STUDY PROJECT

CAMPAIGN PLANNING IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

BY

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With the revitalized interest in operational art and its application to military planning, there has been renewed emphasis on campaigns and campaign planning. Concurrent with the interest in operational art has been increased attention to military operations conducted in the environment described as Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), or military operations short of war. However, there has been little attention paid to the possible use of campaigns in LIC. This study analyses campaign planning to determine its application to LIC, and specifically seeks to determine if it is equally applicable to the four

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

CAMPAIGN PLANNING IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Section 1. Basis for the Study.

Recently there has been a revitalization of interest in operational art and its application to military planning and operations. FM 100-5, the Army doctrinal manual for operations, describes operational art as "the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations."[1] This emphasis on campaigns has renewed the importance of campaign planning. The result has been a wealth of articles and opinions on campaign planning. Most of the attention, however, has been focused on campaigning in war. Concurrently with the interest in operational art, there has been a proliferation of discussion and proposed doctrine on military operations conducted in an environment described as Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), or military operations short of war. Except for a small community of doctrine developers directly involved in LIC, there has been little attention devoted to the possible use of campaigns in LIC. There are many reasons for this which are addressed in the study, but the end result has been the same. There is no consensus or definitive guidance on the use of cam

paign planning for operations conducted in LIC. This study has been prepared to shed light on this issue in an effort to help resolve these problems. It directly responds to a suggestion from J4, The Joint Staff, who recommended the topic for study (Appendix A). The specific questions asked were:

- Should the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) require that each CINC develop LIC campaign plans?
- If so, what should they address?

Section 2. Problem.

After discussions with the originator of the study request, and knowledgeable members of JCS[2] and the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (CLIC),[3] a refinement of the problem was made, resulting in the following problem statement:

The purpose of this study is to analyze campaign planning to determine its application to Low Intensity Conflict, and to determine specifically if it is equally applicable to the four categories of LIC: Insurgency/Counterinsurgency; Peacetime Contingencies, Peacekeeping Operations and Combatting Terrorism.

Section 3. Scope.

This study establishes a common frame of reference for campaigns and campaign planning. The LIC environment is examined with its subcategories. The characteristics of a campaign and the tenets of a campaign plan[4] are then used to determine their application to the categories of LIC. Significant differences between campaign planning for war and for LIC are discussed next and lastly, conclusions and recommendations are presented.

While the study primarily focuses on the military element of power, the LIC environment demands that the effort be integrated and coordinated with a multitude of agencies, and combined and joint activities. For these reasons, much of the information presented is equally applicable to other government agencies and foreign governments.

Section 4. Assumptions.

1. Campaign planning is a productive and beneficial activity.

2. There is a lack of definitive doctrine and guidance on planning for LIC.

Section 5. Methodology.

This study is based on a literature review and personal interviews. Documents reviewed included current articles, books, joint and Service doctrinal publications, other studies and draft doctrinal documents.

Personal interviews were conducted with joint and Service doctrine experts and developers .

Section 6. Organization.

This study is organized into five chapters. Following the introduction, Chapter II, "Terms of Reference," establishes a common frame work for the understanding of campaigns, campaign planning, war and LIC.

Chapter III, "LIC Environment and Categories," describes the environment that constitutes "low intensity conflict" and the categories of military activities conducted in that environment.

Chapter IV, "Analysis and Comparison," examines the various categories of LIC in terms of the characteristics of a campaign and the tenants of the campaign plan.

Chapter V, "Conclusions and Recommendations," provides the results of the study, its implications and recommendations for its use.

Appendix B, "Acronyms and Abbreviations," is provided to assist readers unfamiliar with the acronyms and abbreviations used in the study.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER I

1. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, p.10 (hereafter referred to as "FM 100-5").

2. Interviews with Richard J. Haney, COL, Policy Division, J5, The Joint Staff, and Ray P. Linville, LTC(P), Studies and Analysis Division, J4, The Joint Staff, Washington, 24 October 1988.

3. Interview with Bradley L. Butler, MAJ, USAF, Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, Langley Air Force Base, 25 October 1988.

4. "Tenets" of a campaign plan have not been officially recognized but are listed in Campaign Planning - Final Report by William W. Mendel, COL and Floyd T. Banks, Jr., LTC, Strategic Studies Institute, p. 8 (hereafter referred as "Campaign Planning Study").

CHAPTER II

TERMS OF REFERENCE

To understand the problems involved with campaign planning for LIC, it is important to establish a frame of reference for the key terms that are used in the study. For many of these terms there is currently much disagreement and confusion. This study is not intended to resolve conflicts of opinion concerning terminology, but rather it establishes a common framework for understanding. Each term is discussed in some detail with various opinions presented for review. A conclusion on the meaning of the term for use in the study is presented and the key points of the meaning highlighted.

Section 1. Campaign.

There are several definitions for the term campaign, both within the military and civilian sectors. Some of these definitions are listed below.

> Webster's Dictionary - a connected series of military operations forming a distinct phase of the war; a connected series of operations designed to bring about a particular result.[1]
>
> FM 100-5: Operations - A campaign is a series of joint actions designed to obtain a strategic objective in a theater of war.[2]
>
> FM 101-5-1: Operational Terms and Symbols - A campaign is a connected series of military operations forming a distinct phase of a war to accomplish a long range major objective.[3]

> Coordinating Draft FM 100-6: Large Unit Operations - A campaign is the operational way that the commander of a theater of war or theater of operations coordinates, employs and sustains available resources in a series of joint and combined actions to achieve strategic objectives.[4]

It is interesting to note that there is no definition for campaign in JCS Publication Number 1, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.[5] However, Initial Draft JCS Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations does discuss campaigns to include the statement that, "A single campaign is a phased series of major operations to bring about positional advantage and decisive results from battles."[6] For Comment Draft JCS Publication 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict goes further and does provide a definition: "A campaign is a sequence of related military operations designed to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and space."[7]

While there is much that can be concluded about campaigns from a review of the preceding information, it seems evident that a campaign is a connected series of actions, normally military and joint, to achieve results. Also, "... a campaign is characterized by its broad scope, joint activity and linkage to a series of operations designed to achieve strategic objectives."[8] This study will use the following definition for a campaign from a study conducted on campaign planning by the Army War College:

> "A campaign is the operational way that the commander of a theater of war or theater of operations coordinates , employs and sustains over time his available resources in a series of joint actions across an

expanse of air, land, and sea in order to achieve strategic objectives."[9]

Two additional areas related to campaigns need to be considered. First, campaigns are a product of operational art and are used by operational-level commanders. "Reduced to its essentials, operational art requires the commander to answer three questions:

1. What military condition must be produced in the theater of war or operations to achieve the strategic goal?

2. What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition?

3. How should the resources of the force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions?"[10]

Second, campaigns are composed of "major operations." "A major operation describes the actions of large forces in a single phase, major task, or critical battle which supports attaining the strategic objectives of the campaign."[11] As such, they are "...the coordinated elements of phases of a campaign"[12] and "...decide the course of campaigns."[13]

Section 2. Campaign Plans.

A review of the literature concerning campaign plans results in only one officially approved definition. It is from JCS Pub 1, DOD Directory of Military and Associated Terms and defines campaign plan as:

"A plan for a series of related military operations aimed to accomplish a common objective, normally within a given time and space."[14]

There is however, generally consensus on what a campaign does. These items are referred to as "tenets" or "fundamentals" and are listed below.

*Provides broad concepts of operations and sustainment.

*Provides an orderly schedule of unified decisions.

*Synchronizes air, land, and sea efforts into a cohesive and synergistic whole.

*Displays the commander's vision.

*Orients on the principle strength of the threat, the enemy's center of gravity.

*Phases a series of related unified operations.

*Composes subordinate forces and designates command relationships.

*Serves as the basis for all other planning .

*Clearly defines what constitutes success.

*Provides operational direction and tasks to subordinates.[15]

"Simply stated, a campaign plan is a plan that serves as the key employment plan of the theater of war or theater of operations."[16] Most importantly, "Its purpose is to express an orderly schedule of the strategic decisions made by the commander to allow sufficient time to procure and provide the means to secure desired or assigned objectives."[17]

Several key points need to be made concerning campaign planning. First, it requires identification of friendly and enemy centers of gravity. A center of gravity is "that characteristic, capability or locality from which the force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight."[18] It is defined by Clausewitz as "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends."[19] In developing his campaign, the commander seeks to attack and destroy the enemy's center of gravity while protecting his own. Second, campaigns are normally conducted along lines of operation. "Lines of operation connect the force with it base or bases of operation on the one hand and its operational objective on the other."[20] Third, in planning campaigns consideration is given to culminating points. A culminating point is reached when the balance of combat power typically begins to shift from the attacker to the defender. Identification of culminating points aid the commander in phasing the campaign and protecting his resources. Fourth, phasing is critical to successful campaign planning. It "... insures superior combat force is channeled against enemy vulnerabilities" and "...prevents the premature exhaustion of scarce resources ..."[21] In this way campaign planning is not unlike most military planning, but it is more important because "...specific operations [are] projected as far into the future as practicable..."[22] As such, it serves as the basis for all other planning and "...provides the commander's vision and intent through broad concepts for operations and sustainment throughout

the weeks or months necessary to achieve the strategic military objectives..."[23]

In summary, campaign planning has certain fundamentals or tenants which facilitate successful accomplishment of strategic objectives. Among its many benefits are the unity of effort and synergism achieved during the process.

Section 3. War.

While it may seem irrelevant to agree on the term "war," it is important because of the confusion between war and LIC. Specifically, is LIC a form of war? There are many definitions for war. "What you see depends on where you sit" is especially appropriate for the discussion of war.

Webster's Dictionary provides two definitions of possible value concerning war. It defines war as:

> "a state of...open and declared armed hostile conflict between state or nations."
>
> "a state of hostility, conflict, or antagonism."[24]

Interestingly, there is no definition for war in JCS Pub 1, DOD Directory of Military and Associated Terms. Instead, the publication defines different types of war such as "general war," limited war" and "unconventional warfare."[25] In contrast, the Army has defined war in its manual for The Law of Land Warfare as follows.

> War may be defined as a legal condition of armed hostility between states. ... The outbreak of war is usually accompanied by a declaration of war.[26]

Another attempt at a legal definition states,

> War is thus a sustained struggle by armed force of a certain intensity between groups, of a certain size, consisting of individuals who are armed, who wear distinctive insignia and who are subjected to military discipline under responsible command.[27]

From a philosophical perspective, Carl Von Clausewitz described war as, "...a duel on a larger scale" and "...an act of force to compel an enemy to do our will."[28] Anthropologist Margaret Mead is more basic in her view of war as expressed in her definition for the institution of warfare as, "...a set of articulated rules which distinguish intra-group killing from organized extra-group killing."[29] Another anthropologist considering war, described it as, "...a violent contact of similar entities."[30] Perhaps General Sherman expressed it best when he said, "War is hell."

There is another definition for war that deserves mention.

> War...to mean an overt, armed conflict carried on between nations or states (international war) or between parties, factions, or people in the same state (civil war).[31]

Combining all the points of view, it would appear that war is seen to be a state of law (a legal condition) and a form of conflict involving a high degree of equality, of hostility, and of violence in the relations of organized human groups (and states).

It is interesting that there is no official joint military definition for war, and that the Army definition is expressed in terms of legal declarations. In contrast, the Soviets have a comprehensive definition for war. They define it as:

> A social-historical phenomenon, characteristic of the antagonistic class society.. In its social essence, war is a continuation of the policy of given self-interested powers and the ruling classes within them using forcible means. War is an armed conflict between states (coalition of states) or between striving antagonistic classes within a state (civil war) to gain their economic and political ends. In the contemporary epoch, war is a complex social phenomenon, affecting all aspects of the life and national activity of the people, putting all their moral, political, economic, military and organizational powers to the test. In war, both sides use ideological, economic, diplomatic and other forms and means of strife...[32]

For purposes of this study, the following definition for general war, from JCS Pub 1, DOD Directory of Military and Associated Terms will be used.

> Armed conflict between major powers in which the total resources of the belligerents are employed, and the national survival of a major belligerent is in jeopardy.[33]

It is recognized that the reader may disagree with this definition. However, the scope of this study requires that war be defined in specific terms to avoid possible confusion between war and other terms to describe armed conflict. The above definition is concise and useful for the purposes of this study.

Section 4. Low Intensity Conflict.

In contrast to the term "war," there is an official military definition for LIC listed in JCS Pub 1, DOD Directory of Military and Associated Terms. It defines LIC as:

> A limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psychosocial pressures through terrorism and insurgency. Low-intensity conflict is generally confined to a geographic area and is often characterized by constraints on weaponry, tactics, and the level of violence. Also called LIC.[34]

There is however, a more recent definition for LIC which is generally accepted and used in the current draft military publications. It states:

> Low -intensity conflict is a politico-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low-intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low-intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications.[35]

This is the definition for LIC that will apply to its use in this study. It should be recognized that LIC is as much a condition and environment as it is a confrontation. As such, the term is somewhat misleading and adds to the confusion concerning its use. LIC will be discussed more in Chapter III.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER II

1. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 1983, p. 199 (hereafter referred to as "Webster's Dictionary").

2. FM 100-5, p. 10.

3. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 101-5-1, p. 1-13.

4. U.S. Department of the Army, Command and General Staff College, Field Manual 100-6 (Coordinating Draft), p. 4-1.

5. U.S. Joint Chiefs Chiefs of Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1 (hereafter referred to as "JCS Pub 1").

6. U.S. Joint Chiefs Chiefs of Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 3-0 (Initial Draft), p. III-10 (hereafter referred to as "JCS Pub 3-0 (Draft)").

7. U.S. Joint Chiefs Chiefs of Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 3-07 (For Comment Draft), p. VI-1 (hereafter referred to as "JCS Pub 3-07 (Draft)").

8. Mendel and Banks, Campaign Planning Study, p. 6.

9. Ibid., p. 98.

10. FM 100-5, p. 10.

11. Mendel and Banks, Campaign Planning Study, p. 9..

12. FM 100-5, p. 31.

13. Ibid., p. 10.

14. JCS Pub 1, p. 60.

15. JCS Pub 3-0 (Draft), p. III-10; Mendel and Banks, Campaign Planning Study, p. 100.

16. Mendel and Banks, Campaign Planning Study, p. 7.

17. Ibid., p. 6.

18. FM 100-5, p. 179.

19. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. by Michael E. Howard and Peter Poset, p. 595-596 (hereafter referred to as "On War").

20. FM 100-5, p. 180.

21. Ronald M. D'Amura, COL, USMC, "Campaigns: The Essence of Operational Warfare," Parameters, Summer 1987, p. 46.

22. Mendel and Banks, Campaign Planning Study, p. 6.

23. Ibid., p. 7.

24. Webster's Dictionary, p. 1328.

25. JCS Pub 1, pp. 159, 211, 383.

26. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 27-10, p. 7.

27. Ingrid Detter DeLupis, The Law of War, p. 24.

28. On War, p. 75.

29. The World Anthropology, Pre-Congress Conference of War, 1973, p. 81.

30. Quincy Wright, A Study of War, p. 5.

31. George C. Kohn, Dictionary of Wars, p. V.

32. Dictionary of Basic Military Terms - A Soviet View, p. 48.

33. JCS Pub 1, p. 159.

34. Ibid., p. 214-215.

35. JCS Pub 3-07 (Draft), p. xiii.

CHAPTER III

LIC ENVIRONMENT AND CATEGORIES

Section 1. Background.

Even prior to its establishment as a nation, the United States has been involved with LIC. Our heritage of revolution has instilled within our citizenry an affinity with those who use armed conflict to combat oppression. Conversely, our commitment to rule by law impelled us to reject those who use violence to resolve disagreements and effect change. Thus, we have supported both insurgencies and counterinsurgencies throughout our history. With the formation of the United Nations, we have participated in numerous multinational peacekeeping operations and conducted some unilateral military operations in response to peacetime contingencies. Combatting terrorism has been an activity inherent with providing security for our citizens and institutions. Only in recent years, due to an increase in terrorist groups and incidents, has this area received special attention. Within the last decade, all of these activities have been consolidated under the single heading of "low-intensity conflict." The question often asked is why was it necessary to do this?

The answer is complex. First, it was necessary to describe a condition of conflict which was neither peace nor war as understood by the majority of people. (Figure 1 reflects the relationship of the three conditions of peace, LIC and war.)



Figure 1[1]

There have been many attempts to describe this type of conflict, resulting in a myriad of terms (See Appendix C for list of Alternative Terms for LIC), none of which had universal acceptance. Second, a term was needed to describe insurgent warfare that the American people would not associate with the US failure in Vietnam. As Jerome Klingaman observed, "In such terms as insurgency, counterinsurgency, and guerrilla warfare, many people believed they could read the graveyard inscriptions of ill-fated adventurism in US foreign policy, and no one read those inscriptions more clearly than the US defense establishment..."[2] Third, there was a need to describe the void in US military capabilities in conflicts that did not involve direct conflict with the Soviet Union or the use of all the US military might. One of the first to use LIC in this manner was Lieutenant Colonel Donald

Vought in his article titled, "Preparing for the Wrong War?"[3] In the article Lieutenant Colonel Vought argued that US military forces were structured, equipped and trained for conflicts of high and mid-intensity, but that there was minimal attention on conflicts at the lower end of the spectrum. In 1981, General Meyer, then Army Chief of Staff, used the Conflict Spectrum model (Figure 2) to support the creation of "Forces equally comfortable with all lesser shades of conflict."[4] because such conflicts "...are simply the most likely military challenge to occur."[5]



Figure 2
(Reprinted from "The Challenge of Change" by General Edward C. Meyer, Army, October 1981.)

Recognition of the importance of LIC was reflected in the 1987 National Defense Appropriation Act which provided for an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low- In

tensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC). As listed in the DOD Directive on ASD SO/LIC, his responsibilities include overall supervision of program and budget proposals for special operations, including oversight of policy and resources for LIC activities in DOD, and representation of the department in interagency matters.[6]

Section 2. Policy Guidance.

The first substantial policy guidance for low-intensity conflict appeared in the National Security Strategy of the United States dated January 1987. This document, stated that the principle military instrument in LIC was security assistance and the primary role for US forces was to support and facilitate the security assistance program. It recognized that, "...indirect-- rather than direct-- applications of U.S. military power are the most appropriate and cost effective ways to achieve national goals."[7] However, the military services were told to stand ready to provide more direct forms of military assistance; usually consisting of technical training and logistical support. Further, both the Services and Unified Commands were to "be prepared for the effective execution of contingency and peacekeeping operations..."[8] and that U.S. combat forces would be introduced only as a last resort.[9]

In June 1987, President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 277 which established the LIC Board. This board,to be chaired by the National Security Advisor to the President with membership of the Secretaries of Defense and State

and the Director of Central Intelligence, is to identify key issues, coordinate policy formation, and develop broad-base cooperation, support and understanding of LIC issues. It is organized with a Senior Interagency Group, an Interagency Group and numerous working groups.

The initial national policy and strategy document was followed approximately one year later by the President's Report to the Congress on U.S. Capabilities to Engage in Low Intensity Conflict and Conduct Special Operations. This report was required by Congress in Public Law 99-661 and was to include a description of the following:

> (A) Deficiencies in such capabilities.
> (B) Actions being taken throughout the executive branch to correct such deficiencies.
> (C)The principle low intensity conflict threats to the interests of the United States.
> (D) The actions taken and to be taken to implement this section [of the Public Law].[10]

This document also stated that LIC problems "require balanced application of economic, political, informational, and military instruments of national power."[11]

The next policy document was the National Security Strategy of the United States, dated January 1988, which specifically addressed a Strategy for Low Intensity Conflict. It stated,

> Our strategies for dealing with low intensity conflict recognize that U.S. responses in such situations must be realistic, often discreet, and founded on a clear relationship between the conflict's outcome and important U.S. national interests.[12]

In discussing U.S. actions, it stated the United States would:

*Work to ameliorate the underlying causes of conflict in the Third World by promoting economic development and the growth of democratic political institutions.

*Support selected resistance movements...

*Take measures to strengthen friendly nations facing internal and external threats...by employing appropriate instruments of U.S. power...Where possible...before instability leads to widespread violence...and emphasis...on measures which strengthen the threatened regime's long-tern capability to deal with threats.

*Take steps to discourage Soviet and other state-sponsored adventurism.

*Assist other countries in the interdiction and eradication of illicit narcotics production and traffic.[13]

The indirect application of military power through "security assistance - training, advisory help, logistics support, and the supply of essential military equipment,"[14] was highlighted, along with the need for the "balanced application of national power."[15] Lastly, the "support of the American people, and their willingness to stay the course..." was necessary for success.[16]

The most current U.S. military strategy for LIC is expressed in Secretary of Defense Carlucci's Annual Report to the Congress , dated February 18, 1988. He stated, "The essence of our policy of assisting those who share our ideals must be one of patience and of helping others to help themselves."[17] In discussing the challenge of LIC, Secretary Carlucci stated, "...we must address not only the problems posed by our enemies, but also the many problems plaguing the developing world."[18] He described the threat from LIC as insidious in nature and stated the

enemies' purpose is "to pursue ambiguous aggression to disarm our resolve and undermine our sense of purpose."[19] He identifies US activities at the lower end of the conflict spectrum as including, "support to nations facing insurgent threats and to groups resisting communist aggression; peacekeeping operations (such as in the Sinai); peacetime contingency operations (such as against Libya or current operations in the Persian Gulf); and counterterrorism efforts."[20] Interestingly, neither counter drug activities or the need for integration of DOD efforts with other governmental agencies is addressed.

Section 3. Environment.

LIC is complex. In LIC, military power is not the primary instrument used to achieve national strategic objectives. Instead, it normally involves all the elements of national power with their various goals, objectives, perceptions, procedures and priorities. This complicates the resolution of the conflict and often results in competition among governmental agencies. Additionally, because regional and global security implications are normally involved, there is competing ideologies and public opinions which further complicate the situation. Lastly, military involvement in LIC is often complicated by a multitude of legal restrictions and operational constraints resulting from the competition among the agencies responsible for applying the other elements of power. Accordingly each situation and conflict is

unique, necessitating flexibility and adaptation to achieve any degree of success.

LIC is contradictory. Because LIC reflects a US perspective, there is often a contradiction in interests and goals between the US and the country receiving US assistance. "Low intensity conflict is of primary concern to the United States when its elements are used [by unfriendly nations] to assault the national interests, values and political foundations of the U.S., its friends, and allies"[21] Accordingly, the US modulates its involvement commensurate with its perception of the assault and level of national interest. In LIC, the interests of the recipient of US assistance may be direct and vital, while those of the US indirect and minor. This causes problems in developing common objectives and fostering unity of effort. Another contradiction is in the use of military power. Depending upon the type of conflict, the US uses force either directly, such as in counterterrorism operations, or indirectly, as is the means normally used to assist countries counter insurgencies. Time is also an area of contradiction, with long term commitments required for insurgency/counterinsurgency conflicts compared to the normally short term involvement in counterterrorism operations and peacetime contingencies.

LIC is ambiguous. As Secretary Carlucci said, "The threat from low-intensity conflict lies in its insidious nature, and in its ability to misdirect attention from its ultimate consequences."[22] This hinders the development of clearly defined

goals and objectives, which adds to the ambiguity of the situation. Additionally, because the conflict most often involves competing ideologies, there is the potential for misidentification of the threat and miscalculation concerning response. Added to this is the fact that Americans have a tendency to view everything based on their perception of how the world should be. Sam Sarkesian recognized this when he stated:

> Americans must understand the dilemmas they face in supporting an existing counterrevolutionary (counterinsurgency) system. Neither revolution (insurgency) nor counterrevolution is likely to be democratic. Neither is likely to conform to democratic ideals of just and human behavior on the battlefield. The conflict is focused on political-psychological factors. All the ingredients for a "dirty," ungentlemanly, terror-oriented conflict are there; and participation is likely to be protracted and increasingly costly.[23]

The environment for LIC is one of change. The change may be one of economic, social or political dimension. Or, most often, all three combined. The failure of a governing body to effect change in a timely and effective manner normally results in tension that can evolve into conflict. The conflict becomes violent when one of the parties to the conflict determines force will help him to achieve his goals. The level of response to this violence is likely to change as the situation changes. U.S. goals, type and level of response and assistance are also likely to change as the situation changes. This has significant implications for long-range planning and commitment.

In recognition of the unique environment of LIC, five imperatives necessary for success in planning and conducting LIC operations have been developed.[24] They are:

- Political dominance.
- Unity of effort.
- Adaptability.
- Legitimacy.
- Patience.

Section 4. Categories.

JCS has divided LIC into four broad categories: insurgency and counterinsurgency; combatting terrorism; peacekeeping; and peacetime contingencies. Military operations in two or more of these categories may be ongoing simultaneously within the same country or region. A description of each of the categories,some operational considerations, types of military activities undertaken during the operation, and the US role are presented for review. For purposes of this study, insurgency and counterinsurgency are addressed as separate categories.

Peacekeeping Operations. Peacekeeping has been defined by For Comment Draft JCS Pub 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict, as,

> ...efforts taken with the consent of the civil or military belligerent parties to a conflict to maintain a negotiated truce in support of diplomatic efforts to achieve, restore, and maintain peace.[25]

While primarily a diplomatic activity, military forces may be used to:

-Supervise free territories to ensure access and use of such areas.

-Supervise cease-fires between two belligerents.

-Supervise withdrawals and disengagements as part of a peace process.

-Supervise prisoner-of-war exchanges.

-Supervise demilitarization and demobilization of the bellegerents.

-Maintain law and order, to include possible temporary administration of one of the belligerents and supervision of elections.

U.S. participation in these operations maybe as part of an international organization, in conjunction with other countries, or unilateral. It may involve military units or individuals assigned as members of a multinational force. DOD normally designates a Service as its executive agent for specific peacekeeping operations. When so designated, the Service is responsible for providing the personnel, administrative, operational, logistical and command, control and communications (C3) support for committed US military. Also, it may support forces of other nations in the operation when established by previous agreement.

There are normally three levels of organization in peacekeeping operations. The political council is the highest level and handles negotiations and coordination with the belligerents. The military peacekeeping command is the next level and it has overall control of all the military peacekeeping forces. It is normally organized as a multinational headquarters and exercises OPCON of the combined forces. "The military peacekeeping command issues directives and instructions concerning operations and procedures to be followed."[26] The military area command is the

third level and usually consist of the forces from a single nation, with responsibility for a specific geographic area.

While each peacekeeping operation is unique, a mandate for the operation is negotiated by the diplomats as the peacekeeping force's authority to act. The mandate identifies the participating nations, the type and size of force they will contribute and the scope of operations, to include constraints and restrictions. Specific implementing instructions are published by each nation. For US forces engaged in peacekeeping operations, the DOD executive agent publishes Terms of Reference (TOR) which delineate the mission, organization, command relationships, logistical support, accounting procedures, US responsibilities to the peacekeeping force, and coordination and liaison arrangements. Public affairs procedures and US bilateral relationships with other national force contingencies not listed in the mandate may also be included. Letters of Instruction (LOI) are published by major organizations providing units, personnel and other support to US peacekeeping operations. The LOI provides information and guidance on the preparation, deployment and execution of the operation.

The following are general principles listed in Draft FM 100-20/AFM 2-XY, Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict, for the successful conduct of peacekeeping operations.

-Consent
-Neutrality
-Balance
-Single-Manager Control
-Concurrent Action

-Unqualified Sponsor Support
-Freedom of Movement
-Self-Defense[27]

Of the principles, "the presence and degree of consent (most) determines the success of a peacekeeping operation."[28] In addition to the consent of the belligerents, consent, or at least non interference, is needed from other nations.

Insurgency. An insurgency is "An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict"[29] Insurgency normally arises when a government fails to address the demands of a portion of its society and/or there is no peaceful mechanism for the resolution of adverse social, economic and political conditions. The insurgents use an ideology as the "catalyst to focus grievances on the perceived failure of a state to act in the best interests of the people."[30] In this way, they attempt to discredit the government and establish their legitimacy. JCS Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces, identifies three general phases of an insurgency based on the level of intensity.

> Phase I. This phase ranges from circumstances in which subversive activity is only a potential threat, latent or incipient, to situations in which subversive incidents and activities occur with frequency in an organized pattern. It involves no major outbreak of violence or uncontrolled insurgency activity.
>
> Phase II. This phase is reached when the subversive movement, having gained sufficient local or external support, initiates organized guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the established authority.

> Phase III. The situation moves from Phase II to Phase III when the insurgency becomes primarily a war of movement between organized forces of the insurgents and those of the established authority.[31]

U.S. support to insurgencies considers the compatibility of U.S. interests and those of the insurgents, and the feasibility that effective support can be provided. The decision to support an insurgency rests with the National Command Authority (NCA) and the operations are normally conducted covertly by non-DOD agencies. U.S. military may support insurgencies when directed by the President under Executive Order 12333, U.S. Intelligence Activities, dated December 4, 1981. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are the most suitable military element for conduct of these operations, although other military forces may be used depending upon the situation. "US military actions in support of an insurgency...should be part of a coordinated blend of available instruments of national power, designed to achieve clearly defined political objectives."[32] Accordingly, the other instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic and social) should also be used to support the insurgency.

Counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency is defined as "Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency."[33] Like insurgency, the key issue is legitimacy of the people in-power within a country to govern. The legally recognized government of a country takes actions to neutralize the insurgency by attending to the needs of the society while maintaining internal security.

This is accomplished through the means of a host country Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) program which incorporates the functions of balanced development, security, neutralization of the insurgents and mobilization of manpower and other resources for popular support of the government. Following are four principles which are applied to IDAD to prevent or defeat an insurgency.

-Unity of Effort.
-Maximum use of intelligence.
-Minimum use of violence.
-Responsive government.

The government conducting counterinsurgency integrates all the elements of national power in the conflict to create a synergistic effect. The country's military supports the government's efforts in the following areas.

* Intelligence
* Logistics
* Civil Military Operations
* Psychological Operations
* Civil Affairs
* Health Services Support
* Public Affairs and Information
* Tactical Operations
* Deceptions
* Populace and Resources Control
* C3

The U.S. normally supports a host country's IDAD program and counterinsurgency efforts under auspices of Foreign Internal Defense (FID). "FID is the participation by civilian and military agencies in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency."[34] FID is part of the overall US assistance effort to the host nation which includes development assistance, humanitarian assistance and security assistance. Se

curity assistance is the "principal instrument [used by the US] for combatting low-intensity conflict (LIC)."[35] Too often security assistance has been seen as a means to influence another government's relationship and policy towards the US rather than as a means of "assisting our friends or allies in providing the internal security essential to the growth of democratic institutions."[36] This approach is counter productive to US interests in the short term and detrimental to US influence in the long term.

The U.S. military participates in security assistance in coordination with, and often in direct support of, other US governmental agencies. This assistance is coordinated by the Security Assistance Organization (SAO) which serve as part of the Country Team in the host nation. Mobile Training Teams (MTT), Training Assistance Field Teams (TAFT), Technical Assistance Teams (TAT), SAO members, military attaches and other US military forces provide advise, training, logistical support, and example to the host nation. Also, the US often provides military equipment needed by the host nation. The "...objective of the (US) military instrument will be to improve the efficiency of the supported security force, and its military operations..."[37] To accomplish this, US military activities in support of the host nation include intelligence operations, logistical activities, civil-military operations (CMO), humanitarian assistance, psychological operations, drug interdiction operations and tactical operations. These operations are normally conducted by individuals and SOF, combat support(CS) and combat service support(CSS)

units. Use of US combat forces should be avoided except to "...effect a decisive change in the conflict, preserve US interests in serious jeopardy, or provide the time and space for local forces to regain the initiative and resume control of tactical operations."[38]

Combatting Terrorism. Combatting terrorism is, "Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism) taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire spectrum."[39] Terrorism is defined as, "The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce of intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives."[40] Terrorist methods include assassination, sabotage, threats of violence, armed attacks, hijacking normally involving hostages, kidnapping, arson, hoaxes, and bombings.

Like insurgency , terrorism attacks the legitimacy of a government or group of people. However, there are significant differences such as:

-Popular support not needed or even desired.

-Rules of law or warfare not followed.

-Targets, people or places, frequently are not related to the terrorist cause or grievance.

-Use of violence to alter political behavior vice the political system.

Terrorist groups are normally categorized as being state supported, nonstate supported or state directed, although terrorist acts can also be performed by persons or groups not motivated by politics.

The US has developed a terrorism policy which addresses acts against US citizen in the US and overseas. It is summarized as follows.

* All terrorist acts are criminal and intolerable; thus, whatever their motivation, they should be condemned.

* All lawful measures will be taken to prevent terrorist acts and to punish those who commit them.

* Concessions will not be made to terrorist extortion because it invites further demands.

* The US presumes the host government will exercise its responsibility under international law to protect all persons within its territories. When Americans are abducted or held captive, the host governnment must effect their safe release.

* During incidents affecting Americans abroad, the US maintains close and continuous cantact with the host government and supports it with all practicable intelligence and technical support.

* International cooperation to combat terrorism is a fundamental tenent of US policy. The US should exhaust all avenues to strengthen such cooperation.[41]

Terrorism counteraction within the US government follows the lead agency concept. The Department of Justice is the lead agency for terrorist acts committed within the US, its territories and possessions. The Federal Aviation Administration has the lead for acts involving aircraft in flight. The State Department is the lead agency for US response and interaction with host governments to terrorist acts against US citizens and facilities in foreign countries. The Nuclear Regulatory Commis

sion has the lead for terrorist incidents involving nuclear weapons. DOD agencies are responsible for protecting their own personnel and facilities, as well as providing technical assistance and forces when directed. Within the Army, a Terrorism Counteraction Program has been developed composed of two aspects: Antiterrorism-defensive measures to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property; and Counterterrorism-offensive measures to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.[42]

Normally a Terrorism Incident Working Group forms at the national level to react to specific terrorist incidents requiring US government action. This group, composed of representatives of the major government agencies, ensures interagency coordination and provides assistance to the lead agency in managing the incident. When US military action is required, the Counterterrorism Joint Task Forces (CTJTF), a specialized JTF, normally provides the required support, under direction of the JCS.

Peacetime Contingencies. For Comment Draft JCS Pub 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict, defines peacetime contingencies as, "short-term, rapid projection or employment of military forces in conditions short of war."[43] These operations include:

* Disaster relief.
* Shows of force and demonstrations.
* Noncombatant evacuation operations.

* Rescue and recovery operations.

* Strikes and raids.

* Peacemaking.

* Security assistance surges.

* Support to US civil authorities.

Two specific types of peacetime contingencies need to be addressed; peacemaking and support to civil authorities. First, peacemaking operations. These operations stop violent conflicts and force a return to diplomatic and political methods. They differ from peacekeeping operations in the following ways.

-The intervention may be at the request of third nation not involved in the conflict or initiated unilaterally to protect US interests.

-Consent of the belligerent parties not required.

-Normally force may be used for more that self-defense.

-Countries providing the peacemaking forces have vested interests in having conflict cease.

-Political considerations do not necessarily dominate military considerations.

Military support to US civil authorities requires further explanation. This support is limited by laws and regulations, most notably the Posse Comitatus Act, (18 US Code 1385), which prohibits the US military from engaging in law inforcement within the US without specific authorization by Congress or the Constitution. Military-civilian involvement has been viewed as situation-specific, normally relating to emergencies, disasters or threats to government property. Congress has declared drug

trafficking, illegal immigration and customs to be threats to national security warranting military support. The military support includes equipment, personnel and training to disrupt, interdict, and destroy illicit drugs and its infrastructure. It is anticipated that the military's role in combatting drugs will continue to expand. Whether this expansion will be sufficient to warrant a separate category under LIC has not been decided.

Interestingly, there is a slight difference between For Comment Draft JCS Pub 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict, and Draft FM 100-20/AFM 2-XY, Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict. Under peacetime contingencies the former includes "sea lane protection" while the later list "unconventional warfare." As a caveat, both publications state that the types of peacetime *contingencies is not* limited to the list they present. From this example, it would appear reasonable to assume then that any type operation conducted in peacetime not fitting into one of the other three categories of LIC, is a peacetime contingency.

These contingency operations are normally conducted when diplomacy does not achieve the objective or when unexpected threats demand a rapid response. Because of military involvement, they have strong psychological impact on the attitudes and behavior of the foreign and domestic communities. Each of them has situationally-unique problems relating to a pending or on-going crisis. However, they share a common environment for their execution in that they:

- Require rapid, decisive solutions.

- Are politically and, often, time sensitive.

- Are normally of short duration, but could continue over extended periods of time.

- Are usually managed at the highest levels of government.

- Use tailored forces in joint and/or combined operations.

- Are highly visible, although the actual operation may be conducted covertly

In preparing for peacetime contingencies, commanders "require clearly stated objectives and operational parameters...to balance his security needs with national policies."[44] Due to the uncertainty of most contingencies, planning must be detailed and flexible. Also, the JCS and affected Unified Commander will normally be involved in the planning. Peacetime contingency operations may be conducted by the US unilaterally or in coalition with countries. A Joint Task Force (JTF) is normally formed for conduct of the operation.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER III

1. This diagram reflects the the relationship of LIC to peace and war. It shows that LIC is neither truly peace or war, but that operations categorized under LIC can be conducted during conditions of peace or war. It should be noted that the diagram is not intended to imply that there is a progression through which a state's internal and external relationships take place. Accordingly, conditions of peace do not automatically evolve into low intensity conflicts before there is the condition of war. While this progression is possible, it is not necessary.

2. Jerome W. Klingaman, "U.S. Policy and Strategic Planning for Low-Intensity Conflict," Low-Intensity Conflict in the Third World, p. 164.

3. Donald B. Vought, LTC, "Preparing for the Wrong War?" Military Review, May 1977, pp. 16-34.

4. Edward C. Meyer, GENERAL, "The Challenge of Change," Army, October 1981, p. 14.

5. Ibid., pp.14-15.

6. U.S. Department of Defense Directive Number 5138.3, pp. 2-3.

7. William F. Furr, LTC, USAF, Low-Intensity Conflict Policy and Strategy Statements, p. 5 (hereafter referred to as "US Policy and Strategy Statements").

8. Ibid., p. 5.

9. Ibid., p. 5.

10. U.S. Law, Public Law 99-661, Section 1311.

11. Furr, US Policy and Strategy Statements, p. 10.

12. Ronald Reagan, National Security Strategy of the United States, p. 34.

13. Ibid., p. 34.

14. Ibid., p. 35.

15. Ibid., p. 35.

16. Ibid., p. 35

17. Frank C. Carlucci, Fiscal Year 1989 Annual Report to Congress, p.59 (hereafter referred as "Annual Report to Congress").

18. Ibid., p. 59.

19. Ibid., p. 63.

20. Ibid., p. 60.

21. Furr, US Policy and Strategy Statements, p. 11.

22. Carlucci, Annual Report to Congress, p. 63.

23. Sam C. Sarkesian, "Low Intensity Conflict: Concept, Principles and Policy Guidelines," Air University Review, p. 21.

24. U.S. Departments of the Army and Air Force, FM 100-20/AFM 2-XY (Final Draft), p. 1-8 - 1-10 (hereafter referred to as "FM 100-10/AFM 2-XY (Draft)").

25. JCS Pub 3-07 (Draft), p. xiii.

26. Ibid., p. IV-13.

27. FM 100-20/AFM 2-XY (Draft), pp. 4-2 - 4-3.

28. Ibid, P. 4-2.

29. JCS Pub 3-07 (Draft), p. II-1.

30. Jerome W. Klingaman, "U.S. Policy and Strategic Planning for Low-Intensity Conflict," Low-Intensity Conflict in the Third World, p. 169.

31. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2, p. 4-23.

32. FM 100-20/AFM 2-XY (Draft), p. 2-27

33. JCS Pub 3-07 (Draft), p. II-1.

34. FM 100-20/AFM 2-XY (Draft), p. 2-32.

35. Carlucci, Annual Report to Congress, p. 92.

36. Ibid., p. 61.

37. FM 100-20/AFM 2-XY (Draft), p. 2-27.

38. JCS Pub 3-07 (Draft), p. II-19 - II-20.

39. Ibid., p. III-1.

40. Ibid., p. III-1.

41. FM 100-20/AFM 2-XY (Draft), p. 3-11.

42. Ibid., p. 3-15 - 3-16.

43. JCS Pub 3-07 (Draft), p. xiii.

44. FM 100-20/AFM 2-XY (Draft), p. 5-2 - 5-3.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON

Now that the foundation for the study has been established, an analysis is in order. As stated in Chapter I, the purpose of the analysis is to determine if campaign planning is applicable to LIC generally, and to each of its categories specifically. To accomplish this, the categories of LIC addressed in Chapter III will be analyzed in two ways. First, the category will be examined using the characteristics of a campaign to determine if a campaign could be conducted in the category. Next, the campaign plan tenets will be applied to each category to determine their relevance to military operational planning for that category.

Section 1. Criteria.

The following characteristics of a campaign will be used as the criteria to analyze each category.

- Broad scope. The campaign is conducted over vast areas and extended time periods.

- Joint activity. The forces conducting the campaign are normally composed of two or more services or countries.

- Linkage. Each major operation helps to achieve the strategic objectives of the campaign.

- Phasing. The actions comprising the campaign are sequenced in a series major operations

- Operational area. The campaign is conducted in a vast operationally-defined area.

- Strategic objectives. The campaign either achieves, or helps to achieve, strategic objectives.

The following campaign plan tenets, from Chapter II, will be applied to each LIC category to determine if they are applicable. Typically a campaign plan:

- Provides broad concepts of operations and sustainment.
- Provides an orderly schedule of unified decisions.
- Synchronizes air, land, and sea efforts into a cohesive and synergistic whole.
- Displays the commander's vision.
- Orients on the principle strength of the threat, the enemy's center of gravity.
- Phases a series of related unified operations.
- Composes subordinate forces and designates command relationships.
- Serves as the basis for all other planning.
- Clearly defines what constitutes success.
- Provides operational direction and tasks to subordinates.

Section 2. Peacekeeping Operations.

Certain types of peacekeeping operations conducted in a logical sequence would appear to qualify as a campaign. A hypothetical scenario could be the employment of a multinational peacekeeping force supervising a cease-fire between two countries at war, such as the current situation involving Iran and Iraq. Following the cease-fire, the peacekeeping force could be required to supervise

the exchange of prisoners-of-war between the countries, then remain to assist in the demilitarization and demobilization of the belligerents' armed forces. In this scenario, the peacekeeping force would complete a sequence of related major operations such as deployment, supervision of the cease fire, supervision of the prisoner-of-war exchange, demilitarization and demobilization of the belligerent's armed forces and redeployment. This would satisfy two of the characteristics of a campaign; linkage and phasing. The involvement of two countries and magnitude of the operations meet the criteria for "broad scope." Most likely the peacekeeping force would be composed of both land and air components with forces from several sponsoring nations. Thus the activities of the peacekeeping for would be joint and perhaps combined. By definition the operations would be supporting the diplomatic effort to "achieve, restore and maintain peace." As such, the operations would achieve the strategic goals of the diplomats involved and the international organization and countries they represented. From analysis of this hypothetical example, it would appear that a peacetime operation could be as a campaign.

Using the scenario presented above, it would appear that a peacekeeping campaign could be conducted and a plan for its execution prepared. However, when the tenets for a campaign plan are applied to peacekeeping operations, this proposition proves invalid in two areas. First, the campaign plan does not orient on the enemy's center of gravity. In these type operations there is, by definition, no enemy because of the consent given by the

former belligerents. Without consent the peacekeeping force could not perform its role in helping to facilitate a negotiated settlement to the conflict. In addition to the consent of the belligerents, consent of the sponsoring nations and international organizations involved in the peace process is also required. Additionally, the consent or at least non-interference of other interested countries is also necessary. Yet the peacekeeping force does not target this consent or take any actions to prevent it from attack. The peacekeeping force commander will take prudent actions to maintain an attitude and atmosphere that encourages the disputing parties and other interested countries to continue their consent to the operations. Yet, this is not the primary focus of his activities and he does not include it in his operational plans.

The next area where the campaign plan tenets do not apply concerns defining success. The peacekeeping force commander can not define success because success will be defined in political terms by the negotiators. The strategic objective of the operation will be a negotiated settlement of the conflict. The military condition necessary to achieve this goal is the absence of armed conflict between the belligerents. By consent of the belligerents, this condition already exists, and therefore, success is no longer defined in military terms. Expressed another way, the presence of the peacekeeping force is not necessary to achieve the strategic goal although it is instrumental in preventing renewed conflict between the belligerents. Additionally, campaigning involves the employment of forces against an

enemy. If one of the belligerents was to become the "enemy," then the military condition (the absence of armed conflict) necessary to achieve the strategic objective would not be present. From this analysis it is clear that campaign planning is not applicable to peacekeeping operations.

Section 3. Insurgency.

A comparison of an insurgency to the campaign criteria results in the conclusion that an insurgency could be conducted as a campaign. For example, the insurgency will normally encompass an entire country, and could possibly spill over to other countries as did Vietnam. This, combined with the likelihood that the insurgency will take years to be successful meet the criteria for "broad scope." The insurgents will most likely not be organized along military service lines with separate ground forces, air forces and sea forces. Instead, the force is combined to form a single joint force with division based on geographic or political lines or functions, rather than on type of military service. This joint force, while often containing minimal air and sea assets, will include agencies of the other elements of power such as political cadre, medical teams, propagandists, and support personnel. All of the elements at the different levels work jointly to achieve the ultimate strategic objective, which is defeat of the established government. Accordingly, the insurgency is a "joint activity" that works to achieve "strategic obectives." Lastly, as mentioned in Chap. II, there are normally

three general phases of an insurgency. During each of the phases there are specific actions which take place with different size forces, types of operations and levels of violence. This is because the insurgency does not have adequate resources (forces, equipment, popular support) to accomplish their objective in a single major operation. Thus, the insurgency is "phased" with each phase "linked" to accomplishment of the overall strategic objective. From this analysis it can be seen that an insurgency could be conducted as a campaign.

While an insurgency can be conducted as a campaign, it is not a military campaign for two reasons. First, the enemy center of gravity can not be defeated by military means. The center of gravity for both the insurgents and the government is legitimacy. The defeat of the government's armed forces does not guarantee the insurgency legitimacy. The legitimate authority to govern is granted by the people governed. Therefore, popular support is critical to success. The support of the people is won through political, economic and social activities, not military. It is only during phase three, when the insurgency has primarily become a war of movement, that military power becomes the primary means for the insurgency.

The second reason there is no military campaign for an insurgency is that success is not defined in military terms. As has been stated, legitimacy is the definition of success for an insurgency, not military victory. Therefore, while the insurgency may be conducted as a campaign, it is better served by a

long-range strategy rather than a campaign plan. However, campaign planning could have utility to the insurgent military commander during phase three of the insurgency. It is during this phase that the nature of the conflict changes and the military becomes the primary means used to achieve the insurgent's strategic objectives.

Section 4. Counterinsurgency.

Counterinsurgency, more than any other LIC operation, requires an integrated and coordinated approach to be successful. Combining all the elements of national power in a comprehensive internal defense and development program or strategy to achieve strategic objectives is necessary to create a synergistic effect. It would appear that this effect could be best achieved through the means of a campaign. Such a campaign, by definition, would have a broad scope and vast operational area, two of the campaign criteria. Additionally, the effort would encompass all elements of national power, linked together by the common strategic objective of providing legitimacy to the government. Lastly, the campaign would need to be phased. This is for several reasons. First, most governments have limited resources with which to counter and defeat an insurgency. There must be, therefore, a priority of effort and resources. Second, the level of the insurgency will affect the phasing. If the insurgency is in phase two or three, then defensive actions must be taken by the government to protect itself and its citizens. The third factor

influencing phasing is the amount of support for the government and the insurgents. From this analysis, it should be clear that counterinsurgency could be conducted as a campaign. However, it is not a military campaign because the military is only one element of a counterinsurgency effort.

As discussed above, counterinsurgency lends itself to execution by means of an integrated and coordinated approach. Accordingly, there should be a national counterinsurgency campaign, strategy or program for those countries fighting an insurgency. The question is, should there be a military campaign plan to support the national campaign? Using the criteria from Section 1, it would appear that a military campaign plan might be possible. The plan by necessity would provide a broad concept of operations and sustainment. Additionally, it would phase the operations, providing operational direction and tasks to subordinates to achieve a synchronized effort. This would be accomplished through an orderly schedule of unified decisions which reflected the commander's vision. Lastly, the plan would compose the sub forces, designate command relationships and serve as the basis for all other planning. However, it is in the areas of enemy center of gravity and definition of success that the proposition for a military counterinsurgency campaign plan fails. As previously mentioned, the enemy center of gravity is legitimacy. The military is not organized, equipped or trained to attack legitimacy. Therefore, military power alone cannot defeat the enemy's center of gravity. It can however attack and defeat the insurgent forces and can seize the insurgents' bases. In this

way the military can define success. While a defeat of the insurgents' military forces may diminish their power and prestige, such a loss may not at all reduce their legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Therefore, the definition of success is not the final success, but only the military portion. For these reasons, campaign planning is not a necessary adjunct to counterinsurgency efforts. The exception to this, of course, is during phase three of an insurgency. Due to the change in the nature of the conflict and role of military power during this phase, military campaign planning in counterinsurgency is appropriate and beneficial.

Section 5. Combatting Terrorism.

The US policy regarding terrorism classifies terrorist acts as criminal activity. Accordingly, counterterrorism is primarily a law enforcement function. Military forces may be used to respond to specific terrorist acts, but when employed for this purpose the operation is normally categorized as a peacetime contingency. As such, it is normally a short-term, minor (as compared to major) operation and does not meet the criteria for a campaign. The primary focus of US military involvement in combatting terrorism is on antiterrorism measures. These measures are part of the overall effort for protection of the force which is an inherent responsibility of a commander. Therefore, an antiterrorism campaign is neither appropriate or applicable.

Based on this analysis, campaign planning does not seem to be applicable to antiterrorism or counterterrorism operations.

Section 6. Peacetime Contingencies.

On the surface it would appear that a peacetime contingency could not be conducted as a campaign. By definition, peacetime contingencies are short-term and involve rapid projection of forces, as compared to the broad scope of time and force employment inherent in campaigns. Additionally, they normally do not involve a series of actions and consequently do not require phasing of resources for mission accomplishment. However, like peacekeeping operations, a hypothetical peacetime contingency scenario could be developed which meets the criteria for a campaign.

The most topical example is the current "war on drugs." Identified as counterdrug (CD) operations, these activities are currently listed as a sub-category of peacetime contingencies under "support to civil authorities." However,"The insurgent/terrorist linkage with the drug infrastructure, and the use of military forces as active (rather than merely support) participants in many countries, demonstrates the "war-like" evolution of CD operations."[1] Accordingly, US military involvement in CD operations could appear as a campaign. For example, US military could initially provide intelligence, logistical and transportation support to host nation military units conducting counterdrug operations. If the host nation forces were

unsuccessful due to planning or training, US military MTT's and advisors could be employed to help correct the problems. Further US involvement could include the introduction of combat units. These units might be needed either to help stabilize the country or to provide the host nation time to improve its capabilities to conduct CD operations.

In this scenario, US military forces could complete a series of related major operations such as deployment, combat service support to host nation forces, training of host nation forces, counterinsurgency, and counterinfiltration operations. The nature of these major operations dictate that they encompass large geographic areas and require extended time periods, thus satisfying the criteria of broad scope and phasing as a campaign characteristics. Each of the major operations would be conducted by joint, and probably combined, forces in support of the US and host nation objectives to "...disrupt, interdict, and/or destroy illicit drugs and/or the infrastructure (personnel, material, and distribution system) of illicit drug operational entities."[2] This meets the criteria for a campaign to be a joint activity and achieve strategic objectives. From this analysis it would appear that CD operations could be executed as a campaign. However upon closer examination it can be concluded that CD operations can not be conducted as a campaign. This is because, like the Peacekeeping Operation example presented in Section 2, it fails to meet two key tenets of a campaign plan; orientation on the enemy's center of gravity, and establishing the conditions which clearly define success.

The enemy's center of gravity in CD operations is demand for the illicit drugs. Without the demand there would be limited profit for the drug lords, resulting in their inability to sustain the drug infrastructure. Yet, the military is not organized, trained or equipped to attack demand. Accordingly, while military forces will probably continue to be used to attack the infrastructure and efforts expended to limit the amount of drugs entering the US, true success in countering drugs will not be achieved until the demand for the drugs is significantly reduced or eliminated. Because the enemy center of gravity can not be defeated by military power, success in CD operations can not be defined in military terms. From this analysis it can be concluded that campaign planning is not applicable to peacetime contingencies as a whole, or CD operations specifically.

Section 7. Summary.

Campaign planning is not applicable to insurgency, counterinsurgency and peacekeeping operations for the following reasons.

1. The enemy center of gravity can not be defeated by military power. The nature of the enemy's center of gravity changes from war to LIC. The enemy center of gravity for operational forces in war is a tangible thing such as enemy forces, command and control or places. In contrast, enemy centers of gravity in LIC are intangible, reflecting the prominence of ideas

and politics. This necessitates a change in the use of the elements of power to attack the enemy's center of gravity. In war, and to a certain degree during phase three of an insurgency, the opponent's forces are normally the center of gravity that must be destroyed to defeat an enemy. This is accomplished primarily through the application of fire and maneuver. While the other elements of national power are also used against the enemy in the conflict, they are in support of the military. In LIC, the reverse is the case with military power in support of the other elements of national power. Figure 3 illustrates these differences. As a result of the change to the nature of the enemy's center of gravity in LIC and the corresponding increase in the prominence of political power, military power will not defeat the enemy's center of gravity.



Figure 3
(Reprinted from "Planning Considerations for Combat Employment of Air Power in Peacetime Contingency Operations" by MAJ Brad Butler)

2. Success can not be defined in military terms. This is a direct result of the changes in the nature of the enemy's center of gravity and the role of military power. Rather than defining success in LIC using military terms such as "destroy," "defeat, " or "defend," qualitative terms such a "improved," "increased," and "reduced" are used. This is not to imply that military success can not be achieved in LIC, but rather that the conditions for success in a LIC environment will not be defined in military terms.

Campaign planning is not applicable to counterterrorism operations and most peacetime contingencies because these operations are normally short-term, single engagements or activities. They are minor in that they normally do not involve large forces employed over vast areas for extended periods of time. Also, these operations normally consist of a single task and employment phase. Most importantly, they are primarily focused at the tactical-level, although they are normally managed at a higher level.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER IV

1. U.S. Department of the Army, Command and General Staff College, Counterdrug Organizational and Operational Concept Paper, p. 2-1 (hereafter referred to as "Counterdrug Concept Paper").

2. Ibid., p. iii-1.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Section 1. General.

The purpose of this study has been to analyze campaign planning to determine its application to LIC, and to determine specifically if campaign planning is equally applicable to the four categories of LIC. This study did not address the campaign planning process, campaign plan content or format, or who should prepare campaign plans. Instead, it focused on the characteristics of a campaign plan and the tenets of campaign plans. Most importantly, LIC campaign planning was analyzed from the perspective of its use by military planners.

Section 2. Conclusions.

1. There is not a single, officially-recognized, or generally accepted definition for war. As discussed in Chapter II, war is viewed differently, based on the interests of the viewer. The result is a myriad of diverse legal, military, philosophical and social definitions for the environment, conditions, and types of armed conflicts identified as war. This diversity in turn, adds to the confusion and misunderstandings concerning war and LIC. To eliminate this confusion and misunderstandings, there is a tendency to view war and LIC as similar states of conflict. This leads to the assumption that what is applicable to one , such as

campaign planning, is applicable to the other. A single, officially-recognized and generally accepted definition for war would help to solve this problem.

2. Campaign planning is not generally applicable to LIC. There are three reasons for this conclusion. First, LIC describes an environment between peace and war, rather than a single activity such as war. Second, there are many types of conflicts included under the umbrella of LIC. These range from subversion to insurgency/counterinsurgency. Because each of these conflicts is different in its ends, ways and means, they must be addressed separately. Third, the LIC enviironment involves all the elements of national power; political, economic, socio-psychological and military. Campaign planning, in comparison, is primarily a military activity. While a country may develop a plan to resolve an internal conflict, it is not necessarily a campaign plan, although its execution may have all the characteristics of a campaign. Instead, it becomes a national plan, program or strategy, and includes the phased application of all the elements of national power. The military is only one of those elements, and it normally supports the national plan using an operation or concept plan rather than a campaign plan. Also, if US assistance is provided to a country or group involved in a counterinsurgency or insurgency, then a supporting plan for the assistance should be developed. It is not a campaign plan however, because the US government is not in charge. As such, the US often views the conflict differently from the country being assisted. Cosequently, national interests and the

strategic objectives which flow from them may differ between the US and the host country.

3. Military campaign planning is generally not applicable to the four categories of LIC. As presented in Chapter IV, the reasons for this conclusion are:

- The enemy center of gravity in insurgency, counterinsurgency and peacekeeping operations can not be defeated by military power.

- Success in insurgency, counterinsurgency and peacekeeping operations is not defined in military terms.

- Counterterrorism and most peacetime contingencies are short-term, minor operations.

Section 3. Implications.

If campaign planning is not generally applicable to LIC, then what is a useful form for the operational-level commander to translate strategic objectives into operational direction for military operations short of war? Depending upon the desires of the commander, there are several forms which will enable him to do this. In descending level of scope and ascending level of detail they are:

- Theater strategy
- Letter of Instruction
- Concept Plan
- Operations Plan

The theater strategy "...provides broad conceptual guidance for deterrence and prosecution of regional war and smaller conflicts,

as well as direction for security assistance, support for treaties and agreements, the development of good relations with nonaligned nations, and expanding US influence throughout the theater."[1] Most importantly, "The strategy provides a reason for programming the types and amount of resources...needed to execute [the] strategy with a reasonable assurance of success."[2] A campaign plan is not designed to address the multitude of areas or serve as a requirements document as does the theater strategy. Therefore, campaign plans should not be used as justification for resources, programs or allocations. Strategy, in-turn, is further "operationalized" and implemented by Letters of Instruction, Concept Plans and Operations Plans. These documents address specific situations and provide for the use of available resources in response to those situations.

It should be remembered that the military is in a supporting role in LIC. The purpose of both the theater strategy and implementing documents is to provide military support to the national effort. While the use of the concept of "campaigns" and "campaign plans" may have some utility in the planning and execution of national strategy, it is not campaigning in the military sense. As such, the military must be wary of being used to solve political problems through the use of military campaigns. As this study has shown, such campaigns are not applicable and are therefore most likely to fail.

Section 4. Recommendations.

1. An officially-approved definition for war should be developed by the joint doctrine community.

2. This study should be disseminated to the doctrine developers of all DOD agencies and the services for consideration in development of doctrine and policies.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER V

1. William W. Mendel, COL, "Theater Strategy and the Theater Campaign Plan: Both Are Essential," Parameters, December 1988, p. 43.

2. Ibid., p. 44.

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APPENDIX A

SUGGESTED RESEARCH TOPIC FOR STUDENT RESEARCH
ACADEMIC YEAR 1988-1989

Topic: Low Intensity Conflict Campaign Plan

Brief Elaboration: The CINCs have well defined responsibilities for deliberate planning for military operations. Less defined are their responsibilities for operations short of war, more recently described as low intensity conflict. The development of campaign plans has been proposed to address low intensity conflict planning requirements for a region, a sub-region, or a specific country. Should the Joint Chiefs of Staff require that each CINC develop LIC campaign plans? If so, what should they address?

Agency and office requesting research on the topic: Studies, Concepts, and Analysis Division, Logistics Directorate (J-4), The Joint Staff, Washington, D.C. 20318-4000.

Person in the agency to contact for further details between August 1988 and May 1989: LTC(P) Ray Linville

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Please return to:

APPENDIX B

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFM - Air Force Manual
ASD - Assistant Secretary of Defense
CD - Counterdrug
CINC - Commander-in-Chief
CLIC - Center for Low-Intensity Conflict
CMO -Civil-Military Operations
CS - Combat Support
CSS - Combat Service Support
CT - Counterterrorism
C3 - Command, Control and Communications
DOD - Department of Defense
FID - Foreign Internal Defense
FM - Field Manual
IDAD - Internal Defense and Development
J - Joint
JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff
JTF - Joint Task Force
LIC - Low Intensity Conflict
LOI - Letter of Instruction
MTT - Mobile Training Team
NSDD - National Security Decision Directive
PUB - Publication
SAO - Security Assistance Office
SO - Special Operations
SOF - Special Operations Forces
TAFT - Technical Assistance Field Team
TAT - Technical Assistance Team
TOR - Terms of Reference
US - United States

APPENDIX C

Counterinsurgency
Peacekeeping
Antiterrorism
Insurgency
Low Intensity Warfare
Low Level Warfare
Internal Warfare
Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare
Internal Conflict
Countersubversive Warfare
Conflict Short of War
High Probability Conflict
Subversive Warfare
Concealed Aggression
Subterranean War
Aggressive Containment
Anti-Imperialist Warfare
Constrained Operations
War Against Lesser Adversaries
Forth Dimension Warfare
Attenuated Conflict
Modern Warfare
Peripheral War
Sublimited Wars
Surrogate War
Armed Peace
Shadow War
Covert Wars
Combatting Terrorism
Peacetime Contingencies
Counterterrorism
Unconventional Warfare
Lower Level Warfare
Revolutionary Warfare
People's War
Guerrilla Warfare
Foreign Internal Defense
Wars of National Liberation
Uncomfortable Wars
Irregular Political Warfare
Brushfire Wars
Paramilitary Criminality
Marginal Military Operations
Restricted Engagement
Anti-Bandit Campaigns
Remote Area Conflict
Proinsurgency
Transnational Conflict
Strategie Oblique
Protracted War
Ambiguous War
Violent Peace
Indirect War
Special War
Small Wars
Dark Wars

Alternative Terms for Low-Intensity Conflict

(Reprinted from "Low-Intensity Policy and Strategy Statements" by LTC William E. Furr, p. 2.)