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# MILITARY REFORM--WHAT NEXT?

BY

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

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MILITARY REFORM - WHAT NEXT?

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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# ABSTRACT

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# MILITARY REFORM - WHAT NEXT?

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

The basic principle of civilian control over the military establishment was embedded in our Constitution. The question of who has the right to declare war was decided by the framers of the Constitution after considerable debate, stating that Congress should bear the burden to declare war and the President responsible to conduct war. This precept implied that the voices of the nation, i.e. the elected officials, would not only "raise and maintain" the armed forces, but ensure civilian primacy in their conduct. This basic reasoning was the cornerstone for the organization of the armed forces that has carried it through a civil war, two world wars and numerous incursions and conflicts without major changes. The reform changes that have taken place did not change the basic tenets of military organization, but did have historical significance that will be discussed in chapter II.

The evolution of change that the armed forces has undergone through numerous wars and administrations have had one objective in mind, to achieve the optimum military capability given a set amount of resources.

The purpose of this study is not to debate the wisdom of decisions or recommendations made by blue ribbon commissions, legislators, military officers or past

administrations, but to 1) examine the history of military reform, 2) look at the most recent reorganization efforts and 3) consider how these recent reforms may signal further military reorganization. Even as this study project is being written, there are adjustments being made and signed into law that affect existing organizations. The current thought process that has dominated the Pentagon as well as Capitol Hill could have far reaching effects on the organization of the armed forces in the year 2000.

This study traces military reform from its roots in 1942 to the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act. It assumes that the armed forces of the United States are in better shape than they ever have been in the past. It also assumes that there will be reviews and consequent legislative adjustments as both administrations and U.S. requirements for national security change. Finally, it examines what some of those changes could be and what effect they will have on the force structure.

Civilian supremacy in our system is fundamental. It is the bedrock of all reform efforts. The present system has been tested by some of the greatest military minds of our time and determined to be sound. Military reform has been slow to evolve, but continuous. It has been most dramatic since the end of WW II and the changes have been adjustments to an operating and relatively successful system. It may be necessary to be wary of current reformers who would seek solutions to short term problems by enacting fundamental

systemic changes. The complexity of the current military command and control structure must be thoroughly understood by such reformers, and the effects of their proposals must be analyzed throughout that structure.



## CHAPTER II

### HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

The underlying problems of the military organization and command have been evident for much of this century. At regular intervals during this period of time , these issues have been addressed in a variety of ways by a diverse field of experts. The failure of any one solution is not the fault of its originator, but the complexities of the organization. Although this study is of the military aspects of the Department of Defense, let me digress for a moment to the root problems of the largest organization in the free world. 1.

The report of the Presidents 1970 Blue Ribbon Defense Panel noted changes in the organizational requirement of the U.S. military establishment that began to emerge at the start of the 20th century;

"...for nearly 150 years the President was the sole coordinator of the two [War and Navy] departments and the sole court for settling disputes.

During the 19th century this was a reasonable arrangement and not very burdensome. Army and Navy missions seldom overlapped, and, in the absence of instant communications, such problems as arose in the field had to be resolved in the field anyway. Moreover, the military Services, being relatively

small organizations, except in time of war, caused no earth shaking problems." 2.

The changes referred to in this report, of course, were the quantum leaps in technology and the changing demands in U.S. security interests. This chapter examines how the current problems came about within the military side of the Department of Defense and why there have been repeated failures in dealing with them.

The strategic direction of the military had its origin in December 1941, following the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Joint Chiefs of Staff owe their origin to a joint decision by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill who established a Supreme British-American military organization, the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 3. The Joint chiefs of Staff began to take form in early 1942 and had their first meeting on 9 February 1942. Functioning as a corporate body and providing military advice to the President, the joint chiefs had no formal structure or charter. Throughout World War II the military received its direction from their respective chiefs and were free to prosecute the war as they saw fit within the bounds set by the President, national policy and the resources available.

In 1944 pressure began to increase to formalize the Joint Chiefs of Staff and make them responsible to the executive branch. This is the first time that a single department of armed forces was suggested. This concept was

vehemently opposed by the chiefs and the debate that ensued is still going on today. This wartime agency continued to function until negotiations between the President, Congress, and the War and Navy Departments worked out a unification plan that was acceptable. This plan was the National Security Act of 1947, which among other things, formally established the Joint Chiefs of Staff in statute. This cleared the way for "strategic direction" of the armed forces that was intended to integrate the planning sequence for all combat operations.

Implicit in this Act was that the joint chiefs must inform the Secretary of Defense [also created by the Act] of any issues that could not be resolved. Two years of operations indicated that the Act needed to be ammended and Congress took action. On 10 August 1949, President Truman signed the National Security Act Ammendment of 1949. This Act strengthened the strategic direction of the armend forces, but more importantly, codified authority by the Secretary of Defense over the armed forces. Under the 1949 law, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was established to act as the executive agent of the joint chiefs, but would not exercise military command or control over them or any portion of the armed forces. 4. The Chairman was now the single source to carry forth the disagreements between the Service Chiefs to the Secretary of Defense and the President.

The next reorganization effort was submitted by President Dwight D. Eisenhower to Congress in April of 1953. The key elements of this proposal included:

1. Selection of the Director of the Joint Staff by the Joint Chiefs of Staff subject to the approval of the Secretary of Defense.
2. Selection of members of the joint staff by the JCS, subject to the approval of the Chairman.
3. Transfer to the Chairman of the functions of the JCS with respect to managing the joint staff and its director. 5.

The plan was to strengthen the civilian responsibilities and ensure that the military chiefs of their respective services were responsible to their secretaries for both efficiency and readiness. This plan also ensured;

"... the Secretary of Defense would in each case designate a military department as the executive agency for a unified command. Individual JCS members would no longer serve as executive agent. The channel of command would be from the President to the Secretary of Defense, to the designated civilian secretary of a military department, through the military chief of that department, to the commander in the field. 6.

This reorganization was to last five years until the technological advances and DoD expansion dictated another change. This change was the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act that directed that the Chairman's authority over the Joint Chiefs be exercised "on behalf of" the full chiefs. This Act also integrated the staff as well as expanding it to 400. The new chain of command would now go from the President to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the field commanders. This Act marks the first time that Congress had taken interest in the operating forces of the Unified and Specified Commands.

The military organization has remained basically the same since 1958 with no major legislative changes. There has been, however, continuous "tinkering" with the structure by both the military and the legislative "experts" to meet changing requirements and diverse circumstances. Congress perceived a need for structural change again in 1985 after critical debate over demonstrated deficiencies in the performance of the military organization. These deficiencies were both operational and administrative in nature. After the Vietnam war, the seizure of the Pueblo, the failure of the Iranian hostage rescue and the Grenada incursion, the development of an encompassing military strategy seemed elusive and interservice bickering was draining congressional confidence in the military establishment.

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was the result of an ambitious

effort by reformers who feared that diverse service related issues could not be satisfactorily resolved by a corporate organization. The debate that led to the reorganization centered around six basic issues:

1. Emphasis by military officers on technical skills rather than warfighting skills and strategic planning.
2. Congressional undermining of central authority in the U.S. military establishment.
3. Centralization versus decentralization.
4. Absence of a national military strategy.
5. The division of civilian and military responsibilities.
6. A general staff. 7.

While a case can be made for each of these points, the heart of the controversy in each is the civilian-military relationships and when civilian authority must be brought to bear. The point here is not to refute the necessity for civilian intervention, control and authority over the military, but rather the timing of it. Effective, intelligent reform of the military can solve most of the problems and certainly political decisions to employ the military based on sound military advice have proved essential to our national survival.

The evolution of the military organization came about because of public opinion interpreted by the elected public

legislators and signed into law by the President, who is the Commander in Chief. Each of these co-equal partners are inter-dependent. The complex question that remains is what functions do civilians play in strategy, operational planning, and command? These functions are the heart of the military profession.

## End Notes

1. "Defense Organization: The Need for Change," Armed Forces Journal International, Oct. 1985: 40.
2. Ibid, 56.
3. "Brief Organizational History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 Feb. 1980: 1.
4. Ibid, 3.
5. Committee on Civilian - Military Relationships, "An Analysis of Proposed Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization," The Hudson Institute, 17 Sep. 1984: 10.
6. Historical Division of the JCS, 5.
7. Armed Forces Journal International, 56-7.



## CHAPTER III

### RECENT CHANGES AND EFFECTIVENESS

When the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act was signed into law on 1 October 1986, it ended lengthy debate on defense capabilities, planning procedures and perceived acquisition inefficiencies. The sweeping changes it made will be the focus of this chapter.

The Vietnam experience began to raise questions about the military's capability to plan and execute joint operations. These doubts were exacerbated by the aborted Iranian hostage rescue and difficulties during the Grenada incursion. Some of these concerns included:

- The quality of military advice to the President and the national military establishment.
- The need to redefine the role of the JCS.
- The need to strengthen the authority of the unified and specified combatant commanders.
- Unnecessary layering and duplication. 1.

Implicit in these concerns is the fear that the civilian control of the military or the American political system itself could be overridden by the military. Anyone who is a serious military historian or political analyst knows how unlikely that is in our present system. Quite the opposite has proved to be the case as Admiral Moorer, USN (ret) explained in the spring of 1985 when referring to the

Johnson administration's delegation of directing the Vietnam conflict to Secretary of Defense McNamara:

"Let Bob handle it", he told the JCS. Well, Bob handled it. Our history reveals how Bob's analysts ran the war, neglecting military counsel (even scoffing at it). On many of Secretary McNamara's trips to Vietnam, he took none of his military chiefs with him, and on return, executed programs and plans without consulting his JCS and service chiefs. 2.

When preparing their separate versions of the Reorganization Act of 1986, both the Senate and the House considered the findings of the President's 1985 Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (the Packard Commission). One of their primary concerns was to reorganize the JCS, but in doing so , it caused a ripple effect that went up and down the DoD chain. 3.

What then was the overall affect of legislative efforts? It was a document about 100 pages long that affected the whole of the Department of Defense. The first page of the Act states the policy which guided the authors (see chart, public law 99-433--Oct. 1, 1986). 4. Notice (8) that states "...to enhance the effectiveness of military operations...". The titled provisions of the Act are as follows:

SEC. 3.POLICY

In enacting this Act, it is the intent of Congress, consistent with the congressional declaration of policy in section 2 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401) --

- (1) to reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in the Department;
- (2) to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense;
- (3) to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands;
- (4) to ensure that the authority of the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands;
- (5) to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning;
- (6) to provide for more efficient use of defense resources;
- (7) to improve joint officer management policies; and
- (8) otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense.

- TITLE I      -Department of Defense Generally
- TITLE II     -Military Advice and Command Functions
- TITLE III    -Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities
- TITLE IV     -Joint Officer Personnel Policy
- TITLE V      -Military Departments
- TITLE VI     -Miscellaneous

The common thread that runs throughout the entire Act is the concern to tie operational planning and execution to acquisition and control. The contention being that the warfighters in the combatant commands make a limited contribution to their own destiny in the way of resources, but are required to execute war plans and policy that are resource intensive. This was expressed clearly in the Senate Armed Services Committee Staff Report.

Given the weakness of the JCS system and the relative isolation of the unified commands from the Secretary of Defense, the unified commands do not have sufficient influence over the readiness of their assigned forces, their joint training, their ability to sustain themselves in combat, or the future capability of their forces that derive from development and procurement decisions. As a result, a key force of integrated functioning of the defense establishment--the unified command--plays only a minor role in the most important defense decisions.

While the limited input from the unified commands reduces the integrating staff support readily available to the Secretary of Defense, it is a major problem for the unified commands themselves because they have limited ability to influence policy and resource allocations affecting their commands. 5.

Under this Act, the Chairman of the JCS through his staff must identify the strategy-resource mismatches and readiness shortfalls based on a reporting system developed by the Chairman and the combatant commanders and the Secretary of Defense. This puts the operational commander, not the Service Chiefs, in a position to control and allocate resources. These changes would seem to limit the Service Chiefs responsibilities, by allowing the CinC's to input priorities to the budgeting system that can improve the commands warfighting capability. In turn, this effects the Service's budget process, causing it to either support the CinC's priorities or justify why not. This change brings todays warfighting requirements to the forefront of the budget process.

A closer look at how each title impacts the Department of Defense is in order.

## TITLE I

The provisions of this title are directed at the Department of Defense in general and mandates that the

Secretary of Defense must provide clear written guidance to the Services through the Chairman of the JCS that is realistically tied to the resources that will be available during the applicable time frame. This section also requires the legislative branch to be more visionary and more informed on global strategy so that intelligent decisions can be made with respect to resources. One interpretation of this provision has suggested that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) staff, will be required to review military contingency plans; such an interpretation could provide new meaning to the term civilian control. 6.

The quality of DoD civilian personnel appointees will also be tightened and subject to confirmation by the Senate. Finally, there are provisions that require on-going studies of the Department of Defense.

## TITLE II

Title II is divided into two parts, the JCS and the Unified and Specified Commands. The provisions of this title transfer most of the duties performed by the corporate JCS to the chairman. He is the principle advisor to the president, the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense. As before, the Chairman will present differences of opinion from the Service Chiefs, but under the new provisions he has statutory responsibilities that clearly give him more "clout". He also has a Vice Chairman who is the second ranking military officer in the armed forces and

will become the acting chairman during the absence of the Chairman. The joint staff has been placed firmly under the Chairman's authority, direction and control and they will serve him first and not the corporate JCS as in the past. 7.

The second part of title II specifies that the operational chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the unified and specified commands. The function of the Chairman here is to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in their command functions. The Act gives the unified and specified commanders almost total authority over their theater component commands and more control over administrative and support activities. The Chairman and the Vice Chairman will have an expanded role in the defense resource picture and, although, the CinC's emerge with an increased participation in the resource game, it is still too early to tell what affect they can have over time.

This title also attempts to clear up some of the complex problems associated with command relationships and command authority which are long overdue. For example, the CinC's now participate in the selection of their component commanders and those commanders must keep the CinC informed of service activities within his area of responsibility. 8.

### TITLE III

This title is designed to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the Defense Agencies and DoD Field

Activities. There is an extensive list of options that require the supporting agencies to ensure that the operating forces have sufficient resources to sustain operations.

During hearings on the Reorganization Act of 1986 the Senate Committee noted:

There are 14 Defense Agencies and 8 DoD Field Activities that carry out common supply of service functions for the entire DoD. These agencies and activities have not been adequately supervised and controlled. One negative consequence of this inattention is that the Defense Agencies are more oriented to peace activities than to supporting the combatant commanders in wartime. 9.

This is a clear indictment of the agencies and their activities. It suggests that a hard look at the sustainment side of DoD is in order. Additional hearings and adjustments to bring them in line with current military warfighting strategies are likely to come.

#### TITLE IV

This section of the Act is an attempt to solve the joint officer personnel policy problems with rigid guidelines. What the authors fail to realize is that not only is it difficult to comply with, it may well undermine the whole officer system. This provision requires each service to micro-manage their personnel to meet mandated




objectives and comply with significant reporting requirements to the Congress. The relatively small joint staffs, the types of functional area skills required, tour length requirements and advanced schooling will severely limit joint assignment opportunities. There have been several systems approved to select officers for schooling and assignments, however, leaving this decision to personnel managers will breed discontent and potentially gross inefficiencies within the officer corps. The involvement of senior leadership throughout the selection process will be required to ensure an equitable board process. 10.

#### TITLE V


This title clarifies the roles of the Service Secretaries and the Service Chiefs. The Air Force and the Army were affected the most in this section. The Department of the Navy underwent the fewest changes. There is one unique Navy aspect which removed the Navy's independent authority to conduct reconnaissance, ASW and protection of shipping and put them under the command of the warfighting CinC. While the basic text of the provision was to eliminate duplication of effort, its more significant impact was to remove certain functions under the Service Chiefs and establish entities within the Secretariat, an illustration of this is the Army organization old and new at figures 1 thru 4. 11. Some of these realignments were extremely complex involving integration and consolidation of separate

# **ARMY STAFF** (OLD ORGANIZATION)



**FIG 1**

# **ARMY STAFF** (NEW ORGANIZATION)



**FIG 2**

# SECRETARIAT ORGANIZATION (OLD ORGANIZATION)





FIG 3

# SECRETARIAT ORGANIZATION (NEW ORGANIZATION)



□ ADDITION

FIG 4  
22

elements at both the Secretariat and Service staff levels.

12.

## TITLE VI

This title, as the name implies "Miscellaneous", covers portions of the Act not included under previous titles. Essentially the provisions require the lower-level staffs of military departments and the unified and specified commands to reduce their staffs to 90 percent of current strength. The Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities were driven by a more complicated formula. It also reduced some reporting requirements and added others. The final provisions recognize the future need for statutory change and tasks the Secretary of Defense to draft changes to the law.

The basic charter with which the legislature crafted this law and the results that are beginning to take place seem to be in consonance, but only experience will determine the wisdom of these changes. Although there is growing support for some of the changes, on both sides of the fence, there is equal concern for the side effects that could cripple the armed forces. Some of these concerns are:

- Can the Service Chiefs of Staff exercise proper judgment and influence over future acquisition matters, especially those relating to requirements and priorities?

- How will the reduction of Service staffs affect requirements on the major commands which, in turn, must undergo a cut themselves?
- Will the joint specialty program force our most competent officers to get the prescribed joint qualifications at the expense of Service unique military experience or training?
- How will the increased responsibility and authority given to the Civilian Secretaries affect the functions of the Service Staffs?

This type of military reform will require intelligent, informed support by all of the Congress. To date it appears to be a one-way proposition directed only at the military with small pockets of support within Congress. 13.

## End Notes

1. Association of the United States Army, "Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 - A Primer," (Washington: 1986): 4. (hereafter referred to as AUSA)

2. T.H. Moorer, ADM, USN (ret), "An Opposing View," Wings of Gold, Spring 1985: 8.

3. AUSA, Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 - A Primer, 5.

4. Ibid, 7.

5. U.S. Cong., Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Report, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 1985 (Washington: GPO, 1985), 87.

6. AUSA, Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 - A Primer, 10.

7. Ibid, 13.

8. Ibid, 14.

9. U.S. Cong., Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Report, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 1986 (Washington: GPO, 1986), 9.

10. Michael B. Sherfield, Ltc, USA, "The 1986 DoD Reorganization Act and its Effect on the U.S. Army Officer Development Policies," U.S. Army War College Military Studies Project, 18 April 1988: 28-9.

11. AUSA, Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 - A Primer, 22-3.

12. Ibid, 24.

13. Ibid, 37.

## CHAPTER IV

### ADJUSTMENTS, IMPLICATIONS AND MUTATIONS

The military was on its way to self reform in the 1980's, but was too slow to react. Congressional help, and rightly so, provided the boost toward a more functional system. The assumption that must be made is that no system is perfect and that in the final analysis the only way you can minimize error is to ensure that the best people fill the critical positions. The perceived deficiencies of the American military do not lie in the inadequacy of its personnel or equipment, but rather in the vague application of power as a result of poorly defined national objectives. The reformers disagree among themselves on whether the United States should have a primarily continental or maritime strategy. These disagreements, although interesting, have grave implications.

The basic question of national strategy is not always clear. Where the scope of a particular incident is narrow and the objectives clear, such as the raid on Libya, the National Command Authority (NCA) will become involved and the legislative branch will strongly back military intervention. This is relatively low risk politically and has immediate positive feedback. However, when the scope widens and the national objectives become vague the military is often misused or worse, the scapegoat, such as happened

in Beirut. The point here is that the military is responding to and conditioned for vague guidance with increasing risk.

Over the past 45 years under eight Presidents and 22 Congresses there has been over 20 separate studies and numerous reform bills submitted that have altered the way the military does business. This trend is likely to continue in the shadow of defense budget cuts and technological advances. The military obviously must cooperate with Congress so that they will not further stifle initiative, but they must also not allow bureaucracy to outweigh the security of the United States. Neither can the military afford to stand by and await its fate. Reform themes have become increasingly more radical and targeted at institutional reform. What the recent efforts fail to come to grips with is the gut issue of a national strategy with the attendant military guidance. They address instead juggling wiring diagrams, unifying functional areas and cutting costs. If the goal here is efficiency, which by definition is impossible in a bureaucracy, then it has far reaching implications. One central theme is the unification of all the Service staffs into one general staff. Critics argue that this would eliminate delays in decision making, and cite Britain's 1982 move to abandon its joint chiefs in favor of a more concentrated military authority. This is a poor argument since Britain's global responsibilities have been drastically shrunk by postwar realities. 1. The general



- Each circle is centered on a different set of goals
- They will differ in diameter which reflects their influence based on circumstances (situation)




FIG 5

staff concept was also used by the German's during this century twice and twice it failed miserably.

As figure 5 suggests, there are numerous forces at work that directly influence how the military reacts to a given set of circumstances (situation). To expect the military to internally always agree is fantasy, just as the other three major players (President, Congress, and public) don't always agree.

The reform steps to date do not entirely resolve the concerns of senior military officials or civilians over operational effectiveness or administrative efficiency. Further efforts to consolidate functional areas could bring about the following:

- A consolidated Research and Development Command, CinC R&D, that would eliminate parochial concerns and clearly define systems to meet the changing threat. This would also compress the time it takes to deploy a new systems and significantly reduce interoperability problems. This command would be responsive to the warfighting CinC's for developing concepts before the component responsibilities are defined. This then would further provide the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) with information critical to their deliberations.
- A functional training command, or schools and training command, CinC S&T. This would consolidate all basic training at given locations prior to being sent to component specialty schools and technical schools. The

officer education programs would do likewise and then come back together at the CGS and War College levels to conform to the requirements of title IV of the 1986 Reorganization act. This would cut costs and enhance jointness.

-One of the major problems with interoperability is communications. A CinC COM would eliminate this problem. Radio acquisition would standardize, frequency allocation would be centralized and all EW assets would be centrally managed. This would drastically cut costs and enhance joint operations by giving the supported warfighting CinC a single source for command and control of his resources.

-A strategic forces command, CinC STRATCOM, could be formed based on our nuclear triad. This integrated strategic command would be responsible for the entire nuclear response spectrum as well as defense.

-Finally, a single medical command that is dedicated to the overall well-being of the military, CinC MEDCOM. This has been a source of heated discussion for some time. A single source for the procurement of doctors, dentists and medical supplies would greatly simplify our present dilemma and result in considerable savings.

Some of the above postulations may seem a bit far-fetched, but the recent formation of SPACECOM and TRANSCOM differ very little. I would not dismiss them as military science fiction, even though there are strong historical and

institutional legacies that may preclude their formation. They do contain some of the options that are being considered, if only incrementally, to move us gradually toward an overall military organization that is functionally oriented vis-a-vis Service organization, and theoretically more responsive to our national security needs as they evolve. As former national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski noted:

"The real risk in the years ahead is that the amount of dollars for national security will shrink even as our adversaries capabilities continue to grow, while our traditional and increasing ineffective structure continues wastefully to consume increasing limited resources. A change in our force posture is imperative, but can be undertaken only in the context of a timely strategic reappraisal and of a much overdue organizational reordering." 2.

#### End Notes

1. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Gen USA, (ret), "Dont Alter the Joint Chiefs, "New York Times, 19 June 1984: 27.

2. Zbigniew Brzezinski, " Streamlining U.S. Military Command Setup, "Wall Street Journal, 20 June 1985: 28.

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The recent efforts to reform the military is on the right track. Although the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act increases the warfighting CinC's role and allows him to help control his own destiny and enhances the CJCS's span of influence, it may have dealt the Services Chiefs a serious blow. For the Services to efficiently support the current military strategy of deterrence, flexible response, forward deployed forces, coalition defense, and rapid reinforcement, they must take a responsible role in joint warfighting. The already austere resources look to dwindle even more and put the antiquated 2 1/2 war strategy of the 70's to bed for good.

The changes are likely to continue as will the legislative tinkering with the 1986 Reorganization Act. The military must continue to comply with the intent of Congress and limit parochial interests and functions. The primary responsibilities for air, sea, and land should lie with their respective Services, but operational and strategic matters must be joint. Allowing the Services to equip themselves when we have serious interoperability problems will only lead to disjointed operations with predictable results. There are, arguably, more intra-service problems than inter-services problems. An example of this is the Air Force and its disagreements over hardware between its

functional areas, i.e. fighter pilots, bomber pilots, missilemen, and support activities. Their internal disagreements are just as intense as are those between the Services.

On the other hand, leaving reform decisions entirely up to the legislative branch, with their own parochial interests, will also have predictable results. Historically laws passed on military reform tend to be inflexible and frustrating to implement. This causes an apparent danger of manipulating statistics or guidance to achieve goals contained in the legislation, rather than realistic problem solving. Simply moving desks around and changing office symbols will not solve problems either. Civilian control over the military, and Congressional oversight is necessary and reflects sound reasoning by the authors of the Constitution. However, congressional involvement in such things as creating military commands, evaluating nuclear targeting, and reviewing operational plans is dysfunctional, better left to military professionals who are educated and experienced in the employment of military forces to achieve strategic and operational objectives in support of national political goals.

Congress has been encouraged by some recent successes in consolidating military organizations by functional areas, such as TRANSCOM and SPACECOM. Although this consolidation will improve efficiency in these areas, it is dangerous to

assume that functionalism represents efficiency across the military spectrum.

The most recent reform movement is skewed mostly toward the military who have some small pockets of congressional support. With a new administration in place this is likely to continue until a new agenda is evident and the fiscal parameters are established. This "wait and see" period comes at a dangerous time when there are complex changes taking place between the superpowers and evolving third world countries. Given the budgetary constraints already in place and the Congressional propensity to "tinker" (especially freshman Congressman) more proposed reform for the military is likely in the future.

These conclusions are based upon a broad perspective of military reform, but focus on the analysis made of the recent reform movement.

Recommendations based on those conclusions:

- The CJCS, the Service Chiefs and the military organization as a whole must be proactive in reform and not merely provide lip service to change in the joint arena. Allowing blue ribbon panels, legislative committees and subcommittees to force change through congressional procedures only widens the gap between civil-military understanding.
- The current military reform activities are in support of the civil-military relationship and its sanctity within our Constitutional system. Any further reform must be



cognizant of the clear nature of civil control on the one hand, and effective military operations on the other.

-The Services must launch a coordinated effort to educate legislators, especially freshmen, on the dangers of military reform that is not linked to threat or national strategy. Specifically, such proposals as force reductions of forward deployed forces to meet budget constraints, or conventional arms reduction talks conducted with political not strategic objectives in mind must be cautioned against.

-Reduce the number of congressional committees and subcommittees that alter many or most of the line items in the defense budget, and restrict their role to guidance. The Armed Services Committee should concern themselves with any appropriate line item changes, and the Appropriations Committee should do the funding. The new two year defense budget , brought about by the 1986 Defense Reorganization Act, needs to be met in Congress with proper changes in congressional procedures to prevent duplication and delay. 1.

-The type of forward strategic thinking that produced our maritime strategy, SDI and Air Land Battle must take precedence over parochial interests and intra-service bickering. The Services can ill-afford functional unification unless it serves to improve the warfighting CInC's operational capability.

- The same scrutiny that is applied to the military to ensure that Constitutional rights are secure must be applied to the congressional procedures to ensure that they do not exceed their Constitutional authority in an attempt to "fix" the military.
- The Services must guard against random functional consolidation and ensure that legislators are thoroughly informed on the implications that such changes will have on the military. On the other hand, if such changes make operational sense and are made in the interest of obtaining national strategic objectives, then the Services should be quick to act.
- Finally, the services need to continue to cooperate with Congress to help limit unrealistic requirements. The challenge to the military is to ensure that only the best officers are put in the critical jobs, and the centers for strategic thinking continue to develop joint strategic concepts that match resources with national strategy.

#### End Notes

1. Fredrick H. Hartman and Robert L. Wendzel, Defending Americas Security (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988), 343.

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