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THE NAVY IN THE JOINT ARENA: ANTAGONIST OR TEAM PLAYER?

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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# THE NAVY IN THE JOINT ARENA: ANTAGONIST OR TEAM PLAYER?

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

The reorganization of our military services has been a major topic of discussion in the public forum for the past several years. In most cases the stated goal is to improve the capabilities of our services to function more effectively as "joint " forces. According to JCS Pub 1-02 a joint force is "a force composed of significant elements of the Army, the Navy and/or the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, or two or more of these Services, operating under a single commander." Some of the major campaigns of World War II and the Korean War, such as Normandy and Inchon, were classic examples of joint operations. More recently though, the results of our employment of joint forces have been less sterling as demonstrated by the ill-fated Iranian rescue attempt and the successful, but problem plagued, Grenada invasion. The level of national interest in eliminating such ineffectiveness has reached the point that Congress has enacted legislation mandating military reorganization, most notably the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Since then "jointness", or the ability of the services to work together, has become the

watchword throughout the military and a focus of attention for both the Pentagon and Capitol Hill.

One service, more than any other, has often given others the impression that it is less than enthusiastic in this move towards jointness ... the Navy. Is the Navy deliberately dragging its feet? The purpose of this paper is to determine if the aforementioned perception is correct or whether there are differences between the Navy and the other services that make this transition legitimately more difficult for it to implement. It is my premise that the Navy is striving for jointness but there are logical reasons and unique features of the Navy that make this transition slower for it than the other services. To do this I will examine three main areas: (1) the institutional personalities and attitudes of the individual services, (2) the differences between naval warfare and that of air and land warfare, and (3) interservice rivalry.

## CHAPTER II

### INSTITUTIONAL PERSONALITIES AND ATTITUDES OF THE SERVICES

Are there fundamental differences among the basic U.S. soldier, sailor, airman and marine? While there are always dangers in drawing generalizations about a large group, it is inevitable that any organization will develop a reputation or personality based on the collective mind set of its members. Two authors, Carl H. Builder,<sup>1</sup> and Arthur T. Hadley,<sup>2</sup> have written works on the unique styles and psychological attitudes that develop among the officers of the individual military services. As with any profession, young novices quickly pick up the social norms and attitudes they're exposed to during their early job experiences. Understanding the differences in these institutional personalities is a necessary consideration to understanding how each of the services participates in the joint arena.

In the Army, a new lieutenant quickly learns the necessity of teamwork and coordination with others. Regardless of which branch of the Army he is in, his role within the organization is clearly defined and he must closely coordinate his efforts with others to ensure the overall success of the mission. He cannot move his unit too far or too fast without clearing it with others or he will overextend his supply support or advance into his own



supporting artillery fire. For this reason Army officers tend to be more conscious of the needs of others.<sup>3</sup>

Along with this awareness of the need for coordination is a strong devotion to the country. The Army's heritage is as the nation's loyal citizen-soldier ready to protect duty, honor and country.<sup>4</sup> Army officers take extreme pride in this role and in their particular branch within the Army. More than by particular branch though, Army officers prefer to be categorized by or associated with their warfighting skills, as in armor, airborne or air cavalry.

New Air Force officers immediately gain a strong appreciation for technology. As the youngest service whose birth was triggered by a new marvel, the airplane, their very existence is based on the latest in high-tech weapons systems. As a direct result they develop a brash sort of self-confidence because of their role as the wielders of decisive instruments of war, whether it be fighter aircraft or strategic nuclear missiles.<sup>5</sup> They love to be identified by the particular weapons system or "high-tech toys" they're associated with, as in "I fly fighters" or "I'm in missiles." They tend to be more sophisticated and used to the creature comforts of life than the other services. This may be due to the fact that they normally operate from a fixed base and that they're able to maintain a certain amount of distance from the actual devastation they wield from the air.

The young Navy ensign is immediately exposed to a totally different environment. He becomes a member of an institution heavily based upon tradition, not just of the U.S. Navy, but also the British Navy.<sup>6</sup> This is evident not only from the rank structure which is unique from the other services, but also in the way the Navy operates. While his job within the ship might be clearly defined and supervised, the ship itself goes in harm's way quite independently. The desire for independent command at sea is a key secret to understanding the Navy. The commanding officer of the ship has unmatched freedom in the manner in which he accomplishes his assigned mission. If he wishes to change the ship's course or speed, he simply gives that command without the need to coordinate with others.

Naval officers too have a preoccupation with their "toys" which is quite understandable. Not only are theirs the largest and most expensive, but it is only Navy personnel who live in their war machines for extended periods of time. Navy officers have developed a strong affiliation by these weapons systems and their particular warfare community: surface, air, or subsurface, as in "I'm a blackshoe", "airedale" or "submariner." Because they normally sail off for months at a time in these ships, often with minimal interface with their superiors external to the ship, officers in the Navy develop a strong sense of

independence. They are accustomed to receiving a mission and then being left alone to accomplish it as they see fit.

While the Marine Corps is part of the Navy Department, it is a separate service and as such has developed a style of its own. The young lieutenant picks up much of the independence of his fellow naval officer, but acquires a personality unique to the Marines. His too, is based strongly on tradition, "Semper Fi", but also that of a small elite fighting force ready to do battle anywhere, anytime. Marines are the epitome of machismo, a honed organization bereft of the large bureaucratic staffs typical of the other services.<sup>7</sup>

Besides their differences in personalities, the services also approach doctrine and organizational norms differently. The Army and Air Force both stress centralized control and decentralized execution. A key part of this philosophy is their emphasis on formal doctrine that is centrally imposed, slow to change and applies service-wide. They each have major commands whose specific mission is to establish doctrine. Conversely the Navy believes in decentralized control and execution. Not surprising in view of their penchant for independence, they tend to have a distaste for doctrine as something that will limit their ability to operate. Practically the only service-wide doctrine the Navy has is Navy Regulations. Instead of formal doctrine they prefer guidance in the form of standard

operating procedures (SOP's) or tactical notices (TACNOTES's) that apply to particular weapons systems or warfare groups. These procedural publications tend to be developed by the operators, equipment oriented, and rather easily changed. The Marine Corps lies between the two extremes of the spectrum, both in their views of organization and doctrine.

Two other areas that reveal significant differences in service attitudes are professional military education (PME) and joint staff duty. For continued promotion in both the Army and Air Force it has always been essential to attend their junior staff college, senior war college, and obtain a post graduate degree. Historically the Navy has stressed shipboard assignments and operational experience over PME. It was felt that too much time spent in school kept the officer out of the operational mainstream and prevented him from hitting all the necessary "sea duty" wickets. As a direct result of this attitude it was more important to be selected as a candidate for those schools than it was to attend them. The optimum situation was to be selected but not attend. In that way one's record reflected that he had made the quality cut without losing valuable time at sea attending the school. Even today, in spite of the importance of PME, a naval officer is lucky to attend either post graduate school or either of the Navy's service

colleges. To attend all three is almost unheard of and would probably severely limit chances for promotion due to lack of "operational experience".

An almost identical situation occurs with the attitudes toward joint staff duty. For years the Army and Air Force have sent only their best officers, most likely after completion of PME, to billets on the joint staffs. Until recently in the Navy, being assigned to any staff duty was considered the "kiss of death". More importantly, promotion rates of those assigned to staff duty reflected that these perceptions were true.<sup>8</sup>

The Navy's emphasis on operational assignments has influenced their perceptions on joint staff duty just as it did with PME. However, there are some historical reasons that have contributed to this attitude also. Naval staffs have always been small, particularly sea going staffs because of space limitations aboard ships. Ships are designed to berth the minimum people required by the ship's mission. Even flag ships have few extra spaces allocated for the staff. As a direct result of this and the Navy's foremost requirement to man all operational (shipboard) billets, they have stressed keeping the size of staffs small.

These factors carry over into the joint arena where based on its size the Navy has less officers available for

staff duty. (See Figure 1).<sup>9</sup> The Navy has 1300 less joint billets than either the Army or the Air Force. This coupled with the Navy's attitude towards staffs help explain why it's typical for them to send only one representative to a staff meeting while the Army and Air Force usually send 3 or 4 officers. Fortunately the Navy has realized the importance of having top quality officers representing its interests on the joint staffs and has made a major turnaround on these two issues. Now it too is putting strong emphasis on PME and joint duty, and assigning quality personnel accordingly.

Figure 1: Officer Distribution By Service (FY 1987)

	Joint Staff*	Other Joint Duty*	Total Joint Duty*	Total DoD**
Army	291	2,718	3,009( 37%)	35%
Navy	216	1,495	1,711( 21%)	23%
USMC	58	382	440( 5%)	7%
USAF	314	2,748	3,062( 37%)	35%
DoD	879	7,343	8,222(100%)	100%

\* Allocation of O-4 and higher grade positions on FY 1987 joint duty assignment list.

\*\* Share of all DoD officers in grade O-4 and above (regardless of joint or in-service assignment category).

#### ENDNOTES

1. Carl H. Builder, The Army in the Strategic Planning Process. Who Shall Bell the Cat?, 1987, pp. 22-49.

2. Arthur T. Hadley, "The Split Military Psyche," The New York Times Magazine, July 13, 1986, pp. 26-33.

3. Ibid., p. 28.

4. Builder, p. 26.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., p. 24.

7. Hadley, p. 30.

8. Ibid.

9. Frank C. Carlucci, Report of the Secretary of the Defense to the Congress on the Amended FY 1988/FY 1989 Biennial Budget, p. 310.

## CHAPTER III

### THE UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF NAVAL WARFARE

How is naval warfare different from land or air warfare? Since the days of sailing ships men like Alfred Thayer Mahan, Sir Julian Corbett and Bernard Brodie have written extensively on this subject. By definition there is a significant difference between land and naval warfare. "States conduct war on the land in order to achieve long-term political control over territory. Warfare at sea, on the other hand, is concerned with temporary control over, or denial of use by the adversary of, sea areas for influencing what is taking place on the land."<sup>1</sup> This is not, however, without parallel elsewhere. Air warfare is a direct corollary. Its goal is air superiority or the temporary control of airspace, or denial of its use by the adversary. However, there are some significant other differences between naval warfare and the other types.

Admiral Thomas Hayward, then Chief of Naval Operations, claimed there were unique aspects of naval warfare in his Fiscal Year 1983 Military Posture Statement.<sup>2</sup> One of the most obvious of these aspects is the three-dimensional nature of naval warfare. Maritime forces can be attacked from under the sea, on the surface or from the air.<sup>3</sup> While some are quick to point out that air warfare deals with



three dimensions also, its surveillance and combat capabilities do not have to contend with what is essentially three different mediums: air, water and the surface in between. The warfighting characteristics of each medium are so unique that it has resulted in the development of three distinct warfare specialities: air, surface and subsurface. The diverseness of each is aptly demonstrated by the difficulty often experienced by the Navy in effectively coordinating the efforts of the three communities.

Another unique aspect of naval warfare is the fact that there are no clear geographic battle lines drawn in war on the open seas. Without geographic indicators such as "fronts" or "forward edges of the battle area" as in land warfare, it is much more difficult comprehending how the battle is going. Even air warfare as conducted by the Air Force normally becomes an adjunct to land warfare and oriented to the same geographic boundaries. Also, because the seas are international waters and considered an interconnected whole, war at sea is not confined to particular theaters of war but can occur anywhere globally.<sup>4</sup> In the open seas there are no rear areas or safe havens where naval forces can feel safe from attack without warning. The only warfare that has similar situations is war in space, since as with the open ocean, no one can hold and control space.<sup>5</sup>

Because of the mobility of warships and the multidimensional battle space involved, naval warfare always involves the element of maneuver.<sup>6</sup> As a direct result, an inferior force cannot assume a defensive position and hope to exact a substantial toll on the enemy as in land warfare. On the contrary, the key to tactical success at sea is to attack effectively first, whether an inferior force or not.<sup>7</sup> This advantage for offense over defense is probably the most fundamental difference between naval and land warfare.

The legal nature of the high seas permits frequent interaction of maritime forces of the world on a routine basis. Potential adversaries have the "right" to sail in close proximity and observe each other's operations and tactics in a manner unmatched by land or air forces.<sup>8</sup> This often close physical proximity of combat-ready warships has necessitated development of complex rules of engagement to help prevent unintended provocation to hostilities. Additionally the right of innocent passage allows nonbelligerents into contested areas. These forces may also be warships thus further complicating the need for precise identification and rules of engagement.<sup>9</sup>

One final consideration of naval warfare is the concentration of strength in a relatively few discrete units as contrasted with the distribution of land and air power over vast numbers of men and machines.<sup>10</sup> Loss of a single capital ship, such as an aircraft carrier or a ballistic

missile submarine, could be decisive to the battle or have a significant influence on the overall correlation of forces. This also could mean that in the next war the war at sea may be over very quickly.

Not only does naval warfare bring unique aspects to the combat environment, but in peacetime these same naval forces provide equally unique capabilities. In that naval forces are independent, self-sustaining, and warfighting units able to transit worldwide in international waters, they are uniquely qualified for power projection and diplomatic missions. Without the encroachment to national sovereignty inherent with deploying troops or aircraft ashore, naval forces can dramatically influence an international situation by their presence alone. They can be intrusive or out of sight, threatening or non-threatening, and easily dispatched but just as easily withdrawn. For these reasons naval forces have been the primary forces of choice for crises response since World War II. In approximately 250 instances of employment of American military forces between 1946 and 1982, naval forces have constituted the principal element of our response in about 80% of the incidents.<sup>11</sup>

#### ENDNOTES

1. James John Tritten, "Are Naval Operations Unique?", Naval Forces, No. 5, 1986, p. 25.

2. Thomas B. Hayward, Statement of the Chief of Naval Operations before the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, 3-10 February 1982, pp. 599-600.

3. Ibid., p. 598.

4. James John Tritten, Is Naval Warfare Unique?, p.6.

5. Ibid., p. 11.

6. Hayward, p. 599.

7. Wayne P Hughes, Jr. Fleet Tactics, Theory and Practice, 1987, p. 179.

8. Tritten, "Are Naval Operations Unique?", p. 24.

9. Ibid.

10. National Security Research, The Wartime Influence of Seapower Upon Land Power, 1987, p. 199.

11. James D. Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy", The Maritime Strategy, 1986, p. 8.

## CHAPTER IV

### INTERSERVICE RIVALRY

What prompted the current emphasis on joint operations? The most common blame for our ineffectiveness in joint operations has been interservice rivalry. To gain a better understanding of how this rivalry developed, it is necessary to take a brief look at previous Defense Department reorganization efforts.

Until after World War II there was little interservice competition. There were only two services, the Army and Navy, controlled by separate departments, the War and Navy Departments. As a result, the political success or failure of one service had little implication on the other. There were separate appropriations subcommittees that provided their funds in separate supply bills.<sup>1</sup>

As a result of lessons learned from the war, there was a mandate for reorganization of the military by the President and Congress. It was during the heated, extensive debates that followed that the Army and Navy faced off with differing philosophies. The Army was in favor of greater centralization of control with a single department, secretary, and military budget. They wanted to maintain the JCS but under a single Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. They were in favor of a separate Air Force but

wanted the Navy's aviation function curtailed, and the size and function of the Marine Corps limited. Not surprising, the Navy wanted less centralized control by maintaining the JCS and separate Cabinet-level secretaries for each service who would participate in budget preparation. They opposed a single department of defense and a Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces who would dominate preparation of a single unified budget.<sup>2</sup>


The resulting National Security Act of 1947 was a compromise. It established a single Department of Defense and Secretary of Defense, but circumscribed his authorities sharply. It established the Air Force as a separate service. However, it rejected the concept of a single military man superior to all others in uniform. It assigned the JCS a clear mandate and authority to meet and fulfill the professional warring functions of the National Military Establishment.<sup>3</sup>

Interservice rivalry had begun and a unified defense organization meant competition over organizational position, strategic doctrine and funds. Each service scrambled to define a suitable role for itself before postwar relationships jelled into enduring form.<sup>4</sup> The process continues today with the addition of the Marine Corps as the fourth full-fledged member.

Does this interservice rivalry result in stifling argument, petty parochialism or healthy debate?

Disagreements are bound to develop among four such diverse organizations whose missions often overlap. Colonel Thomas A. Cardwell III has developed a model based on the orientation of each service which helps to explain how many of these debates arise. Most issues in the joint arena can be categorized as strategy, tactics, or organizational issues.<sup>5</sup> (See Figure 2).

Figure 2: Basis for issues between services: perceptions of functions, roles, and missions



On strategy issues the medium (land or sea) tends to orient the services. This results in the Air Force usually agreeing with the Army, and the Marines siding with the Navy. This is perhaps because the strategy of the Air Force most closely relates to continental strategy and the Marines with their amphibious capability fall within maritime strategy.

On tactics or force employment issues the Navy and Air Force, whose focus are on the delivery of fire power, tend

to agree. While the similar terrain warfighting skills of the Army and Marines breed similar attitudes.<sup>6</sup>

Cardwell states that in organizational issues the "owners of the primary mediums", land and sea, tend to side together. This makes sense for a number of reasons. First and foremost, the Army and Navy have the historical precedence of being the original services and therefore had direct influence on present organizational design. Additionally, these two services hold practically all of the unified command positions, particularly those of the regional unified commands. These commands have been assigned primarily upon the preponderance of land or water in the regional area. As a result the Army commands the European (EUCOM) and Southern (SOPCOM) Commands while the Navy holds the Atlantic (LANTCOM) and Pacific (PACOM) Commands.

As a model, it obviously will not apply to all situations but it does seem to explain how some issues arise. Its value may be in making us analyze our disagreements. This process alone, often forces us to rise above petty parochialism.

There are three possible outcomes to the resolution of any joint issue: take no action, resolve it in favor of one position, or reach a compromise.<sup>7</sup> Historically the Joint Chiefs have relied upon compromise in most situations. This technique has been criticized as a way of skirting tough



decisions and leading to watered down results. Undoubtedly this may be true in some cases, but there is another side to the coin. The resolution of joint issues provides a healthy forum for airing different views based on the expertise of each service. There is encouraging evidence that more and more of these issues are being resolved based on the collective wisdom of all the services, and not just one.

Interservice rivalry continues to be a fact of life in the joint arena today. This is not necessarily detrimental to jointness. No one service is more guilty than the others of contributing to this rivalry. What is important is that the services realize that it will occur and that it can disrupt our effectiveness unless we approach interservice issues in a mature, open-minded manner.

#### ENDNOTES

1. Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in International Politics, 1963, p. 371.

2. Victor H. Krulak, Organization For National Security, A Study, 1983, pp. 38-39.

3. Ibid., p. 47.

4. Huntington, p. 371.

5. Thomas A. Cardwell III, "How Interservice Issues Arise", Air University Review, May-June 1986, p. 78.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., p. 80.

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSIONS

If we consider the aggregate of the areas covered some conclusions can be drawn with regards to the Navy's participation in the joint arena. The Navy has developed a distinct personality, set of attitudes and style of operating. This in itself is not unique because this process occurs in any organization. The people within any organization acquire a mind set similar to that of the collective group. As members they also carry along certain characteristics which are based on the reputation of the organization.

By examining the people, the organization and its mission, we gain a better understanding of the Navy and why it operates as it does. Realizing the importance they place on independence is a key to understanding their mind set. Ships go to sea for lengthy periods practically as self-sufficient units. Even when sailing in battle groups, each ship remains an autonomous unit. As terrestrial beings, sailors are placed at sea in a foreign environment, isolated from both those they love and much of the rest of the Navy. The success or failure of their mission is often times solely dependent upon how well they do their job. It is no wonder they develop a strong sense of independence.

This is not to say that the Navy thinks it should or could go it alone. However, the Navy is the only service that has a formidable component in all three functional areas; sea, air and land (the Marines), and these are forward deployed in crisis areas worldwide. They are less dependent on others than any of the services. All of these reasons tend to justify and reinforce the Navy's independent style to its members.

As we've seen, along with independence comes an emphasis on operations over staff functions. This attitude towards staff duty is another important part of the Navy mind-set. It is interesting to note that the Navy's title for their most senior officer is Chief of Naval Operations as opposed to the Chief of Staff of the Army or Air Force. However, the Navy has come to realize that besides meeting the letter of the law, surviving in the joint arena today, makes it absolutely necessary that those representing the service be of top quality and receive the requisite PME. This trend must continue and in the process the Navy's mind-set towards staff duty will gradually become more positive.

On the issue of naval warfare, there are certain characteristics that make it unique. Does this mean that only naval officers can command naval forces and that the Navy should therefore be left to go it alone? No. As was pointed out earlier, the strategic importance of naval

warfare can only be how it influences the political end results ashore. The importance then is to most effectively integrate naval warfare with air and land warfare so as to gain synergistic effects.

Truly joint operations can only be accomplished when the unified commanders, regardless of service affiliation, are aware that each service brings with it certain unique qualities and capabilities. Through PME and joint duty our senior leaders gain this essential knowledge. This does not make them an expert able to run the entire battle. We will only be successful on the battlefield if these unified commanders learn to take full advantage of the expertise of each component commander synergistically.

Is the Navy a team player in the joint arena today? Yes. However, for the reasons that were covered in this paper, the Navy probably had the farthest distance to go to get to this point. True "jointness" is absolutely essential to the success of our military and ultimately, the country. We have made significant progress towards this goal but have yet to reach it completely. The secret to this goal is a two way street. The Navy must get more on board with the spirit and intent of jointness. It must learn about the unique qualities and capabilities of the other services and take advantage of them to better accomplish our mission. Likewise, the other services must gain an appreciation for the Navy's unique qualities and capabilities. Most

importantly though, we all must realize that each service brings with it certain attitudes that makes it unique. Whether you call it style, personality or mind-set, until we take this important aspect of each service into account, we will never be truly "joint".

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