ANALYZING SOVIET INTENTIONS: A SHORT GUIDE TO SOVIET MILITARY LITERATURE

James M. McConnell
**Analyzing Soviet Intentions: A Short Guide to Soviet Military Literature**

**Personal Author(s):**
James M. McConnell

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This research contribution lays out a methodology for interpreting the Soviet literature dealing with military affairs. The following aspects are covered: the subject matter that normally yields the best evidence of Soviet intentions; the theoretical disciplines involved with this subject matter and their relationship to official channels; the problem of determining the truthfulness and authoritativeness of Soviet statements; and the rules of analysis in coping with their literature.

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ANALYZING SOVIET INTENTIONS: A SHORT GUIDE TO SOVIET MILITARY LITERATURE

James M. McConnell

Naval Warfare Operations Division
FOREWORD

This Research Contribution is a slightly modified excerpt of a much larger interpretive work. It has been prepared as a ready, compact aid for readers of Soviet military writings. It describes techniques for extracting latent content that have proven to be notably effective. Through these techniques, analysis of open-source Soviet literature has yielded insights into the emergence of a pro-SSBN mission for the Soviet general-purpose force navy and a withholding strategy for Soviet SSBNs.

One of the keys to the full exploitation of Soviet literature is collegial exchange between practitioners. CNA would greatly value readers' comments, reactions, criticisms, and especially, reports of the practical application of these techniques.

This research contribution lays out a methodology for interpreting the Soviet literature dealing with military affairs. The following aspects are covered: the subject matter that normally yields the best evidence of Soviet intentions; the theoretical disciplines involved with this subject matter and their relationship to official channels; the problem of determining the truthfulness and authoritativeness of Soviet statements; and the rules of analysis in coping with their literature.
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ANALYZING SOVIET INTENTIONS:
A SHORT GUIDE TO SOVIET MILITARY LITERATURE

Introduction

At bottom, this is a work to promote the exploitation of Soviet open-source literature on military affairs, which is in a state of relative neglect. There is a saying in the community—only partly an exaggeration—that there are almost as many Western interpretations of Soviet military intentions as there are Western analysts. It could be argued that one primary explanation for the wide divergence in the findings of Western analysts is an equally wide divergence in the methodologies used for determining the content and authoritativeness of Soviet statements. Because analysts rarely make their methodological approaches explicit, decision makers have had no basis for selecting between competing interpretations, and have fallen back exclusively on the “hard data” produced by technical means of intelligence (which is often not all that “hard”). That is unfortunate. Soviet military literature is not only another source for Soviet intentions but sometimes the best and even the only source for certain aspects. In any event, it seems the earliest source.

Rather than present the usual substantive findings, therefore, this paper will try to make explicit the methodology behind substantive findings published by the author on other occasions. Success in reading the Russians depends heavily on an appreciation of the Soviet communication process; they are simply not straightforward in discussing their military options. They employ what might be dubbed a general “implicative” technique in which the writer implies and the reader is obliged to infer, becoming thereby an active participant in the communication process. There are two aspects to this: an obliqueness of subject matter and, superimposed on that, an obliqueness of treatment. We will examine these and other problems in the following order: the subject matter that seems the most fruitful in yielding evidence of Soviet intentions, the disciplines and sources that deal with this subject matter, how to determine the truth value and authoritativeness of Soviet statements, and some of the crucial “do’s and don’ts” of analysis.

Subject Matter

In the 1960s, the Soviets were reasonably frank in discussing their new, all-out nuclear option for coalition warfare. The frankness here contrasted sharply with their veiled discussions, even at the time, of non-coalition (local) war, and since the 1970s, obliqueness in doctrinal treatments has become the pervasive rule. In no instance have new options been directly announced; instead, selected aspects of military affairs have been discussed in such a way as to imply new options or the modification, downgrading, or abandonment of old ones.

That is our first order of business—to identify those categories of Soviet military thought that seem to offer the most promise for obliquely indicating Soviet options that are to be developed in the future or have reached (or are about to reach) the hardware-operational stage. For reasons of space as well as special salience, we will limit ourselves to Soviet views on the following subjects:

- The “correlation of war and policy” in the ongoing “revolution in military affairs” (approximate subject matter);
- “The character of war and its specifics” with respect to the scale of state participation in the war, its coalitional or non-coalitional character, the types of weapons used, the scope of combat action, the intensity of combat, its expected duration, and the political objectives of the opposing sides;
- The “methods of warfare”;
- The impact of these methods on certain “principles of the military art” (especially the principles of surprise, “economy of force” and “partial victory”);
- The “types and forms” of strategic action;
- The factors influencing the “course and outcome of war.”
The very first of these subject-matter categories, which comes within the competence of a "scientific" discipline referred to by the Russians as Marxist-Leninist Theory on War and the Army, is especially valuable for yielding evidence of long-range intentions for the development of options. The other five, which come within the jurisdiction of the military art (strategy, operational art, and tactics), the principal component of military science, are mainly valuable for yielding evidence of current options, i.e., options which have reached or are on the verge of reaching operational status.

There can be no doubt of the importance of these five latter categories to Soviet military strategy. According to one writer,

Military science studies the character and specifics of wars and the laws governing their course and outcome; it develops and formulates the principles governing military art and determines the most expedient methods of warfare in a given war. . . .

The only one of our military-scientific categories not mentioned in this quotation is that dealing with the "types and forms of strategic action," but there can be no doubt of its importance either. The Sokolovskiy-edited work on Military Strategy in the 1960s devoted thirty pages specifically to that subject, which it introduced with the statement: "It is possible to say without exaggeration that the development of effective methods of modern warfare depends on a decisive extent on a correct solution to the problem of the types of strategic action and the concrete form in which they appear."4

Disciplines

A word on the disciplines involved in this subject matter and their relation to official thinking. There are four spheres that go to make up Soviet "military thought": Marxist-Leninist Theory on War and the Army, military science, military policy, and military doctrine.5 The first two are considered to be "sciences"6 ("systems of knowledge")7 that deal theoretically with military affairs, with one (War and the Army) studying the military-policy aspects,8 and the other (military science) examining the purely military side ("the armed struggle").9 The other two spheres—military policy and military doctrine—are official, and hence are referred to as "systems of views," rather than systems of knowledge.10

War and the Army is a hybrid of the research efforts of civilian and military philosophers, historians and economists (occasionally even military scientists) preoccupied with the three components of Marxism-Leninism: dialectical and historical materialism (which provide the philosophical and sociological dimension), scientific communism (the socio-political aspect), and socialist political economy (the politico-economic aspect).11 It is of most interest to us, perhaps, when considering the following subjects: 1) war as a continuation and instrument of policy, and the return influence of war on policy, 2) the so-called "problem of war and peace," 3) the "social nature and types of wars," and 4) Leninist Theory on the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland, which governs "military development." War and the Army is said to furnish the ideological-theoretical and methodological foundation for all three of the other components of military thought.12 However, the main substantive impact of War and the Army is on military policy13 and on the socio-political side of military doctrine.14 Military science also makes "recommendations" directly to doctrine,15 but it affects the military-technical rather than the socio-political side of doctrine. The Soviets also tell us that military science can influence military policy, both directly and through doctrine.16

There are a number of misconceptions in the West about the official spheres that deal with military affairs. One view has it that military doctrine is the highest conceptual level in the hierarchy of Soviet military thought.17 This is incorrect; the highest level is occupied by military policy.18 The strategy that flows from and serves military policy—the so-called "military-policy (or military-political) strategy"—is said to be more or less equivalent to the U.S. concept of strategic doctrine, grand strategy, national-security strategy, etc.19 Soviet military policy is declared to be "an integral part of party policy," and is normally referred to as the military policy "of the Communist Party."20 on occasion it is also referred to as a policy "of party and state."21 The reason for this dual possession is not clear. It may be because military policy is formulated by the Party and executed by the state, or because it is normally promulgated in the form of joint decrees of Party and government.
On the other hand, military doctrine, which is subordinate to and flows from military policy, is always— I repeat, always— referred to as a military doctrine “of the state.” That is no doubt because it is formulated by the so-called “political and military (or military-policy) leadership of the state,” the traditional designation for the pre-war “defense councils” and “defense committees” that were models for the present-day USSR Defense Council0 chaired by Gorbachev. These pre-war bodies were state committees “attached to” (pri) the Council of Peoples Commissars (today the Council of Ministers), the central agency of government; the current USSR Defense Council is also a state committee, “formed,” however, by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the central agency of state. Thus, the Defense Council cannot be, as some believe, a “subcommittee of the Politburo”; no high-level party body would be formed by an organ of state.

Doctrine is said to be a “concrete expression” of military policy, which mediates between the latter and military strategy. Its socio-political side is basically derived from military policy, while its military-technical side is selected from the recommendations of military strategy. Doctrine performs this mediating function, however, only in peacetime and at the start of a war. In the course of the war, doctrine drops out and military policy and strategy confront each other directly.

Among other things, military policy and military doctrine differ in their time horizons. Whereas military (and military-technological) policy deals with current (one-year), mid-term (five-year) and long-term (10-15 or more year) defense tasks and requirements, doctrine is said to deal only with the “present” (apparently the period up to two years away) and the “near future” (defined as the period three to five years away). It does not deal with the “more remote future,” as military policy does. The five-year restriction on doctrine is apparently due to its synchronization with the five-year economic plans. The economic-plan orientation of doctrine was obliquely indicated by a 1959 military discussion, in which the meaning of the expression “near term,” normally five years away, was expanded to cover the period through 1965, i.e., the same period covered by the 1959-1965 seven-year plan. However, the main reason for associating doctrine with the Soviet planning penchant is not derived from anything the Russians say but from noticing the timing of doctrinal innovations, which tend to cluster at the beginning of the economic planning periods. It is sometimes late in the planning period before we see hardware deployments for an option; it is sometimes rather late before we see hardware testing. However, the Soviets usually begin discussing the option on the very eve of, or early in, the new planning period. The Defense Council will be aware of the weapons and equipment it has authorized for that plan and can decide on missions and direct the training of the armed forces accordingly.

The difference in time horizon between military policy and military doctrine might help explain why the first of our subject-matter categories—the correlation of war and policy—is fruitful for Soviet long-range intentions, while the other five categories—the character and specifics of war, the methods of waging war, the principles of the military art, the types and forms of strategic action, and the factors influencing the course and outcome of war—seem to reflect mid-term intentions only. The correlation of war and policy comes within the purview of War and the Army, which examines military-policy problems and has the same time horizon as military policy. The content of the other categories, however, is either specified in, or flows from, military doctrine.

To be sure, the problem is not quite that simple. These five latter categories are also dealt with by military science (military strategy specifically), which has no restrictions on its vision. Whereas military doctrine deals only with “the present” and “near future,” military science is said to be concerned with the “past,” the “present,” and the “future” as a whole, including the “more remote future” as well as the “near.” That is the case in theory, and I have no doubt of its being the case in fact, except that it cannot be demonstrated from Soviet literature for the subject-matter categories examined here. It is extremely rare to see these discussed by military strategists in a manner to point beyond the “near future.”

The explanation for this, in my opinion, lies in the existence of two phases to military science: a pre-doctrinal phase, in which military science pioneers more or less freely, paving the way for doctrine; and a post-doctrinal, in which military science takes its point of departure in doctrine and spins out its logic. Doctrine selects from the findings of the first phase,
casts its selections in the form of general principles, and returns them to military science for further elaboration. It is, overwhelmingly, the fruit of this further elaboration, limited to the time horizon of doctrine, that seems to get published, not the works of the pioneering phase, which are presumably circulated behind the scenes.

Truth Value and Authoritativeness

There are a number of problems with Soviet military statements that torture Western analysts. There is the problem of their truth value—what part is disinformation to deceive the West, what part is self-serving propaganda for domestic and foreign consumption, and what part constitutes the author’s real message to elites with a need to know. With respect to the latter, there is the further problem of whether the real message represents private views or official views.

Let us take the question of disinformation first. If this is defined as a statement which a sophisticated Soviet reader would declare to be an untruth, then there is probably little disinformation in the military literature. As Axelrod and Zimmerman have remarked about Soviet foreign policy statements:

It is important to bear in mind the distinction between a lie and a misleading statement. Soviet pronouncements are carefully written, and can be carefully analyzed. Their statements often encourage readers to draw misleading conclusions; but they are rarely lies. . . .

Whenever we have had a chance to compare open with Soviet-classified literature (the Penkovskiy Papers) or with restricted literature (the General Staff journal), we find no difference in thrust. Time and again Soviet statements have been subsequently confirmed in hardware, exercises and, in the particular case of their local-war doctrine, with actual Soviet military behavior in Third World conflicts. Moscow says what it means (in its own inimitable but still intelligible way), and it means what it says. There are certain propaganda conventions but, once understood, even these can prove analytically useful—a shortcut to Soviet intentions rather than a false sign to be ignored.

As for the official or unofficial character of real messages, perhaps we can approach it via the following breakdown.

Statements by the Political Leadership. With respect to our selected subject-matter categories, such statements usually relate to military policy and to War and the Army; only in the later Khrushchev era (1960-1964) did we see the political leadership speak directly on doctrine in any illuminating way. Western analysts of various persuasions have thought they discerned contradictions on occasion between political and military spokesmen, but in my opinion these seeming contradictions dissolve under close examination. In short, political pronouncements seem to settle the question for the open literature, at least as far as our subject matter is concerned.

Avowedly Doctrinal Statements. One sometimes encounters the view in the West, even among specialists, that Soviet military doctrine is formulated by and for military men and, as such, has only an educative and morale-building function, does not provide a fair representation of Soviet thought, and in any event, is too amorphous to be useful. However, the Soviets consistently stress the authoritative roots of doctrine and its obligatory character as a guide to action, while the Western point about its amorphousness seems overstated.

The problem is not with the authoritativeness or relevance of avowedly doctrinal statements, but with their rarity. In the 1960s, the Soviets openly, and often, tied their all-out nuclear option for coalition warfare to doctrine. However, beginning in the mid-1960s, when Moscow adopted the first of a series of limited options, statements explicitly labeled as doctrinal have been few and far between and, for the most part, not very enlightening on crucial points.

Concrete Expressions of Doctrine. Just as military doctrine is considered a “concrete expression of military policy,” so certain works of military science in its second phase are termed “concrete expressions of military doctrine.” According to the Soviets, this category not only includes statements on military affairs at Party congresses and other official forums, as
well as the official regulations and manuals of the armed forces, but also certain military-theoretical works that, as the Soviets say, "proceed" from doctrine and "validate" it, and which have been formally approved (one suspects by the strategic leadership of the armed forces or, more likely, by the General Staff, as the working organ of that leadership). Once approved, they are said to acquire the same "force of law" within the armed forces that doctrine has throughout the state.49

Although we know that concrete expressions of doctrine exist, I have never seen a published work specifically labeled as such. What I have seen are works obliquely indicated to be that by the use of what might be termed "doctrinal authenticators," i.e., the substitution, for an overt label, of pars pro toto definitions and descriptions of doctrine and concrete expressions of doctrine, the parts selected to represent the whole often being the least specific. This obliges the reader to keep in his memory a congeries of partial definitions of doctrine and its concrete expressions, insofar as they differ from the definitions and descriptions of military science proper, i.e., military science in its first, pre-doctrinal phase. Thus, instead of saying that a work expounds military doctrine, an editor or reviewer could say that it constitutes a "system of views" (the definition of anything official-military policy, military-technical policy, military doctrine, or its concrete expressions—as opposed to military science proper, which is defined as a "system of knowledge"). Further, an editor might justify the work as promoting a "unity of views" or "common views" (again, the function of official communications, in contrast to military science proper, which makes "recommendations" and is characterized by a "struggle of opinions"). Or an author might note that his prime interest is in "the present and near future" (the temporal focus of doctrine, as opposed to military science's preoccupation with "past, present, and future"). If a reviewer goes further and says that the work "proceeds from doctrine" and "validates" it, then we know, by definition, that it constitutes a concrete expression of doctrine.50

Doctrinal authenticators are infrequently employed. I am aware of only a handful of examples, all from the first half of the 1970s: a series of articles by Admiral Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, in the Naval Digest in 1972-73; a book by the same author, Sea Power of the State, sent to the printer in late 1975; and a two-part series by him, plus several other articles by naval authors, in the General Staff journal in 1971-72.51 Both the appearance and the disappearance of doctrinal authenticators serve to illustrate the declining frankness of Soviet military literature over time. The avowedly doctrinal statements of the 1960s were superseded in the first half of the 1970s by authenticators, not for doctrine itself but for its concrete expressions, only to be succeeded in turn by a paucity of both types.

Unofficial Expressions of Military Policy and Doctrine. This is by far the most numerous category of Soviet statements dealing with the subject matter examined in this paper. It consists of those works, mentioned earlier, that take their point of departure in doctrine (and policy). While these works have to survive the gauntlet of colleagues, editors and censors, they are given no formal authoritative blessing; it would be an impossible task to provide an imprimatur for everything in print. Unofficial expressions of doctrine are identified on the basis of the correspondence of an author's views with the views of other authors at a given time.

Private Views and Polemics. Western analysts tend to find more disputes in the Soviet military literature than is warranted by the evidence, and under the reflex assumptions of the bureaucratic-politics model, they tend to interpret obvious disputes as reflections of institutional vested interests rather than professional differences of opinion. My own impression is that of the debates that must rage behind the scenes (many no doubt rooted in bureaucratic rivalry), few get published; that the military literature we see comes from a disciplined, consensus-loving press; and that the vast majority of published authors, as well as their editors and colleagues, think their works are in the mainstream (though they can make mistakes). Indeed, disputes are so rare in print that an analyst ought to take great pains to justify his conclusion that differences are being aired.52 Debates, in fact, are not all that hard to spot. An author or editor will openly declare a work to be for discussion purposes; or named or unnamed Soviet authors will be attacked. Even here, however, a distinction should be made between polemics directed against a superseded official view, and polemics in a controversy still alive.
The Do's and Don'ts of Analysis

The main problem with Soviet military literature is not in assessing its truth value and authoritativeness, but in determining just what is being said and understanding its significance. This brings us to the all-important subject of rules of analysis for handling Soviet communication techniques. If Kremlinology is to be restored to credibility, we will need discipline in our methodology, repeating after the Calvinists—O, what is man, when left to his own devices!

Rule No. 1: Pay close attention to the views and intentions attributed to the West by the USSR. This is because of the Soviet practice of deliberate mirror imaging in certain contexts. There is no consensus among Western analysts over the Soviet use of foreign surrogates for their own views, capabilities, and military options; that is unfortunate, and we should make it a methodological objective to clear the matter up. Some observers restrict their recognition of surrogates to Soviet domestic debates and debates within the socialist camp over sensitive issues. Others are prepared to recognize them only when the views and intentions attributed to the West are patently false, although it is not clear how the Soviet reader is usually in a position to make such discriminations.

There are obviously certain spheres in which one would not expect to find surrogate treatments; when Soviet authors dilate on the disarray in NATO, for example, this is not to be understood as a veiled reference to Warsaw-Pact infighting. There are other spheres where a capitalist surrogate is inappropriate and only a socialist surrogate will do (e.g., during the early stages of the Sino-Soviet conflict, when Beijing used Belgrade and Moscow used Tirana as substitutes for their real revisionist-dogmatist targets). However, there are certain other, ideologically neutral fields, where it is deemed permissible to displace Soviet views, capabilities, and intentions onto the West. This is the case with military strategy and military technology; there are no such things as a socialist military option or a capitalist tank. Only the ends of power are ideologically charged; the means are normally value free.

In this paper we make no effort at a general theory of Soviet mirror imaging in all spheres; nor, though it is equally desirable, do we attempt to explain why they employ surrogates. The ambition is more limited—to establish the fact of the practice only in their discussions of military options, and exceptions should be taken by the reader only with that restriction in mind. The debates are endless in the West over the degree of distortion in declared Soviet perceptions of NATO military ambitions. My own experience leads me to the conclusion that all such debates are beside the point. Declared perceptions of Western military options are not intended to correspond to real perceptions but to represent symmetrical counterparts of Soviet options. Accordingly, as a methodological principle in the case of the subject matter reviewed here, they should always be treated as surrogates of Soviet intentions and never taken as evidence of real Soviet estimates of Western intentions, regardless of whether the analyst thinks them roughly in line with reality, partly true and partly false, or made up out of whole cloth. If Moscow tells the truth on occasion, that is only because reality happens to coincide with obligatory projection requirements. Soviet expositors of the Western scene are adept at stretching and molding actual Western statements to arrive at the desired symmetry in intentions. However, this effort is no more realistic than Freudian dream work when it exploits real events of the previous day in the memory to fashion inner-determined phantasies.

Of course, the Soviets have ways of negating the surrogate force of attributions. They might take note of official U.S. statements and then pronounce them deceptions, camouflage for quite different intentions. When referring to certain Western capabilities, they can declare them ineffectual, or unsuitable for the USSR on military-geographic grounds. On occasion, they will acknowledge a Western capability, but then state that the Soviet response will be asymmetrical; if no such statement is made, symmetry is to be inferred. Another, much more common method is to declare that, regardless of subjective American intentions, the option is fatally flawed because an imminent logic of war dictates its “inevitable” escalation.

The Soviet penchant for secrecy is an important factor in their use of surrogates. Even though they continue to mirror image when there is no requirement for secrecy, i.e., when Moscow is explicit about its own options, that is no reason for discarding secrecy as a factor. If you are going to use surrogates, you have to be consistent; otherwise Soviet readers would be confused.
Consistency is also encouraged by a particular Soviet propaganda convention that is rooted in ideology. According to Marxism-Leninism, imperialism is the only source of war and the arms race; the USSR never originates a threat. But there is a corollary: Moscow must respond to any threat. There is even an oft-cited passage from Lenin that it would be “foolish and even criminal” not to acquire all the means of warfare possessed by the imperialists. Therefore, if the imperialists actually have an option not available to the USSR, the Russians must ignore its existence, dismiss claims of it as dezinformatsiya, or declare its utter non-viability (i.e., declare the option will “inevitably” escalate); to fail to deny the existence or the efficacy of a unilateral U.S. option would be an intolerable confession of weakness. But by the same token, if the Kremlin has developed an option for which there is no NATO counterpart, it must nevertheless attribute the option to NATO, because Marxist-Leninists never initiate, they only react.

Perhaps the classic example of this pattern comes from the early nuclear years. Garthoff reports that, for the entire period 1947-1953, when the U.S. had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, there was not a single article on the subject in the periodical military press. However, when Moscow acquired its own nuclear arms, this same press suddenly “discovered” that the U.S. had them too—the American possession justifying the Russian.56

Mirror imaging, of course, is not unknown in the West. In the Soviet Union, however, the practice is neither unconscious nor tailored to the requirements of budgetary infighting; indeed, the mirror imaging usually appears after the military-policy and doctrinal decisions have already been made. Nor is the practice designed at bottom to justify the Soviet posture to a foreign audience or to exploit divisions within NATO; the obligation to project intentions onto the West has, in fact, often meant forgoing a better line for exploiting NATO’s internal divisions. On other occasions, the projection has been so subtle that it entirely escaped the attention of Western specialists.

Analysts who reject surrogate interpretations out of methodological scruple are renouncing an important source of intelligence. In my view, it will constitute a real methodological advance when analysts become convinced that, regardless of whether the views or options attributed to foreign opponents are true or false, they normally turn out to be symmetrical counterparts of options desired by Soviet authors or possessed by the USSR. If that is true, then it should be unnecessary to demonstrate in any particular case that the attribution hits or misses the mark, and the very fact of attribution will constitute evidence of Soviet views and intentions. We will also have made a giant step forward when there is general acknowledgement that selectiveness in surrogate analysis is as methodologically unsound as selectiveness in the analysis of other types of data.

Surrogate analysis is all the more important in view of the declining Soviet frankness. They mirror imaged just as much in the 1960s as today. However, they were then relatively open about their intentions for all-out war. They are more reticent today in speaking of their limited options, compelling us to take greater notice of views displaced onto the West.

A kindred rule: Pay close attention to historical treatments; lessons of the past are often surrogate lessons for the present. There can be no question of this practice, however difficult it may be to establish in any particular case. In his masterful study of the Sino-Soviet conflict, Zagoria found that rumors of frontier incidents between the two countries in 1960 gained credibility “when a Soviet historical journal suddenly and gratuitously criticized unprovoked Chinese assaults on undefended Russian borderlands in the 17th century....”57

At least for the purpose of communication, Soviet military scientists also do not believe in history for its own sake; they are incorrigibly present minded. On one occasion, normally without letting the reader know, historical events will be intended as direct analogues of the current situation. On another occasion, a “law-governed pattern” of development will be found in history which, when extrapolated by the reader, will enlighten him about the present. The analyst must continually be asking himself: what relevance does this historical discussion have for today? Perhaps it has none that the analyst can discover, but he should always look for a match, without straining.

Pay close attention to Soviet definitions. This counsel applies to terms often defined (for example, military doctrine and military science); terms rarely defined (for example, designations of the combat objective); terms incompletely defined (a general
problem); terms obliquely defined (e.g., "short war");
terms defined only by usage ("military superiority," a
war’s “immediate” and “intermediate” strategic objec-
tives); terms nowhere near adequately defined even by
usage (for example, the difference between “branches”
and “components” of the armed forces); and terms
borrowed from the West but given their own Russian
definitions (various types of war). Normally the
analyst will not realize he has a problem with defini-
tions; that is the danger. He has to be continually
asking himself: do I really understand what this
means? When a definition does float by, grab it; you
may never see it again.

Pay close attention to hierarchies of terminology.
There is a great deal of difference between a “main,” a
“most important,” and an “important” mission or
branch of the armed forces (a “basic” mission or
branch is a thornier problem). In defining the combat
objective, sharp distinctions are made between an-
nihilating or eliminating (unichtozhenie), crushing or
routing (razgrom), crippling (porazhenie), vitally
degrading (sushchestvennoe oslablenie) and simply
degrading or significantly degrading (znachitel’noe
oslablenie). In discussing a factor’s influence on the
course and outcome of the war as a whole or of the
military action in a theater (two quite different things),
it is crucial to know whether the influence is account-
ed “decisive” or “vital,” or simply “significant,”
“great,” “serious,” or “enormous” (the last four all
interchangeable terms).

When key subject matter is encountered, careful
attention must be paid to every word in the passage.
The really crucial words will, of course, differ accord-
ing to the subject matter. In the case of “the character
and specific features of war,” the odds given for the
stability of the option are of greatest interest, i.e.,
whether it “might” expand and escalate or whether it
will “inevitably” do so. In the case of the “methods of
warfare” and the “principles of the military art,”
attention should focus on the condensed, short-hand
formulae favored by Soviet strategists. In the case of
the “types and forms of strategic action,” the interest
should be in the specialized terminology used to
designate them, and the ranking of the types and
forms. In the case of the factors influencing the
course and outcome of war, special note should be
taken of the degree of impact on both the course and
the outcome, considered separately.

The Russians will tell you no outright lies, but
expect to be misled, up one side and down the other.
After you have read a key passage once, twice, thrice,
read it again to make sure it says what you think it
says. (I can assure you it will not in an extraordinarily
high percentage of cases.)

The real Soviet point is often simply a logical
implication of the stated point. For example, if an
author says that a particular kind of war “might”
estimate, this automatically means that it might not
escalate as well—and that is the real point. The
possibility of escalation, though true in the USSR’s
reckoning, is not the real point.

Often, to get the message, the analyst must com-
pare present and past statements and formulae on the
same subject, noting the similarities and differences.

In these comparisons, what is not said is just as
important as what is. The Soviets will often indicate a
new departure by leaving something out of a
standard formula.

Do not expect the Russians to tell you they are
presenting a new view in place of an old. In the 1960s
Moscow was frank in stating, for example, that it had
introduced new types and forms of strategic action,
and for the following reasons. They would say: we
used to believe this, and now we believe that, and here
is the explanation. No more; the reader is not cued to
changes. The current formula alone is given. Thus,
the analyst has to carry around the past in his memory
for collation with the present, without being prompted.

Do not expect the Russians to flag a noteworthy
item. The naked formula alone is introduced, in the
most casual manner, without preparation. There is
usually nothing in even the most crucial passages that
clamors for our attention.

Single examples do not prove a point. In their
communications, the Soviets have made a deliberate
choice in favor of obscurity. Because of their tenuous,
elliptical quality, and their tendency to be over-
inclusive or under-inclusive, too much credence
should not be put in interpretations based on single
examples. Here, as almost always, patience is a
to. Other examples can be found that will il-
umnate the shady areas, since in any system of esoteric
communication there has to be signal redundancy. Hansel and Gretel did not simply drop a pebble here and there; they dropped pebbles (lots of pebbles) all along the way.

Single points, however well established, do not necessarily make an option. The analyst should not be satisfied with a point, even several points, understood within the confines of a single subject-matter category. To be confident of the character of an option, he must find compatible points in several categories.

Do not expect the Russians to make sustained arguments. It is unusual for them to treat several aspects of an option as a connected whole. They spin out little rags of information, which the reader himself has to shuffle around to find the fit and then stitch together into a garment, in the process treating a mixed bag of rags by different authors as if they were the product of a single weaver.

When the Russians do take a stab at sustained arguments, expect obscurity. The analyst will not only find expressions that are as elliptical as intimate family discourse, but also elliptical and transposed logic. This is not the result of any difference in Eastern or Western thought processes (Hegelian vs. Aristotelian), but of sheer communication cussedness. The analyst will often have to interpolate, but he should be careful to take his logical cues from the text; “anything goes” is not the right methodological approach.

Read as widely as possible in the relevant literature. Soviet military thought is highly integrated, but compartmented in the presentation. Military policy is linked to military doctrine. There is no such thing as a ground-force or naval doctrine or even a doctrine for the armed forces; there is only a single military doctrine for the entire state. However, only aspects of an option are likely to be discussed in the specialized journals. The air-force analyst, therefore, should not confine himself to Aviation and Cosmonautics, the navy analyst to the Naval Digest, or the articles on these services in Red Star and in books.

The analyst has to cast his net as widely as possible because of the opaqueness of Soviet discourse and the relative lack of sustained argument. Only by noting the absence of old themes, and the repeated iteration of new themes across a vast body of books and articles, can an analyst be confident of individual interpretations, find a common denominator, and begin to work his way toward the whole option.

Do not be too “picky” about sources. There are analysts who swear only by the General Staff journal, Military Thought. They reason that, because of its restricted circulation, it alone will give us the “straight dope,” and in a straightforward manner. A priori, this is unimpeachable; it does not work out that way in fact. Military Thought is a much better source than average; however, it is no more authoritative than other publications, does not for the most part present unique information, and employs the same esoteric communication techniques as the open literature. I have never seen a fundamental point established in the journal that was not made elsewhere, usually earlier, and with greater clarity.

On the other hand, there is widespread scorn for journals put out by “think tanks,” such as the Institute for the U.S.A. and Canada. It is said that they are full of propaganda and the analysts “don’t know anything.” But all Soviet sources propagandize; butter will never melt in the mouth of Soviet righteousness. This does not affect substance. As for the charge that think-tank personnel know nothing important, we had better not believe it. Their stock in trade is American national-security policy; it is obligatory that these be surrogate discussions; and think-tank authors have to know Soviet policy and doctrine to make the mirror image fit. Because surrogate discussions can be more open with details, the USA journal is probably our best single source today.

Though no sources or institutions dealing with the right subject matter should be rejected on principle, they do vary in value, and their relative value has changed over time, for both accountable and unaccountable reasons. In the 1960s, the military-policy journal, Communist of the Armed Forces, was highly informative, not only on War and the Army, which one would expect, but also on military doctrine and military science; today, inexplicably, it is virtually useless on all counts. In the 1960s, the output of faculty members of the General Staff Academy was the most directly informative on Soviet doctrine and strategy; today that honor, unaccountably, seems to belong to the Institute of Military History.

Some of the shift in information value is explainable by the recourse to surrogates. Those very
revealing articles dealing directly with Soviet doctrine and military science that, in the 1960s, graced Red Star's page 2 (domestic affairs), since the mid-1970s have appeared as surrogate discussions on Red Star's page 3 (international affairs). For that same reason, The Foreign Military Review (current foreign surrogates) and The Journal of Military History (historical surrogates), as well as the USA Journal, now appear at the top in information content.

Evidence from one period is of no force in another. The analyst should stitch together only contemporaneous rags, since Soviet military policy and doctrine in the modern era are characterized more by discontinuities than continuities. On the side of military policy and War and the Army, the Eugene Rybkin of 1959 was contradicted by the Eugene Rybkin of 1964, who in turn suffered a 180-degree displacement by the Eugene Rybkin of 1965; and one would never recognize that latter Rybkin in the one who writes today. On the military-strategic side, when General Mil'shtein tells us that Sokolovsky is out of date, we should believe him. There is nothing in the three editions of the work edited by him (1962, 1963, 1968) to prepare us for the publications of Marshal Grechko (1971, 1974) and of Admiral Gorshkov (1972-73); and there is nothing in any of these three authors to prepare us for the Marshal Ogarkov of 1979, much less the Ogarkovs of 1981 and 1985.

Do not extrapolate from one context to another. It is impermissible, for example, to take Soviet views on the impact of surprise at the tactical and operational levels as necessarily applying to the strategic level as well.

In sum, the analyst must be an active participant in the communication process. Soviet authors do not spoil their readers. The latter will constantly find themselves reversing mirror images, discovering present-day analogues to historical events, tracking down definitions, collating texts, reconciling authors, noting what is left out, inferring what is implied, filling out an elliptical expression, interpolating a step in logic, and rearranging the sequence in logic. On top of that, the reader must then put established individual points together into a coherent whole—without too much help from the authors.

Because the analyst must be active, he should be careful about his "contribution," lest he become part of the problem. The work belongs to the author, not the analyst, and he should infer only what is implied, interpolate only what is cued, and not allow the insight of one period to become the preconception of the next. He has no choice but to come armed with hypotheses—within reason, perhaps, the more the better—but he should never settle on any one of them until all the evidence is in.
NOTES


[2] War and the Army also deals with factors influencing the course and outcome of war, but at a different level of abstraction.


NOTES (Continued)


NOTES (Continued)


[23] Ibid., pp. 185-186. In wartime they are designated as the “political, military and economic leadership of the state,” because of the amalgamation of the defense and economic functions.


[27] VES, p. 684.


NOTES (Continued)


[39] One emigre from Eastern Europe seems to make much the same distinction between the Soviet long-range view and its incremental implementation. See Jan Sejna, We will Bury You (London: Sidgwich and Jackson, 1982), p. 104.


[42] Other branches of military science, e.g., military-technical science, might be quite different.
NOTES (Continued)


[45] Khrushchev’s speech at the IV Session of the Supreme Soviet in 1960 was subsequently stated to be doctrinal. See P. Rotmistrov, op. cit., pp. 29-30.

[46] There did seem to be a dispute, more or less veiled, in the early 1960s between Khrushchev and the military over balanced military development, but there is no evidence that this extended to option preferences.


[48] In peacetime the strategic leadership has traditionally been designated as a “military council” (e.g., the Higher Military Council of the Khrushchev era).


[53] As one Soviet author pointed out almost three decades ago: “The military science of any state has common underpinnings. This is explained by the fact that the big wars of today are fought on both sides with more or less identical technical means...” P.A. Chuvikov, *Marksism-leninizm o voyne i armii* (2nd ed., Moscow, 1956), p. 134.
NOTES (Continued)

[54] A good example of this is the Soviet depreciation of aircraft carriers in the 1960s. The first tipoff of Soviet interest in sea-based air power came in the early 1970s, when writers on naval affairs went from extremely negative to positive in their estimates of U.S. carriers.

[55] A good example of this can be gleaned from comparing successive editions of the Sokolovskiy-edited work on Military Strategy. In the 1963 edition it was stated: "The imperialist states... are channeling their basic efforts in naval development into building up offensive forces. Hence the principal task of our fleet in a modern war will be combating the forces of the enemy fleet at sea and in their bases." In the 1968 edition, however, while the first sentence was left intact, the second was excised. The implication, which can be confirmed by other data, was that the basic task of the Soviet fleet, too, would be carried out by offensive forces, and that strategic defense had been downgraded. The latter inference was confirmed in the very next paragraph, when the author stated: "At the same time such important tasks remain for the navy as combating forces of the enemy fleet at sea and in its bases. ..." Cf. V.D. Sokolovskiy (ed.), Voennaya strategiya (2nd ed., Moscow, 1963), pp. 312-313; ibid. (3rd ed., 1968), pp. 307-308.

[56] Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, revised edition (N.Y.: Praeger, 1962), p. 64. One would agree with Green that it is probably wrong to attribute Soviet silence on nuclear weapons to the stultification of military science by Stalin. On the other hand, Green's alternative explanations of the "gag order" are, for the most part, even less convincing: to prevent hasty conclusions about the new technology; the dead hand of Beriya; MVD-Army bureaucratic politics. His fourth explanation, presented with a minor accent (almost as an afterthought), correlates far better with the data and the general Soviet practice: silence helped avoid drawing Western attention—and, I might add, Soviet attention—to an area of fundamental Soviet weakness. See William C. Green, "The Early Formulation of Soviet Strategic Nuclear Doctrine," Comparative Strategy, IV, no. 4, pp. 380-382.


[58] See my paper in World Politics, April, 1985, pp. 320-339.


[60] According to Kulikov, "At the end of 1953 the five-year plan for scientific work was amended in compliance with the Defense Ministry mandate to study nuclear weapons and the specifics of preparing, conducting, and supporting operations and tactical engagements when using these weapons. This mandate brought about fundamental changes..." V.G. Kulikov, Akademiya General'nogo Shtaba (Moscow, 1976), p. 129.