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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

IS THE PROPER AGENCY IN CONTROL OF OUR STRATEGIC SEALIFT FUNCTIONS?

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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1 April 1989

ABSTRACT

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Key words: Marine transportation; Military transportation, (etc)



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IS THE PROPER AGENCY IN CONTROL OF OUR STRATEGIC SEALIFT FUNCTIONS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Purpose

"Our basic defense strategy is to safeguard the United States, its allies and its national interests by deterring aggression. Deterrence works by convincing potential adversaries that the probable costs to them of their aggression will exceed their probable gains....To deter the Soviet Union, America and its allies must make clear to Moscow that we have both the means and the will to respond effectively to aggression against our interests...this is the essence of our strategic doctrine of "flexible response" which has been the foundation of U.S. strategy since 1961 and NATO strategy since 1967".[1]

The defense strategy postulated above requires a U.S. capability of global force projection using a triad of strategic mobility elements called sealift, airlift and the prepositioning of equipment. The purpose of this study is to look at strategic sealift in view of our national strategy and in particular those agencies that control our sealift assets and functions.

In order to successfully deploy and sustain military combat power on a worldwide basis, sealift will be called upon to lift 95% of the equipment and resupply cargo and 99% of the petroleum products.2 Could we do it?

The U.S. Government sealift fleet for mobilization has made tremendous improvements during the Reagan Administration in regard to asset availability. This area will be developed later in this study. On the other side of the sealift coin, the U.S. Merchant Marine fleet (the U.S. commercial leg of sealift) has undergone a rapid decline. The Merchant Marine fleet, which once lifted 42% of the U.S. trade, now lifts only 4%. In addition, the U.S. world-wide Maritime ranking has fallen from first to tenth. During the same period the Soviet Union has risen from tenth to second.3

Why is the commercial sealift equation so important? Commercial sealift will be necessary to win any conflict in which the U.S. may find itself involved. U.S. Government assets are considered marginally adequate for the initial surge requirement for mobilization. With a productive and active Merchant Marine fleet the U.S. will increase its ability for mobilization and sustainment of combat forces in any worldwide protracted conflict.

The Honorable Jeremiah Denton, a former Senator and the present Chairman of the Commission on Merchant Marine and Defense, recently stated, "I find it remarkable that a nation

which fronts on two oceans and the Caribbean, with so much of its trade and with so many of its technological defense related items coming from overseas.....doesn't have the largest Merchant Marine in the world".4

If we are going to fight and win a protracted conflict such as the one projected for the European scenario, the United States better make inroads into getting its Merchant Marine fleet back into worldwide dominance. Without adequate sealift (both government and commercial) our Nation's forward defense strategy is seriously flawed.

This study will investigate the government agencies involved in sealift asset control and sealift functional areas. Could better asset control, functional consolidations and interaction with the commercial sealift industry lead to economies and efficiencies in strategic mobility?

ENDNOTES

1. Frank C. Carlucci, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress,FY1989, p.1.

2. Col James Weiss, MSC Fact Sheet, 6 Oct 88, p.1.

3. Ibid, p.14.

4. James D. Hessman, "Disasters by the year 2000", Sea Power, May 1988, p.8.

CHAPTER II

PRESENT SEALIFT MOBILIZATION PROCEDURES

A. Overview

This chapter will review the present procedures in activating sealift assets. The two key agencies involved in this process are the Military Sealift Command (MSC), a Department of Defense agency, and the Maritime Administration (MARAD), a Department of Transportation agency. Activation will involve U.S. Government assets, commercial assets and assets under the control of our allies.

B. Sealift Force Activation Sequence

Figure 2.1 provides a graphic portrayal of the activation sequence that would be used by DOD to meet strategic sealift requirements for mobilization, deployment and sustainability. The chart was obtained from the Military Sealift Command and is used in their current 1988 strategic sealift briefings. The activation sequence entails using MSC controlled assets until requirements exceed availability. MARAD would then become involved to fill the shortfall with the Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) or requisition U.S. flag and U.S. Foreign registered ships pursuant to the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. MARAD is also the U.S. agency that would request additional allied shipping to help meet the wartime requirements. Both government agencies perform similar type asset control functions which could be consolidated.

A brief review of the assets available in each activation category along with the sponsoring agency will provide the reader and understanding of the similiar control functions.

Figure 2.1



1. The Military Sealift Command Strategic Sealift Fleet

During a national emergency requiring sealift, the first assets readied for employment would be those under the control of the Military Sealift Command (MSC) during normal peacetime operations. MSC has assets employed in common user service, in direct support of the U.S. Navy and in support of prepositioning and contingencies.

(a). Common User Fleet

Table 2.1 identifies the MSC controlled ships employed in common user transportation missions under long term charter with commercial ocean shipping companies. The availability of these ships depends upon their current peacetime movement in support of the lift requirements for all services (common user). As and example, the "American Eagle" laden with cargo and steaming in the Atlantic Ocean destined to or from CONUS, would not be available at a loading port for deployment operations for many days.

The MSC tankers augment and supports both the Navy fleet and U.S. facilities worldwide for petroleum product delivery. The ships involved in normal support operations for the U.S. Navy would in most cases continue their support during any protracted conflict vice being used to support common user requirements.

Table 2.1

MSC Common User Fleet

Ship Name	Type	Year Built
Mv American Eagle	RORO	1981
USNS Mercury	RORO	1977
SS Greenwave	BB	1980
SS Louise Lykes	BB	1968
SS Santa Adela	BB	1966
SS Santa Juana	BB	1966
SS Dawn	BB	1963
SS Rover	COMBO	1969
USNS Sealift Pacific	TANKER	1974
USNS Sealift Arabian Sea	TANKER	1975
USNS Sealift China Sea	TANKER	1975
USNS Sealift Indian Ocean	TANKER	1975
USNS Sealift Atlantic	TANKER	1974
USNS Sealift Mediterranean	TANKER	1974
USNS Caribbean	TANKER	1975
USNS Sealift Artic	TANKER	1975
USNS Sealift Antartic	TANKER	1975
Mv Gus M. Darnell	TANKER	1985
Mv Paul Buck	TANKER	1985
Mv Samuel L. Cobb	TANKER	1985
Mv Richard H. Mathieson	TANKER	1986
Mv Lawrence H. Giamella	TANKER	1986
Mv Bravado	TANKER	1977
Mv Falcon Champion	TANKER	1984
USNS Susan Hanna	BARGE	NA
USNS Seneca	TUG	NA
Total	26	

Source: Navy Fact File 8th Edition and the Almanac of Seapower,1988.

Action Agency: MSC

(b). Fast Sealift Ships

These vessels, listed in Table 2.2, were originally built by Sealand Inc. as high speed container ships. They were subsequently laid up as being uneconomical to operate due to their enormous fuel consumption. They were bought by the Department of Defense in the 1981-1982 time period under the Navy's Sealift Enhancement Program. These ships have all been modified to provide roll-on roll-off capability, additional lift and helicopter handling and storage facilities.1 The eight ships provide DOD the capability to lift one Armor or one Mech Infantry Division in one convoy. These ships, which are 946 feet long and capable of 30 knot sustained speeds, are kept under MSC control in a reduced operating status (ROS). They are partially manned and maintained in their ROS status and capable of getting underway from their layberths (East Coast, Gulf, and West Coast) within 96 hours of notification.2

Table 2.2

Fast Sealift Ships

Ship Name	Type	Year Built	Year Converted
USNS Algol	MULTI	1973	1984
USNS Belatrix	MULTI	1973	1984
USNS Denobola	MULTI	1973	1984
USNS Pollux	MULTI	1973	1984
USNS Altair	MULTI	1973	1986
USNS Regulus	MULTI	1973	1986
USNS Capella	MULTI	1972	1986
USNS Antares	MULTI	1972	1986

Total 8

MULTI= Converted container to RORO, BB and Container lift.

Source: The Almanac of Seapower,1988.

Action Agency: MSC

The FSS vessels represent the state of the art in fast military sealift. No others like them are available in the world markets.3 The FSS vessels are routinely employed during exercises to lift military cargoes. They cannot, by agreement with the maritime industry, lift non-exercise military cargoes.

(c). Aviation Maintenance Ships

MSC maintains two aviation logistics ships for strategic mobility purposes. Table 2.3 lists both ships. These vessels were designed to provide the necessary equipment and support for the maintenance of U.S. Marine Corps fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft. The USNS Wright is maintained at Philadelphia and the USNS Curtiss is layberthed at Port Hueneme, California. Both are maintained in a reduced operating status by a skeleton crew and can be made ready in 5 days. Once activated these ships would become part of the Maritime Prepositioning Force.4

Table 2.3

Aviation Maintenance Ships

Ship Name	Year Delivered
USNS Wright	FY86
USNS Curtiss	FY87
Total	2

Source: MSC 1987 Annual Report and the Almanac of Seapower,1988.

Action Agency: MSC

(d). Hospital ships

MSC maintains control of two Navy hospital ships listed in Table 2.4. These two ships are acute care medical facilities converted from commercial tankers. The ships provide front line medical and surgical capability which rival many of the finest hospitals in the United States. They represent an important element in both deterrence and warfighting capability.5

The USNS Mercy is layberthed in Oakland, California and the USNS Comfort is layberthed in Baltimore, Maryland. Both ships are maintained by a civilian crew in a reduced operating status with a military detachment of 40 persons to maintain medical supplies and equipment. Each ship is capable of full operating status in 5 days notification.6

Table 2.4

Military Hospital Ships

Ship Name	Year Delivered
USNS Mercy	FY88
USNS Comfort	FY89
Total	2

Source: The Almanac of Seapower,1988.

Action Agency: MSC

(e). Maritime Prepositioned Force

In order to reduce the response time of the U.S. military projection in different theaters, the Department of the Navy completed a program in 1986 to provide forward positioning of equipment on board ocean vessels for the U.S. Marine Corps. The Maritime Prepositioned Force was founded and consists of three squadrons of maritime prepositioning ships. They are prepositioned at Diego Garcia (Indian Ocean), the Eastern Atlantic and the Guam/Tinian (Pacific Ocean) area. Each squadron of four or five ships carries enough equipment and supplies to support a full Marine Expeditionary Brigade of 16,500 men for 30 days. Each ship carries a spread load of cargo of food, water, oil, ammo, supplies and equipment.7 The ships currently in the MPF program are identified in Table 2.5.

Table 2.5

Maritime Prepositioned Ships

Ship Name	Type	Year built
Cpl Louis J. Hauge	RORO	1979
Pfc William B. Baugh	RORO	1979
Pfc James Anderson Jr.	RORO	1980
1st Lt Alex Bonnyman Jr.	RORO	1980
Pvt Harry Fisher	RORO	1980
Sgt Matej Kocak	RORO	1983
Pfc Eugene A. Obregon	RORO	1983
Maj Stephen W. Pless	RORO	1983
Lt John P. Bobo	RORO	1985
Pfc DeWayne T. Williams	RORO	1985
1st Lt Baldonero Lopez	RORO	1985
1st Lt Jack Lummus	RORO	1986
Sgt William R. Button	RORO	1986
Total	13	

Source: Navy Fact File, 8th Edition and the Almanac of Seapower,1988.

Action Agency: MSC

The MPF ships are under operational command of a Fleet commander. These commercial ships are under long term contract to MSC and manned by a civilian crew. The ships have no amphibious capability and must be off loaded at a benign port facility. They could be offloaded at sea ("in the stream") but at a much longer time period. The MPF program is comparable to the Army's Prepositioning of Materiel Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS) initiative (a land based program). These ships are routinely exercised in fleet operations, convoys and JCS exercises. They are programmed to be downloaded every two years for cargo inspection, testing and maintenance. They are then backloaded and returned to station.

(f). Prepositioned Afloat Ships

Prepositioning equipment and supplies afloat on U.S. flag ocean vessels was initiated in 1980. In recognition of the acute shortage of sealift with which to move forces and equipment to the Indian Ocean area at a time of increased tensions (brought on by the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) the Carter Administration took action to preposition a small sealift force in the Indian Ocean at Diego Garcia.8 Prepositioning provided the U.S. forces a quicker response time to obtain needed supplies for our deployed forces. The Near Term Prepositioning Force (NTPF) grew into what is now called the U.S. Marine Maritime Prepositioned Force (MPF), the thirteen vessels discussed earlier, and twelve afloat prepositioned ships (PREPO). The PREPO ships are listed

in Table 2.6. These commercial ships are under long term charter to MSC and are manned by a civilian crew. The ships carry equipment and supplies for the Navy, Army and U.S. Air Force consisting of ammunition, fuel, water and other basic items. Four of the vessels are LASH (lighter aboard ship) type ships that can transport approximately 75 barges (40x60ft lighters). The LASH vessels provide a drop off capability in an outer harbor by the mother vessel. Using organic small pusher tugs, the barges can be delivered to an offloading site. The twelve ships are dispersed at anchorage sites in the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans. They are frequently employed in convoy and battle group exercises. They are available to respond immediately to any crisis and provide the U.S. a valuable time advantage to get to the scene of potential action vice loading and transiting from the United States.

Table 2.6

Prepositioned Afloat Ships

Ship Name	Type	Year Built
SS American Veteran	LASH	1969
SS Green Island	LASH	1975
SS Green Valley	LASH	1974
SS Green Harbor	LASH	1974
SS American Trojan	BB	1969
SS Letitia Lykes	BB	1968
SS Elizabeth Lykes	BB	1966
SS Overseas Alice	TANKER	1968
SS Overseas Valdez	TANKER	1968
SS Overseas Vivian	TANKER	1969
Mv Falcon Leader	TANKER	1983
Mv American Cormorant	FLOFLO	1975
Total	12	

Source: The Almanac of Seapower,1988.

Action Agency: MSC

2. Commercial Voluntary Charter Vessels

During a national crisis commercial carriers could voluntarily make some of their ships available to the mobilization and deployment effort. These vessels could be from the U.S. Merchant fleet; U.S. citizen owned, Foreign flag fleet; or Foreign citizen owned, Foreign flag fleet. Such vessels would be in the category of tankers and breakbulk freighters not readily involved in sea carriage. These ships would in most cases, be docked at a layberth and possibly maintained in a reduced operating status at a nearby commercial port facility awaiting a commercial lift requirement.

The number of ships available to the Defense Department pursuant to contractural agreements with MSC is considered to be minimal and not readily counted on for strategic sealift. However we must not lose sight of the fact that some may be available and were employed during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts.

3. Ready Reserve Fleet

The Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) has become our nation's mainstay for lift of surge category sealift. At the beginning of the Reagan Administration only 27 vessels of various mixes were available on short notice (less than 30 days). The RRF consists of a fleet of inactive ships no longer able to economically compete in the commercial trade. It currently consists of 85 ships. The RRF is programmed to grow to 120 by the year 1992. These ships are kept in a state of near term readiness and can be selectively activated in 5, 10 or 20 days. Table 2.7 provides a list of the vessels presently in the RRF.[9]

Many RRF ships are maintained at the three National Defense Reserve Fleet sites; East region at James River, Virginia; Gulf region at Beaumont, Texas; and the West region at Suisun Bay, California. Some are outported at berths near activation sites or expected loadout ports. Each RRF ship is designated to be crewed and operated by a particular commercial shipping firm. Periodically these ships are broken out to participate in readiness exercises or to carry out special missions.[10]

The U.S. Navy has invested over $700 million dollars in the acquisition, upgrading, maintenance and repair of the RRF over the past several years. Control of the RRF has recently (FY89) been transferred from the Department of Defense to the Department of Transportation (DOT) under MARAD's stewardship.[11]

The auxiliary crane ships (the newest editions to the RRF) are designed to discharge non self sustaining commercial container ships from U.S. flag or other sources.

Table 2.7

Ready Reserve Fleet

Region	Type Ship	Number
East	RORO and BB	34
	Aux Crane	1
Gulf	RORO and BB	25
	Seatrain	2
	Tankers	2
West	RORO and BB	15
	Tankers	4
	Aux Crane	2
To be placed	Aux Crane	7
	LASH	2
	RORO and BB	8
	Oiler	2
	Total	104

Source: The Almanac of Seapower,1988.

Action Agency: MARAD

4. Sealift Readiness Program

The Sealift Readiness Program (SRP) is a program which evolved from the Vietnam War to augment available shipping if ever needed in future conflicts. The SRP program mandates that commercial carriers must commit 50% of their U.S. flag fleet, in the event of mobilization, as a condition for

participating in the movement of Government sponsored cargo and the receipt of operating subsidies.12

Upon direction by the Secretary of Defense the Secretary of Transportation has the authority to call up SRP ships after having determined the economic impact to the U.S. carriers involved in world shipping.

The SRP program has never been activated. However, the program remains as a formal agreement between MSC and the U.S. flag commercial shipping companies.

Table 2.8 lists the present ships available in the SRP as of 6 January 1988.13

Table 2.8

Sealift Readiness Program

Type Ship	Number
Breakbulk	6
Ctnr-BB	21
Ctnr-NSS	49
RORO	8
LASH	3
Tanker	16
Total	103

Source: MSC, SRP FY87 Rpt, dated Jun 87.

Action Agency: MSC

5. National Defense Reserve Fleet

The National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) is an additional DOT sponsored reserve fleet which could be activated in time periods ranging from 1 to 6 months. These ships would require shipyard work before they could be placed into service. These ships are nearly all WWII vintage ships and are very near the end of their useful economic life. Table 2.9 lists the present composition of the NDRF.14

These ships would be activated by a Presidential proclamation or by the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Transportation under Section 219 of the Defense Appropriation Act of 1979 (P.L. 514). On activation these ships would be crewed and operated by private carriers under contract negotiated by MARAD known as a general agency agreement.

Table 2.9

National Defense Reserve Fleet

Type Ship	Number
RORO and BB	137*
Tankers	24
Troop	10
Total	171

* 79 are WWII Victory Ships

Source: MSC Fact Sheet, 6 Oct 88.

Action Agency: MARAD

6. United States Flag Shipping

Merchant ships owned and operated by U.S. flag carriers could be called to military service only if the President proclaimed a national emergency. The present availability of U.S. flag ships in foreign commerce service is the true barometer of the Merchant Marine capability. Table 2.10 lists the ships presently in foreign service.15 Out of the 91 total ships shown, 59 operate under a federal subsidy which picks up most of the large crew costs. The subsidy qualifies the ships for the SRP.

It should be noted that the majority of the U.S. shipping fleet consists of container vessels which are not conducive to deploying surge unit type equipment.

Table 2.10

U.S. Flag Shipping
Foreign Commerce

U.S. Carrier	Number	Type
American President Lines	23	CTNR
American Transport Lines	7	CTNR
Farrel Lines	6	CTNR
Lykes Bro Steamship Co.	27	CTNR/RORO
Sealand Inc.	23	CTNR
Top Galant	2	CTNR
Waterman Steamship Co.	3	LASH
Total	91	

Source: 1987 MARAD figures listed in the Almanac of Seapower, 1988.

Action Agency: MARAD

7. Effective U.S. Controlled Ships

Effective U.S. controlled ships (EUSC) are those U.S. owned (51%) ships flying flags of convenience of the Bahamas, Honduras, Liberia and Panama. These ships consist primarily of tankers and are crewed by foreign nationals. Table 2.11 lists the present availability of EUSC ships.16

A Presidential proclamation of a national emergency is required for MARAD to place these ships into Government service by authority of Section 902 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936.

Table 2.11

EUSC Ships

Type	Number
BB	19
Tanker	98
PAX	10
Total	127

Source: MSC Fact Sheet, 6 Oct 88.

Action Agency: MARAD

8. NATO Shipping

During the initial stages of a U.S. deployment to Europe the U.S. will be dependent upon NATO allies to help fill the sealift shortfall. MARAD, the U.S. Secretariat on the NATO planning Board for Ocean Shipping (PBOS) is chartered to keep the

wartime planning requirements known for U.S. sealift. NATO countries would pool their assets which would then be allocated to employment in the overall best interests of the alliance. This pool will be managed by an international body designated as the Defense Shipping Authority (DSA). MARAD will represent the U.S. on the DSA.17

The current requirement is for NATO shipping to provide 600 dry cargo vessels. Table 2.12 list the sealift asset planned to be received from NATO.18

Table 2.12

NATO Shipping

Type	Number
BB	206
Ctnr-NSS	98
Ctnr-SS	85
RORO	84
Tankers	62
PAX	12
Total	547

Source: PBOS Working Paper, Sept 1988.

Action Agency: MARAD

9. Other Available Assets

Many other assets are available for sealift, but their excessibility would only be predicated upon a protracted global conflict. Recent aggreements with the Korean Government have identifed assets which could be made available to support a

Korean conflict. Korea has nominated 26 dry cargo ships and 4 tankers for sealift use by the United States for deployments.19

The NATO DSA ship list consists of over 4800 ships considered militarily useful. Although the NATO Alliance nations must depend on some of these ships for their economic support, about 1000 could potentially be made available to support a NATO conflict. These 1000 ships are not included in any DOD planning study.20

There are also many ships from other countries that are smaller in size and do not make any planning list because they are below the 1600 gross ton cutoff. Norway has identified over 100 RORO vessels (below the 1600 GRT limit) which are capable of crossing the Atlantic and providing lift for surge requirements.21

Action Agency: MARAD

ENDNOTES

1. The Almanac of Seapower 1988, Navy League of the United States, p.186.
2. Vadm Stanley R. Arthur, Deputy CNO, Statement Before Subcommittee on Regional Defense of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Fast Sealift, 12 Apr 88, p.2.
3. Arthur, p.3.
4. Military Sealift Command, 1987 Annual Report, p.12.
5. MSC Newspaper, Sealift, Jul 1988, p.3.
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12. Study Guide for Strategic Mobility, United States Naval War College, NWC 2069, Feb 1988, p.11-13.
13. Weiss, p19.
14. Weiss, p.1.
15. Almanac, p.82.
16. Weiss, p.23.
17. Study Guide, p.B.11
18. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Working Papers, PBOS 40-WP/1, 19 Sept 1988., p.1.
19. Weiss, p.1.
20. Ibid, p.11.
21. Ibid, p.11.

CHAPTER III

STRATEGIC MOBILITY AGENCIES FOR SEALIFT

A. Overview

There are four key Government agencies involved in strategic mobility asset control and functional area management. A brief review of their missions and organizational alignment will assist the reader in understanding the overlapping and redundant mission roles which could lead to consolidation.

B. Military Sealift Command

1. General

In 1949 the Secretary of Defense consolidated the Army Transport Service and the Naval Transportation Service into the Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) under the operation of the U.S. Navy. In 1970 MSTS was redesignated as the Military Sealift Command and remained as the executive agent for the Secretary of the Navy as the single manager for all Department of Defense (DOD) sealift.[1] On 1 Oct 1987, MSC joined two other DOD Transportation Operating Agencies (TOAs), the Military Airlift Command (MAC) and the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC),as a component of the new unified command called the Transportation Command (TRANSCOM).

2. Mission

MSC's primary mission is to provide sealift for strategic mobility in support of national security objectives.2 This mission requires the deployment and sustainment of U.S. Forces worldwide. MSC's mission is fulfilled by the employment of U.S. Government ships and U.S. Merchant Marine ships. Another important mission of MSC is the management of the Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force which provides direct support to U.S. Navy operations worldwide. Such forces include oilers, stores ships and ocean surveillance ships.3 These ships are considered an integral part of the U.S.Navy's total combat logistics force. An ancillary mission of MSC is the operation and management of the Navy's Special Mission Support Forces. This force consist of ships that gather scientific and technical data for oceanographic research, hydrographic surveys and missile telemetry.4

In 1984 then Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, made strategic sealift the third major function of the Navy along with sea control and power projection. This new priority in sealift led to the procurement and operational status of strategic sealift assets discussed in Chapter II. The Navy formed a special staff element within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-42) to provide direction and oversight to MSC in its strategic sealift mission. Under OP-42 the ultimate mission of MSC is to provide contingency sealift for military forces worldwide in the event of war. All other MSC missions, programs and exercises are dedicated to improving this function. The most important peacetime mission of MSC is developing plans and

capabilities for emergency sealift expansion.5

In its primary mission to provide strategic sealift, MSC controls the ships identified in Chapter II under charter or contract with private enterprises. These include both dry cargo ships and tankers. MSC relies on U.S. flag commercial shipping to transport military cargo to the maximum extent possible. By law, at least 50% of government cargo must be transported on privately owned U.S. flag merchant ships and all military cargo must be carried in U.S. flag ships unless none are available.6 If commercial carriers cannot lift the cargo or it is destined to ports not serviced by the merchant liner service, MSC employs its common user controlled fleet assets or contracts for other shipping to include foreign flag if necessary.

In its role as DOD's sealift manager, one of MSC's sealift related functions is the negotiation of a shipping and container agreement with U.S. flag commercial carriers under a competitive tariff structure for their worldwide liner routes.7

3. Organization

The organization chart at Figure 3.1 identifies the individual MSC office structure at various port complexes throughout the world.8 MSCEUR has recently relocated from Bremerhaven to London leaving a small MSC office in Bremerhaven, Germany. The MSC offices at the various ports perform sealift functions directly related to arrival and departure of the ships. In most cases the MSC functional offices

are collocated with the DOD port operator, the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC). In some port areas where an MSC office is not located the MTMC port commander performs the MSC functional requirements.

MSC Headquarters in Washington, DC is the contracting officer for the contractural agreements with the commercial shipping industry.

MSC remains as a major command under the Department of the Navy.

Figure 3.1



C. The Maritime Administration

1. General

When the U.S. Maritime policy was established by the 1936 Merchant Marine Act, Congress also established the Maritime Commission to oversee the U.S. Maritime industry. The shipping experts on the Commission had three duties: to aid building a well balanced Merchant ship fleet; to promote the commerce of the United States; and to aid the country's defense.9

In 1950 the Maritime Administration (MARAD) and the Federal Maritime Board (FMB) were formed in the Department of Commerce to replace the Commission. The FMB regulates rates, services and agreements of ocean shipping so that American shipping is on a fair basis with that of other countries. MARAD encourages more shipping, construction of Merchant ships and owns and maintains the U.S. Government Merchant fleet. MARAD is the agency that provides subsidies to U.S. ship owners for construction and operating costs to keep them competitive in foreign commerce.10 In 1983 MARAD became a subordinate agency of the Department of Transportation (DOT) vice the Department of Commerce.

2. Mission

MARAD is charged by the President and Congress with the responsibility of developing and maintaining a

Merchant Marine capable of meeting the United States defense and commercial trade requirements. MARAD administers a number of programs to promote the U.S. Merchant Marine and to ensure an adequate supply of vessels to meet national security needs.

In order to meet shipping requirements of the U.S. during national emergencies, MARAD maintains the inactive reserve fleets known as the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) and the Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) discussed in the previous chapter. As of Fiscal Year 1989, MARAD budgets for the total maintenance and activation of the RRF vice the Department of Defense.

3. Organization

Figure 3.2 provides the current organization of MARAD. The office of National Security and Plans is the primary office involved with strategic sealift. This office is responsible for activating the RRF and the NDRF. During a national emergency MARAD has the authority to requisition ships from the U.S. flag fleet and from the Effective U.S. Controlled (EUSC) fleet.11

During wartime MSC would request ship availability from MARAD, who in turn would nominate a ship from the RRF, NDRF, U.S. flag fleet, EUSC or NATO. After the ship is nominated and assurance is made that it can meet the requirement, the ship would be allocated to MSC control. Within 72 hours from the time of the President's order to deploy military forces, the first requisitioned ships could be on berth prepared to load military equipment. Additional ships would be diverted from commerce to

defense service while military cargoes were moving from unit home stations and depots to MARAD selected ports. 12

To maintain U.S. involvement in NATO shipping availability the Maritime Administrator of MARAD, by direction of the President, is the U.S. Secretariat to the NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping (PBOS). The responsibility of the PBOS is to develop the plans for pooling and control of NATO shipping, vessel allocation, freight rate structures for war risk insurance and other factors involved in military and civilian sealift functions in the event of hostilities. 13

Figure 3.2



D. The Military Traffic Management Command

1. General

The Military Traffic Management Command traces its organizational lineage to the Army's former office of the Chief of Transportation in 1942. In 1956 the Secretary of Defense designated the Secretary of the Army as the single manager for traffic management within the U.S. for defense cargoes. On 1 Jul 1956, the Military Traffic Management Agency (MTMA) was established to carry out this managerial role. In 1964 MTMA was given the added mission of land transportation in CONUS and the operation of some common user ocean terminals in CONUS and overseas. Its name was changed to the Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service (MTMTS). In 1974 MTMTS was redesignated as the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) when it was identified as one of DOD's three Transportation Operating Agencies joining MSC and MAC.14 In 1987 MTMC became a subordinate command of TRANSCOM.

2. Mission

MTMC's mission is service oriented. As a transportation operator it operates common user water terminals throughout the world and monitors cargo movements through all terminals. It plans for, maintains and trains an active and reserve force structure of units, facilities and systems to support all military mobilization, deployments and sustainment operations. As a transportation engineer MTMC monitors the status of infrastructure systems to include ports, inland waterways, pipelines and air facilities. 15

MTMC is a major player in strategic sealift. It's mission incorporates the booking and offering of all Defense Transportation System (DTS) cargoes for ocean lift and it operates ocean terminal facilities throughout the world. In short, the shipper services such as the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) identify their ocean lift requirements and MTMC arranges sealift with MSC and/or commercial shippers.

In the strategic mobility arena, MTMC also maintains data within the Joint Deployment System (JDS) so that the entire DOD community has up to the minute deployment data for mobilization.

3. Organization

Figure 3.3 depicts MTMC's worldwide organization.16 The Eastern and Western Area Commands operate the port facilities on the East coast, Gulf and West coast respectively, whereas the Transportation Terminal Command Europe operates the ports in the European theater. The Transportation Terminal Command Far East was estabilished in 1986 as a planning cell in the Pacific theater but was given command authority over the Far East ports for mission accomplishment. Many of the port operation are collocated with the MSC operations.

MTMC remains as a major command under the Department of the Army.

Figure 3.3



E. The Transportation Command.

1. General

On 1 October 1987 the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) was formed as a unified command in DOD. TRANSCOM combines the three DOD Transportation Operating Agencies of MAC, MSC and MTMC under one CINC which integrates the global air, land and sea transportation capabilities of the Department of Defense.17

2. Mission

The mission of TRANSCOM is to provide common user airlift, sealift and terminal services to deploy, employ and sustain U.S. forces on a global basis. TRANSCOM is responsible for the transportation aspects of worldwide mobility planning to include the management and operation of the Joint Deployment System (JDS). TRANSCOM is tasked to develop procedures for transition to war with strategic mobility in support of all the Unified and Specified Commanders-in-Chief.18 TRANSCOM has also been tasked by DOD to provide wartime traffic management which will coordinate the transportation mode selection and lift capability for National Defense. In short, CINCTRANSCOM supports the war fighting CINCs in all transportation and strategic lift requirements.

In regard to strategic sealift, the common user assets of MSC would fall under operational command of TRANSCOM in the event of mobilization. MSC would continue to exercise operational control. MSC's other two Navy unique forces, the Naval Fleet

Auxiliary and Special Mission Forces would continue to operate independent of TRANSCOM.19

3. Organization

Figure 3.4 depicts the TRANSCOM organization showing its three component commands of MAC, MSC and MTMC.20 Many key positions in MAC and the TRANSCOM staffs are dual hatted. Even CINCTRANSCOM is dual hatted as CINCMAC. The component commands have retained operational control of their common user strategic forces and they continue to operate their day to day missions with little change. Each component command is responsible to organize, train and equip its respective forces. Each service is responsible for its service unique missions, peacetime DOD charters, industrial funds, contracting, rate negotiations, procurement and maintenance scheduling.21

In April 1987, the DOD Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) moved from McDill Airbase, Florida, to TRANSCOM Headquarters at Scott Airbase, Illinois, and became the Directorate of Deployment to TRANSCOM. This Directorate is responsible for movements and deployments of mobilized forces and materiel to meet military objectives. The Director of Deployment uses the automated Joint Deployment System which takes the movement characteristics of forces and resupply listed in selected operation plans and matches them with sealift schedules for real time movement status

and analysis.22 When TRANSCOM is in full operation (1989-90) its Deployment Directorate and associated computer automation will enhance deployment planning and execution while bringing mobilization, employment and sustainment into a single system for use by the entire joint planning and execution staffs at all DOD levels.23

Figure 3.4



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22. Ibid, p.57.

23. Ibid, p.57.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

As can be readily discerned from this report there are several agencies deeply involved in strategic sealift issues for our national defense. Can some of their missions and functions be consolidated for better management and control?

Under the present system, there is a redundancy and confusion in who has control of our strategic sealift functions. MSC by DOD directive acts as the executive director for ocean transportation through the Secretary of the Navy. It is responsible for the execution of plans and programs to meet OP-42 sealift requirements pursuant to the U.S. Navy's sealift mission. MSC interfaces with industry through its legal and contractual entities and operates the Sealift Readiness Program (SRP) discussed in Chapter II. However, MARAD administers the operating and construction subsidies on behalf of the U.S. Government which mandates SRP enrollment. During a declared emergency, MSC would be the agency called upon to invoke the SRP with our Commercial industry, not MARAD.

On a six month basis, MSC negotiates, contracts and publishes a Container and Shipping Guide for worldwide commercial lift of defense cargoes. DOD cargo, due to the propensity of commercial container lift and the nature of the cargo (sustainment supplies for U.S. Forces and families), is borne by competing container ship companies. However, outside of

contractual agreements which deal with funding, procedural and legal issues, the commercial carriers deal routinely with the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC).

MTMC is DOD's Traffic Manager and operates the cargo offering and booking function for all shippers and deals directly with the container shipping companies for ocean lift. As the traffic manager it must route cargo for CONUS inland and OCONUS sealift at favorable costs to DOD. Problems encountered concerning visibility and location of the DOD shipments among the loading port, the discharge port and the government receiver are resolved by MTMC. The MTMC area commands and its worldwide port facility infrastructure are routinely involved with the exclusion of MSC.

Sealift remains as one of three major functional areas for MSC competing with its Fleet Auxiliary Force and Special Mission Force for the U.S. Navy. It is understandable why the Commander of MSC must bear strong allegiance to his service chief and the Navy missions, all of which compete with his sealift mission.

On 1 Oct 1987, MSC joined the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) as one of its subordinate commands joining MTMC and MAC. During wartime, TRANSCOM has operational control over MSC assets with the exclusion of the Fleet Auxiliary Force and the Special Mission Force. Together these Forces equate to over 50% of the MSC ship inventory.

Since MSC has been designated as a supporting command under TRANSCOM it appears that the MSC Commander, with his strategic

sealift hat firmly in place, must profess allegiance to several bosses.

When MTMC took over MSC's function of worldwide ocean cargo offering and booking in 1983 it became the primary interface with the commercial shipping industry vice MSC. MTMC operates port facilities worldwide to work with all government shippers in the delivery of cargoes. MTMC monitors and manages the cargo visibility in the Defense Transportation System (DTS) for all ocean borne traffic and works directly with industry and its worldwide port agents in problem resolution vice any other DOD element.

MTMC is the agency that identifies the type vessel required for shipping during all planning stages for JCS and service exercises. It interfaces with the military shippers who provide identification of type cargo, square footage and tonnage requirements for ocean shipment. The recommended vessel type is then made known to MSC who either provides the vessel via its common user fleet or requests MARAD to nominate a vessel via MARAD channels.

In the area of deployment interface, MTMC is the major data collector and provides input to the Joint Deployment System (JDS) now operated at Scott Airbase, Illinois, by TRANSCOM.

MTMC also has a significant role in the Sealift Enhancement Program run by MSC because of its transportability mission with its subordinate command called the Transportation Engineering Agency (TEA). Sealift enhancement initiatives which led to the

procurement of flat racks and sea sheds for containerization improvements with industry, were studied by TEA for applicability for strategic sealift.

MTMC still remains as a major command within the U.S. Army structure although it became a major subordinate command of TRANSCOM on 1 Oct 1987. Like the Commander of MSC, the MTMC Commander must bear allegiance to more than one boss.

The Maritime Administration (MARAD), our fourth major player in strategic sealift functions is the control agency of the U.S. National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) since its inception after WWII. In fiscal year 1989 MARAD picked up the total funding requirement for storage, maintenance and employment of the RRF vice the U.S. Navy and incorporates this program within its NDRF program.

MARAD remains as the agency that would be called upon to fulfill DOD's strategic sealift shortfall requirements. MARAD, in essence, is DOD's direct interface with the Merchant Marine industry whether it is shipping availability, manpower availability or ship building and repair facilities. MARAD, by law, possesses the authority to requisition U.S. flag and Effective U.S. Controlled ships along with employing the RRF and NDRF assets. As the U.S. Secretariat to NATO's Planning Board for Ocean Shipping (PBOS), MARAD has the visibility and the infrastructure to request employment of available NATO shipping.

If we review MARAD's role in sealift force activation, Fig 2.1, it becomes readily apparent how much MARAD must be counted on in the strategic sealift arena for mobility and national

defense. If the requisite vessel is not available from the MSC common user fleet during a declared emergency, MSC would request shipping from MARAD who in turn nominates and subsequently allocates a vessel for MSC control.

MARAD must be given a larger role in strategic sealift functions. It's interface with the Merchant Marine industry is paramount to turning around our national sealift declining posture. Defense agencies such as MSC, MTMC and TRANSCOM cannot provide the commercial impetus to energize U.S. Merchant Marine initiatives. MARAD can because it has a string on potential subsidies to our Merchant Marine industry. The U.S. requires a strong and viable Merchant Marine along with adequate numbers of mariners for national defense. The U.S. must obtain a larger share of the ocean shipping trade which would provide profit and competition for ocean lift. The U.S. requires a strong Merchant Marine in peacetime. Whatever U.S. flag shipping is in operation during a protracted conflict will be called upon to help in strategic sealift. If the shipping is all container ships we must start now to make them militarily useful. MARAD could and should undertake this mission.

This author concurs with the Denton Commission that the U.S. Merchant Marine industry is a national problem. The recent DOD expenditures in the amount of approximately 7 billion dollars has upgraded the U.S. sealift assets for mobility purposes (i.e. RRF, fast sealift ships and crane ships), but we have only stopped the bleeding. Our primary goal should be the revitalization of our commercial sealift industry. Building,

operating and maintaining a government fleet such as the RRF and NDRF is expensive and not totally effective for our national defense. The most reliable, cost effective source of logistic support to our military Forces is a strong active American flag Merchant Marine employing militarily useful features on ships used during peacetime.

Recent indicators show that the DOD, JCS and members of Congress are supportive of a National Sealift Policy and that a Presidential proclamation is necessary. MARAD must play a vital role in this effort.

We do not need antipathy toward our deteriorating Merchant Marine fleet and our strategic sealift defense capability. We need aggressive action to provide direction and elevation to a national level of understanding. This author believes that two key agencies are needed to provide the needed direction for future strategic sealift issues. We need MARAD for the Department of Transportation and TRANSCOM for the Department of Defense. Some missions and functions must be changed or reallocated to provide better management and unity of effort. The U.S. must operate and be organized in peacetime as it expects to operate in wartime.

MARAD must be the link to sway Congress toward positive action in regard to sealift issues. MARAD must have control over all the assets in peacetime as it would during wartime when it activates the National Shipping Authority.

TRANSCOM must play a key role in strategic sealift functions with a reallocation of missions between MTMC and MSC.

It must have an organization structure that has direct control of sealift functions vice any service element. TRANSCOM must be given peacetime control for sealift, airlift and traffic management and be relegated as DOD's link to DOT.

Figure 4.1 shows which agency has primary and secondary control over assets and functions involved in strategic sealift functions. Clearly some functions could be reallocated and consolidated to provide a much more effective and efficient methodology in controlling and enhancing the strategic sealift posture for National Defense. This author's proposal is shown in the recommended column.

FIGURE 4.1

STRATEGIC SEALIFT FUNCTIONS

	MSC	MTMC	MARAD	TRANSCOM	RECOMMENDED
Asset Control					
Common User Fleet	XX	X			MARAD
Fast Sealift Ships	XX	X			MARAD
Avn Maint Ships	XX				MARAD
Hospital Ships	XX				MARAD
MPS Ships	XX				MARAD
PREPO Ships	XX	X			MARAD
Charter Ships	XX	X			MARAD
RRF		X	XX		MARAD
SRP	XX	X			MARAD
NDRF		X	XX		MARAD
US Flag		X	XX		MARAD
EUSC		X	XX		MARAD
NATO		X	XX		MARAD
Other		X	XX		MARAD
NATO Interface		X	XX		MARAD
Industry Interface	X	X	XX		MARAD
Shipper Interface		XX			TRANSCOM
JDS Interface		X		XX	TRANSCOM
Port Services	XX	X			TRANSCOM
Port Operations	X	XX			TRANSCOM
Cargo Operations		XX			TRANSCOM
Cargo booking		XX			TRANSCOM
Commercial Contracts	XX	X			TRANSCOM
Civ Port Selection		x	XX		MARAD
Mil Port Selection		XX			TRANSCOM

XX= Primary Agency
X= Secondary Agency

CHAPTER V

RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations listed below are provided by this author. They represent the authors personal beliefs based upon the research for this study and personal knowledge of some of the sealift interactions at the port operational level.

1. The United States needs a National Strategic Sealift Policy approved by Congress. This will force our congressional leaders to take a deeper interest in this country's Maritime problems. It would force annual funding programs to fix the present deteriorating condition of the U.S. Merchant Marine. At the present time there is no National policy other than the outdated Merchant Marine Act of 1936 defining the Federal role in Maritime affairs whether it be in general terms, Maritime expansion or Maritime research and development. The U.S. requires a clear cut focus and a set of long range goals.

2. MARAD should undertake many of MSC's functions. The U.S. should operate in peacetime as it will in wartime. MARAD should be the controlling agency for common user sealift assets and the Sealift Readiness Program along with all its other functions for sealift force activation for the U.S. Government. MARAD should allocate all necessary commercial sealift assets to OP-42 for Navy unique requirements and to TRANSCOM for common user requirements.

3. Eliminate the Navy's mission for DOD strategic sealift. This mission, management and necessary interface belongs with TRANSCOM joining its other mandated missions of airlift and traffic management. TRANSCOM, through a strategic mobility staff function, should work with MARAD on all sealift issues. MARAD would thus become the government's interface with industry and TRANSCOM would become DOD's interface with the Department of Transportation (DOT).

4. A reduced MSC staff element should be assigned under OP-42 to control the Naval Auxiliary Fleet, the Special Mission Fleet, the MPF ships (commercial ships allocated from MARAD), the new Aviation ships, the new Hospital ships and those tankers (allocated from MARAD) in direct support of U.S. Navy operations. The remaining tankers in the present MSC common user fleet should be allocated to TRANSCOM.

5. Eliminate the MSC offices worldwide that are presently involved in common user sealift service type functions. Transfer some Navy positions from MSC to the respective staffs of the MTMC Terminal Commanders worldwide to consolidate the administrative and operational sealift functions under one individual. Many ports are jointly manned at the present time.

6. Task TRANSCOM via MTMC to undertake the port operation mission for common user shipping at worldwide ports now serviced only by the Navy such as Norfolk, Guam, Honolulu, Rota, etc. This action will allow a single DOD voice to work with the commercial industry at the operational level. This will enable the U.S. Navy to concentrate on U.S. Navy missions and MTMC to concentrate on DOD common user missions which interface with the commercial industry and military shippers on an operational basis.

7. MTMC as a TRANSCOM subordinate should produce an annual container and shipping rate guide vice the biannual agreement now produced by MSC. The document is best described as a traffic management tool vice a shipping document. The MTMC cargo booking clerks use it daily to select the low cost commercial carrier for container lift.

8. TRANSCOM should undertake the mission for our Sealift Enhancement Program vice MSC. This will provide DOD the engineering interface for military strategic transportability features in the commercial Merchant Marine industry and all future commercial shipping construction. Every future U.S. flag merchant ship must be built with military useful features funded by the Department of Defense. Such features could include national wartime communications and equipment, the capability of transporting oversized military cargo in container ships via seasheds or flatracks and the possibility of carrying self protecting weapons pods for use during wartime.

9. Change JCS Pub 15 which gives the three Military Departments single manager transportation responsibility for sealift, airlift and traffic management. JCS Pub 15 must state that TRANSCOM, as a unified command reporting to the National Command Authority, has total responsibility for the stated transportation functions. MSC, MTMC and MAC would then operate as doctrinal subordinates.

10. Change JCS Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 139 as it pertains to the non divulgence of information to agencies outside the Department of Defense arena. MARAD, as a Department of Transportation entity, must be privy to all maritime and sealift issues within DOD both in peacetime as well as wartime.

Mr. Carlucci our Secretary of Defense made the following statement in May 1988, "...Our ability to mobilize rapidly and efficiently is as important to deterrence as the capability of the forces themselves and directly affects potential adversaries perceptions of our resolve. Should deterrence fail our mobilizing for war and rapidly reinforcing our forces could directly influence a conflict's outcome. We must prepare for mobilization in peacetime...". If we believe in his statement we must make the U.S. Merchant Marine our fifth arm of National Defense. We can't win any future war without them. I believe MARAD and TRANSCOM can make it happen.

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