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This study debates the utility of USAR training divisions and recommends dramatic structural and doctrinal changes which would enable these units (which contain approximately 15% of all drilling Reservists) to be a viable combat multiplier in the total force structure of the 1990s and beyond.

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

THE MISSION OF THE TRAINING DIVISIONS IN THE
1990s AND BEYOND



An Individual Study Project
Intended for Publication

by

LTC Robert A. Lee (Author)

LTC Duane E. Williams, FA
Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College
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ABSTRACT

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The Soviet Union has taken bold initiatives by unilaterally reducing conventional military forces in Europe. The upcoming conventional arms reduction talks considered in light of a perceived lessening of east-west tensions and increasing budget concerns throughout the west will undoubtedly lead to a reduction of U.S. forward deployed forces. Over the next decade or so the U.S. military strategy of forward deployed forces will most likely become a strategy of forward deployable reinforcements. Due to political and economic factors the U.S. will no longer be able to afford as large an Active Component Army as it has since World War II.

Active Component end-strength will be severely reduced, but in order to maintain an adequate defense most of the structure will be retained in the Reserve Components. The Reserves should be restructured with an intent to gain flexibility as well as increase the national military readiness posture.

This study debates the utility of USAR training divisions and recommends dramatic structural and doctrinal changes which would enable these units (which contain approximately 15% of all drilling reservists) to be a viable combat multiplier in the total force structure of the 1990s and beyond. (KF) C-

INTRODUCTION

On December 7, 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev, President of the Soviet Union, startled the world with his proclamation of unilateral Warsaw Pact military force reductions. Gorbachev advised the West that the Warsaw Pact forces would be restructured to form a defensive posture in Europe. So far, only a general framework of the restructuring has been mentioned, not the specific measures. Gorbachev has stated that the basic premise of Soviet conventional arms reduction initiatives is to create "such a structure of the armed forces of a state that they would be sufficient to repulse a possible aggression but would not be sufficient for the conduct of offensive operations."¹ As a related issue the Soviets intend to rule out the possibility of surprise attack.² Gorbachev is nudging the Soviet Union down the road to economic recovery through his program of "perestroika," but military expenditures have taken a heavy toll on the Soviet economy by usurping a large proportion of funds available for industrial investment and in laying priority claim to scarce scientific manpower and high technology supplies.³

The hope for increased Soviet integration into the world economy plays a significant role in Gorbachev's domestic plans and, unlike Brezhnev, he realizes that trade, credits, and tech-

nology transfers will be hindered if the Europeans perceive a looming Soviet military threat.⁴

SOVIET INTENTIONS

The Soviets face a many-faceted dilemma: first, they must improve their ability to compete in the field of military technology; second, they must restructure their economy; and lastly, they cannot afford to bargain from a position of perceived weakness. They cannot accomplish all at once.

"The Soviets believe that détente reduces the will of Western publics to compete."⁵ Simply put, if Gorbachev significantly reduces or eliminates "the threat" and touts peaceful endeavors, the West will be less likely to fund such measures as Strategic Defense Initiatives (SDI) or Competitive Strategies systems. "By reducing the level of forces on the European continent, the Soviets seek to manage Western perception of the conventional threat in order to keep both the level of new NATO systems and the will to consider deploying them low. At the same time the Soviet Union would gain time for its own breathing space (*peredyshka*), which would permit perestroika to go forward in those areas that contribute to the overall strength of the Soviet economy and to the restructuring of Soviet defense industries to account for newly emerging technologies."⁶

If the Soviet economy does not improve its technology base it will not be able to compete with the pace of change driven by the dynamic economies of the West.⁷ The Soviets have elected to revitalize the economy as a whole in order to support

future defense requirements. "Rather than seeing this decision as a choice between guns or butter, it might be more useful to pose the choices as between guns now or guns later."⁸ It is not only possible but is indeed probable that after their economy has been built up they will then increase the war machine.

Instead of allowing themselves to fall further behind technologically and to lose the ability to defend their homeland, they might wait until NATO is complacent and vulnerable and then mount an all-out conventional attack. Such an action, if successful, would have the two-pronged effect of protecting the Soviet Union from armed aggression and of providing the Soviets with the Western European technological base they would need.

CONSIDERATIONS ON RESTRUCTURING U.S. FORCES

Coincident with the Soviet initiatives are rumblings of change in U.S. force structure. 1987 saw an Army end-strength reduction of 10,000 spaces, which was the first time in years that strength had been reduced. The newly generated political climate created by Gorbachev's initiatives combined with the already existing U.S. federal budget deficit has created an opportune political exigency where both military spending and military manpower will undoubtedly be further reduced.

Regardless of Soviet intentions, the public perception in the West is likely to be one of such optimism that politicians will be hard pressed to continue to support expensive defense budgets. Policy makers of both American parties will be more

likely than ever to press for a diminished share in what is viewed chiefly as Europe's defense.⁹

When peaceful overtures are being made, Western politicians simply will not allow themselves to be outdone. Instead of emphasizing the true nature of the unilateral force reductions by the Soviets, Western nations will applaud and demand similar actions from their policy makers. If the threat of surprise attack is removed, the foundation strategy of "forward deployed forces" would indeed have limited credibility and will require reevaluation.

It is almost axiomatic that the 1990s will see dramatic cuts in defense spending. There have already been estimates of budget cuts for the current 5-year plan which exceed 300 billion dollars.¹⁰ "We can and should adjust to a changing threat, but to changing capabilities, not merely to stated intentions."¹¹

In an effort to ensure that, as a minimum, parity continues to exist between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, it is imperative that we reevaluate the overall force structure of the Army before withdrawal of any forces from Europe or any other reduction of U.S. forces.¹² If heavy units were to be returned to stateside, the speed with which they could be redeployed would probably be a matter of months (unless they are converted to rapid deployment forces). Conventional force reductions in Central Europe must be such that the U.S. and NATO do not get caught up in the euphoria of peace prospects to the extent that they denigrate force structure past a point of "no return."

Congressmen have already voted to close military facilities across the United States and continue to look for other ways of trimming the military budget. It is highly unlikely that Active Component forces removed from overseas would remain part of the Active end-strength. If the cuts do, in fact, occur, the logical and economical alternative will be the shift of more missions to the Reserve Components. It will be vitally important to ensure that the budget and equipment to perform those missions are also shifted.¹³ Several plausible proposals have already been made which consider changes that reduce the Active Component forces by making them part of the active, standby reserve forces.¹⁴ "Greater reliance on reserve forces is unavoidable; they are perhaps the best defense bargain available."¹⁵

DO WE STILL HAVE THE LUXURY OF TIME ON OUR SIDE?

In past wars the United States has had ample time to mobilize forces. Prior to World War II, over 370,000 Reserve Component officers and men were activated more than a year before World War II was declared.¹⁶ Most planners predict any future war in Central Europe would be a "come as you are," quick war with no time to expand the size of the Army.¹⁷ Even the Soviets expect the initial period of the next war to shorten as a result of improved weaponry and surprise.¹⁸ Additionally, the Soviets are concerned they cannot win a long war due to our mobilization capability over a protracted period.

Even upon receipt of long-term warning that a massive buildup is required à la World War II, there is little question

that both the president and congress would be loath to commence full or total mobilization without an attack already having occurred. Just as the Israelis withheld mobilizing their full force immediately prior to the '73 Arab-Israeli War due to cost factors, so might the U.S. hesitate to commence "total" or even "full" mobilization in order to gear up for a perceived confrontation in the distant future. Additionally, any mobilization order could tend to have a destabilizing effect on the existing situation. The National Command Authority might delay invoking mobilization orders due to this destabilizing effect, thus almost ensuring only limited time for mobilization.

Past wars have shown that we can train soldiers faster than we can equip them, and some estimates project 2-3 years before we could mobilize the industrial base to produce the equipment and materiel required for sustained operations. On the eve of World War II men called into service trained with sticks for guns.¹⁹ The technology of future battlefields will not afford us the luxury of training soldiers with sticks. The trainees will have to be taught using the actual equipment or sophisticated simulators, and the trainers will obviously have to be equipment experts. Needless to say, in many cases the more complex the equipment the longer the training time. If we reduce Active Component combat forces there will be a corresponding increase in the front-end requirement of the Army Program for Individual Training (ARPRINT) which cannot be satisfied by the current U.S. Initial Entry Training (IET) capability. Trained

combat units will be needed in the initial stages of any conflict, as well as individual replacements.²⁰

Even if total mobilization were ordered, we could well expend our war stocks before the first IET soldier is trained to fight. We currently have approximately 30 days worth of war reserve stocks, and at a cost in excess of \$2 billion per day's stockage it is unlikely we will increase our war reserves prior to an outbreak of war. In other words, we will need to win a short conventional war before it becomes necessary to revert to nuclear war.

What we need are inexpensive forces which could add immediate impact to any confrontation.

ENTER THE TRAINING DIVISION

The USAR has 100% of the training divisions in the force structure.²¹ They are organized to expand the existing training base and conduct post-mobilization training in the event of a war pursuant to a full or total mobilization. They primarily conduct basic training (BT) and either one-station unit training (OSUT) or advanced individual training (AIT) in armor, cavalry, infantry, engineers, and artillery skills; although there are some units which conduct combat support and combat service support training as well.²²

This was not always the case. In World War II there were no training divisions as we know them today; instead, the training divisions were made up of experienced officers and enlisted men who were withdrawn from existing divisions. Reception sta-

tions then sent new recruits directly to their divisions where the "unit which trained together fought together." The time required from activation until a unit was combat ready was 10-12 months.²³

In the Korean War, four entire combat divisions were converted and used as training divisions. Guardsmen, draftees, and volunteers were shuttled in and out of these units to Korea and elsewhere to supplement the Army's rotation policy.²⁴ After the Korean demobilization the Army Reserve continued to contain combat divisions, and each reserve unit trained its own soldiers in initial skills. This ended with the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, which mandated that all reserve personnel receive initial training at active Army training facilities. By the end of FY 59, the Army Reserve totaled over 1,000,000 members, but only 301,796 were in paid drill status. Their units included 10 infantry divisions, 13 infantry training divisions, 63 combat battalions, and numerous other miscellaneous units. The years 1961-1968 were very turbulent for the reserve forces. During this period, basically all of the combat units, including combat divisions, were removed from the Army Reserve force.²⁵

When established, USAR training divisions were created out of the recognition that "trained reserve units must be available for deployment immediately, not 9 to 12 months later."²⁶ As we approach the 21st century it is obvious that the mobilization mission of training divisions is inconsistent with the short warning scenario between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. It is time

that we evaluate this 30-year-old training division concept in light of future mid-to-high intensity European theater conflicts.

USAR training divisions have practically no equipment or training ammunition. It is particularly ironic that the Reserve M-1 tank training battalions are still equipped with M-60 A3 tanks and the only M-3 training squadron has never been allocated 25 mm. ammunition for either familiarization or qualification of its cadre trainers. Although training unit cadre might be used as filler personnel for combat units during mobilization, they are primarily trained at MOS skill level one, since that is what they teach. For years training units were denied the opportunity to conduct "tactical training," although some units incorporated tactics under the guise of "MOS enhancement training." Now that Skill Qualification Test (SQT) scores are considered in the promotion process of Reserve Component NCOs, it is essential that they receive training commensurate with their skill identification level. It is also a moral imperative of commanders that they ensure their soldiers, especially those cadre members who might be selected as filler personnel in combat units, receive as much tactical training as they possibly can. Besides, it just makes sense that those cadre personnel who are tactically proficient make better trainers. They are more confident and they are better able to answer the "what if" questions of the soldiers they train.

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC's) recently conceived initial entry training (IET) strategy calls for training to "become oriented to more realistic combat envi-

ronments and (be) aligned with AirLand Battle doctrine." As the strategy evolves, "training on field training exercises (FTXs) will take on even more significance."²⁷ The better equipped and trained the USAR training units are, the better they will be able to assume their new training responsibilities. The more technologically complex our future equipment, the more time USAR training units will need to train and the more equipment they will require. Having only ten tanks or fighting vehicles per brigade will be woefully insufficient.

HOW SHOULD THE DIVISIONS BE STRUCTURED?

One thing is certain. We can much better afford to keep a training division out of the fighting in the next war than we can a combat division. Thus, units which train IET soldiers should remain in the force structure in the event we do become involved in a protracted war. However, they should become more flexible in order to provide a wider range of employment options to the National Command Authority.

If we withdraw an armored division and/or a mechanized infantry division from Europe and demobilize (disband) them, I propose they be distributed among USAR training divisions as brigade slices of both men and equipment.

If through Conventional Stability Talks (CST), Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) talks or for whatever reason we return the equipment to Continental United States (CONUS) and do not leave it in POMCUS, then in the case of armor (for example), each of the three armored training divisions would be restructured by

converting one training brigade to a combat brigade similar to National Guard round-out brigades. Likewise, divisional Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) personnel and equipment would be distributed as equitably as possible so as to maintain support integrity. Much of the divisional staff structure could be assimilated into the training division with the primary mission of preparing and conducting tactical training and exercises.

By giving a training division a brigade's worth of equipment, the entire division would benefit. Most training divisions have at least three brigades and, since reservists train primarily on weekends and during two-week segments each year, use of the equipment could be spread out so that the two other training brigades would also have an opportunity to train on the equipment. Restructuring would also permit rotation of officers and NCOs between the training brigades and the combat brigade to gain needed combat skills. If such a proposal is accepted, then it should be merely a matter of time until the remaining training divisions with infantry specific MOSs are restructured to contain either a mechanized or light infantry brigade. Although it isn't probable that a low intensity conflict (LIC) would call for using Reserve light infantry units when there are Active Components available, if the situation required additional forces in excess of the capability of the Active Components they would be available almost immediately.

WHAT ARE POSSIBLE ROLES FOR THE TRAINING DIVISIONS IN THE 1990s AND BEYOND?

Modernization of forces cannot just mean modernization of equipment. The missions of the forces which use the equipment must also be modernized if we are to continue to deter or prevail if necessary.

As currently configured, training divisions produce an end product which is basically unacceptable for immediate employment in a mid-to-high intensity combat environment. The soldier who completes IET has basic combat skills but does not possess the necessary skills to function as a unit member. For these soldiers to become an asset to a combat unit instead of a liability they currently need several weeks of additional crew, squad, team and platoon training. By and large, the training cadre do not possess crew, squad, team or platoon related skills and existing IET POIs do not require them to gain such skills. In the high intensity, rapid mobility battlefield envisioned for the 1990s and beyond, we will need soldiers or units that can be inserted into the fray and have immediate impact with little or no additional unit train-up after mobilization. Unless changes are made in IET POIs and in requirements for tactical knowledge on the part of Training Division cadre, we could not, in good conscience, employ soldiers who have completed IET only nor can we use their inadequately trained instructors, the Drill Sergeants and other cadre of the USAR training units, as filler personnel. It is morally imperative that we adequately train our soldiers to fight before we send them off to war.

If the training division is modified to include a full TOE Brigade and support forces as previously mentioned, the National Command Authority would have at its disposal twelve divisions capable of performing any one of several different missions, depending upon the priorities of the particular situation:

(1) Provide AC combat units with a Continuous Operations (CONOPS) capability. Under this mission, divisional units could function as substitutes or add-on forces for units involved in combat. Company- or battalion-sized units of the "combat brigade" could be deployed overseas (less organizational equipment) via air within the first three days of conflict to join with forward deployed forces to give them a CONOPS capability.

In World War II we performed CONOPS through two basic methods: First, we fought mostly in the daytime and slept at night, and secondly, we pulled entire units off line and replaced them for extended periods with fresh, refitted and reconstituted units. With current night vision capabilities it is doubtful that we can capitalize on the night to rest soldiers, and during the first weeks or months of an armed conflict with the Soviets it is highly unlikely we will have sufficient forces to withdraw entire divisions from contact to allow them to rest. The equipment of today and of the future will outlast the personnel who use it. In order to capitalize upon this quality we need to provide personnel around the clock to fight, refuel, rearm, maintain and perform repair. By doing this we can take advantage

of the nighttime and fight the enemy when and where it is most favorable to us and least favorable to him.

Current mobilization planning does not adequately address the total force impact of CONOPS in a mid-to-high intensity environment.²⁸ The Army recognizes the requirement for 24-hour per day combat but does not systematically incorporate this requirement into doctrine and force structure.²⁹ Present unit TO&E's which have been based on long experience in noncontinuous operations will have to be changed to provide the capabilities called for by this new mode of warfare.³⁰

We cannot perform continuous operations with a system which just produces individual replacements. What we need is a system that provides field commanders with units which can replace other units and staffs when they need rest.

If training divisions were restructured to include a combat brigade, the brigade's units and staffs could be configured in the CONOPS concept. The "crew replacement concept" would become the company or battalion "augmentation concept." Substitutions could be made at the rear of the main battle engagement areas by either shuttling platoons, companies or battalions in and out of the fight depending upon the intensity of the battle, not unlike substitutions in a basketball game. Ideally most of the unit training would be done at night and, when possible, habitually with an AC unit.

Staff personnel could be trained on war fighting tasks similarly to the way it is currently done in the various Maneuver Training Commands (MTCs) and would become battalion,

brigade or division staff substitutes. CSS units could be formed into organizations similar to race car pit crews to provide proactive, anticipatory teams which would rearm, refuel and maintain the equipment and personnel each time a transfer is made.

In this option, organizational equipment left behind would be used by the remaining training base units in the conduct of their IET missions.

An approach similar to this has already been adopted by West Germany. On February 23, 1988, the West German Federal Minister of Defense approved a proposal for "Army Force Structure 2000," which would reduce the active military strength and establish battalions consisting of three Active Component companies and one Reserve Component company. The Reserve Component organizational equipment is to be housed and maintained by the active units and the reservists will fall-in on their equipment during training periods as well as in the event of mobilization. This system allows the German AC and RC counterparts to train together on the very terrain they would defend in war. A similar training strategy already exists in the U.S. Army in the form of Overseas Deployment Training (ODT).

The CONOPS units should have habitual, counterpart or cohort-type relationships with AC units with whom they train on an annual basis. Instead of attending reforger-type exercises CONOPS units would fly as close as possible to their cohort unit's location and perform CONOPS Field Training Exercises (FTXs) during Annual Training (AT) periods. Such a relationship would allow the RC members to train on terrain where they would

fight and would create camaraderie and trust between the RC and AC.

U.S. strategy of 10 divisions in 10 days, if it ever becomes possible, still does not provide our forces with a CONOPS capability. The Soviets have solved the CONOPS problem through echelonment of forces. We still have not, although CONOPS is a topic which seriously affects our ability to fight a prolonged conflict. The Army is just beginning to analyze the CONOPS problem and the preliminary consensus is that the human factors portion of CONOPS will have to be met by the Reserve components. We simply can't afford to include the additional personnel required in the Active force.

Training divisions are ideally suited for the CONOPS role since they are already organized to operate as companies, unlike National Guard units which intend to retain unit integrity at Battalion or higher levels. Additionally, Army Reserve units pose no legal problem in training or employment missions such as the ones presently generated by some states on behalf of their National Guard units.

By establishing CONOPS-capable brigades for each of the 12 training divisions we would in effect be providing an additional four divisions worth of CONOPS capability for the high intensity battlefield.

(2) The two or three "training brigades" would continue to conduct their BT/AIT/OSUT mission. If the situation is such that additional combat forces are not needed immediately, then the combat brigade could still perform the IET mission.

Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) members and military retirees who might initially have been selected for the combat theater, but whose functions would have been assumed by the various combat brigades, could now be formed up and trained for several weeks to assume duties as commanders, staff instructors and drill sergeants; in effect taking the place of the deployed brigades. Their training could be accomplished in part during peacetime through a dedicated affiliation program and immediately following mobilization during the period before the training base expands to full capacity. There would be several weeks available when many of the training base cadre are bringing their own skills up to the required level and the IRR and retirees could take part in this scheduled training.

(3) Provide an instructional base for teaching skill levels 3-4. Soldiers in the IRR could receive either reclassification training from one MOS to another or could receive refresher training in their existing MOS. Most of this training is currently scheduled to be taught by the various MOS proponent schools. Since these personnel have already had IET and some sort of military service, their training would only take 3-5 weeks. These soldiers would provide a much earlier individual replacement pool than IET trainees and they would be prepared to perform at higher, more critical MOS skill levels.

Or, as previously mentioned, these IRR personnel could become training base cadre thereby freeing up companies of the combat brigade to do other missions.

(4) Be employed as part of the FORSCOM CONUS Defense Forces. Although the forward deployed forces' defensive strategy reduces the risk of CONUS combat, it cannot be, and has not been, ruled out. There is, as a minimum, the possibility of terrorist or "spetznatz" activity, in the support of global warfare, which would be aimed at hindering our mobilization and sustainment efforts. In World War II we had in excess of 250,000 men earmarked for CONUS defense. FORSCOM currently has only 18 Military Police battalions dedicated to this mission.

Due to their widespread geographic configuration and depending upon mission priorities, the combat brigades could be employed as company or smaller units for the protection of key assets and facilities.

(5) Act as a round-out brigade for an existing AC division or as a component brigade for a division to be formed after M-Day.

(6) Army Long Range Planning Guidance (ALRPG) requires development of a process for establishing new units upon mobilization. We currently have no meaningful method for establishing additional combat divisions beyond the 28 currently in the force. Although the concept of employing a training division headquarters as the core around which to build additional combat divisions is beyond the scope of this article, for the following reasons such a proposal would be enhanced if the divisions contained a combat brigade during peacetime:

(a) Division personnel would have an opportunity during peacetime to train on equipment they would use in combat.

(b) Staff personnel could be rotated through the combat brigade to learn combat staffing procedures as well as Airland Battle (future) tactics.

(c) The training brigades would have the expertise to train both IET and IRR personnel to fill out their cadre units as was done in previous wars.

(d) If the combat brigade is employed in the CONOPS role, the equipment left behind could supply the needs of one of the newly formed brigades thereby reducing the requirement to manufacture equipment for each unit. Two of the brigades could be outfitted with equipment and one could provide staff and fighters for the CONOPS role. Although the divisions would be smaller (i.e., two equipped brigades instead of three), this is in keeping with the ALRPG, which envisions smaller, more mobile units with more destructive power.

PROS AND CONS

With the exception of the first mission (IET), the above proposed missions are employment options which currently do not exist to any appreciable extent within the Reserve components.

If we decrease AC combat divisions and restructure the RC with a larger number of combat divisions, we must then develop new facilities or expand existing facilities in which to house them. Most units are housed in company-sized armories and train as individual companies. Choosing the appropriate sites would be a political nightmare, especially if the units were placed in one geographic region. Training divisions are already spread out

over numerous states and are found in countless congressional districts within these states. Due to their dispersal throughout the continental U.S., the plus-up of training divisions would be a more palatable political alternative than locating entire divisions at one site. Recruiting is also easier if divisional units are not located together.³¹

A negative aspect of spreading equipment all over the countryside is limited access to major training areas. USAR company- and battalion-sized units usually do not have adequate training or motor pool space, especially in urban areas. This article recognizes this limiting factor, but also notes that National Guard combat units have similar problems and are apparently able to overcome them.

One problem with Reserve units being slated as the solution to the CONOPS dilemma is the degree of readiness they would be able to maintain in order to augment the deployed active forces within three days of conflict onset. It can logically be concluded that the 38-39 days of training for Reservists per year cannot guarantee the quality of training that 365 available training days afford the Active Component. The obvious solution is "more is better." A large percentage of Reservists in training divisions already perform more than 39 days of duty, much of it in an unpaid status. Since the "combat brigades" would contain a relatively small percentage of the RC force structure, they could (similar to Air Force Reserve pilots) be required to perform additional training. An additional weekend per quarter and an additional week of Annual Training would increase training

time by 38% at a fraction of the annual training budget. Additionally, more use could be made of training simulation devices such as SIMNET and UCOFT.

The Army made the decision to increase Active Component combat divisions from 16 to 18 during increasing budget years, but now the pressure to reduce national debt, coupled with the popular perception of lessened east-west tensions, brought on particularly by Gorbachev's initiatives, have created a foreboding of reduced defense funding.³² There is no certainty that force cuts will be made, but the Army cannot afford to be "hollow" again.

Army Long Range Planning Guidance (ALRPG) anticipates a reduced manpower pool and advances in technology which are likely to result in smaller but more effective Army units.³³ Additionally, the most recent Wartime Manpower Planning System (WARMAPS) study projected nearly a 40% reduction by 1994 in individual replacement requirements at M+180.³⁴ If we are to plan for smaller future units and fewer casualties, then it stands to reason that we should also plan for fewer immediate replacements and fewer training companies to train those lesser numbers of replacements.

Although the restructuring of the training division is not a panacea, if AC combat divisions are reduced, training divisions are a logical force to be restructured. In an era of ever-increasing reliance on Reserve forces we cannot afford units whose only mission is to train IET soldiers at skill level 1. This is simply not a good defense bargain.

Studies suggest that the condition in which one initially confronts the enemy is much more significant to the outcome of the battle than the condition one can ultimately attain through mobilization.³⁵

We have 12 divisions which will be useful only if we have a war which lasts more than six months. Considering present economic factors and Army Long Range Planning Guidance it seems unwise not to take full advantage of some of the myriad of employment opportunities available for Training Divisions.

¹ Snyder, Jack. "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options." Reprinted by permission. War National Policy and Strategy Course, Vol. IV, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 6 September 1988, p. 106.

² Ibid., p. 100, note 8.

³ Ibid., p. 100, note 7.

⁴ Ibid., p. 107.

⁵ Hines, John G.; Peterson, Philip A.; Trulock, Notra. "Soviet Military Theory from 1945-2000: Implications for NATO." Washington Quarterly, Fall 1986, pp. 126-127.

⁶ Kipp, Jacob W. "Soviet Military Doctrine and Conventional Arms Control." Military Review, December 1988, pp. 13-14.

⁷ Hines, p. 130.

⁸ Hines, p. 129.

⁹ MacGregor, Douglas A. "Conventional Force Reductions on German Soil: A Concrete Proposal." Parameters, December 1988, p. 81.

¹⁰ Pellerin, Cheryl. "Nunn Sees Defense Cuts of \$325 Billion." Washington Post (Washington), 24 October 1988, p. 1.

¹¹ Vuono, Carl E. "Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee." Washington, U.S., 3 February 1988.

¹² This article does not attempt to address which U.S. forces should be withdrawn from Europe. For an opinion that an armored division should be withdrawn see: MacGregor, p. 89.

¹³ ROA National Security Report. Wrap-Up, Gorbachev Takes Drastic Step Dec. 7. Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1989.

¹⁴ Major MacGregor, at p. 89, recommends removal of the equivalent of an armored division from Europe and converting it to an active reserve status. See also, Sullivan, Bloomer D. "Future European
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Battlefield." Military Review, July 1988, p. 56 (author's note). LTC Sullivan's article recommends force structure changes to incorporate light infantry units equipped with those weapons most usable in military operations on urban terrain (MOUT). He recommended several methods for "paying the bills" of additional units, one of which was "incorporating the forces into the reserve components as high-priority deployers with POMCUS equipment." Also see: Maze, Rick. "Aspin urges cut in training funds." Air Force Times, 23 January 1989, p. 4.

¹⁵Record, Jeffrey. Revising U.S. Military Strategy, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., Pergamon-Brassey's, International Defense Publishers, 1984, p. 113.

¹⁶Stuckey, John D. and Pistorious, Joseph H., Mobilization of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve: Historical Perspective and the Vietnam War. U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1984, p. 11.

¹⁷Williams, Gage J. "Are U.S. Army Company Commanders Too Young?" Military Review, November 1988, p. 54.

¹⁸Glantz, David M. "Surprise and Maskirovka." Military Review, December 1988, p. 51.

¹⁹Huston, James A. Sinews of War, Army Logistics 1775-1953, Army Historical Series, Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington, 1966.

²⁰The Army has recognized a need for trained unit replacement packages and has already implemented a new personal replacement system (Unit Manning System). See "New package manning system on the way." Army Times, 27 February 1989, p. 4.

²¹"Defense 88." Almanac, September/October 1988, p. 16.

²²Alvord, Harold F., LTC, Mobilization Training Base Expansion: Structure and Readiness Implications. Thesis. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 16 March 1987. (SL AD-B 112-171L)

²³Stuckey, p. 11.

²⁴Stuckey, p. 13.

²⁵ Stuckey, p. 11.

²⁶ Stuckey, p. 15.

²⁷ Hansel, Charles R. and Bach, Bruce. F. "Take Charge! The Initial Entry Training Strategy." Military Review, October 1988, p. 64.

²⁸ Briefing to U.S. Army War College Mounted Warfare Study-2004 Group, by Mobilization Division, Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, Department of the Army, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 6 May 1988.

²⁹ U.S. Department of the Army, Continuous Operations Study (CONOPS), Final Report, CACDA, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: 21 April 1987.

³⁰ Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Continuous Land Combat, Arlington, VA, September 1977, p. 16.

³¹ Carroll, Frederick A., Jr., Headquarters, TRADOC, Memorandum, Subject: Reserve Component Augmentation, 13 January 1989.

³² Ross, Jimmie D. "Logistics - A Vision for the Future." Army Logistician, July/August 1988.

³³ Army Long Range Planning Guidance 1998-2008. U.S. Department of the Army Memorandum, Washington, p. 14.

³⁴ U.S. Army Concepts and Analysis Agency. Wartime Manpower Planning System FY 90 and FY 94 (WARMAPS 90/94), Bethesda, MD, July 1988, p. 1-7.

³⁵ Briefing, 6 May 1988.