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AT THE CROSSROADS OF THE NATO BURDENSARING DEBATE--  
THE U.S. DILEMMA: WHICH PATH TO CHOOSE?

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL LAURENCE R. SADOFF

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formidable adversary; NATO must recognize its global responsibilities; and the U.S. and its allies must strengthen cohesiveness through compromise. The final segment builds upon these judgments -- by proposing ten guidelines for use in allocating burden within NATO. The analysis demonstrates that while many factors impact upon the burdensharing debate, economic considerations are the most contentious. Several economic assessments are conducted -- each showing that the U.S. contributes a disproportionately high share of the financial support to the alliance. The treatise then identifies factors which dictate a redistribution of costs, demonstrating that failure to reallocate expenses will neutralize the remaining nine findings. Specific recommendations include selected implementation of role specialization; increased standardization; recognition of indirect costs; incorporation of nonquantitative commitments; better use of multilateral agreements; and a review of the current force structure within NATO. The study concludes by warning that although a redistribution of U.S. commitments is warranted, any reduction of U.S. responsibilities will bring with it a corresponding reduction in the United States's dominant leadership role within NATO -- an issue the U.S. has not adequately addressed.

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AT THE CROSSROADS OF THE NATO BURDENSARING DEBATE --  
THE U.S. DILEMMA: WHICH PATH TO CHOOSE?

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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U.S. Army War College  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013  
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## ABSTRACT

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*---> This*  
This two-phased study focuses on the future of the United State's burdensharing responsibilities within NATO. It examines an alliance in transition -- assessing the future allocation of roles, risks, and responsibilities. The ~~initial~~ *first* segment concentrates on political, economic, social and technical impacts -- concluding that: Europe must maintain primacy in U.S. defense planning; the Soviet Union will continue to be the U.S.'s most formidable adversary; NATO must recognize its global responsibilities; and the U.S. and its allies must strengthen cohesiveness through compromise. The ~~final~~ *second* segment builds upon these judgments -- *by* proposing ten guidelines for use in allocating burden within NATO. The analysis demonstrates that while many factors impact upon the burdensharing debate, economic considerations are the most contentious. Several economic assessments are conducted -- each showing that the U.S. contributes a disproportionately high share of the financial support to the alliance. The ~~article~~ *article* then identifies factors which dictate a redistribution of costs, demonstrating that failure to reallocate expenses will neutralize the remaining nine findings. Specific recommendations include: selected implementation of role specialization; increased standardization; recognition of indirect costs; incorporation of non-quantitative commitments; better use of multilateral agreements; and a review of the current force structure within NATO. The study concludes by warning that although a redistribution of U.S. commitments is warranted, any reduction of U.S. responsibilities will bring with it a corresponding reduction in the United State's dominant leadership role within NATO -- an issue the U.S. has not adequately addressed.

*---> Resource allocations, etc.*

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AT THE CROSSROADS OF THE NATO BURDENSARING DEBATE --  
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Within the U.S. a growing sentiment exists to reduce our troop support and financial commitment to NATO. U.S. Representatives Pat Schroeder and Richard Gephardt, two leading advocates for reduction, assert that we are paying too much and must decrease our spending.<sup>1</sup> They argue that we expend \$160-170 billion annually to support Western Europe -- more than the defense contributions of the other 15 members of NATO combined.<sup>2</sup> They state that we should not continue to pay 6.7% of our GNP on defense when countries such as Germany and Italy pay only 3.1% and 2.2% respectively.<sup>3</sup>

Proponents for maintaining the status quo, such as Senator John McCain, Secretary of Defense Carlucci and NATO Minister Manfred Woerner, argue that the allies are in fact paying their fair share of the burden.<sup>4</sup> They suggest that contributions to the burden must be measured in more than dollars and cents, asserting that issues such as assumed risk, willingness to provide base rights, different abilities to pay, et al. must be considered in addition to economic contributions. They contend that European allies now provide 90% of the ground forces, 75% of the airpower and 80% of the naval forces.<sup>5</sup>

Many of the current arguments from both proponents and critics tend to be narrowly focused and fragmented. Few have linked burdensharing to national security objectives. Few have



conducted a comprehensive assessment of the significant issues that will influence future U.S. roles and responsibilities. Few have evaluated the political, economic, social, and technical factors that will impact upon the U.S. role within NATO.

By significantly expanding the focus of the burdensharing debate, this study broadens the scope of the analysis. Four specific issues are identified, the resolution of which ties future U.S. national interests to the burdensharing dilemma. Competing arguments are then assessed, with ten recommendations presented to distribute more equitably the burden in the future.

# ENDNOTES

1. Morton M. Kondracke, "Make 'Em Pay," The New Republic, October 13, 1987, is but one example of many where Congresswoman Schroeder is quoted about her current displeasure on current NATO burdensharing arrangements. Congressman Gephardt is also quoted in this article.

2. Ibid, p. 17.

3. Ibid.

4. Senator John McCain, "Designing a Cooperative Distribution of the Burden," Armed Forces Journal, p. 86.

5. Ibid, p. 87.

## CHAPTER II

### NATO -- ROLES, RISKS, AND RESPONSIBILITIES REVISITED

"...To safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law..."<sup>1</sup>

So reads the preamble of the treaty by which the United States, Great Britain, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Since the partnership was formed on April 4, 1949, the world has undergone significant change -- change that is causing NATO to be an alliance in transition, an alliance that needs to reassess its roles, risks, and responsibilities.

When the alliance was formed, concern existed about an imminent Soviet Union land attack of Western Europe.<sup>2</sup> Western European defenses were impotent. The United States was the world's only superpower. Assisted by the infusion of resources from the Marshall Plan, Western European countries were beginning the path to economic recovery. Western European nations were dependent upon the United States ability to preserve the peace.<sup>3</sup>

During the next 40 years the alliance evolved to its present 16 nation membership. Greece and Turkey joined in 1952. After lengthy and emotional debate, West Germany joined in 1955. In 1966 France, under the leadership of its nationalist president, Charles de Gaulle, withdrew French armed

forces from NATO's integrated military structure. In 1982 Spain formally joined NATO, although it has not committed forces to NATO's military commands (similar to France).

During this same period the Soviet Union achieved world superpower status. The United States lost its nuclear monopoly. European nations arose from the ashes of war to become a strong economic force. NATO nations rebuilt their military capability. Other areas of the world became more important. The world began "to shrink" as a global economy evolved. Concurrently, NATO nations endured external and internal change to include the erection of the Berlin Wall, the Suez crisis, Soviet suppressive actions in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, and the withdrawal of French troops from alliance military structure. Still, NATO survived and flourished.

As the 21st century approaches, new iterations of old challenges for NATO abound. The West is faced with new Soviet Union initiatives. In his December 1988 United Nations speech, General Secretary Gorbachev offered to reduce unilaterally 500,000 soldiers and 10,000 tanks from the USSR force structure during the next two years. He also promised continued good faith on strategic and conventional force cuts in Europe.<sup>4</sup>

Currently NATO is confronted with the perception by many European and U.S. leaders of a decreased Soviet Union threat, future conventional and nuclear arms reductions, the relative value of NATO Europe as a global versus regional alliance, a revised and enlightened European economic federation, and

severe budget limitations and constraints. Changing technologies and demographics also impact the future of this alliance.

These combined political, military, economic, technological and social impacts on NATO are creating severe pressures that will affect the future of the partnership. These effects upon NATO must be addressed. An analysis of the factors impacting upon the United State's role within the alliance follows.

# ENDNOTES

1. This quote was taken from the preamble of the treaty establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which was signed on April 4, 1949, in Washington, D.C.

2. Dean Rusk, "6th Annual Conference for Former Secretaries of State," Nashville, Tennessee, December 8, 1988. Highlights of this conference were shown on Public Service Television, The American Experience, Channel 33, Harrisburg, PA., January 4, 1989.

3. Ibid.

4. Michael Dobbs, "Gorbachev Announces Troop Cuts of 500,000," The Washington Post, December 8, 1988, p. A1.

### CHAPTER III

#### FACTORS IMPACTING UPON THE U.S. FUTURE ROLE WITHIN NATO

"The primary U.S. national interests are peace, freedom and prosperity of our friends around the world."<sup>1</sup>

Freedom and the preservation of our values has been and clearly will continue to be at the heart of our national interests.<sup>2</sup> These values are fundamental and non-controversial. The challenge is to link strategy and policy to the maintenance of these values, and thus, to the attainment of these national interests.

The United States current dominant role within NATO exists because of U.S. political leaders' belief that attainment of our stated national interests depend on a free Europe. This belief that peace, freedom and prosperity are linked to European primacy in defense planning places the defense of Western Europe as second only to the defense of North America itself.<sup>3</sup>

While the current level of U.S. support to NATO is tied to this Europe-first policy, the issue of whether this focus should continue remains.<sup>4</sup> Specifically, does this level of support to NATO underpin these national interests?<sup>5</sup> An examination of some of the factors which will influence the future security of Western Europe attempts to address this issue. Resolution is requisite to any subsequent analysis of burdensharing.

## THREAT

An effective way to assess "threat" is to analyze its components -- intentions and capabilities. By judging a rival's intentions and capabilities, one assesses his will, combined with his ability to execute possible courses of action. Intentions manifest themselves in rhetoric or deed; capabilities emerge in the form of resources. Intentions are the products of a political system and are subject to rapid and notable change; capabilities are products of a military-industrial complex and thus require diversion of resources over a relatively long period of time to effect any significant change. Intentions can be evaluated subjectively; capabilities can be measured quantitatively. A comprehensive threat assessment combines a subjective and analytical evaluation of intentions and capabilities.

General John R. Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), asserts that the threat against NATO by the Warsaw Pact forces is the most significant menace to United States' security interests. He contends,

"In the three years of Mikhail S. Gorbachev's tenure, there has been no indication or redirection of military effort . . . During this period the USSR alone has outproduced all the NATO nations combined in every category of ground weapons systems. The result is that the imbalance between the conventional forces of NATO and those of the Warsaw Pact has worsened."<sup>6</sup>



General Galvin, in an interview with David Brinkley following Gorbachev's U.N. speech on troop withdrawals, warned that the threat will continue until the USSR significantly reduces its military capability.<sup>7</sup> He argued that the USSR, even after troop reductions, will still possess overwhelming military superiority in Europe -- a capability that cannot be ignored.<sup>8</sup>


The Soviet Union's warfighting capability is indeed immense. While the United States devotes approximately six percent of its national wealth to defense, the Soviet Union's military spending consumes 15-17 percent of its gross national product (GNP).<sup>9</sup> As Chart 1 indicates, the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations enjoy a great superiority in key weapon systems. They possess significant numerical advantages in tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces, tactical aircraft and attack submarines.

The perception of a massive Soviet threat espoused by General Galvin is by no means universal. Many contend that the Soviet Union is becoming less of a threat because of economic ties to Western Europe. An October 16, 1988, New York Times article describes a large Soviet diplomatic offensive with the hope of increasing trade with Western Europe.<sup>10</sup> Economic bonds further crystallized in October 1988 when West German bankers arranged for the largest Western line of credit to the Soviet Union -- almost \$1.6 billion.<sup>11</sup>

One cannot neglect nor dismiss the Soviet Union's economic overtures. History has clearly demonstrated that economic bonds often dominate other considerations. However, while glasnost, perestroika, economic links, and recent Gorbachev political initiatives provide a source of conjecture and even a glimmer of hope about the Soviet Union's intentions, there can be no argument as to its capabilities. The USSR's overwhelming superiority, as manifested in its continued military build-up, demonstrates that the Soviet Union will be a formidable adversary for the foreseeable future. The threat will not be diminished until the USSR's capabilities are significantly reduced --no matter what the stated or implied intentions.

# CHART 1.

## PRODUCTION OF SELECTED WEAPONS FOR NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES (1978-1987)



LEFT COLUMN - SOVIETS  
NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT

RIGHT COLUMN - U.S.  
NON-U.S. NATO

SOURCE: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FY 89 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

## ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

Economic conditions within the United States, Soviet Union, and Europe, and not the Soviet threat, may well be the principal catalyst for defining future U.S. participation within NATO. The U.S. economy is in transition. Western European nations are broadening economic relationships among themselves, as well as with Eastern Bloc countries. The Soviet Union is beginning to focus inwardly to modernize its crumbling internal economic structure. These economic factors will influence national security policies on both sides of the Atlantic.

In the United States, concerns about the federal deficit, the trade imbalance, and high federal spending (to include high defense spending) have ignited a debate about our future defense needs and a reassessment of U.S. global military commitments.<sup>12</sup> While the concerns about excessive spending and demands to cut the budget are certainly not new, a growing momentum of sentiment argues not only that the budget must be reduced, but that defense expenditures be the prime candidate for these reductions.<sup>13</sup>

NATO expenditures constitute approximately 60% of the U.S. defense budget.<sup>14</sup> Thus the U.S. is spending \$160-170 billion on NATO -- significantly more than the other 15 alliance members combined.<sup>15</sup> Critics claim that the U.S. cannot continue its same spending patterns of increasing the debt, and increasing the federal trade deficit while continuing to be a

viable economic power.<sup>16</sup> Budget cuts will decrease defense spending which will in turn impact upon financial support to NATO.

Within Europe, nations are currently forging stronger economic links among themselves; between themselves and the Soviet Union; and between themselves and the United States. For example, private U.S. investment in Europe totals over \$90 billion, while European investment in the U.S. is over \$40 billion. Over 25% of all U.S. exports go to Europe, accounting for \$50 billion dollars in sales each year. Europe is a major supplier of goods and services to the United States. The U.S. purchases over \$70 billion or over 20% of our imports from European countries.<sup>17</sup> The Siberian pipeline, the rapidly growing trade between Western Europe (and specifically West Germany) and the Soviet Union, and the recent European bank loans to the Soviet Union are but three examples of this growing Soviet Union/European economic interdependency.<sup>18</sup>

European economic conditions will further change on January 1, 1993 as the 12 nations of the European Community lift all barriers to free trade (member nations include all European NATO members except Iceland, Norway and Turkey, as well as Ireland, the only non-NATO member). With the ability to trade freely among themselves, economic parties among Community members will shift. Furthermore, economic agreements between European Community members and either the Soviet Union

or the U.S. could create new and different economic dependencies. Shifting economic dependencies cannot help but change current alliance relationships.

TABLE 1 -- SHARES OF WORLD GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT

<u>Region/Country</u>	<u>Percent of World GNP</u>
Western Industrial	
United States	25
NATO Europe	22
Canada	2
Total NATO	49
Japan	9
Other Europe	3
Warsaw Pact	
Soviet Union	14
Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact	4
Total Warsaw Pact	18
Third World	
Latin America	5.5
Africa	3
Middle East	3
South Asia	3
East Asia	5

Source: Ruth Leger Sivard, World Social and Military Expenditures, 1986 (Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1986) as reprinted in NATO 2000: The United States and the Atlantic Alliance, James R. Golden et al. West Point, N.Y.

Internal growth within the USSR is but yet another factor to be considered when assessing influences upon the U.S. and NATO. The sharing of allied roles, risks and responsibilities will be predicated on the perceived Soviet threat. The economic viability of the Soviet Union will help define the parameters of that threat. As Table 1 indicates, the USSR's

GNP is only slightly more than half that of the U.S. Yet they continue to spend 15-17% on defense as opposed to the 6.7% that the U.S. spends.

If the Soviet Union is to endure as a world power, it must modernize and become economically viable. Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika are means to allow the Soviet Union to focus inwardly and consolidate its economic strength. What must be determined is not only how successful this economic focus will be, but how long it will take; and most importantly, what the ultimate goals of the Soviet leaders really are. As Senator Bill Bradley said, "It would be a tragic mistake if Western capital enables the USSR to put off the hard choice between guns and butter."<sup>19</sup>

Economic development within Western Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union; and the resulting economic ties will dictate the future direction of NATO. Strong economic bonds between the U.S. and a Western Europe which is expanding its economic base will continue. Economic bonds between the Soviet Union and Western European countries may not only reduce the perception of a threat, but may in fact cause polarization and schism against the United States. The crystallization of the Soviet Union's political goals, when and if it develops a strong internal economic base, will further define the limits of the threat. Lastly, current and projected fiscal constraints will not permit the U.S. to maintain the same level of financial support to the alliance. Thus, economic

considerations on both sides of the Atlantic will become the principal catalysts for defining future roles, risks and responsibilities within NATO.



## POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS

"Meeting the political (emphasis added) needs of the alliance is equally, if not more, important than achieving force goals... Maintaining the political (emphasis added) cohesion of NATO in peacetime and wartime, all agreed, should be America's primary goal."<sup>20</sup>

Countless political and social considerations will impact on the future of the alliance. Three illustrative examples are chosen to demonstrate the scope and complexities of such influences.

Out-of-area burdensharing is one of the most contentious political issues of the NATO agenda. European leaders assert that NATO should remain a regional alliance, as defined by the 1949 treaty, the terms of which prevent members from acting as an alliance outside the treaty area.<sup>21</sup> They contend that defense costs for out-of-area expenses are not the responsibility of NATO and should not be considered when allocating a member nation's burden. Since partnership members have not made a commitment, these expenses are somewhat irrelevant to NATO.<sup>22</sup>

The recent House Armed Services Committee report on burdensharing argues that it is inappropriate for member nations to have their defense contributions and capabilities counted on a regional basis since 20 percent of Europe's trade is with the non-industrialized world. The United States and other NATO members contribute to worldwide defense because they

have commercial, political and security interests in these areas. The report asserts that contributions for out-of-area support are legitimate alliance responsibilities.<sup>23</sup>

The resolution of regional versus global responsibilities is not only polemic, but reaches to the core of NATO's raison d'etre. Agreement is essential to developing a future strategy and an ultimate allocation of burden.

Manning the force will be another political challenge, as the alliance is faced with a reduced pool of available service members. NATO will have difficulty maintaining its current number of people in uniform. A recent study by the Institute for Defense Analysis estimates that by the year 2000, NATO's overall draft-age male population will decline by about 12 percent. By contrast, the Warsaw Pact's draft-age manpower pool is projected to rise by some 15 percent in the same period.<sup>24</sup>

The perception by many Europeans that the cold war is over is but a third political challenge facing the alliance. Today only 11 percent of West Germans see the Soviet Union as a threat to peace -- down from 71 percent at the beginning of the decade. Eight out of ten West Germans want all nuclear weapons withdrawn from Europe. Three quarters say they trust the Soviet Union. Slightly more than half hold negative attitudes toward U.S. policies.<sup>25</sup>

Maintenance of political cohesion is essential to the future viability of NATO. How member nations address out-of-area defense costs and how they determine the size and

composition of conventional forces are two key issues that will have a significant impact on the future of the alliance. Resolution of key issues such as this will be decided by a new generation of leaders who are changing their impression about the U.S., Soviet Union and their own security. Their assessment of threat and their allocation of resources will manifest itself in future support to NATO, and ultimately the United States' role in NATO.

## TECHNOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Technological advances will effect dramatic changes in future warfighting. Technology will serve as a strategic currency. Laser driven transistors, optical computers and robotics will dominate the battlefield.<sup>26</sup> The new frontier of space will provide another dimension as will Strategic Defense Initiatives.

These technological advances will affect the future of NATO in three ways. First, since the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact nations possess numerical superiority in troop strength and weapons systems, technology becomes an increasingly important component of any defense strategy. Given NATO's reliance on technology to offset numerical advantages, the alliance must strive to preserve its remaining technological advantage.<sup>27</sup>

Second, while the Western Bloc possesses current technological advantage, the Soviet Union is obtaining increased access because of current economic agreements with the NATO allies. This access will continue into the foreseeable future. Third, and of most significance, the benefactor of this technology will be the side that is willing to invest the most money. Technology costs -- advanced technology costs even more. NATO nations must resolve whether they are willing to spend the money; whether they are willing to consider multilateral endeavors such as standardization, role specialization and joint ventures; and whether they are willing

to give credit for technology expenses for systems that might not traditionally come under the NATO umbrella. Technology, the strategic currency, will go to the highest investor.

## IMPACT OF FACTORS FOR CHANGE

In order to develop guidelines to allocate future roles, risks and responsibilities within NATO this study examined: U.S. interests in the 21st century; the future threat; regional and global interests and responsibilities; the impact of internal and external fiscal factors; the impact of changing demographics; and the impact of emerging technology. Four major issues for resolution were identified. As the analysis in the next chapter will demonstrate, prior to any assessment of burdensharing within NATO, the U.S. and its allies must agree upon:

- U.S. continued commitment to a "Europe-first" policy.
- The requirement to strengthen cohesion among NATO members.
- The continued danger of the Soviet threat.
- NATO's global vis-a-vis regional responsibilities.

## ENDNOTES

1. Ronald Reagan, National Security Strategy of the United States, 1988 p. 3.
2. Frank C. Carlucci, Fiscal Year 1989 Annual Report to Congress, p. 5.
3. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National Security Strategy, Testimony of General Bernard Rogers, p. 441 (hereafter referred to as "Congress, National Security Strategy, Rogers").
4. "Congress, National Security Strategy, Rogers, p. 441.
5. Lynn Page Whittaker, Report of a Conference on "U.S. Conventional Forces: Current Commitments, Future Needs:, p. 1. At this conference 75 military and civilian experts concluded that the U.S. commitment to Europe should retain primacy in U.S. planning, with a "Europe-first" commitment in its grand strategy. However, acceptance of the "Europe-first" policy is by no means universal.
6. General John R. Galvin, "Euphoria Over INF Treaty Poses Serious Challenges for NATO Military Leaders," Army, September 1988, p. 19.
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13. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Report of the Defense Burdensharing Panel, p. 2 (hereafter referred to as Burdensharing).
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16. Burdensharing, p. 3.
17. James B. Golden et al., NATO: The United States and the Atlantic Alliance, p. 7.
18. Taubman, p. 3.
19. Farnsworth, p. 1.
20. Whittaker, p. 3.
21. Fair Shares, Appendix D.
22. Burdensharing, p. 5.
23. Galvin, p. 21.
24. Robin Knight, "West Germany Looks to the East," San Francisco Chronicle, 25 January 1989, p. 1.
25. Eurogroup, Western Defense: The European Role in NATO, p. 16.
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27. Galvin, p. 21.



## CHAPTER IV

### NATO: AN ALLIANCE IN TRANSITION

This chapter analyzes the four previously identified unresolved issues that will influence the future role of the U.S. within NATO. Specific recommendations are offered.

#### Recognition of the Continued Danger of the Soviet Union Threat

The Soviet Union will continue to be the primary rival of the United States well into the 21st century. Although Soviet leaders assert that the country is moving from an offensive to defensive posture, this rhetoric only indicates Soviet intentions as we perceive them, or more precisely, as they want us to perceive them.<sup>1</sup> To date the Soviet Union's military capability has not changed.<sup>2</sup> The USSR continues to be a dominant military force (see Chart 1). The U.S. cannot dismiss the enormity of the Soviet threat until its military capabilities are significantly reduced.

#### Resolution of the U.S. Commitment to a "Europe-first" Policy

Western Europe provides a fertile ground for Soviet Union expansion. The USSR's military and economic power base would surge with any significant Soviet Union encroachment, as conquest of the NATO countries would give the USSR the potential to more than double its GNP (see Table 1). The USSR would obtain ports, rich natural resources, a large industrial base, and an Atlantic beachhead.

Thus, while other areas of the world are gaining in importance, and the likelihood of low intensity conflicts throughout the world is increasing, the primacy of Europe is in no way diluted. The U.S. is bonded to Western Europe by strong cultural, social, political, economic, and historical ties. The loss of Western Europe would have a dramatic psychological impact which would reverberate throughout the world. Europe must maintain dominance in future U.S. defense planning.

#### Recognition for the Need for Cohesion Among NATO Members

Current Gorbachev initiatives, growing Soviet Union and Western European economic ties, and polarization of NATO nations on the burdensharing debate are all potential sources of schism within the alliance. Despite these potentially decoupling factors, it is essential that the cohesion of the alliance remain strong. NATO leaders must come to realize that while each has individual requirements, the retention of the alliance as a forceful entity is key to their own best national security interests. Compromise must return to the lexicon of NATO. A weak, ruptured alliance offers an open invitation for the Soviet Union to effect inroads against individual nations.

#### Resolution of NATO's Global vis-a-vis Regional Responsibilities

One of the most contentious issues on the NATO agenda is the debate of regional versus global responsibilities. Proponents argue that NATO should remain a regional alliance.<sup>3</sup> They contend that since NATO members cannot make an alliance

commitment for out-of-area support, any out-of-area expenses are irrelevant. Critics argue that NATO nations have matured. These countries are now leading industrial powers whose revenues are earned from a global economy in a shrinking world.<sup>4</sup> These critics contend that these industrialized nations profit from unrestricted trade routes, uninterrupted oil flow, and free ports of embarkation. They correctly assert that NATO nations who accrue benefits have a responsibility to resource legitimate out-of-area defense related expenses.

NATO is not the same alliance it was 40 years ago. The Marshall Plan has transformed war-torn European nations into industrialized world powers. It is in the best long-term interests of these NATO countries to amend their treaty and to assume their legitimate global responsibilities for maintenance of the world order.

In summary, an examination of the future political, economic, social and technical factors impacting upon U.S. defense planning has demonstrated findings that:

- The Soviets will continue to be our primary and most dangerous adversary into the 21st century.
- The U.S. must maintain a "Europe-first" policy as the cornerstone of its defense planning. Although other areas of the world are gaining in importance, the primacy of Europe is in no way decreased.
- The U.S. and its allies must maintain a cohesive NATO as we embark into the 21st century. Compromise will be the key to maintaining this cohesion.

- NATO and its members have global as well as regional responsibilities. NATO nation must recognize that they have commitments concurrent with their worldwide interests.

These findings establish the parameters from which the burdensharing issue can be addressed.

# ENDNOTES

1. General John R. Galvin, "Euphoria Over INF Treaty Poses Serious Challenges for NATO Military Leaders," Army, September 1988, p. 19.

2. Ibid.

3. Gordon Adams and Eric Munz, "Fair Shares: Bearing the Burden of the NATO Alliance," Defense Budget Project Office, April 1988, p. 72.

4. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Report of the Defense Burdensharing Panel, p. 5.

## CHAPTER V

### BURDENSARING

#### THE PROBLEM

During the past year, three comprehensive U.S. assessments of NATO burdensharing have been conducted. Each has reached distinctively different conclusions. Required by law, the Secretary of Defense's Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense, contends that the allies should increase their resource commitment to NATO. However, it reluctantly concludes that the maintenance of the status quo may be the best that can be expected in the immediate future.<sup>1</sup>

The Report of the Defense Burdensharing Panel by the House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, concludes that the NATO allies are not committing their fair share to the alliance. The report asserts that unless drastic changes occur, the U.S. should significantly reduce its financial support. To this committee, burden is analogous to cost -- all other factors are irrelevant.<sup>2</sup>

The Fair Shares: Bearing the Burden of the NATO Alliance report by the private Defense Budget Project Office, deduces that the other NATO nations are providing a fair share of the support. This study minimizes the impact of cost and instead emphasizes the roles and responsibilities the European allies endure by the very nature of their proximity to any future conflict.<sup>3</sup>

Each of these reports assesses essentially the same data and yet comes to notably different conclusions. The House Committee on Armed Services report calls for significant U.S. troop withdrawals and corresponding reductions in financial commitment if its NATO allies do not increase their financial support to the alliance. The Fair Shares report asserts that non-U.S. allies do contribute more than their fair share of the burden -- the U.S. is simply assessing burden incorrectly. Non-economic considerations dominate their assessment of the burden. The Secretary of Defense report takes a middle ground -- arguing for more financial support from non-U.S. allies, but contending the status quo will suffice.

The focus of the next phase of the study will be to analyze these conflicting arguments in order to develop some guidelines to distribute burden more equitably in the future. An examination of the concept of burden initiates this portion of the assessment.

## DEFINITION OF BURDENSARING

Burdensharing, a relatively new phrase, denotes a concept whereby one tries to assess each member country's contribution in order to determine what its fair share of alliance support will be. No universal definition of burdensharing exists because a burden is composed of shared roles, risks, and responsibilities to include, but not limited to:

- Defense expenditures
- Ability to pay
- Political and social considerations
- Perceived benefits
- Host nation support
- Input versus output considerations

No matter what one's position is on the current debate, agreement generally exists as to the components of burdensharing. Where disagreement exists, is when one tries to determine how important certain components are, relative to others. The U.S. might argue that cost is the most significant component of burdensharing, while the FRG would assert that political considerations should dominate. Any analysis is further complicated because some variables are quantifiable while others are not. Decision analysts would call this quandary an example of multi-attribute utility analysis. They would contend that many attributes or factors must be considered, with each being assigned a certain weight -- whether quantifiable or not. While this concept might sound complicated, and it can be, we often use multi-atctribute utility analysis in our private decision making.



When we purchase a car we consider such factors as: cost, size, color, comfort, safety, maintenance record, insurance and personal taste. Some factors are quantifiable and others are not. Some of the quantifiable factors can be defined in terms of monetary considerations while others cannot. We weigh each individual factor and assign a relative importance to each one to arrive at a decision.

When the analysts arrive at different conclusions concerning burdensharing, it is not because they disagree on the factors that make up the burden, but rather because they disagree on the relative importance of one factor to another. In the example of purchasing an automobile, one buyer might purchase a Rolls Royce, another a Chevrolet, and the third a Dodge Caravan. Each of the three buyers considers the same information, but makes different decisions because of the different priorities placed upon the factors that impact upon the automobile purchase. In the current burdensharing debate, critics and proponents consider the same data and take different positions because of the relative importance they place on the shared roles, risks and responsibilities. Essential to developing an acceptable protocol is an integration of the attributes in order to determine a relative agreed priority of importance. To date this integration is missing.

## ENDNOTES

1. Frank Carlucci, Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense, Department of Defense, April 1988.
2. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Report of the Defense Burdensharing Panel, August 1988.
3. Gordon Adams and Eric Munz, Fair Shares: Bearing the Burden of the NATO Alliance, Defense Budget Project Office, March 1988.

## CHAPTER VI

### BURDENSARING: NO EASY ANSWERS<sup>1</sup>

Solutions to the current burdensharing dilemma are not readily apparent. As the chapter title suggests, there are no easy answers. Although roles, risks and responsibilities are shared among the allies, debate about the equity of the correct distribution continues. In this chapter, investigation of key issues will provide some guidelines to allocate burden more equitably in the future.

Before presenting specific burdensharing recommendations, a brief review of the previous analysis is warranted. The initial phase of this study examined NATO, an alliance in transition. Future political, economic, social and technical impacts were assessed, concluding that -- Europe must maintain primacy in U.S. defense planning; the Soviet Union will continue to be the U.S.'s most formidable adversary; NATO must recognize global responsibilities; and the U.S. and its allies must strengthen cohesiveness through compromise.

Against this backdrop, the second phase of the study began with an analysis of the burdensharing problem. The complexity of the concept was reduced to agreement of a common definition -- albeit with different priorities on the various components. What follows is an examination of the various components.

### Redistribution of Costs

The most common ways to assess an alliance member's financial commitments include:

- Monetary contributions
- Percentage of GNP
- Per capita defense spending
- Average annual growth in defense spending

No matter how the financial burden is evaluated, it is evident that the U.S. pays a disproportionate share of the NATO burden.

Table 2 shows NATO defense spending in constant 1986 dollars. The United States spent over \$272 billion dollars on total defense for 1986 while France, Great Britain, and West Germany each spent approximately \$28 billion dollars. Of the total \$397 billion dollars of defense expenditures of NATO countries, the United States expended almost 69%, or more than all the other countries combined!!

Percent of GNP is a universal measure of defense spending. Table 3 indicates defense spending as a percentage of GNP of NATO countries. The United States is paying a higher percentage (6.7% of GNP) than any other NATO country and over twice the non-U.S. weighted GNP average (3.3%) on defense spending.

Although suffering from some limitations such as rate exchange, fluctuations and differences of average income, per capita defense spending offers an indication of how much NATO governments are paying per citizen for defense. Table 4 lists

per capita defense expenditures, showing that the United States spent \$1,555 per person on defense, compared with an average of \$318 among non-U.S. NATO countries.

Table 5 indicates the growth in defense spending among NATO countries. Measured in terms of average annual real growth since 1978, U.S. defense spending grew 5.8%, the highest rate in the alliance.

In each of the financial analyses: total monetary contributions; percentage of GNP; per capita defense spending; and average annual growth in defense spending; the results demonstrate that the United States is paying a disproportionate share of the NATO financial burden. The U.S. pays over two-thirds of the NATO defense costs, more than the other 15 nations combined; it pays more than twice any other nation's percentage of GNP on defense; it pays more than three times per person on defense than any of our allies; and in terms of real growth the U.S. defense spending grew by 5.8% since 1978 -- the highest rate in the alliance.

Although many factors contribute to the burdensharing debate, the most contentious and critical is that of cost. Essential to any redistribution of burden is a reduction of the U.S. financial commitment. Failure to redistribute costs will make any other recommendation invalid!

TABLE 2 -- NATO DEFENSE SPENDING IN  
CONSTANT 1986 DOLLARS (ADD 000,000)

	<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1986</u>
<u>Small States</u>				
Belgium	1913	2334	3612	2870
Canada	5230	4847	5548	8002
Denmark	948	1277	1693	1700
Greece	538	1097	2074	2619
Luxembourg	23	24	53	57
Netherlands	2962	4101	5153	5406
Norway	659	1229	1638	2135
Portugal	399	1194	943	926
Turkey	741	1098	1794	2769
 <u>Large States</u>				
FRG	16211	20984	26879	27824
France	17031	19204	25513	28391
Italy	6154	8726	11593	13368
UK	19631	19153	24441	28185
 United States	 168054	 212442	 192500	 272499
 Small States	 13414	 17190	 22508	 26484
 Large States	 59027	 68066	 89426	 98039
 TOTAL NATO	 240495	 297699	 304434	 397022

Source: Extrapolation from Table 5, Fair Shares.

TABLE 3 -- DEFENSE SPENDING IN PERCENTAGES OF  
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT  
(Based on data in national currencies)

<u>Country</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1986</u>
United States	10.0	8.9	7.4	7.7	6.0	5.1	6.7
<u>NATO Allies</u>							
Belgium	4.0	3.6	3.2	2.9	3.1	3.3	3.0
Canada	6.3	4.2	2.9	2.3	2.0	1.9	2.2
Denmark	3.2	2.7	2.8	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.0
France	6.4	6.5	5.2	4.2	3.8	4.0	3.9
Germany	4.1	4.0	4.3	3.3	3.7	3.3	3.1
Greece	3.7	3.1	3.1	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.2
Italy	3.7	3.1	3.1	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.2
Luxembourg	3.2	1.0	1.4	0.7	0.9	1.0	0.9
Netherlands	5.7	4.1	4.0	3.4	3.2	3.1	3.0
Norway	3.9	2.9	3.8	3.5	3.2	2.9	3.1
Portugal	4.2	4.2	6.2	7.1	5.3	3.5	3.2
Turkey	5.6	5.1	5.0	4.4	6.3	4.7	4.8
United Kingdom	8.1	6.4	5.8	5.1	5.2	5.0	5.0
<u>Non-U.S. NATO</u>							
Weighted Avg. <u>a/</u>	4.5	4.1	3.8	3.1	3.2	3.0	3.3
Japan <u>b/</u>	1.0	1.1	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.0

Sources: Congressional Budget Office based on NATO definition of defense expenditures and GDP data from the International Monetary Fund.

NOTES: n.a. = not available

- a. Averages use 1986 national GDP shares as weights. Spain was not included, because historical data consistent with that of the other NATO nations were lacking.
- b. Defense expenditures for Japan use the national, not NATO definition as reported in international Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1987-1988 (London: IISS, 1987).

TABLE 4 -- PER CAPITA DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, 1986  
(In U.S. Dollars)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Per Capita Defense Expenditures</u>
United States	1,155
NATO Allies	318
Belgium	346
Canada	308
Denmark	322
France	511
Germany	453
Greece	232
Italy	235
Luxembourg	145
Netherlands	365
Norway	519
Portugal	90
Spain	113
Turkey	53
United Kingdom	488
Other Allies	137
Australia	673
Japan	163
New Zealand	610
Philippines	9
South Korea	121
Thailand	30

Sources: NATO Press Service, "Financial and Economic Data Related to NATO Defense" (December 1987), and International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1987-1988 (London: IISS, 1987) for defense expenditures; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook (1987) for exchange rates and population.



TABLE 5 -- AVERAGE ANNUAL REAL GROWTH IN DEFENSE SPENDING

	<u>1961-77</u>	<u>1978-86</u>
<u>Small States</u>		
Belgium	3.00%	-2.75%
Canada	0.25	4.15
Denmark	2.80	1.02
Greece	8.90	1.50
Luxembourg	3.00	4.20
Netherlands	3.00	1.63
Norway	4.68	3.20
Portugal	4.43	1.15
Turkey	7.38	3.09
<u>Large States</u>		
FRG	2.65%	0.83%
France	2.00	1.57
Italy	3.02	3.35
United Kingdom	0.56	3.32
United States	0.13%	5.82%
Small States	3.00%	1.69%
Large States	1.87%	2.06%
TOTAL NATO	0.79%	4.50%

Source: Table A, Fair Shares.

### NATO Has Global Responsibilities

Although the terms of the NATO treaty prevent members from acting as an alliance outside the treaty area, the common interests of the allies extend beyond the NATO sphere, and beyond the purely military.<sup>2</sup> The U.S. and its NATO allies have worldwide economic and political interests. Credits should be given for selected legitimate global expenses. For example, the U.S. should receive credit for defense expenses to keep trade routes unrestricted, to sustain uninterrupted oil flow, and to maintain world order. Similarly, our allies should receive credit for mine sweepers sent to the Suez, warships in the Gulf region, and contributions to multinational peacekeeping forces.

Removing sources of regional instability which may create openings for Soviet intervention is another series of out-of-area expenses for which NATO members should receive appropriate credit. Because of their long historical relationships with developing nations, European allies are well placed to provide diplomatic and non-military economic assistance. In 1987 our NATO allies contributed \$16.9 billion of official development aid -- the U.S. contributing \$9.6 billion.<sup>3</sup> Associated credits for these contributions should be recognized. As leading industrial actions of the free world, NATO nations must assume selected legitimate global commitments -- and be credited accordingly in any burdensharing protocol.

### NATO Needs to Account for All Costs

Currently many indirect expenditures are not considered when burdensharing costs are evaluated. For example:

- On the over 900 U.S. military bases in NATO countries the allies provide rent free housing and land with a market value of \$28 billion.<sup>4</sup>
- Germany alone provides 56,000 rent free housing units which costs \$80 million a year in lost revenue.<sup>5</sup>
- Germany provides 292,000 acres for exclusive U.S. use, and 380,000 acres for all foreign forces. This land has a value of \$16 billion.<sup>6</sup>
- All European countries except the UK and Luxembourg use a draft. Accompanied by lower manpower costs, analysts indicate that personnel costs for the Bundeswehr computed at U.S. pay rates raises German defense expenditures by 20%.<sup>7</sup>
- Germany incurs costs associated with Berlin that are not computed in the burdensharing equation.<sup>8</sup>
- Germany pays 25% of all allied maneuver damage costs.<sup>9</sup>

These costs must be captured.

### The U.S. Must Develop a Greater Sensitivity for Non-Economic Aspects of Burdensharing

The burden must be allocated to account for many on the non-monetary contributions. For example:

- FRG contains the greatest density of nuclear weapons in the world.<sup>10</sup>
- FRG hosts almost 725,000 foreign military members and dependents in a country the size of Oregon.<sup>11</sup>
- NATO countries host 5000 field exercises per year.<sup>12</sup>
- NATO countries endure over 110,000 low level flights a year.<sup>13</sup>
- NATO governments have given the U.S. support in INF siting, often against a great amount of internal opposition.<sup>14</sup>

- The war will be fought in Europe, and specifically in Germany.

While finite values cannot be placed on all these qualitative components, they nevertheless must be considered in the burdensharing equation. Table 6 shows that if war were to break out in Europe tomorrow, non-U.S. NATO nations would provide 75% of the main battle tanks, 92% of the artillery, 83% of the land based combat aircraft, and almost 85% of the naval power. The allies are not given sufficient credit for these burdens. Support such as this must be factored into the burdensharing protocol.

TABLE 6 -- SHARE OF SELECTED WEAPONS SYSTEMS  
(All Numbers in Percentages)

<u>Small States</u>	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Belgium	1.57	1.09	1.51	0.75	3.29	2.16	1.29
Canada	0.54	0.37	2.20	1.09	3.20	2.10	1.98
Denmark	0.98	0.68	3.03	1.50	2.19	1.44	4.95
Greece	8.36	5.81	11.36	5.62	6.67	4.37	6.93
Luxembourg	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Netherlands	4.30	2.99	10.13	5.01	4.80	3.15	4.11
Norway	0.38	0.26	3.53	1.75	2.15	1.41	4.95
Portugal	0.28	0.20	1.65	1.75	2.31	1.51	3.27
Turkey	17.41	12.11	17.43	8.63	10.28	6.74	15.22
 <u>Large States</u>							
FRG	23.04	16.03	21.08	10.43	11.99	7.87	14.69
France	6.12	4.26	6.65	3.29	12.67	8.31	7.00
Italy	8.09	5.63	9.67	4.79	8.63	5.66	7.08
UK	5.41	3.76	4.05	2.01	14.50	9.51	11.80
 <u>U.S.</u>	 23.53	 46.80	 7.72	 54.32	 17.33	 45.77	 16.74
<u>Sm. States</u>	33.81%	23.52%	50.83%	25.16%	34.87%	22.88%	42.69%
<u>Lg. States</u>	42.66%	29.68%	41.45%	20.52%	47.80%	31.36%	40.56%
<u>TOTAL NATO</u>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Code:

Column A -- Shares of NATO Main Battle Tanks in Europe  
Column B -- Shares of NATO Main Battle Tanks in Europe and CONUS  
Column C -- Shares of NATO Artillery Pieces in Europe  
Column D -- Shares of NATO Artillery Pieces in Europe and CONUS  
Column E -- Shares of NATO Land Based Combat Aircraft in Europe  
Column F -- Shares of NATO Land Based Combat Aircraft in Europe and U.S.  
Column G -- Shares of NATO Naval Combatants

Source: Extrapolations of Tables 10, 11, 12, 13, 14a, 14b, 15a, 15b, 16a, and 16b, FY 89 Carlucci Report to Congress.

## No Sacred Cows

Burdensharing within NATO must incorporate a zero base budgeting mindset. If necessary, sacred cows must be gored. A fundamental reassessment of the alliance is in order.<sup>15</sup> Table 7 indicates that the U.S. is providing over 40% of the active duty and over 20% of the reserve forces for NATO. What began as a temporary force in 1949 has become permanent.

Representative Schroeder argues that we can no longer afford to support these many forces in NATO.<sup>16</sup> Former National Security Advisor Brzezinski contends that the U.S. can reduce its forces in NATO by 100,000 soldiers -- all that is necessary to remain is a trip wire force.<sup>17</sup>

U.S. troop reduction is a potentially viable alternative to assist in burden redistribution. However any reduction must be linked to U.S. warfighting and deterrence objectives. Global impacts must be evaluated. Decision makers must consider:

- What will be the political impact?
- What will be the military impact?
- How will reductions take place -- joint forces, combined forces . . . time-phased?
- Who will bear the costs of reduction?
- Where will the troops go? Will they stay in the active or reserve force structure?
- How will future conventional arms reductions impact on any unilateral actions?
- How will any actions be integrated into the NATO decision making process vis-a-vis appearing to be a unilateral decision?

TABLE 7 -- SHARES OF NATO ACTIVE DUTY AND RESERVE PERSONNEL

<u>Small States</u>	A	B	C	D
Belgium	1.75%	.92%	2.52%	1.47%
Canada	1.63	.33	.37	.08
Denmark	.56	.57	3.11	3.49
Greece	4.03	2.00	7.03	3.87
Luxembourg	.13	1.90	0.00	0.00
Netherlands	2.08	.74	3.05	1.20
Norway	.76	.95	4.95	6.81
Portugal	1.28	.64	3.30	1.82
Turkey	12.61	1.25	16.54	1.81
 <u>Large States</u>				
FRG	9.40	.80	13.39	1.29
France	10.54	.98	6.80	.70
Italy	7.48	.68	13.38	1.34
UK	6.14	.57	5.51	.56
United States	41.59	.89	20.05	.47
Small States	24.85	.97	40.87	1.77
Large States	33.57	.76	39.08	.98
TOTAL NATO	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Code:

Column A -- Shares of NATO Active Duty Personnel  
 Column B -- NATO Duty Active Personnel as a Percentage of  
 Population  
 Column C -- Shares of NATO Trained Personnel  
 Column D -- NATO Trained Reserve Manpower as Percentage of  
 Population

Note: All percentages are for CY 1986 strengths

Source: Extrapolation of Tables 17, 18, 19 and 20 Fair Shares.

### Standardization

Standardization of NATO systems must be established as technological advances provide a new generation of armaments and weapon systems. Billions of dollars will be spent on research, development, and production. If member nations can come to some multilateral agreements to stop the repetition and competition among nations, economies of scale and savings will accrue to the allies.

While such endeavors are difficult to achieve because of political, social and economic constraints, the utility to NATO can be significant. NATO must stop producing eight different tanks and over a dozen different artillery rounds. Collaborative projects such as the Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Phase 1, Sidewinder Air-to-Air Missile and the NATO frigate replacement must set the standard.<sup>18</sup>

### Role Specialization

One of NATO's most promising initiatives is role specialization. Role specialization is analogous to standardization whereby member nations undertake specific responsibilities on the premise of financial savings through economies of scale. For example one nation might focus its efforts on portions of air defense systems while another might focus on selected components of target acquisition for the deep battle. A nation could then concentrate its research, development, production and implementation. Economies of scale could then be achieved. This concept is not without some risk



as member nations forfeit aspects of their national security to the allied nation assuming this responsibility. Still, role specialization offers potentially great savings -- it is a concept whose time has come.

#### Multilateral Agreements

Multilateral agreements are essential to any burdensharing redistribution. Although member nations will neither seek nor achieve universal agreement, they must better assess the full impact of unilateral decisions on other alliance members. For example, restationing agreements, weapons joint ventures, and force restructuring or modernization affect not just the nations involved, but the entire alliance. Such changes impact upon shared roles, risks and responsibilities, and thus, de facto, reapportion the burden. As long as NATO nations continue to negotiate bilateral agreements and act unilaterally, the alliance will endure unplanned and often unequal allotment of the burden.

#### Focus Burdensharing on Individual Nations

Burdensharing assessment must consider the contributions of each individual nation. In the past, arguments have categorized the rich and poor members, or the small and large countries. This generalization should not continue. NATO consists of 16 sovereign nations. Each country's contribution must be considered on its own merits. Likewise each country's particular challenge or uniqueness must also be considered.

For example, the Federal Republic of Germany hosts the largest contingent of allied forces. As a result she endures different responsibilities than Luxembourg or France. Canada is the only NATO member other than the U.S. to provide support from across the Atlantic Ocean. Since her defense is linked to the U.S., the U.S. will likely protect the Canadian sovereignty -- not solely because of Canadian interests, but because of U.S. interests. Thus the U.S. and NATO allies must consider how these political realities will affect any proposed Canadian increases.

Each NATO partner has different responsibilities, which, while not easy to evaluate, must be considered individually in any future burdensharing assessment.

#### Reevaluation of Leadership Roles and Responsibilities

The previous recommendations focused on a redistribution of burden. The most significant reallocation requires the U.S. to reduce its disproportionately high share of NATO's financial commitment. If this is accomplished, and if member nations assume more of the burden, these same nations will insist on more of a leadership role within NATO. If the U.S. wants to relieve itself of some of its NATO responsibilities, it must be willing to relinquish an appropriate share of its dominate leadership role.

The U.S. cannot expect its allied partners to increase their commitment without quid pro quo support. This recommendation, while currently not given much consideration in

the NATO burdensharing debate, will radically change the way business is conducted within the alliance. The U.S. will no longer be the general partner among limited partners, nor hold the majority of shares on the NATO corporate board. Agreement will have to be achieved through consensus. The U.S. must be willing to accept this change in leadership.

## ENDNOTES

1. James Kitfield, "Burdensharing: No Easy Answers," Military Forum, September 1988, p. 36.
2. Eurogroup, Western Defense: The European Role in NATO, p. 16.
3. Ibid., p. 17.
4. U.S. Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Briefing Notes, NATO Undated (Circa, Fall 1988). These set of notes were from a briefing LTC Robert Downes, DCSOPS Action Officer on Burdensharing gave.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
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11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Kitfield, p. 42.
16. Morton M. Kondracke, "Make 'Em Pay," The New Republic, October 13, 1988, p. 16 is but one example of many.
17. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National Security Strategy, Testimony of Dr. Z. Brzezinski, p. 80.
18. Western Defense, p. 17.

## CHAPTER VII

### RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Since NATO was formed forty years ago, the world has undergone significant change -- change that is causing NATO to be an partnership in transition. This two-phased study focused on the future sharing of roles, risks and responsibilities within this changing alliance. The initial phase examined the threat; as well as the political, social, technical and economic impacts upon the U.S. and the alliance, concluding:

- The Soviets will continue to be our primary and most dangerous adversary into the 21st century.
- The U.S. must maintain a "Europe-first" policy as the cornerstone of its defense planning. Although other areas of the world are gaining in importance, the primacy of Europe is in no way decreased.
- The U.S. and allies must maintain a cohesive NATO as we embark into the 21st century. Compromise will be the key to maintaining this cohesion.
- NATO and its members have global as well as regional responsibilities. NATO nations must recognize that they have commitments concurrent with their worldwide interests.

The second phase linked the resolution of national security issues to the more discrete burdensharing problem. Specific findings indicate that:

- Future NATO defense costs must be redistributed so the United States does not continue to bear a disproportionate share of the financial burden. Without a reallocation of expenditures all the other findings will be neutralized. Cost is the most dominant and critical burdensharing component.
- The redistribution of costs must take into consideration NATO's worldwide and global commitments.

- The calculations of NATO costs must incorporate the expenditures not currently included in the economic assessment of burden.
- The United States must develop a greater sensitivity for the non-quantitative burdens that many of its allies bear.
- There can be no "scared cows" in assessing any redistribution of the burden. An evaluation of U.S. troop strength in Europe should be conducted. Potential joint and combined withdrawals should consider worldwide commitments.
- NATO standardization should be integrated into changing technology.
- Role specialization should be addressed.
- Nations should strive for greater use of multilateral commitments.
- The assessment of burdensharing needs to focus on specific countries in greater detail. NATO is a mosaic of 16 different countries with different concerns and interests. Each allies' contribution needs to be addressed separately, with generalizations and categorizations avoided.
- The United States must be willing to relinquish some leadership responsibilities if it expects its allies to assume a greater share of the burden.

Burdensharing is a complex concept whereby member nations share roles, risks and responsibilities. In the past, the United States has assumed dominance in leadership and financial commitment. The U.S. cannot and will not continue to provide a disproportionate share of the defense costs. The burden must be redistributed. This reallocation has the potential to polarize alliance members and rupture cohesion among the partners. Thus it is essential to approach the problem

rationally, objectively, and most importantly, under an umbrella of national and allied interests and objectives. This study has provided some guidelines to assist in this endeavor.

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