAVING COLLEGE										<input type="checkbox"/> PHYSICS		1.									
DEGREE												<input type="checkbox"/> ALGEBRA		2.									
MAJOR												<input type="checkbox"/> TRIGONOMETRY		3.									
MINOR												<input type="checkbox"/> CHEMISTRY		4.									
												<input type="checkbox"/> TYPING (BPM)		5.									
IV																							
LEGAL DATA																							
I have been involved in		ND		YES		AGE		INTERVIEWER REMARKS ONLY															
Curfew violation																							
Malicious behavior																							
Disturbing the peace																							
Run away from home																							
Trespassing																							
Vandalism																							
Drinking under age																							
Conducting of mind																							
Sneaking																							
Failure to obey a traffic signal																							
Hit and run																							
Driving while intoxicated																							
Reckless/careless driving																							
Suspension of drivers license																							
Shoplifting																							
Theft																							
Breaking and Entering																							
Assault																							
Illegal possession of a weapon																							
Possession of drugs																							
Bad checks																							
Diner																							
V																							
EMPLOYMENT DATA																							
KINDS OF JOBS HELD																							
SKILLS, LICENSES OR TRAINING RECEIVED																							
REASON FOR LEAVING PAST JOBS																							
VI																							
DRUG EXPERIENCES (Drugs used or even tried once without a prescription)																							
		NO		YES		DATE FIRST USED		DATE LAST USED		FREQ OF USE													
Marijuana or Hashish																							
LSD or other hallucinogens																							
Stimulants (Uppers, diet pills, speed, cocaine)																							
Depressants (Tranquillizers, downers, sleeping pills)																							
Narcotics (Heroin, Codeine, Smack)																							
Others (Glue, paint thinner, Freon, etc.)																							
Alcoholic beverages																							
SPECIAL EMPHASIS																							
Any problems with BMT? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO																							
Do you now have or have you ever had any nervous disorders or emotional problems? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO																							
Have you ever attempted or are you considering suicide? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO																							
PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT																							
<small>           AUTHORITY: 10 U.S.C. 3012, Secretary of the Air Force, powers and duties, delegation by, implemented by 3807 ACS SOJ 30-1, Processing Figures Personnel. PURPOSE: To obtain personal, educational, legal, vocational, and drug experience data in order to determine individual's qualifications for classification into various Air Force specialties. ROUTINE USES: As indicated in system notice F030 ATC, Processing and Classification of Enlistees. FURNISHING THE INFORMATION IS VOLUNTARY. Failure to provide requested information will limit the ability of job counselor to assist individual in making job preference and in identifying his/her unique qualifications for various jobs.         </small>																							
DEP DATE																							

ATC HO FORM NOV 83 712 (DPU)

PREVIOUS EDITIONS WILL BE USED

BIOGRAPHICAL QUESTIONNAIRE



# AIR FORCE BIOGRAPHICAL QUESTIONNAIRE PAGE 2

<b>CREDIT</b>	<b>INITIAL REVIEW</b>	<b>PEER RATING SCORE</b>	S	P	<b>REFERRED TO</b>	<b>DATE</b>
	S 1 2 3 4 R				XIV. SENSITIVE SKILLS - LEGAL DATA	
	P 1 2 3 4 R					
	L 1 2 3 4 R					
<b>EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS</b>	A 1 2 3 4					
	C 1 2 3 4 R					
	E 1 2 3 4 R					
<b>FOREIGN RELATIVES/FRIENDS</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>					
	<b>FINAL RELEASE</b>					
	<b>CODE</b>					
<b>RELEASE JUSTIFICATION</b>						
<b>XV. GENERAL REMARKS SECTION - SENSITIVE SKILLS</b>						
	<b>SENSITIVE SKILLS - DRUG REMARKS</b>	<b>STATEMENT OF RIGHTS</b>				
		I acknowledge that I have been advised of my rights under Article 31 UCMJ and understand my rights.				
		<b>SIGNATURE</b>				

# AIR FORCE BIOGRAPHICAL QUESTIONNAIRE PAGE 3

INTERVIEWER		X. TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THE FOLLOWING ITEMS TYPICAL IF YOU NOW, OR IN THE PAST? (Indicate by circling the appropriate letter.)				
		U-UNUSUALLY TRUE	F-FREQUENTLY TRUE	O-OCASIONALLY TRUE	R-RARELY TRUE	N-NEVER TRUE
1. AWAKENED EASILY BY NOISE U F O R N	11. UNABLE TO GO TO SLEEP U F O R N	21. BLEEPY U F O R N	31. BLEEPY U F O R N	41. RECURRENT OR FRIGHTENING DREAMS U F O R N		
2. SPEECH PROBLEMS WHEN NERVOUS (Stuttering, stammering, etc.) U F O R N	12. BITE YOUR FINGERNAILS U F O R N	22. URINATED IN BED SINCE AGE 15 U F O R N	32. PROBLEMS FINDING GIRLS (BOYS) YOU WOULD LIKE TO DATE U F O R N	42. HAD HOMOSEXUAL EXPERIENCES U F O R N		
3. UNABLE TO CONTROL YOUR TEMPER U F O R N	13. DRINK WHEN THINGS GO WRONG U F O R N	23. FEEL YOU ARE OVERWEIGHT U F O R N	33. LIKE TO GAMBLE U F O R N	43. HEARTBURN, STOMACH PAINS, INDIGESTION, WHEN NERVOUS U F O R N		
4. LOSE YOUR APPETITE WHEN NERVOUS U F O R N	14. NAUSEA WHEN NERVOUS U F O R N	24. HAVE DIARRHEA OR CONSTIPATION WHEN NERVOUS U F O R N	34. ALLERGIES (HIVES, RASHES, HAYFEVER, ASTHMA, ETC.) U F O R N	44. BACKACHES U F O R N		
5. HEADACHES U F O R N	15. HIGH BLOOD PRESSURE U F O R N	25. BEEN UNCONSCIOUS U F O R N	35. AMNESIA U F O R N	45. HAD CONVULSIONS OR PARALYSIS U F O R N		
6. FEEL YOUR MIND IS WANDERING U F O R N	16. WORRY OR FEEL NERVOUS U F O R N	26. UNABLE TO CONCENTRATE U F O R N	36. CARELESSNESS U F O R N	46. FEEL NERVOUSNESS PREVENTS YOU FROM PERFORMING WELL U F O R N		
7. DAYDREAM U F O R N	17. NERVOUS IN HIGH PLACES U F O R N	27. WORRY OR FEEL NERVOUS AROUND GUNS U F O R N	37. NERVOUS WHEN IN CROWDED PLACES U F O R N	47. NERVOUS WHEN IN CLOSED OR TIGHT PLACES U F O R N		
8. UNABLE TO GET A THOUGHT OUT OF YOUR MIND U F O R N	18. FEEL PEOPLE PICK ON YOU U F O R N	28. FEEL DISTANT FROM OTHERS U F O R N	38. FEEL YOU ARE SHY U F O R N	48. FEEL LONELY U F O R N		
9. THOUGHTS OF SUICIDE U F O R N	19. FEEL YOU ARE LOSING YOUR MIND U F O R N	29. LACK SELF-CONFIDENCE U F O R N	39. AVOID COMPETITION U F O R N	49. FEEL BLUE AND MOODY U F O R N		
10. FEEL INFERIOR TO OTHERS U F O R N	20. PERIODS WHEN YOU LACK ENERGY U F O R N	30. FEEL YOU HAVE A SERIOUS MEDICAL PROBLEM U F O R N	40. CONFUSED ABOUT YOUR RELIGIOUS BELIEFS U F O R N	50. LACK MEANING AND PURPOSE IN LIFE U F O R N		
XI. COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING SENTENCES TO EXPRESS YOUR TRUE FEELINGS WITH WHATEVER COMES TO MIND. DO EVERY ONE. BE SURE TO MAKE A COMPLETE SENTENCE.				XII. MILITARY DATA		
I like	My greatest weakness	I need	Do any of the following apply to you? YES NO			
I secretly	My reasons	In high school	Dorm Chief			
Rules are	The worst thing I ever did	I feel that my MTI	Sergeant Leader			
My father	When I was a child	My mother	Personal visits to Chaplain			
My family	When I get angry	What annoys me	VMI's to Mental Mygiene			
Most woman	A man	My friends	Unsatisfactory Ratings			
A husband	My greatest fear	I regret	What is the most difficult thing in Basic Training for you?			
A wife	I	I worry				
I feel	The members of my flight	Compares with others, I				
My nerves	My strongest point	I feel the Air Force				
HAVE YOU EVER UNDERGONE ANY TYPE OF COUNSELING OR TREATMENT FOR BEHAVIORAL, EMOTIONAL, OR PERSONAL PROBLEMS? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		HAVE YOU HAD ANY SERIOUS ILLNESS, ACCIDENT, OR NERVOUS CONDITION THAT MAY AFFECT YOUR PERFORMANCE? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		DO YOU FEEL THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO COMPLETE BASIC TRAINING ON SCHEDULE? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		
HAVE TRANQUILIZERS, STIMULANTS, OR DEPRESSANTS BEEN PRESCRIBED FOR YOU? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		DO YOU HAVE ANY SERIOUS EMOTIONAL PROBLEMS? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		DO YOU CONSIDER YOURSELF PHYSICALLY, MENTALLY AND EMOTIONALLY FIT FOR A RESPONSIBLE AIR FORCE JOB? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		

# AIR FORCE BIOGRAPHICAL QUESTIONNAIRE PAGE 4

I understand that in my Classification Interview I will be asked questions concerning my eligibility and qualifications for retention and classification in the United States Air Force. I further understand: (1) I have the right to remain silent that is, say nothing at all. (2) Any statement I make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against me in a trial or in other judicial or administrative proceedings. (3) I have the right to consult a lawyer and have a lawyer present during this Classification Interview. This lawyer may be a civilian lawyer of my own choosing, at my own expense or a military lawyer free of charge. I may request a lawyer at any time during this Classification Interview. (4) If I decide to answer questions without a lawyer present, I may stop the Classification Interview at any time. I have read the foregoing language. I completely understand my rights. I  do  do not wish to exercise my right to remain silent. I  do  do not want a lawyer present. No promises or threats have been made to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me.

TIME/DATE	LOCATION	SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWEE	SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWER
INTERVIEWER USE ONLY			
INDICATE OVERALL EVALUATION OF AIRMAN <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5			
VII. LIST ANY PHYSICAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL DISPARITIES WHICH WOULD AFFECT JOB PERFORMANCES IN ANY PARTICULAR AFSC(S):			
VIII. REMARKS			
IX. CERTIFICATION/STATEMENT OF APPLICANT			
I CERTIFY THE FOREGOING STATEMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE. I FURTHER CERTIFY I COULD BE CLASSIFIED INTO ANY AFSC IN MY APPTITUDE AREA FOR WHICH I AM TOTALLY QUALIFIED. THE NEED OF THE AIR FORCE COME FIRST.			SIGNATURE
DATE	STATEMENT	AFSC(S)	SIGNATURE
	I understand that I am no longer best qualified for my guaranteed job (GTEP). I further understand that I have the option of selecting another job or discharge. I elect to remain on active duty with the Air Force job indicated.		
	I <input type="checkbox"/> DO <input type="checkbox"/> DO NOT desire to take an Apprentice Knowledge Test.		
	I volunteer for Enlistment Aptitude Area (EAA/AFSC) indicated.		
	I volunteer for AFSC indicated. I realize this job requires a flight physical and will require me to fly as an aircrew member.		
	I have been briefed on jobs requiring additional processing.		
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974, I CONCUR WITH THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED WITNESSING THIS STATEMENT/DDCU-MENT.	DATE	NAME AND GRADE OF WITNESS	SIGNATURE OF AIRMAN

# AIR FORCE

## CHARACTER REFERENCE REQUEST




DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
3507TH AIRMAN CLASSIFICATION SQUADRON (ATC)  
LACKLAND AIR FORCE BASE, TX 78236

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF DPUA

SUBJECT Character Reference

TO

1. The above named individual, a recent USAF enlistee, is being considered for an Air Force assignment to a position that requires the most stable and reliable person available. These positions may be physically or emotionally stressful. Airmen not selected for these sensitive positions will be considered for other interesting and worthwhile assignments.
2. To assist us in making a decision as who could best fulfill these duties, we would appreciate your evaluation of this individual. Please complete the questionnaire on the reverse side of this letter.
3. If the airman is selected for this assignment, a Defense Department representative may contact you for additional information in the near future. Should this occur, your further cooperation is solicited.
4. Since final selections for these positions must be completed within the next 10 days, we would appreciate an early return of your evaluation. A postage-free envelope is provided for your convenience. Please return this letter as it contains information which will ensure proper identification of the individual concerned. However, if you do not have any derogatory information to report, you do not have to return this or any other correspondence related to this individual. Your cooperation and assistance in this endeavor are greatly appreciated.
5. The Privacy Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-579) requires that information obtained by federal agencies about an individual be released to that individual upon their formal written request. The identity of the person providing the information must also be released to the individual. The information you provide in this questionnaire conforms to the provisions of the Privacy Act.

  
LENNY C. MOSHIER, 1Lt, USAF  
OIC, Adjudication/Counseling Section

- 2 Atch  
1. ATC HQ Form 706 (Reverse)  
2. Envelope

# AIR FORCE CHARACTER REFERENCE FORM

CHARACTER REFERENCE INQUIRY											
1. TYPE OF RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIVIDUAL	DATE OF ASSOCIATION	PLACE OF ASSOCIATION									
<i>ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS BY PLACING AN "X" IN THE PROPER BLOCK OR COLUMN</i>											
2. TO THE BEST OF YOUR KNOWLEDGE, HAS THIS INDIVIDUAL:											
							YES	NO			
a. Ever travelled or resided in a foreign country or had friends, relatives, or business connections in a foreign country?											
b. Ever belonged to or shown interest in Communist or other subversive activities?											
c. Ever used alcohol excessively?											
d. Ever used harmful or illegal drugs?											
e. Ever been in difficulty with law enforcement agencies?											
f. Ever received medical treatment of a serious nature or psychological treatment?											
g. Questionable moral characteristics?											
h. Ever been fired from a job for cause?											
3. ARE YOU AWARE OF QUESTIONABLE ACTIVITIES ON THE PART OF THE INDIVIDUAL'S FAMILY OR ASSOCIATES?											
<small>NOTE: If your answer to any of the above questions is "YES", please explain in Block 7.</small>											
4. DO YOU RECOMMEND THE INDIVIDUAL FOR A POSITION OF TRUST AND RESPONSIBILITY INVOLVING THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA? <small>(If your answer is "NO", please explain in Block 7.)</small>											
5. IF YOU HAVE ANY UNFAVORABLE INFORMATION YOU PREFER TO DISCUSS WITH US BY TELEPHONE, CHECK THIS BLOCK AND TELL US IN BLOCK 7 HOW WE MAY CONTACT YOU BY TELEPHONE.											
6. HOW WOULD YOU RATE INDIVIDUAL'S:											
RATINGS: "O" - Outstanding		"E" - Excellent		"A" - Average		"P" - Poor		O	E	A	P
a. Dependability											
b. Financial Responsibility											
c. General Intelligence											
d. Ability to work with others											
e. Initiative											
f. Judgment											
g. Self-confidence											
h. Home Environment											
i. Leadership											
j. Emotional Stability											
k. Loyalty											
7. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO ABOVE QUESTIONS OR FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION <small>(Indicate question numbers to which answers apply).</small>											
DATE					SIGNATURE						

**AIR FORCE**  
**LAW ENFORCEMENT INQUIRY REQUEST**



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
3507TH AIRMAN CLASSIFICATION SQUADRON (ATC)  
LACKLAND AIR FORCE BASE, TX 78238

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: DPKA

SUBJECT: Law Enforcement Inquiry

TO:

1. The above-named individual (date and place of birth as shown) recently enlisted in the United States Air Force and is now being considered for a sensitive assignment related to national security matters. Your assistance in providing any pertinent information contained in your records will be a valuable aid in determining the airman's suitability for such duty. The space on the reverse of this letter and a postage-free envelope are provided for this purpose.
2. Time limitations require that selections for these positions be completed within the next 10 days. Your early reply will be greatly appreciated.
3. Please return this letter with your reply as it contains information which will insure proper identification of the individual concerned.

*Gerald Elam*

GERALD ELAM, GS-9, DAF  
Chief, Assessments Section

1 Atch  
Envelope

---

I authorize the addressee to furnish the United States Air Force any information concerning me which they have available and hereby release such authorities from any liability arising from this action.

---

(SIGNATURE)

# AIR FORCE LAW ENFORCEMENT INQUIRY FORM

LAW ENFORCEMENT INQUIRY		
<input type="checkbox"/> OUR RECORDS CONTAIN NO UNFAVORABLE INFORMATION IDENTIFIABLE WITH THE SUBJECT BY NAME.		
<input type="checkbox"/> PERTINENT INFORMATION IS ATTACHED OR SHOWN BELOW.		
DATE	TITLE	SIGNATURE
DATE	NATURE OF OFFENSE	DISPOSITION
REMARKS <i>(Include any incidents involving the subject in which no arrest was made, e.g., suspicion, questioning, warnings.)</i>		

# AIR FORCE

## CREDIT INQUIRY REQUEST

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
3507TH AIRMAN CLASSIFICATION SQUADRON (ATC)  
LACKLAND AIR FORCE BASE, TEXAS 78236



REPLY TO  
ATTN OF

DPKA

SUBJECT:

Credit Inquiry

TO

1. The individual identified above, a recent enlistee in the US Air Force, is being considered for an assignment important to the security of the United States. We feel that a good credit rating is one indication of personal integrity.
2. The airman has listed you as a source of credit. Your assistance in providing the information requested on the reverse of this letter will be a valuable aid in determining his (her) suitability for a sensitive military assignment.
3. The Privacy Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-579), requires that information obtained by Federal Agencies about an individual be released to that individual upon their request. The identity of the person providing the information must also be released to the individual. The information you provide in this questionnaire conforms to the provisions of the Privacy Act.
4. Time limitations require that initial selections for these positions be completed within the next ten days. Your early reply in the envelope provided will be appreciated.
5. I authorize the person/business listed hereon to furnish any and all information concerning my credit rating to the United States Air Force and release such persons from any liability arising from this action.

---

Signature

*Gerald Elam*  
GERALD ELAM, GS-9, USAF  
Chief, Assessment Section



# AIR FORCE CREDIT INQUIRY FORM

CREDIT INQUIRY		
HOW LONG HAVE YOU HAD CREDIT DEALINGS WITH THIS INDIVIDUAL?		
TYPE OF CREDIT EXTENDED		
<input type="checkbox"/> RETAIL CHARGE ACCOUNT <input type="checkbox"/> SECURED LOAN (Includes co-signed loans) <input type="checkbox"/> UNSECURED LOAM <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Please specify)		
APPROXIMATE HIGH CREDIT		\$
AMOUNT OF MONTHLY PAYMENTS		\$
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE		\$
AMOUNT CURRENTLY PAST DUE		\$
IF ACCOUNT HAS NOT BEEN HANDLED TO YOUR SATISFACTION, PLEASE EXPLAIN BELOW		
SIGNATURE	TITLE	DATE

# AIR FORCE

## EDUCATION INQUIRY REQUEST

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
3507TH AIRMAN CLASSIFICATION SQUADRON (ATC)  
LACKLAND AIR FORCE BASE, TEXAS 78236



REPLY TO  
ATTN OF DPKA

SUBJECT: Educational Inquiry

No Transcripts Please

TO

1. The above-named individual, a recent enlistee in the USAF, is being considered for an assignment important to the security of the United States. These duties involve handling classified information, access to nuclear weapons and other equally responsible positions. Airmen assigned to these positions must possess a high degree of stability and reliability.

2. Please complete the items on the back of this letter. Your information will be a valuable aid in determining this airman's suitability for this sensitive military assignment. The airman is aware of this inquiry and, by signature below, concurs in release of the information. Please do not send a transcript.

3. The Privacy Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-579), requires that information obtained by Federal Agencies about an individual be released to that individual upon his/her request. The identity of the person providing the information must also be released to the individual. The information you provide in this questionnaire conforms to the provisions of the Privacy Act.

4. If this airman is selected for this assignment, an investigator may contact you for additional information. Should this occur, your further cooperation is solicited. Time limitations require that selections be completed within the next ten days. Your early reply and return of this letter will be greatly appreciated.

*Gerald Elam*  
GERALD ELAM, GS-9, DAF  
Chief, Assessment Section

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### R E L E A S E   A U T H O R I Z A T I O N

I am aware of this inquiry and I request that the information itemized on the reverse of this form be furnished for official Air Force use. This release includes any medical/psychological data deemed pertinent to the inquiry.

---

(Signature of Airman)

---

(Last Year Attended)

# AIR FORCE EDUCATION INQUIRY FORM

EDUCATIONAL INQUIRY		
<p><i>NOTE: Please complete the appropriate Section(s) of this form (Section I, II, or both) that apply to your knowledge of the individual, and the nature of your association. Answer all questions in the appropriate Section(s) by checking the proper box, and enter other fill-in information as applicable. GRADE TRANSCRIPTS ARE NOT REQUIRED.</i></p>		
SECTION I - RECORDS DATA		
<b>1. Educational Level Completed</b>		<b>4. Academic Standing (Final Year)</b>
<input type="checkbox"/> Freshman	<input type="checkbox"/> Senior	Class Rank _____ of _____
<input type="checkbox"/> Sophomore	<input type="checkbox"/> Graduate Student	
<input type="checkbox"/> Junior	<input type="checkbox"/> None	
<b>2. Dates Attended (Month and Year)</b>		Letter Grade Average _____ or Grade Point Average _____ _____ on Point System _____
FROM _____	TO _____	<b>5. Personal Conduct</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Satisfactory Record <input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) _____
FROM _____	TO _____	
<b>3. Reason For Leaving School</b>		
<input type="checkbox"/> Graduated/Completed	<input type="checkbox"/> Finances	
<input type="checkbox"/> Was Failing	<input type="checkbox"/> Expelled	<b>6. Emotional Stability</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Poor (Explain in Item 13) <input type="checkbox"/> Average <input type="checkbox"/> Good <input type="checkbox"/> Excellent
<input type="checkbox"/> Suspended (Graduate)	<input type="checkbox"/> Unknown	
<input type="checkbox"/> Suspended (Undergrad)	<input type="checkbox"/> Other	
<b>SECTION II - PERSONAL EVALUATION</b>		
<b>7. Aptitude</b>		<b>8. Achievement</b>
<input type="checkbox"/> Can Learn Quickly	<input type="checkbox"/> Outstanding	<b>9. Motivation</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Strives Consistently <input type="checkbox"/> Moderate Effort <input type="checkbox"/> Apathetic, Aimless
<input type="checkbox"/> Average	<input type="checkbox"/> Average	
<input type="checkbox"/> Learns Slowly	<input type="checkbox"/> Low	
<b>10. Emotional Adjustment</b>		<b>11. Maturity</b>
<input type="checkbox"/> Adapts Well to Surroundings, Even Under Stress	<input type="checkbox"/> Adult Outlook, Uses Discretion	<input type="checkbox"/> Average <input type="checkbox"/> Short-Sighted Behavior
<input type="checkbox"/> Average	<input type="checkbox"/> Average	
<input type="checkbox"/> Unable to Cope With Problems	<input type="checkbox"/> Short-Sighted Behavior	
<b>12. Was individual a Disciplinary Problem? (For example, suspended or expelled)</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Yes (Explain) <input type="checkbox"/> No		
13. If you have additional information concerning this individual's character, morals, leadership ability, or other factors bearing on suitability for a sensitive Air Force assignment, we will appreciate your comments in the space below.		
<b>14. I</b> <input type="checkbox"/> DO <input type="checkbox"/> DO NOT    have unfavorable information to discuss by telephone.		
I may be contacted by telephone at _____ between the hours of _____ and _____. (Area code and number)		
DATE	NAME AND POSITION/TITLE	SIGNATURE

ATC HQ FORM 44 (DPKA)  
FEB 80

REPLACES 3307 ACS FORM 6, JAN 77, WHICH IS OBSOLETE

# AIR FORCE

## EMPLOYMENT INQUIRY REQUEST

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
3507TH AIRMAN CLASSIFICATION SQUADRON (ATC)  
LACKLAND AIR FORCE BASE, TEXAS 78236



REPLY TO: DPKA  
ATTN OF:  
SUBJECT: Employment Inquiry  
TO:

1. The above named individual, a recent USAF enlistee, is being considered for an Air Force assignment to a position that requires the most stable and reliable person available. These duties involve handling classified information, access to nuclear weapons and other equally responsible positions. These positions may be physically or emotionally stressful. Airmen not selected for these sensitive positions will be considered for other interesting and worthwhile assignments.
2. To assist us in making a decision as to who could best fulfill these duties, we would appreciate your evaluation of this individual. Please complete the questionnaire on the reverse side of this letter.
3. If the airman is selected for this assignment, a Defense Department representative may contact you for additional information in the near future. Should this occur, your further cooperation is solicited.
4. Since final selections for these positions must be completed within the next ten days, we would appreciate an early return of your evaluation. A postage-free envelope is provided for your convenience.
5. Please return this letter as it contains information which will insure proper identification of the individual concerned.
6. The Privacy Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-579), requires that information obtained by Federal Agencies about an individual be released to that individual upon their formal written request. The identity of the person providing the information must also be released to the individual. The information you provide in this questionnaire conforms to the provisions of the Privacy Act.

*Gerald Elam*  
GERALD ELAM, GS-9, USAF  
Chief, Assessment Section

# AIR FORCE EMPLOYMENT INQUIRY FORM

EMPLOYMENT INQUIRY			
1. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (From - To)		2. IF AVAILABLE FROM YOUR RECORDS - SUBJECT'S	
		JOB TITLE	
		SALARY (Per Month, Week, Etc.)	
		DATE OF BIRTH	
3. REASON FOR LEAVING			
ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS BY PLACING AN "X" IN THE PROPER BOX OR COLUMN			
4. WOULD		5. JOB PERFORMANCE	
a. Be glad to rehire subject?		a. Extremely competent	
b. Prefer someone else (Explain below)		b. Very competent	
		c. Adequate	
		d. Incompetent	
6. EMOTIONAL STABILITY		7. ABILITY TO WORK WITH OTHERS	
a. Exceptionally mature and stable. Functions effectively in periods of stress.		a. Excellent, effective in relationships with others; requires little supervision.	
b. Average for individual's age group.		b. Good - About average for individual's age in personal relationships.	
c. Questionable. May not stand up well under stress.		c. Poor - Cannot work effectively with others; is uncooperative or arouses antagonism needlessly. A liability in a team effort.	
8. TO THE BEST OF YOUR KNOWLEDGE, HAS THE SUBJECT			YES
a. Had relatives or business interests in a foreign country?			NO
b. Ever belonged to or shown sympathetic interest in a communist, fascist or other subversive group?			
c. Ever associated with individuals whose moral character is low (as to the United States of America is questionable)?			
d. Ever used alcohol excessively?			
e. Ever used harmful or illegal drugs?			
f. Ever been in any difficulty with law enforcement agencies?			
g. Ever been listed from a job for cause?			
h. Any chronic ailments or physical defects?			
i. Ever received medical or psychological treatment for emotional problems?			
j. Ever exhibited any behavior or activities which would indicate that individual is not reliable, honest, trustworthy, or loyal to the United States of America, financially responsible, and of good character?			
NOTE: If your answer to any of the above questions is "YES", please explain in Item 12 below.			
9. ARE YOU ASSOCIATED WITH THE SUBJECT'S FAMILY?			
a. If so, would your answers to questions 8a through 8j generally apply to them? (Please explain any questionable areas in Item 12 below.)			
10. DO YOU HAVE ANY UNFAVORABLE INFORMATION YOU WOULD PREFER TO DISCUSS PERSONALLY WITH AN AIR FORCE REPRESENTATIVE?			
11. WOULD YOU RECOMMEND THE SUBJECT FOR A POSITION OF TRUST AND RESPONSIBILITY INVOLVING THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA? (If your answer is "NO", please explain in Item 12 below.)			
12. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO ANY OF THE ABOVE QUESTIONS (Indicate question numbers to which answers apply.)			
NAME OF COMPANY FIRM			
DATE	NAME AND POSITION TITLE		SIGNATURE

# AIR FORCE PEER RATING FORM

## SENSITIVE SKILLS - PEER RATING

The Peer Rating is a very important tool used in considering candidates for sensitive Air Force skills governed under the provisions of the personnel reliability program (PRP). Only individuals of the highest caliber, stability, and character are assigned duties in high-risk sensitive positions. Keep this in mind as you complete this form. Enter your flight number, then roster number of each member of your flight identified for sensitive skill consideration. Based on your association with each of these airmen, rate them in each category (circle one), using the following scale: A - Excellent, B - Above Average, C - Average, D - Below Average, and E - Poor. Do not rate yourself.

FLIGHT : _____	ROSTER # _____	ROSTER # _____	ROSTER # _____	ROSTER # _____	ROSTER # _____	ROSTER # _____
Responsibility	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E
Trustworthiness	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E
Temperment	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E
Honesty	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E
Attitude	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E
Self-confidence	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E
Adjustment to stress	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E
Interpersonal relations	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E
Off-duty conduct	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E

FLIGHT : _____	ROSTER # _____	ROSTER # _____	ROSTER # _____	ROSTER # _____	ROSTER # _____	ROSTER # _____
Responsibility	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E
Trustworthiness	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E
Temperment	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E
Honesty	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E
Attitude	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E
Self-confidence	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E
Adjustment to stress	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E
Interpersonal relations	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E
Off-duty conduct	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E	A B C D E

Please give Roster # and brief explanation for all low ratings (D and E): \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

APPENDIX D

MATERIALS USED BY THE ARMY  
DURING THE SECURITY SCREENING PROCESS  
FOR ENLISTED ACCESSIONS

ARMY

SECURITY SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE (169-R)

PAGE 1



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL CENTER
2481 EISENHOWER AVENUE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22331-0400

SECURITY SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE

APPLICANTS NAME: \_\_\_\_\_ SSN: \_\_\_\_\_

DOB: \_\_\_\_\_ POB: \_\_\_\_\_ MOS: \_\_\_\_\_ DEP DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

AD DATE: \_\_\_\_\_ INITIAL \_\_\_\_\_ UPDATE \_\_\_\_\_ SI-ONE-ON-ONE \_\_\_\_\_
(CHECK ONE)

\*\*\*\*\*

PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 (ADVISEMENT STATEMENT): The Authority for requesting the following information is 10 U.S.C. 3012 and Executive Orders 10450, 11652, and 9397. The information is requested for the purpose of making security determinations for membership in the Armed Forces of the United States and for access to classified information. Routine uses include evaluation for determining the scope and coverage of personnel security investigations, use in conducting investigations and development of investigative leads to assure completeness of security investigations, providing evaluators or adjudicators with detailed personal history information relevant to security and suitability determinations, and for making and reviewing enlistment eligibility decisions. The information may be disclosed to other Federal or Government agencies and administrative personnel involved in processing actions that evolve during the course of these determinations. COMPLETION OF THIS FORM IS VOLUNTARY: Failure on your part, however, to furnish all or part of the information requested may result in your not being accepted for your chosen MOS or enlistment option.

GENERAL INFORMATION CONCERNING THIS FORM: Completion of this processing questionnaire represents an initial security screening by representatives of the U.S. Army. If reviewed favorably, additional security screening will follow, to include a detailed background investigation conducted by the Defense Investigative Service. This investigation may encompass extensive checks with appropriate law enforcement agencies, credit and financial institutions, school teachers and administrators, friends, neighbors, employers, and other persons who may know and be willing to provide information concerning you. Upon completion of all screening and investigations, a determination will be made concerning your eligibility for access to sensitive intelligence information, and/or the MOS or option for which you are applying. You are advised that falsification of this questionnaire may result in the loss of your MOS/enlistment option, denial of a security clearance or access to sensitive information, denial of enlistment into the Army, reassignment or possible separation from the military service.

ANY ADVICE YOU MAY HAVE RECEIVED CONCERNING THE WITHHOLDING OF REQUESTED OR APPLICABLE INFORMATION SHOULD BE DISREGARDED. It will be in your best interest to complete honestly and accurately all questions below by circling the appropriate "YES" or "NO" response. If you answer "YES" to any question, fully explain your answer in the REMARKS section of this form, or on a separate piece of paper.

\*\*\*\*\*

I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THE ABOVE TWO STATEMENTS:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature of Applicant



# ARMY

## SECURITY SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE (169-R)

### PAGE 2

1. Have you ever:

a. Been processed for employment to include military service with or ..... YES NO  
investigated by a Federal Government Agency for any reason?

b. Held a security clearance with the Federal Government or Civilian ..... YES NO  
contractor?

c. Been denied or had a security clearance revoked or suspended? ..... YES NO

d. Received disciplinary action under the Uniform Code of Military ..... YES NO  
Justice, to include Article 15, Captain's Mast or Courts Martial?

e. Been denied enlistment in, rejected by, or discharged from any ..... YES NO  
branch of the Armed Forces?

f. Been a member of the Peace Corps? ..... YES NO

g. Been a conscientious objector? ..... YES NO

2. Have you or any member of your family:

a. Held citizenship in any country other than the United States? ..... YES NO

b. Had U.S. citizenship by other than birth (been naturalized)? ..... YES NO

c. Had or currently have relatives residing outside the U.S. (Do not ..... YES NO  
include travel under U.S. Government orders or direction. Do not include  
periods of less than one month travel to Canada or Mexico)

d. Maintained any ties of affection, obligation or kinship to any ..... YES NO  
individual of foreign birth or who is not a U.S. citizen? (If YES, give  
complete identifying data, to include full name, occupation, age, address,  
citizenship, extent of contact, and correspondence in the Remarks Section.)

e. Had any financial interests, holdings or dealings with a foreign ..... YES NO  
based business?

f. Own property or a bank account in a foreign country? ..... YES NO

g. Ever travelled outside the United States, excluding short duration ..... YES NO  
(less than one month) visits to Canada or Mexico? (Also exclude travel under  
U.S. Government orders or direction.)

3. Have you:

a. Ever experimented with, EVEN ONE TIME, used on an infrequent or regular basis, any  
of the following type drugs or substances:

MARIJUANA.....	YES	NO	BARBITURATES.....	YES	NO	COCAINE.....	YES	NO
HASHISH.....	YES	NO	HEROIN.....	YES	NO	THC.....	YES	NO
AMPHETAMINES.....	YES	NO	HALLUCINOGENS.....	YES	NO	OPIUM.....	YES	NO
			(LSD, STP, PCP, etc)					

b. Any synthetic or cure-type drugs, such as Methadone, or any other ..... YES NO  
habit forming, dangerous, or illegal drug or substance?

ARMY

SECURITY SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE (169-R)

PAGE 3

c. Any narcotic sedative, stimulant, tranquilizer, antidepressant, ..... YES NO  
glue, gas, solvent, etc?

d. IF YOUR ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE QUESTIONS WAS "YES" ENTER THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

Type drug/substance \_\_\_\_\_  
Date of first use \_\_\_\_\_  
Date of last use \_\_\_\_\_  
Frequency of use (daily, weekly, etc) \_\_\_\_\_  
Total times used (approximately) \_\_\_\_\_  
Method of use (smoked, injected, snorted, etc) \_\_\_\_\_

e. Have you ever, EVEN ONE TIME:

POSSESSED..... YES NO TRANSPORTED..... YES NO  
GROWN..... YES NO PRODUCED..... YES NO  
BOUGHT..... YES NO SOLD..... YES NO

any of the above drugs/substances mentioned in Questions 3a thru d above?

f. Has your usage of cannabis (marijuana, hashish, etc), narcotic substances, or dangerous drugs resulted in:

MEDICAL TREATMENT..... YES NO EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS..... YES NO  
COUNSELING..... YES NO EDUCATIONAL PROBLEMS..... YES NO  
QUESTIONING/DETENTION BY ANY LAW OFFICIAL..... YES NO

4. Have you ever:

a. Used alcoholic beverages? ..... YES NO

(If your answer is YES, complete the following)

Date first used \_\_\_\_\_ Date last used \_\_\_\_\_  
Frequency of use \_\_\_\_\_ Number of times intoxicated during last year \_\_\_\_\_

Your perception of what intoxication is \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

**ARMY**  
**SECURITY SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE (169-R)**

**PAGE 4**

b. Has your use of alcoholic beverages ever resulted in:

MEDICAL TREATMENT.....	YES	NO	EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS.....	YES	NO
COUNSELING.....	YES	NO	EDUCATIONAL PROBLEMS.....	YES	NO
QUESTIONING/DETENTION BY ANY LAW OFFICIAL .....				YES	NO

c. Have you ever illegally:

MANUFACTURED ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES..	YES	NO	PURCHASED ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES...	YES	NO
TRANSPORTED ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES...	YES	NO	SOLD ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES.....	YES	NO

5. Have you ever:

a. experienced or are you now experiencing any of the following:

NERVOUS PROBLEMS.....	YES	NO	MENTAL PROBLEMS.....	YES	NO
EMOTIONAL PROBLEMS.....	YES	NO	BEHAVIORAL PROBLEMS.....	YES	NO
PERSONAL PROBLEMS.....	YES	NO	STABILITY PROBLEMS.....	YES	NO
MENTAL ABUSE.....	YES	NO	PHYSICAL ABUSE.....	YES	NO

b. as a result of problems listed in 5a above, have you ever been referred to, visited with, consulted with, or been examined by any:

MEDICAL AUTHORITY.....	YES	NO	PSYCHIATRIST.....	YES	NO
PSYCHOLOGIST.....	YES	NO	SOCIAL WORKER.....	YES	NO
PROFESSIONAL COUNSELOR...	YES	NO	SCHOOL COUNSELOR.....	YES	NO
GROUP COUNSELING.....	YES	NO	FAMILY COUNSELING.....	YES	NO

(IF "YES", GIVE DATES, PLACES, ADDRESSES, NAMES, AND NATURE OF PROBLEM IN REMARKS SECTION)

6. Have you ever experienced financial problems listed below:

LIENS.....	YES	NO	LAW SUITS (FINANCIAL).....	YES	NO
BANKRUPTCY.....	YES	NO	CREDIT PROBLEMS.....	YES	NO
REFUSED CREDIT.....	YES	NO	LATE/BEHIND IN PAYMENTS...	YES	NO
REPOSSESSIONS.....	YES	NO	GARNISHMENTS.....	YES	NO
WRITTEN BAD CHECKS.....	YES	NO	PASSED BAD CHECKS.....	YES	NO
DO YOU ANTICIPATE ANY FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE FUTURE.....				YES	NO

EXPLAIN: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

# ARMY SECURITY SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE (169-R)

## PAGE 5

LIST ALL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS THAT ARE OUTSTANDING (TO INCLUDE CAR PAYMENTS/STUDENT LOANS)

BALANCE DUE	MONTHLY PAYMENTS	NAME OF CREDITOR	REASON FOR DEBT	DATE LAST PAYMENT MADE	STATUS OF ACCT (CURRENT, LATE, ETC)

7. Have you ever:

a. Attempted/contemplated/considered suicide whether as a gesture or ..... YES NO  
on purpose?

b. Been involved in or accused of:

CHILD MOLESTING..... YES NO STATUTORY RAPE..... YES NO

WINDOW PEEPING..... YES NO INDECENT EXPOSURE..... YES NO

MOONING..... YES NO STREAKING..... YES NO

HOMOSEXUAL ACT (SINCE AGE 15) YES NO ADULTERY..... YES NO

COHABITATION..... YES NO PROSTITUTION..... YES NO

c. Run away from home or considered doing so? ..... YES NO

d. Out of wedlock, been pregnant or caused someone to become pregnant? ..... YES NO

8. Have you ever:

a. Left any employment under less than favorable conditions or while under investigation or suspicion such as:

FIRED..... YES NO QUIT WITHOUT NOTICE..... YES NO

b. Have you ever had problems with employers or co-workers ..... YES NO

9. Have you ever:

a. Advocated the use of force or violence to overthrow the Government of ... YES NO  
the United States or alter the form of Government of the United States by  
unconstitutional means; been a member of any group or closely associated with  
any individual(s) whose aims are in opposition to those of the United States?

b. Advocated the use of force or violence to prevent others from ..... YES NO  
exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United  
States or any subdivision thereof?

**ARMY**  
**SECURITY SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE (169-R)**  
**PAGE 6**

10. a. Have you ever been (whether guilty or not):

DETAINED BY LAW OFFICIALS.....	YES	NO	ARRESTED BY LAW OFFICIALS..	YES	NO
CITED BY LAW OFFICIALS.....	YES	NO	HELD BY LAW OFFICIALS.....	YES	NO
QUESTIONED BY LAW OFFICIALS.....	YES	NO	FINED BY ANY COURT.....	YES	NO
BEEN CONVICTED OF ANY LAW VIOLATION.	YES	NO	HAD ANY TRAFFIC OFFENSES...	YES	NO
HAD ANY JUVENILE OFFENSES.....	YES	NO	CONFINED BY ANY LAW.....	YES	NO
HAD ANY CIVIL COURT APPEARANCE.....	YES	NO			
HAD ANY CHARGES OR OFFENSES WHICH YOU WERE TOLD WERE DISMISSED/DROPPED BY... COURT OR POLICE?	YES	NO			

b. LIST ALL INSTANCES THAT YOU ANSWERED YES TO IN 10a ABOVE:

MONTH/YEAR	CITY/STATE	OFFENSE/REASON	DISPOSITION

c. Have you ever been involved in shoplifting/theft of any kind ..... YES NO (whether caught or not)?

d. Have you ever:

PARTICIPATED IN ANY ILLEGAL OR VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIONS.....	YES	NO
BEEN A MEMBER OF A STREET OR OTHER TYPE GANG.....	YES	NO
BEEN SUSPENDED OR EXPELLED FROM SCHOOL FOR ANY REASON.....	YES	NO

11. Are there any other instances in your life, not already listed on this form which would adversely reflect upon your responsibility, reliability, or maturity or which you feel should be brought out at this time? ..... YES NO

12. HAVE YOU RECEIVED ANY ADVICE FROM ANY PERSON, EITHER DIRECT OR..... YES NO INDIRECT, OR IMPLIED, TO WITHHOLD ANY INFORMATION?

\*\*\*\*\*

EXPLAIN ANY YES ANSWER IN REMARKS SECTION ON PAGE 9

ARMY

SECURITY SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE (169-R)

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I certify that I have read and understand the Privacy Act of 1974 Advisement Statement on Page 1 of this form, and that the answers on this form are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge, memory, and belief. I understand that willfully making false statements or omissions of pertinent information may result in my not receiving a security clearance or SCI access, my dismissal from my MOS and/or enlistment option and/or unit and/or the U.S. Army. I further certify that I have not received any advice, implied or otherwise, to omit information requested by this form, unless otherwise noted in item 11.

I UNDERSTAND THAT MY CONTINUED ELIGIBILITY FOR SCI ACCESS MAY BE SUBJECT TO VERIFICATION THROUGH A PERIODIC POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION.

I further understand that I am obligated to inform the Security Interviewer or the appropriate Security Manager of any substantial change which occurs and which may alter the results of this security screening.

PRINT FULL NAME: \_\_\_\_\_

SSN: \_\_\_\_\_

DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH: \_\_\_\_\_

APPLICANT'S SIGNATURE: \_\_\_\_\_

\*\*\*\*\*  
FOR THE SECURITY INTERVIEWER'S USE ONLY  
\*\*\*\*\*

I certify that I have discussed each aspect of this form with the above named individual and have informed the applicant of the consequences of providing incomplete, misleading, or erroneous information.

_____ Typed or Printed Name	_____ SI Number	_____ Signature of SI	_____ Date and Place of interview
--------------------------------	--------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------------------

\*\*\*\*\*  
SECURITY DETERMINATION INFORMATION  
\*\*\*\*\*

\_\_\_\_\_ INITIAL INTERVIEW    SI ONE-ON-ONE INTERVIEW \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ UPDATE INTERVIEW    Date of Initial Interview: \_\_\_\_\_

THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE CALLED IN FOR DETERMINATION (Circle applicable numbers)

1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e, 1f, 1g, 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e, 2f, 2g, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 4a, 4b, 4c,

5a, 5b, 6, 7a, 7b, 7c, 7d, 8a, 8b, 9a, 9b, 10a, 10b, 10c, 10d, 11, and 12.

WAIVER APPROVED/DISAPPROVED BY:    PCCF: \_\_\_\_\_    DET: \_\_\_\_\_

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_    CN#: \_\_\_\_\_

ANVT 1  
SECURITY SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE (169-R)

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SCI/SECURITY CLEARANCE ELIGIBILITY DRUG STATEMENT

1. I understand that the possession, use, sale, transfer, cultivation, or manufacture of marijuana, narcotics, dangerous drugs or other controlled substances is against army policy, may constitute unlawful conduct and may result in my being declared ineligible for access to sensitive compartmented information (SCI), and a security clearance.

2. I understand that any request for waiver of prior drug involvement will be considered only one time and, if granted, will be limited to and apply only to such involvement as I specifically described in this security screening questionnaire.

3. I understand that my statements regarding prior use or non-use or involvement with drugs are subject to further investigation and that any deliberate misrepresentation, falsification, or omission of material fact may be a basis for a determination or ineligibility for SCI access and a security clearance.

4. I will refrain from any future personal possession, use, sale, transfer, cultivation, manufacture, or other involvement with any and all types of marijuana, narcotics, dangerous drugs, or other controlled substances unless prescribed by competent medical authority. I will also avoid attendance at any activity where such substances may be present or in use. I will immediately remove myself from any activity or location should I become aware of the use or presence of such substances.

I FURTHER UNDERSTAND THAT MY INTENT TO REFRAIN FROM ALL ILLEGAL DRUG INVOLVEMENT BEGINS IMMEDIATELY UPON SIGNING THIS STATEMENT.

5. This statement is made freely, voluntarily, and of my own free will because of my desire to be granted a security clearance and/or access to sensitive compartmented information.

note: INSURE THAT YOU THOROUGHLY READ AND UNDERSTAND THIS STATEMENT PRIOR TO SIGNING.

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_ SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT: \_\_\_\_\_

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_ SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWER: \_\_\_\_\_

ARMY  
SECURITY SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE (169-R)

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REMARKS

Fully explain all "Yes" answers, by citing the number of the questions, then your explanation. If you continue this section on a plain sheet of paper, indicate the following information on the top of the continuation sheet, full name, SSN, place of birth, date of birth.



**ARMY**  
**PERSONNEL RELIABILITY PROGRAM**  
**SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE (189-R)**  
**PAGE 1**



**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
 U.S. ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL CENTER  
 7481 EISENHOWER AVENUE  
 ALEXANDRIA VIRGINIA 22331 0400  
**PERSONNEL RELIABILITY PROGRAM**  
**SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE**

**PART I (FOR APPLICANT TO READ AND UNDERSTAND)**

**DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT:** The authority for requesting the following information is 10 U.S.C., 3012, Executive Orders 10450, 11652, 9397, and Army Regulation 50-5. The principal purpose is to determine if you are eligible to enlist for training in a nuclear-related Military Occupational Specialty. The routine use of data obtained is to determine acceptability for the Personnel Reliability Program, and may be used to determine eligibility for enlistment in the Army. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION REQUESTED IS VOLUNTARY. However, if you do not provide the desired information, you may be denied the nuclear-related Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) Training-of-choice Option.

**STANDARDS FOR NUCLEAR DUTY:** Due to the destructive power of nuclear weapons and the grave implications of either accidental or deliberate detonation of these weapons, only those persons who have demonstrated unswerving loyalty, integrity, trustworthiness, and discretion of the highest order will be assigned to nuclear duties. All persons performing this duty will be continually evaluated, are obligated to report any factors or conditions which may adversely affect their performance, and will be promptly removed from nuclear weapons duty if there is any question about their judgment or reliability.

\*\*\*\*\*

**PART II (TO BE COMPLETED BY SECURITY INTERVIEWER)**

NAME \_\_\_\_\_ SSN \_\_\_\_\_  
           Last                      First                      MI

has been interviewed using criteria listed below to evaluate his/her acceptability under the Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) for training leading to an assignment to perform duties of a Critical or Controlled position. (S1 circle applicable answer - YES or NO) ----- APPLICANT MUST INITIAL EACH RESPONSE. Applicant's  
Initials

1a. Objects to handling, participation in the firing, or military use of nuclear weapons. YES/NO \_\_\_\_\_

1b. FOR USE BY 95B MOS APPLICANTS ONLY: Objects to performing security duties in the vicinity of nuclear weapons stored, fired, or staged for military use. YES/NO \_\_\_\_\_

2. Required (or has an approved) waiver for a moral or administrative disqualification contained in AR 601-210, Table 4-1, line C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, (K-USAR ONLY), M, N, O, Q, W, X, Y, AA, AB, AC, AE, AG, AH, or AI; preservice alcohol or preservice drug abuse (if yes, circle applicable items). YES/NO \_\_\_\_\_

3. Has experimented with cannabis or a derivative (Marijuana, Hashish), within the last 90 days, but did not continue to use it, even on an infrequent basis. (Isolated, experimental cannabis use may be waived to authorize an enlistment commitment for training in a nuclear related PRP MOS). (See Part II, Item 4). YES/NO \_\_\_\_\_

4. Has illegally used or experimented (even once) with any other drugs or controlled substances, whether or not charged or convicted of same. (Includes: Cocaine, Heroin, Amphetamines, Morphine, LSD, PCP, Mescaline, Benzadrine, Valium, and similar substances) (Use as prescribed by a physician is not illegal). YES/NO \_\_\_\_\_

NOTE: For S1 - Each YES response must be explained in Remarks.

**ARMY**  
**PERSONNEL RELIABILITY PROGRAM**  
**SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE (189-R)**

**PAGE 2**

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**PART III (TO BE COMPLETED BY APPLICANT WITH ASSISTANCE OF SECURITY INTERVIEWER)**

1. I have read and understand the Privacy Act Statement and Standards for NUCLEAR DUTY shown in Part I.
2. I have not received any advice, implied or otherwise, to omit information during this interview.
3. To the best of my knowledge, memory, and belief, the above information is accurate and valid.
4. I request that my isolated experimental use of cannabis be waived, and that I be authorized training in a nuclear-related MOS as an enlistment commitment. (Cross out if not applicable).
5. I understand that cannabis use in the Service is illegal and always disqualifying and will result in my removal from duty with nuclear weapons and reclassification to another skill. I will not use drugs of any kind while in the Delayed Entry Program and/or after reporting for active duty (unless prescribed by medical authority) if permitted to enlist in MOS \_\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Signature)

\*\*\*\*\*

**PART IV (TO BE COMPLETED BY SECURITY INTERVIEWER)**

Based upon evaluation of the above factors, waiver for cannabis is (approved/disapproved/not applicable) and: (Name) \_\_\_\_\_ meets the initial screening criteria for the PRP. If the remaining specific MOS requirements are met, he/she is eligible for nuclear-related MOS training.

(Name) \_\_\_\_\_ does not meet PRP requirements as noted and is therefore ineligible to enlist for nuclear-related MOS training.

\*\*\*\*\*

I certify that I have discussed each aspect of this form with the above-named individual and have informed the applicant of the consequences of providing incomplete or erroneous information.

\*\*\*\*\*

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature of Interviewer

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Place of Interview

\*\*\*\*\*

**PART V REMARKS SECTION**



**ARMY**  
**PERSONNEL SECURITY SCREENING INTERVIEW (IA-92)**  
**PAGE 2**

PART IV. GENERAL																															
7. Why did you join the Army?	9. Most difficult thing for you	11. Would you like to get out of the Army now? Why?																													
8. Why did you select the Army job (MOS) for which you enlisted?	10. Do you feel that you will be able to complete basic training on schedule? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Not sure																														
PART V. BACKGROUND DATA																															
12. Have you ever been involved with any of the following?																															
<table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr><td style="text-align: left; padding-left: 5px;">Yes No</td></tr> <tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> a. Curfew Violation</td></tr> <tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> b. Malicious Mischief</td></tr> <tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> c. Disturbing the Peace</td></tr> <tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> d. Disorderly Conduct</td></tr> <tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> e. Vagrancy</td></tr> <tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> f. Bad Checks</td></tr> <tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> g. Failure to pay alimony or child support</td></tr> <tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> h. Hit and Run</td></tr> <tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> i. Moving Traffic Violation</td></tr> </table>	Yes No	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> a. Curfew Violation	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> b. Malicious Mischief	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> c. Disturbing the Peace	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> d. Disorderly Conduct	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> e. Vagrancy	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> f. Bad Checks	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> g. Failure to pay alimony or child support	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> h. Hit and Run	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> i. Moving Traffic Violation	<table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr><td style="text-align: left; padding-left: 5px;">Yes No</td></tr> <tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> j. Injuring someone while driving</td></tr> <tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> k. Running away from home</td></tr> <tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> l. Trespassing or hunting violation</td></tr> <tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> m. Illegal possession of weapon</td></tr> <tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> n. Vandalism</td></tr> <tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> o. Theft</td></tr> <tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> p. Shoplifting</td></tr> <tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> q. Breaking and entering</td></tr> <tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> r. Assault</td></tr> </table>	Yes No	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> j. Injuring someone while driving	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> k. Running away from home	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> l. Trespassing or hunting violation	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> m. Illegal possession of weapon	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> n. Vandalism	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> o. Theft	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> p. Shoplifting	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> q. Breaking and entering	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> r. Assault	<table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr><td style="text-align: left; padding-left: 5px;">Yes No</td></tr> <tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> s. Possession, sale, or use of dangerous drugs or marijuana</td></tr> <tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> t. Drinking underage</td></tr> <tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> u. Excessive drinking</td></tr> <tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> v. Contributing to delinquency of minor</td></tr> <tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> w. Misuse of Identification</td></tr> <tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> x. Sex Offenses</td></tr> <tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> y. Indecent exposure</td></tr> <tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> z. Other law violations</td></tr> </table>	Yes No	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> s. Possession, sale, or use of dangerous drugs or marijuana	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> t. Drinking underage	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> u. Excessive drinking	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> v. Contributing to delinquency of minor	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> w. Misuse of Identification	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> x. Sex Offenses	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> y. Indecent exposure	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> z. Other law violations
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<i>Interviewers Comments</i>																															

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**ARMY**  
**PERSONNEL SECURITY SCREENING INTERVIEW (IA-92)**  
**PAGE 3**

<b>13 Have you ever?</b>	
<p><b>Yes No</b></p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> a Been jailed or taken to police station</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> b Been summoned to appear in court</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> c Been involved in a lawsuit</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> d Had problems with creditors</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> e Had drivers license suspended or revoked</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> f Had trouble with supervisors</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> g Had trouble with co-workers</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> h Quit a job without notice</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> i Been fired or dismissed from any job</p>	<p><b>Yes No</b></p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> j Attempted or considered suicide</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> k Been mentally or physically abused</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> l Been pregnant or caused a pregnancy while not married</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> m Had a homosexual experience since sixteenth birthday</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> n Undergone treatment or counseling for problems</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> o Had tranquilizers, stimulants or depressants prescribed for you</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> p Traveled or resided outside the United States</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> q Supported the violent overthrow of the Government</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> r Supported denial of rights to any group or individual</p>
<p><i>Interviewers Comments</i></p>	
<b>14 Do you have?</b>	
<p><b>Yes No</b></p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> a Any debts</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> b Any friends or relatives who are not US citizens</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> c Any friends or relatives in foreign countries</p>	<p><b>Yes No</b></p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> d Any correspondence with foreign nationals</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> e Any business interests or investments in a foreign country or company</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> f Any money in foreign banks</p>
<p><i>Interviewers Comments</i></p>	

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# ARMY

## PERSONNEL SECURITY SCREENING INTERVIEW (IA-92)

PAGE 4

PART VI. EDUCATIONAL HISTORY			
	HIGH SCHOOL	COLLEGE OR TECH SCHOOL	20 What educational goals have you set for yourself?
15 Type of program or major			
16 Graduated	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
17 If you did not graduate why did you leave school?			
18 Were you ever disciplined by school authorities?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
19 How did you finance your education?			
<i>Interviewers Comments</i>			
PART VII. INTERVIEWEE STATEMENT			
<i>(For signature by the interviewee at the conclusion of the personal interview.)</i>			
<p>In connection with my consideration for sensitive duties with the US Army, I, _____, have been informed of the authority for this interview under the Privacy Act of 1974, and the voluntary nature of my participation in the interview. If criminal activities were disclosed during the interview, I was advised of my legal rights under the Constitution of the United States and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. If I requested it, a copy of the Privacy Act Advisement for this interview has been given to me for my retention.</p> <p>The information on this form is given voluntarily to be used in conjunction with my processing for possible future assignment.</p> <p>I understand that any information I give may be placed in my security files, whether or not I am selected for sensitive duties, and may be used in the future, along with an appropriate investigation, for determining my eligibility for a security clearance, military assignments or continued military service.</p> <p>I have examined this form and the interviewer's comments thereon. The information I provided is accurately described by the interviewer.</p> <p>Date: _____ Signature: _____ SSN: _____</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Interviewer: _____</p>			

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APPENDIX E

MATERIALS USED BY THE NAVY  
DURING THE SECURITY SCREENING  
FOR ENLISTED ACCESSIONS

**NAVY**  
**SAMPLE FORM USED AT MEPS FOR SCI APPLICANTS**  
**PAGE 1**

**SUGGESTED QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED OF POTENTIAL CRYPTOLOGIC TECHNICIAN  
AND INTELLIGENCE SPECIALIST CANDIDATES:**

Have you ever been arrested, held, cited, detained or questioned by any law enforcement agency? (Include any juvenile offenses, or charges that were ultimately dismissed, withdrawn or you were not found guilty).

For NAVET and OSVET include: Have you ever been court-martialed or received non-judicial punishment (Captain's Mast, Article 15, office hours) while in the military service?

Have you ever used or experimented with drugs, narcotics or marijuana? (This includes even one use).

Have you ever bought or sold illegal drugs, narcotics or marijuana?

Are any members of your immediate family involved in any way in use or trafficking in marijuana, illegal drugs or narcotics? Do any of your family members have any arrest record pertinent to illegal drugs?

Do you or any member of your immediate family have a history of excessive use of alcohol? (For candidate ask about arrests for minor in possession and DWI/DUI).

Have you ever declared bankruptcy or had any item of goods repossessed?

Have you ever had a check returned for insufficient funds? Explain.

What are your current financial obligations? (Provide total amount owed to each account and monthly payments against the account).

Are any accounts in arrears?

Have you ever been fired from a job or quit to avoid being fired?

Are you eligible to be rehired at each and every place you have been employed?

Have you ever been treated for any nervous, emotional or mental disorders?

Is there a history of epilepsy in your immediate family?

Have you ever been expelled or suspended from any educational institution (junior high through college) for cause?

Are any members of your immediate family citizens of a country other than the United States?

Do you have any close friends or relatives who are residing in a foreign country?



NAVY  
SAMPLE FORM USED AT MEPS FOR SCI APPLICANTS  
PAGE 2

*Do you have any friends or relatives who are not U.S. citizens?*

*Have you ever travelled outside the United States? To what country(ies)?*

*Have you ever been associated with any group or individual that advocates the use of force or violence to alter the Government of the United States?*

*Have you ever participated, either actively or passively, in a sexual relation with someone of your own sex?*

*Have you ever been involved in sexual activity that you consider to have been unusual, abnormal or perverted?*

*Are there any questions previously asked that would be answered "yes" by your current or ex-spouse?*

*Are there any incidents or situations in your background which might reflect on your loyalty or suitability for access to sensitive information?*

*Is there any individual such as a former employer, school official, co-worker, neighbor, landlord, girl friend, school friend or creditor who might provide adverse or negative information about you or your family during the course of a full-field background investigation?*

\* \* \* \*

*Don't be reluctant to go further into any of the above questions to explore questionable or unusual circumstance. If a "yes" answer is given to any question ask for full details of the matter.*

*Adjudicate the information you obtain objectively. Ask yourself a question. Is this individual the type with whom we can trust our nation's secrets? If you were the official solely responsible for security of the highly sensitive defense information at your duty station would you feel secure in certifying this person for full access knowing any compromise would be your responsibility?*

APPENDIX F

MATERIALS USED BY THE MARINE CORPS  
DURING THE SECURITY SCREENING PROCESS  
FOR ENLISTED ACCESSIONS

# MARINE CORPS

## SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SCI APPLICANTS

### PAGE 1



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
U. S. Marine Corps Recruiting Station  
1520 State Street, Suite 210  
San Diego, California 92101-2984

PRELIMINARY QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ENLISTMENT FOR THE  
INTELLIGENCE/SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE/GROUND ELECTRONIC  
WARFARE OPTION AND THE SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE OPTION UNDER THE EOP

Background

a. Executive order 11905. Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, and the National Security Council Directives have established minimum personnel security standards for all United States Government military personnel who require access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI).

b. Assignment to occupational fields 26 and 02 requires both a Top Secret Clearance and a Certification of Eligibility for Access to SCI.

c. Assignment to these occupational fields (2600) and (0200) (program 382) therefore falls within this requirement. Consequently, the applicant will undergo a rigorous background investigation to determine access eligibility. The formal investigation process will begin at the recruit depot. Unsatisfactory completion of the following questionnaire will eliminate those persons who clearly do not meet the basic eligibility requirements. Reasonable assurances will be given to those personnel satisfactory completing this questionnaire that they should meet the overall requirements. They may be recruited into this program contingent upon a final, favorable eligibility determination. However, it must be emphasized that satisfactory completion of the following questionnaire does not guarantee that the determination of eligibility will be favorable. If the determination is unfavorable, the conditions as specified in the basic SOU apply. In general, the candidate shall be of excellent character and discretion and of unquestionable loyalty to the U. S., and members of the candidate's immediate family and persons to whom the individual is bound by affection or obligation should not be subject to duress by a foreign power. Below is a listing and explanation of the areas which comprise the criteria for determining the security clearance level and the eligibility for SCI.

(1) Citizenship. Applicants and members of their immediate family (Spouse, parents, brother, sister and children) must be U.S. citizens. If naturalized, proof of naturalization must be furnished. Security clearance waiver may be granted even if immediate family members are not U.S. citizens, providing such family members reside in the U.S. as immigrant aliens and providing their citizenship is not in a communist or communist-controlled country.

(2) Foreign Relatives. No applicants will be selected who have relatives or close friends with whom close contact is maintained who are residing in or who are citizens of a communist or communist-controlled country

(3) Drugs. No applicant will be selected who is addicted to or physically or psychologically dependent on any illegal drug, who has trafficked in drugs, has illegally used narcotics within the past year or who has used dangerous drugs within the past six months.

(4) Mental Illness. Any applicant who has been treated for mental illness must produce medical evidence of successful treatment.

**MARINE CORPS**  
**SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SCI APPLICANTS**

**PAGE 2**

(5) FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY. No applicant will be selected who has a history of bad checks (unless through bank error), repossessions, cancelled or suspended charge accounts, or indebtedness exceeding one-half of the annual salary of the pay grade at which the person is being recruited.

(6) Criminal Record. No applicant will be selected who has an adult conviction of a felony, or who has an established record of repeated misdemeanors or traffic violations.

(7) School Record. No applicant will be selected who established a pattern of repeated difficulties with school officials, periodic suspensions, vandalism or abusive behavior, or who has been permanently expelled as a result of such activity.

(8) Sexual Offenses. No applicant will be selected who has engaged in homosexual activity, exhibitionism, voyeurism, transvestism or coercive sexual behavior of any kind.

(9) Employment. No applicant will be selected who has established a job-hopping record where there is a demonstrated pattern of loafing, irresponsibility, unexplained absenteeism, theft or inability to get along with superiors or fellow employees. No applicant who is a former member of the peace corps will be selected.

d. The ultimate determination of whether the granting of SCI access is clearly consistent with the interest of national security shall be an overall, common-sense determination based in all available information. However, persons who fail to satisfactory complete the following questionnaire, probably will not meet the requirements, and should not be considered.

2. Instructions.

- a. A "NO" answer to question "A" automatically disqualifies an applicant.
- b. A "YES" answer to questions "F", "W", or "Y" automatically disqualifies an applicant.
- c. Three or more unfavorable answers should disqualify an applicant. All unfavorable answers should be fully explained to expedite the clearance process.

Under the authority of 5 U.S.C. 301, Department regulations, and executive orders 10450, as amended, and 11652, information concerning your personal history is requested in order to evaluate your eligibility for access to sensitive information. The information provided by you will become a permanent part of your security file in the Naval Security Group Personnel Security/Access File System. The information provided by you will not be divulged, without your written authorization, to anyone other than Personnel, Security, Investigative, or Intelligence Agencies of the Department of Defense, you are not required to provide the information, however, failure to do so will result in the inability of the Commander, Naval Security Group Command to evaluate your eligibility for access to Sensitive Compartmented Information, therefore making you ineligible for assignment to duties requiring access to Sensitive Compartmented Information, and thereby disqualifying you for enlistment under this program.

**MARINE CORPS**  
**SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SCI APPLICANTS**  
**PAGE 3**

QUESTIONNAIRE

THE APPLICANT WILL ANSWER THE QUESTIONS BELOW BY  
 PLACING INITIALS IN THE APPROPRIATE BLOCK  
 ERASURES AND CROSS-OUTS ARE NOT PERMITTED

	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>
a. ARE YOU A UNITED STATES CITIZEN?	---	---
b. ARE ANY MEMBERS OF YOUR IMMEDIATE FAMILY OF A COUNTRY OTHER THAN THE UNITED STATES?	---	---
c. DO YOU HAVE ANY CLOSE FRIENDS OR RELATIVES WHO ARE RESIDING IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY?	---	---
d. HAVE YOU EVER TRAVELLED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES?	---	---
e. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH ANY GROUPS OR INDIVIDUALS WHO ADVOCATE THE USE OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO ALTER THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES?	---	---
f. DO YOU ADVOCATE THE USE OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO ALTER THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES?	---	---
g. HAVE YOU EVER USED ANY NARCOTIC, DEPRESSANT, STIMULANT HALLUCINOGEN (to include LSD or PCP) OR CANNABIS (to include MARIJUANA and HASHISH) EXCEPT AS PRESCRIBED BY A LICENSED PHYSICIAN? (some cannabis use is waivable)	---	---
h. HAVE YOU OR ANY MEMBER OF YOUR IMMEDIATE FAMILY EVER BEEN INVOLVED IN THE ILLEGAL PURCHASE, POSSESSION OR SALE OF ANY NARCOTIC, DEPRESSANT, STIMULANT, HALLUCINOGEN OR CANNABIS?	---	---
i. HAVE YOU OR ANY MEMBER OF YOUR IMMEDIATE FAMILY'S USE OF ALCOHOL BEVERAGE EVER RESULTED IN THE LOST OF A JOB, ARREST BY POLICE OR TREATMENT OF ALCOHOLISM?	---	---
j. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A PATIENT IN ANY INSTITUTION PRIMARILY DEVOTED TO THE TREATMENT OF MENTAL, EMOTIONAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL OR PERSONALITY DISORDERS?	---	---
k. BESIDES MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS AND MISDEMEANORS, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, HELD, CITED, DETAINED OR QUESTIONED BY ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY?	---	---
l. HAVE YOU EVER DECLARED BANKRUPTCY?	---	---
m. HAVE YOU EVER HAD ANY ITEM REPOSSESSED?	---	---
n. HAVE YOU EVER HAD ANY CHECKS RETURNED FOR INSUFFICIENT FUNDS?	---	---
o. DO YOU HAVE ANY ACCOUNTS THAT ARE IN ARREARS?	---	---
p. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EXPELLED OR SUSPENDED FROM ANY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION FOR CAUSE?	---	---
q. ARE YOU ELIGIBLE TO BE REHIRED AT EACH AND EVERY PLACE THAT YOU HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED?	---	---
r. HAVE YOU EVER PARTICIPATED, EITHER ACTIVELY OR PASSIVELY, IN A SEXUAL RELATION WITH SOMEONE OF YOUR OWN SEX, IN EXHIBITIONISM, IN TRANSVESTISM OR IN ANY OTHER SEXUAL ACTIVITY THAT YOU CONSIDER TO BE PERVERTED (kinky)?	---	---

**MARINE CORPS**  
**SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SCI APPLICANTS**  
**PAGE 4**

- |  | <u>YES</u> | <u>NO</u> |
|--|------------|-----------|
| a. ARE THERE ANY INCIDENTS OR SITUATIONS IN YOUR BACKGROUND WHICH MIGHT REFLECT ON YOUR LOYALTY OR SUITABILITY FOR ACCESS TO SENSITIVE INFORMATION?  | ---        | ---       |
| t. HAVE YOU EVER FAILED OR REFUSED TO SIGN A LOYALTY OATH OR PLEADED PROTECTION OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT OR ARTICLE 31 OF THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE?  | ---        | ---       |
| u. IF AGE 18 YEARS OR OLDER DID YOU REGISTER FOR THE DRAFT AS REQUIRED?  | ---        | ---       |
| v. IS THERE ANY INDIVIDUAL SUCH AS A FORMER EMPLOYER, SCHOOL OFFICIAL, CO-WORKER, NEIGHBOR, LANDLORD OR CREDITOR WHO MIGHT PROVIDE NEGATIVE INFORMATION ABOUT YOU DURING THE COURSE OF A SPECIAL BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION? | ---        | ---       |

FOR PRIOR SERVICE PERSONNEL

- |  |     |     |
|--|-----|-----|
| w. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN VIOLATION OF ANY SECURITY REGULATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT?                    | --- | --- |
| x. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED OR RECIEVED NONJUDICIAL PUNISHMENT (Capts' Mast, Art 15, Office Hours, etc)? | --- | --- |
| y. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF THE PEACE CORPS?   | --- | --- |

FOR ENLISTEE:

DAY/MONTH/YEAR	SSN	PRINTED NAME	SIGNATURE
----------------	-----	--------------	-----------

FOR MEPS LIAISON NCO:

DAY/MONTH/YEAR	SSN	PRINTED NAME	SIGNATURE
----------------	-----	--------------	-----------

**MARINE CORPS**  
**INTERVIEW OUTLINE USED AT RECRUIT TRAINING**  
**PAGE 1**

INTERVIEW OUTLINE

1. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME, SUFFIXES (JR., I, II, ETC.)
2. TODAY'S DATE (DAY/MONTH/YEAR) (1ST THREE LTRS OF MONTH)
3. PLT, BOOT CAMP GRADUATION DATE
4. SSN
5. DATE OF BIRTH (CITY AND STATE)
6. PLACE OF BIRTH (CITY AND STATE)
7. PROGRAM INTERESTED IN (2600, 0200, 0300)
- PERSONAL FROM HERE ON. . .ALL QUESTIONS REFER FROM BIRTH UNTIL TODAY.....
8. ANY OR ALL TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS, NO MATTER HOW MINOR. MO/YR VIO FINE
9. ANY OR ALL INCIDENTS WHERE YOU'VE BEEN INVOLVED WITH THE LAW. (WHETHER OR NOT YOU WERE DETAINED, QUESTIONED, FINGERPRINTED, PHOTOGRAPHED OR JAILED) MO/YR VIO FINE
10. HAVE YOU DRANK ANY ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE? (WINE WITH COMMUNION) HAVE YOU PASSED OUT OR BLACKED OUT WHILE DRINKING? (IF SO THE NUMBER OF TIMES) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN INVOLVED IN ANY SERIOUS ARGUMENTS, FIGHTS OR LEGAL PROBLEMS WHILE DRINKING? IF SO, LIST
11. HAVE YOU EVER USED ANY HABIT FORMING DRUGS SUCH AS HASHISH, HEROIN, COCAINE, SPEED, LSD, MARIJUANA, ANGELDUST, PCP, MUSHROOMS, CRANK, MESCALINE, PEYOTE, ETC, ILLEGAL OR LEGAL HABIT FORMING DRUG EVEN IF PRESCRIBED BY A DOCTOR? (NAME OF SUBSTANCE, TIME PERIOD USED, AND THE NUMBER OF TIMES USED)
12. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN INVOLVED IN ANY HOMOSEXUAL ACTIVITIES, ACTS OF SODOMY OR SEXUAL ORGIES?
13. IS EVERYONE IN YOUR IMMEDIATE FAMILY A U.S. CITIZEN? DO YOU HAVE ANY CLOSE AND CONTINUOUS CONTACTS WITH ANYONE WHO IS NOT A U.S. CITIZEN? (IF YES, RELATIONSHIP AND COUNTRY/COMPANY)
14. ARE YOU ADOPTED? YES OR NO
15. DO YOU HAVE ANY FRIENDS OR RELATIVES LIVING OUTSIDE THE U.S. NOT WORKING FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT? (IF YES - RELATIONSHIP TO YOU AND COMPANY)
16. HAVE YOU SUFFERED FROM FREQUENT HEADACHES, NERVOUS DISORDER, HAD ANY PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT OR BEEN COUNSELED ON PROBLEMS? (IF YES, WHICH ONE AND WHEN MON/YR)
17. HAVE YOU USED ANY OTHER NAME(S) BESIDES THE ONE YOU LISTED ABOVE? (LEGAL NAME CHANGE OR ADOPTED NAME) (IF YES LIST NAME)
18. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN FIRED FROM A JOB? (LIST COMPANY, WHY AND YR)
19. HAVE YOU BELONGED TO ANY ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, OR ANY RADICAL GROUP? (IF YES, LIST GROUP)
20. ARE YOU SINGLE MARRIED OR DIVORCED? (TODAY)
21. DO YOU SPEAK A FOREIGN LANGUAGE FLUENTLY? (IF YES LIST LANGUAGE)
22. DO YOU WALK OR TALK IN YOUR SLEEP? (IF YES - LAST TIME