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Much has been written about command climate during the Vietnam war. Criticisms abound regarding the one-year rotation policy and the six-month command tour. Moreover, the officer corps has been attacked by many for a careerist, selfish approach to Vietnam service. Notwithstanding, first-hand accounts of command climate experiences and attitudes from officers who served as combat company commanders are rare. This account is drawn from 300 extensive interviews with majors, lieutenant colonels and colonels who, as young officers, had served in combat in Vietnam. The interviews were conducted over a four-month period while these officers were students at the United States Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) and the United States Army War College (USAWC). The principal focus of this paper is on the command climate relationship which existed between the 72 maneuver company commanders interviewed and their battalion commanders. Based on a review of these interviews and secondary sources, it is the author's contention that far too many maneuver battalion commanders in Vietnam had failed in their professional duty to their subordinate company commanders to establish and share with them fully and selflessly a common bond in the prosecution of the war. In the sixteen years since the last American forces were withdrawn from Vietnam, the Army has done much to rectify the kinds of senior leadership failures described in this paper. Much, however, still must be done.

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

MANEUVER COMPANY COMMANDERS AND THEIR BATTALION COMMANDERS IN VIETNAM: NO SHARED VALUE

An Individual Study Project

by

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ABSTRACT

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Much has been written about command climate during the Vietnam war. Criticisms abound regarding the one-year rotation policy and the six-month command tour. Moreover, the officer corps has been attacked by many for a careerist, selfish approach to Vietnam service. Notwithstanding, first-hand accounts of command climate experiences and attitudes from officers who served as combat company commanders are rare. This account is drawn from 300 extensive interviews with majors, lieutenant colonels and colonels who, as young officers, had served in combat in Vietnam. The interviews were conducted over a four-month period while these officers were students at the United States Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) and the United States Army War College (USAWC). The principal focus of this paper is on the command climate relationship which existed between the 72 maneuver company commanders interviewed and their battalion commanders. Based on a review of these interviews and secondary sources, it is the author's contention that far too many maneuver battalion commanders in Vietnam had failed in their professional duty to their subordinate company commanders to establish and share with them fully and selflessly a common bond in the prosecution of the war. In the sixteen years since the last American forces were withdrawn from Vietnam, the Army has done much to rectify the kinds of senior leadership failures described in this paper. Much, however, still must be done.

I recognized his voice instantly. Even with a bad radio connection, the background clatter of his helicopter and his unfamiliar call sign, I knew that it was Colonel Max trying to reach me. He had been my battalion commander for nearly six months before he changed command to become the division Inspector General. I had not seen or spoken to him in nearly four months. I had been his reconnaissance platoon leader, then took command of a rifle company ten days after his departure from the battalion. I admired him enormously. He seemed personable, intelligent and competent. He spoke nightly by radio to each of his company commanders and his reconnaissance platoon leader, reviewing the day's activities and confirming the next day's missions. His voice was engraved in my memory from those nightly sessions and the countless other radio exchanges he and I had had during scores of firefights. He was always overhead in his helicopter, seeking progress reports and providing fire support coordination as I fought the ground battle. To me, a young lieutenant who two years before coming under Colonel Max's command had been drafted into the Army from graduate school, this Infantry lieutenant colonel was a skilled, experienced military commander.

Often the other company commanders, staff officers and I who had served under Colonel Max and later under his successor, would compare the two on competence and leadership. Colonel Max would always come out immeasurably ahead of his successor, a man we considered a vain, selfish, timid careerist. We younger officers knew little of the military profession to which these two lieutenant colonels had dedicated their lives, energies and talents.

Whatever Colonel Max and his successor had endured in the Army to achieve the rank of lieutenant colonel and the position of battalion commander was unknown and irrelevant to us. We knew even less about their aspirations and the sacrifices required of them to achieve their professional goals. What mattered most to us in our relationships with our immediate bosses was how they behaved as combat battalion commanders. Did they know their jobs, put the welfare of their soldiers above their own, and have unshakable integrity? Colonel Max was beloved by all of us for measuring up to these simple, universal soldier standards.

Although I could not imagine why Colonel Max was flying in to my company command post after being away from the battalion for nearly four months, I was absolutely thrilled at the prospect of seeing him again. We sat in the small, makeshift conference room at the district headquarters compound where my company was a tenant for a few weeks conducting joint combat operations with the local Vietnamese forces. We had a beer compliments of the district senior adviser who kept a stocked refrigerator. Colonel Max looked magnificent. He had gained about twenty pounds since I last saw him at his change of command on the fire base in early January. It was now the end of April and each of us was within ninety days of completing our tours in Vietnam. As usual, Colonel Max was thoughtful--he would not discuss business until he had inquired about my wife, my parents, my soldiers.

Then he got to the point of his visit. Did I remember the lengthy firefight my reconnaissance platoon had been in the

previous October? Of course, I remembered. My platoon had been airlifted in to assist one of the rifle companies being mauled by a North Vietnamese force in a bunker complex. It had been a brutal fight, ending several hours later when the North Vietnamese Army disengaged, weary no doubt from the relentless artillery and aircraft bombardments. Two of my soldiers had been killed and six others wounded in fighting near the bunkers. After all the shooting had stopped, Colonel Max evacuated one of my badly wounded soldiers in his helicopter rather than wait for a medical evaucation helicopter to arrive. Colonel Max reviewed with me all of these and other details of that fight to be certain, he said, that we were both clear as to the specifics.

Then he asked me if I knew that he had been recommended for a valor award for his actions that day. I said no. Colonel Max went on to say that as the division Inspector General, he had discovered recently that his award recommendation had been lost or mishandled and had never been processed. Moreover, the author of that recommendation, the battalion sergeant major, had departed Vietnam and was not available to rewrite it. Since I was involved in the fight that day and remembered the details clearly, Colonel Max asked if I would sign a statement recommending him for the Silver Star.

I was stunned that Colonel Max was asking me to do that. I had little recollection of him doing anything more that day than circling overhead in his helicopter, coordinating fires and receiving radio reports. Moreover, his aircraft took no ground-

to-air fire, nor was there any firing on or around the secured landing zone where he landed briefly to on-load one of my wounded soldiers. In nine months of command, I had written many award recommendations for my soldiers but none read so eloquently as the one I was being asked to sign for Colonel Max. It sounded as though Colonel Max had single-handedly won the battle. While the award recommendation itself was overblown and unnecessary, I was more bewildered by the thought that Colonel Max was promoting himself in this way.

I asked him if I could review the statement for a few days, reword it as needed, and mail it to him. He told me he would prefer finalizing it then as such things had a way of getting lost if not handcarried. Besides, he said, as the division Inspector General, he had knowledge and instincts which suggested to him that some major operations were forthcoming and that he needed to resolve this unfinished business without delay. After changing an insignificant word or two, I signed the statement. Colonel Max quickly finished his beer, thanked me, then put the statement in his valise. As we walked to his helicopter, I could hear him talking to me about each of us soon returning to the states and rejoining our families. Just before he boarded the helicopter, he pulled me close to him and, over the noise of the rotors, warned me not to try to be a hero with fewer than ninety days to go in Vietnam.

A few days after my visit from Colonel Max, my division air assaulted into Cambodia. My first thought upon learning about the operation was that Colonel Max had known it was being planned

as he sat across from me a few days earlier. Though the fighting was heavy throughout the 59 days in Cambodia, I reflected frequently on Colonel Max's visit with me and his ulterior motives. I began to watch closely the actions of my current battalion commander and compared what he did daily to what Colonel Max had done while in command. When I had separated Colonel Max's charm and ease in dealing with people from the tasks he performed. I realized that both battalion commanders did the same things: stayed on the fire base at night, flew around in their helicopters during daylight, talking with company commanders in the jungle below, and coordinated fire support assets during firefights. I realized that neither battalion commander, nor for that matter, any member of the battalion staff or brigade headquarters, had ever spent a night in the field or participated in a daylight ground operation with either my reconnaissance platoon or rifle company. Indeed, Colonel Max rarely visited me in the field. His successor did so just twice in the six months I served under him.

The conduct of combat operations was the same regardless of who commanded the battalion: ground units moved through the jungle within designated areas, made enemy contact, maintained contact and poured on the firepower--artillery, armed helicopters and fixed wing ordnance. When the shooting stopped, friendly dead and wounded, prisoners and captured material were evacuated; reports were rendered; and vital supplies were replenished. The battalion commander then moved on to business with his other units or returned to the fire base to spend the night. Rarely did the battalion

commander descend from his perch above the battle to share with his soldiers the horror and exhilaration of jungle combat, the essence for ground soldiers of the Vietnam war.

Suddenly, in Cambodia after nine months of platoon and company commander under two battalion commanders, I had become aware that my bosses and I had never had anything in common. We had rarely truly communicated. We had simply functioned as separate entities in a seamless web of events, unfocused by a common goal. To the young company commanders with no bureaucratization, life in the jungle seemed a suspended animation, unconnected to anything which had preceeded it or to anything prorised for the future. Their exquisite sense of pride, honor, and self-worth derived instinctively from the men they led, the ones with whom they shared the war, the ones close to them in age, hardship and naivete. To the older, more sophisticated battalion commanders, it seemed to their subordinates, the war was a necessary evil to be exploited for professional experience and gain, but not to the extent of dying on the jungle floor. Colonel Max's visit within days of the Cambodian invasion had opened by eyes. Neither he nor his successor and I had any shared value.

For years after returning from Vietnam, I reflected on my relationship with these two battalion commanders. Was I alone or did other Vietnam-era maneuver company commanders experience the same lack of a shared value with their battalion commanders? If others experienced the same thing, then was there some flaw in the system itself and not just individual failing which caused these

battalion commanders to put their careers above loyalty to subordinates? If there were flaws in the system which promoted such unprofessional behavior, what were they? Finally, what has our Army done to fix these flaws and what, if anthing, still needs to be done?

My search for answers to these questions began with the Senior Officer Oral Histories at the United States Army War College (USAWC) and the United States Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC), where nearly 300 extensive interviews were conducted with majors, lieutenant colonels and colonels who had served in combat in Vietnam in a variety of capacities. Of those 300 interviews, 72 were with officers who had served as commanders of maneuver companies within maneuver battalions (airborne infantry, airmobile infantry, light infantry, mechanized infantry, armored or armored cavalry). It is upon the command climate relationships which existed between those 72 ground company commanders and their battalion commanders that this paper focuses. Based on a review of the interviews, it is my contention that far too many maneuver battalion commanders in Vietnam, regardless of when they served there or with whom, had failed in their professional duty to their subordinate company commanders to establish and share with them fully and selflessly, a common bond in the prosecution of a futile and unpopular war. By failing to share hardships, to trust, to teach, to communicate, to provide vision, to subordinate personal ambition, to be visible and approachable, and to exude dignity and integrity, some battalion commanders impeded rather than contributed

to successful combat operations and in so doing, tarnished the image of the officer corps.

Of the 72 former Vietnam-era maneuver company commanders interviewed while students at the USAWC and the USACGSC--anywhere from 10 to 18 years after their combat tours--60 percent condemned their former battalion commanders for leadership failures. The small sample size and homogeneity of the sample population aside, it is remarkable that such a high percentage of professional Army officers still in the system and still successful in it, would volunteer such candid negative assessments of the performance of their former bosses, some of whom were still in uniform or had recently retired as very senior officers at the time of the interviews. Consider the flavor and substance of responses from the thousands of Vietnam-era maneuver company commanders who might have been subjected to similar negative command climates and departed the service, never having been asked or proffered their views.

On leader integrity in his battalion in Vietnam, one former company commander, a USAWC student, recalled painfully:

> After I'd been in the company for about a month, the battalion commander called me aside and said we gotta increase the body count. I said right. We'll get more patrols out there and get as many as we could. He shook his head and said you don't understand what I'm telling you. . .He said, I want you to report more body count. . .I was really taken aback. . .I couldn't believe he was telling me to falsify the report. I had such respect for the guy. He said. . .we need to report more than you actually get. I said, sir, we can't, that would be like lying. . .He said, yes, but there are reasons for it. Well, I couldn't believe what

was happening but I went back and thought about it and actually did it for him. I compromised my integrity for this guy. If we had 3, I'd say 5. . . and I'd estimate a little higher. I did that for two or three weeks and then I got wounded so I was removed from it. I've thought about that a lot. . . and I told myself. . .that never again would I ever set my integrity aside for a superior. . .I was absolutely loyal to this guy and I would not have done anything to let him down but in doing so, I set aside my own integrity which is one of the most valuable things I had. . .I kind of believe that if other people were doing as I did and perhaps they did. . .the whole picture then was exaggerated.[2]

Said another former commander on the subject of the integrity of the several battalion commanders he served:

They wanted to make themselves look good, there's no doubt in my mind. . .These guys would come in and they didn't want to miss out on their packet, their Silver Star, their Legion of Merit, their Distinguished Flying Cross. . .and it was ludicrous. It was horrible. I had real heartburn with that, and I saw that and a lot of people did. And these guys were our senior leaders. All I can say is they got to look themselves in the mirror when they look at their decorations and ask if they really earned those things. I think our solders did; I'm not so sure that all our senior battalion and brigade commanders did.[3]

And, finally, on integrity is this succinct statement from a veteran of company command during TET of 1968:

I did not have a very pleasant experience with the battalion commander. . .I think he was very ill-prepared to lead a battalion. I question his courage and integrity.[4]

When it comes to the subject of battalion commander visibility and approachability, many former company commanders had strong negative reactions.

> My company infrequently saw the battalion commander. I think those guys should be visible at company levels, especially when the firefight is raging. . . I saw a great aloofness in Vietnam. The battalion commander was too busy doing other things and rarely got into the company area. . .They could easily have come out and rather than fly over and chew ass about security. . .or something else, maybe come down and visit with us and march for a while.[5]

Along the same lines:

> You don't see your battalion commander a lot in a combat situation in the jungle. . .You don't really get to know him very well.[6]

And,

> I served under him for about four months. . .He didn't sleep in the field; didn't even maneuver with his soldiers.[7]

Finally,

> I didn't know the man that well. He was just a guy who dropped in by helicopter every once in a while when it was very, very safe.[8]

Lack of understanding by the battalion commander of the company commander's jungle environment and its effects was another sore point highlighted in the transcripts. Moreover, company commanders felt that their battalion commanders were unwilling to get their hands dirty learning more about field conditions. Some examples:

> I had three [battalion commanders] that absolutely had no business being battalion commanders. They didn't know what the unit was and they didn't know how to handle it. . .These people hadn't seen a

> soldier in many, many years. They were uncomfortable with a unit. . .and didn't know how to employ it. . . what he does is kill the guys under him. It is killing his company commanders, it is killing his platoon leaders, and it is killing his men--literally killing them.[9]

This from a company commander in another division a year later in the war:

> We had battalion commanders who were not necessarily qualified and had not been with soldiers for quite a long time. They did not understand the wear and tear of daily operations on soldiers, with or without contact.[10]

And, finally, on the subject of battalion commander job knowledge and appreciation of ground combat in the jungle are these angry comments from a former company commander:

> I thought he was completely out of it and very, very incompetent. . .He tried to conduct a squad ambush from his battalion TOC talking by radio telling the squad leader, "Don't fire yet. I'll tell you when to fire." How can you say that when you're sitting in a nice cozy TOC. . .Rediculous.[11]

A strong feeling that their battalion commanders lacked trust in them during combat situations was expressed frequently by many former company commanders. Resentment was strong in those company commanders whose battalion commanders rarely spent time on the ground away from the fire bases or out of their helicopters.

> . . .Our senior leaders didn't trust us. We saw such things as squad leaders in helicopters above us. [It was frustrating] to be in the middle of a firefight and have a senior officer break into your radio communications, as limited as it was, and start trying to give advice. . .[12]

From another company commander:

> . . .If there was something that impacted on morale, I guess it was the 1,500 foot mentality of some of our senior leadership. It was not leadership by example. Privates aren't stupid! These guys knew when I was talking to the battalion commander or brigade commander. . .They knew from the R.T.O. I mean the R.T.O. was a Spec. 4. The Spec. 4 would let them know what in hell these guys--what fools they were. . .I think our senior leaders lost a lot of respect in the eyes of the individual private. . .[13]

Apart from a palpable anger over a perceived lack of integrity, no failing by their battalion comanders evoked more bitterness in company commanders than what can only be described as an arrogant disregard for the plight of subordinates. When this attitude was eivdent in a battalion commander, their former company commanders spoke out with a vengence.

> . . .The battalion commander. . .was disrespected by everyone in the battalion. One of the few guys that I've never, ever seen anyone say anything good about. Wore spit-shined boots, starched fatigues and would chew your ass out because your troops looked scrubby. Had an aide as a battalion commander who shined his boots. . .an enlisted aide, honest to God, and a batman.[14]

Bitterly, one interviewee recalled of his battalion commanders:

> . . .He'd come out, spit-shined boots, starched fatigues. He looked like something out of a magazine advertizement for cigarettes or something. He'd. . .strut around. Everybody hated him. It wouldn't surprise me if someday somebody would have shot him because there was that much resentment against the guy.[15]

On the subject of communications with their commanders and the belief that their superiors had the interest and welfare of subordinates at heart, company commanders expressed strong disappointment.

> As a troop commander or a subordinate, I've got to have somebody I could talk to. . .I never could talk to the squadron commander. He and I existed.[16]

Along the same lines:

> . . .I don't think he was a leader. He was not very skilled interpersonally, so no one really got close to him. He was just preoccupied. . .oblivious to people's needs. I never thought of him as a leader. In fact, I disliked him.[17]

And, lastly, with regard to the perceived lack of an honest, open relationship between company and battalion commanders and the lack of bonding which resulted, one company commander had this to say:

> I didn't have any battalion identity. Hell, I served in Vietnam with commanders I didn't even know. . .I went through four battalion commanders in one year. That shows you how ludicruous it is . . .I had a lot of time to reflect on the professional ethics and the re-inspection of our profession and I am totally convinced. . .that you do a serious disservice to guys if you're not honest with them.[18]

Honesty, the kind of intellectual honest which flows from a shared soldierly commitment, understanding and instinct, was the trait seen most lacking in their superiors by company commanders who spoke negatively of their bosses. Young company commanders

grew to see some of their battalion, brigade and higher commanders as self-serving, career-oriented posturers, more interested in how they looked to those above them than in the truth and reality of the war in the jungle. The following comments by a USAWC student made 16 years after his first Vietnam company command tour reflect the contempt of a young officer who felt betrayed by his superiors.

> So here we are in the building [the U.S. Embassy, Saigon, after leading a company combat assault to help protect the Embassy during TET 1968]. We made it in. My first thought is. . .how many people are in the corridors down here that I have to clear out . . .Then, the last one is killed. . .We went into a defensive position. . .About that time General Westmoreland shows up. . .I expected General Westmoreland to say where are your automatic weapons, where is your reserve, how are your communications. . .I expected a very professional discussion because this is a high priority target. The guy took one look at me and said, "Captain, you haven't shaved and your men haven't either. You look like hell!" He scowled at me, turned on his heel and walked away. I stook there stunned, absolutely stunned. I said this is the kind of jerk that's leading this thing and I concluded we were losing the war. There's no question in my mind we were losing and we're going to lose. I was completely disappointed with my senior leadership and I'm still upset about it to this day.[19]

Regretably, such things happened. Shockingly, they happened to 60 percent of the maneuver company commanders whose Vietnam experiences were recorded while they were still in uniform. What do such things tell us about flaws in our system and what have we done to correct them?

"A study of combat leadership done by a U.S. military academy study group has determined that the quality of leadership is 'the most decisive factor' in determining cohesion in combat."[20]

Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, in their book, Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army, contend that officers were more focused on the career-enhancing aspects of Vietnam combat duty than in fulfilling their solemn duty to share hardship with their subordinates.[21] One policy which fueled the perception by subordinates that their superior officers were undeserving of respect was the six-month command rotation policy. "This was done to share the risks of combat among more officers in Vietnam and to provide the opportunity for combat command to more officers."[22] Little wonder that if leadership is intentionally changed frequently in combat, subordinates see their leaders as selfish or, in the words of one company commander regarding his battalion commander as ". . .trying to look good in order to go up."[23] "One conclusion that emerges from Vietnam is that never again can the U.S. Army afford to use a [command] replacement system such as was used there. The detrimental effects on cohesion and combat effectiveness are too great to allow its use."[24]

Lengthening command tours, then, does much to promote the bonding of leaders to their subordinates. Accordingly, the Army has recognized and institutionalized this vital reality. Moreover, much has been done in the Army education system since Vietnam to increase leader awareness of the ethical imperatives of command responsibility. Clearly, these efforts must be viewed as a genuine drive to return to ". . .the corporate ethos andmove away from the ethos of the modern business corporation."[25] These significant advances notwithstanding, more can still be done to bond officers

in the common set of values by which all must be judged. "The professional's competency will be judged by his peers and his conduct will be determined by the norms of his profession. He will not abuse society's faith in his skills by ignoring either his client's needs or the regulating judgment of his colleagues."[26]

It is in this ". . .regulating judgment of his colleagues" aspect that the Army officer corps can make great progress. Much has been written and done since Vietnam about eliminating the kinds of inappropriate officer behavior to which many maneuver company commanders referred when interviewed. The suggestion not yet tried though often made by various studies, is to include peer and subordinate ratings in the evaluation of the performance and professionalism of officers.

> . . .For many who are motivated by a sense of professionalism, this change will mean very little in terms of behavior. But for those motivated almost solely by one's self interest, the pursuit of power and prestige, a change of behavior will be necessary."
>
> The focus. . .must now shift to his units. Time. . . must be reallocated downward to his units and soldiers. . .He must become involved, be a participant, rather than a stern or totally critical observer. . .[27]

Support for such an evaluation system may be found in the 1970 Army War College "Study on Military Professionalism," in the 1984 "Professional Development of Officers" study, in a 1984 Naval Postgraduate School Study by three Army officers, "Excellence in the Combat Arms," in a 1986 study, "Excellence in Brigades," by four Army War College students, and in various articles found in military publications. All point to the need to institutionalize

within the officer corps behavior which is consistent with the values of loyalty to and mentoring of subordinates. "Subordinate ratings for commanders could be used to improve command climate where an improvement is needed and to provide an additional perspective on the performance of commanders."[28]

Vietnam taught the Army many lessons and we have improved enormously since the war. Yet we continue to see with alarming frequency a need for an improved command climate in units. "The observer-controllers suggested that a positive command climate did not exist in many units." This finding by Majors Samuel C. Edicott and Earl C. Pence in NTC Lessons Learned is supported by the "Professional Development of Officers Study," which in 1984 suggested that the Army still has a major challenge in developing a command climate supportive of innovation and initiative by leaders.[29]

By insisting that for officers to become senior leaders, they must consistently demonstrate throughout their careers a loyalty to and genuine concern for the welfare of their subordinates, the Army will take great strides in improving the command climate and combat effectiveness of units and in eliminating the lack of shared value which prompted two combat company commanders to say of their bosses, "The battalion commander was selfish and superificial. . . and the command knew it. They didn't have a lot of respect for him."[30] "He absolutely didn't take part in anything."[31]

In the sixteen years since the last American forces were withdrawn from Vietnam, the Army has done much to rectify the kinds of senior leadership failures described in this paper. Much, however, still must be done.

ENDNOTES

1. Of the 72 maneuver company commander interview transcripts analyzed, 54 were of lieutenant colonels and colonels studying at the USAWC, Carlisle Barracks, PA; and 18 were of majors studying at the USCGSC, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Of the 54 USAWC student transcripts, 4 were not considered because the subject of senior leadership performance was either not addressed or commented upon. One was discarded because the taped interview was uanble to be transcribed. So of the 49 respondents at the USAWC whose transcripts confronted headon the issue of senior leadership, 29 or 59.2 percent were negative in their comments. Twenty or 40.8 percent were supportive of their bosses. Of the 18 USACGSC student transcripts from former maneuver company commanders, 2 were discarded for failure to address the subject of senior leadership. Ten of 16 (62.5 percent) respondents were negative and 6 of 16 (37.5 percent) were positive on the subject of their battalion commander's leadership. Overall, 39 of 65 (60 percent) company commanders felt their battalion commanders had let them down, while 26 of 65 (40 percent) supported their commanders.

2. Interview of Lieutenant Colonel A by Lieutenant Colonel Bade (Project #83-22, USAWC).

3. Interview of Lieutenant Colonel B by Lieutenant Colonel Bade (Project #83-78, USAWC).

4. Interview of Lieutenant Colonel C by Lieutenant Colonel White (Project #84-23, USAWC).

5. Interview of Lieutenant Colonel D by Lieutenant Colonel Taylor (Project #85-4, USAWC).

6. Interview of Lieutenant Colonel E by Lieutenant Colonel Otjen (Project #82-14, USAWC).

7. Interview of Lieutenant Colonel F by Lieutenant Colonel Burney (Project #85-32, USAWC).

8. Interview of Lieutenant Colonel G by Lieutenant Colonel Ekman (Project #81-32, USAWC).

9. Interview of Lieutenant Colonel H by Lieutenant Colonel Ekman (Project #81-33, USAWC).

10. Interview of Lieutenant Colonel I by Lieutenant Colonel Wetzel (Project #83-6, USAWC).

11. Interview of Lieutenant Colonel J by Lieutenant Colonel Burney (Project 83-6, USAWC).

12. Interview of Lieutenant Colonel K by Lieutenant Colonel Taylor (Project #85-6, USAWC).

13. Interview of Lieutenant Colonel L by Lieutenant Colonel Felder (Project #85-24, USAWC).

14. Interview of Colonel M by Lieutenant Colonel Taylor (Project #85-21, USAWC).

15. Interview of Major Richard Wiggins at USACGSC, 1982.

16. Interview of Lieutenant Colonel N by Lieutenant Colonel Taylor (Project #85-18, USAWC).

17. Interview of Major John White at USACGSC, 1982.

18. Interview of Colonel M by Lieutenant Colonel Taylor (Project #85-21, USAWC).

19. Interview of Lieutenant Colonel O by Lieutenant Colonel Lord (Project #84-60, USAWC).

20. Major(P) William A. Knowlton, Jr., "Cohesion and the Vietnam Experience," Military Review, May 1986, p. 62.

21. Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army, Hill and Wang, New York: 1978, pp. 51-73.

22. Knowlton, p. 63.

23. Interview of Lieutenant Colonel P by Lieutenant Colonel Fox (Project #84-21, USAWC).

24. Knowlton, p. 63.

25. Gabriel and Savage, p. 150.

26. Allan R. Millett, "Military Professionalism and Officership in America," The Mershon Center of the Ohio State University, 1977, p. 3.

27. Major(P) William Knowlton, Jr., "In Rating the Leaders, Ask the Led," ARMY, June 1987, p. 23.

28. Ibid., p. 25.

29. Ibid., p. 21.

30. Interview of Major James Montano, at USACGSC, 1982.

31. Interview of Major Daniel Cleary at USACGSC, 1982.