ALTERNATIVE BASING LOCATIONS
FOR U.S. FORCES
DEPLOYED IN THE PHILIPPINES

BY
LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAROLD W. FULLER

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29 MARCH 1989

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The United States military bases in the Philippines are ideally located to support U.S. forward deployed forces in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Unfortunately, the presence of U.S. bases in the Philippines is so controversial among the Filipino people, that the initial basing agreement has been renegotiated and will expire in 1991. If the anti-American elements continue to prevail, chances are great that the U.S./Philippine military bases agreement will not be renewed. This study identifies the United States and Soviet
ABSTRACT Block 20 continued

Union's national interests in the Pacific area. It lists the military forces deployed in the region and how they are supported by U.S. and Soviet bases. The focus narrows to examine the U.S. bases in the Philippines and alternatives to provide continuous support for U.S. forces. To determine the most viable option, the evaluation process is reduced to comparing each of the option's abilities to support the eight missions required of the U.S. forward deployed forces in the event that Soviet forces are stationed in Cam Ranh Bay. The operational range of current weapon systems is such a significant factor that it is used as the common denominator to illustrate the effectiveness and support the selection of the recommended option.
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ABSTRACT

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The United States military bases in the Philippines are ideally located to support U.S. forward deployed forces in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Unfortunately, the presence of U.S. bases in the Philippines is so controversial among the Filipino people, that the initial basing agreement has been re-negotiated and will expire in 1991. If the anti-American elements continue to prevail, chances are great that the U.S./Philippine military bases agreement will not be renewed. This study identifies the United States and Soviet Union’s national interests in the Pacific area. It lists the military forces deployed in the region and how they are supported by U.S. and Soviet bases. The focus narrows to examine the U.S. bases in the Philippines and alternatives to provide continuous support for U.S. forces. To determine the most viable option, the evaluation process is reduced to comparing each of the option’s abilities to support the eight missions required of the U.S. forward deployed forces in the event that Soviet forces are stationed in Cam Ranh Bay. The operational range of current weapon systems is such a significant factor that it is used as the common denominator to illustrate the effectiveness and support the selection of the recommended option.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The United States has been involved with the development of the Philippine Islands since defeating Spain in 1898. The U.S./Philippine relationship started with a period of resentment but bonded strongly through mutual support prior to World War II. The Japanese invasion of the Philippine Islands during World War II created such a strong U.S. commitment to reestablish a democratic government for the Filipino people, that it influenced the strategies for the invasion of Japan.

Since World War II, the U.S. support for democratic government of the Philippines has developed into a much broader plan for promoting peace in the Pacific region. Treaties establishing mutual support agreements between the United States and the Philippines were signed. Bilateral agreements were expanded to provide long-term military basing rights permitting U.S. forces to be stationed in the Philippines archipelago.

The significance of the Pacific region to the economic development and security of the United States is reflected in its national interest and Pacific defense policy. The United States developed alliances to assist in mutual defense and maintaining harmony and peaceful coexistence in the Pacific region. It realized economic revitalization and development of
stable governments were essential to promoting peace and stability of the region. The economic aid to Japan and other countries after World War II was a small but significant U.S. contribution to the economic growth witnessed in the Pacific region.

The United States has not been alone in recognizing the value of this area. The Soviet Union and People's Republic of China both have supported expansion of communist ideology into the peninsula of Korea and South East Asia.

The continued economic growth and development of the countries in the area have been the best weapons to repel communist expansion. The Soviets have recognized the economic and political potential of this area and have developed techniques to use diplomacy and commerce to expand their influence in the region.

Soviet naval forces have significantly expanded their operations in the Pacific and Indian Oceans in the past few years. They developed Cam Ranh Bay as a Soviet forward naval base to enhance their operational capabilities in the area. The increased number of Soviet forces combined with Soviet economic influence attained by developing fishing agreements with some Pacific small island governments have increased the political acceptance and the expansion of communist doctrine. While overtly it seeks friendship and economic cooperation, the
United States must assume Soviet long-term goals of communist expansion will directly challenge the United States' interest in the Pacific region.

The economic development ongoing in the Pacific region, China, and Asia will surpass quickly that of the European continent. This continuous economic growth will depend heavily on the open sea lanes that support the flow of oil, raw materials, and finished products to the market. Most countries in the area depend on U.S. forward deployed forces to ensure critical sea lanes of communication remain open.

Most of the Pacific region states are Western oriented or have established favorable relations with the United States. Economic development of Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea, as example, of trade partners and allies of the United States have influenced other governments to seek Western technology and industrial development.

The United States has maintained forward positioned forces west of Hawaii since before World War II. The United States' national interests in the area have required U.S. commitment in three major conflicts: World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam conflict.
U.S. bases in the Philippines were developed primarily to support forward deployed forces. After withdrawing from Vietnam, the United States Pacific, Southwest Asia, and Mid-East policies have relied heavily on operational forces and the services provided by Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines.

The popularity of the United States bases presence in the Philippines began to deteriorate in the 1980's. U.S. support for President Marcos' government was blamed by many Filipinos for his ability to retain power without the support of the majority of the Filipino people. The Marcos government was blamed for a substantial increase in the cost of living and the decline of job opportunities. The national economy of the country was severely damaged by two large successive increases in the world price of oil. The continued decline in the profits from Philippine exports in the world market throughout the 1970's and early 1980's required the Philippines to export twice the amount of products as they did in 1972 to purchase the same amount of imports. This, plus Marcos' approach to handling internal problems, resulted in a significant deterioration of the people's support for the Marcos government.

The U.S. bases in the Philippines, becoming less popular, still provided the country with its most stabilizing source of employment in the region. The United States was required to
make a decision whether to continue its support for President Marcos, or support the desires of the Filipino people for government reforms. After the contested presidential election in 1986, the issue was resolved by the U.S. assisting President Marcos' exile to Hawaii and recognizing Mrs. Corazon Aquino as the duly elected president of the Philippines.

The current military basing agreement between the United States and the Philippines expires in 1991. The possibility of renewing that agreement has become the concern of both countries, other nations of the Pacific region, and of Asia. The services provided by those U.S. bases are essential to accomplish U.S. military missions in the Pacific Ocean, Indian Ocean, and Southeast Asia regions.²

There are several options available to support the national interest of the United States. Alternate base locations for forward deployed forces must be identified. The evaluation of our Pacific policy and the reevaluation of the United States strategic policy, as directed by President Bush in his speech to the Congress on 9 February 1989, could refocus the United States' effort in the Pacific region.
HYPOTHESES

The United States operational forces located in the Philippines are strategically located in the region to monitor critical sea lanes and promote the United States national interest in the Asia, Pacific, and Indian Ocean areas.

The United States has developed policies and treaties for mutual support that include the application of all elements of national power. This includes U.S. military forces being employed to protect the United States and its allies' interests in the Pacific region.

The national interest of the Soviet Union, especially the expansion of communism, remains constant regardless of the techniques used to gain access and influence in existing governments.

The facilities evacuated in the Philippines would be converted to support other than military forces, and the Philippines will remain a treaty ally with the United States.

The implications of the bilateral reduction of U.S. and Soviet forces in the Pacific region called for by Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's speech at Vladivostok, in
July 1986, was directed at eliminating only the Soviet's small port facility at Cam Ranh Bay, without an overall reduction of Soviet naval forces in the Pacific.
The author contends that the very real possibility of the United States losing its Philippine bases during the next decade exists and that alternative and viable, albeit expensive, alternative bases can be developed.
Missions of Forward Deployed Forces

This study will be concerned with only the projection of military power from forward deployed forces west of Hawaii. It includes the application of land, sea, and air forces performing the full range of their combat, combat support, and combat service support missions.

The primary missions that can be accomplished by U.S. forces from the Philippines bases are:

- Provide surveillance of critical sea lanes of communication in the Pacific;
- Stationing of operational forces as a deterrence;
- Provide reaction forces to conflict in the Pacific, South West Asia, and Indian Ocean areas;
- Support U.S. operations in the Pacific Ocean;
- Support U.S. operations in the Indian Ocean;
- Support U.S. operations in South West Asia;
- Support U.S. operations in the Persian Gulf;
- Support U.S. allies and treaty commitments in the region;
- Provide the capability to launch a strike against Soviet bases.
Since the United States has other treaties with the Philippines this study will examine the amount of revenue that will be removed from that economy when, and if, the U.S. facilities and contractual support are removed from the Philippines.

Methodology

The study will evaluate each redeployment option against the capabilities currently available at the United States operational forces bases located in the Philippines. It will focus on the capabilities of these bases to provide the housing, storing, parking, berthing, and servicing of the operational forces. In addition, it will evaluate the current capability for expansion of operations to meet demands of increased forces in the Middle East.

Limitations of Study

The study will not compare the construction costs of each option. It will compare the relative cost of each option based on what facilities are already available at the location selected as an option for redeployment.
ENDNOTES


CHAPTER II

SOVIET THREAT IN THE PACIFIC

Soviet Pacific Policy

Soviet strategy towards the Asian-Pacific basin states from part of a global strategy characterized by several broad objectives:

- to enhance the security of the USSR by developing a network of buffer states along its borders;
- to decouple, politically and militarily, the United States from its allies and friends in the region;
- to extend Soviet influence over strategically important Third World States; and
- to extend Soviet influence far into the Asian-Pacific basin region.¹

This strategy concerns the modernization and expansion of Soviet military power as the basis for a carrot-stick diplomacy in the region. As has been suggested elsewhere, "it can be correctly asserted that in some instances, and particularly in northeast Asia, the Soviet Union is substituting (military) power for political weakness."²

By virtue of its location, the Soviet Union has always had interest in the Asian-Pacific area. By developing competing capabilities, the Soviets have pursued their interest in a variety of ways. In July 1986, General Secretary Mikhail
Gorbachev delivered a speech in Vladivostak that signaled a Soviet decision to aggressively pursue commercial diplomatic and political ties with the nations of East Asia and the Pacific.³

In that speech, an appeal was made to the Japanese and others to join the Soviets in economic and political development of the region. The speech also had an open proposition to the United States for U.S. withdrawal from bases in the Philippines; the Soviets would give up some bases in the Pacific.⁴

This new Soviet diplomatic approach coupled with the lack of appeal in their economic blandishments is not obvious in their Asian policies which still appear disproportionately power oriented. They include:

- The development of Siberia’s natural resources and establishment of its East Asian territories as a power base from to project force into Northeast Asia and the North and West Pacific.

- The establishment of a strong naval presence in East Asia to control the vital straits near Japan and Korea and to project and protect that presence in the Sea of Okhotsk and Sea of Japan.

- Hopes for neutralizing Japan politically.
Using its Pacific fleet to intimidate Japan by threatening its SLOCs, the Soviets hope to achieve a more accommodating government in Tokyo and to drive a wedge between Japan and the United States.

- The isolation, encirclement, and containment of China while keeping it from becoming a dangerous adversary in the course of its modernization. Alternatively, the Gorbachev regime could follow a more positive policy towards the PRC in the hope of causing it to delay military modernization.

- The creation of a new regional military presence in Southeast Asia through the mentorship of a pro-Soviet, Vietnam-led Indochina; at the same time, and contradictory to this, the prevention of security arrangements among ASEAN, the United States, Japan, and possibly even China. A strong Soviet naval presence in Southeast Asia would enable the Soviets to protect their own SLOCs and possibly threaten to interdict the Strait of Malacca and other strategic points in the region that lead into the Indian Ocean.

- The projection of a dual, though somewhat mutually contradictory, image of itself as both a revolutionary society and developmental model to the Third World and a formidable superpower dedicated to the orderly advancement of interstate relations and regional stability. While proclaiming peaceful intent, the Soviets continue their Asia military buildup, occupy one nation with armed force, and support an ally’s
military suppression of another. The net effect is hardly reassuring to those countries the Soviets hope to convince of their desires for regional tranquility.

At minimum, the Soviets are committed to achieving equality with the United States in Asia, which in practical terms means participation in all regional security issues.\textsuperscript{5}

\textbf{Treaties and Alliances}

The Soviet Union's ties to North Korea have steadily improved since 1984. The Soviets provide North Korea with MiG aircraft and air defense weapon systems. Combined naval exercises and port visits and cooperation in intelligence gathering have increased between the two countries. The Soviets have exercised over-flight routes over North Korea since 1986.

The Soviet Union has supported Vietnam's needs since 1954. The majority of the support has been provided since 1982. In return for this economic aid, the Soviets have developed Cam Ranh Bay into the largest Soviet naval base outside of the USSR.\textsuperscript{6} The Soviets have also provided Vietnam with airplanes, helicopters, frigates, mine sweepers, tanks and air defense missiles.
The Soviets have made progress in the South Pacific. In August 1985, Soviets signed a one-year accord with the island state of Koribati. Although this treaty was not renewed, in early 1987 the Soviets signed an agreement with Nanuatu that allowed them port access. The Soviets have also sought to exploit regional anti-nuclear sentiments by acceding to the protocols of the 1986 Treaty of Rarotonga, which established the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone.  

Soviet Bases in the Pacific

The main Soviet Pacific base is at Vladivostok, with other bases at Sovietskava, Garian, Magason and Petropavlovsk, the main base for submarines. Year-round operations at Vladivostok requires the use of ice breakers. This presents a problem for Soviet operations in the Pacific. In order for Soviet vessels to leave port and enter the Pacific, they have to pass through one or more of the three straits patrolled by Japan. The other Soviet ports in the Pacific established in North Korea and Vietnam have to be supplied by sea; therefore, are of limited value, even though they extend the range of Soviet naval activities in peacetime.

The Soviet Pacific Fleet is now the largest of the Soviet fleets, comprising 840 vessels. This includes two aircraft carriers, 15 cruisers, 14 destroyers, 21 frigates and 30 corvettes, as well as 136 smaller vessels and 96 mine countermine vessels.
Different sources provide varying figures for the number of submarines in the Pacific Fleet, ranging from a minimum of 77 to 126. The number of submarines armed with ballistic missiles is estimated to be somewhere between 25 to 31. Other nuclear forces include 171 SS-20's with a range of 3,000 miles, able to hit targets in China, Japan, and most of Southeast Asia.

The Soviets have a capability to support Pacific fleet operations with 1500 combat aircraft and 500 helicopters from Irkutsk. In addition, they have Backfire, Blinder and Badgers within quick response range to the Pacific area. The Soviet Navy has 120 bombers, 60 ASW aircraft, 20 maritime reconnaissance aircraft, and 100 ASW helicopters.8

The Soviets have made significant progress toward achieving their Pacific region goals. The increased military presence of Soviet forces coupled with diplomatic, political, and economic in-roads have enhanced Soviet acceptance and their potential to be a predominant influence in the region. Their expansion efforts have solidified long-range bilateral and multifaceted ties with China, North Korea, Vietnam, and Kampuchea. The undertaking of Soviet initiatives have increased its potential to force a wedge between the United States and its Pacific region alliances. This would create an anticipated void that the Soviets would quickly fill to further their efforts to control the vital sea lanes of communication.
This would provide the Soviets the bargaining power to extract from Japan and other industrialized countries the technology needed to modernize the Soviet’s industrial base.
ENDNOTES


CHAPTER III
U.S INTERESTS IN THE PACIFIC

U.S. Pacific Policy

The United States faces formidable challenges in protecting its national interests in the broad region of the Pacific. The defense policy must insure that regional peace continues. The foundation of the U.S. policy was outlined by Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger as: the key importance of U.S. security relationship with Japan; the U.S. commitment to stability on the Korean peninsula; continued U.S. effort to build an enduring relationship with the People’s Republic of China; support for the political and economical vitality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; and maintaining our long-term partnership with Australia and New Zealand.¹

Secretary of State, George P. Shultz, discussed the role that the United States has played in the Asia Pacific region. He believes that responsible leadership has come to the surface in Asia and the Pacific countries. The result is that our relations with most nations of the region are strong and getting stronger. If there is a symbol of the dramatic change that has marked the region in recent years, and of the benefits that such development can bring to everyone, it is perhaps
China's emerging role as a constructive force. Secretary of State Shultz outlines the U.S. position for further successes in the Pacific region as:

- There is a need for global, not merely a regional, view.
- Despite great diversity, a growing community of interest is apparent in the Pacific region.
- The extension of economical and political freedom is of essential importance to the region's future.
- The United States has both a vital interest and a unique and critical role to play in the area.

There are no broad regional institutions like NATO and the European Communities to provide a framework for regional cooperation. Despite enormous diversity, the nations of the region are increasingly cooperative with one another. This new and encouraging pattern is driven by two factors:

- The immense stake that they have in continued economic growth and a open world economy.
- A clear-eyed perception of the military threat posed by the forces of the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and North Korea.\textsuperscript{2}

The proximity of the Soviet threat to the United States allies requires a Pacific defense strategy based on the twin pillars of forward deployed forces and strong alliances.
The strong forward deployed forces will deter aggression and coercion; increase the United States' ability to respond effectively and quickly in the event of conflict; reassure United States' allies of its commitment to a common security by assisting them in resisting intimidation and encouraging them to sustain their full contribution to alliance security; discourage regional instabilities; and provide a more stable international environment for construction diplomacy.\(^3\)

The United States forces in the Pacific consist of almost half the U.S. Navy, two-thirds of U.S. Marine Corps operational force, two U.S. Army divisions and five Air Force wings.\(^4\) This is a substantial military force, but would still require the support of all the U.S. Pacific allies' military strength to ensure regional stability.

Treaties and Alliances

The second pillar of U.S. Pacific defense strategy depends on mutual support of its friends and allies. Military cooperation provided by the U.S. Pacific allies is essential to the security of the region. Pacific Basin alliances that have directly affected the mutual support of the U.S. and Pacific countries include:

- Multilateral treaties such as the Manila Pact of 1954 (which spawned the now-defunct Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, but which still provides a basis for U.S.
military assistance to Thailand and the Philippines) and the Australia/New Zealand/United States (ANZUS) Treaty which has existed since 1952.

- Loose multilateral consultative arrangements such as the Five-Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA) among Malaysia, Singapore, Britain, Australia and New Zealand, which replaced the formal defense guarantee known as the Anglo-Malaysian Defense Agreement in 1971.


- In addition to the above systems, which link local states to external powers, there are unobtrusive border security pacts which are oriented primarily towards localized threats. Such pacts exist between Malaysia and Thailand and between Malaysia and Indonesia.5

The security treaty with Japan is the foundation of U.S. defense policy in the Pacific. The U.S. nuclear umbrella and defensive shield, combined with Japan’s commitment to defend its territory, air space, and vital sea lanes of communication out to 1,000 miles, makes the prospect of Soviet Pacific operations risky and complicated.
The United States and Thailand treaty establishes the commitment for Thailand’s independence, stability and territorial integrity. It is crucial to peace and security in Southeast Asia. Under the terms of the treaty the United States supports Thailand with a broad range of programs to modernize and improve the Royal Thai Armed Forces, to include participation in combined exercises. The United States is obligated to provide military equipment and training under the security assistance program, and prepositioning of war reserve stockpiles. In addition, modest aid to the resistance force fighting communist forces in Cambodia.

The United States and the Republic of Korea developed a mutual defense treaty in 1954. Its primary function was to insure the security of South Korea from its unfriendly North Korean neighbor. The positioning of U.S. air and ground forces in South Korea have played a key role in preserving peace. If the deterrence was to fail the U.S. forces would be engaged immediately alongside Republic of Korea forces and a combined U.S./allied command.

United States support under the terms of this treaty has permitted the Republic of Korea armed forces to undergo a significant modernization program. Its Army ranks seventh in the world in number of soldiers on active duty. In only a few decades, the Republic of Korea forces have evolved into a
self-confident, effective military force capable of assuming an increasingly large share of the burden for security of the peninsula and Pacific region.

The United States will continue to emphasize interoperability of U.S. and Republic of Korea forces. The U.S. expects to remain Korea's prime source of military technology, so that major weapons, communications, transportation and logistics systems remain compatible.\textsuperscript{6}

The United States and the Philippines - Our security relationship with the Philippines predates both NATO and our regional alliances. The contemporary basis for our close military relations is found in our Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 and Military Bases Agreement of 1947. Our alliance is grounded in a common recognition that the security of the Philippines, which sits astride vital sea lanes, strongly influences peace and stability in the entire East Asia and Pacific region. The presence of U.S. forces at Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base constitutes our military contribution toward preserving our common interests of peace and security. Our security assistance program -- an FY 1988 request of $110 million in military grant aid and $2.6 million in military training grants -- is designed to assist the Philippine armed forces in meeting their alliance responsibilities by equipping and training them to protect the nation, and by enhancing their military professionalism. Our current efforts are focused on
providing the equipment needed by the Philippine armed forces to combat the current communist insurgency that threatens the democratic gains of the February 1986 revolution.\textsuperscript{7}

The United States and Australia and New Zealand - The regional stability provided by the ANZUS Treaty now rests on the close security cooperation existing between Australia and the United States. In 1987 the enactment of legislation transformed into law the New Zealand government's policy preventing normal patterns of alliance cooperation. The United States has confirmed that our ANZUS security obligations to New Zealand remain suspended pending adequate corrective measures. The strength of the alliance relationship between Australia and the United States is reflected in our continuing active defense cooperation.\textsuperscript{8}

The United States and China - Our developing defense relationship with China is based on common security interests. A secure, modernizing China can be a force for peace and stability in East Asia and the world. Recognizing that China is a friend, the United States has sought to play a positive role in China's defense modernization. We will continue to pursue high-level meetings, functional military exchanges, and military technological cooperation in areas that are of mutual interest to China and the United States. In doing so, we also will take into account the interests of other friends and allies in the region.\textsuperscript{9}
interest to China and the United States. In doing so, we also will take into account the interests of other friends and allies in the region."
ENDNOTES


7. Ibid., p. 85.

8. Ibid., p. 85.

9. Ibid., p. 85.
CHAPTER IV
U.S. BASES IN THE PHILIPPINES

Missions

The major U.S. facilities in the Philippines are Subic Bay Naval Station, Cubic Point Air Station, and Clark Air Force Base. In addition, there are smaller support facilities: John Hay Air Station near Baguio City, the Naval Radio Station at Copas, the U.S. Naval Communications Station at San Miguel and Wallace Air Station at Para Point.

The missions assigned to the Thirteenth Air Force and the Seventh Fleet, United States Forces based in the Philippines are complex. They are the quick-reaction forces designed to protect U.S. security interests in the West Pacific. They are to react to threats to the United States and to its treaty allies in either a general or local conflict involving either a major or regional power.

The U.S. forces are designed to provide a credible deterrent against the expansion capabilities of the Soviet Union, a fighting force in the event of general conflict and both a deterrent to local conflict and, should deterrence fail, an influential fighting force. The presence of U.S. forces complicates the aggressive actions of any element in the region. The U.S. forces as a military power in the area with
no immediate interest in most local disputes, it can effectively serve as a mediator to reduce the probability of increased violence.

The geostrategic locations of the Philippine bases allows the forces stationed there to easily conduct surveillance of the three strategic straits along the sea lanes between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Approximately 50 percent of Asia's oil supplies and 80 percent of its strategic materials transit the Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok Straits.

In the event of hostility in the Western Pacific or Southeast Asia, U.S. forces have combat ready aircraft that would be activated by an array of major satellite intelligence, radio communications and active defense alert systems to suppress enemy forces attempting to close the vital sea and air lanes in the Pacific region. These forces would also be able to assist in controlling the Soviet's resupply routes from Siberia through the Pacific to the Indian Ocean. This is a very important mission, especially during the ice season.

Capabilities

These U.S. bases in the Philippines were expanded during the Vietnam conflict to provide support for the large number of forces in Southeast Asia. Since the end of the conflict, the bases have continued to function as logistical hubs for
operations in the Pacific region, with a capacity to surge for operations in Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf.

The modern aircraft maintenance facilities at Clark provide the major aircraft maintenance for all U.S. forces in the western Pacific. Its major runway is 10,500 feet long and can accommodate our larger transport aircraft, including the C-5 Galaxy. It has a 200,000 cubic foot ammunition storage capacity, a 3 million square foot supply storage space, and 25 million gallons of fuel storage capacity. Clark maintains the Crow Valley Weapons Range, the only instrumented tactical training range west of California. In addition, the close proximity and supply handling facilities of Clark and the Subic Naval Station provides the United States with an excellent transfer point between airlift transportation systems and sealift.

The capabilities of the Subic Bay complex will include the Subic Bay Naval Station, Ship Repair Facility, Naval Air Station at Cubic Point, and the Naval Communications Station at San Miguel. This complex is primarily a repair and supply center. It has the capacity to support combat operations of several carrier battle groups and provide logistic back-up support for operations in the Indian Ocean.
The facilities of Subic Bay consist of 1.75 million square feet of storage space, 110 million gallon storage for liquid fuel and lubricants, and ammunition storage for 46,000 tons. The repair facility is 800,000 square feet enclosed by three wharfs, providing lift support by both floating and portal cranes. It includes four floating dry docks that can handle vessels up to 54,000 tons displacement. It currently provides 60 percent of all repairs and services for the Seventh Fleet.4

Cubic Point is capable of supporting both land and sea based aircraft. It is equipped with all complete systems to support all aspects of flight operations. It can support the supply operation for airlift to aircraft carriers at sea.5

Wallace Air Station provides training support for the Air Force and naval air by operating a live-fire range that extends over Philippine territorial waters into the South China Sea basin. It also supports tactical air training and delivery air-to-air services as necessary. They provide for launch and control of target drones and remotely piloted vehicles used in the Pacific Air Forces’ weapon systems evaluation programs.

The last U.S. base in the Philippines is John Hay Air Station. It provides rest and recreation facilities maintained by the U.S. Air Force for all U.S. personnel in the U.S. and Philippine military services. The camp also provides facilities for a Voice of America radio transmitter complex.
U.S. Forces at Philippine Bases

Air Force - 9300 personnel

1 Air Force HQ
1 Air Div, 48 Combat Aircraft
1 Wing: 2 fighter squadrons
1 with F4E
1 with F4E/G
1 special operation squadron
MAC with 4 MC-130E
1 tactical transportation wing
with 16 C-130
1 SAR squadron (MAC)
with 5 C/HH-3
1 training group
with 15 F5E, T-33, T39A

Navy - 5900 personnel
1 ship home-ported

Marines - 1200 personnel
1 MEU deployed intermittently
ENDNOTES


CHAPTER V

ALTERNATIVES TO U.S. BASES IN THE PHILIPPINES
AND ANALYSIS OF THOSE ALTERNATIVES

ALTERNATIVES

This section will focus on options available to maintain operational forces forward deployed west of Hawaii. The primary options not mutually exclusive are:

- Move to other existing U.S. bases in the Pacific.
- Build new bases on property leased in the Marianas and Micronesia.
- Negotiate with one or more new host nations for permission to establish U.S. bases on their territories.

Each option or combination of options will be evaluated based on its ability to provide the operational and logistical support for U.S. forces.

The primary consideration of each alternative is the geostrategic location. The range of the U.S. air and naval weapon systems impose a significant limitation on the forward deployed forces' ability to accomplish the eight basic functions critical to achieving the U.S. national goals.
ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES

Move to Existing U.S. Bases

Evaluation of the alternatives will compare the option's capability for operational and logistical support for U.S. commitments to Northeast Asia, Pacific Ocean, Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf.

The United States has operational facilities in the Pacific west of Hawaii to which the Philippine base functions could be added. These bases are in Japan, Okinawa and Guam. No one area can absorb the total services provided by the Philippine bases. The fleet service and maintenance function could be transferred to Yokosuka, Japan. These services were accomplished there prior to the expansion of Subic during the Vietnam conflict. The facilities at Yokosuka are adequate and actually surpass Subic's capability to bring a carrier into drydock. Yokosuka already has the capability to service and berth the large U.S. multi-purpose aircraft.

Yokosuka does not have the capability to remove aircraft from the carrier for station repair. The liquid storage facilities for fuel and lubricants are larger at Yokosuka; however, the operational cost and labor cost are significantly higher in Japan than in the Philippines.¹
Guam could accommodate part of the naval operations from Subic. The width and depth of the harbor would not handle the large cruisers and aircraft carriers that require more than 37 foot drafts. The supply storage is large and adequate to handle the support requirements for the Seventh Fleet.\textsuperscript{2} Agana Naval Air Station can accommodate an entire carrier air group. The new ammunition pier at Apra Harbor could support the Seventh Fleet's Ordnance requirement.

Relocating the U.S. Air Force and the services provided by Clark to U.S. facilities at Japan, Okinawa and Guam will require expansion of these facilities.

Guam has 4200 Air Force personnel already stationed there. It has one bomber wing with one squadron of B52 and one wing of KC 135 tankers.

Japan has 16,200 Air Force personnel with two tactical wings, one squadron AWACs, 1 transportation group, one tanker wing and ancillary support aircraft.

Okinawa supports one Marine MEF of 38,000 Marines.\textsuperscript{3} The U.S. facilities at Japan, Okinawa, and Guam could absorb the logistical support for the Seventh Fleet.
Moving the Air Force elements from Clark would require expansion of facilities at U.S. air bases at Japan, Okinawa, and Guam.

The geographical location would significantly increase the U.S. reaction time to the critical straits between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The U.S. bases in Japan and Guam are 1200 miles farther than the bases in the Philippines from the strategic choke points between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf. Obviously, additional forces would have to be allocated in order to accomplish the operational missions.

The 1500 nautical mile operational radius from U.S. and Soviet bases in the Philippines. The Option 1 maps indicate the significance of the U.S. Philippine bases and how Option 1 will affect U.S. power projection. Map 1 reflects the current U.S. capabilities to control the critical straits, project power into the Indian Ocean and strike Soviet bases. Map 2 indicates the diminished land-based capabilities if U.S. base operations were relocated back to Guam, Japan, and Okinawa. Map 3 indicates the same situation as Map 2 with the Soviet forces removed from Cam Ranh Bay.
East Asia and Oceania
Build New Bases on Property Leased in the Marianas and Micronesia

The United States has already leased land for military bases on Siapan, Tinian, and Palau. The lease agreements permit U.S. forces to use the small port facilities on Siapan, and includes lease of 177 acres on Siapan and 18,000 acres on Tinian that could be developed to support U.S. forces. The harbor area at Palau could eventually host air strips that could be expanded to absorb the majority of the forces now based in the Philippines.4

Palau is about 600 miles east of the Philippines. If U.S. forces were relocated to Palau from the Philippines their combat effectiveness would be degraded, but not as much if they were moved all the way back to Guam and Japan. In order to retain the same capabilities in the South China Sea and Persian Gulf it will require more U.S. forces to be committed in the Pacific area.

The 1500 nautical mile operational radius from U.S. and Soviet bases is depicted on the Option 2 maps. Map 1 reflects the current status with forces in the Philippine bases, while Map 2 reflects the range of U.S. forces based in the Marianas and Micronesia compared to Soviet forces occupying Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam. Map 3 reflects operational potential if the Soviets pull out of Vietnam.
The relocation of the Philippine base supply and maintenance functions to the Marianaas and Micronesia would reduce the naval on station time in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf region. This could be offset by an increase in logistical capacity in order to provide fleet support commensurate with that available through Subic Bay. Traveling the additional 600 miles from Palau to any site in the South China Sea or beyond would complicate the U.S. forces' ability to augment its forward deployed forces quickly, or to sustain its combatants on station.

In addition to the need for more forces to compensate for the increased 600 miles travel time, overflight permission would be required from the Philippine government to permit U.S. air force to use the most direct and efficient flight path to conduct South China Sea operations.

Base construction in the Marianas and Micronesia would be difficult. The islands are small and provide no construction materials. All construction materials including the labor force would have to be imported. The island population is also inadequate to support the operative and maintenance labor requirement if the bases were constructed.
Negotiate with One or More New Host Nations for Permission to Establish U.S. Bases on Their Territory

The possibility of finding a host nation to support U.S. bases would be better with one of the U.S. treaty allies. The areas belonging to Japan were included in option one. The countries in closer proximity to the Philippines would be Indonesia and Malaysia. They both have favored non-alignment and neutralization. 4

Thailand has had a treaty with the United States for neutral support and defense against communist expansion from Vietnam. It has a past history of support for the United States and is concerned about the increased Soviet threat in the area. 5

Singapore, not a treaty ally but a good friend, is a good geographical location but is too small to provide all the facilities needed. The port facilities are small. Their air strips are limited by the small amount of space available. Singapore could only accommodate a small portion of the U.S. base operations now in the Philippines.

China and Taiwan are excellent geostrategical locations for U.S. bases. The Hainan Island and Taiwan would have secure lines of communication from U.S. bases in Okinawa, Guam, and Japan. These locations would significantly contribute to the
operational responsibilities of both air and naval forces for operations in the Pacific and Northeast Asia. It would also provide excellent location for operations against Soviet forces in Vietnam and Cambodia.

The removal of U.S. forces from Taiwan was a stipulation for enhanced U.S./China relations. It is considered unlikely that any U.S. forward deployed forces would be politically accepted on Taiwan.

U.S. relations with China have improved significantly the past decade but there is no indication that U.S. forces would ever be accepted on mainland China. The Hainan Island, a territory of China, might be considered for U.S. forward deployed forces. It would provide China with a friend near the troubled border between China and Vietnam. It would also require Vietnam to consider the close proximity of U.S. combat forces to their territory. This could relieve some Vietnam pressure from both China border and Kampuchea.

Option 3 is inclusive of all the base options in the immediate area of the South China Sea and the straits between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The Option 3 maps reflect relocation of U.S. bases to Thailand, Singapore, and Hainan Islands. These bases would be augmented by relocated Air Force units stationed in Australia.
Map 1 reflects the current situation with U.S. bases in the Philippines. Map 2 indicates the operational coverage provided if bases were relocated to Thailand with augmenting air forces in Australia. Map 3 reflects the same U.S. posture as Map 2 but the Soviet forces have moved from Cam Rahn Bay.

Map 4 reflects U.S. forces relocated to the Hainan Island with augmenting air force from bases in Australia. Map 5 indicates the same U.S. forces as Map 4, but removes the Soviet forces from Cam Rahn Bay.

Map 6 indicates the possibility of U.S. forces in Singapore will require air force from bases in Australia. Map 7 only removes the Soviet threat from Cam Rahn Bay.

The relocation of U.S. bases to any of these locations would require political negotiations and great economical expenditures by the United States.

Available space would limit the development of U.S. bases in Singapore and could only accept part of the Philippine base functions.
The map shows East Asia and Oceania. Notable locations include China, Japan, Indonesia, and Australia. The map highlights various countries and territories, including Japan, China, and Australia. The scale is 1:6,000,000.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid., p. 73.


5. Ibid., p. 80.
Option 1, move to existing U.S. bases, does not project adequate military power in the west Pacific and Indian Ocean to monitor and control, if necessary, the critical straits between the Pacific and Indian Ocean. The vital sea lanes of communication for U.S. and Pacific nations depend on uninterrupted navigation through these critical straits to sustain their economies.

Existing base facilities at Japan, Guam, and Okinawa are not adequate to accept all the forces and functions from the Philippine bases. This option would require construction to expand the bases and reshuffling of forces to insure forward deployed forces consist of the type and quantity to meet the mission demands.

Option 2, new bases on Siapan, Tinian, and Palau would not accommodate U.S. forces within the near future. Ground-up construction would require several years to complete. In addition to the base construction adequate facilities would have to be acquired or built to support the required imported labor force to sustain base operations.

Military power projection could be further limited by the Philippine government denying over-flight rights to U.S. air forces.
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Military power projection could be further limited by the Philippine government denying over-flight rights to U.S. air forces.
Construction costs would be large due to the requirement to import all construction material and the labor force required.

Option 3 negotiates with new host nations for permission to establish U.S. bases on their territory, provides U.S. forces with excellent positions to provide continuous operations in the Pacific and Indian Ocean. Bases in Thailand would reestablish U.S. forces in previously occupied areas. Facilities could be built around existing ports and air strips. The labor forces and construction materials are readily available to build and support U.S. bases.

Singapore is an excellent location, but could provide accommodations for only a small portion of the services currently provided by Philippine forces. Separation of the sea and air operations would significantly reduce the transportation support functions currently provided by Clark and Subic. The geostrategical location of bases in Singapore would be equal or possibly better than the bases' current location in the Philippines.

Base construction cost on Singapore would be great due to the high price of real estate. The total amount of space required to relocate U.S. bases could not be provided by the city nation of Singapore.
Hainan Island would be an excellent location to support U.S. Forward Deployed Forces. A long term base agreement with China would solidify the resolve for mutual cooperation in the Pacific and Asia. The Hainan Island as U.S. base location would allow China to maintain its position of no foreign troops on mainland China, reduce pressure on their Vietnam border, and enhance their relationship with the western world. Construction costs and the supply of labor could be negotiated with China as part of the base agreement.
All of the options will require significant expenditures. Only a comparison of the cost, to be determined, for continued use of the Philippine bases would permit a fair evaluation. Obviously, options 2 and 3 will cost more than option 1. There are some existing air strips and sea port facilities in option 3 that possibly could reduce cost below that of option 2.

Recommend option 3: U.S. negotiate with Thailand to build sea and air bases on their territory. U.S. bases in Thailand will increase slightly travel time between Japan, Guam, and these new bases but will still be within the limitation of current systems. These bases will provide adequate facilities for U.S. forces and deployed forces to continue the operational missions provided by current U.S. bases in the Philippines. The geostrategical location on territory of a U.S. ally, existing ports and air strips, and an adequate labor force to support construction and operation of the facilities are best in option 3.
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