


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CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS IN THE WAR ON DRUGS
BY
LIEUTENANT COLONEL VIRGIL E. RAINES, AV

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Every year since 1986, the United States Congress has increased the Military's role in the war on drugs. With the passage of the Department of Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1989, the military assumed the federal lead in command, control, communications and intelligence in this effort. If the past is any indication of future trends, the military role is almost certain to increase as policy makers become increasingly frustrated with the nation's seeming inability to curb the supply of illicit drugs crossing our borders. This study seeks to establish that the military has significant capabilities for dealing with the supply side of the drug war, but this role goes beyond that of traditional interdiction assistance. The study shows the linkages between narco-terrorism, drug trafficking and low intensity conflict (LIC), thus proposing that the military's primary contribution in limiting the supply of illicit drugs will embrace the imperatives of LIC. The criteria for the military's success in the war on drugs is exacting. Rules of engagement, doctrine and readiness issues must be anticipated. Unless we are to repeat the mistakes of the past 25 years, policy makers must consider invoking the public's support if the military involvement is to continue in the war on drugs. This study presents several important considerations and recommendations in the use of the news media to accomplish this end.

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CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS IN THE WAR ON DRUGS

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS IN THE WAR ON DRUGS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.^{1/}

von Clausewitz

The President of the United States declared war on 14 September 1986! In a televised address, he called for the nation to "mobilize for a national crusade against drugs." In this speech, President Reagan stated that "drug use is a repudiation of everything America is, and that the destructiveness and human wreckage mock our heritage".² The intent of this speech was to call the attention of Congress and the public to a national problem which was reaching a magnitude and pervasiveness beyond that of a mere social problem. The President, in an earlier National Security Decision Directive, had pointed out international drug trafficking's potential for destabilizing democratic governments, thus posing a threat to our national security. His speech and subsequent Administration policies set the stage for the government's "War On Drugs," which has marshalled the resources of nearly every government agency to fight an "enemy" that is ill-defined, little understood, and extremely elusive.

Congress reacted swiftly, sometimes ambiguously, to the President's declaration by enacting legislation to simultaneously reduce both the demand and supply of illegal drugs. Each year since 1986, Congress has passed legislation more deeply involving the military in the "War On Drugs", but not without controversy. Even the experts disagree on the proper mix of anti-drug programs, particularly on the use of the military towards this end. This disagreement persists among key Congressional, governmental and military leaders concerning strategies, policies and the efficacy of military involvement. No matter how well intentioned these arguments may be, they--even their slogan "War On Drugs"--tend to obscure the full nature of the problem, and therefore the requirements for combating it.

This chapter will examine the nature of the war on drugs, setting forth the most promising roles for the military in successfully contributing to the national objective of a drug-free America. It will also establish that controlling the supply of drugs is closely interrelated with Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), thus the most effective means of prosecuting the war will address the imperatives of LIC. Military success in the war on drugs will not come without risks and challenges, as the criteria for success is exacting. So if the military is to be successful, innovative campaign planning and strict attention to the basics are essential. Adequate doctrine and legal authority exists to begin this important undertaking, however both will evolve as the war unfolds. The military will face failure, however, if the mission is not properly resourced, and if the national will is

not invoked for the most unusual war the military has ever undertaken.

If this then is a war, our first undertaking must be to achieve a full understanding of its nature, as we have so wisely been counseled by von Clausewitz. Failure to recognize the nature of this war and to identify the forces waging it is manifest in a lack of coherent national policy and strategy for dealing with what most current public opinion polls reflect as the nation's number one problem--rampant drug use. Moreover, this failure has relegated one of the war's most potentially potent forces, the military, to a "support and follow" role. The second undertaking must be to determine what policies and strategies must exist in order for the military to make a major contribution towards winning the "War On Drugs". This chapter will address these issues. It will also examine the criteria needed for successful employment of U.S. military forces, including interdepartmental coordination, training, rules of engagement and readiness implications.

ENDNOTES

1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, pp. 88-89.

2. Ronald Reagan, "President's Address On Drug Abuse and Prevention," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, vol 44 no 38 1986, p. 2227.

CHAPTER II

NATURE OF THE DRUG WAR

Is this really a war as depicted by the President? Or was his charge merely rhetoric aimed at generating support for a major social program such as the "War On Poverty"? The drug war is certainly not a war in the classical sense: There has been no formal declaration by Congress; the enemy, for the most part, is unknown to us; and even federal laws limit direct military involvement except in clearly defined instances. The term "war" is elusive, and published military doctrine does little to aid us in grasping the true meaning of the term. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Publication 1, "Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms", Jan 86, does not contain a definition of this widely used term. Clausewitz in opening On War sheds some light on the subject: He asserts that "war is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will"¹. This definition does not sufficiently anticipate a drug war, because war as he views it, requires the act of force, and possibly maximum force, in order to be successful. Clausewitz goes on to state that "to introduce the principle of moderation into the theory of war itself would always lead to logical absurdity"².

It is therefore easy to understand that the term War On Drugs can lead to some critical, but predictable, misunderstandings when the role of the military is considered. If military participation in the war on drugs is premised upon traditional expectations from the military in a conventional war, then we

will most assuredly repeat the failures of the Viet Nam conflict. We will not engage in decisive battles which can bring victory. We will not engage a foreign government who will concede when overwhelmed with our military strength. Nor is there even an ideology against which we can marshal public opinion.

Yet the War On Drugs, though not a conventional war, certainly involves the conflicting interests of nations, governments and individuals, therefore qualifying itself as a low intensity conflict (LIC). In his 1988 military preparedness report to Congress, the President categorized the military involvement in drug interdiction as low intensity conflict, thus linking the military role in drug interdiction operations to low intensity conflict. ³ FM 100-20/AFM 2-XY (final draft, June 1988), defines LIC as "a political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states". ⁴ The draft manual continues by maintaining that LIC is conducted by employing a mix of political, economic, informational and military instruments of power. It may involve protracted struggles of competing interests. Surely this definition of war most closely anticipates the "War On Drugs." Future supporting military operations must be conceived then in terms of LIC.

But current doctrine falls short of fully recognizing counter-drug operations, or support of civil authorities in this role, as a valid LIC operational category. The definition of LIC has expanded in recent years to include nearly all conflict short

of full scale war in an effort to adapt military art to a proper role in current world events. These definitions have also become much more precise in separating LIC actions from conventional war and in defining the activities which comprise LIC. Numerous contemporary writers have defined LIC, but little has evolved to support this new addition to the spectrum of conflict. Draft FM 100-20/AFM 2-XY describes military support to civil authorities while in the conduct of "certain types of drug interdiction operations" as an element of peacetime contingency operations, which is, of course, a LIC operational category⁵. This definition is incomplete, however, for it fails to include other elements of national power which might also be included in a coordinated effort to limit or eliminate the available supply of illicit drugs. Such an effort could include the full range of socio-psychological, economic, political, and military actions, to include use of force, short of conventional war.

Political and diplomatic leadership, or as described in draft FM 100-20/AFM 2-XY as political dominance, is essential if the war on drugs is to be effectively waged in close coordination with legitimate governments of countries involved with drug trafficking and narco-terrorism. In recent years, the U.S. policy towards the Americas, which includes many of the drug producing nations, has evolved from that of emphasis on human rights to the "four Ds"-democracy, development, defense, and dialogue. This policy calls for support of morally legitimate nations in this hemisphere who would look to the U.S. as an

a sample of democratic success. The war on drugs programs must clearly support U.S. regional political objectives and must be coordinated across the various agencies who are charged with execution of U.S. foreign policy. Although it is important for military leaders to comprehend the political objectives of any war, it will be absolutely essential that the U.S. political objectives in the Americas be fully taken into account while planning and executing counter-drug operations in that area. So acknowledgment of the political dominance imperative by both the military and law enforcement agencies will bolster the U.S. position in this conflict and enhance unity of effort in the war on drugs.

This need for unity of effort in the drug war is well known. It was addressed by Congress in the 1988 Omnibus Drug legislation which established the "drug czar" cabinet post.⁶ Likewise, the 1988 Defense Authorization Act assigned the military the command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) role.⁷ As early as 1983, the GAO pointed out the need for strong central oversight in drug interdiction efforts, highlighting several poorly planned and coordinated projects that did not make the most of military resources due to poor inter-agency coordination.⁸ Much remains to be done with respect to building unity of effort, specifically inter-agency sharing of intelligence, and coordination of other activities which support the war on drugs.

Certainly, this will not be business as usual for the military. Great adaptability and flexibility on the part of the military, will be needed in modifying and developing new structures and tactics to deal with highly imaginative and adaptive drug-smugglers. It will likely be a protracted war, as is often true with low intensity conflicts. Therefore we have ample opportunity to examine the threat, and to assess, program and resource military needs to deal with it. This is a slow methodical task for the military; however, we must recognize the ability of drug-producers and traffickers to quickly change supply routes, production and delivery methods, using their own informal intelligence sources. Thus the U.S. must be capable of operating within the decision cycle of those who would choose to produce and traffic in illicit drugs.

Legitimacy in the war on drugs resides not so much in the acceptance of the right of a government to govern its constituency, as would be the case in an insurgency situation. Rather, the propriety of the war will be determined by perception of the moral rightness of the U.S. to combat illegal drug use and all that is associated with it. It will be essential for the U.S. and, in particular, the military to achieve "moral ascendancy" over drug producers and governments who support them in the drug war. So the American public and the majority of world governments must readily perceive that the "moral high road" is taken by those nations who refuse to condone drug trafficking and that "good" is destined to prevail over "evil" in

this situation. A nation that continues to allow, or even covertly supports drug traffickers, must be perceived as lacking moral rightness and be so targeted in world opinion. It should be the intent of the military leaders to portray the military role in the drug war as an essential means by which the U.S. will achieve moral ascendancy over those dealing in illicit drugs. This must be achieved by careful, wise use of the press and media to present the military story and by denying our opponents this opportunity when possible.

The war on drugs is likely to become the most protracted conflict this nation has become involved in. While drug use has been a growing social problem for more than 20 years, it is only in the past eight or nine years that it has been addressed at the federal level and only two years since declared as a threat to national security by the President. As is true with most low intensity conflicts, it is difficult to determine exactly when the conflict began, and it will be equally difficult to recognize when it is ending, or more importantly, when it is being won or lost. History has shown that it is difficult to maintain public support for extended conflicts. Colonel Harry G. Summers in On Strategy, A Critical Assessment of the Vietnam War states that "the failure to invoke the national will was one of the major failures of the Vietnam War".⁹ Patience will be essential to military leaders as they pursue long-term programs with few short-term payoffs and to the public who will be asked to support a little understood long-lasting war. Unless we invoke the national will for the war on drugs, we are destined for strategic

failure. Later in this chapter, "The Media and the War On Drugs Campaign" will outline why and how this is to be accomplished.

Current U.S. drug interdiction and eradication policies are directed at the competing interests of the U.S. government whose objective is to be comprised of a drug-free society, and those of drug traffickers whose motives are economic or perhaps even ideological. There is even some evidence linking international terrorism and international drug-trafficking, thus involving governments and groups not previously associated in drug-trafficking.¹⁰

Drug traffickers have even resorted to terroristic activities such as ransoming hostages for release of U.S. jailed drug kingpins. News reports indicate that two U.S. missionaries in Columbia were recently taken hostage by drug traffickers who offered to exchange them for release of Carlos Lehder Rivas, an extradited and convicted Colombian drug kingpin who had been sentenced to life without parole in the U.S.¹¹ Unless these threats are dealt with in a manner consistent with that used in other terrorist activities, including state supported terrorism, our ability to limit the supply of available illicit drugs and to deal with traffickers will be rendered ineffective.

Past drug interdiction and eradication operations have involved the full spectrum of available instruments of power, to include military capabilities, which are directed at the ends of

achieving a drug-free society. It should come as no surprise then, that as the "War On Drugs" expands, because of either increased drug demand or failed policies and strategies, that the military role would grow accordingly. After all, this is low intensity conflict. A significant danger of this conflict is that this nation's security will be at risk from interests outside our borders, be they economic, ideological or political, or a combination. The economic and social implications of widespread drug use by our society are staggering. The evolving strategies for combating a significant part of the drug war, that of interdiction and eradication, is increasingly involving the ways and means of low intensity conflict to achieve the desired ends. This then portends of military involvement in a more than minor support role.

ENDNOTES

1. von Clausewitz, p. 75.
2. Ibid., p. 76.
3. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, p. 34.
4. U.S. Army, and U.S. Air Force. FM 100-20/AFM 2-XY (Final Draft) 24 June, 1988, p. 1-1.
5. Ibid., p. 5-15.
6. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Law and Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative Law, Anti-Drug Act of 1988, p. 124.
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8. U.S. General Accounting Office, Federal Drug Interdiction Efforts Need Strong Central Oversight, p. 73.

9. Harry G. Summers, On Strategy, A Critical Assessment of the Vietnam War, p. 19.

10. Ehrenfeld, Rachel. "Narco-Terrorism and the Cuban Connection," Strategic Review, summer 1988, p. 55.

11. "Two Missionaries Held by Drug Traffickers," The Patriot, Harrisburg, Pa., 6 Jan, 1989, p. A8.

CHAPTER III

ROLE OF THE MILITARY

The role of the military in the drug war has been primarily to support civilian agencies, as has been Congressionally mandated by the 1986 Anti-Drug Act, which broadened the legal basis for military support of the drug interdiction program. This support has been provided on a case by case basis, rather than through adherence to a comprehensive strategy based on a clear, purposeful national policy, executed under centralized leadership. DoD has been fully committed to providing personnel and equipment, usually on a reimbursable basis, and only if requested. GAO reports to Congress concerning the adequacy of that support have indicated a high level of compliance.¹

Such support has primarily involved loan of radar surveillance aircraft (AWACS and E2-C) or more accurately, use of these aircraft and their crews, and support of the Coast Guard law enforcement detachment (LEDET). The LEDET program places Coast Guard personnel aboard Navy ships to interdict suspected drug traffickers and conduct searches, seizures, and arrests. In 1987, the Navy provided over 2,500 ship days to the LDEC program, which resulted in 20 vessel seizures, 110 arrests and seizure of over 225,000 pounds of marijuana and almost 550 pounds of cocaine seized. AWACS support during the same period involved 591 flying hours, resulting in 6 seizures and 10 arrests. Total cost of this support was estimated to be \$29.6 million.²

The DoD is providing considerably more support to the drug war, however. Operation "Blast Furnace" provides a single, well publicized example of direct action. In this operation, U.S. Forces participated in interdiction and eradication operations on foreign soil, with mixed results. ³ Other support is being provided, such as equipment loans and transfers of excess equipment to the DEA, Coast Guard, Customs, and civilian police agencies. The CINC, United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) also provides training support to governments of Central and South American countries with mobile training teams (MTTs), provided through the Military Assistance Group Commander. The National Guard has also played an important role in border interdiction operations with operations such as "Operation Autumn Harvest" during which National Guard personnel and equipment were used to detect and track drug smuggling aircraft attempting to cross U.S. borders.

But three persistent issues constrain both the level and the nature of support provided by the military: the DoD imposed requirement for equivalent training, restrictions on readiness impact, and statutory restraints imposed by the Posse Comatitus Act. Each request involving participation of military personnel must provide training in tasks that are applicable to those skills required in combat. While not placing a tremendous limitation on military support, this constraint prevents loan of military personnel to civilian police agencies. DoD Directive 525.5 states that no support will be provided to any law

enforcement official, if that support would adversely affect military preparedness. It is not difficult to imagine that almost any level of support, either personnel or equipment, could conceivably impact military readiness to some degree. However this stipulation in itself had not been a major constraint to providing support. The Fosse Comitatus Act, as amended in 1981, permits military assistance in drug interdiction operations, but prohibits direct involvement in searches, seizures and arrests. It is clear from both the applicable laws and the sense of Congress, that there can be no active military involvement within the U.S. borders and that military activities outside the borders are limited. Without doubt, soldiers can't make arrests. Although Congress has relaxed the laws limiting military support to civilian agencies, there is still considerable reluctance to permit the military to conduct police type activities, even outside the U.S. borders.

National Guard personnel and units who operate under state control and state laws do however have ample authority to conduct interdiction operations not only in their home state, but in any state if approved by both governors. The Missouri National Guard carried out "Operation Autumn Harvest" in coordination with Customs in Arizona in Sept 1987 as an example of this type of operation.

The previously mentioned FY 89 Defense Authorization Act considerably broadened the role of the military in interdiction operations. This act assigned DoD responsibility to serve as the

single lead agency of the Federal government for detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States, and to integrate U.S. command, control, communications and technical intelligence assets dedicated to drug interdiction into an effective communications network. The DoD will also approve and fund state governors' plans for expanded use of the National Guard in support of drug enforcement activities while in State Status under Title 32.

DoD policy guidelines for implementation of the FY 89 Defense Authorization Act, recently prepared by the Secretary of Defense, reflect the increased role of the military. But most importantly, the guidelines define the extent of the leadership role to be exercised by the DoD. While legislation has mandated a leadership role as previously indicated, the policy guidelines continue to reflect the role of support in those areas. While these guidelines have not yet been published, it is interesting to note the care and caution with which the DoD moves towards a leadership role in interdiction and other counter-drug programs.

ENDNOTES

1. U.S. Government Accounting Office, Military Assistance For Anti-Drug Agencies, Report to Congress, December 1987, p. 4.

2. U.S. Government Accounting Office, Issues Surrounding Increased Use of the Military in Drug Interdiction, Report to Congress, pp. 28-29.

3. Michael H. Abbot, COL, "U.S. Army Involvement in Counterdrug Operations: A Matter of Politics or National Security", Parameters, US War College Quarterly, Dec 1988.

4. U.S. Government Accounting Office, Operation Autumn Harvest: A National Guard-Customs Anti-Smuggling Effort, Report to Congress, June 1987.

5. William H. Taft, U.S. Department of Defense letter to CJCS, "Policy Guidelines for Implementation of FY 89 Congressionally-Mandated DoD Counter-Drug Responsibilities", 6 Jan 1989.

CHAPTER IV
FUTURE ROLE OF THE MILITARY

U.S. vital interests will, of course, dictate any future changes to military roles in the war on drugs. Recent developments in nuclear arms reduction negotiations and the potential for similar reductions in conventional arms will almost certainly change the level of U.S. defense commitments overseas. Whether or not this and the actions of narco-terrorists, results in renewed emphasis on physical security of the U.S. homeland, given that no new threats to national security develop, remains to be seen. Robert H. Kupperman and William J. Taylor, Jr, in their book Strategic Requirements for the Army to the Year 2000, establish that U.S. vital interests in the Americas will include the ability to maintain key strategic posts, regulate maritime chokepoints in and out of the Caribbean and maintain control over the North Atlantic. They cite uncertain conditions in many regions of the Third World as a fundamental challenge to U.S. interests in the Americas. ¹ The capabilities of drug traffickers and narco-terrorists to influence and disrupt governments such as has recently occurred in Panama and Colombia will almost certainly continue to add to these uncertain conditions in the coming years.

The threat to the U.S. national security posed not only by drug use and illicit drug trafficking but also by the instability to the governments who involve themselves in drug trafficking and transshipping will become one of the top challenges for the

military. The challenge will be to determine the proper military role and the correct mix of other elements of national power in responding to such challenges--given the legal, political, and traditional constraints inherent to LIC.

Several assumptions are relevant to consideration of future military roles for responding to the challenges of Narco-terrorism and drug trafficking. These assumptions, if sound, will define the role of the military in the war on drugs as we enter the 21st century.

1. Congress will continue to mandate increases in the military role in counter-drug operations as long as current drug use and terrorism trends continue. These increases will likely continue on a piecemeal basis.

2. Civilian state, federal, and local enforcement agencies will increasingly look to the military for assistance, not only in the traditional areas of support, but in new areas as well.

3. Total military force levels will not increase, and may actually be reduced as a result of budget constraints and conventional arms negotiations.

4. Worldwide military commitments, other than NATO, will not be reduced substantially.

The FY 89 Defense Authorization Act added significantly to the DoD counter-drug role by designating DoD as the lead federal agency for detection and monitoring both aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States, and for integration of U.S. command and control, communications and technical intelligence assets dedicated to drug interdiction. These added

responsibilities draw the military deeper into the war on drugs by assigning some leadership roles, although the Justice Department remains the most influential federal agency in this area. The creation of a cabinet level "drug czar" (1988 Omnibus Drug Law) will provide much needed centralized policy making and control over counter-drug operations, both domestically, and outside the U.S. borders. It would be reasonable to expect that a result of these two acts, (drug czar, and DoD C3I), policy and strategy coordination, as well as unity of command will improve significantly.

Given the emerging realization that the supply-side of the drug war is in fact a low intensity conflict, the ways and means of dealing with the threats imposed by this problem will increasingly be shaped by the imperatives of LIC. These imperatives, which are set forth in FM 100-20/AFM 2-XY, call for political dominance, unity of effort, adaptability, legitimacy and patience. They are equally applicable, to combating narco-terrorism, planning and executing peacetime contingency operations, or carrying out the drug detection and interdiction role.²

CAMPAIGN FOR SUCCESS

The aim of the defense must embody the idea of waiting. The idea implies that the situation may improve, gaining time is the only way [the defender] can achieve his aim. 3/

von Clausewitz

The current military roles of interdiction support and CBI will continue to be important to the war on drugs. However other, more decisive programs must evolve in the war on drugs if we are to win. Interdiction, which has been the centerpiece of drug supply war is by its nature defensive. But wars are not won on the defensive. An important purpose of the defense, according to Clausewitz, is to gain time until more favorable conditions exist in which to launch decisive offensive actions. There is ample evidence to question the effectiveness of drug interdiction, as it is currently being conducted. This will be discussed in depth later in the chapter. The drug war is complex. Consequently, it must be conducted with all available resources, using a coordinated campaign plan that addresses all the conditions necessary to achieve the desired strategic goal of a drug-free America. This campaign plan should apply needed resources at the drug-producer's and trafficker's center of gravity, which is quick economic profit at minimum risk.

For instance, if the Colombian drug farmer finds it just as profitable to produce alternative crops at less risk, he will do so. If the drug producer finds a greatly reduced supply of coca

leaves at higher prices and if he loses governmental "support" (non-interference with his activities), he may well move to a more productive line of work. If the drug smuggler suffers unacceptable transit losses due to effective interdiction, combined with a reduced volume of traffic due to decreased domestic demand, he will become extinct. Thus, the next step in planning the campaign will be to establish the sequence of actions necessary to produce these economic conditions, and then apply the correct mix of military and other resources to produce the desired conditions.

The supply-side drug war campaign, of course, cannot be completely defined in military terms alone, as is true with any low intensity conflict. It calls for a series of interagency, joint and combined actions, designed to obtain the desired strategic objectives. Many agencies will play important and perhaps decisive roles in this campaign besides the military. But the military role will be crucial, and significantly beyond providing support for civilian agencies, as is the current policy. This role will include civil military operations (CMO), security assistance programs, continued support to civil authorities, and possibly unconventional warfare (UW) direct action options. Even so, the military will not be the primary player in the campaign, which will also include a full range of complementary socio-psychological, economic, and political efforts, all directed at the same strategic aim.

CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS

Civil military operations (CMO), encompass civic action programs which provide for the needs of the population of drug producing nations by providing local security, separating drug producers from the populace, and providing crop substitution programs. Psychological operations (PSYOPs), and public information programs, aimed at providing information to mobilize public support for other counter-drug programs, will also play an important role in CMOs. While many drug producing governments will not be receptive to U.S. conducted CMOs, there are nations in which programs are currently being conducted that will serve as excellent models in the future, if resourced for success now. Ironically, past Congressional actions have been directed at imposing economic sanctions against drug-producing nations that fail to demonstrate sufficient progress towards limiting drug exportation. Limiting the amount of assistance provided to a drug-producing nation is potentially counter-productive, since the sanction serves to limit the resources aimed directly at reducing the supply of illicit drugs. Section 2005 of the 1986 Anti-Drug Act specifies that 50 percent of U.S. assistance allocated for any country determined to be a major drug producing country will be withheld from obligation and authority.⁴ The Administration has been slow to decertify governments as long as some progress is shown, but this serves as an example of the inconsistent nature and lack of continuity of some U.S. foreign assistance programs, among which CMOs and security assistance programs may be included. The Congressional desire to show

strong resolve in dealing with drug producing nations must be balanced with the need to support and provide continuity to long-term payoff foreign assistance programs.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

Our goals in Latin America and the Caribbean are bipartisan. We all want to further democracy, establish the groundwork for renewed prosperity, and defeat antidemocratic insurgents and narcotics traffickers.^{5/}

Elliot Abrams

Security assistance programs can provide a cost effective means of controlling the supply of illicit drugs destined to enter the US by providing this aid through existing channels of support. Various programs which provide security assistance: Foreign Military Sales (FMS), International Military Education and Training (IMET), peacekeeping operations and Economic Support Funds (ESF). These programs are widely perceived as evidence of US commitment to advance the cause of human rights and to encourage the spread of and enhance the stability of democratic governments. These programs have the flexibility, if carefully designed by the host government and the US Country Team, to meet the threat of illicit drugs just as readily as the threat of communist insurgence or any other perceived threat. Of the 18 countries that are the primary sources of illicit drugs entering the US, 15 receive some form of economic, military or other aid from the US. ⁶ The three remaining countries, Iran, Afghanistan, and Laos, are politically inaccessible.

These programs, if properly coordinated, funded and executed, have tremendous potential for providing both the means and will to governments to eradicate and provide substitute crops, as well as providing the capabilities to bring traffickers to justice. Second order affects of foreign assistance directed at drug suppression are equally important. It is impossible to place a value on the expected benefits from the enhanced stability to developing democracies, and increased US influence and credibility in Latin America that will be reaped from consistent, long term aid programs. Much has been accomplished already by USSOUTHCOM in working with host governments and Security Assistance Organizations. General John R. Galvin, when serving as CINCSOUTHCOM, stated that "if properly resourced, it is logical to assume that the military will be asked to respond to the threat presented by drug trafficking." USSOUTHCOM now provides some form of counter-drug assistance in several Central and South American nations, much of which is funded through security assistance programs.

It is noteworthy that security assistance programs to drug producing and transiting nations in South America and the Caribbean have been reduced as a result of budget reductions, while funding for counter-drug interdiction programs has increased dramatically. This has the net effect of chasing an even larger supply of drugs through questionable means. However as will be shown later in this chapter, interdiction is also an important weapon in the counter-drug program. The following table reflects the administration requested funds for assistance

programs for FY 1987 and 1989. As can be seen, the total request suffered a 45% reduction in just three years. If the counter-drug program is to be effective, foreign assistance and counter-drug specific programs must be coordinated and directed at similar objectives.

Latin America and the Caribbean
FY 1987 and 1989 Foreign Assistance Requests @/
(millions US\$)

(1987/1989)

Country	ESF	DA	MAP	FMS	IMET	Totals
Dom. Rep.	50./25.	28.7/20.3	7.0/2.0	3./0.	.850/.70	89.55/48.0
Jamaica	100./25.	23.0/17.6	8.0/3.5	0./0.	.300/.30	131.3/46.4
Bolivia	20./25.	9.3/22.3	6.0/5.0	0./0.	.400/.40	35.7/52.7
Colombia	0./0.	0./0.	0.0/5.0	0./0.	.950/.95	.950/1.45
Ecuador	15./9.	22.5/16.7	8.0/3.0	0./0.	.650/.65	46.2/29.35
Peru	37./2.	20.0/15.3	20./0.0	5./0.	.850/.56	127.8/17.86
Total:						431.75/195.76

Security Assistance Programs must be coordinated with the efforts of the Justice Department where there is potential for overlap or conflict in drug producing nations. The DEA routinely conducts training and assists with interdiction programs in several South American nations which are also receiving security assistance for counter drug programs. While this in itself may not present problems, the actions of the DEA are more and more taking on the characteristics of military operations, with the DEA using military equipment and assisting para-military and police organizations to destroy drug labs and interdict drug shipments. While it can be effectively argued that DEA

assistance is consistent with support to Third World police agencies, the potential for destructive conflicts with Security Assistance programs increases as the levels of activities increases.

Security Assistance Programs, if part of a comprehensive, well coordinated national policy aimed at eliminating the supply of illicit drugs, will pay dividends in terms of stability and development of drug producing nations as well as enhancement of the image of the US in the Americas. These programs should not however, become billpayers for interdiction programs; rather they should complement the efforts taken by other federal agencies. The Federal Drug Czar must work in close coordination with the State and Justice Departments to insure that Congressional funding requests for counter-drug programs represent the most effective mix of federal programs, given the likelihood of highly constrained budgets in the years to come.

ASSISTANCE TO AGENCIES

Assistance to federal agencies will continue to be the central focus of military involvement in counter-drug operations for the near future, as this is the most visible and also the most likely program to produce immediate, measurable results. This will involve National Guard support of civil agencies in the border protection (see chapter IV) and sea and air detection and interdiction operations. Chapter II has shown that the strategy for the Congressionally mandated military role will necessarily

involve channelizing the flow of illicit drugs for Coast Guard and Customs interdiction at carefully selected choke points. However, for the military to be successful in this mission, several challenges must first be considered and understood by both the military and policy makers.

ENDNOTES

1. Robert H. Kupperman and William J. Taylor Jr., Strategic Requirements for the U.S. Army to the Year 2000, p. 11.
2. FM 100-20/AFM 2-XY, p. 1-8.
3. von Clausewitz, p. 94.
4. "Omnibus Drug Legislation", Congressional Digest, vol 65, November 1986, p. 259.
5. Elliot Abrams, Asst. Sec. of Defense for Inter-American Affairs, statement before the House Appropriations Committee on 18 March, 1986, Department of State Bulletin, July 1986, p. 86.
6. John C. Whitehead, "US International Narcotics Control Programs and Policies," Department of State Bulletin, October 1986, p. 38.
7. Larry Carney, "SOCOM Chief Sees Military Role in Drug War," Army Times, October 13, 1986, p. 4.
8. Elliot Abrams, "FY 1989 Assistance Requests for Latin America and the Caribbean," Department of State Bulletin, July 1986, and October 1987.

CHAPTER V
CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS

Once the true nature of the war is recognized and agreed upon, the role of the military understood, the campaign planning completed, and resources allocated, then we must address a number of remaining concerns. While these issues are not new, they do present unique challenges to military involvement in the drug war. They must be addressed in policy and practice before the military is further committed to this conflict. These concerns address the legal environment in which the military must operate, doctrine and training issues, and need for public support in a protracted conflict. Finally, how will we know when we have won?

QUANTIFYING INTERDICTION: FACT OR HYPE?

There are varying opinions concerning the effectiveness of military support to the interdiction mission. In fact, even the effectiveness of drug interdiction itself has been questioned. Several instances have been cited in which assistance provided to civilian agencies by the DoD was not well coordinated or utilized by those agencies. As a result, valuable military resources were not used to their full advantage and interdiction was less effective than it could have been. Several examples have been cited in a General Accounting Office study, in which E2-C surveillance aircraft support was provided, but Customs intercept aircraft and other assets were not available to conduct searches, seizures and arrests once suspect aircraft were detected.

These and other instances of inefficient use of expensive military equipment cited both by the GAO and a Rand Corporation studies have limited the impact of the support provided.² The purpose of presenting these instances of inefficient use of resources is not to condemn military support of interdiction operations. But this merely suggests that coordination of complex operations, involving multiple agencies, requires strong unity of command and unity of effort, especially if scarce and expensive resources are to be used to maximum advantage.

Quantitative methods of measuring interdiction success are vulnerable to challenge on the basis that they are inaccurate and fail to reflect the actual effectiveness of interdiction operations. Reports prepared by the various agencies involved in drug interdiction generally present statistics reflecting the number of arrests, confiscations of vessels, aircraft, etc, and pounds of illicit drugs seized. Due to the nature of these operations, which are often jointly conducted, involving agents from two or more agencies, double counting of the confiscations and arrests are commonplace. Moreover, while interdiction statistics show marked increases each year, there are few comparisons of this trend with the amount of illicit drugs which escape interdiction and ultimately reach the consumer. Therefore interdiction statistics are of limited value because they are often unintentionally inflated, and they fail to reflect their true impact on the supply of drugs. The Rand Corporation reported in a 1988 study that drugs smuggled into the U.S. have increased at a much greater rate than the quantity of drugs

interdicted, even if the most optimistic interdiction statistics are accepted.

Methods of measuring interdiction success is of vital importance to military leaders because of potential ethical implications, as these statistics are being used in a similar manner to the Viet-Nam "body count". It is commonplace to see interdiction statistics used in newspapers and even government reports, attesting to either the success or lack of success of a particular agency or program. For example, various agencies' data on arrests, seizures and confiscations reported in the 1988 National Drug Policy Board Report to the President for July 1987 to July 1988, if taken in aggregate, represent an overstatement of accomplishments due to double counting.⁴ Continued military involvement in drug interdiction operations must be predicated on the insistence that more realistic measures be adopted for measurement of success or failure.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

On 14 July, 1983, Coast Guard officials aboard the U.S.S. Kidd, a Navy destroyer, sighted a suspicious fishing vessel. After a boarding request was refused, the Coast Guard checked the registry of the vessel. After the registration had been denied by the claimed country of license, the Kidd ordered the vessel to stop. The vessel refused, and the Kidd gave chase after raising the Coast Guard ensign (to signify the ship was on a Coast Guard mission). After firing warning shots and following the vessel

for some time, the Kidd resorted to firing "disabling shots", which finally stopped the vessel. Members of the Coast Guard tactical law enforcement team (TACLET) boarded the vessel, where they found almost 900 bales of marijuana. The boat and contents were seized and the crew members were later prosecuted in civilian court for violation of federal drug laws.

Rules of engagement (ROE) are frequently regarded as providing guidance to the military, who in the performance of their duties must use force to protect their lives. While this is a true perception, ROE for counter-drug operations must be premised on a much broader scope to include instances such as presented above. Yet they must be specific enough to remain within the bounds of international and maritime law requirements, as well as the law of war. ROE govern the actions and provide guidance to the military members in the absence of higher command authority. In a sense, ROE provide for an orderly transition from peacetime conditions to combat or crisis, providing graduated, clearly defined levels of escalation as a response to any anticipated action taken by an opponent.

Peacetime ROE developed by CINCs and subordinate commanders must conform to JCS guidance. There are a number of JCS publications providing peacetime ROE guidance, and all additions or modifications must be submitted to the JCS in standardized format for approval. The emphasis for peacetime ROE is standardization. Pursuant to this, the JCS publishes basic

peacetime ROE by classified memorandum for use by CINCs, sub-unified commanders and Joint Task Force (JTF) commanders, as a basis for preparation of each command's ROE. Peacetime ROE may apply to an entire CINC area of responsibility or to a specific operation. They may be as complex or as simple as required for the given situation. It should be no surprise that ROE for a Navy fighter aircraft crew stationed in the Mediterranean Sea would differ significantly from those used by an SOF country team operating in Central America. However, there are a number of common characteristics to all peacetime ROE:

- Inherent right to individual or unit self-defense.
- Application only to peacetime and conditions short of war only.
- Provision of flexibility for commanders or individuals to respond to a crisis.
- Limitation of scope of conflict to discourage or control escalation (minimum force and proportionality concept)
- Compliance with all applicable law.
- Recognition of political objectives and constraints.
- Usually classified.

There is no single document which provides all the needed guidance for preparation of peacetime ROE. Even the above common characteristics have been derived from a variety of both military and non-military documents. So obviously ROE preparation is a complex process, the result of which is, or should be, the subject of review by competent legal authority, both during and after preparation.

Peacetime ROE for counter-drug operations are potentially even more complex in the sense that the list of applicable laws and interested or involved agencies and governments will expand dramatically. Consider the above example of the U.S.S. Kidd, which occurred in 1983 in international waters. What if the suspect boat entered the U.S. territorial 12 mile limit after warning shots were fired, but prior to the firing of disabling shots? Did the Navy ship have legal authority to conduct hot pursuit operations in U.S. waters? Would Posse Comitatus law have prevented further pursuit? These are but a few of the considerations for development of counter-drug ROE that must be taken into account by military commanders who become involved in these operations. Some JCS and DoD guidance has been provided but little has been written to date that will provide detailed guidance under the multitude of potential situations in which counter-drug aircrews, special operations and Reserve Component forces are increasingly becoming involved.

The following issues serve to influence counter-drug ROE beyond the common ROE characteristics listed above:

- Consideration of numerous host country laws.
- Counter-drug operations routinely transcend CINC areas of responsibility.
- The requirement for interoperability with numerous federal, state and local law enforcement agencies.
- DoD drug interdiction policy.
- Domestic U.S. drug laws.

There are at least eight Central or South American and Caribbean drug producing or transiting nations, several of which U.S. forces operate within while involved in counter-drug operations while serving with mobile training teams (MTT). These forces, whose primary duties are often not related to counter-drug operations, have operated with country-specific ROE for years, however, adjustments must be made to take account for the need for interoperability with other federal agencies, as was the case with operation "Blast Furnace" in 1986. The JCS should publish general ROE guidelines for counter-drug operations in foreign countries, considering not only the interoperability requirements but other issues suggested above.

The importance of ROE for counter-drug operations cannot be overemphasized, for ROE keep the military within the bounds of the law and national policy, enabling us to achieve moral ascendancy over those who chose to profit from the production and sale of illicit drugs.

DOCTRINE FOR COUNTER-DRUG OPERATIONS

Whether or not one subscribes to the concept that military involvement in the drug war conforms with any readily available definition of LIC may be irrelevant. The strategy (ways) and ends (objective) are being set by policy makers. So like it or not, we are increasingly finding ourselves used as the means. We need to assess our ability to conduct this mission and get on with it. John M. Gates, in a recent article in "Military Review",


"The Humpty Dumpty Approach to Doctrine Development", states that the terms of LIC and military operations short of war sometimes provide a distorted view of contemporary conflict. Both terms seem to be based on the premise that military operations are not really war if called something else. The terms specify what policy makers want them to be, but they do not define the real environment in which the U.S. military must operate. The warning should be clear here: the fact that the DEA is being used in direct actions against drug producers in foreign nations, using military equipment and tactics, does not lessen the truth that this is LIC. Placing these operations under the realm of police business makes no more sense than calling the Korean War a police action.

Earlier in this chapter I noted that much of what we are now doing to combat drug producers and traffickers, and much of what we are likely to do in the future, resembles LIC in a number of very important ways. Current doctrinal publications provide little specific guidance for organizing, training and conducting counter-drug operations. But does this mean we should add a chapter to FM 100-20 or throw away FM 100-5? Probably not. The military is being enlisted in this war for only one or both of two widely touted reasons: first, we have the means now to make a difference; second, our involvement may be as much an act of political frustration as of strategic acumen.

Little vision has surfaced about the direction the military may be headed in this war. This is due in part to the piecemeal development of national strategy to deal with the problem as well as to reluctance on the part of many in the military to again become involved in a conflict lacking clear objectives that can be readily translated into military terms. But, by looking at the problem through the "looking glasses" of LIC imperatives, the objectives (ends) compare favorably with the available military means.

We do not need totally new doctrine to fight this war. What we do need is to utilize existing doctrine, and ensure that it is adapted for future combat development implications. For now, however, the terms initiative, agility, depth and synchronization have just as much meaning in this conflict as in a heavy forces battle in the "Fulda gap". Much has already been said in this chapter concerning the need for improved interoperability and coordination, so perhaps synchronization is an interchangeable term in this instance. To carry the analogy even further, perhaps agility and adaptability have similar implications especially in view of the requirement for mental flexibility, a term which FM 100-5 indicates is a key ingredient of agility. If the military involvement in the drug war is not LIC, but merely support of civilian police agencies as a peacetime contingency, as has often been stated, then there is certainly little need for doctrinal reviews. This would merely call for development of sufficiently detailed operations plans, as was done in response to the civil disturbance threats of the 1960s.

Future DoD studies of the problem of the drug war should draw on the TRADOC Problem Solving Model, or some similar model, as depicted in the figure below, in an effort to determine needed doctrine, training, equipment and force structure.



The problem of how to best apply the military element of national power to reduction of the supply of drugs should begin with a thorough analysis of the threat. Who are drug traffickers? What motivates them? What if any, is their center of gravity? This analysis will necessarily examine the legal framework and political constraints under which the military must work.

The technical assessment will examine both available and needed technologies for the conduct of the mission. It is this area that shows the greatest promise for the recently acquired C3I mission. Improvements in C3I technology promise to increase the effectiveness of interdiction in this economy of force operation. Concerns that classified military technologies may be jeopardized in the judicial process should not be a major constraint, but legislative protection may become necessary if these technologies are so threatened.

Concept alternatives must be developed jointly and in coordination with other federal agencies involved in the war on drugs. This will provide the basis for force structure requirements and determine resource constraints and risks associated with each concept. Operations and Organization Plans will evolve from these concepts, with testing, evaluation and analysis also being conducted jointly. The implementation process will produce any needed doctrinal changes, and set requirements for equipment, training and force structure changes. As is the case with Joint Doctrine, proponentcy for this process will likely be assigned to a single service.

While this model may provide an overly complex and time consuming approach to a relatively small addition to the military role, it emphasizes the need for thorough analysis and study of the problem before additional resources are committed. The final

product must ensure the correct force structure and doctrine to support national strategy in the war on drugs.

FORCE_READINESS_IMPLICATIONS

The successful execution of any strategy depends upon the availability of adequate resources. This means that we must not adopt strategies that our country cannot afford; and our diplomats and military leaders must not base their plans on resources that are beyond the nation's capability to provide.

9

President Reagan

Does military support of the drug war adversely affect military readiness? If so what are the risks? Can they be reasonably overcome? The above quote from the 1988 U.S. National Security Strategy Statement implies that ways must always be consistent with the means at hand. The quote serves not only as a warning to policy makers, but the President's statement continues by reminding Congressional leaders that they must provide the resources necessary to implement a realistic, prudent and effective National Security Strategy. To date, this resourcing has been barely adequate for the limited mission given to the military. But any growth in the military's role towards that envisioned in this paper, or as periodically debated in Congress, must be adequately resourced. Otherwise, military readiness will certainly suffer.

While the military has devoted considerable resources to the drug war, the costs have actually been extremely small in

relationship to the overall defense budget. Congressional appropriations for interdiction support in the FY 86 Defense Authorization Act was approximately \$213 million for equipment purchases,¹⁰ and increased to \$300 million in the FY 89 Defense Act,¹¹ with prospects for some future growth. The above amounts however, are far from the total DoD expenditure in the war on drugs. Support to civilian police agencies is reimbursable, unless it directly relates to military training tasks otherwise referred to as substantially equivalent training. Support provided under the provisions of the 1986 Anti-Drug Act involve loan of expensive aircraft, boats radars and crews, which also play a key role in other defense missions. They must be diverted or shared to provide the mandated support.

DoD response to increased Congressional pressure to do more to combat drugs has generally taken the form of carefully worded statements of concern about potential military readiness costs if the military role is increased. A DoD press release in response to 1988 Congressional debate to direct the military to "seal the borders" estimated that, "a massive shift of the military to drug interdiction would require 90 infantry battalions, 50 helicopter companies, 54,000 Army troops and 110 AWACS aircraft."¹² A military commitment of this magnitude would indeed have significant negative impact upon the capability of the military to perform its other worldwide missions. However, sealing the borders isn't the mission. The mission is of course smaller, as discussed in the first three chapters of this paper. But it is being incrementally increased by Congress each year as the war on

drugs continues and as the Administration's drug policies evolve. In some ways, we are echoing our experiences in Southeast Asia 25 years ago, and we should not be destined to repeat those mistakes.

Both the 1986 Omnibus Drug Act and DoD regulation 5525.5 prohibit DoD's support of civilian police agencies if the assistance adversely affects readiness. Yet it can be argued that any level of assistance affects military readiness to some extent. However current levels of involvement do not seem to trigger those concerns. Recently published DoD guidelines state that detection and monitoring of illegal drugs into the U.S. is now a part of the DoD's national defense mission; Thus it may be provided without adherence to the "substantially equivalent training" requirement. The policy statement continues by stating that other support may be provided as long as readiness is not adversely affected.¹³ This statement implies that as long as Congressionally mandated support requirements are not exceeded, readiness is not an issue requiring further DoD guidance. Military leaders' concerns may be well founded however, particularly if the role were to be expanded to the levels envisioned by Congress in 1986 and again in 1989. It would be difficult for the Soviet Union to devise a competitive strategy more capable of influencing the U.S. to divert larger amounts of defense resources away from key NATO defense commitments, than that of massive military support of the drug war.

Any significant military involvement in this conflict must be consistent with U.S. vital interests; then it should be planned, programmed and resourced as indicated in the President's report to Congress on National Security Strategy. Protection of the U.S. physical homeland is a keystone to national security. This implies the necessity to defend, by military means if necessary, this and other interests vital to the continued well-being of the U.S. The menace of drugs to the continued well-being of the U.S. and other democratic nations is both real and increasing, but it can be defeated if the strategy and commitment of resources are adequate. On the other hand, there is a danger of the U.S. overextending itself through a poorly resourced commitment of the military.

THE MEDIA AND THE WAR ON DRUGS CAMPAIGN

War requires for its successful pursuit the mobilization of a moral consensus of the legitimacy of both the objectives of violence and the means by which these objectives are pursued. The maintenance of that consensus is one of the key objectives of national strategy, in both a political and a military sense, for when it fails, the war is lost.14/

For the military commander, information is a weapon of war. To use a current term, it is a combat multiplier. The more information a commander has about his opponent, his capabilities, disposition and weaknesses, the more effectively he can plan and conduct operations. The same, of course, holds true for denial of similar information from our opponent. One of the commander's most important tasks in campaign planning is to convince his

opponent to accept inaccurate information, thus deception plays a critical role in military strategy. For this reason, a military commander has an interest in accurate information being withheld and, on occasion, inaccurate information being disseminated. This is no surprise however, as security and surprise are principles of war that cannot often be ignored or violated during military conflict without disastrous results.

The news media play an increasingly important and legitimate role in relaying military information from one side of a conflict to the other. One has only to tune his television set to CNN to hear a real-time account of any significant military operation that the U.S. might be involved in on any given day, anywhere in the world. These news accounts nearly always include comments from senior military and political leaders as well as from the "soldier in the foxhole." They are consistently high on emotional content. Coverage of counter-drug operations whether in the forests of Bolivia or the at the U.S./Mexico border, have been no exception to this "instant coverage".

Colonel Michael H. Abbot in a recent Parameters article reporting on the U.S. Army "Operation Blast Furnace" drug raids in Bolivia, stated that "When the C5 with the Blackhawks first landed at Santa Cruz, a small crowd, including representatives of both the U.S. and the Bolivian press, awaited their low key arrival. Who leaked the deployment to the press is not known, but it had a significant effect. The hope of gaining a few days of

surprise operations before the drug infrastructure could figure out how to react to the U.S. military's presence was shattered." Moreover, the article continues to explain that the political costs of the operation were high, since the President of Bolivia received heavy criticism within his own country for having allowed foreign military forces to conduct operations against Bolivian citizens.¹⁵ A senior DoD official has stated that future operations such as "Operation Blast Furnace" would never again be possible, because of the inevitable publicity and political impact.¹⁶ The role played by the news media's coverage of this and other counter-drug operations will play a crucial role in future strategy for counter-drug operations.

This coverage is increasingly of prime importance not only in setting the public agenda but also in determining public attitudes and opinions and influencing, directly and indirectly, the decision making process. Public attitudes, or national will, have a profound impact on strategy formulation. Ultimately they may determine whether we win or lose the war. As we have noted, Colonel Summers attributes our failure in Vietnam to a collapse in the national will.¹⁷ For without national will, it is impossible to conduct a long war, particularly if it is an undeclared war, as was true with the Vietnam war, and is likely to be the case with the war on drugs. Chapter One, of this paper declares that there must be a reasonable degree of assurance the military will have the support of the American people to eliminate or reduce drug abuse by active military intervention. This principle was true on 20 Jan 1973, at the conclusion of the

Vietnam War, and it is equally true now as the US military becomes involved in the "War On Drugs".

Earlier in this chapter, the requirement for "moral ascendancy" in the war on drugs was discussed. Without the perception on the part of the US public, foreign nations, and even drug producers of the moral rightness of the US actions, we cannot long be successful in this conflict. Every strategy and policy must be weighed against a moral yardstick. If morality is lacking, the strategy must be discarded in favor of a more morally acceptable course of action. The news media is a valuable tool and cannot be overlooked in this effort. It is certain that Colonel Mu'ammara Gadhafi, President Daniel Ortega and Gen Manuel Noriega have not overlooked the finer points of use of the news media to advance their cause into the forum of world opinion. Although these individuals present a poor example of moral rightness, there is perhaps something to be learned from them in the use of the press to achieve political objectives.

What challenges does this present to a political leader or a military CINC who is charged with leading the war on drugs? The greatest challenge perhaps is to control information. Whether this is information regarding operational security or information regarding public diplomacy, or both, the challenge will be to control this flow of information to the best interests of the US. This challenge can be more easily met by learning from past experiences and applying these lessons to present day situations.

Much has been written about US policy in Central America and how this policy has been influenced by journalistic reporting. Eduardo R. Ulibarri has written in the Strategic Review that although US press coverage in Central America has not reflected reality because it tended to focus on US policy rather than on the real and complex issues, it has had played a crucial role in setting the public agenda. ¹⁸ The British Falklands Island Campaign presents contrasting lessons concerning journalist's responsibilities to exercise judgment and restraint in operations security matters as well as the need for responsible planning on the part of the military to insure that the public's need for information is met. Both instances are classical, in the sense that they represent the need for balance between operational concerns and the public's right to information. Lessons learned from these and other events point out the two following public diplomacy imperatives.

-Plan for news media coverage at the national and operational level:

At the national level, set objectives to be accomplished by insightful use of the media. Some federal agencies are more effective than others in this area. The Drug Czar, as a cabinet officer, will be in a unique position to influence public opinion in an area in which the press, except for some excellent efforts by Mrs Reagan, has singlehandedly set the agenda in recent years. The Drug Czar can and must set the moral agenda for the Drug War.

At the operational level, the drug war campaign plan must include the informational media in much the same manner as that

of deception planning. This should not, of course, be a deception plan, or even a part of it. But the point is that the setting of informational objectives is a commander's responsibility. These objectives must be set concurrently with the Concept Plan, and developed as the Campaign Plan evolves. They will specify what information will be released at which level, and when it is to be released. Additionally, campaign planners must anticipate and understand the inevitable presence of news media reporters from the outset of the campaign. They live off information and scavenge for it wherever it might be found. Their reputation depends, in part, on the accuracy of the information they can obtain. As counter-drug operations often occur in remote areas, access and comprehensive coverage by news media will be difficult for them to accomplish at best. The commander will often be faced with decisions concerning limiting access of the media early in the campaign. If he does this, must balance the public's need to know with operations security concerns. It is clearly in the best interests of the US to insure that news media members are afforded access to the information they need, on a timely basis, which is consistent with operations security requirements. But these questions must be considered prior to beginning the campaign.

-Train military leaders to deal effectively with members of the press:

Counter-drug operations are somewhat unique, in that servicemen may routinely be required to operate independently and geographically separated from the chain of command. Leaders can

expect to encounter news media personnel as a normal course of action. If both operations security is to be maintained and the commander's information objectives are to be achieved, he must be properly prepared and trained. The Public Affairs Officer alone cannot be expected to control the flow of information from the area of operations. Most military courses of instruction do not properly prepare leaders in the skills needed to deal with media. Until these training requirements are recognized, commanders must resource, plan and conduct this training for their leaders.

Thus far, it has been shown that legitimacy, and ultimately success, in the war on drugs is greatly dependent upon the mobilization of public support. This can be achieved by insuring that the public receives accurate and timely information that does not jeopardize operational security and yet allows the press to perform its role in obtaining, organizing, and presenting this information in salable form. It is the commander's role to plan the the information campaign that will make information a true combat multiplier in the war on drugs.

ENDNOTES

1. U.S. Government Accounting Office, Federal Drug Interdiction Efforts Need Strong Central Oversight, pp. 86-87.
2. Peter Reuter, and Gordon Crawford, Sealing the Borders: The Effects of Increased Military Participation in Drug Interdiction, p. 47.
3. Ibid., p. 128.
4. U.S. National Drug Policy Board, "Progress Report 1987-1988" p. 39.

5. John P. Coffey, "The Navy's Role in Interdicting Narcotics Traffic: War On Drugs or Ambush on the Constitution?". The Georgetown Law Journal, Aug 1987, p. 1949.

6. The following documents were used in development of the list of 7 ROE characteristics:

U.S. Department of Defense, JCS Pub 12, "Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance for Joint Operations."

U.S. Department of Defense, JCS Memorandum SM-846-88, "Peacetime Rules of Engagement."

Taft letter "Policy Guidance for Implementation of FY 89 Congressionally Mandated Counterdrug Responsibilities", 6 Jan 1989.

CPT Ashley Roach, "Rules of Engagement", Naval War College Review, Jan-Feb 1983.

D.P. O'Connell, The Influence of Law on Seapower.

7. John M. Gates, "The Humpty Dumpty Approach to Doctrine Development," Military Review, May 1988, p. 62.

8. Model was presented by General Maxwell R. Thurman, Cdr, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), during a United States Army War College presentation at Carlisle Barracks on 1 Feb, 1989.

9. National Security Strategy of the United States, p. 37.

10. "Congress Clears Massive Anti-Drug Measure," Congressional Quarterly Almanac, volume XIII, 1986, p. 94.

11. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1989, p. 124.

12. George C. Wilson and Molly Moore, "Pentagon Warns of No-Win Mission," The Washington Post (Washington), 13 May 1988, p.C2.

13. Taft letter, 6 Jan 1989, p. 2.

14. Chaplain (Colonel) Charles F. Kriete, "The Moral Dimension of Strategy," Parameters, US War College Quarterly, vol. VII, No 2, 1977, p. 67.

15. Abbot, Colonel, pp. 102-104.

16. Interview with Giny S. Abrams, Regional Policy Officer, Inter-American Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington D.C., 30 Nov, 1988.

17. Summers, p. 11.

18. Eduardo R. Ulibarri, "Covering Conflict in the Strategic Backyard: US Media and Central America," Strategic Review, Fall

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The war on drugs is unlike any other war this nation has ever been involved in. It is not a war of ideologies or of political domination. But it is a war of wills, with huge economic motivations and underpinnings. This war will not be won by the military alone. But the military is expected to, and must, play a pivotal role in limiting the supply of illicit drugs while allowing social programs to deal with the increasing demand for this clear and undeniable threat to our nation's security.

Before embarking on this conflict with an elusive, ill-defined enemy, it is crucial that our policy makers and military leaders fully understand the true nature of this war. This chapter has shown the similarities of the drug war with Low Intensity Conflict. Many of the elements of national power used in this spectrum of conflict are not only useful, but necessary, in attacking the supply of drugs and those who are connected with it. The military's most effective role in this war will be determined by the needs of LIC, not simply by supporting civil authorities.

There are many concerns and risks at the operational level however, as the military role grows in a piecemeal fashion. Interdiction programs, although absolutely necessary to show the nation's resolve, have limited, measurable effectiveness. We

must not become entangled in the trap that this strategy poses for the military. Our forces lack a comprehensive set of Rules of Engagement which recognize the many complexities of the conflict and permit implementation of national strategies down to the lowest levels. This problem must be addressed now, at a level appropriate with its inter-agency nature. Doctrine and training are adequate for the present, but the system must be sensitized to the unique requirements of the conflict. So doctrine must evolve in anticipation of the threat, not in response to it. All Services should begin analyzing the requirements for resources, in terms of force structure, equipment, and training, posed by the evolution of the military role in the war on drugs. Otherwise, military readiness for other critical world-wide requirements will be jeopardized.

Most importantly perhaps, is the requirement, indeed the imperative, that the national will be mobilized against this enemy. Otherwise we are destined to repeat the mistakes of the past 25 years of US history. Achievement of moral ascendancy over those who choose to produce and deal in illicit drugs will be an essential task for our policy makers if we are ultimately to succeed. We must look to the news media to aid in building our position of moral ascendancy as well as that for building public support for the required drug war programs. We in the military sometimes demonstrate insufficient understanding of the perspective used by the news media when viewing military conflict. We should plan accordingly for this and train to use this powerful force to our advantage in the war on drugs.

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