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# STUDY PROJECT

## RESERVE COMPONENT TRAINING UNDER CAPSTONE

BY

COLONEL JERRY C. SMITHERS

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## ABSTRACT (continued)

of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS). The DCSOPS exercises overall staff responsibility for the Army CAPSTONE Program. Forces Command (FORSCOM) serves as coordinating authority for implementation of the CAPSTONE Program, prescribes current policies, responsibilities, and objectives for training Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) units for the execution of their wartime missions. FORSCOM also implements programs that establish training relationships between AC and RC units. This Total Army Program outlines the procedures for training that is designed to prepare AC and RC units to fight and win on tomorrow's battlefield. Is the program satisfying its purpose for the RC? Has the program improved or impeded training and the overall combat readiness of the RC - specifically, the ARNG? This study examines training for combat through the eyes of randomly selected RC soldiers as well as RC soldiers within two large ARNG units. Finally, the study concludes with recommendations for improving the CAPSTONE Program.

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

RESERVE COMPONENT TRAINING UNDER CAPSTONE

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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15 March 1989

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# ABSTRACT

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The Total Army's growing dependence upon the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) to meet its defense needs has prompted RC commanders to establish a training and operational climate that promotes aggressive, bold, initiative-seeking performances by their subordinates and units. Emphasis on innovative training must continue to ensure winning results on tomorrow's battlefield. CAPSTONE, a Total Army Program for training, was developed at Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS). The DCSOPS exercises overall staff responsibility for the Army CAPSTONE Program. Forces Command (FORSCOM) serves as coordinating authority for implementation of the CAPSTONE Program, prescribes current policies, responsibilities, and objectives for training Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) units for the execution of their wartime missions. FORSCOM also implements programs that establish training relationships between AC and RC units. This Total Army Program outlines the procedures for training that is designed to prepare AC and RC units to fight and win on tomorrow's battlefield. Is the program satisfying its purpose for the RC? Has the program improved or impeded training and the overall combat readiness of the RC - specifically, the ARNG? This study examines training for combat through the eyes of randomly selected RC soldiers as well as RC soldiers within two large ARNG units. Finally, the study concludes with recommendations for improving the CAPSTONE Program. (SDO)



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# RESERVE COMPONENT TRAINING UNDER CAPSTONE

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

#### PURPOSE

The Reserve Component (RC) of the Army consists of the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). The RC's mission is to provide trained units and individuals to augment the Active Component (AC) in time of war or national emergency. Service in the AC and RC is completely voluntary. Both reserve components have Federal missions; however, the ARNG is unique in that it as well has a State mission. The State mission is to provide units organized, equipped and trained to protect life and property and preserve peace, order and public safety under competent orders of Federal or State authorities. The State retains command of any ARNG unit not in Federal service. However, both the ARNG and USAR are fully integrated into the total Army and have wartime missions.<sup>1</sup>

Even though the CAPSTONE Program applies to both the ARNG and the USAR, this paper will focus only on the ARNG.

#### ARNG HISTORY

Historically, the ARNG is the oldest military force in the United States; its origins go back to the Old North, South and East Regiments of Massachusetts, formed in 1636. Many modern National Guard organizations in the eastern states can trace their lineage back to these regiments, which also fought along side the British in the French and Indian campaigns. Later, many

of these same militiamen were arrayed against British regiments as the emerging nation decided to break away from English rule. The militia organizations first answered the call on what might be termed a "large scale" when George Washington called for troops to fight the British in the American War for Independence. Known in earlier years as the Volunteer Militia, the Guard acquired its present name in 1825 when a New York Militia unit renamed itself in honor of Lafayette, the Revolutionary War hero, who commanded France's famed Garde Nationale. The designation gradually spread until it had been adopted nationwide by the beginning of this century. Under the National Defense Act of 3 June 1916, the organized militia was officially reestablished as the National Guard; then the organization was designed to conform to that of the Regular Army. It was not until 1933 that the title "Militia Bureau" was changed to National Guard Bureau.<sup>2</sup>

Historically, the United States has fought its wars with a small AC filled out with reserve units. In today's Army, we are organizing and training in peacetime the way we will fight. The RC is no longer a backup force, but a critical link in the total force from Day One in any conflict. Because the National Guard and the USAR are absolutely indispensable components of the total national defense force, ensuring the readiness of RC units is a top Army priority.<sup>3</sup>



## THE TOTAL ARMY PROGRAM - CAPSTONE

CAPSTONE, originating in 1971, is the title of a program, not an acronym. There are four separate and distinct training relationships under the CAPSTONE program. They are:

- DIRECTED TRAINING ASSOCIATIONS (DTA). A dedicated year round training assistance relationship between an AC unit and an RC unit. DTA are programs under which AC units provide training assistance and Annual Training (AT) evaluation to RC units and are an integral function of WARTRAIN, Roundout, and Affiliation. The objective of DTA is improved training readiness and deployment capability of the RC unit.
- WARTRAIN. An evolutionary program for training in support of wartime requirements. WARTRAIN streamlines various programs which have proven beneficial; emphasizes active involvement of the wartime commander in the training of his CAPSTONE-aligned units; and refines the responsibilities of both the wartime and peacetime commanders. Under WARTRAIN, training relationships are established between AC and RC units in support of their wartime mission.
- ROUNDOUT. A Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) managed program that brings units up to a designated structure by filling organizational voids with units from a different component.
- AFFILIATION. Provides for DTA relationship opportunities for the RC combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) units which are not organic to above the line units and already included in WARTRAIN. Above the line units refer to

combat divisions and brigades, armored cavalry regiments, corps artillery and special forces groups. The subordinate brigades, battalions, squadrons, companies, troops, etc., of these units are also included.<sup>4</sup>

As we know, all military units respond to an organic chain of command. The RC chain of command is not the only one to which unit commanders must respond. CAPSTONE assigns varying degrees of responsibility for responding and complying to program requirements. Again, in the ARNG, all units have responsibilities to the state for state missions in addition to federal missions. The RC chain of command is more complex, diverse and difficult to manage than it is in the active force. Some examples are:

- Senior commanders face unique training management challenges. Example: They must manage State contingency mission operations plans (OPLANS) and training and Federal mission OPLANS and training. All mission essential training must be planned, executed, and evaluated within 48 Inactive Duty Training (IDT) periods and two weeks of Annual Training (AT) per year (39 days per year). Additional IDT and/or AT training man-days are allocated to support further mission essential task training based on availability of funds.

- The potential for confusion in training and guidance is increased. Example: Commanders have peacetime as well as wartime chains of command. Also, brigade level commanders in some states are commanding units located in more than one state -

e.g., the Montana brigade has the brigade units in Montana less the artillery battalion located in Wyoming. In this case, command, control and supervision becomes a challenge.

- Quality control and evaluation of training is more difficult. Example: Quality control of training is hampered from one IDT period and/or AT period to another because there are approximately 28 days between drill weekends and 50 weeks between AT periods. Continuity of training operations and unit level cohesion suffers during this "down time" between training periods thereby hindering quality control efforts.

- The creation of balanced training programs that satisfy multiple headquarters is more difficult. The peacetime and wartime headquarters chain of command situation is an example. As in the case of the Montana brigade - the brigade artillery battalion is located in Wyoming (peacetime HQ) and the remainder of the brigade is located in Montana (wartime HQ). Wyoming and Montana will have completely different resource constraints and priorities. The differences make training management and training execution difficult, or in some cases impossible, to reach brigade level readiness without first satisfying multi-state political and economic differences.<sup>5</sup>

The CAPSTONE program ties the total Army training system together. All AC and RC units are assigned wartime commands based on global or regional OPLANs. The Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) is the computer-supported data base portion of an OPLAN. TPFDD contains time-phased force data, non-unit related cargo and personnel data, and transportation

data for the OPLAN. The Time-Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL) is that part of the TPFDD that includes a time-phased force list, identifies type units to be deployed, and provides data concerning their deployment. Together, TPFDD and TPFDL provide information that establishes the wartime CAPSTONE chain of command for the RC. Some units have more than one gaining command based on the different OPLANs but all are given a primary CAPSTONE mission for which they prepare and train. The wartime CAPSTONE headquarters provides training and guidance to the units on wartime missions. Peacetime headquarters provide resources, supervision and evaluation of the RC unit's performance. Each unit must know its wartime mission, the area of employment and the priorities of its gaining wartime command.

Based on the CAPSTONE mission, units develop Mission Essential Task Lists (METL) that specify the performance objectives the units must attain to be combat ready. Most units have an Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) that sets forth task, conditions, and standards for meeting each objective. The wartime CAPSTONE headquarters is designated as approving authority for the METL.

#### PROGRAM IMPORTANCE

How important is CAPSTONE to total force readiness? Forces Command, in FORSCOM Reg 350-4, Training Under CAPSTONE, states:

CAPSTONE is an organizational approach to managing and training the force. Under this program AC and RC units are placed into a wartime organization of the Army

designed to meet the enemy threat in a European, Southwest Asian, or Pacific contingency. The structure also includes the forces necessary to sustain the CONUS base.<sup>6</sup>

The Forces Command statement simply asserts that our national security and the security of our allies are virtually dependent on the success of the CAPSTONE approach to managing and training the force.

Additionally, the Army's Overseas Deployment Training (ODT) is integrated with the CAPSTONE program. RC individuals, units, and cells, in order to participate in ODT, must be on the TPFDL for the theater in which the exercise takes place. These exercises give units valuable training while conducting operations with their wartime commands.

How does the U.S. Army currently feel about CAPSTONE's contribution to RC unit readiness? The Army Forces Magazine concludes that:

The readiness of the RC has improved significantly over the past three years due to the CAPSTONE program which aligns RC and AC units with which they would fight in wartime, intensive management of equipment programs, dedicated procurement funds, and careful management of unit modernization. The ARNG provides warfighting capabilities upon mobilization that are essential for U.S. national security. They are, therefore, fully integrated with the active forces in

U.S. defense plans. In recognition of their roles, the Army has special initiatives underway to maintain RC readiness at a level consistent with their wartime mission. Today their readiness is at the highest level ever in peacetime. The ARNG is a vital partner in deterrence and defense. Their readiness is essential to meeting U.S. mobilization requirements today in the tradition of U.S. citizen-soldiers who were among the founders of the Nation and have defended it for over two centuries. The management, training, and modernization programs such as CAPSTONE, designed to maintain RC readiness, must continue to receive strong support.<sup>7</sup>

"The Army leadership is committed to a 'Total Army'. The RC is receiving resources that reflect their ever-increasing responsibilities. Equipment is provided to both components according to the philosophy that the first to fight are the first to be equipped. Both components must be able to pack up and deploy to distant theater of operations, cope with foreign terrain, weather conditions and ways of life, and train side-by-side with each other and our allies. Such training often cannot be duplicated or simulated on any stateside Army installation. It is this investment that will pay big dividends in the readiness of the Total Army."<sup>8</sup>

General Carl E. Vuono, Chief of Staff of the Army, recently wrote:

"Today we depend on our RC not just for potential, as we sometimes did in the past, but for current readiness. We will fight the first battle together. We must design, equip, and train our forces and develop our leaders with that truth in mind."<sup>9</sup>

General Joseph T. Palastra Jr., Commanding General, FORSCOM makes a similar observation:

"Integral to the success of all FORSCOM missions is the critical dependence on the ARNG and USAR, the RC of the Army. Contrary to times past, the RC is no longer a backup force, but a full partner in our nation's first line of defense."<sup>10</sup>

Resources support for enhanced RC training is an absolute necessity. Army Focus Magazine points out:

"As members of the Total Army, the RC will share equally in warfighting if deterrence fails. It is imperative to pursue a focused strategy to 'ensure their training and to optimize their warfighting capability.' Given the major role the RC play in the Total Army, their 'readiness is of critical concern' and deserving of intensive management."<sup>11</sup>

## SUMMARY

The Total Army Training Under CAPSTONE Program is designed to provide a coherent procedure for integrating the RC into the Total Force. It provides many opportunities for units to conduct exercises under realistic wartime conditions that will enhance combat proficiency and readiness. Since the program's conception, how has it worked for RC individuals and units? Is it assisting and preparing RC soldiers and units to fight and win on tomorrow's battlefield? In chapter II, this study will review responses from a mail-interview questionnaire sent to randomly selected individual RC soldiers and soldiers in two large ARNG units. Their individual and collective responses to important questions concerning their relationships and experiences in training for combat under CAPSTONE will be assessed. Chapter III will offer conclusions and recommendations for improving the program.



## ENDNOTES

1. Training and Organization of the U.S. Army RC (A reference text for Total Force Trainers), U.S. Army Training Board, pg. 9.

2. Ibid, pg. 9.

3. Joseph T. Palastra Jr., GEN, HQ FORSCOM, Public Information Office Release on RC Readiness and Training, October 86.

4. Department of the Army, FORSCOM Reg. 350-4, pg. 15-18 and pg. 1 of glossary.

5. Training and Organization of the U.S. Army RC (A reference text for Total Force Trainers), U.S. Army Training Board, pg. 8.

6. Department of the Army, FORSCOM Reg. 350-4, pg. 1-1.

7. Army Forces Magazine, pg. 21.

8. Department of Defense, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, U.S. Reserve Overview Fiscal Year (FY) 1988, pg. 7.

9. Vuono, Carl E., GEN, The Dynamics of Combat Readiness, Army, October 1987, pg. 21.

10. Palastra, Joseph T., GEN, Reshaped FORSCOM Given More Missions, Army, October 1987, pg. 37.

11. The Army Focus Magazine, November 1988, pg. 19.

## CHAPTER II

### TRAINING FOR COMBAT UNDER CAPSTONE

This chapter reviews, from randomly selected RC soldiers and soldiers from two large ARNG units, individual and collective responses to questions dealing with soldier relationships and experiences in training for combat under the CAPSTONE program. Soldier responses were obtained through the use of mail -interview questionnaires, personal interviews and telephone interviews. Questions were designed to encourage negative as well as positive replies. The questions and the responses to those questions in this chapter represent soldiers' "un-edited replies" received by the Military Studies Program (MSP) author. All soldiers interviewed have knowledge of the program, are currently in RC units or have been in units that have been assigned or associated with the CAPSTONE program.

#### QUESTION ONE

Does your CAPSTONE trace headquarters contribute to your unit's training planning requirements?

#### SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSES - QUESTION ONE

Overwhelming yes. Guidance received from CAPSTONE HQ is sufficient to plan for and execute mission essential task training throughout the year. However, in some instances METL update guidance from the CAPSTONE HQ has not been promptly disseminated.

#### INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSES

- "Yes. However, sometimes guidance is received after start of the Fiscal Year (FY)."

- "Yes. All required locations for training planning purposes to include recommend training emphasis areas, mission statement, and joint war-planning data within OPLAN 4102."

- "It contributes immeasurably. This headquarters has developed a special 'War Planning Committee' that is the most active section in this unit. Our entire training year is based on the wartime mission. We sent soldiers to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) about three times a year for planning and training purposes. I communicate regularly with my CAPSTONE boss in Germany. I receive regular threat briefings and mission guidance from CAPSTONE higher. From this I prepare my training plan and training schedule based on the units METL which comes from wartime mission and higher CAPSTONE guidance."<sup>7</sup>

- "Yes! Key Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) tasks and missions based on wartime missions and area of operations."

- "Yes. However, some of the material is very slow in developing and twice as slow being disseminated. We have not received METL update guidance since 1984."<sup>19</sup>

- "Yes. METL was based on CAPSTONE, collective training, CPXs, FTXs etc. All were done on a CAPSTONE scenario. Each year we participated in a CAPSTONE conference for intelligence and

mission updates. CAPSTONE chain of command was consistent with normal chain of command (115 Field Artillery [FA] Brigade [Bde], WY, ARNG, I Corps Artillery [AT], UT ARNG) and they emphasized CAPSTONE missions. One FA Battalion (Bn) within a FA Bde has conducted OCONUS Annual Training in country; the Bn I commanded is scheduled for 1992. Bde HQ has participated in OCONUS Annual Training IAW CAPSTONE mission once and has sent cells three other times. My Bn has been given slots in exercises OCONUS/CAPSTONE at least once a year for the past 5 years."<sup>54</sup>

#### QUESTION TWO

What levels of training have your units conducted that have been associated with the AC/RC CAPSTONE unit? What were the results of this training?

#### SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSES - QUESTION TWO

Training from individual through Division (Div) levels has been conducted. The consensus is that all training has contributed significantly to individual/collective level proficiency and combat readiness.

#### INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSES

- "Conducted levels of training from individuals through Div that have improved combat readiness throughout the Div. It really worked with the CAPSTONE Corps HQ actually assumed the Corps HQ role, with a commander and staff cell, for our division FTX. Individuals and teams trained with CAPSTONE units

throughout the year then deployed with them to Team Spirit. Valuable training experience for all, but especially our key leaders."

- "Individual through Bde with both higher and subordinate CAPSTONE units. Training with units with whom we would go to war is the best way to improve wartime readiness. It develops and enhances command and staff relationships, mutual respect and confidence, increased mission understanding, and individual/team/unit technical proficiency. With the exception of LOGEX and conferences, all mutual training has been Overseas Deployment Training (ODT). This has provided first-hand knowledge of actual wartime locations and in-theater operating systems. It provides an opportunity for direct coordination with in-country headquarters and agencies, both U.S. and Host Nation."<sup>2</sup>

- "We participate in several CONUS CPXs with CAPSTONE higher and host nation on an annual basis. We also participate in REFORGER about every three years for the whole unit and many subordinate CAPSTONE units that lasts about six weeks - closest thing to WW III possible! Great exercise!"<sup>8</sup>

- "Staff training is excellent. Unfortunately, theater level support units (Support Bn Companies) don't experience enough workload to feel wartime mission reality."

- "Individual through Group - All enhance readiness!"

- "All levels of training from individual (through ability to participate in Corps schools program, partnership trainer support) to Div level which will occur with this commands

participation in Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) Warfighter 89-9 which will be supported by XVIII Abn Corps as the higher HQ. Levels are based on sub-unit training plans and execution. CAPSTONE CORTRAIN/AC/RC Partnership is best program to date, and in my opinion is the only realistic use of the 'One Army Concept'."26

- "Currently our association with CAPSTONE HQ has been during AT periods only, with them being evaluators. Results on training have been very positive. Our 1-R reports have been very good. The evaluators have been open minded and objective. They assist whenever possible."31

- "Training, overall, has been excellent. During AT 86 and 87 the 82nd Abn sent a Company (-) to help with our support mission and also to help us train-up to incoming new equipment. During AT 88 the 24th ID sent approximately 15 soldiers for the same type of missions. We have participated with the 82nd Abn external ARTEP at Fort Bragg during the fall of 1986. 24th ID is much better for us because their TOE and CAPSTONE mission is related to ours more than the 82nd Abn's was."40

- "Individual through Bde. Results of joint CAPSTONE activities are beyond measure and defy brief explanation. Constant interface with the wartime headquarters obviously produces outstanding results. My unit has had the opportunity to visit and work on its wartime 'turf' many, many times - to interface with USAREUR logistics system - to provide real world CSS to its biggest wartime customer (III Corps) on the actual wartime Area of Operations (AO). I've had the opportunity to

deploy most of my wartime subordinates several times in both operational and CPX roles. My headquarters is the proponent for our part of the warplan. A CAPSTONE relationship like this is simply superb as a training vehicle. We're ready to go to war. Solid C-1!"<sup>45</sup>

### QUESTION THREE

How many and what type of staff exercises, with or without troops, have your units conducted in association with the AC/RC CAPSTONE unit? Results of the training enhance or impede combat readiness?

#### SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSES - QUESTION THREE

Types of staff exercises that have been conducted include MAPEXs, CPXs and FTXs. Company level ARTEPs were also conducted by the CAPSTONE HQ that provided superb battalion and brigade staff training. Soldiers agree that staff exercises associated with CAPSTONE HQ significantly improve staff understanding of duties and responsibilities and develop staff competence. The CAPSTONE staff training relationship is the most important driving force behind everything a HQ does. The results of the training has enhanced combat readiness.

#### INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSES

- "Several. Outstanding training!"

- "Seventeen exercises in the last four years - all produced outstanding results. ODT is more beneficial than CONUS training."

- "Several. CAPSTONE has been the single most important factor leading directly to the outstanding training and combat readiness of this unit. CAPSTONE has focused our purpose for existing and therefore our planning and training. It is the most important driving force behind everything this headquarters does."<sup>9</sup>

- "Several from Company to Bde. Excellent staff training for BN and Bde. Company level ARTEPs conducted by CAPSTONE Bn HQ produced superb training for Bn staff and realistic evaluation for the companies."

- "Approximately 20 exercises comprised of CPX/FTX design. All enhanced combat readiness through increased proficiency and knowledge."

- "Two staff exercises. The CPXs we were involved in created more confusion than answers to our problems. The limited time spent with our higher headquarters is not enough to promote good working relations. A shortage of dollars exists to make it all work. If our annual training periods were better aligned with the CAPSTONE program, it might work better."<sup>20</sup>

- "28th ID has only participated in one major staff exercise with CORPS HQs in my experience. Exercise was challenging, and resulted in upgrade of doctrinal applications,



functioning with higher and adjacent divisions and Corps; which upgraded Div overall HQs personnel and their respective readiness to warfight."<sup>27</sup>

- "Two. Excellent training vehicle for inexperienced and untrained staff personnel. Made a significant improvement in their duties and responsibilities and went a long way in developing their competence as staff officers. I have always felt these exercises were valuable training/learning experiences. It is unfortunate they cannot be conducted more often. These exercises definitely enhanced our combat readiness."<sup>49</sup>

- "Three during a 3 year period. The Bn participated in Gallant Eagle and the Bright Star exercises which involved full deployment of Bn. This training was outstanding due to the ability to train in the exact environment that we could expect to fight in. These experiences certainly facilitated combat readiness. In addition the Bn also participated in a CPX with the same results." <sup>53</sup>

#### QUESTION FOUR

Sum up the official results of After Action Reviews (AARs), 1-Rs (Annual Training Evaluation Reports) that represent CAPSTONE program and/or related training.

#### SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSES - QUESTION FOUR

The individual/collective soldier responses concerning AARs and 1-Rs endorse the CAPSTONE program.

## INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSES

- "Excellent training!"
- "All have been extremely positive."
- "This unit is successful and effective due to its exceptionally outstanding commander and equally to its able, dedicated, and loyal NCOs. In every instance these two inseparable factors have overcome the most difficult challenge of REFORGER 87 (ODT CAPSTONE training opportunity) and instilled pride and enthusiasm amongst the rank and file soldiers of the unit. Their dedication to duty and unwavering support of the mission have been instrumental to the overall success of the Redeployment Assembly Area (RAA). The RC soldiers for the most part were indistinguishable from their AC counterparts throughout REFORGER 87."<sup>10</sup>

- "Annual Training (AT) period conducted in FRG, 1988. This unit performed all assigned and assumed missions in a completely professional and outstanding manner. Recommend this unit continue to rotate to USAREUR for at least every other year. This training (ODT CAPSTONE related) was invaluable and provides assurance to the AC counterparts that this unit is ready for war and the total Army concept is a reality."<sup>14</sup>

- "Results have been excellent to outstanding. The CAPSTONE training produced a mutual support effort with our RC unit obtaining hands-on training and also supplied needed assistance to offset workload concerns for AC counterpart."<sup>15</sup>

- "The reports continue to describe the great job everyone did with 'no meat to the matter.'"

#### QUESTION FIVE

What specific resource constraints and/or shortages inhibit the program? Were these constraints/shortages due to AC/RC problems/solutions?

#### SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSES - QUESTION FIVE

The significant resource constraints and/or shortages are time, funding, insufficient and/or inadequate maneuver training areas, and insufficient Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) equipment. Large geographic dispersion among CAPSTONE aligned units contributes to high costs/fund shortages. Fund shortage significantly reduces the number of program participants and the availability of MILES equipment for training. Inspections and other related administrative requirements distract from CAPSTONE program training time. Overall, most resource constraints and shortages are due to insufficient RC resource allocations from higher HQ.

#### INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSES

- "One particular constraint was time. The activity level was so high we had difficulty getting key players to participate in exercises. M-Day soldiers and leaders had civilian job and family problems. In one situation training opportunities had been arranged with AC counterpart (dates, times, etc.) then subsequently changed by AC which caused problems for M-Day soldiers that had gotten leave from civilian jobs."

- "Funding for ODT. Caused units to be dropped from the Crested Eagle troop list thus minimizing valuable training opportunities."

- "None to date. However, we are supposed to lose much funding in the future for ODT and other related training funds. If so, this would have an adverse impact on the CAPSTONE programs ability to provide these vital training opportunities."

- "Funds and training days. Primarily a RC problem. Costs are more due to large geographic dispersion among CAPSTONE aligned units. Therefore, it takes more time and dollars for units to train together as often as they need. Fund shortages significantly reduce the number and types of personnel who can or could participate."

- "Funding cutbacks which result in limited soldier participation. An RC problem at Department of the Army/National Guard Bureau (DA/NGB) level."

- "Inspections and other related administrative matters continue to distract from CAPSTONE training time. We tend to ready equipment for inspection and 'shelf it' for at least a weekend drill until the inspection is completed - result, the equipment is not available for training. All due to RC situations."

- "Funding for DTA is very limited therefore everyone (RC) that needs to benefit from the experience cannot. Most dollar shortages are on the RC side. AC support units always seem to have the money to travel and assist as needed."<sup>24</sup>

- "Limited maneuver areas restrict training of my Infantry (Inf) and Armor BNs. Lack of MILES equipment degrades realism for all BNs. Maneuver cannot be conducted over realistic conditions or distances for the heavy BN. Obviously, the lack of MILES does not permit realistic results of fire and maneuver of tracks and dismounted infantry. Best available Armor/Mech Inf area in First Army LOST to 10th ID at Fort Drum. MILES shortages due to funding constraints."<sup>36</sup>

#### QUESTION SIX

How do you view the AC/RC CAPSTONE officer/enlisted opinions/attitudes toward the program?

#### SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSES - QUESTION SIX

Overall opinions/attitudes are positive - however, in some instances it takes too long to get positive. Bottom line - the personality and attitude of the AC/RC commander determine success or failure for the CAPSTONE program.

#### INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSES

- "Very well received throughout the Division. Good working relationships between AC/RC senior commander and leaders. COMMAND ATTITUDES TO INCLUDE UNDERSTANDING OF PROGRAM IMPORTANCE IS WHAT MAKES IT WORK OR FAIL. We received positive feedback from our enlisted soldiers."

- "Current CAPSTONE headquarters command has an outstanding program attitude that is reflected by his staff as well. He believes in the 'One Army Concept' and gives RC commanders the opportunity to provide input to overall war-plan development."<sup>4</sup>

- "AC and RC soldiers working together, as the CAPSTONE program promotes, is important as each must earn the other respect, confidence, support and understanding."

- "Attitudes of commanders, staffs and key officer and enlisted personnel at all levels are most supportive and favorable."

- "Good now. However, it took years of continuous communications between RC and AC units to get there. Would like to go OCONUS (ODT) more often to get familiar with FRG AO and wartime HQs procedures that do not fit into peacetime CONUS scenario."

- "Very positive! All involved personnel seem eager to get involved."

- "Every annual training period the AC enlisted personnel are a little doubtful of the skills and enthusiasm of our RC soldiers. However, after a day or two they change their minds and become impressed with our soldiers' performance in executing the training programs."<sup>32</sup>

- "Depends on people's attitudes. Most are helpful but a few are still negative. PEOPLE MAKE THE DIFFERENCE!"

- "This organization had a partnership relationship from 1980 through 1987 with the 82nd Airborne. In general, officers and enlisted personnel approached evaluations and training

activities in a positive helpful attitude. An occasional individual with a 'superiority complex' of Airborne over National Guard was a problem. Our new partnership division, the 24th Mech, has assumed the role and after one year appears to be even more willing to aid us in developing readiness. Most enlisted personnel are favorably impressed with the skills and enthusiasm of our soldiers in executing the training. Although some are initially suspicious of our capabilities and intentions, most attitudes are quickly changed. AC soldiers have greater contact with RC soldiers than in the past and their attitudes have improved."<sup>37</sup>

- "A 24th Sig Bn Platoon Sergeant was the NCOIC for AT 88. He was very enthusiastic and stated that his soldiers also had positive learning experiences."<sup>41</sup>

- "LTC Mike O'Brian, commander, 1-14 FA, was, and still is, extremely enthusiastic. He is the type of individual who can make affiliation work as intended. THE PERSONALITY AND ATTITUDE OF THE AFFILIATED COMMANDER CAN MAKE OR BREAK THE PROGRAM. In 1984, the affiliated unit commander, LTC Trimmer, 1-319th FA, shattered our faith in the program by unrealistically conducting a two-week campaign designed to prove how superior he was, and how inferior we were."<sup>42</sup>

- "Difficult to evaluate. Usually there is an initial 'separation' which has to be overcome through performance. In many cases, roles quickly reverse, as RC NCOs and soldiers, who

are usually considerably older and more experienced in their specialties, become the mentors of younger, less experienced AC soldiers. Particularly true in CSS hard skill units."<sup>46</sup>

- "I think the CAPSTONE program is highly supported by all the officers and NCOs I've worked with. My experience is that the program has opened up so many training opportunities and provided so much knowledge that the higher headquarters are often unable to provide the amount of details and plans requested by subordinate units. My impression is that with the 'maturity' of the CAPSTONE program, we should be getting more out of it, eg., we should now have fairly sophisticated and detailed plans and battle books. I'm afraid in too many cases we don't have these because some headquarters have not focused their time and effort. As for the enlisted soldiers - they are the primary exercise participants in my experience or at least equal numbers of officers/enlisted. It has been a tremendous boost in their professional competence and perception of the scope of their responsibilities. They have invariably had a positive learning experience. These programs have greatly enhanced the technical skills of the enlisted soldiers I've worked with."<sup>50</sup>

- "I have found the AC personnel that are knowledgeable about the RC and about CAPSTONE to be supportive. Those that are ignorant of both act accordingly. When I went to Korea on an exercise in 1986 I found the AC to be keenly aware that the RCs timely arrival in Korea was all that stood between them and a North Korea POW camp."<sup>55</sup>



#### QUESTION SEVEN

What are the RC officer/enlisted (program recipient) opinions/attitudes toward the program?

#### SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSES - QUESTION SEVEN

Overall opinions/attitudes are overwhelmingly positive.

#### INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSES

- "CAPSTONE has provided an impetus and direction to RC training that was not present prior to program inception."<sup>3</sup>

- "Our enlisted soldiers that have experience in CAPSTONE training activities comment on how much better prepared we really are. All soldiers now appreciate the importance of our wartime mission and understand its relationship to the CAPSTONE program."

- "Good attitudes, all positive. The soldiers are all for good challenging training that the CAPSTONE program drives. It contributes to our recruiting and retention efforts."

- "Very supportive. They all realize that for the unit to be prepared for mobilization, this type of training is a necessity. We are all part of the team that develops the training plan for IDT and annual training periods."

- "CAPSTONE is the best program to instill sense of mission and purpose. We make it work for ourselves. The 43rd Bde has demonstrated little interest in integrating us into the force."<sup>18</sup>

- "Positive attitudes! Outstanding relationships. We have benefitted greatly from their experience."

- "My personal opinion is that AC/RC partnership was a shot in the arm to RC units. I speak from my overall experience in the RC chain from Bn - Div, in that with their support, we advanced individual and collective training, integrating new ideas and concepts from the AC, perhaps not as rapidly, but sure enough to keep pace with changes. Our AC brothers carried the message from their leaders, who overall, were totally supportive of our efforts and understood that time was the key constraint. Short of mentioning names, evaluators and partners of the 28th ID are now key commanders of units in the U.S. Army. The point is, Army obviously sent us their best to assist in our training effort, but secondly, to train them and give them an appreciation of the RC and their honest efforts to train. Soldiers are the same regardless of being in the AC or RC. When it comes to putting two E-4's or E-5's together in the same AO they quickly mold into one cohesive element all bearing the same environment as each other."<sup>28</sup>

- "With eleven annual training periods (7 as a Bn commander and already 4 as a Bde commander) our chain of command approaches each event as an opportunity to expand our personal knowledge and our unit readiness. Daily contact with evaluation personnel and frank discussion of their observation and our observations of operations produce a consensus of opinion on unit strengths and weaknesses. The program has been very effective in improving readiness."<sup>38</sup>

### QUESTION EIGHT

Overall - have the relationships within the CAPSTONE program impeded or enhanced combat proficiency and readiness?

#### SUMMARY OF RESPONSES - QUESTION EIGHT

Overall, the CAPSTONE program has enhanced combat proficiency and readiness. The realistic 'train as we are to fight' situations were impossible to attain prior to CAPSTONE. We now have purpose and direction to training management and training execution that otherwise would not have been possible. The value in program relationships will best be reflected in the success of any future mobilization.

#### INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSES

- "Improved readiness. The AC Division leaders and commanders were totally professional. They provided outstanding assistance throughout the training year and their evaluations during annual training were educational and contained constructive criticism - our soldiers and leaders who trained under our AC counterparts became more proficient. While in Sixth U.S. Army I conducted a study on combined arms training and found that those units with a DTA attempted and achieved a higher level of training readiness than non-DTA units."<sup>1</sup>

- "ODT is CAPSTONE driven therefore must receive priority for resource support."

- "Enhanced combat readiness!"

- "Readiness has definitely improved."

- "Enhanced! We have learned more about other units, participated in realistic ODT exercises rather than spend annual training at some isolated training installation, and have increased our combat readiness and proficiency."<sup>12</sup>

- "Enhanced for the technical support unit I command. We would not be ready for mobilization without this type of training."<sup>16</sup>

- "Enhanced readiness. During AT most comments and suggestions are realistic and helpful. During AC CAPSTONE visits we have acquired many improved methods on how to operate tactically. The AC visits to our AT periods is worth many times its cost in valuable ideas and training readiness. Also, the I Corps artillery exercise in Utah provided mobilization training never before experienced."<sup>21</sup>

- "The CAPSTONE alignment has improved our combat readiness by providing guidance and assistance in the direct link provided through our experience at annual training. Also, valuable assistance is provided in the communications established with our AC CAPSTONE counterparts throughout the year."<sup>22</sup>

- "DTA has definitely enhanced combat readiness overall. From its inception, the partnership relationships have solidified from an initial evaluator/trainee viewpoint, to a major friendship if that is a good choice of words; what has actually occurred is a realistic approach to training from the standpoint that the AC brother has seen that the RC soldier gives his all in a short time to keep pace. The RC soldier steps from a world of civilian to soldier in a quick 24 hour period and is demanded to

meet the standards and challenge of his AC counterpart.

Initially, this takes 3-5 days of step keeping and rapid pace and the RC soldier becomes tuned to a keener edge. He begins to use his leadership, his initiative and when he reaches the level that a two week training period can leave an individual, he is thrust back into his civilian environment. Although the employer gains a leaner, mentally tougher, and sharper employee, the RC soldier begins his decline as any lack of training will bear. The point of all this is that the AC DTA has realized this as associations have shown, and he then takes a more realistic approach to his support and evaluation. Fair, by the same standards, yet it too has made him a better leader for now he can make a true, unbiased appraisal of the abilities and level of training in the RC unit he supports, advises, and evaluated."<sup>29</sup>

- "It certainly has enhanced our combat readiness. The evaluations point out the areas we need to improve and we use the evaluation guidance to develop or update our Yearly Training Program (TYP)."<sup>33</sup>

- "In terms of training, slightly enhanced. In terms of planning, preparation, organization, and battle focus, it's tremendously enhanced combat readiness."

- "Significantly enhanced. Unit has learned and grown. The experience, National Training Center (NTC) etc., of our affiliated officers and senior NCOs has been passed to this unit since the program began, raising both our awareness of combat requirements and our training threshold each year. Each annual training period we are more ready to learn and improve."<sup>43</sup>

- "CAPSTONE has been a tremendous enhancer of readiness. There's nothing like doing your job in a realistic environment to foster readiness, develop skills and underwrite mutual confidence and trust. Units called upon to 'put the rubber on the road' quickly weed out non-performers and develop and experience base of practical, sustainable knowledge which results in quantum leaps in readiness. Such 'real world' capabilities were impossible prior to the CAPSTONE program."<sup>47</sup>

- "Enhanced. We learned a great deal of professional technical skills from our association. We had purpose and direction to our program which otherwise would not have been available. The value in this program will best be reflected in the success of any future mobilization. Our training programs were greatly enhanced by the CAPSTONE program."<sup>51</sup>

#### QUESTION NINE

What are your judgments, conclusions, and/or recommendations for program improvement?

#### SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSES - QUESTION NINE

The responses overwhelmingly favor the DTA within the CAPSTONE program. Utilization of the CAPSTONE program is the only realistic method available for preparing for mobilization and war. Recommendations for program improvement are summarized in Chapter III.

## INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSES

- "Need to improve and tighten command relationships in CSS USAR trace. A number of RC companies have CAPSTONE relationships with battalion headquarters two thousand miles away."

- "The AC/RC interaction due to CAPSTONE has contributed immeasurably to increasing combat readiness since its inception. This interaction will 'pay off' in a smoother transition to war and enhance mission performance."<sup>5</sup>

- "To improve we must bring peacetime and wartime chain of command in line so the peacetime commander can influence readiness of subordinate units, reduce CAPSTONE alignment turbulence, and eliminate conflicts between TPFDL and CAPSTONE trace. OCONUS headquarters go by the TPFDL and insist it's gospel. FORSCOM says their trace is correct and fund RC units IAW it; RC commanders are caught in the middle."<sup>6</sup>

- "We would take a giant step backward without this program. FORSCOM needs to further align units so those in the peacetime chain remain in the wartime chain."<sup>11</sup>

- "I strongly favor DTA and related CAPSTONE programs. It is the only viable way to train for war. However, my peacetime Bn HQ is not part of my wartime chain of command. This CAPSTONE alignment turbulence needs to be corrected ASAP!"<sup>13</sup>

- "The CAPSTONE program is necessary if we want RC units to be prepared for mobilization. The hands on training with 'live situations is what it is all about.'<sup>17</sup>

- "Basically, the more opportunities available to observe, participate, and exercise with the AC CAPSTONE organization, the more our organization proficiency will improve."<sup>23</sup>

- "We have just been realigned with the 24th ID, Fort Stewart and have not yet had the opportunity to work with them - overall, the DTAs are a positive step in helping RC units to progress from adequate to outstanding. Our soldiers are receptive."<sup>25</sup>

- "DTA relationships provide the annual 1-R, annual training evaluation report, for subordinate units of this command. The RC unit uses this evaluation as a training management tool and considers and reacts during training to the evaluator. The concept of Battalion Training Management System (BTMS) is alive and well in my opinion in the 28th ID, and by our current Corps alignment support of our current training efforts; I feel that their evaluation judgment is that this command is conducting training and adapting to current doctrine and philosophies and is on track with improvement necessary. Such has been the comment in the 1-R from year to year. We now have a new DTA with the 24th ID (mech) and their method of use of the 1-R is similar but different from previous partnerships. Perhaps this is due to internal division methods of operations and the newness of our partnership. Each takes an initial feeling out period which we both have gone through together."<sup>30</sup>

- "In my personal opinion the CAPSTONE program is effective and seems to improve each year."<sup>34</sup>

- "Get more soldiers involved!"



- "The biggest shortfall is not in CAPSTONE but in our low priority designation for equipment. Roundout units get everything their AC partners have and train with them. We may never get new equipment, but must struggle to stay current to fight with AC in time of conflict.!"<sup>35</sup>

- "The program has been effective and with a partnership with a division which has greater similarity to our own I expect it will improve. A coming event will be the division participation in the BCTP with our CAPSTONE Corps headquarters."<sup>39</sup>

- "The program works best when like units are matched, as our recent affiliation with 1-14 FA, a general support battalion like the 1-109 FA, proves. Our affiliation with the 82nd ID was generally productive but was occasionally counter productive with 105mm Airborne tactics which were often pushed on us."<sup>44</sup>

- "Below the lines forces - Program would be substantially improved by aligning peacetime and wartime forces as much as possible. Although this sounds dishonestly obvious, the fact is that the CAPSTONE program does a very poor job of this, even after numerous interactions with higher HQ and revisions of the 'trace'. This serious failing defies explanation. The issue of turbulence within the CAPSTONE program MUST be resolved. DCSOPS types have all sorts of reasons why the CAPSTONE trace has to change every year or two, but it's all baloney! If CAPSTONE is to produce long term results, the force and missions must be reasonably stable, changing only when absolutely necessary. AC planners do not understand and refuse to recognize the trauma

these significant changes in mission and/or force structure have on RC units and leaders. The strength and purpose of CAPSTONE lies in our ability to train RC units and task organizations against specific wartime missions, in the process developing deep institutional knowledge and continuity of personnel. Without that, CAPSTONE is little more than another ambiguous chain of command."<sup>48</sup>

- "Needs to be more focused. Very specific objectives, task, plans, etc. More product oriented. In some cases trips are made that are of questionable value. In my opinion there needs to be an effort to educate commanders and the chain of command on purposes, intents, etc. Senior military leaders need to provide adequate resources to maximize the benefits. CAPSTONE higher HQ units need to be more aggressive in accepting their training responsibilities to subordinate units and become more involved in ensuring adequate guidance is provided and training goals are achieved."<sup>52</sup>

- "CAPSTONE is great, but it has not been carried to its logical end. It is my understanding that not all RC units have been assigned a CAPSTONE trace. In my opinion ALL RC units should further have a DTA. The budget for OCONUS ATs need to be expanded so that RC units can attend OCONUS AT once every 5 years. Also, 1-2 man cells need to be send OCONUS yearly."<sup>56</sup>

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## CHAPTER III

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### CONCLUSIONS

Overall, the following conclusions point out that the CAPSTONE program not only clearly outlines the procedures for training designed to prepare AC and RC units to fight and win on tomorrow's battlefield, but also has significantly improved RC training and enhanced its overall combat readiness. Finally, the conclusions also identify problem areas that, if corrected, should contribute to improving combat readiness and proficiency. Conclusions are:

- Combat readiness has improved significantly since program inception, approximately 10 years ago.
- RC leaders indicate marked improvements in the areas of professional education, e.g., more resident, non-resident and correspondence course dates available for Military Occupational Specialty Qualification (MOSQ), leader proficiency, and professional education and development of junior leaders.
- The program has prompted and promoted, through working together, a better understanding of RC uniquenesses and peculiarities by the AC. The program also encourages AC/RC communication, coordination, confidence, respect, and solidifies 'one Army' promoting one standard.

- The program by design encourages the development of individual through brigade levels of training for the RC with their wartime commands in an ODT status. This relationship has resulted in first-hand knowledge of actual wartime locations, training in those locations, and knowledge of in-theater operating systems.

- Staff training has improved tremendously.

- The program has focused with RC on a 'proud purpose for existing' in peacetime and in wartime. Program involvement is now the most important driving force behind everything the RC does.

- "The current Army force structure assigns approximately 70 percent of CSS units to the ARNG and USAR. Although the Assistant Secretary of Defense has raised legitimate concerns about readiness of RC CSS units, deficiencies are being overcome through effective CAPSTONE planning, continuous exercising, and increased resources."<sup>3</sup>

- With continued modification and/or reorganization of RC units (force modernization) comes a need for dedicated AC assistance and involvement through CAPSTONE, specifically DTA.

- There are now 'first to fight' RC roundout units that also require higher funding priorities. Allocation of additional funding is necessary if the RC is to support total Army concepts such as 'train as we are to fight' and effectively fight jointly with combined arms teams. Resource constraints, specifically time and dollars, inhibit further progress and curtail sustainment training. The most significant loss resulting from

these resource shortages is soldier participation. Fund shortages significantly reduce the number and types of personnel who participate.

- RC administrative burdens continue to distract from CAPSTONE training time.

- AC/RC soldier understanding of and attitude toward the program is what makes CAPSTONE succeed or fail.

- In order for the peacetime and wartime chain of command to function smoothly under the CAPSTONE program, RC units must be aligned with and assisted by the same AC/RC units in peacetime for training as they are in wartime for fighting. The unit providing the DTA assistance to a unit outside its peacetime and/or wartime chain of command is less likely to assist that unit with the same degree of generosity in resource allocation, commitment, concern, and aggressiveness as it would to a unit in its own chain of command. When this type of alignment turbulence or 'chain of command mix' occurs, AC/RC commanders find conflicts of interest between headquarters when planning, executing, and supervising training efforts.

- "For soldiers in all components, CAPSTONE means greater speed and more effective organization when it comes time to mobilize and deploy."<sup>1</sup>

- "Not only will units know ahead of time who their partners would be during war, but under CAPSTONE these partnerships will be able to make pre-mobilization plans which



include training together. The Army is making further plans to streamline mobilization - to make it work, and to make it work fast. CAPSTONE is a step in that direction."<sup>2</sup>

This examination of key characteristics of the RC environment could, taken in isolation, conclude that the complexity of the CAPSTONE training challenge exceeds the RCs ability to deal with it, or that the RC may experience great difficulty sustaining acceptable levels of combat readiness; such an observation would be inaccurate. It is accurate, however, to conclude that RC training under CAPSTONE offers unique challenges and that the RC training environment demands training approaches that are aggressive, innovative, creative, but practical. Also, it is important to realize that the RC approach to meeting challenges is evolutionary. The RC has met the challenges in the past, they are meeting them today, and thanks to the CAPSTONE program support will continue to meet them in the future.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations for program improvement are:

- Additional financial resources must be allocated the RC, especially 'first to fight units', to further exploit individual and collective CONUS and ODT CAPSTONE program peacetime training opportunities. RC participation in these additional training opportunities will increase RC combat readiness.
- Accelerate the effort to reduce the administrative burdens in the RC that continue to detract from and inhibit the use of limited CAPSTONE training time.

- HQ, Department of the Army should design, as part of 'all component' key leader development, education, and knowledge, a 'School House Total Force' course about the RC. The course, at a minimum, should be designed to educate key leaders on RC history, missions, uniquenesses, and peculiarities. The course should also be exportable to the field and available in correspondence mode.

- HQ Department of the Army should CAPSTONE align RC units with the same AC/RC units in peacetime for training as they are aligned in wartime for fighting. There are units providing and/or receiving DTA assistance that are outside the other units peacetime and/or wartime chain of command. When this type of 'chain of command mix' occurs, AC/RC commanders find conflicts of interest occur between HQ in training planning, training execution, and training supervision efforts. Additionally, program alignment relationships should be 'geographic and by mission' as much as force structure will allow.

#### SUMMARY

The CAPSTONE training program encompasses all activities that support improved proficiency in wartime missions. It also establishes valuable training relationships between AC and RC units. The continued funding of this program is essential to effectively equip, train, mobilize and deploy for war all components of our Army for tomorrow's battlefield.

All of the above recommendations based on the study's conclusions are practicable. Their implementation will lead to a combination of systemic changes and better interaction among all components of the Army. Improving CAPSTONE will improve readiness. Improved readiness will provide an Army that is prepared to fight outnumbered and win.

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