


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GLASNOST AND PERESTROIKA:  
CAMPAIGN OR DECEPTION?

BY

COLONEL EDWARD P. MCCARTHY

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GLASNOST AND PERESTROIKA: CAMPAIGN OR DECEPTION?

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION

by

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What are the strategic implications of glasnost and perestroika? Is Mikhail Gorbachev embarked on a campaign of strategic deception, or on a crusade to lead the USSR into the age of modern technology? Must the answer be one or the other, or is it possible he is doing both? What kind of support does he need both at home and abroad? How much time does he have to succeed? And, if he does, what will be the impact on world order?

These questions represent a significant challenge. Gorbachev himself probably cannot provide accurate answers. He may personally be on a crusade; however, the "System" may be executing the greatest strategic deception the West has ever seen.

## INTRODUCTION

Glasnost and perestroika signal a new strategic direction for the Soviet Union. They are terms which have signaled both major improvements in East-West relations and new freedom for the citizens of the USSR. Though this may sound noble, it is not without significant problems. Glasnost, the new freedom to speak out, has released a tremendous amount of frustration inside the USSR. Gorbachev, for good reasons, has encouraged this; however, if he lets it go too far, he could lose control of the "Empire."

Perestroika, meaning restructuring, is the operative term. The problem here is that no previous Soviet leader has been able to overcome the inertia of the system, in order to accomplish significant change.

Gorbachev understands what Moscow's emphasis on military programs has done to the Soviet economy. A major element of perestroika will cause the reallocation of resources from the military to the civilian sector; this will involve conversion of defense plants to commercial production and major industrial modernization.

The success of Gorbachev's vision depends on two things: major change at home, and significant financial backing by the West. Therefore, glasnost and perestroika become the catalyst for eliminating the image of what President Reagan termed the "Evil Empire."

It is important to view recent Soviet history to understand the significance of Gorbachev's initiatives.

## RECENT HISTORY

Recently, the Soviet Union celebrated its 70th birthday. More accurately, those in power celebrated. What were they celebrating? To understand this one should explore as far back as the older members of the Politburo can remember, the era of Joseph Stalin, who ruled the Soviet Union from 1929 until 1953.<sup>1</sup> Under him, the Soviet people no longer had to worry about the backwardness of the Imperial era; the new concerns were collectives and labor camps. Between 1937 and 1938, one million Soviet citizens were executed and another two million died in these camps.<sup>2</sup>

Stalin's new watchword, 'TYURMA TYURMOI,' (give the prisoners what is their due) applied to all prisoners. Over the unhappy victims of Stalin's social policy rolled the insensitive and cruel machinery of a slavery unknown since the days of antiquity--differing from it only in the techniques employed by a modern totalitarian and industrial state.<sup>3</sup>

Brutal beyond belief, Stalin's actions were based on his fear of the people around him. In 1937, he purged the army for fear of a coup.

According to well-informed sources, 75% of the members of the Supreme War Council, three out of five marshals, thirteen out of fifteen army generals, 62 out of 85 corps commanders, 110 out of 195 divisional commanders and 220 out of 406 brigade commanders were liquidated during 1937 and 1938. Perhaps 65% of the upper echelons (from colonel up) and ten percent of the lower echelons (altogether twenty thousand officers) were arrested. Of the six thousand high ranking officers alone, 1500 were executed. The others disappeared, at least temporarily, into prisons and labor camps . . . It is noteworthy that the military specialists taken over from the Czarist Army were less affected by purges than the 'Red Commanders' who were mainly members of the working and peasant class, mostly old Bolsheviks and veteran soldiers of the civil war.<sup>4</sup>

These were his own supporters he was killing! Stalin ruled with the same level of brutality through World War II and into the Cold War, until his death in 1953. A conservative estimate of the toll Stalin inflicted on the Soviet people during his reign of terror is 20 million dead.<sup>5</sup>

Stalin's successor was Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev. The transition was not altogether smooth. The Minister of Internal Affairs, Beria, mustered his forces in Moscow and gave the warning signals of a coup. As a result, he was executed.<sup>6</sup>

Khrushchev immediately transformed the government from a dictatorship of both the people and the Politburo to one of shared power. He pressed to decentralize industry. He replaced the Minister of Defense, an old Stalin comrade, Marshal Zhukov, and eventually replaced 300 generals with much younger ones.<sup>7</sup> Khrushchev's reforms were, in fact, more radical than we have seen under Gorbachev. When the reforms were considered too great a threat to the bureaucracy, Leonid Brezhnev and a group of his supporters engineered the removal of Khrushchev in 1964. Khrushchev and his reforms were quickly swept from public view.<sup>8</sup>

Under Brezhnev, repression was renewed. The following quote will suggest that Brezhnev was as fearful of the people as was Stalin:

What if the only alternative is disintegration? If we relax and are hanged by an indignant mob, stirred up by those intellectual rebels whom you in the West foolishly tolerate in your midst, do you really think there would be freedom, democracy and prosperity in our country? I may not be a genius, but I am the best General Secretary we've got.<sup>9</sup>

Brezhnev relied on the KGB and the military to consolidate power at home. His next focus was on world domination. According to Professor Vernon V. Aspaturian, Director of Slavic Studies at Pennsylvania State University, Brezhnev saw an easy route:



He felt the United States was in a period of decline. And, he thought the Third World offered the best avenue for challenge, for three reasons: least cost, least risk, and non-burdensome. He would look to support small Marxist cells which would overthrow governments.

Several events convinced Brezhnev his theory was valid: the fall of the Shah of Iran, and the fall of Somoza in Nicaragua. In addition, when the U.S. did not react to the Iranian seizure of its embassy, it proved his point. He knew could invade Afghanistan and the Americans would do nothing.<sup>10</sup>

The next step to true superpower status was the achievement of superior military power vis-a-vis the United States. Here is where competition with the United States focused the Soviet Union away from butter in favor of guns. Brezhnev realized it was "guns or internal development." He believed a shift to internal development might cause the Soviet Union to be mediocre in dimensions. There was danger they would end up as another China or Brazil. However, he was sure he could compete in the military field. When President Reagan took office, the costly conventional arms race between the Soviet Union and the West began.<sup>11</sup>

There is substantially more about Brezhnev's reign than oppression, Third World focus, and an arms race. But, these three are the sources of the problems the Soviet Union faces today.

When Brezhnev died in 1982, the struggle towards reform began. It looked as though Brezhnev's right hand man, Konstantin Chernenko, was the heir apparent.<sup>12</sup> But, this was not to be. The Central Committee elected the head of the KGB, Yury Andropov, General Secretary. Chernenko, (his main opponent) at the direction of the Politburo, nominated him.<sup>13</sup>

Andropov immediately focused on the task of creating a new team which would foster radical change in the Soviet system. He replaced about 20 percent "of the Oblast and Kray party secretaries and a similar percentage of the Moscow-based members of the Council of Ministers."<sup>14</sup> He elevated Gorbachev to the key position of Secretary in charge of cadres. This move put Gorbachev in a position to succeed Andropov.

The objectives of Andropov's programs were threefold. First, he wanted to eliminate bureaucratic corruption, the corruption that allowed Brezhnev to retain the loyalty of stagnant bureaucrats. Secondly, he wanted to increase discipline (read initiative and efficiency). He had a vision of what it would take to put his economy on solid footing. Thirdly, he focused on the problem of alcoholism.<sup>15</sup> Andropov had little success because of strong resistance from the "Brezhnev" faction of the Party leadership. But he did worry those who perceived his objectives as threatening. His illness was another limiting factor. On February 10, 1984, the Soviet Union's leader of little over one year died.<sup>16</sup>

Andropov had maneuvered Gorbachev into a position to succeed him. However, the Politburo, which fought Andropov's policies, chose Chernenko. He appeared to be their hope for maintaining the status quo.

In a clear sign of what a survivor he is, Gorbachev made the following speech in support of his rival's nomination:

Comrades! We are completing the work of the Extraordinary Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee, convened at a crucial moment in the life of the Party and the people. The Plenary Meeting has proceeded in an atmosphere of unity and cohesion. Questions relating to the continuity of leadership have been resolved with a great sense of responsibility to the Party and the people.

The Plenary Meeting has shown that the Party will continue its advance along the Leninist course charted by the 26th CPSU Congress and the November 1982 and December 1983 Central Committee Plenums. This was particularly vividly

manifested in the unanimous election of Comrade Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko to the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and in the full support of the propositions and conclusions on questions of the domestic and foreign policy activities of the Party and the State which were advanced in his speech at today's Plenary Meeting of the CPSU CC.

Allow me, on behalf of the Political Bureau, to express confidence that the members of the Central Committee and all participants in the Plenary Meeting, on returning to their localities, to their Party organizations, will act in the spirit of unity and cohesion, high exactingness, and responsibility that has marked the present Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Party.

We wish you every success in your work. The Plenary Meeting is hereby declared closed.<sup>17</sup>

Chernenko was to rule for only 13 months. During this period, the Gorbachev faction kept him in check. He had no great impact on the Soviet Union. He did, however, muster enough support to resume disarmament talks with the U.S.<sup>18</sup> His death set the stage for Gorbachev's second bid for the leadership of the USSR.

#### GORBACHEV ARRIVES

To understand the impact of Gorbachev's ascension to power in March of 1985, one must understand the significance of the man himself. He is the first college graduate to hold the seat of Soviet power. He graduated from the Faculty of Law of Moscow State University and from the Stavropol Agricultural Institute.<sup>19</sup>

In a class session, during his November 10, 1988 visit to Carlisle, Mr. Chris Donnelly, Director of Soviet Studies at Sandhurst, gave an excellent summary of how Gorbachev got where he is and what drove him to his strategy:

1. He came to power without any strategic understanding.

2. He thought the military was not paying attention to the political element. (A good example was the friction between political and military leadership after the shooting down of a South Korean 747. The military made the decision to down the aircraft without consulting the political leadership.)<sup>20</sup>

3. He realized the economic problems of the USSR and the magnitude of potential internal disaster.

4. He had no military background; therefore, he took military advice from outside the General Staff. (Watch for later changes in the military leadership.)

5. He believed the military was causing economic problems through conventional arms competition with the U.S. (15 to 25 percent of GNP directed towards the military as compared to 6 percent in the United States.)

6. He knew the government had to economize and the people had to become more productive. (In this statement comes the rebirth of a threat to the corrupt bureaucracy.)

7. He believed there was no credible threat of a NATO conventional attack.

8. He believed that, if he reduced the nuclear threat, he would reduce the need for large conventional forces. This would allow for redirection of resources.

9. He knew the Soviets feared a surprise nuclear attack while NATO feared a surprise conventional attack.<sup>21</sup>

If one keeps these nine points in mind, it is easy to understand what Gorbachev is all about. He is not a born-again Marxist seeking to reaffirm the evils of his predecessors. "He is a sincere Marxist."<sup>22</sup> He is the

leader of an empire which will destroy itself, if he does not get it fixed. His major problem is the misuse of resources and lack of modern technology. His recovery plan must be financed by the West.

Before he would have a chance to campaign for Western support, he had to organize his power base. Otherwise, he would be as hampered as was his predecessor, Chernenko. When Gorbachev came to power, there were only ten members on the Politburo. This represented an opportunity to engineer the movement of supporters to top party positions and foster support for his program.

#### REORGANIZATION

In the last three years, Gorbachev finessed significant change in the Soviet Union's leadership. The motives were two: position backers who would aggressively support his programs, and eliminate opposition. At first, his concern was the KGB and the military. That is easy to understand when one sees what he has done with glasnost and what he is doing with/to the military. He had to do what Krushchev failed to do, slowly engineer the Politburo his way by injecting supporters and removing the opposition. He has masterfully executed this operation.

In 1985 Gorbachev added Ryzhkov and Ligachev to Politburo full membership. Ryzhkov had expertise in and shared views on economics and industrial management with Gorbachev. Ligachev was an agricultural expert who seemed to share views with Gorbachev. Gorbachev was sure he could count on these two votes in the Politburo. Romanov, the 62-year old Politburo member

and Party secretary, was Gorbachev's main rival. Romanov had extremely close ties to the military, which was not content with its diminishing influence. He represented a potential threat to Gorbachev. On July 1, 1985, Romanov was retired for health reasons(?). At the same time, Eduard Schevardnadze was promoted to Politburo full membership, where he stands at Gorbachev's right hand. Victor Chebrikov, the KGB Chief, was elevated to Politburo full membership, perhaps to insure KGB loyalty. He had been promoted to the KGB position by Andrepov, and Gorbachev assumed he could count on his support. Marshal Sokolov was given nonvoting status on the Politburo. For the military, this represented presence, but little voice.<sup>24</sup> Numerous other changes were made at lower levels. Gorbachev also planned to streamline the Party machinery. His intent was to reorganize the Central Committee from 20 departments to 6 commissions. The object was to rid the structure of inefficiency and incompetence. His program of glasnost is in the forefront, focusing on waste, abuse, and incompetency.

The next major move was made in 1988, when on September 26, Gorbachev called a surprise Monday meeting of the Politburo (they usually meet on Thursday). He had just returned from a Siberian trip and professed dissatisfaction with the lack of progress toward change (a good excuse to execute this well planned coup). The results of this meeting surprised the world. Major changes were:

Constitutional changes were approved making it possible to elect Gorbachev president, soon to be a position of enhanced authority. He retired three Brezhnev holdover Politburo members and moved two others. Ligachev was put in charge of agriculture. Chebrikov was removed from his KGB position and put in charge of a commission on legal affairs. He retired Gromyko with much

praise and others with no mention. Four members were added - Anatoly Lukyanov, Aleksandr Vlasov, Aleksandra Biryukova (the only female member), and the only new voting member, Vadim Medvedev.

After all these moves, Gorbachev can probably count, for sure, on 5 of 12 Politburo votes - Yakovlev, Medvedev, Shevardnadze, Slyunkov, and his own. The situation he faces is that he has no left wing support among the leadership, because there is no one left of Gorbachev on the Politburo. However, there are no Stalinists either, although there is a large constituency in the Party. As a result, he ends up with a coalition-type majority. They support him; but, more importantly, they do not criticize him.<sup>25</sup> The trend seems to be that Party members are moved or retired when they appear to be critical.

#### GLASNOST AND PERESTROIKA

The name Gorbachev has become synonymous with the terms glasnost and perestroika. Dr. Vernon V. Aspaturian contends that glasnost and perestroika are on a collision course. Glasnost has turned everyone loose on the system. It has unleashed open dissidence. A population repressed for so long may be getting carried away. One must keep it all in perspective. According to Aspaturian, the Slavs are only 70 years removed from serfdom. There is no middle class; most people are peasants culturally. That really makes Gorbachev look good; but appearances alone won't change the system.<sup>26</sup>

We should next examine the relationship between glasnost and perestroika. Perestroika represents the strategic direction, the major restructuring required to transform the Soviet Union to a modern society. This restructuring will not work without significant assistance from the West. But, how can the Soviet Union acquire assistance from the West if it is truly

viewed as the "Evil Empire"? That is where glasnost comes in. Gorbachev's first external offensive was the Reykjavik meeting with President Reagan, at which he was the clear winner. He used its outcome to his advantage, as illustrated by excerpts of his October 12, 1986 press conference:

You already know the meeting took place on the initiative of the Soviet leadership but, naturally, there would have been no meeting if Mr. Reagan had not agreed to it. That is why, I would say, it was our joint decision to have that meeting Reykjavik . . . . Regrettably, the Americans came to the meeting empty-handed, with the same old moth-eaten trash from which the Geneva talks are already choking. We tabled the proposals, which I have already spoken about, in order to overturn the situation developing, to clear the path, to bring negotiations up to a new level and to make real decisions . . . . Question (Pravda): Mikhail Sergeevich, Why do you think the U.S. Administration decided to wreck the negotiations, to act so irresponsibly and to ignore world public opinion? Answer. It seems to me that America has yet to make up its mind. I don't think it has done this yet. This, we felt, reflected on the President's stand.<sup>27</sup>

As a follow-on to this strategy, the INF treaty gained Gorbachev the respect and popularity he needed in the West to gain access to vital technology and credits. Glasnost was now to be accelerated.

Gorbachev made hints at internal reform, to which Western leaders would overreact. An example occurred recently with the Germans. During a German visit to Moscow in October 1988, the Soviets passed a signal to Chancellor Helmut Kohl's staff about the freeing of political prisoners (this signal was exaggerated by Kohl).<sup>28</sup>

It laid the political foundation for what was to follow:

West German businessmen accompanying Kohl signed 16 contracts today with Soviet officials, including one to build a high-technology nuclear reactor in the Soviet Union by a West German-Swiss consortium. More than a dozen additional deals are to be signed during the four day trip, including one granting the Soviets a \$1.7 billion credit line.<sup>29</sup>



Only when one understands the level of mistrust and hatred that exists between the Germans and the Soviets can the true significance of this transaction be appreciated.

Even Andrei Sakharov, one of the most outspoken critics of the Soviet Union, supports Gorbachev's campaign. USA Today, in a November 14 article, reflected the level of U.S. corporate interest generated:

Six big U.S. companies - Ford, Eastman Kodak, RJR Nabisco, Johnson & Johnson, Chevron, and Archer-Daniels Midland -are near agreements to do business in the Soviet Union. And the Soviets, in a bow to free enterprise, are making it easier for foreigners to make a profit.

Arms negotiations, which could ease world tensions and save billions of dollars, continue to look promising.

Cultural contacts are gradually expanding. When Sakharov meets with President Reagan today, he will applaud those efforts.<sup>30</sup>

It is not surprising that Gorbachev announced a unilateral arms reduction only days prior to the opening of the Soviet Trade Fair in New York City. The preparation was a true public relations blitz. In December 1988, the Soviets purchased a seven page advertisement in the Wall Street Journal.

Surprisingly, a wide range of products, some of which are scarce in the USSR, were promoted. Some of those advertised were: Moskovskaya Vodka, Latvian Minibuses, Blorard Medical Products, Stroidormaskezport Hydraulic Excavators, and even the "World's Biggest" MI-26 Helicopter. This advertising campaign clearly represented a new approach and a major advance in public relations for the Soviet Union.<sup>31</sup>

Perhaps the unilateral reduction will serve to convince doubters that Gorbachev is serious about defensive intentions and will open the door to more credits. He has, so far, only announced intentions (which, by the way, are extremely self serving) and cries are being heard demanding Western reductions. Here are the proposed cuts and a typical reaction:

ARMS CUTS: Soviet Armed forces will be reduced by 500,000 men and 10,000 tanks within two years. Six tank divisions will be withdrawn from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and disbanded by 1991, reducing Soviet forces in those countries by 50,000 men and 5,000 tanks.<sup>32</sup>

Gorbachev's speech at the UN was barely finished when reporters started asking what the West was going to give up. On the December 11, 1988, "This Week with David Brinkley," General Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, had to defend the modernization of nuclear forces in NATO. He, along with most military thinkers, is concerned with capabilities while Gorbachev is swinging opinion based on stated intentions. If Gorbachev wins at this game, the U.S. could see the Europeans push its nuclear forces from their soil. This is exactly what Gorbachev needs for his plan to work. Points seven, eight, and nine on page 7 of this paper reveal that his campaign and deception appears to be working abroad. But, what about at home?

Gorbachev has gone to great lengths to reduce the role of the military. His plan calls for the reallocation of resources from the military to the civilian sector. He needs loyal military leaders to accomplish this without feeling threatened or diminishing the perceived effectiveness of his armed forces. "Since becoming the Soviet leader . . . Mr. Gorbachev has replaced all but a handful of the Soviet Union's top 20 military figures."<sup>33</sup> The most notable change was when his Army Chief of Staff, Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, retired on the same day Gorbachev announced major troop cuts during his December 1988 United Nations address. Akhromeyev strongly objected to civilian involvement in strategy development; that had been a "sacred cow" to military leaders.<sup>34</sup>

In a recent seminar at Sandhurst with Soviet expert, Chris Donnelly, Akhromeyev was pressed on the issue of "Defensive Posture." After much pressure, Akhromeyev conceded that the concept of doing away with his

offensive capability was a non-starter. In his opinion, a good defensive strategy must be backed by a strong offensive capability.<sup>35</sup> One must only look back to the Battle of Kursk to understand the old Soviet military leader's mind-set. While the Soviets were defending Kursk with superior strength, they maintained a counterattack force of over 500,000 strong. Old Soviet thinking has not changed. Therefore, Gorbachev must have young military leaders whom he can trust to support his restructuring.

It was not surprising when Gorbachev named a young, 50 year old, Colonel General Mikhail Moiseyev, to replace Arkhromeyev. At the same time, rumors were heard that General Dimitri Yazov, the Defense Minister, might be replaced by a civilian. While he would not deny the rumor during a recent interview, Deputy Foreign Minister, Viktor Karpov, eluded to the possibility by saying a civilian had held the position before (referring to Dimitri Ustinov, who had been Defense Minister under Brezhnev). At the same press conference he joked, "Arkhromeyev's retirement marked the start of the military cutbacks announced by Gorbachev."<sup>36</sup> This appears to be one more indicator that the military will continue to be pushed towards a position of lesser influence.

The most recent change in military leadership was directed at the Warsaw Pact structure. Gorbachev named General Pytor Lushev to replace Marshal Viktor Kulikov as Commander of Pact forces. Kulikov, an old Brezhnev holdover, served in this position for 17 years. Lushev is a strong supporter of Gorbachev's military policies. He will, no doubt, guide the Warsaw Pact forces along the "defensive policy" lines of the Soviet Union.<sup>37</sup> When one considers this change in light of East German and Hungarian announced intentions to reduce military structure, it would appear that perestroika is gaining impetus in the Warsaw Pact.

## IMPACT AT HOME

The impact of glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union has been significant, but not always to Gorbachev's advantage.

These two concepts are what the USSR needs; however, they represent a major threat to many party bureaucrats. Perestroika eliminates many positions, and glasnost identifies inefficiency problems. A typical restructuring is described in a Moscow article on the transition of economic management in the Ukraine:

By today nine ministries and departments have been abolished. Fifty-four industrial associations and over three hundred other industrial bodies have been liquidated. It has to be said that the reductions are not being made simply for the sake of it.<sup>38</sup>

A portion of the military industrial complex is being converted to the production of consumer goods. It will be retooled to produce television sets, computers for school children, video recorders, and 600,000 refrigerators a year.

At the same time, the government is restricting the export of selected consumer goods. It is apparently having a problem with visiting East Europeans buying goods cheaply (probably black market) and taking or sending them out of country. There is a total restriction on the export of "color and black and white television sets, household refrigerators and freezers, washing and sewing machines, children's clothing and children's footwear, fresh and instant coffee . . . ." A 20% to 100% duty will be charged on the export of "vacuum cleaners, mixers, coffee grinders, irons, radios, cameras and car accessories."<sup>39</sup> This is what frequently happens in a command economy when a

better price is extracted on the black market than in the shops. Shop owners in the USSR will sell goods out the back door to foreigners, exacerbating an already short supply for local consumers.

"Mikhail Gorbachev's popularity at home has diminished as the Soviet standard of living has declined over the past three years. The West does not understand this," according to Chris Donnelly.<sup>40</sup> Glasnost has turned the media loose to tell the world what the Soviet people already know. Journalists in both the East and West are critical.

"Poverty is a reality, our national tragedy," the newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda recently wrote.

Officially, the poverty level in the Soviet Union for an urban family of four is 205.6 rubles a month (\$339.24 at the officially established exchange rate of \$1.65 to the ruble). This is about 51 rubles or \$85 a person.

But the Soviet authorities readily admit that the figure, calculated in the 1960's, is outdated. Most agree that around 75 rubles, or \$124 a month a person, are necessary for what the government calls minimum material security.

Between four and five million Soviet families fall below the formal poverty level, according to Soviet officials, and a full 20 percent of the population lives on less than 75 rubles a month.

"More than 43 million people are living in families with incomes of less than 75 rubles a month per person," Leonid E. Kunelsky, Chief of the Economics Department at the State Committee on Labor and Social Issues, said: "We have to do something to help these people."

There is not a state plan, however, for dealing with poverty, according to interviews with several Soviet officials.<sup>41</sup>

Glasnost encourages a population which has never been allowed to protest to make themselves heard. This has caused major problems with some of the 15 republics. A good example is the recent move for independence in Estonia. More significant than the move is the fact that it was reported in the Soviet press.

Over the past months, they have brought about some once-unthinkable changes in Estonia . . . including the ouster of the despised party leader and the return of the national flag, banned since 1940, when independent Estonia was forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union along with its neighboring Baltic states of Lithuania and Latvia.<sup>43</sup>

Gorbachev reacted angrily, but only in words. The Estonians will seek another route--economics. They are pushing for a larger role in the budget process. They complain that Moscow takes resources and provides little in return. An example the Estonians cite is a claim that they provide Moscow \$148 million worth of top grade meat and, in return, they get \$17 million worth of feed and fertilizer from Moscow. The region is said to be short 25 percent of required feed.<sup>44</sup>

In early September 1988, 300,000 Estonians gathered at a rally where speakers, in the presence of the Party leader, Vayno Vyalyas, called for Estonian independence. Their Central Committee, just two days prior, backed nationalist calls for Estonian to become the republic's official language and for Estonian citizenship to be introduced next year."<sup>45</sup> What is the significance of this? The 300,000 represents one-third of the republic's population. The populations of other republics are watching and, in some cases, moving. If they move too far, too fast, the empire could be in trouble.

The Ukrainians are getting restless. They too are looking for economic and political independence. However, glasnost and perestroika seem to be somewhat restricted for them. Gorbachev kept the Brezhnev era strong man, Vladimir Shcherbitsky, as their Party chief to keep an iron grip on his 50 million countrymen. The reformers claim they are not as free to write their story as are other Soviet citizens. There had been rallies of up to 50,000 people prior to the July 1988 order banning such assemblies.<sup>46</sup>

Though Shcherbitsky maintains relatively tight control, one can read of the people's concerns, where frustration with the bureaucracy is often the subject. One article tells of an emotional issue connected to the Chernobyl incident: "We even learned that while the leadership refused for days to tell us a word of what had happened, the children of all the Ukrainian party leadership were immediately evacuated."<sup>47</sup> Another tells of uprisings in the Baltics, which the Ukrainians are watching closely.

When Gorbachev visited the earthquake stricken Republic of Armenia in December 1988, logic would have caused him to expect a people devastated by the loss of life, pleading for assistance. The welcome he received frustrated these expectations. He was greeted by demonstrators demanding the transfer of the Nagorno-Karabakh Oblast from Azerbaijan to Armenia. This was a significant signal. It suggested that, at the lower level, glasnost has released a host of separate agenda rather than united support for Gorbachev.<sup>48</sup>

A positive aspect of this new program was seen as it unfolded in December 1988. Five armed men hijacked a bus with 30 school children on board. TASS reported, "In order to save the lives of the captives, the country's leadership decided to provide the criminals with a Soviet transport plane." They did just that. Then, they coordinated the movement of the aircraft from takeoff to final destination, Tel Aviv.<sup>49</sup> The entire action received real-time media coverage. It is difficult to imagine this series of events unfolding, as they did, three years ago. Prior to Gorbachev's leadership, it is likely no aircraft would have been authorized and the incident would not have been reported. The handling of this incident was a major propaganda victory both at home and abroad.

Recently, the Moscow newspaper NEDELYA published a short report on the KGB. It was accompanied by pictures taken inside the KGB's super-secret headquarters on Moscow's Dzerzhinsky Square. This is a true first, even under glasnost. One picture identifies a Professor Alexander Ignatyev lecturing young officers; the professor is pictured in the uniform of a highly decorated colonel. The journalists who wrote the article were obviously carefully controlled and their article contained no mention of the new head of the KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov.<sup>50</sup>

There are signals that Gorbachev has had to slow the public demonstrations which he earlier encouraged. In August 1988, new "Special Purpose" Squads were formed in Moscow under the Ministry of the Interior. These squads are said to be designed to fight unruly, unauthorized mobs. However, in articles in both IZVESTIYA and SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA, their equipment includes bulletproof vests. The deployment of one was described, and its commander was listed as a Colonel D. Ivanov.<sup>51</sup> This could be a priority operation to control the pace of glasnost more than to fight crime.

#### IMPACT ABROAD

The most significant impact of glasnost and perestroika has so far been external to the Soviet Union, where Gorbachev must first make his mark to draw Western financial support. In the West, he is one of the more popular world leaders, while at home he enjoys questionable support.

What Gorbachev absolutely must have is Western financial support to convert and modernize Soviet industry. The second step is to gain enough trust to convince Western governments to transfer technology.



Gorbachev is a master at public relations. He manages to keep Western leaders in the react-mode. How many world leaders publish books while in office? In September 1988, Gorbachev won a special Italian literary prize for his book, Restructuring and New Thinking for our Country and the Whole World. The text cites him for "publicizing in East and West the phenomenon of restructuring and the ideas of peace and disarmament."<sup>52</sup> Pergamon Press published two volumes of his speeches and writings carefully prefaced by him for regional readers. Those published in the United Kingdom read as follows:

"As I agreed to write a preface to my selected works . . . I avail myself of this opportunity to reaffirm the Soviet people's willingness to develop friendly ties with the people of Great Britain and I wish them peace and prosperity."<sup>53</sup> In volume II one finds a "Speech at the Kremlin Dinner for Margaret Thatcher," March 31, 1987. Gorbachev talks about centuries of ties, of the common struggle to defeat Nazi Germany and of nuclear disarmament. He professes a "no first" strike position, and guarantees no nuclear strikes will ever be launched on a country which refuses to store nuclear weapons on its territory.<sup>54</sup>

In a message to Willy Brandt, chairman of Germany's Socialist Democratic Party (SDP) in 1985, he writes of close German ties and the need for even greater improvements in German-Soviet relations.<sup>55</sup> After all, it is from the Germans he stands to gain the most in assistance and technology. Among the German public, he is much more popular than was President Reagan.

Recently, Gorbachev's income was revealed and compared to President Bush's. It is \$30,000 a year compared to Bush's of \$200,000. The information was released by Vitali Korotich, the editor of a Moscow periodical. Korotich also mentioned that Gorbachev "donated \$600,000 in foreign royalties from his book Perestroika to the Communist Party."<sup>56</sup>

Glasnost is clearly the vehicle through which Gorbachev's popularity is to be increased in the West. One cannot scan a daily report of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service without reading of high level political/economic contacts between senior Soviet representatives and heads of industrial or emerging nations. This is far beyond what would have been seen before Gorbachev. He is on the offensive striking deals with Western nations to draw hard currency to the Soviet Union. He has received lines of credit from German and British banks, and has American companies anticipating major investment potential in the USSR.

Gorbachev's every action is directed toward eliminating the "threat" from Western eyes. As the "Evil Empire" image is reversed, the bank vaults of the West are being opened.

#### IMPLICATIONS

The implications of glasnost and perestroika are almost limitless to both Soviets and the free world. If Gorbachev succeeds internally, the impact will surely be registered in the West. Whether that impact is positive or negative will depend on what the verdict is: crusade or campaign.

Let us assume it is a crusade to save the sinking ship. The population of the USSR must go through a complete change in mind-set. They must deal with the transition from a command economy to one which approaches a free market (one which selectively adopts capitalist methods). This change must be supported by a great deal of hard work and initiative. Initiative is not something for which the Soviets are well known. They are used to being told, step by step, what to do.

Politically, glasnost has created groups of individual, localized constituencies vice local representatives of centralized government. The republics want to be like Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, part of the system, but independent. Gorbachev has to show results early enough to reverse this movement. If he does not move quickly enough, the hinge will be the Ukraine. If it makes a strong move for independence, other republics will follow, and the fall of the empire will be irreversible.<sup>57</sup>

If Gorbachev is to avoid this fall, it will be necessary to gain Western commercial credits and technology rather quickly. However, he must first change Western perceptions of the USSR. He is surely doing a good job of that! For a considerable time, he has been more popular among the citizens of our closest NATO ally, West Germany, than our own President.<sup>58</sup> Bonn also happens to be Europe's industrial giant, possessing potentially all the credits and technology the USSR can use. There is an added benefit: the closer the ties between the Soviet Union and any NATO ally, the greater the potential for a weaker NATO.

Gorbachev's military cutbacks serve two significant purposes: First, they provide the image of a more peaceful nation. The peoples of the West are being strongly influenced by this element, causing problems for their governments in the area of defense funding. Secondly, the redirected resources and manpower are needed in the commercial sector. However, Gorbachev had to make significant changes in military leadership to keep the military in line in the face of this reversal. Will the new leadership sit still if the movement towards independence becomes too threatening?

How much time does he have? Depending on who one asks, five to ten years (probably closer to five in my view). If perestroika does not meet the time test, one of two things may happen:

1. The "Empire" will fold (if the military allows this).

2. Gorbachev will be forced back to Stalinist methods.<sup>59</sup> Can he survive long enough? If he is sincere, we had better hope so. But is he sincere?

If one were to worse-case the issue in favor of the strategic deception argument, then glasnost and perestroika are being used to buy breathing room. This breathing room will allow the USSR to regroup and catch up economically and technically to the West, with the West paying the tab. They simply rebuild and modernize using Western credits and technology, with the potential of ending up with a stronger and more modern industrial base than we have.

Then, when the Soviets are ready, they continue their program of world domination. However, this time they will have the industrial capacity to build more, and better, weapons than the West. All this will be accomplished using Western resources and technology.

How probable is this? Well, has anyone heard Gorbachev reject Marx or Lenin? Quite the contrary: He embraces their philosophy. And, what is that? The goal is communist world domination! The question remains: Glasnost and Perestroika - Crusade or Deception?

Since this paper was written, two significant events in U.S.-Soviet relations occurred which tend to tax the question. The first was the visit of two Soviet officers, Colonel Alexander Zobkov and Lieutenant Colonel Yuri Pakhtusov, to the U.S. Army War College on February 10, 1989. Both officers were assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. Colonel Zobkov read a prepared text titled "New Thinking in International Affairs and the Defensive Nature of the Soviet Military Doctrine." He spoke of trust, cooperation, and

common goals of world peace. During both the "reading" and the question and answer period, Lieutenant Colonel Pakhtusov carefully observed the audience and recorded all questions and answers.

The second, and more significant, event was the March 7, 1989 arrest of Lieutenant Colonel Pakhtusov in Washington on charges of spying. He was "caught receiving sensitive information on how the U.S. government protects military secrets."<sup>60</sup>

One should not necessarily draw conclusions from these two events. However, the question remains, are we witnessing a crusade or a deception? Regardless of which one it is, prudence dictates a high degree of caution when dealing with the Soviets.

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