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OFERATIONAL DECISIONS AND THE INFORMATION EXPLOSION! WHAT ARE THE CRITICAL JOINT WARFIGHTING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CINC?

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAUL F. ROQUES, JR.


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OPERATIONAL DECISIONS AND THE INFORMATION EXPLOSION!
WHAT ARE THE CRITICAL JOINT
WARFIGHTING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CINC?

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Paul F. Roques, Jr., LtCol, USMC

TITLE: Operational Decisions and the Information Explosion!

What are the Critical Joint Warfighting Requirements

for the CINC?

DATE: 31 March 1989 PAGES: CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The information requirements for the operational decision processes of the theater Commanders-in-Chief are a small part of the overall information transfer in the modern world. of the information that he needs is critical to his decision process. Each CINC may have different requirements. requirements of all of the CINCs may, in fact, compete with each other. This paper examines the critical information requirements, discusses various considerations and constraints, and recommends a systematic scheme to assist each CINC to identify his critical requirements. A pilot survey is included along with a proposed implementation plan. results of the surveys could be used by the CINCs, by the Joint Staff and Joint Commands in computer-assisted simulations. Although standardization of requirements may be difficult to achieve, many similarities might be found. may also be able to enhance the ability of the communications systems to ensure the transfer of vital information.

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OPERATIONAL DECISIONS AND THE INFORMATION EXPLOSION! WHAT ARE THE CRITICAL JOINT WARFIGHTING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CINC?

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In his excellent book <u>Command in War</u>, Martin Creveld describes the process of command. Paraphrased, and expressed in a simplified form, this process includes the gathering, storing, and processing of information; estimating the situation; developing alternative courses of action; decision-making; detailed planning; drafting and transmitting orders; executing the plan; and, monitoring. Anticipating the dangers of such an over-simplification, Creveld cautions us that "...in practice, the incoming information is of inconsistent value; 99 percent of it is likely to disappear without a trace, whereas the remaining 1 percent may have a profound effect on operations..." How can we know which 1 percent will profoundly affect operations? How can we ensure the correct 1 percent of information is received; and recognized?

There are many incidents in history where failure to perceive the value of available information resulted in

serious consequences. One such example is the surprise attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor. In her book, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, Roberta Wohlstetter examines the availability of information in Washington and in Hawaii; exploring the perceptions held in both locations by the Navy and the Army. She concludes that "...our decisionmakers had at hand an impressive amount of information on the enemy. They did not have the complete list of targets, since none of the lastminute estimates included Pearl Harbor. They did not know the exact hour and date for opening the attack. but (sic) If we could enumerate accurately the British and Dutch targets and give credence to a Japanese attack against them either on November 30 or December 7, why were we not expecting a specific danger to ourselves?" For a variety of reasons, our leaders did not recognize the signals that were available as indicators of the planned events.

Improvements in organization and structure, multiplied by quantum leaps in technological capabilities to gather information make us many times more vulnerable to this phenomena now than we were in 1941. How can we identify the information critical to our decisions and, then, ensure recognition and processing?

GENERAL

The question under consideration is simple and universal in its application to effective decision-making for

individuals, groups, corporations and military organizations. While each can have vital implications, none may be quite so vital as those concerned with command in wartime.

This paper will focus on information flowing to senior military commanders; specifically to the Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs). Particular attention will be directed to the CINCs of the five designated regional commands, generally referred to in this paper as the Warfighting CINCs. I am primarily concerned with their operational decision-making during periods of war and how they acquire and use the information upon which their decisions are based. Peacetime, crises, and other than warfighting applications require separate analyses.

We need to identify and analyze that information which is critical to the operational decision-making of the Warfighting CINC. There are some efforts underway in this area, but they are not tailored to this specific task. The U.S. Army, for example, in its draft FM 101-5, has developed the Army Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR)⁴. These CCIRs naturally focus on the requirements of the ground combat commander. Moreover, the scope and level of this effort is on Corps and below. While one could anticipate a follow-on effort to capture the requirements of Echelons-Above-Corps, it would not necessarily be applicable to the Warfighting CINC.

The Joint Staff efforts to create a joint reporting structure⁵ are useful in standardizing reports and procedures. This effort could assist the decision process in many instances. Whenever we standardize, however, there is a

tendency to seek the lowest common denominator. In most cases of concern to the Joint Staff, this will be the military information required by the National Command Authority (NCA). While certainly important to the NCA, and probably the CINCs as well, this information may be considerably different from the critical information required by any or all of the Warfighting CINCs in their own decision process. The distinction here is simply to identify critical information which will be required for a CINC to make his operational decision.

The unique and diverse nature of the various regional areas of responsibility may preclude any attempt to standardize critical information requirements across the spectrum of Unified and Specified Commands. The interests of the United States are different in each region. political, geographic, economic, and diplomatic considerations of each region will fluctuate. Alliances within the regions will affect any bilateral agreements with friendly countries. Formal requirements to communicate with regional countries will depend on local circumstances. The resources available to each region are determined by the priorities assigned by the NCA. Needless to say, the threat and capability of our potential adversaries varies by region. Although it may seem obvious, the strategic objectives of the United States, and the ways, means and ends to achieve them will differ from region to region.

Yet, at the same time there seem to be many similarities which would tend to form a common thread of information requirements. Even though the CINCs may rotate from service to service in several key commands, the experience and background of these decision-makers is still similar. The nature of the way the services operate, while different from each other, is similar in each region. The doctrine of employing forces and weapons systems is similar; as are the forces and weapons systems themselves. The process for estimating the strengths and weaknesses of our adversary is similar. The political and economic analysis techniques are also similar. Therefore, while we can expect a distinct set of requirements for each region, they also may have identical requirements at times, or differences which are only subtle in nature.

KEY ROLE OF THE CINC

The vision of how political strategy, national military strategy, and the resulting operational objectives of the campaign are melded within the theater is one of the CINC's most critical functions in command - indeed, it is his source of effectiveness⁶. He might share his vision with some of his closest advisors, but complete understanding is his alone. Only the CINC can recognize which elements of information are most important to the development of his vision and decision-making during war. His staff will try to anticipate the

requirement. They may even be correct, but only the CINC can know for sure. The use of doctrine may assist in development of requirements. But it is the integration by the CINC of many diverse informational factors that completes the process.

This search for critical information requirements is, therefore, aimed at the incumbent active duty Warfighting CINCs; and, to some extent, the CINCs who support them.

Nevertheless, since they have shared the experience of decision-making on the same order of magnitude, retired and former CINCs could be an invaluable source of additional insights and perspectives on the issues. Although some differences between former and incumbent CINCs will probably exist, many requirements would be similar, if not the same.

The differences between the requirements of incumbent and former CINCs could be attributed to a number of variances. Indeed, the requirements of a CINC might even change during his tenure! Regional considerations such as agreements and alliances tend to be dynamic. The nature of the threat might change. An alteration of national strategy could cause a shift in resources available to a region, necessitating new operational objectives. Then, there is always the personal style and complexity of the CINC himself, which might dictate a shift in the range of information required.

In addition to these perceived differences, the techniques used by the CINCs to assimilate information and make decisions deserve a systematic review and analysis to establish potential similarities, congruencies, and

disparities that can affect the overall efficiency of joint operations and the C3I subsystems that support them. Common sense suggests that many of the components of decision-making should be generic.

THE DECISION PROCESS

In his book, <u>The Decision Maker's Handbook</u>, Cornell expands on some previous comparisons of decision-making processes. By examining six different approaches and the specific steps of each in a matrix form, he was able to group them together into common phases. "All the methods start from about the same place in time and nearly all go through most steps even though different descriptions are used." The generic description applied by Cornell included: Problem and/or opportunity identification, formulation phase, search phase, evaluation phase, interpretation phase, and verification phase.

Most decision-making methodologies probably fit into this rough description. The degree to which individuals adhere to the rigorous applications of each phase will most likely differ. Additionally, some individuals will be more logical and systematic at times when other individuals will rely more on intuition. While Cornell's typology is descriptive of the process common to most individuals of comparable experience and education, it is likely to be significantly different in application. As a result, the divergence of theory and

practice could contribute to difficulties in establishing general principles of command decision-making. Moreover, while the subject matter might indeed be very similar for each region, the specific questions, and the way in which they are asked may vary greatly. The source and the time when information is required may also differ, as a function of both the occurrence of the event and the perceived need for that information by the decision-maker.

PURPOSE

Three should result from this research. first is to determine the critical information required to prosecute a joint campaign including the planning for followon operations, new initiatives, and war termination. effort should prove useful to the CINCs by providing results which will forecast their warfighting requirements. The second objective is to develop computer-assisted information flow during simulated joint wargames using the critical information determined for each region. This will result in more realistic and more accurate computer-assisted simulations and better trained CINCs. The third objective is to provide a reference for use in analyzing the information architecture supporting joint operations. We have a good idea of what planners think they want; but not necessarily what they need. If we can do a better job of identifying critical

requirements for operational decision-making we can protect the essential information required for wartime conditions.

SCOPE

The principal effort of this study is aimed at the information critical to the decision process of the Warfighting CINC. What information does he need? How is it provided? Who provides it? If it is available over time, is there an ideal time when it should be provided?

A secondary effort will focus on the interaction of the Warfighting CINC with other providers/recipients of information. To the extent that they are sources affecting information critical to the CINC's operational decision—making. How do they affect factors which may contribute to conflicting informational inputs? For example, does the generation of information by the functional CINCs and component commanders for purposes of fulfilling their own missions and tasks compete with their generation and transfer of timely, critical information for the theater CINC?

ENDNOTES

- 1. Martin Van Creveld, Command in War, Cambridge, Mass., 1985, p. 7.
- 2. Ibid.
- 3. Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: <u>Warning and Decision</u>, Stanford, Calif., pp. 386,7.
- 4. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, Washington, D.C., Draft, Appendix C.
- 5. Armed Forces Staff College, AFSC Pub 1, The Joint Staff Officers Guide, Norfolk Va., 1988, p.92.
- 6. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels, Washington, D.C. 1987, p. 8
- 7. Alexander H. Cornell, The Decision-Maker's Handbook, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1980, p. 13.
- 8. Ibid., p. 14.

CHAPTER II

DISCUSSION

GENERAL

Like his predecessors, today's Warfighting CINC has an abundance of information available to him; perhaps an overabundance. He receives this information from a variety of sources. Some information is provided on request; other information is force fed. Whether pushed or pulled, the information originates from a variety of sources.

A vertical linkage up exists to permit the national command authority (NCA), the President and the Secretary of Defense, to issue strategic direction or policy guidance. This communication occurs through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff who also monitors the prosecution of campaigns, providing feedback to the NCA.

The functional Unified and Specified CINCs have their own decision-making processes which result in information for the Warfighting CINC. Lateral linkages exist to transfer this information, as well as information from other Department of Defense agencies or other governmental entities.

The component commanders of each Warfighting CINC provide campaign planning functions and execute the Warfighting CINC's decisions. Vertical linkages down exist to transfer

instructions and feed back of information from the CINC to his components.

The major combatant commanders of the components are on the line of battle. Here the execution order gets translated into action. The vertical linkages down are extended to the major combatant commands. While the component may act as a filter, the CINC's guidance still must be passed; and the combatant commander's observations, questions, and assessments should be analyzed, consolidated and forwarded back to the CINC.

COMPLEXITY AND CONFUSION

Thus far, the information transfer picture <u>appears</u> to be straight forward and simple. But this is an illusion. The simple structural lines belie reality.

Each Unified and Specified Command, each Component
Command, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and every agency has its
own organizational mission, objectives, and decision-making
process. In a perfect world, all of the missions and
objectives might be complementary and in "sync" with each
other. In that event, there might be little opportunity for
the priorities of one command to interfere with the priorities
of another command. This is not a perfect world, however.
The natural inter-organizational frictions which arise from
the needs of the supporting CINC competing with the needs of

the supported CINC could inadvertently interfere with the timely flow of critical information.

A variety of sources also produce both raw and processed intelligence and operational information. These sources are full-fledged agencies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency or Central Intelligence Agency. They can also be detachments assigned to a CINC, fusion cells within a component, etc. Needless to say, they produce a lot of information for many different customers. Sometimes the sources agree with each other in their analysis. Sometimes, differing assumptions underlying the analysis lead to different conclusions. Disagreement among intelligence sources dramatically increases uncertainty and brings into question the relevance of information available to the CINC. Frequently, the CINC and his staff are unable to precisely define the intelligence they need. They, then, must sort through the intelligence products using their own cognitive process and analytical abilities to pick out the information essential to their own applications. This process, of course, requires the staffs to have sufficient understanding of what the CINC needs to perform his decision-making in order for them to satisfy his requirements.

INFORMATION AVAILABILITY

A wealth of information exists to provide friendly information reports and data bases. The worldwide military command and control system (WWMCCS) includes remote access to

computer networks with massive data bases. Other national and regional command and control systems provide specific capabilities. Administrative and logistics information systems abound throughout the services. All of these systems provide valuable information on a daily basis, but they also may obscure some key indicators and linkages between information bits.

Twenty or thirty years ago, communications discipline prevented lengthy, verbose messages. The capability to transmit and receive message traffic did not permit the luxury of full and complete expression. In most cases circuit limitations permitted only 75 word per minute teletype operations. As capabilities improved somewhat through the years; so did the quantity and length of messages. Today, the official telecommunication circuits are much more efficient. Unofficial circuits also are common, especially wherever an action officer can hook-up his personal computer and modem to a telephone line. Exercises, particularly over the last ten years, have demonstrated an unmistakable propensity for Warfighting CINCs and their staffs to demand and get more and more information.

The CINC and his staff obviously generate a legitimate demand for information which is useful to the completion of their full range of tasks. The question is how to identify and protect the critical information necessary to ensure it reaches the decision point in a timely fashion during war, when the transmission means will be most vulnerable. It

seems especially true, when the tendency seems to be to generate more information to the command, rather than to tailor the information according to what the command may need. The difficulty is amplified when someone, perhaps the CINC or a member of his staff, generates additional demand for information in an ad hoc search for a previously unidentified element of information that is suddenly considered critical to the decision process.

In practice, the process may be exceptionally complex, blurred beyond recognition. As noted earlier, each CINC is different; so are the members of his staff. Some CINCs may rely heavily on one form or source of information that others do not. Some may rely on multiple forms and sources.

Whatever the CINC uses, he must be cognizant of it himself; and then ensure others understand. For example, a particular CINC may listen carefully to his component commanders, trusting in their judgment and recommendations. But are their perceptions the same? Do the component commanders have the same vision, the insight into the problem that the CINC is using? He must enunciate these elements to those with whom he communicates in his information gathering/decision-making process.

Certainly, the CINC does not (and, can not) personally see all of the information that comes into the command. Much of the material is filtered as the staff sorts through the mounds of information available. Depending on the nature of the information, it may be used, filed, or discarded. This

process is laborious, however, and the discovery of critical information is often serendipitous. Critical information is most susceptible to being especially perishable. It must be received, perceived, identified and processed in time to affect the CINC's decision. Superfluous or routine information must be quickly distinguished from salient, critical information gathering and processing.

INFORMATION OVERLOAD

The issue of information overload is widely accepted as a fundamental problem for individuals in the modern era of civilized development. The assumption is that there is a limit to the amount of information that an individual can process over a specified time period. While this statement appears obvious, clinical research of several well-known psychologists suggests the following inferences. First, people are different and they deal with information needs differently. The ability of individuals to obtain and use information varies with the degree of complex activity that each employs in his integration of information.

"The results of various studies seem to suggest that complex persons exceed simple persons in information transmission or utilization... complex persons search for more novel information, but not for more information in general..."

If a CINC and his staff fit into the category of complex persons, we can assume that they are more capable of discerning relevant information and discarding unimportant

information, as they search for the new and unique. I was not prepared for a finding that indicates the greater ability of complex persons to discern relevancy and integrate information in complex circumstances. However, this does underscore the importance of seeking novel means of identifying the critical requirements and ensuring that the system gets this relevant information to the decision-maker.

Information overload can affect the weakest link - the chain of information processing. My personal observation from an exercise several years ago is indicative of the problem. The complaint was a 600 message backlog on a particular circuit. All messages were immediate or flash precedence. There was only one circuit, one terminal; and, further investigation revealed, one analyst to process those messages. Without question, the transmission paths were inadequate to transfer the required information. At the same time, however, I doubt the analyst could have read and integrated the information had he received it. Despite the greater capabilities of the CINCs and their staffs to process, discern, and integrate relevant information, at some point the quantity of information can bog down the transfer of information at an important node in the overall communication network. Critical information, other relevant information, and irrelevant information may not be transmitted beyond this point to the CINCs. As a result, the system must be tailored to segregate critical information for immediate processing,

save other useful information for routine processing, and discard the non-pertinent information.

Other research reveals cultural influences that could mitigate the inherent capabilities of an individual.

"We know (cf. the research of Brock and of Streufert) that information has considerable value in Western society. Even when already too much information is provided for inclusion in a person's information processing activities, he is likely to ask for more information. Rather than selecting the relevant information that is already provided for action, the individual is likely to request additional information and to (try to) utilize the additional information..."

Which traits of an individual will dominate his processing activities are unpredictable without examining and analyzing the individual. Self-awareness and consciousness-raising are important and can help identify personal proclivities. In general, CINCs and their staffs will tend to demand more information than they need or can utilize. While I do not suggest establishing psychological profiles to determine the complexity quotient of our CINCs, I submit that at the systems level there is sufficient justification for assisting the CINCs in defining those elements of information which are critical to his most vital decision-making processes.

TECHNOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

Technology improvements in communications and information processing have vastly increased our capability to process and transfer information. Moreover, it is greatly expanding the

overall capability to access information. A virtual explosion in the availability of computers to staff officers along with the linking of these devices through various types of local and wide area networks is making the transmission of information and ideas quicker and in greater detail. In peacetime, we are limited in the use of this new technology only by the resources available to us and the laws of physics.

In wartime, however, we must factor in the additional constraints caused by physical destruction of facilities, electronic countermeasures, and the basic confusion caused by the turbulence of events. We must expect to lose a great deal of our peacetime capability when we engage in combat. This is not to suggest we shouldn't use what is available to us now. It does require that we identify critical information requirements so that we can ensure the reliability of transferring this information in a timely fashion.

Of course, the resources available to us are finite. We cannot afford to be wasteful. Therefore, we must be cautious in designing command, control, and communications systems. If the information requirements differ by region, CINC, service, etc. then the tendency will be to build systems unique to one's own requirement. These systems are often incompatible in terms of hardware, software and communications security. Interoperability between incompatible systems can be very costly. Interoperability of all systems, i.e. mandating compatibility, may not be feasible with constrained fiscal resources. The answer may lie in the identification of nodes

which require interoperability; and the identification of information critical to decision-making to ensure it goes over those links.

DETERMINING CRITICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

The most difficult aspect of this task is identifying the questions to ask. The answers should come easily if the questions are posed correctly; but, the expertise and experience of the question developer will determine and set the parameters. This factor alone will dictate a role for the CINC to play in accurately defining the questions as well as his requirements. Or that reason, a good starting point might be to develop some generic questions. These questions could then be validated, perhaps initially by former and retired CINC arther refinement could occur through iterative assumption of a survey, with each CINC providing his personal and regional requirements.

An initial assessment of some areas of interest for inclusion in a generic questionaire led to development of the pilot survey contained in Appendix 1. This list does not purport to be all-inclusive; nor will every element be applicable to each CINC. It is, essentially, an analytical hypothesis which has to be validated by those who make the decisions. Additionally, the associated questions of how, who, and when also must be validated.

ALTERNATIVES

So far, I have tried to describe a need for defining the CINC's critical information requirements, and to develop a plan for collecting and using this information. Are there any alternative courses to consider? Obviously, one course that can be easily identified is simply to do nothing. Let the CINC worry about his decisions. This is the least costly of the options; it requires no investment of time, people or money. This option, however, does nothing to reduce the risk of missed opportunities, or worse, of failing to recognize signals of impending danger.

A second option might be to produce a joint version of Appendix C to FM 101-5. Codification of some joint critical information requirements might be useful. However, where the Army effort deals with decision-making on the battlefield, the CINC must integrate elements of information concerning not only the use of military power, but also the political, economic, and informational instruments of power within his region. Development of Joint CCIRs then would require including the breadth of application of national instruments of power as they apply to each region.

The third alternative is to establish an active/proactive, rationalized system for identifying critical information. This system would provide initial assistance to current and former CINCs in identifying their baseline critical information requirements. It would then validate

those requirements through iterative gaming and survey techniques. The disadvantage of this option is in the resources required to implement it. The advantages are multiple.

First, it could be of tremendous assistance to the CINC by providing a method to fully rationalize his critical information requirements. Second, it would create an institutional memory which would permit each new CINC to start from a known knowledge baseline rather than creating it anew each time a CINC changes. Third, the new CINC could easily adjust the baseline to suit his vision, techniques, and changing requirements. And, fourth the staffs, agencies and other commands would be able to easily shift to serve the needs of the new CINC.

If determined to be feasible, measures could be devised which would increase the timeliness and reliability of information transfer. Examples of such measures include placing a critical flag in the message heading or subject line. Critical information could be linked to the message precedence system, obtaining the appropriate priority of transfer. I would strongly endorse a communications innovation permitting the CINC to selectively require that designated elements of critical information be transmitted with a precedence of his choosing rather than that of a sender and his perception of the need and priority.

ENDNOTES

- 1. Streufert, Siegfried; and Streufert, Susan C. Behavior in the Complex Environment, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1978, pp. 59, 60.
- 2. <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 106,7.

CHAPTER III

CONCLUSIONS

We should establish an active system for identifying and analyzing the CINC's critical information requirements.

We should provide assistance to him by framing the problems and issues and by devising a survey instrument which will help him to determine the that, who, how, and when of each of his critical requirements.

We should incorporate those requirements into joint wargames in order to properly train our commanders and staffs in the gathering and processing of information relevant to critical operational decision-making.

We should use these critical requirements to size and protect the minimum essential command, control, communications, and intelligence architecture necessary to prosecute a joint campaign.

With the aim of providing the Warfighting CINC more control over the flow of information into and out of his theater of war, we should conduct further research into: the structure of the process we use to fuse and disseminate information; the procedures employed to establish message precedence; and, the mechanics of the process by which we effect message precedence.

CHAPTER IV

RECOMMENDATIONS

That the Director of Operations, J3 of the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assume sponsorship of a multi-year effort to determine the critical information requirements of the Warfighting CINCs.

That the Director of Command, Control, and Communications Systems, J6, Director of Operational Plans and Interoperability, J7, and the Director of Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments, J8 provide support to the J3 as appropriate in the conduct of this study. Using approved study findings, they should develop and integrate systems architecture and procedures to best serve the needs of the Warfighting CINC. Using the approved study findings again, they should provide the basis and timing of information flow to be used in joint wargaming exercises.

That the U.S. Army War College manage and conduct the study for the JCS J3 using the methodology contained in Appendix 1 and the Plan of Action and Milestones contained in Appendix 2..

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APPENDIX 1

COLLECTING THE CRITICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMETNS

I have attempted to define a method for data collection which provides the least disruption in the functioning of the commands involved. In particular, while the CINC must play the key role, he should not be burdened by the collection effort. Further, I felt that this was an area which had not been explored. For that reason alone, the results must be iterative and validated several times.

War College students provide a source of researchers which is least costly, and serves several purposes. First, they have the talent to do the job correctly. Second, they can learn operational lessons from their effort. Third, they achieve an academic goal in the written and oral presentations. The selection of students should be without respect to functional expertise; in particular, signal experience is not required. Quite the contrary, whatever background an individual has, command or operational experience should be the driving factor towards selection.

- ANNEX A: SURVEY METHODOLOGY
- ANNEX B: PROPOSED LETTER TO ACCOMPANY PILOT SURVEY
- ANNEX C: PILOT SURVEY
- ANNEX D: PROPOSED RESPONDENTS TO JOINT COMMANDERS CRITICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS SURVEY
- ANNEX E: REQUEST FOR APPROVAL TO SURVEY DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PERSONNEL

ANNEX A

SURVEY METHODOLOGY

The preferred method is to conduct a personal interview of the CINC. If that is not feasible, the survey instrument can be completed and returned through the mail.

Each Warfighting CINC's requirements will be consolidated for his area of responsibility.

The USAWC Center for Strategic Wargaming will incorporate the requirements using the time lines provided in joint gaming exercises. These requirements will also be provided to the wargaming departments at each of the other War Colleges.

During the conduct of the joint wargames, recorders will observe the flow of information and record pertinent aspects.

The student researchers will analyze and document these results, brief the JCS J3,6,7 & 8, and provide their findings to the participating CINC.

In addition to collecting data from the regional Unified CINCs, the same survey will solicit information from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the functional Unified CINCs, the Specified CINCs, the component CINCs, and major combatant commanders of the components. The purpose of this secondary process is to determine how the Warfighting CINC's requirements are perceived by senior, lateral, and subordinate commanders. In addition, it seems useful for the major combatant commander to assess how he would use the information that he provides; and

for the CINC to know that his subordinate commanders understand his own imperatives.

After all surveys have been administered, and several iterations of wargames have played, the survey results will be returned to the CINCs for final validation. The JCS can then approve these requirements for use. In essence a baseline of requirements would exist. Changes to the baseline would occur on request of the CINC; JCS would maintain the data base.

ANNEX B

PROPOSED LETTER TO ACCOMPANY PILOT SURVEY

DEPARATMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYSLVANIA 17013-5050

Office of the Commandant

Dear

The U.S. Army War College's Center for Strategic Wargaming is sponsoring a student Military Study Project (MSP) entitled "Operational Decisions and the Information Explosion!" What are the Critical Joint Warfighting Requirements?

The purpose of the study is to examine the critical information required to prosecute a joint campaign: to include planning for follow-on engagements, new initiatiaves, and war termination. The data obtained will facilitate development of computer-assisted information flow during the joint war games. The conclusions may provide a basis for the development and/or refinement of an information architecture supporting joint warfighting.

This study will focus on information requirements critical to the decision-making of the regional Unified Commanders-in-Chief during the prosecution of a campaign. We have identified the target population of this decision-making process as the Unified Commanders-in-Chief, Specified Commanders-in-Chief, Sub-Unified Commanders, and Component Commanders. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have a unique perspective on the CINC's decision process; viewing it from above and from a distance. The Component Commanders and their major subordinates also have a unique perspective, viewing this process from below, possibly from a distance but as a provider of information and an executor of decisions. The observations of these other Commanders will enable a worthwhile comparison and analysis.

Emphasis on the <u>critical warfighting</u> information requirements is stressed. Peacetime preparations for war, crisis actions, and indications and warnings may in fact have overlapping requirements; they should be treated separately from this study. Similarly, information transfer requirements generated by staffs, while important, are only relevant when

they contribute to the commander's operational warfighting decisions. The discerning perspective of the commander is essential to this endeavor.

A pilot survey, designed to capture these requirements, is attached. We need your assistance to validate this survey, providing your insights in the direction and scope of the survey instrument. Indeed, any comments or recommendations that you might provide would be most beneficial. The survey does appear to be long. However, most of the questions seek only a check mark in the appropriate box on the answer sheets provided. We would also appreciate your comments on the appropriateness, or usefulness of this technique.

In order to complete this initial phase of the project, your response must be received no later than 25 May 1989. The student conducting this study is Lieutenant Colonel Paul F. Roques, Jr. U.S. Marine Corps (phone: AV 242-4200 or commercial 717/245-4200 at the College, or commercial 717/243-6825 after local working hours). The faculty advisor for this project is Lieutenant Colonel Richard Mahlum, U.S. Army (phone: AV 242-3017 or commercial 717/245-3017)

ANNEX C

PILOT SURVEY

BACKGROUND: This survey was compiled by a student at the U.S. Army War College, in consultation with faculty advisors. The questions are based on personal observations and predilections plus academic research into generic decision-making processes.

INSTRUCTIONS: The purpose of this pilot survey is to validate the questionaire. Respondents are requested to determine if the questions are posed and constructed to obtain from the incumbent CINC those elements of critical information required to make operational decisions. An attempt was made to be all encompassing. Comments on length, ease of completion, simplicity, focus, and direction are appropriate. In addition, we would greatly appreciate respondents answering the questions and filling in the data collection sheets based on your own personal recollections and decision processes.

Questions requiring narrative answers have space provided for those answers. If additional space is required, feel free to use the reverse or additional pages; but please label answers clearly. Some questions are worded in such a way as to require check marks on a data collection sheet. If this is insufficient, please annotate with your comments.

Please keep in mind that this is a pilot. We would like to refine it before administering the survey to the incumbent CINCs. Any comments or suggestions that you have will be most welcome.

QUESTIONAIRE

- I. OPERATIONAL DECISION MAKING: THIS SECTION DEALS WITH THE TIME AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE OPERATIONAL DECISION MAKING PROCESS.
- A. WHAT KINDS OF OPERATIONAL WARFIGHTING DECISIONS SHOULD THE CINC BE MAKING?

B. WHAT IS THE MOST FREQUENT PLANNING HORIZON (TIME FRAME) FOR OPERATIONAL DECISIONS AT YOUR LEVEL OF COMMAND?

C. IS TIME A CRITICAL FACTOR IN DETERMINING OPERATIONAL OPTIONS AND MAKING YOUR DECISIONS? COMMENT, PLEASE.

D. HOW MUCH TIME IS REQUIRED TO ANALYZE AND MAKE OPERATIONAL DECISIONS AT YOUR LEVEL OF COMMAND?
E. WHAT CONSTITUTES THE NATURE OF A PERCEIVED OPERATIONAL OPPORTUNITY AT YOUR LEVEL OF COMMAND?
F. WHAT FORM OF ANALYSIS OR ESTIMATE DO YOU USE IN DECIDING WHETHER TO REAPPORTION RESOURCES TO EXPLOIT OPERATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES?
G. HOW DO YOU ASSESS RISKS IN EXAMINING ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION?

ESTIM	F YOU EMPLOY COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS AS PART OF YOUR ATE:
(1).	HOW DO YOU WEIGH THE COSTS AGAINST THE BENEFITS?
(2).	DO YOU SEEK A QUANTITATIVE DECISION POINT?
(3). DECIS	HOW MUCH INFLUENCE DO QUALITATIVE FACTORS HAVE IN YOU ION?
RESOU	HOW DO YOU EVALUATE THE COSTS OF REAPPORTIONING RCES? WHAT CONFIDENCE DO YOU HAVE IN THE ACCURACY OF ESTIMATES?
RESOU	HOW DO YOU EVALUATE THE BENEFITS OF REAPPORTIONING RCES? WHAT CONFIDENCE DO YOU HAVE IN THE ACCURACY OF ESTIMATES?
REINFO ASIDE	DO YOU FIND THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS DEMANDS AND ORCES RELIANCE ON YOUR OWN EXPERIENCE AND INTUITION, FROM THE SPECIFIC NATURE OF INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO Y GIVEN MOMENT OF DECISION?

(J) ASSUMING THAT TIME, DISTANCE AND RELATIVE SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS KEEP YOU PHYSICALLY REMOVED FROM THE FRONT, HOW DO YOU OBTAIN A COMMANDER'S "FEEL" FOR THE BATTLE?

K. GENERAL COMMENTS:

II. RANK ORDER THE FOLLOWING TWELVE INFORMATIONAL ELEMENTS AS THEY APPLY TO YOUR MOST IMPORTANT OPERATIONAL DECISION MAKING: (ONE = MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT; TWELVE = LEAST IMPORTANT ELEMENT)				
A.	ENEMY INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES.			
B.	FRIENDLY CAPABILITIES AND DISPOSITIONS.			
c.	ACHIEVEMENT OF FORCE POSITIONING.			
D.	SYNCHRONIZATION OF JOINT OPERATIONS.			
E.	ANALYSIS OF TIME-SPACE FACTORS TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS.			
F.	SUSTAINMENT ISSUES.			
G.	MISSION.			
н.	COORDINATION.			
I.	RATIONAL PROCESSES AND ESTIMATES.			
J.	INTUITIVE UNDERSTANDING AND EXPECTATIONS.			
K.	WEATHER.			
L.	TERRAIN OR GEOGRAPHICAL CONSIDERATION.			

- III. ENEMY SITUATION: THIS SECTION DEALS WITH INFORMATION GATHERING AND ANALYSIS ON THE ENEMY SITUATION BY FOCUSING ON THE ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND EXPECTED TIME FACTORS TO OBTAIN THAT INFORMATION. PLEASE USE THE CORRESPONDING DATA COLLECTION SHEET TO IDENTIFY THE SOURCE AND TIME REQUIRED FOR YOU TO MAKE CRITICAL OPERATIONAL DECISIONS USING THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION (SINCE WE ARE FOCUSING ON WARFIGHTING REQUIREMENTS, WE ASSUME A BASELINE OF INFORMATION ALREADY EXISTS):
- A. CHANGES IN ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE.
- B. CHANGES IN THE DISPOSITION OF ENEMY FORCES (DEPLOYMENT).
- C. CHANGES IN THE ESTIMATE OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES.
- D. CHANGES IN THE ESTIMATE OF ENEMY INTENTIONS.
- E. DO YOU HAVE ADDITIONAL CRITICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS ON THE ENEMY SITUATION THAT SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO YOU THAT ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE FOUR CATEGORIES LISTED ABOVE?

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER III.A

2. THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS MOST LIKELY TO COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:	•
NCA	
JCS	
OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY	
FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY	
SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY	
DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY	
SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER	
COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY	
JTF COMMANDER	
MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY	
OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY	
SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY	
OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY	
(2) THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED A THE TIME INDICATED BELOW:	
NOTE: If information is required from more than one source at the time required is different, please link the source and time by placing corresponding letters in each blank is	.nd
time by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e information required from both DIA and components would have an "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the component block and the 0-24 hour block.	he

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER III.B

1.	IS	Α	FURTHER	BREAKDOWN	OF	THE	CATEGORY	REQUIRED?	ΙF	SO,
PLE	ASE	SI	PECIFY:							

2. TO	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS MOST LIKELY COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:
	ICA
	rcs
_	THER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY
	UNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY
	PECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY
	OOD AGENCY; SPECIFY
_	UB-UNIFIED COMMANDER
	COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY
	TF COMMANDER
_	AJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY
	THER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY
	ERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY
	THER SOURCE; SPECIFY
(2) THE	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT TIME INDICATED BELOW:
	-24 hours 25-48 hours 49-72 hours 73-96 hours
the tim	: If information is required from more than one source an time required is different, please link the source and by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e ermation required from both DIA and components would have
	A" in the DIA block and $25-48$ hour block, and a "B" in the onent block and the $0-24$ hour block.

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER III.C

2. THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS MOST LIKELY TO COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:
NCA
JCS
OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY
FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY
SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY
DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY
SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER
COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY
JTF COMMANDER
MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY
OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY
SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY
OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY
(2) THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT THE TIME INDICATED BELOW:
NOTE: If information is required from more than one source and the time required is different, please link the source and time by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e information required from both DIA and components would have an "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the
component block and the 0-24 hour block, and a B in the

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER III.D

2. THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS MOST LIKELY TO COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:	•
NCA	
JCS	
OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY	
FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY	
SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY	
DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY	
SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER	
COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY	
JTF COMMANDER	
MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY	
OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY	
SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY	
OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY	
(2) THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED ATTHE TIME INDICATED BELOW:	T
	s
NOTE: If information is required from more than one source at the time required is different, please link the source and time by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e information required from both DIA and components would have an "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the component block and the 0-24 hour block.	:

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER III.E

2. THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS MOST LIKELY TO COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:
NCA
JCS
OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY
FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY
SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY
DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY
SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER
COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY
JTF COMMANDER
MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY
OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY
SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY
OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY
(2) THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT THE TIME INDICATED BELOW:
NOTE: If information is required from more than one source and the time required is different, please link the source and time by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e information required from both DIA and components would have an "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the
component block and the 0-24 hour block.

IV. OWN SITUATION: THIS SECTION DEALS WITH INFORMATION GATHERING AND ANALYSIS ON THE FRIENDLY SITUATION BY FOCUSING ON WHAT INFORMATION IS REQUIRED, FROM WHOM, AND WHEN IT IS REQUIRED.

PLEASE USE THE CORRESPONDING DATA COLLECTION SHEET TO IDENTIFY THE SOURCE AND TIME REQUIRED FOR YOU TO MAKE CRITICAL OPERATIONAL DECISIONS USING THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION (AGAIN, WE ARE FOCUSING ON WARFIGHTING REQUIREMENTS AND ASSUME A BASELINE ALREADY EXISTS):

- A. CHANGES TO FRIENDLY FORCES AVAILABLE (ORDER OF BATTLE).
- B. CHANGES IN DEPLOYMENT OF FRIENDLY FORCES.
- C. INCREASE/DECREASE IN THE CAPABILITIES OF FRIENDLY FORCES TO PROJECT COMBAT POWER.
- D. ISSUANCE/MODIFICATION OF NATIONAL STRATEGY OR POLICY.
- E. ISSUANCE/MODIFICATIONS TO MISSION.
- F. IMPACT OF UNEXPECTED CHANGES IN WEATHER.
- G. CHANGE IN EXPECTED REINFORCEMENTS; EITHER INCREASE/DECREASE IN NUMBERS OF PERSONNEL/UNITS OR IN TIME OF ARRIVAL.
- H. CHANGE TO ANTICIPATED LOGISTICS/SUSTAINMENT CAPABILITY.
- I. CHANGE TO IN-THEATER MOBILITY CAPABILITY.

J.	OTHER;	SPECIFY	
κ.	OTHER;	SPECIFY	
L.	OTHER;	SPECIFY	
м.	OTHER;	SPECIFY	

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER IVA

2. THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS MOST LIKELY TO COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:
NCA
JCS
OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY
FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY
SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY
DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY
SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER
COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY
JTF COMMANDER
MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY
OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY
SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY
OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY
(2) THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT THE TIME INDICATED BELOW:
NOTE: If information is required from more than one source and the time required is different, please link the source and time by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e information required from both DIA and components would have an "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the component block and the 0-24 hour block.

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER IV.B

THE TIME INDICATED BELOW:	
OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY	NCA
FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY JTF COMMANDER MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY (2) THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT THE TIME INDICATED BELOW: 0-24 hours	JCS
SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY JTF COMMANDER MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY OTHER INDICATED BELOW: 0-24 hours	OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY
DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY JTF COMMANDER MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY (2) THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT THE TIME INDICATED BELOW: 0-24 hours	FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY
SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY JTF COMMANDER MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY (2) THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT THE TIME INDICATED BELOW: 0-24 hours	SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY
COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY JTF COMMANDER MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY (2) THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT THE TIME INDICATED BELOW: 0-24 hours	DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY
	SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER
MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY (2) THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT THE TIME INDICATED BELOW: 0-24 hours 25-48 hours 49-72 hours 73-96 hours 5-7 days 8-14 days 15-21 days 22-30 days 30 + days other (e.g. critical time is between 0 and 24 hours) NOTE: If information is required from more than one source and time required is different, please link the source and time by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e information required from both DIA and components would have an "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the	COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY
OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY (2) THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT THE TIME INDICATED BELOW: 0-24 hours	JTF COMMANDER
SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY	MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY
OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY (2) THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT THE TIME INDICATED BELOW:	OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY
(2) THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT THE TIME INDICATED BELOW:	SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY
THE TIME INDICATED BELOW:	OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY
NOTE: If information is required from more than one source and the time required is different, please link the source and time by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e information required from both DIA and components would have an "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the	(2) THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT THE TIME INDICATED BELOW:
the time required is different, please link the source and time by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e information required from both DIA and components would have an "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the	
COMPANIED FOR AND THE USIA DONE DIOCK.	the time required is different, please link the source and time by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER IV.C

2. THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS MOST LIKELY TO COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:
NCA
JCS
OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY
FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY
SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY
DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY
SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER
COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY
JTF COMMANDER
MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY
OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY
SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY
OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY
(2) THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT THE TIME INDICATED BELOW:
O-24 hours 25-48 hours 49-72 hours 73-96 hours 5-7 days 8-14 days 15-21 days 22-30 days other (e.g. critical time is between 0 and 24 hours)
NOTE: If information is required from more than one source and the time required is different, please link the source and time by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e information required from both DIA and components would have an "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the component block and the 0-24 hour block.

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER IV.D

2. THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS MOST LIKELY TO COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:	
NCA	
JCS	
OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY	
FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY	
SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY	
DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY	
SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER	
COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY	
JTF COMMANDER	
MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY	
OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY	
SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY	
OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY	
(2) THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT THE TIME INDICATED BELOW:	Г
NOTE: If information is required from more than one source at the time required is different, please link the source and time by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e	nđ
information required from both DIA and components would have an "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the component block and the 0-24 hour block	

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER IV.E

2. THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS MOST LIKELY TO COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:	
NCA	
JCS	
OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY	
FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY	
SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY	
DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY	
SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER	
COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY	
JTF COMMANDER	
MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY	
OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY	
SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY	
OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY	
(2) THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED A THE TIME INDICATED BELOW:	T
O-24 hours 25-48 hours 49-72 hours 73-96 hour 5-7 days 8-14 days 15-21 days 22-30 days 30 + days other (e.g. critical time is between 0 and 24 hours)	
NOTE: If information is required from more than one source a the time required is different, please link the source and time by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e information required from both DIA and components would have	
an "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the component block and the 0-24 hour block.	he

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER IV.F

2. THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS MOST LIKELY TO COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:
NCA
JCS
OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY
FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY
SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY
DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY
SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER
COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY
JTF COMMANDER
MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY
OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY
SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY
OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY
(2) THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT THE TIME INDICATED BELOW:
NOTE: If information is required from more than one source and the time required is different, please link the source and time by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e
information required from both DIA and components would have an "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the component block and the 0-24 hour block.

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER IV.G

	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS MOST LIKELY COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:
	NCA
	JCS
	OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY
	FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY
	SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY
	DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY
	SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER
	COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY
	JTF COMMANDER
	MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY
	OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY
	SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY
	OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY
(2) THE) THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT E TIME INDICATED BELOW:
_	0-24 hours 25-48 hours 49-72 hours 73-96 hours 5-7 days 8-14 days 15-21 days 22-30 days 30 + days other (e.g. critical time is between 0 and 24 hours)
the tin inf an	TE: If information is required from more than one source and time required is different, please link the source and me by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e formation required from both DIA and components would have "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the mponent block and the 0-24 hour block.

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER IV.H

2. THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS MOST LIKELY TO COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:
NCA
JCS
OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY
FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY
SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY
DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY
SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER
COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY
JTF COMMANDER
MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY
OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY
SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY
OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY
(2) THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT THE TIME INDICATED BELOW:
NOTE: If information is required from more than one source and the time required is different, please link the source and time by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e
information required from both DIA and components would have an "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the component block and the 0-24 hour block

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER IV.I

TO COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:
NCA
JCS
OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY
FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY
SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY
DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY
SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER
COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY
JTF COMMANDER
MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY
OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY
SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY
OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY
(2) THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT THE TIME INDICATED BELOW:
NOTE: If information is required from more than one source and the time required is different, please link the source and time by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e information required from both DIA and components would have
an "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the component block and the 0-24 hour block.

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER IV.J

	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS MOST LIKELY COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:
1	NCA
	jcs
_ (OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY
1	FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY
'	SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY
1	DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY
'	SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER
_ (COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY
`	JTF COMMANDER
!	MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY
_ (OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY
_ '	SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY
_ (OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY
	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT TIME INDICATED BELOW:
<u> </u>	0-24 hours 25-48 hours 49-72 hours 73-96 hours 5-7 days 8-14 days 15-21 days 22-30 days 30 + days other (e.g. critical time is between 0 and 24 hours)
the time info an	E: If information is required from more than one source and time required is different, please link the source and by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e ormation required from both DIA and components would have "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the ponent block and the 0-24 hour block.

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER IV.K

	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS MOST LIKELY COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:
1	NCA
`	JCS
_ (OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY
1	FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY
_ '	SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY
1	DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY
_ :	SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER
(COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY
`	JTF COMMANDER
1	MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY
_ '	OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY
{	SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY
_ '	OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY
THE	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT TIME INDICATED BELOW:
<u> </u>	0-24 hours
the time info	E: If information is required from more than one source and time required is different, please link the source and e by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e ormation required from both DIA and components would have
	"A" in the DIA block and $25-48$ hour block, and a "B" in the ponent block and the $0-24$ hour block.

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER IV.L

			INFORMATIO FOLLOWING		CATEGORY	IS M	OST	LIKEL	Y
	NCA								
	JCS								
	OTHER	WARFIGHT	ring cinc;	SPECIFY _					
	FUNCT	IONAL CIN	C; SPECIFY	•					
	SPECI	FIED CINC	; SPECIFY						
	DOD A	GENCY; SP	ECIFY						
	SUB-U	NIFIED CO	MMANDER						
	COMPO	NENT COMM	ANDER; SPE	CIFY					
	JTF C	OMMANDER							
	MAJOR	WARFIGHT	ING COMMAN	D; SPECIF	<i></i>				
	OTHER	DEPARTME	ENT (e.g. D	os) specii	FY		_		
	SERVI	CE HEADQU	JARTERS; SP	ECIFY					
_	OTHER	SOURCE;	SPECIFY _	 					
		CRITICAL INDICATE	INFORMATI D BELOW:	ON IN THIS	CATEGORY	ris	REQU	IRED A	ΑT
	0-24 5-7 d 30 +	hours ays days	25-48 hou 8-14 days other	rs49- (e.c	-72 hours -21 days g. critica tween 0 ar	 1 ti 1d 24	73-9 22-3 me i	6 hour 0 days s rs)	rs s
the tim inf an	e time ne by format "A" i	required placing of ion requing the DIA	ion is required in the corresponding the control of the control of the correct indicates	uired from ent, pleas ng letters oth DIA as 25-48 hou	n more that is in each and compone or block,	n on ne so blan ents	e source k i. woul	urce a and e d have	e

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER IV.M

	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS MOST LIKELY COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:
	NCA
	JCS
	OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY
	FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY
	SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY
	DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY
	SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER
	COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY
	JTF COMMANDER
	MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY
	OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY
	SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY
	OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY
THE	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT TIME INDICATED BELOW:
<u> </u>	0-24 hours 25-48 hours 49-72 hours 73-96 hours 5-7 days 8-14 days 15-21 days 22-30 days 30 + days other (e.g. critical time is between 0 and 24 hours)
the tim inf an	TE: If information is required from more than one source and time required is different, please link the source and me by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e formation required from both DIA and components would have "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the mponent block and the 0-24 hour block.

- V. IN-THEATER (NON-BELLIGERENTS): THIS SECTION DEALS WITH THE INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR YOU TO DETERMINE WHETHER OTHER COUNTRIES IN YOUR THEATER, WHICH ARE NOT PARTICIPATING IN HOSTILITIES, MAY IMPACT ON THE PROSECUTION OF YOUR CAMPAIGN. PLEASE USE THE CORRESPONDING DATA COLLECTION SHEET TO INDICATE THE SOURCE AND TIME REQUIRED FOR YOU TO MAKE CRITICAL OPERATIONAL DECISIONS USING THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION (BASELINE DATA MAY OR MAY NOT ALREADY EXIST FOR THESE AREAS)
- A. CAPABILITIES OR CHANGES TO CAPABILITIES OF OTHER COUNTRIES THAT WOULD INFLUENCE YOUR CAMPAIGN.
- B. INTENT OR CHANGE TO THE INTENT OF OTHER COUNTRIES THAT WOULD INFLUENCE YOUR CAMPAIGN.
- C. ANY ACTIONS TAKEN BY OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH MAY INFLUENCE YOUR CAMPAIGN.

D.	OTHER;	SPECIFY	

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

QUESTION NUMBER V.A

	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS MOST LIKELY COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:
_	NCA
_	JCS
_	OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY
	FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY
_	SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY
_	DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY
	SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER
_	COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY
 -	JTF COMMANDER
	MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY
	OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY
	SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY
	OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY
THI	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT TIME INDICATED BELOW:
	0-24 hours 25-48 hours 49-72 hours 73-96 hours 5-7 days 8-14 days 15-21 days 22-30 days 30 + days other (e.g. critical time is between 0 and 24 hours)
the tim inf an	TE: If information is required from more than one source and the time required is different, please link the source and me by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e. Formation required from both DIA and components would have "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the apponent block and the 0-24 hour block.

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER V.B

	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:	ATEGORY	IS MOS	r LIKELY	
	NCA				
_	JCS				
_	OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY				
_	FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY				
	SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY				
	DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY				
_	SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER				
_	COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY				
_	JTF COMMANDER				
_	MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY				
	OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY				
_	SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY				
	OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY				
) THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS E TIME INDICATED BELOW:	CATEGORY	IS RE	QUIRED AT	
=	0-24 hours 25-48 hours 49-7 5-7 days 8-14 days 15-2 30 + days other (e.g. between	2 hours 1 days critica een 0 an	73 22 1 time	-96 hours -30 days is	
the tim inf an	TE: If information is required from a time required is different, please me by placing corresponding letters formation required from both DIA and "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour mponent block and the 0-24 hour block	more that link the in each compone block,	n one e sour blank nts wo	source and i.e uld have	

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER V.C

	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS MOST LIKELY COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:
	NCA
_	JCS
	OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY
	FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY
	SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY
_	DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY
_	SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER
_	COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY
	JTF COMMANDER
	MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY
=	OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY
	SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY
	OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY
THI) THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT E TIME INDICATED BELOW:
<u>_</u>	0-24 hours 25-48 hours 49-72 hours 73-96 hours 5-7 days 8-14 days 15-21 days 22-30 days 30 + days other (e.g. critical time is between 0 and 24 hours)
the tir in: an	TE: If information is required from more than one source and time required is different, please link the source and me by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e formation required from both DIA and components would have "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the mponent block and the 0-24 hour block.

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER V.D

	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS MOST LIKELY COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:
	NCA
	JCS
_	OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY
	FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY
	SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY
_	DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY
	SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER
	COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY
	JTF COMMANDER
	MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY
_	OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY
	SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY
	OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY
	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT TIME INDICATED BELOW:
_	0-24 hours 25-48 hours 49-72 hours 73-96 hours 5-7 days 8-14 days 15-21 days 22-30 days 30 + days other (e.g. critical time is between 0 and 24 hours)
the tin inf an	TE: If information is required from more than one source and the time required is different, please link the source and me by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e formation required from both DIA and components would have "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the mponent block and the 0-24 hour block.

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

QUESTION NUMBER V.E

	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS MOST LIKELY COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:
	NCA
	JCS
_	OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY
	FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY
_	SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY
_	DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY
_	SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER
	COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY
	JTF COMMANDER
	MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY
	OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY
_	SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY
_	OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY
THE	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT TIME INDICATED BELOW:
<u></u>	0-24 hours 25-48 hours 49-72 hours 73-96 hours 5-7 days 8-14 days 15-21 days 22-30 days 30 + days other (e.g. critical time is between 0 and 24 hours)
the tin	TE: If information is required from more than one source and the time required is different, please link the source and the by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e. Formation required from both DIA and components would have
an	"A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the

- VI. STRATEGIC CONSIDERATION OF EXTERNAL THEATER EVENTS BY BELLIGERENTS/NON-BELLIGERENTS: THIS SECTION DEALS WITH THE INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR YOU TO DETERMINE WHETHER OTHER COUNTRIES OUTSIDE OF YOUR THEATER MAY IMPACT ON THE PROSECUTION OF YOUR CAMPAIGN. PLEASE USE THE CORRESPONDING DATA COLLECTION SHEET TO INDICATE THE LIKELY SOURCE AND TIME REQUIRED FOR YOU TO MAKE CRITICAL OPERATIONAL DECISIONS USING THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION (BASELINE DATA MAY OR MAY NOT ALREADY EXIST):
- A. OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES OR CHANGE IN THE SCOPE AND MAGNITUDE OF HOSTILITIES IN ANOTHER THEATER.
- B. CAPABILITIES OR CHANGE IN CAPABILITIES OF BELLIGERENT COUNTRIES IN EXTERNAL THEATERS THAT COULD INFLUENCE YOUR CAMPAIGN.
- C. INTENT OR CHANGE IN INTENTION OF BELLIGERENT COUNTRIES IN EXTERNAL THEATERS TO INFLUENCE YOUR CAMPAIGN.
- D. CAPABILITIES OR CHANGE IN CAPABILITIES OF NON-BELLIGERENT COUNTRIES IN EXTERNAL THEATER TO INFLUENCE YOUR CAMPAIGN.
- E. INTENT OR CHANGE IN INTENTION OF NON-BELLIGERENT COUNTRIES IN EXTERNAL COUNTRIES TO INFLUENCE YOUR CAMPAIGN.

F.	OTHER;	SPECIFY	 •
G.	OTHER;	SPECIFY	•

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER VI.A

	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS MOST LIKELY COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:
	NCA
	JCS
	OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY
	FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY
_	SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY
	DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY
	SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER
	COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY
	JTF COMMANDER
_	MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY
	OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY
	SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY
	OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY
	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT E TIME INDICATED BELOW:
	0-24 hours 25-48 hours 49-72 hours 73-96 hours 5-7 days 8-14 days 15-21 days 22-30 days 30 + days other (e.g. critical time is between 0 and 24 hours)
the tim inf an	TE: If information is required from more than one source and time required is different, please link the source and me by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e formation required from both DIA and components would have "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the mponent block and the 0-24 hour block.

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER VI.B

	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS MOST LIKELY COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:
	NCA
	JCS
	OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY
	FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY
_	SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY
_	DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY
_	SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER
_	COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY
	JTF COMMANDER
	MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY
	OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY
	SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY
_	OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY
	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT TIME INDICATED BELOW:
_	0-24 hcurs 25-48 hours 49-72 hours 73-96 hours 5-7 days 8-14 days 15-21 days 22-30 days 30 + days other (e.g. critical time is between 0 and 24 hours)
the tim inf an	E: If information is required from more than one source and time required is different, please link the source and the by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e formation required from both DIA and components would have "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the apponent block and the 0-24 hour block.

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER VI.C

2. TO CO	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS MOST LIKELY OME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:
NO	CA
JO	CS
01	THER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY
FU	UNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY
si	PECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY
DO	OD AGENCY; SPECIFY
st	JB-UNIFIED COMMANDER
_ co	OMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY
J1	TF COMMANDER
MA	AJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY
01	THER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY
SE	ERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY
or	THER SOURCE; SPECIFY
	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT I'E INDICATED BELOW:
— 0- 5- 30	-24 hours 25-48 hours 49-72 hours 73-96 hours 7 days 8-14 days 15-21 days 22-30 days
the time infor an "A	: If information is required from more than one source and time required is different, please link the source and by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e rmation required from both DIA and components would have A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the onent block and the 0-24 hour block.

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER VI.D

	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS MOST LIKELY COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:
:	NCA
	JCS
	OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY
:	FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY
	SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY
:	DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY
_	SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER
	COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY
	JTF COMMANDER
:	MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY
	OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY
	SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY
	OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY
	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT TIME INDICATED BELOW:
_	0-24 hours 25-48 hours 49-72 hours 73-96 hours 5-7 days 8-14 days 15-21 days 22-30 days 30 + days other (e.g. critical time is between 0 and 24 hours)
the time info an	E: If information is required from more than one source and time required is different, please link the source and e by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e ormation required from both DIA and components would have "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the ponent block and the 0-24 hour block.

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER VI.E

	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS MOST LIKELY COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:
1	NCA
_ :	JCS .
_ (OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY
F	FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY
8	SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY
_ r	OOD AGENCY; SPECIFY
8	SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER
(COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY
;	JTF COMMANDER
!	AAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY
_ (OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY
8	SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY
_ (OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY
	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT TIME INDICATED BELOW:
_ ;	0-24 hours 25-48 hours 49-72 hours 73-96 hours 5-7 days 8-14 days 15-21 days 22-30 days 30 + days other (e.g. critical time is between 0 and 24 hours)
the time info	E: If information is required from more than one source and time required is different, please link the source and by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e ormation required from both DIA and components would have 'A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the bonent block and the 0-24 hour block.

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER VI.F

2. THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS MOST LIKELY TO COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:
NCA
JCS
OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY
FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY
SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY
DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY
SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER
COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY
JTF COMMANDER
MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY
OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY
SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY
OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY
(2) THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT THE TIME INDICATED BELOW:
NOTE: If information is required from more than one source and the time required is different, please link the source and time by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e information required from both DIA and components would have an "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the component block and the 0-24 hour block.

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER VI.G

TO COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:
NCA
JCS
OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY
FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY
SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY
DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY
SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER
COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY
JTF COMMANDER
MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY
OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY
SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY
OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY
(2) THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT THE TIME INDICATED BELOW:
NOTE: If information is required from more than one source and the time required is different, please link the source and time by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e information required from both DIA and components would have an "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the component block and the 0-24 hour block.

- VII. STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS OF OTHER JOINT/COMBINED ACTIVITIES THAT MAY IMPACT ON OR INFLUENCE IN-THEATER OPERATIONS: THIS SECTION DEALS WITH THE INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR YOU TO DETERMINE THE IMPACT OF SITUATIONS IN OTHER THEATERS ON THE PROSECUTION OF YOUR CAMPAIGN. PLEASE USE THE CORRESPONDING DATA COLLECTION SHEET TO INDICATE THE SOURCE AND TIME REQUIRED FOR YOU TO MAKE CRITICAL OPERATIONAL DECISIONS USING THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION (BASELINE DATA PROBABLY EXISTS; BUT WE DO NOT ASSUME ACCURATE DATA IN THIS CATEGORY):
- A. ISSUANCE OR MODIFICATION TO NATIONAL STRATEGY OR POLICY.
- B. ISSUANCE OR MODIFICATION TO JCS MISSIONS.
- C. ISSUANCE OR CHANGE TO ALLIANCE POLITICAL-MILITARY GUIDANCE.
- D. CHANGE IN INTENSITY OR SCOPE OF HOSTILE ACTIONS.
- E. CHANGE IN REQUIREMENT FOR REINFORCEMENTS OR IN NATIONAL AND ALLIED DECISION TO APPORTION REINFORCEMENTS (EITHER INCREASE/DECREASE OR TIME OF ARRIVAL).
- F. CHANGES TO LOGISTICS/SUSTAINMENT REQUIREMENTS.
- G. CHANGES TO STRATEGIC MOBILITY REQUIREMENTS; OR TO OTHER THEATER INTERNAL MOBILITY REQUIREMENTS THAT MAY IMPACT ON YOUR CAMPAIGN.

H.	STATUS	OF WAR	TERMINATION	EFFORTS.
I.	OTHER;	SPECIFY	·	

J. OTHER; SPECIFY _____.

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER VII.A

2. THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS MOST LIKELY TO COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:
NCA
JCs
OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY
FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY
SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY
DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY
SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER
COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY
JTF COMMANDER
MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY
OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY
SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY
OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY
(2) THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT THE TIME INDICATED BELOW:
NOTE: If information is required from more than one source and the time required is different, please link the source and time by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e information required from both DIA and components would have an "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the component block and the 0-24 hour block.

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER VII.B

2. THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS MOST LIKELY TO COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:	
NCA	
JCS	
OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY	
FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY	
SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY	
DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY	
SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER	
COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY	
JTF COMMANDER	
MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY	
OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY	
SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY	
OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY	
(2) THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT THE TIME INDICATED BELOW:	•
	;
NOTE: If information is required from more than one source are the time required is different, please link the source and time by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e information required from both DIA and components would have an "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the component block and the 0-24 hour block.	nd

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER VII.C

2. THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS MOST LIKELY TO COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:
NCA
JCS
OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY
FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY
SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY
DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY
SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER
COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY
JTF COMMANDER
MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY
OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY
SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY
OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY
(2) THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT THE TIME INDICATED BELOW:
NOTE: If information is required from more than one source and the time required is different, please link the source and time by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e information required from both DIA and components would have
an "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the component block and the 0-24 hour block.

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER VII.D

	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS MOST LIKELY OME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:
N	CA
J	CS
0	THER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY
F	UNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY
s	PECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY
D	OD AGENCY; SPECIFY
s	UB-UNIFIED COMMANDER
c	OMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY
_ ^J	TF COMMANDER
M	AJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY
_ °	THER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY
s	ERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY
_ 0	THER SOURCE; SPECIFY
	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT TIME INDICATED BELOW:
0 5 3	-24 hours 25-48 hours 49-72 hours 73-96 hours 73-96 hours 22-30 days 0 + days other (e.g. critical time is between 0 and 24 hours)
the time info an "	: If information is required from more than one source and time required is different, please link the source and by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e rmation required from both DIA and components would have A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the onent block and the 0-24 hour block.
P	

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER VII.E

1.	IS	A	FURTHER	BREAKDOWN	OF	THE	CATEGORY	REQUIRED?	ΙF	so,
PLEA	ASE	SI	PECIFY:							_

	COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:
	NCA
	JCS
	OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY
	FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY
	SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY
	DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY
	SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER
	COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY
	JTF COMMANDER
	MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY
	OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY
	SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY
	OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY
	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT TIME INDICATED BELOW:
<u> </u>	0-24 hours 25-48 hours 49-72 hours 73-96 hours 5-7 days 8-14 days 15-21 days 22-30 days 30 + days other (e.g. critical time is between 0 and 24 hours)
the tin in:	Detween 0 and 24 hours) TE: If information is required from more than one source and time required is different, please link the source and me by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e formation required from both DIA and components would have "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the mponent block and the 0-24 hour block.

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER VII.F

	COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:
	NCA
	JCS
_	OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY
	FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY
	SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY
_	DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY
_	SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER
_	COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY
	JTF COMMANDER
	MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY
_	OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY
_	SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY
_	OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY
	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT TIME INDICATED BELOW:
_	0-24 hours 25-48 hours 49-72 hours 73-96 hours 5-7 days 8-14 days 15-21 days 22-30 days 30 + days other (e.g. critical time is between 0 and 24 hours)
the tin inf an	TE: If information is required from more than one source and the time required is different, please link the source and me by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e. formation required from both DIA and components would have "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the apponent block and the 0-24 hour block.

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER VII.G

2. THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS MOST LIKELY TO COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:
NCA
JCS
OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY
FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY
SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY
DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY
SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER
GOMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY
JTF COMMANDER
MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY
OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY
SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY
OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY
(2) THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT THE TIME INDICATED BELOW:
NOTE: If information is required from more than one source and the time required is different, please link the source and
time by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e information required from both DIA and components would have an "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the component block and the 0-24 hour block.

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER VII.H

	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS MOST LIKELY COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:
	NCA
	JCS
_	OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY
	FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY
_	SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY
	DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY
	SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER
_	COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY
_	JTF COMMANDER
	MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY
	OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY
	SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY
	OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY
	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT TIME INDICATED BELOW:
<u>-</u>	0-24 hours 25-48 hours 49-72 hours 73-96 hours 5-7 days 8-14 days 15-21 days 22-30 days 30 + days other (e.g. critical time is between 0 and 24 hours)
the tim inf an	TE: If information is required from more than one source and the time required is different, please link the source and me by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e. formation required from both DIA and components would have "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the apponent block and the 0-24 hour block.

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER VII.I

	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS MOST LIKELY COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:
	NCA
	JCS
	OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY
	FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY
	SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY
	DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY
	SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER
_	COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY
	JTF COMMANDER
	MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY
	OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY
	SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY
	OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY
	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT TIME INDICATED BELOW:
<u>-</u>	0-24 hours 25-48 hours 49-72 hours 73-96 hours 5-7 days 8-14 days 15-21 days 22-30 days 30 + days other (e.g. critical time is between 0 and 24 hours)
the tim inf an	TE: If information is required from more than one source and time required is different, please link the source and me by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e formation required from both DIA and components would have "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the aponent block and the 0-24 hour block.

WARFIGHTING CINC'S CRITICAL JOINT INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
QUESTION NUMBER VII.J

	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS MOST LIKELY COME FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES:
	NCA
	JCS
_	OTHER WARFIGHTING CINC; SPECIFY
	FUNCTIONAL CINC; SPECIFY
_	SPECIFIED CINC; SPECIFY
	DOD AGENCY; SPECIFY
	SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDER
_	COMPONENT COMMANDER; SPECIFY
	JTF COMMANDER
	MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMAND; SPECIFY
	OTHER DEPARTMENT (e.g. DOS) SPECIFY
	SERVICE HEADQUARTERS; SPECIFY
	OTHER SOURCE; SPECIFY
THI	THE CRITICAL INFORMATION IN THIS CATEGORY IS REQUIRED AT TIME INDICATED BELOW:
<u>_</u>	0-24 hours 25-48 hours 49-72 hours 73-96 hours 5-7 days 8-14 days 15-21 days 22-30 days 30 + days other (e.g. critical time is between 0 and 24 hours)
NOT the tin inf an	TE: If information is required from more than one source and the time required is different, please link the source and the by placing corresponding letters in each blank i.e formation required from both DIA and components would have "A" in the DIA block and 25-48 hour block, and a "B" in the apponent block and the 0-24 hour block.

VIII. GIVEN OUR NATIONAL STRATEGY AND SUPPORTING NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY, THE MOST LIKELY FORM OF ANY FUTURE LARGE SCALE OPERATIONS WILL EVOLVE FROM A CAMPAIGN ORIENTED INITIALLY ON STRATEGIC DEFENSE. IN A CLASSIC CAMPAIGN COMPOSED OF PHASES (DEFENSIVE, COUNTEROFFENSIVE, PURSUIT/EXPLOITATION), WHAT ARE THE CRITICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS THAT WILL SUPPORT A MAJOR DECISION TO SHIFT FROM ONE PHASE TO ANOTHER? (e.g. AIR SUPERIORITY; ENEMY ABOUT TO ENCOUNTER A CULMINATING POINT)

A. DEFENSE TO COUNTEROFFENSIVE:

B. COUNTEROFFENSIVE TO PURSUIT/EXPLOITATION:

IX. FORMULATING THE MAJOR OPERATIONAL DECISION: PLEASE PROVIDE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCEDURES YOU EMPLOY IN FORMULATING YOUR MOST IMPORTANT OPERATIONAL DECISIONS. e.g. SUBORDINATE ESTIMATES, FORMAL STAFF ESTIMATES, LESS-FORMAL BRIEFINGS.

X. CAN YOU DESCRIBE HOW YOU SYNTHESIZE THE INFORMATION/DATA, THAT YOU OBTAIN OR ARE PROVIDED, INTO A DECISION?

XI. WE ARE INTERESTED IN THE TYPES OF EXERCISE AND WARTIME REPORTS THAT ARE FORWARDED FROM YOUR HEADQUARTERS TO A HIGHER AUTHORITY? PLEASE ENCLOSE A COPY OF THE REPORTS ANNEX OR APPENDIX TO YOUR COMMAND SOP OR HAVE YOUR STAFF PROVIDE SOME SAMPLES, SAMPLE FORMATS, OR EXERCISE VERSIONS OF THOSE REPORTS WITH THIS QUESTIONAIRE.

XII. THE REPORTS ANNEX/APPENDIX TO YOUR COMMAND SOP WILL INCLUDE THE REPORTS YOU REQUIRE FROM YOUR SUBORDINATES AND HOW OFTEN THEY ARE REQUIRED. PLEASE ATTACH SOME SAMPLE FORMATS OR EXERCISE VERSIONS OF THOSE REPORTS WITH THIS QUESTIONAIRE.

XIII. HOW DOES YOUR STAFF PROVIDE FORMAL AND INFORMAL INFORMATION TO YOU? HOW FREQUENTLY DO YOU REQUIRE BRIEFINGS? PLEASE ATTACH A SAMPLE OF A RECENT EXERCISE BRIEFING OR THE INFORMATION FORMAT AND ANY MATRICES USED FOR YOUR EXERCISE BRIEFINGS.

XIV. PLEASE PROVIDE ANY ADDITIONAL COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE ON THE NATURE OF CRITICAL INFORMATION GATHERING AND DECISION-MAKING FOR THE JOINT WARFIGHTING CINC.

ANNEX D

PROPOSED RESPONDENTS TO JOINT COMMANDERS CRITICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS SURVEY

A. UNIFIED COMMANDS

COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

- US ATLANTIC COMMAND
- US CENTRAL COMMAND
- US EUROPEAN COMMAND
- US PACIFIC COMMAND
- US SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
- US SOUTHERN COMMAND
- US SPACE COMMAND
- US TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

B. SPECIFIED COMMANDS:

COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

- US FORCES COMMAND
- US STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

C. SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDS:

COMMANDER:

- US FORCES AZORES
- US FORCES CARIBBEAN
- US FORCES JAPAN
- US FORCES KOREA
- ICELANDIC DEFENSE FORCE

D. COMPONENT COMMANDS:

COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

- US ATLANTIC FLEET
- US ARMY FORCES ATLANTIC (FORSCOM)
- US AIR FORCES ATLANTIC (TAC)
- US ARMY EUROPE
- US AIR FORCES EUROPE
- US NAVAL FORCES EUROPE
- US PACIFIC FLEET
- US WESTERN COMMAND
- US PACIFIC AIR FORCES

- US ARMY FORCES CENTRAL
- US CENTRAL AIR FORCES
- US NAVAL FORCES CENTRAL
- US ARMY FORCES SOUTH
- US NAVAL FORCES SOUTH
- US AIR FORCES SOUTH
- US ARMY SPACE COMMAND
- US NAVAL SPACE COMMAND
- US AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND
- US MILITARY TRANSORTATION MANAGEMENT COMMAND
- US MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND
- US MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND

1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE COMMAND

EIGHTH US ARMY NAVAL FORCES KOREA 7TH AIR FORCE

US ARMY-JAPAN NAVAL FORCES JAPAN 5TH AIR FORCE

- E. CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
- F. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

CHIEF OF STAFF, U. S. ARMY

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

CHIEF OF STAFF, U. S. AIR FORCE

G. MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMANDS:

COMMANDING GENERAL:

I CORPS
III CORPS
V CORPS
VII CORPS
XVIII ABN CORPS

I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE II MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE III MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

1ST AIR FORCE 3RD AIR FORCE 8TH AIR FORCE 9TH AIR FORCE 12TH AIR FORCE 13TH AIR FORCE 15TH AIR FORCE 16TH AIR FORCE 17TH AIR FORCE

COMMANDER:

US SECOND FLEET

US THIRD FLEET

US SIXTH FLEET

US SEVENTH FLEET

US MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE

LIST OF PROSPECTIVE RETIRED/FORMER CINCS:

ADMIRAL MCDONALD

ADMIRAL TRAIN

GENERAL GOODPASTER

GENERAL ROGERS

GENERAL OTIS

GENERAL CRIST

GENERAL KROESEN

GENERAL LIVESEY

GENERAL WICKHAM

GENERAL VESSEY

GENERAL KINGSTON

ADMIRAL LONG

ANNEX E

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL TO SURVEY DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PERSONNEL

THE ARMY ATTITUDE AND OPINION SURVEY PROGRAM (AR 600-46)

TO: USA Soldier Support Center-NCR

date

submitted:

ATTN: ATNC-MOA

Alexandria, Va 22332-0400

date approved/

disapproved

AUTOVON 221-9680/9689 COM 703-325-9680/9689

RECOMMENDED TITLE OF SURVEY:

JOINT COMMANDER'S CRITICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS SURVEY

NAME OF MILITARY SPONSORING ORGANIZATION OR OFFICE:

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC WARGAMING

POINT OF CONTACT:

FACULTY: LTC RICHARD MAHLUM

Dr. GLENDA NOGAMI

STUDENT: LTCOL PAUL ROQUES

MAILING ADDRESS:

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE (DAA)

CARLISLE BARRACKS

CARLISLE PENNSYLVANIA 17013-5050

TELEPHONE: COMMERCIAL 717-245-3017/4007/4200

AUTOVON 242-3017/4007/4200

PROPOSED SCHEDULE: SEE ATTACHED IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.

SURVEY INSTRUMENT COMPLETION DATE:

SURVEY ADMINISTRATION DATES:

DATA ANALYSIS DATES:

FINAL REPORT DUE DATE:

JUSTIFICATION FOR SURVEY REQUEST:

O DESCRIBE THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF THE SURVEY.

To define information requirements critical to the joint decision-making process of the Regional Unified CINCs in war.

O LIST THE SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES BEING ADDRESSED BY THE SURVEY.

- a. What information is needed?
- b. How is it provided?
- c. Who provides it?
- d. When should it be provided?
- o DESCRIBE HOW THE SURVEY RESULTS WILL BE USED.
 - a. To generate information flow to the CINCs and staff players participating in USAWC exercises and war games.
 - b. To gather the data for analysis and preparation of a student research paper.

BACKGROUND RESEARCH:

O DESCRIBE THE PLANNING AND COORDINATION OF THE SURVEY, WITH A FOCUS ON WHAT ARMY ORGANIZATION/OFFICES HAVE BEEN CONTACTED CONCERNING RELATED RESEARCH.

Planning has been primarily internal to USAWC. While any Army research might prove valuable as a correlation to the joint requirement, it will not be germane until the joint requirements are identified. Therefore, no Army organizations or staffs have been contacted.

O DESCRIBE THE MOST RECENT RELEVANT RESEARCH, IF ANY.
IDENTIFY ANY PUBLICATION, ARTICLES, AND/OR PAPERS
REVIEWED. INCLUDE BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SOURCES.

Draft FM 101-5

FM 22-103

Information Requirements for Battlefield Management System Survey and Prototype Evaluation; Research Report 1424

U. S. Army Research Institutte for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. 1986.

ARC-ART AND Requirements of Command. Gen Bruce C. Clarke and BG John G. Hill; Art of War Colloquium; USAWC 1983

Generalship in the World War Volume I. Comparative Studies by Lieutenant General Baron von Freytag-Loringhoven. Art of War Colloquium; USAWC 1983.

Command in War. Martin Van Creveld. 1985.

The Decision-Maker's Handbook. Alexander H. Cornell. 1980.

Competive Strategy. Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors. Michael E. Porter. 1980.

Statistics for Modern Business Decisions. Lawrence Lapin. 1973.

Business Research Methods. Vernon T. Clover and Howard L. Balsley. 1979

TARGET POPULATION:

- O DESCRIBE THE POPULATION ON WHICH THE SURVEY WILL FOCUS.
 - a. Unified and Specified CINCS; Sub-Unified Commanders, Component Commanders.
 - b. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Commanders of Selected Major Commands will be targeted as a control group for comparison and analysis.
- o PROVIDE THE ESTIMATED SIZE OF THE TARGET POPULATION. Sixty.

SAMPLE:

O DESCRIBE THE RATIONALE AND PROCEDURES FOR SELECTING THE SURVEY SAMPLE (PROVIDE JUSTIFICATION FOR SAMPLING WITHIN SUBGROUPS, IF PROPOSED)

Only the perspective of the Commander is germane to identifying his critical information requirements. Commands were chosen because they are charged with prosecuting a campaign or with supporting the Joint warfighting commander.

O PROVIDE THE SUGGESTED SIZE OF THE FINAL OBTAINED SAMPLE (SUBGROUPS AND TOTAL) AND THE DESIRED SAMPLING ERROR. (INDICATE OVER-SAMPLING FOR ANTICIPATED NON-RESPONSE.)

identified. However, since much of the data is judgmental and open-ended, statistical relevance and confidence levels are not sought for each item in the survey.

ADMINISTRATION: DESCRIBE METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION, COMMAND EFFORT REQUIRED, AND TIME REQUIRED FOR RESPONDENT TO COMPLETE SURVEY.

Data collection will be manual. Respondent will be asked to check the appropriate block or provide expository comments. The student researcher will analyze and categorize the information for generation into the common user format for further analysis and future war games. Respondents should complete the survey in less than two hours.

INSTRUMENT: ATTACH DRAFT OF SURVEY INSTRUMENT, LETTER OF INSTRUCTION TO ADMINISTRATORS, AND PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT (IF APPLICABLE)

DATA ANALYSIS PLAN: DESCRIBE MANNER OF DATA PROCESSING AND STATISTICAL PROCEDURES TO BE USED.

Information requirements will be catalogued by source and provider. Time requirements will be computed for the arithmetic mean, identifying the extremes as: provide no earlier than/no later.

DISTRIBUTION OF SURVEY RESULTS:

RELEASE OF DATA BY SSC-NCR

<u>xxx</u>	Release data to any requestor/media.
	Release data only to those requestors/media specified below.
	Release of data is not desired. Specify reason:

APPENDIX 2

PROPOSED PLAN OF ACTION AND MILESTONES

The recommendation to develop the Warfighting CINC's critical information requirements recognizes the complexity and dynamics of the decision process at this level. It also recognizes that a definition might be achieved quickly by asking carefully prepared questions. However, the results must be used, observed, and validated over time in order to attain reasonable certainty concerning the usefulness of the defined requirements.

Therefore, this proposal seeks to define those requirements over a multiyear period - in three parts with seven distinct phases.

Part I is single phased. During this period, the initial survey was designed and this paper was written. The phase concludes with validation of the pilot survey and documenting the results.

Part II has four phases. In phase II, we survey the Warfighting CINCs; current and those former CINCs who participate. The results are collected by region and documented in a research paper. Results of this survey are also used in USAWC wargaming exercises with observation collected, analyzed, and provided to the appropriate CINC. The Joint Staff receives a report on the survey results which will conclude this phase.

In phase III, we survey the functional Unified and the Specified CINCs. The results are collected, compared to the requirements identified by the Warfighting CINCs, and form the basis of a research paper. USAWC wargaming exercises use these requirements; pertinent observations are then reported back to the CINCsl. The Joint Staff receives a report on the survey results which will conclude this phase.

During phase IV, we survey the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Component Commanders. Their perspectives are compared to the requirements of the CINCs and the USAWC wargaming execises are adjusted as appropriate. The analysis forms the basis for a student research paper, and the conclusions are provided to all participants. The Joint Staff receives a report on the results of the survey which will conclude this phase.

During phase V, we survey the major combatant Commanders listed in Annex D to Appendix 1. The survey may need to be adjusted to facilitate the operational/tactical orientation of these commanders. The results are then analyzed with

conclusions reported back to all participants. Where appropriate, the USAWC wargaming exercises are adjusted. A student research paper reports on the overall findings. The Joint Staff receives a report on the results of the survey which will conclude this phase.

Part III has two phases. In phase VI, we distribute consolidated requirements and conclusions from analysis to the survey participants for their comment and verification. The verified feedback is incorporated into a student research paper and forms the basis for changing the USAWC wargaming exercises. Observations from the exercise are documented and a report is made to the Joint Staff. By this time, we should have a set of requirements that is rather refined.

In phase VII, we distribute the updated consolidated requirements back to the survey participants for validation. The results of this validation process form the baseline CINC requirements. They will be used to update the USAWC wargaming exercises and form the basis of a student research paper. A final report to the Joint Staff will include specific recommendations concerning perpetual updating of the CINC' requirements.

The student research paper prepared in each phase will include analysis of the CINC's requirements, comparison with other requirements available at that juncture, conclusions, and recommendations. These recommendations will be provided for consideration by the Joint Staff as they are made.

ANNEX A: TIME LINES OF IMPLEMENTATION

ANNEX A

MILESTONES AND TIME LINES OF IMPLEMENTATION

MILESTONES:

PART ONE: JUNE 1989

PART TWO:

PHASE II: JUNE 1990

PHASE III: JUNE 1991

PHASE IV: JUNE 1992

PHASE V: JUNE 1993

PART THREE:

PHASE VI: JUNE 1994

PHASE VII: JUNE 1995

TIMELINES: THE CHARTS ON THE FOLLOWING PAGES DEPICT THE PROPOSED TIMES AND DURATION OF IMPLEMENTATION OF EACH PHASE.

JOINT COMMANDER'S CRITICAL WARFIGHTING INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS -- INITIAL PROJECT

Jun , £ 9

Ε, 40, 20, АВ9 89 F3 Α 48, 78,0 PILOT SURVEY Feb 89 J♣7 89 A PART ONE - RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BRIEF JCS J3/PILOT SURVEY UALIDATE PILOT SURUEY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FINAL PAPER 1ST DRAFT 2ND DRAFT RESEARCH PHASE I

PART TWO - DATA COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, AND INCORPARATION INTO WARGAMES JOINT COMMANDER'S CRITICAL WARFIGHTING INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS--LONG RANGE PROJECT

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	PHASE 11 (AY90)	REUIEW PHASE I RESULTS	REVISE SURVEY	SURVEY WARFIGHTING CINCS (UNIFIED/SUBUNIFIED CMDS)	ANALYZE DATA	INCORPORATE INTO WARGAMES	PREPARE PAPER	BRIEF JCS J3	PHASE 111 (AY91)		SURVEY FUNCTIONAL UNIFIED CINCS AND SPECIFIED CINCS	PNALYZE DATA	INCORPORATE INTO WARGAMES	PREPARE PAPER	BRIEF JCS J3

JOINT COMMANDER'S CRITICAL WARFIGHTING INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS--LONG RANGE PROJECT

PART TWO (CON'T)

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PHASE IU (AY92)			-
REUIEW PHASE I, II, & III RESULTS	I		
SURVEY JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, AND COMPONENT COMMANDERS OF WARFIGHTING CINCS	I		
ANALYZE DATA		I	
INCORPORATE INTO WARGAMES		I	
PREPARE PAPER		I	
BRIEF JCS J3		I	
PHASE U (AY93)			
REUIEW PHASE I, II, AL IU		I	
SURVEY MAJOR WARFIGHTING COMMANDS		Ī	
ANALYZE DATA		Ι	
INCORPORATE INTO WARGAMES		1	
PREPARE PAPER		1	_
BRIEF JCS J3			I

JOINT COMMANDER' CRITICAL WARFIGHTING INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS--LONG RANGE PROJECT

PART THREE - UERIFICATION

	SOND JFMAMJJASOND JF	F M A M J J A
PHASE UI (AY94)		
REUIEW PHASE I THROUGH U	I	
CONSOLIDATE AND CATEGORIZE CINC WARFIGHTING REQUIREMENTS	I	
DISTRIBUTE CONSOLIDATED REQUIREMENTS TO SURVEY PARTICIPANTS FOR COMMENT		
REUIEW COMMENTS/INCORPORATE CHANGES TO WARGAMES	I	
PREPARE PAPER		
BRIEF JCS J3	I	
PHASE UII (AY95)		
REUIEW PHASE UII AND JLASS 94	I	
CONSOLIDATE AND CATEGORIZE CINC	I	
DISTRIBUTE CONSOLIDATED REGUIREMENTS TO SURVEY PARTICIPANTS FOR COMMENT		
REUIEW COMMENTS/INCORPORATE CHANGES TO WARGAMES		I
PREPARE PAPER (MAKE RECOMMENDATION FOR MECHANISM TO CONTINUE CHANGING WARGAMES AS REQUIRED)	<u>.</u>	I
BRIEF JCS J3		I