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COMMAND AND CONTROL OVER THE
MILITARY ROLE IN "COMMON DEFENCE"

by

Richard A. Williams

March 1989

Thesis Advisor:

Richard A. McGonigal

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Command and Control Over the Military Role in "Common Defence"

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

This author provides an overview of command and control (C2) in "common defence." The approach is to show the linkage between the American people and the operational performance of the U.S. military during combat. The Preamble to the Constitution and the basic definition of C2 stated in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Publication 1 are used as the start point for the thesis. From this start point, a tracing of C2 in "common defence" is conducted. The focus is based on seven distinct levels of C2 in "common defence." These levels are hierarchical with a two-way vertical and horizontal flow of information. Low/high context and external transference are used to describe and trace the flow of C2 in "common defence" through the hierarchical levels. The author documents the actual means of decision making, planning, directing, influencing, coordinating, and/or controlling the operational performance of the military force.



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I. INTRODUCTION

A. WHY SHOULD WE STUDY C2 OVER THE MILITARY ROLE IN "COMMON DEFENCE?"

Providing for "Common Defence" is much like playing sports, but much more complex, difficult, unpredictable, and expensive. The University of Notre Dame does not play football with its basketball team or place its basketball coach in charge of the football team. The decision on the starting line up for either team at Notre Dame is not made by the Trustees or President but rather by the Coach who is intimately aware of the capabilities and limitations of his players. Yet, the coaches at Notre Dame are stringently held accountable for the performance of the teams. When the people of the United States (U.S.) "provide for the Common Defence", they prepare themselves for future events which may challenge the existence of the nation. Unlike football, the rules, time, place, participants, impact, and nature of this challenge are unknown. This paper is a description of the U.S. system in place today whose objective is to prepare the nation for this challenge. It is a system which is justifiably (?) consuming over six percent of the Gross National Product and impacting the survival of the U.S. What is your role in the system for "common defense?"

The objective of this thesis is to establish a framework by which the American people and the military can realistically understand Command and Control (C2) over the military role in "Common Defence" for the following reasons:

- The ability to effectively have C2 over the American people's effort to accomplish the mission of "common defence" is vital to the preservation of the United States of America.
- Time, distance, weapons destructiveness and accuracy, and recoverability or reconstitution capability have complicated and sensitized C2 in "common defence."
- Too often, the means or tools for passing or preparing C2 decisions are confused with the C2 decision to the detriment of combat effectiveness.
- The focus of C2 doctrine is limited to the military operational applications, whereas it should encompass all elements providing C2 over the military force.
- The submersion of the United States up to its chin in international trade and multi-national alliances for defense provides potential for controversy.

Is football at Notre Dame more important than the challenge of providing for "common defence?"

B. "COMMON DEFENCE"

"Common defence" is the action or lack of action taken by the United States' citizenry and Government to provide and ensure that other nations or powerful individuals by coercion do not deny the American people an opportunity for the accomplishment of the objectives stated in the Preamble. "Common defence" is an inherent interest and responsibility of every citizen whether fostered or not.

The Mayflower Compact signed in 1621 serves as the first documented action of a group in the land known as the United States to provide for "common defence." The signers of the Mayflower Compact found a rallying point in their commonality of interest.

A key passage of the Mayflower Compact reads as follows:

Do by these Presents, solemnly and mutually in the Presence of God and one another, covenant and combine ourselves together into a civil Body Politick, for our better Ordering and Preservation, and Furthermore of the Ends aforesaid; and

by Virtue hereof do enact, constitute, and frame, such just and equal Laws, Ordinances, Acts, Constitutions, and Offices, from time to time, as shall be thought most meet and convenient for the general Good of the Colony; unto which we promise all due submission and Obedience.[Ref. 1]

Their power and strength rested in their willingness to work together for "the general good of the colony." The basic agreements of the Mayflower Compact were made in order to enhance their opportunity for survival. The Mayflower Compact was voided in 1691 when "the colony was absorbed by the Massachusetts Bay Colony." The significance of the Mayflower Compact is the ideology behind the willingness of the signatories to subject themselves to "just and equal Laws, Ordinances, Acts, Constitutions, and Offices ... for the general Good of the Colony..." The ideology present is based on the Judeo-Christian belief in vesting "religious authority in the congregation." Adapting this belief to their situation, the Pilgrims set forth an ideology for "Government by the people and for the people."

The Preamble to the Constitution of the United States reads:

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America. [Ref. 2]

Interestingly, the Preamble to the Constitution of the United States cites six objectives for governance. "Common defence" is one of these objectives, but it is not in any context given a higher priority than the other five objectives. "Common defence" and the other five objectives for establishing the Constitution of the United States must reinforce and support each other. There is a dependency relationship so

strong that failure in one objective may easily cause failure in the other five objectives.

Professor Frank Teti at the Naval Postgraduate School in his class on National Security Affairs describes the responsibility of the US Government for national security as the Janus Effect. The Greek God, Janus, in accordance with Encyclopedia Americana:

was worshipped under 2 aspects: as the God of all places of passage and as the spirit of all beginnings. In the former capacity he was believed to protect all gates and arches in Rome, many of which were consecrated to him and bore his image of two bearded faces looking in opposite direction. [Ref. 3]

The Janus concept utilizes the concept of the two faces on the same body looking internally as well as externally to protect Rome. By the same token, "common defence" is an internal and external focus by the citizens of the United States to ensure opportunities for posterity, justice, "domestic tranquility", "common defence", "blessing of liberty", "more perfect Union", and "general welfare."

The seed of "common defence" is strong and well documented in the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble. "Common defence" is nourished by the heritage and values of America; its root is the will of the individual citizen; its trunk is the people's will and the nation's economic and technological power; and its branches are the bodies of the Government. This tree analogy provides an insightful look at "common defence." The relationship of the parts of a tree to the tree accurately portrays the interworkings of key elements in the American society. The heritage and values of the American people, the will of the individual citizen, the people's will and

ideology, the nation's economic and technological power, and the functional branches of Government have worked together for the nation's prosperity.

In this age of high technology, world ending military power capability, bountiful wealth and luxury, and high-stakes diplomacy (such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, membership in North Atlantic Treaty Organization, etc.), it is tempting to ignore the elements of our society which have been vital to the "common defence" of the United States. Admittedly, the "common defence" of the United States is a controversial topic with advocates for many different strategies and national security policies.

In the author's opinion, the "common defence" of the United States has been a success for the following reasons:

- The strong ideological and moral values exhibited by the early American colonist provided a strong foundation for the birth of a nation.
- The proud heritage of the United States and continuous growth of sound democratic ideology and practices inspired loyalty and responsible citizenry among the citizens of the United States.
- The abundance and/or availability of resources, successful technological and economic development, ample time to build-up during crisis, relatively weak neighbors, almost insurmountable distance from relatively strong countries, and the people's willingness as a body to uphold democratic ideology permitted the survival and growth of the United States.
- The balance of power between the branches of Government and the overall mature leadership (although there were instances of immature leadership) in each body guided the growth of the United States and promoted the common good.

Therefore, "common defence" includes some aspects of domestic policy and all aspects of foreign policy. The five elements used by the American people to provide for "common defence" are:

- Ideology;
- Intelligence;
- Diplomacy and Foreign Policy;
- Military Defense Policy; and
- Technological and Economic Power.

These elements have interdependencies which are inseparable. This paper pertains to C2 over the military role in "common defence", therefore the orientation or focus is on military defense. However, the other four elements will not be ignored due to their direct influence on military defense and their involvement in the same decision making process as military defense. [Ref. 4, pp. 16-17]

Concentration on high technology, military power, diplomacy, and personal and national wealth is potential catastrophe for "common defence" because such concentration causes an imbalance between the sources of our strength as a nation working against or working with other nations. The source of strength in the United States has always been the American people through expressions of their will, values, and sense of heritage. The result of the American people's effort has been high technology, military power, diplomacy, and personal and national wealth. Focusing the resources of the nation too heavily on the end product may stunt the will, values, and sense of heritage of the American people.

C. COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2)

C2 is a very confusing term to personnel inside and outside of the Department of Defense (DOD). JCS Pub 1, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines C2 as follows:

Command and Control (C2) is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission.

Command and Control System consists of the facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing, and controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant to the missions assigned. [Ref. 5, p. 77]

Noticeably, JCS PUB 1 does not define Command, Control, and Communication (C3) or Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I). However, the confusion over C2, C3I, and C3 stems from the different connotations of the individual words from what we have accepted as the phrases' meaning.

In this paper, C2 is defined as the orchestration of the military role in "common defence." Due to the uncertainties surrounding future conflict, C2 elements are an evolving group. C2 involves rational, logical, and emotional processes. The logical process is the use of analytical assessment in order to formulate policy, plans, and operations. The emotional process is the guidance of policy, plans, and operations by will, values, and sense of heritage. The rational process is reasoning between the logical and the emotional.

In recognition of the communications systems and associated discipline areas contribution to the orchestration of war, the phrase C3 evolved. In recognition of the communications and intelligence communities and the associated industrial support contributions to the orchestration of war, the phrase C3I evolved. Throughout history, technological developments have made C2 over warfare extremely complex and difficult. For example, the range of weapons during the stone age was as far as a person could throw the stone but the range on nuclear weapons is several thousand

miles. The leader of the stone age warriors orchestrated the fight at close range whereas the leader today may fight at close range or extremely long distance.

Having brought out the above point, this paper uses the Williams Model (see Figure 1) to present a clear view of C2, C3, and C3I.

The Williams Model presents C2 in "common defence" as having seven hierarchical levels of actuality. The foundation or lowest level (Level One) in the hierarchy for C2 in "common defence" is the American people through expressions of their will, values, heritage, and economic potential toward "common defence." The remaining levels in the hierarchy for C2 in "common defence" in the order from lowest to highest are:

- Level Two - The Constitution of the United States.
- Level Three - The three branches of the Federal Government who expound their power in the form of Congressional Laws, Judicial Rulings, and Executive Orders.
- Level Four - The National Security Objectives, Policy, and Strategy.
- Level Five - The Military Force Organization.
- Level Six - The Combat Readiness of the Military Force.
- Level Seven - The Operational Performance.

The numerical count for a level has an inverse relation with the level in the hierarchy. The model uses an inverse relation because there is a pyramid-like structural relationship between higher and lower levels. The levels with the higher count in the model are derived from the levels with the lower count. The derivation of the higher level can be traced to low and high context activity in the lower levels or extension transference of the lower levels.




Figure 1. The Williams Model for C2

The "common defence" of the United States depends upon the mature development of each C2 level. The concept of the model requires each level to be fully functional during peace and war time. The moment of transition from peace to war is unpredictable and the unpreparedness or poor development of a C2 level could mean the annihilation of the United States in a matter of hours, weeks, or months.

Up to World War II, the United States could feel secure because of time and space. The Atlantic and Pacific Ocean along with friendly/weak neighbors at our borders offered time and space for "common defence". The ability of our potential adversaries to quickly deliver a destructive force onto the shores of the United States has reduced to a negligible amount the security provided by time and space. The surprise attack at Pearl Harbor forced the realization that the security of time and space has passed and brought the end to isolationism.

The destruction suffered at the hand of the Japanese at Pearl Harbor is a speck in one's eye compared to the potential destructiveness of a successful surprise attack in this day and age. As a matter of fact, the ability of potential attackers to quickly deliver unacceptable damage remains even if the attack is not a surprise. In Sir John Hackett's book, The Third World War 1985, or Tom Clancy's book, Red Storm Rising, the assertions of modern weapons destructiveness are valid, although presented in an imagined plot. Again, time and distance are not a factor which we can count on in order to reduce the level of preparedness for military forces. The force projection capability of the United States and her potential enemies have reduced time and distance to a minuscule factor in the security/national defense of our country. Actually, the plot in Hackett and Clancy's novels was conservative in their portrayal of the

current threat to national defense. The objective in making such comments as those above is not to scare, but to reinforce the importance of the mature development of the C2 levels. The Williams Model captures the requirement for the mature development of the levels through the pyramid structure.

There are numerous C2 models which tend to focus on the battle management or operational process, but with the Williams Model credit is given to the countless activities happening before operational performance or combat which are part of C2. It is unrealistic to limit military C2 to activities that occur during battle. The directions or decisions being decided by American people, Congress, the President, and Secretary of Defense in our peacetime environment directly, influences -- sometimes, determines -- and always, limits the combatant commander's decisions and decision making capability during battle.

Many authors on military sociology in their writings and teachings have indirectly discussed C2 over the military in "common defence" issues while explaining the civil-military relationship. In actuality, these discussions on the civil-military relationship have applicability to the Williams Model first four levels of C2 in "common defence." Writings by National Security experts on national interest, national security, and national security policy also pertain to the first four levels of the Williams Model for C2 over the military role in "common defence."

By the same token, level five and six contributions to C2 in "common defence" is covered under doctrine, readiness, systems acquisition, training programs, and etc.

There is not a void of information about the contribution of each of these levels to "common defence" but we tend not to think of the first six levels in terms of C2.

Why? This question has no clear answer. This paper addresses why we should think of the first six levels in terms of C2.

The JCS Pub I limits the focus of C2 to a "properly designated commander over assigned forces", but the act of designating is an "exercise of authority and direction" stemming from the American people. The highest designated commander in the United States is the Commander-in-Chief, the President. To limit our study of C2 to the President downward ignores the influence on "common defence"/national security of the American people, the Constitution, Congress, and the Judicial System. And above all, the American people designate the President. The Williams' model captures the flow of C2 from the power source or the highest appeal authority to the mission execution.

The JCS Pub I focuses on "the commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission", but the mission belongs ultimately to the American People. The Williams model reflects the origin and total execution of the mission for "common defence" in the United States.

II. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN C2

A. INTRODUCTION

Level one of the Williams Model shows the American people via the expression of their will, values, sense of heritage, and economic strength as the foundation and ultimate source of C2 over the military role in "common defence" (See Figure 2-1). Natural law and the Constitution to the United States protect the rights of the American people. This protection provides an environment whereby the people may exercise C2 over the government. This chapter develops and shows the role of the American people in C2.

B. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE'S C2 OVER THE STRUCTURE AND OBJECTIVES OF GOVERNMENT

An elementary look at the United States heritage shows that the American people through expressions of their will, values, and economic strength determine the structure and objectives of the government. In determining the structure and objectives of the government, the American people directly influence the military role in "common defence."

1. Perception in Common Sense

In the pamphlet, Common Sense, Thomas Paine stated:

Some convenient tree will afford them a State House, under the branches of which the whole Colony may assemble to deliberate on public matters. It is more than probable that their first laws will have the title only of Regulations and be enforced by no other penalty than public disesteem. In this first parliament every man by natural right will have a seat.




Figure 2. Level 1 of the Williams Model for C2.

But as the colony encreases, the public concerns will encrease likewise, and the distance at which the members may be separated, will render it too inconvenient for all of them to meet on every occasion as at first, when their number was small, their habitations near, and the public concerns few and trifling. This will point out the convenience of their consenting to leave legislative part to be managed by a select number chosen from the whole body, who are supposed to have the same concerns at stake which those have who appointed them, and who will act in the same manner as the whole body would act were they present. If the colony continue encreasing, it will become necessary to augment the number of representatives, and that the interest of every part of the colony may be attended to, it will be found best to divide the whole into convenient parts, each part sending its proper number: and that the elected might never form to themselves an interest separate from the electors, prudence will point out the propriety of having elections often: because as the elected might by means return and mix again with the general body of the electors in a few months, their fidelity to the public will be secured by the prudent reflection of not making a rod for themselves. [Ref. 6, p. 47-48]

In the passage, Thomas Paine explains that Government exists and operates under the consent of and as a convenience to the people.

2. Perception in Other Important Historical Documents

There are many important historical documents that provide testimony to the strength and resolve of the American people to determine the structure and objective of the government. Three such documents are the Declaration of Independence, the Preamble to the Constitution of the United States, and the Gettysburg Address.

a. *Perception in the Declaration of Independence*

The Declaration of Independence states and justifies the American Colonies intent "to dissolve the political bands" between themselves and the British Crown. A key passage of the Declaration of Independence reads as follows:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. -That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the

consent of the governed, -That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its power in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. [Ref. 7, p. 1]

These passages like many other passages of the Declaration of Independence show soundly that the power of the United States comes clearly from the people or the governed. A willingness to give life, wealth, and a spiritual drive for "Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness" are profoundly expressed in the undertones of this document. In the Revolutionary War, the American people exercised their "inalienable right" and demonstrated their power and endurance. As the source of power for the government and possessor of a willingness to defend their power, the American people have C2.

b. The Preamble to the Constitution

The Preamble to the Constitution of the United States asserts a recognition by the Founding Fathers that the people "do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." The first attempt by the colonist to formulate a government was under the Articles of Confederation from March 1781 till the inauguration of the constitutional government in March 1789. Under the Articles of Confederation, a union was created of the 13 sovereign states, but there was noted weaknesses in the union and the confederation government's ability to "establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessing of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." The Confederation government lacked the authority to overcome the perceived weaknesses. Through an on-going public debate from the signing of the proposed

Constitution of the United States on September 17, 1787 till the final state ratification by Rhode Island on May 29, 1790, the American people decided to set aside the Confederation government for the constitutional government. The drafting and ratification of the Constitution by the American people is an outstanding exercise of C2. The Preamble's citing of "common defence" as an objective for governance confirms it as part of the will and values of the American people. The drafting and signing of the Constitution of the United States was the second illustration of the American people exercising C2.

c. *The Gettysburg Address*

In the conclusion of the Gettysburg Address, President Lincoln stated:

...It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us, that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion; that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain; that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom; and that government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth. [Ref. 8]

In honoring the dead at the Battle of Gettysburg, President Lincoln declared the Civil War as a test of whether a Government receiving power from the people can withstand the test of time. Again, the American people manifested their C2.

d. *Summary of the Role Played by Historical Documents*

Although only three historical documents were quoted, there are many other cherished documents which set forth the inner fire which bestows the will, values, heritage, and economic strength of the American people as the ultimate source of C2.

C. THE IMPACT OF CULTURE ON C2

Parents, the educational system of the United States, the business community, historical publications, institutional systems, such as Holidays, the flags, the Church, and etc., teach the meaning, presence, and importance of the American people's will, values, and economic strength to the power and vitality of the nation. These mechanisms which are institutionalized and deeply rooted in our culture contribute immensely to C2. In the book, Beyond Culture, Edward T. Hall writes:

Culture is man's medium; there is not one aspect of human life that is not touched and altered by culture. This means personality, how people express themselves (including shows of emotion), the way they think, how they move, how problems are solved, how their cities are planned and laid out, how transportation systems function and are organized, as well as how economic and government systems are put together and function. [Ref. 9, p. 16]

The willingness of young men in the prime of life to give their life for "duty, honor, and country" is well accepted in the United States. Why? The American people feel good about their culture and have the strength and resolve to preserve their ideology.

The abundance of natural resources and resourceful people earned for the United States economic advantages over other countries. The United States promised hope, liberty, and fruitful rewards to hard and smart workers. As a result, the nation attracted many quality people during the seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries. These quality people converted the United States from a wilderness to a first rate economic, technological, and military power in the twentieth century. The United States' economic and technological strength paid high returns for the Allied forces during World War I and II.

A pertinent question is whether the demands of our culture will exceed the available supply of resources? And if the demand exceeds the available supply, can our society make the necessary quality of living adjustments to cope with the situation and still maintain our strong ideology? Currently, the United States depends upon foreign sources for several strategic resources/minerals. The cut-off of these supplies will place the United States in an awkward situation. The American people will determine the success of policy during a cut-off. The American people, industry, and military are far behind in preparing themselves for the implications of resource shortages or cutoff. Many politicians know the implications of a resource shortages; are formulating positions on possible courses of action; but consider the topic too politically sensitive to address. The American people need to know the facts of how the United States plans to resolve resource shortages, so they can wholeheartedly support the choices made by their elected officials. Successful investment in Research and Development can potentially solve the dependency problem but the lead time is tremendous.

Furthermore, can our society continue to withstand the drain on resources brought about by containment policy? With the US military and intelligence personnel spread around the world, there is a serious external flow of resources into other countries. The external flow of resources means that the dollars are not circulating within the United States for additional growth. Growth of the San Diego and San Antonio area and industrial buildup in Massachusetts and California are classic examples of economic gains received from the circulation of military expenditures. The turnover of funds spent by the government contribute immensely to economic growth. This economic

growth creates an increase in corporate and personal revenues which directly elevates the nation's tax base.

The technological and industrial base of the United States has lost some of its competitive edge. In some industries, the decline in market share is very drastic. Many American corporations in order to reduce corporate cost have transferred their production plants to foreign countries because of cheaper labor cost and other cost effective reasons. The American people must take a stand and maintain the competitive edge of the United States technology and industrial base or else lose its capacity for "common defence."

D. THE PRESENCE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN C2

In the book, Civil-Military Relations, Andrew J. Goodpaster wrote:

The military establishment is designed, operated, and supported to serve goals and interests--in particular, security goals and interests--of the society at large. This is the fundamental, all-embracing relationship of civil and military in our democratically governed society, and all that the military is or does should be aligned to these goals. [Ref. 10, p. 311]

Here, General Goodpaster acknowledges the American people as the source of the "common defence" mission and the importance of the military being closely aligned with its source of power. Throughout the history of the United States, the American people have exercised C2 to maintain close alignment between their goals and interest and the functioning of the government.

The degree of C2 by the American people is often determined at the emotional and rational level. At the emotional and rational level, the American people assess how well the government is fulfilling their goals and interests. The outcome of the assessment determines the degree of involvement by the American people in C2.

A natural theme is whether a group acting emotionally and/or rationally can provide a sound foundation of C2. This theme is traceable to the following:

- Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and Thomas Jefferson's differences in "images of the public and the origins of American government." [Ref. 11, pp. 139-234]
- The existence of conservative military realism in a liberal American society. [Ref. 12, pp. 5-27]

Interestingly, these themes are still debatable items today. They concern the soundness of the people's emotional and rational view of "common defence." The people's emotional and rational view of "common defence" have strengthened the nation.

1. The American People Performing Silent C2

The American people have a strong rational propensity to depend upon the government to guide the course of the United States toward its objectives. They recognized that expert analysis of options and timely decisions were paramount to the future security and prosperity of the nation. The rational propensity took the decision making responsibility and authority over policies, plans, and operations from the American people as a group. It passed responsibility to the talented elements of the population who the people judged best capable to determine the future direction of the nation.

The following comments by Calvin Coolidge in his 1923 Memorial Day Address explains the emotional element of the American people's dependence on government:

...The authority of law here is not something which is imposed upon the people; it is the will of the people themselves. The decision of the court here is not something which is apart from the people; it is the judgment of the people themselves. The right of the ownership of property here is not something withheld from the people; it is the privilege of the people themselves. Their

sovereignty is absolute and complete. A definition of the relationship between the institutions of our government and the American people entirely justifies the assertion that: "all things were made by them; and without them was not anything made that was made." It is because the American government is the sole creation and possession of the people that they have always cherished it and defended it, and always will. . . . [Ref. 13]

On the emotional level, a good faith element of the C2 process enables the American people to rely on the Government to be logical and rational. The American people express their goals and interest for "common defence" in very broad terms which generally directs the long term evolvement of "common defence." Then, the people depend on the government to develop these broad goals and interest into detailed policy, plans, and operations for "common defence" as well as the other objectives for governance. Therefore, duly elected or appointed government officials regulate, execute, and judge the activities of the United States. Yet, the American people maintain C2 by holding the government officials accountable for the objectives of governance.

2. The American People Performing Active C2

Recognizing the impact of Governmental decisions, the American people have a recourse for direct communication of their opinions to the government in order to influence C2 and change the course of policy. In the book, Civil-Military Relations, Samuel P. Huntington develops that the American people tend to constrain the level and use of military force. By constraining the level and use of military force, the American people influence and direct the accomplishment of the "common defence" objective. [Ref. 12, pp. 17-22]

To sway certain decisions by the government concerning the military, the American people use various techniques to surface indicators of potential favorable or unfavorable political consequences for each alternative. In the author's opinion, the people use the following techniques to exercise C2 over the Government:

- The electoral vote;
- Feedback networks to the Government's military, civil servant employees or elected officials;
- Freedom of the press;
- Financial and Technological Support;
- Public protest;
- Responsible citizenry as indicated by all volunteer military force and quality of public servants;
- Succession;
- Active lobby and special interest groups;
- Exercise of the Judicial system by individuals or groups; and
- Others.

Historically, the American people have used a mixture of these techniques to exercise their C2 over the government. The responsiveness of the government to each of these techniques varies in accordance with the merits of the position expounded and the perceived magnitude of the public opinion.

3. Historical Look at American People Exercising Silent or Active C2.

Through World War II, Huntington's constraint idea was accurate in scope. Prior to World War II, the American people were comfortable with the very broad

direction and guidance of the Constitution of the United States for the provision of "common defence" except for the Civil War.

Whenever a perception of "common defence" being threaten was raised, such as during the Indian Wars of the late nineteenth century and the Poncho Villa Raids across the Rio Grande, the American people surfaced feedback to Congress or the resident requesting appropriate actions by the United States. Through the feedback system, the people directed the military role in "common defence."

In the book, Commander-in-Chief by Eric Larabee, the deliberations of President Roosevelt and his staff over whether to enter World War II were discussed from 1938 to 1941. Personally, President Roosevelt favored entering the war earlier than 1941 but, his presidential decision was not to enter because of strong public sentiment toward isolationism. The President cited the political destruction of President Woodrow Wilson after World War I when he attempted to involve the United States in the League of Nations without having public support. Mr. Larabee explains that President Roosevelt's action during 1938 to 1941 was everything short of going to war. [Ref. 14, pp. 40-96]

In the book, Politics and Government in the United States, by Emmette S. Redford, David B. Truman, Alan F. Westin, and Robert C. Wood, a discussion is made about the Quarantine Speech in which President Roosevelt stated:

It seems unfortunately true that the epidemics of world lawlessness is spreading. When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease.

The authors of Politics and Government in the United States stated:

The public and press reaction to this "Quarantine Speech" was so negative, however, that Roosevelt was forced to proceed with great caution in preparing America, morally and physically, to engage Germany and Japan. Even the fall of France to Hitler's blitzkrieg in the spring of 1940 did not bring domestic opinion around to accepting the necessity of involvement. Roosevelt felt compelled to declare in a campaign speech in Boston in October of 1940, "I shall say it again and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." Great Britain was to be shored up by "all aid short of war." Congress did accept the nation's first peacetime draft in 1940; and after three months of agonizing politicking, the Lend-Lease program was approved early in 1941. [Ref. 15, p. 712]

After his election in 1940, President Roosevelt appointed the hawkish Henry Stimson as Secretary of War. Secretary Stimson interpreted his appointment as a mandate for the inevitability of war and commenced a campaign for war within the administration staff. Even with the insistence of Secretary Stimson for the United States to go to war, President Roosevelt still refused to request a declaration of war from Congress. [Ref. 14, pp. 45-46]

The President waited till the bombing of Pearl Harbor before requesting a declaration of war against Japan. The request for declaration of war against Germany and Italy came six days later after Germany and Italy first declared war against the United States. In President Roosevelt's actions, we can plainly see the will, value, and heritage of the American people providing C2 over the military role in "common defence." In both instances where the request was made for a declaration of war, the President had the clear backing of the American people. In subjecting his will to the will of the American people, President Roosevelt demonstrated the American people's effectiveness at providing C2 over the military. The government's C2 over the military role in "common defense" was continuously well aligned with the consensus view through World War II.

After World War II, the American people through their international trade arrangements, cultural habits, and support of containment policy have dictated the vast growth in the mission and scope of "common defence." Unfortunately, many citizens and government officials in the United States fail to understand, communicate, and/or recognize this linkage of the American people to C2.

The American people's C2 over the military role in "common defence" came to the forefront and the scope of Huntington's constraint idea needed expanding. In the author's opinion, the American people became more active participants in C2 for the following reasons:

- The improvements in automation and communication technology have enabled the television, newspaper, and literary society to provide the American people with information pertaining to "common defence" issues on an almost real-time basis. Having available the information to make evaluations on the merits of the government's performance in the area of "common defence."
- The Communist Threat, early military attitude toward the potential destruction of the world by Nuclear Weapons, political sensitivity of low intensity conflict, the large military expenditures, and reports of fraud, waste, and abuse aroused deep concerns.

The increased involvement of the American people has obtained and is obtaining mixed results.

The Government's C2 over the military role in "common defence" is prone for controversy, if not well aligned with the consensus view. Many authors narrowly view the Vietnam War as a demonstration of the inability of a democratic nation to successfully wage a long war without the support of public opinion. This view overlooks the C2 issue of whether the American people saw the United States involvement in the Vietnam War as destructive to the objective of governance.

In the Constitution of the United States, the American people delegated to Congress the authority to declare war. Traditionally, the President of the United States has initiated the declaration of war through a formal request to Congress for approval. In the case of the Vietnam War, the President did not request a declaration of war. Congress gave instead the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 1964 which said the president may "take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force" to help any nation requesting aid "in defense of its freedom" under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and authorized the President to take "all necessary measures to repel any armed attack" against US armed forces. [Ref. 16, p. 717] With the power given President Johnson, he was perfectly legal in committing US forces in Vietnam.

Therefore, the C2 issue lies between the government and the American people. Even when the government has consented to the use of the armed forces, the American people must still decide whether the government acted within the broad objectives for "common defence." In the book, Military Heritage of America by R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, the authors state:

Many facets of the Vietnam situation caused disillusionment and confusion among elements of US citizenry. Increasingly the feeling grew that the United States was engaged in a war that was none of our business, and which did not in any way affect the vital interests of the United States. [Ref. 16, p. 726]

As a result, the American people used the electoral vote, feedback networks, public protest, irresponsible citizenry (draft evasion), exercisement of the judicial system, freedom of the press, and active lobby to exercise their C2 over the military role in "common defence" during the Vietnam War period. In 1971, the Congress revoked the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Still, it took President Nixon until 1973 to comply

with this revocation. When it became apparent in 1975 that South Vietnam would fall, the Congress refused to provide supplies in order to possibly change the inevitable.

The following words of General Fred C. Weyand, Chief of Staff, US Army, July 1976 best describe the outcome:

Vietnam was a reaffirmation of the peculiar relationship between the American Army and the American people. The American Army really is a people's Army in the sense that it belongs to the American people who take a jealous and proprietary interest in its involvement. When the Army is committed the American people are committed, when the American people lose their commitment it is futile to try to keep the Army committed. In the final analysis, the American Army is not so much an arm of the Executive Branch as it is an arm of the American people. The Army, therefore, cannot be committed lightly. [Ref. 17, p. 7]

The Vietnam War was a classical example of the American people placing constraints on the use of military force.

The presidential electoral vote is the primary technique used by the American people for C2 over the military role in "common defence." With the electoral vote, the American people decide who will be the President/Commander-in-Chief of the United States. The presidential election in 1968 provides an excellent example of how the American people used the electoral vote to perform C2 over the military role in "common defence." By 1968, the Vietnam War had certainly lost the public support. President Johnson decided not to run for re-election in 1968 because he felt that public opposition to his Vietnam War policy adversely affected his chances of winning. By influencing President Johnson's decision, the American people were exercising C2. President Nixon ran his campaign on the promise to bring "peace with honor." [Ref. 16, p. 727] The election of President Nixon in 1968 demonstrates an exercise of C2 over the military role in "common defence" which influenced the

direction of the Vietnam War. In the election of 1980, President Reagan defeated President Carter. President Reagan campaigned for strong "common defense." During war and peace, the designation of the Commander-in-Chief is a vital C2 function performed by the American people.

III. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

A. INTRODUCTION.

Level two covers the delegation of responsibility for "common defence" from the American people to the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches by the Constitution of the United States (See Figure 3-1). The Constitution of the United States did the following:

established the government, outlined its purposes, limited its scope, indicated the several branches of that government, and defined the offices of each branch, saying how they shall be filled and how the authority and power vested in each shall be related to one another. [Ref. 18, pg. 4]

The Constitution provides an excellent hierarchical delegation of authority over the military role in "common defence" from the people to the government of the United States. This level is broad as well.

The Constitution of the United States created the oldest form of government in existence, today. The Constitution has survived because it is a living document providing an adequate balance between government stability and flexibility in a changing world. The provisions of the Constitution have allowed flexibility by way of amendments to the Constitution or through interpretations of the authority conferred. Government stability was accomplished by the implementation of some republican features to the American democracy, such as:

- The election of US Senators by the state legislators from the state (this has been changed).




Figure 3. Level 2 of the Williams Model for C2.

- The election of the President by electors who are determined by state legislature specified procedures.
- The requirement for consent and approval by Congress for the Presidential appointments of personnel to key government positions in the Executive Departments.
- The procedures for Constitutional Amendments.

Over the years, there have been many discussions concerning the virtues of this document. Many argue that the Constitution was drafted in order to protect certain economic interest belonging to the delegates at the Constitutional Convention and deprive certain people of their liberty. Whereas the Constitution may have omitted or overlooked certain liberties, the Constitution has expressed procedures for whereby the oversights may be corrected or changes may be implemented as needed. The corrections are known as Constitutional Amendments. As to whether the Constitution was drafted to protect certain economic interests, the fact remains that authoritative interpretations have protected every citizens economic interests and rights and the American people have supported the ideas and structure for government implemented by the Constitution. [Ref. 19]

The Constitution provides for federalism and separation of power. Federalism provisions divided the power in the United States between the national government, states, and people. The separation of power provisions vest the national government's power to the executive, legislative, and judicial branches in such a manner that each may perform checks and balances on the other.

B. THE ROLE OF FEDERALISM IN C2.

Immediately following the Revolutionary War, the colonist drafted and adopted the Article of Confederations as the instrument of government. In the book, The American Republic: Its Government and Politics, Peter H. Odegards states that "the major weakness of the Confederation, however, was not its lack of powers, but rather its lack of power to enforce its powers." [Ref. 20, p. 94] The Framers of the Constitution faced the challenge of appropriately dividing responsibility and authority between the national government and states. The federal system implemented by the Constitution of the United States created a framework to meet this challenge.

The Constitution of the United States provided a reinforcement of responsibility with the authority to accomplish the assigned objectives.

In giving the responsibility and authority for "common defence" to the national government, the American people took a firm stand toward enhancing the chances of the United States' survival. In 1787, external and internal threats jeopardized the security of the American people. England, France, and Spain still advocated colonialism and posed an external threat to the sovereignty of the United States. Internally, the smaller states feared that the larger states would possibly force their will on them. Under the Confederation government, it was conceivable for the sovereign states to be divided and conquered. Realizing their commonality of beliefs, fears, and objectives, the American people united under the Constitution for "common defence."

The Constitution implements the federal system by granting and restricting the powers of the states and the branches of the national government.

The States were given responsibility for "the appointment of the officers" in the militia, "and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress" when the militia was not "employed in the service of the United States." Otherwise, the provisions in the Constitution of the United States passed responsibility and authority to the national government for "common defence." [Ref. 21]

The Civil War was a strong test of the federalism principle. The Civil War tested the national governments authority to enforce constitutional laws upon the individual states. The national government proved strong enough to overcome an internal threat to the union.

C. SEPARATION OF POWER ROLE IN C2.

On the ability of the Article of Confederation to legislate, execute, and judicature, Odegards stated:

Except for the Committee of States, it lacked any effective central executive establishment with its own machinery for the enforcement of the laws of Congress. All government was, in effect, in commission, with all the weaknesses that go with rule by committees. The weaknesses of committee government were compounded under the Articles by the fact that every state had an equal vote, and most important legislation, and most important administrative acts, required the consent of nine of the thirteen states. The Confederation had no courts for this. And, of course, Congress had no power to regulate commerce, to enforce the validity of contracts, and - most important - no independent power to collect taxes. [ref. 20, p. 94]

The Constitution of the United States divided the power of the national government between the Legislative, Judicial, and Executive branches. Whereas the national government under the federal system received certain responsibilities and appropriate authority, the branches of the national government shared responsibilities and authority. The Constitution instituted a system of checks and balances where each branch

reviewed the actions of the other for compliance with the Constitution, law, or common good. The provisions for "common defence" include shared responsibility and authority; and a system of checks and balances.

The following excerpts from the Constitution granted "common defence" related powers to the Legislative Branch:

Power to try all impeachment;

Power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;

To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;

To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin;

To promote the Progress of Science and useful arts;

To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;

To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;

To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;

To provide and maintain a Navy;

To make rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the

Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress; and

To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.
[ref. 21]

Also, the legislature has "Advice and Consent" authority over all Presidential appointments and Treaties.

The following excerpts from the Constitution granted "common defence" related powers to the Executive branch:

The executive Power shall be vested in a President...

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

...he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.[Ref. 22]

Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise

be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become Law. . . . [Ref. 23]

The following excerpts from the Constitution granted "common defence" related power to the Judicial branch:

The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. [Ref. 24]

The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; - to all Cases affecting. . . . [Ref. 25]

D. AN OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.

As stated earlier, the Constitution provided shared power between the branches of government and implemented checks and balance by one branch over another branch's actions. Neither the Executive, Judicial, or Legislative branch has authority to act, independently. The set-up of the national government fulfills the American people's desire for the authority over "common defence" to be centrally focused, but not abused. Together, the three branches have the ways and means for the orchestration of the American people's effort to accomplish the "common defence" objective. The Constitution separated law and policy making (including the purse string) from law and policy execution; and provided independent judgment on conflicts between the law and its fulfillment. The provisions of checks and balances reduced the likelihood of abuses and permitted the policing of abuses as they occurred. The shared power and system of checks and balances cause drawbacks, such as accountability problems between the executive and legislative branches and conflicts over authoritative interpretations.

IV. THE LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES

A. INTRODUCTION

Level 3 of the Williams model covers the evolvement of the legislative, executive, and judicial role in C2 (See Figure 4-1). The legislative, executive, and judicial role in C2 evolved from the Preamble which provides the objective, "to provide for common defence," and the Constitution which specifies the division of authority related to the obtainment of the objective.

The American people have provided the national government with a strong ideology and heritage, appreciation for diplomacy, strong military force, technological and economic strength, and intelligence to implement the national security policy and thereby protect the national interest and accomplish the objective for "common defence."

Using the authority specified in the Constitution, the legislative, executive, and judicial branches plan, direct, coordinate, and control the utilization of the "common defence" elements provided by the American people for protecting the national interests and achieving the objectives for governance. The national government sets the policies, organizations, procedures, and strategies for using, preserving, and/or developing the *sound features belonging to the elements of "common defence."* The national government constantly creates, modifies, and deletes parts or all of the policies, organizations, procedures, and strategies to enhance and facilitate the protection of national interests and the accomplishment of the national objectives as the world




Figure 4. Level 3 of the Williams Model for C2.

environment and internal United States change. The process is an evolving and tends to change along with the elements of "common defence."

Policy is "a definite course or method of action" selected from among alternatives by the national government "and in light of given conditions to guide and determine present and future decisions." [Ref. 26, p. 910]

Organization is "the administrative and functional structure" for the resources applied toward the accomplishment of "common defence." [Ref. 26, p. 831]

Procedure is "a series of steps followed in a regular definite order" to achieve a "common defence" related function. [Ref. 26, p. 937]

Strategy is "the science and art of employing the political, economic, psychological, and military forces of a nation or group of nations to afford the maximum support to adopted policies in peace or war." [Ref. 26, p. 1165]

Since the three branches share the authority of the national government, potentially, they develop and scrutinize all policies, procedures, organizations, and strategies from three perspectives. Each perspective is uniquely focused on the accomplishment of the objectives for governance.

The resulting policies, procedures, organizations, and strategies frequently represent a compromise or consensus view. There is strength in the adaptation of policy, procedures, organization, or strategy through compromise or consensus view as long as the derivation comes out of the specified process in the Constitution. The strength rests with compliance by the mass of the people.

This chapter covers how the legislative, executive, and judicial branches set goals and implement policies, organizations, procedures, and strategies for "common defence."

B. THE ROLE OF THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH IN C2

The Constitution grants to the legislative branch numerous powers pertaining to C2. Each branch shares its powers with the other branches. Each of the powers resting in the legislative branch may be classified as legislative, executive, and/or judicial in nature. In other words, many functions performed by the legislative branch may be better classified as judicial or executive in nature. Nevertheless, the functions performed by the legislative branch play a vital role in C2. In the book, Foreign Policy Makers: President vs. Congress, David M. Abshire states the following:

What Congress does or does not do, has become a vital determinant in shaping war and peace, diplomacy, arms control, the nuclear balance, energy sufficiency, and foreign economic policy...Strategic, political, and economic assessments in foreign relations increasingly rest upon analyses of the Congress. [Ref. 27, p. 6]

The United States military is under and upholds the public law. Through the Constitution and public law, the legislature exercises C2.

The legislative role in C2 is divided into information system, organization and policy setting, budgetary control over strategy, declarative, approving authority, and oversight functions.

1. Information System

The adequacy of the Congress' information system determines the effectiveness of analysis by the legislative branch. Congress' proficiency is limited by the analytical accuracy, insightfulness, and timeliness of information received.

Within the legislative branch, there exists an internal information system for information gathering, processing, and transfer which provides the foundation for the congressional role in C2. Offices responsible for the internal information system

are the Congressional Research Service, General Accounting Office, Congressional Committees and their Staffers, Congressional Budget Office, Office of Technology Assessment, and Library of Congress.

The bulk of the Congressional work is performed in the Committees. The Committees are responsible for staffing proposal and formulating legislation. The Committees supporting "common defence" are the House of Representative's Appropriation, Armed Services, Budget, and Foreign Affairs Committees and the Senate's Appropriation, Armed Services, Budget, and Foreign Relations Committees. Congressional actions pertaining to "common defence" are strongly influenced and directed by these committees and their sub-committees. The Committees and their sub-committees frequently hold hearings and meetings to discuss important issues concerning "common defence" and to ensure the thorough development of all viewpoints. Members of the executive branch are frequent participants in the hearings of the committees.

In addition, the executive branch reports information to the legislative branch. The Constitution requires a State of the Union Address by the President and provisions in the United States Code require periodic reporting on important "common defence" issues by key personnel of the executive department.

On a formal and informal level, Congress receives information from many special interest groups. These groups work hard to monitor and influence current decisions in order to protect and/or enhance their present and future welfare.

After all the information is gathered, filtered, and analyzed, Congress makes many crucial decisions. The decisions of Congress are made through the voting

process and, unless the President vetoes or the Supreme Court rules unconstitutional, we have a public law. Presidential vetoes may be overridden by a two-third vote and Supreme Court rulings may be overturned by the amendment process.

2. The Organization and Policy Setting Function

The Constitution gives to the legislative branch the authority to "make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution" the powers specified in the Constitution. The public law establishes and institutionalizes policies and government organizations for C2. The setting of policies and organization is important to the orderly, fair, efficient, and effective orchestration of the military role in "common defence."

The organization and policy setting function is a shared power with the President. The legislative and executive branches plan, coordinate, control, and direct the provisions for "common defence" at minimum cost to the American people.

The legislative branch has passed several enactments which set policy and the organization for C2. These enactments range from federal laws which specify the organization for the upper levels of "common defence" related departments and agencies in the executive branch to specific policies concerning foreign military sales or conduct of service members. The federal laws known as United States Code (USC) are constantly being reviewed, changed, or updated as necessary. Some of the enactments related to C2 follows:

- The National Defense Act of 1916 set the trend for twentieth century administrative and policy setting. In this act, Congress made one specification which stated that the Regular Army would "be adequately organized and equipped to meet any sudden emergencies." [Ref. 16, p. 6] For the first time, the United States recognized a peacetime need for a strong national defense. Also, the selection of "national defense" in the act's title in lieu of "common

defence" indicates the American people's acceptance of federalism. However, the implementation of the act fell short of expectations. The bombing of Pearl Harbor by the Japanese is attributable to the shortfalls in implementing the act. This act has since been rescinded.

- The Neutrality Act of 1937 "prohibited export of arms and munitions to any belligerent nations." In this act, Congress establishes a policy supporting isolationism by adapting neutrality posture toward the war in Europe. [Ref. 16, p. 427]
- The Lend-Lease Act of 1941 was an effort to equip non-aggressor nations, so that they could prevent the spread of aggressor forces to American soil. [Ref. 16, p. 458]
- Congress passed the War Powers Act of 1973 over Presidential veto to:

insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.

The War Powers Act stipulated three conditions where the President may introduce US forces into hostilities and they are: "(1) declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces." The act stipulated consultation and reporting requirements by the President as well as Congressional procedures to review and end the deployment. Controversy surrounds the act from the President perspective as curtailment of his rights as chief executive and commander in chief to protect Americans abroad and from liberal congressmen who feel that the act granted more power to the President than he was entitled under the Constitution. [Ref. 28, p. 833]

- The National Security Act of 1947 and its amendments establish the national security organization as known today. The purpose of this act reads as follows:

In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security; to provide a Department of Defense, including the three military Departments of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense; to provide for their unified direction

under civilian control of the Secretary of Defense but not to merge these departments or services; to provide for the establishment of unified or specified combatant commands, and a clear and direct line of command to such commands;... [Ref. 29, p. 1]

The organization for national security as known today was derived through the evolution of this act. The original act created the Department of Defense (DOD), Secretary of Defense, National Security Council (NSC) and staff, Central Intelligence Agency and its Director and Deputy Director, Operational Commands, Service Departments, Defense Agencies, Joint Chief of Staff and its chairman and joint staff. The organization for national security is shown in Figure . The role, power, and responsibilities of these executive departments, executives, agencies, commands, and staff may be found in Title 10 and 50 of USC.

- Foreign Assistance and Arms Export Acts and Public Laws/Resolution on War Powers, Collective Security, and Related Materials specify the United States policies and objectives for foreign relations by country and/or treaty. [Ref. 28]
- Other Administrative Laws govern such things as military acquisition, civilian and military personnel policies, research and development, etc.

After the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, the Joint Congressional Investigating Committee cited the following two general categories as the cause of American deficiencies: "first, those errors which resulted from the presence of command by mutual cooperation; and, second, those which resulted from the bad judgment displayed by the two commanders [Ref. 16, p. 574]." The current policies and organizations corrects the problem of "command by mutual cooperation." Congress has exercised effective C2 through the organization and policy setting function.

3. The Budgetary Control Function

Through the budgetary process, Congress provides control over the organization, policy, and strategy employed by the United States for "common defence." Congress thoroughly reviews the budget proposal submitted by the President

for justification and adequacy of all expenditures. Congress evaluates the budget from a micro and macro management level.

The Congressional budget process produces the authorizations and appropriations bills. The authorizations bills approve programs and set ceilings for how much to spend on each program. The appropriations bills authorize the expenditure of money for authorized program and within the ceilings of the authorizations bills.

At the macro level, Congress and the President decide the level of expenditures for "common defence." Congress and the President face the challenge of providing for the objectives of governance in an environment of limited resources and expanding requirements. The "common defence" objective competes for the limited funds against the other objectives for government. The level of expenditures for "common defence" influences the organization, policy, and strategy.

Also, the Congress at the macro level faces the challenge of reviewing the President's proposed budget for adequacy of funding for Operations and Support, force modernization, research and development, and military constructions. Congress matches the budget proposal of the President against the preparedness of the forces for low intensity conflict (LIC), conventional warfare, and nuclear warfare in the upcoming year and future years. Uncertainty prevails in the President's proposed budget and the Congressional decision. However, the President and Congress tackle their budget responsibility with earnestness because the future security of the United States is at stake.

Through the budgetary process, Congress at the macro level determines the force levels and the make-up of the force. Congress places ceilings through authorizations for the force strength. These ceilings restrict the composition of the military force by service departments.

During the budgetary process at the micro level, Congress validates new operational and developmental requirements when deciding whether a program should exist. Normally, requirements are derived from deficiencies and/or forecasted increase in force warfare or administrative capability from technological improvements at the technical, tactical, campaign, or strategic levels of "common defence." The adaptation of these programs and the eventual fielding of the programs' output influence and direct the performance of the military art at the technical, tactical, campaign, or strategic levels of "common defence." The spectrum for the levels of "common defence" ranges from the technical involving the performance of tasks by the individual soldier to the strategic involving the summative application of means to obtain the national objective(s). Through the validation of programs, Congress influences and directs the organization, policy, and strategy for "common defence."

Congress decides the funding level for each individual program on an annual basis. The initial funding level for a program determines the amount and type of program output to be purchased or whether the program is continued. Reductions in funding for a program during subsequent years may cause delays or changes in the fielding plan, escalation of cost per program output, selection of less than optimum program output, and/or the discontinuation of the program.

The choice to extensively micro-manage a program is usually based on threshold cost level; risk assessments; perceived mismanagement; or reports of fraud, waste, and abuse. Occasionally, extensive micro-management may result from a Congressman receiving concerns from constituents. Whenever Congress decides to extensively micro-manage, they may select to review and influence all aspects of the program.

4. Approving Authority Function

The Congress serves as approving authority for all presidential appointments. Through this authority, the Congress influences the course of decision making in the Executive and Judicial branches of government. The Congressional membership has qualification expectation for each position filled by presidential appointment and requiring their approval. Congress uses thorough investigation and approval hearings to assess the philosophical position, moral character, spiritual sobriety, and the leadership and managerial potential of the presidential nominees. Also, special interest groups or individuals supply Congress with ample information on the nominee's background.

The person nominated for the various "common defence" related positions is very crucial. The presidential appointments are for designated military and civilian positions. The authority going with the various positions may include a combination of controlling vast amount of national resources, influencing and/or deciding on nuclear weapons release, committing United States forces, establishing national security policy and strategy, etc.

Congress with the President shares the responsibility for the quality of leadership and management at the upper levels of the National Security related departments.

5. The Declarative Function

The authority of Congress to declare war is called the declarative function in this paper. Congress used the declarative function to declare war during World War I and II, the Mexican War, the War of 1812, and the Spanish-American War of 1898. The United States has fought several other wars without a Congressional declaration of war.

During a declaration of war, there is a mobilization of American warfighting capability, work force, and defense industrial complex; and an increase in the President's power as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief. The increase in Presidential power comes partially from a Congressional delegation of power in order to focus leadership and obtain the aggressive execution of the war.

The War Powers Act mentioned earlier discusses the situation where the President has directed US armed forces into hostile or potentially hostile environments. The US fought the Korean, Vietnam, and Civil Wars without a formal declaration of war. The Civil War was considered a national emergency and the President as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief mobilized the nation. The Vietnam and Korean Wars were very controversial and the American people and Congress questioned the President's authority throughout and after these conflicts. It is important for the President to exercise the Constitutional process if he intends to hold public support.

6. Congressional Oversight

The Constitution implies a requirement for Congressional oversight when it authorizes the legislative branch "to try all impeachment" and "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" the authorities granted to the branches of the Government. To perform these authorizations, Congress performs oversight over C2 and many other activities of the Executive and Judicial branch. The 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act "directs all congressional committees to exercise oversight over agencies and programs under their jurisdiction." [Ref. 30, p. 60]

Congressional oversight has really increased over the last forty years. In the book, Congressional Involvement and Relations: A Guide for Department of Defense Program Managers, the Defense Systems Management College cites the following reasons for increased Congressional oversight:

- Fraud, waste and abuse in the executive branch.
- Conscientious efforts to ensure that limited resources are utilized most effectively for national security, internal social harmony and the execution of other national policies.
- "Big government," involving itself more in the lives of citizens and resultant dissatisfaction.
- Conversely, failure of or skepticism of the abilities of government to deliver as promised
- Availability of more congressional staff, thus allowing for more attention in this area.
- Assertion by Congress of authority in the 1970s after years of the strong presidency, with the Vietnam War and Watergate opportunities the prime examples.

- Increasing complexity of issues begging solutions which need to be aired.
- Personal objectives of Members seeking recognition.
- Display committee initiative and aggressiveness in dealing with agencies and forestall appearance of inactivity or comfortable relationships.
- Finally, the feeling "things just aren't being done as well as they should. [Ref. 30, pp. 60-61]

The Constitution grants to Congress "the power to try all impeachments." This is Congress's most powerful oversight capability. Congress must remain aware of the performance of all personnel in government. Congress held impeachment hearings against President Andrew Johnson in 1868, however the impeachment charges were not approved. Several federal judges have been impeached over the years. President Nixon resigned rather than possibly face impeachment charges. The impeachment power of Congress is truly powerful, but can only be enforced as long as Congress keeps abreast of what is going on.

The Constitution requires the President from time to time to make a "State of the Union Address" and Congress through provisions within public laws requires key executive department officials to submit verbal and written reports on key issues. [Ref. 31] These reports provides insight into how well the executive department complies with public law and meets the objective for governance. The reports may address various issues ranging from perceived shortfalls in the current public law to potential alternatives for solutions to the status of individual programs. This feedback loop enhances Congress a capability to implement control.

Congress holds regular hearings during the budgetary process in search of information to judge whether the current organizations, public policies, procedures,

and strategies meet the objectives of governance or produce a less than optimal solution. These hearings permit Congress to impose accountability over the Executive Department.

Congress holds Investigative hearings as a means of oversight. These hearings may involve an effort to check compliance by an individual or organization with public law. The Iran Contra Hearings were investigative in nature. Non-compliance with public law may lead to criminal prosecution against involved individuals and/or tighter reporting and oversight procedures placed over an organization.

The General Accounting Office (GAO) performs audits of programs and operations to determine their efficiency and effectiveness and compliance with public law. The GAO provides the Congress with an independent assessment of how programs and operations are functioning. Independent assessment furnishes an unbiased, reliable evaluation of programs and operations performance. The responsible committee often designates the specific programs and operations for GAO audit.

Congressional inquiries serve as another method of oversight. Congressmembers or their staff may request a reply to an issue. The issue may have been raised by a constituent or of concern to the requestor. The President has directed the Executive Departments to give timely replies to these inquiries.

Congressional Committee Staff keeps the Congress informed of the pertinent information concerning programs and operations. The staff is very professional and knowledgeable of C2 and serves frequently as the eyes, ears, and information filter for

the Congressional Committees. The staff enhances the oversight capability of Congress.

Congressional trips are another means of performing oversight. During the 1970s when Congress was considering the reduction of the forward deployed forces in NATO, Senator Sam Nunn made a Congressional trip to Europe and came back to successfully lead the fight in Congress against force reduction. The information gained during Congressional trips is a vital source of information for oversight. [Ref. 32, p. 1331]

Congress uses the legislative veto as a tool to control the executive departments. Under the legislative veto, Congress establishes law "which allows the President to put forth a proposal, subject to the approval or disapproval of Congress." [Ref. 33, pp. 82-83] Congress has used legislative veto method of legislation to control reorganizations within the executive departments. Legislative veto has been an effective means of Congressional oversight.

The OTA and Congressional Research Services have also enhance the oversight capabilities. The OTA provides assessments of technology application and potential utilities. The Congressional Research Services "advise committees in the analysis, appraisal, and evaluation of legislative proposals; assist in determining the advisability of enacting a proposal; estimate its probable results; and evaluate alternate methods of accomplishing the same results."

C. THE EXECUTIVE'S ROLE IN C2

The Constitution states that "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." The Constitution designate the President as

Commander in Chief, Head of State, and Chief Executive. In his Oath of Office, the President swears to "faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States" and "to the best of" his "Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." Also, the President has appointment authority with "the Advice and Consent of the Senate" and legislative veto authority. The role of the President is also vital to C2. [Ref. 34, p. xii]

Over the years, the executive department has grown larger and larger and the Presidency has become more and more difficult. As the executive department increased in size and scope of mission, the government's bureaucracy became more intense, the necessity to delegate authority between the President and the executors increased, and the span of control became greater. In 1798, Congress with the approval of the United States established the State Department. Shortly there after, the War and Navy Departments were founded. Today, there are thirteen cabinet level departments, fifty-one Independent Establishments and Government Corporations, and ten executive offices under the supervision of the President.

Beyond a doubt, the President has a very difficult job. The American people judge the President on the nation's accomplishment of the objectives for governance. Their judgment tends to be a mixture between fairness and critical. In performing his C2 role, the President must focus on all the pertinent considerations of an issue.

The President uses all of his assigned power to lead and manage the executive department.

This section looks at the President's national mandate, legislative role, definition of national interest, leadership/management strategy, appointment authority and

delegation of authority, utilization of authority delegated to him by Congress, and national security policy.

1. The National Mandate

The President is the only elected public figure with a national mandate from the populist. Whereas the Senators have a state-wide mandate and the Representatives have a state-wide or district of the state view, the President is the only official elected nationwide. The national mandate is a term used whenever the President is newly or re-elected by a convincing margin. The national mandate implies that the majority of the public supports the values, judgment, and platform of the President and therefore, Congress and the government bureaucracy should support his platform.

The President uses the evidence of a national mandate as a tool to push key provisions from his platform through enactment by Congress and to inspire support from the government bureaucracy. President Reagan's victory in 1980 was perceived as a national mandate for stronger defense capability. As a result, the United States underwent a defense build-up of three percent above inflation. [Ref. 4, pp. 68-69]

The national mandate may work two ways. If the platform of the President-elect calls for a strong national defense, then it works for defense. The national mandate works against defense, if the President-elect platform calls for a reduction in defense expenditure or strength.

2. Defining National Interest

The President along with Congress plays a key role in defining National Interest. Alexander L. George and Robert O. Keohane identified the use of the

national interest "concept in two different ways: first, as a criterion to assess what is at stake in any given situation and to evaluate what course of action is "best"; second, as a justification for decisions taken." [Ref. 35, p. 218]

Normally, the President comes into office with pre-conceived notions of the National Interest. This notion is usually changed as he becomes privileged to the vast information made available to the President of the United States and his perspective of the world becomes broader in scope.

Over the years, the following have surfaced again and again as part of our national security interest:

- The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values and institutions intact and its people secure.
- The promotion of freedom's growth, democratic institutions intact and free-market economies throughout the world, linked by fair and open international trade.
- The security, stability and well-being of our allies and other nations friendly to our interests.
- The opposition to the expansion of influence, control or territory by nations hostile to freedom and to other fundamental values shared by America and its allies. [Ref. 36, p. 8]

In the prepared statement of Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., USN, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the National Security Strategy Hearings held by the Armed Services Committee of the United States Senate in 1987, national interest is viewed as follows:

Identifying U.S. National Security Interests -- these encompass both broad ideals (freedom, human rights, economic prosperity) and substantive concerns (territorial integrity, U.S. interests abroad, access to world markets and resources, a supportive international order). [Ref. 37, p. 412]

This fundamental categorization of national interest into ideals and substantive concerns is correct but lacks a yard stick by which ideals and substantive concerns can be measured.

On the basis of national security interests, the United States develops national security objectives, policy, and strategy.

In the book, National Interests and Presidential Leadership: The Setting of Priorities, Donald E. Nuechterlein sets a framework for the evaluation of world events impact on national interests. Nuechterlein developed the National Interest Matrix which is composed of two parts: first, the basic national interests and secondly, the intensities of interest.

The basic national interest includes:

- Defense interests: the protection of the nation-state and its citizens against the threat of physical violence directed from another state or against an externally inspired threat to its system of government.
- Economic interests: the enhancement of the nation-state's economic well-being in relations with other states.
- World order interests: the maintenance of an international political and economic system in which the nation-state may feel secure and in which its citizens and commerce may operate peacefully outside its borders.
- Ideological interests: the protection and furtherance of a set of values that the citizens of a nation-state share and believe to be universally good. [Ref. 38, pp. 4-5]

The intensity of interest was categorized according to:

- Survival issues: when the existence of a nation-state is in jeopardy.
- Vital issues: when serious harm will very likely result to the state unless strong measures ... are employed to counter an adverse action by another state or to deter it from undertaking a serious provocation.

- Major issues: when a state's political, economic, and ideological well-being may be adversely affected by events and trends in the international environment and thus requires corrective action in order to prevent them from becoming serious threats (vital issues).
- Peripheral issues: when a state's well-being is not adversely affected by events or trends abroad, but when the interests of private citizens and companies operating in other countries might be endangered. [Ref. 38, pp. 8-11]

Figure 5 shows the National Interest Matrix. The analyst uses the matrix to assess the intensity of interest for all countries involved in an issue. The national interest matrix presents a problem in that it fails to take into account the context of the issue and the basic interest at stake overlooks the real world view of all events.

The author feels that the national interest matrix could provide a more idealistic and realistic perception of the American view of foreign affairs, if the matrix was supplemented by three similar matrices having the basic interests at stake changed to the elements of "common defence" and the analysis separated into the local, regional, and international context of the issues. This modification takes into account that the United States perpetuates the elements of "common defence" with its national security policy and may often involve itself in local issues because of local, regional, or international concerns. The local view of an issue takes into consideration the effect of the incident's local impact on the United States. The regional and international view of an issue takes into consideration the projected regional and international impact on the United States. (See Figures 6, 7, and 8)

In 1954, Vietnam at the local level had peripheral impact on the United States. At the regional and international level, there were vital ideology and major

Country:	Issue:
<u>Basic interest at stake</u>	<u>Intensity of interest</u>
	<u>Survival</u> <u>Vital</u> <u>Major</u> <u>Peripheral</u>
<u>Defense of Homeland</u>	
<u>Economic Well-being</u>	
<u>Favorable World Order</u>	
<u>Ideological</u>	

Figure 5. The National Interest Matrix.

Country:	Local View of Issue:
<u>Elements of "Common Defence"</u>	<u>Intensity of interest</u>
	<u>Survival</u> <u>Vital</u> <u>Major</u> <u>Peripheral</u>
<u>Ideology</u>	
<u>Diplomacy</u>	
<u>Military force</u>	
<u>Technological and</u> <u>Economic Strength</u>	
<u>Intelligence</u>	

Figure 6. Local View of Issue.




Figure 7. Regional View of Issue.




Figure 8. International View of Issue

diplomacy and military force impact stemming from Vietnam. Many strategic planners felt that if Vietnam failed there would be a domino effect.

By identifying the elements of "common defence" and categorizing the intensity of interest, the President and his advisers could assess world events as they impact the United States, individual allies, and the involved countries.

3. The President's Legislative Role in C2

The President works with the legislature to set the organization and policy for "common defence" and to formulate the budget for orchestration and execution of "common defence." The Constitution granted the needed authority for the President to fulfill the above functions.

First, the President has veto power over all legislative enactments passed by Congress. The Congress may overrule the presidential veto if two-thirds or more of the legislature decides to do so. The Presidential review of all legislature keeps him involved in the legislative process. The President by virtue of his national mandate provides a national perspective to the legislative process.

Second, the Constitution states that the President "shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient..." This authority permits the President to focus the attention of Congress and the nation on issues of national concern. Proper use of this authority enables the President to keep in balance the key aspects of American society.

Next, the President, as Chief Executive Officer, tends to have the best information. This permits the President to work with Congress from a position of knowledge. As a result, the President is respected and has influence over the decisions of Congress.

Lastly, Executive Orders are a means for the President to execute his legislative role. The President's issuance of Executive Orders is based upon his "vested power" under the Constitution and the statutory law.

As a participant in the legislative process, the President influences the legislative decisions on the organization and policies for C2 and budgetary bills.

4. Powers Delegated to the President by Congress

Congress over the years has delegated much of its Constitutional powers to the President. In the author's opinion, Congress delegates its power to the President for the following reasons:

- The President is better able to cope with time sensitive national emergencies than the Congress. Time sensitive decision making is an expected reality in the international environment. The timeliness of decisions influences and determines the outcome of many events considered vital to the national interest. The timeliness and quality of decisions and speedy execution of the decided course of action may prevent the escalation of an emergency into nuclear holocaust or regional conflict. The organization of government permits an orderly flow of information on a real time basis to and from the President. The president has an executive staff which provides tremendous information processing and validation support. And finally, the President can make split second decisions based on the recommendation of his staff.
- The Constitution places the President as Chief Executive, Commander in Chief, and Head of State, therefore the President serves as the focal point of government. The Constitution does not provide a central focal point for accountability and responsibility in the Congress.
- Past President's performance during national and international crisis brought greater dependencies on the Presidency for national leadership and management. The Presidency played a crucial role during the Civil War,

World War I, and World War II and took the lead in the establishment of organizations and policies to correct economic problems of The Great Depression. Next to the Revolutionary War, these crisis are the most remembered and written about experiences of our heritage.

- Whenever the Congress and President through legislative enactment establish government institutions, a certain amount of Congressional authority is passed to the President.

During and after the Vietnam War, the Congress has tried to regain much of the power forfeited or delegated.

The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 changed the way that budget proposals were generated. For fiscal years after 1921, the Executive branch became responsible for the development and submission of a proposed budget.

The 1974 Budget Act and the Graham-Rudman Balanced Budget Act are attempts by Congress to regain some discretion in the budgetary objective. The 1974 Budget Act established "a much more disciplined procedure for congressional consideration of defense and other requests" and "created a rudimentary systems analysis capability." [Ref. 39, p. 559] The Graham-Rudman Balanced Budget Act directs the movement of budgetary allocation from a deficit trend to a balanced budget.

The employment of national forces into hostilities abroad or at home is a very controversial issue. The President has employed the national forces into hostile or potentially hostile situations abroad to protect the life and property of American citizens, to fulfill the nation's commitment to the United Nations or other treaties, and to carry out the nation's goal for containment. In the case of the Korean War and the Lebanon Situation, the United States acted as a part of the United Nations. In other cases like Grenada, Dominican Republic, and Libya, the United States acted unilaterally

to allegedly protect the life and property of American citizens. In Vietnam, Greece, and Turkey, the United States acted to obtain containment. In each of these cases, the Congress issued some form of Resolution supporting the position of the President. The War Powers Act of 1973 addresses these issues. Congress passed the War Power Act over Presidential veto. In the War Powers Act, Congress delegates responsibility to and restricts authority of the President.

Through the Presidency, the executive department generates seventy percent of the proposed legislation. As the executive department grew larger and larger, many experts were attracted to government service in the various disciplinary areas. Congress takes advantage of this experience when it accepts proposals from the executive department.

5. Leadership/Management Strategy

The way that the President makes his decisions and the prevalent tendencies and outcome of these decisions permit an analysis of the President's leadership/management strategy for "common defence." Effective C2 is the hopeful result of his leadership/management strategy for "common defence."

a. Use of Appointment Authority

The President appoints with the consent of Congress the Justices of the Supreme Court, Federal Judges, and key officials of the Executive Branch. Each President has authority to appoint the top officials of the Executive Offices and Departments. The appointment of officials to any of these offices does not concur with the Presidential term. A President may serve one or two terms of office without making an appointment to the Supreme Court, Federal bench, Independent

Establishment or Government Corporations. During a four year term, the President may or may not be able to change the political orientation of the Supreme Court, Federal bench, Independent Establishment, and Government Corporations. Nevertheless, the President's appointment authority is vital to his C2 function.

The selection of quality personnel who share the values and outlook of the President is important for all appointed positions. The bureaucracy of large government, large span of control, and multi-levels between point of execution and policy/decision makers necessitate the appointment of well qualified personnel. The proficiency of these appointees can set the tone of an administration. The days of political patronage have not passed but are well tempered by the necessity for quality personnel in the key staff and cabinet positions.

The Presidential appointees that are closely related to "common defence" in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947 and its amendments include:

- Central Intelligence Agency - the Director and Deputy Director;
- Department of Defense - the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Under and Assistant Secretaries, Inspector General, General Counsel, Secretaries and Assistant and Under Secretaries of the military departments, Chairman to Joint Chief of Staff, Unified and Specified CINCs, Chief of Staff for Air Force and Army, Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corp, and others.
- National Security Council - National Security Adviser and Secretary;
- The State Department - the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Under and Assistant Secretaries, Inspector General, legal adviser, and ambassadors.

These positions are very crucial to C2. A careful look at the organization for National Security reveals the huge responsibility and potential possession of great authority in the above positions.

b. Delegation of Authority

Public law leaves to the President's discretion how much of his executive authority to be delegated to the Executive Offices and Departments. An exception to this rule is the Nuclear release authority which public law prohibits the President from delegating. The President's confidence in the appointees proficiency, credibility, and consistency with his position determines the amount of delegation.

The President may decide to centralize decision making and setting policy in the oval office or decentralize it as much as possible. The proper level for decision making and setting policy on "common defence" related issues varies with the nature of the situation. Ideally, the President places authority at the level that he feels most comfortable.

Sometimes the President may seek advice and rely on someone other than the secretary of an Executive Department or head of an Executive Office. This situation leads to potential breakdown of the system during time sensitive emergencies and increases the complexity of an already complex system. In this case, the formal organizational structure is replaced by an informal structure.

With the power to appoint, there is an implied power to hold the appointees accountable and responsible to the President. The supervisory responsibility includes the authority to fire. The President seldom fires an individual, but tends to tactfully demand an appointee's resignations.

c. *Ability to Integrate and Coordinate*

The Executive Office of the President functions to aid the President in staffing and organizing coherent programs. The Executive Office enables the President to integrate the elements of "common defence", perform C2, and function as a national leader and manager. The offices are:

- The White House Office;
- Office of Management and Budget;
- National Security Council;
- Office of Policy Development;
- Office of the United States Trade Representative;
- Council of Economic Advisers;
- Council on Environmental Quality;
- Office of Science and Technology Policy;
- Office of Administration; and
- Office of the Vice President of the United States.

These offices play a vital role in the leadership and management capability of the President.

The offices permit an external transference of the President's will and values proportional to the level of world activity. The Executive offices function as the nervous system for the President on all areas of national interest. They may perform information gathering and processing, coordinate the development and analysis of options, coordinate the implementation of decisions, and verify compliance with and success of decisions for the President, if he so chooses.

The Executive Offices help the President to answer the following questions:

- Who will constitute the policymaking group for different kinds of issues?
- How will policy alternatives be identified, discussed, and evaluated within the policymaking group?
- How will participants in the group satisfy their needs for information and analysis?
- Will general advice or specialized inputs to the policymaking task be expected from each participant?
- What process will be followed in attempting to form consensus within the group on behalf of the policy that is chosen?
- What "rules" will govern the expression of disagreement, the regulation of competition among participants to influence the leader's choice, and the scope of bargaining and compromise during different phases of policymaking?
- How will the task of synthesizing the various elements of complex policy problems be handled?
- In arriving at a decision, what relative weight will be given by the executive to arriving at the technically best alternative as against one that commands the desired kind and magnitude of consensus within the group?
- What degree of support, however expressed, will be expected of the participants once a decision has been made by the executive?
- What "rules" will govern reconsideration of a past decision or policy?" [Ref. 35, p. 99]

The answer to these questions about "common defence" determines the President's leadership/management strategy.

d. Ability to Communicate

In the age of mass media, the President's ability to effectively communicate his position on issues to the American people, Congress, his subordinates,

allies, and other nations determines the success or failure and ease of implementing "common defence" policy. Roosevelt's "fireside chats" over radio are remembered today for calming the fears of the American people during World War II and the Great Depression. So often, the decisions in Congress on "common defence" related issues are swayed one way or another solely, on the merits of his communications skill. The President's ability to communicate is vital to C2.

6. President's Role in Setting C2 Aspect of National Security Policy

Why was "common defence" replaced by National Security in 1947 and by National Defense in 1916? The replacement of "common defence" may easily be attributed to an outlook of acceptance for federalism. Whether addressed as "common defence", national security, or national defense, the meaning is the same. The National Security Act of 1947 and its amendment has practically externalized and institutionalized the processes performed by the President as Commander in Chief and Head of State. National security asserts that defense policy is no longer totally compartmented from foreign policy. These policies brought together with ideology, economic and technological strength, and intelligence create the elements of a sound national security policy. Yet, the bottomline is the accomplishment of "common defence."

Ironically, the President and Congress have not formalized the process for reaching a compromise or consensus on national security policy, except for the budgetary process. The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 took measures toward formalizing the national security policy process with the requirement for "the President to submit an annual report to the Congress on the national security strategy

of the United States." [Ref. 40, p. 9] However, this measure falls short of correcting the problem cited by the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, chaired by David Packard that "there is no rational system whereby the executive branch and the Congress reach coherent and enduring agreement on national military strategy, the forces to carry it out and the funding that should be provided. . . ." [Ref. 41, p. xvii] In some kind of way the system needs to create a process where the President and the Congress reach compromise and consensus on national security strategy and policy.

Judging by the United States deployment of military forces, diplomatic agreements, use of ideology, intelligence gathering effort, and perpetuation of technology and economic strength, some basic national security policies may be drawn. This approach to obtaining national security strategy and policy is non-deterministic and dependant on empirical analysis of results and outputs. A more systemic, deterministic and theoretical basis of formulating national security strategy and policy is desirable.

In the executive branch, the President has ultimate policy making and implementation responsibility for "common defence." Other active participants in the policy making and implementing decisions for "common defence" in the executive branch include the National Security Council, Defense Department, State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Commerce, Department of Treasury, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, United States Information Agency (USIA), Agency for International Development, and the Office of Management and Budget. His fulfillment of this responsibility depends upon his leadership/management strategy.

The United States postures and prepares its military to be an instrument of deterrence and, if necessary, to fight and win, today or tomorrow, anywhere in the world at each level of conflict. The military posturing and operational readiness of the United States are constrained by the nation's limited resources, the trade-off between the elements of "common defence," the trade-off between the different military programs, and the trade-off between providing "common defence" and accomplishing the other objectives for governance. The presence of uncertainty in the world environment complicates military posturing and preparedness for "common defence." The elements of uncertainty includes the unpredictability of results, technological advancements, international personalities, political pressures, and world conditions from day to day or in the future. The President along with Congress must select how to best use the limited resources in order to accomplish the objectives for governance.

At the Presidential level, C2 involves the maintenance and readiness of a deterrent military force and the systemic coordination of all five elements of "common defence." The military role is a unique element of "common defence" because it has posturing and operational states. During peace, a strong military posture works with ideology, economic and technological strength, intelligence, and diplomacy to prevent war and promote free trade. During conflict, a strong operational military force works with ideology, economic and technological strength, intelligence, and diplomacy to quickly terminate it at the lowest possible level. In its operational state, the nation has used the military as the last or most serious recourse to solving threats to national objectives.

During war and crisis, the nature of the military changes from a state of raw potential energy to a strong operational force. The military is employed in war or hostilities for "common defence" when:

- Military posturing and the other elements of "common defense" have failed or project little hope of safeguarding crucial national interests; and
- The military option poses less risk or offers an acceptable more permanent solution than the other elements.

History teaches that nations may resort to military action to resolve threats from time to time.

The author feels that the ultimate test of the nation's survival depends upon its ability and willingness to fight and defend our Constitution.

D. THE JUDICIAL BRANCH

The courts of the United States have made rulings on constitutionality and public law compliance of actions by the executive and legislative branches of national and state governments. Through these rulings, the Judicial Branch influences and directs the accomplishment of "common defence." These rulings have covered such subjects as the President's War and Emergency Powers, individual rights, legislative veto, the Constitution and Collective security, the military power overseas, the United Nations and federal-state relations, executive power, and legislative power. [Ref. 11]

Earlier, it was mentioned that compromised and consensus decisions work well as long as they were enacted under the constitutional process but there is a caveat to that statement. The caveat is that they must comply with the constitution and public law. The Judicial systems are charged to verify compliance of individual, groups, and governmental with the constitution and public law.

V. NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVE, POLICY, AND STRATEGY

A. INTRODUCTION

In the Constitution, the American people set the framework for government, establish the objective for governance, and divide the authority of the government between the branches; also, the American people bound the national interests; but the branches of the government develop the national security interests, objectives, policy and strategy to meet the challenges of the today's world environment and expected world environment at a future period in time. A part of the government's resource expenditure today is dedicated to ensuring the capability of the U.S. to accomplish the objective of governance in expected world environments in the future. The force organization and combat readiness processes (discussed in Chapter 6 and 7, respectively) require long lead time. The government sets the national security interests, objectives, policy, and strategy within the boundary, objectives, and framework set by the American people in the Constitution and otherwise so that an appropriate force organization may be implemented to accomplish combat readiness.

Level 4 of the Williams model covers the role of national security objectives, policy and strategy in C2 (See Figure 9). The author's definitions of these terms are as follows:

- national security interests - are the combined impact on U.S. objective for "common defence" of an internal or external issue or event from its local, regional, international, and overall contexts.




Figure 9. Level 4 of the Williams Model for C2.

- national security objectives - are the expressed and implied statement of the purpose for U.S. government involvement in an issue or event given the level of national security interest.
- national security policy - is the guideline for the use of national power and the scope and limitation for the commitment of the national power in an issue or event for the accomplishment of the national security objective.
- national security strategy - is the specification of what elements of national power should be used and how to employ these resources for the accomplishment of national security objectives within the constraints of national security policy.

Based on national security interests, objectives, policy and strategy, the United States prioritizes the expenditure of resources; sets the military force structure; and determines the required readiness of the military forces. So, the national security interests, objectives, policy and strategy are very important to C2.

Professor Carl Jones of the Naval Postgraduate School in his class, "Decision Making in Command," states that "obtaining the goals is the result of a process of observation, hypothesis statement, dialogue, generalization, observation, and so forth." [Ref. 42] Obtaining the national security interests, objectives, policy, and strategy involves a like process.

This chapter takes a look at what is the current world environment, the executive structure for national security, the process for developing national security interests, objectives, policy and strategy and how the United States utilizes the national security objectives, policy, and strategy in C2.

B. THE ENVIRONMENT

The pace of change in the world environment has increased tremendously since World War II. Therefore, the government faces the challenge of evolving national

security interests, objectives, policy, and strategy which are compatible and viable with the rapidly changing world environment possessing the vestiges of varying cultures. Given that the world environment is constantly changing, the national security interests, objectives, policy, and strategy are dynamic products and hopefully developed through an evolutionary process.

1. The Inheritance

Each new generation of the American people inherits and shares a nation handed down from the previous generations. In the same sense, this generation is making an investment today for current and future generations. For example, the Constitution, as it reads today, is a viable, living part of the inheritance and provides a source of pride and nationalism within the United States.

The executive and judicial decisions and legislative enactments made during previous generations affect the lives of Americans, today, with different degrees of impact. These decisions and enactments may have been an investment for short or long term returns to the United States. Regardless, the decisions and enactments of past administrations remain valid unless rescinded by due process of law or statutory limitations. Whether rescinded or not, the impact is still being felt today because of foregone opportunities as well as expended resources. The Revolutionary and Civil War plus World War I and II are classic examples that affected the nation's values and outlook on the world.

If a past administration decided to neglect national security for three or four years or made a few bad choices, then the current and future administrations would suffer the consequences. If a past administration established a bad alliance, then

the current administration must cope with the political, economic, diplomatic, and military ramifications. If the current generations give away the technological advantages and now waste or fail to preserve scarce resources, then future generations will suffer. The strengths and weaknesses of past administrations' decisions and enactments are brought forward to the current administration.

Looking at the United States today, a person can easily conclude that the past generations left to the current generation a nation possessing strong ideology, diplomacy, technology, economy, military force, and intelligence gathering capability. However, there is no room for complacency. There are some troubling aspects of the economy, technology, military force, diplomacy, and intelligence gathering capability which represent weaknesses or potential weaknesses which could cause problems. These weaknesses represent risks which our society is sometimes forced to take because of limited resources, bad decisions by previous generations, and natural causes.

For example, American high technology firms have been building plants abroad in order to reduce labor costs. The American automobile industry for years placed emphasis on production volume and variety in lieu of production quality. American semi-conductor producers and electronic firms are unable to compete effectively against the Japanese. The government and industry have been unable to respond to these situations. The repercussions have been technology transfer, the loss of jobs in the United States, trade deficit, and the loss of the multiplier benefit derived from funds changing hands because funds are circulating abroad instead of within the United States.

The decisions of yesterday and today determine whether the national culture can perpetuate and remain viable. The challenge faced by previous generations was to pass on a nation that is prepared for the current challenges and implement measures that will keep the nation ready for future challenges. The previous generations have succeeded so far.

2. Communist Ideology is Aggressive

Most of the national security objectives, policy, and strategy, since World War II, are predicated on an assumption that Communist ideology is aggressive in nature. During the period after World War I and up through World War II, the world looked upon communism as non-threatening. Before and during World War II, President Roosevelt treated Stalin and Russia as a friend and ally. After World War II, when Russia took actions considered aggressive in nature to impose puppet Communist governments in Eastern European countries under their control, the world's view of communism changed. The failure of the Russian Army to demobilize after World War II interrupted the United States and its allies demobilization effort. As a result, the United States and the Western European countries plus Canada formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Today, Premier Gorbachev has taken several steps of a non-aggressor nature (Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty, withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, partial withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, Perestroika, and glasnost), but he has failed to reverse the aggressive steps of his predecessors which caused the current posturing of NATO forces.

A weakening of the United States and its allies' defense and alliance on the basis of the overtures made by Gorbachev is premature and not pragmatic at the current time. The puppet administrations of the Warsaw Pact countries still exist. Human rights are still highly suppressed in these nations. The Berlin Wall still stands as a symbol of repression. The Wall separating East and West Germany remains. Movement of people in the Warsaw Pact countries within and outside of each country is highly restricted. The Russian Army continues to police the puppet countries in large numbers compared to NATO forces in Western Europe. And finally, the Russian Army is still mobilized. If Gorbachev were to change the Soviet policies which caused the deep concern of the Truman administration and the Congress of those years, then and only then, the United States and its allies might change their policies toward Russia.

3. The Spectrum of Warfare

Some statesmen affirm that the United States must prepare itself to wage war at the low intensity conflict, conventional warfare, and nuclear warfare level in the various theaters of the world.

- Low-intensity conflict - is a limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psychosocial pressures through terrorism and insurgency. Low-intensity conflict is generally confined to a geographic area and is often characterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and the level of violence. [Ref. 5, pp. 214 and 215]
- Conventional warfare - is warfare to achieve political, social, economic, or psychological objectives with the non-use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weaponry being the only constraint on the geographical area, tactics, weaponry, and level of violence.

- Nuclear warfare - is warfare involving the employment of nuclear weapons.
[Ref. 5, p. 255]

The spectrum of warfare represents the potential warfare environment which the United States must train its forces.

C. THE CURRENT STRUCTURE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The heads of two departments and two agencies are involved in the making of national security policy. They are the DOD, State Department, CIA, and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. With the National Security Council staff, other departments, and selected interdepartment agencies and Government Corporations, these departments coordinate and execute the application of ideology, military force, diplomacy, technological and economic strength, and intelligence to influence the policies of other nations. Each play a unique role in "common defence."

I. National Security Council.

The National Security Council consists of the President, Vice President, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of State as members and the Director of Central Intelligence as intelligence adviser, the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff as military adviser, and Director of Arms Control and the Disarmament as arms control adviser. Other departments or agencies may participate at the discretion of the President.

The National Security Act of 1947 provides the following guidance on the function and duties of the National Security Council:

The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security. [Ref. 29, p. 2]

...the duty of the Council-

(1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith; and

(2) to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and to make recommendations to the President in connection therewith. [Ref.29, p. 2]

The National Security Council and support staff have functions and duties to aid the President in the formulation and implementation of national security policy, strategy, and objectives. The way that the Council and staff is used depends on the President.

2. The CIA

The National Security Act of 1947 and its amendments specify the following duties for the CIA:

- advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security;
- make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;
- correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government;
- performs for intelligence agencies such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished in the Agency;
- collects, produces, and disseminates counterintelligence and foreign intelligence, including information not otherwise obtainable. The collection of counterintelligence or foreign intelligence within the United States shall be coordinated with the FBI as required by procedures agreed upon by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General;

- collects, produces, and disseminates intelligence on foreign aspects of narcotics production and trafficking;
- conducts counterintelligence activities outside the United States and without assuming or performing any internal security functions, conducts counterintelligence activities within the United States in coordination with the FBI as required by procedures agreed upon by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General;
- coordinates counterintelligence activities and the collection of information not otherwise obtainable when conducted outside the United States by other departments and agencies;
- conducts special activities approved by the President. No agency, except the CIA (or the Armed Forces of the United States in time of war declared by Congress or during any period covered by a report from the President to the Congress under the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1541 et seq.), may conduct any special activity unless the President determines that another agency is more likely to achieve a particular objective;
- carries out or contracts for research, development, and procurement of technical systems and devices relating to authorized functions;
- protects the security of its installations, activities, information, property, and employees by appropriate means, including such investigations of applicants, employees, contractors, and other persons with similar associations with the CIA, as are necessary;
- conducts such administrative and technical support activities within and outside the United States as are necessary procurement and essential cover and proprietary arrangements; and
- perform such other functions and duties relating to intelligence that affect the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct. [Ref. 43, pp. 515-516]

The CIA's ability to coordinate the gathering, filtering, and assessment of intelligence information is vital to the establishment of national security policy and strategy.

3. Department of State

The United States Government Manual explains the mission and duties of the State Department as follows:

The Department of State advises the President in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. As Chief Executive, the President has overall responsibility for the foreign policy of the United States. The Department of State's primary objective in the conduct of foreign relations is to promote the long-range security and well-being of the United States. The Department determines and analyzes the facts relating to American overseas interests, makes recommendations on policy and future action, and takes the necessary steps to carry out established policy. In so doing, the Department engages in continuous consultations with the American public, the Congress, other U.S. departments and agencies, and foreign governments; negotiates treaties and agreements with foreign nations; speaks for the United States in the United Nations and in more than 50 major international organizations in which the United States participates; and represents the United States at more than 800 international conferences annually. [Ref. 43, p. 422]

The Secretary of State represents the Department of State as a member on the National Security Council.

4. The Department of Defense (DOD)

The United State Government Manual describes the DOD as follows:

The Department of Defense is responsible for providing the military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our country....

Under the President, who is also Commander in Chief, the Secretary of Defense exercises direction, authority, and control over the Departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff providing military advice, the unified and specified combatant commands, and various defense agencies established for specific purposes. [Ref. 43, p. 172]

The Secretary of Defense is a member of the NSC.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the primary military advisor to the National Security Council. The complete role of the Chairman is discussed in the Chapter 6 of this thesis.

5. The United States Arm Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)

The United State Government Manual describes the ACDA as follows:

The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency formulates and implements arms control and disarmament policies that will promote the national security of the United States and its relations with other countries. At present,

to effectively carry out its responsibilities, it prepares and participates in discussions and negotiations with the Soviet Union and other countries on such issues as strategic arms limitations, mutual force reductions in Central Europe, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not now possess them, a prohibition on chemical weapons, and monitoring the flow of arms trade throughout the world. [Ref. 43, p. 690]

The Director of ACDA advises the NSC on Arms Control matters.

D. THE PROCESS OF SETTING NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES, POLICIES, AND STRATEGIES

The process set forth in the White House's January 1988 paper titled, National Security Strategy of the United States, implies a sequence as follows for formulating national security strategy:

- U.S. Interests;
- National Security Objectives;
- Identification of Threats to U.S. Interests;
- National Security Power and Policy; and
- National Security Strategy. [Ref. 44]

Step one and two of this sequence are normally performed within the National Security Council. An issue may be generated by an individual department/agency on some world event impacting U.S. interests. In the Preface to the report, President Reagan wrote that "The fundamentals of our strategy change little from year to year; our interests and objectives are derived from enduring values." [Ref. 44] Although the fundamentals of our strategy are constant and the U.S. has enduring values, the national security interests, objectives, policy, and strategy are evolving.

The information gathering, filtering, assessments, and options for step three, four and five are coordinated efforts performed by the staff of NSC, CIA, DOD, State Department, USIA, AID, Department of Treasury, and Department of Commerce. The work is performed separately in each department or agency or together through Senior Interdepartmental Groups (SIG) and Interdepartmental Regional Groups (IRG).

The decision making function for step four and five is performed by the President or National Security Council. The output of step four and five is generally broken into geo-political separation by sub-disciplines such as defense, economic, diplomatic, etc.

The Presidents have previously used policy papers and three types of directives to document their position on issues elevated to their level within the Executive Department and the national security system. The three directives are National Security Action Memorandums (NSAM), National Security Decision Directives and Presidential Directives. The NSC staff, SIGs, and IRGs perform the ground work for these papers and directives. These directives are normally, highly classified. Their impacts on national security policy are far-reaching.

The sequence could be improved by moving the national security power from step number four to step number three. During step number three, an assessment of the national security power of the United States and the threats against U.S. Interests would provide insight on whether to keep, modify, or delete policies and strategies from the previous year. The assessment would probably change the unclassified version into a classified one.

E. UTILIZATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The national security strategy is utilized by the Congress and concerned Executive Departments and Agencies. It serves as a starting point for fulfilling their responsibilities.

1. National Security Strategy Provides a Framework for the President

The National Security Strategy represents the product of deliberate or of crisis planning. In either case, the National Security Strategy provides a framework for the President to understand and fulfill his role as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief. In the art of setting National Security Strategy, the President exercises his leadership over the armed forces; obtains a perspective for making future tough decisions during peace and war; and passes the commander's intent to the subordinate operational forces.

2. Congress

In the opening remarks of the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings on National Security Strategy, Senator Sam Nunn in 1987 stated the following:

The committee has decided to focus its initial series of hearings on U.S. national security strategy and its military strategy component, because strategy is the only logical starting point for both the development and the consideration of security policies and programs and budgets... A broad understanding of strategy and resource priorities is a necessary beginning point for a meaningful and objective defense budget examination. The committee is not approaching these hearings with the intention of formulating a Senate Armed Services Committee or even a congressional alternative to our current strategy. The strategy is the responsibility of the executive branch, including our military and civilian leadership in the Pentagon, the State Department, and the National Security Council... At this stage I have serious questions about the clarity, coherence, and consistency of our current strategy. [Ref. 45, p. 2]

Why would the Senate Armed Services Committee spend twelve crucial days hearing testimony and analyzing the U.S. national security strategy? Why would a major provision of Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act require the President to submit a report on the National Security Strategy? The answer to both questions is intertwined. Congress plays an active part in the formulation and implementation of national security strategy.

Through the budgetary and enactment processes, Congress influences and directs the establishment of national security strategy. The Congressional statement of national security policy is usually a subtle one found in the Authorization and Appropriation Bills and foreign policy laws. General Maxwell D. Taylor in 1960 wrote that "The determination of U.S. strategy has become a more or less incidental by-product of the administrative process of the defense budget." [Ref. 46, p. 137] During the budgetary process, Congress starts its review of the proposed budget with a macro view of the "U.S. military posture and a budget overview." During this process, Congress conducts a thorough look at the national security policies, objectives, strategy, and the soundness of intended resource commitments against the national security objectives and strategy. With the foreign policy and budget laws, Congress establishes "the parameters and boundaries of acceptable policy." [Ref. 47, p. 61]

So often, the resourcing, organizing, and policy setting responsibilities of Congress are belittled and viewed as disruptive by members of the armed forces. Congressional resourcing, organizing, and policy setting actions may force the modification or elimination of elements from the national security strategy as set by

the Executive Branch. Three classic examples are the military aid to the Contras in Nicaragua, military involvement in drug interdiction, and the SALT II treaty.

How is Congress conducting trade-offs between the elements of "common defence" and ensuring that their enactments cause a harmonious environment for the execution of national security policy and strategy? Although Congress has externalized and instituted the integration and coordination of the national security policy process in the Executive Branch, the Congress looks at the defense policy and foreign policy, separately. The House of Representatives and the Senate have two committees which review their respective parts of the proposed budget. Certainly, the two committees in each body of Congress must talk to one another.

Ideally, there should be a institutionalized formal or informal process to integrate and coordinate a recommended compromise or consensus on the priorities for National Security Policies in Congress and between Congress and the Executive Branch. Such a measure would force a priori focus on national security. In the "National Security Strategy Hearings" conducted by the Senate Arms Services Committee, Senator John W. Warner of Virginia stated:

Last year I introduced legislation, together with Senator Nunn and 26 other Senators, a bill entitled The National Strategy Act. This initiative would require the administration to present a national strategy assessment to a joint session of the Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee at the beginning of each session of Congress. Further, a printed document describing the national strategy would also be provided to each Member of the Congress. This would enable these four key committees, the rest of the Congress, and the Nation to have common understanding of our overall national strategy. As a result, we could better assess how defense programs work and foreign policy fits into this overall framework. [Ref. 48, p. 7]

Unfortunately, Senator Warner's National Security Act was not enacted.

3. Department of Defense

Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger prepared a statement for the Senate Armed Services Committee's Hearings on National Security Strategy. He stated that the defense portion of the national security policy and strategy determines the necessary military capabilities. Therefore, the national security policy and strategy play an intimate part in the DOD Planning System.

The national security policy and strategy influences and directs the administrative, logistical, and training activities under the services, the operational planning under the JCS and CINCs, and research and development under the Secretariat staff. The hopeful outcome of these activities is the matching of operational capabilities with national security policy and strategy.

F. THE ROLE OF NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS, OBJECTIVES, POLICY AND STRATEGY IN C2

The C2 over the military has evolved from the following broad national security objectives related to the military:

- to deter war, and
- when deterrence fails to fight and win the war or obtain favorable termination of war.

From these two national security objectives, the military objectives, policy, strategy have been derived for the spectrum of warfare.

World War II saw the addition of nuclear warfare fought all over the world simultaneously, to the warfare spectrum of low intensity conflict and conventional warfare. Ideally, the forces should be specially trained for a particular warfare

environment and possess equipment and weaponry which will maximize likelihood of the accomplishment of the national security objectives, policy and strategy. Because of limited resources, the United States accepts greater risk with potential low-intensity conflict and conventional warfare. When waging warfare in low-intensity conflict or conventional warfare environment, the United States depends upon a mobilization and training programs which enable forces to be fully trained in one environment and adaptable to other environments. The unpreparedness of the United States to react promptly and appropriately to either of these levels may cost the destruction of the nation, limitations on the accomplishment of one or more objectives for governance, or prolong the duration of conflict.

1. Nuclear Warfare

Nuclear war requires time sensitive decision making and total preparedness/readiness of active nuclear forces. The destructiveness, range, and delivery speed of the modern nuclear weapons dictate that the Presidents adapt a leadership/management strategy which calls for positive control and little delay during the transitioning of the active nuclear force from military posturing to military operational force.

2. Low-intensity Conflict

Low intensity conflict in third world nations represents the most probable type of warfare in the near future. Low intensity conflict is more likely because lesser forces stand a chance of winning outright or concessions in this type of warfare. It is a strategy to wear down the opposition till his will to resist is destroyed. The forces may be lesser in terms of technology, finances, weaponry, etc.

3. Conventional Warfare

For Conventional War, past Presidents have relied upon a period of mobilization from a leveraged military posture to a military operational force. The leverage military posture calls for the maintenance of forward deployed active forces capable of holding the enemy for a certain number of days allowing the mobilization of CONUS forces, reserves, industry, and new recruits to ensure the winning of the war.

VI. FORCE ORGANIZATION

A. INTRODUCTION

Level five of the Williams Model covers the force organization as an element of C2 over the military role in "common defence" (See Figure 10). The focus is on the preparation of a military force organization which implements national security strategy, follows national security policy, and provides an acceptable probability of accomplishing national security objectives.

In the Department of Defense Directive 5100.1 dated April 3, 1987, the functions of the DOD are simply stated as follows:

As prescribed by higher authority, the Department of Defense shall maintain and employ armed forces to:

- a. Support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.
- b. Ensure, by timely and effective military action, the security of the United States, its possessions, and areas vital to its interest.
- c. Uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United States."
[Ref. 49, p. 3]

The DOD level looks at the institutionalized systems and force structures. The institutionalized systems and force structures from the National Command Authorities (NCA) downward have influence and provide direction over the military role in "common defence." The downward look reveals the force organization in the DOD (See Figure 11). The C2 aspect of the force organization is traceable to the establishment of staffs and commands, the delineation of functions and




Figure 10. Level 5 of the Williams Model for C2




Figure 11. Organization for "Common Defence."

responsibilities, the granting of authority among the staff and lines of command, and the establishment of systems for formulating policies, plans, programs, and doctrines.

All institutionalized systems and force structures within DOD operate under the control, direction, and authority of the Secretary of Defense.

Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF or JCS Pub 2 (Currently JCS Pub 0-2)) describes the chain of command and inter-relationship between the Departments and Combatant Commanders for forces within the Department of Defense (DOD).

Armed Forces Staff College Publication 1 (AFSC Pub 1), The Joint Staff Officers Guide 1988, provides 350-plus pages of insight into how the operational side of the force structure works. Among these pages, many Command and Control features are discussed. This chapter cites UNAAF and AFSC Pub 1, extensively.

The derivation of force structure is an evolutionary governmental process which documents decisions via legislative enactment, Executive Orders, Department of Defense Directives, Service Department Regulations, Operational Plans, and etc. With each organization, there exists responsibility and accountability for the successful accomplishment of assigned functions and missions. With the institutionalized system, the decision maker imposes measures designed to insure the efficient and effective functioning of assigned resources.

This chapter looks at organizational staff support and lines of command, and institutionalized systems.

B. The Staff Support

1. The Office of the Secretary of Defense

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) assists the Secretary of Defense in his mission as "the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense (DOD). The Secretary of Defense "exercises direction, authority, and control" over the Departments, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and defense agencies. The OSD is an external extension of the Secretary's management capabilities. The OSD consists of:

- The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
- The Executive Secretary of the Department of Defense.
- The Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense.
- The Director of Administration and Management.
- The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition.
- The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD/P).
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics.
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence).
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs).
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.
- The Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation.
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs).
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs).

- The Assistant to Secretary (Intelligence Oversight).
- Director Net Assessment.
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs).
- DOD Inspector General (IG).
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel).
- The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs).
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy).

As the name of the staff sections imply, OSD is functionally divided. The appropriate section of Title 10 of United States Code and DOD Directives provide the purpose, responsibilities and functions, relationships, and/or authorities of each staff section.

Former Defense Secretary Weinberger stated the following in reply to a question submitted by Senator Towers during the Senate Arms Service Committee Hearings on the Organization, Structure, and Decision-making Procedures of the Department of Defense: "The OSD staff provides the technical cross-Service and major mission analyses necessary to integrate the capabilities of the Services and to meet the objectives identified by the President and Congress." [Ref. 50, p. 54]

OSD permits the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense to effectively function in their positions. The Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense manage DOD at the macro-level. OSD frees the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense from the detailed and technical work. Therefore, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense may actively participate in the development of national security interests, objectives, policy and strategy and focus on the overall capabilities, limitations,

employment, maintenance, and readiness of the U.S. forces in DOD to accomplish the national security strategy. As the American people, Congress, and President increase the accountability of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Defense adopts a perspective leaning toward micro-management rather than macro-management.

Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci when he was Deputy Secretary of Defense on 27 March 1981 in a "Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Secretaries of Defense, Assistant Secretaries of Defense, General Counsel, and Assistants to the Secretary of Defense" delineated the division of responsibilities among OSD:

- Overall Policy, Strategy, Force Planning, and Planning Guidance
 - Lead Offices: Under Secretary of Defense for Planning
 - In Coordination With: JCS, Services, CINCs, OSD (NSC)
- Resource Objectives, Planning and Guidance
 - Lead Offices: Research and Engineering* and Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics+
 - In Coordination With: OSD and Services, as appropriate; Comptroller
- Fiscal Guidance
 - Lead Offices: Comptroller, Program Analysis and Evaluation
 - In Coordination With: OMB, White House, USD/P
- Program Development
 - Lead Offices: Services
- Program Unification and Standardization
 - Lead Offices: Research and Engineering

- In Coordination With: OSD
- Program Review and Evaluation
 - Consistency with policy
 - Lead Offices: If Nuclear then Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy and, if Conventional, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.
 - In Coordination With: Program Analysis and Evaluation, Research and Engineering, and Comptroller.
 - Cost-effective force trade-offs, cross-Service balance, and mutual support.
 - Lead Offices: Performance Analysis and Evaluation
 - In Coordination With: USD/P, Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics, Research and Engineering, Comptroller
 - Cross-program, modernization, Research and Development
 - Lead Offices: Performance Analysis and Evaluation
 - In Coordination With: Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, Policy Review, Comptroller, other OSD as appropriate.
 - Readiness, sustainability, other logistics
 - Lead Offices: Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics
 - In Coordination With: USD/P, Performance Analysis and Evaluation, Research and Engineering.
 - Manpower program feasibility and efficiency
 - Lead Office: Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics
 - In Coordination With: USD/P, Performance Analysis and Evaluation, Comptroller.
- Budget Review; Cost Savings and Added Efficiencies
 - Lead Offices: Comptroller

· In Coordination With: All of OSD, Services

- * - Research and Engineering is the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, today
- + - Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics responsibilities are divided between Production and Logistics, Force Management and Personnel, and Reserve Affairs.

In the same memorandum, former Secretary of Defense Carlucci stated the following:

. . . OSD will, with help from the Services, design and plan for additional standardization, joint programs and joint systems, to improve efficiency and reduce costs. . . .

OSD must help the Secretary and me manage the organization as a whole and help us identify major problems and issues in the total system in time to act.
[Ref. 51, p. 4-6)

In the above quotes, Secretary Carlucci and Weinberger provide insight into their utilization of OSD and perceived accountability. AYE the assignments set-up by Secretary Carlucci and Weinberger, the accountability of the Secretary of Defense rests in the areas of overall policy, strategy, force planning, and planning guidance; resource objectives, planning, and guidance; fiscal guidance; program development; program unification and standardization; program review and evaluation; and budget review, cost savings, and added efficiencies.

OSD documents, evaluates, and facilitates the development, implementation and establishment of defense policies, the current force structure and capabilities, projected enhancement from programs, changes to national security strategy and functions of DOD. In so doing, OSD looks at the proposals and activities of the Departments, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified/Specified Commands, Defense Agencies, and DOD field activities at the technical, tactical, operational, and strategic levels as appropriate in order to relate them to the perspective of the Secretary of Defense.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Title 10, United States Code (as amended) and DOD Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components" define the roles and missions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

a. *Function of Joint Chiefs of Staff*

AFSC Pub 1 summarizes the function of the JCS as follows:

"The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and Secretary of Defense, the Chairman is responsible for the principal functions listed below:

- Strategic Direction
 - furnish strategic direction of the Armed Forces
- Strategic Planning
 - prepare strategic plans
 - prepare joint logistic and mobility plans to support those strategic plans
 - perform net assessments of the capabilities of the Armed Forces
- Contingency Planning
 - provide for preparation and review of contingency plans
 - advise on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities
- Requirements, Programs, and Budget
 - advise on the priorities of requirements
 - advise on program recommendations and budget proposals
 - assess military requirements for defense acquisition programs
- Doctrine, Training, and Education

- develop doctrine for joint employment
- formulate policies for coordinating military education and training

Other Matters

- exercise exclusive direction of the Joint Staff
- as directed by the President, attend and participate in meetings of the NSC
- advise and assist the National Command Authority on establishing combatant commands
- transmit communications between the National Command Authority and combatant commands
- review plans and programs to determine adequacy and feasibility
- as the Chairman considers appropriate, consults with and seeks the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders.

The role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is organic and mission oriented. Their view is driven toward the overall organization, readiness and capabilities during peace time and performance during war. [Ref. 52, p. 35]

The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 sets the JCS Chairman as the head of the JCS and assigned to the Chairman duties previously belonging to the corporate body of the JCS . Therefore, the Chairman is the principal military adviser to the National Command Authority. By placing the corporate responsibility of the JCS under the Chairman, the Congress and National Command Authority demand joint advise and decisions oriented toward what is good for the nation, and then, what is good for the service. Prior to the Act, the judgment of the JCS's effectiveness was very difficult because the representative of the service was dual hatted and the JCS recommendations were weakened by their concern for a consensus.

[Ref. 53, p. 69] Their dual-hatted status led to a perception that they met in the JCS with the perspective to protect their service as well as the national interest. Although protecting the service and national interest are compatible to a certain degree, there are foreseeable situations where they are not. The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act gave to the Chairman the authority, responsibility, and accountability for the actions of the JCS being in the national interest.

Also, the Act increased the scope of the JCS statutory duties in each of the functional areas and the capabilities of the JCS. The capabilities of the JCS were enhanced tremendously with the creation of the Directorate for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7) and the Directorate for Force Structure, Resource and Assessment Directorate (J-8). In John M. Collins' book, U.S. Defense Planning: A Critique, the JCS is described as not being "organized to connect those (strategic) plans with programs and budgets." [Ref. 53, p. 69] The Goldwater-Nichols Act provides an organization for the connection of programs and budgets to strategic plans.

b. Organization

The organization of the JCS is composed of the following:

- The JCS consisting of:
 - Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
 - Chief of Staff Army;
 - Chief of Staff Air Force;
 - Chief of Naval Operations; and
 - Commandant of the Marine Corps.
- Assisted by the following:

- Operations Deputies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff consisting of the Director of the Joint Staff (as Chairman), Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Navy Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations, and Marine Corps Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans; and
- Deputy Operations Deputies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff consisting of the Deputy Director of the Joint Staff (as Chairman) and a two-star flag or general officer from each service. [Ref. 52, p. 36]
- The Joint Staff includes:
 - The Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
 - The Office of the Director of the Joint Staff;
 - Secretary of the Joint Staff;
 - Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J-1);
 - Operations Directorate (J-3);
 - Logistics Directorate (J-4);
 - Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5);
 - Command, Control, and Communications Systems Directorate (J-6);
 - Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7);
 - Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment Directorate (J-8);
 - Directorate for Information and Resource Management (DIRM);
 - Adviser for Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Support;
 - Office of the Inspector General.

c. *Effectiveness of the JCS*

The effectiveness of the JCS is historically judged by the performance of the military during crisis, conflict, and warfare, however the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act directs a broader scope for the evaluation of the JCS's

effectiveness. The performance of the military during crisis, conflict, and warfare will always provide the best possible information for judging the JCS's effectiveness, but the cost of crisis, conflicts, and warfare is horrendous and unacceptable and our national security strategy remains to deter as long as the elements of national power are maintained.

Nevertheless, the emphasis of the nation today is on the activities surrounding the preparedness of the military for crisis, conflict, and warfare. To look at a particular crisis, conflict, or war is very dangerous because each incident is unique and the circumstances surrounding it can never be recaptured or duplicated. Therefore, the functionings of the JCS which worked in one crisis, conflict or war situation may not work in the next. In this environment, the JCS is evaluated on the perceived thoroughness of "joint doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures" found in the joint publications; the perceived accuracy of identified critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities and their effect on meeting national security objectives; and ability to look beyond a parochial view of programs, resource allocations, and operations and make the tough decisions or choices between alternative policies, plans, doctrine, and advise which is best for national security. [Ref. 52, pp. 85-98]

The Director, JCS J-7, has responsibility for the Joint Publication System. The functional series structure of the joint publication system is organized as follows:

- 0 Series, Capstone Joint Warfare Doctrine - links joint doctrine to national strategy and the contributions of other government agencies and alliances. Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) continues to establish the basic organization and command and control relationships for effective joint operations.

- 1 Series, Joint Reference Publications - includes publication guide and index and general reference publications.
- 2 Series, Doctrine for Intelligence Support - establishes the joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for intelligence support, including direction, planning, collection, processing, production, and dissemination.
- 3 Series, Doctrine for Joint Operations - establishes the joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for directing, planning, and executing joint operations.
- 4 Series, Doctrine for Logistics Support - establishes the joint doctrine, techniques, and procedures for directing, planning, and carrying out logistics support of joint operations.
- 5 Series, Doctrine for Joint Operations - establishes joint planning processes relating to the conduct of joint military operations.
- 6 Series, Doctrine for C3 Systems Support of Joint Operations - establishes joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for C3 systems support to joint operations. [Ref. 52, pp. 86-87]

Through the development of publications under the above series, the JCS is setting "joint doctrine, techniques, and procedures."

The Goldwater-Nichols Act directs the JCS to make realistic assessments in their plans, policies, and doctrine that take into account the limitation of resources, politics, and military capabilities.

The JCS uses different versions of memorandums to communicate policies, instructions, and recommendations to the outside world.

3. DOD Agencies and DOD Field Activities

The DOD agencies and field activities have about 86,000 personnel and control about six percent of the DOD budget.

a. *DOD Agencies*

When discussions surface about the DOD force structure, the DOD agencies are frequently overlooked. The Secretary of Defense in creating the defense agencies and maintaining or adding functions to the defense agencies makes his decision on believed improvements in "economy, effectiveness, and efficiency in the Defense Department and the inability of the military services to agree on common procedures." [Ref. 54, p. 5] The Antonelli Report provides the best overview of the defense agencies and categorizes the agencies as follows:

- Support of the operating forces
 - Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
 - Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
 - Defense Communications Agency (DCA)
 - Defense Mapping Agency (DMA)
 - National Security Agency (NSA)
 - Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO)*
 - Defense Audiovisual Agency (DAVA)*
- Staff support
 - Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA)
 - Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
 - Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)
 - Defense Legal Services Agency (DLSA)*
- Audit and investigation
 - Defense Audit Service (DAS)

- Defense Investigative Service (DIS)
- Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)

* - The Antonelli Report did not include this agency. [ref 54, p. 17]

Dr. Archie D. Barrett in Reappraising Defense Organization states that

The agencies were created to eliminate the duplication which occurs when four separate services perform the same function. A defense agency consolidates the performance of a common function previously performed by more than one service. [Ref. 55, p. 73]

Dr. Barrett also discusses and cites other sources which express concerns over the agencies impact on the Secretary of Defense span of control. The Secretary reduces the impact of the defense agencies by assigning the appropriate level of supervisory responsibility to closely related staff sections in OSD and/or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. DOD Field Activities

In the Senate Armed Services' Staff Report titled, "Defense Organization: The Need For Change," the eight DOD field activities are described as performing "selected support and service functions of a more limited scope than Defense Agencies." [Ref. 56, p. 73]

C. LINES OF COMMAND

The two primary lines of command available to the National Command Authority are the Departments and the Unified/Specified Commands. The Departments have the mission to maintain and strengthen the force. The Unified/Specified Commands have the mission to employ the force.

1. The Departments

a. *The Department of the Army*

The Department of the Army is responsible for maintaining and strengthening the ability of land forces to fight and win the land, land-air, and space battle in a joint and coalition environment throughout the spectrum of conflict. The land forces include the reserve and active components. The organization chart shown in Figure 11 depicts the location of the Department of the Army in the organization for "common defence."

b. *The Department of the Navy*

The Department of the Navy is responsible for maintaining and strengthening the ability of amphibious and sea forces to fight and win the sea, air, space, and land battle in a joint and coalition environment throughout the spectrum of conflict. The Department of the Navy includes the Navy and Marine Corps. The amphibious and sea forces include reserve and active components. The location of the Department of the Navy in the organization for "common defence" is depicted in Figure 11.

c. *The Department of the Air Force*

The Department of the Air Force is responsible for maintaining and strengthening the ability of the air forces to fight and win the air, space, and air-land battle in a joint and coalition environment throughout the spectrum of conflict. The Department of the Air Force includes reserve and active components. The location of the Department of the Air Force in the organization for "common defence" is depicted in Figure 11.

2. Unified and Specified Command

General George Marshall stated during early days of World War II that:

I am convinced that there must be one man in command of the entire theater - air, ground, and ships. We cannot manage by cooperation. Human frailties are such that there would be an emphatic unwillingness to place portions of troops under another service. If we made a plan for unified command now, it would solve nine-tenths of our troubles. There are difficulties in arriving at a single command, but they are much less than the hazards that must be faced if we do not do this. [Ref. 57, p. 455]

The realization for the need of unified commands by the American people took root during and after the bombing of Pearl Harbor. The land, air, and sea based weapon systems have tremendous range and the weapon system of either land, air, sea environment may easily impact battle being conducted in another environment.

The National Security Act of 1947 established the Unified and Specified Commands. Over the years, the names of some commands have changed; some commands have been joined with another command and lost its self identity; but the role of a unified or specified command remains constant. Their respective definition is as follows:

Unified Combatant Command is a command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Services, and which is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. [Ref. 58, p. 3-21]

Specified Combatant Command is a command which has broad, continuing missions and that is established by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is normally composed of forces from but one Service. [Ref. 58, p. 3-29]

The chain of command flows from the National Command Authority to the Unified and Specified Combatant Commanders. DOD Directive 5100.1, paragraph B.2.c. states the following about the chain of command for the combatant commanders:

c. The Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands are responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense for accomplishing the military missions assigned to them and shall exercise command authority over forces assigned to them as directed by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to section 10 U.S.C. 164 reference (d)). The operational chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands. The Chairman, JCS functions within the chain of command by transmitting to the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands the orders of the President or the Secretary of Defense.

(1) Orders to such commanders shall be issued by the President or the Secretary of Defense or by the Chairman, JCS with the authority and direction of the President or the Secretary of Defense.

(2) Communications from the President or the Secretary or the Secretary of Defense to the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, shall be transmitted through the Chairman, JCS. Communications from the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands to the President and/or the Secretary of Defense shall be transmitted through the Chairman, JCS.

(3) Communications in matters of joint interest, addressed to the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands by other authority, shall, unless urgent circumstances do not permit, be coordinated with the Chairman, JCS. Information copies of all communications in matters of joint interest between Washington level offices, agencies, activities and commands and the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands shall be provided to the Chairman, JCS.

(4) Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman acts as the spokesman for Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, especially on the operational requirements of their commands and shall be responsible for overseeing the activities of the combatant commands. The President and the Secretary of Defense may assign other duties to the Chairman to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in performing their command function. [Ref. 49, pp. 2-3]

The Unified Commands are:

- U.S. European Command (USEUCOM);
- U.S. Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM);
- U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM);
- U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM);
- U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM);
- U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM);
- U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM); and
- U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM);

The Specified Combatant Commands are the following:

- Forces Command (FORSCOM); and
- Strategic Air Command (SAC).

The DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 grants to the CINCs the authority to:

- give authoritative direction to subordinate commands, including all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics;
- prescribe the chain of command within the command;
- organize commands and forces to carry out assigned missions;
- employ forces necessary to carry out assigned missions;
- coordinate and approve administration, support, and discipline; and
- exercise authority to select subordinate commanders and combatant command staff. [Ref. 52, p. 44]

The authority used by the CINC is referred to as Operational Command (OPCOM) or Operational Control (OPCON). JCS Pub 0-2, UNAAF defines these types of authority. The definition of operational command is as follows:

OPCOM is the authority to perform those functions of command involving the composition of subordinate forces, assignment of tasks, designation of objectives, and authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCOM includes directive authority for logistics and joint training. OPCOM should be exercised through the commanders of assigned normal organizational units or through the commanders of subordinate forces established by the commander exercising OPCOM. OPCOM provides full authority to organize forces as the operational commander deems necessary to accomplish assigned missions, and to retain or delegate operational control or tactical control as necessary. OPCOM does not, of itself, include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training. OPCOM is exercised solely by the commanders of unified and specified commands. [Ref. 58, p. 3-9]

The definition of OPCON is basically the same except for the following:

- It is used by levels of the command below the unified or specified combatant commander.
- It is authority delegated to a commander but "limited by function, time, or location." [Ref. 58, p. 3-9]

3. Line of Command Relationship Between the Departments and Combatant Commanders

The mutually dependent relationship between the Departments and the Combatant Commanders is crucial to the performance of the DOD. The maintenance and strengthening processes of the departments include training, equipping, administering, sustaining, and preparing the forces to fight, but they do not employ the forces during the fight. All line forces within the services are OPCOM to one of the Combatant Commanders who have the responsibility for the employment of the forces throughout the spectrum of warfare.

The success of the Combatant Commanders is totally dependent upon the processes of maintaining and strengthening the forces capability to fight and deter within each Department. This dependency is becoming more and more critical as

technology continues to shape and re-shape modern warfare. It is not a helpless dependency as some may have argued prior to the passing of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 which gave authority to National Command Authority to modify the authority balance. The Departments still control the money, but the CINCs have authority and influence over their activities which may impact his ability to employ the forces. In order for the system to work, the Combatant Commanders must successfully exercise the appropriate authoritative direction over the activities of the Departments.

D. THE INSTITUTIONALIZED SYSTEMS WITHIN THE DOD

Taking from the analysis provided in AFSC Pub 1, there are five major internally institutionalized systems that govern C2 within the DOD. They are:

- Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS),
- Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS),
- The Joint Operational Planning System (JOPS),
- The DOD Acquisition System, and
- Information System*.

* - AFSC Pub 1 includes NSC System and Worldwide Military Command and Control and not the Information System. [Ref. 52]

1. PPBS

The PPBS is the overall system within the DOD used for documenting the projected optimal allocation of resources for a targeted fiscal year. As the name implies, the system involves three distinct, but interrelated phases/processes. They are the planning, programming, and budgeting phases/processes. The PPBS system has a

fantastic audit trail which links all resource allocation to realistic defense strategy and plans that are traceable to national security strategy in theory.

Through the PPBS process the DOD establishes an overall plan, program, and budget for itself on an annual basis. All DOD organizations participate in the PPBS and feel some impact from its results. LTC Mel Stinnett in his article, the A-B-Cs of PPBS (Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System) states that "The Defense Review Board serves as a corporate review body for the Secretary of Defense in each phase of the process." [Ref. 59, pp. 1 and 3] The success of the PPBS process depends upon the quality of external products from the formulation of national security strategy, budget guidance from CBO and OMB, threat estimates from intelligence community, JSPS, and JOPS.

a. The Planning Phase

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy has lead responsibility for the development of the planning phase in PPBS. The audit trail for this phase goes as follows:

- Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) - provides a plan for measuring the effectiveness of Program Objective Memorandum (POM) submissions. The JSPD states the "comprehensive military appraisal of threat world-wide, recommended national military objectives, policy appraisal and recommendations, . . . planning force levels . . . , and attainability of those forces based on resource constraint." [Ref. 60, p.35)
- National Security Study Directive (NSSD) and National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) - are the Presidents statements of national purpose, policy, objectives, and strategy submitted to the Secretary of Defense. [Ref. 52, p. 107]
- Draft Policy Guidance - comes from the Secretary of Defence for input or direction on the JSPD. [Ref 52, p. 107]

- Strategy and Options Review - is held by the Secretary of Defense for the purpose of developing strategy and options for presentation to the President. [Ref. 52, p. 107]
- Strategy and Option Decision - is the decision of the President on the strategy and Options. [Ref. 52, p. 107]
- Defense Guidance (DG)- "defines the threat against which DOD programs are measured; states national and defense policy, objectives, and strategy; provides resource and forces guidance and establishes the fiscal guidelines for the upcoming programming phase." [Ref. 61, p. 366] The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy chairs and leads the Steering Group that drafts the DG for the Secretary of Defense approval.

The publication of the Defense Guidance (DG) culminates the planning phase. The Defense Resource Board oversees the planning process to ensure that the DG published and distributed in a timely manner. The audit trail of this phase is more than adequate and touches all bases for development. The major actors in the establishment of national security strategy and defense strategy and policy have their chance for input and participation.

b. Programming Phase

During the programming phase of PPBS, the DOD tries to establish the program for the next five years which will optimize the chances of fulfilling the DG in an environment of limited resources. LTC Mel Stinnett in his article, the A-B-Cs of PPBS (Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System) states that "The purpose of the programming phase is to structure resources (forces and personnel) by mission in order to achieve the objectives established in the DG." [Ref. 59, p. 3] The participants in this phase are the Services, Defense Agencies, OSD, Defense Resource Board (DRB), and JCS.

The documentation of this phase includes:

- DG - see planning phase definition of DG. The DG is the starting point for the programming phase.
- Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) - provides the programs for the next five years that the service departments and defense agencies believe necessary to optimize chances of accomplishing DG. [Ref. 60, p. 13]
- Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM) - an assessment of whether the programs under the POM will fulfill requirements in JSPD. [Ref. 59, p. 5]
- Issue Book - is a review of the service and defense agencies proposal by OSD, the JCS, other departments, and the OMB for issues on capabilities, cost, and resourcing. The issues are grouped into the following areas: policy and risk assessment, nuclear forces, conventional forces, modernization and investment, readiness and other logistics, manpower, intelligence, and management initiatives. [Ref. 52, p. 109] The DRB researches these issues to make recommendation for solution of issues.
- Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) - is the Secretary of Defense's decision on the service and defense agencies programs. [Ref. 61, p. 368]

The PDM is the last document of this phase.

c. The Budgeting Phase.

The budgeting phase is the process of estimating cost in order to obtain resource funding for the targeted fiscal year. The documents of this phase include:

- POM
- PDM
- Budget Estimate Submission (BES) - is prepared by each Service and defense agency for cost of programs. [Ref. 59, p. 6]
- Program Budget Decisions (PBDs) - is the budget proposal which results from the joint review by OSD, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, and OMB. [Ref. 59, p. 6]
- President's Budget (PB) - is the budget proposal submitted by the President to Congress. [Ref. 60, p. 35]

This is the translation of forecasts into needed resources.

2. The JSPS.

The JSPS is the set processes used by the Joint Staff to fulfill the following functions:

- its strategic direction,
- strategic planning,
- requirements, programs, and budget, and
- review of plans and programs to determine adequacy and feasibility.

The JSPS has an institutionalized documentation process which includes:

- Essential Elements of Information (EEI) - an input from the CINCs to the JCS J-2, DIA, of the information needed for an update on the threat. [Ref. 52, p. 104]
- Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning (IPSP) - on the basis of EEI and other input from CINCs, services, DOD staff, and the Joint Staff, the J-2 drafts for the chairman approval the military intelligence requirements and priorities to be filled by the intelligence community. [Ref. 52, p. 104]
- Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning (JIEP) - on the basis of intelligence gathered to meet IPSP requirements an estimate is made for the targeted budget year and nine years afterwards. [Ref. 52, p. 105]
- Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis (JSPDSA) - JSPDSA I provides national military objectives, strategy, and planning guidance and tasks the CINCS for their input to follow on documents; JSPDSA II is the CINCS estimate of the minimum risk force; and JSPDSA III is the planning force level needed to achieve national strategy. [Ref. 52, pp. 105-106]
- JSPD - was discussed as a document under the planning phase of PPBS.
- Joint Security Assessment Memorandum (JSAM) - is an annual assessment of the security assistance program submitted by the Department of State. [Ref. 52, p. 108]
- JPAM - was discussed as a document under the program phase of PPBS.

- Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) - provides the military task guidance to each service department and combatant commander for a two year period. The JSCP is published every other year and may be modified if significant changes occur during the off year. The JSCP "apportions major combat forces to the combatant commanders." From the received guidance, the CINCs develop operational plans in support of the national security strategy. [Ref. 52, p. 111-112]

The success of the system is vital to the translation of National Security Strategy and defense policy into viable and executable operational and contingency plans.

3. JOPS

JOPS is the system used by DOD whereby the service departments and combatant commanders prepare plans for the execution of assigned military tasks. The assigned military tasks may come from JSCP or directly from the National Command Authority or JCS. The service departments and combatant commanders develop procedures for deliberate or crisis planning conditions. The guidance and procedures for JOPS are found in the following:

- JCS Pub 5-02.1, JOPS Volume I (Deliberate Planning Procedures);
- JCS Pub 5-02.2, JOPS Volume II (Supplementary Planning Guidance);
- JCS Pub 5-02.3, JOPS Volume III (ADP Support); and
- JCS Pub 5-02.4, JOPS Volume IV (Crisis Action Procedures). [Ref. 52, pp. 121-123]

During JOPS, the planners are required to exercise great judgment in estimating the expected environment for the execution of the operational plan. Knowledge is needed on every aspect of the environment. This knowledge is very extensive and covers the capabilities, limitations, and doctrine of friendly and opposing forces at the technical, tactical, operational, theater, and strategic levels of warfare; the

presence and expected arrival of friendly and opposing forces; and psychological strength of the opposing force.

The documentation of preparations under JOPS to meet military taskings is normally Operation Plans (OPLANs) and Operation Orders (OPORDS).

4. The Defense Acquisition System.

The Department of Defense Acquisition System is a technostucture implanted throughout DOD to ensure that the combatant commanders have the best feasible mix of weaponry and other equipment to win the war throughout the spectrum and whether it is waged at the technical, tactical, operational, theater, or strategic level. The best feasible mix was selected based on affordability to the nation, operational capability, applied technology limitations, managerial efficiency, defense industry workmanship, and moral values. These trade-offs and limiters are considered and placed on the acquisition system.

Guidance for Defense Acquisition Systems are found in the following documents:

- OMB Circular NO. A-109 to the Heads of Executive Departments and Establishments, subjected "Major System Acquisitions."
- DOD Directive 5000.1, subjected: "Major and Non-Major Defense Acquisition Programs."
- DOD Instruction 5000.2, subjected: "Defense Acquisition Program Procedures."
- DOD Directive 5134.1, subjected: "Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition)."
- DOD Directive 4245.1, subjected "Military Department Acquisition Management Officials."
- Many others.

These documents set policies and procedures for the acquisition of systems within the DOD along with the managerial structure and guidelines.

5. Information Systems.

The DOD employs the information systems to enhance the decision makers capability to make the right decisions from the National Command Authority on down. An information system is "a person/machine arrangement of components that interact to support the operational, managerial, and decision-making information needs of an organization." [Ref. 62, p. 39]

The decision makers, today, face the age old problems of employing military art better than our adversary. However, the environment presents new complexities because:

- the national interests are so pervasive that a large and strong military is needed;
- the force is dispersed over extensive geographical areas that include space, land, air, sea, and submerged based elements;
- the weapons have global range, phenomenal accuracy, unbelievable lethality, and abundance of numbers; and
- the potential pace of resource expenditure during warfare.

Therefore, the decision maker has a very compressed decision cycle, timewise. However, the large volume of information and dispersed sources of information makes the decision cycle extremely difficult to compress. The decision maker's ability to wage modern warfare at the technical, tactical, operational, and strategic level is impaired by the compressed decision cycle, information volume, and dispersion of information sources. Bad decisions in this environment are potentially unforgivable.

With the compressed decision cycle, disperse information sources, and information volume the decision makers ability to scope has been improved by the information system which consists of the following elements:

- the staff,
- the communication systems,
- the automation systems, and
- the information requirements.

The elements of the information system help the decision maker to minimize the uncertainty in his perception of the current situation and explore the pros and cons of alternative courses of action for accomplishing the mission.

From the National Command Authority downward there are staff sections of varying sizes responsible for the efficient operations of the information systems. A staff section may have a technical, operational, and/or managerial orientation.

a. Information Requirements and Joint Reporting Structure

The information requirements identify the necessary information to be passed vertically and horizontally in the command and the frequency that the information should be updated in order to coordinate the employment and maintenance of the military force. The formulation of efficient and effective information requirements is crucial to the timely flow of pertinent operational, logistical, administrative, security, and intelligence information in support of decision making throughout the force organization. The information requirement influences the decisions on staff, communication systems, and automation systems support and design.

The system for designing an information flow from the technical level to the National Command Authority is the Joint Reporting System (JRS). JCS Publication 6 defines the purpose for the JRS as follows:

- National Command Authority need for military information to perform its functions.
- The JRS participants need for a central catalogue of recurring reporting requirements used to support command decisions regarding military operations and to minimize duplicative reporting.
- The general need for standardization in reporting systems, to the maximum extent possible, of the JCS, Services, and DOD agencies.
- The need for central management and standard rules regarding the application of message text formatting to reporting systems. [Ref. 63, p. 2-1]

Throughout the chain of command, an evaluation of the unit's current status is very important to C2. The range of information needed throughout the chain of command is extensive. There are conditions where the employment of micro-management is most appropriate as well as other conditions necessitating macro-management by the National Command Authority.

In crisis situation and low intensity conflict, the National Command Authority may select to micro-manage the situation because of the situation's political sensitivity. In this case, the chain of command from the involved unit or ship to the JCS needs the most accurate information in order to give the best advise to the National Command Authority. All decision makers need knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of their force being committed in a certain environment.

In formulating the military strategy of global or theater scope, the National Command Authority needs the best information possible for reaching its

decisions. In this particular case, the decision maker performs a macro-management function. Again, the recommendations of appropriate commanders and the JCS are sought. Their recommendations need to be based on the current capabilities and limitation of the military force, globally or theater-wide in the current environment.

The JRS provides insight to the services, operational commands, JCS, and applicable agencies of information considered important for reporting. The services, operational commands, and applicable agencies use the JRS as a reference point for implementing their own reporting procedures. [Ref. 64, p. 3]

The JRS depends upon the units and ships being honest about their status and other reports. There is potential integrity problems with such a system if the unit decision maker or responsible staff personnel foresee the potential for unfavorable action being taken toward the unit or himself if a status or condition is reported honestly. Military ethics requires personnel to place the welfare of the unit or ship above personal motivations.

b. The Staff

The staff is a functional division of the personnel dedicated to the organizational role of supporting the operational, managerial, and decision-making information needs. The staff supporting the upper level of management are generally more specialized than the lower levels. The decision maker and staff relationship is present throughout the C2 hierarchy of the defense organization.

There are many disciplines and subdisciplines employed by the staff in order to reach their best possible recommendation. The disciplines include automation, operational analysis, mathematics, military art, physics, management, and

others. Some subdisciplines employed by the staff in the area of automation include data base management, software engineering, computer programming, computer graphics, and others.

c. The Communication Systems

The communication systems are electronic means of gathering intelligence information from electronic signatures and passing voice and data information over dispersed locations. The communication systems enable the decision maker to receive information from dispersed information sources. The United States has a variety of communications systems supporting the mission of the force at the technical, tactical, operational, and strategic levels of combat. For each communications system, there exists a different mix of performance requirements as listed in figure 12.

a. supportability	b. operability
c. maintainability	d. survivability
e. operational capability	f. transportability
g. interoperability	h. affordability
i. securability	j. reliability
k. durability	l. data compatibility

Figure 12. Possible Performance Requirement for Communications System

The Defense Acquisition System has the tough responsibility of fielding communication systems that comply with technical and operational requirements. The lines of

command have the responsibility for designating the features required for each communication system.

d. The Automation Systems

The automation systems are designed for the following:

- to improve information processing, storage, accuracy and retrieval;
- to control and maybe perform very precise and repetitive functions;
- to perform data manipulation, graphical display, analysis and other types of decision aids; and
- to expedite information transfer.

With automation systems, the staff and decision maker have enhance ability to handle and filter the large volume of information and produce the estimates and recommendations on the alternative courses of actions.

E. FUNCTIONALITY OF THIS LEVEL IN C2

The functionality of force organization in C2 is a compatibility issue between the force organization and the national security interests, objectives, policy, and strategy. The military force organization is operationally employed to implement national security strategy, under the constraints of national security policy, and to accomplish the national security objective. The force organization is a broad statement of the military objectives, policy, and strategy. In the force organization, there exists the real capabilities and limitations of the military force.

Three very basic questions are required to determine the functionality of this level in C2. They are:

- Has the U.S. current force organization managed to deter war?

- Can the U.S. current force organization fight and accomplish the national security objective of our next low intensity conflict, conventional warfare, and nuclear warfare?
- Can the U.S. continue to efficiently and effectively maintain and strengthen the military force capability to accomplish national security objectives in the face of the advancement in technology development, the human ability to grasp the utilizations of high tech and very destructive weaponry, and resource constraints?

The answer to all three rests in the military force ability to effectively function at the technical, tactical, operational, and strategic level. Combat readiness is the measure of this capability.

VII. COMBAT READINESS

A. INTRODUCTION

This level of the Williams Model for the military role in C2 covers the methods used by:

- the military departments to maintain and strengthen their forces and
- the Combatant Commanders to be operationally prepared for employing the forces (See Figure 13).

In this chapter, we shall look at a conceptual overview of combat readiness, doctrine development, the role of training and indoctrination, sustainability, program development, and evaluation of the military's combat readiness.

B. CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW OF COMBAT READINESS

Combat readiness is an important factor in the ability of the military to deter or fight in order to meet or secure the national security objectives. The force structure, division of functions, responsibility, and authority, and institutionalized systems have provided the broad military objectives, policy, and strategy. The DOD has implemented some very sound managerial measures to ensure that the output of the established military objectives, formulated military policy, and implemented military strategy is combat readiness. These managerial measures contribute immensely to the C2 over the military role in "Common Defence." During the preparation for combat readiness, the military strategy is divided and subdivided until all the technical tasks necessary for the application of military force are delineated.




Figure 13. Level Six of the Williams Model for C2.

The technical level covers the preparation of the individual and the small weapon teams for their jobs and the functioning of equipment. At the technical level, the U.S. prepares, as well as feasible under resource constraints, the force organizations for all foreseeable and feasible environments. The personnel learn the operational function on how to apply the weaponry against the opposing force and the managerial skills and staff functions for the mission accomplishment. The equipment is designed, developed, produced, fielded, purchased, and/or operated for operational requirements which are supported by a validated mission. Deterrence depends upon the combat readiness of the U.S. military. An element of combat readiness is the willingness and capability of the American people to apply its military force at the technical level so effectively that the opposing force stands practically no chance of accomplishing desired political, economic, ideological, military, technological, or other advantages.

Since the fight of David and Goliath, the outcome of military conflict has seldomly been determined by the outcome of a single conflict at the technical level, so the C2 of the military force is geared toward tactical, campaign, and strategic levels of warfare. At the tactical, campaign, and strategic level, the force organization ensures that the military force is integrated and ready, as one, mentally, operationally, logistically, technically, administratively, and intelligence-wise to deter and, if required, to fight for the accomplishment of the national security objectives. Functional and performance shortfalls in the above areas limit the C2 capacity of the Commander on the battlefield or the President and the CINCs from their command posts. RB 101-999, Staff Officers' Handbook, published by the U.S. Army defines the principles of war as follows:

- Objective. Every military operation should be directed towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.
- Offensive. Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
- Mass. Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time.
- Economy of force. Allocate minimum-essential combat power to secondary efforts.
- Maneuver. Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the dynamic application of combat power.
- Unity of Command. For every objective, there should be unity of effort under one responsible commander.
- Security. Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.
- Surprise. Strike the enemy at a time and/or place where he is unprepared.
- Simplicity. Prepared clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders for thorough understanding. [Ref. 65, pp. 3-1 and 3-2]

The military force must be able to apply the principles of war when it performs the technical tasks assigned to an individual or group; the tactical and campaign tasks assigned to units or ships; and the strategic mission in a coherent manner.

The military departments, JCS, and combatant commands divide the battlefield preparation functions (operation/maneuver, administrative, security, logistic, and intelligence) into tasks and subtasks until the military strategy reaches those tasks performed at the technical level. In the orchestration of warfare at the tactical, campaign, and strategic levels, there are information requirements in support of the battlefield preparation functions which flow from higher to lower commands and from lower to higher commands to support the task held at a certain level. The culmination of the planning stage of the battlefield preparation function is the commander's concept

for orchestration of the activities by friendly and opposing forces influencing his mission accomplishment. The commander's instruments on the battlefield are his operational/maneuver, fire support, combat service support, intelligence/electronic warfare, and air defense capabilities. He employs these instruments during warfare in accordance with his concept to obtain the optimum effect upon the opposing force. The optimum is tough to define for modern warfare. The total destruction of an enemy in the pure sense may seem the optimum but may not be the optimum action if such action may cause an equally destructive retaliatory response or draw others in the rank of the opposing force.

The military attempts to standardize the basic capability of all like forces, equipment, procedures, and personnel of the same grade and specialty at the technical level to obtain performance consistency, economies of scale, and ease of C2. Through the standardization effort, a commander may give clear and concise orders which the subordinate may understand.

The end product of preparing the military force for their role in national security strategy is combat readiness.

C. DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

Doctrine development is the process of developing stringent and not so stringent guidelines for the implementation of current military strategy. The doctrine development process involves the formulation of guidance for the conduct of military operations during war and peace. Previously, the author discussed the Joint Publication System, JOPS, and DOD Directives and Instructions which are four of many types of

doctrine development efforts. Some other types of doctrine development efforts are the following:

- Regulations - "are authoritative rules dealing with the details of procedures" [Ref. 26, p. 722] for various military operations.
- Manuals - are documents which provide the procedures for the operation or maintenance of equipment or concept of operations for a type of unit.
- Order - is "a communication, written, oral, or by signal, which conveys instructions from a superior to a subordinate." [Ref. 5, p. 266]
- Operation Order - is "a directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of affecting the coordinated execution of an operation." [Ref. 5, p. 264]
- An establishment - is "the table setting out the authorized number of men and major equipment in a unit/formation sometimes called "table of organization or "Table of Organization and Equipment" (TOE). [Ref. 5, p. 134]
- Standard Operations Procedures (SOP) - describes the standard procedures for operations, administration support, logistic, and security within the unit.
- Standard Operation and Regulation Manual - describes the standard function of each duty position on the various ships.
- Captain Standing Order - is a document explaining the operations procedures on a particular ship.
- Staff Action Type Papers such as the Staff Study, Decision Paper, Talking Paper, Information Paper, Memorandum, and Military and Nonmilitary Letters.

Through these documents, the Commander or Captain sets the guidelines for mission accomplishment within the unit or ship and exercises control over the action of subordinates. The amount of control is reflected in the expressed specificity of the document and tends to vary with the situation and nature of the subject matter. Except for orders and operation orders, these documents are changeable under the current

system and offers an opportunity for exception to policy. There is a document which covers every aspect of military life.

D. TRAINING AND INDOCTRINATION

Training and indoctrination is the method used to perpetuate military art in the current environment which poses a dynamic situation. The military from day to day is never the same because personnel turnover is constant, new systems and equipment are constantly being fielded, and doctrine is evolving. The military uses training and indoctrination as one means to maintain the combat readiness of the force organization. Training in the military begins at the technical level and progresses to the strategic level.

Training is a very serious activity in the military. For most training, there is a minimal level of proficiency which must be accomplished for successful completion or before an evaluation is made on the performance. The military views failure to obtain the minimal standard, unfavorably. The careers of service personnel are determined by these evaluations.

1. Technical Training of Individuals and Small Weapon Systems Team

Technical training is the start point for all training in the military. Technical training involves the development of personnel proficiency as prescribed in the following areas:

- individually operated weapons,
- individual job task performance,
- weapon systems operation,
- repair, maintenance, and/or operations of equipment.

- steps in pre-set procedures,
- common task skills of soldier, sailor, airmen, or marine,
- tactics,
- managerial and technical skills for job or grade, and
- physical fitness.

A soldier or marine receives technical training in the classroom and unit; a sailor in the classroom and ship or squadron; and an airmen in the classroom and squadron. The training may consists of hand-ons, lecture type, on the job, and simulation training.

Technical training is the process employed by the DOD to ensure that a person with the essential basic skills is filling DOD positions. This philosophy is practiced from grade E-1 to O-10. It is through the process of learning and practicing that the individual or small group becomes proficient in skills to be performed during war and peace.

Technical training becomes important during wartime because it reduces the required information to be passed during war. If the Captain of a ship is assigned a mission to a distant port, the originator of the mission provides the Captain with general guidelines for the mission performance, but does not have to tell the details of operating and managing the ship. By the same token, if a Brigade Commander in the Army is assigned a mission to defend a certain location, the originator of the mission provides the Commander with general guidelines for the mission performance, but does not have to tell the details of commanding the Brigade.

2. Training of Tactical Forces

Tactical training is the process of learning how to employ two or more non-nuclear weapon systems in a battle. Operational training is the process of learning how to employ two or more units, ships, squadrons, etc. in a series of battles. Tactical and operational training focuses on the employment of combined arms. Generally, wars are fought and won during decisive tactical and operational battles of strategic importance. The Battle at Midway and the Battle of the Bulge were such a battle. Tactical training is normally performed with a single or multiple unit(s), ship(s), squadron(s), etc. The Army uses the National Training Centers for realistic battalion level tactical training. The Navy goes to sea on Refresher Training and has the Top Gun School at Miramar Navy Air Station. The training of air units is normally captured by the average number of flying hours. The performance of tank elements in the military is usually captured by the average mileage per tank and gunnery qualification.

During major exercises held by the CINCs or Service Components, the services perform Tactical and Campaign type training using joint and maybe combined doctrine. Campaign training is very expensive and is not conducted too often. To make up for the shortage of live training, the services and CINCs hold Command Post Exercises (CPX) and run/play different simulation and model war games.

3. Training of Strategic Forces

The training of strategic forces is normally conducted via the nuclear test program and during JCS directed exercises. Policy Paper 5: Nuclear Weapons Testing, by the U.S. Department of Energy, dated January 1987, stated the following:

- Our security and that of the Free World depend on deterrence.
- For deterrence to work, potential aggressors must be convinced that we have the capability and the will to deliver a devastating response to attack on us or on our allies.
- U.S. nuclear weapons are an essential part of deterrence.
- Nuclear weapons must be tested to remain safe, reliable, effective, and survivable. [Ref. 66, p. 1747]

As Policy Paper 5 reflects, the test program is crucial to the combat readiness of the nuclear force.

The JCS has several exercises that involve the utilization of tactical forces in strategic level activities and the testing of different aspects of procedures set for the nuclear related force.

4. Indoctrination

Indoctrination is the process of teaching the U.S. military code of ethics to the military personnel. The U.S. military code of ethics provides the expected behavior of military personnel during war and peace. The military code of ethics has "duty, honor, and country" as its basic precepts. From these basic precepts, discipline, values, mode of operation, and/or ethics of the military system taught to new recruits and/or arrivals are derived. Part of the needed values, discipline, and ethics is taught prior to a person's entry on active duty by different aspects of our culture. Indoctrination is a repetitive process which occurs over and over throughout a person's military career. Indoctrination is very important to the military for discipline and unquestionable, immediate obedience of lawful orders are necessary for mission accomplishment.

Normally, there are set indoctrination procedures when a person first enters on active duty and each time he or she reports to a new assignment. The military process for indoctrination began with the oath of commissioning or enlistment. It is followed by many classes on the Code of Conduct and Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). A person's socialization into the military depends upon the acceptance of values, ethics, and lawful military discipline. In warfare, a person risks the loss of his life for his country and knows that there is a strong probability that death may come. It takes a love for country and unit for an individual to face the challenge of death during warfare. Without this type of discipline, C2 suffers during warfare. Past wars provide testament to the discipline and internal fortitude of active duty military service.

E. SUSTAINABILITY

Sustainability is the ability of the nation to logistically replace elements of the combat force attrited or expended during combat. Sustainability is complicated because of the expected fast pace of combat and potential global lines of communications (LOC) during future wars. The U.S. ability to sustain the force is directly influenced by allies and U.S. success at keeping the LOC open and flowing.

Deputy Secretary of Defense William H. Taft IV in his statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee grouped sustainability under the following headings:

- personnel, and
- materiel.

Under materiel, the DOD is concerned with the level of munitions, spares and repair parts, war reserve secondary items, POL, and industrial base. [Ref. 67, pp. 665-681]

The U.S. Army relies heavily upon pre-positioned stocks. The deployment of reserve elements and CONUS based forces will provide a substantial part of the combat, combat support and combat service support units for sustained combat. The early deployment of these forces is crucial for combat effectiveness.

Shortages of personnel and materiel restricts the options of the Commander or Captain during combat.

F. PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

The departments and their service(s) have responsibility for program development. Program development involves the process for bringing together the functioning of the acquisition, PPBS, JSPS, JOPS, and information systems in order to maintain and strengthen the readiness of the service component. The interaction of the services' program development with the DOD level systems is crucial to the accomplishment of the military objective. The services must document and obtain funds for programs which will give their service component in the operational force the capability to conduct war in accordance with the mission requirements. The Combatant Commanders must develop thorough, operational requirements which specify their precise mission needs.

In many ways, the program development process is all relative to projected strengths and developments of the threat and the U.S. technology capability. Changes of the threat cause the friendly forces to make changes in order to maintain deterrence capability.

To document a program, the service component must identify a projected shortfall in their mission capability to function at the technical, tactical, operational, or strategic

level in the near or distant future. Two illustrations of effort to enhance mission capability of military forces are shown below:

- the U.S. Navy is exploring the use of laser communications between satellites and the submarine force. This improvement will benefit the operational and strategic level utilization of the submarine force.
- the U.S. Army is researching an anti-armor weapon to counteract the reactive armor currently used by the Soviet Union. This improvement will benefit the technical, tactical, and operational level utilization of anti-armor weapons.

There are countless other illustrations which the author could use.

Program development includes documentation and funding to maintain and sustain the output of the program throughout its life cycle. A program has potential to become a problem for the units if it is not maintainable and sustainable.

G. EVALUATION OF THE MILITARY FORCE'S COMBAT READINESS

1. Self-Evaluation of Combat Readiness

The JRS provides the primary system for the commander and staff to report the current status of the unit's combat readiness. The self-evaluation of combat readiness depends heavily upon the technical capability of mid-level management personnel in the U.S. military. Using their technical training, they provide an assessment of the unit or ship capability to execute warfare and current status of the personnel, training, and equipment situation.

2. Inspections, Evaluation, and Command Visits

Inspections, evaluations, and command visits provide an independent source of information on combat readiness. In these cases, an evaluation, inspection, or command visit team representing a higher commander accesses the performance, readiness, and compliance with procedures, regulations, etc. of subordinate units or

ships. They provide the higher authority an unbiased perception of a subordinate unit's current status which is used for the rating of officers and units, setting training and resource priorities, reviewing procedures, and assessing quality of operational plans.

VIII. OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE

A. INTRODUCTION

This level of the Williams Model for C2 over the military role in "Common Defence" covers the operational performance of the U.S. military when deterrence fails (See Figure 14). The operational performance is the orchestrated employment of the operations/maneuver, fire support, intelligence/electronic warfare, air defense, and combat service support elements of the military force by the commander. The military force performs functions at the technical, tactical, operational, and strategic levels of conflict during combat. All parties in the conflict are firing real rounds of immense lethality and their intent is to quickly impose unacceptable casualties, losses, and destruction upon the adversary or adversaries in order to neutralize his or their capability and will to fight before the opponent can accomplish the same against the friendly forces.

This chapter reviews the combat environment on day one of the conflict, the commander's preparation of the air, sea, and land battlefield, the commander's execution of the battle plan through the employment of military art and control and feedback loops, and the modification of the combat environment by the other levels of the Williams Model for C2 after day one.

B. THE CREATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The ability of the U.S. to wage war is controlled tremendously by the operational environment. The U.S. and its allies and adversaries create the operational




Figure 14. Level 7 of the Williams Model for C2.

environment. JCS Pub 1 defines the operational environment as "a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences which affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander." [Ref. 5, p. 263] The author views the operational environment as the external constraints placed on the commander that provides and limits his operational options. In accordance with the author, the operational environment consists of the political/ideology, economic, technology, ideology, diplomatic, geographic, and military power constraints on the employment of the military force which all play vital C2 roles. The NCA has a responsibility to the combatant commanders to describe these constraints whenever their military force is employed in conflict. The NCA must understand that he defines the rules and influences the likelihood of his operational forces winning during the conflict.

1. Political/Ideological Constraints

The political constraints limit the level of warfare and the use of operation/maneuver and fire support elements of the force. Internal and external sources apply political pressure on the NCA to prevent the escalation of warfare and to obtain the speedy termination of conflict. The escalation of warfare may occur in terms of intensity, geographical area, or type of conflict. Sometimes, the political decision is contrary to the military decision to destroy the center gravity of the opposing force. The Vietnam War was a classic example of the political considerations overruling the military decisions. President Johnson decided not to request a declaration of war from Congress which would have mobilized the nation partially because it would have taken resources away from his "War on Poverty" domestic

program. The speedy termination of conflict involves the reaching of a diplomatic agreement or treaty to terminate the war.

The moral ideology of the U.S. about warfare influences the operational execution of war. The moral ideological elements are exhibited in the officer and enlisted oath upon signing the contract to join the military, the Code of Conduct, the provisions of the Geneva Convention, and the willingness of the individual, military, and country to wage war for the national security objective. Moral ideology sets the parameters for the expected behavior in certain situations of the U.S. military during war and peace. Ideology generally provides constraint on the operational employment of force during warfare. The operational ideology includes an expectation that man will be in the loop during the employment of destructive weapons.

The ideology of the conflict frequently influence the fervor by which the friendly and opposing forces wage war. If the war evolves around the fundamental values of a nation, the forces of that nation may be willing to accept greater losses and fight with greater zest than their opponent(s) or allies. This aspect of the external environment is uncontrollable. The ideology of the conflict impacts the national support. Vietnam was a case where the American people had difficulty understanding the purpose and basic reasons for the national involvement.

2. Economic Constraints

The economic constraints limit the capability of the U.S. to support the war. Support includes the production and fielding of supplies, weaponry, equipment, munitions, POL, spare parts, and etc. These products are needed to sustain the military force involved in the battle.

3. Technology Constraints

The technology constraints limit the capability of the U.S. to:

- predict and detect the enemy actions,
- surgically apply military power against the enemy,
- manage information on the battlefield, and
- reduce its vulnerability against the application of military power by the adversary.

The U.S. technology is the best in the world and provides the nation with many advantages in combat situations over its adversaries.

4. Diplomatic Constraints

The United States is involved in numerous international agreements and treaties. These agreements and treaties have influence on the U.S.'s execution of warfare. The U.S. must consider the impact of its military and diplomatic actions on its other diplomatic agreements. The actions of the U.S. in the Middle East are influenced immensely by the diplomatic relations with countries outside the Middle East region. Acts of aggression by the U.S. against a substantially inferior country may be looked upon unfavorably by the members of NATO or United Nations, therefore causing an escalation of warfare or the weakening of alliances.

5. Geographical Constraints

Geographical constraints are felt in the following ways:

- The vast improvements in weapon range and delivery means have created a global situation where space and time provides very little security.
- Depending upon the location of the combat action, the lines of communications may or may not be difficult to maintain.

Geographical constraints places complication on the execution of warfare. Long lines of communications has an adverse effect on command's ability to sustain itself.

6. Military Power Constraints

Military power has limits which the decision maker must consider in the employment of the military force. Human preparedness, perception, and stamina; equipment's technical and operational capabilities; weapon's lethality, delivery, and range; control, feedback, and intelligence gathering capabilities; and the sustainability of the war fighting effort provide the factors which provides and limits military power. These factors must be timed and synchronized to impose maximum impact on the enemy's will and capability to fight.

C. THE COMMANDER'S PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

The commander makes many decisions in the preparation of the battlefield which impact the command's mission accomplishment. The preparation of the battlefield involves the development of campaign and/or tactical plans and operation orders. The preparation of the battlefield occurs to a certain degree at all levels of the command. The higher levels of the command may provide for a formalized process, but within the scope of each commander's responsibilities a like process occurs. The process includes the mission identification, intelligence assessments, estimates, decisions, plan, and execution.

The commander has the following options available for reaching decisions:

- Commander makes decision and announces it.
- Commander presents decision and invites questions.
- Commander presents problem, gets suggestions, makes decision.

- Commander defines limits, asks group to make decision.
- Commander permits subordinates to function within limits defined by superior. [Ref. 68, p. 42]

The determination of the decision making process used by the commander is based on his leadership style. A commander's leadership style may be autocratic, democratic, or a combination of the autocratic and democratic. The processes are listed in the order of how autocratic they are. The "Commander permitting subordinates to function within limits defined by superior" is considered a democratic style. [Ref. 68, pp. 37-42]

First, the commander must become intimately familiar with his operational environment. There is a molding process which occurs at this time. The NCA and combatant commander organize and indoctrinate the military force to the operational environment. During the molding process, the combatant commander is very concerned that the military force is able to operate at its optimum combat effectiveness and maintain a combat edge in the designated operational environment. The morale of the military force suffers when casualties and losses are incurred while under warfare conditions where the operational environment restricts the utilizations of its combat power. If the combat edge is lost or judged unobtainable due to the constraints of the operational environment, then the NCA and the commander must make a decision whether to change the operational environment, withdraw from the environment, or sacrifice the military force for the accomplishment of strategic objectives. The combatant commander and NCA have a responsibility to modify, maintain, or change the operational environment to the advantage of the U.S. military force.

Within the confines of the operational environment, as molded, the combatant commander along with the NCA (includes the JCS as a staff proponent) formulate the strategic plan for the execution of the war.

Within the confines of the strategic plan and doctrine, the combatant commanders formulate the campaign plan which "provides for a series of related military operations to accomplish a common objective, normally within a given space and time." [Ref. 69, p. 6-2]

Within the confines of the campaign plan and doctrine, the tactical plan is formulated which "covers a single operation or a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession." [Ref. 69, p. 6-2]

Depending upon the operational environment, the battlefield under the plan is bounded by the area of interest and area of influence. The area of interest and influence varies in accordance with the battlefield mobility and weapon's lethality, delivery system, and range of friendly and opposing forces. Staff Officers' Handbook provides the following definitions:

- The area of influence is the area which normally contains enemy forces whose actions affect the Unit's close battle, and it is also the area wherein a commander is capable of acquiring and fighting enemy units with assets organic to or in support of his command. [Ref. 70, p. 3-8]
- The area of interest includes territory which contains enemy forces capable of affecting future operations. [Ref. 70, p. 3-8]

The commander must include both of these areas when he prepares the battlefield. The U.S. has reached the day and age where a combatant commander's area of influence is actually global. The NCA, CINCLANT, CINCSAC, and CINCPAC have global perspective for the employment of strategic weapons.

The authors preference is a decision making format close to the one specified in the U.S. Army's RB 101-999, Staff Officers' Handbook. This format is closely aligned with the decision making process where "Commander presents problem, gets suggestions, makes decision." This represents a combination between autocratic and democratic styles of leadership.

1. The Mission

The commander receives his mission from higher headquarters to defend, seize, escort, or attack a certain military objective along with combat environment type information. The combat environment information includes instructions on force allocation and applicable specific constraints on the employment of the force. The commander performs assessments of the mission in order to clearly define the explicit and implicit elements of the mission under the combat environment.

During these assessments, the commander begins to formulate his predictions and perceptions of the possible battlefield environments. He contemplates how he intends to direct the actions of the friendly forces and directly or indirectly influence the actions of the opposing force so that his will and intent are the outcome on the battlefield.

The commander's will and training must be strong and unwavering. The combatant commander is a 4-star general or flag officer with vast command experience at almost all levels of combat. His perspective on warfare is very broad and he is aware of the intricate details of mission accomplishment at the various levels. He knows that his success in warfare depends immensely upon the overall success of his air, sea, and land forces to win at the technical, tactical, campaign, and strategic levels

during conventional warfare, the technical, tactical, and strategic levels during low intensity conflict, and the strategic level during nuclear warfare. So, he weighs the performance considerations and conditions for all appropriate levels when he assigns combat missions.

He and his men are trained to go into combat knowing that the force may and will sustain substantial casualties no matter how effectively the military force is employed against the enemy. They live with the losses of their fellow service members as the fate of employing military art and a consequence of decisions reached through the lawful process set forth in the Constitution for the employment of military force to obtain the national security objectives. As painful as war is to the commanders, they cannot afford to show it to their men for it may destroy their morale and mental toughness.

Now, he contemplates the battlefield for combat. The commander's will involves a mental simulation of the battlefields which includes the capabilities and limitations on the employment of U.S. forces from the technical to the strategic level. When he considers the capabilities and limitations of the military force, the commander weighs his combat power against the combat power of the opposing force; and identifies those actions which are necessary in combat for his force to obtain an advantage in these situations. These actions include the application of the Principles of War, doctrine, and strategy along with tenacity, synchronization, sheer force, and execution. Nothing can be taken for granted in combat. During this simulation, the Commander explores mentally what he feels will work for the command and comes up with his perceived, feasible alternative courses of action.

He discusses the mission with his staff and subordinate commanders to gain further understanding of the scope and definition of the alternative courses of action. The mission recognition phase of the process goes on throughout the operational performance. At some point, he passes a tasking to the staff for the development of plans and analysis of the alternative courses of action.

2. Intelligence

JCS Pub 1 defines intelligence as "the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas." [Ref. 5, p. 189] Intelligence is vital to the preparation of the battlefield. The commander must know his battlefield. There are elements on the battlefield which are uncontrollable such as weather. There are some elements on the battlefield that are semi-fixed such as terrain. There is the enemy, the commander's combat opposition. JCS Pub 1 provides the following definitions on types of intelligence:

- basic intelligence - Fundamental intelligence concerning the general situation, resources, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of foreign countries or areas which may be used as reference material in the planning of operations at any level and in evaluating subsequent information relating to the same subject.[Ref. 5, p. 48]
- combat intelligence - That knowledge of the enemy, weather, and geographical features required by a commander in the planning and conduct of combat operations. [Ref. 5, p. 74]
- current intelligence - Intelligence of all types and forms of immediate interest which is usually disseminated without the delays necessary to complete evaluation or interpretation. [Ref. 5, p. 98]
- scientific and technical intelligence - The product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, and technical information which covers: a. foreign developments in basic and applied research and in applied engineering techniques; and b. scientific and technical characteristics, capabilities, and

limitations of all foreign military systems, weapons, weapon systems, and materiel, the research and development related thereto, and the production methods employed for their manufacture. [Ref. 5, p. 322]

- security intelligence - Intelligence on the identity, capabilities and intentions of hostile organizations or individuals who are or may be engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism. [Ref. 5, p. 328]
- strategic intelligence - Intelligence that is required for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels. [Ref. 5, p. 349]
- tactical intelligence - Intelligence which is required for the planning and conduct of tactical operations. [Ref. 5, p. 362]
- target intelligence - Intelligence which portrays and locates the components of a target or target complex and indicates its vulnerability and relative importance. [Ref. 5, p. 365]

These types of intelligence are important to the commander's evaluation of his liabilities in the combat environment. The liabilities of the commander are found in the area of interest and influence. The commander must stay informed of the opposing force's intent in order to deny or disrupt the opponent commander's execution of his will in combat.

The commander sets the intelligence requirements for the battlefield. During the JSPS process, the commander requested the EEI, but now, he is looking for specific information on the combat environment that he faces.

The means of intelligence gathering are categorized as human or electronic. There are numerous systems falling under each. The satellites, air platforms, and Over-the-Horizon Radars are examples of electronic means that provide intelligence for a geographical area equivalent to the range of modern weaponry. An intelligence baseline is used for the planning from the time of conflict initiation to the very end.

The commander, intelligence section, operations section, and chief of staff are responsible to evolve this intelligence baseline throughout the conflict.

3. The Estimates

The estimates are prepared to give an assessment of the alternative courses of action from the perspective of personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, and civil-military staff. The basic assumption consistency and integration of these staff efforts is the responsibility of the Chief of Staff. The estimates may be skipped by the commander if he feels that he has a thorough grasp of the situation or there is an urgent need for immediate action. [Ref. 65, p. 2-7] The estimates represent the prediction by each staff section of the battlefield results for the alternative courses of action in their functional area. Based on these forecasts, a comparison is performed in order to obtain the best course of action for a particular functional area. The staff has tough time constraints in order to complete their estimates.

The personnel estimate reviews the impact of each course of action on personnel administration and unit manpower strengths. In some cases the personnel levels may drop below an acceptable limit for the long-term sustainment of operations. [Ref. 65, p. 2-7]

The intelligence estimate is an evaluation of the opposing force, weather, terrain, and other factors in "the area of operations" impact on each course of action. The intelligence estimate looks at the intent and will of the opposing force and projects his disposition, action, and probable reactionary courses of action during the period of interest. The intelligence estimate gives the advantage and disadvantage of each course of action and makes a recommendation on their feasibility. [Ref. 65, p. 2-7]

The operation estimate provides an estimate of the projected performance of the command during the alternative courses of action. It takes into account the operational along with the intelligence, logistics, personnel, and civil-military factors. The recommendation states which course of action the command can perform best in the combat environment from the operational perspective. [Ref. 65, p. 2-7]

The logistic estimate looks at the logistic factors which impacts each course of action. A military force without ammunition and equipment is handicapped. The logistic estimate provides the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative from the logistic perspective. [Ref. 65, p. 2-7]

The civil-military operations (CMO) estimate is described as follows:

An analysis of the influence of CMO factors on accomplishment of the mission. The CMO estimate draws conclusions and makes recommendations concerning the feasibility of various courses of action from the perspective of the G5, and the effects of each course of action on CMO. [Ref. 65, p. 2-7]

The target output of these estimates represents information that the commander needs and wants to know about the current and future battlefield for his decisions. The staff presents the best information and projections at the designated time of the decision brief. The best information and projections may have shortfalls. These shortfalls are characterized as bad or inaccurate information and projections.

4. Decisions

Based on the staff estimates and his perception of the battlefield, the commander provides his own estimate of the situation. Prior to announcing his decisions, the commander addresses the pertinent factors under each course of action.

In the commander's estimate, the decision is made between the alternative courses of action.

Also, the commander gives his concept of the operation to the staff. In the concept the commander provides his intent and will for the operation which sets the tone for the planning and execution of the operation.

5. Plan

Planning is the process of "determining what is to be done, how it is to be done, where it is to be done, who is responsible for doing it or seeing that it is done, and when it is to be done." [Ref. 68, p. 94]

The plan stage involves the setting of tactical and/or campaign plans and the creation of operation orders. Staff Officers' Handbook cites the following differences between plans and orders:

- Orders are based on facts, while plans are based on assumptions that are included in the plans.
- The time for execution of an order is known and specified, while the time of a specified occurrence or contingency will dictate the execution of a plan. [Ref. 65, p. 4-2]

The plan or order provides instruction on the mission, resource allocation and organization, taskings, control, coordination, and additional information for the subordinate commanders to accomplish the mission. The plan or order captures the will and intent of the commander during the operation or campaign.

6. Execution

The fulfillment of the commander's will and intent during the battle is the essence of execution. The commander must implant his will and intent into the mind

and soul of the military force. Still, the execution on the battlefield may or may not develop as the higher commander had mentally projected. If the course of things on the battlefield progress adversely, the leader at the execution level can make the necessary adjustments during the course of battle in accordance with the higher commander's intent and will or request assistance from higher headquarters or adjacent commands when he lacks the capability to correct adverse situation within his own means. Assistance from higher or adjacent commands may be provided through fire support, air support, reinforcement by reserve units and replacement personnel, or other means. The execution must be decentralized and very flexible.

A frequently overlooked part of execution is the reporting of battlefield information in accordance with guidance from higher headquarters. The higher headquarters have valid information needs which can only be met by the subordinate units. By the same token, the subordinate units have valid information needs which only the higher headquarter can provide.

D. THE COMMANDER'S CONTROL AND FEEDBACK LOOP

The expected extensiveness of the activities within the areas of influence and interest forces the commander to use an extensive information system consisting of his staff, communication, and automation systems. During the operational performance, the information system is crucial to effective C2 because it provides the means for the commander to exercise control, and gain important feedback information. The exercising of control is interpreted as the processes of coordinating, directing, and controlling. These processes are defined as follows:

- Coordinating -- "integrating all details necessary for the accomplishment of the mission."
- Directing -- "the vital step between preparation and actual operation involving the issuance of orders and instructions to subordinates and others to indicate what is to be done."
- Controlling -- "establishing and applying fully the necessary means to ensure that plans, orders, and policies are complied with in such a manner that the objective will be attained." [Ref. 68, p. 94]

The information system consists of the information gathering, processing, storing, filtering, analysis, evaluation, and/or transfer by the staff, automation, and communication systems within the command post and between the command post and adjacent, higher, or subordinate elements.

Within the commander's area of influence and interest, he needs to immediately and constantly have available the following:

- Military code of ethics throughout the command.
- Secure and reliable communications with friendly forces.
- The ability to detect and predict the hostile actions of the opposing force.
- The capability to engage the enemy with weapon payload at a farther distance and with greater accuracy than the enemy.
- A reliable assessment of the damage inflicted.
- Accurate intelligence and friendly force information.
- A decision making cycle shorter and more effective than his adversary.

The information system aids the commander to reduce uncertainty on the battlefield. Whereas the commander is knowledgeable of the friendly and opposing force, the commander faces much uncertainty on the battlefield caused by the unpredictable

impact of the operational environment on the friendly and opposing forces and the human factor in C2 and execution by the opposing and friendly forces.

The qualitative information generated by the information system for the commander improves his decision making. The information system aids the commander and his staff during the mission accomplishment and is actively used during the preparation of the battlefield at all levels of the command. Without the information system, the commander and staff are unable to make preparation of the battlefield with an acceptable level of certainty and confidence in the probability of mission accomplishment. Sometimes, the commander may have all the information in the world, but it may not capture the battlefield situation, due to the timeliness, accuracy, or format of presentation. The information system aids in the presentation of the information to the Commander in an accurate and concise form.

1. U.S. Military Code of Ethics

The commander must ensure that the U.S. military code of ethics is in place within his command. Half of his problems are over if throughout the chain of command the military personnel are complying with the U.S. military code of ethics. The military code of justice teaches duty, honor, and country. The entire military force is expected to individually know their duty, perform it with honor, and place country before self. This means that lawful orders and directives are obeyed. Unlawful orders and directives are not obeyed and are reported, appropriately. A certain amount of expertise is expected from the military personnel. The information being passed throughout the command is accurate to the best of the originators knowledge. Therefore, a basic premise for operations may be assumed that each person is

performing their assigned missions to the best of their ability and if he is not then the system is geared to identify sub standard performance and correct it. The U.S. military code of ethics is very important for control purposes.

2. The Staff

The staff is the oldest externalized element of the information system. The staff for operational performance is functionally divided into operations, intelligence/electronic warfare, administration, logistics, and civil-military sections. Each section serves as the commander's expertise and information system for their respective area.

The staff is working during the operational performance to:

1. Facilitate and monitor the accomplishment of command decisions.
2. Provide timely and accurate information to the commander and subordinate units.
3. Anticipate requirements and provide estimates of the situation.
4. Determine courses of action and recommend a course of action which will best accomplish the mission.
5. Prepare plans and orders. [Ref. 69, p. 1-4,5]

The staff plays a substantial role in C2 at the operational performance level of the Williams Model.

The staff at higher headquarters is typically divided between those elements of each staff section who are performing current operations, planning, and the combat service support functions. Each grouping of the staff along the above lines has different operational perspective and requirements, but their efforts need orchestration internally and externally as a unit. Today's plans are tomorrow's current operations

and today's resources under direct control of and acquisition by the combat service support elements are tomorrow's tools for battle. [Ref. 70, pp. 4-1 to 4-16]

3. The Communication System

The communication system facilitates the commander and his staff's ability to plan, control, and coordinate the modern battlefield which is broadly dispersed. The communication system allows the commander and his staff to receive and pass information internally and externally. Information is passed externally to the various locations of subordinate commanders, adjacent commanders, and higher headquarters and their staff. Information is passed internally between the staff sections and groupings. At each level of command, the commander has a tailored communication system to provide nets in support of the command/operations, administrative/logistics, fire support, air defense, and intelligence functions in the command. These nets require the capability to pass data and voice traffic.

The communication system includes personnel and equipment which are dedicated to the commander's communication needs. With the increased pace of low intensity conflict and conventional warfare and improved mobility of the military force, the communication personnel face the interesting challenge of employing the communication equipment in a manner that meets the required reliability, survivability, connectivity, redundancy, circuit allocation and quality, mobility, and security for the communication systems that match the battlefield dynamics. [Ref. 70, p. 4-17] The elements of communications personnel are responsible for planning, engineering, installing, operating, and maintaining the communication system in a real-time mode. The engineering is normally limited to black box and link engineering in the real-time

mode. The aggregate total of communication personnel and equipment on the battlefield is extremely large. [Ref. 70, p. 4-16 and 4-17] A substantial amount of the end-user communication equipment is operated and maintained by the user.

There are a limited number of communication pipes on the battlefield. The operations section of the staff prioritize the allocation of communication pipes. The communication personnel on the staff works closely with the operation section to ensure that the allocations do not exceed communication resource capacity. Excessive communication traffic as well as requirements and bad placements of communication gear are poor operations security (OPSEC). Effective management of the radio spectrum is paramount to effective C2. The primary means of managing the radio spectrum is through a frequency allocation document, known as the Communications Electronic Operating Instructions (CEOI). The frequencies allocated to units in the CEOI are deconflicted. Still, there are problems if the command does not exercise good communication discipline during operational performance.

The old communication rule within the Army provided that higher headquarters provided communications to lower headquarters and adjacent commands provided communications from left to right. In the joint and combined warfare arena, there are special problems because the orderliness of the all Army scenario is ineffective for modern warfare. At the tactical level, the Air Force is frequently an adjacent command to the Army from the Battalion level upward. The combatant commander fights joint wars. Therefore, the Army must talk to the Navy, Air Force, and Marines. Due to the range, destructiveness, and accuracy of weaponry, each service through their operations/maneuver, fire support, and air defense elements is

able to project possibly decisive power to aid the other service in an engagement within their traditional combat environment. Because the other services can provide combat power in another services traditional battlefield area, there are valid information requirements for receiving and passing information on a timely basis between the services. The traditional way to solve this problem was to provide a liaison officer(s) with his own communication capability to coordinate support.

The separate communication system is intolerable, complicates frequency management, and contributes to different battlefield perceptions. The Army has its information system and the Air Force, Marines, and Navy have their own. The land, air, and sea forces need an accurate and timely picture of the situation at sea, on land, and in the air to fulfill their mission. The communication system for the military force should be integrated and compatible so that the information may be passed as required automatically around the battlefield. The ground commander in need of munition should learn that his munition supply ship was sunk by the opposing force as soon as possible so that the impact may be assessed and appropriate measures adopted to minimize the adverse affect.

There is a part of the communication system dedicated to electronic warfare. This equipment falls under the intelligence personnel who use the equipment to gather intel information on the disposition of the opposing force.

4. The Automation System

The automation system facilitates the control, coordination, and planning process on the modern battlefield. Many redundant procedures manually performed by the staff and the instruments of the commander during previous wars have succumbed

to automation. The automation of these procedure facilitates the rapid and timely flow of information on the battlefield. Through the automation of key redundant procedures, the staff's performance has been enhanced tremendously.

The use of manual map overlay displays for the information presentation is slowly being replaced by wide screen digitized displays that provide a more accurate topographical display. These displays are very flexible and permit the projection of trends and previous point of time information as well as current battlefield situation.

The storage, processing, and filtering of information were through a cumbersome manual process, but the processes are being replaced by an automated system(s) which provides prompt, reliable, and accurate information retrieval. The JRS and other documents spelled out the information requirements of the NCA and commanders. The automated systems facilitate the processing of this information by permitting the interactive input of information. Also, the system permits automatic display of essential information concerning friendly and opposing forces on the topographical display. The automated storage and processing are permitting the single manual entry of information into the information system and the automatic transfer of updates to higher and adjacent headquarters.

Briefing charts and slides were manually generated by graphics personnel which was very slow and inflexible, but now the automated graphic packages are permitting the staff action officers to do their own in a timely and flexible manner. The staff officers are able to portray with greater accuracy the current battlefield situation.

By combining the satellite communications technology and automation capability, the following improvements were made:

- Manual system of map reading for determining position was replaced by an automated system with unbelievable accuracy.
- The delivery, accuracy, and range of many weapon system were enhanced.
- The detection, tracking, sensory, warning, and projection of threatening forces increased immensely.

Automation is a key element of the distributed C2 system such as World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) that is serving the commanders at all levels. "The primary mission of WWMCCS is to support the national-level command and control function." [Ref. 52, p. 117] WWMCCS consists of the following elements:

- Warning Systems are the tactical warning systems that notify operation command centers of the occurrence of a threatening event.
- WWMCCS Communications include the general- and special-purpose communications capabilities to convey information, hold conferences, and issue orders.
- Data Collection and Processing is the collection and handling of data to support information requirements of WWMCCS.
- Executive Aids are the WWMCCS-related documents, procedures, reporting structure, and system interaction that permit the user to connect with the system, enter data, and receive output records, forms, and displays.
- WWMCCS Command Facilities are the primary or alternate command centers. [Ref. 52, p. 117]

The various C2 systems are aids to the commander's decision making process.

There are many other improvements being provided to the C2 process by automation system. There are many future improvements projected for C2.

5. The Leadership Ability of the Commander

The commander has overall authority and responsibility for the accomplishment of assigned missions within his area of influence and interest. He may delegate authority, responsibility, and accountability for designated missions, but the delegation does not relieve his accountability. As the Commander, he has responsibility to effectively employ the assigned forces in the operational environment. His success in this endeavor is dependent on his leadership. In the book, Taking Command: The Art and Science of Military Leadership, Colonel Samuel H. Hays and Lieutenant Colonel William N. Thomas define leadership as "the art of influencing human behavior so as to accomplish a mission in the manner desired by the leader." [Ref. 68, p. 16] The commander may decentralize execution and decision-making but he must ensure that all personnel in his command have accountability for their actions. The military units must fight as a team and it is his responsibility to plan, organize, coordinate, control, monitor, and direct the activity in his command to ensure that the fight is well orchestrated. [Ref. 68]

E. THE EVOLVEMENT OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

During combat the other six levels of the Williams Model do not go away. They are very active and working to evolve the operational environment, so that, it is more favorable to the U.S. The military chain of command can not afford to ignore these levels. The Acquisition System may produce new military force capabilities which may change the tide of the war. The American people may elect a new President who is violently opposed to the war. The combat readiness level will continue to train and sustain the military force. The national security interests, objective, policy, and

strategy may be redefined and thereby cause change to the military objective, policy, and strategy as well as the military force organization.

IX. THE CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. SUMMARY

Effective C2 over the military role in "common defence" is vital to the nation's ability to face the challenges to its existence. The Williams Model provides a clear portrayal of C2 over the military role in "common defence." (See Figure 15) There is a hierarchical flow of C2 from the American people to the fighting force. The author documents this hierarchical flow.

The American people via the expression of their will, values, sense of heritage, and economic strength are the foundation and ultimate source of C2 over the military role in "common defence." The Constitution of the United States is the second level of C2. The Constitution delineates the federal system which delegates power and authority between the national and state government and divides the power of the national government between the branches. Using the power received, the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the federal government plan, direct, organize, coordinate, and control the utilization of the "common defence" elements for obtaining the objective of "common defence" and providing opportunity for the other objectives for governance. The national security interests, objectives, policy, and strategy are the bases for prioritizing the expenditure of resources, setting the military force structure, and determining the required readiness of the military forces. The force organization provides the institutionalize systems and force organizations that set the personnel and equipment structure, and functional requirements needed to implement national security,




Figure 15. The Williams Model for C2.

so that national security interests are protected, national security objectives are accomplished, and national security policy is followed. Within the force organization, the military objectives, policy, and strategy are formulated. Combat readiness is the process of training, maintaining, and strengthening the force as an instrument for deterrence and a capable fighting force. The operational performance is the orchestrated employment of the military force for "common defence" in combat. There is a chain of command from the National Command Authority to the lowest technical level during the operational performance.

B. THE CONCLUSION

C2 over the military role in "common defence" is crucial to the obtainment of the objective assigned to the national government, "to provide for the common defence." The author gives a realistic approach to understanding and enhancing the effectiveness of C2.

The main theme is that C2 over the military role in "common defence" occurs in war as well as in peace, and therefore, it is safe to say that C2 is a historical as well as current process that starts with the will, values, and heritage of the American people. The levels of C2, functioning outside the realm of operational performance level, but exercising control, are just as important as the performance during operations. Whenever the U.S. goes to war or has a conflict the success of the military force is influenced and directed tremendously by its operational environment. The decisions being made today will determine the capabilities and limitations of the military force in combat today as well as for the future. A commander cannot direct the shooting of weapons he does not have. The commander cannot direct the destruction of a

moving target outside the confines of his detection capabilities and weapons delivery, range, and accuracy capability. The commander's range of activities, options and predicted outcomes are predetermined before combat. These predetermined ranges are an exercise of C2 and determines the operational environment. Everything that the commander can do, does or cannot do is predicated on the operational environment which is created by the other six levels of C2.

A secondary theme is that every American citizen has a responsibility in providing for "common defence." The will and values of the American people are present in silent and active forms. The silent form is captured in the Constitution and the processes such as elections, constitutional amendment, and the legislation, execution, and judication of the law by duly elected or appointed officials. In its active form, the will and values of the American people are expressed through protest, strikes, and other means. The government personnel must deal with the active and silent forms.

The NCA must interpret, influence, and direct the will of the American people for C2 as well as influence, direct, and control the activities of the military force. The mature development of all the levels is paramount to effective C2, however one level may dominate during a period of history.

The information system is common to all levels and elements of the C2 system. The performance of the decision makers are dependent upon the quality of the information system. The information system consists of the staff, communications, and automation systems used for the gathering, processing, storing, filtering, analysis, evaluation, and/or transfer of information in support of a valid information requirement.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are submitted:

- The perception of C2 by the American people and the military should be expanded to include the realm of decision making activities which determine the operational environment. An understanding of the operational environment and knowledge on how to determine if the operational environment is changeable are crucial to successful operational performance.
- Continued research should be undertaken on the C2 functioning of each level in the Williams Model for C2. Research is needed on the C2 functioning of each level to precisely identify, define, and measure their attributes in the C2 perspective.
- The information system design, architecture, concept of operation, and etc. should be developed for every level in the force organization. Each level of the C2 hierarchy is dependent upon the quality of information received. Without quality information, the decision makers at a level cannot make sound decisions.
- The techniques for mission analysis, intelligence, estimates, decisions, plans, and execution during operational performance should be studied in greater depth. The study of the decision making process will improve the staff's ability to assist the Commander. The staff must provide information to the commander which will result in the sound preparation of the battlefield and maximize the friendly forces chance of success.

Effective C2 over the military role in "common defence is crucial to the obtainment of the objective assigned to the federal government, "to provide for the common defence."

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